Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Moral Reasoning" by Henry S. Richardson |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Anderson, E. S., 1991. “John Stuart Mill and experiments in living,” Ethics, 102: 4–26. (Scholar)
- Audi, R., 1989. Practical reasoning, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––. 2004. The good in the right: A theory of good and intrinsic value, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Beauchamp, T. L., 1979. “A reply to Rachels on active and passive euthanasia,” in Medical responsibility, ed. W. L. Robinson, Clifton, N.J.: Humana Press, 182–95. (Scholar)
- Brandt, R. B., 1979. A theory of the good and the right, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bratman, M., 1999. Faces of intention: Selected essays on intention and agency, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Broome, J., 2009. “The unity of reasoning?” in Spheres of reason, ed. S. Robertson, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Campbell, R. and Kumar, V. “Moral reasoning on the ground,” Ethics, 122: 273–312. (Scholar)
- Chang, R. (ed.), 1998. Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Clarke, S. G., and E. Simpson, 1989. Anti-theory in ethics and moral conservativism, Albany: SUNY Press. (Scholar)
- Dancy, J., 1993. Moral reasons, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. Ethics without principles, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dewey, J., 1967. The middle works, 1899–1924, Vol. 14, Human nature and conduct, ed. J. A. Boydston, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press. (Scholar)
- Donagan, A., 1977. The theory of morality, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Dworkin, R., 1978. Taking rights seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Engstrom, S., 2009. The form of practical knowledge: A study of the categorical imperative, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Fletcher, J., 1997. Situation ethics: The new morality, Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, H. G., 1988. The importance of what we care about: Philosophical essays, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Gert, B., 1998. Morality: Its nature and justification, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Greene, J., 2004. “The secret joke of Kant's soul,” in W. Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral psychology (Vol. 3: The neuroscience of morality: Emotion, disease, and development), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Habermas, J., 1984. The theory of communicative action: Vol. I, Reason and the rationalization of society, Boston: Beacon Press. (Scholar)
- Haidt, J., 2001. “The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment,” Psychological Review, 108: 814–34. (Scholar)
- Hare, R. M., 1981. Moral thinking: Its levels, method, and point, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Harman, G., 1986. Change in view: principles of peasoning, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Hauser, M.D., 2005. Moral minds: how nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong, New York: Harper Collins. (Scholar)
- Held, V., 1995. Justice and care: Essential readings in feminist ethics, Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. (Scholar)
- Horty, John F., 2012. Reasons as defaults, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hume, David, 2000 [1739–40]. A treatise of human nature, ed. D. F. Norton and M. J. Norton, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hurley, S. L., 1989. Natural reasons: Personality and polity, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jonsen, A. R., and S. Toulmin, 1988. The abuse of casuistry: A history of moral reasoning, Berkeley: University of California Press. (Scholar)
- Kagan, S., 1988. “The additive fallacy,” Ethics, 90: 5–31. (Scholar)
- Knobe, J., 2006. “The concept of individual action: A case study in the uses of folk psychology,” Philosophical Studies, 130: 203–231. (Scholar)
- Koenigs, M., 2007. “Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgments,” Nature, 446: 908–911. (Scholar)
- Kolodny, N., 2005. “Why be rational?” Mind, 114: 509–63. (Scholar)
- Korsgaard, C. M., 1996. Creating the kingdom of ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Lance, M. and Tanesini, A., 2004. “Rationality and emotion,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (Supplementary Volume), 30: 275–95. (Scholar)
- McDowell, John, 1998. Mind, value, and reality, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- McKeever, S. and Ridge, M. 2006., Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Idea, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- McNaughton, D., 1988. Moral vision: An introduction to ethics, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Millgram, E., 1997. Practical induction, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Mikhail, J., 2011. Elements of moral cognition: Rawls's linguistic analogy and the cognitive science of moral and legal judgment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Nell, O., 1975. Acting on principle: An essay on Kantian ethics, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- Nussbaum, M. C., 1990. Love's knowledge: Essays on philosophy and literature, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001. Upheavals of thought: The intelligence of emotions, Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Rachels, J., 1975. “Active and passive euthanasia,” New England Journal of Medicine, 292: 78–80. (Scholar)
- Railton, Peter, 1984. “Alienation, consequentialism, and the demands of morality,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 13: 134–71. (Scholar)
- Rawls, J., 1971. A theory of justice, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- –––, 1996. Political liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999. A theory of justice, revised edition, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- –––, 2000. Lectures on the history of moral philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Raz, J., 1990. Practical reason and norms, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Richardson, H. S., 1994. Practical reasoning about final ends, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000. “Specifying, balancing, and interpreting bioethical principles,” Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 25: 285–307. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002. Democratic autonomy: Public reasoning about the ends of policy, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004. “Thinking about conflicts of desires,” in Practical conflicts: New philosophical essays, eds. P. Baumann and M. Betzler, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 96–117. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012. “Mapping out Improvements in Justice: Comparing vs. Aiming,” Rutgers University Law Review, 43(2): 211–242 (Scholar)
- Ross, W. D., 1988. The right and the good, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Sandel, M., 1998. Liberalism and the limits of justice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sartre, J. P., 1975. “Existentialism is a Humanism,” in Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre, ed. W. Kaufmann, New York: Meridian-New American, 345-69. (Scholar)
- Scheffler, Samuel, 1992. Human morality, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schmidtz, D., 1995. Rational choice and moral agency, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Schneewind, J.B., 1977. Sidgwick's ethics and Victorian moral philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Schroeder, M., 2011. “Holism, weight, and undercutting.” Noûs, 45: 328–44. (Scholar)
- Schwitzgebel, E. and Cushman, F., 2012. “Expertise in moral reasoning? Order effects on moral judgment in professional philosophers and non-philosophers,” Mind and Language, 27: 135–53. (Scholar)
- Sidgwick, H., 1981. The methods of ethics, reprinted, 7th edition, Indianapolis: Hackett. (Scholar)
- Singer, M. G., 1961. Generalization in ethics, New York: Knopf. (Scholar)
- Sinnott-Armstrong, W., 1988. Moral dilemmas, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Smith, M., 1994. The moral problem, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Sneddon, A., 2007. “A social model of moral dumbfounding: Implications for studying moral reasoning and moral judgment,” Philosophical Psychology, 20: 731–48. (Scholar)
- Sunstein, C. R., 1996. Legal reasoning and political conflict, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Tiberius, V., 2000. “Humean heroism: Value commitments and the source of normativity,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 81: 426–446. (Scholar)
- Vogler, C., 1998. “Sex and talk,” Critical Inquiry, 24: 328–65. (Scholar)
- Wellman, H. and Miller, J., 2008. “Including deontic reasoning as fundamental to theory of mind,” Human Development, 51: 105–35 (Scholar)
- Williams, B., 1981. Moral luck: Philosophical papers 1973–1980, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Young, L. and Saxe, R., 2008. “The neural basis of belief encoding and integration in moral judgment,” NeuroImage, 40: 1912–20. (Scholar)
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