Linked bibliography for the SEP article "The Revision Theory of Truth" by Philip Kremer and Edoardo Rivello
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- Antonelli, G.A., 1994a, “The complexity of revision”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 35: 204–218. (Scholar)
- –––, 1994b, “Non-well-founded sets via revision rules”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 23: 633–679. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “The complexity of revision, revised”, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 43: 75–78. (Scholar)
- Asmus C.M., 2013, “Vagueness and revision sequences”, Synthese, 190: 953–974. (Scholar)
- Belnap, N., 1982, “Gupta’s rule of revision theory of
truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11:
103–116. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 73: 705–712. (Scholar)
- Berker S., 2011, “Gupta’s gambit”,
Philosophical Studies, 152: 17–39. (Scholar)
- Bruni, R., 2013, “Analytic calculi for circular concepts by finite revision”, Studia Logica, 101(5): 915–932. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015, “Some remarks on the finite theory of revision”, in Unifying the Philosophy of Truth, Achourioti et al. (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer, 169–187. (Scholar)
- –––, 2019, “Addressing circular definitions via systems of proofs”, in Mathesis Universalis, Computability and Proof (Synthese Library 412), Centrone et al. (eds.), Cham: Springer, 75–100. (Scholar)
- Bruni, R., and Sillari, G., 2018, “A rational way of playing: Revision theory for strategic interaction”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 47(3): 419–448. (Scholar)
- Campbell-Moore, C., 2019, “Limits in the revision theory”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48(1): 11–35. (Scholar)
- –––, 2021, “Indeterminate Truth and Credences”, in Modes of Truth (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy), London: Routledge, 182–208. (Scholar)
- Campbell-Moore, C., Horsten, L., and Leitgeb, H., 2019, “Probability for the revision theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48(1): 87–112. (Scholar)
- Chapuis, A., 1996, “Alternate revision theories of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 399–423. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “An application of circular definitions: rational decision”, in Löwe, Malzkorn, and Räsch (eds.), Foundations of the Formal Sciences II: Applications of Mathematical Logic in Philosophy and Linguistics, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 47–54. (Scholar)
- Cook, R. T., 2019, “Revising Benardete’s Zeno”,
Journal of Philosophical Logic, 48(1): 37–56. (Scholar)
- Field H., 2008, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Fjellstad, A., 2020, “Herzberger’s limit rule with
labelled sequent calculus”, Studia Logica, 108(4):
815–855. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., 1982, “Truth and paradox”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 1–60. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, Empiricism and Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., and Belnap, N., 1993, The Revision Theory of Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Gupta, A., and Standefer, S., 2017, “Conditionals in theories of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46(1): 27–63. (Scholar)
- Halbach, V., 2011, Axiomatic Theories of Truth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Hammer, E., 2003, “The Revision Theory of Truth”,
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/truth-revision/>. (Scholar)
- Herzberger, H.G., 1982, “Notes on naive semantics”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 11: 61–102. (Scholar)
- –––, 1982, “Naive semantics and the liar paradox”, Journal of Philosophy, 79: 479–497. (Scholar)
- Horsten, L., 2011, The Tarskian Turn: Deflationism and Axiomatic Truth, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Horsten, L., Leigh, G.E., Leitgeb, H., and Welch, P., 2012, “Revision Revisited”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 5: 642–665. (Scholar)
- Hsiung, M., 2017, “Boolean paradoxes and revision periods”, Studia Logica, 105(5): 881–914. (Scholar)
- –––, 2022, “Designing Paradoxes: A Revision-theoretic Approach”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 51: 739–789. (Scholar)
- Kremer, M., 1988, “Kripke and the logic of truth”, Journal of Philosophical Logic, 17: 225–78. (Scholar)
- Kremer, P., 1993, “The Gupta-Belnap systems
\(\mathbf{S}^{\#}\) and \(\mathbf{S}^*\) are not axiomatisable”,
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 34: 583–596. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “How Truth Behaves When
There’s No Vicious Reference”, Journal of
Philosophical Logic, 39: 345–367. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1975, “Outline of a theory of truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 72: 690–716. (Scholar)
- Kühnberger, K., Löwe, B., Möllerfeld, M., and Welch, P., 2005, “Comparing inductive and circular definitions: parameters, complexity and games”, Studia Logica, 81: 79–98. (Scholar)
- Löwe, B., 2001 “Revision sequences and computers with
an infinite amount of time”, Journal of Logic and
Computation, 11: 25–40. (Scholar)
- Löwe, B., and Welch, P., 2001, “Set-theoretic absoluteness and the revision theory of truth”, Studia Logica, 68(1): 21–41. (Scholar)
- Martin, R., and Woodruff, P., 1975, “On representing
‘True-in-L’ in L”, Philosophia, 5:
217–221. (Scholar)
- Pinder, M., 2018, “How to find an attractive solution to the liar paradox”, Philosophical Studies, 175(7): 1661–1680. (Scholar)
- Restall, G., 2005, “Minimalists about Truth Can (and Should) Be Epistemicists, and it Helps if They Are Revision Theorists too”, in Deflation and Paradox, JC Beall and B. Armour-Garb (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 97–106. (Scholar)
- Rossi, L., 2019, “A unified theory of truth and
paradox”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 12(2):
209–254.
- Standefer, S., 2015a, “Solovay-type theorems for circular definitions”, The Review of Symbolic Logic, 8(3): 467–487. (Scholar)
- –––, 2015b, “On artifacts and truth-preservation”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 12(3): 135–158. (Scholar)
- –––, 2016, “Contraction and revision”, Australasian Journal of Logic, 13(3): 58–77. (Scholar)
- Wang, W., 2011, “Theories of abstract objects without ad hoc restriction”, Erkenntnis 74: 1–15. (Scholar)
- Welch, P., 2001, “On Gupta-Belnap revision theories of truth, Kripkean fixed points, and the Next stable set”, Bulletin for Symbolic Logic, 7: 345–360. (Scholar)
- Wintein, S., 2014, “Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave
When There’s no Vicious Reference”, Journal of
Philosophical Logic 43: 665–690. (Scholar)
- Yaqūb, A., 1993, The Liar Speaks the Truth : A Defense of the Revision Theory of Truth, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Two types of deflationist”, Synthese, 165: 77–106. (Scholar)