Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Truthmakers" by Fraser MacBride |
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If everything goes well, this page should display the bibliography of the aforementioned article as it appears in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, but with links added to PhilPapers records and Google Scholar for your convenience. Some bibliographies are not going to be represented correctly or fully up to date. In general, bibliographies of recent works are going to be much better linked than bibliographies of primary literature and older works. Entries with PhilPapers records have links on their titles. A green link indicates that the item is available online at least partially.
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- Anderson, A. R. and N. D. Belnap, 1975, Entailment: The Logic of Relevance and Necessity (Volume I), Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Armstrong, D. M., 1973, Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989a, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989b, “C. B. Martin, Counterfactuals, Causality, and Conditionals,” in J. Heil (ed.) Cause, Mind, and Reality, Dordrecht: Kluwer. (Scholar)
- –––, 1989c, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder: Westview Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1997, A World of States of Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Difficult Cases in the Theory of Truth-making,” The Monist, 83: 150–160. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Truth and Truth-makers,” in R. Schantz (ed.), What Is Truth?, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, Truth and Truth-makers, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Beebee, H., 2004, “Causing and Nothingness,” in J. Collins, N. Hall, and L.A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 291–308. (Scholar)
- Beebee, H. and J. Dodd, 2005a. Truth-makers: The Contemporary Debate, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005b, “Introduction,” in their 2005a: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Bergmann, G., 1961, “The Glory and the Misery of Ludwig Wittgenstein,” in G. Bergmann, Logic and Reality, Madision: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964: 225–41. (Scholar)
- –––, 1967, Realism: A Critique of Brentano and Meinong, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. (Scholar)
- Bigelow, J., 1988, The Reality of Numbers: A Physicalist's Philosophy of Mathematics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Truthmakers and Truthbearers,” in Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal and Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, London: Routledge, 389–400. (Scholar)
- Bricker, P., 2006, “The Relation Between General and Particular: Entailment vs. Supervenience,” in Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics (Volume 2), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Cameron, R., 2008a, “How to be a truthmaker maximalist,” Noûs, 42: 410–21. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “Truthmakers and Necessary Connections,” Synthese, 161: 27–45. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008c, “Truth-makers and Ontological Commitment,” Philosophical Studies, 140: 1–18. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “From Humean Truthmaker Theory to Priority Monism,” Noûs, 44: 178–198. (Scholar)
- Cox, D., 1997, “The Trouble with Truth-makers,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78: 45–62. (Scholar)
- Daly, C., 2000, “Properties as Truth-makers,” Logique et Analyse, 43: 169–170): 95–107. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “So Where's the Explanation?” in Beebee and Dodd 2005a: 85–103. (Scholar)
- –––, 2012, “Scepticism about Grounding” in Fabrice Correira and Benjamin Schneider (eds.), Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 81–100. (Scholar)
- David, M., 2005, “Armstrong on Truth-making,” in Beebee & Dodd 2005a: 141–59. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Truth-Making and Correspondence,” in Lowe & Rami 2009: 137–57. (Scholar)
- Demos, R., 1917, “A Discussion of Certain Types of Negative Propositions,” Mind, 26: 188–196. (Scholar)
- Dodd, J., 2002, “Is Truth Supervenient on Being?,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 102: 69–85. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Negative Truths and Truth-maker Principles,” Synthese, 156: 383–401. (Scholar)
- Fine, K., 1994, “Essence and Modality,” Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 1–16. (Scholar)
- Fox, J.F., 1987, “Truth-maker,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 65: 188–207. (Scholar)
- Glock, H., 2007, “Truth in the Tractatus,” Synthese, 148: 345–368. (Scholar)
- Goodman, N., 1961, “About,” Mind, 70: 1–24. (Scholar)
- Gregory, D., 2001, “Smith on Truth-makers,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79: 422–427. (Scholar)
