Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Singular Propositions" by Greg Fitch and Michael Nelson
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Philosophy of Language and Mind: Sections 1–4
- Armstrong, Joshua and Stanley, Jason, 2011, “Singular Thoughts and Singular Propositions”, Philosophical Studies, 154: 205–222. (Scholar)
- Bach, Kent, 1992, “Intentions and Demonstrations”, Analysis, 52: 140–6. (Scholar)
- Bach, Kent, 1994, Thought and Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bell, David, 1990, “How ‘Russellian’ was
Frege?”, Mind, 99: 267–77. (Scholar)
- Bertolet, Rod, 1993, “Demonstratives and Intentions: Ten Years Later”, Communication and Cognition, 26: 3–16. (Scholar)
- Black, Max, 1952, “The Identity of Indiscernibles”, Mind, 61: 153–64. (Scholar)
- Boer, Steven and Lycan, William, 1986, Knowing Who, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Braun, David, 1993 “Empty Names”, Noûs, 25: 449–469. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, Richard, 1997, “Singular Propositions”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 23: 67–84. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick, 1976, Person and Object, London: Allen & Unwin. (Scholar)
- Crane, Tim, 2011, “The Singularity of Singular
Thought”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(Supplementary Volume), 85: 21–43. (Scholar)
- Crimmins, Mark and Perry, John, 1989, “The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs”, Journal of Philosophy, 86: 685–711. (Scholar)
- Dummett, Michael, 1991, The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Evans, Gareth, 1981/1985, “Understanding Demonstratives”, in his Collected Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 291–321. (Scholar)
- Evans, Gareth, 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Fitch, G. W., 1988, “The Nature of Singular Propositions”, in D. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 281–297. (Scholar)
- Fitch, G. W., 1990, “Thinking of Something”, Noûs, 24: 675–696. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1879/1967, Begriffsschrift : A Formula Language Modeled on That of Arithmetic, For Pure Thought, in J. van Heijenoort (ed.), From Frege to Gödel: A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879–1931, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1–82. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1892/1948, “Sense and Reference”, Philosophical Review, 57: 209–30. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1897/1979, “Logic”, in H. Hermes,
F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach (eds.), Posthumous Writings,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 126–51. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1914/1979, “Logic in Mathematics”, in
H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach (eds.), Posthumous
Writings, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 203–50. (Scholar)
- Frege, Gottlob, 1918/1956, “The Thought: A Logical Inquiry”, Mind, 65: 289–311. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, John and Manley, David, 2012, The Reference Book, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Jeshion, Robin, 2002, “Acquaintanceless De Re
Belief”, in J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke, and D. Shier (eds.),
Meaning and Truth: investigations in Philosophical Semantics,
New York: Seven Bridges Press, 53–78. (Scholar)
- Jeshion, Robin, 2010, New Essays on Singular Thought, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David, 1975a, “How to Russell a Frege-Church”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 716–729. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David, 1975b, “Dthat”, Syntax and Semantics, 9: 383–99. (Scholar)
- Kaplan, David, 1977/1989, “Demonstratives”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press, 481–504. (Scholar)
- King, Jeffrey, 1996, “Structured Propositions and Sentence Structure”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 495–521. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1970/1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Lawlor, Krista, 2001, New Thoughts About Old Things, New York: Garland. (Scholar)
- Martin, Michael, 2002, “Particular Thoughts and Singular Thought”, in A. O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 173–214. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 1984, “De Re Senses”,
Philosophical Quarterly, 34: 283–94. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 2005, “Evans's Frege”, in J. Bermudez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 42–65. (Scholar)
- Perry, John, 1977, “Frege on Demonstratives”, Philosophical Review, 86: 474–97. (Scholar)
- Perry, John, 1979, “The Problem of the Essential Indexical”, Noûs, 13: 3–21. (Scholar)
- Perry, John, 1980a, “A Problem about Continued Belief”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 4: 317–32. (Scholar)
