Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Properties" by Chris Swoyer |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Achinstein, Peter, 1974, “The Identity Conditions of Properties,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 11: 257–275. (Scholar)
- Ainsworth, Peter M., 2010, “What is Ontic Structural Realism?,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 41: 50–57. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, David M., 1978, Nominalism and Realism, Vol. I. A Theory of Universals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978a, Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. II. A Theory of Universals, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, What is a Law of Nature?, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, “Replies,” in Radu Bogdan, ed., D.M. Armstrong: Profiles, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Four Disputes About Properties,” Synthese, 144: 309–320. (Scholar)
- Aaron, Richard, 1967, A Theory of Universals 2nd/ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George, 1973, A Theory of Qualities: A First-order Extensional Theory which includes a definition of analyticity, a one-level semantic method, and a derivation of intensional logic, set theory and modal logic, Ph.D. Dissertations, University of California, Berkeley. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, Quality and Concept, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, “Fine-Grained Type-free Intensionality” in Chierchia et al, (1989): 177–230 (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Property Theory: The Type-free Approach vs. the Church Approach,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 23: 139–171. (Scholar)
- Bealer, George and Uwe Mönnich, 1989, “Property Theories,” in Dov Gabbay and Franz Guenthner, eds., Handbook of Philosophical Logic, Vol. IV, Reidel, Dordrecht: 133–251. (Scholar)
- Benacerraf, Paul, 1965, “What Numbers Could Not Be,” Philosophical Review, 74: 47–73. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, “Mathematical Truth,” Journal of Philosophy, 70: 661–679. (Scholar)
- Bergmann, Gustav, 1960, “Ineffability, Ontology and Method,” The Philosophical Review, 69: 18–41 (repr. in his Logic and Reality, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison: 45–63). (Scholar)
- –––, 1968, “Elementarism,” Ch. 6 of his Meaning and Existence, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, New Foundations of Ontology (ed. by W. Heald). Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. (Scholar)
- Bigelow, John and Robert Pargetter, 1989, “A Theory of Structural Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1–11. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, Science and Necessity, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Bochvar, D. A., 1981, “On a Three-valued Logical Calculus and Its Application to the Analysis of the Paradoxes of the Classical Extended Functional Calculus” (transl. from Russian by M. Bergmann), History and Philosophy of Logic, 2: 87–112. (Scholar)
- Bozon, Serge, 2004, “Why λHST* and HST*λ Do Not Solve the Russell-Myhill Paradox After All,” in Laura Alonso I Alemany and Paul Égré (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th Student ESSLLI Session: 48–60. (Scholar)
- Broad, C. D., 1933, Examination of McTaggart's Philosophy: Volume I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Butchvarov, Panayot, 1966, Resemblance and Identity, Bloomington: University of Indiana Press. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Nancy, 1983, How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, Nature's Capacities and their Measurement, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Casullo, A., 1988, “A fourth version of the bundle theory,” Philosophical Studies, 54: 125–139.
- Castañeda, Hector-Neri, 1972, “Thinking and the Structure of the World,” Critica, 6: 43–86. (Scholar)
- Cherniss, H. F., 1936, “The Philosophical Economy of Plato's Theory of Ideas,” American Journal of Philology, 57: 445–456. (Scholar)
- Chierchia, Gennaro, and Barbara Partee and Raymond Turner (eds.), 1989, Properties, Types and Meanings (Volume I: Foundational Issues). Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- Chierchia, Gennaro and Raymond Turner, 1988, “Semantics and Property Theory,” Linguistics and Philosophy, 11: 261–302. (Scholar)
- Cocchiarella, Nino B., 1985, “Review of G. Bealer's Quality and Concept,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 50: 554–56. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, Logical Investigations of Predication Theory and the Problem of Universals, Napoli: Bibliopolis. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986a, Frege, Russell and Logicism: A Logical Reconstruction, in Leila Haaparanta and Jaakko Hintikka (eds.), Frege Synthesized. Essays on the Philosophical and Foundational Work of Gottlob Frege, Dordrecht: Reidel: 197–252. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism, Dordrecht: Springer. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Reply to Landini's Review of Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism,” Axiomathes, 19: 143–153. (Scholar)
- Copi, Irving, 1971, The Theory of Logical Types, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Dipert, Randall R., 1997, “The Mathematical Structure of the World: The World as Graph,” Journal of Philosophy, 94: 329–358. (Scholar)
- Dretske, Fred, 1977, “Laws of Nature,” Philosophy of Science 44: 248–268. (Scholar)
- Egan, Andy, 2004, “Second-order predication and the Metaphysics of Properties,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 48–66. (Scholar)
- Ellis, Brian, 2001, Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Esfeld, Michael, 2003, “Do Relations Require Underlying Intrinsic Properties? A Physical Argument for the Metaphysics of Relations,” Metaphysica, 5: 5–25. (Scholar)