- Grossman, R., 1992, The Existence of the World: An Introduction to Ontology, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Heil, J., 2000, “Truth-making and Entailment,” Logique et Analyse, 43(169–170): 231–242. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford, Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “The Legacy of Linguisticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84: 233–244. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Relations,” in Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal and Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, London: Routledge, 310–21. (Scholar)
- Hochberg, H., 1967, “Nominalism, Platonism, and ‘Being True of’,” Noûs, 1: 413–419. (Scholar)
- –––, 1969, “Negation and Generality,” Noûs, 3: 325–343. (Scholar)
- –––, 1978, Thought, Fact, and Reference: The Origins and Ontology of Logical Atomism, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. (Scholar)
- Hofmann, F., 2006, “Truth-making, Recombination and Facts Ontology,” Philosophical Studies, 128: 409–440. (Scholar)
- Hornsby, J., 2005, “Truth without Truth-making Entities,” in Beebee & Dodd 2005a: 33–47. (Scholar)
- Horwich, P., 2009, “Being and Truth,” in Lowe & Rami 2009: 185–200. (Scholar)
- Incurvati, L., 2012, “How to Be a Minimalist about Sets,” Philosophical Studies, 159(1): 69–87. (Scholar)
- Künne, W., 2003, Conceptions of Truth, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D., 1968, “Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic,” Journal of Philosophy, 65: 113–126. (Scholar)
- –––, 1986, On the Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1991, Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell. (Scholar)
- –––, 1992, “Armstrong on Combinatorial Possibility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 70: 211–224. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “A World of Truth-makers?” in his 1999 Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, “Truth Making and Difference Making,” Noûs, 35: 602–15. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Things Qua Truth-makers,” in Lillehammer & Rodriguez-Pereyra 2003: 25–41. (Scholar)
- –––, 2004, “Void and Object,” in J. Collins, N. Hall, and L.A. Paul (eds.), Causation and Counterfactuals, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Lewis, D. and S. Lewis, 1970, “Holes,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 48: 206–212. (Scholar)
- Lewis, David, and Gideon Rosen, 2003, “Postscript to ‘Things Qua Truth-makers’: Negative Existentials,” in Lillehammer & Rodriguez-Pereyra (eds.) 2003: 39–41. (Scholar)
- Lillehammer, H. & G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, (eds.), 2003, Real Metaphysics: essays in honour of D.H. Mellor, London: Routledge (Scholar)
- Lowe, E.J., 1994, “Ontological Dependence,” Philosophical Papers, 23: 31–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “An Essentialist Approach to Truth-Making,” in Lowe & Rami 2009: 201–16. (Scholar)
- Lowe, E.J. & A. Rami (eds.), 2009, Truth and Truth-Making, Stocksfield, UK: Acumen (Scholar)
- MacBride, F., 2002, “The Problem of Universals and the Limits of Truth-making,” Philosophical Papers, 31: 27–37. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Lewis's Animadversions on the Truth-maker Principle,” in Beebee & Dodd 2005a: 117–40 (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Universals: The Contemporary Debate,” in Robin Le Poidevin, Peter Simons, Andrew McGonigal and Ross P. Cameron (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Metaphysics, London: Routledge, 276–285. (Scholar)
- –––, 2011, “Relations and Truth-Making,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, CXI: 159–177. (Scholar)
- Martin, C. B., 1980, “Substance Substantiated,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 58: 3–20. (Scholar)
- –––, 1996, “How It Is: Entities, Absences and Voids,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 57–65. (Scholar)
- McFetridge, I. G., 1977, “Truth, Correspondence, Explanation and Knowledge,” in his 1990. Logical Necessity & Other Essays, J.Haldane and R. Scruton (eds.), London: Aristotelian Society, 29–52. (Scholar)
- Melia, J., 2005, “Truth-making without Truth-makers” in Beebee & Dodd 2005a: 67–84. (Scholar)
- Mellor, D. H., 1995, The Facts of Causation, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, “Real Metaphysics: Replies,” in Lillehammer & Rodriguez-Pereyra 2003: 212–6. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Truthmakers for What?,” in H. Dyke (e.d.) & From Truth to Reality: New Essays in Logic & Metaphysics London: Francis & Taylor. (Scholar)
- Merricks, T., 2007, Truth and Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Replies to Cameron, Schaffer, and Soames,” Philosophical Books, 49: 328–343. (Scholar)
- Milne, P., 2005, “Not Every Truth has a Truth-maker,” Analysis, 65: 221–224. (Scholar)
- Molnar, G., 2000, “Truth-makers for Negative Truths,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 78: 72–85. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, Powers, Stephen Mumford (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Mulligan, K., 2003, “Stati di cose, verità e fattori di verità,” Sistemi Intelligenti, XV: 539–556. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006, “Ascent, Propositions and other Formal Objects,” Grazer Philosophische Studien, 72: 29–48. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, “Two Dogmas of Truth-making,” in J.M. Monnoyer (ed.) Metaphysics and Truth-makers, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Truth and the Truth-maker Principle in 1921,” Lowe and Rami 2009: 39–58. (Scholar)
