Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Liar Paradox" by Jc Beall |
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- Aczel, Peter, 1980, “Frege structures and the notions of proposition, truth and set”, in The Kleene Symposium, J. Barwise, H. J. Keisler, and K. Kunen, eds., Amsterdam: North-Holland, 31–59. (Scholar)
- Anderson, Alan Ross, 1970, “St. Paul’s epistle to Titus”, in The Paradox of the Liar, Robert L. Martin, ed., Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1–11. (Scholar)
- Asenjo, F. G., 1966, “A calculus of antinomies”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 16: 103–105.
- Barwise, Jon and Etchemendy, John, 1987, The Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beall, Jc, 2001, “Is Yablo’s paradox non-circular?”, Analysis, 61: 176–187. (Scholar)
- Beall, Jc, 2005, “Transparent disquotationalism”, in Deflationism and Paradox, Jc Beall and B. Armour-Garb, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7–22. (Scholar)
- Beall, Jc (ed.), 2008, Revenge of the Liar, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beall, Jc, 2009, Spandrels of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Beall, Jc and Glanzberg, Michael, 2008, “Where the paths meet: Remarks on truth and paradox”, in Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XXXII: Truth and its Deformities, P. A. French and H. K. Wettstein, eds., Boston: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Beall, Jc and van Fraassen, Bas C., 2003, Possibilities and Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Brady, Ross T., 1989, “The non-triviality of dialectical set theory”, in Paraconsistent Logic: Essays on the Inconsistent, G. Priest, R. Routley, and J. Norman, eds., Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 437–470. (Scholar)
- Burge, Tyler, 1979, “Semantical paradox”, Journal of Philosophy, 76: 169–198. Reprinted in Martin (1984). (Scholar)
- Burgess, John P., 1986, “The truth is never simple”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 51: 663–681. (Scholar)
- Cantini, Andrea, 1996, Logical Frameworks for Truth and Abstraction: An Axiomatic Study, Amsterdam: Elsevier. (Scholar)
- Chihara, Charles, 1979, “The semantic paradoxes: A diagnostic investigation”, Philosophical Review, 88: 590–618. (Scholar)
- Cook, Roy, 2006, “There are non-circular paradoxes (but Yablo’s isn’t one of them)”, The Monist, 89: 118–149. (Scholar)
- Dowden, Bradley H., 1984, “Accepting inconsistencies from the paradoxes”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13: 125–130. (Scholar)
- Dummett, Michael, 1959, “Truth”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 141–162. Reprinted in Dummett (1978). (Scholar)
- Dummett, Michael, 1978, Truth and Other Enigmas, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Eklund, Matti, 2002, “Inconsistent languages”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 251–275. (Scholar)
- Feferman, Solomon, 1984, “Toward useful type-free theories, I”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 49: 75–111. Reprinted in Martin (1984). (Scholar)
- Feferman, Solomon, 1991, “Reflecting on incompleteness”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 56: 1–49. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 1994, “Deflationist views of meaning and content”, Mind, 103: 249–285. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 2008, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Friedman, Harvey and Sheard, Michael, 1987, “An axiomatic approach to self-referential truth”, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 33: 1–21. (Scholar)
- Gaifman, Haim, 1988, “Operational pointer semantics: Solution to self-referential puzzles I”, in Proceedings of the Second Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, M. Y. Vardi, ed., Los Altos: Morgan Kaufmann, 43–59. (Scholar)
- Gaifman, Haim, 1992, “Pointers to truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 89: 223–261. (Scholar)
- Gauker, Christopher, 2006, “Against stepping back: A critique of contextualist approaches to the semantic paradoxes”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 35: 393–422. (Scholar)
- Glanzberg, Michael, 2001, “The Liar in context”, Philosophical Studies, 103: 217–251. (Scholar)
- Glanzberg, Michael, 2004a, “A contextual-hierarchical approach to truth and the Liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 33: 27–88. (Scholar)
- Glanzberg, Michael, 2004b, “Quantification and realism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 541–572. (Scholar)
- Glanzberg, Michael, 2004c, “Truth, reflection, and hierarchies”, Synthese, 142: 289–315. (Scholar)
- Glanzberg, Michael, 2006, “Context and unrestricted quantification”, in Absolute Generality, A. Rayo and G. Uzquiano, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 45–74. (Scholar)
- Grim, Patrick, 1991, The Incomplete Universe, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Groeneveld, Willem, 1994, “Dynamic semantics and circular propositions”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 23: 267–306. (Scholar)
- Gupta, Anil, 1982, “Truth and paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 1–60. Reprinted in Martin (1984). (Scholar)
- Gupta, Anil and Belnap, Nuel, 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Halbach, Volker, 1997, “Tarskian and Kripean truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26: 69–80. (Scholar)
- Heck, Richard, 1997, “Tarski, truth, and semantics”, Philosophical Review, 106: 533–554. (Scholar)
- Herzberger, Hans G., 1967, “The truth-conditional consistency of natural language”, Journal of Philosophy, 64: 29–35. (Scholar)
- Herzberger, Hans G., 1970, “Paradoxes of grounding in semantics”, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 146–167. (Scholar)
- Herzberger, Hans G., 1982, “Notes on naive semantics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 61–102. Reprinted in Martin (1984). (Scholar)
- Horwich, Paul, 1990, Truth, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Koons, Robert C., 1992, Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1975, “Outline of a theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. Reprinted in Martin (1984). (Scholar)
- Littmann, Greg and Simmons, Keith, 2004, “A critique of dialetheism”, in The Law of Non-Contradiction, G. Priest, Jc Beall, and B. Armour-Garb, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 314–335.
