Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Disjunctive Theory of Perception" by Matthew Soteriou |
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- Austin, J.L., 1962, Sense and Sensibilia, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Brewer, Bill, 2000, Perception and Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Realism and the Nature of Perceptual Experience”, Philosophical Issues, 14(1): 61–77. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Perception and Content”, European Journal of Philosophy, 14(2): 165–181. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “How to Account for Illusion”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 168–180. (Scholar)
- Burge, Tyler, 1983, “Russell's Problem and Intentional Identity”, in Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World, James E. Tomberlin (ed.). Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, pp. 79–110. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Vision and Intentional Content”, in John Searle and his Critics, E. LePore and R. Van Gulick (eds.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 195–213. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology”, Philosophical Topics, 33: 1–78. (Scholar)
- Byrne, Alex, 2001, “Intentionalism Defended”, Philosophical Review, 110: 199–240. (Scholar)
- Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather, 2008, “Either/Or”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 57–94. (Scholar)
- Byrne, Alex and Logue, Heather (eds.), 2009, Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Campbell, J., 2002a, Reference and Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b, “Berkeley's Puzzle”, in Conceivability and Possibility, Tamar Szabo Gendler and John O'Leary Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 127–144. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Précis of Reference and Consciousness, and Replies to Neil Manson and Georges Rey”, Philosophical Studies, 126: 103–114, 145–153, 155–162. (Scholar)
- Cassam, Q., forthcoming, “Tackling Berkeley's Puzzle”, in Understanding Perception, Causation and Objectivity, N. Eilan, H. Lerman and J. Roessler (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Child, William, 1992, “Vision and Experience: The Causal Theory and the Disjunctive Conception”, Philosophical Quarterly, 42(168): 297–316. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Causality, Interpretation and the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Currie, G., and Ravenscroft, I., 2002, Recreative Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dancy, Jonathan, 1995, “Arguments from Illusion”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 45: 421–38. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “On How to Act—Disjunctively”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 262–282. (Scholar)
- Davies, M., 1992, “Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 92: 21–45. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Evans, Gareth, 1981, “Understanding Demonstratives”, in Meaning and Understanding, H. Parret and J. Bouveresse (eds.), Berlin: W. de Gruyter, pp. 291–321. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Farkas, K., 2006, “Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 106: 39–59. (Scholar)
- Fish, William C., 2008, “Disjunctivism, Indistinguishability, and the Nature of Hallucination”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 144–167. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, Alvin, 1979, “What is Justified Belief?”, in Justification and Knowledge, George Pappas (ed.), Dordrecht: Reidel, pp. 1–23. (Scholar)
- Grice, H.P., 1961, “The Causal Theory of Perception”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 35: 121–52. (Scholar)
- Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona, 2008a, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona, 2008b, “Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–24. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, in Philosophical Perspectives, 4, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, pp. 31–52. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John and Kovakovich, Karson, 2006, “Disjunctivism”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 80: 145–183. (Scholar)
- Hellie, Benj, 2007, “Factive Phenomenal Characters”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21: 259–306. (Scholar)
- Hinton, J.M., 1967a, “Visual Experiences”, Mind, 76(April): 217–227. (Scholar)
- –––, 1967b, “Experiences”, Philosophical Quarterly, 17: 1–13. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, Experiences: An Inquiry into Some Ambiguities, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980, “Phenomenological Specimenism”, Analysis, 40(January): 37–41. (Scholar)
- Hornsby, J. 2008, “A Disjunctive Conception of Acting for Reasons”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 244–261. (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 2004, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination”, Philosophical Studies, 103: 113–83. (Scholar)
- Langsam, Harold, 1997, “The Theory of Appearing Defended”, Philosophical Studies, 120: 33–59. (Scholar)
- Loar, Brian, 2002, “Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia”, in Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, A. Jokic and Q. Smith (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 77–96. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 2008, “Against Disjunctivism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 95–111. (Scholar)
- Martin, M.G.F., 1997, “The Reality of Appearances”, in Thought and Ontology, M. Sainsbury (ed.), Milan: Franco Angeli, pp. 77–96. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Setting Things Before the Mind”, in Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, A. O'Hear (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 157–179. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Out of the Past: episodic recall as retained acquaintance”, in Time and Memory, C. Hoerl and T. McCormack (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 257–284. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “The Transparency of Experience”, Mind and Language, 17: 376–425. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought”, Thought and Language, in A. O'Hear (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 173–214. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, Philosophical Studies, 120: 37–89. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “On Being Alienated”, in Perceptual Experience, Tamar S. Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 354–410. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy, 68: 455–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “De Re Senses”, Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 325–363; also in Frege: Tradition and Influence, C. Wright (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 98–109. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, in Subject, Thought and Context, Pettit and McDowell (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 137–168. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 376–389. (Scholar)
