Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition of Nonexistent Objects ZHIHUA YAO INTRODUCTION Do all the knowables exist? Can we know things that do not exist? It seems that everything that we know must be something, that is, a being. Now can we know a nonbeing? This issue has been discussed and debated over throughout the history of Indian and Buddhist philosophy. In particular, we find rich sources on the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects (asad-ålambana-j¤åna) in Buddhist Abhidharma texts. All the contemporary studies on this concept, such as those of Sakamoto (1981), Cox (1988), Dhammajoti (2007a), and Kwan (2007), have focused on these sources, and examined the important role of this concept in the debate between the Vaibhå¶ikas and the Dår¶¢åntika-Sautråntikas. The present article will instead explore some pre-Vaibhå¶ika sources that are extant in Påli and Chinese, including the Kathåvatthu, Samayabhedoparacanacakra, ›åriputråbhidharma, and Vij¤ånakåya. These sources suggest an early origin of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects among the Mahåså√ghikas and some Vibhajyavådins under their influence, and a possible connection of this concept to the concept of non-cognition (anupalabdhi) developed later by the Buddhist epistemological tradition. These scattered sources also indicate some different aspects of this theory from that held by the Dår¶¢åntika-Sautråntikas. In particular, some Mahåså√ghika arguments reveal how a soteriologically-oriented concept of cognition without objects gradually develops into the sophisticated philosophical concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects. This again, to echo my conclusion on the study of self2 ZHIHUA YAO cognition (svasa√vedana) (Yao 2005), shows that the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects has an origin in the soteriological discourse, and that many Mahåså√ghika theories have great impact on the later development of Buddhist doctrinal systems. LATENT DEFILEMENTS WITHOUT OBJECTS The first argument has to do with anu‹aya, a genetic term for defilements. But in the Mahåså√ghika usage, it is more appropriate to translate it into ìlatent defilements.î It is well-documented that the Mahåså√ghikas disagreed with the Sarvåstivådins (and possibly other Sthaviravåda schools) on the relationship between anu‹aya and paryavasthåna (the manifested defilements). In his Samayabhed oparacanacakra, Vasumitra lists the following statement as one of the main doctrines shared by the Mahåså√ghikas and its sub-schools including Ekavyavahårika, Lokottaravåda, and Kaukku¢ika: ìAnu‹aya is not a mind or mental activity, and it has no objects. Anu‹aya is distinguished from paryavasthåna, and paryavasthåna is distinguished from anu‹aya. It should be said that anu‹aya is not associated with the mind, while paryavasthåna is associated with the mind.î1 The same statement is found among the shared doctrines of the Mah∂‹åsakas and its sub-school Dharmaguptaka.2 These schools are the major components of the so-called Vibhajyavådins.3 It is possible that the Vibhajyavådins were influenced by the Mahåså√ghikas on this point, and this agreement between the two parties is the basis for their contributions to the development of the theory of cognition of nonexistent objects. In contrast to the Mahåså√ghika and Vibhajyavåda view on anu‹aya and paryavasthåna, the Sarvåstivådins held the exactly opposite view: ìAll anu‹ayas are mental activities, associated with the mind, and have objects. All anu‹ayas are included in paryavasthåna, but not all paryavasthånas are included in anu‹aya.î4 Similar views are found in more elaborated form in Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma works such as Mahåvibhå¶å, Nyåyånusåra and Abhidharmako‹abhå¶ya.5 This debate involves some issues with great soteriological implications. Liberation, the goal of Buddhist practice, is meant to be liberated from defilements (anu‹aya). Therefore, anu‹aya 3Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition undoubtedly occupies a central position in the Buddhist soteriology, and the understanding and analysis of defilements constitute the essential part of Buddhist doctrinal system. Schools such as Mahåså√ghika and Mah∂‹åsaka held that a finer analysis should be made to distinguish between anu‹aya and paryavasthåna, the latent and manifested defilements. This distinction is applicable to many soteriological issues including the possibility of retrogression, an issue hotly debated among sectarian Buddhists.6 As I am not mainly concerned with soteriological issues in the current study, I am not going to further discuss how this distinction between latent and manifested defilements is applied to solve or evoke various soteriological problems. Instead, I am interested in how this distinction is made. It is suggested that the Mahåså√ghikas and Mah∂‹åsakas made this distinction on the following ground: Anu‹aya is not associated with the mind, while pvasthåna is. In other words, anu‹aya or the latent defilement that is disjoined from the mind is not a mental activity. In contrast, paryavasthåna or the manifested defilement that is conjoined with the mind