Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Practical Reason and the Structure of Actions" by Elijah Millgram |
This is an automatically generated and experimental page
If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Anscombe, G. E. M., 1985, Intention (2nd ed.), Ithaca: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Benson, P., 1987, ‘Freedom and Value,’ Journal of Philosophy, 84: 465–486. (Scholar)
- Brandom, R., 2001, ‘Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning,’ in E. Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Buss, S., 1999, ‘What Practical Reasoning Must Be If We Act for Our Own Reasons,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 399–421. (Scholar)
- Enoch, D., 2006, ‘Agency, Schmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come from What Is Constitutive of Action,’ Philosophical Review, 115: 169–198. (Scholar)
- Ferrero, L., 2009, ‘Constitutivism and the Inescapability of Agency,’ Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 4: 303–333. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, H., 1971, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of the Person,’ Journal of Philosophy, 68: 5–20. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C., 1990, The Standpoint of Practical Reason, New York: Garland Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, The Constitution of Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Self-Constitution, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Millgram, E., 2006, ‘Review of Candace Vogler, Reasonably Vicious,’ European Journal of Philosophy, 14: 430–434. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, Hard Truths, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘Pluralism about Action,’ in T. O'Connor and C. Sandis, A Companion to the Philosophy of Action, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, ‘Critical Notice: Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution and The Constitution of Agency,’ Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 89: 549–556. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1970, The Possibility of Altruism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1997, ‘Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice,’ in his Socratic Puzzles, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Rawls, J., 1955, ‘Two Concepts of Rules,’ Philosophical Review, 64: 3–32. (Scholar)
- Rödl, S., 2007, Self-Consciousness, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Schapiro, T., 2001, ‘Three Conceptions of Action in Moral Theory,’ Noûs, 35: 93–117. (Scholar)
- Schapiro, T., 2006, ‘Kantian Rigorism and Mitigating Circumstances’ Ethics, 117: 32–57. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W., 1997, Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, ed. R. Brandom, R. Rorty, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, M., 1987, ‘The Humean Theory of Motivation,’ Mind, 96: 36–61. (Scholar)
- Thompson, M., 2008, Life and Action, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Tubert, A., 2010, ‘Constitutive Arguments,’ Philosophy Compass, 5: 656–666. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J. D., 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, The Possibility of Practical Reason, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Vogler, C., 2001, ‘Anscombe on Practical Inference,’ in E. Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, Reasonably Vicious, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Watson, G., 1975, ‘Free Agency,’ Journal of Philosophy, 72: 205–220. (Scholar)
- Williams, B., 1981, ‘Internal and External Reasons,’ in his Moral Luck, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, ‘Replies,’ in J. E. J. Altham and R. Harrison (eds.), World, Mind and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
Generated Mon May 6 16:55:40 2013
