Asymmetrical Reciprocity From Recognition To Responsibility and Back* Steffen Herrmann FernUniversität in Hagen** steffen.herrmann@fernuni-hagen.de ABSTRACT. In this article, I argue that Hegel's concept of recognition and Levinas' concept of responsibility complement each other and lead to the idea of an asymmetrical reciprocity in which the origin of our social relations is not mutual equality, but rather mutual inequality. I will unfold this argument in three steps. I will first work out a fundamental asymmetry of recognition in Hegel by means of the figure of the bondsman before elucidating in a second step the asymmetry of responsibility in Levinas by means of the figure of the hostage. In the last and third step, I will correlate both asymmetries and show how far the asymmetry of recognition and the asymmetry of responsibility constantly develop from and transition into one another in our social relationships. KEYWORDS. Hegel; Levinas; Arendt; Responsibility; Master-Servant Dialectic. * Translated by Lilian Peter. ** Correspondence: Steffen Herrmann – FernUniversität in Hagen, Institut für Philosophie, Universitätstrasse 33, 58084 Hagen. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 74 Steffen Herrmann Although Hegel and Levinas may be considered two central figures for theories of intersubjectivity, there is little research on connections between the two.1 I would like to productively correlate their theories and show that their fundamental concepts – recognition and responsibility – complement each other. My proposition is that we should consider the primal scene of sociability, following Hegel and Levinas, starting from the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity: The origin of our social relations is not mutual equality, but rather mutual inequality. In order to develop this thought, I will draw on those two fundamental figures by Hegel and Levinas that display our asymmetrical relationship with others with particular sharpness, namely the figure of the bondsman and the figure of the hostage. Being a bondsman or being a hostage are, as I will show, more than just pathological forms of intersubjective relationships; they rather provide the fundamental forms of how we relate to others. Being a subject always means being subject to in a double sense: by way of being dependent upon the recognition of others as well as by way of being exposed to the responsibility for others. Hegel's and Levinas' theories of intersubjectivity started gaining greater attention in the 1990s. Authors such as Charles Taylor, Axel Honneth, Judith Butler, Jacques Derrida, Zygmunt Bauman and Simon Critchley have contributed to the fact that theories of recognition and responsibility now belong to the core of social philosophy. In the light of their interpretations, at least three differences between both theoretical traditions strike the eye. The first concerns the normative measures of what can be considered a successful form of sociality. Both theories are based upon very different ideas of the latter: While, from the perspective of the theory of recognition, social exchange is mainly about approving the other's identity, the perspective of the theory of responsibility focuses on respecting the otherness of the 1 Cf. BERNASCONI 2005, BESNO 2007, PAGES 2011, PEPERZAK 2007, 2010, REY 2006, LIEBSCH/KEINTZEL 2010. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 75 other. Where the former contemplates recognition as based upon some kind of identification, the latter contemplates it as renouncing identification. The second difference concerns the process of subjectification. Both traditions agree in that the genesis of subjectivity must be thought as starting from a communication process. They disagree, however, with regard to the question as to how this communication process is to be imagined. Where the theory of recognition starts from the subject and its desire for recognition, the theory of responsibility starts from the demand of the other. While subjectivation for the former thus means rediscovering oneself in the other, for the latter it means discovering the other within oneself. A third point of controversy, finally, is the question as to how the social bond is structured. Where the theory of recognition assumes a symmetry of social relations, the theory of alterity assumes an insurmountable asymmetry of social relations. While intersubjective relationships are structured according to the principle of mutuality for one theoretical tradition, the other assumes a unilateralism between the 'I' and the other. There are, as we can see, wide-ranging differences between the theory of recognition and the theory of responsibility. They cannot be seamlessly translated into one another. Any attempt to correlate them faces the challenge of having to take a position regarding these oppositions. There are at least three ways to proceed: The first chooses a comparative approach and examines which one of both traditions is more suitable to appropriately comprehend social relations and then decides for one or the other.2 The second way is based upon an integrative approach which tries to dissolve the oppositions between the two traditions by showing that aspects of one theory can be found in the other.3 The third way, lastly, which I will pursue in this paper, follows a complementary approach. It shows that the theory of recognition and the theory of alterity do not oppose but rather refer to 2 Cf. HONNETH 2008. 3 Cf. DÜTTMANN 2000. STAEHLER 2016 emphasises the methodological kinship between Hegel's phenomenology and the phenomenological tradition following Husserl. