volume	16,	no.	3 january	2016 What Is Sexual Orientation? Robin A. Dembroff Princeton University © 2016 Robin	A.	Dembroff This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/016003/> 1. Introduction Ordinary discourse is filled with discussions about "sexual orientation".	Everyone	seems	to	have	opinions	about	it	-	whether	it	should be	a	legally	protected	class,	whether	it	is	apt	for	moral	judgment,	and whether	Lady	Gaga	is	right	that,	whatever	our	sexual	orientations,	we were	"born	this	way".1 This	discourse	suggests	a	common	understanding	of	what	"sexual orientation"	is.	But	even	a	cursory	search	turns	up	vastly	differing,	conflicting,	and	sometimes	ethically	troubling	characterizations	of	sexual orientation.	Consider the following, taken from	(respectively)	a	professional scientific association, an LGBTQ	advocacy organization, a neuroscientist,	and	a	philosopher: 1. Sexual	orientation	refers	to	an	enduring	pattern	of	emotional,	romantic,	and/or	sexual	attractions	to	men,	women,	or	both	sexes.2 2. 'Sexual	orientation'	is	the	preferred	term	used	when	referring to	an individual's	physical	and/or	emotional	attraction	to	the	same	and/or	opposite	gender.3 3. Sexual	orientation	...	is	the	trait	that	predisposes	us	to experience	sexual	attraction	to	people	of the	same	sex as	ourselves	(homosexual,	gay,	or	lesbian),	to	persons	of the	other	sex	(heterosexual	or	straight),	or	to	both	sexes (bisexual).4 4. A	person's	sexual	orientation	is	based	on	his	or	her	sexual	desires	and	fantasies	and	the	sexual	behaviors	he	or she	is	disposed	to	engage	in	under	ideal	conditions.5 1. Lady	Gaga	(2011).	"Born	This	Way".	Born This Way.	Abbey	Road	Studios. 2. The	American	Psychological	Association	(2008). 3. Human	Rights	Campaign	(2014). 4. LeVay	(2011),	1. 5. Stein	(1999),	45. ImprintPhilosophers' robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) The conceptual jumble surrounding sexual orientation suggests that the topic is overripe for analytical philosophical exploration.9 While the	delay in such exploration	may	be	due to	metaphysicians' historical	focus	on	discovering	and	articulating	metaphysically	necessary	truths	about	reality,	recent	feminist	critiques	have	brought	topics related to	contingent	social realities into the	subfield's focus.	Philosophers such as	Charlotte	Witt and Sally	Haslanger have	begun, for example,	rich	and	growing	literatures	on	metaphysical	questions	concerning	gender	and	race.	But	sexual	orientation	has	yet	to	receive	due in-depth	metaphysical	exploration. This	paper	lays	the	groundwork	for	one	such	in-depth	exploration and,	in	so	doing,	encourages	further	analytic	philosophical	discussion of sexual orientation. Its target is twofold: (i) the everyday concept of	sexual	orientation,	and	(ii)	the	corresponding	concepts	associated with the taxonomy of sexual orientation (e. g., gay, straight). These concepts	are	highly interwoven,	since the	concept	of	sexual	orientation	constrains	the	taxonomy.	(For	example,	a	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	centrally	concerns	a	relation	between	a	subject's	own	sex [or	gender]	and	the	sex	[or	gender]	of	the	persons	they	are	attracted to	will imply	a taxonomy	containing	correspondingly relational	concepts.)	My	project	sets	out	to	engineer	a	revised	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	implies	a	new	taxonomical	schema	of	sexual	orientation. Both	the	revised	concept	and	the	new	taxonomical	schema	are	intended	to	elucidate	and	improve our	everyday	concepts	in	light	of	particular theoretical	and	socio-political	purposes.	And,	importantly,	this	project is	limited	in	scope:	the	proposed	concept	and	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation	are	not	meant to	apply	across	all cultural contexts. Instead, my	project	constructs	a	concept	that	is	both	responsive	to	and	critical people, I	encourage	you	with	all	good	will to incorporate	a	gender-neutral singular	pronoun	of	your	own	choosing	into	ordinary	English	discourse. 9. While sexual orientation has received little attention in the analytical tradition, the	continental tradition	has	a	rich	history	of thinking	about	sexual orientation	-	see Foucault (1980) and	Halperin (1990) and (2002), among others. To	name just	a few	of the	worries that	might	be raised for these characterizations: (1)–(3)	assume	binary	categories	of	sex	or	gender (i. e.,	male/female	or	men/women)6;	(2)	and	(3)	disagree	on	whether sexual	orientation	concerns	gender-attraction	(attraction	to individuals	with certain genders) or sex-attraction (attraction to individuals with	certain	sexes);	and	(4)	appeals	to	the	opaque	notion	of	"ideal	conditions"	for	acting	on	one's	sexual	desires	(more	on	this	later). Characterizations	like	these	-	assuming	they	are	attempts	to	elucidate	a	shared,	pre-existing	concept	of	sexual	orientation	-	reveal	that we	have	an	extremely	poor	grasp	of	this	concept.	