EMOTfONS, METAPHORS AND REAfiITY A Thesis presented to tha D e p a r t m e n t of Philosophy wehead U n i v e r s i t y , Thirnnar w, Ontario In partial fuifillment of the requireaients for the dogtee o f M a s t e r o f Ar ts National Library 1+1 ,.,da Bibliothèque nationale du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibtographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A O N 4 OtrawaON K 1 A W Canada Canada The author has granted a nonexclusive licence allowing the National Lîbrary of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats. The author retains ownership of the copyright in this thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's permission. L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/nlm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. Ni la thése ni des extraits substântiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation. LAKEHEAD U T 1 VERS ITY OFFICE OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH T i t l e o f thesis: Emotions, Metaphors and Reality Name of student: Gabr ie l Furmuzachi Degree Awarded: Master of Arts The undersigned Supervising Commit tee certify that this thesis has been prepared u n d e r their direction and that the candidate has complied with the Masterr s r e g u l a t i o n s Advisor: Richard A. Berg Cortunittee Member: Todd Duf re s n e Cornmittee Member: J . D . Rabb In t h e i r work The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Wilosophy and Culture in English Canada 1850-1 950, Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott consider that tne Canadian way of doing philosophy uses reason in an accommodationist manner1 propose i n t h i s thesis t h a t William Lyall' s Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature represents a splendid example of the accomodationist use of reason . The Maritimes p h i l o s o p h e r advances t h e idea that ernotions have a cognitive value, a claim which 1 support by t ry ing to put Lyallfs ideas in a modern framework offered by French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre. Latent in Lyallrs work can a lso be found a theory of metaphor which 1 t r y to revive with the help of French philosopher Paul Ricoeur. Thus, fo l lowing Lyall, emotions and reason are always in a balance and they work together in order to give us a m o r e consistent and fuller grasp of r e a l i t y . AN OF WïLSIAM LPALZf S PRfLOSOPEY Philosaphy in canada Lyall the Philosopher, L y a ï l the Roanantic Lyall ' s mthod Lyaïl' s Understanding of the Intellect mtionrr, Morality Being INTELLECT, EMOTXONS AND II* ON EK)TmN E'OUR THEORfES OF EMOTION The Feteling Tbeory The p.rthriviorist Theory The Psychoanalytic Theory The Cognitive !ï!heoxy FRLPALL TO SARllRE ANb BACJK Sartre: Xmagination and m t i o n s The Magical W o r l d L y a l l aad S a r t r e FOUR -0-S OF METAPHOR The! Emotive meory The C ~ a o n mwrp The Iconic Signification ThThe VeEbal Opposition Theory TURBAYNE, WHEELWRIGHT AND BSZAPHORICAL REALITY TurbayneandlZm&gythof~ts lphor Philip Wheeïwrightl s &4eta#mr and R e a l i t y Epiphor Diaphor ENTER RICOEUR! Ref emmce: Metaphots arui Reality a g i n a t i o n LYALL AND MeTAPBORS The Ehnotive D h e n s i o n iii iv 1 T h e two extremes i n philosophizing the highly ideal and the l o w s e n s a t i o n a l are equa l ly a t f a u l t . They both equally subject the mind to a kind of necessity of a c t i o n , or o f being acted upon, i n s t e a d o f viewing it as Being, having l a w s by which it is regulated, indeed, b u t still possessed of a free activity, a personal ex i s tence , and an action with in itself. William L y a l l (1811 1890) This chap t e r aims t o give a p i c t u r e of William Lyallfs phi losophica l i deas . His work In te l lec t , the Wnotions and the Moral N a t u r e (1855) can be considered an e x a m p l e o f the accommodationist theory of reason, as it is developed i n Leslie Armour and Elizabeth T r o t t ' s s t udy of Canadian philosophy ana cu l tu r e , The Faces of Reason: An Essay on Philosophy and C u l t u r e in English Canada (1850 1950 ) published in 1981 (hencefor th abbreviated as Faces of Reason). B r i e f l y pu t , Armour and Tro t t consider that t h e accommodationist use o f reason is (o r , a t least, used t o be i n the period of t h e analyzed i n t h e i r work) typical o f English Canadian philosophers and it implies that reason is used as a means t o accommodate ph i lo soph ica l p o s i t i o n s opposed t o one8 s own i n order t o learn from t h e m . However, their analysis of L y a l l F s work does no t conclude on a very happy note . T h e Maritimes professor does n o t seem t o have brought an o r i g i n a l con t r i bu t ion t o philosophy. Moreover, he se-, Armour and T r o t t consider, t o be a r ep re sen t a t i ve o f Canadian philosophy on ly i n name. M y claim i n t h i s chapter is that con t ra ry t o t h e above considerations, Lyall should be taken into account i n an at tempt t o configure a p ic ture of philosophy as done i n Canada. L y a l l r s p a r t i c u l a r understanding of t h e mot ions (of t h e way they connect us with phenornenal world) and of their r e l a t ionsh ip with i n t e l l e c t i n the imaginative s t a t e of mind is an original contr ibut ion which, however. is overlooked because it is not f u l l y in te rpre ted . L y a l l f s philosophical ideas c m be character ized as having an i d e a l i s t s t reak , even though, as we will see, he r e j e c t s t h e s o r t of idealism t h a t Berkeley, f o r example, o r Hegel, prac t ice . Moreover, t h e r e can be spotted i n h i s work a tendency toward mind/body dualism which develops out of h i s s truggle t o meet t h e shortcomings of ideal ism and materialism. Following my explanation of L y a l l r s thought it will be easy t o see that, if the sort of idealism descr ibed by Armour and Tro t t is indeed s p e c i f i c t o Canadian philosophers, then L y a l l r s ideas f i t t h e i r desc r ip t ion very wel l , L y a l l r s ideas a r e not e a s i l y access ib le because of t h e pecu l i a r way i n which he narrows d o m what he thinks is w o r t h y f r o m t h e works o f other philosophers regarding the issues t h a t he analyzes. His understandng of t h e e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t i e s of mat te r , where he "converses" with John Locke and Thomas Brown o r t h e r o l e played by emotions r e l a t i v e t o morality, where he draws on David Humers and Immanuel Kant's ideas i l l u s t r a t e t h i s pecu l i a r i ty . Another issue t h a t unàe r l i e s Lyallrs work is cons t i tu t ed by his proneness t o using metaphorical language which is s u r e l y t o be expected considering t h a t he wr i tes under t h e influence o f the Romantic movement. However, t h i s explanation i s t o o s i m p l i s t i c and leaves undeveloped an important s ide of h i s work. T h e use of rnetaphorical language m a r k s the existence of a preoccupation with the productive capaci ty of language. Imagination is a key term here: the imaginative s t a t e is the place where motions and the i n t e l l e c t ( i n i t s a b i l i t y t o create metaphors) meet, where they are under each other r s influence. T h i s represents an important issue, because although Lyal l considered the i n t e l l e c t t o be divorced from phenomenal reality and gave emotions f u l l c redi t f o r making u s a part of t he world (an idea which will be analyzed i n the second chapter), fo r connecting us with Nature, t h e i n t e l l e c t too should have been awarded t h i s honour ( t h i s w i l l cons t i tu te my preoccupation i n the t h i r d chapter) . Therefore, i n t h i s chapter, a f t e r giving a general perspective on Lyallr s In te l lec t , the Emotions and the Moral Nature 1 w i l l analyze the p a r t t h a t deals w i t h h i s theory of emotions and 1 w i l l look closer a t how emotions are connected with t h e i n t e l l e c t i n the imaginative s t a t e . I w i l l try t o emphasize some of the relevant aspects which w i l l become t h e f o c i of further and more deta i led considerations which w i l l e s t ab l i sh more clearly Lyallfs s ta tus as a Canadian philosopherAW OVeRVIEW OF WILLIAM LPALLf S PHILOSOPmr Leslie Armour and Elizabeth Trott give an interpretation of philosopby as it was done in Canada by stressing a special use of reason which can be seen at work in the musings of most English Canadian philosophers. In the Faces of Reason, they state: The single point which we would make here if we could make &ly one point in this book would be this: Dominantly in English Canadian philosophy, reason is used as a device to explore alternatives, to suggest ways ofcombining apparently contradictory ideas, to discover nex ways of passing from one idea to another. Only rarely it is used as an intellectual substitute for force as a device to defeat one's opponent, to show h i s ideas to be without foundation, or to discredit his claims to philosophical thought. There is, in short, a kind of philosophical federalism at work, a natural inclination to find out why oners neighbor thinks differently rather than to find out how to show him up as an idiot. (1981, 4) Thus, for Armour and Tsott, many of the early Canadian philosophers used reas on t h i s particular accommodationist way . They shared willingness to attempt to understand and accommoaate philosophical positions opposed to their own" ( J D . Rabb 1986, 93) . In other words, the opinion of the Other counts. Dominantly, in Canada, following Annous and Trott' s findings, the Other as such counts, whether it represents other human beings or Nature. It should not be dismissed j u s t because it a s s e r t s something d i f f e r e n t t o what i s expected o r it a s s e r t i tself i n as m u c h as Nature is concerned i n r a t h e r unexpected ways. From t h e d e s c r i p t i o n given by Armour and T r o t t , one c m i n f e r that reason is not a r i g i d t o o l d iv id ing and s t r u c t u r i n g ideas whife be ing guided by ve ry s t r i c t rules. Reason is t h e c a t a l y s t fo r mediating apparent conf ron t ing pos i t i ons and not t h e t r i b u n a l where c o n f l i c t i n g ideas meet. In t h e i r book, Armour and T r o t t look f o r "a p a r t i c u l a r way i n which reason develops a s it comes t o be s u b s t i t u t & for i n s i g h t and i n t u i t i o n i n order t h a t c e r t a i n kinds of c o n f l i c t s might be overcome i n a reasonable way" (1981, 18) . Reason, when used by Canadian philosophers, is thus seen as developing and as assuming d i f f e r e n t "faces", according t o the i n e v i t a b l e changes t h a t occur i n e i t h e r sc ience o r publ ic awareness, o r i n i ts dia logue with f a i t h o r when d i f f e r e n t t r a d i t i o n s axe challenged. For example, John Watson saw reason as an ally i n h i s concern t o "develop and defend a kind of na t iona l i sm which would be compatible with EL world order", t o a t t enua te individual ism "while maintaining a s t rong sense of human r i g h t s and l i b e r t i e s " (Ibid., 5 1 2 ) . George John B l e w e t t uses reason i n order " to find a picture of the world i n w h i c h t h e world i s no t a mere p lay th ing o f Godrs and not a mere machine. H e wants t o find a view of the world wi thin which.. animal l i f e comes t o have a p o i n t beyond i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r human food, c lo th ing , and amusement" ( Ib id . , 5 1 4 ) . Rupert Lodge is searching f o r " the l i m i t s of reason i n order t o es tab l i s f i a t r u c e between the combatant p a r t i e s so t h a t he can c r e a t e , i n an educat ional s e t t i n g , a common he r i t age while preserving a c u l t u r a l p l u r a l i t y " (Ibid. , 513). These examples, among many o thers , e n t i t l e Armour and T r o t t t o corne t o the conclusion t h a t i n Canada, there is a sort of philosophical federalism at work. Arrnour writes in "The Faces of Reason and Its C r i t i c s " , an article in the journal Dialogue, that: [I J n the period which Prof. Trott and 1 chose, we find the kind of philosophical federalism which one might expect under the circumstances. We found James Beaven, perhaps something of a bigot before he left Englana, trying to find a rational framework within which rival kinds of Christians could make common causeWe found philosophers of the Scottish common sense tradition, like William Lyall, becoming much more eclectic as their lives wore on in Canada, (1986, 76) There is, therefore, something distinctive about Canadian philosophy and there is sornething which gives shape t o philosophical ideas promoted by Canadian philosophers, However, it is not my purpose here to argue whether the thesis sustaining Faces of Reason is legitimate or not. Rather, what 1 am interested in is to see how William Lyall's work f i t s into the framework thus provided. In other words, given this matrix, 1 want to see how Lyall's ideas develop within it and also how t h e y are appreciated by Arniour and Trott. L y a l l the Philonupher, Lyall the R o m a a t i c What should be done now is to take a look at Lyall's philosophical background and, by surveying In t e l l ec t , the Emotions and the Mural Nature, to sketch his philosophical stand point. First, let us briefly consider the context in which the book was written. William Lyall taught philosophy at the Free Church College i n Halifax, which was l a te r t o become Dalhousie Univers i ty . Fmour and T r o t t t e l l us t h a t Lyall: had been educated first at the Universi ty of Glasgow and then a t Ediriburgh, where he encountered t h e thought of Thomas Brown w h i c h was t o l e ave a l a s t i n g mark on his philosophyFor a t h e he çerved as a clergyman and took part of the Free Chuxch i n t h e G r e a t Disruption of 1843H e had a church i n Linlithgow when, i n 1848, he c a m e t o Ontario as a t u t o r a t Knox CollegeTwo years later, Paxton Young replaced him a t Knox when he decided t o accept a chair a t t he new Free Church College i n Halifax. T h e Free Church Col lege of Halifax had a staff of two: L y a l l , who se rved o f f i c i a l l y as Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy and C l a s s i c a l L i t e r a tu re , and Andrew King, who w a s Professor of TheologyI n f a c t , Lyall t aught a l1 t h e arts sub jec t s - (1981, 62 1 Lya l l was educated i n Scotland where he encountered t h e philosophy of c o m m o n sense. In Canada, a f t e r two years as a t u t o r at Knox College, he moved t o Halifax where he taught n o t only philosophy of mind and ethics but a l 1 a r t s r e l a t e d sub j ec t s as well. Lyall was, as it was w r i t t e n i n the Dalhousie Gazet te ( 2 0 D e c e m b e r 1893, 1361, "the whole Faculty of Arts". The In te l lec t , the Emotions and the M o r a l Nature is L y a l l ' s major work. It touches upon many phi losophica l f o c i a s it opens with an ana lys i s of the i n t e l l e c t followed by an inquiry i n t o the w o r l d of emotions, both of them constituting a picture of t h e human be ing i n i t s uniqueness. T h e third p a r t i s made up of r e f l ec t i ons on moral na ture , where t h e conclusions reached i n t h e f i r s t two parts are jo ined toge ther i n an at tempt t o explain how h u m a n beings c o e x i s t , how they corne t o g e t h e r i n a community. However, according t o F. H i l t on Page, i n William L y a l l in H i s S e t t i n g s (1980) : Lyal18 s book i s very much a per iod piece. 1 do not say t h i s t o belittle it as 1 am myself r a t h e r p a r t i a l t o period-pieces, e spec ia l ly t hose of Lyall ' s own period-anyone reading Lyal l ' s book now has t o be aware of the conventions and attitudes of the t h e ; otherwise his a t t e n t i o n w i l l be d i s t r a c t e d from t h e rnatter t o t h e manner of writing-..There was a time when almost every Sco t t i sh professor of philosophy publ ished h i s l e c t u r e s Volumes of l e c t u r e s were almost as popular as volumes o f sermons. To understand Lyal l it is necessary t o understand the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of t h e S c o t t i s h philosophy lecture of t h i s period, on which his own l e c t u r e s wero, i f uri_consciously, s t y l i s t i c a l l y modeled.. [For Lyal l , ]~ .e loquent passages; t a s t e , culture, moral and s p i r i t u a l e leva t ion ... [were important] . (1980, 59-61) T h o u g h 1 would not Say t h a t Lya l l ' s book merely r ep resen t s a co l l ec t ion of h i s p u b l i c l ec tu re s , t h i s explains, t o a c e r t a i n ex ten t , w h y Lyall used it as a textbook f o r the c l a s s e s he taught; f o r a good number of years, s o did teachers i n s e v e r a l o t h e r col leges (Dalhousie Gazette, 30 January, 18 90) . The "eloquent passages", t h e metaphorical language intertwined w i t h phi losophical explanat ions a s wel l a s t h e abruptness of t h e presen ta t ion and t h e mul t i tude of ideas t h a t unexpectedly spring up here and there leaving enough space f o r d e t a i l s i n t h e classroom can thus be understood. B u t t h i s , I th ink, is not the only explanation f o r Lyal18s s t y l e . Reading Lyall is of ten s i m i l a r t o reading from t h e works o f a Romantic poet , In h i s work, quotat ions from poe ts r i v a l w i t h quotations f r o m philosophers, That which cannot b e explained by reason alone, by t h e i n t e l l e c t , i s o f t e n cha rac t e r i zed by Lyal l as something t h a t "def ies def in i t ion" o r is "unexplainable" and thus is engulfed i n an aura o f rnystery. When t a l k i n g about the mind, f o r example, i n an attempt t o revise h i s ideas and h i s f indings w i t h regard t o t h i s issue i n order r e j ect the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t mesely organic product , Lyal l writes i n the tone of i d e a l i s t philosophy: t h e f irst idea one has is about onese l f and it is followed by t h e one about t h e o t h e r than self, o r "ex t e rna l i t y " which implies the exis tence of "matter wrapping up t h e mind". It fol lows t h e idea o f substance, t hen those o f space and t h e and power which becorne " the sub jec t s of science", Science i tself something which develops , s omething which advances and mind's role 'is no t [ t o bel i t s e l f a mere law, but is conversant about t h e l a w " ; it 'is i n t e l l i g e n t of it"; un£ o ld i t s process o r laws is cognizant of itself". But then, soon a f t e r talking about the mind employing concepts dear t h e philosophy brings into d i scuss ion t h e one t ime , Lyal l changes perspec t ive and t h e f a c u l t i e s mind, imagination says t h a t : i f we go i n t o t h e region of imagination, i f we mark the subtle process of t h a t f a c u l t y , i f we observe i t s potent sway h o w it e t h e r e a l i z e s o r s p i r i t u a l i z e s mat te r itself, c l o t h e s it i n i ts own beauty, invests it i n i ts own f a i r hues, s c a t t e r s around i ts thousand s p e l l s , gives animation and meaning t o every o b j e c t by which w e a r e surrounded, and t o every sound t h a t comes t o us, t o the l i g h t e s t whisper o f t h e breeze, and t o the s t i l l es t r u s t l i n g of t h e summer o r t h e autumn fo l i age ; which hears a voice i n t h e gurgling brook, that comes £rom depths y e t unfathomed by t h e mind i t se l f , and l i s t e n s i n converse with the ocean as it m~rmurs unceasingly, and with Wordsworth, hea r s t h e sound of another ocean ' r o l l i n g evermore', when 'our s o u l s have s i g h t of t h a t Unmortal sea which brought us h i t h e r r : who w i l l Say t h a t a l 1 t h i s i s t h e result of mere organiza t ion? Who would be a materialist who has ever f e l t t h e v i s i t a t i o n s of t h a t spirit which cornes t o us when nature i s s t i l l , which woos u s i n t h e moods and aspects of c r e a t i o n , who has felt - 'A presence t h a t d i s t u r b s him with t h e joy of e l e v a t e d thoughtsc , who has c u l t i v a t e d and cher i shed t h a t presence, and is indeed hardly ever unat tended by it, so t h a t it meets him i n and every pathway where t h e inf luences of na ture a r e around h k ? (1855, 93-94) Mind, therefore, according to Lyall , i s not a product, is not "an organic result"; it is d i f f e r e n t f r o m m a t t e r . The phi losophical inquiry, guided by reason, as well as t h e emotions one experiences under imaginationrs s p e l l bring us t o t h e same conclusion which is t h a t mat te r is not a l 1 t h e r e i s and t h a t t h e mind is no t merely a product of it. T h i s is, though, j u s t an example among o thers . As Lyal l sees it then, metaphors and concepts work together f o r t h e b e n e f i t of a b e t t e r explanation. A comect ion between philosophy and poet ry i s something w h i c h o f t en develops i n the Romantic period. G i l l e s Deleuze, i n one of his l e c t u r e s about Kant (1978), advances t h e r a d i c a l idea that w e never find those who understand philosophers among philosophers. In Kant's case, h i s b e s t d i sc ip l e w a s none other thdn Hdlderlin. T h e f o r Kant, t o g ive an exarnple, ceaçes t o have a psychological o r cosmological connotation. It becomes a pure f o m ; it is n o t something t h a t unfolds c i r c u l a r l y but ra ther something t h a t stretches itself, l i n e a r l y . This kind of t h e is t h e pure and a p t y form i n which, Deleuze claims, HOlderlinrs Oedipus wanders. ~ h e r e is then an intimate comect ion between t h e findings of phiiosophy and poetic effusiveness , B u t how is t h i s r e l a t e d t o Lyal l? 1s Lyal l ' s aff luence of p o e t i c language inter twined with phi losophical arguments a mere proof of h i s wr i t ing f o r the sake of an audience, f o r t h e sake o f eloquent, though scholar ly presentations? 1s it proof of h i s being an incurable Romantic? O r does it imply something more than t h a t ? Can it be t h a t h i s e f f o r t s were d i r e c t e d toward an attempt t o unpack Romantic themes and common places i n a phi losophical mi l ieu thus feeding t h e philosophical r e f l ec t ion i t s e l f with meanings revealed by poe t i c creation? I t h i n k t h i s qyes t ion deserves an af f i rmat ive a n s w e r . In sum, with Lyall , philosophical reason and p o e t i c imagination m e e t ; w i t h Lyall, reason and mot ion jo in hands and c r e a t e a balance. T h i s way, reason is not used as t h e one and only t r u e philosophical tool , which is an idea t h a t underlines the t h e s i s sus t a in ing Armour and Tro t t ' s Faces of Reason, that is , reason is used by English Canadian philosophers i n an accommodationist marner. Lyall s B&&hoâ L e t us now take a c loser look at t h e content of the Intellect, the Emotions and the M o r a l Nature i n order t o i l l u s t r a t e what 1 called a t t h e beginning of t h i s chapter Lÿallfs pecu l i a r way of re ta in ing w h a t is usefu l £rom the works of other philosophers. L y a l l f s ideas w e r e developed i n c lose connection t o t h e Scot t i sh philosophy of comon sense. He studied thoroughly Locke, R e i d , C a r l y l e and, espec ia l ly , Thomas Brown, as well as Descartes, Kant and Fichte. B i s way of dea l ing w i t h th ings can be reduced t o so r t ing and c la r i fy ing intuitions, "which a r e bas ic c e r t a i n t i e s w h i c h are given t o us" (Armour/Trott 1981, 66), i n order t o i n t e g r a t e them i n t o a coherent pattern. Once a t t h i s point , he r e e x a m i n e s t h e philosophical s i t u a t i o n t o see w h a t o ther , new i n t u i t i o n s corne t o light. Lyal l "tends t o s t a t e a thesis, and then qua l i fy it, qual i fy it some more, and then qual i fy it stj-11 fur ther . After several pages of such qua l i f i ca t ions w e discover t h a t he does not hold the o r ig ina l t hes i s a t al l" (J.D .Rabb, 1990 ) . For exânipfe, t h i s i s L y a l l t a l k i n g about t h e essential q u a l i t i e s of matter: he starts by saying that "we have thus, then, a r r ived a t the e s s e n t i a l p roper t i e s of matter. These a r e extension, d i v i s i b i l i t y , s o l i d i t y o r f l u i d i t y , hardness o r softness, and figure" (Lyal l 1855, 47). Then, l i k e Locke, he c l e a r l y dis t inguishes between these e s sen t i a l , o r primary qua l i t i e s and t h e secondary q u a l i t i e s such as color , sound, fragrance, heat or co ld , sweetness o r bittemess which "do not e n t e r i n t o our idea of matter"There is nothing su rp r i s ing up t o here. Other philosophers worked with this d i s t i n c t i o n i n t h e European phi losophical t r a d i t i o n When one would expect t h a t he is happy with t h e framework, he a c t u a l l y goes fu r the r , turning t o the thought of h i s former teacher, t h e Scot t ish common sense phiLosopher Thomas Brown. With Brown's he lp , he manages t o change the "bundle" of p roper t i e s with which he s t a r t e d : "According t o D r . Brown, himself, extension and res i s tance are t h e only two q u a l i t i e s which can invariably be predica ted about matter; fo r f igu re and magnitude a r e modifications of extension, as s o l i d i t y and f l u i d i t y , hardness and so f tness , are of resistance" (Ibid., 4 8 ) . Thesefore, from t h e o r i g i n a l Es t o r primary q u a l i t i e s extension , a i v i s i b i l i t y , s o l i d i t y o r f l u i d i t y , hardness o r so f tness , and figure, we a re now d o m t o j u s t two extension and re s i s t ance . A t h a s t t h i s new q u a l i f i c a t i o n should s a t i s f y Lyal l . After a l l , how much f u r t h e r can he go? B u t he does not s t o p even here. " D r . B r o w n has reduced the primary q u a l i t i e s t o t h e s e two. They may be reduced s t i l l fu r the r , v i z . , t o res i s tance , f o r extension i s rather a property of space than t h a t of matter" (Ibid., 48). As can be seen, Lyal l continuously q u a l i f i e s h i ç f indings and t h i s implies t h a t a great deal of a t t e n t i o n i s required i n order t o ge t t he correct p o s i t i o n that he mainta ins . This is Lyall's marner of p re sen t a t i on throughout the Intellect, the Emo t ions and the Moral N a t u r e L y a ï l s Understanding of the Intellect Now l e t u s see what Lyall t h i n k s about how knowledge is gained, what t h e r o l e o f t h e i n t e l l e c t i s and that of sensa t ion in t h i s e n t e r p r i s e . Reading t h e f i r s t p a r t of t h e In te l lec t , the Emotions and the Moral N a t u r e , one can be su rp r i s ed by t h e struggle Lyall goes through i n the a t tempt t o explain how sensa t i on becomes knowledge, how r e a l i t y becomes idea. Al1 this leads one f u r t h e r t o think that he will n o t g ive up e a s i l y when it cornes t o the actual ex i s t ence of t h e physical worldH e cannot concede t o materialisrn, because, on his view, mate r ia l i sm is "the propes spawn of too great an engrossrnent i n m e r e mat ter , whether F t be in t h e t o o exclus ive devot ion t o t h e bus iness and pursuit of l i f e , o r too e n t i r e an a t t e n t i o n t o t h e physical and mechanical sciences" (Ibid., 891, O n the other hand, he does n o t subscr ibe completely t o idealist views e i t h e r , because h e continuously speaks about the world ou t s ide and t h e ex i s t ence of both sensa t i on and intellect- 'It is a marvelous connexion which exists between t h e world without and the world wi thin" (Ibid, , 1 0 2 ) . The mind cannot work without the d a t a which s e n s a t i o n provides it. There are places i n the f i r s t t h i r d of h i s book w h e r e he cari be pe rce ived as nothing b u t a mind/body dualist and n o t an i d e a l i s t a t all. "Mind and matter are the two substances about which al1 philosophy i s conversant. These two substances may be s a i d t o d iv ide t h e universe" ( Ibid. , 13) . Moreover, he repeatedly d a i m s t h a t : Minci cannot be an organic r e s u l t . True, sensation i s p a r t l y m a t e r i a l and the d i f f i c u l t y of deciding where t h e m a t e r i a l part of t he process o r phenomenon s tops , and the mental part begins, may be urged i n favor of materialism; but sensation is not a l 1 t h e phenornena of mind, and while w e confess a d i f f i c u l t y , w e s t i l l m a r k the t o t a l di f ference between a mater ia l and a mental product . ( Ibid., 92 ) Hence, Lyal l disapproves of both t h e extreme materialism of "extreme sensa t iona l i s t s" , as he calls than, and the transcendetalism of t h e "extreme i d e a l i s t s f t . Rather, he f inds a middle path between the t w o more s a t i s f y i n g . I n order t o prove h i s point , he dis t inguishes between intellection, which is "the action of t h e mind as min&' and sensation which is "pa r t ly corposeal and p a r t l y a mental funct ion o r s t a t e " ( Ib id . , 1 0 2 ) , Thus, i n the presence of certain sensat ions , t h e mind produces ideas like t hose of matter, substance, space and t i m e , e tc . Through them w e gain knowledge of the e x t e r n a l world. These ideas rest upon ex i s t ing t h i n g s i n the phenomenal world; there i s more to the world than pure ideas as there is more t o it than pure sensations. The i n t e l l e c t provides us w i t h s c i e n t i f i c knowledge which develops on the presupposit ion t h a t there is a mater ia l worldHowever , for Lyal l , the i n t e l l e c t i s not t h e only source of knowledge. Let us r e c a l l Lya l l ' s manner o f presentat ion: he s ta tes a t h e s i s and then q u a l i f i e s it i n order t o find out what new i n t u i t i o n s corne t o l i g h t , The same approach i s used when talking about the i n t e l l e c t : he assumes and acknowledges the implicat ions of h i s statements and that the i n t e l l e c t not t he only important element when it cornes t o explaining t h e w a y w e gain knowledge, There i s something else t h a t a l s o cont r ibutes t o our understanding of t h e world. T h e i n t e l l e c t opera tes " f r o m a distance", it i s "wholly divorced from t h e physical worldf'. Lyall appears t o be an i d e a l i s t but not of t h e German kind nor of t h e kind professed by Berkeley s ince as w e said e a r l i e r , ne was very much against both of them. Lyall's ideal ism f i ts within the framework of a d i s t i n c t i v e Canadian idealism which has as i t s most important p a r t i c u l a r i t y t h e search f o r a balance, for an equi l ibr ium which w i l l not be exclusive bu t r a t h e r accommodationist; i n t h i s case, a bâlance between reason and mot ion . what 1 am ta lking about here i s t h a t Lyal l f inds necessary che use of another sort of reason a p a r t from pure reason namely, p r a c t i c a l reason. For Lyall, p r a c t i c a l reason is what completes our in t e rac t ion with t h e world. It refers t o our moral nature and t o our emotions. UnlFke the i n t e l l e c t , the knowledge gained through the use of p r a c t i c a l reason is indubi tab le and reveals t o us our t rue nature as moral agents and our ob l iga t ions t o others , Lyal l writes: There is a practical power i n t h e sentiment. It has an a u t h o r i t a t i v e voice within us which makes us f e e l our r e l a t i o n t o being, and such relations as w e dare not d is regard . It is here that consciousness c a m o t be mistaken. There can be no discussion about the t ru thfu lness o f its int imat ions, T h e f e e l i n g within now i s such that no dubiety rests upon it; it i s p r a c t i c a l , overwheiming. Thexe is reality here i f nowhere e l se . W e have got out of t h e world of shadows into t h e world of r e a l i t i e s o f m e r e consciousness into au thor i t a t ive consciousness which speaks aloud, which enforces itself, which does not admit f o r a moment of questioning, which w i l l not allow debate o r parleying, which unites us i n r e l a t i o n s not to be broken with our fellowbeings , w h i l e it makes us r e a l i z e t o ourselves our own subs tant ive exis tence and importance. ( Ibid. , 469) The claim t h a t practical reason i s indubi table cannot be e a s i l y expla ined without first unders tanding how emotions work and how t hey work i n connection t o moral n a t u r e Lyal l recognizes t h e importance of the i n t e l l e c t i n t h e process of acquir ing knowledge bu t he still thinks t h a t , by i t s e l f , t h e intellect i s use less , I t p re sen t s us w i t h a p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y which is n o t d i f f e r en t from the one P l a t o o f f e r s i n the