Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Mental Representation" by David Pitt |
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Almog, J., Perry, J. and Wettstein, H. (eds.), (1989), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Alter, T. and Walter, S. (2007), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Aristotle, De Anima, in The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
- Baker, L. R. (1995), Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Ballard, D.H. (1986), “Cortical Connections and Parallel Processing: Structure and Function,” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 9: 67–120. (Scholar)
- Ballard, D.H and Hayes, P.J. (1984), “Parallel Logical Inference,” Proceedings of the Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Rochester, NY. (Scholar)
- Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds.), (2011), Cognitive Phenomenology, Oxford: Oxord University Press. (Scholar)
- Beaney, M. (ed.) (1997), The Frege Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- Berkeley, G. Principles of Human Knowledge, in M.R. Ayers (ed.), Berkeley: Philosophical Writings, London: Dent, 1975.
- Block, N. (1983), “Mental Pictures and Cognitive Science,” Philosophical Review, 93: 499–542. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986), “Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology,” in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and H.K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. X, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 615–678. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996), “Mental Paint and Mental Latex,” in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues, 7: Perception: 19–49. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), “Mental Paint,” in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Block, N. (ed.) (1981), Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 2, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.) (1982), Imagery, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P. A. (1995), “Content,” in J. Kim and E. Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell, 94–96. (Scholar)
- Brandom, R. (2002), “Non-inferential Knowledge, Perceptual Experience, and Secondary Qualities: Placing McDowell's Empiricism,” in N.H. Smith (ed.), Reading McDowell: On Mind and World, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Burge, T. (1979), “Individualism and the Mental,” in P.A. French, T.E. Uehling and H.K.Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Vol. IV, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 73–121. (Reprinted, with Postscript, in Burge 2007.) (Scholar)
- ––– (1986a), “Individualism and Psychology,” Philosophical Review, 95: 3–45. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986b), “Intellectual Norms and Foundations of Mind,” The Journal of Philosophy, 83: 697–720. (Scholar)
- ––– (2007), Foundations of Mind: Philosophical Essays, Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2010), Origins of Objectivity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D. (1993), “Connectionism and Compositionality: Why Fodor and Pylyshyn Were Wrong,” Philosophical Psychology, 6: 305–319. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996), The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), “The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief,” in Q. Smith & A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 220–272. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004a), “The Representational Character of Experience,” in B. Leiter (ed.), The Future for Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 153–181. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004b), “Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument,” in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa and D. Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R. and Sellars, W. (1958), “The Chisholm-Sellars Correspondence on Intentionality,” in H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell (eds.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 529–539. (Scholar)
- Chomsky, N. (1965), Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P.M. (1981), “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. (Scholar)
- ––– (1989), “On the Nature of Theories: A Neurocomputational Perspective,” in W. Savage (ed.), Scientific Theories: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 14, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 59–101. (Scholar)
- Clark, A. (1997a), “The Dynamical Challenge,” Cognitive Science, 21: 461–481. (Scholar)
- ––– (1997b), Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001), “Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind,” Mind and Language, 16: 121–145. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005), “Intrinsic Content, Active Memory, and the Extended Mind,” Analysis, 65: 1–11. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008). Supersizing the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Clark, A., and Chalmers, D. (1998), “The Extended Mind,” Analysis, 58: 7–19. (Scholar)
- Collins, A. (1987), The Nature of Mental Things, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press. (Scholar)
- Crane, T. (1995), The Mechanical Mind, London: Penguin Books Ltd. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D. (1973), “Radical Interpretation,” Dialectica 27: 313–328. (Scholar)
- ––– (1974), “Belief and the Basis of Meaning,” Synthese, 27: 309–323. (Scholar)
- ––– (1975), “Thought and Talk,” in S. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 7–23. (Scholar)