is a mental activity. So the line is clear: anu‹aya is not a mental activity, but paryavasthåna is. In his commentary on the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Kuiji explains the reason for the Mahåså√ghika view that anu‹aya is not a mental activity. First of all, anu‹aya consists of ten types of defilements and they are desire (råga), enmity (pratigha), ignorance (avidyå), conceit (måna), doubt (vicikitså), self view (satkåyadae¶¢i), extreme view (antagråhadae¶¢i), false view (mithyådae¶¢i), adherence to oneís own views (dae¶¢i-paråmar‹a), adherence to abstentions and vows (‹∂lavrata-paråmar‹a).7 It accompanies the ordinary person (paethagjana) all the time, even in her state of mindless meditation (asa√j¤isamåpatti) or in her mental state that is morally good.8 The state of mindless meditation is especially important for the Mahåså√ghikas to develop their view on anu‹aya. It is believed to be a state in which all the mind and mental activities cease to function. The fact that the mind and mental activities can resume after the state of mindless meditation contributed greatly to the development of the concept of store consciousness (ålaya-vij¤åna) later among the Yogåcårins. The Mahåså√ghikas, however, are more concerned with what happens 4 ZHIHUA YAO in the state of mindless meditation. As it is a state accessible to an ordinary person through proper training, there must be defilements in this state. Otherwise, those who are in the mindless meditation would be the librated ones (arhat) rather than ordinary persons. As we know, according to the Buddhist soteriology, the key difference between the librated ones and the ordinary person is whether they are accompanied by defilements. So the Mahåså√ghikas admit that the defilements that pertain through mindless meditation must not be mental activities. As a result, we have to distinguish between paryavasthåna, the manifested defilements that are associated with the mind, and anu‹aya, the latent defilements that are not mental activities. Believing in a non-mental latent defilement is a view shared by the Mahåså√ghikas and its sub-schools including Ekavyavahårika, Lokottaravåda, and Kaukku¢ika, the Mah∂‹åsakas and its sub-school Dharmaguptaka, and the Sa√mat∂yas.9 For some, especially the Sarvåstivådins, this view is unacceptable. How can desire etc., which are usually considered to be typical mental activities, be non-mental? They hold firmly that ìall the latent defilements (anu‹aya) are mental activities and associated with the mind.î10 Meanwhile, they do not make a sharp distinction between anu‹aya and paryavasthåna, and consider both to be the epithets of kle‹a (defilements). Anu‹aya, either mental or non-mental, is understood to be a human disposition with the characteristic of increasing or decreasing along with its objects. For instance, oneís desire may increase when encountering a favorable object and may decrease when meeting with an unfavorable object. Understanding the interaction between defilements and their objects is a very important aspect of Buddhist practice that aims to eliminate these defilements. And the practice consists of internally calming down the defilements and externally avoiding objects that help the growth of defilements. Now the Mahåså√ghikas have to face a serious challenge: If anu‹aya is non-mental, how can it have an object? If it has no objects, how can it maintain its growth? Again, it is well-documented that the Mahåså√ghikas and its sub-schools including Ekavyavahårika, Lokottaravåda, and Kaukku¢ika exclaimed that ì[anu‹aya] has no objects either.î11 The Mah∂‹åsakas and its sub-school Dharmaguptaka 5Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition adopted the same view, and the Sarvåstivådins, accordingly, went against such a view by insisting that ì[anu‹aya] has objects.î12 It is evident that the Theravådins also argued against this view. As a matter of fact, their debate with the Andhakas and some Uttaråpathakas on the subject as found in Kathåvatthu IX.4 constitutes the most substantial material for the current discussion.13 First of all, this text indicates that seven types of anu‹aya (Påli anusaya) are under discussion, and they are sensual desire (kåmaråga), enmity (pa¢igha), conceit (måna), erroneous opinion (di¢¢ha), doubt (vicikicchå), desire of life (bhavaråga), and ignorance (avijjå). On the view of the Andhakas, the anu‹aya of desire (latent desire) is distinguished from the manifested desire, the desire as flood (kåmarågapariyu¢¢håna), bond (kåmarågasa¤¤ojana), outburst (kåmogha), fetter (kåmayoga), or obstacle (kåmacchandan∂varaƒa), all of which are the manifestations of desire in different degrees. The latent desire has no objects, while the rest has. The reason for this is not that anu‹aya belongs to material form, sense organs, or sense objects, all of which are part of the material realm and certainly possess no objects. Nor is it because anu‹aya belongs to nirvåƒa, the unconditioned state that goes beyond material and mental factors, and beyond the division between subject and object. Instead, anu‹aya is associated with conditioning force (sa∆khåra, sa√skåra). The text then discusses more extensively how