Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Problem of Perception" by Tim Crane |
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1965, “The Intentionality of Sensation: a Grammatical Feature” in R.J. Butler ed. Analytical Philosophy: First Series, 143–58, Oxford: Blackwell. [Reprinted in her Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind: Collected Papers, Vol. II. Oxford: Blackwell; also in Noë and Thompson (eds.) 2002.] (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D.M., 1968, A Materialist Theory of the Mind London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Austin, J.L., 1962, Sense and Sensibilia Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Barnes, W.H.F., 1944–45, “The Myth of Sense-Data” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 45: 89–117. (Scholar)
- Block, Ned, 1996, “Mental Paint and Mental Latex” In Enrique Villanueva (ed.) Philosophical Issues 7 Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview, 19–49. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Inverted Earth” in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere (eds.) The Nature of Consciousness, 677–94, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Mental Paint”, In Martin Hahn and Bjørn Ramberg (ed.) Reflections and Replies: 10 Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, 165–201, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘Wittgenstein and Qualia’ Philosophical Perspectives 21(1):73–115. (Scholar)
- BonJour, Laurence, 1985, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Brewer, Bill 2000, Perception and Reason Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Broad, C. D., 1923, “The Theory of Sensa” In Swartz 1965, 85–129. (Scholar)
- Burge, Tyler, 1982, “Other Bodies” in Andrew Woodfield (ed.) Thought and Object, 97–120, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception” in Pettit and McDowell, John, (eds.) 1986. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Vision and Intentional Content” In E. LePore and R. Van Gulick (eds.) John Searle and his Critics, 195-214, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Byrne, Alex 2001, “Intentionalism Defended” Philosophical Review 110:199–240. (Scholar)
- Byrne Alex, and Heather Logue, 2009, Disjunctivism Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Campbell, John, 2002, Reference and Consciousness Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, David, 1996, The Conscious Mind Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, ‘Perception and the Fall from Eden’ in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 49–125. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, R. 1957, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Craig, E.J., 1976, “Sensory Experience and the Foundations of Knowledge” Synthese 33. (Scholar)
- Crane, Tim 1998a, “Content, Non-Conceptual” in E.J. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encylopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998b, “Intentionality” in E.J. Craig (ed.) Routledge Encylopedia of Philosophy, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, ‘The Origins of Qualia’ in Crane and Patterson (eds.) 2000, 169–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Elements of Mind Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, ‘Is there a Perceptual Relation?’ in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 126–46. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009 ‘Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?’, Philosophical Quarterly 2009 59: 452–69. (Scholar)
- ––– (ed.) 1992, The Contents of Experience Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Crane, Tim and Sarah Patterson (eds.) 2000, History of the Mind-Body Problem London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Crane, Tim and Katalin Farkas (eds.) 2004, Metaphysics: a Guide and Anthology Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Crowther, Tom, 2006, ‘Two Conceptions of Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism’, Erkenntnis, 65: 245–276. (Scholar)
- Cussins, Adrian, 1990, “The Connectionist Construction of Concepts” In M. Boden (ed.) The Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence, 368–440, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dancy, Jonathan (ed.) 1988, Perceptual Knowledge Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Arguments from Illusion” The Philosophical Quarterly 45: 421–38. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Donald, 1970, “Mental Events” in Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events, 207–229, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1982. (Scholar)
- Davies, M. 1992 Perceptual Content and Local Supervenience. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92: 21–45. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Individualism and Perceptual Content” Mind 100: 461–84. (Scholar)
- Dennett, Daniel, 1991, Consciousness Explained New York: Little, Brown. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred, 1969, Seeing and Knowing Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, Knowledge and the Flow of Information Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, Naturalizing the Mind Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Ducasse, C.J., 1942. “Moore's Refutation of Idealism” in P.Schilpp (ed.) The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, 223–52, Chicago: Northwestern University Press. (Scholar)
- Egan, Andy, 2006, ‘Appearance Properties?’ Noüs 40 3:495–521. (Scholar)
- Evans, Gareth, 1982, The Varieties of Reference Oxford: Clarendon Press (Scholar)
- Farkas, Katalin, 2003, “What is Externalism?” Philosophical Studies 112: 187–208. (Scholar)
- Farkas, Katalin, 2006, ‘Indiscriminability and the Sameness of Appearance’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106:39–59. (Scholar)
- Fish, William, 2009, Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Foster, John, 2000, The Nature of Perception Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gendler, Tamar Szabó and John Hawthorne, eds., 2006, Perceptual Experience Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Graff, Delia, 2001 Phenomenal Continuua and the Sorites. Mind 110, 905–935. (Scholar)
- Grice, H.P., 1961, “The Causal Theory of Perception” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 35: 121–52. Selection reprinted in Dancy 1988. (Scholar)
- Gunther, York (ed.), 2002, Essays on Non-Conceptual Content Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Guttenplan, Samuel (ed.), 1995, A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Haddock, Adrian and Macpherson, Fiona, (eds.) 2008, Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, Gilbert, 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience” in J. Tomberlin ed. Philosophical Perspectives, 31–52, 4 Atascadero: Ridgeview 1990, reprinted in Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Guven Guzeldere eds. The Nature of Consciousness, 663–76, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1997. (Scholar)