Cave m y t h , i n t h e Republic. Lyal l pictures phenomenal r e a l i t y as having t h e same c o n s t i t u t i o n as t h e shadows on t h e walls of Plators Cave. However, u n l i k e P la to , he considers these shadows t o be t h e f a b r i c from which the i n t e l l e c t t a i l o r s the phenomenal r e a l i t y , a reality, though, which c a m o t be reached, which e x i s t s 'out there", which can only be analyzed and d i s s e c t e d as a corpse i n a l abo ra to ry . Lyall writes t h a t : [ t l h e i n t e l l e c t u a l p a r t of our na ture i s a surpass ing mystery those processes by which t h e mind becomes al1 l i g h t , opens t o idea of i t s e l f and the o u t e r world of t h e universe , p u t s upon a l 1 t h a t i s e x t e r n a l o r in te rna1 its forms, while these forms have the i r counterpar t without, o r i n t h e inner self, cons t ruc t s sc ience, and makes i ts own processes t h e subject of i t s i n v e s t i g a t i o n bu t marvelous as this is, t h e r e a r e myster ies o f o u r nature fag r e a t e r than t h e s e and the i n t e l l e c t u a l part m a y be s a i d t o be t h e least wonderful o f our compound be ing . ( Ib id . , 27 9 ) The i n t e l l e c t , t he re fo re , i s a n impor tant cons t i t uen t of our nature, b u t it is no t t h e most important one. The i n t e l l e c t a lone i s n o t a b l e t o g i v e us a proper account o f r e a l i t y . It needs t h e i npu t of ernotions Thus, w e have seen t h a t L y a l l does not want to concede t o e i t h e r idealism o r mater ia l i sm. Instead, he wants t o b r ing t h e m t o and given their due. t h a t that emotions should be Emotiõ, M x a ï i t y and m g After wr i t ing almost t h r e e hundred pages on t h e i n t e l l e c t and i t s functions, Lyall goes further and analyzes the emotions. The i n t e l l e c t l o s e s i ts glamour and this i s because the emotions corne onto t h e scene. Without t h e m , human beings would not be capable of a c t i o n and action is that which make us what w e r e a l l y are. Actions are t h e way w e a s se r t ourselves i n t h e world and become p a r t of it. What L y a l l seems t o think is t h a t the i n t e l l e c t has t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o r e f l e c t upon any possible s i t u a t i o n bu t without ac t ion it would not be different from what w e would cal1 today a powerful computer. Without a c t i o n , hwnan beings would l i v e as i f surrounded b y a glass bubble. But ac t ions themselves or ig ina te i n the w i l l and emotion i s t h a t which "provides us w i t h t h e i n i t i a l impetuous t o action" (Armour/Trott 1981, 761 . L y a l l claims t h a t "emotion is a higher s t a t e than pure i n t e l l e c t " (Lyal l 1855, 2 8 4 ) . T h i s is a ser ious aff i rmat ion and it has implications i n his theory of moral nature , Prima facie, i t looks as if he i s going i n the same di rec t ion as H u m e on t h i s point . "Hume and those who follow him t r e a t emotians as e s sen t i a l ly feelings ( ' a f fec ts f o r ' impressionsr) with thoughts inc identa l ly attached" (Neu 1977, 1) , For L y a l l , " [ the] moral element cornes from t h e region of duty, and may mingle w i t h our emotions, b u t t h e emotions themselves are d i s t i ngu i shab le from t h a t element, and are capable of s epa ra t e considerat ionr ' (Ibid., 2851 . By s ay ing that emotions are capable o f s epa ra t e cons idera t ion L y a l l seems t o reach conclus ions very close t o t h o s e of HumeH e says t h a t t h e mind can recognize witi-rout a shade of doubt a d i s t i n c t i o n between r i gh tnes s and wrongness. It does that with the same ease as it does when it has t o d i s t i ngu i sh between, Say, two c a t e g o r i e s , o r two numbers. B u t t h i n g s get complicated when the ques t i on why? a r i s e s - "Can w e exp l a in why it i s r i g h t , o r why it is wrong give any reasons f o r p r o n ~ ~ c i n g it so? Now, it would seem that no account o r explanat ion of t h i s can be given, but that w e perce ive a t once t h e q u a l i t y o f r i g h t n e s s o r wrongness apa r t f rom any such explanation" (Ibid, , 4 87 ) . Does L y a l l ' s account o f mora l i ty no t sound l i k e Hume's? =ter all, Hume is g iv ing s i g n i f i c a n t c r e d i t t o emotions too. I n h i s Treatise of Human Nature (1967) he argues t h a t the r o l e o f r eason i n m o r a l d e c i s i o n s is very l i m i t e d and t h a t moral approval i s only a f ee l i ng i n the m i n d of the person t h a t makes a moral judgment. "Actions, he says , may be laudable o r blmable, but they cannot be reasonable o r unreasonable" (Hume 1967, 4 5 8 ) . There a re s e v e r a l arguments w h i c h Hume br ings f o r t h t o sustain his pos i t ion . The f i rs t one is t h a t reason involves only judgments about rea l i ty , but when one examines t h e content of a moral ac t ion , one does n o t have t o deal with a f a c t . The only t h i n g t h a t is t h e r e i s j u s t a feel ing. Moreover, moral pronouncements are c l o s e r t o our w a y o f exper iencing a e s t h e t i c pronouncements, which a r e a l s o f ee l i ngs , and they are nowhere close t o r a t i o n a l judgments. One could t b i n k that moral pronouncements develop i n a similar manner t o logical . and mathematical reasoning, B u t Hume argues t h a t while i n t h e d i s c i p l i n e s of log ic and mathematics w e begin w i t h known f a c t s and discover a new, unknown f a c t , i n the d i s c i p l i n e of e th ic s , a l 1 the re levant f a c t s must be known from the beginning. Besides, accoraing t o Hume, moral ac t ions a r e done with t h e so le purpose of happiness and, insofar a s happiness is t he goal, reason has t o s tep aside. "Morality, therefore , is more properly f e l t than judged of; though t h i s f ee l ing o r sentiment i s commonly so s o f t and gen t l e t h a t w e a r e a p t t o confound it with an idea, according t o our common custom of taking a l 1 th ings f o r the same, which have any near resemblance t o each other" (Ibid. , 470). The foregoing is a summary of what Hume has t o Say on t h i s subject, But it does n o t exact ly fit Lyal l f s f ramework, Towards t h e end of t h e second chapter of h i s work, where he is t a l k i n g about emotions, L y a l l notes t h a t : Man is not only a mere being, he is a moral being; has n o t only a place i n c rea t ion , b u t hâs a pa r t t o p e r f o m i n creation: he not only l ives , and thinks, and feels he w i l l s and not only wi l l s , but w i l l s according t o a law of r i g h t and wrong. And this l a w i s not a r b i t r a r y , it i s e te rna l ; it i s not imposed, it i s a p a r t of his very nature. It belongs t o every moral being, enters i n t o t h e essence of a moral cons t i tu t ion . It is the l a w of duty, the law of r i g h t and wrong, a law o f eternal and ahstract propriety. ( L y a l l 1855, 468) T h i s t h e , it seems that Lyal l moves a long way a p a r t from Hume. But, l e t us no t forge t L y a l l r s manner of presentat ion: he s t a t e s a pos i t ion even though, i n t h i s case, he does not Say c lea r ly that t h i s particular pos i t ion is Hume's, and then, he qualifies it. B u t he does not s t o p the re : he q u a l i f i e s it again. W i t h t h i s new qua l i f i ca t ion , Lyall is "talkingO' w i t h Kant and his ideas about moral duty which a r i s e s out o f t h e reverence for law. H e goes f u r t h e r i n analyzing the meaning of t h e w o r d "reverence" and how it is comected with t h e concept of "duty" and t h a t of "law". For Kant, an ac t ion perfonued out of duty 'has to be done i r r e s p e c t i v e of al1 a p p e t i t e whatsoeverO'. Vir tue i s deprived of any t r a c e of f e e l i n g and it is entirely subjec ted t o the l a w . But, according t o Lyall: what 1 apprehend t o be my l a w , 1 recognize t o be so with reverence, which word denotes merely t h e consciousness of the immediate, unconditional, and unreserved subordination of my w i l l t o t h e l a w . T h e inmediate determination of t h e will by t h e law, and the consciousness of itf is ca l l ed reverence, and is regarded not as t h e cause but as the effect of t h e law upon t h e person- (Ibid,, 509) Thus, f o r Lyall, the will is determined and subordinated t o t h e law. T h e same position is supported b y Kant and, after what happened w i t h Lyal l r s appropria t ion of Humef s posi t ion, f irst explaining it and then qual i fying it, one might th ink t h a t this Kantian q u a l i f i c a t i o n u i l l s a t i s f y him. But t h i s does not seem t o be t h e case either! Kant too is wrong. Why? According t o Armour and Trott: Lyall admires t he f ormal aspect of Kantr s moral theory. But t h i s formal element i s no t , i n his view, s u f f i c i e n t t o account for moral i ty . For w e need t o be impelled toward s p e c i f i c acts and outcomes. One can be determined t o a c t coherently only i f one i s determined t o act a t a l l . And one must enjoy, amongst possible a c t i o n s t h e choice already guaranteed by t h e open-textured ambiguity of the s t i rñlus-response s i t u a t i o n created by the nature of our emotions, Thus, a rule l i k e Kant's categorical imperative - 'act only on a maxim through which you can a t the same time w i l l that ié should become a universal l a w 8 is not s u f f i c i e n t , The gap, i n pa r t , i s f i l l e d by the original moral mot ion which appears to us as a moral i n t u i t i o n . (1981, 77, xny i t a l i c s ) L y a l l accuses Kant of not admit t ing love t o be a p a r t of reverence. H i s almost i n s t i n c t i v e react ion is t o think t h a t i n al1 reverence there must be a c e r t a i n degree of love, otherwise the reverence would be "mere fear". For Lyall, it would seem t o be necessary, i n order t o moral approbation being real, that t he re should be love a s w e l l a s reverence f o r t h e Law: it would be otherwise a d i s t a n t reverence, not approval: t h e r e would be assent t o t h e r igh tness of the law, not approbation. Distant reverence is a t most a cold fee l ing , and it i s not properly approbation till t h e s e is love. (Lyali 1855, 510) Love is what Kant lacks i n h i s account o f morali ty. Lyall emphasizes g r e a t l y the concept of love. Love i s t h e most e s s e n t i a l m o t i o n , love i s t h a t w h i c h connects u s t o t h e o ther , love is t h a t which d iscovers a being f o r us . Love, next t o sympathy, benevolence and g r a t i t u d e , is one of t h e emotions which "tenninate on being". Love has as i t s ob jec t Being but Lyall does not spend t h e explaining what he m e a n s by using t h e word "Being". I t would seem that f o r L y a l l Being expresses that which has a real exis tence. The world, f o r t h e Maritimes philosopher, i s not a co l l ec t ion of sensations. II meets our gaze organized i n t o things w h i c h stand apa r t , detached from t h e i r s u r r ~ u n d i n g s ~ Hence, there can be t a l k about love not only with regard t o fe l low humans but a l s o love fo r Nature and everything t h a t pe r t a ins t o Nature. T h e only d i f f e rence , Lyall thinks, is t h a t t h e ernotion o f love increases propor t iona l ly with t h e pu r i ty o f i t s ob jec t . Love of God is the absolu te on the scale of which Lyall i s thinking. "Moral and i n t e l l e c t u a l q u a l i t i e s give an inmense i n c r e a s e t o emotions", he writes ( Ib id . , 4 1 0 ) , Moreover, he claims t h a t : w e know that inanimate objects even may awaken our love, a kind of attachment, and t h i s rnay be dis t inguished from t h e delight or pleasure which they give us; t h e one is del ight i n the ob jec t , the o ther is d e l i g h t produced by the obj ect. T h e former, then, is j u s t love; and t o Say t h a t love is de l ight i n an objec t , o r i n t h e contemplation of t h a t object , is t o describe t h e emotion by i t s e l f . (Ibid., 392) Such are, on L y a l l f s account, t h e implications that emotions have on morality. Now, w e have seen that emotions (and more p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e emotion of love) complete our "interaction" with what we ca l1 " the real" while t h e i n t e l l e c t could not go f u r t h e r than s c i e n t i f i c unders tanding . Lyal l sensed t h a t there is something l e f t out of the s c i e n t i f i c account of r e a l i t y arrd only t h e emotions could connect us with itPure reason has t o work toge the r with p r a c t i c a l reason i n order t o give us the complete p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y . Why? Because p r a c t i c a l reason, u n l i k e pure reason r e f e r s t o the very being of what exists i n Nature, of another human o r of God. As J . D . Rabb explains i n his Si lver Jubilee lecture: The emotion of love is a source of knowledge. Nature herself \is animated, i n t e l l i g e n t , f u l l of sentimentf. This is t h e ideal is t ic i n s i g h t concealed from us by our narsow r e l i a n c e on the i n t e l l e c t as our source of knowledge. Yet f o r Lyal l t h e i n t e l l e c t i s s t i l l important. It too i s a source of knowledge. H e devotes t h e first third of the book t o it and t o the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e mater ia l world it reveals. Unlike t h e Romantic poets o r o ther e th ica l i d e a l i s t s , Lyal l ' s idealism ne i the r ignores nor dirninishes a s unimportant t h e f indings of science. (1990) Yet, the i n t e l l e c t , being 'divorced" from t h e phenomenal world, being unrelated t o t h e objects o f t h e physical world, cannot bui ld a bridge between us and t h e other-than-us. T h i s i s t h e task of emotion, Emotion is "the atmosphere of mind; it is i ts v i t a l breath" (Lyal l 1855, 284)In L y a l l r s p i c t u r e of t h e human e n d , t h e emotions, " i n i t i a l l y , a r e d i r e c t e d t o ob jec t s i n the world and, by reason of t h e i r connection t o the secondary objec ts which a re S ta t e s of mind, they provide t h e background f o r t h e i n t e l l e c t " (Armour/Trott 1981, 7 6 ) . T h i s is why emotions a r e a source of knowledge and t h i s is why w e are able t o see nature as "animateà" and "ful l of sentiment". Lyall aff i rms t h a t Nature, i n a sense, resonates t o our emotions and our emotions are i n tune with Nature. In as much as we are s e n t i e n t beings w e resonate with Nature. T h e i n t e l l e c t does not have any means t o reach the phenomenal r e a l i t y with al1 its complexity. But' for tunate ly , we connect w i t h Nature through our emotions and thus w e are a b l e t o provide t h e i n t e l l e c t something with which t o work, w e are a b l e t o gain knowledge of r e a l i t y and understand it. In s u , w e have seen t h a t Lyal l r e j e c t s t h e k i n d of ideal ism which stems £rom Berkeley's theory of ideas where t h e only t h i n g t h a t e x i s t s and t h a t w e a r e c e r t a i n of is t h e mind, B u t t h i s does n o t r e f l e c t well on Lyal l . H e could have c r i t i c i z e d him by following e i t h e r Hume and consequently, f a l l i n g i n t o skepticism, o r Kant which he does not because he r e j e c t s p a r t of Kant's ideas a l so . Row t hen can Lyal l ' s p o s i t i o n be explained? The thing which might expla in it i s that Lyall became aware of t h e importance o f Nature. H i s stay i n Canada must have influenced him. H e wants t o Say t ha t , doubt less , Berkeley was wrong. Nature e x i s t s ! Physical objec ts exist! This is what Lyal l does: he finds out t h a t the power of the i n t e l l e c t i s limited bu t he does not desert the post. I n order t o have t h a t piece of knowledge t h e mind needs but cannot get through the i n t e l l e c t , Lyal l requests help from the emotionsmot ions can give us knowledge about the world. Love i s the emotion which unvei ls Being, Certainly, t h i s emphasis on love and emotion would sound very strange for Berkeley and it would be strange f o r Kant a s w e l l . Hume would not have expected this turning po in t . B u t it seem natural to Lyall. Therefore, i f there is anything t h a t i s worthwhile i n Lyall 's work it is h i s emphasis on t he cogni t ive value of motions which is an overlooked aspect of his philosophy because it w a s not f u l l y in t e rp re ted . W i l l i a m Lyall 's phi losophical work then i s not j u s t a "patchwork q u i l t " of foreign ideas , as Armour and Tro t t c l a h (Ibid*, 79) . It i s original, moreover, o r i g i n a l i n a Canadian way. J. D. R a b b recognizes t h a t " H i s work i s a splendid example of what m o u r and Trot t have c a l l e d the accomodat ionis t use of reason, of phi losophical federalism" ( 1 9 9 0 ) . By c lass i fy ing Lyall as an e c l e c t i c and by n o t investigating thoroughly h i s a t t i t u d e t o emotion, Armour and T r o t t f e l t e n t i t l e d t o accord him only a minor r o l e i n t h e general p i c t u r e of philosophy done i n Canada. It is not my in t en t ion t o say that Lyall put a d i s t i n c t i v e mark on t h e philosophical pantheon of ideas. But he d id , most cer ta inly, realize t h a t i n order t o do philosophy a t l e a s t i n t h a t p a r t of the world, one must have open n o t only a r a t iona l eye, but an emotional eye as well. The only thing lacking i n L y a l l , i n t h e formulation and aff i rmat ion of h i s ideas, is confidence. The s i l e n t echo of a nonexistent t r a d i t i o n springs through t h e chasms of t h e chapters of h i s work. H e was an exi le . He was supposed t o f e e l at home, but he did not and he could not since h i s philosophical home was overseas i n Scotland. Instead, he was i n Canada t ry ing t o b u i l d his own s h e l t e r . H e knew how t o do it but he had to do it making use of w h a t he w a s offered there. And t h a t , as J.D. Rabb recognizes i n his Jubilee l ec tu re , w a s Nature: I n s o far as L y a l l r s i d e a l i s m is concerned what i s important , indeed c ruc i a l , i s h i s c l a i m , not merely that w e can sympathize with nature , but r a t h e r t h a t t h e emotion of sympathy can a c t u a l l y animate na tu re Here he begins t o sound more l i k e a romantic poet than a r a t i o n a l i s t philosopher: 'There i ç something i n t h e voice of a brook w h i c h s t irs the innermost m o t i o n s of t h e s o u l , p lac id , s teady, deep; in the s ign of t h e wind; i n t h e dash of the ocean; i n t h e sunshine and gloom; i n c a b and tempest : our mind f e e l s i n all, has an emotion corresponding t o each. Such is t h e l a w , such is t h e power of sympathy. What power does it e x e r t i n u n i t i n g society! What a bond of c o m e c t i o n ! What an amalgamating principle ! And through it nature i t s e l f is animated, i n t e l l i g e n t , full of sentiment, and t h e i n s p i r e r of t h e f i n e s t , and t h e most d e l i g h t f u l , sometimes the most exalted emotionsr ( L y a l l 1885, 461-462). (1990) Not surpr i s ing ly , L y a l l r s development of ideas t akes place abrupt ly . T h e r e is not a smooth flow of phi losophical thoughtHe t r i e s t o set new views, b u t h e does t h a t i n as an ye t un-explored t e r r i t o r y The school he cornes £rom, t h e school of Sco t t i sh philosophy, enjoys the r ichness of a t r a d i t i o n which did not e x i s t i n Canada, but whose exis tence was f e l t necessary. A t r a d i t i o n cannot corne i n t o being by using borrowed elements but only by using i t s own resources. A t r a d i t i o n i s necessary because without it nothing can be labeled as new. Novel ideas cannot be recognized a s new i f t h e r e are no o t h e r terms t o which they can be compared. For Lyal l , t o u se t h e t r a d i t i o n a l ph i losophica l language and concepts o f Western philosophy seems a seduc t ive temptation. B u t they do no t work any longer s ince the a t t i t u d e toward the given of ana lys i s has changed. This change explains t h e aura of ec l ec t i c i sm surrounding Lyallrs work. A certain philosophical t r a d i t i o n can only be reached when it gets t o the p o i n t o f finding a part icular n e w f o r m of cornmication. It finds i t s own i den t i t y when it develops a more free a d efficient means of relating t o t h e other t r a d i t i o n s . It is only then that thought can fo l low its essential and natura l ques t ions . Now, after providing srio u t l i n e of L y a l l r s work, the next th ing 1 w i l l do is examine more c l o s e l y h i s ideas about the cognitive value of emotions and about t h e i r connection with t h e i n t e l l e c t in t h e imaginative s t a t e . Thus, understanding L y a l l r s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of emotions, as well as understanding how emotions work, how they b u i l d t h e br idge between r e a l i t y and t h e emotional being, w i l l c o n s t i t u t e rny focus throughout t he concluding sec t ion of t h i s chapter . The fact t h a t Lyal l uses metaphors throughout h i s exposit ion w i l l be emphasized i n what follows because it is my content ion t h a t L y a l l f s understanding o f emotions and metaphors as being connected and how they merge toge ther i n t h e imaginative s t a t e of mind are of c e n t r a l importance i n comprehending h i s philosophy. For L y a l l , t h e intellect is "but a p a r t of his [man's] compound being, and not [even] t h e most important part". Lyall talks about t h e mind a s having two dimensions. He d r a w s on t h e Cartesian conception t h a t t h e mind's essence i s thinking but he brings i n t o discussion t h e Lockean view t h a t th ink ing is the "action of t h e soul" and not i t s proper essence. This compels him t o adopt a m o r e balanced pos i t ion with regard t o t h i s issue. "Thinking and feeling, however, a r e t h e two States of mind i n which, i f it exists i n a s t a t e o f consciousness a t a l l , it must e x i s t " (Lyall 1855, 289) . They are d i s t i n c t and they do not i n t e r a c t i n the sense that one of them cannot be t h e rnaster of the o ther . One's thought can provoke one t o have an emotion and, as w e l l , an emotion is "the great prompter and enkindler of thought" ( Ibid . , 290) . This means t h a t both t h ink ing and having emotions share t h e same honours, i n as much as one is n o t t h e master of the o t h e r Thoughts and m o t i o n s a r e bound together . The mind, a s long as it is self-conscious, is a l s o m o t i o n a l . 'Some one emotion o r o t h e r , it may be sa id , i s occupying o r f i l l i n g the mind every moment of its conscious exis tence" ( I b i d - , 290) , It seems t h a t Lyall i s s i t u a t e d , once again, on c o n c i l i a t o r y ground. H e does not side with P l a t o and thus consider t h e i n t e l l e c t and the emotion as opposite with one, t h e i n t e l l e c t , being t h e master o f the o t h e r ; o r with Hume w h e r e the emotion becomes t h e master and reason i ts s lave . B u t t h i s should no t be a su rp r i s e , s i n c e we have seen t h a t h i s work is a "splendid example of t h e accommodationist use of reason". Lyallfs d e f i n i t i o n of emotion is drawn from analogy. An emotion i s a movement of t he e n d , consequent upon some moving cause. Regarding the emotion as a movement of the mind is an a r t i f i c e based on the analogy of t h e mind w i t h the body: " there is some analogy between motion of t h e body, o r o f any mate r i a l substance, and this phenomenon of the mind, as t h e r e i s an analogy between an act of the body and t h e a c t s of t h e w i l l o r t h e i n t e l l e c t " ( I b i d , , 286) . Thus, i n def ining emotion as a movement of the mind, Lya l l makes use of t h e metaphor, b r inging toge ther two remote tems ("emotion" and "movement") t o t r y t o ç ive a d e s c r i p t i o n of "emotion". But he is quick t o d r a w a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t emotion cannot be an "act" of mind because t h e only "act ive power" (again, another metaphor) of t h e mind i s t h e w i l l . T h i s "movement" of t h e mind, Lyall recognizes, is something d i f f e r e n t than an act of t h e mind: By an act of will, or an impulse from some foreign body, our limbs, or our whole bodies, are put in motion; =d in the sarne way, by an act of will, or the impulse of other bodies, bodies other and foreign to ourselves are put in motion, There is impulse and motion, Now, in the phenornena of emotion, there is something like impulse, and the emotion of the mind is the consequence, An emotion is thus, more properly, any feeling of the mind suddenly inspired or produced; it is the feeling either in its first and sudden excitement, or the same feeling considered in relation to that first or sudden impulse or excitement. We cal1 it a feeling, or, perhaps, an affection of the mind when it is not considered with relation to this impulse or excitement, but regarded in its continuous existence or exercise. Thus, love or admiration when awakened by any object, is an emotion; when continuous, it is an affection. (Ibid,, 286) Here Lyall àraws a distinction between feeling (or affection) and emotion. The difference between the two is rooted in the difference between abruptness and continuous flow. When the state of an emotional person is precipitously altered by the object of emotion we are dealing with an emotion. When the altered state persists, then we are dealing with feelings. Moreover, an affect has a connotation of passivity. One is affected or being acted upon rather than acting. The common use of language corroborated with Lyallfs proneness to continuously qualify his findings, compels him to disregard this distinction. He asserts that, when using the term "emotion" we also extend it to feelings because originally it regards the sudden rise of emotion.But this, by no means, should narrow the usage of the word. Thus, the emotions "take over" feelings and Lyall considers himself justified in writing that "the emotions are just the feelings" (Ibid., 287) . Now is this new "qualification", this new achievement a legitimate one? On the one hand, it xrtakes sense if one takes into account Lyallfs desire to "stay in the domain of cownon sense". But on t h e o ther hand, it diminishes the c l a r i t y of h i s exposit ion, Lya l l i s g u i l t y of l eaving tnings unexplained and considering t h a t nuances a re not re levant , As observed by Amour and Trot t : "One would suppose t h a t h i s system could, i n t h i s respect , be t id ied" (1981, 7 4 ) . If Lyall were concerned w i t h t he use of ordinary language and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e t e = "emotion" got t o t he point where it cm be used interchangeably with t h e term "feeling", he would have discovered t h a t t h i s term denotes d i f f e r e n t things i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. Feeling words a re not always employed i n t h e same w a y , as one can see i n examples l i k e '1 feel that t h i s is t he r i g h t way" and '1 f e e l pain" o r '1 f e e l bad". Moreover, t h e r e i s another s e t of problems t h a t a r i s e when emotion is defined on t h e bas i s of an analogy w i t h t h e 'motion" of t h e body which impiies that we have, more o r l e s s , an analogy w i t h t h e phenomenon of sensation, T h i s means t h a t L y a l l gives an account of ernotions i n terms of sense percept ion which does not hold very well for various reasons: i n the f i r s t place, sense perception implies t h e existence o f an organ of perception. B u t t h i s i s not t r u e w i t h regard t o emotionsThere i s no organ f o r sensing t h e emotions. A question l i k e "What organ do you use when you fee l sad?" is nonsense, Also, t h e objects and s t a t e of a f f a i r s i n sense perception e x i s t independently of them being perceived. Can that be s a i d about emotions? C a n one have an ernotion without knowing t h a t one has that emotion? Can one a l s o have an emotion without knowing w h i c h one it is, o r genuinely mistaken about it? Perhaps we can as it happens when we are angry without knowing it. We seem qui te r e a d i l y deceived, self-deceived, and a l s o wi l l ing and able t o deceive o thers about it. However, Lyall does not s h o w any interest i n a t tacking t h i s problem. Moreover, s ense perception involves percept ion of t h e i n t r i n s i c , non-re la t ional p roper t i es of t he objects perceived. 1s t h a t true about emotions? Warren Shib les i n h is book on Emotion (1974) d i s t i ngu i shes emotions from f e e l i n g s on t h e fol lowing basis: Because emotions involve cogni t ion they can be shared, w h e r e a s , feelings cannot D e shared. Sympathy involves having s imilar f e e l i n g s o r understanding ano ther r s f e e l i n g s . Feelings do no t have objects as emotions do. '1 enjoy g o l f r and '1 enj oy a f ee l i ng r , bu t 'painr i n '1 f eel painr i s no t an ob jec t of the f e e l i n g b u t the f e e l i n g i t s e l f . One can enjoy a feeling but it is a category mistake t o Say he f e e l s an enjoyrnent. If emotion were a f e e l i n g t h e n it would seem t h a t phys ica l i r r i t a t i o n s and pains would have t o be regarded as emotions. They are not . (1974, 143) Thus, f e e l i n g s and emotions a r e d i f f e r e n t . Shibles po in t ed ou t that f e e l i n g s may be p a r t o f w h a t w e mean by emotion. "They may precede, coex i s t w i t h o r fo l low cognition" (Ibid. , 1 4 1 ) . But t h i s does not imply t h a t t h e r e i s a r e l a t i o n of i d e n t i t y between f e e l i n g s and emotions. O f course, one can reply t o t h i s t h a t William James has built h i s theory o f emotions on t h e supposi t ion that emotions are feelings. For James, emotions a r e nothing but i n t e r n a 1 bodily sensat ions . t h a t is, " the f ee l i ngs o r subjective s e n s i b l e a spec t s of phys io log ica l occurrences caused by perceptions" (Lyons 1980, 14). However, u n l i k e James, Lyal l sketches a d i s t i n c t i o n between f e e l i n g and emotion and then abandons it, leaving it undeveloped. Defining emotion by making use of the analogy with t h e "motion" of the body, Lya l l does no t r a i s e t h e kind of quest ions asked above and thus, he fa i l s t o i n v e s t i g a t e a very r i c h area which would otherwise cast a brighter light on the issue he wants t o analyze. But even i f he does not rnake t h e d i s t i n c t i o n very clear, he does no t f a11 i n t o the fallacy of ambiguity, reasoning now about emotions and then about feelings. However, Lyall does distinguish between emotion and passion and between emotion and desire. Lyall describes emotion by comparing it to passion: "Emotion is generic. Passion is specific [..-1 Passion is but a stronger emotion [..