- Perry, John, 1980b, “Belief and Acceptance”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 5: 533–42. (Scholar)
- Perry, John, 1997, “Rip Van Winkle and Other Characters”, European Review of Philosophy, 2: 13–40. (Scholar)
- Perry, John, 2001, Reference and Reflexivity, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1974, The Nature of Necessity, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1978, “The Boethian Compromise”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 429–38. (Scholar) (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O., 1956, “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”, Journal of Philosophy, 53: 177–187. (Scholar)
- Recanati, François, 1993, Direct Reference, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Reimer, Marga, 1991a, “Three Views on Demonstrative Reference”, Synthese, 99: 373–402. (Scholar)
- Reimer, Marga, 1991b, “Do Demonstrations Have Semantic Significance?”, Analysis, 51: 177–83. (Scholar)
- Reimer, Marga, 1992, “Demonstrating with Descriptions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 52: 877–93. (Scholar)
- Richard, Mark, 1990, Propositional Attitudes: An Essay on Thoughts and How We Ascribe Them, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1903, The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1905, “On Denoting”, Mind, 14: 479–93. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1910, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11: 108–28. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1912, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1914, “On the Nature of Acquaintance”, Monist, 24: 435–453. (Scholar)
- Russell, Bertrand, 1927, The Analysis of Matter, New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company. (Scholar)
- Salmon, Nathan, 1986, Frege's Puzzle, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). (Scholar)
- Salmon, Nathan, 1998, “Nonexistence”, Noûs, 32: 277–319. (Scholar)
- Searle, John, 1983, Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sosa, Ernest, 1970, “Propositional Attitudes De Dicto and De Re”, Journal of Philosophy, 67: 883–896. (Scholar)
- Stanley, Jason, 1997a, “Rigidity and Content”, in R. Heck (ed.), Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in honour of Michael Dummett, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 131–56. (Scholar)
- Stanley, Jason, 1997b, “Names and Rigid Designation”, in B. Hale and C. Wright (eds.), Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 555–86. (Scholar)
- Stanley, Jason, 2002, “Modality and What is Said”, Philosophical Perspectives, 16: 321–44. (Scholar)
- Sullivan, Arthur, 1998, “Singular Propositions and Singular Thoughts”, Norte Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 39: 114–127. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P. F., 1959, Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London: Methuen. (Scholar)
- Zalta, Edward N., 1989, “Singular Propositions, Abstract Constituents, and Propositional Attitudes”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press, 455–78. (Scholar)
Modality and Time: Sections 5–6
- Adams, Robert, 1974, “Theories of Actuality”, Noûs, 5: 211–231. (Scholar)
- Adams, Robert, 1979, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 76: 5–26. (Scholar)
- Adams, Robert, 1981, “Actualism and Thisness”, Synthese, 49: 3–41. (Scholar)
- Adams, Robert, 1986, “Time and Thisness”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 11: 315–329. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1980, “Identity Through Time”, in P. van Inwagen (ed.) Time and Cause, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 67–78. (Scholar)
- Chisholm, Roderick, 1976, Person and Object, London: Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Thomas, 2002, In Defense of Presentism, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Notre Dame. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Thomas, 2005, “Presentism and Cross-Temporal
Relations”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 42:
5–17. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Thomas, 2007a, “Presentism”, in M. Loux and D. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, New York: Oxford University Press, 211–45. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Thomas, 2007b, “Presentism and Grounding”,
Noûs, 41: 47–82. (Scholar)
- Crisp, Thomas and Smith, Donald, 2005, “‘Wholly
Present’ Defined”, Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 71: 318–44. (Scholar)
- Davidson, Matthew, 2000, “Direct Reference and Singular Propositions”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 37: 285–300. (Scholar)
- Deutsch, Harry, 1990, “Contingency and Modal Logic”, Philosophical Studies, 60: 89–102. (Scholar)
- Deutsch, Harry, 1994, “Logic for Contingent Beings”, Journal of Philosophical Research, 19: 273–329. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 1977, “Postscript: Prior on the Construction of