anu‹aya is associated with conditioning force. First of all, if the latent desire belongs to sa∆khåra, then sa∆khåra should also be without objects. On the other hand, however, the manifested desire itself also belongs to sa∆khåra, and this desire certainly possesses objects, then sa∆khåra should have objects. The Andhakas are forced into a selfcontradiction by admitting sa∆khåra to be with and without objects at the same time. Their solution to this contradiction is to admit ìa portion of sa∆khåra being with objects and the other portion without objects. î14 Buddhaghosa explains that the sa∆khåra with objects refers to the aggregate of sa∆khåra that is associated with mind (citta-sampayutta-sa∆khåra-kkhandha), while the sa∆khåra without objects is meant to cover other factors included in sa∆khåra such as latent defilements (anusaya), vitality (j∂vitindriya), and forms of bodily actions (kåyakammådirμupa).15 As we know, the latter group 6 ZHIHUA YAO of concepts developed into a separate category of the conditionings disassociated with the mind (citta-viprayukta-sa√skåra) among the Sarvåstivådins. Although they disagree among themselves on the number of concepts included in this category, they unanimously exclude anu‹aya from the list because they believe, as we discussed earlier, anu‹aya is associated with the mind and has objects. When the Andhakas were asked whether this division between the portion associated with the mind and that disassociated with the mind is applicable to other aggregates such as feeling (vedanå), conception (sa¤¤å), and consciousness (vi¤¤åƒa), they denied. This means that only the aggregate of sa∆khåra enjoys the status of being both associated and disassociated with the mind. Interestingly enough, a parallel view is found in the ›åriputråbhidharma, an early Abhidharma work believed to be associated with the Mah∂‹åsakas and the Dharmaguptakas.16 The text states: ìWhat is the one which is of two portions ñ either associated with or disassociated with the mind? It is the aggregate of conditioning force (sa√skåra).... What is [the portion of] the aggregate of conditioning force which is disassociated with the mind? It is [the portion of] the aggregate of conditioning force which is not mental activities, i.e., life (jåti), etc., up to the attainment of cessation (nirodha-samåpatti).î17 Since the list is shortened, we do not know whether it would include anu‹aya or not, but Cox (1995: 76 n19) suggests that it may do. Finally, the Andhakas argue for the latent defilements being without objects along the line of moral psychology. When the ordinary person, i.e., those who have not liberated from defilements, is willing something morally good (kusala) or neutral (abyåkata), he is still understood to be embedded with anu‹aya, for otherwise he will be liberated.18 In this state, his good or neutral thoughts have their corresponding objects, but the latent defilements at that moment cannot have any objects. If it does, the morally bad thought would emerge and that would eradicate any morally good or neutral thought. This argument in terms of moral psychology makes more sense if we understand anu‹aya as an unconscious or subconscious state. An unconscious or subconscious state can be understood to be disassociated with the conscious mind, so it is not a regular type 7Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition of mental activity. Therefore, it does not take the normal mental objects as its objects, and can be considered to have no objects. Another way to make sense this point is to resort to the Lacanian concept of pure desire that is beyond any recognizable object. For Lacan, desire is not a relation to an object but a relation to a lack (manque). In any case, the thesis that latent defilements have no objects constitutes the first step toward the formation of the concept of the cognition of nonexistent objects. AWARENESS WITHOUT OBJECTS The second argument for the cognition of nonexistent objects that is associated with the Mahåså√ghikas and its sub-schools has to do with awareness (¤åƒa). So far the most extensive source for such an argument is found in the Kathåvatthu IX.5, where a debate between the Theravådins and the Andhakas is reported. This section has a similar structure as the section we discussed earlier. First, the Andhakas distinguish awareness from wisdom (pa¤¤å), wisdom faculty (pa¤¤indriya), wisdom power (pa¤¤åbala), right view (sammådi¢¢hi), discernment as a limb of enlightenment (dhammavicaya-sa√bojjh-a∆ga), all of which are believed to have objects. Awareness, however, is assumed to have no objects. The reason for this is not that awareness is associated with material form, sense organs, or sense objects, all of which have no objects. Nor is it because awareness is associated with nirvåƒa, the unconditioned state that is beyond material and mental factors and certainly has no objects. Awareness is rather associated with the aggregate of sa∆khåra. If awareness is assumed to have no objects and to be associated with the aggregate of sa∆khåra, then the sa∆khåra itself as a whole should have no objects. But the Andhakas admit that the wisdom that possesses objects is also associated with the