Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Inverted Qualia" by Alex Byrne |
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- Averill, E. W., 1992, “The Relational Nature of Color”, Philosophical Review, 101: 551-88. (Scholar)
- Ayer, A. J., 1936, Language, Truth and Logic, London: Victor Gollancz; page reference is to the 1971 reprint, Harmondsworth, England: Pelican Books. (Scholar)
- –––, (ed.), 1959, Logical Positivism, New York: The Free Press. (Scholar)
- Block, N., 1980, “Troubles with Functionalism”, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, N. Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “Inverted Earth”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 53-79. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227-47. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996a, “Mental Paint and Mental Latex”, Philosophical Issues, 7: 19-49. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996b, “Functionalism”, in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy Supplement, D. Borchert (ed.), New York: Macmillan. [Functionalism.pdf" target="other">Preprint available online in PDF.] (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Sexism, Racism, Ageism and the Nature of Consciousness”, in Philosophical Topics, 26 (1&2). [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “The Harder Problem of Consciousness”, Journal of Philosophy, 94: 1-35. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Mental Paint”, in Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge, M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Preprint available online in PDF.] (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Wittgenstein and Qualia”, Philosophical Perspectives, 21: 73-115. [Preprint available online in PDF.] (Scholar)
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- Block, N. and Stalnaker, R., 1999, “Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap”, Philosophical Review 108: 1-46. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- Boghossian, P., and Velleman, J. D., 1991, “Physicalist Theories of Color”, Philosophical Review, 100: 67-106. Reprinted in Byrne and Hilbert 1997a. (Scholar)
- Broackes, J., 2007, “Black and White and the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 161-75. (Scholar)
- Burge, T., 1979, “Individualism and the Mental”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4: 73-121. (Scholar)
- Byrne, A., 2001, “Intentionalism Defended”, Philosophical Review, 110: 199-240. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Something About Mary”, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 63: 123-40. (Scholar)
- Byrne, A., and Hilbert, D. R., 1997a, Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997b, “Colors and Reflectances”, in Byrne and Hilbert 1997a. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- –––, 2003a, “Color Realism and Color Science”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26: 3-21. [Preprint available online ]. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003b, “Color Realism Redux”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26: 52-63. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- Campbell, N., 2000, “Physicalism, Qualia Inversion, and Affective States”, Synthese, 124: 239-55. (Scholar)
- Carruthers, P., 2000, Phenomenal Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Casati, R., 1990, “What is Wrong in Inverting Spectra?” Theoria, 10: 183-6. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., 1995, “Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia”, in Conscious Experience, T. Metzinger (ed.), Ferdinand-Schoningh: Paderborn. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, The Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “The Representational Character of Experience”, in The Future for Philosophy, B. Leiter (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., and Jackson, F., 2001, “Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation”, Philosophical Review, 110: 315-61. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- Churchland, P. M., and Churchland, P. S., 1981, “Functionalism, Qualia, and Intentionality”, Philosophical Topics, 12: 121-46. (Scholar)
- Clark, A., 1985, “Spectrum Inversion and the Color Solid”, Southern Journal of Philosophy, 23: 431-43. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, Sensory Qualities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, A Theory of Sentience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cohen, J., 2001, “Color, Content, and Fred: On a Proposed Reductio of the Inverted Spectrum Hypothesis”, Philosophical Studies, 103: 121-44. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Color Properties and Color Ascriptions: A Relationalist Manifesto”, Philosophical Review, 113 (October): 451-506, [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- Cole, D. J., 1990, “Functionalism and Inverted Spectra”, Synthese, 82: 207-22. (Scholar)
- Crane, T., 2000, “The Origins of Qualia”, in History of the Mind-Body Problem, T. Crane and S. Patterson (eds.), London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1987, “Knowing One's Own Mind”, Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 60: 441-58. Reprinted in Davidson, 2001, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Davies, M., 1997, “Externalism and Experience”, in The Nature of Consciousness, N. Block, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. C., 1988, “Quining Qualia”, in Consciousness and Contemporary Science, A. Marcel and E. Bisiach (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press; page reference is to the reprint in Chalmers 2002. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “The Message is: There is no Medium”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 919-31. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Instead of Qualia”, in Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience, A. Revonsuo and M. Kamppinen (eds.), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Egan, A., 2006, “Appearance Properties?”, Noûs, 40(3): 495–521. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
