A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem Antti Kauppinen Final draft, September 15, 2009 Abstract Expressivists have long struggled with a non-circular individuation of the attitudes of approval and disapproval they argue constitute moral judgment. Since there seems to be no special moral feeling, they have in general tried to define moral attitudes in terms of their special functional role. Recently, Alexander Miller has presented strong arguments against Simon Blackburn's various attempts, and Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson have formulated a persuasive challenge to Allan Gibbard's view. I suggest that expressivists are better off abandoning the focus on functional role and instead following the lead of classical sentimentalists like Hume and Smith. Their views can be construed as distinguishing moral attitudes in terms of the special process from which they characteristically result, namely impartial sympathizing with the emotional reactions of those affected by the action or character traits. I call this type of view historical sentimentalism, and argue it not only solves the moral attitude problem but also explains why moral attitudes typically have the functional features expressivists have picked up on. In the final section, I defend historical sentimentalism against the challenge raised by the plain fact that we do not always arrive at our moral judgments by way of impartial sympathy.