aggregate of sa∆khåra, therefore sa∆khåra is considered to have objects. To resolve the contradiction that sa∆khåra is with and without objects at the same time, the Andhakas admit that a portion of sa∆khåra has objects, while the other portion does not. This division, again, is only applicable to the aggregate of sa∆khåra, but not to other 8 ZHIHUA YAO aggregates such as feeling, conception, and consciousness, all of which are believed to have objects all the time. In the Kathåvatthu XI.3, a similar pattern of argument is employed to argue that awareness is not associated with the mind (citta). Buddhaghosa attributed this view to the Pubbaseliyas, a sub-school of the Andhakas. These two sets of arguments with regard to awareness, though attributed to different branches of the Mahåså√ghikas, are related to each other. If awareness is associated with the mind, then it certainly should have objects. If, however, awareness is not associated with the mind, then it is understandably without objects. But a difficult point is how to understand the awareness disassociated with the mind, for this concept contradicts our usual understanding of awareness (¤åƒa), which can be anything but other than a mental activity. In the various lists of conditionings disassociated with the mind (citta-viprayukta-sa√skåra) developed among the later Sarvåstivådins, they do not include awareness there. To fully understand this we have to look into the rest part of argument that involves the relationship between awareness and consciousness (vi¤¤åƒa). Being a pair of concepts that are widely circulated in Buddhist doctrinal system, awareness and consciousness have a complicated relationship. In the Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma system, extensive sources indicate that they are used in many cases interchangeably. When distinguished, they are believed to be associated with different realms: awareness being undefiled and a mental activity (caitta), while consciousness being defiled and synonymous to the mind (citta).19 In the earlier debates among various Buddhist schools as recorded in the Kathåvatthu, we see some other aspects of the relationship between awareness and consciousness. In the Kathåvatthu IX.5 and XI.3, both the Andhakas and the Pubbaseliyas argue that an arhat, after the attainment of the knowledge of path (magga), she is believed to ìpossess awarenessî (¤åƒ∂ti) at all time from then on. This is also the case when she is engaged in a sense consciousness. For instance, when she perceives something, fully engaged in the visual experience, her awareness is also active.20 In this process, the visual consciousness has visual objects as its objects, but the awareness, the Andhakas and the Pubbaseliyas conclude, should have no objects. The reason for this 9Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition is probably that there cannot be two objects of cognition at the same instant of time. As the account in the Kathåvatthu is too brief, we do not know for sure the context of this argument. One possibility is to understand it in the context of the Andhaka arguments for reflexive awareness. As I discussed elsewhere, the Andhakas and some other schools of the Mahåså√ghika origin hold that the mind is aware of itself while acting on external objects.21 In this process, the sense consciousness that acts on sensory objects is working at the same time when a certain awareness is active. I call it a reflexive model of self-awareness in contrast to the reflective model of self-awareness propounded among the Sarvåstivådins. The latter model is thus named because the Sarvåstivådins hold that self-awareness is only possible in the later moment when the mind reflects the sensory experience. In the Mahåså√ghika model, however, the awareness is active at the same time as the sensory experience. While the sensory consciousness takes sensory objects as its objects, the awareness ends up with no objects, because it is believed that no two objects can be presented at the same time, although for the Mahåså√ghikas two mental processes can take place at the same time. This discussion with reference to self-awareness may only indicate one way of making sense of the Andhaka argument that awareness has no objects. To seek alternative ways of understanding, we have to take into account the Pubbaseliya view that awareness is disassociated with the mind. This view, to a great extent, contradicts our usual understanding of awareness, but it is not entirely unimaginable. In the later Buddhist epistemological tradition, the concepts of mere non-perception (adar‹anamåtra) and non-cognition (anupalabdhi) were developed to account for the cognition of negative facts. One of the salient features of this means of knowledge is indicated by the inactiveness of other means of knowledge such as perception and inference.22 If following this line of thought, the awareness disassociated with the mind can be understood as a state in which all mental activities are ceased. This non-mental awareness is not an entirely blank-out, rather it could be, similar to the case of non-perception or non-cognition, responsible for the cognition of negative facts. When it is said that