- Fodor, J., 1992, A Theory of Content and Other Essays, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Frege, G., 1884/1953, The Foundations of Arithmetic, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Gert, B., 1965, “Imagination and Verifiability”, Philosophical Studies, 16: 44-47. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1951, The Structure of Appearance, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Hardin, C. L., 1987, “Qualia and Materialism: Closing the Explanatory Gap”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 48: 281-98. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Reply to Levine's ‘Cool Red’”, Philosophical Psychology, 4: 41-50. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, Color for Philosophers (expanded edition), Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Reinverting the Spectrum”, in Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color, A. Byrne and D. R. Hilbert (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––-, 1999a, “Color Quality and Structure”, in Toward a Science of Consciousness III: The Third Tucson Discussions and Debates, S. Hameroff, A. Kaszniak, D. Chalmers, (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. [Preprint available online.] (Scholar)
- –––-, 1999b, “Color Relations and the Power of Complexity”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 963-4. (Scholar)
- –––-, 2003, “A Spectral Reflectance Doth Not a Color Make”, Journal of Philosophy, 100: 191-202. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1982, “Conceptual Role Semantics”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 23: 242-56. (Scholar)
- –––, 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, Philosophical Perspectives, 4: 31-52. (Scholar)
- Harrison, B., 1967, “On Describing Colors”, Inquiry, 10: 38-52. (Scholar)
- –––, 1973, Form and Content, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Harvey, J., 1979, “Systematic Transposition of Colours”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 57: 211-19. (Scholar)
- Hellie, B., 2004, “Inexpressible Truths and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument”, in There's Something about Mary, P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Hempel, C., 1965, “Aspects of Scientific Explanation”, in Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, C. Hempel, New York: Free Press (Scholar)
- Hilbert, D. R., and Kalderon, M., 2000, “Color and the Inverted Spectrum”, in Color Perception: Philosophical, Psychological, Artistic, and Computational Perspectives, S. Davis (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hill, C., 1991, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T., 1984, “Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 453-70. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T., and Tienson, J., 2002, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality”, in Philosophy of Mind, D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hurley, S. L., 1998, Consciousness in Action, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Hurvich, L. M., Jameson, D., and Cohen, J. D., 1968, “The Experimental Determination of Unique Green in the Spectrum”, Perceptual Psychophysics, 4: 65-8. (Scholar)
- Jacovides, M., 1999, “Locke's Resemblance Theses”, Philosophical Review, 108: 461-96. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1977, Perception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly, 32: 127-36. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Johnsen, B. C., 1986, “The Inverted Spectrum”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 64: 471-6. (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “The Intelligibility of Spectrum Inversion”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 23: 631-6. (Scholar)
- Kaiser, P. K., and Boynton, R. M., 1996, Human Color Vision, Washington, DC: Optical Society of America. (Scholar)
- Kay, P., 1999, “Asymmetries in the Distribution of Composite and Derived Basic Color Categories”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 957-8. (Scholar)
- Kirk, R., 1982, “Goodbye to Transposed Qualia”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 82: 33-44. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Raw Feeling, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kuehni, R. G., 2003, Color Space and Its Divisions: Color Order from Antiquity to the Present, Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. (Scholar)
- Levine, J., 1983, “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64, 354-61; page reference is to the reprint in Chalmers 2002. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “Absent and Inverted Qualia Revisited”, Mind and Language, 3: 271-87. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Cool Red”, Philosophical Psychology, 4: 27-40. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, C. I., 1929, Mind and the World Order, New York: Scribner's. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1980, “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, N. Block, (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Locke, J., 1689/1975, Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W. G., 1973, “Inverted Spectrum”, Ratio, 15: 315-9. (Scholar)
- –––, 1987, Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- MacLaury, R. E., 1999, “Asymmetry Among Hering Primaries Thwarts the Inverted Spectrum Argument”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 960-1. (Scholar)
- Macpherson, F., 2005, “Colour Inversion Problems for Representationalism”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 70: 127-52. (Scholar)
- Marcus, E., 2006, “Intentionalism and the Imaginability of the Inverted Spectrum”, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 321-39. (Scholar)
- Mausfeld, R., 2003, “‘Colour’ as Part of the Format of Different Perceptual Primitives: the Dual Coding of Colour”, in Colour Perception: From Light to Object, R. Mausfeld and D. Heyer (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- McGinn, C., 1983, The Subjective View, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989, Mental Content, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- McLaughlin, B., 2003, “The Place of Color in Nature”, in Colour Perception: From Light to Object, R. Mausfeld and D. Heyer (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mollon, J., Pokorny, J., and Knoblauch, K. (eds.), 2003, Normal and Defective Colour Vision, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Moore, G. E., 1953, Some Main Problems of Philosophy, London: George Allen & Unwin. (Scholar)