- Heck, Richard, 2000, “Non-conceptual Content and the Space of Reasons” Philosophical Review 109: 483–523. (Scholar)
- Heidegger, Martin, “The Origin of the Work of Art” translated by David Farrell Krell, in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings New York: Harper and Row 1977. (Scholar)
- Hilbert, David R. and Mark Eli Kalderon, 2000, “Color and the Inverted Spectrum” In S. Davis (ed.) Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic and Computational Perspectives Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science Volume 9 New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hinton, J.M., 1973, Experiences Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Horgan, Terence and Uriah Kriegel, forthcoming, Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, David, 1748, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge; 3rd edition revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975. (Scholar)
- Husserl, Edmund, 1900–01, Logical Investigations translated by J.N. Findlay, 2 volumes, revised edition by D. Moran, London: Routledge 2001. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1977, Perception: A Representative Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 2004, “The Obscure Object of Hallucination” Philosophical Studies 103:113–83. (Scholar)
- Kim, Jaegwon, 1993, Supervenience and Mind Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lewis, C.I., 1929, Mind and the World Order London: Constable. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1966, “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, Journal of Philosophy 63 17–25. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Veridical Hallucination and Prosthetic Vision” In Dancy (ed.) 1988. (Scholar)
- Loar, Brian, 2002, “Transparent Experience” in A. Jokic and Q.Smith eds. Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, 77–96, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G., 1996, Consciousness and Experience Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Mind and Cognition Second Edition. Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Mackie, J.L., 1977, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong Harmondsworth: Middlesex (Scholar)
- Macpherson, Fiona, forthcoming, ‘Individuating the Senses’, in Macpherson (ed.) The Senses: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Macpherson, Fiona and Dimitris Platchais, (eds.) forthcoming, Hallucination, MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Marcus, Eric 2006. Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum. Philosophical Quarterly 56 224:321–339 (Scholar)
- Martin, M.G.F., 1992, “Sight and Touch” in Crane (ed.) 1992, 196–215. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992a, “Perception, Concepts and Memory” Philosophical Review 101:745–63. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, ‘The Rational Role of Experience’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 93: 71–88. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Perceptual Content” in Guttenplan (ed.) 1995, 459–62. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Setting Things Before the Mind” in A. O'Hear (ed.) Contemporary Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, 157–80, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Beyond Dispute: Sense-Data, Intentionality and the Mind-Body Problem” in Crane and Patterson (eds.) 2000, 195–231. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “The Transparency of Experience” Mind and Language 17, 376–425. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Sensible Appearances” in Thomas Baldwin (ed.) Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945, 521–32, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “The Limits of Self-Awareness” Philosophical Studies 120: 37–89. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006,'On Being Alienated' in Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, 354–410. (Scholar)
- McCulloch, Gregory, 1995, The Mind and its World London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, The Life of the Mind London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “Criteria, Defeasibility & Knowledge” Proceedings of the British Academy 1982 455–79. Reprinted in Dancy (ed.) 1988. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 1987, “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space” in McDowell and Pettit (eds.) 1987. Reprinted in McDowell 1998. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “The Content of Perceptual Experience” Philosophical Quarterly 44, 190–205; reprinted in Noë & Thompson eds. 2002. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994a, Mind and World Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, Meaning, Knowledge and Reality Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 2009, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’ in John McDowell, The Engaged Intellect, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 256–74. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John & P. Pettit (eds.) Subject, Thought and Context Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- McGinn, Colin, 1989, Mental Content Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 1945, The Phenomenology of Perception translated by Colin Smith, London: Rooutledge 2002. (Scholar)
- Millar, Alan, 1996, “The Idea of Experience” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97: 75–90. (Scholar)
- Millikan, Ruth Garrett, 1987, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Mills, Eugene, 2002, “Fallibility and the Phenomenal Sorites” Nous 36: 384–407. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E., 1905, “The Refutation of Idealism” In Philosophical Studies. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Reprinted in Moore 1993, 23–44. (Scholar)
- –––, 1910, “Sense Data” Reprinted in Moore 1993, 45–58. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, Selected Writings edited by Thomas Baldwin London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Noë, Alva and Evan Thompson (eds.), 2002, Vision and Mind: Selected Readings in the Philosophy of Perception Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Noë, Alva, 2004, Action and Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Nudds, Matthew, 2001, “Experiencing the Production of Sounds”European Journal of Philosophy 9: 210–29. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “The significance of the senses” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104: 31–51. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, ‘Recent Work in Perception: Naïve Realism and its Opponents’, Analysis, 69: 334–6. (Scholar)
- Nudds, Matthew and O'Callaghan Casey, (eds.) 2009, Sounds and Perception, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- O'Callaghan, Casey, 2007, Sounds: a Philosophical Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- O'Shaughnessy, Brian, 1980, The Will: A Dual Aspect Theory Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “The Sense of Touch” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 67, 37–58. (Scholar)
