Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Qualia: The Knowledge Argument" by Martine Nida-Rümelin |
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- Alter, T., 1995, “Mary's New Perspective”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 582–584 (Scholar)
- Alter, T. , 1998, “A Limited Defense of the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophical Studies 90 (1): 35–56. (Scholar)
- Alter, T., and S. Walter (eds.), 2007, Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge. New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Alter, T., 2007, “Does representationalism undermine the knowledge argument?” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 65–67. (Scholar)
- Balog, K., forthcoming , “Aquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem” in Identity Theory, Christopher Hill and Simone Gozzano (eds.), Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Block, N., 2007, “Max Black's Objection to Mind-Body Identity,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 249–306. (Scholar)
- Bigelow, J. and Pargetter, R., 1990, “Acquaintance with Qualia”, Theoria 61: 129–147 (Scholar)
- Broad, C.D., 1925, The Mind and its Place in Nature, New York: The Humanities Press Inc, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD (Scholar)
- Byrne, A., 2002,“Something about Mary”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (Essays in Honour of the Philosophy of Terence Horgan, J. Brandl & O. Markic): 123–140. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
- Conee, E., 1994, “Phenomenal Knowledge”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 136–150. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., 1996, The Conscious Mind. In Search of a Fundamental Theory, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., 2002, “Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief”, in Q. Smith & A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Essays, Oxford, OUP [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., 2005, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Knowledge Argument,” in P. Ludlow et al. (2005). (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D., 2007, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 167–194. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P., 1985, “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States”, Journal of Philosophy 82: 8–28 (Scholar)
- Churchland, P., 1989, “Knowing Qualia. A Reply to Jackson”, in A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT, pp. 67–76. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D., 1984, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D., 2007, “What RoboMary Knows,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 15–31. (Scholar)
- Feigl, H., 1958, “The Mental and the Physical” in Herbert Feigl, Michael Scriven & Grover Maxwell, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science II: Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. (Scholar)
- Flanagan, O., 1992, Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. (Scholar)
- Furash, G., 1989, “Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Materialism,” Dialogue 32: 1–6. (Scholar)
- Gertler, B., 1999, “A Defense of the Knowledge Argument”. Philosophical Studies 93: 317–336. (Scholar)
- Van Gulick, R., 2005,“So many ways of saying no to Mary”. In Ludlow et al., 2005. (Scholar)
- Graham, G. & Horgan, T., 2000, “Mary Mary, Quite Contrary”, Philosophical Studies 99: 59–87. (Scholar)
- Hardin, C.L., 1992, ‘Physiology, Phenomenology and Spinoza’a true Colors, in Emergence or Reduction. Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, A. Beckermann, H. Flohr, J. Kim, Berlin: De Gruyter (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1990, “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience”, Philosophical Persepctives 4, Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind: 31–52. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T., 1984, “Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
- Hellie, B., 2005, “Inexpressible Truth and the Allure of the Knowledge Argument”, in Ludlow et al. (2005). (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1982, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”, Philosophical Quarterly 32: 127–136. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1986, “What Mary Didn't Know”, Journal of Philosophy 83: 291–295 (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1995, “Postscript on ‘What Mary didn't know’”, in P. Moser & J. Trout 1995, 184–189. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1998, “Postscript on Qualia”, in Jackson: Mind, Methods and Conditionals, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 2007, “The knowledge argument, diaphonousness, representationalism,” in T. Alter & S. Walter 2007: 52–64. (Scholar)
- Jacquette, D., 1995, “The Blue Banana Trick: Dennett on Jackson's Color Scientist”, Theoria 61: 217–230. (Scholar)
- Levin, J., 2007, “What is a phenomenal concept?” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 87–110. (Scholar)
- Levin, J., 1986, “Could Love Be Like a Heat Wave?: Physicalism and the Subjective Character of Experience”, Philosophical Studies 49: 245–261. (Scholar)
- Levine, J., 1997, “Recent Work on Consciousness”, American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (4): 397– 404. (Scholar)
- Levine, J., 2007, “Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 145–166. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1983, Postscript to “Mad Pain and Martian Pain”, in D. Lewis, Philosophical Papers (Volume 1), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1988, “What Experience Teaches”, Proceedings of the Russellian Society, 13: 29–57. Reprinted in Lycan (1990). (Scholar)
- Ludlow, P., Nagasawa, Y. & Stoljar, D. (eds.), 2005, There is something about Mary: essays on phenomenal consciousness and Frank Jackson's knowledge argument., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W. G., 1990, “What is the Subjectivity of the Mental”, Philosophical Perspectives 4 (Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind): 109–130. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W. G. (ed.), 1990, Mind and Cognition, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G., 1996, ed., Mind and Cognition. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Loar, B., 1990, “Phenomenal States” (Revised Version), in The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, N. Block, O. Flanagan, G. Güzeldere (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
- Maloney, Ch., 1985, “About Being a Bat”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 (1): 26–49. (Scholar)
- McConnell, 1994, “In Defense of the Knowledge Argument,” Philosophical Topics 22 (1&2): 157–187. (Scholar)
- McMullen, C., 1985, “ ‘Knowing what it's Like’ and the Essential Indexical”, Philosophical Studies 48: 211–233.
