Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Self-Knowledge" by Brie Gertler |
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Works Cited
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- Anscombe, G.E.M., 1981, ‘The First Person’, in The Collected Papers of G.E.M. Anscombe, vol. II: Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D., 1963, ‘Is introspective knowledge incorrigible?’ Philosophical Review 62: 417–32. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, The Nature of Mind and Other Essays, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. (Scholar)
- Arnauld, A., 1641/1984, excerpts from ‘Fourth Set of Objections and Replies’, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Aydede, M., 2003, ‘Is Introspection Inferential?’, in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, B. Gertler (ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
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- Barnes, A., 1997, Seeing Through Self-Deception, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- Bar-On, D. and D. Long, 2001, ‘Avowals and First-Person Privilege’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62: 311–335. (Scholar)
- Bar-On, D. and D. Long, 2003, ‘Knowing Selves: Expression, Truth, and Knowledge’, Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge. B. Gertler (ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
- Bermúdez, J. L. 1998. The Paradox of Self-Consciousness. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press). (Scholar)
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- BonJour, L., 2003, ‘Reply to Sosa’, in BonJour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (Scholar)
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- Cassam, Q., 1997, Self and World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Castañeda, H.N., 1966, ‘ “He”: A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness’. Ratio 8: 130-157.
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- Chisholm, R., 1977, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed., Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, The First Person, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Cunning, D., 1999, ‘Agency and Consciousness’, Synthese 120: 271–294. (Scholar)
- Davidson, D., 1985, ‘Deception and Division’, in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin (eds.), Action and Events, pp. 138–148, New York: Basil Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Dennett, D., 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston: Little, Brown & Company . (Scholar)
- DeRose, K. 2002, Review of T. Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53: 573–77. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R., 1641/1984, ‘Meditations on First Philosophy’, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume II, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R., 1644/1985, ‘Principles of Philosophy’, in Cottingham, Stoothoff and Murdoch (trans.), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Volume I, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Dretske, F., 1994, ‘Introspection’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94: 263–278. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, ‘The Mind's Awareness of Itself’, Philosophical Studies 95: 103–24. (Scholar)
- Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford: Oxford University Press (ed. J. McDowell). (Scholar)
- Fernandez, J., 2003, ‘Privileged Access Naturalized’. The Philosophical Quarterly 53: 352–72. (Scholar)
- Frankfurt, H., 1971, ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68: 5–20. (Scholar)
- Freud, S., 1923, The Interpretation of Dreams, 3d ed., A.A. Brill (trans.), London: Allen & Unwin. (Scholar)
- Fumerton, R., 2005, ‘Speckled Hens and Objects of Acquaintance’, Philosophical Perspectives 19: 121–39. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, Metaepistemology and Skepticism, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. (Scholar)
- Gallois, A., 1996, The Mind Within, The World Without, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press . (Scholar)
- Gertler, B., 2000a, ‘The Mechanics of Self-Knowledge’, Philosophical Topics 28: 125–146. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000b, Review of Gallois' The Mind Within, The World Without, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61: 235–8. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, ‘Introspecting Phenomenal States’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63: 305–328. (Scholar)
- –––, forthcoming, ‘Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief’, in Self-Knowledge, ed. A. Hatzimoysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gibbons, J., 1996, ‘Externalism and Knowledge of Content’, Philosophical Review 105: 287–310. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A.,2004, ‘Epistemology and the Evidential Status of Introspective Reports’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 11(7–8): 1–16. (Scholar)
- Gordon, R., 1986, ‘Folk Psychology as Simulation’, Mind and Language 1: 158–171. (Scholar)
- Heil, J., 1988, ‘Privileged Access’, Mind 97: 238–251. (Scholar)
- Hill, C., 1991, Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Holton, R., 2001, ‘What is the Role of the Self in Self-Deception?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101: 53–69. (Scholar)
- Howell, R., 2006, ‘Self-Knowledge and Self-Reference’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72: 44–70. (Scholar)
- Hume, D., 1739–1740/1978, A Treatise of Human Nature, L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.); revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hurlburt, R. and Schwitzgebel, E., 2007, Describing Inner Experience? Proponent Meets Skeptic. MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1973, ‘Is There a Good Argument Against the Incorrigibility Thesis?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 51: 51–62. (Scholar)
- James, W., 1884, ‘On Some Omissions of Introspective Psychology’, Mind 33: 1–11. (Scholar)
- Kind, A., 2003, ‘Shoemaker, Self-Blindness, and Moore's Paradox’, Philosophical Quarterly 53: 39–48. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1980, Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, C.I., 1946, The Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, LaSalle, IL: Open Court. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1972, ‘Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50: 249–58. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1979, ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’, Philosophical Review 88: 513–543. (Scholar)
- Locke, J., 1689/1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, P.H. Nidditch (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press . (Scholar)
- Lycan, W.G., 1996, Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Martin, M.G.F., 1998, ‘An Eye Directed Outward’, in Knowing our Own Minds, C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 99–121. (Scholar)
