Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Mechanisms in Science" by Carl Craver and James Tabery
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- Aizawa, K. and C. Gillett, 2011, “The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience”, in Causality in the Sciences, in Illari et al. 2011: 202–23. (Scholar)
- Allen, G.E., 2005, “Mechanism, Vitalism and Organicism in Late Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Biology: The Importance of Historical Context”, in Craver and Darden 2005: 261–283. (Scholar)
- Alon, U., 2006, An Introduction to Systems
Biology, Boca Raton: Chapman and Hall/CRC Press. (Scholar)
- Andersen, Holly, 2011, “Mechanisms, Laws, and Regularities”, Philosophy of Science, 78(2): 325–331. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “The Case for Regularity in Mechanistic Causal Explanation”, Synthese, 189: 415–432. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014a, “A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part I”, Philosophy Compass, 4: 274–283. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014b, “A Field Guide to Mechanisms: Part II”, Philosophy Compass, 4: 283–297. (Scholar)
- Baker [now Byron], J.M., 2005, “Adaptive Speciation: The
Role of Natural Selection in Mechanisms of Geographic and
Non-geographic Speciation”, in Craver and Darden 2005:
303–326. (Scholar)
- Barros, D.B., 2008, “Natural Selection as a Mechanism”, Philosophy of Science, 75: 306–322. (Scholar)
- Batterman, R., 2002, “Asymptotics and the Role of Minimal Models”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53: 21–38. (Scholar)
- Batterman, R. and C. Rice, 2014, “Minimal Model Explanations”, Philosophy of Science, 81: 349–376. (Scholar)
- Baumgartner, M., 2010, “Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40: 359–384. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Rendering Interventionism and Non-Reductive Physicalism Compatible”, Dialectica, 67: 1–27. (Scholar)
- Baumgartner, M. and A. Gebharter, forthcoming, “Constitutive Relevance, Mutual Manipulability, and Fat-Handedness”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. doi:10.1093/bjps/axv003 [Baumgartner and Gebharter forthcoming available online] (Scholar)
- Beatty, J., 1995, “The Evolutionary Contingency
Thesis”, in James G. Lennox and Gereon Wolters
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Sciences, Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press,
pp. 45–81. (Scholar)
- Bechtel, W., 1988, Philosophy of science: An overview for cognitive science, Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Italian translation Filosofia della scienza e scienza cognitiva, Gius. Laterza & Figli, 1995. Second edition in preparation. [some of Bechtel 1988 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Discovering Cell Mechanisms: The Creation of Modern Cell Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [some of Bechtel 2006 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, Mental Mechanisms: Philosophical Perspectives on Cognitive Neuroscience, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009a, “Looking Down, Around, and Up: Mechanistic Explanation in Psychology”, Philosophical Psychology, 22: 543–564. [Bechtel 2009a available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2009b, “Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity, and Situated Cognition”, in P. Robbins and M. Aydede (eds). Cambridge handbook of situated cognition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 155–170. [Bechtel 2009b available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Mechanism and Biological Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 78: 533–557. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013a, “Addressing the Vitalist’s
Challenge to Mechanistic Science: Dynamic Mechanistic
Explanation”, in S. Normandin & C.T. Wolfe
(eds), Vitalism and the Scientific Image in Post-Enlightenment
Life Science, 1800–2010, Dordrecht: Springer,
pp. 345–370. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013b, “From Molecules to Behavior and the Clinic: Integration in Chronobiology”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 44: 493–502. (Scholar)
- Bechtel, W. and A. Abrahamsen, 2005, “Explanation: A Mechanistic Alternative”, Studies in History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36: 421–441. [Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2005 available online] (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Thinking Dynamically about Biological Mechanisms: Networks of Coupled Oscillators”, Foundations of Science, 18: 707–723. [Bechtel and Abrahamsen 2013 available online] (Scholar)
- Bechtel, W. and R.C. Richardson, 2010 [1993], Discovering Complexity: Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research, Second Edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books. (Scholar)
- Bedau, M., 1997, “Weak Emergence”, Philosophical Perspectives, 11: 375–399. (Scholar)
- Beebee, H., C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies, (eds), 2010, The Oxford Handbook of Causation, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Boas, M., 1952, “The Establishment of the Mechanical
