Linked bibliography for the SEP article "Zombies" by Robert Kirk |
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- Alter, T., 2007, ‘On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts’, Philosophical Studies, 134: 235–53. (Scholar)
- Aranyosi, I., 2010, ‘Powers and the Mind-Body Problem’, International Journal of Philosophy, 18: 57–72. (Scholar)
- Balog, K., 1999, ‘Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical Review, 108: 497–528. (Scholar)
- Barnes, G., 2002, ‘Conceivability, Explanation, and Defeat’, Philosophical Studies, 108: 327–38. (Scholar)
- Block, N., 1980a, ‘Troubles with Functionalism’, in Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, Ned Block (ed.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 268–305. (Scholar)
- –––, 1980b, ‘Are Absent Qualia Impossible?’ Philosophical Review, 89: 257–274. (Scholar)
- –––, 1981, ‘Psychologism and Behaviorism’, Philosophical Review, 90: 5–43. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, ‘On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18: 227–247. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, ‘The Harder Problem of Consciousness’, Journal of Philosophy, 99: 391–425. (Scholar)
- –––, O. Flanagan and G. Güzeldere (eds.), 1997, The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- ––– and R. Stalnaker, 1999, ‘Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap’, Philosophical Review, 108: 1–46. (Scholar)
- Braddon-Mitchell, D., 2003, ‘Qualia and Analytical Conditionals’, Journal of Philosophy, 100: 111–135. (Scholar)
- Brown, R., 2010, ‘Deprioritizing the A Priori Arguments Against Physicalism’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17 (3–4): 47–69. (Scholar)
- Brueckner, A., 2001. ‘Chalmers's Conceivability Argument for Dualism’, Analysis, 61: 187–193. (Scholar)
- Campbell, K., 1970, Body and Mind, London: Macmillan. (Scholar)
- Chalmers, D. J., 1996, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, ‘Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 475–496. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002, ‘Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?’, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002. (Scholar)
- –––, 2003, ‘The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief’, in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap’, in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 167–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2010, ‘The Two-Dimensional Argument against Materialism’, in his The Character of Consciousness, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- ––– and F. Jackson, 2001, ‘Conceptual Analysis and Reductive Explanation’, Philosophical Review, 110: 315–61. (Scholar)
- Cottrell, A., 1999, ‘Sniffing the Camembert: on the Conceivability of Zombies’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6: 4–12. (Scholar)
- Crane, T., 2005, ‘Papineau on Phenomenal Consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 71: 155–62 . (Scholar)
- Dennett, D. C., 1991, Consciousness Explained, Boston, Toronto, London: Little, Brown. (Scholar)
- –––, 1995, ‘The Unimagined Preposterousness of Zombies’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2: 322–6. (Scholar)
- –––,1999, ‘The Zombic Hunch: Extinction of an Intuition?’ Royal Institute of Philosophy Millennial Lecture. (Scholar)
- Descartes, R., Discourse on the Method; The Objections and Replies, in The Philosophical Writings Of Descartes, 3 vols., translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (volume 3, including A. Kenny), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Dretske, F., 1995, Naturalizing the Mind, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Flanagan, O., and T. Polger, 1995, ‘Zombies and the Function of Consciousness’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2: 313–321. (Scholar)
- Frankish, K., 2007, ‘The Anti-Zombie Argument’, Philosophical Quarterly, 57: 650–666 . (Scholar)
- Garrett, B. J., 2009, ‘Causal Essentialism versus the Zombie Worlds’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 39: 93–112 . (Scholar)
- Gendler, T., and J. Hawthorne (eds.), 2002, Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Goff, P., 2010, ‘Ghosts and Sparse Properties: Why Physicalists Have More to Fear from Ghosts than Zombies’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 81: 119–37. (Scholar)
- Harnad, S., 1995, ‘Why and How We Are Not Zombies’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1: 164–167. (Scholar)
- Hawthorne, J. P., 2002a, ‘Advice to Physicalists’, Philosophical Studies, 108: 17–52. (Scholar)
- –––, 2002b. ‘Blocking Definitions of Materialism’, Philosophical Studies, 110: 103–13. (Scholar)
- Hill, C. S., 1997, ‘Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical Studies, 87: 61–85. (Scholar)
- Hill, C. S., and B. P. McLaughlin, 1999, ‘There are Fewer Things in Reality Than Are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 446–454. (Scholar)
- Jackson, F., 1998, From Metaphysics to Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- James, W., 1890, The Principles of Psychology, New York: Dover (originally published by Holt). (Scholar)