-] The desires are distinct States of mind. They may be accompanied with emotions, but they are not emotions" (Lyall 1855, 2 8 7 ) . It seems that emotions are, as he said, quite generic, If any "movement of the mind" can be translated into emotion then we are under its spell for the majority of timeIndeed, if "the first essential condition of emotion would seem to be one of calm and placid enjoyment" and if this "might be taken as the first essential state of emotion" then "the balance of al1 the emotions would seem to require or necessitate a calm and settled state" ( Ibid- , 2 91 1 . Anything disturbing this balance, this settled state, Fs an emotion but, in as much as emotion is 'the movement of the mind consequent upon some moving cause" it means that there must be an impulse which acts like a cause. The cause or the impulse is represented by the feeling which, as we saw above, is the "first and sudden excitement of the mind". This excitement of the mind occurs in the presence of the object of the emotion. mat then constitutes the object of the emotion? For Lyall, emotions have two sorts of objects. There are direct and indirect ob j ects . Thus, on one hand, when one loves somebody, when one is depressed about something, etc. we are dealing with direct objects. On the other hand, when the state of mind which "the emotion produces or the outcomes of the actions stimulated by the emotions" (Armour/Trott 1981, 75) are involved, we are dealing with indirect objec ts , Armour and Tro t t explain. Examples of emotions awakened by a d i r e c t objec t are: de l igh t , wonder, surprise and astonishment, admiration and adorat ion. Delight, f o r example, is produced by "every o ~ j e c t h a t can minis te r t o our enjoyment, tha t can give us happiness, t h a t a f fords us pleasure" (Lyal l 1855, 3 4 8 ) . Wonder, i s " tha t emotion which is awakened on the contemplation of something great , o r by what i s extraordinary, and o u t of t h e usual course of experience o r observation" (Ibid. , 358) . A meteor i n the sky , o r 'some phenomenon upon earth, which has never been seen before", o r something t h a t does not fit our ordinary, day t o day occurrences, induces us t o experience t h e m o t i o n of wonder. Melancholy, sorrow, joy etc. are emotions which do not occur as a r e s u l t of t h e i n t e r a c t i o n with a d i r e c t ob jec t . Rather, these m o t i o n s rest on oner s s e l f awareness, Thus, i n Lyall' s account of emotion t h e case t h a t : X e l i v e i n events and w e a r e connected with objec ts [,.] The events and circumstances that t r a n s p i r e da i ly , o r t h a t a r e ever a r i s i n g , produce joy o r sorrow, o r exc i t e f r e t f u l n e s s and impatience, o r are lit up with the calm and t h e sunshine of cheerfulness, o r again a r e steeped in t h e sombre shades of melancholy, T h e da i ly h i s t o r y of every individual i s made up of these events, these circumstances and they awaken such and such emotions i n the breast ; and thus t h e t i s s u e of l i f e cons is t s of those events without, and t h e s e emotions within. ( Ib id , , 3 4 6 3 4 7 ) Sorrow, f o r example, a r i s e s out of our thoughts about death. "Death", writes Lyall making use of metaphorical construct ions, "is t h e grim t y r a n t that shakes his sceptre over every ind iv idual of our race, and t h a t will claim al1 for his dominion o r his prey. W e must bow our heads i n death, and t h e t r i b u t e o f sorrow we have paid t o others may 5e rendered t o us" ( Ibid. , 340) There are, howeaer, two exceptions t o the =le of emotions not occurring as a r e s u l t o f i n t e rac t ion with a d i r e c t obj e c t . T h e f i r s t one i f 'cheerfulness i s t h e harmony of a l 1 emotions" ( Ibid. , 3031, 2s L y a l l writes, then t h i s implies t h a t cheerfulness does not exactly have an ob jec t It is, as it w a s said e a r l i e r , t h e condition of a l 1 emotions, t h e i r balance. It is not t h a t , when being cheerful , one lacks emotion. For Lyall, t he mind, a t a l 1 times, is informed by one emotion o r another, In the cheerful s t a t e , a l 1 the emotions a r e ac t ive but they are ac t ive i n such a way that they counteract each other so they make possible a balance, Lyall writes t h a t : I n t h e equil ibrium of t h e atmosphere, al1 t h e elements seem t o be a t rest, and yet, they are a l 1 i n harmonious actionWhen a balance i s i n equil ibrium, ne i ther of t h e sides s e e m t o be i n ac t ion; and yet it is because both are i n ac t ion equal ly that t he equilrbrium i s produced, o r thexe is a rest on the point of equilibrium. So i s it w i t h emotions. None may be sa id t o be i n ac t ion , and yet al1 may be s a i d t o be i n action, o r capable of action, and only await t h e c a l 1 f o r thern a t the proper time, o r i n t h e i r proper place. (Ibid., 303) Thus, cheerfulness, being the harmony of al1 emotions ac tua l ly lacks a spec i f i c objec t . T h e second exception is represented by the emotion of lcve. 'A th ing loved", Armour and Trot t explain, "is loved f o r its own sake. Since i t s u l t ima te sustaining ob jec t must be something which can be loved f o r i t s own sake and not f o r t h e sake of an i n d i r e c t object , love, combined w i t h intellectual understanding, must lead on t o the only thing actually capable of sustaining love for its awn sake. That, in Lyallfs view, is being i t se l f" (1981, 7 5 ) . Since he views love as the most powerful emotion, Lyall dedicates numerous pages to it where he t a l k s about different kinds of love: m a t e r n a 1 love, filial love, love for country, erotic love, etc., abbut different degrees of it, and about love in iés absoluteness, He starts in an Augustinian vein writing, more or less, that at the beginning there was love. "Lave may be contem;?lated as an absolute emotion existing even apart from an object to exercise it or call it forth. It is a s t a t e conceivable p r i o r to rhe existence of any being to call it f o r t h . God was love in this absolute sense" (Lyall 1855, 4 0 5 ) . Everything that exists is an obj ect of Gadr s love. Every human being, everything that is endowed with life, as well as every tree and every stone, every grass leaf, came to being as an exercise of Godrs love. Love is that which binds us al1 together. " W e feel that we c m regard with a kind of affection even inanimate objects; that our love, the absolute emotion, rests upon them" (Ibid., 4061, Lyall writes. This means that love, by itself has an intrinsic value. Through love, in Lyallrs account, we are capable of rising above the limitations of immediate objects as such and see them as participating in Being. What dues t h i s mean? Amour and Tro t2 explain: we have then a link between thought and feeling. For only what is wholly unlimited can justify, finally, absolute allegiance. Suppose X loves Y. If X really does s o , he does so unconditionally and without reservation. But, as he reflects on his situation, the limitations of Y must, in the end, become clear to him. As limitations, they suggest that they are occasions on which he should not give h i s unconditional allegiance to Y, bu t t h i s c o n f l i c t s with h i s love. In t h e end, he can only j u s t i f y t h e combination of t h e two kinds of awareness i f there is an ul t imate being which is i n h e r e n t l y valuable and without l i m i t a t i o n i n i t s e l f and with in w h i c h t h e r e is a special and unique place t o be occupied by Y, In t h a t case, t h e l imi t a t i ons of Y are simply p a r t of what makes it possible f o r Y t o occupy that place i n being, B u t that is only cornprehensible i n t h e case t h a t being i tself does measure up t o t h e conaitions . ( Ib id . , 80) Therefore, t h a t which gives rise t o love does not have much t o do with p a r t i c u l a r beings but with Being i t s e l f . By r e a l i z i n g t h a t we love something which is wor thy of abso lu te value w e establish a connection between O u r emotional s ide and Our intellectual s i d e . B y claiming tha t "love i s the necessary condi t ion of a perfect moral nature" (Ibid,, 405), Lyall c o m e c t s the r e a h o f emotions and the realm of moral i ty , O u r awareness of l o v e i s an i n c e n t i v e f o r u s t o respond t o our moral emotions. B u t this awareness i s an a c t of the i n t e l l e c t . By i tself the i n t e l l e c t would not be able t o reach Being and it does no t have t h e power t o i n t e r a c t w i t h t h e world. Through t h e emotion of love w e have the p o s s i b i l i t y of conceiving that Being i s intrinsically valuable and, i n a more general way, through our emotions w e are able t o bridge t h e gap between the i n t e l l e c t and t h e w o r l d . For L y a l l , a human being who lacks the capacity of having emotions is not f u l l y human. "The 'Stoic of the woods t h e m a n without a t e a r r , - ' impassive, fear ing b u t t h e shame of fearf was ye t capable of t h e s t r o n g e s t emotion w a s roused t o ind igna t ion w a s f ired w i t h revenge w a s touched with t enderness was moved t o sympathy though he could conceal al1 under an appearance of indi f ie rence , o r r e s t r a i n al1 within the bounds of comparative equanimity" (Ibid., 252). Being able to experience emotions i s pa r t of oneself and being conscious is another p a r t . One cannot e x i s t without t h e other. One's "mind warms under t h e sun tha t enlightens, k indles witn emotion, and burs t s i n t o a l 1 t h e f r u i t f u l n e s s of moral and spiritual vegetation" (Ibid., 283 ) . NOW, what is t h e l i n k between i n t e l l e c t and m o t i o n ? The answer, Lyal l th inks , lies i n t h a t faculty of mind t h a t h e calls Unagination. Lyallf s chapter on imagination i s the l a s t one i n the first par t of Intellect , the Emotions and the Moral Nature and i t comec t s it with t he second part, the one on ernotions, Thus, i n o r d e r t o understand how it i s that the intellect and the emotions are i n c lose connection and how they i n t e r a c t , we have t o understand what imagination is, because t h i s f a c u l t y of mind, i n Lyallf s view is the meeting place of t h a t which links us, as hunan beings who possess both t h e capacity t o th ink and feel, with t h e phenomenal world and makes it possible for us t o understand it. Following a Cartes ian account, L y a l l seems t o bel ieve t h a t the i n t e l l e c t has knowledge o f i t s e l f and through t h e emotions, has knowledge of t h e world, is comec ted w i t h it, b u t only i n imagination can it perceive of t h e human being as a whole i n t h e world. We w i l l i n s i s t on t h i s i s sue i n the n e x t chapter. B u t i n t h e meantime, l e t us s e e what imagination is and how it woxks. L y a l l t a l k s about imagination a f t e r al1 other f a c u l t i e s of t h e mind have been looked a t : conception, abstraction, judgment and reasoning. They a l 1 are facult ies of the mind but, u n l i k e imagination, they l a c k t h e pecul ia r s t a t e of mind which is t h e imaginative state. T h e ideas of t h e mind, where imagination is concerned, 'are seen under o r accompanied by a s t a t e , which gives t o them al1 their p e c u l i a r i t y ; so that w e have not merely ideas, but ideas of t h e imagination" (Ibid., 270) , Imagination capable o f bringing i n t o emotional s t a t e because it f i l ters r e a l i t y i n the sense that it makes us resonate w i t h t h e phenomenal world. Through emot ions attuned aspec t s of r e a l i t y which cannot be expressed using j u s t the means o f f e r ed by o rd inary language. T h i s i s where imagination and metaphoric language corne i n t o play. Thus, due t o our imaginative capaci ty , w e a re able t o make s e n s e out of verses like t h e ones Shakespeare wrote: s eeiing [sic] n igh t , /Scarf up the t ender eye of p i t i f u l day" ( c i t e d by Lyall, idem, 272) . The eye i s tender , t h e day p i t i f u l and the nigh t cornes sealing them. These words which provoke imagination c a s t a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t on t h e real, on what is. By p u t t i n g together words l i k e eye and t ender , day and p i t i f u l o r s e a l i n g and n igh t , one awakens c e r t a i n emotions i n onese l f . L y a l l asks how t h i s happens, when he w r i t e s : Whence the power of t h e s e conceptions? o r what g ives them t o us? It is t h e analogy t h a t i s couched i n them? But every imaginative conception does n o t convey o r embody analogy. And even where it i s analogy as th is unquestionably is the p r i n c i p a l source o r v e h i c l e of imaginative conception that i s the explanation of the beauty of any thought, t h e quest ion is, why analogy should be such a source of beauty o r produce such e f f e c t s ? What i s t h e r e i n analogy t o do th is , and only i n some analogies and not i n a l l ? Many analogies are s c i e n t i f i c , and have no imaginat ive charac te r . It is no t t h e analogy t h a t w i l l exp l a in the imagination, ne i t he r is i t imagination t h a t g ives a cha rac t e r t o the analogy, but a certain s t a t e which w e c a l 1 t h e imaginat ive s t a t e , and w h i c h seems t o be inexpl icab le , allows of certain analogies being imaginative, while others are no t . (Ibid. , 273) Lyall 's conclusion is t h a t it i s not the analogy t h a t explains imagination but r a t h e r t h a t imaginative s t a t e which, i n i t s e l f , def ies d e f i n i t i o n . T h e season why it defies e x p l m a t i o n is that it is par t ly i n t e l l e c t u a l and p a r t l y emotional. M y opinion is t h a t , inasmuch as it is i n t e l l e c t u a l , imagination implies s e i z i n g analogies o r p u t t i n g together d i s p a r a t e terms under one nameI n as much as it is emotional, imagination connects us with Being, with " w h a t is". The i n t e l l e c t u a l pa r t provides us with a t h e o r e t i c a l frame, with a matrix, separa te from r e a l i t y which is f i l l e d up with t h e "flesh" of Being through the emotional p a r t . As Lyall p u t s it i n his own more c a r e f u l language: 'It is i n the imaginative state that the mind is so active i n perceiving analogies, 'seeking concretes ' , animating and personifying na ture , and obta in ing those f i g u r e s of speech which have t h e i r element, o r f i n d t h e i r mater ia l , i n resemblances and ânalogy" (Ibid, , 2 7 4 ) . T h i s b i t of text is one of t h e inost important i n Lyal l ' s work on t h e l i n k between the i n t e l l e c t , t he emotions and imagination. I t i s true, it is loca ted toward the end of his discussion of imagination but it is the peak whose versants a r e cons t i tu ted by the i n t e l l e c t and t h e emotionsI n t h e imaginative s t a t e , we discover t h e mind being ac t ive and perceiving analogies. I n the imaginative s t a t e we f i n d t h a t Nature appears as animated, emotional. In this s t a t e , we a r e under the s p e l l of the ernotions. T h i s se= l i k e magic. Now w e m u s t engage ourselves i n the a c t of in t e rp re t ing t h i s t e x t , and look for what each important concept means, how are they comected, how Lyal l sees thern inter twined. Most Unportantly, we must see how they w i l l appear a f t e r employing the t o o l s offered by a phenomenology of emotions complemented w i t h a hermeneutical ap~rcach t o metaphor, The bridge between t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l and t h e emotional is, a s w e saw before, tne imagination whose most important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c i s the imaginat ive state. Being able t o imagine, t o put ourselves i n t h a t imaginat ive s t a t e is what de f ines u s a s human beings, as botki emotional and i n t e l l e c t u a l beings. The mind seeking " n e w concretes" when perce iv ing ana log ies br ings t o mind what A r i s t o t l e said, t h a t " to be a t i nven t ing metaphors is t o have an eye for resemblances" (Ricoeur 1976, 5 4 ) . The s e e i n g of s i m i l a r i t i e s , o r analogies, as Lyall terms th-, is t h e a c t i v i t y of t h e mind which, a t i t s peak, creates metaphors. Thus, t h e active mind, i n an imaginat ive s t a t e , w h i c h perceives analogies and p e r s o n i f i e s Nature, express ing it i n a f i gu re of speech i s i n fact t h e mind involved i n t h e act of c r ea t i ng metaphors. Moreover, i n t h e imaginative s t a t e , pe r son i f i ed and animated Nature is connected t o us through Our emotions. Thus, w e have t h e metaphor which is a c r ea t i on of our i n t e l l e c t and thus separated from the phenomenal r e a l i t y but through emotion we are able t o understand it 'as i f " it refers t o something real. Now t h a t w e have a r r i ved a t t h i s point , 1 want t o t ake t h i s f i n d i n g and in t roduce it i n t o a new t e r r i t o r y , whose coordinates a r e metaphor and emotion, this t ime though, viewed as t h e y are regarded i n modern phi losophyMore s p e c i f i c a l l y , by us ing Jean-Paul S a r t r e ' s e x i s t e n t i a l analysis of emotions and Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor. I w i l l make emotion and rnetaphor t h e f o c i of t h e next two chapters . An emotion refers back t o what it s i g n i f i e s . And, i n effect, what it signifies i s the t o t a l i t y of t h e r e l a t i onsh ips of t h e human r e a l i t y t o the world. The passage t o emotion is a t o t a l modificat ion of 'being-in-theworld ' according t o the very p a r t i c u l a r laws of magic. J. P. S a r t r e I n t h i s chapter 1 w i l l inquire i n t o how it i s pos s ib l e for t h e emotions t o connect u s with t h e phenomenal world and in doing so, 1 w i l l explore t h e c o m e c t i o n between imagination and emotion, al1 t h i s , with t h e i n t e n t i o n t o develop L y a l l r s c la im about t h e cogn i t i ve va lue of emotions. For Lyal l the imaginative s t a t e has two parts, an i n t e l l e c t u a l one and an emotional one, and t h e emotional element i s what connects us with r e a l i t y . How does t h i s work? How do o u r emotions l i n k us t o r e a l i t y ? And what kind of r e a l i t y i s t h a t ? I n order to answer t he se ques t ions 1 look f o r h e l p i n J . P , Sartre's theory of emotion, For Sartre, emotion is a conscious t ransformat ion of the world, a "magical" world t h a t i s . I b e l i e v e t h a t Lyall , i f offered t h e g i f t of phenomenology, would reach very similar conclusions to t h o s e of Sartre o r , t o put it i n a d i f ferent way, Lyal l seems t o anticipate Sartre by p u t t i n g h i s analysis of emotions i n a framework which is not at al1 common to his time. However, Sartre's approach offers just a fictitious connection with the world because he was only able to see emotions 'as fictive idealism", as Joseph Fe11 puts it in his book on the 5zot ion in the Thouqht of S a r t r e (1966, 2 3 6 ) . Now, Lyallr s assertion that emotions connect us with Being which, of course, should be understood as asserting motion as an expression of God's existence, Thus, he avoids reaching Sartre's unhappy conclusion. This chapter begins with a survey of four different theories which attempt to understand the complex phenomenon of emotion. We need to do this survey in order to discover a framework that will best suit Lyall's views. What follows is a discussion of Sartre's theory which 1 consider most successful and its applicability to Lyallf s, stressing their s t r i k i n g svnilarities and their important difference . FOUR THEORIES OF EMOTfON William Lyons, in his book on Emotion (1980), distinguishes among four classical theories of emotion: the feeling theory, the behaviorist theory, the psycboanalytic theory and the cognitive theory. m i l e the feeling and the cognitive theories of ernotions have been the most influential and important in philosophy, the behaviorist and the psychoanalytic theories were valued the most in psychoiogy. In what follows 1 will give a short description of each, intending to mphasize their merits as well as their flaws. What 1 am fooking for is a theory that connects emotion and imagination and involves the intellectual side as well and one that considers emotions able to create a l i n k between the emotional person and the phenomenal world. Tbe F e e l i n g Theory The feeling theory is based on the Cartesian account of emotions, as it appears in The Passions of the Soul . For Descartes, soul and body have different functions. The body's functions are movement and heat. A i l the movements of the lunbs are explained by drawing on the movements of the animal spirits which are extremely small material bodies and "the most animated and subtle portions of the blood" (Descartes 1985-1991, 335). The soulrs function is tnought and it is of two sorts: actions or desires which either aim at sornething immaterial, for example God, or at moving our body; and passions which represent our reflective awareness of the disturbances occurring in the body. "Fear, for example, is the awareness of the animal spirits causing or tending to cause us, Say, to turn our back and run away, and is caused by these animal spirits. That is why, for Descartes, emotions are passive or passions" (Lyons 1980, 4 1 , This explanation of emotion as passion implies that in experiencing an emotion we are merely aware of what our soul feels when there i s something going on in the body. But the connection between emotion and behavior thus described has a major flaw, pointed out by Lyons: Perhaps the most fundamental difficulty with Descartesr view of emotions is that it does not separate off what are cornmonly agreed to be emotions from what are commonly agreed not to be emotions. Given his theory, Descartes is forced to grant not merely that the subjective awareness of the bodily movements and physiological changes following on a perception of something such as a frightening animal, is an emotion, but also that the subjective awareness of the bodily movements and physiological changes following the injection of a drug or the onset of a disease, should merit the title \emotionrFor after al1 the perception of the external object is not central to Descartes' account of emotion, for he does allow that some emotions, such as objectless and imaginary-object fears are caused entirely by 'temperaments of the body or [..,] impressions which are fortuitously met with in the nrain' (1985 1991, 356), and there is no rubric laid d o m as to how these in turn must be caused. So it seems that there is nothing against a disease or drug causing them. (Ibid- , 7-8) William James tried to straighten out Descartesr account of emotion by considering that, even though emotions are feelings, they are feelings "of the physiological changes and disturbances that went on during an emotional occurrence". According to Lyons, "[James8] hope was that, at least eventually, psychology would be able to dist inguish emotions f rom one another, and from non-emotions , by reference to these observable changes" (Ibid., 12). For William James, it is impossible to imagine an emotion occurring without physiological change. The emotion is our awareness or feeling of the bodily changes which themselves are ignited by the perception of the object of the emotion. This way, the only link between emotion and consciousness is the perception of the object. But it too acts only as a "causal antecedent to emotion". The idea of an emotion dissociated from Our feeling of the body is non-sense . because then there is nothing left to it, James considers. If there is no increase in our heart beat making our blood rush madly through our veins, if our muscles do not contract and our hands do not become clenched into a fist, then how can we know that we are experiencing the emotion of rage? Feeling al1 these changes is what constitutes an emotion. To sum it al1 up, even though James writes from a Cartesian perspective, "he took the feeling out of the sou1 and put it into a purely bodily arena, fox his feeling was just the subjective side of the physiological changes involved, so that if the feeling was different for each emotion it was because the physiological changes accompanying each emotion must be different as well" (Ibid., 15). This distinction opens up the way to objective quantitative measusement in which the modern psychology of emotions is rooted. Once it had a specific given with which it could work, which could be used in experiments, psychology detached itself from philosophy and became a sepazate discipline, However, this approach to emotions, besides being too wide and inclusive, does not allow for any cognitive element to enter the discussion, Save for the "perception of the object" which only acts as a 'causal antecedent to ernotion". Behaviorisrn, roughly defined, is the theory or doctrine that human or animal psychology can be accurately studied only through the examination and analysis of o b j e c t i v e l y observable and q u a n t i f i a b l e behavioral events , i n con t r a s t w i t h sub jec t ive mental s t a t e s . Two o f the most in£ luential exponents o f t h e behavior i s t t h e o r y a r e J. B. Watson who is u s u a l l y considered t o be t h e "father" of behav io r i s t psychology, and B.F. Skinner, a m o d e r n represen ta t ive . W i l l i a m Lyons observes t h a t : " T h e behav io r i s t t h e o r y of emotions, like ~ e h a v i o r i s m i t s e l f , is a product of t h a t period when psychology w a s breaking away from philosophy and seeking t o e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f as a na tura l science" (Ibid., 1 7 ) . Watson considered emotions t o be p a r t of the behavior pa t t e rns which a r e s o m e h o w i n h e r i t e d and not so much acquired. New-born ch i l à r en have t h e s e p a t t e r n s u n a l t e r e d and, thus, t h e place t o look f o r "pure" emotions is in i n f an t s . "An e m o t i o n i s an h e r e d i t a r y 'pa t te rnreac t ionr involving profound changes of the bod i ly mechanism as a whole, but p a r t i c u l a r l y of the v i s c e r a l and g l andu la r systems. B y p a t t e r n r e a c t i o n w e mean t h a t the sepa ra t e de ta i l s of response appear with some constancy, w i t h some r e g u l a r i t y and i n approximately t h e same s e q u e n t i a l o r d e r each t h e t h e exc i t i ng s t imulus is presented" (Watson 1919, 195) . The emotion occurs when everything t h a t concerns the s t imulus and t h e mechanism o f phys io log ica l response i s j u s t r i g h t so the effect groduced by the s t imulus is t h e intended one. But following t h i s account we have to favor some s t i m u l i over o t h e r s and also we have t o be able t o e x p l a i n why t h e same stimulus causes different emotional react ions i n d i f f e r e n t sub jec t s . For example, the s igh t and t h e closeness o f a big dog might f r i g h t e n a l i t t l e ch i l d b u t t h e same b i g dog might be t h e p r i d e of h i s owner. How can t h e s e d i f f e r e n t emotions be explained i n these circumstances? One w a y t o explain emotional difference is by dec la r ing that h e r e d i t a r y p a t t e r n s change w i t h o n e f s psychological development. Acquired c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s corne ont0 t h e scene and they d i s t o r t t h e h e r e d i t a r y ones. In f a c t , there cannot be a l i n e drawn between what i s i n h e r i t e d and what is not , between h e r e d i t a r y p a t t e r n s and acquired f e a t u r e s . This means t h a t a very clear account of what it is t o have an emotion is no t r e a l l y poss ib le . For s imi l a r reasons it is n o t r e a l l y pos s ib l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h c l e a r l y among mot ions . Even though Watson d i s t i ngu i shed emotions which occur when 'the adjustments c a l l e d out by t h e s t imulus a r e i n t e r n a 1 and conf ined t o the s u b j e c t ' s body". f o r example blushing, f r o m i n s t i n c t i v e reactions which happen when "the s t imulus l eads t o adjus tment .of t h e organism as a whole t o objects". f o r example, i n defens ive responses, grasping, e t c . , h i s argument is no t s t rong enough. Watson affirms t h a t the he red i t a ry p a t t e r n i s thus s h a t t e r e d apart and it l a r g e l y disappears . Lyonsr assessment is t h a t when this occurs we are left with very l i t t l e t o c i rcumscr ibe t h e d e f i n i t i o n of emotion : Watson has t o l d u s t h a t an emotion i s a 'pat ternr e a c t i o n f , c h i e f l y o f phys io log ica l changes, which is found i n i ts unadul te ra ted form only i n t h e new-born c h i l d , though it is d i f f i cu l t t o get clear evidence of t h i s . Since he admits that t h i s 'pa t tern-react ionr is a d u l t e r a t e d o r becomes e t i o l a t e d , o r both, soon after infancy, he is admitting i n e f f e c t t h a t w i t h a d u l t s one cannot d i s t i n g u i s h one emotion from another. o r emotional r eac t i ons from o ther s o r t s of react ion, by m e a n s of a behaviorist account. Indeed, given the admitted pauc i ty of h i s evidence concerning emotional r eac t i ons i n the new-born, one can doubt his cla im t o be a b l e t o do t h i s even with i n f a n t s . ( Ib id . , 18 ) Thus Watsonrs behavioral explmation o f emotions is circulas. H e affims tha t pure emotions a re only experienced by new-born chi ldren and that emotional reactions alter soon after infancy t o t h e extent that adults are no longer able t o discern among di f ferent îmotions. Eowever, he brings l i t t l e evidence i n support of t he idea t h a t "pattern-reactions" i n new-born children are pristine and thersfore he fails t o explain how they become al tered with the passing o f time. Watsonrs v i e w is taken further and somehow improved by B.F. Skinner. Unlike Watson, Skinner does not stress t h e physiological changes nor the reflex behavior, Instead, he emphasizes the operant behavior which i s that behavior whose outcome is the desired one. m a t does it mean f o r Skinner t o say the desired resul t is brought about by operant behavior? Suppose, f o r example, that X offends Y. As a r e su l t , X gets angry, clenches h i s f i s t s , pounds t h e table, slams t h e door, e tc . T h i s kind o f behavior will drive Y out of the w a y and t hus , Y's offensive behavior, which s ta r ted the scene w i l l not be persisted in nos, probably, repeated. X was predisposed t o emit t h i s specific operant behavior (pounding the table and slamming the door) and the offensive behavior of Y w a s t h e promoter of it. But nothing quarantees that the above behavior i s always exhibited by everyone. X might react i n t h e way described above o r might j u s t calmly walk away and breath deeply, pretending there was no harm done. Moreover, it would be an impossible t a s k t o l is t a r U features of a spec i f i c behavior ( a n g r y ) t ha t must be present for t h a t behavior t o be considered as angry. William Lyons argues tha t : Skinner's behaviorism, much more than Watson's version, i s open t o the d i f f i cu l t y t h a t many instances of some emotions, and most instances of the others, exh ib i t little or no operant behavior. Grief, especially when it is about something i r r e t r i e v a b l y l o s t o r dead, does not lead t o much, if any; operant behavior, because no behavior can b r i n g about any des i red resul ts . For the des i red result t h a t what is àead be brought back t o life or what is irretrievably l o s t be found is clear ly impossible t o achieve. B u t even angry people can be angry and not show it i n operant behavior. That is, some people a r e j u s t con t ro l l ed , undemonstrative people. (Ibid., 22) Simply put , Skinner's account takes away any chance f o r freedom w e might have because there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y f o r us t o behave i n a w a y t h a t we consciously choose. I n s t e â d w e only exhib i t an operant behavior , In the in t roduc t ion t o Exfstential Psychoanalysis (a t r a n s l a t i o n of a m a j o r section of Sartref s B e i n q and Nothingness, about the connection b e t w e e n e x i s t e n t i a l i s m and psychoanalysis) , Rollo May gives a brief account of t h e exchange b e t w e e n Car1 Rogers and B.F. Skinner a t a 1960 conference. Told from Rogersf viewpoint, t h e exchange between them is t h e following: From what I understood Dr. Skinner t o Say, it is h i s understanding t h a t though he might have thought he chose t o corne t o t h i s meeting, might have thought he had a purpose i n giving h i s speech, such thoughts are r e a l l y i l l u so ry . H e a c t u a l l y made certain marks on paper and emitted c e r t a i n sounds h e r e simply because h i s genetic make-up and his p a s t environment had operant ly condit ioned h i s behavior i n such a w a y t h a t it was rewarding t o make these sounds, and that he as a person doesn't enter i n t o t h i s I n fact if 1 get h i s thinking c o r r e c t l y , from h i s s t r i c t l y s c i e n t i f i c point o f view, he, as a person, d o e s n r t exist'. In h i s reply D r . Skinner s a i d t h a t he would not go i n t o t h e quest ion of whether he had any choice i n t h e matter (presumably because t h e whole i s s u e is i l l u s o r y ) b u t s t a t e d , '1 do accept your c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of my own presence herer. 