Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Value of Knowledge" by Duncan Pritchard |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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Works Cited
- Alston, W. (2005), Beyond “Justification”: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation, Ithaca, NJ: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- BonJour, L. (2010), ‘The Myth of Knowledge’, Philosophical Perspectives, 24: 57–83. (Scholar)
- Bradley, B. (2002), ‘Is Intrinsic Value Conditional?’, Philosophical Studies, 107: 23–44. (Scholar)
- Brady, M. S. (2006). ‘Appropriate Attitudes and the Value Problem’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 43: 91–99. (Scholar)
- Brady, M. S., and Pritchard, D. H., eds. (2003), Moral and Epistemic Virtues, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Brentano, F. (1969), The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong, tr. R. Chisholm, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Brogaard, B. (2007), ‘Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge?’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36: 335–54. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R. (1986), Brentano and Intrinsic Value, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R. (1989), Theory of Knowledge, 3ed., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentic Hall. (Scholar)
- Conee, E. (1988), ‘Why Solve the Gettier Problem?’, in Philosophical Analysis, ed. D. Sosa, Dordrecht, Holland: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Conee, E. and R. Feldman, Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Craig, E. (1990), Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- David, M. (2001), ‘Truth as the Epistemic Goal’, in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Virtue, and Responsibility, ed. M. Steup, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005), ‘Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis’, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, eds. E. Sosa and M. Steup, 296–312, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- DePaul, M. (1993). Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), ‘Does an Ugly Analysis Entail that the Target of the Analysis Lacks Value?’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 112–38, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Elgin, C. (1996), Considered Judgement, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004), ‘True Enough’, Philosophical Issues, 14: 113–31. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), ‘Is Understanding Factive?’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 322–30, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Feldman, R. (1997), ‘Review Essay: Human Knowledge and Human Nature, by Peter Carruthers and Knowledge and the State of Nature, by Edward Craig’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57: 205–21. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A. (1990), Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. (1999), Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A., and Olsson, E. (2009), ‘Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 19–41, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Greco, J. (1999), ‘Agent Reliabilism’, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 273–96. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000), Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), ‘Knowledge as Credit for True Belief’, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, eds. M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007), ‘The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge’, typescript. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008), ‘What's Wrong With Contextualism?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 58: 416–36. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), ‘The Value Problem’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 313–21, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Grimm, S. (2006), ‘Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 57: 515–36. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J. (2004), Knowledge and Lotteries, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hyman, J. (2010), ‘The Road To Larissa,’, Ratio, 23: 393–414. (Scholar)
- Jones, W. (1997), ‘Why Do We Value Knowledge?’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 423–40. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, M. (1985), ‘It's Not What You Know That Counts’, Journal of Philosophy, 82: 350–63. (Scholar)
- Kvanvig, J. (2003), The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005), ‘Truth is not the Primary Epistemic Goal’, in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, eds. E. Sosa and M. Steup, 285–96, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009a), ‘Responses to Critics’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 339–52, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009b), ‘The Value of Understanding’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 95–111, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lackey, J. (2007), ‘Why We Don't Deserve Credit for Everything We Know’, Synthese, 157. (Scholar)
- Lynch, M. (2004), True to Life: Why Truth Matters, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), ‘The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 225–42, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Percival, P. (2003), ‘The Pursuit of Epistemic Good’, Metaphilosophy, 34: 29–47; and reprinted in Brady and Pritchard (2003). (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D. H. (2007), ‘Recent Work on Epistemic Value’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 44: 85–110. (Scholar)
- ––– (2010), ‘Knowledge and Understanding’, The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, D. H. Pritchard, A. Millar & A. Haddock, chs. 1–4, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Rabinowicz, W., and Roennow-Rasmussen, T. (1999), ‘A Distinction in Value: Intrinsic and For its Own Sake’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100: 33–49. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), ‘Tropic of Value, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 389–403. (Scholar)
