Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Law and Language" by Timothy Endicott |
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Cited works
- Austin, J.L., 1962, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Austin, John, 1832, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined, H.L.A.Hart ed. London : Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954. (Scholar)
- Bentham, Jeremy, 1776, A Fragment on Government, J.H.Burns and H.L.A.Hart ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. (Scholar)
- –––, 1782, Of Laws in General, H.L.A.Hart ed., London: Athlone Press, 1970. (Scholar)
- –––, 1843, Anarchical Fallacies. (Scholar)
- Coleman, Jules (ed.), 2001, Hart's Postscript, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Coleman, Jules and Simchen, Ori, 2003, “Law,” Legal Theory, 9: 1–41. (Scholar)
- Dascal, Marcelo and Wroblewski, Jerzy, 1988, “Transparency and Doubt: Understanding and Interpretation in Pragmatics and in Law,” Law and Philosophy, 7: 203–224. (Scholar)
- De Paramo, 1988, “Entrevista a HLA Hart”, Doxa, 5: 340. (Scholar)
- Dworkin, Ronald, 1986a, “Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?” in A Matter of Principle, Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986b, Law's Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press) (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “On Gaps in the Law,” in Neil MacCormick and Paul Amselek (eds.), Controversies about Law's Ontology, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. (Scholar)
- Endicott, Timothy, 2001, “Law is Necessarily Vague,” Legal Theory, 7: 377–383. (Scholar)
- Finnis, John, 1980, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Greenawalt, Kent, 2001, “Vagueness and Judicial Responses to Legal Indeterminacy,” Legal Theory, 7: 433–445. (Scholar)
- H.L.A.Hart, 1994, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, Essays on Bentham, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Marmor, Andrei, 2008, “The Pragmatics of Legal Language,” Ratio Juris, 21: 423–452. (Scholar)
- Posner, Richard, 1996, Law and Legal Theory in England and America, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Raz, Joseph, 1990, Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Schiffer, Stephen, 2001, “A Little Help from your Friends?” Legal Theory, 7: 421–431. (Scholar)
- Stavropoulos, Nicos, 1996, Objectivity in Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
Further reading
- Alchourrón, Carlos, and Bulygin, Eugenio, 1971, Normative Systems, Vienna: Springer. (Scholar)
- Bix, Brian, 1996, Law, Language and Legal Determinacy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, Simon, 1984, Spreading the Word, Oxford: Oxford University Press; especially pages 205–209. (Scholar)
- Brink, David O., 1988, “Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 17: 105–48. (Scholar)
- Bulygin, Eugenio, 1982, “Norms, normative propositions and legal statements”, in G. Floistad (ed.), Contemporary Philosophy A New Survey, The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 157–163. (Scholar)
- Greenawalt, Kent, 1992, Law and Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Greenberg, Mark and Harry Litman, 1998, “The Meaning of Original Meaning,” Georgetown Law Journal, 86: 569. (Scholar)
- Endicott, Timothy, 2000 Vagueness in Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “How to Speak the Truth,” American Journal of Jurisprudence, 46: 229–248. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “The Value of Vagueness,” in Vijay K. Bhatia, Jan Engberg, Maurizio Gotti and Dorothee Heller (eds), Vagueness in Normative Texts, Bern: Peter Lang, Chapter 1, 27–48. (Scholar)
- Fish, Stanley, 1989, Doing What Comes Naturally, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Green, Michael, 2003, “Dworkin's Fallacy, or What the Philosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law”, Virginia Law Review, 89: 1897–1952. (Scholar)
- Moore, Michael, 1985, “A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation,” Southern California Law Review, 58: 277 (Scholar)
- Patterson, Dennis, 1996, Law and Truth, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Perelman, Chaim, 1963, The Idea of Justice and the Problem of Argument, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Williams, Glanville, 1945–1946, “Language and the Law”, Law Quarterly Review, 61: 71, 179, 293, 384; 62: 387. (Scholar)
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