1 do not need t o l abo r the p o i n t t h a t f o r D r . Skinner the concept o f 'learning t o be freer would be quite meaningless. (Sartre 1966, 4 ) T h e kind of explanat ion of emotions of fe red by t h e behavior is t theory takes away any conscious in t e rac t ion between us, as human beings and t h e surrounding w o r l d . Everything happens without us p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n it. W e j u s t r e a c t , w e jus t perform i n the presence of certain s t imul i . Thus, bes ides being too narrow and exclusive, t h i s theory has nothing t o o f f e r i n the way of a cogni t ive aspect underlying our emotions . The Psychozrnalytic Theozy Another approach t o the sub jec t of emotions is offered by psychoanalysis. O f course, t he inventor and chief exponent of t h i s theory i s FreudEven though he did no t have a specific and c l e a r account of emotions: Freud ca l l ed emotions 'affects". However, because of Freud8 s main preoccupation with t r e a t i n g h i s emotionally d is turbed p a t i e n t s , t h e only emotions t h a t were considered were the negat ive emotions l i k e fear, anxiety, etc. T h e emotions of t h i s kind are resur rec t ions of traumatic events which were repressed i n the individual's unconscious. "Affective states", considers Freud i n Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (19711, 'have become incorporated in t h e mind as p r e c i p i t a t e s of primaeval t raumatic experiences, and when a s imi la r s i t u a t i o n occurs they are revived l i k e memic symbols" (1971, 9 3 ) . For Freud, an emotion has more t o do with the ind iv idua l ' s inher i ted repressed memories which themselves primarily because there is an external cause for it but rather because it is connected with an originally traumatic and subsequently repressed memory. Lyons explains that: Unlike the Cartesian, or the Behaviorist accounts for that matter, the Freudian account sees the external stimulus as acting only as remote cause of emotionEvents in the world cause us to react emotionally only insofar as they first stir up in us some instinctual drive or impulse, and insofar as this drive or impulse is repressed or blocked. Emotion is the safety vaive that lets off psychic s t e m w h e n the repression or blocking of the normal outlets becomes unbearable . " (Lyons 198 0, 2 9 This implies that emotion is not primarily a reaction to the world but to something that is in our unconscious. ".In anxiety", Lyons writes, "1 am anxious, not because the situation is difficult or threatening, but because it triggers off some unconscious repressed desire which 1 find threatening or difficult to cope with" (Ibid., 2 9 ) . But this sort of explanation would raise immediately some questions because there can be a great number of possible manifestations of anxiety, and choosing the one that fits best is a pretty d i f f icult j ob. William Lyons believes that J. P. Sartre proposes quite an interesting variation on the Freudian account of emotion. Sartre's account substitutes Freud's concept of unconscious with the concept of "magical" behavior But the idea that emotionfs significance does not consist in "ordinary perceptual consciousness" is still at work (Ibid., 28) . Sartre's rejection of the unconscious is based on the fact that he observes that consciousness must always be aware of i tselfT h i s awareness, however i s not constantly made e x p l i c i t i n re f fec t ion; Sa r t r e calls it a preref lec t ive consciousness which does not t ake t h e self as an objec t , The two theor ies analyzed above t h e fee l ing theory and the behavior is t theory f a i l e d t o look a t the body as a subjec t , ûnly t r e a t i n g it as an objec t , they f a i l e d as w e l l a t giving a per t inent account of emotions, For Sartre, thoughts, dreams and fee l ings depend on consciousness, and consciousness Fs where one should look for explanations f o r them. Mental events are in ten t iona l events; they a r e always meaningful and they a r e always d i r ec ted towards objec ts of their own. Thus, Sartre moves a long way away from Freud's perspective: "The Freudians are held t o be wrong because they overlook t h e i n t e n t i o n a l i t y of mental events, and think t h a t t h e r e can be an induct ive ly de temined causa l r e l a t ion between my dream, l e t us Say, and some ex te rna l o b j e c L a re l a t ion of which 1, t h e pa t i en t , am not aware s i n c e the connection is made by m e subconsciously. So the argument aga ins t bare causal explanat ions of mental phenornena and aga ins t t h e unconscious come t o the same" (Sartre 1976, 9). Sartre sees emction not as an accident , but as a 'mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways i n which consciousness understands ( i n Heidegger's sense of Verstehen) i t s Being-in-the-World" (Ibid., 9 1 ) . This, 1 think, br ings him c l o s e r t o a cogni t ive theory of emotion, which will be discussed next , As r ega rds t h e cogni t ive tbeory of emotion, A r i s t o t l e s e e m s t o be t h e f i r s t who took t h i s approach among philosophers. However, he did no t analyze it i n D e Ilnima as one would expect , but r a t h e r i n t h e Rhetoric. I n h i s book on A r i s t o t l e ' s concept of emotion, W, W. Fortenbaugh n o t e s t h a t : I n the second book of t h e Rhetoxic, A r i s t o t l e de f ines anger as a desire f o r revenge accompanied by pain on account o f (dia) an apparent s l i g h t t o onese l f o r t o one r s own, t h e s l i g h t being c n j u s t i f i e d (1378 a 30-2) [...] Anger is not pain which happens t o occur together with ( m e t a ) t h e thought of outrage. O n t h e contrary, anger is n e c e s s a r i l y caused by t h e thought of outrage, so that such a thought is mentioned i n t h e e s s e n t i a l d e f i n i t i o n of anger. The same is t r u e of f ea r . It is caused by the thought of imminent danger, so that t h e appearance of f u t u r e e v i l , de s t ruc t ive o r p a i n f u l , is mentioned i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f f e a r (1382 a 21-2) . Fear is not some pain o r b o d i l y dis turbance d i s t i n c t f r o m cogni t ion. It i s a complex phenomenon which necessarily involves no t only pa infu l disturbance b u t a l s o t h e thought of danger. (1975, 1 2 ) Lyons stresses t h e fact t h a t t h i s l a s t theory is most l i k e l y c l o s e r t o a cornprehensive explanation of emotion because it explains what t h e theor i e s p rev ious ly analyzed did not . A person experiencing an emotion, i n A r i s t o t l e ' s v i e w , has a c e r t a i n percept ion of t h e world. One th inks i n a c e r t a i n way about t h e people oce is angry with and one ih inks t h a t way because of a c e r t a i n reason. However, j u s t t h i s is not enough t o make up an emotion. Besides t h e p a r t i c u l a r percept ion of t h e world one has f ee l ings and impulses which are t r i gge red by what one t h inks about t h e world, T h i s means t h a t t h e primary cause f o r phys io log ica l changes is c o n s t i t u t e d by one's belief. Believing t h a t sornething i s going t o affect our phys ica l i n t e g r i t y , f o r example, causes us t o experience fear. The cogni t ive theory stresses t h e importance of t h e f a c t that emotion i s not something that rests j u s t on feeling, o r j u s t on behavior, o r is just a r e a c t i o n t o a traumatic eventAu contraire, t h e r e is an i n t e l l e c t u a l p a r t t o it a l so . An emotion t hen is no t something t h a t has t o do exc lus ive ly with t he body o r exclusiveiy with t h e mind but r a t h e r it has t o do with both of t h e m , T h i s happens because through emotions one becomes p a r t of the w o r l d , Through emotions it i s the body and the mind, intertwined, that p a r t i c i p a t e t o t h e world. I t r s not j u s t a reaction toward an ex t e rna l stimulus and it is not a r e a c t i o n t o a suppressed trauma. Rather, it has to do with belief in a specific apprec i a t i on of the w o r l d . How does W i l l i a m Lya l l relate t o t h e foregoing accounts of emotion? Under which heading should h i s theory ofemotion be c l a s s i f i e d ? Lyall's ideas about emotions seem t o corne very close t o the cognitive view. He too believed t h a t emotions tell us something about the f a b r i c of the world. However, as we s a w i n the previous chapter, L y a l l has i d e a l i s t t endenc ies . T h i s implies that for him the world i t s e l f has been "poured" i n t o a specific £rame, ~ e i n g s o very c lo se t o the s p i r i t of Romanticism, w e can understand how he r e l a t e s t o na ture within t h e ideal is t framework. Tt is an underlying theme of t h i s per iod of t ime t h a t , once the subject and t h e ob jec t , mind and nature have been separa ted , once an unbridgeable gap has been placed b e t w e e n thern, one concludes that t h e on ly w a y t he s u b j e c t can know i t s e l f i s through what it does t o t h e o b j e c t , and t h e only way the objec t can be known i s through what it does t o the subject, What can w e t a l k about, then? The i n t e r ac t ion between t h e two, the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l tension between mind and world. Nei ther t h e s e l f , nor t h e world cari be known, t b a t is, t a l k e d about; they c m only be experienced, t h e one i n terms of the o t h e r , Reality, then, is what t h e mind has done t o t h e world and what t h e world has done to the mind. Spirit i s t h e term many Romantics used f o r i n t e r p r e t i n g the tens ion between the s u b j e c t and the o b j e c t o r r e a l i t y . L y a l l seems t o regard t h e i n t e r a c t i o n between t h e s u b j e c t and t h e ob jec t as a challenge and h i s account o f emotions can be taken as h i s answer , Unlike Berkeley' s idealism, f o r example, o r Hegel' s, Lya l l bu i lds h i s case by considering t h a t the l i n k between the world and t h e s e l f is f a c i l i t a t e d by the emotions. Moreover, for Lyall, imagination i s of foremost importance when it cornes t o explaining the l i n k between the world and the s e l f . I n t h e imaginative s t a t e , both emotions and t h e i n t e l l e c t meet. Ernotions, i n Lyall's view, reach out f o r r e a l i t y and through them, the intellect grasps i t s essence, B u t t h i s can not happen i f w e l a c k imagination. Imagination is both i n t e l l e c t u a l and emotional . Now, from the foregoing theo r i e s of emotions, t h e one t h a t cornes very close t o L y a l l r s p a r t i c u l a r v i e w is t h e one developed b y JP. SartreSartre links consciousness and emotions and w r a p s them up in the v e i l of a "magical behavior". Being able to use our imagination is what brings us into the presence of the world as our emotions discover it. Sartre: imagination anci Rnotions W i i h reçard to this issue, Sartre asks "what must be the nature of consciousness i n general in order that the construction of an image should always be possible?" (1966, 259). In imagination, thought does not reach out for the object, but rather "appears as the object". Sartre tells us what it means : If the development of an idea occurs in the form of a series of imaginative consciousnesses that are synthetically linked, it will irnbue the object as an image with a sort of vitality. It w i l l appear now under one aspect, now under another, now with this determination, now with some other. To judge that a coachman whose face one imagines vaguely had a mustache is t o see his face appear as having a mustache. There is an imaginative form of the judgment which is nothirig else than the addition to the object of new qualities, accompanied by the feeling of venturing, promising, or of assuming responsibilities [,.] If we think imaginatively of some individual objects it will be these objects themselves that will appear to our consciousness. (Ibid. , 160) Thus, for S a r t r e , the images acquire the right to existence -"as any other existence". The only difference between the type of existence given to us in imagination and the real existence is the w a y in which we grasp them. While the real existence is perceived as forming a whole, where 'my attention is CO-present as an essential condition of the existence of the reality actually perceived" (Ibid., 2 6 2 ) , we grasp the existence given to us in imagination by isolating it from the perceived reality and by positing it as empty of data- "To posit an image is to construct an object on the fringe of the whole of reality, which means therefore to hold the real at a distance, to free oneself from it, in a word, to deny it" (Ibid., 266) . Consciousness cannot exist without imagining because this ability is consciousnessr ticket for freedom, "In order to imagine, consciousness must be free from al1 specific reality and this freedom must be able to define itself by a 'being-in-the-world which is at once the constitution and the negation of the world" (Ibid., 2692 7 0 ) . Imagination is where consciousness realizes its own freedom by withdrawing from the real, by always being able, at any moment, to produce the unreal. This is how consciousness works when imagining. Now, w i t h regard to emotions, Sartre affirms that emotional consciousness is not reflective consciousness, An emotion does not present itself as a state of mind of which the one experiencing. the emotion is conscious. This would be equivalent to saying that the perception of this paper is consciousness of perceiving the paper. The emotional consciousness is "prirnarily consciousness of the world". "In a word, the emotional subject and the object of the emotion are united in an indissoluble synthesis. The emotion is a specific manner of apprehending the world" (Sartre 1976, 57). The world is continuously present to tne emotional subject. There is an intercomection which avoids the reflectivity of consciousness. For Sartre, emotion is "a transformation of the world", Now, the world i t s e l f is regarded under two d i f f e r e n t aspects: the world is e i t h e r "instrumental" o r "dif f i c u l t " . There is , first, an instrumental perspective on t he world. Joseph Fe l l explains cha t i n S a r t r e r s view, "Men perceive their environment as a complex of instruments, a medium i n which, provided w e know cer ta in r u l e s o r techniques, w e can manipulate people and things so as t o achieve ce r t a in ends-. We assume t h i s r e g u l a r i t y every tine we act" ( F e l l 1906, 15) . As long as things happen following t h e sarne s t ruc ture , as long as they are out-there, t h e y are , a t the same tirne, i n one's amSiance, t o use a term employed by Gabriel Marcel in his metaphysical journal. W e are , more o r l e s s , comfortable with what goes on around us. W e do things i n a c e r t a i n way because w e know what t o expect; w e know what s o r t of reac t ions a ce r t a in ac t ion would cause as long as t h e world unfolds i n the way w e a r e used t o it. T h i s does not mean, however, t h a t we merely f o l l o w habitsS a r t r e would r eac t v i ru len t ly aga ins t t h i s idea. Orestes, the chief charac ter i n Sa r t r e r s play, The F l i e s , would be the most representat ive character w i t h regard t o t h i s . He shouted against a manipulating and d i l e t t a n t e Zeus, as Sa r t r e doubt less would do, '1 am my freedom!". F l h a t S a r t r e means by t h i s kind of dec lara t ion i s t h a t t h e world, i n i t s instrumental pragmatic feature is an easy world. This world set o be determinis t ic because it follows Our expectations and we are no t deceived by it, as Sartre explains : From t h i s point o f view, t he world around us t h a t which the Gemâns c a l 1 t h e Umwelt t h e world of our desires, our needs and o f our a c t i v i t i e s , appears to be a l 1 furrowed with s t r a i t and narrow paths leading t o such and such determinate ends t h a t is, it has t h e appearance of a created object . Natusally, here and there , and t o some extent everywhere, there are p i t f a l l s and t r a p s ... This world is d i f f i c u l t . T h e notion of d i f f i c u l t y here is n o t a re f lex ive not ion which would irnply a re la t ion t o oneself . It is out there , in t h e world, it is a qual i ty of t he world given t o perception ( j u s t a s t h e paths t o t h e poss ib le goals, t he p o s s i b i l i t i e s themselves and the exigencies of o b j e c t s books t h a t ought t o be read, shoes t o be resoled, etc. ) , it is the noet ic c o r r e l a t e of the a c t i v i t y w e have undertaken o r have only conceived, (Ibid., 63) Therefore, t h e world i s double-faced. These is an easy world, on the one hand, and there is a d i f f i c u f t world, on the other hand. T h i s d i f f i c u l t world, however, i s also t h e world i n which w e lFve and i n which we must act, Sometimes it becornes unbearable but we s t i l l need t o a c t , t o continue l i v i n g even though the things cf t h e world do not follow t h e i r expected paths, even though they happen as i f they are out of control . For S a r t r e though, w e a r e our freedom which i n p l i e s t h a t t h e w o r l d i s "out of control", i f the 'time i s out of joint" , as Shakespeare said through Hamletrs voice, w e cannot a f f o r a to remain immobilized and p r o s t r a t e waiting f o r it t o change and becorne instrumental again. Rather, we change t h e world i t se l f by making it a magical world. What t h i s means i n Sartre's v i e w i s explained a t least i n p a r t by F e l l : Emotion is a way of a c t i n g on ourselves when ac t ion i n t h e p r a g m a t i c w o r l d i s of no a v a i l . T h e \magicr cons i s t s i n t h e fact t h a t our a c t i o n on ourselves (e. g- , f a i n t i n g ) is intended as a transformation of t h e world, not of ourselves. We have remarked t h a t i n emotion a t t en t ion i s d i r ec ted outward, on the object. To be sure , w e r e the sub jec t l a t e r t o r e f l e c t upon h i s a c t i o n he would recognize h i s f a i l u r e t o transform t h e world, Magic is not e f f i cac ibus . Bu t Sartre repeatedly emphasizes t h a t emotional behavior i s unref lec t ive . And i n the unref lec t ive s t a t e t h e subject ' l i v e s r the magical t ransformat ion: it is the w o r l d which seems changed, (Fell 1966, 17) There are two different w a y s i n which consciousness can 'be-in-theworld ", There is, first, a percept ion of t h e world a s a "cornplex of u t i l i z a b l e th ings" which are manipulated in orde r t o obta in such and such r e s u l t s , 'If one wants t o produce a p r e d e t e d n e d e f f e c t , one must act upon t h e determinable elements of t h a t complex"(Sartre 1976, 90) Thus, a c t i ng , asserting oner s freedoxu has a major s igni f i cance , However, a t t h i s level, there i s no abso lu te ac t i on , there i s no possible way in which t o act i n osder for a 'radical changef t o occur , Rather, 'we have t o modify one particular u tens i l , and t h i s by m e a n s of another which refers i n its t u r n t o y e t another, and s o to i n f i n i t y " (Ibid, , 9 0 ) . B e s i d e s t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l i s t way of being-in-the-world, t h e r e i s ano ther one, where the world does not p r e s e n t i t s e l f as an utilizable whole any l onge r . Acting, now i s set on a d i f f e r e n t pe r spec t ive . This t h e , there is nothing a t hand t h a t can be used in o r d e r t o change it, t h e r e is no intermediary between us and the world. T h e world l o se s its structure and i t s ca tegor ies , Sartre explains when, f o r example, w e are f r i gh t ened by someone seen through a window : the face t h a t f r i g h t e n s u s through the window acts upon us without any means; there i s no need f o r t h e window t o open, for a man t o leap i n t o t h e room o r t o w a l k across the f loor) . And, conversely, t he consciousness tries t o combat there dangers o r t o rnodify t h e s e objects a t no distance and without means, by some absolute, massive modif ica t ion of the world. This aspect of t h e world i s an e n t i r e l y coherent one; t h i s is t h e rnagical world. (Ibid., 9 0 ) This is the kind of magic that occurs when we experience an emotionOn Sartre's view, emotion is not comprehended any longer as something that cornes from outside, Rather, it is something that begins with consciousness, where consciousness returns to the magical attitude which is characteristic of a magical world. "Clearly to understand the emotional process as it proceeds £rom consciousness, we must remember the dual nature of the body, which, õi the one hand is an object in the world and on the other is immediately lived by the consciousness" (Ibid., 77), writes Sartre. Thus, emotional consciousness does more than merely "projecting affective meanings upon the world around it", because the body is not j u s t an ins t m e n t . The Magieaï W o r l d The human body, in Sartre's account is also something through which consciousness lives the world. If the world happens to be a new magical world into which experiencing emotion then, the consciousnes s leaps body also there . when a££ ected, it undergoes changes. TQe body, "considered as the point of view upon the universe immediately inherent in consciousness" alters itself in t he behavioral manifestations . Sartre believes that : the origin of emotion is a spontaneous debasement lived by consciousness in face of the world. What it is unable to endure in one way it tries to seize in another way, by going to sleep, by reducing itself to the States of consciousness in sleep, dream or hysteria. And the bodily disturbance is nothing else than the belief lived by t h e consciousness, as it is seen from outside. (Ibid., 79) However, t h e magic of the world is no t only a temporary q u a l i t y w h i c h is p r o j e c t e d upon t h e w o r l d according to our p a r t i c u i a r emotional s t a t e . T h e emotional world often presen t s itself t o us as being magical, as breaking free f r o m any s t r u c t u r e and thus it provokes us t o change i n t h e following ways h igh l igh ted by Sartre: Thus, t h e r e are two forms of einotion, according t o whether it i s w e who c o n s t i t u t e t h e magic of t h e world t o replace a de te rmin i s t i c a c t i v i t y which c a m o t be r e a l i z e d , o r whether the world itself is unrea l izab le and revea is i t s e l f suddenly as a magical environmentI n the s t a t e of horror , w e a r e suddenly made a w a r e t h a t the de t e rmin i s t i c b a r r i e r s have givea wayThat face which appears at the window, for i n s t ance we do n o t a t f i rs t take it as t h a t of a m a n , who might push t h e door open and take twenty paces t o where w e are standing. O n t h e contrary, it presents itself, motionless though it is, as acting a t a d i s t ance , The face o u t s i d e the window is i n iwnediate r e l a t lonsh ip with our body; w e are l i v i n g and undergoing i ts s i g n i f i c a t i o n ; it is with Our own f l e s h that we c o n s t i t u t e it, but a t the same t h e it imposes itself, ann ih i l a t e s t h e d i s t a n c e and e n t e r s i n t o us. Consciousness plunged i n t o t h i s magic world drags the body with it i n as much as the body i s b e l i e f and the consciousness believes in it. (Ibid, , 86-87) B u t t h e "magic" q u a l i t y o f t h e world does n o t p e r t a i n exc lus ive ly t o the human. 'It extends t o things a l s o , in as much as they may presen t themselves as human (the d i s t u r b i n g impression of a landscape, of c e r t a i n ob jec t s , o r a room which r e t a i n s t h e t r a c e s of some mysterious v i s i t o r ) o r bear the imprint of the psychic" (Ibid. , 8 7 ) . This happens, S a r t r e thinks, because consciousness grasps t h e world as having magical features and because it can perceive these magical f ea tu res as r e a l f e a t u r e s . It i s not j u s t one oSject o r another, taken away from t h e surrounding world, t h a t can be perceived as Say, frightening o r i r r i t a t i n g . According t o S a r t r e , when someone experiences on emotion, t h e whole world is changed. T h e whole world tsansforms i ts structure, i s a l t e r e d , on Fe l l ' s account of his theory, i n t h e following way: W e may Say t h a t i n emotion consciousness perceives a world txansformed by i t s a f fec t ive pro jec t ions . This 'newr w o r l d is a 'magical' one f o r two reasons. F i r s t , i n it t h e order ly and regular paths w h i c h permit t h e achievement of ends by determinate means a r e o b l i t e r a t e d by a spe l lb inding q u a l i t y ( 'hor r ib le ' , ' r evol t ingr , e t c . ) . Second, consciousness f a l l s under t h i s s p e l l and is deceived by i ts own sleight of hand. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a t Sa r t r e refers t o emotion as a 'degradation' of consciousnessIn emotion, ~consciousness is caught i n i t s own trapf. Sar t r e r s ca ta log of emotions i s a catalog of self-decept ions [...] Furthermore, f o r Sartre, emotional deceptions seem predominantly of a negative even d i r e sort: fear, sadness, horror, anger, disgust, and the like, (Fe l l 1966, 22-23) S a r t r e follows t h e phenornenoiogical t r a d i t i o n and pra ises Husserl f o r tu rn ing t o t h e " things i n themselves". "To Heidegger, t o S a r t r e , t o Merleau-Ponty, Husserl i s something of a savior : the phi losopher who f i n a l l y has assembled t h e proper conceptual apparatus ... f o r rejoining sub jec t and world, value and f a c t , i n a Long-lost inmediate r e l a t i o n . Sartre's theory of emotion is one phase of this attempt" (Ibid. , 2 2 6 ) . For Sa r t r e o b j e c t s a r e o r ig ina l ly charged with an a f f e c t i v e meaning. "Al1 t h i s cornes t o pass as i f w e corne t o l i f e i n a universe where feel ings and acts are al1 charged w i t h something m a t e r i a l , have a s u b s t a n t i a l stuff, are r e a l l y s o f t , d u l l , slimy, low, e l eva ted , etc. and i n which material substances have o r i g i n a l l y a psychic meaning w h i c h renders them repugnant, ho r r i fy ing , a l lu r ing , etc - " (1956, 605) , For S a r t r e , the meaningfulness of a "thing" is the r e s u l t of a fusion between one's p ro j ec t t o appropriate It and the t h ing f s disobedience t o appropriat ion. There i s a constant interplay between t h e pour-soi and the en-soi, But Sa r t r e ' s conception of the i n t e r p l a y of consciousness and B e i n g whenever one experiences an emotion i s a conscious s e l f - deception. T h e world is a magical world, and thtrs t h e r e l a t i o n between it and consciousness is a f i c t i t i o u s r e l a t ion , as Fe11 [Sar t re] t e l l s us that t h e r e is an intermonde between pour-soi and en-soi but that it is a f i c t i o n , The intermonde i s the r e l a t i o n 1 t r y t o e s t ab l i sh , t h e r e l a t i o n which t h e ob jec t r e s i s t s - There is thus a ' m i d w o r l d r r e l a t i n g pour-soi and en-soi, but t he r e l a t i o n i s one of denia l o f r e l a t ion , o f a n t i t h e s i s . Here, as always i n Sa r t r e ' s pos i t i on , a n t i t h e s i s p reva i l s ; there can be -no synthes i s , no continuum. Relations are always f i c t i o n s , If al1 r e l a t i o n s a r e a t tempted appropria t ions , and i f appropr ia t ion i s a f i c t i o n , then al1 r e l a t ions are f i c t i v e . T h i s r e a l l y amounts t o saying (a) t h e r e is 'pro ject ion ' b u t it i s not unref l e c t i v e l y recognized as such; (b) t h e 'p ro jec ted meaningr is abrogated by the r e c a l c i t r a n t ob jec t whose own 'meaningr ( o r u l t i m a t e on to log ica l s ignif icance) is i t s r e s i s t a n c e t o ' p ro j ec t ive meaningr ; (c) therefore recogni t ion of t h e real na ture of a f f ec t ive i n t e n t i o n a l i t y involves a divorce of t h e i n t e n t i o n a l value from i t s objec t , an abrogation of 'naïve c o n t a c t wi th t h e worldr, an aff i rmat ion of the fundamental on to logica l d i s p a r i t y between sub j ect and obj e c t . ( F e l l 1966, 228) This d i s p a r i t y between sub jec t and o b j e c t reigned i n the history of philosophy since Descartes' s p l i t between mind and matter. What Sartre does i s t o b u i l d a br idge between res cogitans (the t h i n k i n g mind) and res extensa (the extended body) fashioned by the new and appealing phenomenological perspect ive which recognizes bodi ly subjectivity. Eowever, t h e r e i s something pecul iar i n t h e way Descartes had been understood: h i s ideas developed i n d i f f e r e n t ways i n G e r m a n philosophy and i n French philosophy. Descartes, without t h e proof of Godr s existence can be regarded as an i d e a l i s t This, a s Anthony Beavers explains, is how t h e Germans saw him: Kant labels him a 'problematic i d e a l i s t f f o r whom ' there i s only one m p i r i c a l asser t ion t h a t is indubi tably c e r t a i n , namely t h a t 1 am' (Cr i t ique of Pure Reason B27 4 ) , suggesting t h a t , as f a r a s Kant is concerned, Descartesf attempt t o prove the reaf exis tence of anything outs ide of his mind, including God, does not work. And Schopenhauer, j u s t before claiming t h a t 'true philosophy must a t a l 1 costs be i d e a l i s t i c , ' p ra ises Descartes f o r f inding t h e 'only cor rec t s t a r t i n g po in t [...] of al1 philosophy' (World as W i l l and Representation II, 4). Husserl is so taken by t h i s s t a r t i n g point t h a t he w i l l t i t l e one of h i s in t roduct ions t o pure phenomenology, Cartesian Meditations, t h u s inv i t ing h i s reader t o repea t Descartes1 Meditations, t h i s t i m e , without t h e proofs f o r God's existence and d iv ine ve rac i ty Due t o t h e t r ad i t ion i n which he has been passed d o m t o us, Descartes may be c a l l e d not only t h e ' f a the r of modern philosophy,' bu t a l so ' the grandf a t h e r of transcendental phenornenologyf . (Beavers 1990) However, f o r Descartes, p r a c t i c a l l i f e has a p a r t i c u l a r importance and meditating on t h e p r i n c i p l e s of metaphysics w i l l not b r i n g about i t s s ignif icance. According t o Descartes, imagination and t h e senses a r e t ù be focused upon a f t e r e s t a b l i s h i n g the existence of God and of t h e soul . In Descartes' words : 1 think t h a t it i s very necessary t o have understood, once i n a l i fe t ime, t h e p r inc ip le s of metaphysics s ince it is by them that w e corne t o the knowledge of God and of our sou l . But 1 t h ink also that it would be very h a m u 1 t o occupy oners i n t e l l e c t f requent ly i n med i t a t i ng upon them, since t h i s would impede it from cievoting itself t o the imagination and the senses. (1970, 143) Thus, f o r Descartes t h e ep is temologis t t h e human being is composed of two s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s the mind and t h e body. Epistemology needs t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n because t h i s is the only way it can work. But there is something m o r e t o human n a t u r e than t h i s . B e s i d e s the mind and t h e body t h e r e is another "pr imi t ive notion" as Descartes calls it and t h a t i s " the union of sou l and body" : T h e s o u l can b e conceived only by pure i n t e l l e c t : t h e body (i , e . , extensioc , shape and movement) can l ikewise be known by pure i n t e l l e c t , but much b e t t e r by t h e i n t e l l e c t aided b y the imagination; and f i n a l l y what belongs t o the union o f t he s o u l and body can b e known only obscurely by pure i n t e l l e c t o r by the i n t e l l e c t a i d e d by the imagination, b u t it can be known ve ry c l e a r l y by t h e senses. That is why people who never phi losophize and use only t h e i r senses have no doubt t h a t t h e s o u l moves the body and t h e body acts on the soul. ( I b i d . , 141) Here imaginat ion and t h e senses are given t h e i r due and it would be u n f a i r t o Descar tes t o c a t e g o r i z e him h a s t i l y as 'the father of transcendental phenomenology". Descartes ho lds t h a t mind and body a r e bo th divorced and i n a union. But because t h e intellect cari see c l e a r l y t h e d i s t i n c t i o n and only obscurely t h e union it does n o t c o n s t i t u t e a concern. Descar tesr idea of t h i s union o f mind and body is not a clear and d i s t i n c t idea . But most c e r t a i n l y it i s present i n Descartes' ph i lo soph ica l letters and he makes u s e of it i n his attempt to unders tand t h e way human beings exist i n t h e world, i n the practical worldA person emerges i n the w o r l d of everyday involvements as thought t oge the r with t h e bodyOtherwise, t h e world would be merely a theoretical one which is an object o f s c i e n t i f i c inves t iga t ions . 