- Myin, E., 2001, “Color and the Duplication Assumption”, Synthese, 129: 61-77. (Scholar)
- Nida-Rümelin, M., 1996, “Pseudonormal Vision: An Actual Case of Qualia Inversion?”, Philosophical Studies, 82: 145-57. Reprinted in Chalmers 2002. (Scholar)
- Noë, A., 2005, Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Palmer, S., 1999a, “Color, Consciousness, and the Isomorphism Constraint”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 923-43. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999b, “On Qualia, Relations, and Structure in Color Experience”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22: 976-85. (Scholar)
- Papineau, D., 2002, Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C., 1983, Sense and Content, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1988, “The Limits of Intelligibility: A Post-Verificationist Proposal”, Philosophical Review, 97: 463-96. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001. “Does Perception have a Nonconceptual Content?”, Journal of Philosophy, 98: 239-64. (Scholar)
- Piantanida, T. P., 1974, “A Replacement Model of X-linked Recessive Colour Vision Defects”, Annals of Human Genetics, 37: 393-404. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1967, “Psychological Predicates”, in Art, Mind and Religion, W. Capitan and D. Merrill (eds.), Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Reprinted as “The Nature of Mental States” in Putnam, 1975, Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1975, “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, in Language, Mind and Knowledge, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, K. Gunderson (ed.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in Putnam, 1975, Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Rey, G., 1992, “Sensational Sentences Switched”, Philosophical Studies, 68: 289-319. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “A Narrow Representationalist Account of Qualitative Experience”, Philosophical Perspectives, 12: 435-58. (Scholar)
- Robinson, H., 1994, Perception, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1927, The Analysis of Matter, London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd. (Scholar)
- Sacks, O., 1997, The Island of the Colorblind, New York: Knopf. (Scholar)
- Schlick, M., 1932/3, “Positivism and Realism”, Erkenntnis, 3; page reference is to the reprint in Ayer 1959. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1975a, “Functionalism and Qualia”, Philosophical Studies, 27: 291-315. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984. (Scholar)
- –––, 1975b, “Phenomenal Similarity”, Critica, 7: 3-37. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, “Absent Qualia Are Impossible”, Philosophical Review, 90: 581-99. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1984. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “The Inverted Spectrum”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 357-81; page reference is to the reprint in Shoemaker 1984. (Scholar)
- –––, 1984, Identity, Cause, and Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, “Review of Colin McGinn's The Subjective View”, Journal of Philosophy, 83: 407-13. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, “Qualia and Consciousness”, Mind, 100: 507-24. Reprinted in Shoemaker 1996a. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994a, “Phenomenal Character”, Noûs, 28: 21-38. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994b, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner-Sense’”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54: 249-314; page reference is to the reprint in Shoemaker 1996a. (Scholar)
- –––. 1996a, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996b, “Intersubjective/Intrasubjective”, in Shoemaker 1996a. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Content, Character, and Color”, Whitehead lectures, Harvard University. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006a, “On the Ways Things Appear”, in Perceptual Experience, T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, ‘The Frege-Schlick View’, in Content and Modality, J. Thomson and A. Byrne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Speaks, J., forthcoming, “Spectrum Inversion Without a Difference in Representation is Impossible”, Philosophical Studies. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R., 1987, Inquiry, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Comparing Qualia Across Persons”, Philosophical Topics, 26: 385-405; page reference is to the reprint in Stalnaker, 2003, Ways a World Might Be, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, ‘Reply to Shoemaker’, in Content and Modality, J. Thomson and A. Byrne (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, G., 1989, “Red and ‘Red’”, Synthese, 78: 193-232. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, Mental Reality, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Sundström, P., 2002, “An Argument Against Spectrum Inversion”, in Physicalism, Consciousness and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, S. Lindström and S. Sundström (eds.), Umeå: The Department of Philosophy and Linguistics. [Preprint available online in PDF.] (Scholar)
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- Tye, M., 1994, “Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum”, Noûs, 28: 159-183. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited”, in Philosophy of Mind, D. Chalmers (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Qualia”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), E. Zalta (ed.), URL = <Qualia">http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/Qualia>. (Scholar)
- Westphal, J., 1991, Colour: A Philosophical Introduction, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- White. S., 1994, “Color and Notional Content”, Philosophical Topics, 22: 471-503. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1958, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1968, “Notes for Lectures on ‘Private Experience’ and ‘Sense-data’”, Philosophical Review, 77: 275-320. (Scholar)
- –––, 1977, Remarks on Colour, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
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