- Kirk, R., 1974a, ‘Sentience and Behaviour’, Mind, 83: 43–60. (Scholar)
- –––, 1974b, ‘Zombies v. Materialists’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 48 (Supplementary): 135–152. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, Zombies and Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2008, ‘The Inconceivability of Zombies’, Philosophical Studies, 139: 73–89. (Scholar)
- Kripke, S., 1972/80, Naming and Necessity, Oxford: Blackwell. (Revised and enlarged version of ‘Naming and Necessity’, in Semantics of Natural Language, D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 253–355. (Scholar)
- Latham, Noa, 2000, ‘Chalmers on the Addition of Consciousness to the Physical World’, Philosophical Studies, 98: 71–97. (Scholar)
- Leuenberger, S., 2008, ‘Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 4, D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 145–170. (Scholar)
- Levine, J., 2001, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Loar, B., 1990/1997, ‘Phenomenal States’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 4, J. Tomberlin (ed.), Atascadero: Ridgeview. Revised version repr. in Block, et al. 1997, 597–616. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, ‘David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 465–472. (Scholar)
- Lyons, J. C., 2009, Perception and Basic Beliefs: Zombies, Modules and the Problem of the External World, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Scholar)
- Marcus, E., 2004, ‘Why Zombies are Inconceivable’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 82: 477–90. (Scholar)
- Marton, P., 1998, ‘Zombies vs. materialists: The battle for conceivability’, Southwest Philosophy Review, 14: 131–38. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1970, ‘Armstrong on the Mind’, Philosophical Review, 79: 394–403. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1974, ‘What is it Like to Be a Bat?’ Philosophical Review, 83: 435–450, reprinted in his Mortal Questions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. (Scholar)
- Nagel, T., 1998, ‘Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophy, 73: 337-352. (Scholar)
- Papineau, D., 2002, Thinking about Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press. (Scholar)
- Perry, J., 2001, Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Searle, J. R., 1992, The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1975, ‘Functionalism and Qualia’, Philosophical Studies, 27: 291–315. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1981, ‘Absent Qualia are Impossible’, Philosophical Review, 90: 581–599. (Scholar)
- Shoemaker, S., 1999, ‘On David Chalmers's The Conscious Mind,’ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 439–444. (Scholar)
- Soames, S, 2005, Reference and Description: The Case against Two-Dimensionalism, Princeton: Princeton University Press. (Scholar)
- Stalnaker, R., 2002, ‘What is it Like to Be a Zombie?’, in Gendler and Hawthorne 2002. (Scholar)
- Stoljar, D., 2000, ‘Physicalism and the Necessary a Posteriori’, Journal of Philosophy, 97: 33–54. (Scholar)
- –––, 2001, ‘The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical’, in Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 15, James E. Tomberlin (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell, 393–413. (Scholar)
- –––, 2005, ‘Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts’, Mind and Language, 20: 469–94. (Scholar)
- –––, 2007, ‘Two Conceivability Arguments Compared’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 108: 27–44. (Scholar)
- Stout, G. F., 1931, Mind and Matter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Scholar)
- Sturgeon, S., 2000, Matters of Mind: Consciousness, reason and nature, London and New York: Routledge. (Scholar)
- Tanney, J., 2004, ‘On the Conceptual, Psychological, and Moral Status of Zombies, Swamp-Beings, and Other ‘Behaviourally Indistinguishable’ Creatures’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69: 173–86. (Scholar)
- Thomas, N. J. T., 1998, ‘Zombie Killer’, in S. R. Hameroff, A. W. Kaszniak, and A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness II: The Second Tucson Discussions and Debates. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 171–177. (Scholar)
- Tye M., 1995, Ten Problems of Consciousness: a Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind, Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- –––, 2006. ‘Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem’, Philosophical Review, 115: 139–68. (Scholar)
- –––, 2009. Consciousness Reconsidered, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (Scholar)
- Webster, W. R., 2006, ‘Human Zombies are Metaphysically Impossible’, Synthese, 151: 297–310. (Scholar)
- Worley, D., 2003, ‘Conceivability, Possibility, and Physicalism’, Analysis, 63: 15–23. (Scholar)
- Yablo, S., 1993, ‘Is conceivability a guide to possibility?’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 53: 1–42. (Scholar)
- –––, 1999, ‘Concepts and Consciousness’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 455–463. (Scholar)
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