Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Epistemology of Modality" by Anand Vaidya |
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- Almog, Joseph (2005). What Am I: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, David (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Baldwin, Thomas (2002). “Kantian Modality”, Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76 (1): 1–24. (Scholar)
- Barnes, Gordon (2002). “Conceivability, Explanation, and Defeat”, Philosophical Studies, 108: 327–338. (Scholar)
- Barnes, Gordon (2006). “Necessity and A priority”, Philosophical Studies, 132 (3): 495–523. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George (1987). “Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 1: 289–365. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George (1999). “A Theory of the A Priori”, Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 29–55. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George (2002). “Modal Epistemology and the Rationalist Renaissance”, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 71–125. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George (2004). “The Origins of Modal Error”, Dialectica, 58 (1): 11–42. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George (2006). “A Definition of Necessity”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 17–40. (Scholar)
- Benaceraff, Paul (1973). “Mathematical Truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661–679. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, Simon (1993). “Modals and Morals”, in S. Blackburn (ed.), Essays in Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 52–74. (Scholar)
- Brueckner, Anthony (2001). “Chalmers' conceivability argument for dualism”, Analysis, 61: 187–93. (Scholar)
- Bueno, Otavio & Scott Shalkowski (2000). “A Plea for a Modal Realist Epistemology”, Acta Analytica, 15: 175–93. (Scholar)
- Carnap, Rudolph (1956). Meaning and Necessity: A Study in the Semantics of Modal Logic (2nd edition), Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Craig, Edward (1985). “Arithmetic and Fact”, in I. Hacking (ed.), Exercises in Analysis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 89–112. (Scholar)
- Casullo, Albert (1975). “Conceivability and Possibility”, Ratio, 17: 118–121. (Scholar)
- Casullo, Albert (1979). “Reid and Mill on Hume's Maxim of Conceivability”, Analysis, 39 (4): 212–219. (Scholar)
- Casullo, Albert (2000). “Modal Epistemology: Fortune or Virtue?”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 38 (Spindel Supplement): 17–25. (Scholar)
- Casullo, Albert (2005). “Knowledge and Modality”, In Donald M. Borchert (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed.), New York: Macmillan: 79–86. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, David (1996). The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, David (2002). “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility”, in J. Hawthorne & T. Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 145–200. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, David (2004). “Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics”, Philosophical Studies, 118 (1–2): 153–226. (Scholar)
- Cohnitz, Daniel (2003). “Modal Skepticism: Philosophical Thought Experiments and Modal Epistemology”, The Vienna Circle and Logical Empiricism — Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 2002, Dordrecht: Kluwer: 281–296. (Scholar)
- Davies, Martin and Humberstone, Lloyd (1980). “Two Notions of Necessity”, Philosophical Studies, 38: 1–30. (Scholar)
- Davies, Martin and Stoljar, Daniel (2004). “Introduction to The Two-Dimensional Framework and Applications: Metaphysics, Language, and Mind”, Philosophical Studies, 118 (1–2): 1–10. (Scholar)
- Descartes, Rene (1985). The Philosophical Writings of Rene Descartes Volume II, J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Della Rocca, Michael (2002). “Essentialism vs. Essentialism”, in J. Hawthorne & T. Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 223–252. (Scholar)
- Divers, John (1999). “Kant's Criteria of the A Priori”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 80: 17–45. (Scholar)
- Divers, John (2004). “Agnosticism About Other Worlds: A New Antirealist Programme in Modality”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 49: 659–84. (Scholar)
- Divers, John (2006). “Quinean Skepticism About De Re Modality After David Lewis”, European Journal of Philosophy, 14 (3): 40–62. (Scholar)
- Ellis, Brian (2002). The Philosophy of Nature: A Guide to the New Essentialism, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press. (Scholar)
- Fiocco, Marcello (2007a). “Conceivability, Imagination, and Modal Knowledge”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74 (2): 364–380. (Scholar)
- Fiocco, Marcello (2007b). “Conceivability and Epistemic Possibility”, Erkenntnis, 67 (3): 387–399. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit (1994). “Essence and Modality”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Garcia-Carpintero, M. & Macia, J. (2006). Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Geirsson, H. (2005). “Conceivability and Defeasible Modal Justification”, Philosophical Studies, 122 (3): 279–304. (Scholar)