1 am f u l l y a w a r e of the ideaç expressed by Descartes at the end of the second Meditation: it i s now manifest t o me t h a t even bodies a r e not proper ly speaking known by t h e senses or by t h e f a c u l t y of imagination, but by the understanding only, and since they are not known £rom the f a c t t h a t they are seen o r touched, but only because t h e y are understood, 1 see clearly t h a t there i s nothing which is easier f o r m e t o know than my mind. (1985-1991, 157) 1 do not want t o turn Descartes on h i s head. 1 j u s t want t o p o i n t out an idea t h a t is meaningful and which has had a much greater in f luence l a t e r i n the a rea of French phenomenology. T h e i dea of bodily s u b j e c t i v i t y is something which w i l l l a t e r becorne valuable i n t h e hands of Merleau-Ponty, for example, and, t o a c e r t a i n extent, t h i s is how Descartes is perceived i n the French phi losophica l t r a d i t i o n . For Merleau-Ponty: Being thought u n i t e d with a body, it [ the union] cannot, by d e f i n i t i o n , r e a l l y be thought (conceived). One can practice it, and, so t o speak, e x i s t it; y e t one can draw nothing from it which deserves t o be ca l l ed t r u e . . . The truth is t h a t it is absurd t o submit t o pure understanding, t h e mixture of understanding and body. These would-be thoughts a r e t h e h a l h a r k s of 'ordinary usagef , mere verba l iza t ions of t h i s union, and can be allowed only if they are not taken t o be thoughts. They are indices of an order of exis tence of man and world as ex i s t i ng about which w e do not have t o th ink . (1964, 176 ) The Car te s i an observation that once the mind i s incarnate i n t h e body and l i v e d as a uni ty , it appears i n the world of daily involvements, has not only been picked up by Merleau-Ponty. It also appears in t h e works of Sartre and Levinas, who recognize a bodi ly intentionality that is directed towards an other person who exists outside of the horizons of reason or beyond the cabinet of consciousness. In al1 four cases and here 1 am including Descartes affectivity is an intimate characteristic of embodiment thzt enables the practical connections that make up daily life, Here we are again: affectivity! !Xe get in touch with ourselves as bodies and minds (at the same time) and with the surrounding world through affectivity. Sartre, as noted above, did not ignore this phenomenological approach. Moreover, he tried to reassess it through his own existentialist perspective. In this regard, Fe11 considers Sartre to be indebted to both Kierkegaard and Hegel, Fe11 notes that: "Sartre himself refers to existentialism as 'this idealist protest against idealism' " (1966, 233) . Thus, he is indebted to Kierkegaard because h i s thought has at its centre the problern of the individual and his persona1 or subjective existence or his existence as "inwardness" which is something that most speculative philosophies, like Hegelrs, overlook. Against Hegelianism, Kierkegaard urged that the distinction between being and non-being be firmly maintained, on pain of l o s i n g the human proportion and perspective. The distinction between Being and Nothingness, as the t i t l e of Sartre's major work indicates, is something on which his philosophical work is based. However, praising Husserl and the phenomenological idea of "turning to the things in thenselves", Sartre realized the importance of building a bridge between subject and object, between the individual and the world. The link between hman beings and the world is established, Sartre considers, through our emotions. In having an emotion we transform the world and f o r t h i s w e connect with it. Moreover, an emotion is a conscious transformation of t h e world. Emotion, he affirms, "is not an accident, it i s a mode of our conscious existence, one of the ways i n which consciousness understands i ts Being-in-the-World" (Sartre 1976, 9 1 ) . But emotion i s a l so decept ive and ineffective because it i s a f i c t i t i o u s r e l a t i o n . T h i s amounts t o saying t h a t : 'If Kierkegaard was r igh t (against Hegel) i n arguing t h a t thought does not, by any kind of h i s t o r i c a l automatism, translate i t s e l f i n t o r e a l i t y , Hegel was r i g h t (against Kierkegaard) i n arguing t h a t thought c m be translated i n t o objective change, is not limited t o i so la t ed s o l i p s i s t i c decision" (Fell 1966, 234). Thus, even though Sartre's project stasts with Kierkegaard, he f inds t h a t consciousness cannot be t r u l y "free" i f thought cannot be t r a n s l a t e d in to objective change. By saying t h i s Sa r t r e is paying t r i b u t e t o Hegel's specula t ive philosophyFe11 concludes: " S a r t r e is only a b l e to see emotion as f ictive idealism because he identified e m o t i o n with t h o u g h t " . (Ibid. , 2 3 6 ) Lyall and Sartre T h e foregoing exposit ion of Sar t re ' s theory of emotion provides us with a new f r a m e w o r k i n which Lyal l ' s ideas about emotions can be analyzed. For Lya l l t h e emotions and espec ia l ly the emotion of love connects us with t h e world. Exnotions are the l i n k between our i n t e l l e c t and the phenomenal world. "Without emotion, i n h i s v i e w " , Armour and Trot t note, "the mind is empty, incapable of action. [Exnotion] is to be welcomed in a l1 its richness, and the hazards it presents by way of the stimulation of rash acts are to be faced cheerfully and without regret. Indeed, without emotion we would have no connection with the objective world" (1981, 79) . L y a l l was interested in finding a way to bridge the gap between the subject and the object, between us, as human beings and the world. Sartref s endeavor is similar. Both wanted to produce a means for making human beings part of the world, in a more intimate and immediate way. Both Sartre and Lyall were looking for a return to things in themselves, The only possibility through which this connection could be established is offered by the emotions. Lyall says of emotion, that : [it] is not an idea; it is not an act of intellect, or exercise of intelligence; it is not memory; it is not imagination, although emotion accompanies every act of imagination, and is essential to it [..,] An emotion is not a sensation, although it is more nearly allied to that than to what is purely mental or intellectual; while, again, it does not belong to that lower department of mind to which sensation is referable, and ranks higher than even the exercise of intelligence or intellect, Emotion is a higher state than pure intellect; not this or that emotion, but the region or susceptibility of emotion. (1855, 285) Thus, in Lyall's view, emotion is a higher state than pure intellect because, extended into the world, it grasps Being and informs the intellect, Emotion cannot be reduced to imagination, even though imagination is "essential" when experiencing an emotion, Also, emotion is not the same as ssnsation, even though they present similar features, Emotions, f o r L y a l l , reach out i n t o t h e world; t h e y a r e e x t e n s i o n s i n t o t h e wor ld of o u r e x i s t e n c e as bo th mind and body. L e t us t a k e , f o r example, t h e case o f Armour and T r o t t e x p l a i n i n g what L y a l l means when he w r i t e s t h a t love is an emotion t h a t "71enninates on being": Suppose l o v e could be conceived without r e f e r e n c e t o being i t se l f Then i f it needed an o b j e c t it would become r e l a t i v e t o the occurrence o f t h a t ob jec t . B u t i f it did n o t need an obj e c t , t h e n it would no t m o t i v a t e us t o seek t h e good. T t would be a s imple a b s t r a c t i o n . But love is n o t i n t h a t way r e l a t i v e and it does mot iva te u s . There fo re , w e a r e n o t wnolly without j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n supposing t h a t w e can go beyond p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s t o being i t s e l f . (1981, 8 1 ) That l o v e goes 'beyond p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s t o being i t s e l f " i n L y a l l ' s v i e w , Unplies t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t a t r ans fo rmat ion of t h e world so t h a t the gap between t h e subjec t and p a r t i c u l a r o b j e c t s vanishes when w e grasp, through emotions, Being i tself . When e x p e r i e n c i n g t h e emotion of love which L y a l l c a l l s " t h e abso lu te emotion", we do no t l o v e w h a t i s a c c i d e n t a l i n the o b j e c t of our love. A c t u a l l y , it is wrong t o speak of o b j e c t s a t all, L y a l l cons iders , because love t e r m i n a t e s on Being, "The one s t a t e o f love exists; e v e r y o b j e c t , eve ry be ing, shares i n its exerc i se : it has s e l e c t e d no o b j e c t for i t s exercise; but every o b j e c t r e c e i v e s a p a r t o f i t s r e g a r d as it cornes w i t h i n i t s sphere . In i t s most a b s o l u t e c h a r a c t e r , being i s i ts o b j e c t " ( L y a l l 1855, 4 0 8 ) . Our love is d i r e c t e d toward something t h a t l a s t s , something that is n o t r e l a t i v e , namely Being, even though it presents t o u s i n v a r i o u s forms. Another emotion t h a t Lyall emphasizes when t a l k i n g about t h e "most powerful emotions" i s sympathy. L y a l l remarks tha t : W e sympathize even with t h e aspects of na ture , as t h e s e a r e i n d i c a t i v e of c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s , whether e s s e n t i a l l y , o r by a r b i t r a r y circumstances of a s soc i a t i on , and w e e n t e r i n t o t h e very mood of e x t e r n a l c rea t ion , A l 1 n a t u r e speakç t o us, has a vo ice and an aspec t that w e understarid 1-1 T h e a i r , t h e ear th , the w a t e r , al1 changes, and al1 seasons, speak t o t h e mind, and impress t h e i r p e c u l i a r lessons, o r beget t h e i r app rop r i a t e emotionsAnd w e communicate Our f e e l i n g s again t o outward ob jec t s AL1 na tu re is joyous o r sad as we are so ou r se lves Half of i t s power over us is from ourselves. T h e in ternalmind is imaged on t h e ex t e rna l world. ( I b i d , , 061) For Lyal l , our emotions a r e a t t u n e d t o NatureW e a r e sympathetic t o t h e changes i n Nature and Nature i tself changes according to Our emotions, A b e a u t i f u l day can make us happy. However, when w e are sad, the whole world looks g ray What Lyal l wrote above, t h a t t h e " interna1 mind i s imaged on t h e e x t e r n a l world" i s something t h a t br ings him a t l e a s t momentarily very c lo se t o S a r t r e ' s view on t h i s matter . S a r t r e too , i n The Wall, descr ibes Pablo I b b i e t a who is imprisoned, wa i t i ng f o r h i s execut ion. The hero f i n d s himself i n a world which does not have any appeal . Everything i s gloomy and bleak. The people and t h e objects t h a t previously w e r e f a s c i n a t i n g became du l l , f a i n t . Lyall ' s approach, however, and t h i s is c r u c i a l i n understanding Lyal l ' s p o s i t i o n , d i f f e r s from S a r t r e ' s i n a very s u b t l e way. Sartre s t r e s s e s t h e dual nature o f our body, f i r s t as an instrument b u t then a l s o as something tkrough which consciousness l i v e s t h e world. B y t r y i n g t o c o n c i l i a t e t h i s d i s p a r i t y he arrives a t t h e i dea of a magical world i n which w e p r o j e c t ourselves when experiencing zn m o t i o n as t h e following passage from Sartre's Sketch f o r a Theory of Emotions i n d i c a t e s : A l 1 emotions have t h i s i n cornori,, that they evoke the appearance of the sâme world, c r u e l , t e r r i b l e , bleak, j oy fu l , e t c . , b u t i n which t h e r e l a t i o n s of t h i n g s t o consciousness are always and exc lus ive ly magical . W e have t o speak of a world of emotions as w e have t o speak o f a world cf d r e m o r of worlds of madness. (1976, 81) Now the whole process i s an illusory process . A t l e a s t t h i s i s t h e conclusion t h a t w e reach i f w e t r y t o understand Lyal l only through Sa r t r e ' s con t r ibu t ion t o t h e a n a l y s i s o f emotions. However, f o r Lyall, t h i n g s a r e a b i t d i f f e r e n t . For Lya l l , as w e saw above, l o v e connects u s wi th Being itself, P a r t i c u l a r i t i e s a r e unimportant. Love endures t h e apparent changes i n t h e ob jec t , it goes beyond acc iden t s , "Love absolute", L y a l l w r i t e s , "presents no modification, and e x i s t s f o r no purpose bu t i tself" ( L y a l l 1855, 0 0 8 ) . He p o i n t s ou t t h e "unifying" nature o f love. Through love w e become p a r t of t h e world, an i n t e g r a l p a r t , t h a t i s . Thus, when loving, tne f e a t u r e s of t h e world change s o t h a t t h e world is seen no t through i t s d i f f e r ences but through i ts sirnilarities. The world i s t h a t which is, it i s Being i t s e l f . Now, w e know that every ob jec t rece ives a p a r t of love. W e a l s o know t h a t , as Lyal l , says, "It is t h e soul , and the highest p r o p e r t i e s of the s o u l that a r e t h e t m e ob jec t s of l ove The body can be but t h e index of these and it i s w h e n these attract through t h e ex t e rna l form, t h a t love is worthy of t h e name" ( I b i d , , 407). What t h i s pos i t i on c a l l s t o mind i s that Lyal l seems t o be a proponent o f animism. If love b r ings us i n c o n t a c t with the world and i f love r e s t s no t on w h a t changes but on Being i t s e l f , i f t h e body i s "an index" of t h e soul , then Lya l l manages t o avoid S a r t r e ' s f a i l u r e . The world i n which we dwell when experiencing an emotion is not a world made up of our projections, It is the world in its very essenceWhat is fictitious in our relationship with the world when we are wder the spell of emotions is not the relationship itself but the way the object is characterized. There is not and cannot be a fictitious interaction with the world but jus t a fictitious characterization of the objectThe mundane relationship itself is a true relationshipLyall does not see this as fictitious. It is independent of the characteristics of the objects in the world because it grasps Being, that which goes beyond particularities. The phenornenal world is not just a projection, as Sartre considers. At this point we can see that for Lyall the Other is not really out there and that the Other is not really the other. Emotions integrate us into the world; they make us realize that we are a part of it. The Other is not "set at a distance" and there is no need to appropriate it, to make it ours. The "magical world" is rnagical because we find ourselves in it as identical and different from it at the sarne time and not because w e project ont0 it. I n t h e c a s e of metaphor, t h i s r e d e s c r i p t i o n [of r e a l i t y ] i s guided by the i n t e r p l a y between d i f f e r e n c e s and resemblances t h a t g i v e s rise t o the t e n s i o n a t the l e v e l of t h e u t t e r a n c e . It i s p r e c i s e l y from t h i s t e n s i v e apprehension that a new v i s i o n o f reality s p r i n g s f o r t h , which o rd ina ry v i s i o n resists because it is a t t a c h e d t o the o r d i n a r y u s e of words. T h e e c l i p s e of the o b j e c t i v e , manipulable world t h u s makes way for the r e v e l a t i o n of a new dimension o f r e a l i t y and t r u t h , Paul Ricoeur We have seen t h a t L y a l l is able t o p r o v i d e t h e b a s i s f o r a c o n s i s t e n t t h e o r y of ernotion, even though he did n o t develop it thoroughly. T h i s i s w h y Sartre's i n s i g h t w a s welcomed. It o f f e r e d a more advanced t h e o r e t i c a l basis rooted i n the phenomenological t r a d i t i o n and a more r e f i n e d set of d i s t i n c t i o n s which when a p p l i e d t o L y a l l r s ideas made it p o s s i b l e f o r u s t o see more clearly h o w it is t h a t th rough our emotions w e are l i n k e d t o t h e phenomenal w o r l d . However, this is not a l 1 there i s i n L y a l l t h a t dese rves our c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Bes ides emotions, there i s t h e intellect which Lyall b e l i e v e d t o be d i v o r c e d from t h e world. This i s where L y a l l e r r e d , because t h e i n t e l l e c t t o o b r i n g s i t s c o n t r i b u t i o n t o o u r i n t e r a c t i o n with t h e world. For Lyall, t h e mind i n t h e imaginative s ta te is composed of

In his article on "Metaphor" in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy (ed. Paul Edwards, 1972, vol. 5&6), Monroe C. Beardsley considers that we can talk about four distinctive theories of metaphor, They are: the emotive theory, the conparison theory, the iconic signification theory, and the verbal opposition theory. The purpose of going through this typology is to find whether there is a theory that construes metaphors in a way that is adequate to explain and expand Lyallr s ideas on the sub j ect. The Emotive Theory The emotive theory is based on the fact that metaphors, in virtue of their deviant meaning, cannot be verified. From Aristotlers definition of metaphor which will be discussed later in this chapter, we find out that a metaphor is "the application to a thing of a name that belongs to something else". This ambiguity inherent in metaphor implies that metaphorical constructions are not capable of verification and therefore, they do not bear any cognitive meaning at all. Thus, w h a t tells a metaphor apart from a non-metaphorical construction is the emotive meaning which springs up in the "process of r e l i nqu i sh ing i t s cogni t ive o r descr ip t ive , meaning' (Beardsley 1972a, 285) . For example, if w e have t h e fol lowing two l i n g u i s t i c const ruct ions: " T h e is an uncle" and "Time is, of al1 modes o f exis tence, most obsequious CO the imagination'' (Samuel Johnson) , w e can s e e t h a t t h e f i r s t one i s n o t a metaphor s i n c e t h e r e i s no powerful emotive meaning a t t ached t o it. This is not t h e case with t h e second example which is w h e r e t h e emotive theory of m e t a p h o r s t ops . Tt does no t go any f u r t h e r . T t can be said t h a t i d e n t i f y i n g metaphors i s as f a r as it g o t . It does not Say anything about w h a t a metaphor is i n i t s e l f . For example, t h e percep t ion of time bowing t o imagination, can rouse a c e r t a i n emotion i n ourse lves on t h e basis of a t ens ion between t h e perception of cime and t h a t of imagination. It a l s o tells us t h a t w e can elude time by making use of Our imagination, whereas seeing t ime as an uncle does nothing of t h e s o r t . Thus, t h e r e i s knowledge t o be gained through metaphor. Th i s i s what t h e r ep re sen t a t i ve s o f the emotive theory overlookea, which is t h a t metaphors have a cogni t ive s ide . They d i f f e r from nonsense cons t ruc t ions because they a r e beare rs of cogn i t i ve meaning. I n sum, t h e emotive t h e o r y of metaphor, thus f a i l s t o p rov ide a good b a s i s f o r explaining i n d i v i d u a l metaphors. Emotions a l o n e are no t s u f f i c i e n t i n t h i s at tempt. T h i s theory r ep re sen t s a rudimentary approach "which has been broached, although never very thoroughly worked out", on Beardsley1 s assessment (Beardsley 1972a, 285) . The C-son Tbeory T h i s theory of metaphor, t h e comparison theory, i s t h e oppos i te of t h e one above. It emphasizes the i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y of metaphor t o t he de t r iment of i t s emotional t ens ion . Bas ica l ly , i n t h i s view, metaphor does no t differ very much from a simileThe only d i f f e r ence l i e s i n dropping t h e use of words such "as" o r " l i k e " i n metaphors. Thus, t h e metaphor "love i s a red rose" can be r e w r i t t e n : "love i s l i k e a red rose" and there fore , through the metaphor we compare two terms ("love" and t h e "red r o s e " ) . By doing t h i s w e a r e ab l e t o know something about "love", i.e., t h a t it has some £ s a t u r e i n common with the 'red rose". According t o Beardsley: This comparison theory ev iden t ly makes t h e metaphorical a t t r i b u t i o n i n t e l l i g i b l e , but it has d i f f i c u l t i e s i n explaining what i s s o special about it. There are two r e l a t e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s . One is t o make a d i s t i n c t i o n between, Say \ c lose ' and \remotef comparisons, and exp la in the tens ion i n t e m of remoteness: t h e t ens ion is present when time is compared t o a river (Herac l i tus ) o r t o a c h i l d a t p l ay (or when Bergson says t h a t 'real dura t ion i s that duration which gnaws on th ings , and l eaves on them t h e mark of i t s toothr ) , but absent when t i m e i s compared w i t h space. The c r i t e r i a of remoteness hâve not proved easy t o provide. A second p o s s i b i l i t y is t o measure t h e degree of metaphoricalness (so t o speak) a s t h e i nve r se o f r e l a t i v e f requency ... B u t t h a t , too, seems i n s u f f i c i e n t : even i f one compared, f o r t h e f i r s t time, t h e co lo r o f a f r u i t c a k e ta t h e c o l o r of a newly cleaned Rembrandt, a metaphor would n o t thereby be e s t ab l i shed , (Ibid., 285) Usually, t h e comparison theory of metaphor i s a s soc ia t ed with o b j e c t comparison w h i c h means t h a t metaphor focuses on comparing ob jec t s - This implies t h a t the connotations of the words used i n metaphor derive from "what i s genera l ly t r u e of the objects" Now t h e r e are new d i f f i c u l t i e s t h a t a r i s e with t h i s n e w theory which Beardsley quickly p o i n t s out, t h i s time i n t h e essay The Metaphorical Twist (1972) . For example, Beardsley cites from T . S. E l i o t r s Four Q u a r t e t s : "f r i g i d purga tor ia l f i r e s / Of which the f lame is roses, and t h e smoke i s b r i a r s " (Beardsley 19725 , 7 4 ) . Beardsley considers that : some of t he important marginal meanings of ' b r i a r s r i n t h e E l i o t poem cornes, of course, from t h e way t h e crown of thorns f igures i n t h e Chr i s t i an s t o r y And q u i t e apart from i t s h i s t o r i c a l t r u t h , t h e existence of t h a t r e l ig ion is s u f f i c i e n t t o g ive t h e word t h a t meaning. If i n expl ica t ing t h i s l i n e w e l i m i t ourselves t o what w e know about briars, we would not fully understand it. ( I b i d - , 75) O n e has t o have some p a r t i c u l a r knowledge of the world i n order to understand it. Not knowing w h a t t h e connotation of t h e word nbr ia rs" is as it i s used i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r context, makes it impossible t0 grasp the metaphor. Another d i f f i c u l t y remarked upon by Beradsley i s that "once we commit ourselves t o f inding, o r supplying, an o b j e c t t o be compared with the s u b j e c t of t h e metaphor w e open t h e way for t h a t flow of id iosync ra t i c imagery t h a t is one of t h e s e r i o u s b a r r i e r s between a reader and a poem" ( Ib id . , 75) . These then are the f l a w s of t h e comparison theory. Jus t by comparing terms o r ob jec ts even though sometimes w e can a r r i v e a t something t h a t is meaningful, t h a t can be understood, w e are n o t n e c e s s a r i l y producing metaphors. It leaves aside any t e n s i o n a l element and any m o t i o n a l component as well . The Iconic Signification Theory Out o f t h e comparison t h e o r y grew t h e i c o n i c s i g n i f i c a t i o n theory which regards rnetaphor as i n v o l v i n g a double semantic r e l a t i o n s h i p . F i r s t , t h e modi f i e r , which Beards ley def i n e s a s "the metaphor ica l p r e d i c a t e o r term, whether n o m o r ad jec t ive" , leads us t o a s p e c i f i c occurrence o r s i t u a t i o n . Then, t h i s occurrence o r s i t u a t i o n i s brought f o r t h as an i c o n i c s i g n o f t h e s u b j e c t . An i c o n i c sign should be understood i n C.S. Pierce's sense , a s a sign capable of s ign i fy ing through i t s s i m i l a r i t i e s t o what it s i g n i f i e s . "The meaning o f t h e metaphor", Beards ley e x p l a i n s , "is obta ined b y reading o f f t h e p r o p e r t i e s thus i c o n i c a l l y a t t r i b u t e d r ' (Beardsley 1972ar 2 8 5 ) . For exa-aple, when say ing t h a t "Tirne i s a r iverf ' , the word "river" is used here s o t h a t it f u n c t i o n s a s an i c o n i c s ign fo r time, t h u s c o n f e r r i n g on us an i n s i g h t i n t o the nature of t h e , narnely t h a t it i s d i r e c t e d one-dimensionally, that it cannot be reversed , etc. T h e trouble here , Beardsley t h i n k s , i s t h a t the i c o n i c t h e o r y imports a f o r e i g n object of a c e r t a i n kind and t h u s it is subj ect t o t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a r i s i n g wi th r e g a r d t o what o b j e c t works b e s t i n order t o bring f o r t h t h e f u l l meaning of t h e metaphor. Moreover, the i c o n i c s i g n i f i c a t i o n theory, because it is based on t h e o b j e c t comparison theory , allows f o r swaps between t h e modi f i e r and t h e modified subject. Thus, i n t h e exarnple above "Time i s a river", w e c m inverse the metaphor and say "The r i v e r is the". The only dif ference, Paul Henle, azz exponent of t h e i c o n i c s i g n i f i c a t i o n theory, th inks i s t h a t sometimes, "the f e e l i n g tone i s d i f fe ren t" . Beardsley ob jec ts : "1 d o n f t b e l i e v e t h i s w i l l do: t h e d i f fe rence between ' t h i s man i s a l ion ' and ' t h i s l i o n is a manf i s i n what t h e dif f e ren t metaphorical modif iers a t t r i b u t e t o t h e subj ects" (1972b, 78 ) . The examples above a r e no t comparable t o each o the r s ince i n c a l l i n g men l i o n s and l i o n s men w e a r e no t a t t r i b u t i n g the same proper t ies £rom one t o t h e o the r . The p rope r t i e s of l i ons t h a t we a t t r i b u t e t o men a r e d i f f e r e n t f r o m the p r o p e r t i e s of men t h a t w e a t t r i b u t e t o l i o n s and the re fo re , t h e metaphor cannot be inver ted . The i con ic s i g n i f i c a t i o n theory of metaphor presents us with a refinement o f t h e comparison t n e o r y i n t h a t it br ings i n a t e n s i v e moment c rea ted by p u t t i n g toge the r remote ideas . "Time" and "r iver" , i n t h e example above, a r e t w o remote ideas which a r e rnetaphorically connected. However, t h e r e is n o t enough place f o r a well def ined emotive component s ince t h e r e is a d i f f e rence i n t h e "feel ing tone", as Henle considers , when a metaphor i s inver ted . This d i f fe rence however, does not t ake u s too f a r because, i n Henlers view, w e would be dealing with t h e same metaphor: ' this man is a l ion" and ' t h i s l i o n is a man" a r e b a s i c a l l y expressions of t h e same metaphor, even though t h e r e might be a s l i g h t d i f f e rence i n t h e ' feeling tone". There is , however, another a t t enp t t o expla in metaphor f o r which t h e f l a w s encountered he re are not a concern. The Vetbal Opposition Theory The four th t heo ry , t h e verbal oppos i t ion theory of metaphor, b r ings toge ther words or phrases whose c e n t r a l meanings c o l l i d e . They e n t e r i n t o a l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t and t h i s is an i n d i c a t i o n of a necessary s h i f t , a s h i f t from the c e n t r a l meaning t o the marginal meaning. Beardsley's view of metaphor w i t h r egard t o t h i s t h e o r y is t h a t : In many common words and phrases , w e can roughly d i s t i n g u i s h two s o r t s of meaning: (1) t h e c e n t r a l rneaning, o r meanings what is c a l l e d designation o r ( i n M i l l r s sense) connotation, and rnay be recorded i n a d i c t i ona ry a s s tandard; and ( 2 ) t h e marginal meaning, cons i s t i ng of t hose proper t ies t h a t t h e word suggests o r connotes ( i n t h e l i t e r a r y c r i t i c r s sense of t h i s term) [--1 This theory thus rests upon (1) a d i s t i n c t i o n between two levels of meaning, and ( 2 ) t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t metaphor involves e s s e n t i a l l y a l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t of c e n t r a l meanings. (Beardsley 1972 , 286) This c o n f l i c t i s what alerts us t o t h e fact t h a t t h e word o r ph ra se has t o be taken rnetaphorically, It i s what Beardsley c a l l s "the metaphorical t w i s t " . This approach t o metaphor, however, does n o t a l low f o r words t o acqui re new meanings because words corne i n t o p l a y wi th a s e r i e s of meanings which a r e e i t h e r c e n t r a l o r marginal and a s a r e s u l t of t h e l o g i c a l opposi t ion w e p i c k from t h e " r epe r to i r e of marginal meanings (and from t h e non-conf l ic t ing p a r t of t h e c e n t r a l meaning) those proper tkes t h a t can s e n s i b l y be a t t r i b u t e d t o t h e subject th ing, and s o read t h e metaphor as making t h a t a t t r i b u t i o n " (Beardsley 1972a, 28 6 ) . Foreseeing t h i s problem, ~ e à r d s l e ~ xpanded the t h e o r y o f f e r i n g i n h i s essay T h e Metaphorical Twist a r e v i s e d vers ion of t h e verbal oppos i t ion theory. Metaphor, Beardsley cons iders , br ings i n t o p lay some p r o p e r t i e s of t h e words o r phrases used i n i t s s t r u c t u r e t h a t were n o t previously i n t h e foreground of t h e meaning. He expla ins t h a t t h e r e are a t l e a s t t h r e e s t eps t h a t make up t h i s process: I n t h e f i r s t s t a g e we have a word and p rope r t i e s t h a t are d e f i n i t e l y no t p a r t o f che in tens ion of t h a t word. Some of t hose p roper t i es a r e e l i g i b l e t o become part of t h e in tension, t o j o in the range of connotat ion, I n order t o be e l i g i b l e they have t o be f a i r l y common prope r t i e s ... When t h e word cornes t o be used metaphorical ly i n a c e r t a i n s o r t of context , t hen what w a s previously only a p roper ty is m a d e , a t l e a s t temporari ly i n t o a meaning. And widespread f a m i l i a r i t y with t h a t metaphor, o r similar ones, can f i x t h e proper ty a s an e s t a b l i s h e d par t of t h e meaning [...] When a connotat ion becomes s o standardized f o r a c e r t a i n types of context , it may be shifted t o a n e w status, where it becomes a necessary condi t ion f o r applying t h e word i n that context . It c o n s t i t u t e s a new standard. (Beardsley 1 9 7 2 , 84 ) Thus, a t first, a word has a d e f i n i t e s e t o f p roper t i es t h a t make up t h e i n t e n s i o n o f t h a t word, Then, o the r p roper t i es a r e brought f o r t h inasmuch as they could, p o t e n t i a l l y , become p a r t of t h a t word's i n t ens ion . Then, when t h a t word is used metaphorically, t h e p rope r ty a c t u a l l y becomes p a r t of t h e word's in tension and t he re fo re a new meaning is c rea t ed . To i l l u s t r a t e how t h i s works, 1 w i l l borrow Beardsley 's exampleH e w r i t e s t h a t t h e word \warmt was ex t rapo la ted from t h e area o f sensory experience and employed i n descr ib ing human p e r s o n a l i t y : 1 should th ink t h a t t h e f i r s t app l i ca t ion of 'warmy t o a person had t o change some acc iden ta l p rope r t i e s of warm things i n t o p a r t of a new meaning o f the word, though now w e e a s i l y thinK of t h e s e p rope r t i e s as connotations of 'wamy f o r example, approachable, pleasurable-in- acquaintance, i n v i t i n g . These q u a l i t i e s were pa r t o f t h e range of connotations of 'warmf even before they w e r e noted i n w a r m things, which may no t have been u n t i l t hey were noted i n people and u n t i l sorneone, c a s t i n g about f o r a word t h a t would metaphorically descr ibe t h o s e people, h i t upon t h e word 'wann ' But before t h o s e q u a l i t i e s could corne t o belong t o t he s t a p l e connotation of 'warmf, it had t o be discovered t h a t they could be meant Dy t h e word when used i n an appropr ia te metaphor. ( Ib id . , 8 5 ) Thus, i n o rde r Co understand t h e metaphor "she i s a warm person", one has t o t h i n k of p roper t ies o f t h e word 'warm" such as i n v i t i n g , approachable, etc., which i n i t i a l l y w e r e not among the connotat ions of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r word. Through metaphorical use, t h e word expanded i t s range of meanings and became f u l l e r . Now, t h e verbal opposi t ion theory of metaphor, even though it does not inc lude an emotive component, seems t o be a very e l a b o r a t e approach t o t h e study of metaphor allowing f o r metaphor t o augment t h e use o f words i n a language, allowing f o r new rneanings t o occur , allowing f o r su rp r i s ing ideas t o emerge from t h e jux tapos i t ion of words. Two exponents of t h i s v i e w a r e Colin T u r b a y n e and Philip Wheelwright, both