awareness is without objects, it 10 ZHIHUA YAO really means that it does not take the normal existent objects as its objects, but rather it has nonexistent objects as its objects. The connection between the awareness without objects and the awareness of nonexistent objects seems to be supported by a preVaibhå¶ika source from the ›åriputråbhidharma. This work is believed to be the earliest Abhidharma work in the Northern tradition of Indian Buddhism, but its received version in Chinese reflects more of the Mah∂‹åsaka and Dharmaguptaka views. While enumerating various types of awareness (j¤åna), this text lists ìthe awareness of nonexistent objectsî (����, *asadålambanaj¤åna) as one of more than two hundred types of awareness.23 The first thing to be noted is that it is called an ìawarenessî (j¤åna) of nonexistent objects, which echoes the Andhaka arguments with respect to awareness, though we are not sure whether the ìawarenessî here is associated with the mind or not. Later in the text, two definitions of this concept are given. The first definition reads: ìWhat is the awareness of nonexistent objects? The awareness that has no objects (*anålambana) is the awareness of nonexistent objects.î24 Contemporary scholars including Sakamoto (1981: 135) and Cox (1988: 44) took the first definition as a denial of this concept: ìThere is no the awareness of nonexistent objects. î25 But this denial contradicts to the fact that it is listed earlier in the text as one type of awareness. My interpretation, in contrast, makes it clear that the awareness of nonexistent objects is defined as ìthe awareness that has no objects.î CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE The third argument for the cognition of nonexistent objects is related to the consciousness of the past and the future. Unlike the first two arguments that were to a great extent neglected by the later scholars, this argument became one of the focal points in the Sautråntika-Sarvåstivåda debates. It is interesting to note that the Dåae¶¢åntikas did not explore the argument with this respect when they argued for the cognition of nonexistent objects. It can be explained by the fact that the Dåae¶¢åntikas still, along the line of the Sarvåstivådins, believe the existence of past and future factors. 11Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition This also helps us to draw a line between the Dåae¶¢åntikas and the Sautråntikas, at least on this point. Buddhaghosa attributed the argument for the consciousness of the past and the future to the Uttaråpathakas.26 In this argument, a key term to be noted is ìconsciousnessî (citta). As compared to the latent defilements (anu‹aya) and the awareness (¤åƒa) that we discussed earlier, consciousness is unambiguously mental and conscious. So the consciousness recalling a past object (at∂tårammaƒa√ citta√) is the cognition of the object on a conscious level.27 The central thesis that the Uttaråpathakas argue for can be stated as follows: ìThe consciousness that [recalls] a past object or [anticipates] a future object is [a consciousness] without objects.î28 In the eyes of their opponents, i.e., the Theravådins, however, this is a self-contradictory statement. They have already talked about the consciousness being involved with a past object (at∂tårammaƒa) or a future object (anågatårammaƒa), how can they say that the consciousness is ìwithout objectsî (anårammaƒa)? Moreover, there is still adverting of consciousness (åva¢¢anå), ideation, coordinated application, attention, volition, anticipation, or aiming at (paƒidhi) concerning that which is past or future, how is it possible that the consciousness in these states is without objects? If the Uttaråpathakas want to be consistent, the Theravådins urge, they should also admit that the consciousness perceiving a present object is the consciousness without objects. But they would not go so far to deny the existence of the present object. Instead, they insist that the basic reason for the consciousness that involves with a past or future object being the consciousness without objects is that ìthe past and the future do not exist.î29 Therefore, when the consciousness is attending or aiming at a present object, it is a consciousness with objects; when the consciousness is attending or aiming at a past or future object, it is a consciousness without objects. As the Theravådins agreed with the Uttaråpathakas and many other Buddhist schools in propounding the view that past and future factors do not exist, they did not get into further debate on this point. But the Theravådinsí accusation of their opponents being self-contradictory still makes sense. If past and future factors do not exist, it is impossible to talk about ìa past objectî (at∂tårammaƒa) or 12 ZHIHUA YAO ìa future objectî (anågatårammaƒa) in the first place, and it evokes a self-contradiction to say that ìthe consciousness recalling a past object is a consciousness without objects.