The PhilPapers SurveysPreliminary Survey results (Back to contents)

Note: set response grain to "fine" for details on "other" responses.

Population  AOS Response details

A priori knowledge: yes or no?

Accept or lean toward: yes 146 / 191 (76.4%)
Accept or lean toward: no 28 / 191 (14.7%)
Other 17 / 191 (8.9%)

Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?

Accept or lean toward: Platonism 82 / 191 (42.9%)
Accept or lean toward: nominalism 62 / 191 (32.5%)
Other 47 / 191 (24.6%)

Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?

Accept or lean toward: objective 75 / 191 (39.3%)
Accept or lean toward: subjective 71 / 191 (37.2%)
Other 45 / 191 (23.6%)

Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?

Accept or lean toward: yes 127 / 191 (66.5%)
Accept or lean toward: no 54 / 191 (28.3%)
Other 10 / 191 (5.2%)

Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?

Accept or lean toward: externalism 88 / 191 (46.1%)
Other 53 / 191 (27.7%)
Accept or lean toward: internalism 50 / 191 (26.2%)

External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?

Accept or lean toward: non-skeptical realism 167 / 191 (87.4%)
Other 15 / 191 (7.9%)
Accept or lean toward: skepticism 7 / 191 (3.7%)
Accept or lean toward: idealism 2 / 191 (1.0%)

Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?

Accept or lean toward: compatibilism 117 / 191 (61.3%)
Accept or lean toward: no free will 28 / 191 (14.7%)
Other 25 / 191 (13.1%)
Accept or lean toward: libertarianism 21 / 191 (11.0%)

God: theism or atheism?

Accept or lean toward: atheism 157 / 191 (82.2%)
Other 19 / 191 (9.9%)
Accept or lean toward: theism 15 / 191 (7.9%)

Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?

Accept or lean toward: invariantism 83 / 191 (43.5%)
Accept or lean toward: contextualism 68 / 191 (35.6%)
Other 38 / 191 (19.9%)
Accept or lean toward: relativism 2 / 191 (1.0%)

Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?

Other 78 / 191 (40.8%)
Accept or lean toward: empiricism 61 / 191 (31.9%)
Accept or lean toward: rationalism 52 / 191 (27.2%)

Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?

Accept or lean toward: non-Humean 126 / 191 (66.0%)
Other 33 / 191 (17.3%)
Accept or lean toward: Humean 32 / 191 (16.8%)

Logic: classical or non-classical?

Accept or lean toward: classical 104 / 191 (54.5%)
Other 54 / 191 (28.3%)
Accept or lean toward: non-classical 33 / 191 (17.3%)

Mental content: internalism or externalism?

Accept or lean toward: externalism 108 / 191 (56.5%)
Other 49 / 191 (25.7%)
Accept or lean toward: internalism 34 / 191 (17.8%)

Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?

Accept or lean toward: moral realism 120 / 191 (62.8%)
Accept or lean toward: moral anti-realism 42 / 191 (22.0%)
Other 29 / 191 (15.2%)

Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?

Accept or lean toward: naturalism 113 / 191 (59.2%)
Other 44 / 191 (23.0%)
Accept or lean toward: non-naturalism 34 / 191 (17.8%)

Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?

Accept or lean toward: physicalism 117 / 191 (61.3%)
Accept or lean toward: non-physicalism 42 / 191 (22.0%)
Other 32 / 191 (16.8%)

Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?

Accept or lean toward: cognitivism 128 / 191 (67.0%)
Accept or lean toward: non-cognitivism 35 / 191 (18.3%)
Other 28 / 191 (14.7%)

Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?

Accept or lean toward: internalism 76 / 191 (39.8%)
Accept or lean toward: externalism 60 / 191 (31.4%)
Other 55 / 191 (28.8%)

Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?

Other 99 / 191 (51.8%)
Accept or lean toward: two boxes 54 / 191 (28.3%)
Accept or lean toward: one box 38 / 191 (19.9%)

Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?

Other 67 / 191 (35.1%)
Accept or lean toward: consequentialism 47 / 191 (24.6%)
Accept or lean toward: deontology 46 / 191 (24.1%)
Accept or lean toward: virtue ethics 31 / 191 (16.2%)

Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?

Accept or lean toward: representationalism 82 / 191 (42.9%)
Other 35 / 191 (18.3%)
Accept or lean toward: disjunctivism 33 / 191 (17.3%)
Accept or lean toward: qualia theory 33 / 191 (17.3%)
Accept or lean toward: sense-datum theory 8 / 191 (4.2%)

Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?

Accept or lean toward: psychological view 71 / 191 (37.2%)
Other 62 / 191 (32.5%)
Accept or lean toward: biological view 38 / 191 (19.9%)
Accept or lean toward: further-fact view 20 / 191 (10.5%)

Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?

Other 75 / 191 (39.3%)
Accept or lean toward: egalitarianism 67 / 191 (35.1%)
Accept or lean toward: communitarianism 28 / 191 (14.7%)
Accept or lean toward: libertarianism 21 / 191 (11.0%)

Proper names: Fregean or Millian?

Accept or lean toward: Millian 77 / 191 (40.3%)
Accept or lean toward: Fregean 67 / 191 (35.1%)
Other 47 / 191 (24.6%)

Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?

Accept or lean toward: scientific realism 160 / 191 (83.8%)
Other 20 / 191 (10.5%)
Accept or lean toward: scientific anti-realism 11 / 191 (5.8%)

Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?

Accept or lean toward: death 82 / 191 (42.9%)
Accept or lean toward: survival 77 / 191 (40.3%)
Other 32 / 191 (16.8%)

Time: A-theory or B-theory?

Other 96 / 191 (50.3%)
Accept or lean toward: B-theory 56 / 191 (29.3%)
Accept or lean toward: A-theory 39 / 191 (20.4%)

Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?

Accept or lean toward: switch 143 / 191 (74.9%)
Other 36 / 191 (18.8%)
Accept or lean toward: don't switch 12 / 191 (6.3%)

Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?

Accept or lean toward: correspondence 123 / 191 (64.4%)
Accept or lean toward: deflationary 37 / 191 (19.4%)
Other 24 / 191 (12.6%)
Accept or lean toward: epistemic 7 / 191 (3.7%)

Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?

Accept or lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible 91 / 191 (47.6%)
Accept or lean toward: inconceivable 47 / 191 (24.6%)
Accept or lean toward: metaphysically possible 35 / 191 (18.3%)
Other 18 / 191 (9.4%)

Back to contents