Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism" by Mark van Roojen |
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Ayer, A.J., 1952, Language, Truth and Logic, New York: Dover Publications, first Dover edition. (Scholar)
- Barker, S., 2000, “Is value content a component of conventional implicature?” Analysis, 60: 268–79. (Scholar)
- Barnes, W. H F., 1933, “A suggestion About Value,” Analysis, 1: 45–46. (Scholar)
- Björnsson, G., 2001, “Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency,” Philosophical Studies, 104: 81–108. (Scholar)
- Blackburn, S., 1971, “Moral Realism.” in Casey 1971, 101–124. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, Spreading the Word, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, “Errors in the Phenomenology of Value,” in Honderich 1985, 1–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988a, “Supervenience Revisited,” in Sayre-McCord 1988, 59-75. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988b, “Attitudes and Contents,” Ethics, 98: 501–17. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, Essays in Quasi-Realism, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Ruling Passions, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P., 1990, “The Status of Content,” Philosophical Review, 99: 157–184. (Scholar)
- Boisvert, D., 2008, “Expressive-Assertivism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 89(2): 169-203. (Scholar)
- Boyd, R, 1988, “How to be a Moral Realist,” in Sayre-McCord 1988a, 181–228. (Scholar)
- Brighouse, M. H., 1990, “Blackburn's Projectivism — An Objection,” Philosophical Studies, 59: 225–33. (Scholar)
- Brink, D., 1986, “Externalist Moral Realism,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 24 (Supplement): 23–42. (Scholar)
- Broome, J., 1991, Weighing Goods, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Carnap, R., 1937, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.. (Scholar)
- Casey, J., 1971, Morality and Moral Reasoning, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
- Copp, D., 2001, “Realist Expressivism — A Neglected Option for Moral Realism,”Social Philosophy and Policy, 18: 1–43. (Scholar)
- Dancy, J., 1996, “Real Values in a Humean Context.” Ratio, 9: 171–183. (Scholar)
- Darwall, S., 1983, Impartial Reason, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality,” in Darwall, Gibbard, & Railton (eds.) 1997, 305–312. (Scholar)
- Darwall, S., Gibbard, A. and Railton, P., 1997, Moral Discourse and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Divers, J. & Miller, A., 1994, “Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth,” Analysis, 54: 12–19. (Scholar)
- Dorr, C., 2002, “Noncognitivism and Wishful Thinking,” Nous, 36: 97–103. (Scholar)
- Dreier, J., 1990, “Internalism and Speaker Relativism,” Ethics, 101: 6–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 30: 13–38. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996a. “Expressivist Embeddings and Minimal Truth,”Philosophical Studies, 83: 29–51. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996b. “Accepting Agent-Centered Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 409–22. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998. “A Defense of Expressivism Against an Interesting Objection” abstract in The Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association. 71: 85. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999. “Transforming Expressivism,” Nous, 33: 558–572. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Lockean and logical truth conditions,” Analysis, 64: 84–91. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006. “Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for their Solution,” in Shafer-Landau 2006a, 217-234. (Scholar)
- Firth, R., 1952, “Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 12: 317–345. (Scholar)
- Foot, P., 1958–9, “Moral Beliefs.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 59: 83–104. Reprinted in Foot 1978, 110–131. (Scholar)
- –––, 1972, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives.” Reprinted in Foot 1978, 157–174. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, Virtues and Vices, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Frankena, W., 1939, “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind, 48: 464–477. (Scholar)
- Geach, P. T., 1957–8, “Imperative and Deontic Logic,” in Analysis, 18: 49–56. (Scholar)
- –––, 1960, “Ascriptivism,” Philosophical Revie, 69: 221–225. (Scholar)
- –––, 1965, “Assertion” in Philosophical Review, 74: 449–465. (Scholar)
- Gert, J., 2002, “Expressivism and Language Learning” in Ethics, 102: 292–314. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Normative Concepts and Recognitional Concepts,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 64: 151–162. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003. Thinking How to Live, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. & Kim, J., 1978, Values and Morals, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
- Haldane, J. & Wright, C., 1993, Reality, Representation and Projection, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hale, B., 1986, “The Compleat Projectivist,” Philosophical Quarterly, 36: 65–84. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Can There Be a Logic of Attitudes,” in Haldane & Wright 1993, 337–363. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Can Arborial Knotwork Help Blackburn out of Frege's Abyss,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 144–149. (Scholar)
- Hare, R. M., 1952, The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- –––, 1963, Freedom and Reason, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1978, “What is Moral Relativism?” in Goldman & Kim 1978, 143–161. (Scholar)
- Holtzman, S. & Leich, C., 1981, Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Honderich, T., 1985, Morality and Objectivity, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. & Timmons, M., 1992, “Troubles For New Wave Moral Semantics: The ‘Open Question Argument’ Revived,” Philosophical Papers, 21: 153–175. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic,” Philosophical Papers, 29: 121–153. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006a, Metaethics After Moore, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Cognitivist Expressivism,” in Horgan & Timmons, 2006a, 255–298. (Scholar)
- Horwich, P., 1990, Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Gibbard's Theory of Norms,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 22: 67–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “The Essence of Expressivism,” Analysis, 54: 19–20. (Scholar)
- Humberstone, L., 1996, “A study in philosophical taxonomy,” Philosophical Studies, 83: 121–169.
