Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Anti-Realism" by Richard Joyce |
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- Ayer, A.J. [1936] 1971. Language, Truth and Logic. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
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- Blackburn, S. 1993a. Essays in Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Blackburn, S. 1993b. “Circles, finks, smells and biconditionals.” Philosophical Perspectives 7: 259-279.
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- Brink, D. 1989. Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- Cuneo, T. 2001. “Are moral qualities response-dependent?” Nous 35: 569-591. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. 1991. Realism and Truth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
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- Dummett, M. 1978. Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
- Dummett, M. 1993. The Seas of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Firth, R. 1952. “Ethical absolutism and the ideal observer.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12: 317-345. (Scholar)
- Firth, R. 1954. “Reply to Professor Brandt.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 12: 414-421. (Scholar)
- Garner, R.T. 1990. “On the genuine queerness of moral properties and facts.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 137-146. (Scholar)
- Garner, R.T. 1994. Beyond Morality. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. (Scholar)
- Hägerström, A. 1953. Inquiries into the Nature of Law and Morals. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell. (Scholar)
- Haji, I. 1998. Moral Appraisability. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Haji, I. 2003. Deontic Morality and Control. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hare, R.M. 1952. The Language of Morals. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hare, R.M. 1963. Freedom and Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. 1975. “Moral relativism defended.” Philosophical Review 84: 3-22. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. 1977. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. 1986. “Moral explanations of natural facts: Can moral claims be tested against moral reality?” In N. Gillespie (ed.), Spindel Conference: Moral Realism. (The Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 24): 57-68. (Scholar)
- Harman, G. and Jarvis Thomson, J. 1996. Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Hinckfuss, I. 1987. “The moral society: Its structure and effects.” Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy 16. Philosophy Program (RSSS), Australian National University. (Scholar)
- Horowitz, T. 1998. “Philosophical intuitions and psychological theory.” In M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield: 143-160. (Scholar)
- Hume, D. [1751] 1983. An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett.
- Hussain, N.J.Z. 2004. “The return of moral fictionalism.” Philosophical Perspectives 18: 149-187. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford : Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M. 1989. “Dispositional theories of value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 62: 139-174. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M. 1991. “Explanation, response-dependence and judgement-dependence.” In P. Menzies (ed.), Response-Dependent Concepts. Working Papers in Philosophy: Philosophy Program (RSSS), Australian National University: 122-183. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M. 1992. “How to speak of the colors.” Philosophical Studies 68: 221-263. (Scholar)
- Johnston, M. 1993. “Objectivity refigured: Pragmatism without verificationism.” In J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 85-130. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R. 2001. The Myth of Morality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R. 2002. “Expressivism and motivation internalism,” Analysis 62: 336-344. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R. 2007. “Morality, schmorality.” In P. Bloomfield (ed.) Morality and Self-Interest. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R. Forthcoming. “Is moral projectivism empirically tractable?” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. (Scholar)
- Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. 1979. “Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk.” Econometrica 47: 263-291. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D.K. [1989] 2000. “Dispositional theories of value.” In his Papers in Ethics and Social Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 68-94.
- Lewis, D.K. 2005. “Quasi-realism is fictionalism.” In M. Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Lillehammer, H. 2004. “Moral error theory.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 93-109. (Scholar)
- Loeb, D. 1998. “Moral realism and the argument from disagreement.” Philosophical Studies 90: 281-303. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L. 1977. Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong. Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L. 1982. The Miracle of Theism. Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J. 1985. “Values and secondary qualities.” In T. Honderich (ed.), Objectivity and Morality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul: 110-129. (Scholar)
- McNaughton, D. 1988. Moral Vision. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Miller, A. 2003. An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics. Cambridge: Polity. (Scholar)
- Pettit, P. 1991. “Realism and response-dependence.” Mind 100: 587-626. (Scholar)
- Price, H. 1991. “Two paths to pragmatism.” In P. Menzies (ed.), Response-Dependent Concepts. Working Papers in Philosophy: Philosophy Program (RSSS), Australian National University: 46-82. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H. 1987. The Many Faces of Realism. La Salle, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
- Rawls, J. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, MA: Belknap. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G. 1994. “Objectivity and modern idealism: What is the question?” In M. Michael and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.) Philosophy In Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer: 277-319. (Scholar)
- Satris, S. 1987. Ethical Emotivism. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff. (Scholar)
- Sayre-McCord, G. 1986. “The many moral realisms.” Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 24: 1-22. (Scholar)
- Searle, J. 1969. Speech Acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Shafer-Landau, R. 1994. “Ethical disagreement, ethical objectivism and moral indeterminacy.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 331-344. (Scholar)
- Smith, G. 1980. Atheism: The Case Against God. Buffalo NY: Prometheus. (Scholar)
- Smith, M. 1989. “Dispositional theories of value.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 62: 89-111. (Scholar)
- Smith, M. 1993. “Objectivity and moral realism: On the significance of the phenomenology of moral experience.” In J. Haldane and C. Wright (eds.) Reality, Representation, and Projection. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 235-55. (Scholar)
- Smith, M. 1994a. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smith, M. 1994b. “Why expressivists about value should love minimalism about truth.” Analysis 54: 1-12.
- Stevenson, C.L. 1944. Ethics and Language. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Stevenson, C.L. 1963. Facts and Values. New Haven CT: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P.F. 1956. “On referring.” In A. Flew (ed.), Essays in Conceptual Analysis. London: MacMillan: 21-52. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, N.L. 1985. “Moral explanations.” In D. Copp & D. Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason and Truth. Totowa NJ: Rowman & Allanheld: 49-78. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, N.L. 1986. “Harman on moral explanations of natural facts.” In N. Gillespie (ed.), Spindel Conference: Moral Realism. (The Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 24): 69-78. (Scholar)
- Tersman, F. 2006. Moral Disagreement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D. 1987. “A sensible subjectivism?” In his Needs, Values and Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 185-214.
- Williams, B. 1981. “Internal and external reasons.” In his Moral Luck. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 101-113. (Scholar)
- Wong, D.B. 2006. Natural Moralities: A Defense of Pluralistic Relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wright, C. 1988a. “Realism, antirealism, irrealism, quasi-realism.” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12: Realism and Antirealism: 25-49.
- Wright, C. 1988b. “Moral values, projections, and secondary qualities.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. vol. 62: 1‑26.
- Wright, C. 1992. Truth and Objectivity. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Zangwill, N. 2003. “Against moral response-dependence.” Erkenntnis 59: 285-290. (Scholar)
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