- Gendler, T. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.) (2002). Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Grundmann, Thomas (2007). “The Nature of Rational Intuitions and a Fresh Look at the Explanationist Objection”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 74: 69–87. (Scholar)
- Gregory, Dominic (2004). “Imagining Possibilities”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69 (2): 327–348. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob (1997). “Absolute Necessities”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 271–308. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob (2003). “Knowledge of Possibility and of Necessity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 103: 1–20. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob (2004a). “The Source of Necessity”, Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 299–319. (Scholar)
- Hale, Bob (2004b). “Putnam's Retreat: Some reflections on Hilary Putnam's Changing Views about Metaphysical Necessity”, in Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 28: 321–79. (Scholar)
- Hanson, William (2006). “Actuality, Necessity, and Logical Truth”, Philosophical Studies, 130 (3): 437–459. (Scholar)
- Hill, Christopher (1997). “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem”, Philosophical Studies, 87: 61–85. (Scholar)
- Hill, Christopher (1998). “Chalmers on the a priority of modal knowledge”, Analysis, 58: 20–26. (Scholar)
- Hill, Christopher (2006). “Modality, Modal Epistemology, and the Metaphysics of Consciousness”, in S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–236. (Scholar)
- Hetherington, S.C. (1991). “Conceivability and Modal Knowledge”, In T. Horowitz (Ed.) Thought Experiments in Science and Philosophy, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield: 317–325. (Scholar)
- Hume, David (2000). A Treatise of Human Nature, David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ichikawa, Jonathan and Jarvis, Benjamin (2007). “Thought-experiment intuitions and truth in fiction”, Philosophical Studies, 142 (2): 221–246. (Scholar)
- Jones, J. (2004). “Illusory Possibilities and Imagining Counterparts”, Acta Analytica, 19 (32): 19–43. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, Frank (2004). “Why We Need A-Intensions”, Philosophical Studies, 118 (1-2): 257–277. (Scholar)
- Kail, P. (2003). “Conceivability and Modality in Hume: A Lemma in an Argument in Defense of Skeptical Realism”, Hume Studies, 29: 43–61. (Scholar)
- Kant, Immanuel (1999). Critique of Pure Reason, P. Guyer and A. Wood (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kment, Boris (2006a). “Counterfactuals and Explanation”, Mind, 115 (458): 261–310. (Scholar)
- Kment, Boris (2006b). “Counterfactuals and the Analysis of Necessity”, Philosophical Perspectives, 20: 237–302. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul (1959). “A Completeness Theorem in Modal Logic”, Journal of Symbolic Logic, 24 (1): 1–14. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul (1963). “Semantical Considerations in Modal Logic”, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 16: 83–94. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul (1971). “Identity and Necessity”, in M.K. Munitz (ed.), Identity and Individuation, New York: New York University Press, pp. 135–164. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul (1980). Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Levine, J. (1998). “Conceivability and the Metaphysics of Mind”, Noûs, 32 (4): 449–480. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David (1973). Counterfactuals, Oxford: Blackwell Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell Press. (Scholar)
- Lightner, T. (1997). “Hume on Conceivability and Inconceivability”, Hume Studies, 23 (1): 113–132. (Scholar)
- Linsky, Bernard, and Edward N. Zalta (1994). “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431–458. (Scholar)
- Linsky, Leonard (ed.), (1971), Reference and Modality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Machan, T. R. (1969). “Note on Conceivability And Logical Possibility”, Kinesis, 2: 39–42. (Scholar)
- Mackie, P. (2006). How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- MacPherson, B. (1997). “A Challenge to the Kripke/Putnam Distinction between Epistemic and Metaphysical Necessity”, Southwest Philosophy Review, 13 (2): 113–128. (Scholar)
- Manfredi, P. (2000). “The Compatability of A Priori Knowledge and Empirical Defeasibility: A Defense of a Modest a priori”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 38 (Spindel Supplement): 179–189. (Scholar)
- Marcus, E. (2004). “Why Zombies are Inconceivable”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 477–490. (Scholar)
- Marcus, R. B. (1983). “Rationality and Believing the Impossible”, Journal of Philosophy, 80 (6): 321–338. (Scholar)