- Hume, D., 1888, Treatise of Human Nature, L.A. Selby-Bigge (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1999, “Non-Cognitivism, Validity and Conditionals,” in Jamieson 1999, 18–37. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F. and Pettit, P., 1995, “Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 20–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “A Problem for Expressivism,” Analysis, 58: 239–51. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., Oppy, G, and Smith, M., 1994, “Minimalism and Truth Aptness,” Mind, 103: 287–302. (Scholar)
- Jamieson, D., 1999, Singer and His Critics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Joyce, R., 2002, “Expressivism and motivational internalism,” Analysis, 62: 336–343. (Scholar)
- Kalderon, M. E., 2005. Moral Fictionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C., 1986, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” Journal of Philosophy, 83: 5–25. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1972, “Naming and Necessity,” in Semantics of Natural Language, edited by D. Davidson and G. Harman. (Dordrecht: Boston: Reidel): 253–355, reprinted in 1980 as Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). (Scholar)
- Lenman, J., 2003, “Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66: 32–57. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. K., 1989, “Dispositional Theories of Value,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63 (Supplement): 113–137. (Scholar)
- MacIntyre, A., 1981, After Virtue, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, New York: Penguin. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1981, “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following,” in Holtzman and Leich 1981, 141–172. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E., 1903, Principia Ethica, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1942, “A Reply to My Critics,” in Schilpp 1942, 533–678. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Ogden, C. K. and Richards, I. A., 1923, The Meaning of Meaning, New York: Harcourt Brace & Jovanovich. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1975a, “The Meaning of Meaning,” in Putnam 1975b, 215–271. (Scholar)
- –––, 1975b, Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Railton, P., 1986, “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review, 95: 163–207. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, F., 1927, “Facts and Propositions,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 7 (Supplement): 153–170. (Scholar)
- Ridge, M., 2006a,“Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege,” Ethics, 116/2: 302–336. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds?” in Shafer-Landau 2006b, 302-336. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G., 1998, “Blackburn's Essays in Quasi-Realism,” Nous, 32: 386–405. (Scholar)
- Ross, W.D., 1930, The Right and The Good, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sayre-McCord, G. (ed.), 1988a, Essays on Moral Realism, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Schilpp, P.A., (ed.) 1942, The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, The Library of Living Philosophers, Evanston: Northwestern University. (Scholar)
- Schroeder, M., 2008a, “Expression For Expressivists,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76(1): 86-116. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “How Expressivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem With Negation,” Noûs, 42(4): 573-599. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008c, Being For, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schueler, G. F., 1988, “Modus Ponens and Moral Realism,” Ethics, 98: 492–500. (Scholar)
- Searle, J., 1962, “Meaning and Speech Acts,” Philosophical Review, 71: 423–32. (Scholar)
- –––, 1964, “How To Derive ‘Ought’ From ‘Is’,” Philosophical Review, 73: 43–58. (Scholar)
- –––, 1969, Speech Acts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Shafer-Landau, R., 2006a, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 2000, “Expressivism and Embedding,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61/3: 677–93. (Scholar)
- Smith, M., 1987, “The Humean Theory of Motivation,” Mind, 96: 36–61. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994a, The Moral Problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994b. “Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth,” Analysis, 54: 1–11. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994c. “Minimalism Truth-Aptitude and Belief.” Analysis, 54: 21–26. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. “Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 5: 305–320. (Scholar)
- Stevenson, C., 1937, “The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms,” Mind, 46: 14–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 1944, Ethics and Language, New Haven and London: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Stoljar, D., 1993, “Emotivism and Truth Conditions,” Philosophical Studies, 70: 81–101. (Scholar)
- Timmons, M., 1999, Morality Without Foundations, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Unwin, N. 1999, “Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem,” Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 337–352. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic,” Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 60–75. (Scholar)
- van Roojen, M., 1996, “Expressivism and Irrationality,” Philosophical Review, 105: 311–355. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic,” Ratio, 18: 190–205. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., 1993, “Realism, The Contemporary Debate — Whither Now?” in Haldane and Wright 1993, 63–84. (Scholar)
- Zangwill, N., 1992, “Moral Modus Ponens,” Ratio, 2: 177–93. (Scholar)
Generated Fri May 3 22:46:56 2013