î This desperate situation is similar to what Western philosophers called the Meinongian paradox, a paradox involving with virtually all types of negative existential statements. This instance shows that Buddhist philosophers were aware of the difficulty involved with such an issue. Besides the Kathåvatthu, we have a few more pre-Vaibhå¶ika sources that argue for the cognition of nonexistent objects along the line of the consciousness of the past and the future. In the ›åriputråbhidharma, the second definition of the awareness of nonexistent objects reads: ìWhat is the awareness of nonexistent objects? ...... Or, the arising of the awareness that contends to past or future factors is called the awareness of nonexistent objects.î30 This definition is evidently related to the Uttaråpathaka argument from the consciousness of the past and the future. As we know the received version of ›åriputråbhidharma is associated with the Mah∂‹åsakas and the Dharmaguptakas, then, most probably, this concept originated in the Mahåså√ghika subgroup Uttaråpathaka and was accepted and further developed among the Vibhajyavådins including the Mah∂‹åsakas and the Dharmaguptakas. Later in the ›åriputråbhidharma, while enumerating various types of meditation, a meditation of nonexistent objects (����, *asadålambanasamådhi) is listed as one of more than two hundred types of meditation.31 Later in the text, two definitions of this concept are given: 1) the meditation that has no objects; 2) the meditation that contemplates on past or future factors.32 This is a concept that we have not encountered in earlier discussions. It may indicate another possible origin for the Buddhist theory of the cognition of nonexistent objects. Besides the soteriological and epistemological approaches that we have discussed earlier, the meditative practice undoubtedly occupies a central position in the Buddhist tradition, and it is understandable that the Buddhist practitioners would develop their theory of the cognition of nonexistent objects on the basis of their relevant meditative experience. If we had more sources, this could be a promising direction for tracing the origin of this concept. 13Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition The other early source is the Vij¤ånakåya, one of the ìsix limbsî of Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma works. Being attributed to Deva‹arman, this work begins with the refutation of the views of a certain Maudgalyåyana. It is repeatedly stated that Maudgalyåyana holds that things of the past and the future do not exist, but the present and the unconditioned exist.33 In his Samayabhedoparacanacakra, Vasumitra reports that this view was shared by the Mah∂‹åsakas and its subgroup Dharmaguptaka.34 According to the same text, the Dharmaguptakas claim themselves to be the followers of Maudgalyåyana.35 So we can assume that Maudgalyåyana mentioned in the Vij¤ånakåya is this Dharmaguptaka Maudgalyåyana. Among the various views of Maudgalyåyana refuted by Deva‹arman, one view is reported as follows: ìThere is the consciousness (xin�, *citta) of nonexistent objects.î36 It is worth noting that the key term ìconsciousnessî is used, which indicates that the faculty for the cognition of nonexistent objects is the consciousness itself. It is also coherent to the Uttaråpathaka usage of ìthe consciousness without objectsî (citta√ anårammaƒan) that was discussed earlier in this section. More importantly, Maudgalyåyana further explains the reason for admitting this consciousness of nonexistent objects as follows: ìThere must be the consciousness of nonexistent objects. Why? Because the consciousness cognizes the past or the future.î37 This view is in turn built upon their shared assumption that ìthe past and the future do not existî, which is refuted extensively by Deva‹arman in the Vij¤ånakåya. In any case, the Sarvåstivådins supplied us some scattered sources that reveal the connection between the Uttaråpathakas and the Dharmaguptakas on the understanding of the cognition of nonexistent objects as the cognition of the past and the future. This view was probably also shared by some other Mahåså√ghika and Vibhajyavåda subgroups. Without further evidence, we cannot explore further. But it is evident that the later Sautråntikas (but not the Dåae¶¢åntikas) further developed this view by heavily engaging debates with the Vaibhå¶ikas on the cognition of the past and the future. 14 ZHIHUA YAO CONCLUSION Based on scattered sources in Påli and Chinese, we have reconstructed three arguments for the cognition of nonexistent objects that are associated with the Mahåså√ghikas and some of its sub-schools. In the first argument, the thesis reads: ìLatent defilements (anu‹aya) have no objects.