- Riggs, W. (2002), ‘Reliability and the Value of Knowledge’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 79–96. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), ‘Getting the Meno Requirement Right’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 331–38, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T. M. (1998), What We Owe to Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E. (1985), ‘Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue’, The Monist, 68: 224–45. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988), ‘Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of our Knowledge’, Mind, 97: 153–89. (Scholar)
- ––– (1991), Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000), ‘For the Love of Truth’, in Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility, eds. A. Fairweather and L. Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), ‘The Place of Truth in Epistemology’, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,, eds. M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004), ‘Reply to Linda Zagzebski’, in Sosa and His Critics, ed. J. Greco, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007), Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Swinburne, R. (1999), Providence and the Problem of Evil, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000), Epistemic Justification, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Turri, J. (2010), ‘Does Perceiving Entail Knowing?’, Theoria, 76: 196–206. (Scholar)
- ––– (2011), ‘Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved’, Philosophers' Imprint, 11(8): 1–11. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, B. (1980), The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Weiner, M. (2009), ‘Does Knowledge Matter?’, in Epistemic Value, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 163–82, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D. (1987), ‘A Sensible Subjectivism?’, in his Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T. (2000), Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Zagzebski, L. (1996), Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1999). ‘What is Knowledge?’, in Epistemology, eds. J. Greco and E. Sosa, 92–116, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), ‘The Search for the Source of the Epistemic Good’, Metaphilosophy, 34: 12–28; and reprinted in Brady and Pritchard (2003). (Scholar)
Collections
- Haddock, A., Millar, A. and Pritchard, D. H., eds. (2009), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
Other Important Works
- DePaul, M. (2001), ‘Value Monism in Epistemology’, in Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Virtue, and Responsibility, ed. M. Steup, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ellis, B. (1988), ‘Solving the Problem of Induction Using a Values Based Epistemology’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39: 141–60. (Scholar)
- Fallis, D. (2004), ‘Epistemic Value Theory and Information Ethics’, Minds and Machines, 14: 101–17. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005), ‘Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation’, Episteme, 2: 39–55. (Scholar)
- Horwich, P. (2006), ‘The Value of Truth’, Noûs, 40: 347–60. (Scholar)
- Kvanvig, J. (1992), The Intellectual Virtues and the Life of the Mind: On the Place of the Virtues in Contemporary Epistemology, Savage, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998), ‘Why Should Inquiring Minds Want to Know?: Meno Problems and Epistemological Axiology’, The Monist, 81: 426–51. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004), ‘Nozickian Epistemology and the Value of Knowledge’, Philosophical Issues, 14: 201–18. (Scholar)
- ––– (2010), ‘The Swamping Problem Redux: Pith and Gist’, in Social Epistemology, eds. A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. H. Pritchard, 89–111, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, D. H. (2008), ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value’, Proceedings and Addresses of the Aristotelian Society (suppl. vol.), 82: 19–41 (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), ‘Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value’, Epistemology (Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures), (ed.) A. O'Hear, 19–43, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2011a), ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, The Journal of Philosophy, 108. (Scholar)
- ––– (2011b), ‘What is the Swamping Problem?’, in Reasons for Belief, eds. A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen, 244-59, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Riggs, W. (1998), ‘What are the “Chances” of Being Justified?’, The Monist, 81: 452–72. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002), ‘Beyond Truth and Falsehood: The Real Value of Knowing that P’, Philosophical Studies, 107: 87–108. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), ‘Understanding Virtue and the Virtue of Understanding’, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology,, eds. L. Zagzebski and M. DePaul, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007). ‘The Value Turn in Epistemology’, in New Waves in Epistemology, eds. V. Hendricks and D. H. Pritchard, London: Palgrave Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E. (2000), ‘Skepticism and Contextualism’, Philosophical Issues, 10: 1–18. (Scholar)
- Zagzebski, L. (2001), ‘Recovering Understanding’, in Knowledge, Truth, and Obligation: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Virtue, and Responsibility, ed. M. Steup, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), ‘Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth’, in Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology, eds. M. DePaul and L. Zagzebski, 135–54, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004), ‘Epistemic Value Monism’, in Sosa and His Critics, ed. J. Greco, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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