Possible Worlds and Instants”, in A. N. Prior and K. Fine,
Worlds, Times, and Selves, Amherst: University of
Massachusetts Press, 116–61. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 1985, “Plantinga on the Reduction of Possibilist
Discourse”, in J. Tomberlin and P. van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin
Plantinga, Dordrecht: Reidel, 145–186. (Scholar)
- Fine, Kit, 2005, Modality and Time: Philosophical Papers, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fitch, G.W., 1996, “In Defense of Aristotelian Actualism”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 53–71. (Scholar)
- Forbes, Graeme, 1987, “Is there a Problem about Persistence? II”,
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume),
61: 137–55. (Scholar)
- Geach Peter, 1966, “Some Problems about Time”,
Proceedings of the British Academy, 51: 321–336. (Scholar)
- Geach, Peter, 1967, “Identity”, Review of Metaphysics, 21: 3–12 (Scholar)
- Haslanger, Sally, 1985, Change, Persistence, and
Possibility, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of California at
Berkeley. (Scholar)
- Haslanger, Sally, 1989a, “Persistence, Change and Explanation”, Philosophical Studies, 56: 1–28. (Scholar)
- Haslanger, Sally, 1989b, “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”, Analysis, 49: 119–125. (Scholar)
- Haslanger, Sally, 2003, “Persistence Through Time”, in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (eds.) The Oxford Handbook to Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hawley, Katherine, 2001, How Things Persist, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hazen, A. P., 1995, “On Quantifying Out”, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, 24: 291–319 (Scholar)
- Heller, Mark, 1990, The Ontology of Physical Objects, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hinchliff, Mark, 1988, A Defense of Presentism, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University. (Scholar)
- Hinchliff, Mark, 1996, “The Puzzle of Change”, Philosophical Perspectives, 10: 119–36. (Scholar)
- Hoffman, Aviv, 2003, “A Puzzle About Truth and Singular Propositions”, Mind, 112: 635–651. (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 1983, Particulars and Persistence, Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University. (Scholar)
- Johnston, Mark, 1987, “Is there a Problem about
Persistence? I”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(Supplementary Volume), 61: 107–35. (Scholar)
- Jubien, Michael, 1993, Ontology, Modality and the Fallacy of Reference, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- King, Jeffrey, 2003, “Tense, Modality, and Semantic Value”, Philosophical Perspectives, 15: 195–245. (Scholar)
- Kripke, Saul, 1963, “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic”, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 60: 83–94. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1971, “Counterparts of Persons and their Bodies”, Journal of Philosophy, 68: 203–211. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1976, “Survival and Identity”, in A. Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 117–40. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, 1988, “Re-arrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”, Analysis, 48: 65–72. (Scholar)
- Linsky, Bernard and Zalta, Edward, 1994, “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic”, Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 431–58. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E.J., 1987, “Lewis on Perdurance versus Endurance”, Analysis, 47: 152–4. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 1988, “The Problems of Intrinsic Change: Rejoinder to Lewis”, Analysis, 48: 72–77. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E. J., 1998, “Tense and Persistence”, in P. Le Poidevin (ed.) Questions of Time and Tense, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 43–59. (Scholar)
- Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 1963, “Modalities and Intensional Languages”, Synthese, 13: 303–322. (Scholar)
- Marcus, Ruth Barcan, 1985/1986, “Possibilia and Possible Worlds”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 25–26: 107–133. (Scholar)
- Markosian, Ned, 2003, “A Defense of Presentism”, in D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 47–82. (Scholar)
- Mellor, D.H., 1981, Real Time, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Mellor, D.H, 1998, Real Time II, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Menzel, Christopher, 1991, “The True Modal Logic”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 20: 331–74. (Scholar)
- Menzel, Christopher, 1993 “Singular Propositions and Modal Logic”, Phiosophical Topics, 21: 113–48. (Scholar)
