Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Prisoner's Dilemma" by Steven Kuhn |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Aumann, Robert, “Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality,” Games and Economic Behavior, 8 (1995):97-105 (Scholar)
- Aumann, Robert, “Note on the Centipede Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, 23 (1998):97-105 (Scholar)
- Axelrod, Robert, “The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists,” The American Political Science Review, 75 (1981): 306-318. (Scholar)
- Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation , New York: Basic Books, 1984.
- Axelrod, Robert and Douglas Dion, “The Further Evolution of Cooperation”Science, 242(9 December 1988): 1385-1390. (Scholar)
- Axelrod, Robert and William Hamilton, “The Evolution of Cooperation”Science, 211(27 March 1981): 1390-1396. (Scholar)
- Becker, Neal and Ann Cudd, “Indefinitely Repeated Games: A Response to Carroll,” Theory and Decision, 28(1990): 189-195. (Scholar)
- Bendor, Jonathan, “In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World,” American Journal of Political Science, 31 (1987): 531-558. (Scholar)
- Bendor, Jonathan, “Uncertainty and the Evolution of Cooperation,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 37 (1993): 709-733. (Scholar)
- Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, “Types of Evolutionary Stability and the Problem of cooperations,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 92 (April 1995): 3596-3600. (Scholar)
- Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, “The Controversy about the Evolution of Cooperation and the Evolutionary Roots of Social Institutions,” in Gasparski, Wojciech et al (eds), Social Agency, New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996. (Scholar)
- Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, “Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications,” Theory and Decision, 3 (forthcoming). (Scholar)
- Bendor, Jonathan, and Piotr Swistak, “The Evolutionary Stability of Cooperations,” American Political Science Review, 91/2 (June 1997): 290-307. (Scholar)
- Bendor, Jonathan, Roderick Kramer and Piotr Swistak, “Cooperation Under Uncertainty: What is New, What is True and What is Important?” American Sociological Review, 61 (April 1996): 333-338. (Scholar)
- Bergstrom, T., “Evolution of Social Behavior: Individual and Group Selection Models,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (2002): 231-238. (Scholar)
- Bicchieri, Cristina, “Self-refuting Theories of Strategic Interaction,” Erkenntinis, 30 (1989): 69-85. (Scholar)
- Binmore, Kenneth, Fun and Games, Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company (1992).
- Binmore, Kenneth, Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract 1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1994).
- Binmore, Kenneth, “Rationality and Backward Induction,” Journal of Economic Methodology, 4 (1997): 23-41. (Scholar)
- Binmore, Kenneth, Natural Justice New York, NY: Oxford Univsity Press (2005).
- Boyd, Robert and Jeffrey Lorberbaum, “No Pure Strategy is Evolutionarily Stable in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Nature, 327 (7 May 1987): 58-59. (Scholar)
- Carroll, J.W. “Indefinite Terminating Points and the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Theory and Decision 22 (1987):247-256. (Scholar)
- Cambell, Richmond and Lanning Snowden, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation, Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press (1985).
- Danielson, Peter, Artificial Morality: Virtual Robots for Virtual Games, London: Routledge (1992).
- Davis, Laurence, “Prisoners, Paradox and Rationality,” Amierican Philosophical Quarterly, 14 (1977): 319-327. Reprinted in Campbell and Snowden, 45-58. (Scholar)
- Davis, Laurence, “Is the Symmetry Argument Valid?,” in Campbell and Snowden (1985), 255-262. (Scholar)
- Donninger, Christian “Is It Always Efficient to be Nice?” in Dickman and Mitter (eds) Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior Heidelberg: Physica Verlag (1986): 123-134. (Scholar)
- Farrell, Joseph, and Roger Ware, “Evolutionary Stability in the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Theoretical Population Biology, 36 (1989): 161-167. (Scholar)
- Gauthier, David, Morals by Agreement, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1986).
- Grim, Patrick, Gary Mar and Paul St. Denis, The Philosophical Computer, Cambrige, Mass: MIT Press (1998).
- Hardin, Garret, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science, 162 (13 December 1968): 1243-1248. (Scholar)
- Howard, Nigel, Paradoxes of Rationality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1971).
- Howard, J.V. “Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Theory and Decision, 24 (1988):203-213. (Scholar)
- Hurley, S.L. “Newcomb's Problem, Prisoners' Dilemma, and Collective Action,” Synthese, 86 (1991):173-196. (Scholar)
- Joyce, James, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory, Cambridge University Press, (1999).
- Kavka, Gregory, “Hobbes War of All Against All,” Ethics, 93 (1983): 291-310. (Scholar)
- Kavka, Gregory, Hobbesean Moral and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press (1986).
