Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Modularity of Mind" by Philip Robbins |
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Antony, L. M. (2003). Rabbit-pots and supernovas: On the relevance of psychological data to linguistic theory. In A. Barber, ed., Epistemology of Language (pp. 47–68). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Arbib, M. (1987). Modularity and interaction of brain regions underlying visuomotor coordination. In J. L. Garfield, ed., Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding (pp. 333–363). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ariew, A. (1999). Innateness is canalization: In defense of a developmental account of innateness. In V. G. Hardcastle, ed., Where Biology Meets Psychology (pp. 117–138). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Bargh, J. A. and Chartrand, T. L. (1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psychologist, 54, 462–479. (Scholar)
- Barrett, H. C. (2005). Enzymatic computation and cognitive modularity. Mind & Language, 20, 259–287. (Scholar)
- Barrett, H. C. and Kurzban, R. (2006). Modularity in cognition: Framing the debate. Psychological Review, 113, 628–647. (Scholar)
- Borg, E. (2004). Minimal Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Buller, D. (2005). Adapting Minds. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Buller, D. and Hardcastle, V. G. (2000). Evolutionary psychology, meet developmental neurobiology: Against promiscuous modularity. Brain and Mind, 1, 302–325. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, P. (2006). The Architecture of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P. (1988). Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality: A reply to Jerry Fodor. Philosophy of Science, 55, 167–187. (Scholar)
- Cosmides, L. and Tooby, J. (1992). Cognitive adaptations for social exchange. In J. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby, eds., The Adapted Mind (pp. 163–228). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cowie, F. (1999). What's Within? Nativism Reconsidered. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Currie, G. and Sterelny, K. (2000). How to think about the modularity of mind-reading. Philosophical Quarterly, 50, 145–160. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. A. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. A. (1984/1990). Observation reconsidered. Philosophy of Science, 51, 23–43. Reprinted in Fodor (1990), pp. 231–251. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. A. (1988/1990). A reply to Churchland's “Perceptual plasticity and theoretical neutrality.” Philosophy of Science, 55, 188–198. Reprinted in Fodor (1990), pp. 253–263. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. A. (1990). A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. A. (2000). The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Gallistel, R. (1990). The Organization of Learning. Cambridge, MA; MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. I. (2006). Simulating Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kurzban, R., Tooby, J., and Cosmides, L. (2001). Can race be erased? Coalitional computation and social categorization. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 98, 15387–15392. (Scholar)
- Machery, E. and Barrett, H. C. (2006). Debunking Adapting Minds. Philosophy of Science, 73, 232–246. (Scholar)
- Marslen-Wilson, W. and Tyler, L. K. (1987). Against modularity. In J. L. Garfield, ed., Modularity in Knowledge Representation and Natural-Language Understanding. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- McCauley, R. N. and Henrich, J. (2006). Susceptibility to the Müller-Lyer illusion, theory-neutral observation, and the diachronic penetrability of the visual input system. Philosophical Psychology, 19, 79–101. (Scholar)
- Pinker, S. (1997). How the Mind Works. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. (Scholar)
- Prinz, J. J. (2006). Is the mind really modular? In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (pp. 22–36). Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Pylyshyn, Z. (1984). Computation and Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ramus, F. (2006). Genes, brain, and cognition: A roadmap for the cognitive scientist. Cognition, 101, 247–269. (Scholar)
- Robbins, P. (2007). Minimalism and modularity. In G. Preyer and G. Peter, eds., Context-Sensitivity and Semantic Minimalism (pp. 303–319). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Rosch, E., Mervis, C., Gray, W., Johnson, D., and Boyes-Braem, P. (1976). Basic objects in natural categories. Cognitive Psychology, 8, 382–439. (Scholar)
- Samuels, R. (2000). Massively modular minds: Evolutionary psychology and cognitive architecture. In P. Carruthers and A. Chamberlain, eds., Evolution and the Human Mind (pp. 13–46). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Samuels, R. (2006). Is the human mind massively modular? In R. Stainton, ed., Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science (pp. 37–56). Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Scholl, B. J. and Leslie, A. M. (1999). Modularity, development and ‘theory of mind’. Mind & Language, 14, 131–153. (Scholar)
- Segal, G. (1996). The modularity of theory of mind. In P. Carruthers and P. K. Smith, eds., Theories of Theories of Mind (pp. 141–157). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Segall, M., Campbell, D. and Herskovits, M. J. (1966). The Influence of Culture on Visual Perception. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. (Scholar)
- Spelke, E. (1994). Initial knowledge: Six suggestions. Cognition, 50, 435–445. (Scholar)
- Sperber, D. (1994). The modularity of thought and the epidemiology of representations. In L. A. Hirschfeld and S. A. Gelman, eds., Mapping the Mind (pp. 39–67). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sperber, D. (2002). In defense of massive modularity. In I. Dupoux, ed., Language, Brain, and Cognitive Development (pp. 47–57). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Sperber, D. and Wilson, D. (2002). Pragmatics, modularity and mind-reading. Mind & Language, 17, 3-23. (Scholar)
- Stone, V. E., Cosmides, L., Tooby, J., Kroll, N., and Knight, R. T. (2002). Selective impairment of reasoning about social exchange in a patient with bilateral limbic system damage. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99, 11531–11536. (Scholar)
- Stromswold, K. (1999). Cognitive and neural aspects of language acquisition. In E. Lepore and Z. Pylyshyn, eds., What Is Cognitive Science? (pp. 356–400). Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Sugiyama, L. S., Tooby, J., and Cosmides, L. (2002). Cross-cultural evidence of cognitive adaptations for social exchange among the Shiwiar of Ecuadorian Amazonia. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 99, 11537–11542. (Scholar)
- Wilson, R. A. (2008). The drink you're having when you're not having a drink. Mind & Language, 23, 273–283. (Scholar)
Generated Mon May 13 00:39:22 2013