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 76 Steffen Herrmann one another mutually, in such a way that each of them can only be reasonably understood in conjunction with the other.4 This approach has the advantage, I believe, that it neither has to compare what cannot be compared, nor does it level out both traditions. It instead preserves the independence of both theoretical traditions in their opposition by way of showing their correlation. In the following, I would like to develop the proposition of the asymmetrical reciprocity of social relations in three steps. I will first work out a fundamental asymmetry of recognition in Hegel by means of the figure of the bondsman (1) before illucidating in a second step the asymmetry of responsibility in Levinas by means of the figure of the hostage (2). In the last and third step, I will correlate both asymmetries and show as to in how far the asymmetry of recognition and the asymmetry of responsibility constantly develop from and transition into one another in our social relationships. My final conclusion will be that sociality is not to be understood as per sample of symmetrical, but rather as per sample of asymmetrical reciprocity (3). 1. The Asymmetry of Recognition: Hegel and the Figure of the Bondsman Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, published in 1807, can be considered an important milestone in his thought regarding recognition, for here he makes the process of recognition result in the relation of lordship and bondage for the first time. The common argument is that, by reference to the dialectic of lordship and bondage, Hegel shows that relationships of mutual recognition can only be realised in reciprocal and symmetrical relations. In contrast to this classical interpretation, I would like to argue that what Hegel actually illustrates by reference to the figure of the bondsman is a constant asymmetry of recognition. In order to develop this idea, we have to bring to mind the point in 4 Cf. BEDORF 2010. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 77 Hegel's argumentation where he first introduces the relation of lordship and bondage. Before illustrating my alternative interpretation, I will first briefly outline what I call the classical interpretation.5 The classical interpretation reads the relation of lordship and bondage as the result of a struggle for recognition. The two protagonists that Hegel puts in the centre of his thought concerning the constitution of self-consciousness are in a relation of irreconcilable disaccord, which unavoidably leads to this struggle. Each of them assumes his being superior to the other and taking a favoured place in the world. As long as none of the two is willing to resign his selfconcept, a conflict develops from this discord, ending in the very moment in which it escalates from a simple competition to a fight to the death. Hegel says: «Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death struggle.»6 In the light of such a death struggle, the protagonists react in very different ways. While one looks death in the eye without any fear, the other caves in at death's door. Where one subject is willing to give up on its claim for superiority and to instead surrender to the claim for superiority of the other when facing death, the other subject appears unperturbed by the death threat – it instead holds on to its claim for superiority. According to the classical interpretation, this holding on to its own conviction is the crucial achievement of what will for Hegel later be the lord. While the bondsman clings to life and remains thus chained to his animal-like nature, the lord is able to overcome the latter. He outmasters his creaturely passions, instincts and fears and manages to keep up the image that he has of himself. Put otherwise: He would rather die for his beliefs than giving them up and living in chains. It is not until taking up this attitude, according to Hegel, that man stays aloof from his animal-like existence. This thought becomes clear in another work where Hegel speaks of suicide: «The human being alone is able to 5 I have developed this thought in detail in HERRMANN 2012. 6 HEGEL 1977, 113-4f. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 78 Steffen Herrmann abandon all things, even his own life.»7 Human existence comes to itself in the lord because for him the humane dimension of his life with its values, beliefs and mindsets outvalues his creaturely being and the needs, desires and affects coming with it. My alternative interpretation of the lordship and bondage relation assumes that the struggle for recognition is more complex than posited by the classical interpretation. This begins with the fact that in the Phenomenology, the struggle is not abandoned before one of the participants dies (as Hegel had stated in earlier writings during his time in Jena), but instead fought out until the very end. For the protagonists, the fight to the death does not remain a mere anticipation; it becomes bitter reality. One subject initially survives the struggle as the winner before then deciding to bow to the other as the bondsman. I believe it is crucial to consider this process in order to understand as to why Hegel makes the struggle for recognition result in the lordship and bondage relation in the Phenomenology for the first time: It enables him to show in how far recognition may become the reason of inequality and asymmetrical dependency. Let us thus review again what Hegel says: In the Phenomenology, we follow the development of the self-consciousness that survives because it has killed the other. Hegel himself makes very clear that the history of experience of the self-consciousness leads up to the point at which it has «survived this struggle».8 On this basis, the interpretation of the struggle shifts its focus: The question is then no longer which one of the two subjects has faced the threat of death, but rather what surviving this struggle means for the subject. Hegel's answer is very clear: Being the winner of the struggle is not so much a sign of braveness but rather what causes the subject to fail. The subject has to realise that in as much as it has destroyed its counterpart, its being certain of its own self-concept – which was supposed to be fulfilled when winning the fight – has become questionable. «This trial by death however», Hegel states, «does away with the truth which was 7 HEGEL 2003 § 5 Addition. 