- ––– (1982), “Rational Animals,” Dialectica, 4: 317–327. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. (1969), Content and Consciousness, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981), “The Nature of Images and the Introspective Trap,” pages 132–141 of Dennett 1969, reprinted in Block 1981: 128–134. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987), The Intentional Stance, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987a), “True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works,” in Dennett 1987: 13–35. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987b), “Reflections: Real Patterns, Deeper Facts, and Empty Questions,” in Dennett 1987: 37–42. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988), “Quining Qualia,” in A.J. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Consciousness in Contemporary Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 42–77. (Scholar)
- ––– (1991), “Real Patterns,” The Journal of Philosophy, 87: 27–51. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. (1996), Coming to Our Senses: A Naturalistic Program for Semantic Localism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F. (1969), Seeing and Knowing, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981), Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988), Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995), Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996), “Phenomenal Externalism, or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where are Qualia?”, in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues 7: Perception: 143–158. (Scholar)
- ––– (1999), “The Mind's Awareness of Itself,” Philosophical Studies, 95: 103–124. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998), “Minds, Machines, and Money: What Really Explains Behavior,” in J. Bransen and S. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Philosophical Studies Series 77, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Dretske 2000. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000), Perception, Knowledge and Belief, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Evans, G. (1982), The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Farkas, K. (2008), The Subject's Point of View, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Field, H. (1978), “Mental representation,” Erkenntnis, 13: 9–61. (Scholar)
- Flanagan, O. (1992), Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J.A. (1975), The Language of Thought, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1978), “Propositional Attitudes,” The Monist 61: 501–523. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981), Representations, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981a), “Introduction,” in Fodor 1981: 1–31. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981b), “Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology,” in Fodor 1981: 225–253. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981c), “The Present Status of the Innateness Controversy,” in Fodor 1981: 257–316. (Scholar)
- ––– (1982), “Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23: 98–118. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987), Psychosemantics, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990a), A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990b), “Psychosemantics or: Where Do Truth Conditions Come From?” in W.G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 312–337. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994), The Elm and the Expert, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1998), Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000), The Mind Doesn't Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008), The Mind Doesn't Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J.A. and Lepore, E. (2002), The Compositionality Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J.A. and Pylyshyn, Z. (1981), “How Direct is Visual Perception?: Some Reflections on Gibson's ‘Ecological Approach’,” Cognition, 9: 207–246. (Scholar)
- ––– (1988), “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture: A Critical Analysis,” Cognition, 28: 3–71. (Scholar)
- Frege, G. (1884), The Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J.L. Austin, New York: Philosophical Library (1954). (Scholar)
- ––– (1892), “On Sinn and Bedeutung”, in Beany 1997: 151–171. (Scholar)
- ––– (1918), “Thought”, in Beany 1997: 325–345. (Scholar)
- Geach, P. (1957), Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Gibson, J.J. (1966), The senses considered as perceptual systems, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (Scholar)
- ––– (1979), The ecological approach to visual perception, Boston: Houghton Mifflin. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. (1993), “The Psychology of Folk Psychology,” Behavioral and Brian Sciences, 16: 15–28. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N. (1976), Languages of Art, 2nd ed., Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Grice, H.P. (1957), “Meaning,” Philosophical Review, 66: 377–388; reprinted in Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (1989): 213–223. (Scholar)
- Gunther, Y.H. (ed.) (2003), Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. (1973), Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1987), “(Non-Solipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics,” in E. Lepore (ed.), New Directions in Semantics, London: Academic Press: 55–81. (Scholar)
- ––– (1990), “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience,” in J. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 31–52. (Scholar)
- Harnish, R. (2002), Minds, Brains, Computers, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers Inc. (Scholar)
- Haugeland, J. (1981), “Analog and analog,” Philosophical Topics, 12: 213–226. (Scholar)