Philosophy”, Osiris, 10: 412–541. (Scholar)
- Bogen, J., 2005, “Regularities and Causality; Generalizations and Causal Explanations”, in Craver and Darden 2005: 397–420. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008a, “Causally Productive Activities”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 39: 112–123. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “The Hodgkin-Huxley Equations and the Concrete Model: Comments on Craver, Schaffner, and Weber”, Philosophy of Science, 75: 1034–1046. (Scholar)
- Boogerd, F.C., F.J. Bruggeman, R.C. Richardson A. Stephan, and
H. V. Westerhoff, 2005, “Emergence and Its Place in Nature: A
Case Study of Biochemical Networks”, Synthese, 145:
131–164. (Scholar)
- Boyd, R., 1991, “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds”, Philosophical Studies, 61: 127–148. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, “Kinds as the
‘Workmanship of Men’: Realism, Constructivism, and Natural
Kinds”, in J. Nida-Rumelin (ed.), Rationality, Realism,
Revision: Proceedings of the 3rd International Congress of the Society
for Analytical Philosophy, New York: Walter de Gruyter,
pp. 52–89. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, “Homeostasis, Species, and Higher Taxa”, in R.A. Wilson (ed.), Species, MIT Press: Cambridge, 141-185. (Scholar)
- Brandon, R., 1985, “Grene on Mechanism and Reductionism: More Than Just a Side Issue”, in Peter Asquith and Philip Kitcher (eds), PSA 1984, v. 2. East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, pp. 345–353. (Scholar)
- Bromberger, S., 1966, “Why Questions”, in R.G. Colodny (ed.), Mind and Cosmos, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 86–111. (Scholar)
- Burnston, D.C., B. Sheredos, A. Abrahamsen, and W. Bechtel, in
press, “Scientists’ Use of Diagrams in Developing
Mechanistic Explanations: A Case Study from
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- Campaner, R., 2011, “Understanding Mechanisms in the Health Sciences”, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, 32: 5–17. (Scholar)
- Cartwright, N.D., 1989, Nature’s Capacities and their
Measurement, New York: Oxford University
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- –––, 1999, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Modularity: It Can—and Generally Does—Fail”, in Stochastic Dependence and Causality, D. Costantini, M.C. Galavotti, and P. Suppes (eds), Stanford: CSLI Publications, pp 65–84.
- –––, 2002, “Against Modularity, the Causal Markov Condition and Any Link Between the Two: Comments on Hausman and Woodward”, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 53: 411–453. (Scholar)
- Chemero A. and M. Silberstein, 2008, “After the Philosophy
of Mind: Replacing Scholasticism with Science”, Philosophy
of Science, 75: 1–27. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P.S., 1986, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind/Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Churchland, P.S. and T.J. Sejnowski, 1992, The Computational
Brain, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Chirimuuta, M., 2014, “Minimal Models and Canonical Neural Computations: The Distinctness of Computational Explanation in Neuroscience”. Synthese, 191: 127–153. (Scholar)
- Clarke, B., D. Gillies, P. Illari, F. Russo, and J. Williamson, 2013, “The Evidence that Evidence-Based Medicine Omits”, Preventive Medicine, 57: 745–747. (Scholar)
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- Couch, M.B., 2011, “Mechanisms and Constitutive Relevance”, Synthese, 183: 375–88. (Scholar)
- Craver, C.F., 2001a, “Role Functions, Mechanisms and Hierarchy”, Philosophy of Science, 68: 31–55. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001b, “Structures of Scientific Theories”, in P.K. Machamer and M. Silberstein (eds), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science, Blackwell: Oxford, pp. 55–79. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “When Mechanistic Models Explain”, Synthese, 153: 355–376. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Mechanisms and Natural Kinds”, Philosophical Psychology, 22: 575–594. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “Functions and Mechanisms: A
Perspectivalist Account”, in P. Huneman (ed.), Functions:
Selection and Mechanisms, Dordrecht:
Springer, pp. 133–158. (Scholar)
- –––, 2014, “The Ontic Conception of
Scientific Explanation”, in Andreas Hütteman and Marie Kaiser
(eds), Explanation in the Special Sciences: The Cases of Biology
and History, Dordrecht: Springer,
pp. 27–52. (Scholar)
- Craver, C.F. and A. Alexandrova, 2008, “No Revolution Necessary: Neural Mechanisms for Economics”, Economics and Philosophy, 24: 381–406. (Scholar)
- Craver, C.F. and W.M. Bechtel, 2007, “Top-down Causation without Top-down Causes”, Biology and Philosophy, 22: 547–563. (Scholar)
- Craver, C.F. and L. Darden, 2013, In Search of Mechanisms: Discoveries Across the Life Sciences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Cummins, R., 1975, “Functional Analysis”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 741–764. (Scholar)
- –––, 1983, The Nature of Psychological Explanation, Cambridge, MA: Bradford/MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “‘How Does It