- Fales, Evan, 1990, Causation and Universals, New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Field, Hartry, 2004, “The Consistency of the Naïve theory of Properties,” Philosophical Quarterly, 54: 78–104. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 2000, “Neutral Relations,” Philosophical Review, 14: 1–33. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Response to Fraser McBride,” dialectica, 61: 57–62. (Scholar)
- Fitch, Frederic B., 1952, Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York: The Ronald Press Company. (Scholar)
- Fisk, Milton, 1972, “Relatedness without Relations,” Noûs, 6: 139–151. (Scholar)
- Forrest, Peter, 1986, “Ways Worlds Could Be,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 15–24. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Universals as Sense-Data,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 622–631. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1892, “Über Begriff und Gegenstand,” Vierteljahresschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie, 16: 192–205. Translated as “Concept and Object” by Peter Geach in Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, P. Geach and Max Black (eds. and trans.), Oxford: Blackwell, third edition, 1980. (Scholar)
- French, Steven and James Ladyman, 2003, “Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure,” Synthese, 136: 31–56. (Scholar)
- Gaskin, Richard, 2008, The Unity of the Proposition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gozzano, Simone and Francesco Orilia, 2008, Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. (Scholar)
- Grandy, Richard E., 1976, “Anadic Logic and English,” Synthese, 32: 393–402. (Scholar)
- Graves, P. R., 1993, “Argument Deletion without Events,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 34: 607–620. (Scholar)
- Greimann, Dirk, 2003, “Is Zalta's Individuation of Intensional Entities Circular?,” Metaphysica, 5: 93–101. (Scholar)
- Grossmann, Reinhardt, 1983, The Categorial Structure of the World, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John, 2001, “Causal Structuralism,” Philosophical Perspectives, 13: 361–378 (repr. as Ch. 10 of his Metaphysical Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). (Scholar)
- Heal, Jane, 1997, “Indexical Predicates,” Mind, 106: 619–640. (Scholar)
- Heal, John, 2003, From an Ontological Point of View: Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hochberg, Herbert, 1968, “Nominalism, Platonism, and Being True of,” Noûs, 2: 413–419. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “Russell's Analysis of Relational Predication and the Asymmetry of the Predication Relation,” Philosophia, 17: 439–459. (Scholar)
- Jubien, Michael, 1989, “On Properties and Property Theory,” in Chierchia et al. (1989): 159–175. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Landini, Gregory, 1998, Russell's Hidden Substitutional Theory, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Russell's Definite Descriptions De Re,” in Nicholas Griffin and Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell vs Meinong: The Legacy of ‘On Denoting’, Routledge: New York: pp. 265–296. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Cocchiarella's Formal Ontology and the Paradoxes of Hyperintensionality,” Axiomathes, 19: 115–142. (Scholar)
- Leeds, Stephen, 1978, “Quine on Properties and Meanings,” Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 9: 97–108. (Scholar)
- Leo, Joop, 2008, “Modeling Relations,” Journal of Philosophical Logic: 353–385. (Scholar)
- Levinson, Jerrold, 1991, “Attributes,” in Hans Burkhardt and Barry Smith, eds., Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology, Vol. I. Munich: Philosophia: 65–70. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986a, “Against Structural Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 25–46. (Scholar)
- Linsky, Bernard and Edward Zalta, 1995, “Naturalized Platonism vs. Platonized Naturalism,” Journal of Philosophy 92: 525–555. (Scholar)
- Loux, Michael J., 1972, “Recent Work in Ontology,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 9: 119–138. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. Jonathan, 2006, The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- MacBride, Fraser, 2005, “The Particular-Universal Distinction: A Dogma of Metaphysics?,” Mind, 114: 565–614. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Neutral Relations Revisited,” Dialectica, 61: 25–56. (Scholar)
- Margolis, Eric and Stephen Laurence (eds.), 1999, Concepts: Core Readings, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Martin, C.B., 1994, “On the Need for Properties: The Road to Pythagoreanism and Back,” Synthese, 112: 193–231. (Scholar)
- Maurin, Anna-Sofia, 2002, If Tropes, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- McMichael, Alan and Edward Zalta, 1981, “An Alternative Theory of Nonexistent Objects,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 9: 297–313. (Scholar)
- Meinong, Alexius, 1978, “On Objects of Higher Orders,” in A. Meinong, On Objects of Higher Orders and Husserl's Phenomenology, M.-L. Schubert Kalsi, ed. and transl. The Hague: M. Nijhoff. (Scholar)
- Mellor, D. H., 1991, Matters of Metaphysics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Menzel, Chris, 1986, “A Complete Type-free ‘Second
Order’ Logic and its Philosophical Foundations,”
Center for the Study and Language and Information, Technical Report #CSLI-86-40, Stanford University. (Scholar) - –––, 1993, “The Proper Treatment of Predication in Fine-grained Intensional Logic,” Philosophical Perspectives, 7: 61–87. (Scholar)
- Molnar, George, 2003, Powers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Montague, Richard, 1974, Formal Philosophy: Selected Papers of Richard Montague (Richmond Thomasson, ed.). New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- Mugnai, Massimo, 1992, Leibniz's Theory of Relations, Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag (Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa, Vol. 28). (Scholar)
- Mulligan, Kevin, and Peter Simons and Barry Smith, 1984, “Truth-Makers,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 287–321. (Scholar)
