Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Structural Realism" by James Ladyman |
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- Cao, T. (1997). Conceptual Development of 20th Century Field Theories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
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- Chakravartty, A. (2003). “The Structuralist Conception of Objects.” Philosophy of Science, 70: 867–878. (Scholar)
- Chakravartty, A. (2004). “Structuralism as a Form of Scientific Realism.” International Studies in Philosophy of Science, 18: 151–171. (Scholar)
- Chakravartty, A. (2007). A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Chang, H. (2003). “Preservative Realism and Its Discontents: Revisiting Caloric.” Philosophy of Science, 70: 902–912. (Scholar)
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- Cruse, P. (2005). “Ramsey sentences, structural realism and trivial realization.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 36: 557–576. (Scholar)
- da Costa, N.C.A. and French, S. (2003).Science and Partial Truth: A Unitary Approach to Models and Scientific Reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Demopoulos, W. (2003). “On the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54: 371–403. (Scholar)
- Demopoulos, W. (2008). “Carnap's philosophy of science.” In R. Creath and M. Friedman (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Carnap. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 248–272. (Scholar)
- Demopoulos, W. and Friedman, M. (1985 [1989]). “Critical notice: Bertrand Russell's The Analysis of Matter: Its historical context and contemporary interest.” Philosophy of Science, 52: 621–639. Reprinted in C.W. Savage and C.A. Anderson (eds.), (1989), Rereading Russell: Essays on Bertrand Russell's Metaphysics and Epistemology (Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science: Volume XII). Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Dipert, R.R. (1997). “The mathematical structure of the world: The world as graph.” Journal of Philosophy, 94: 329–358. (Scholar)
- DiSalle, R. (1994). “On dynamics, indiscernibility, and spacetime ontology.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 45: 265–287. (Scholar)
- Dorato, M. (2000). “Substantivalism, relationism and structural spacetime realism.” Foundations of Physics, 30 (10): 1605–1628. (Scholar)
- Dummett, M. (1991). Frege: Philosophy of Mathematics. London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
- Earman, J. and Norton, J. (1987). “What price space-time substantivalism? The hole story.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 38: 515–525. (Scholar)
- Elsamahi, M. (2005). “A Critique of Localised Realism.” Philosophy of Science, 72: 1350–1360. (Scholar)
- English, J. (1973). “Underdetermination: Craig and Ramsey.” The Journal of Philosophy, 70: 453–462. (Scholar)
- Esfeld, M. (2004). “Quantum entanglement and a metaphysics of relations.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 35: 601–617. (Scholar)
- Esfeld, M. and Lam, V. (2008). “Moderate structural realism about space-time.” Synthese, 160: 27–46. (Scholar)
- Esfeld, M. (forthcoming). “Structures and Powers.” In A. and P. Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism. Dordrecht: Springer (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science). (Scholar)
- Floridi, L. (2008). “A Defence of Informational Structural Realism.” Synthese, 161 (2): 219-253. (Scholar)
- French, S. (1989). “Identity and individuality in classical and quantum physics.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67: 432–446. (Scholar)
- French, S. (1998). “On the withering away of physical objects.” In E. Castellani (ed.), Interpreting Bodies: Classical and Quantum Objects in Modern Physics, pp. 93–113. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- French, S. (1999). “Models and mathematics in physics: The role of group theory.” In J. Butterfield and C. Pagonis (eds.), From Physics to Philosophy, pp. 187–207. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- French, S. (2000). “The reasonable effectiveness of mathematics: Partial structures and the application of group theory to physics.” Synthese, 125: 103–120. (Scholar)
- French, S. (2003). “Scribbling on the Blank Sheet: Eddington's Structuralist Conception of Objects.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34: 227–259. (Scholar)
- French, S. (2006). “Structure as a Weapon of the Realist.” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106: 1–19. (Scholar)
- French, S. and Kaminga, H. (eds.) (1993). Correspondence, Invariance and Heuristics: Essays in Honour of Heinz Post, (Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume 148). Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- French, S. and Krause, D. (2006). Identity in Physics: A Historical, Philosophical and Formal Analysis. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- French, S. and Ladyman, J. (1999). “Reinflating the semantic approach.” International Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 13: 103–121. (Scholar)
- French, S. and Ladyman, J. (2003a). “Remodelling structural realism: Quantum physics and the metaphysics of structure.” Synthese, 136: 31–56. (Scholar)
