Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Epistemological Problems of Testimony" by Jonathan Adler |
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- DeRose, K., 1992, “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LII: 913–929. (Scholar)
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- –––, 2002 “Assertion, Knowledge and Context”, The Philosophical Review, 111(2): 167–203. (Scholar)
- Douven, I., 2006, “Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility”, The Philosophical Review, 115: 449–485. (Scholar)
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- Dummett, M., 1981, Frege: The Philosophy of Language, Second Edition, London: Duckworth. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994, “Testimony and Memory”, in Matilal and Chakrabarti 1994, 251–272. (Scholar)
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- Ebbs, G., 2002, “Learning from Others”, Nous, 36: 525–549. (Scholar)
- Elgin, C. Z., 2001, “Word Giving, Word Taking”, in Fact and Value: Essays for Judith Jarvis Thomson, Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker and Ralph Wedgwood (eds.), Cambridge: The MIT Press, 97–116. (Scholar)
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- Evans, G., 1982, The Varieties of Reference, John McDowell (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fallis, D., 2010 “Lying and Deception” Philosopher's Imprint, 10. (Scholar)
- Faulkner, P., 1998, “David Hume's Reductionist Epistemology of Testimony”, , Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79: 302–313 (Scholar)
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- Foley, R., 1994, “Egoism in Epistemology”, in Schmitt 1994b: 53–73. (Scholar)
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- –––, 1994, “Against Gullibility”, in Matilal and Chakrabarti (eds.) 1994, 125–161. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, “Critical Notice: Telling and Trusting: Reductionism and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony”, Mind, 104: 393–411. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Testimony: Knowing through Being Told”, in I. Niiniluoto, M. Sintonen, and J. Wolenski, (eds.), Handbook of Epistemology, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers: 109–130. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Testimony and Epistemic Autonomy”, in Lackey and Sosa, (eds.) 2006, 225–251. (Scholar)
- Fricker, M., 2007, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Friedman, R., 1987, “Route Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay”, Yale Law Journal, 96: 667–742. (Scholar)
- Garver, E., 2004, For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of Belief, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. (Scholar)
- Gauthier, D., 1986, Morals By Agreement, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gelfert, A. 2006, “Kant on Testimony”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 14: 627–642. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010a, “Hume on Testimony Revisited”, Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 13: 60–75. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010b, “Kant and the Enlightenment's Contribution to Social Epistemology”, Episteme, 79–99. (Scholar)
- Gendler, T. S. 2008, “Alief and Belief”, Journal of Philosophy, CV: 634–663. (Scholar)
- Gibbard, A., 1990, Wise Choice, Apt Feelings, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Gilbert, D. T., 1991, “How Mental Systems Believe”, American Psychologist, 46:107–119 (Scholar)
- –––, 1993, “The Assent of Man: Mental Representation and the Control of Belief”, in D. M. Wegner & J. Pennebaker (eds.), The Handbook of Mental Control, New York: Prentice-Hall: 57–87 (Scholar)
- Golanski, A., 2001, “Why Legal Scholars Get Daubert Wrong: A Contextualist Explanation of Law's Epistemology”, Whittier Law Review, 22: 653–721. (Scholar)
- Goldberg, S. C., 2001, “Testimonially based knowledge from false testimony”, The Philosophical Quarterly, 51: 512–526. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006 “Reductionism and the Distinctiveness of Testimony”, in Lackey and Sosa (eds.) 2006, 127–144. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldberg, S. and D. Henderson, 2006. “Monitoring and Anti-Reductionism in the Epistemology of Testimony” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72: 600–617. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. I., 1991, “Epistemic Paternalism”, Journal of Philosophy, 88: 113–131. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, Knowledge in a Social World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goldman, A. I and M. Shaked, 1991, “An economic model of scientific activity and truth acquisition”, Philosophical Studies, 63: 31–55. (Scholar)
- Govier, T., 1993, “Trust and Testimony: Nine Arguments on Testimonial Knowledge”, International Journal of Moral and Social Studies, 8: 21–39. (Scholar)
- Graham, P. J., 1997, “What is testimony?”, Philosophical Quarterly, 47: 227–232. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000a, “Transferring Knowledge”, Nous, 34: 131–152. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000b, “The Reliability of Testimony”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61: 695–708 (Scholar)
- –––, 2000c, “Conveying Information”, Synthese, 123: 365–392 (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Metaphysical Libertarianism and the Epistemology of Testimony”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 41: 37–50 (Scholar)
- –––, 2006a “Fundamentalism and its Rivals”, in Lackey and Sosa (eds.) 2006, 93–114. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Testimonial Justification: Inferential or Non-inferential”, Philosophical Quarterly, 56: 84–95. (Scholar)
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- Greco, J., 2012, “Recent work on Testimonial Knowledge”, American Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 15–28. (Scholar)
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- Grice, P., 1989, Studies in the Way of Words, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. (Scholar)
- Habermas, J., 1996, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, Cambridge: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Hardwig, J., 1985, “Epistemic Dependence”, The Journal of Philosophy, 82: 335–349. (Scholar)
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- Harris, P., 2002, “What do children learn from testimony?”, in The Cognitive Basis of Science, P. Carruthers, S. P. Stich, and M. Siegel (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 316–334. (Scholar)
- Harris, P. and K. Corriveau, 2011, “Young children's selective trust in informants”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London B (Biological Sciences), 366(1567): 1179–87. (Scholar)
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