- Martin, Robert L. (ed.), 1984, Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Martin, Robert L. and Woodruff, Peter W., 1975, “On representing ‘true-in-L’ in L”, Philosophica, 5: 217–221. Reprinted in Martin (1984). (Scholar)
- McGee, Vann, 1991, Truth, Vagueness, and Paradox, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Parsons, Charles, 1974, “The Liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 3: 381–412. Reprinted in Parsons (1983). (Scholar)
- Parsons, Charles, 1983, Mathematics in Philosophy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Parsons, Terence, 1984, “Assertion, denial, and the Liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13: 137–152. (Scholar)
- Patterson, Douglas, 2007, “Understanding the Liar”, in The Revenge of the Liar, Jc Beall, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197–224. (Scholar)
- Patterson, Douglas, 2009, “Inconsistency theories of semantic paradox”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 79: 387–422. (Scholar)
- Priest, Graham, 1984, “Logic of paradox revisited”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13: 153–179. (Scholar)
- Priest, Graham, 1997, “Yablo’s paradox”, Analysis, 57: 236–242. (Scholar)
- Priest, Graham, 2006, In Contradiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press, second ed. (Scholar)
- Priest, Graham, 2008, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, second ed. (Scholar)
- Rahman, Shahid, Tulenheimo, Tero, and Genot, Emmanuel (eds.), 2008, Unity, Truth and the Liar: The Modern Relevance of Medieval Solutions to the Liar Paradox, Berlin: Springer Verlag. (Scholar)
- Rayo, Agustín and Uzquiano, Gabriel (eds.), 2006, Absolute Generality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Read, Stephen, 2002, “The Liar paradox from John Buridan back to Thomas Bradwardine”, Vivarium, 40: 189–218. (Scholar)
- Read, Stephen, 2006, “Symmetry and paradox”, History and Philosophy of Logic, 27: 307–318. (Scholar)
- Restall, Greg, 2008, “Modal models for Bradwardine’s theory of truth”, Review of Symbolic Logic, 1: 225–240. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Lionel, 2006, “The rationale behind the revision theory”, Philosophical Studies, 129: 477–515. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Lionel, forthcoming, “Expressibility and the Liar’s revenge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Stewart, 2004, “Simple truth, contradiction, and consistency”, in The Law of Non-Contradiction, G. Priest, Jc Beall, and B. Armour-Garb, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 336–354. (Scholar)
- Simmons, Keith, 1993, Universality and the Liar, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Soames, Scott, 1999, Understanding Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sorensen, Roy, 1998, “Yablo’s paradox and kindred infinite Liars”, Mind, 107: 137–155. (Scholar)
- Sorensen, Roy, 2003, A Brief History of Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Tarski, Alfred, 1935, “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalizierten Sprachen”, Studia Philosophica, 1: 261–405. References are to the translation by J. H. Woodger as “The concept of truth in formalized languages” in Tarski (1983). (Scholar)
- Tarski, Alfred, 1944, “The semantic conception of truth”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 4: 341–375. (Scholar)
- Tarski, Alfred, 1983, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Indianapolis: Hackett, second ed. Edited by J. Corcoran with translations by J. H. Woodger. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, Bas C., 1968, “Presupposition, implication, and self-reference”, Journal of Philosophy, 65: 136–152. (Scholar)
- van Fraassen, Bas C., 1970, “Truth and paradoxical consequence”, in Paradox of the Liar, R. L. Martin, ed., Atascadero: Ridgeview, 13–23. (Scholar)
- Visser, Albert, 1984, “Four valued semantics and the Liar”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13: 181–212. (Scholar)
- Woodruff, Peter W., 1984, “Paradox, truth, and logic part 1: Paradox and truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 13: 213–232. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen, 1993a, “Hop, skip, and jump: The agnostic conception of truth”, Philosophical Perspectives, 7: 371–396. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen, 1993b, “Paradox without self-reference”, Analysis, 53: 251–252. (Scholar)
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