Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Material Constitution" by Ryan Wasserman
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Baker, L.R., 1997, “Why Constitution is not Identity,” Journal of Philosophy, 94: 599–621. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Persons and Bodies: a Constitution View, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “On Making Things Up: Constitution and its Critics,” Philosophical Topics, 30: 31–52. (Scholar)
- Bennett, K., 2004, “Spatio-Temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem,” Philosophical Studies, 118: 339–371. (Scholar)
- Brower, J., 2014, Aquinas’s Ontology of the Material World:
Change, Hylomorphism, and Material Objects, Oxford: Oxford
University Press. (Scholar)
- Burke, M., 1992, “Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper: A Challenge to the Standard Account,” Analysis, 52: 12–17. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Preserving the Principle of One Object to a Place: A Novel Account of the Relations among Objects, Sorts, Sortals and Persistence Conditions,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 591–624. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997a, “Persons and Bodies: How to Avoid the New Dualism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 457–67. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997b, “Coinciding Objects: Reply to Lowe and Denkel,” Analysis, 57: 11–18. (Scholar)
- Carnap, R., 1950, “Empiricism, Semantics, Ontology,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie, 4: 20–40. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D, Manley, D. and Wasserman, R., 2009, Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R., 1973, “Parts as Essential to their Wholes,” Review of Metaphysics, 26: 581–603. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, Person and Object, London: Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
- DeRosset, L., 2011, “What is the Grounding Problem?,” Philosophical Studies, 156: 173–197. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R., 1641 [1993], Meditations on First Philosophy, third edition, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company. (Scholar)
- Doepke, F., 1982, “Spatially Coinciding Objects,” Ratio, 24: 45–60. (Scholar)
- Einheuser, I., 2011, “Toward a Conceptualist Solution of the Grounding Problem,” Noûs, 45: 300–314. (Scholar)
- Eklund, M. forthcoming, “Collapse and Quantifier
Variance,” in J.T.M. Miller (ed.), The Language of
Ontology, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Elder, C., 2008, “Against Universal Mereological Composition,” Dialectica, 62: 433–454. (Scholar)
- Fairchild, M., 2019, “The Barest Flutter of the Smallest Leaf: Understanding Material Plenitude,” Philosophical Review, 128: 143–178. (Scholar)
- Fara, M. and Williamson, T., 2005, “Counterparts and Actuality,” Mind, 114: 1–30. (Scholar)
- Fine, K., 2000, “A Counterexample to Locke’s Thesis,”
The Monist, 83: 357–361. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “The Non-Identity of a Thing
and its Matter,” Mind, 112: 195–234. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Arguing for Non-Identity: A Response to King and Frances,” Mind, 115: 1059–1082. (Scholar)
- Finn, S. and Bueno, O., 2018, “Quantifier Variance Dissolved,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 82: 289–307. (Scholar)
- Frances, B., 2006, “The New Leibniz’s Law Argument for
Pluralism,” Mind, 115: 1007–1021. (Scholar)
- Geach, P., 1962, Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1967, “Identity,” Review of Metaphysics, 21: 3–12. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 1975, “Contingent Identity,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 4: 187–221. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., 1980, The Logic of Common Nouns, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J., 2004, “Identity,” in D. Zimmerman and M. Loux (eds.), Oxford Companion to Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 99–130. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Three-Dimensionalism,”
in Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
85–110. (Scholar)
- Heller, M., 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks of Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hirsch, E., 1982, The Concept of Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002a, “Against Revisionary Ontology,” Philosophical Topics, 30: 103–127. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b, “Quantifier Variance and Realism,” Philosophical Issues, 12: 51–73. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Physical-Object Ontology, Verbal Disputes, and Common Sense,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70: 67–97. (Scholar)
- Hirsch, E. and Warren J., 2019, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 98: 592–605. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M., 1992, “Constitution is not Identity,” Mind, 101: 89–105. (Scholar)
- King, J., 2006, “Semantics of Monists,” Mind, 115: 1023–1058. (Scholar)
- Korman, Daniel, Z. 2015, Objects: Nothing Out of the Ordinary, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Koslicki, K., 2008, The Structure of Objects, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2018, “Towards a Hylomorphic Solution to the Grounding Problem,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements, 82: 333–364. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1971, “Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies,” Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976, “Survival and Identity,” in A. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley: University of California Press, 17–40. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Liebesman, D. and Eklund, M., 2007, “Sider on Existence,” Noûs, 41: 519–528. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E.J., 1983, “Instantiation, Identity and Constitution,” Philosophical Studies, 44: 45–59. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Coinciding Objects: In Defense