8 HEGEL 1977, 114. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 79 supposed to issue from it, and so, too, with the certainty of self generally.»9 In the context of the fight to the death, the subject fails in so far as the other that it has killed can no longer approve its selfconcept. When killing the other, the subject inherently kills the condition of possibility of conscious certainty of itself. The conclusion that the self-consciousness draws from its survival must be seen in the light of this loss of its self-certainty. Hegel says: «In this experience, self-consciousness learns that life is as essential to it as pure self-consciousness».10 The surviving subject realises that it must maintain life in order to fulfill itself as a self-consciousness. It is this discovery that represents the crucial turning point in the progression of this history of experience. When encountering a human being the next time, the subject will no longer seek conflict; quite the reverse, it will seek submission. It will approve the superiority of the other and recognise him as its lord. The reason for this self-imposed bondage is that it guarantees the subject the stability of its self-concept. So long as the bondsman approves the lord, he will in return receive recognition from the latter. The bondsman is thus ready for submission because he will, in return, receive at least the amount of recognition from the lord that he needs in order to achieve a minimal form of self-certainty.11 The submission of the bondsman is thus, according to my alternative interpretation, not due to his lack of bravery but must rather be understood in the light of his dependency upon recognition. Accepting the submissive relationship is, from the bondsman's perspective, a result from his experience of frustration: He has to realise that, in order to achieve certainty, he is dependent upon others. Without recognition, however, he must come to doubt his real existence in the surrounding world: Doesn't he actually live in a condition of invisibility? Hegel describes this condition elsewhere as «waking [...] dreaming».12 When talking of invisibility, Hegel brings a 9 HEGEL 1977, 114. 10 HEGEL 1977, 115. 11 Cf. also Paul Redding for the argument that the bondsman is willing to submit in return for a form of self-certainty (REDDING 2009, 106). 12 HEGEL 1986, 199. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 80 Steffen Herrmann description into play that is also used frequently in discussions regarding contemporary social theory in order to address the social exclusion of subaltern subjects. Without the recognition of others – this is the core idea in both Hegel and contemporary social theory – people are endangered to drop out of the circle of those counted as the members of a society.13 What is at stake in the struggle for recognition, as we are now able to conclude, is not so much the protagonists' physical life, but rather their 'being-in-the-world'. What Hegel wants to show us when transitioning to the lord and bondage relation is that the development of this relationship results from the very fear of losing this being-inthe-world. The «absolute Lord»14 that makes the bondsman's consciousness surrender, according to my subaltern interpretation, is not so much the fear of physical death, but rather the fear of social death. The bondsman gets to feel what social death means once he has killed the other and is left behind without recognition. Hegel thus says: «In that experience it [self-consciousness] has been quite unmanned, has trembled in every fibre of its being, and everything solid and stable has been shaken to its foundations.»15 Experiencing the dissolution of one's own existence as described by Hegel here means transitioning to the experience of social invisibility as a result from the loss of self-certainty. According to my subaltern interpretation, the bondsman represents the very figure that reveals how existential our dependency upon recognition is. He would rather accept a disregarding form of recognition that enables him to reach at least some form of self-certainty than not being able to achieve any self-certainty at all. One will certainly want to object at this point that I have so far only reconstructed half of what Hegel says. And indeed his thoughts are, eventually, meant to sublate the aforementioned asymmetry of recognition. The argument at the core of the lordship and bondage 13 On invisibility cf. HONNETH 2001 and BAUMAN 2003. 14 HEGEL 1977, 117. 15 HEGEL 1977, 117. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 81 dialectic says: In so far as the lord has to realise that being recognised by someone he despises is worth nothing, he ends up in an «existential impasse».16 Recognition relationships, according to this thought, contain a potential for emancipation, since they aren't satisfying for the priviledged agent unless a symmetrical equality between both agents gets established. Based on this assumption, Hegel then concludes that recognition relationships can only be realised in mutual and symmetrical relations. I think that Hegel's conclusion is wrong. There are many ways to obstruct the dissolution of the lordship and bondage relation, but this is not even my point: I think that his argument simply does not work. Let us remember the self-concept with which the agent who later becomes the lord faces up to his counterpart: He is convinced at this point to be superior to the other. Believing in his own superiority necessarily means regarding the other as inferior. Put otherwise: The lord's self-concept depends on his being in an asymmetrical social relationship with the other, and the bondsman's submission approves this self-concept. There is just no reason for him to doubt or alter it. Hegel argues that the lord's disregarding the bondsman devaluates the recognition of the latter and thus leaves the lord unsatisfied. The error he commits is that he presumes what is yet to be shown: The failure that Hegel speaks of only makes sense if the subject seeks the recognition of someone equal but has to realise that the only recognition it receives comes from someone inferior, and that it thus does not find what it is looking for. But the subject of this history of experience does not actually seek the recognition of someone equal – it seeks the recognition of its superiority by someone inferior, and this is exactly the kind of recognition it receives from the bondsman. So in his aim to achieve certainty in his self-concept by being recognised by the bondsman, the lord can indeed be successful. His disregard of the bondsman does not necessarily entail a devaluation of his recognition. Quite the opposite: The bondsman's recognition consists in the very gesture of certifying his own inferiority and thus confirming the self16 KOJÈVE 1980, 19. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 82 Steffen Herrmann concept of the lord. Up to this point, my argument was that the lordship and bondage relationship contains an asymmetry of recognition that is not necessarily doomed to failure. In the next step, I would like to show that this relationship does not simply depict a random empirical fact, but is rather socio-ontologically fundamental to sociality as such. The structure of the lordship and bondage relation being inherent in every intersubjective relationship becomes clear when considering our communicative relationships. The reciprocity of speech and response, understood as an exchange of recognition rather than a mere exchange of information, contains the very form of asymmetrical dependency that Hegel thought of with the figure of the bondsman. The reason for this lies in the diachrony of our communicative relations: Speech and response cannot take place at the same time. They must come after each other for otherwise we would be exposed to but a babel of voices. So the mutuality of recognition can only be established step by step. Every and any process of recognition must begin with a unilateral advance of recognition: One subject recognises another subject without being able to know at this point whether it will in return itself receive recognition from the other subject. In order to achieve mutual recognition, one subject has to take the risk of first unilaterally rendering recognition.17 Let us make this clear by reference to an example: Greeting someone and the other person's greeting in return can be considered a mutual process of recognition in which the agents communicate that they are of importance for one another. In order to achieve mutuality, one subject has to initiate the communication and greet first. It thus renders an advance of recognition without knowing whether its recognition will be returned. Even more: In the moment in which the subject addresses another, the latter is no longer a random other; it becomes a significant other whose response has authority and weight. The initiation of communication comes along with the unequal situation in which the subject that speaks first is much more dependent upon the subject it addresses than the other way around. 17 Marcel Hénaff argues in a similar way (HÉNAFF 2010, Part II). Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 83 Neither does the addressed subject necessarily have to greet in return, nor can the subject that speaks first just ignore a disrespectful response, since it has awarded the other with a certain authority. This asymmetrical dependency is not empirically contingent but rooted in the very structure of communication as such. It thus cannot simply be sublated by the participants. Even if the two subjects have promised each other in advance that they will greet one another, this promise does not guarantee that in the moment of communication the other will actually greet in return. It is the asymmetrical structure of the communication process that is indicative of a socio-ontological interpretation of the bondsman figure. A subject that addresses another subject in order to receive recognition renders an advance of recognition. It recognises the other as someone who is as such worth being recognised, and at the same time as someone whose recognition it would like to receive. But a subject can never know for sure whether it will actually receive the recognition it is seeking; therefore, addressing another creates a situation of asymmetrical dependency. The relation between the subject that addresses and the subject that is being addressed equals that of the bondsman and the lord. What prevails in both instances is an asymmetry of recognition. The result of my alternative interpretation of Hegel's thoughts is thus that recognition and asymmetry are not necessarily contradictory. Quite the reverse, they are equiprimordial in so far as they form the basis of our intersubjective communication relations. 