- Mulligan, K., P. Simons, and B. Smith, 1984, “Truth-Makers,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44: 287–321. (Scholar)
- Prior, A. N., 1971, Objects of Thought, P. Geach and A. Kenny (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Read, S., 2000, “Truth-makers and the Disjunction Thesis,” Mind, 109: 67–79. (Scholar)
- Restall, G., 1996, “Truth-makers, Entailment and Necessity,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 74: 331–340. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Modelling Truthmaking,” Logique et Analyse, 169–70: 211–30. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “Post-script to “Truth-makers, Entailment and Necessity”” in Lowe & Rami 2009: 98–101. (Scholar)
- Robinson, D., 2000, “Identities, Distinctnesses, Truth-makers, and Indiscernibility Principles,” Logique et Analyse, 43(169–170): 145–183. (Scholar)
- Rodriguez-Pereyra G., 2005, “Why Truth-makers,” in Beebee & Dodd 2005a: 17–31. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006a, “Truth-making, Entailment, and the Conjunction Thesis,” Mind, 115: 957–982. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Truth-makers,” Philosophy Compass, 1: 186–200. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006c, “Truthmaker Maximalism Defended,” Analysis, 66: 260–64 (Scholar)
- Ruben, D., 1990, Explaining Explanation, London: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Russell, B., 1918–19, “The Philosophy of Logical Atomism,” The Monist, 28: 495–527; 29: 190–222, 345–380. (Scholar)
- –––, 1919, “On Propositions: What They Are, and How They Mean” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volume), 2: 1–43. (Scholar)
- Sainsbury, R. M., 1995, Paradoxes, (2nd edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Schaffer, J., 2008a, “Truth-maker Commitments,” Philosophical Studies, 141: 7–19. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008b, “Truth and Fundamentality: On Merricks' Truth and Ontology,” Philosophical Books, 49: 302–16. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009, “On What Grounds What,” in D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 347–83. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “The Least Discerning and Most Promiscuous Truth-maker,” Philosophical Quarterly, 60: 307–24. (Scholar)
- Schmutz, J., 2007, “Réalistes, nihilistes et incompatibilistes. Le débat sur les negative truth-makers dans la scolastique jésuite espagnole,” in J. Laurent (ed.), Dire le néant, Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 131–178. (Scholar)
- Schnieder, B., 2006a, “Truth-Making without Truth-Makers,” Synthese, 152: 21–46. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006b, “Troubles with Truth-Making: Necessitation and Projection,” Erkenntnis, 64: 61–74. (Scholar)
- Sider, T., 2001, Four-Dimensionalism, Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Simons, P., 1992, “Logical Atomism and Its Ontological Refinement: A Defense,” in K. Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 157–179. (Scholar)
- –––, 1998, “How the World can Make Propositions True: A Celebration of Logical Atomism,” in M. Omyla (ed.), Sklonnosci Metafizyczna, Warsaw: Uniwersytet Warzawski, 113–135. (Scholar)
- –––, 2000, “Truth-maker Optimalism,” Logique et Analyse, 43(169–170): 17–41. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, “Negatives, Numbers, and Necessity: Some Worries about Armstrong's Version of Truth-making,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 83: 253–261. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, “Why the Negations of False Atomic Sentences are True,” in T. De Mey & M. Keinänen (eds.), Essays on Armstrong, Acta Philosophica Fennica, 84: 15–36. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, “Relations and Truth-making,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Supplementary Volumes), 84: 199–213. (Scholar)
- Smith, B., 1999, “Truth-maker Realism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 77: 274–291. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, “Truth-maker Realism: Response to Gregory,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80: 231–234. (Scholar)
- Tarski, A., 1933, “The Concept of Truth in Formalised Languages,” in his 1956 Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, J. H. Woodger (trans.), Oxford: Clarendon. (Scholar)
- Taylor, R., 1952, “Negative Things,” The Journal of Philosophy, 49: 433–449. (Scholar)
- Williamson, T., 1999, “Truthmakers and the Converse Barcan Formula,” Dialectica, 53: 253–70. (Scholar)
- Wittgenstein, L., 1921, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, C.K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. (Scholar)
- –––, 1953, Philosophical Investigations, G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd. (Scholar)
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