of the ‘Standard Account’,” Analysis, 55:
171–178. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Substantial Change and Spatiotemporal Coincidence,” Ratio, 16: 140–160. (Scholar)
- Markosian, N., 1998, “Brutal Composition,” Philosophical Studies, 92: 211–249. (Scholar)
- McDaniel, K., 2001, “Tropes and Ordinary Physical Objects,” Philosophical Studies, 104: 269–290. (Scholar)
- McGrath, M., 2005, “No Objects, no Problem?,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 457–486. (Scholar)
- Merricks, T., 2001, Objects and Persons, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Oderberg, D., 1996, “Coincidence Under a Sortal,” Philosophical Review, 105: 145–71. (Scholar)
- O’Leary-Hawthorne, J. and Michael, M., 1996, “Compatibilist Semantics in Metaphysics: A Case Study,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 72: 117–134. (Scholar)
- Olson, E., 1995, “Why I have no Hands,” Theoria, 61: 182–197. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Material Coincidence and the Indiscernibility Problem,” Philosophical Quarterly, 51: 337–355. (Scholar)
- Parsons, J., 2004, “Dion, Theon, and DAUP,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 85: 85–91. (Scholar)
- Paul, L.A., 2002, “Logical Parts,” Noûs, 36: 578–596. (Scholar)
- Pfeifer, K., 1989, Actions and Other Events: The Unifier-Multiplier Controversy, New York: Peter Lang Publishing. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1987, “Truth and Convention: On Davidson’s
Refutation of Conceptual Relativism,” Dialectica, 41:
69–77 (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O., 1953, “Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis,” in From a Logical Point of View, second edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 65–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Rea, M. (ed.), 1997, Material Constitution: a Reader, Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Sameness without Identity: An Aristotelian Solution to the Problem of Material Constitution,” Ratio, 3: 316–328. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Constitution and Kind Membership,” Philosophical Studies, 97: 169–193. (Scholar)
- Saenz, N.B., 2015, “A Grounding Solution to the Grounding Problem,” Philosophical Studies, 172: 2193–2214. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1999, “Self, Body, and Coincidence,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol.,
73: 287–306. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Realization, Micro-Realization, and Coincidence,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 67: 1–23. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, J., 2003, “Is there a Fundamental Level?,” Noûs, 37: 498–517. (Scholar)
- Sider, T., 1993, “van Inwagen and the Possibility of Gunk,” Analysis, 53: 285–289. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Ontological Realism,” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 384–423. (Scholar)
- Simons, P., 1985, “Coincidence of Things of a Kind,” Mind, 94: 70–75. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Parts: A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 1987, “Subjects among Other Things,” Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 155–187. (Scholar)
- Sud, R. and Manley, D., 2020, “Quantifier Variance,” in R. Bliss and J.T.M. Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametasemantics, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Sutton, C.S., 2012, “Colocated Objects: Tally-Ho: A Solution to the Grounding Problem,” Mind, 121: 703–730. (Scholar)
- Thomasson, A.L., 2015, Ontology Made Easy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation,” Analytic Philosophy, 57: 1–28. (Scholar)
- Thomson, J.J.T., 1983, “Parthood and Identity Across Time,” Journal of Philosophy, 80: 201–20. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “The Statue and the Clay,” Noûs, 32: 148–173. (Scholar)
- Unger, P., 1979, “There are no Ordinary Things,” Synthese, 41: 117–154. (Scholar)
- Uzquiano, G., 2004a, “The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle,” Noûs, 38: 135–153. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004b, “Plurals and Simples,” The Monist, 87: 429–451. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, P., 1981, “The Doctrine of Arbitrary Undetached Parts,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 62: 123–137. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Wasserman, R., 2002, “The Standard Objection to the Standard Account,” Philosophical Studies, 111: 197–216. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “The Constitution Question,” Noûs, 38: 693–710. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1968, “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time,” Philosophical Review, 77: 90–95. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1987, “Identity, Essence and Indiscernibility,” Journal of Philosophy, 84: 293–314. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, D.W., 1995, “Theories of Masses and Problems of Constitution,” Philosophical Review, 104: 53–110. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Could Extended Objects Be Made Out of Simple Parts? An Argument for Atomless Gunk,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56: 1–29. (Scholar)