- Heil, J. (1991), “Being Indiscrete,” in J. Greenwood (ed.), The Future of Folk Psychology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 120–134. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (1996), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology, Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2002), “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in D.J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Horst, S. (1996), Symbols, Computation, and Intentionality, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, D. (1739), A Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigg (ed.), rev. P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1978). (Scholar)
- Jackendoff, R. (1987), Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. (1982), “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986), “What Mary Didn't Know,” Journal of Philosophy, 83: 291–295. (Scholar)
- Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1983), Mental Models, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Wason, P.C. (1977), Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science, Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, D. (1989), “Demonstratives,” in Almog, Perry and Wettstein 1989: 481–614. (Scholar)
- Kosslyn, S.M. (1980), Image and Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1982), “The Medium and the Message in Mental Imagery,” in Block 1982: 207–246. (Scholar)
- ––– (1983), Ghosts in the Mind's Machine, New York: W.W. Norton & Co. (Scholar)
- Kosslyn, S.M. and Pomerantz, J.R. (1977), “Imagery, Propositions, and the Form of Internal Representations,” Cognitive Psychology, 9: 52–76. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, U. (2011), The Sources of Intentionality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kriegel, U. (ed.) forthcoming, Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Leeds, S. (1993), “Qualia, Awareness, Sellars,” Noûs XXVII: 303–329. (Scholar)
- Lerdahl, F. and Jackendoff, R. (1983), A Generative Theory of Tonal Music, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Levine, J. (1993), “On Leaving Out What It's Like,” in M. Davies and G. Humphreys (eds.), Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers: 121–136. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995), “On What It Is Like to Grasp a Concept,” in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues 6: Content, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 38–43. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001), Purple Haze, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. (1971), “Analog and Digital,” Noûs, 5: 321–328. (Scholar)
- ––– (1974), “Radical Interpretation,” Synthese, 27: 331–344. (Scholar)
- Loar, B. (1981), Mind and Meaning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996), “Phenomenal States” (Revised Version), in N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press: 597–616. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003a), “Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia,” in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 77–96. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003b), “Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content,” in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Locke, J. (1689), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press (1975). (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G. (1987), Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1986), Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- MacDonald, C. and MacDonald, G. (1995), Connectionism: Debates on Psychological Explanation, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- Marr, D. (1982), Vision, New York: W.H. Freeman and Company. (Scholar)
- Martin, C.B. (1987), “Proto-Language,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 277–289. (Scholar)
- McCulloch, W.S. and Pitts, W. (1943), “A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity,” Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics, 5: 115–33. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J. (1986), “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,” in P. Pettit and J. McDowell (eds.), Subject, Thought, and Context, Oxford: Clarendon Press: 137–168. (Scholar)
- ––– (1994), Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- McGinn, C. (1977), “Charity, Interpretation, and Belief,” Journal of Philosophy, 74: 521–535. (Scholar)
- ––– (1982), “The Structure of Content,” in A. Woodfield (ed.), Thought and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 207–258. (Scholar)
- ––– (1989), Mental Content, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- ––– (1991), The Problem of Consciousness, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- ––– (1991a), “Content and Consciousness,” in McGinn 1991: 23–43. (Scholar)
- ––– (1991b), “Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?” in McGinn 1991: 1–22. (Scholar)
- ––– (2004), Mindsight: Image, Dream, Meaning, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Millikan, R. (1984), Language, Thought and other Biological Categories, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Menary, R. (ed.) (2010), The Extended Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Minsky, M. (1974), “A Framework for Representing Knowledge,” MIT-AI Laboratory Memo 306 June. (A shorter version appears in J. Haugeland (ed.), Mind Design II, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press (1997).) (Scholar)
- Nagel, T. (1974), “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” Philosophical Review, 83: 435–450. (Scholar)
- Newell, A. and Simon, H.A. (1972), Human Problem Solving, New York: Prentice-Hall. (Scholar)
- ––– (1976), “Computer Science as Empirical Inquiry: Symbols and Search,” Communications of the Association for Computing Machinery, 19: 113–126. (Scholar)