î38 The Mahåså√ghikas and its sub-schools including Ekavyavahårika, Lokottaravåda, and Kaukku¢ika, the Mah∂‹åsakas and its sub-school Dharmaguptaka, and the Sa√mat∂yas were arguing for this view, while the Sarvåstivådins (and possibly other Sthaviravåda schools) were arguing against it. The proponents formulate four main reasons to support their thesis: 1) Latent defilements (anu‹aya) is distinguished from manifested defilements (paryavasthåna); 2) Latent defilements are not associated with the mind (citta), nor are they a mental activity (caitta), but rather they are associated with conditioning force (sa∆khåra), and possibly components of conditionings disassociated with the mind (citta-viprayukta-sa√skåra); 3) Latent defilements accompany an ordinary person (paethagjana) at all the time, even in her state of mindless meditation; 4) When an ordinary person is willing something morally good or neutral, her good or neutral thoughts have their corresponding objects, but the latent defilements at that moment cannot have any object. To make sense of this argument from a contemporary perspective, we have to resort to the Freudian concept of unconscious or subconscious and the Lacanian concept of pure desire without objects. In the second argument, the thesis is expressed in two different ways: 1) ìAwareness (¤åƒa) has no objectsî;39 or 1í) ìThe awareness that has no objects (*anålambana) is the awareness of nonexistent objects.î40 The Andhakas, Pubbaseliyas and Dharmaguptakas were proponents, while the Theravådins were their opponents. The proponents provide three reasons to support their thesis: 1) Awareness is distinguished from wisdom (pa¤¤å); 2) Awareness is not associated with the mind (citta), nor is it a mental activity (caitta), but rather it is associated with conditioning force (sa∆khåra), and might also be a component of conditionings disassociated with the mind (citta-viprayukta-sa√skåra); 3) When an arhat perceives something, fully engaged in the visual experience, her awareness is 15Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition also active. In this process, the visual consciousness has visual objects as its objects, but the awareness should have no objects. To make sense of this argument, we have discussed the Mahåså√ghika theory of reflexive awareness, according to which, awareness is active while the subject engages visual or other sensory experience. Moreover, their concept of ìawareness disassociated with the mindî anticipates the concept of non-cognition in Buddhist epistemology, which is a state of mind that other means of knowledge such as perception and inference are inactive. In the third argument, the thesis is expressed in various different ways: 1) ìThe consciousness (citta) that [recalls] a past object or [anticipates] a future object is [the consciousness] without objectsî;41 or 1í) ìThe arising of the awareness (j¤åna) that contends to past or future factors is called the awareness of nonexistent objectsî;42 or 1î) ìThere must be the consciousness (citta) of nonexistent objects. Why? Because the consciousness cognizes past or future [factors]. î43 The reason given by the proponents, i.e., the Uttaråpathakas and the Dharmaguptakas, is simple, that is, ìbecause the past and the future do not exist.î Although agreeing with this reason, their opponentsóthe Theravådinsópoint out a paradox involving with virtually all negative existential statements: If past and future factors do not exist, it is impossible to talk about ìa past objectî (at∂tårammaƒa) or ìa future objectî (anågatårammaƒa) in the first place. So it is self-contradictory to say: ìThe consciousness recalling a past object is the consciousness without objects.î As compared to other arguments for the cognition of nonexistent objects developed later by the Dåae¶¢åntika-Sautråntikas and the Yogåcårins, these three arguments of Mahåså√ghika origin are more primitive. But they reveal some features of this theory in its early development. In particular, the x of nonexistent objects is evolved from x without objects. In the case of latent defilements, it is the latent defilements without objects. But when it comes to awareness, it can be the awareness without objects or the awareness of nonexistent objects. And finally the consciousness of the past and the future is more explicitly the cognition of nonexistent objects in the past and the future. In the further debates between the Vaibhå¶ikas and the Dåae¶¢åntika-Sautråntikas, varieties of 16 ZHIHUA YAO nonexistent objects were discussed. To fully understand these discussions, we may have to employ a phenomenological distinction between the cognition of non-existent objects and that of in-existent objects. The former applies to objects of the past and the future, negations and expressions referring to nonexistent objects, while the latter applies to internal objects such as meditative objects, dream images, reflected images, echoes, sensory error, illusions, and magical creations. Therefore, the single Sanskrit phrase asadålambana-j¤åna can be interpreted in three different ways, i.e., cognition without objects, cognition of nonexistent objects, and cognition of inexistent objects. NOTES AND REFERENCES: 1 Samayabhedoparacanacakra: �����������������������������������������T2031, 15c2816a1. 2 See Samayabhedoparacanacakra, T2031, 16c28-17a1. 3 See Yao 2005: 90 n10. 4 Samayabhedoparacanacakra: �������������������������������������T2031, 16b16-18. 5 For a discussion of the Sarvåstivåda theory of defilements based on these sources, see Dhammajoti 2007b: 418-479. 6 See Dhammajoti 2007b: 442-443. 7 See Yibu zonglun lun shuji, X844, 582b18-21. In his commentary on the Kathåvatthu, Buddhaghosa named seven types, see below for details. 8 For the latter, more sources from the Kathåvatthu will be discussed below. 9 For the Sa√mat∂ya view, see Buddhaghosaís commentary on Kathåvatthu XI.1. 10 Samayabhedoparacanacakra: ��������������T2031, 16b16. 