Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Reference" by Marga Reimer |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
This experiment has been authorized by the editors of the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. The original article and bibliography can be found here.
- Almog, J., J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.) (1989), Themes from Kaplan, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bach, K. (1987), Thought and Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bach, K. (2004), ‘Points of Reference,’ in Bezuidenhout & Reimer (eds.) 2004. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
- Barcan Marcus, R. (1947), “The Identity of Individuals in a Strict Functional Calculus of Second Order,” Journal of Symbolic Logic, 12(1): 12–15. (Scholar)
- Barcan Marcus, R. (1961), ‘Modalities and Intentional Languages,’ Synthese, 13(4): 303–322. (Scholar)
- Barcan Marcus, R. (1993), Modalities, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Bezuidenhout, A., and Reimer, M. (eds.) (2004), Descriptions and Beyond, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Brandom, R. (1994), Making it Explicit. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Brueckner, A. (1986), ‘Brains in a Vat,’ Journal of Philosophy, 83: 148–167. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D. (1984), Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- DeRose, K. (2000), ‘How can we know that we are not Brains in Vat?,’ Southern Journal of Philosophy, 39: 121–148. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. (1981), Designation, New York: Columbia University Press. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. (1990), ‘Meanings just ain't in the head,’ in Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 79–104. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. (1996), Coming to our Senses, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. and Sterelny, K. (1999), Language and Reality (2nd edition), Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Devitt, M. (2004), ‘The Case for Referential Descriptions,’ in Bezuidenhout and Reimer (eds.) 2004. (Scholar)
- Donnellan , K. (1966), ‘Reference and Definite Descriptions,’ Philosophical Review, 75: 281–304. [Post-print online version] (Scholar)
- Donnellan, K. (1972), ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions,’ in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds) The Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
- Evans, G. (1973), ‘The Causal Theory of Names,’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 47: 187–208. (Scholar)
- Evans, G. (1982), The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Field, H. (2001), Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J. (1990), A Theory of Content and other Essays, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Frege. G. (1893), ‘On Sense and Reference,’ in P. Geach and M. Black (eds.) Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Oxford: Blackwell (1952). (Scholar)
- Kaplan, D. (1989), ‘Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.’ In J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S. (1977), ‘Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference,’ Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2: 255–76. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Meinong, A. (1904), ‘The Theory of Objects,’ in Meinong (ed.) Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandtheorie und Psychologie, Barth: Leipzig. (Scholar)
- Mill, J. S. (1867), A System of Logic, London: Longmans. (Scholar)
- Montague, R. (1960), ‘Logical Necessity, Physical Necessity, Ethics and Quantifiers,’ Inquiry, 3: 259–69. (Scholar)
- Nunberg, G. (1993), ‘Indexicality and Deixis,’ Linguistics and Philosophy, 16: 1–43. [Preprint available online] (Scholar)
- Parsons, T. (1980), Nonexistent Objects, Yale University Press: New Haven CT. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H. (1975), Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers, vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O. (1960), Word and Object, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Quine, W.V.O. (1961), From a Logical Point of View, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Russell, B. (1905), ‘On Denoting,’ Mind, 14: 479–93. [Post-print version online] (Scholar)
- Russell, B. (1919), ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,’ in Mysticism and Logic: London: George Allen and Unwin, 1917. [Post-print version online] (Scholar)
- Salmon, N. (1986), Frege's Puzzle, Cambridge MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Salmon, N. (1998), ‘Nonexistence,’ Nous 32:3, 277–319. (Scholar)
- Salmon, N. (2004), ‘The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.’ in Bezuidenhout & Reimer (eds.) 2004. (Scholar)
- Searle, J. (1983), Intentionality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Smith, P. (1984), ‘Could we be Brains in a Vat?,’ Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 14: 115–123. (Scholar)
- Soames, S. (1989), ‘Direct Reference and Propositional Attitudes,’ in Almog, et al., 1989, pp. 393–419. (Scholar)
- Strawson, P. (1950), ‘On Referring,’ Mind, 59: 320–44. (Scholar)
- Van Inwagen, P. (1979), ‘Creatures of Fiction,’ American Philosophical Quarterly, 14(4): 299–308. (Scholar)
- Zalta, E. (1983), Abstract Objects, Dordrecht: Reidel. (Scholar)
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