s t r e s s i n g t he importance of metaphor i n br inging f o r t h new rneanings fo r words o r phrasesThey a l s o represen t two opposed views on t h e r e l a t i o n between metaphors and r e a l i t y . This con t rove r s i a l r e l a t i o n i s of foremost importance because it represen ts t h e connection w i t h L y a l l f s ideas . In this section, 1 will critically examine Turbayne and Wheelwright's approaches, Through criticisrn of their views I will arrive at Paul Ricoeur's theory which I consider iç the most comprehensive one. Ricoeur retains what is fruitful from the above mentioned theories and tries to make them part of a very ambitious project which is representeü by his monumental work The Rule of Metaphor (1977) , In order to give a crude preliminary description of his theory it should be montioned that he manages to open a new dimension in the analysis of metaphor by linking it through a special use of imagination to the phenomenal world, and by according it the status of a statement by redefining Frege's sense and reference polarity. The issue of emotional rneaning is also an integral part of Ricoeur's work. This brings us back to tne framework of William Lyall's thought. Moreover, in as much as metaphors have an intellectual dimension, they do improve our relationship with the world. They augment the world itself, an insight that Lyall failed to achieve but nonetheless one which Ricoeur rightly emphasized. Thus, 1 will start with the two different views on this issue, f i r s t that of Collin Turbayne, who develops a theory of metaphor based on the "as if" prescription and thus brings the whole discussion on metaphor to the field of reflective judgment. Then there is Philip Weelwrightrs theory which considers that metaphorical laquage, through its fluidity and tensiveness, is closely connected t o "what is", t h a t is, t o the real. Then, by u s ing these two t h e o r i e s a s d i a l e c t i c a l counterpar ts , 1 w i l l t r y . t o br ing them toge ther i n an a c t of synthesis, a r r i v i n g f i n a l l y a t Paul Ricoeur 's theory of metaphor. T h e g o a l of t h i s chap te r is t o show that metaphors do "reach" r e a l i t y and that Lyall, i n s t e a d of r e f e r r i n g t o t h e imaginative s t a t e a s something t h a t d e f i e s explanat ion, could have gone f u r t h e r and thus have r e a l i z e d t h a t t h e i n t e l l e c t i s not completely a l i ena t ed from t h e phenomenal world because of i t s a b i l i t y t o c r e a t e metaphorsOf course , L y a l l r s l ack of t h e phi losophical tools necessary t o achieve t h i s t a s k , such as t h o s e of phenomenology and theory of metaphor, hampered h h from developing these ideas. Tnis chapter thus amounts t o a c r i t i q u e of Lyall which should a l s o be understood as a con t inua t ion of h i s thought. Tuzbayne and the Myth of Metaphor T h e c l a s s i c a l d e f i n i t i o n of metaphor i s t h e one given by AristotleFor A r i s t o t l e , metaphors: "consis t i n giving t h e t h i n g a name that belongs t o something else; the t r ans fe r ence (epi-phora) being ei ther £rom genus t o spec ies , o r from spec i e s t o genus, o r from spec ies t o spec ies , o r on t h e grounds of analogy" (Poe t i c s 1457 b 69 ) . For example, t he express ion 'love i s a red rose" is a metaphor. To break d o m A r i s t o t l e r s d e f i n i t i o n , w e can see t h a t t h e noun "love" is t h e focus of t h e metaphor. Something happens t o it: it i s explained, it is made unders tandable by employing a l e s s abstract and more concre te term, t h e "red rose"We a r e dea l ing with a movement £rom an a b s t r a c t concept t o a term which can be grasped more e a s i l y by t r a n s f e r r i n g one name ont0 t h e o ther . "Love", f o r t h e person experiencing t h i s emotion i s t h e same a s a "red rose" f o r our experience of beauty: i t s r i c h co lor , i t s d i s p o s i t i o n of ve lve ty p e t a l s , as w e l l as i t s perfume make us want t o have it a s c l o s e a s poss ib l e s o w e cari enjoy i t s beauty. The same happens when i n l ove t h e r e i s a s t a t e of in tense longing f o r union with t h e o ther where t he o t h e r represen ts everything t h a t i s beau t i fu l and exci t ing. In t h i s case , t h e t rans fe rence happens "on the grounds of analogy" between love and t h e r ed rose. Co l l i n Turbãyne begins h i s book The M y t h of Metaphor (1970) by chal lenging A r i s t o t l e f s d e f i n i t i o n . Turbayne i s no t s a t i s f i e d wi th it because he i d e n t i f i e s cases of metaphors t h a t , i n v i r t u e of t h e i r ex i s tence , r e q u i r e t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n be e i t h e r broader o r narrower. I t should be broader because some metaphors do no t have t o be expressed i n words. There can be metaphors t h a t a r e expressed through pa in t ing , scu lp ture , dance, etc. Turbayne explains : Michelangelof f o r example, used t h e f i g u r e of Leda, with t h e Swan t o i l l u s t r a t e be ing l o s t i n t h e r ap tu re of phys i ca l passion, and t h e same f i g u r e of Leda, only this time without t h e Swan, t o i l l u s t r a t e being l o s t i n t he agony of dying. I t w i l l a l s o allow t h e concrete phys ica l models of app l ied s c i e n t i s t s , t h e blackboard of teacherç , t h e toy blocks of children t h a t may be used t o represent t h e b a t t l e of Trafa lgar , and t h e raised eyebrow of t h e ac tor t h a t may i l l u s t r a t e t h e whole s i t u a t i o n i n t h e s t a t e of Denmark, t o be c l a s s i f i e d a s metaphor. ( Ib id . , 13 1 In o rde r t o so lve t h i s problem, Turbayne takes "name" £rom t h e above d e f i n i t i o n t o mean 'a s i g n o r a co l l ec t ion of signs" (Turbayne 1970 , 1 3 ) . Thus, f o r Turbayne, t h e a c t o f t rans fe rence f epi-phora) from A. r i s to t le r s d e f i n i t i o n does not occur from genus t o species , o r f r o m spec ies t o genus, e t c . but from a 'sort" t o o t h e r "sort". A "sort" is a p a r t i c u l a r kind, class o r group and he calls the t rans fe rence "sort-crossing". What t h i s means is t h a t now, every a c t of t rans fe rence can be perceived as a metaphor. The outcome of bu i ld ing t h e metaphor on t h e bas i s of sor t -cross ing is t h a t suddenly i t s whole meaning becomes uns tab le . "If t h e term metaphor be l e t apply t o every t r o p e of language, t o every r e s u l t of a s soc i a t i on of ideas and analogical reasoning, rio a r ch i t ec tu re , music, pa in t ing , re l ig ion , and t o al1 t h e s y n t h e t i c processes of art, science, and philosophy, t h e n indeed metaphor w i l l be warred a g a i n s t by metaphor [..-] and how then can i t s meaning stand?" (Bedell 1936, 1 0 3 ) . This would mean, as no ted above, t h a t every sor t -cross ing would be a metaphor and thus t h e d e f i n i t i o n of metaphor should be narrower. The s o l u t i o n , Turbayne considers, l i e s i n the f a c t that every sor t -c ross ing i s j u s t a potential metaphor. What makes a metaphor t o be a metaphor i s t h e 'as if", t he "make Sel ieve" which i s inheren t ly p re sen t i n it . I n t h e example usea above, "love is a red rose" t h e metaphor e x i s t s i n as much as t h e express ion is taken t o mean t h a t l ove i s "as i f " it i s a red rose. The 'as i f " p re sc r ip t ion i s imp l i c i t . It involves a c e r t a i n l e v e l of awareness without which t h e metaphor does no t occur t o u s . Thinking of love a s being l i t e r a l l y a red rose does not bring us i n t o t h e presence of metaphor. What does, i s perceivingt h e s i m i l a r i t y and being aware of it, knowing t h a t t h ings happen 'as i f " they axe similar . Turbayne' s theory of metaphor "represents t h e facts [...] a s i f they belonged t o one log i ca l t ype o r category ( o r range, o r types of c a t e g o r i e s ) , when they a c t u a l l y belong t o another". (Turbayne 1970, 1 8 ) . B u t t h i s new d e f i n i t i o n happens t o be t h e very d e f i n i t i o n t h a t Gi lber t Ryle gave, not f o r metaphor, bu t f o r t h e category mis take ( o r c a t e g o r i a l confus ion) , The rnetaphor f i n d s i t s essence i n t h e act of so r t c ros s ing o r d u a l i t y o f sense, bu t it does t h a t by f i l l i n g up the "as i f" p r e s c r i p t i o n , " fus ing two senses by naking believe t h e r e i s only one sense". Thus, metaphor on Turbayne' s account s h i f t s from being a category confusion t o a "category fusion", What Turbayne meam is t h a t t h e r e is no mistake i n se l f -consciously c ross ing s o r t s f o r otherwise a l1 metaphors w i l l be nothing b u t mistakes. This does no t imply t h a t one is r i g h t i n "presenting t h e f a c t s of one s o r t i n t h e idioms o f another without awareness" (Ibid., 2 2 ) . This i s p l a i n confusion of d i spa ra t e senses of a s ign which su re ly does n o t give b i r t h to a metaphor. If t h e quest ion i s when does a metaphor occur, then Turbayne r e p l i e s t h a t : T h e answer l i es i n t h e a s if o r make-believe f e a t u r e [,.] When Descartes says t h a t t h e world i s a machine o r when 1 Say with Seneca t h a t man is a w o l f , and n e i t h e r of us in tends our a s se r t i ons to be taken l i t e r a l l y büt only metaphorically, bo th of us are aware, i i r s t , t h a t w e a r e so r t - cross ing, t h a t is, re-present ing t h e f a c t s of one s o r t i n t h e idioms appropr ia te t o another, o r , i n o t h e r words, of t h e dua l i t y of sense . 1 Say 'are awaref , but of course, we must be, otherwise t h e r e can be no metaphor. W e a r e aware, seconcLLy, t h a t we are t r e a t i n g t h e world and man a s i f they belong t o new s o r t s . W e a r e aware of t h e d u a l i t y o f sense i n 'machinef and 'wolf , bu t w e make believe t h a t each has only one sense t h a t t h e r e i s no d i f f e r ence i n kind, only i n degree, between t h e g i an t clockwork of na ture and t h e pygrny clockwork of m y w r i s t watch, o r between manwolves and t h b e r wolves. (Ibid., 1 7 ) Thus t h e r e are two d i f f e r e n t ways f o r looking a t the r e l a t i o n s h i p between s o r t s : t h e r e is sor t -c ross ing , which a c t u a l l y defines metaphor, and t h e r e is so r t t r e spas s ing which brings f o r t h the i s s u e of being used by t h e rnetaphor because i n t h i s ca se t h e 'as i f " p r e s c r i p t i o n is overlooked and t h e metaphor i s t aken l i t e r a l l y ( s e e It follows t h a t be ing a b l e t o 'see" t h e metaphor Unplies an awareness w i t h o u t which one m e r e l y g e t s l o s t i n the m i d s t o f recognizing various s enses of a sign. An example would be r e a l i z i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e between "seeing t n e po in t of a need le and see ing t h e point o f a joke", In t h a t moment when only one o f t h e two d i f f e r e n t senses f u s e d is metaphor ical bu t i s taken l i t e r a l l y , we are d e a l i n g with sor t t respass ing , as Turbayne recognizes t h a t : The v ic t im o f metaphor accepts one way of s o r t i n g o r bu i ld ing o r a l l o c a t i n g t h e f a c t s as t h e only way t o sort, bundle, o r a l l o c a t e thern. T h e victim not only has a s p e c i a l view of t h e world bu t regards it as t h e only v i e w , o r r a t h e r , he confuses a s p e c i a l view of t h e world with the world. H e is t h u s a rnetaphysician. H e ha s mistaken the mosk f o r t h e face . Such a v i c t i m who i s a metaphysician malgré l u i i s t o be d i s t i ngu i shed f rom t h a t o t h e r metaphysician who i s aware t h a t h i s a l l o c a t i o n of t h e f a c t s i s a r b i t r a r y and might have been otherwise. ( Ib id . , 27 1 For Turbayne, t h e encounter with a metaphor provokes our awareness. We have t o perform t h r e e opera t ions i n order t o understand a metaphorical cons t ruc t ion . W e must be able, first, t o spot t h e metaphor, t o d iscover it i n a t e x t , i n a work of a r t o r i n music. Then, we have t o i d e n t i f y i t s literal i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and w e have t o p o i n t it o u t i n order t o g e t r i d of it so t h a t w e are l e f t with t h e metaphorical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . Af t e r doing t h a t w e are t h e n a b l e t o r e s t o r e the metaphor as a metaphor, as something where the process of sor t -c ross ing happens bu t t h i s t h e with awareness of its occurrence. Turbaynefs theory of metaphor r e s t s upon r e f l e c t i v e judgment. H i s f e a r of being vic tun ized by metaphor can only be e r a d i c a t e d if we a r e c o n s t a n t l y aware and make use of t h e above operat ions . Metaphor i s something t h a t i s c r e a t e d by breaking p a t t e r n s , and making n e w connections i n s t ead of preserving o ld a s soc i a t i ons . T h i s must be accompanied by t h e "v ig i lance of t h e a s if", as Ricoeur p u t s it i n The R u l e of Metaphor (1977) . To summarize, Turbayne is advocating a theory of metaphor i n which every s i n g l e use of sor t -c ross ing must be very lucid aEd r a d i c a l l y i n t e l l e c t u a l . He under l ines t h i s c la im i n The M y t h o f Metaphor as follows: "the main theme of t h i s book is t h a t w e should cons t an t ly t r y t o be aware o f the presence of metaphor, avoiding being v i c t imized by our own a s w e l l a s by others" ( I b i d . , 217) . B u t how i s it possible f o r a metaphor t o p re sen t i t s e l f i n i ts f u l l n e s s and with al1 i t s power without us b e l i e v i n g i n i t s d e s c r i p t i v e and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e value? Throughout h i s book, Turbayne is worried t h a t w e no t fa11 prey t o "believing" t h a t which rnetaphor r ep re sen t s which w i l l l e a d u s t o take t h e metaphor l i t e r a l l y . However, Ricoeur as ks, 'can one create metaphors wi thout be l i ev ing t h e m and without be l iev ing t h a t , i n a c e r t a i n way, ' t h a t is' ?" (Ricoeur 1977, 2 5 0 ) . Should t h e c r e a t i v e dimension of language be divorced £rom t h e c r e a t i v e aspect of r e a l i t y i t s e l f ? TurSaynefs prescription f o r netaphor limits imagination. It subjects it to the "philosophy of the a s if". T h e spark fired by the metaphor i n poetry, f o r example, i s prornptly put out the moment w e become "aware" t h a t it is j u s t an a r t i f i c e which, once spot ted , canriot have t h e power t o l i f t us up on r e v e r i e ' s s u r m n i t . When th ink ing about t h e ' love i s a red r o s e r metaphor, Turbayne would l i k e us t o enjoy t h e c leverness of t h e cons t ruc t ion . H e rernarks t h a t "the invent ion of a rnetaphor f u l l of i l l u s t r a t i v e power is t h e achievement of genius" (Turbayne 1970, 5 7 ) . O n h i s account t h e r e should be nothing beyond t h i s . The sole joy t h a t w e r e t r i e v e f r o m metaphor should oniy be de l ive red by our capac i ty f o r r e f l e c t i v e judgment. But t h e r e is more t o metaphor than t h i s . A l o t more! Philip Wheelwrightr s Metaphor and Reality It is Phi l ip Wheelwright's pos i t i on , developed i n h i s book Metaphor and Reality ( 1973 ) t h a t t h e r e is a very s t rong r e l a t i o n s h i p between language and phenomenal r e a l i t y , and metaphor i s t h a t which i l l u s t r a t e s it t h e best. Wheelwright adopts a pos i t i on con t r a ry t o t h a t o f Turbayne. If Turbayne i s prcne t o draw a t t e n t i o n t o what t h e metaphor i s not, t o make it c l e a r t h a t everything t h a t p e r t a i n s t o metaphorical c r ea t ion happens within t h e l i m i t s determined by t h e "as if", Wheelwright l e a n s toward emphasizing what the metaphor is, how it i s s o very s t rong ly in te r twined with phenomenal r e a l i t y . With Wheelwright, metaphor o f f e r s more than t h e kind of p l easu re r e s t i n g e n t i r e l y on our capac i ty f o r r e f l e c t i v e judgment. Through rnetaphor we become capable of be ing in t imate ly connected with "What Is", as he w r i t e s , with what i s r e a l i t y and how it presents i t s e l f t o us. For Wheelwright. reality can be descsibed as having three important f e a t u r e s : it i s p re sen t i a l , it i s coa lescen t and it is The t h a t p r e s e n t i a l of presence which can be f e l t wi th regard that t he re being, another pexson, and t o w a ~ d haai rnate beings t o another human The other i s p re sen t f o r us not a s an ob jec t , not as something out there , ou t of reach, bu t rather as something with which we are linked. We experience t h e presence of the-other-than-us we connect with it: Every presence has an i r r e d u c i b l e core of mystery, so long as it retains i t s p r e s e n t i a l charac te r . Explanations, theories, and s p e c i f i c quest ionings a r e d i r e c t e d toward an o b j e c t i n Its thinghood, no t i n its presentness. An object i n i t s thinghood i s charac te r ized by spatio-temporal and causal relations to other objects i n t h e i r thinghood: w e i n q u i r e about i t s name, i t s p l a c e , i t s w h y and whither, i t s status accordinq t o some system of values .... m e n , on t h e o t h e r hand, two persons meet and t h e i r meeting i s one of mutual presentness , t h e e s s e n t i a l i t y of t h e i r rneetinq has nothing t o do with names and a a d r e s ~ e s - ~ N o mul t i p l i ca t i on of such d e t a i l s , however full and meticulous, cari be a s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e r e a l meeting .... The same is true when no other human being is involved, and hence no assured mutual i ty . The sense of presence t h a t occuss t o one who catches a s~dden glimpse of , Say, a c e r t a i n , contour of h i l l s o r of a red wheelbarrow i n the r a in , d e f i e s explanation; for when explanations are begun o r sought t h e sheer presentness diminishes o r d i sappears . (Wheelwright 1973, 150-1591 Being open t o sensing t h e presence of t h e surrounding world, means t h a t t h e Cartesian dualism between m i n d and body does no t hold any lonqer. As a consequence, there i s something more here than just t h e mind as perceiving subj ect and the body as perceived obj ect. Both of them a r e blended toge ther , both of them are uni ted; they a r e nothing but t h e two s i d e s o f a co in , R e a l i t y , f o r Wheelwright, su rpasses d i s t i n c t i o n s l i k e s u b j e c t and object , o r mind and bodyRea l i ty , h e w r i t e s , "is That t o w h i c h every [...] category tries t o r e f e r and which every p h i l o s o p h i c a l s tatement tries t o desc r ibe , always £rom an i n t e l l e c t u a l p o i n t of v i e w and always with u l t i m a t e inadequacy" T h e a s p e c t r e a l i t y w h i c h i t s Wheeiwright r e p r e s e n t s by using t h e term "coalescent" . To c o a l e s c e means t o grow t o g e t h e r o r i n t o one body; t o u n i t e , j o i n t o g e t h e r . What Wheelwright seems t o p o i n t o u t i s t h a t w e are part of t h e world and we grow t o g e t h e r w i t b the environment. The the s u b j e c t / o b j e c t s p l i t have unfor tuna te consequencesWheelwright c o n s i d e r s t h a t it: gives undue p r e s t i g e t o c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of exper ience ( those which we c a l 1 c o l l e c t i v e l y t h e 'phys ica l ' a spec t s ) a t t h e expense of o t h e r and perhaps i n t r i n s i c a l l y m o r e important a s p e c t s ; moreover, it genera tes a r t i f i c i a l q u e s t i o n s To as k (as phi losoph ica l a e s t h e t i c i a n s o f t e n do) whether t h e beauty o f a r o s e is i n t h e r o s e o r i n t h e eye and mind of t h e beholder is p a l p a b l y an u n r e a l ques t ion , for t h e concre te answer is \Bothr ; and i f the answer looks c o n t r a d i c t o r y , s o much t h e worse for the d u a l i s t i c s t r u c t u r e of thought t h a t makes it look so. T h e 1 w h o am aware and t h e t h a t of which 1 am aware a r e b u t two a s p e c t s of a s i n g l e s u r e a c t u a l i t y , as i n s e p a r a b l e as the convex and t h e concave a s p e c t s o f a s i n g l e geometr ica l curve. ( Ibid. , 1661 W n a t Wheelwright means is t h a t t h e world i s no t an i n e r t mechanical o b j e c t b u t a l i v i n g f ie ld , an open and dynamic landscape . The w o r l d does n o t d e r i v e from an impersonal or o b j e c t i v e dimension of s c i e n t i f i c f a c t s , It i s no t a c o l l e c t i o n of d a t a "from which a l 1 s u b j e c t s and s u b j e c t i v e q u a l i t i e s a r e pared away, but it i s r a t h e r a n in te r twined matr ix of s ensa t i ons and percept ions" (Abram 1997, 3 9 ) . Thus, w e are n o t mere observers . W e p a r t i c i p a t e i n r e a l i t y . The last f ea tu re of r e a l i t y d iscussed by Wheelwright r o f e r s to it a s be ing perspec t iva l . T h e f a c t that r e a l i t y possesses a p e r s p e c t i v a l and contextual cha rac t e r , imp l i e s t h a t i t s n a t u r e i s cons t an t ly problematic, it cannot be c o r s e t e d wi th in formulas o r systematized. We, as complex human beings are d i v e r s e and w e are a l s o i n t h e presence of a r e a l i t y i tself d ive r se and complex, w e are p a r t of it and t h u s w e cannot p o s t u l a t e 'a s ingle type of r e a l i t y as ult imate" For Wheelwright, it i s evident t h a t : The communication of p r e s e n t i a l and coalescent r e a l i t y is no t p o s s i b l e by r e l y i n g on words with i n f l e x i b l e meanings; i f it i s t o be achieved a t a l 1 (and t h e achievement is always imperfect a t b e s t ) t h e common words must be chosen and contextual ized wi th d i s c r imina t ing s u i t a b i l i t y . Much of the con tex t is cons t ruc ted i n t h e a c t and b y t h e manner o f saying fo r th ; it is not a l 1 previously given. The f r e s h con tex t may be regarded a s an ang le of v i s ion , a perspec t ive , through which r e a l i t y can be beheld i n a c e r t a i n way, a unique w a y , no t e n t i r e l y cornmensurate w i t h any other way. ( 1 9 7 3 , 170) This b r i n g s us t o t h e i s s u e of language and, i m p l i c i t l y , t o metaphor. Language, Wheelwright cons iders , in a s much as it i s used t o express t h e complexity and t e n s i v i t y of t h e phys i ca l world and a l s o t h e complexity of human na ture , i s i t s e l f i n t r i c a t e , engulfed i n t e n s i o n s between s u i t a b l e word combinations used t o " represen t some a s p e c t o r o ther of t h e pemas ive l i v i n g tension" ( Ib id . , 48). On Wheelwrightrs approach, language i s i t se l f a l i v e , i n continuous change because those who use it try t o f ind b e t t e r and s imp le r w a y s t o exp re s s themselves o r t o r e f l e c t t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i th t h e surrounding world. Wheelwright argues t h a t : language t h a t s t r i v e s toward adequacy as opposed t o signs and words of practical i n t e n t o r o f mere habit is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y t ens ive t o some degree and i n some marner o r o the r . This is true whether t h e language c o n s i s t s of ges ture , drawings, musical compositions, o r (what o f f e r s by f a r t h e l a r g e s t p o s s i b i l i t i e s of development) ve rba l language cons i s t ing o f words, idioms, and syntax. ( I b i d . , 46-47) A t the core o f t h i s s t r i f e within language i s t n e metaphor. Quot ing John Micidleton Murry, Wheelwright r e f e r s t o metaphor a s be ing "as u l t ima te a s speech i t s e l f , and speech as u l t ima te as thought". Metaphor i s t h a t which r e f l e c t s be s t t h e t e n s i v e nature of language and, a t t h e same the, t h a t which provokes our th inking and imagination. As we have seen above, where we presen ted A r i s t o t l e r s d e f i n i t i o n , t h e metaphoric process impl ies a t r a n s f e r , a movement wi thin t h e semantic field of a s p e c i f i c s o r t t o t h e semantic f i e ld of another . T h i s t r a n s f e r ( "phora") has, as Wheelwright notes , two d i s t i n c t i v e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , a "double imaginat ive a c t of outreaching and combining t h a t e s s e n t i a l l y marks t h e metaphoric process" ( I b i d . , 7 2 ) . But t h e s e two components of metaphor appear, i n t h e most eloquent cases a s working together and thus , they should n o t be regarded sepa ra t e ly bu t r a t h e r as two dimensions of metaphor. However, i n o rder t o b e t t e r understand them, Wheelwright names and analyzes t h e m one a t a time. Their names are epiphor, which s t a n d s f o r " the outreach and ex tens ion of meaning through cornparison" and diaphar, meaning "the c r e a t i o n of a new meaning by j ux t apos i t i on o r synthesis" Epiphor

The metaphor a s epiphor i n i t s essence does nothing more than express a s i m i l a r i t y between two d i f f e r e n t tems where one of them has a commonly known sense and i s used as a vehicle t o shed l i g h t on a more important but, a t t h e same time, more d i f f l c u l t t o comprehend term, t h e tenorThus, by e a s i l y bringing i n a context , ep iphor ic metaphor make-believes sornething about something e l s e which i s usua l ly obscurely known. For example, when Seneca s a i d t h a t " M a n i s a wolf", he did not mean that t h e s o r t "man" is included i n t h e s o r t "wolf", b u t r a t h e r b y t r a n s f e r r i n g the name "wolf" t o t h e name "man", he a s s e r t e d something about human nature , namely t h a t it shares some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s with t h e na tu re of t h e wolf. T h i s i s a metaphor because h e r e t h e r e are two d i s t i n c t ideas between which, through t h e a c t of t r ans f e r ence , a connection i s r ea l i zed which i s not v a l i d i n the case of " the Tasmanian wolf i s a wolf" where " the Tasmanian wolf" is a sort included i n a l a r g e r s o r t , t h e one o f "wolf" with which it shares s iLdlar c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . It i s i n t h e l a t t e r ins tance when t h e word 'wolf" i s taken i n i t s l i t e r a l meaning whi le it i s i n t h e former where it i s taken metaphor ical ly . Therefore, t h e ep ipho r i c metaphor assumes a s i m i l a r i t y between the modifier (wolf) and t h e modified (man) and it i s primariiy based on t h e i r comparison. But, as Wheelwright p o i n t s out , these two elements of s i m i l a r i t y and comparison need not be obvious, nor e x p l i c i t . If they a re , t h e t ens ion provoked by t h e t rans fe rence would be diminished and the metaphor would lose i t s depth. 'A t e n s i v e vibrancy can be achieved on ly where an ad ro i t choice of d i s s i m i l a r s is made, s o that t h e comparison cornes as a shock which is yet a shock o f recognition" (Ibid., 7 5 ) . This i s what gives "freshness" t o t h e epiphoric metaphor a t i t s bes t . When saying t h a t "Time is û r iver", t h e r e a r e no obvious s L n i l a r i t i e s between "time", which i s an a b s t r a c t notion and "river", which has a cancrete, empir ical experience. Connecting these two terms cornes as a s u r p r i s e a t f i r s t bu t soon, when consider ing t h e f l o w of t he r i v e r as being s imi l a r t o t h e flow of t h e , w e r e a l i z e t h e depth of the metaphor. Another source f o r v i t a l i t y is offered by synes thes i s , a têrm which expresses t h e work ing t oge the r of d i f f e r e n t sense organs. Synesthesis l eads t o c rea t ion of metaphors, Wheelwright considers , "s ince the comparison of one type of sense-impression with t h a t given by a d i f f e r e n t sense-organ s t i rs t h e reader t o r e f l e c t i v e contemplation a long two of h i s avenues of sense a t once" (Ibid., 7 6 ) . Examples of synesthetic expressions a r e " b i t t e r colors", "gray whispers", "green s m e l l s " , etc. Diaphor Besides t h i s kind of t ransference through comparison, t h e r e i s another one which Wheelwright c a l l s "diaphor" (from the Greek dia th rough) . I n t h i s case , the semantic rnovement t akes p l ace not by comparing, but by juxtaposing d i s t i n c t i v e s o r t s . Taken alone, as p a r t s , t h e elements of t h e metaphor do not sây anything but a t the moment when they a r e put toge ther a whole new rneming is unveiled. As an example, l e t us t a k e Descartesr r h e t o r i c a l statement i n T h e World, chapter V I , where he wri tes about the world as being a machine: "Give me extension and motion and I w i l l cons t ruc t t h e world" ( C i t e d by Turbayne 1970, 6 7 ) . Descartes p r e s e n t s us with a relation between the world as ex tens ion and t h e world as motion which p u t toge ther , juxtaposed and metaphor ica l ly interpreted gives us an i d e a about the world 's essence. There can be de t ec t ed a c o n t r a s t between ex tens ion and motion. But on ly when t h e y a r e pu t t oge thex can they g i v e u s something new. Leaving a s i d e whether Descar tes perceived t h i s a s a metaphor n o t , obvious t h a t u s ing t h e combinat i o n express ions he w a s a b l e t o produce a new meaning f o r the concept "world". T h e world, f o r Descartes, is t h a t which has n o t only ex tens ion bu t motion a s well, Bowever, the best examples of d i a p h o r i c metaphor a r e t o be area a r t i s t i c product ion a b s t r a c t pa in t i ng , where combinations of colored l i n e s o r brush s t rokes o r p a i n t sp i l l s open up d i f f e r e n t spaces transforming canvas' Sidimensional space i n t o fou r continuum, where t r id imens iona l coord ina tes are enr iched w i t h t h e add i t i on of an i n n e r , personal t h e o r music, where t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n var ious ins t ruments and vo i ce s c r e a t e s emot ional ly meaningful s t a t e i n t h e l i s t e n e r . Thus, f o r Wheelwright: [ t l h e e s s e n t i a l p o s s i b i l i t y o f diaphor l i e s i n the b road on to log ica l fac t t h a t new q u a l i t i e s and new meanings can emerge, simply come i n t o be ing , out o f some h i t h e r t o ungrouped combination of elements, If one can imagine a s tate of the un ive r se , perhaps a t r i l l i o n yea r s ago, be fo re hydrogen atoms and oxygen atoms had ever come t o g e t h e r , it rnay be presumed that up t o that t i m e w a t e r did n o t e x i s t . Somewhere i n t h e l a t e r v a s t i t u d e of t h e , then, water f i rs t came i n t o be ing when j u s t those two necessary elements came t o g e t h e r a t l a s t under t h e r i g h t cond i t i ons of t empera tu re and pressure . Analogous n o v e l t i e s occur i n the sphere of meanings as well. A s i n n a t u r e new q u a l i t i e s rnay be engendered by t h e j u x t a p o s i t i o n of p rev ious ly unj oined words and images. (Ibid., 85-86) However, pure d iapho r i c metaphor can hard ly be found. It r a t h e r exisis i n combination wi th ep ipho r i c metaphor. Together, t h e y can b r i n g d i f f e r e n t s o r t s c lo se . Through t h e cornparison v i r t u e s of epiphor and through t h e fresh jux t apos i t i on of " severa l veh i cu l a r images" of diaphor, new meanings emerge. A s an example, t h e fo l lowing t e x t from the r e f l e c t i v e poet ry of Egyptian Pyramids can i l l u s t r a t e t h e co l labora t ion of ep iphor and diaphor : Death is i n m y eyes today: As i n a s i c k man b e g i m i n g t o recover From a deep i l l n e s s . (Erman 1927, 1 0 ) Thus, t h e phrase "death is i n my eyes today" represen t s an ep ipho r . However, t a k i n g s e p a r a t e l y the rest of t h e verse : "As i n a s i c k man b e g i m i n g t o recover / From a deep i l l n e s s " w e w i l l f ind t h a t it is n o t a metaphor. On ly i n combination with t h e f i rs t p a r t it can be regarded metaphor ica l ly . The whole verse is a diaphor. The e s s e n t i a l cha rac t e r o f t h e metaphor, as Wheelwright sees it, i s t h e a b i l i t y t o provoke a t e n s i o n which, as Ricoeur pu t it, "guaran t ies the ve ry t r ans f e r ence of meaning and gives p o e t i c language i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of semantic 'plus-valuer, i t s c a p a c i t y t o be open towards n e w a spec t s , new dimensions, new horizons, new