- Merricks, Trenton, 2012, “Singular Propositions”, in K. Clark and M. Rea (eds.), Reason, Metaphysics, and Mind: New Essays on the Philosophy of Alvin Plantinga, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 61–81. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1978, “The Boethian Compromise”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15: 429–38. (Scholar)
- Plantinga, Alvin, 1983, “On Existentialism”, Philosophical Studies, 44: 1–20. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1959, “Thank Goodness That's Over”, Philosophy, 32: 12–17. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1962, “Changes in Events and Changes in Things”, in Papers on Time and Tense, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1965, “Time, Existence, and Identity”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 66: 183–92. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N.,1967, Past, Present, and Future, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1970, “The Notion of the Present”, Stadium Generale, 23: 245–248. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N. and Fine, Kit, 1977, Worlds, Times, and Selves, Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O., 1960, Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O., 1950, “Identity, Ostension and Hypostasis”, in his From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 65–79. (Scholar)
- Robinson, Denis, 1982, “Re-identifying Matter”, Philosophical Review, 81: 317–42. (Scholar)
- Salmon, Nathan, 1989, “Tense and Singular Propositions”, in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press, 331–392. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 1996, “All the World's a Stage”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 433–453. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 1997, “Four-Dimensionalism”, Philosophical Review, 106: 197–231.. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 2000, “The Stage View and Temporary Intrinsics”, Analysis, 60: 84–8. (Scholar)
- Sider, Theodore, 2001, Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Smart, J. J. C., 1955, “Spatialising Time”, Mind, 64: 239–41. (Scholar)
- Smart, J. J. C., 1972, “Space-Time and Individuals”, in R. Rudner
and I. Scheffler (eds.), Logic and Art: Essays in Honor of Nelson
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- Speaks, Jeff, 2012, “On Possibly Nonexistent Propositions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 85: 528–562. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert, 1994 “The Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity”, in W. Sinnott-Armstrong, D. Raffman, and N. Asher (eds.), Modalities, Morality and Belief: Essays in Honor of Ruth Barcan Marcus, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 12–28. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, Robert, 2012, Mere Possibilities, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Taylor, Richard, 1955, “Spatial and Temporal Analogues and the Concept of Identity”, Journal of Philosophy, 52: 599–612. (Scholar)
- Thomson, Judith Jarvis, 1983, “Parthood and Identity Across Time”, Journal of Philosophy, 80: 201–20. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter, 1990, “Four-Dimensional Objects”, Noûs, 24: 245–55. (Scholar)
- van Inwagen, Peter, 2000, “Temporal Parts and Identity Across Time”, Monist, 83: 437–59. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David, 1968, “On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time”, Philosophical Review, 77: 90–5. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David, 1980, Sameness and Substance, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wiggins, David, 2001, Sameness and Substance Renewed, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Williams, Donald, 1951, “The Myth of Passage”, Journal of Philosophy, 48: 457–72. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2000, “Existence and Contingency”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 100: 117–139. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2001, “Necessary Existents”, in A. O'Hear (ed.), Logic, Thought, and Language, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 233–51. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2006, “Stalnaker on the Interaction of Modality with Quantification and Identity”, in J. Thompson and A. Bryne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 123–147. (Scholar)
- Williamson, Timothy, 2013, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, Dean, 1996, “Persistence and Presentism”, Philosophical Papers, 25: 115–126. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, Dean, 1998a, “Temporary Intrinsics and
Presentism”, in P. van Inwagen and D. Zimmerman (eds.),
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- Zimmerman, Dean, 1998b, “Temporal Parts and Supervenient Causation: The Incompatibility of Two Humean Doctrines”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76: 265–88. (Scholar)