- O'Callaghan, C. (2007), Sounds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Osherson, D.N., Kosslyn, S.M. and Hollerbach, J.M. (1990), Visual Cognition and Action: An Invitation to Cognitive Science, Vol. 2, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Papineau, D. (1987), Reality and Representation, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C. (1983), Sense and Content, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1989), “Perceptual Content,” in Almog, Perry and Wettstein 1989: 297–329. (Scholar)
- ––– (1992), “Scenarios, Concepts and Perception,” in T. Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 105–35. (Scholar)
- ––– (2001), “Does Perception Have a Nonconceptual Content?” Journal of Philosophy, 99: 239–264. (Scholar)
- Pinker, S. (1989), Learnability and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Pitt, D. (2004), “The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is it Like to Think That P?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 1–36. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), “Intentional Psychologism” Philosophical Studies, 146: 117–138. (Scholar)
- ––– (2011), “Introspection, Phenomenality and the Availability of Intentional Content,” in Bayne and Montague 2011. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Indexical Thought,” in Kriegel (ed.) forthcoming. (Scholar)
- Port, R., and Van Gelder, T. (1995), Mind as Motion: Explorations in the Dynamics of Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H. (1975), “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 215–71. (Scholar)
- Pylyshyn, Z. (1979), “The Rate of ‘Mental Rotation’ of Images: A Test of a Holistic Analogue Hypothesis,” Memory and Cognition, 7: 19–28. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981a), “Imagery and Artificial Intelligence,” in Block 1981: 170–194. (Scholar)
- ––– (1981b), “The Imagery Debate: Analog Media versus Tacit Knowledge,” Psychological Review, 88: 16–45. (Scholar)
- ––– (1984), Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2003), Seeing and Visualizing: It's Not What You Think, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Raffman, D. (1995), “The Persistence of Phenomenology,” in T. Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience, Paderborn: Schönigh/Imprint Academic: 293–308. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, W., Stich, S. and Garon, J. (1990), “Connectionism, Eliminativism and the Future of Folk Psychology,” Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 499–533. (Scholar)
- Reid, T. (1764), An Inquiry into the Human Mind, D.R. Brooks (ed.), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (1997). (Scholar)
- Rey, G. (1981), “Introduction: What Are Mental Images?” in Block 1981: 117–127. (Scholar)
- ––– (1991), “Sensations in a Language of Thought,” in E. Villaneuva (ed.), Philosophical Issues 1: Consciousness, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company: 73–112. (Scholar)
- Rumelhart, D.E. (1989), “The Architecture of the Mind: A Connectionist Approach,” in M.I. Posner (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press: 133–159. (Scholar)
- Rumelhart, D.E. and McCelland, J.L. (1986). Parallel Distributed Processing, Vol. I, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Schiffer, S. (1987), Remnants of Meaning, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1972), “Introduction” (Paperback Edition), in Meaning, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1972/1988): xi-xxix. (Scholar)
- Searle, J.R. (1980), “Minds, Brains, and Programs,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3: 417–424. (Scholar)
- ––– (1983), Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1984) Minds, Brains, and Science, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W. (1956), “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press: 253–329. (Scholar)
- Shepard, R.N. and Cooper, L. (1982), Mental Images and their Transformations, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S. (1990), “Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 50: 109–31. (Scholar)
- Siewert, C. (1998), The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Smolensky, P. (1988), “On the Proper Treatment of Connectionism,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 11: 1–74. (Scholar)
- ––– (1989), “Connectionist Modeling: Neural Computation/Mental Connections,” in L. Nadel, L.A. Cooper, P. Culicover and R.M. Harnish (eds.), Neural Connections, Mental Computation Cambridge, Mass.:The MIT Press: 49–67. (Scholar)
- ––– (1991), “Connectionism and the Language of Thought,” in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), Meaning in Mind: Fodor and His Critics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.: 201–227. (Scholar)
- Sterelny, K. (1989), “Fodor's Nativism,” Philosophical Studies, 55: 119–141. (Scholar)
- Stich, S. (1983), From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1996), Deconstructing the Mind, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, G. (1994), Mental Reality, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2008), Real Materialism and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Thau, M. (2002), Consciousness and Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Turing, A. (1950), “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind, 59: 433–60. (Scholar)
- Tye, M. (1991), The Imagery Debate, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (1995), Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2000), Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2009), Consciousness Revisited, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Van Gelder, T. (1995), “What Might Cognition Be, if not Computation?”, Journal of Philosophy, XCI: 345–381. (Scholar)
- Von Eckardt, B. (1993), What Is Cognitive Science?, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– (2005), “Connectionism and the Propositional Attitudes,” in C.E. Erneling and D.M. Johnson (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L. (1953), Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. (Scholar)
Generated Tue May 14 03:58:38 2013