meanings" (Ricoeur 1977, 2 5 0 ) . The epiphor and t h e diaphor are the revo lv ing e l e c t r o n s around the nucleus of metaphor's meaning. To sum up, i t can be a f f i rmed that throughout Metaphor and Reality, Wheelwright continuously stresses t h e "tensive" c h a r a c t e r of language. To i l l u s t r a t e t h i s , he makes use of words l i k e " l iv ing" , "a l ive" o r "intense" which a l1 are meant t o c a s t a l i g h t on the f a c t t h a t language is so similar t o l i f e , t o w h a t is real, t o "What 1s". Language and 'h?hat 1s" have =alogous on to log ica l f e â t ü r e s and t n i s e n t i t l e s Wheelwright t o thirik of metaphor, s ince it r ep re sen t s b e s t t he se f e a t u r e s of the t e c s i v e language, as having the p o w e r t a reacn r e a l i t y . However, Wfieelwrightrs account of the connection between r e a l i t y md language r e f l e c t e d through metaphor cannot surpass t h e t r a p of an "on to log ica l naiveté", Ricoeur considers i n The X u l ê of Mstaphor. The power of t h e d i a l e c t i c between diaphor and epiphor which started Wheelwrightrs ana lys i s fades away when t h e " i n t u i t i o n i s t and v i t a l i s t tendency" is disc losed toward t h e end of h i s book. Ricoeur thinks that: Wheelwright i s not wrûng t o speâk of 'presêntial r e a l i t y r r but he neg lec t s to d i s t i n g u i s h p o e t i c truth from mythic âbsu rd i ty H e who does s o much t o have t h e ' tens ional ' c h a r a c t e r of language recognized misses t h e ' t en s iona l ' charac te r of truth, b y simply s u b s t i t u t i n g one not ion of t r u t h for another ; accordingly, h e goes over t o t h e s i d e o f abuse by aproximating poe t i c t e x t u r e s slmply ta pr imi t i ve a n i m i s m - ( IS id . , 255) Thus, i i i coeur r e p ~ o a c h e s Wheelwright arguing t h a t h ï s âccount , sven though bo ld i n i t s at temgt, i s d i s appo in t ing in i t s outcome. For Wheelwright, Ricoeur th inks , t h e b o r d e r between language and t h e w o r l d i s b l u r r e a t o such an extent t h a t it ha3 almost vanished. Words and the re fo re , metaphors and th ings zre e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r . I n t h i s r e spec t , Wheelwright w e n t too far, abusing the tensional use of language, overemphasizing t h e s t rong c a r r e l a t i o n between metaphor and r e a l i t y and thus f a i l i n g t o observe t h e d i f f e r ences between t h e two. Now Ricoeur uses Wheelwright' s approach t o metaphor i n oppos i t i on to Turbayne's and considers them a s s t e p s of a d i a l e c t i c a l p rocess . H e brings them t o g e t h e r i n order t o shape his own theory of netaphor. W e pointed out w h a t he f i n d s ü n s a t i s f a c t o r y i n Wheelwright' s approachAs regards Turbayne, "abuse is [...] t h e 'myth ' o f h i s t i t l e , i n a more ep i s t eno log ica l than e thnologica l sense, scarce ly d i f f e r i n g £ r o m what we j u s t c ü l l e d o n t o l o g i c a l naiveté" (Ibid., 251)Turbayners t h e s i s , t h a t metaphoricâl cons t ruc t ions a r e pureiy i n t e l l e c t u a l cons t ruc t ions , implies t h a t they do n o t r e f e r t o r e a l i t y d i f f e r e n t l y than s c i e n t i f i c formulas , Turbayne' s approach Is always eoncerned with truth from an epis temological pe r spec t ive which makes his endeavor very similar t o t h e pos i t i v i sm t h a t ne c r i t i c i z e s . Turbayne leaves no room f o r p o e t i c language w h i c h breaks through " the very not ions of f a c t , ob j ec t , r e a l i t y and t r u t h , âs de l imi ted by epistemology, Turbayne's metaphor s t i l l beiongs t o t h e o rde r o f t h e manipulable. I t is something we choose t c use, t o not use, t o re-use. T h i s power t o decide, coextensive wi th the absolute hg ld of the 'as i f r , is without analogue on the side of p o e t i c experience, i n which imagination i s 'bound' " ( IbLd., 253 1 Thus w e have Turbayne' s p o s i t i o n on t h e one hand, and Wheelwrightfs, on the other . Turbayne s t r e s s e s what metaphor is not by smphasizing t h a t rnetaphorical cons t ruc t ions are pure ly i n t e l l e c t u a l p roduc ts with no real r e f e rence whereas Wheelwright emphasizes what metaphar is by s t r ê s s i n g t h e fâc t that metaphors a r e deeply rooted i n t h e n a t u r a l world. T h e former wants us t o be aware of t h e "as i f " p r e s c r i p t i o n of t h e metaphor; the latter discovers deeper connections between metaphor and " W h â t 1s". =ter t h e a n a l y s e s o f metaphor by w r i t e r s such âs C o l l i n m lurbâ4;?;e, Philip Wheelwright aïîd, as we w i l l ses, BaiilRicoeur, metaphor does n o t allow itself t o be regarded as a simple srriment AL CLL reeE t y or that cozveys r;o fiew xieouirg, that kas nathing ta do --'+L w i t h our r e l â t i o n s h i p to it. Ricoeur breaks away from t h e t r â d i ï i o n a l . -Aerstâadi~g . .-. of rnetâpricr which stârted s k o r t l y âf ter k i s t û t l e m U cuh ina t ed with Romanticisrn. Ketâpkor bricgs remûte ideas together i i î t û â ünitÿ a d it dûes t h a t by following the guidance offered by t h e i r l i k e n e s s , as we have seez &ove, fvr exmple, when "tLizef' w d "riverfr wêre broüght t o g e t h e r in the metaphor "The Is a r iver" . T h e fac t that t h e remote ideâs are a l i h e LTLplies 4-L-t 4" . . L L A ~ saie the, s ~ ~ ü l â r zd LLLSY âre, at th d i f f e r e n t . I n a rnetâphor, d i f f e r e n t ideâs melt and t h e i r likeness - -& QLL3 as a cetàlyst . III this wây, xstâphûr acts l i k e a szree: o r â E i l t e r i n the d i s c u r s i v e process. F i n a l l y , Ricoeur brings us face to faCe .Y : * A L L l +L à r;ew s+ ,,,LLU,e W..-+--of r e â l l t y . This new s t r ü c t ü r e xaUe visible by the metaphor emerges on t h e ruins o f the p r e v i o u s s t r u c t u r e t o w h i c h tke risnote ideas previûüsiji beloiqed, â3 w e will see Selow. R e f e r e n c e : Metaphors and Reality Metaphors are philosophically re levan t , argues Ricoeur, because they c r e a t e new meanings, becaüse they are innovative. With Ricoeur the approach t o metaphor implies a charrge of view inâsmüch as he brir;gs f o r t h a riew understanding of sense and o f reference, of imzgina t ion , to xhich he sdds an s m ~ t i v e dhens ion . Ricoeür upgrades Got t lob Frege 's d i s t i nc t i û r , bstweeri sense and meaning ixhere t h e sense iç xhat t h e p ropos i t ion States; the deao ta t ion , o r m e a ~ i n g , i s t h a e aSoüt which t h e sense Is s t a t e d ) irito one between sense and re fe rence . f o r Ricoeur, sense resüits from a l â r g e l y h o r i z o n t a l , s e m a i i t i c proceeding and i den t i fLes an e n t r y i n the h a g i n a r y c u l t u r a l encyclopedis c o n s t i t u t i n g vhat eün be c a l i e d a metaphoric p ropos i t i on . Referezce is "[metaphor's] clâim t o reach r e a l i t y " (Ricoeur 198G, 140), even if o f t e n a r ede f ined reaiity. It adds t o sense an zmotiorial and imaginâtive and prâgmatic v e r t i c a l i t y . For iiicoeilr, " the l i t e r a r y work through t h e str-irctüre p m p e r tu it d i sp l âys a world on ly under the condi t ion that the r e f e r ence o f d e s c r i p t i v e d i s cou r se is suspended. O r , t o p u t it auo the r way, d i scourse i n t h e l i t e r a r y wark s e t s ou t i t s dena ta t ion , bÿ means of the suspension of t h e f i r s t level denotâ t ion o f d i scourse" (Ricoeur 1 9 7 7 , 2 2 1 ) . Thus, f o r Ricoeur, there a r e two d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t i e s to refer to t h e i s s u e oz reference , o r denotat ion with regard t o metaphorical s t a tements . In The i i u i e o f Metaphor, Sicoeur contwasts Go t t l ob Frege's approach, with Emilz BenvtnFsters. H e begins with the qzeçt ion: "What does the metaphor ica l s t â t e n e n t s ay &o.-+ UL realitÿ? T h i s qdes t ion carries us ac ros s t h e t h r e sho ld from t h e sense towards t h e reference of discourse" ( Ib id . , 216). In other words, i r i o rdz r t a kïiow how metaphors relate t o Eea l i t y w e have t o f i n d out first t o what they rêf sr. Following Fregef s a r t i c l e an Sense and Reference i196Û). we rcâlizt that the reftrtnze, âs Ricoeur püts it, 'is corn-micâted frorn the propex nane to t h e e ~ t i r e propos i t icn , which, with respxt to 218) . Proper mmes "pLck üp" objects i r i the xarld, they stand fûï OZ dssi,7;ats tbe i r reference and, Secause tBeis reference is communicated t o the e n t i r e proposition, tha t Fs, t h e en t i r e referring t o proper names. Thus, when w e use a piopsr name, l i k e "the 2Jloozr', k;s do n o t r î f e r t o o ü r ides oE the moor; =or t o a sgezific mentel event corresponding t o it. N o r do w e refer Co some kind of ide& o b f s c t 'Lrr~ducibls t o ariy xientâl evant" w h i c h ws "prssnpposs besides a ref erence" . It is Frege' s understanding that: T h e sentence 'Cdysseüs waç s s t àshore a t Ithaca while sound asleepr obviously has a sense. B u t sincs it iç doubtful whcther the nant 'Odysseus', occurring therein, has reference, it i s a l s o do..k4LiLLILLuI S.. 7 whether t h e whcle senteixe has or,e 1.-.: For it is of the re ference of t h e name t h a t the predizate is sffirmed o r denisd. Whoever does n o t admit the name has reference can ne i the r apply nor wlthhcld t h e predica te . (1960, 6 2 = S J 1 Thus, once a name i n a sentence has no clear r e f e rence then the whole s z n t a x ê l s c k s referenceFrsgs considers that ouï qùest for t r ü t h , our " in t en t ion on speaking and thinking" demands a reference, it daiânds t h â t wa "advexe fron sens= t o refêrence", Eowever, t h i s demand causes us to err , aicoeur t h i n k s . " T h i s s t r i v i n j f o r t r u t h süffüses the s a t i r e proposition, t o the sx ten t t h a t it cen 5s a s swla t ed t o a proper name: bu t it is via the proper name as f nteLmediâry that , Tor Frege, the propos i t ion has ref erenze" ( R i c o e ü r 1977, 2 1 8 ) . Thus, because Odysseus has no reference, the sentence "Odysseas is a journey" o r a ~ y netaphor ica l s t a t e r t ~ e n t t h a t fias t h e woxd Cûysseus i n it, woüld have nû re fe re rxe either which rrreaiis t h ~ t they are mere i n t e l l e c t ü a l productions. T h i s Ricoeur considers to be a lLa i t a t ion of Frege's posZ+- ' A ~ 1 û n . H o w e v e r , Ricoeur brings f o r t h E n i l Benvenister s theory of re fe rence i~ order t a break awa j i frorrr these 1 L ~ t t a t i o n s . In the second volume of Problèmes de linguistique généraie (19741, Benveniste irrites: "Le sense ci'-= m o t cons i s t e râ dâns sa cspâci tg df êtlL,e f r i ~ t e g r a t c i r u . s y n t a p e p a r t i c u l i e r e t de remplir une foiictiûu p rûpûs i t i ons i l e " (Benvtuiste 1974 , 227 . Moreûver, f o r Benveniste, the sense of the words in a sentence " r é su l t e précis6mect n r r a L daes t h i ~ EEâII? de la niânière dont ils sont ~orntj i i i&~" (Ibid, ) , ""-' Senveniste considers that taken In i s o l a t i o n , words have anly a p o t e u t l â l meâning 'vv'hich Ls onlyâztüal ized w h e n it Fs us3d i n â sentence. The pctential meaning is made up of al1 the narginsl --Li~~ariings thât s w x d câz have depending ûf t h e diversity of contexts i n which they cm be üseü. Then, when they a r e püt together i~ a sêï~têuct this ntïltitüde of p û t z u t i â l meauings is reduced tû j u s t thê meaning funct ioning Ln t h e " ins t snce of discourse", L-e., a given It is now obvious why Benveniste's view is cûz t ras ted w i t h Frege's. For Frege the sentcrics would play t h e rûle of a prûper naneBÿ this I mean that the seatence itself being conposéd of words with specific meanirrg desiynates its reEertnce. On the other haizd, for B e ~ v e n i s t e , t h e re fe rence of a sentence attribütes meaning to the wurds -in its composftfon. Ricoeur explains t h â t : These two conceptions of reference are complementary and rec iproca l , wnether one r i s e s by s p t h e t i c composition f r o m t h e proper nane towards t h e p ropos i t ion , o r whether one descends by a n a l y t i c d i s s o c i a t i o n from t h e sentence t o the semantic u n i t of t h e wordA t t h e i r i n t e r s e c t i o n , t h e two i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f reference make apparent the pola r c o n s t i t u t i o n of t h e reference itself, which can be c a l l e d t h e object when t h e r e f e r e n t of t he name i s considered, o r t h e state of affairs i f one cons ide r s t h e r e f e r e n t o f t h e e n t i r e statement", (1977, 2 1 8 ) B y br inging Benvenistef s p o s i t i o n i n t o d iscuss ion, Ricoeur is a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between two s o r t s of r e f e r ence there i s the f i r s t l e v e l re fe rence , r ep re sen t ed by Fregef s approach and t h e second l e v e l re fe rence recognized i n Benvenister s approach. The metaphorical s tatement i s t h e most adequate i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s s p l i t between levels of r e f e r e n c e o r denota t ion. Metaphors acqu i r e t h e i r metaphorical meaning and achieve t h e i r reference on t h e ruins of l i t e r a l meaning and l i t e r a l r e f e r ence . Ricoeur exp l a in s tha t : If it i s true t h a t l i t e r a l sense and metaphorical s e n s e a r e d i s t ingu ished and a r t i c u l a t e d wi th in an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , s o t o o it is w i t h i n an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t a second level re fe rence , w h i c h is properly t h e metaphorical r e fe rence , is set free by means of t h e suspension of t h e f i r s t l e v e l r e f erence, (1977, 221) For example, i f we t ake t he metaphor "Odysseus i s a journey", then w e can s e e t h a t , l i t e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d (i. e., f ollowing Frege) , it would have no impact on t h e way we pe rce ive o r r e l a t e t o r e a l i t y because Odysseus has no reference . On the o t h e r hand, taken metaphorical ly, "Odysseus is a j ourney" desc r ibes a new w a y of r e l a t i n g t o r e a l i t y , a new way of look ing a t human beings and t h e i r s t r u g g l e t o a r r i v e "home". I f metaphor is this d i a l e c t i c a l c o r r e c t i v e o f a l1 a n a l y t i c a l language cen t e r ed on concepts then, as al1 language it also refers, among o t h e r things, t o what a given cu l tu re and ideology consider as r e a l i t y This means t h a t some conclusions t o which any metaphor c m lead a r e per t inent t o o r c u l t u r a l l y "true" t o given understandings of r e l a t ionsh ips i n p rac t i ce , Metaphor can af f irm such an understanding or, i n the bes t case, develop 'the before un-apprehended r e l a t i o n s o f things" i n ways a t t h a t m o m e n t not otherwise able t o be fomulated. For example, saying that "love is a wam feeling" we use warm i n a d i f f e r e n t way than it is usual ly used and thus , w e e s t ab l i sh a new r e l a t i o n between "love" and "feeling", Such i s the s p l i t becween the two kinds o f reference. However, Ricoeur does not s top hereWhen t a lk ing about the re-descr ipt ive power of t h e i n t e l l e c t which makes it poss ib le t o d a i m that metaphors do reach r e a l i t y , w e have t o ask ourselves how do they come t o l i g h t ? What i s it that makes i t possible for t he i n t e l l e c t rzo c rea te , t o bring f o r t h novel ideas, novel meanings? In order t o answer t h i s question w e have t o see how Ricoeur understands imagination t o work. imagination W e have seen above t n a t i n the metaphorical use of language w e come across an innovation a t t h e l e v e l of reference. Now, metaphor r e l a t e s our image of r e a l i t y given t o us through perception t o t h e image of r e a l i t y t h a t is offered by languageRicoeur takes inaginat ion t o mean what Kant meant when he used t h i s concept. T h e act of imagination is that which puts t h e s p a t i a l - temporal determinat ion of phenomena i n correspondence with t h e conceptual determinat ion of phenomena. determinat ions a r e b l i n d on t h e i r own. Conceptual determinat ion is empty when t a k e n by itself. The act of imagination i s fu s ing them toge ther and thus a l lows us t o grasp t h e phenomena. With Kant, imagination longer t h e f a c u l t y w i t h which reproduce images. It is no longer j u s t reproduc t ive imagination. G i l l e s Deleuze, d i scuss ing t h e process of imagination as understood Kant, considers t h a t "When 1 Say: 1 imagine my f r i e n d P ie r r e , t h i s is t h e reproduct ive imagination. 1 could do something else besides imagine Pierre, could him, go t o nis place , remember him, which i s no t the same t h i n g as imagining him. Imagining rny f r i e n d Pierre is t h e reproduc t ive imagination" (Deleuze 1 9 7 8 ) . However, Kant recognizes t h a t imagination has another func t ion . I t i s a l s o product ive , working a s a kind o f syn thes i s . Deleuze exp la ins Kantf s concept of p roduc t ive imagination a s : determining a space and a t h e i n conformity t o a concept, bu t i n such a way t h a t t h i s determinat ion cannot flow f r o m t h e concept i t s e l f ; t o make a space and a time correspond t o a concept, that i s t h e a c t of t h e productive imagination. What does a mathematician o r a geometer do? O r i n another way, what does an a r t i s t do? They ' re going t o make productions of s p a c e t h e . (Deleuze 1978) product ive h a g i n a t ion , spat ia l temporal determinat i ons not merely fol low conceptual determinations. There is a "production of space and time", a s Deleuze pu t it, t h a t goes beyond t h e space and t ime given phenomena and t h a t i s how t h e imagination productive. Now, when Ricoeur d i s t i ngu i shes image as replica from image as fiction, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n corresponds t o that between Kant's reproductive imagination and product ive imagination. These two r e f e r t o d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s and t o mristake the one f o r t h e o t h e r is a f a l l a c y . The image as r ep l i ca , as p o r t r a i t , is t h e image t h a t w e g e t through percept ion, It r e f e r s t o a s p e c i f i c something that e x i s t s i n t h e r e a h of reality. Thus, 1 can imagine my aog, t h e one 1 used t o have a couple of yea r s ago. The image 1 have here and now r e s t s upon the corresponding percep t ion of t h e r e a l dog 1 had. T h e same dog whose presence used t o be given i n the past is now given i n absence, O r , as Ricoeur puts it, "absence and presence are modes of givenness of t h e same r e a l i t y " . Now, the other s o r t o f image, t h e image as f i c t i o n , does not rest upon a given model. It does no t r e f e r t o anythfng t h a t was a l r eady given a s o r i g i n a l . I n t h e image a s f i c t i o n , again, w e dea l w i t h an absent th ing , but t h i s time t h e absent th ing r ep re sen t s nothingness. W e imagine t he centaur but it e x i s t s nowhere. It is unreal , even though w e can have an image of it. Thus, the image of m y dog r e s t s on t h e absence of i t s ob jec t , whereas t h e image of t h e cen taur r e s t s on t h e un rea l i t y of i t s ob jec t . M y dog i s r ea l ; the cen taur i s un rea l , Ricoeur considers t h a t "the nothingness of absence concerns the mode of g ivemess of a real t h ing i n absentia, t h e nothingness o f u n r e a l i t y cha rac t e r i ze s t he r e f e r e n t i t s e l f of t h e f i c t i o n " (1991, 120) . The image as f i c t i o n r e f e r s t o r e a l i t y i n a new wayThis i s why w e have t o d i s t i n g u i s h it f rom the image a s r e p l i c a The image as repl ica "reproduces" r e a l i t y , whereas the image as f i c t i o n "produces" reality. There is a productive r e f e r ence a t work i n f i c t i o n . Ricoeur considers it t o be t h e case t h a t : f i c t i o n changes r e a l i t y , i n t h e sense t h a t it both ' inventsr and \d iscoversr it, [which] could no t be acknowledged as long a s t h e concept of image was rnerely i d e n t i f i e d with t h a t of p i c t u r e - Images could no t i n c r e a s e r e a l i t y s i n c e they add no r e f e r e n t s o the r t han those of t h e i r o r ig îna l s . The only o r i g i n a l i t y of t h e image had thus t o be found i n t h e spontane i ty c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e production of t h e image. ( Ib id . , 121 1 Imaginetion i s thus productive, n o t only reproduct ive . And it i s productive i n as much as thought i s involved, i n as much a s language i s challenged. When 1 imagine my dog and reproduce h i s irnage, t h e r e i s no f u r t h e r l abo r involved i n t he process. However, when 1 produce an image, when 1 descr ibe an unreal object , when I t e l l a s t o r y , when 1 make a plan o r make a model, 1 have t o make use of my i n t e l l e c t u a l capaci ty . Imagination is product ive not only o f unrea l o b j e c t s , b u t a l s o of an unexplored v i s ion of r e a l i t y . "Imagination a t work i n work produces i tself as a w o r l d " (Ibid., 1 2 3 ) . To sum up, metaphor i s t h a t which relates r e a l i t y and language, an expanded r e a l i t y and a dynamic language, t ha t is . This t akes p l a c e with t h e help of imagination which does no t reproduce images b u t r a t h e r produces n e w ones. Inasmuch as imagination is productive, it allows us t o see s i m i l a s i t i e s between t h e remote i deas that make up metaphors. "Man i s a wolf", says Seneca. W e can only understand what he rneant no t by simply having a mental p i c t u r e o f a woif-like man but by emphasizing r e l a t i o n s i n a dep ic t ing mode. Moreover, imagination is h e l p f u l when it cornes t o pu t t i ng i n b racke t s t h e f isst l e v e l reference, t h e l i t e r a r y reference, allowing f o r the pro jec t ion of new p o s s i b i l i t i e s of redescr ib ing the world. Now, l e t us see how L y a l l f i t s i n t o al1 t h i s For Lyafl, a human being as a whole i s b a t h capable of i n t e l l e c t u a l e f f o r t and capable also of en-otional exper ienceThus it would appear t h a t i n t h e imaginative s t a t e one would a s s e r t one's existence i n f u l l . Why? Because i n t h i s case, one i s re-affirming o n e r s presence i n the world by re-describing it and l i v i n g it from within. W e see t h a t f o r Lya l l , imagination bas to do more with t h e production of images and less with t h e i r reproduction: The ghosts and fair ies, the gnomes and o t h e r Urtaginary beings of a rude s t a t e of soc i e ty , owe theFr or ig in t o t h e a c t i v i t y of t h i s p r i n c i p l e , u n i t e d with t h e suggest ions of a s u p e r s t i t i o u s fear. In c e r t a i n circumstances t h e imagination i s r e ady enough, i n t h e most c u l t i v a t e d age, t o body f o r t h these imaginary c rea tures , and t o e n t e r t a i n a c e r t a i n dread which it requi res some e f f o r t of reason t o counteract . It i s i n those very places where t h e imagination has most scope t o operate, o r most suggest ives t o i t s act ion, t h a t w e f i n d t h e s u p e r s t i t i o n s p reva i l i ng which are ccnnected with t h e ex is tence and t h e exp lo i t s of t h e beings of imagination. (Lya l l 1855, 275) As we can s e e , f o r Lyall, imagination i s "ready enough t o body f o r t h these imaginary creatures". It i s t h e act of producing t h e m which i s t h e big task of inaginat ion. By doing t h a t , i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r example, it stirs our emotions and it makes us p a r t i c i p a t e i n a new aspect o f r e a l i t y . B u t it a l s o "requires some e f f o r t of reason" t o counteract , It involves Lhus our i n t e l l e c t i n as much as it has t o r e l a t e t o and deal with expanded r e a l i t y , a r e a l i t y which was c r e a t e d i n t he f i r s t p l a c e by t he mind i n i ts a c t i v i t y of perceiving analogies, of animating and personifying na ture . However, Lya l l does no t f u l l y h i s f ind ings . content wi th j u s t exposing t h e d i f f i c u l t y of understanding t h e inner workings of t h e imagination- "Why [does imaginat ion works as it does]? It i s impossible t o say", he wri tes (Ibid., 2 7 4 ) . However, it seems t h a t Lyall, l i n k i n g t h e i n t e l l e c t and t h e emotions i n the imaginative state took a s t e p f u r t h e r from t h e Romantic rnainstream. For the Romantics, understanding rests upon t h e connection wi th t h e s p i r i t t h a t is behind any c r e a t i o n . Lyall embraces t h i s a t t i t u d e bu t , i f he had developed h i s ideas , he could have come t o t h e conclusion t h a t imagination no t only connects with r e a l i t y bu t a l s o augments it, more meaningful and diverse. Through language, through tne c r e a t i o n of metaphors, which is a f e a t u r e of t h e i n t e l l e c t , one improves one's r e l a t i o n s h i p with L h e and no t only mi r ro r s it. Through emot ions a r e in t imate ly connected with it. I n a l e c t u r e given i n 1825 a t t h e opening of t h e Free Church College of Halifax l a t e r t o be Dalhousie Univers i ty , Lyal l talks about t h e "philosophy of thought" and he says, when drawing on the importance of language: What an adap ta t ion between t h e mind and i t s modes of expression! How the one f i l l s t h e o t h e r with life and meaning! while t h e l a t t e r , again, s u i t s every varying idea and emotion of the former now rouses w i t h energy, and now soothes wi th p leasure , o r t r anspo r t s with d e l i g h t . Kaving found such a vehicle, mind f r e e l y expa t i a t e s i n every region. How much w e owe t o language perhaps cannot be t o l d , f o r t he excursiveness of mind f o r t h e f i nenes s of i t s imaginations and t h e s u b t l e t y of i t s conceptions. (Lya l l 1853, 5) Moreover, 'a tnought o f t en lies i n the s t a t e of a f e e l i n g till a word, o r words, evoke it from i ts recess" ( Ib id . , 5 1 . As can be soen again, l i nked emotions which with thougnts . connect with phenomenal r e a l i t y a r e a l s o I t is L y a l l f s opinion t h a t tne only way f o r t h e s e connections among emotions, phenornenal reality and thoughts t o be expressed l i n g u i s t i c a l l y i s when w e make use of our imaginat,ion: There is a per iod of i t s h i s t o r y when Imagination has to do with outward forms and semblânces, a s express ive of inward thoughts and f e e l i n g s : but t h e r e cornes a time when t h e most sub t l e and evanescent f ee l ings o r conceptions a r e made the syrnbols of mater ia l o b j e c t s o r ideas; o r , t h e s e ob jec t s o r ideas a r e expressed o r conveyed under t h e most s u b t l e conceptions of t he rnind. Between Homer and Wordsworth, o r Shelley, t h e r e seems the interval t o which we have here alluded: Shakespeare may be said t o u n i t e t o two per iods . Terms are appl ied t o o b j e c t s o r circumstances t o which they could never have been s u i t a b l e , bu t f o r t h e a b s t r a c t sense t h a t has been a s s i g n e d t o them, from t h e s u 5 t l e analogies which t h e mind can perce ive between even t h e most m a t e r i a l and t h e most s p i r i t u a l circumstances o r o b j e c t s . ( Ib id- , 6 ) Poe t ic creat ions , as those of Homer, Shakespeare, Wordsworth o r Shelley, b u i l t on t h e extensive use of metaphors a r e thus at t h e c e n t e r of L y a l l r s a t t e n t i o n . He is able t o r e a l i z e t h a t metaphorical language, mastered by the i n t e l l e c t , under the spe l l of productive imagination has t h e power t o c r e a t i v e l y improve our r e l a t i o n s h i p wi th the world. However, Lya l l does not fol fow up t h i s discovery of t h e enormous csea t ive capac i ty of imagination. H e does n o t spend much time explaining how it works because of t h e limits of h i s expos i t ion and because of he considered the faculty of imagination to be incomprehensible as suchImagination avoids a pure ly intellectuai approach since it is a composite of both intellect and emotionsAnotner reason would be his presupposition that the intellect itself is divorced from reality. Therefore, instead of sacrificing the Platonic view about the intellect i.e., considering it as transcending the woxld which is given to us in space and time, instead of sacrificing the intellect as representing order and as being an eternal principle, he sacrifices the creative power of the intellect, The Emotive D i m a r i s i o n For Lyall though, in the imaginative state, the intellect works together with the emotions. Moreover, Ricoeur, in his theory cf metaphor, links the two as well. However, he talks about feelings: To feel, in the emotional sense of the word, is to make ours what has been put at a distance by thougnt in its objectifying phase. They [feelings] are not merely inner States but interiorized thoughts ... Its function is to abolish the distance between knower and known without cancelling the cognitive structure of thought and the intentional distance which it impels . Feeling is not contrary to thought. It is thought made ours. (Ricoeur 1980, 154) Now, we have seen that Lyall does not distinguish drastically between feelings and emotions and that his basic idea at work in the theory of emotion is t h a t emotion is no t opposi te t o thought. Q u i t e t h e contrary, emotion is t l i a t which informç t h e i n t e l l e c t about what, f o r t h e i n t e l l e c t "is at a dis tance" , i e . t h e phenomenal worldThrough emotion w e become c l o s e r t o t h e world. Thus, Lyal l and Ricoeur s e e m t o be i n agreement with r ega rd t o t h e i d e a t h a t through emotion w e become closer t o t he world, w i t h the d i f f e r e n c e t h a t Ricoeur develops t h i s idea and completes h i s t heo ry of metaphor, By following Ricoeur 's thought 1 intend t o expand L y a l l r s i n s i g h t and make it more complete along t h e l i n e s o f Ricoeurr s theory. For Ricoeur, f e e l i n g s accompany imagination by adding t o t h e "seeing as" what Ricoeur cal ls t h e dimension of "feel ing as"In imagination, as shown above, w e "see" s i m i l a r i t i e s i n remote ideas, we grasp t h e "mixture o f l ike and unlike, proper t o s imi l a r i t y8 ' - Feel ing is thus not j u s t something t h a t per ta ins exclusively t o what happens t o t h e body, o r j u s t something t h a t r e s t s on a s t a t e of mind. Feeling, by accompanying imagination, i s pa r t of us as knowing sub j ects . "We f e e l l i k e what we see like" ( I b i d . , 154 ) . Through f e e l i n g s w e are involved i n t h e process of grasping s i m i l a r i t i e s between remote ideas, w e p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e i n t e l l e c t ' s d iscovery of a new meaning, Without it, w e would probably fa11 i n t o merely apprec i a t ing t h e f ineness o f t h e metaphorical construct ion, as Turbayne would have l i k e d us t o do. Ricoeur then recognizes t h a t , f ee l ings "accompany and complete imagination as picturing r e l a t ionsh ips" (Ibid., 1 5 5 ) . This a s p e c t of f e e l i n g iç what Northrop Frye, i n The Anatomy of Criticism calls "mood". The mood i s t h e consequence of us being a f f ec t ed by a poem a s a whole, as a unique c h a h of words. Thus, the mood of t h a t poem i s t h e i c o n i c r ep re sen t a t i on of t h e poem be ing f e l t . Now, Ricoeur refers t o rnetaphor as being a poem i n minia ture . If t h i s i s t r ue , t h e n s e i z i n g t h e metaphor i s not a complete p rocess without t h e element of f e e l i n g which i s "the iconic a s fe l t" . ( I b i d . , 155) Fina l l y , Ricoeur t a l k s about f e e l i n g s as t hey b r ing their con t r i bu t i on t o t h e s p l i t r e fe rence of p o e t i c d i scourse . Through imagination thought can suspend i t s d i r e c t r e fe rence t o r e a l i t y as we have seen. Besides reproduc t ive imagination, where thought just reproduces r e a l i t y , t h e r e i s product ive imagination, where thought has the a b i l i t y t o produce something newThis way, i n imagination, thought augments our p o s s i b i l i t i e s t o read r e a l i t y . Correspondingly, f e e l i n g s , Ricoeur says, "are ways of 'b2ing-there' , of ' f ind ingf ou r se lve s wi th in t h e world .