2. The Asymmetry of Responsibility: Levinas and the Figure of the Hostage Hegel's point of departure is the addressing subject. Levinas' philosophical signature, however, is to start from the subject that is being addressed. In asking what it means to be someone's addressee, responsivity is the register that then comes into focus when contemplating social relations. Levinas' social philosophy is arranged Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 84 Steffen Herrmann around the figure of the hostage.18 It first appears in an essay from 1967 entitled Language and Proximity; in his subsequent writings, it becomes more and more prominent before finally occupying centre stage in his late work Otherwise than Being. The figure of the hostage is, on the one hand, designed to reveal a morality that is fundamental to social relations. On the other hand, Levinas uses it to make clear that this morality is rooted in an ineluctable asymmetry. His core idea is that the source of our morality is not the subject's potential for reflection – be it in the sense of using rules of sagacity, of universalising guiding principles or of orienting oneself by hierarchies of values – but rather its exposition to alterity. In order to understand this exposition, we must take a closer look at Levinas' phenomenology. What does it mean to encounter another human being? For Levinas, the primal scene of intersubjective encounters is the situation of the face-to-face. He contemplates this situation as an essentially communicative scene in which an addressing subject and an addressed subject face one another. What fascinates Levinas about the face-to-face situation is the mutual and unveiled gaze into the face of another human being. Levinas' fascination for this situation of mutual gaze is easy to comprehend when considering the difference between looking into a 'living face' as opposed to a 'portrayed face'. The gaze at a portrayed face – be it a painting, a photograph or a mask – remains uninterrupted. The colour, texture, tone and shade of the eyes can as leisurely be perceived as the pores and wrinkles of the skin or the contoures of the eyes, nose and cheeks. The portrayal of a face can thus be perceived piece by piece. This is not the case with the living face – it does not allow us to dwell, our gaze is being perturbed. It is hard to look the other in the eye without doing something. For Levinas, this is due to the fact that the other is able to reverse the gaze relation. While the portrayed face silently tolerates the gaze, the other can himself look at us. And the gaze of the other demands a gesture: a smile, casting down one's eyes, or a grimace. We are of course free to 18 «[...] man must be thought from the condition or incondition of hostage [...]» (LEVINAS 2006, 68). Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 85 refuse these gestures and to just look the other motionless in the eye – but the fact that this costs us an exceptional effort only bears witness to the demand of the other. Levinas thus states: «The Other imposes himself as an exigency».19 The question – and the concern of Levinas' philosophy – is what it means to be affected by this demand. Its basic structures can best be reconstructed by virtue of the three meanings of the French word répondre: (i) "Répondre à qn." as "respond to sb.": Levinas contemplates the subject as a responding subject. His basic proposition is that we cannot leave the demand of the other unanswered, for in the moment of confrontation we cannot act as if nothing were happening. We are forced, rather, to somehow react to the other's demand. «It is that discourse», says Levinas, «that obliges the entering into discourse.»20 Even remaining silent is a response to the demand of the other. Saying nothing does not mean doing nothing, for it means to disregard or ignore the other. There is no way of evading the other's demand. The demand of the other cannot be neutralised: Refusing a response is still a reaction that confirms the very demand that it is trying to reject.21 (ii) "Répondre de qc." as "to answer for sth.": When in everyday life we speak of taking over responsibility for something, we refer to acts of which we consider ourselves to be the originators, given we have acted voluntarily and not under constraint. The concept of freedom thus seems to outline the condition under which we are able to take over responsibility. How about our responsibility when the demand of the other forces us to respond? Can we then still claim responsibility for our response? Levinas answers this question starting from the concept of «invested freedom».22 He uses this concept to show that the subject not being released from its responsibility despite being forced to respond is actually a characteristic of the face-to-face-relation. The subject must in fact take over responsibility for something of which it 19 LEVINAS 1979, 87. 20 LEVINAS 1979, 201. 21 As an example, cf. PEPERZAK 2012, 4: «Any response changes the preceding speaker into a listener, who, in turn, responds to the responder.» 22 LEVINAS 1979, 84. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 86 Steffen Herrmann is neither the origin nor the beginning. Levinas speaks of a «responsibility for the other, for what has not begun in me».23 The reason why this is a case of responsibility is that the subject is indeed forced to respond; but what and how it responds is up to the subject alone. We may speak of being 'forced' to give a certain response in particular situations of everyday life; this is, however, a phrase to express that we have actually decided on a certain response. The demand of the other always leaves the subject the possibility of freedom within a certain unfreedom, and this is why Levinas can say: «The will is free to assume this responsibility in whatever sense it likes; it is not free to refuse this responsibility itself.»24 (iii) "Répondre de qc. devant qn." as "to answer sth. before sb.": The last step of Levinas' thoughts is to make clear that the demand of the other does not only force to take over responsibility for one's response, but