- Marcus, R. B. (1993). Modalities: Philosophical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Massey, G. J. (1991). “Backdoor Analyticity”, in T. Horowitz (ed.), Thought Experiment in Science and Philosophy, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield: 285–296. (Scholar)
- McLeod, Stephen (2005). “Recent Work on Modal Epistemology”, Philosophical Books, 46: 235–245. (Scholar)
- Menzies, P. (1998). “Possibility and Conceivability: A Response-Dependent Account of Their Connections”, in R. Casati (ed.), European Review of Philosophy, 3: 255–277. (Scholar)
- Miscevic, N. (2000). “Intuition as a Second Window”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 38 (Spindel Supplement): 87–112. (Scholar)
- Miscevic, N. (2003). “Explaining Modal Intuition”, Acta Analytica, 18: 5–41. (Scholar)
- Murphy, P. (2006). “Reliability Connections Between Conceivability and Inconceivability”, Dialectica, 60: 195–205. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T. (1974). “What is it like to be a Bat?”, Philosophical Review, 83 (4): 435–450. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T. (1998). “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem”, Philosophy, 73: 337-352. (Scholar)
- Nichols, Shaun (2006a). “Imaginative Blocks and Impossibility: An Essay in Modal Psychology”, in S. Nichols (ed.), The Architecture of the Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 237–256. (Scholar)
- Nichols, Shaun (2006b). The Architecture of Imagination: New Essays on Pretence, Possibility and Fiction, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Nozick, Robert (2003). Invariances, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- O'Leary-Hawthorne, John (1996). “The epistemology of possible worlds: A guided tour”, Philosophical Studies, 84 (2–3): 183–202. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher (1985). “Imagination, Possibility, and Experience”, in J. Foster and H. Robinson (eds.), Essays on Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher (1997). “Metaphysical Necessity: Understanding, Truth and Epistemology”, Mind, 106: 521–74. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher (1998). Being Known, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher (2002a). “The Principle-Based Account of Modality: Elucidations and Resources”, in “A Symposium on Being Known” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXIV: 663–79. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher (2002b). “Principles of Possibilia”, Noûs, 36 (3): 486–508. (Scholar)
- Perry, J. (2003). Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness (Jean Nicod Lectures), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Prudovsky, G. (1995). “Arguments from Conceivability”, Ratio, 8 (1): 63–69. (Scholar)
- Poust, Joel (2004). “On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity”, Dialectica, 58 (1): 71–87. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary (1956). “Red, Green, and Logical Analysis”, Philosophical Review, 65 (2): 206–217. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary (1957). “Red and Green All Over Again: A Rejoinder to Arthur Pap”, Philosophical Review, 66 (1): 100–103. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary (1962a). “The Analytic and the Synthetic”, in H. Fiegel and G. Maxwell (eds.), Midwest Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 3: 358–397. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary (1962b). “It Ain't Necessarily So”, Journal of Philosophy, 59 (22): 658–671. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary (1975). “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in K. Gunderson (ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7: 131–193. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O. (1951). “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, Philosophical Review, 60 (1): 20–43. A revised version, published in 1961, is reprinted in W.V.O Quine, From a Logical Point of View, second revised edition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. [See this online transcript for the differences between the two versions.] (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O. (1961). “Reference and Modality”, in Linsky 1971, pp. 139–159. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, William & DePaul, M. (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. (Scholar)
- Salmon, Nathan (1981) Reference and Essence (2nd edition), Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. (Scholar)
- Salmon, Nathan (1989). The Logic of What Might Have Been, Philosophical Review, 98: 3–34. (Scholar)
- Shalkowski, Scott & Otavio Bueno (2004a). “Modal Realism and Modal Epistemology: A Huge Gap”, in Erik Weber & Tim De Mey (eds.), Modal Epistemology, Brussels: Koninklijke Vlaamse Academie van Belgie, pp. 93–106. (Scholar)
- Shalkowski, Scott (2004b). “Logic and Absolute Necessity”, The Journal of Philosophy, 101: 55–82. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney (1998). “Causal and Metaphysical Necessity”, Philosophical Quarterly, 79 (1): 59–77. (Scholar)