- Mellor, D.H., 1993, “Nothing Like Experience,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 93: 1–15. (Scholar)
- Moser, P. and J. Trout, 1995, Contemporary Materialism, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Nagel, Th., 1974, “What is it like to be a bat?”, Philosophical Review 83: 435–50. (Scholar)
- Nemirow, L., 1980, “Review of Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions,” Philosophical Review 89: 473–477. (Scholar)
- Nemirow, L., 1990, “Physicalism and the Cognitive Role of Acquaintance,” in Lycan 1990: 490–499. (Scholar)
- Nemirow, L., 2007, “So this is what it's like: a defense of the ability hypothesis,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 32–51. (Scholar)
- Nida-Rümelin, M., 1996, “What Mary couldn't know”, in Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Phenomenal Consciousness, Schoenigh: Paderborn. (Scholar)
- Nida-Rümelin, M., 1998, “On Belief About Experiences: An Epistemological Distinction Applied to the Knowledge Argument”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 51–73. (Scholar)
- Nida-Rümelin, M., 2007, “Grasping phenomenal properties,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 307–349. (Scholar)
- Nordby, K., 2007, “What is this thing you call color? Can a totally color blind person know about color?”, in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007). (Scholar)
- Papineau, D. 1996, “The Antipathetic Fallacy”, in Conscious Experience, Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Papineau, D., 2002, Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Papineau, D., 2007, “Phenomenal and perceptual concepts,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 111–144. (Scholar)
- Pereboom, D. 1994, “Bats, Scientists, and the Limitations of Introspection”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 315–329. (Scholar)
- Perry, J., 2001, Knowledge, Possibility and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Raymont, P., 1999, “The Know-How Response to Jackson's Knowledge Argument”, Journal of Philosophical Research 24: 113–126. (Scholar)
- Raymont, P., 1995, “Tye's Criticism of the Knowledge Argument”, Dialogue 24: 713–726. (Scholar)
- Raymont, P. (1995), “Tye's Criticism of the Knowledge Argument”, Dialogue 34 (4): 713–726. (Scholar)
- Robinson, H., 1993, “Dennett on the Knowledge Argument”, Analysis 53 (3): 174–177. (Scholar)
- Robinson, H., 1996, “The Anti-Materialist Strategy and the Knowledge Argument”, in Objections to Physicalism, H. Robinson (ed.), New York, Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Press. (Scholar)
- Shepard, R., 1993, “On the Physical Basis, Linguistic Representation, and Conscious Experience of Colors”, in Conceptions of the Mind: Essays in honor of George A. Miller, G. Harman (ed.), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. (Scholar)
- Teller, P., 1992, “Subjectivity and Knowing What it's Like”, in Emergence or Reduction, Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, A. Beckermann, H. Flohr & J. Kim (eds.), Berlin: De Gruyter: 180–200. (Scholar)
- Tye, M., 1986, “The Subjective Qualities of Experience”, Mind 95 (377): 1–17. (Scholar)
- Tye, M., 1989, The Metaphysics of Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Tye, M., 1995, Ten Problems of Consiousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Tye, M., 2000, “Knowing What it is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument,” in M. Tye, Consciousness, Color, and Content, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Tye, M., 2009, Consciousness Revisited, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Warner, R. (1986): “A Challenge to Physicalism,” In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64: 249–265. (Scholar)
- Watkins, M., (1989): “The Knowledge Argument Against the Knowledge Argument”, Analysis 49: 158–160. (Scholar)
- White, St. L. (2007), “Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise,” in T. Alter & S. Walter (2007): 210–248. (Scholar)
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