- French, S. and Ladyman, J. (2003b). “Between platonism and phenomenalism: Reply to Cao.” Synthese, 136: 73–78. (Scholar)
- French, S. and Redhead, M. (1988). “Quantum physics and the identity of indiscernibles.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 39: 233–246. (Scholar)
- Giedymin, J. (1982). Science and Convention: Essays on Henri Poincaré's Philosophy of Science and the Conventionalist Tradition. Oxford; Pergamon. (Scholar)
- Giere, R. (1985). “Constructive realism.” In P.M. Churchland and C.A. Hooker (eds.), Images of Science, pp. 75–98. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Gower, B. (2000). “Cassirer, Schlick and ‘structural’ realism: The philosophy of the exact sciences in the background to early logical empiricism.” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 8: 71–106. (Scholar)
- Hardin, C.L. and Rosenberg, A. (1982). “In defence of convergent realism.” Philosophy of Science, 49: 604–615. (Scholar)
- Harte, V. (2002). Plato on Parts and Wholes: The Metaphysics of Structure. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J. (2001). “Causal Structuralism.” Philosophical Perspectives, 15: 361–378. (Scholar)
- Hellman, G. (2001). “Three varieties of mathematical structuralism.” Philosophia Mathematica, 3: 184–211. (Scholar)
- Hellman, G. (2005). “Structuralism.” In S. Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Hochberg, H. (1994). “Causal connections, universals and Russell's hypothetico-scientific realism.” Monist, 77: 71–92. (Scholar)
- Hoefer, C. (1996). “The metaphysics of space-time substantivalism.” Journal of Philosophy, 93: 5–27. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and Potrc, M. (2000). “Blobjectivism and indirect correspondence.” Facta Philosophica, 2: 249–270. (Scholar)
- Horgan, T. and Potrc, M. (2002). “Addressing questions for blobjectivism.” Facta Philosophica, 4: 311–322. (Scholar)
- Howson, C. (2000). Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Jackson (1998). From Metaphysics to Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kantorovich, A. (2003). “The priority of internal symmetries in particle physics.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 34: 651–675. (Scholar)
- Ketland, J. (2004). “Empirical adequacy and ramsification.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 409–424. (Scholar)
- Kincaid, H. (2008). “Structural Realism and the Special Sciences.” Philosophy of Science. 75: 720–731. (Scholar)
- Kitcher, P. (1993). The Advancement of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Kukla, A. (1998). Studies in Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (1998). “What is structural realism?” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 29: 409–424. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (2000). “What's really wrong with constructive empiricism?: van Fraassen and the metaphysics of modality.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 51: 837–856. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (2002a), ‘Science, metaphysics and structural realism. Philosophica, 67: 57–76. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (2002b). Understanding Philosophy of Science. London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (2004). “Modality and constructive empiricism: A reply to van Fraassen.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55: 755–765. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (2005). “Mathematical structuralism and the identity of indiscernibles.” Analysis, 65: 218–221. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (2007). “On the Identity and Diversity of Individuals.” The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 81: 23-43. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. (2008). “Structural Realism and the Relationship between the Special Sciences and Physics.” Philosophy of Science, 75: 744–755. (Scholar)
- Ladyman, J. and Ross, D. (with Spurrett, D. and Collier, J.) (2007). Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalised, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- Langton, R. and Lewis, D. (1998). “Defining ‘intrinsic’.” Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, pp. 116–132. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Laudan, L, (1981). “A confutation of convergent realism.” Philosophy of Science, 48: 19–49.
- Laudan, L. (1984). “Discussion: Realism without the real.” Philosophy of Science, 51: 156–162. (Scholar)
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- Laudan, L. and Leplin, J. (1993). “Determination underdeterred.” Analysis, 53: 8–15. (Scholar)
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- Leitgeb, H. and Ladyman, J. (2008). “Discussion Note: Criteria of Identity and Structuralist Ontology.” Philosophia Mathematica 16: 388–396. (Scholar)
- Leplin, J. (1997). A Novel Defense of Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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- MacBride, F. (2005). “Structuralism reconsidered.” In S. Shapiro (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Logic and Mathematics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
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