- Sidelle, Alan (1989). Necessity, Essence, and Individuation, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Simchen, Ori (2004). “On the Impossibility of Nonactual Epistemic Possibilities”, Journal of Philosophy, 103: 5–26. (Scholar)
- Soames, Scott (2005). Reference and Description, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Sorenson, Roy (2002). “The Art of the Impossible”, in J. Hawthorne & T. Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 337–368. (Scholar)
- Sorenson, Roy (2006). “Meta-conceivability and Thought Experiments”, In S. Nichols (Ed.) The Architecture of the Imagination, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257–272. (Scholar)
- Sosa, Ernest (1996). “Rational Intuition: Bealer on its Nature and Epistemic Status”, Philosophical Studies, 81: 151–162. (Scholar)
- Sosa, Ernest (2000). “Modal and other A Priori Epistemology: How Can We Know What is Possible and What is Impossible?”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 38 (Spindel Supplement): 3–16. (Scholar)
- Sosa, Ernest (2002). “Reliability and the A priori”, in J. Hawthorne & T. Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 385–400. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert (1968). “A Theory of Conditionals”, in N. Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory, Oxford: Blackwell Press, pp. 98–112. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert (2003). Ways a World Might Be: Metaphysical and Anti-Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, Scott (2006). “Modal Infallibilism & Basic Truth”, in F. Mcbride (ed.), Modality and Identity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 40–56. (Scholar)
- Tidman, Paul (1994a). “Conceivability as a test for Possibility”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 31: 297–309. (Scholar)
- Tidman, Paul (1994b). “Logic and Modal Intuitions”, The Monist, 77: 389–398. (Scholar)
- Tidman, Paul (1996). “The Justification of A Priori Intuitions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56 (1): 161–171. (Scholar)
- Tieszen, Rick (2002). “Godel and the Intuition of Concepts”, Synthese, 133 (33): 363–391. (Scholar)
- Vahid, H. (2006). “Conceivability and Possibility”, Philosophical Explorations, 9 (3): 243–260. (Scholar)
- van Cleve, J. (1983). “Conceivability and the Cartesian Argument for Dualism”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 34–45. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter (1998). “Modal Epistemology”, Philosophical Studies, 92: 67–84. (Scholar)
- van Woudenberg, Rene (2006). “Conceivability and Modal Knowledge”, Metaphilosophy, 37 (2): 210–221. (Scholar)
- Wiiliams, B. (2006). “Imagination and the Self”, in B. Williams (ed.), Problems of the Self (2nd edition), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 26–45. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy (2002). “Peacocke's Theory of Modality”, in “Symposium on Being Known”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64 (2): 650–655. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy (2005). “Armchair Philosophy: Metaphysical Modality and Counterfactual Thinking”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 105 (1): 1–23. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy (2007). “Philosophical Knowledge and Knowledge of Counterfactuals”, Grazer Philosophiche Studien, 74: 89–123. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy (2008). The Philosophy of Philosophy, Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Worley, Sara (2003). “Conceivability, possibility, and physicalism”, Analysis, 63: 15–23. (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin (1989). “Necessity, Caution, and Skepticism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LXIII: 203–38. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen (1993). Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 1–42. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen (2000). “Textbook Kripkeanism and the Open Texture of Concepts”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81 (1): 98–122. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen (2002). “Coulda, Woulda, Shoulda”, in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 441–492. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen (2006). “No Fools Cold: Notes on Illusions of Possibility”, in M. Garcia-Carpintero & J. Macia (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 327–346. (Scholar)
- Zalta, Edward N. (1988). “Logical and Analytic Truths That Are Not Necessary”, Journal of Philosophy, 85 (2): 57–74. (Scholar)
- Zalta, Edward N. (1993). “A Philosophical Conception of Propositional Modal Logic”, Philosophical Topics, 21 (2): 263–281. (Scholar)
- Zalta, Edward N. (2006a). “Essence and Modality”, Mind, 115 (459): 659–693. (Scholar)
- Zalta, Edward N. (2006b). “Deriving and Validating Kripkean Claims Using the Theory of Abstract Objects”, Noûs, 40 (4): 591–622. (Scholar)
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