also to frame this response in moral terms. His proposition is that our social relationships always appear in the light of morality. In order to illucidate this idea, I would like to draw on the historical event that has deeply influenced Levinas' thinking: the persecution and extermination of European Jews by the National Socialists. Levinas' proposition must be understood in its full radicality: Even among the Nazis, morality cannot have been entirely suspended. What the Jews had to go through when entering the camp can be interpreted as attempts to neutralise the normative demand coming from them. Taking away their clothes, shaving their heads and tattooing a number into their skin would then have to be understood as attempts to transform the individuals into a uniform mass of bodies as soon as they arrived – bodies that were supposed to appear as nothing but things. From this perspective, the internment ritual would have to be regarded as a practice of dehumanisation, aiming to suspend the normative demand that came from the enslaved and to disconnect any moral consciousness on the perpetrators' side, so as to enable a 23 LEVINAS 1978, 125. 24 LEVINAS 1979, 218-9. Cf. also Derrida: «This responsibility that assigns freedom to us without leaving it with us, as it were – we see it coming from the other. » (DERRIDA 2005, 231-2). Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 87 ruthless extermination procedure. We know from many survivers' reports that all these attempts of dehumanisation were, to some extent, doomed to failure: Humans can be treated as if they were things, but they cannot actually be turned into things.25 Put otherwise: It is possible to disregard the demand of the other, but it is impossible to suspend it. The ongoing desire of the camp wardens to degrade and torture the inmates despite their already miserable situation can thus be understood as evidence for the impossibility of neutralising the morality of alterity. From this perspective, the torment of the inmates would not just be a hollow form of sadism but rather it would bear witness to the persistence of the moral consciousness the perpetrators were unable to get rid off, despite all efforts to dehumanise the other. Their immorality would thus need to be understood as the irreducible morality of alterity because it still relates to this register, even if in a negative form. Levinas was not (or not primarily) interested in such a perspective on the perpetrators. Whenever he seems to be speaking of the camp, his perspective is that of the persecutees. But his thoughts on the subject matter are nonetheless surprising. He writes that the responsibility for the other goes so far as to the subject being responsible even «for its persecutor».26 This thought that may seem a little disturbing at first can be interpreted in different ways. One may argue that what Levinas is thinking of is not really the National Socialist perpetrators, but rather the fundamental communication structure, namely being haunted by the demand of the other. An argument against this interpretation is, however, that Levinas' theory must prove itself specifically in extraordinary situations, given that the proposition of the morality of alterity is supposed to actually be socioontologically fundamental. For this reason, I think that we have to understand Levinas' thought in the sense that the victims of the 25 Cf. Robert Antelme who speaks of the executioner as someone powerless, for his only power is the power of murder. This means that «He can kill a human being, but he cannot turn him into something different» (ANTELME 1987, 305). This thought has been theoretically tidied up by Avishai MARGALIT (1996). 26 LEVINAS 1978, 126. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 88 Steffen Herrmann National Socialist persecution cannot secede from being morally exposed to their perpetrators. Levinas' dictum of the «impossibility of killing» may clarify this idea.27 I believe that the way this statement must be understood is that one cannot take another one's life and declare it a 'neutral' killing, even if the other used to be one's own torturer. Because of their moral exposition, human beings cannot but understand violence as 'justified' or 'unjustified' revenge, 'legitimate' or 'illegitimate' self-defense or as 'rightful' or 'unrightful' liberation. Being exposed to the demand of the other makes it impossible for us to contemplate social relationships other than in the normatively loaded vocabulary of morality and immorality. Returning to the point from where we started, we can now better understand as to why the figure of the hostage is emblematic for Levinas' thought. The other human makes us their hostage in so far as his demand engages us morally. Of course this does not mean that the other makes us do the right thing per se. Quite the opposite – Levinas says that the face of the other is also «inviting us to an act of violence».28 What is crucial is that we cannot but try to justify violence against others. This makes clear that our relationships with others can only be understood in the light of morality. Morality doesn't spring from a devotion to the other in an empathetic, compassionate or generous way, but rather from the visitation by the other. It is not based upon a relation of mutual equality and of symmetrical exchange between two parties, but rather on the relation of a unilateral asymmetry by way of which the subject finds itself as inherently in the grip of morality. Levinas thus states: «The responsibility for another, an unlimited responsibility which the strict book-keeping of the free and non-free does not measure, requires subjectivity as an irreplaceable hostage.»29 27 LEVINAS 1979, 199. 28 LEVINAS 1985, 86. 29 LEVINAS 1978, 124. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 89 3. Asymmetrical Reciprocity: From Hegel to Levinas and Back In the aforegoing paragraphs I have reconstructed Hegel's theory of recognition and Levinas' theory of responsibility. I have argued that both Hegel and Levinas reveal a fundamental asymmetry at the basis of social relations. In the following, I would like to argue that both asymmetries are mutually intertwined. In doing so, I will follow Derrida's proposition that the relation between Hegel and Levinas can be described as «transcendental symmetry of two empirical asymmetries».30 In order to make this proposition plausible, I will show that both thinkers' theories each contain an empty space that can be filled by the other. The leading question for my argumentation will be: In how far do the asymmetry of recognition and the asymmetry of responsibility merge in the figure of asymmetrical reciprocity? Let us first take another look at Hegel. The empty space of his thinking becomes specifically clear in his description of the «movement of recognition» that precedes his reflections on the dialectic of lordship and bondage. Hegel describes it as a threefold process that begins with the subject coming out of itself, its attempt to supersede, and, lastly, its return into itself.31 What is crucial for my argumentation in this paper is the way in which he introduces the second subject after this process. «Now, this movement of selfconsciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in this way been represented as the action of one self-consciousness, but this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well. [...] Thus the movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses.»32 Hegel thus stresses the necessity of describing the search for recognition as a twofold activity. But in just adding the other subsequently, he reduces 30 DERRIDA 1978, 157. Adriaan T. Peperzak comes to a similar conclusion in his contemplation of Hegel and Levinas, namely that a social relationship can be described as «twofold or chiastic asymmetry» (PEPERZAK 2000, 161). 31 HEGEL 1977, 111. 32 HEGEL 1977, 111-2. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 90 Steffen Herrmann him to a behavioral double that is not affected by the behaviour of the other, but rather acts in the exact same way. Put otherwise: Because Hegel describes the activity of both subjects as «double movement», he loses sight of the fact that what one subject does inherently affects the other, and that the other has to cope with this. We can thus state that what is characteristic of Hegel's account is its aperspectivity – he does not distinguish between the perspective of the addressing subject and that of the addressed subject. What therefore remains unthought is what it means for a subject to be confronted with the other subject's dependency upon recognition. Put otherwise: Hegel teaches us the meaning of the desire for recognition, but disregards a description of what it means to be confronted with this desire. Levinas' theory of responsibility allows for filling the empty space just outlined, in so far as the demand of the other can be described as a confrontation with the desire for recognition. It is interesting in this context that in an essay from 1978, Levinas describes the «search for recognition by the other man in Hegel» as one of the few moments in the history of philosophy in which the alterity of the other appeared.33 He elsewhere speaks of the «way the Other has of seeking my recognition» and makes thus clear that his philosophy is a change of perspective in giving priority to thinking about what it means to be affected by the dependency upon recognition.34 If we understand Levinas' theory of responsibility as an answer to Hegel's theory of recognition, it becomes clear that the desire for recognition can, with Levinas, be understood as a call for response. The reason for this is that the demand that is at the core of Levinas' thought can be interpreted as the most fundamental way in which the desire for recognition, as posited by Hegel, articulates itself. In so far as any kind of answer confirms, to some extent, the call it is responding to, giving a response can be considered the most fundamental form of confirming the desire for recognition. Levinas' theory of responsibility 33 LEVINAS 1982, 119. 34 LEVINAS 1996, 70. Simon Critchley also argues along these lines: «Ethical experience is, first and foremost, the approval of a demand, a demand that demands approval.» (CRITCHLEY 2007, 16). Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 91 can thus be interpreted as the essential flip side of Hegel's theory of recognition. What I have outlined above shows how far the asymmetry of recognition transforms into an asymmetry of responsibility. The first part of my argumentation, the asymmetrical reciprocity of social relations, has thus been established. What remains to be shown in a second step is how far the asymmetry of responsibility transforms back into an asymmetry of recognition. It is this transformation that now reveals an empty space in Levinas' thinking. Just as Hegel focuses unilaterally on the desire for recognition, Levinas concentrates unilaterally on the necessity of responsibility. His subject merges entirely in its responsibility for the other. Levinas thus misses the fact that by way of answering, the subject does not only avow for the other, but also inherently conceptualises itself coming from the other. When stating in Otherwise than Being or beyond Essence: «This book has exposed my passivity, passivity as the-one-for-the-other; [...] The-onefor-the-other goes to the extent of the-one-being-hostage-for-the-other. In its identity invoked the one is irreplaceable, and does not return to itself [...]»,35 Levinas misses the fact that every and any form of taking over responsibility also contains a conception of self and thus a projected return to oneself. I would like to clarify this point by referring to Hannah Arendt. 