Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Particularism" by Jonathan Dancy |
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- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.
- Audi, R., 1998, ‘Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgement’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 1: 15–44 (especially pp. 36–41). (Scholar)
- Blackburn, S., 1992, ‘Through Thick and Thin’, Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume) 66: 285–299. (Scholar)
- Broad, C. D., 1930, Five Types of Ethical Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Crisp, R., 2000, ‘Particularizing Particularism’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 23–47. (Scholar)
- Dancy, J., 1981, ‘On Moral Properties’, Mind, 90: 367–85. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, ‘Intuitionism in Meta-epistemology’, Philosophical Studies, 42: 395–408. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, ‘Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties’, Mind, 92: 530–47. (Scholar)
- –––, 1985, ‘The Role of Imaginary Cases in Ethics’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 66: 141–53. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, Moral Reasons, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000a,‘The Particularist's Progress’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 130–56. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Ethics without Principles, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Dworkin, G., 1995, ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy (Volume 20: Moral Concepts), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 224–39. (Scholar)
- Frazier, R., 1995, ‘Moral Relevance and Ceteris Paribus Principles’, Ratio, 8: 113–27. (Scholar)
- Garfield, J., 2000, ‘Particularity and Principle: The Structure of Moral Knowledge’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 178–204. (Scholar)
- Gert B., 1998, Morality: Its Nature and Justification, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hooker, B. W., 2000, ‘Moral Particularism — Wrong and Bad’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 1–23. (Scholar)
- –––, and Little, M. (eds.), 2000, Moral Particularism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., Pettit, P., and Smith, M., 2000, ‘Ethical Particularism and Patterns’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 79–99. (Scholar)
- Jonsen, A. R. and Toulmin, S., 1988, The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Kagan, S., 1988, ‘The Additive Fallacy’, Ethics, 99: 5–31. (Scholar)
- Lance M., Potrč, M. and Strahovnik, V. (eds.), 2008, Challenging Moral Particularism, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Lance, M. and Little, M., 2007, ‘Where the Laws Are’, in R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics (Volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 149–71. (Scholar)
- Little, M., 2000, ‘Moral Generalities Revisited’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 276–304. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, ‘Wittgensteinian Lessons on Particularism’, in Carl Elliot (ed.), Wittgensteinian Bioethics, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp. 161–80 (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, ‘Moral Realism: Non-Naturalism’, Philosophical Books, 35: 225–32. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, ‘Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology’, Hypatia 10: 117–37. (Scholar)
- McDowell, J., 1979, ‘Virtue and Reason’, The Monist, 62: 331–50. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, ‘Non-cognitivism and Rule-following’, in S. Holtzman and C. Leich (eds), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, pp. 141–62; reprinted in McDowell 1998, pp. 98–218. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- McKeever, S. and Ridge, M., 2005, ‘What does Holism have to do with Particularism?’, Ratio, 18: 93–103. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- McNaughton, D. A., 1988, Moral Vision, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, ‘An Unconnected Heap of Duties?’, Philosophical Quarterly, 46: 433–47. (Scholar)
- McNaughton, D. A. and Rawling, P., 2000, ‘Unprincipled Ethics’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 256–75. (Scholar)
- Moore, G. E., 1903, Principia Ethica, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Murdoch, I., 1970, The Sovereignty of Good, Oxford: Blackwell (especially pp. 32–3, 44). (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M., 1990, Love's Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- O'Neill, O., 1996, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Reconstructive Account of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Philips, M., 1987, ‘Weighing Moral Reasons’, Mind, 96: 367–76. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 2000, ‘The Truth in Particularism’, in Hooker and Little 2000, pp. 48–78. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 2006, ‘The Trouble with Particularism (Dancy's Version)’, Mind, 115: 99–120. (Scholar)
- Richardson, H. S., 1990, ‘Specifying Norms’, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19: 279–310. (Scholar)
- Ross, W. D., 1930, The Right and the Good, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1939, Foundations of Ethics, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Scanlon, T. M., 1998, What We Owe Each Other, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, S., 1987, ‘Morality through Thick and Thin’, Philosophical Review, 96: 411–34. (Scholar)
- Shafer-Landau, R., 1997, ‘Moral Rules’, Ethics, 107: 584–611. (Scholar)
- Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 1999, ‘Some Varieties of Particularism’, Metaphilosophy, 30: 1–12. (Scholar)
- Stratton-Lake, P. J., 2000, Kant, Duty, and Moral Worth, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Tännsjö, T., 1995, ‘In Defence of Theory in Ethics’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 25: 571–94. (Scholar)
- Walker, M. U., 1997, Moral Understandings, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Wallace, J., 1996, Ethical Norms, Particular Cases, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, D., 1976a, ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 76: 29–51; reprinted in Wiggins 1987, pp. 215–37. (Scholar)
- –––, 1976b, ‘Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life’, Proceedings of the British Academy, 62: 331–78; reprinted in Wiggins's 1987, pp. 87–137. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Needs, Values, Truth, Oxford, Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
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