Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Nominalism in Metaphysics" by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Alston, W., 1958, “Ontological Commitments”, Philosophical Studies, 9: 8–17. (Scholar)
- Adams, R. M., 1974, “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs, 8: 211–31. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism, vols. I and II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1986, “In defence of structural universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 85–88. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1989, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M, 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Balaguer, M., 1998, “Attitudes Without Propositions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58: 805–26. (Scholar)
- Balaguer, M., 2004, “Platonism in Metaphysics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2004 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2004/entries/platonism/> (Scholar)
- Bealer, G., 2006, “Universals and the Defense of Ante Rem Realism”, in Universals, Concepts and Qualities. New Essays on the Meaning of Predicates, P. F. Strawson and A. Chakrabarti (eds), Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, pp. 225–238. (Scholar)
- Benacerraf, P., 1973, “Mathematical Truth”, The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661–79. (Scholar)
- Bradley, F. H., 1893, Appearance and Reality, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Burgess, J. and Rosen, G., 1997, A Subject with no Object, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Campbell, K., 1990, Abstract Particulars. Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Cresswell, M., 1972, “The World is Everything That is the Case”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 50: 1–13; page reference is to the reprint in Loux, M., 1976. (Scholar)
- Daly, C., 1997, “Tropes”, Properties, D. H. Mellor and A. Oliver (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 140–59. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M., 1980, ‘“Ostrich Nominalism” or “Mirage Realism”?’, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 61: 433–9; page reference is to the reprint in Mellor, D. H. and Oliver, A. (eds.) 1997. (Scholar)
- Dummett, M., 1973, Frege. Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1980, Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Field, H., 1989, Realism, Mathematics & Modality, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Forrest, P., 1986a, “Ways Worlds Could Be”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 15–24. (Scholar)
- Forrest, P., 1986b, “Neither Magic nor Mereology”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 89–91. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1972, “A World of Individuals”, in his Problems and Projects, Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., pp. 155–72. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1986, “Nominalisms”, in The Philosophy of W. V. Quine, L. E. Hahn and P. A. Schilpp (eds.), Open Court: La Salle, Illinois, pp. 159–61. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N. and Quine, W. V. O., 1947, “Steps Toward a Constructive Nominalism”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12: 105–22. (Scholar)
- Hale, B., 1987, Abstract Objects. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Keinänen, M., 2005, Trope Theories and the Problem of Universals, Helsinki: University of Helsinki Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1983, “New Work for a Theory of Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–77. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1986a, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1986b, “Against Structured Universals”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. (Scholar)
- Linsky, B. and Zalta, E., 1994, “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431–458. (Scholar)
- Loux, M., 1976, The Possible and the Actual, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Loux, M., 1998, Metaphysics. Contemporary Introduction, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 1995, “The Metaphysics of Abstract Objects”, The Journal of Philosophy, 92: 509–524. (Scholar)
- Maddy, P., 1990, Realism in Mathematics. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Maurin, A-S., 2002, If Tropes, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. (Scholar)
- Mellor, D. H. and Oliver, A. (eds.) 1997, Properties, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 2003a, “Actualism and Possible Worlds”, in his Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, edited by Matthew Davidson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 103–21. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, A., 2003b, “ Two Concepts of Modality: Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism”, in his Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, edited by Matthew Davidson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 192–228. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V. O., 1947, “On Universals”, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12: 74–84. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V. O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V. O., 1964, “On What There Is”, in his From a Logical Point of View, Second edition, revised, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 1–19. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V. O., 1969, “Propositional Objects”, in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 139–60. (Scholar)
- Quine, W. V. O., 1981, “Things and Their Place in Theories”, in his Theories and Things, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, pp. 1–23. (Scholar)
- Ramsey, F. P., 1925, “Universals”, Mind, 34: 401–417. (Scholar)
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 2002, Resemblance Nominalism. A solution to the problem of universals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Rodriguez-Pereyra, G., 2004, “Modal Realism and Metaphysical Nihilism”, Mind, 113: 683–704. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G., 1990, “Modal Fictionalism”, Mind, 99: 327–354. (Scholar)
- Rosen, G., 2001, “Abstract Objects”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2006 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2006/entries/abstract-objects/> (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, I., 1954, “An inscriptional approach to indirect quotation”, Analysis, 14: 83–90. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, I., 1958, “Inscriptionalism and indirect quotation”, Analysis, 19: 12–18. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R. 1987. Inquiry, Cambridge, MA, London, England: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R., 2003, Ways a World Might Be, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, D. C. 1953, “On the Elements of Being: I”, Review of Metaphysics, 7: 3–18. (Scholar)
- Zalta, E., 1983, Abstract Objects, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster: D. Reidel Publishing Company. (Scholar)
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