- Kavka, Gregory, “Is Individual Choice Less Problematic than Collective Choice?” Economics and Philosophy, 7 (1991): 291-310. (Scholar)
- Kollock, Peter, “An Eye For an Eye Leaves Everybody Blind: Cooperation and Accounting Systems,” American Sociological Review, 58 (1993): 768-786. (Scholar)
- Kraines, David and Vivian Kraines, “Pavlov and the Prisoner's Dilemma,” Theory and Decision, 26 (1989): 47-79. (Scholar)
- Kraines, David and Vivian Kraines, “Learning to Cooperate with Pavlov: an Adaptive Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with Noise,” Theory and Decision, 35 (1993): 107-150. (Scholar)
- Kreps, David, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson, “Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory, 27 (1982): 245-252. (Scholar)
- Kuhn, Steven, “Agreement Keeping and Indirect Moral Theory” Journal of Philosophy, 93 (1996): 105-128. (Scholar)
- Kuhn, Steven, “Reflections on Ethics and Game Theory” Synthese, 141 (2004): 1-44. (Scholar)
- Kuhn, Steven, and Serge Moresi, “Pure and Utilitarian Prisoner's Dilemmas” Economics and Philosophy, 11 (1995): 123-133. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, “Prisoner's Dilemma Is a Newcomb Problem,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 8 (1979): 235-240. (Scholar)
- Maynard Smith, John, “The Evolution of Behavior,” Scientific American, 239 (1978): 176-192. (Scholar)
- Molander, Per, “The Optimal Level of Generosity in a Selfish, Uncertain Environment,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29, (December 1985): 611-619. (Scholar)
- Molander, Per, “The Prevalence of Free Riding,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36, (December 1992): 756-771. (Scholar)
- Mukherji, Arijit, Vijay Rajan and James Slagle, “Robustness of Cooperation,” Nature, 379 (11 January 1996): 125-126. (Scholar)
- Nowak, Martin, and Robert May, “Evolutionary Games and Spatial Chaos,”Nature, 359 (29 October 1992): 826-829. (Scholar)
- Nowak, Martin and Karl Sigmund, “Tit for Tat in Heterogeneous Populations,” Nature, 355 (16 January 1992): 250-253. (Scholar)
- Nowak, Martin and Karl Sigmund, “A Strategy of Win-stay, Lose-shift that Outperforms Tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Nature, 364 (1 July 1993): 56-58. (Scholar)
- Nowak, Martin, Robert May, and Karl Sigmund, “The Arithmetics of Mutual Help,” Scientific American (June 1995): 76-81. (Scholar)
- Nozick, Robert, “Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice”, in N. Resher (ed) Essays in Honor of Carl G. Hempel, Reidel (1969):114-146. Reprinted in Cambell and Snowden, 107-132. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Phillip, “Free Riding and Foul Dealing,” Journal of Philosophy, 83 1986: 361-379. (Scholar)
- Pettit, Phillip and Robert Sugden, “The Backward Induction Paradox,” Journal of Philosophy, 86 1989: 169-182. (Scholar)
- Poundstone, William, Prisoner's Dilemma New York: Doubleday (1992).
- Quinn, Warren, “The Paradox of the Self-Torturer,” Philosophical Studies, 59 (1990):79-90. (Scholar)
- Rabinowicz, Wlodek, “Grappling with the Centipede: Defense of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games,” Economics and Philosophy,, 14 (1998): 95-126. (Scholar)
- Rosenthal, R. “Games of Perfect Information, Predatory Pricing, and the Chain Store,” Journal of Economic Theory 25 (1981): 92-100. (Scholar)
- Schelling, Thomas, Micromotives and Macrobehavior New York: Norton (1978).
- Segal, Nancy and Scott Hershberger,“Cooperation and Competition Between Twins: Findings from a Prisoner's Dilemma Game,” Evolution and Human Behavior 20, 1999:29-51 (Scholar)
- Selten, Reinhard, “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept of Equilibrium in Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory,, 4 (1975): 25-55. (Scholar)
- Selten, Reinhard, “The Chain-Store Paradox,” Theory and Decision, 9 (1978): 127-159. (Scholar)
- Selten, Reinhard, “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-person Games,” Mathematical Social Sciences, 5 (1983): 269-363. (Scholar)
- Sigmund, Karl, Games of Life: Explorations in Ecology Evolution and Behavior, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1993).
- Skyrms, Brian, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (1990).
- Skyrms, Brian, Evolution of the Social Contract, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (1996).
- Skyrms, Brian, “The Shadow of the Future,” in Coleman and Morris (eds.)Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, New York, Cambridge University Press (1998). (Scholar)
- Skyrms, Brian, The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (2004).
- Sobel, J.H., “Backward Induction Without Tears?,” in D. Vanderveken (ed), Logic, Thought and Action,, Springer (2005):433-461. (Scholar)
- Sobel, J.H., “Backward Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained,” Philosophy of Science 60 1993: 114-133. (Scholar)
- Sober, Elliott and David Sloan Wilson, Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior, Cambridge, MA: 1998.
- Sugden The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare, New York, Basil Blackwell (1986). Second edition published in 2004 by Palgrave MacMillan, Basingstoke, UK. (Scholar)
- Taylor, Michael, The Possibility of Cooperation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (1987).
- Trivers, Robert, “The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism,” Quarterly Review of Biology, 46 (1971): 35-57. (Scholar)
- Vanderschraaf, Peter, “The Informal Game Theory in Hume's Account of Convention,” Economics and Philosophy, 14(1998):215-247. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, “Inexact Knowledge,” Mind, 101 (1992): 217-242. (Scholar)
- Wilson, D.S. and E. Sober, “Reintroducing Group Selection to the Human Behavioral Sciences,” Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17 (1994): 585-654. (Scholar)
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