Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Multiple Realizability" by John Bickle |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Aizawa, Kenneth, 2007. “The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: Model Systems for the Philosophy of Mind,” Synthese, 155: 65–98 (Scholar)
- Aizwa, Kenneth, 2008. “Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale,” Synthese, 167, 495–510. (Scholar)
- Aizawa, Kenneth, forthcoming. “Multiple Realizability by Compensatory Differences,” European Journal for Philosophy of Science, DOI:10.1007/s13194-012-0058-6. (Scholar)
- Aizawa, Kenneth and Carl Gillett, 2009a. “The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences,” Mind and Language, 24: 181–208. (Scholar)
- Aizawa, Kenneth and Carl Gillett, 2009b. “Levels, Individual Variation, and Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology,” in J. Bickle (Ed.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience, New York: Oxford University Press, 529–581. (Scholar)
- Aizawa, Kenneth and Carl Gillett, 2011. “The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience,” in P.M. Illari, F. Russo, and J. Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences, New York: Oxford University Press, 203–223. (Scholar)
- Antony, Louise and Joseph Levine, 1997. “Reduction With Autonomy,” in Tomberlin 1997, 83–106 (Scholar)
- Bechtel, William and Robert McCauley, 1999. “Heuristic Identity Theory (or Back to the Future): the Mind-Body Problem Against the Background of Research Strategies in Cognitive Neuroscience,” Proceedings of the 21st Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (Scholar)
- Bechtel, William and Jennifer Mundale, 1999. “Multiple Realizability Revisited: Linking Cognitive and Neural States,” Philosophy of Science, 66: 175–207. (Scholar)
- Bickle, John, 1998. Psychoneural Reduction: The New Wave, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Bickle, John, 2003. Philosophy and Neuroscience: A Ruthlessly Reductive Account, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Bickle, John, 2010. “Has the Last Decade of Challenges to the Multiple Realization Argument Given Aid and Comfort to Psychoneural Reductionists,” Synthese, 177: 247–260. (Scholar)
- Block, Ned, 1978. “Troubles With Functionalism,” In. C.W. Savage (ed.), Perception and Cognition: Issues in the Foundations of Psychology. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. 9. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 261–325. (Scholar)
- Block, Ned, 1997. “Anti-Reductionism Slaps Back,” in Tomberlin 1997, 107–132. (Scholar)
- Block, Ned and Jerry Fodor, 1972 “What Psychological States Are Not,” Philosophical Review, 81: 159–181. (Scholar)
- Churchland, Patricia, 1986. Neurophilosophy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Churchland, Paul, 1982. “Is Thinker a Natural Kind?” Dialogue, 21: 223–238 (Scholar)
- Couch, Mark, 2004. “Discussion: A Defense of Bechtel and Mundale,” Philosophy of Science, 71: 198–204. (Scholar)
- Dubnau, Josh and Tom Tully, 1998. “Gene Discovery in Drosophila: New Insights for Learning and Memory,” Annual Review of Neuroscience, 21: 407–444. (Scholar)
- Enç, Berent, 1983. “In Defense of the Identity Theory,” Journal of Philosophy, 80, 279–298. (Scholar)
- Endicott, Ronald, 1993. “Species-Specific Properties and More Narrow Reductive Strategies,” Erkenntnis, 38: 303–321. (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry, 1974. “Special Sciences: Or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis,” Synthese, 28: 97–115 (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry, 1975. The Language of Thought, New York: Thomas Crowell. (Scholar)
- Fodor, Jerry, 1997. “Special Sciences: Still Autonomous After All These Years,” in Tomberlin 1997, 149–164 (Scholar)
- Gillett, Carl, 2002. “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View,” Analysis, 62: 316–323. (Scholar)
- Gillett, Carl, 2003. “The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realization and the Special Sciences,” Journal of Philosophy, 100: 591–603 (Scholar)
- Gozzano, Simone and Christopher S. Hill, eds. (2012). New Pwerspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hooker, Clifford, 1981. “Towards a General Theory of Reduction. Part III: Cross-Categorial Reductions,” Dialogue, 20: 496–529. (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terence, 1993. “Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology,” in S. Wagner and R. Warner (eds.), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal, Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 295–320. (Scholar)
- Kim, Jaegwon, 1989. “The Myth of Nonreductive Physicalism,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 63: 31–47. (Scholar)
- Kim, Jaegwon, 1992. “Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 1–26. (Scholar)
- Klein, Colin, 2008. “An Ideal Solution to Disputes About Multiply Realized Kinds,” Philosophical Studies, 140: 161–177. (Scholar)
- LePore, Ernest and Barry Loewer, 1989. “More on Making Mind Matter,” Philosophical Topics, 17: 175–191. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1969. “Review of Art, Mind, and Religion,” Journal of Philosophy, 66: 23–35. (Scholar)
- Nagel, Ernest, 1961. The Structure of Science, New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World. (Scholar)
- Polger, Thomas, 2004. Natural Minds, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Polger, Thomas, 2009. “Evaluating the Evidence for Multiple Realization,” Synthese, 167: 457–472. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1967. “Psychological Predicates,” in W.H. Capitan and D.D. Merrill (eds.), Art, Mind, and Religion, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 37–48. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1988. Representation and Reality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Pylyshyn, Zenon, 1984. Computation and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Richardson, Robert, 1979. “Functionalism and Reductionism,” Philosophy of Science, 46: 533–558. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Lawrence, 2000. “Multiple Realizations,” Journal of Philosophy, 97: 635–654. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Lawrence, 2008. “How to Test for Multiple Realization,” Philosophy of Science, 75: 514–525. (Scholar)
- Shapiro, Lawrence and Thomas Polger, 2012. “Identity, Variability, and Multiple Realization in the Special Sciences,” In Gozzano and Hill, 264–286. (Scholar)
- Sharma, Jitendra, Alessandra Angelucci, and Mriganka Sur, 2000. “Induction of Visual Orientation Modules in Auditory Cortex,” Nature, 404: 841–847. (Scholar)
- Sober, Elliott, 1999. “The Multiple Realizability Argument Against Reductionism,” Philosophy of Science, 66: 542–564. (Scholar)
- Tomberlin, James (ed.), (1997). Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, Boston: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Witmer, Gene, 2003. “Multiple Realizability and Psychological Laws: Evaluating Kim's Challenge,” in S. Walter and H. Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation, Charlottesville, VA: Imprint Academic, 59–84. (Scholar)
- Zangwill, Nick, 1992. “Variable Reduction Not Proven.” Philosophical Quarterly, 42: 214–218 (Scholar)
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