11 Samayabhedoparacanacakra: �����T2031, 15c28. The Tibetan translation reads: dmigs med par brjod par byaío. Peking 5639: 172a. 12 Samayabhedoparacanacakra: �����T2031, 16b16. 13 For the affiliation of the Andhakas and their sub-schools to the Mahåså√ghikas, see Yao 2005: 23-25. 14 Kathåvatthu IX.4: Sa∆khårakkhandho ekadeso sårammaƒo, ekadeso anårammaƒo ti. 17Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition 15 See Kathåvatthu-a¢¢hakathå IX. 4: Anusaya√ j∂vitindriya√ kåyakammådirμupa¤ ca sa∆khårakkhandhapariyåpanna√, ta√ sandhåya pa¢ijånåti. 16 See Lü 1991: 1964-1965. 17 ›åriputråbhidharma: ��������������������������������......�������������������������������� T1548, 547b12-17 See also Dhammajoti 2007b: 373. 18 See Kathåvatthu IX.4, XI.1, and XIV. 5. 19 See Yao 2005: 68-70. 20 In Kathåvatthu XI. 2, however, the Mahåså√ghikas seem to argue that awareness should be inactive during this process. 21 See Yao 2005: 15-33. 22 See Yao (forthcoming). 23 See ›åriputråbhidharma, T1548, 590a7-8. 24 ›åriputråbhidharma: ��������������T1548, 593c16-17. 25 Some editions of the text delete the second jing� (ìobjectî) to make this reading possible. 26 The Påli Text Society edition of the Kathåvatthu and its English and Japanese translations separate the argument on the cognition of the future an independent section IX.7. If examining the text more carefully, one would find it unnecessary to do so. This might be the reason that Buddhaghosa comments on the two sections together. 27 The English translator of the Kathåvatthu is therefore justified in rendering ìcittaî as ìconsciousness.î See Shwe 1969 [c1915]: 237. 28 Kathåvatthu IX.6: At∂tårammaƒa√ citta√ anårammaƒan ti; IX. 7: Anågatårammaƒa√ citta√ anårammaƒa√ ti. 29 Kathåvatthu IX.7: at∂tånågata√ natth∂ti. Here I follow the Cha¢¢ha Sa∆gåyana CD (v. 3.0) edition. The Påli Text Society edition reads: ìat∂tårammaƒa√ níatth∂tiî (ìthe past objects do not existî). 30 ›åriputråbhidharma: �������......������������������T1548, 593c16-18. 31 See ›åriputråbhidharma, T1548, 701c10-11. 32 See ›åriputråbhidharma, T1548, 717a29-b2. I have to interpolate the character jing� (ìobjectî) to make this reading of the first definition possible. 33 See Vij¤ånakåya, T1539, 531a27-537a12. 34 See Samayabhedoparacanacakra, T2031, 16c26-27. 35 See Samayabhedoparacanacakra, T2031, 15b16-17. 36 Vij¤ånakåya: ������T1539, 535a8. 37 Vij¤ånakåya: �����������������������T1539, 535a19-20. 18 ZHIHUA YAO 38 Kathåvatthu IX.4: anusayå anårammaƒå; Samayabhedoparacanacakra: � �...�����T2031, 15c28-29. 39 Kathåvatthu IX.5: ¤åƒa√ anårammaƒan. 40 ›åriputråbhidharma: �������T1548, 593c17. 41 Kathåvatthu IX.6: at∂tånågatårammaƒa√ citta√ anårammaƒan. 42 ›åriputråbhidharma: ���������, �������T1548, 593c17-18. 43 Vij¤ånakåya: ��������, ����? ���������T1539, 535a19-20. REFERENCES Kathåvatthu ascribed to Tissa Moggaliputta. Taylor, A. C., ed. The Kathåvatthu. London: Påli Text Society, 1894-1897; Cha¢¢ha Sa∆gåyana CD edition (v. 3.0), 1999. Kathåvatthu-a¢¢hakathå of Buddhaghosa. Jayawickrama, N. A., ed. Kathåvatthuppakaraƒa-a¢¢hakathå. London: Påli Text Society, 1979. Samayabhedoparacanacakra of Vasumitra, trans. Xuanzang��, T2031; Tibetan translation gZhung lugs kyi bye brag bkod paíi ëkhor lo, trans. Dharmåkara and Bzang skyong, Peking 5639. ›åriputråbhidharma, trans. Dharmaya‹as and Dharmagupta, T1548. Vij¤ånakåya of Deva‹arman, trans. Xuanzang, T1539. Yibu zonglun lun shuji������� of Kuiji��, X844. Cox, Collett. 1988. ìOn the Possibility of a Nonexistent Object of Consciousness: Sarvåstivådin and Dår¶¢åntika Theories.î Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 11(1): 31-87. _____. 1995. Disputed DharmasóEarly Buddhist Theories on ExistenceóAn Annotated Translation of the Section on Factors Dissociated from Thought from Sa∆ghabhadraís Nyåyånusåra. Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph Series 11, Tokyo. Dhammajoti, K.L. 2007a. Abhidharma Doctrine and Controversy on Perception. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, the University of Hong Kong. _____. 2007b. Sarvåstivåda Abhidharma. Hong Kong: Centre of Buddhist Studies, the University of Hong Kong. Kwan, Siu Tong. 2007. ìThe Semantic Problem of the Non-existent Object in Abhidharma Buddhism.î Journal of Buddhist Studies 5: 243-58. Lü Cheng��. 1991. Lü Cheng foxue lunzhu xuanji��������. Jinan: Qi Lu shushe. Sakamoto Yukio����.1981. Abidatsuma no kenkyμu�������. Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha. 19Some Mahåså√ghika Arguments for the Cognition Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids. 1969 [c1915]. Points of Controversy; or, Subjects of discourse / being a translation of the Kathå-vatthu from the Abhidhammapi¢aka. London: Pub. for the Pali text society by Luzac & Co. Yao, Zhihua. 2005. The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition. London and New York: Routledge. _____. Forthcoming. ìNon-cognition and the Third pramåƒa.î Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition: Proceedings of the Fourth International Dharmak∂rti Conference, edited by Helmut Krasser, Eli Franco, Birgit Kellner, and Horst Lasic (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften), 497-510.