-Because of f e e l i n g s w e are ' a t t uned to ' a spec t s of r e a l i t y which cannot be expressed i n terms of t h e o b j e c t s r e f e r r e d t o i n ordinary language" (Ibid. , 156) To sum it a l 1 up, Ricoeur considers t h a t a rnetaphor includes, bes ides i t s cogni t ive dimension, an imaginat ive and an emotional eiernent as w e l l . A l 1 of them a r e i n t ima te ly connected. T h e f u l l c o g n i t i v e i n t e n t of a metaphor would be incomplete without the c o n t r i b u t i o n of imagination and f ee l i ngs . I n Ricoeur's own words: " the re i s a structural analogy between t h e cogni t ive , t he imaginat ive , and tire emotional components of t h e complete metaphor ica l act and t n a t t h e metaphorical p rocess draws i t s concre teness and i t s completeness from t h i s s t r u c t u r a l analogy and t h i s complementary funct ioning" (Ibid., 157 ) . Ricoeur 's theory o f metaphor i s o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o a s a t ens ion theory of metaphor. The reason f o r employing t h e term "tension" is obvious if w e t ake i n t o account t h e fact t h a t Ricoeur b r ings forward two levels o f re fe rence , a s w e s a w when he analyzed t h e d i f f e r ences between Frege and Benveniste's approaches concerning t h i s i s s u e t h a t make up the foundat ions f o r a s p l i t reference i n which the metaphorical s ta tement is r o o t e a Then, t h e r e are two d i f f e r e n t ways of looking a t t h e concept of an image: t h e r e can be t a l k about the image as r e p l i c a and t h e image as f i c t i o n and they Soth act t oge tbo r i n a metaphor with one being surpassed by the other. Finally, feelings corne onto t h e scene a t t ached t o and conple t ing the metaphorical u t t e r ance . Moreover, t h e l i n g u i s t i c elements t h a t e n t e r i n t o t h e makeup of a metaphor are connecred by t h e copula 'is". The copula i t s e l f should only be t aken together wi th F t s c o r r e i a t e "is not" because a metaphor points o u t not only the s i m i l a r i t i e s between remote i deas b u t a l s o t h e i r d i f fe rences , p reserv ing t h e tension between themThrough metaphor we d i scover a new c r e a t i v e aimension i n languageMetaphor, as Ricoeur p u t s it, has an h e u r i s t i c func t ion . Metaphor r e l a t e s t o r e a l i t y by br inging forward new aspects of it. B y improving our language w e a r e likely t o d i scove r i n t h e world something t h a t could no t be prev ious ly descr ibed . Thus, metaphor does no t m i r r o r r e a l i t y bu t it re-descr ibes it, it makes it more d i v e r s e and f u l l e r . And through t h a t it changes our w a y of r e l a t i n g t o it, it chânges "our way of dwelling i n t h e world". Lya l l d i d n o t develop h i s ideas on metaphor t o t he ex ten t t h a t Ricoeur d i d . However, as shown above, there are s i m i l a r i t i e s between h i s thought on the subject and Ricoeur's. Unlike Ricoeur, Lya l l did not have a t hand t h e f indings of phenornenology, such as the importance of s u b j e c t i v i t y i n t h e attempt t o d e s c r i b e t h e way t h e world makes i tself present t o awareness, o r t h e idea of the importance of r e tu rn ing t o t h e t h i n ç s i n themselves. Thus L y a l l did not have an incen t ive f o r walking i n uncharted t e r r i t o r y , p r e f e r r i n g t o stay on t h e path l i g h t e d by t r a d i t i o n a l European views on t h i s m a t t e r . Nevertheless, he foresaw t h e importance of language and s t r e s s e d tne use o f metaphor ica l language which, complemented by ernotions i n t h e imaginative s t a t e has the a b i l i t y t o open up new dimensions i n Our i n t e r a c t i o n wi th t h e world. The same s o r t of connect ion is emphasized by David Abram i n h i s book The Spell o f the S ~ R S U O U S (1997) where he a s s e r t s t h a t : A t t he h e a r t o f any language then, is t he poe t i c p roduc t iv i t y of express ive speech, A l i v i n g language is c o n t i n u a l l y being made and remade, woven out of the s i l e n c e by those who speak ... And t h i s s i l e n c e i s t h a t of our wordless p a r t i c i p a t i o n s , of our perceptual immersion i n t h e depths o f an animate, express ive world. (1997, 8 4 ) By be ing immersed i n t h e natural world w e have the opportunity t o improve our language, and rnetaphor i s the best t o o l t h a t w e can use i n o r d e r t o achieve t h i s . The world, as Abram s e e s it, i s animate and i ts "wild, p a r t i c i p a t o r y l o g i c r a m i f i e s and e labora tes i t s e l f i n language" (Ibid- , 8 4 ) . W e cannot p i c k up a s i n g l e phenornenon, as John M u i r once sa id , without "finding it h i t c h e d t o everything else" i n the universe . Abram cont inues t h i s same l i n e of thought: It i s t h i s dynamic, in terconnected r e a l i t y t h a t provokes and s u s t a i n s a l1 our speaking, lending something of i t s s t r u c t u r e t o al1 our various languages. T h e enigmatic nature o f language echoes and 'prolongs unto t h e i n v i s i b l e ' t h e w i l d , i n t e r p e n e t r a t i n g , interdependent nature of t h e s ens ib l e landscape i t s e l f . (Ibid., 85) This means t h a t everything i s connected, everything is p a r t of t h e immense un i ty which cannot be grasped by t h e r i g i d use language. In sum, metaphor is of tremendous importance i f w e are t o e s t a b l i s h a re la t ionship between human beings as language users and r e a l i t y . The purpose of metaphorical language i s n e i t h e r t o "improve communication, nor t o ensure univocity i n argumentation, but t o s h a t t e r and t o increase our sense of r e a l i t y by s h a t t e r i n g and increasing our language [-..] With metaphor w e experience the metamorphosis of both language and r e a l i t y " (Ricoeur 1991, 8 5 ) . W e do not u s e metaphors f o r the sake o f comunication, nor do we use them a s mere ornaments. Metaphors do not help u s t o reduce ambiguity or t o a t t a i n univocity. Instead, they break apart t h e s t ruc tu res of language by bringing together remote ideas t h a t , a t t h e same t i n e , exh ib i t s imi la r and d i f f e r e n t t r a i t s , as i n the metaphorical a s se r t ions t h a t "Time i s a r iver" and "Odysseus is a journey", etc. Such a s se r t ions grasp kinship and bui ld s i rn i l a r i t i e s on d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s . Moreover, metaphors change our way of being-in-theworld . They do not merely describe r e a l i t y any longer. The r e a l i t y they bring f o r t h i s completely new and unexpected. Metaphors do not imi t a t e r e a l i t y . Rather, they redescribe it, they re-present i t through words. With t h e metaphorical a s se r t ion "Tirne i s a r ive r " we a r e prepared t o understand time i n a new way, as sornething continuously flowing and forever chmging. Thus, reality becomes novel because we chznged our way of r e l a t i n g t o it. IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS An a l d e r l e a f , loosened by wind, is d r i f t i n g o u t with the t i d e . As it d r i f t s , it bumps i n t o t h e s lender leg of a grea t b lue heron s t a r i n g i n t e n t l y through t h e r i pp l ed surface, then drifts on. The heron r a i s e s one l e g o u t of t h e water and replaces it, a s ing le s t e p . A s 1 watch 1, too, am drawn i n t o t h e spread of s i l e n c e . Slowly, a bank of clouds approaches, s l i p p i n g i t s bulged and bi l lowing texture over t h e e a r t h , fo ld ing t h e heron and t h e a l d e r t r e e s and my gazing body into t he depths o f a vast brea th ing being, enfo ld ing us a l 1 wi th in a common f l e s h , a conunon s t o r y now bur s t i ng with r a i n . David Abram David Abram, i n his much ce lebra ted book The Spel l of the Sensuous, seems t o summarize t h e l a t e n t i deas presen t i n ~ ~ a l i ~ s book In te l lec t , the Emotions and the Moral N a t u r e . For L y a l l human beings a r e part of t h e world i n a s much as t h e y t o o like t h e r e s t of "what is" p a r t i c i p a t e i n Being. T h e i n t e l l e c t , Seing t h e e t e r n a l p r i n c i p l e , connects with God bu t separated from Nature. The the o the r hand, put us i n touch, through phenomenal r e a l i t y , w i t h Being which fs another name f o r God, a t least i n what concerns L y a l l - L y a l l first and f oremost r e l i g i o u s and n a t u r a l t o f i nd hlin t a l k i n g about God and p r a i s i n g h i m , he re and the re , throughout t h e Intel lect , the Emotions and the Moral N a t u r e - However, bes ides comec t ing with G o d through grace w e can see God i r r H i s works. Regarding t h i s a l t e r n a t i v e , Lyall, i n t h e inaugural l e c t u r e a t Free Church College, on t h e philosophy of mind, reminds us: Perhaps, we a r e t oo apt t o forge t t h e c l a b s of God i n Nature, because of t h e super ior mani fes ta t ions of him in Grace. There is t o o g r e a t a tendency t o d i sparage the one, because of t he more overwhelming demonstrations of the o the r . It w a s not t n u s wi th t h e Psalmis t . H e looked up t o t h e heavens which God made, t o t h e moon and t h e s t a r s w h i c h he had ordained, and he l ea rned h i s lesson of p i e t y from these . H e r e j o i n e d i n t h e p o e t i c beau t i e s of c r ea t ion : and made t h e m express his f e e l i n g s o f devot ion and u t t e r the language of t h e most s p i r i t u a l experiences . And we b e l i e v e t h e more s c i e n t i f i c Our acquaintance with G o d works, we s h a l l s e e G o d more i n them, we s h a l l be brought more i n t o immediate contact w i t h t h e Divine Being not with a law, o r a p r i n c i p l e , but with a pe r sona l God w e s h a l l behold more t o admire [...] God i s obviously recognized b o t h i n na ture and i n grace . (1853, 13) Lya l l recognized the importance of see ing God through His works, in Nature. Here 1 have no t been concerned with t h e o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t y of comec t ing with G o d through grace b u t r a the r with t r y i n g t o make t h e most out of w h a t i s l e f t , namely Nature. This i s w h y 1 th ink t h a t David Abram's i d e a s a r e most u s e f u l , a s he of fe r s u s an i n s i g h t t h a t comes £rom the phenomenological t r a d i t i o n , imbued w i t h cons idera t ions about language and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a world where human beings a r e n e i t h e r subordinated t o , nor above Nature. Thus, I will make use of t h e conclusions reached i n the previous chapte rs i n order t o show t h a t Lyall i n t u i t e d avant l a da te the importance of being a human being i n a more-than-human world. Looking back t o Lya l l f s considerations on t h e imaginative s t a t e , w e can see t h a t is the place w h e r e he br ings together both the i n t e l l e c t and t h e emotions. In t h e imaginative s t a t e we are ab le t o commune with Nature because i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s t a t e w e perceive analogies, w e s ee beyond what is out t h e r e as an objec t , we "personify nature", we do not l i m i t ourselves t o j u s t describirrg r e a l i t y Dut w e re-describe it through an extensive use of metaphorical language , Moreover, Lyal l would Say t h a t w e empathize with Nature through emotions, grasping its concreteness and unity, t h e same w a y Abram does: From t h e rnagician's, o r phenomenologist's, perspective t h a t which w e c a l 1 imagination is from t h e f i r s t an a t t r i b u t e of t h e senses themselves; imagination is no t a separa te mental f a c u l t y (as we often assume) but i s r a t h e r a way t h e senses themselves have of throwing themselves beyond what is h e d i a t e l y given, i n order t o make t e n t a t i v e contact w i t h t h e other s i d e s of th ings t h a t we do not sense d i r e c t l y , w i t h t h e hidden o r i n v i s i b l e aspects of t h e sens ib le . (Abram 1997, 58) The idea that i n imagination w e "make contact with o ther sides of things" is s b i l a r t o what Lyall thinks when he says t h a t emotions and e spec ia l ly t h e emotion of love, "see" beyond p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s , beyond what i s acc identa l and changeable, toward Being i t s e l f . Ultimately, f o r Lyal l as well as f o r Abram, "both t h e perceiving and t h e perceived being are o f the same stuff C..] the perceiver and t h e perceived are interdependent and i n some sense even revers ib le aspec ts of a comon animate element, o r Flesh, tha t i s a t once both sensible and sensitive" (Abram Ibid. , 67) . Abram takes Flesh t o mean w h a t Merleau-Ponty meant w h e n he used t h i s term i n his w o r k The Visible and the InvisibleThe Flesh i s " the r e c i p r o c a i presence of t h e s e n t i e n t i n t h e s e n s i b l e and of t h e s e n s i b l e i n t h e s e n t i e n t " . I t i s t h e i n t e r c o ~ e c t e d n e s s of the p e r c e i v e r and of t h e p e r c e i v a b l e world, These two cannot exist independently of each o t h e r because w e can only s e n s e our surroundings f r o m a p a r t i c u l a r p e r s p e c t i v e which i m p l i e s t h a t we extend o u r s e n t i e n c e i n t h e surroundings , Moreover, it would be imposs ib le t o imagine a s e n t i e n t s u b j e c t completely s e p a r a t e d from a " f ie ld of sensed phenornena". For Lyal l , as w e s a w be fo re , when h e t a l k e d about love , he cons ide red t h a t "every o b j e c t , every being, shares i n i t s e x e r c i s e : it has s e l e c t e d no o b j e c t f o r i t s e x e r c i s e ; but eve ry o b j e c t r e c e i v e s a p a r t of i ts r e g a r d as it cornes w i t h i n i t s sphere. I n i t s most a b s o l u t e c h a r a c t e r , being i s i t s ob jec t " ( L y a l l 1855, 4 0 8 ) . T h e same in terconnectedness between us a s s e n t i e n t be ings and t h e s e n s i b l e surroundings is p r e s e n t he re . W e are capable of l o v e and w e l o v e Being, r e g a r d l e s s of t h e p a r t i c u l a r i t i e s i n which it i s expressed o r of t h e changes which it might endure. Through love w e axe i n touch with "what is", w e o u r s e l v e s , be ing p a r t o f it. Thus, L y a l l r s thought i s n o t e x c l u s i v e i y c e n t e r e d on God and man s i n c e t h i s c o m e c t i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d by t h e i n t e l l e c t a lone . But w e a r e on ly whole when t h e i n t e l l e c t and t h e emotions work t o g e t h e r . Through emotions, however, we . t ake a de tour and see Cod expressed i n p e r s o n i f i e d Nature. Through imaginat ion where t h e i n t e l l e c t and emotions m e e t , w e have t h e oppor tun i ty t o d i s c o v e r new ways of r e l a t i n g t o Nature, by making it more complex and f u l l e r . For S t . Bernard o f Clairvaux (1090-11531, f o r example, Nature w a s a lmost void o f any s i g n i f i c a n c e s i n c e he is s a i d t o have t r a v e l l e d a c r o s s t h e most b e a u t i f u l landscapes wi thout even noticing them as he was concerned exclusively with thoughts about his sou1 and GodFor Lyall, Nature cannot be avoided because we are part of it as it is part of us. Even though Lyallrs work exhibits idealist features, he detaches himself from the general understanding of idealisrn, as he does not follow, for example, either Berkeleyr s or Hegel's ideas. This however, did not compel him to embsace a materialist point of v i e w He knew that the idealist tries to dissolve the tension between the 1 and the world by explaining the world as a mere projection of the mind, whereas the materialist submerges the 1 into the vast sea of matter. So Lyall took a more balanced stance, asserting that both the 1 and the world exist but that they are connected by our emotions through which we are a l e to see nature as animate and as " f u l l of 1ife"However, Lyall does not see the world as Sartre, for exampie, saw it, when we are under the spell of emotionsSartre, even though he emphasized the difference between the 1 and the world, stressed the tension tnat exists between the two, the tension that springs when the 1 tries to appropriate the world which, in its turn, opposes resistance. Thus, the I tries to make its own something that still remains "strange" and distant. Lyall avoids this "deception" because for him ernotions grasp what is beyond the particular characteristics of the world: emotions grasp Being i t s e l f . Ernst Breisach in his Ifitroduction to Modern Existentialism writes about simiiar existentialist views on this matter: Neither a denial of the reality of the world (idealist position} nor the denial of the uniqueness of man (materialist position), nor a set of benevolent laws of nature nor Divine Providence can eliminate the fundamental fact of t h e human condi t ion , t h a t no miraculous harmony e x i s t s in the world and t h a t t o reso lve t h e enormous t e n s i o n between man and h i s world is beyond human powerWhat becomes audib le i n t h i s t ens ion i s the echo of man's questions r e f l e c t e d from \somewheref , and human l i f e a t i t s best i s t h i s sounding of t h e depths. (1962, 203) W e can s e e now t h a t Lya l l ' s pos i t i on d i f f e r s from S a r t r e ' s i n t h a t he does n o t regard the r e l a t i o n s h i p between human beings and the world as Deing under the s i g n of an unsurpassable t ens ion . For him, both w e and t h e world a r e p a r t o f Being. Emotions make t h i s s i m i l a r i t y v i s i b l e t o us Now, t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p can and should be developed by augmenting and improving ou r langilage as well which gives us t h e chance t o discover i n t h e world something that could n o t be prev ious ly described. This is where Ricoeur's theory of metaphor i s u s e f u l . Ricoeur does n o t consider metaphor t o be just an ornarnent a s it w a s t r a d i t i o n a l l y understood. Au contraire, he t a l k s about a metaphorical statement whicn implies t h a t metaphors can be true, t n a t they can r e f e r t o r e a l i t y , I n order t o show t h a t metaphors have the c a p a b i l i t y t o reach r e a l i t y , he had t o reassess t h e i s s u e of re fe rence . There is a rnetaphorical reference, bes ide l i t e r a l re fe rence , Ricoeur cons iders , z s t h e r e i s a metaphorical i n t e r p r e t a t i o n beside l i t e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The r e a l i t y t o which metaphors refer i s a r i c h e r r e a l i t y . Ricoeur a l s o had t o d i s t i n g u i s h between two types of imagination and s t r e s s t h e importance of the product ive imagination. Imagination, f o r Ricoeur, produces an unexplored v i s ion of r e a l i t y . F ina l ly , he had t o draw on d i f f e r e n t ways i n which t h e emotional efement complements t h e metaphorical p rocess . Imagination always accornpanied emotional element which r ep re sen t s a way of "finding ourselves" i n t h e world, of "being there". These t h e m e s from Ricoeur are common t o Lya l l even though adrnittedly L y a l l does not develop a theory of metaphorHowever, he makes ex t ens ive use of metaphorical construct ions and discusses t h e i n t r i c a t e work of imagination al though he does no t produce an explanation o r a thorough a n a l y s i s of imagination which involves bo th t h e emotions and t h e i n t e l l e c t . Where L y a l l w a s mistaken w a s i n consider ing t h e i n t e l l e c t to be separated from r e a l i t y , Ricoeur showed t h a t t h i s should not be t h e case because metaphors, which are c rea t ions of our i n t e l l e c t , do n o t merely d e s c r i b e r e a l i t y . Instead, metaphors re-describe F t They make it more d i v e r s e and f u l l e r and thus they improve our r e l a t i onsh ip with it, Something s i m i l a r is expressed by Abram when he wri tes : "Only by overlooking t h e sensuous, evocat ive dimension of human discourse , and a t t end ing s o l e l y t o the deno ta t ive and conventional aspect of verbal communication, can we hold ourselves a p a r t from, and ou t s ide o f , t h e rest of animate nature" ( I b i d . , 7 9 ) . Thus, w e a r e constant ly under t h e "spe l l of t n e sensuous" because we ourse lves a r e sensuous beings . T h e i n t e l l e c t is not, a s Lyal l bel ieved, divorced from r e a l i t y , from Nature. As Abram puts it: Our senses d i sc lose t o us a wild-flowering p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f e n t i t i e s and elements, i n which h m a n s a r e thoroughly immersed. While t h i s d i v e r s i t y of sensuous forms c e r t a i n l y d i sp l ays some s o r t of reckless order, w e f i n d ourselves i n t h e midst of, rather t han on top of, t h i s order ... Does the human i n t e l l e c t , o r Ireason' , r e a l l y spr ing u s f r e e from Our inherence i n t h e depths of t h i s wild p r o l i f e r a t i o n of f o m ? O r on the contrary , is t h e human i n t e l l e c t rooted in , and s e c r e t l y borne by, our forgo t ten contac t w i t h t h e mul t ip l e nonhuman shapes t h a t surround us?. (Ibid., 4 8 4 9 ) The l i n k of reason with r e a l i t y goes deeper than L y a l l consideredEven though h e stressed t h e f a c t t h a t our emotions have a cogn i t i ve value, t h a t t h e y r ep re sen t t h e channel through which t h e i n t e l l e c t reaches t h e world, they a r e s t i l l n o t t h e only l i n k . Abram f o r one recognizes t h a t through language, t h e i n t e l l e c t f inds i tself i n t h e midst of t h ings because: W e [.--] l e a r n Our na t ive language not mental ly b u t bod i ly . W e appropr ia te new words and phrases f i rs t through t h e i r express ive t o n a l i t y and t e x t u r e , through t h e w a y they feel i n the mouth o r r o l l o f f t h e tongue, and it i s t h i s d i r e c t , felt s ign i f i cânce t h e t a s t e of a word o r phrase , t h e w a y it in f luences o r modulates t h e body t h a t provides the f e r t i l e , po lyva len t source f o r a l 1 t he more re f ined and r a r e f i e d meanings which t h a t term m a y come t o have f o r us ... Language, then, cannot be genuinely s t u d i e d o r understood i n i s o l a t i o n from the sensuous r eve rbe ra t ion and resonance of a c t i v e speech- (Ibid., 7 5 ) But t h i s r e c i p r o c i t y , t h i s interdependence between language and the i n t e l l e c t , on t h e one nand, and percept ion and "sensuousness", on t h e o the r tiand, has a downside f o r Lyall. If w e a r e t o p l ace ourselves i n Lya l l ' s shoes w e can see that he took the i n t e l l e c t t o mean what it means i n the P la ton ic t r a d i t i o n , It represents o rde r and it is t h e e t e r n â l p r i n c i p l e , and t h i s forced him t o def ine t h e sur romding world as a determinate set of objects t o cu t t h e conscious s e l f o f f irom t h e spontaneous l i f e of Nature- "To def ine another being a s an i n e r t o r p a s s i v e ob jec t i s t o deny i t s a b i l i t y t o a c t i v e l y engage us and t o provoke Our senses; w e t h u s block our perceptual reciprocity with t h a t being" ( Ib id . , 5 6 ) . Thus, by def ining another being as a passive object, for the intellect the phenornenal world becomes j u s t a worla of shadows. Trying to avoid interacting with an inert world, Lyall sprinkled metapnors on the dry, abstract language that he used to explain this and that concept or ideaFor the same purpose he needed the input of emotions which represent the only accessible path to the animateness of the world. Abram explains that : If we wish to describe a particular phenomenon without repressing our direct experience, then we cannot avoid speaking of the phenomenon as an active, animate entity with which we find ourselves engaged ... Only by affirming tne animateness of perceived things do we allow our words t o emerge directly from the depths o f our ongoing reciprocity with the world". (,Abram, idem, p. 56) Lnasmuch as we a r e part of the world, inasmuch as we and the world are "of the same stuff", we cannot simply disassociate from it, we cannot regard it from a purely objective perspectiveLyall intuited that we are emotionally involved in the world. Our emotions, Lyall considers, represent our extension in the world. Through them we discover ourselves as participants in the world. This idea is rightfully emphasized by Armour and Trott in their analysis of Lyallf s major work Intellect, the Emotions and the Moral Nature. The way Lyall understood the balanced relation between reason and enotions compels Armour and Trott to consider him a representative of Canadian philosophy. However, for them, his work seems to be more a patchwork quilt of foreign ideasIt was my goal here to show that Lyallrs contribution is more significant than Armour and Trott estimated. Indeed, emotions connect us with reality. But so does our intellect tnrough its activity of creating metaphors w h i c h L y a l l uses throughoiit nis work even though he doeç n o t o f f e r a study of metapnor as such. However, metaphors themselves are no t purely i n t e l l e c t u a l const ruct ions . There is an emotional element that enters i n t o t h e i r constitution as wellT h u s , t h e l i n k between emotions and reason becomes more ev iden t . T h e i r balance i n Lyall's w o r k i s a s t rong exdmple of the accommodationist use of reason. Being Used by Metaphor: The Fallacy of T a k i n g a Metaphor L i t e r a l l y Turbayne d i s t i ngu i shes between two sides of t h e metaphor which c a s t a Janus p r o f i l e on it: on t h e one hand, it can b e used t o express t h e otherwise un-expressible; but , on the other hand, it can abuse i ts u s e r s . Metaphor abuses i t s use rs when the "make believe" Fs taken s e r i o u s l y . This i s where one must be v i g i l a n t Otherwise, t h e "make-believe" is transformed i n t o "believe" and t h e "as if" l o s e s i t s meaning and becomes "is". Thus, frorn enjoying t h e tens ion c r ea t ed by t h e metaphor one can e a s i l y end up, i f one i s no t ca r e fu l , dwell ing i n an un rea l world. This i s what happened t o Descartes, f o r example. Wnat Descartes intended Co do with h i s M a t h e s i s Universa l i s w a s t o " t r a n s f e r t h e c e r t a i n t y of geometr ica l demonstration t o t h e procedure of s c i e n t i f i c à iscovery, t h a t is, t h e c e r t a i n t y of syn thes i s t o ana lys i s" (Turbayne 1 9 7 0 , 3 8 ) . What t h i s means is t h a t Descartesr quest f o r c e r t a i n t y had t o t ake i n t h e advantages of t h e mathematical method, "more geornetrico" . Now, i s t h i s conjunction of s c i e n t i f i c discovery and geometrical demonstration a valid one? According t o Turbayne, it i s n o t e Descartes engaged himself t h i s i n a sor t t respass ing process. Unaware of the outcome of h i s ques t , Descartes ac ted as if by saying t h a t "man i s a wolf", he a c t u a l l y be l ieved t h a t man w a s indeed a wolf. Turbayne s e l e c t s t h r ee ca se s of so r t t r e spas s ing where Descartes does no t seen t o cornprehend t h e f u l l ix tpl ica t ions o f h i s arguments. 1. The first case of so r t t r e spas s ing "is t h a t of t h e deductive r e l a t i o n wi th t h e r e l a t i o n between even t s , The former r e l a t i o n belongs t o procedure [-,.] The l a t t e r r e l a t i o n Delongs t o t h e process going on i n nature" (Ibid. , 46). Making use of deduction, Descartes w a s a b l e t o work w i t h t h e theorems which were deduced f r o m p r i n c i p l e s . "Pr inciple and theorem w e r e neces sa r i l y comected" ( Ib id . , 4 6 ) . Supposing t h e principles were true, and because t h e mathematical method was employed, as i n a chain of reasoning, it would be expected for t h e theorems t o be t r u e and t h e r e f o r e t o be p u t a t work i n t h e process of explaining t h e world, Which br ings us t o t h e next i s sue . "The p r i n c i p l e of procedure t h a t s tarts a demonstration i s repea ted i n t h e ' a c t i v e p r inc ip l e* t h a t s t a r t s t h e causa l process" ( I b i d - , 46). Thus, w h a t Turbayne argues i s t h a t when Descartes thought about t h e f a c t t h a t "physical causes produce t h e ex is tence of t h e i r e f f e c t s , and t h a t t h e e f f e c t s n e c e s s a r i l y follow from t h e causes" (Ibid., 4 7 ) he was applying t h e procedural a lgor i thm t o t h e phys ica l world o r , as Turbayne metaphorical ly pu t s it "a prominent page of t h e r ec ipe was mixed i n w i t h t h e stew" ( Ib id . , 4 7 ) . T h i s a c t of s h i f t i n g what w a s found i n one domain i n t o the orner, o r of a s s o c i a t i n g them u n t i l they became "necessar i ly connected" gave enougn grounds f o r Descartes t o a f f i r m t h a t nature can be subjected t o t h e deductive method. Wnich, Turbayne considers, i s a c l e a r example of t a k i n g a metaphor l i t e r a l l y . 2 . T h e second c a s e of t he so r t t r e spas s ing d e t e c t e d by Turbayne i n Descartesr system of thought is "the inadver ten t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of explanat ion with phys ica l explanation and t h i s with causa l explanation, t h a t i s , t h e reciuction of one t o t h e o the r " ( Ib id . , 47) . This means sirnply t h a t Descartes thought t h e main preoccupation of physics t o be t h a t of discovering t h e laws governing t h e movement of t h e bodies and then, us ing these laws t o account f o r t h e i r motion. And t h i s explanation was nothing o t h e r than a causa l explanat ion which impl ies t h a t events were a c t u a l l y caused by the "physical laws". One should n o t fo rge t Descartes w a s determined t o make use only of d i s t i n c t and c l e a r ideas a s opposed t o "obscure notions". I n t h i s case , t h e c l e a r and d i s t i n c t i d e a s were o f f e red by e n t i t i e s such as: "bodies moving", "bodies a t r e s t " and 'external causes" o r "resistance", where t h e former ones a r e no th ing bu t t h e e f f e c t s of t h e causes expressed by the l a t t e r ones, A l 1 along Descartesf explanat ion the word "pr inc ip le" was used t o designate both "the premise o r statement of t h e law i n t h e procedure and t h e a c t i v e p r i n c i p l e , t h e supposed cause i n t h e process" ( Ib id . , 4 8 ) Thus, Descartes f a i l e d t o s ee the d i f f e r e n c e between t h e physical explanat ion of phenornena and t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l explanation, T h e concept of f o r c e , used i n t h e o r e t i c a l explanat ions , is f a l l a c i o u s l y asc r ibed t o o b j e c t s . "Something t h a t belongs t o perçons o r l i v i n g th ings i s a sc r ibed t o matter", Turbayne cons iders . 3T h e t h i r d case of so r t t r e spas s ing involves t h e unwarranted i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of deduction with computation o r c a l c u l a t i o n o r any o the r f o m of m e t r i c a l reckoning o r counting [,.] Because mathematical computation is cons t an t ly used i n sc ience , we must no t regard i t a s a def in ing proper ty . Because l i n e s and ang les a r e used t o enormous advantage i n o p t i c a l demonstration [,.] w e must no t t h e r e f o r e succumb t o t h e tendency t o t h i n k t h a t exp lana t ion by means o f l i n e s and ang les exhaust o p t i c a l explanat ion, We might j u s t as well Say t h a t mechanical exp lana t ions exhaust s c i ence o r t h a t w e cannot s e t up a deductive system without u s i n g d i f f e r e n t i a l equat ions . ( Ib id- , 49-50) I n Turbaynef s view, the M a t h e s i s Universalis need not be geometr ica l . What is t o be taken and used £rom t h e method i t se l f i s the dernonstration f e a t u r e and n o t " the na ture of t h e terms used i n it". The "geometrical method" i s va luab le inasmuch a s it uses dernonstration, no t inasmuch as i t i s geometrical . It does not mat te r if t h e terms p e r t a i n t o the area of geometry o r no t , as long as t h e algori thm followed is t h e one of demonstration. Turbayne concludes that: "If w e a r e v ic t imized, then w e confuse devices of procedure with the a c t u a l process of nature , and t h u s , unknowingly i n s i n u a t e metaphysics" ( Ib id . , 56) , REFERENCES : Abram, David. 1997. The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human-WorldNew York: Vintage Books . Aristotle. 1941. The Basic Works of AristotleMcKeon, Richard (ed. ) . New York: Random House. 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