- McElvie, S.J., 1995, ‘The VVIQ as a psychometric test of individual differences in visual imagery vividness: A critical quantitative review and plea for direction’, Journal of Mental imagery 19: 1–106. (Scholar)
- McKinsey, M., 1991, ‘Anti-Individualism and Privileged Access’, Analysis51: 9–16. (Scholar)
- Mele, A., 1997, ‘Real Self-Deception’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20: 91–136. (Scholar)
- Meyers, D. T., 2002, Gender in the Mirror: Cultural Imagery and Women's Agency, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mill, J.S., 1867, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, 3rd ed., London: Longmans. (Scholar)
- Moore, G.E., 1942, ‘Reply to Critics’, in The Philosophy of G.E. Moore, P.A. Schilpp (ed.), Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. (Scholar)
- Moran, R., 1997 ‘Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing’. European Journal of Philosophy 5: 141–161. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, Authority and Estrangement: An Essay on Self-Knowledge, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, ’Responses to O'’Brien and Shoemaker’, European Journal of Philosophy 11: 402–19. (Scholar)
- Neisser, U., and D. Jopling (eds.), 1997, The Conceptual Self in Context: Culture, Experience, Self-Understanding, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Nisbett, R., and T. Wilson, 1977, 'Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes'. Psychological Review, 84: 231–259. (Scholar)
- Nozick, R., 1981, Philosophical Explanations, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (Belknap). (Scholar)
- O’Brien, L., 2003, ’Moran on Agency and Self-Knowledge’, European Journal of Philosophy 11: 375–90. (Scholar)
- Peacocke, C., 1992, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, ‘Conscious Attitudes, Attention, and Self-Knowledge’, in Knowing our Own Minds, C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 63–98. (Scholar)
- Perry, J., 1979, ‘The Problem of the Essential Indexical’,Noûs 13: 3–21. (Scholar)
- Putnam, H., 1975, ‘The Meaning of “Meaning”’, in his Philosophical Papers 2: Mind, Language, and Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 215–271. (Scholar)
- Reed, B., 2006, ‘Shelter for the Cognitively Homeless’. Synthese 148: 303–308. (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1917, ‘Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description’, in Mysticism and Logic, London: George Allen and Unwin. (Scholar)
- Ryle, G., 1949, The Concept of Mind, New York: Barnes and Noble. (Scholar)
- Sartre, J.P., 1956, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, H. Barnes (trans.), New York: Philosophical Library. (Scholar)
- Sawyer, S., 1998, ‘Privileged Access to the World’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76: 523–533. (Scholar)
- Schultheiss, O., and J. Brunstein, 1999, ‘Goal imagery: Bridging the gap between implicit motives and explicit goals.’ Journal of Personality 67: 1–38. (Scholar)
- Schwitzgebel, E., 2002 ‘How Well Do We Know Our Own Conscious Experience? The Case of Visual Imagery’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 9(5–6): 35–53. (Scholar)
- Scott-Kakures, D., 2002, ‘At Permanent Risk: Reasoning and Self-Knowledge in Self-Deception’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65: 576–603. (Scholar)
- Sellars, W., 1963, ‘Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind’, in his Science, Perception, and Reality, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1968, ‘Self-Reference and Self-Awareness’, Journal of Philosophy 65: 555-567 . (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, ‘Self-Knowledge and “Inner Sense”’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54: 249–314. (Scholar)
- Siewert, C., 1998, The Significance of Consciousness, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, ‘Self-Knowledge and Rationality: Shoemaker on Self-Blindness’, in Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, B. Gertler (ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
- Sosa, E., 2003, ‘Reply to BonJour’. In BonJour and Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. (Scholar)
- Stich, S., 1983, From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Strawson, G., 1997, ‘The Self’, Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, #5/6 (online). (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, S., 2000, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, Reason, and Nature, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Taylor, C., 1985, ‘Self-Interpreting Animals’, ch. 2 of his Human Agency and Language (Philosophical Papers, vol. I), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Tye, M. and McLaughlin, B., 1998, ‘Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge’, in Knowing our Own Minds, C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald (eds.), Oxford: Clarendon Press, 285–320. (Scholar)
- Unger, P., 1975, Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Velleman, J. D., 1989, Practical Reflection, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Weatherson, B., 2004, ‘Luminous Margins’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 373–83. (Scholar)
- Wikforss, Å., 2006, ‘Content Externalism and Fregean Sense’, in What Determines Content? The Internalism/Externalism Dispute, ed. P. Marvan, Cambridge Scholars Press, 163–79. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 2000, Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Wilson, T., 2002, Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Winkler, K., 1991, ‘Locke on Personal Identity’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 29: 201–26. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1953, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., 1989, ‘Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy of Mind: Sensation, Privacy, and Intention’, Journal of Philosophy 86: 622–634. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, ‘Self-Knowledge: the Wittgensteinian Legacy’, in Knowing our Own Minds, C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald (eds.)Macdonald, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Zimmerman, A., 2008, ‘Self-Knowledge: Rationalism vs. Empiricism’, Philosophy Compass 3/2: 325–52. (Scholar)
Further Reading
Anthologies on self-knowledge:
- Cassam, Q., ed., 1994, Self-Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gertler, B., ed., 2003, Privileged Access: Philosophical Accounts of Self-Knowledge, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. (Scholar)
- Hatzimoysis, A., ed., forthcoming, Self-Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hill, C., ed., 2000, Philosophical Topics 28(2): Introspection. (Scholar)
- Ludlow, P., and Martin, N., eds., 1998, Externalism and Self-Knowledge, Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. (Scholar)
- Wright, C., Smith, B., and Macdonald, C., eds., 1998, Knowing Our Own Minds, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
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