- Mundy, Brent, 1987, “The Metaphysics of Quantity,” Philosophical Studies, 51: 29–54. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Elementary Categorial Logic, Predicates of Variable Degree, and Theory of Quantity,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 18: 115–140. (Scholar)
- Orilia, Francesco, 1996, “A Contingent Russell's paradox,” Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 37: 105–11. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Predication, Analysis and Reference, Bologna: CLUEB. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Property Theory and the Revision Theory of Definitions,”Journal of Symbolic Logic, 65: 212–246. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000a, “Argument Deletion, Thematic Roles, and Leibniz's Logico-grammatical Analysis of Relations,” History and Philosophy of Logic, 21: 147–162. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Identity Across Time and Stories,” in Andrea Bottani and Richard Davies, eds., Modes of Existence, Frankfurt: Ontos: 193–222. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006a, “States of affairs. Bradley vs. Meinong,” in Venanzio Raspa, ed., Meinongian Issues in Contemporary Italian Philosophy, Frankfurt: Ontos: 213–238. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Relational Order and Onto-thematic Roles,” Metaphysica, 12: 1-18. (Scholar)
- Parsons, Terence, 1980, Nonexistent Objects, New Haven: Yale University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Why Frege Should not have Said ‘The Concept Horse is not a Concept’,” History of Philosophy Quarterly, 3: 449–465. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Pollard, Stephen and Norman Martin, 1986, “Mathematics for Property Theorists,” Philosophical Studies, 49: 177–186. (Scholar)
- Priest, Graham, 2006, In Contradiction (2nd ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, Willard V. O., 1956, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes,” Journal of Philosophy, 53: 177–187. (Scholar)
- –––, 1961, “On What There Is,” in From a Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. N.Y: Harper and Row. (Scholar)
- Quinton, Anthony, 1973, The Nature of Things, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Rapaport, William J., 1978, “Meinongian Theories and a Russellian Paradox,” Noûs, 12: 153–180. (Scholar)
- Resnik, Michael, 1997, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Robb, David, 1997, “The Properties of Mental Causation,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 178–194. (Scholar)
- Rogerson, Susan, 2007, “Natural Deduction and Curry's paradox,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 36: 155–179. (Scholar)
- Rosch, Eleanor, 1978, “Principles of Categorization,” in E. Rosch and B. Lloyd (eds.), Cognition and Categorization, Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum: 27–48. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, London: Home University Library. (Scholar)
- –––, 1948, Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits, London: Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, Theory of Knowledge––– (ed. by E. R. Eames in collaboration with K. Blackwell), London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Schock, Rolf, 1969, New Foundations for Concept Theory, Lund: C.W.K. Gleerup. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, Sydney, 1984, Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sober, Elliott, 1982, “Why Logically Equivalent Predicates may Pick out Different Properties,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 19: 183–189. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P. F., 1959, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. (Scholar)
- Summerford, James, 2003, “Neither Universals nor Nominalism. Kinds and the Problem of Universals,” Metaphysica, 5: 101–126. (Scholar)
- Swoyer, Chris, 1983, “Realism and Explanation,” Philosophical Inquiry, 5: 14–28. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, “The Metaphysics of Measurement,” in John Forge, ed., Measurement, Realism and Objectivity, Dordrecht: Reidel: 235–290. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “Logic and the Empirical Conception of Properties,” Philosophical Topics, 21: 199–231. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “Theories of Properties: From Plenitude to Paucity,” Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 243–264. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “Complex Predicates and Theories of Properties and Relations,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 27: 295–325. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “How Ontology Might be Possible: Explanation and Inference in Metaphysics,” in Peter A. French and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23: 100–131. (Scholar)
- Tooley, Michael, 1977, “The Nature of Laws,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 7: 667–698. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Vallicella, William F., 2002, “Relations, Monism, and the Vindication of Bradley's Regress,” Dialectica, 56: 3–35. (Scholar)
- Van Cleve, James, 1985, “Three Versions of The Bundle Theory,” Philosophical Studies, 47: 95–107. (Scholar)
- Van Fraassen, Bas, 1989, Laws and Symmetry, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wetzel, Linda, 2009, Types and Tokens. On Abstract Objects, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, Donald, C., 1953, “The Elements of being,” Review of Metaphysics, 7: 3–18, 171–192. (Scholar)
- Zalta, Edward N., 1983, Abstract Objects: An Introduction to Axiomatic Metaphysics, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, Intensional Logic and the Metaphysics of Intentionality, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Natural Numbers and Natural Cardinals as Abstract Objects: A Partial Reconstruction of Frege's Grundgesetze in Object Theory,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 28: 619–660. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Neologicism? An Ontological Reduction of Mathematics to Metaphysics,” Erkenntnis, 53: 219–265. (Scholar)
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