- McGinn, Colin, 1982, The Character of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Millar, Alan, 1996, “The Idea of Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 97: 75–90. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “What the Disjunctivist is Right About”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1): 176–198. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Perceptual-recognitional Abilities and Perceptual Knowledge”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 330–347. (Scholar)
- Neta, Ram, 2008, “In Defence of Disjunctivism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 311–329. (Scholar)
- Noordhof, P., 2002, “Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences”, Mind and Language, 17: 426–455. (Scholar)
- Nudds, M., 2009, “Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents”, Analysis, 69: 334–346. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher, 1985, “Imagination, Experience and Possibility”, in Essays on Berkeley, J. Foster and H. Robinson (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 19–35. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Externalist Explanation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 93: 203–230. (Scholar)
- Pears, David F., 1976, “The Causal Conditions of Perception”, Synthese, 33(June): 25–40. (Scholar)
- Pritchard, Duncan, 2008, “McDowellian Neo-Mooreanism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 283–310. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1999, The Threefold Chord, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- Rey, G., 2005, “Explanation, Not Experience: Commentary on John Campbell's Reference and Consciousness”, Philosophical Studies, 126: pp. 131–143. (Scholar)
- Robinson, Howard, 1985, “The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism”, In Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration, J. Foster and H. Robinson (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 163–186. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Perception, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Ruben, D.H., 2008, “Disjunctive Theories of Perception and Action”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 227–243. (Scholar)
- Searle, John, 1983, Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sedivy, Sonia, 2008, “Starting Afresh Disjunctively: Perceptual Engagement with the World”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 348–375. (Scholar)
- Siegel, S., 2004, “Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal”, Philosophical Studies, 120: 90–112. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “The Epistemic Conception of Hallucination”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 205–224. (Scholar)
- Smith, A.D., 2002, The Problem of Perception, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008,, “Disjunctivism and Discriminability”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 181–204. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “Husserl and Externalism”, Synthese, 160(3): 313–333. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, “Disjunctivism and Illusion”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, P.F., 1980–81, “Perception, Vision and Causation”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 81: 175–92. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “The Objects of Perceptual Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volumes, 64: 121–150. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Strawson on the Concept of Perception”, in The Philosophy of P.F. Strawson, L. Hahn (ed.), Chicago and Lasalle: Open Court, pp. 293–310. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005a, “The Formulation of Disjunctivism: A response to Fish”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 105: 129–141. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005b, “Some Reflections on an argument from Hallucination”, Philosophical Topics, 33(1): 285–305. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Hinton and the Origins of Disjunctivism”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–56. (Scholar)
- Spener, Maja, 2003, Gilding or Staining the Mind: Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Visual Experience, PhD thesis, University of London. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P.F., 1974, “Causation in Perception”, in Freedom and Resentment, London: Methuen, pp. 73–93. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, Scott, 1998, “Visual Experience”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, 98: 179–200. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Reflective Disjunctivism”, Supplement to the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 80: 185–216. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Disjunctivism About Visual Experience”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Fiona Macpherson and Adrian Haddock (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 112–143. (Scholar)
- Thau, Michael, 2004, “What is Disjunctivism?” Philosophical Studies, 120(1–3): 193–253. (Scholar)
- Travis, Charles, 2004, “The Silence of the Senses”, Mind, 113(449): 57–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Frege, Father of Disjunctivism”, Philosophical Topics, 33: 307–34. (Scholar)
- Tye, M., 1992, “Visual Qualia and Visual Content”, in The Contents of Experience, Crane (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 158–176. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Consciousness, Color and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21(1): 589–613. (Scholar)
- Vendler, Zeno, 1984, The Matter of Minds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, B. 1973, “Imagination and the Self”, in Problems of the Self., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 26–45. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 1990, Identity and Discrimination, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wright, Crispin, 2002, “Anti-sceptics Simple and Subtle: G.E. Moore and John McDowell”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 65: 330–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Comment on John McDowell's ‘The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument’”, in Disjunctivism: Perception, Action and Knowledge, A. Haddock and F. Macpherson (eds.),. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 390–404. (Scholar)
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