Work?’ Vs. ‘What Are The Laws?’ Two Conceptions of
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(eds), Explanation and Cognition, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
pp. 117–144. (Scholar)
- Darden, L., 1986, “Reasoning in Theory
Construction: Analogies, Interfield Connections, and Levels of
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- –––, 1991, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Strategies for Discovering Mechanisms: Schema Instantiation, Modular Subassembly, Forward/Backward Chaining”, Philosophy of Science, 69: S354–S365. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Relations Among Fields: Mendelian, Cytological and Molecular Mechanisms”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36: 349–371. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Reasoning in Biological Discoveries: Mechanism, Interfield Relations, and Anomaly Resolution, New York: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Darden, L. and J. Cain, 1989, “Selection Type Theories”, Philosophy of Science, 56:106–129. (Scholar)
- Darden, L. and N. Maull, 1977, “Interfield Theories”, Philosophy of Science, 44: 43–64. (Scholar)
- Datteri, E., 2009, “Simulation Experiments in Bionics: A Regulative Methodological Perspective”, Biology and Philosophy, 24: 301–324. (Scholar)
- Datteri, E. and G. Tamburrini, 2007, “Biorobotic Experiments for the Discovery of Biological Mechanisms”, Philosophy of Science, 74: 409–430. (Scholar)
- DesAutels, L., 2011, “Against Regular and Irregular Characterizations of Mechanisms”, Philosophy of Science, 78: 914–925. (Scholar)
- Des Chene, D., 2001, Spirits & Clocks: Machine &
Organism in Descartes, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Mechanisms of Life in the Seventeenth Century: Borelli, Perrault, Régis”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36: 245–260. (Scholar)
- Dijksterhuis, E.J., 1961, The Mechanization of the World Picture, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dowe, P., 1992, “Wesley Salmon’s Process Theory of Causality
and the Conserved Quantity Theory”, Philosophy of
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- –––, 2011, “The Causal-Process-Model Theory of Mechanisms”, in Illari et al. 2011: 865–879. (Scholar)
- Dray, W., 1957, Laws and Explanation in History, London: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Dupré, J., 1993, The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
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- Elster, J., 1989, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Eronen, M.I., 2013, “No Levels, No Problems: Downward Causation in Neuroscience”, Philosophy of Science, 80: 1042–1052. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “ Levels of Organization: A Deflationary Account”, Biology and Philosophy, 30: 39–58. (Scholar)
- Fagan, M.B., 2012, “The Joint Account of Mechanistic
Explanation”, Philosophy of Science, 79:
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- –––, 2013, Philosophy of Stem Cell Biology: Knowledge in Flesh and Blood, London: Palgrave MacMillan. (Scholar)
- Fehr, C., 2004, “Feminism and Science: Mechanism without Weductionism”, National Women’s Studies Association Journal, 16: 136–156. (Scholar)
- Fodor, J., 1968, Psychological Explanation, New York: Random House. (Scholar)
- Garson, J., 2011, “Selected Effects Functions and Causal Role Functions in the Brain: The Case for an Etiological Approach to Neuroscience”, Biology & Philosophy, 26: 547–565. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Function, Selection, and Construction in the Brain”, Synthese, 189: 451–481. (Scholar)
- –––, 2013, “The Functional Sense of Mechanism”, Philosophy of Science, 80: 317–333. (Scholar)
- Giere, R.N., 2004, “How Models Are Used to Represent Reality”, Philosophy of Science, 71: 742–752. (Scholar)
- Gillett, C., 2002, “The Dimensions of Realization: A Critique of the Standard View”, Analysis, 62: 316–323. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2013, “Constitution, and Multiple Constitution, in the Sciences: Using the Neuron to Construct a Starting Framework”, Minds and Machines, 23: 309–37. (Scholar)
- Glennan, S.S., 1996, “Mechanisms and The Nature of Causation”, Erkenntnis, 44: 49–71. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2010a, “Mechanisms”, in Beebee et al. 2010: 315–325. (Scholar)
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- Godfrey-Smith, P., 2010, “Causal Pluralism”, in Beebee et al. 2010: 326–337. [Godfrey-Smith 2010 available online] (Scholar)
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- Harbecke, J., 2010, “Mechanistic Constitution in Neurobiological Explanations”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 24: 267–285. (Scholar)
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- Harinen, T., forthcoming, “Mutual Manipulability and Causal Betweenness”, Synthese, doi:10.1007/s11229-014-0564-5 (Scholar)
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- Havstad, J.C., 2011, “Discussion: Problems for Natural
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- Hedström, P. and R. Swedberg, 1998, Social Mechanisms: An
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