- Owens, David, 1992, Causes and Coincidences Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, Christopher, 1983, Sense and Content Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, A Study of Concepts Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Perkins, Moreland, 1983, Sensing the World Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Pessin, Andrew and Sanford Goldberg, (eds.), 1996, The Twin Earth Chronicles New York: M.E. Sharpe. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Philip and John McDowell, (eds.), 1986, Subject, Thought and Context Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Pitcher, George, 1970, A Theory of Perception Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Price, H.H., 1932, Perception. London: Methuen. (Scholar)
- Putnam, Hilary, 1999, The Threefold Cord New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- Robinson, Howard, 1985, “The General Form of the Argument for Berkeleian Idealism” In Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration, edited by J. Foster and H. Robinson, 163–86. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Perception London: Routledge (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand. 1912, The Problems of Philosophy Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Sainsbury, Mark, 2010, ‘Intentionality without Exotica’ in Robin Jeshion, (ed.), Singular Thought: New Essays, 300–18, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Searle, John, 1983, Intentionality Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Segal, Gabriel, 1989, “Seeing What is Not There” Philosophical Review 98: 189–214. (Scholar)
- Sellars, Wilfrid, 1956, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind In Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science Volume 1, edited by H. Feigl and M. Scriven, 253–329, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted as a book by Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA, 1997. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1990 “Qualities and Qualia: What's in the Mind?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50, Supplement: 109–31. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1996, ‘Color, Subjective Reactions, and Qualia’, in Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical Issues, 55–66, Atascadero: Ridgeview. (Scholar)
- Siegel, Susanna, 2004, ‘Indiscriminability and the Phenomenal’, Philosophical Studies 120:91–112. (Scholar)
- Smith, A.D., 2002, The Problem of Perception Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press (Scholar)
- Smith, A.D., 2008, ‘Translucent Experiences’, Philosophical Studies 140:197–212. (Scholar)
- Snowdon, P.F., 1979–80, “Perception, Vision and Causation” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81: 175–92. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “The Objects of Perceptual Experience” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 64: 121–150. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “How to Interpret ‘Direct Perception’” in Crane 1992, 48–78. (Scholar)
- Soteriou, Matthew, 2000, “The Particularity of Visual Experience” European Journal of Philosophy 8: 173–89. (Scholar)
- Speaks, Jeff, 2005, ‘Is there a problem about non-conceptual content?’, Philosophical Review, 114:359–98. (Scholar)
- Speaks, Jeff, 2009, ‘Transparency, Intentionalism, and the Nature of Perceptual Content’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79:539–573. (Scholar)
- Spener, Maja, 2003, Gilding or Staining the Mind: Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Visual Experience PhD thesis, University of London. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P.F., 1979, “Perception and its Objects” in G. Macdonald (ed.) Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A.J. Ayer with His Replies London: Macmillan; reprinted in Noë and Thompson (eds.) 2002. Page references to reprint. (Scholar)
- Stoljar, Daniel, 2004, “The Argument from Diaphanousness*rdquo; in M. Ezcurdia, R. Stainton and C. Viger (eds.) New Essays in the Philosophy of Language and Mind: Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 341–90, Calgary: University of Calgary Press. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, Scott, 1998, “Visual Experience” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98: 179–200. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason and Nature London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Swartz, R.J. 1965, Perceiving, Sensing and Knowing Los Angeles and Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Thau, Michael, 2002, Consciousness and Cognition Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Tye, Michael, 1984, “The Adverbial Theory of Visual Experience” Philosophical Review 93: 195–225. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Visual Qualia and Visual Content” in Crane (ed.) 1992, 158–76. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Consciousness, Color and Content Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Valberg, J.J., 1992, The Puzzle of Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992a, “The Puzzle of Experience” in Crane (ed.) 1992, 18–47. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2000, Knowledge and its Limits Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Yablo, Stephen, 1992, “Mental Causation” Philosophical Review 101: 245–280. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Wide Causation” In James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspectives 11: Mind, Causation, and World, 251–81, Boston: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Zahavi, Dan, 2003, Husserl's Phenomenology Stanford: Stanford University Press. (Scholar)
Further reading
The 20th century literature on perception is vast and confusing. Any serious attempt to master the literature on the problem of perception should include a reading of Anscombe (1965), Armstrong (1968: chapter 10), Dretske (1969), Jackson (1977), Martin (2002), Moore (1905), Peacocke (1983: chapter 1), Russell (1912), Snowdon (1979–80), Strawson (1979), Tye (1992), Valberg (2002a). Some of these are contained in the very useful collection of essays, contemporary and classic, edited by Noë and Thompson (2002); Dancy (1988) is a useful collection too, although now out of print. Robinson (1994) is a very clear introduction to many of the problems of perception, including a trenchant defence of the sense-data theory. Smith (2002) is a thorough and original, though very readable, attempt to solve the problem of perception (as conceived in this entry). Two recent anthologies which concern intentionalism and disjunctivism respectively are Gendler and Hawthorne (eds.) 2006, and Haddock and Macpherson (eds.) 2008.
Generated Thu Apr 25 12:03:12 2013
