Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Analysis of Knowledge" by Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Almeder, R., 1999. Harmless Naturalism. The Limits of Science and the Nature of Philosophy, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court. (Scholar)
- Alston, W., 1991. Perceiving God. The Epistemology of Religious Experience, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1973. Belief, Truth, and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Bird, A., 2007, “Justified Judging,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1): 81–110. (Scholar)
- Blome-Tillmann, M., 2009a. “Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’-Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:315–331 (Scholar)
- ––– 2009b. ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’, Mind, 118(470): 241–294. (Scholar)
- Brown, J., 2006. “Contextualism and Warranted Assertability Manoeuvres,” Philosophical Studies, 130: 407–435. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R., 1989. Theory of Knowledge, 3rd. ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- –––, 1977. Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- Clark, M., 1963. “Knowledge and Grounds. A Comment on Mr. Gettier's Paper,” Analysis, 24: 46–48. (Scholar)
- Cohen, S., 1988 “How to be a Fallibilist.” Philosophical Perspectives 2, Epistemology: 91–123. (Scholar)
- Comesaña, J., 2005. “Unsafe Knowledge,” Synthese, 146(3): 395–404. (Scholar)
- Conee, E. and Feldman, R., 1985. “Evidentialism,” Philosophical Studies, 48: 15–34. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001. “Internalism Defended,” in Kornblith (ed.) 2001, pp. 231–60. Reprinted in Conee and Feldman 2004, pp. 53–82. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. Evidentialism. Essays in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- DeRose, K., 1995. Solving the skeptical problem. The Philosophical Review, 104(1): 1–52. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000. “Ought We to Follow Our Evidence?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60: 697–706. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009. The Case for Contextualism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dougherty, T., 2011. Evidentialism and its Discontents, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985. “Precis of Knowledge and the Flow of Information,” in Hilary Kornblith, ed., Naturalizing Epistemology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989. “The Need to Know,” in Marjorie Clay and Keith Lehrer (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism, Boulder: Westview Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. “The Case Against Closure,” in Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Malden, MA: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Fantl, J. & M. Mcgrath, 2009. Knowledge in an Uncertain World, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J., 1998. Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gettier, Edmund, 1963. “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23: 121–123, [available online]. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. I., 1967,” A Causal Theory of Knowing,” The Journal of Philosophy, 64(12): 357–372. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” The Journal of Philosophy, 73: 771–791. (Scholar)
- –––, 1979. “What is Justified Belief?” in Justification and Knowledge, George S. Pappas (ed.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999. “Internalism Exposed,” Journal of Philosophy, 96(6): 271–93 (Scholar)
- –––, 2009a. “Replies to Discussants,” in G. Schurz & M. Werning (eds.), Reliable Knowledge and Social Epistemology: Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Goldman and Replies by Goldman, Amsterdam: Rodopi. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009b. “Internalism, Externalism, and the Architecture of Justification,” Journal of Philosophy, 106(6): 309–338. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011. “Reliabilism”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Reliabilism/">http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/Reliabilism/>. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. and Olsson, E., 2009, “Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge,” in A. Haddock, A. Millar, and D. Pritchard (eds.) Epistemic Value, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Greco, J., 2009. “Knowledge and Success from Ability,” Philosophical Studies, 142(1): 17–26. (Scholar)
- Hazlett, A., 2010, “The Myth of Factive Verbs,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(3): 497–522. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J., 2002. “Deeply Contingent A Priori Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65(2): 247–69. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Knowledge and Lotteries, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ichikawa, J. J., 2011a, “Quantifiers, Knowledge, and Counterfactuals,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 82: 287–313. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011b, “Quantifiers and Epistemic Contextualism,” Philosophical Studies, 155(3): 383–98. (Scholar)
- Ichikawa, J. J., B. Jarvis, & K. Rubin, 2012, “Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology,” Analytic Philosophy, 5(3): 296–312. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, D., 1977. “Demonstratives,” in Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), 1989, Themes From Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kornblith, H., 2008. “Knowledge Needs No Justification,” in Q. Smith (ed.), Epistemology: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 2011. “Nozick on Knowledge,” in Philosophical Troubles: Collected Papers, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1973. Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. “Elusive Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74(4): 549 – 567. (Scholar)
- Littlejohn, C., 2012, Justification and the Truth-Connection, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lyons, J. C., 2009. Perception and Basic Beliefs. New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Merricks, T., 1995, “Warrant Entails Truth,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 55(4): 841–855. (Scholar)
- Myers-Schulz, B. & E. Schwitzgebel, forthcoming, “Knowing that P without Believing that P,” Noûs. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 1993. Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996. “Respondeo,” in Jonathan L. Kvanvig. Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology. Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Pollock, J., 1986. Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., 2005. Epistemic Luck, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D., A. Millar, & A. Haddock, 2010. The Nature and Value of Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Radford, C., 1966. “Knowledge—By Examples,” Analysis 27: 1–11. (Scholar)
- Rysiew, P., 2001. “The Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge Attributions,” Noûs, 35(4): 477–514. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011. “Epistemic Contextualism,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/contextualism-epistemology/>. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, J., 2004. “From Contextualism to Contrastivism,” Philosophical Studies, 119(1–2): 73–104. (Scholar)
- Schiffer, S., 1996. “Contextualist Solutions to Scepticism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96: 317–333. (Scholar)
- Shope, R. K., 1983. The Analysis of Knowing. A Decade of Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1999. “How to Defeat Opposition to Moore,” Noûs, (Supplement: Philosophical Perspectives, 13, Epistemology) 33: 141–153. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge (Volume I), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Stanley, J., 2005, Knowledge and Practical Interests, New York: Oxford University Press (Scholar)
- –––2011, Know How, New York: Oxford University Press
- Stine, G., 1976, “Skepticism, Relevant Alternatives, and Deductive Closure,” Philosophical Studies, 29: 249–261. (Scholar)
- Sutton, J., 2007, Without Justification, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Weatherson, B., 2012. “Knowledge, Bets and Interests,” in Knowledge Ascriptions, J. Brown & M. Gerken (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2000. Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005. Knowledge, Context, and the Agent's Point of View. In Gerhard Preyer & Georg Peter (eds.), Contextualism in Philosophy: Knowledge, Meaning, and Truth, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Reply to Alvin Goldman,” in Williamson on Knowledge, P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., 2004, “Warrant for Nothing (And Foundations for Free)?” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 78(1): 167–212. (Scholar)
- Zagzebski, L., 1994. “The Inescapability of Gettier Problems,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 44(174): 65–73. (Scholar)
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