36 In the paragraph «The Disclosure of the Agent in Speech and Action» in Vita Activa, she reflects about how a person's individuality expresses itself. For Arendt, it is not so much what one thinks of oneself and claims publicly that determines «who somebody is»,37 but rather what our speech discloses involuntarily about ourselves. When speaking, we always have to take a stand in relation to the plurality of human beings. How we deal with the demand of the other – be it a child, a friend, a stranger – in concrete situations reveals much more about who we are than the abstract ideals that we have of ourselves. In the 35 LEVINAS 1978, 141. 36 On the relation between Levinas and Arendt, cf. TOPOLSKI 2015. 37 ARENDT 1958, 178. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 92 Steffen Herrmann grapple of speech we show who we are, by means of how we respond. A response, however, is not meaningful as such; it becomes meaningful once others have recognised it as a response. Arendt contemplates speech as having to be stored in «stories», for this is the only way in which the particularity of how we act can be comprehended in its full complexity and in which stereotypes and character masks can be avoided.38 Arendt's reflections on self-disclosure make clear how the circle of the twofold asymmetry of social relations becomes complete in the giving of an answer. Starting from Levinas' reflections, we saw how the dependency upon recognition diagnosed by Hegel transforms into the subject's being exposed to responsibility. By referring to Hannah Arendt, we then saw how being exposed to responsibility transforms back into the dependency upon recognition. The subject thus permanently sways between being a bondsman and being a hostage; it is subjected not only to its call for recognition, but also to its gift of responsibility. This twofold subjection shows that subjects bring about their social existence in relation to one another. The proposition of the asymmetrical reciprocity of social relations designates an intersubjective process that moves from the asymmetry of recognition to the asymmetry of responsibility and back. Shining a light on this process was the last step of my argumentation. Before finishing this paper, I would like to briefly draw on one last question: What does considering sociality as being based upon the idea of asymmetrical reciprocity change for the theory of intersubjectivity? I would like to answer this question by reference to Iris Marion Young's reflections. In her essay Asymmetrical Reciprocity, she argues that the idea of symmetry is deeply rooted in our ideas of intersubjectivity.39 This can be seen in everyday situations whenever we prompt others to think about something from a different perspective («Just think about what this must feel like for X!»). Young sees the problem of this idea in the fact that it considers 38 ARENDT 1958, 184f. 39 YOUNG 2001. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) Asymmetrical Reciprocity 93 intersubjectivity on the basis of the reversibility of social perspectives. This idea is reflected in those philosophical theories that argue for subjects as being able to participate in a 'view from nowhere' in which they can transgress their particular stance to something more general. The symmetry of social relations is, in this tradition, based on all social agents being able to take a general stance. The same is true for the tradition in which the symmetry of social relations is based upon the idea of a 'view from somewhere'. The general stance, however, is in this tradition not situated beyond our world but much rather, it is understood as part of it, in so far as it draws on ethical life and the norms, values and ideals of a community. Although the general stance is here no longer abstract but based in the lifeworld, the assumption that intersubjectivity is based upon taking a supraindividual stance remains dominant also in this tradition. Young criticises both traditions as being unable to account for the plurality of social relations. Neither can social perspectives simply be exchanged, nor would this even always be desirable. Taking over somebody else's perspective might in fact often be usurping and blind for their specific perspective. To give an example, Young speaks of the dispute between white and black feminists in the second wave of the feminist movement.40 While the former wanted to form a union with the latter on the basis of the universal subject woman, the latter pointed out that there were severe differences between them that ran the risk of being made invisible by way of the universalisation of the subject woman. Starting from this example and others, Young argues that social relationships are always local and require situated evaluations that account for the differences between social agents. Put otherwise: Successful sociality does not necessarily require that we would think or act in the same way if in the situation of the other, but rather that we give us and others the chance to act out of a specific situatedness. In this perspective, intersubjectivity is thus not based upon taking a supraindividual stance in which particular perspectives overlap, but rather upon the gathering of particular standpoints that 40 YOUNG 2001, 210f. Metodo Vol. 5, n. 1 (2017) 94 Steffen Herrmann differ in their perspectives. Asymmetrical rather than symmetrical relations are at the basis of successful sociality. In Young's words: «Through such dialogue that recognizes the asymmetry of others people can enlarge their thinking in at least two ways. 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