And	even	if	the	characterizations	are	stipulative,	we	have	good	reason	to	resist	adopting many	of them.	Inadequate	understandings	of	sexual	orientation	can reinforce	heteronormative	assumptions	(i. e.,	assumptions	that	heterosexuality	should	be	privileged	within	society)	by	maintaining	a	majority/minority	divide	between	heterosexuality	and	other	sexual	orientations	that	historically	has	been	normatively	loaded	and	policed.	They also	can	reinforce	cisnormative	assumptions	(i. e.,	assumptions	that	all persons	are	cisgender	-	that	is,	that	all	persons'	genders	are	the	ones assigned	to	them	at	birth	on	the	basis	of	their	anatomy)	by	failing	to provide	recognition	or	clarity	within	the	sexual-orientation	taxonomy for	persons	who	are	not	cisgender	or	who	are	attracted	to	persons	who are	not	cisgender.7, 8 6. I	here	understand	sex	as	a	classification	solely	on the	basis	of	human	bodies' physical characteristics and gender as a classification (at least in part) on	the	basis	of	social	situatedness.	For	more	on	this	distinction,	see	section 3.	Also, I	acknowledge	that	gender-identity	(the	gender	one	self-attributes) and	gender-expression (the	external characteristics and	behaviors that are socially	interpreted	as	communicating	that	one	belongs	to	a	certain	gender category)	can	come	apart.	In	this	paper,	talk	of	gender-attraction	is	most	easily	understood	as	attraction	to	certain	gender	expressions,	but	I	leave	open that	persons'	gender	identities	can	also	play	a	role	in	gender-attraction. 7. Often	this	cisnormative	assumption	is	paired	with	the	views	that	gender	is biologically	determined	by	one's anatomy,	and that	gender is essentially	a biological	rather	than	social	category. 8. Throughout	this	paper,	I	will	use	'their'	as	a	gender-neutral	singular	pronoun. Some	people	may	take	grammatical	issue	with	this.	If	you	are	one	of	those robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) (if	any)	our	ordinary	concept	of	x	tracks.	The	last	project,	and	the	one that	best	categorizes	the	methodology	of	this	paper,	is	what	I	will	call the	"engineering	project":	it	asks	about	the	purposes	of	our	concept	of x,	and	(if	necessary)	improves	or	replaces	the	existing	concept	to	better	realize	the	purposes	we	want	this	concept	to	fulfill.11, 12	This	project takes	seriously	that,	as	Alexis	Burgess	and	David	Plunkett	put	it,	"our conceptual	repertoire	determines	not	only	what	we	can	think	and	say but	also,	as	a	result,	what	we	can	do	and	who	we	can	be".13	Given	this important	feature	of	our	conceptual	repertoire,	we	can	think	of	the	engineering	project	as	one	that	sets	out	to	elucidate	and	possibly	revise or	replace	our	everyday	concepts	in	light	of	the	impact	we	would	like them	to	have. Importantly,	the	engineering	project	is	not	required to	replace	or even to revise an existing concept	-	what is important is that the final concept serves the proposed purposes. In some cases, these purposes	may	be	best	served	by	preserving	(e. g.)	the	ordinary	usage, connotation, or extension	of the everyday concept in	question.	To quote	Haslanger: [I]f	we	allow	that	everyday	vocabularies	serve	both	cognitive	and	practical	purposes,	purposes	that	might	also	be served	by our theorizing, then a theory offering an improved	understanding	of	our	(legitimate)	purposes	and/ or improved	conceptual resources for the tasks	at	hand might reasonably represent itself as providing a (possibly	revisionary)	account	of	the	everyday	concepts.	...	The responsibility is	ours to	define [these concepts] for	our 11. Haslanger	(2000),	32–33.	Haslanger	calls	this	the	"analytic	project".	In	order to	distinguish	it	from	"conceptual	analysis",	though,	which	is	more	akin	to	the "conceptual	project",	I	will	refer	to	it	throughout	as	the	"engineering	project". 12. Though I	do	not	want to take	a strong	stance	on the	nature	of concepts, I am	loosely	understanding	concepts	here	as	ways	of	representing	the	world.	I mean	this,	though,	in	a	deflationary	sense	that	remains	neutral	on	the	issue of	whether	concepts	can	carry	non-descriptive,	expressive	content. 13. Burgess	&	Plunkett	(2013),	1091. of	our	everyday	thinking	in	contemporary	Western	society	about	sexual	orientation. On	my	proposed	account	of	sexual	orientation,	which	I	call	"Bidimensional	Dispositionalism",	sexual	orientation	is	based	upon	a	person's sexual	behavioral	dispositions	under the	ordinary	manifesting conditions for these	dispositions (i. e., the conditions corresponding to	applications	of	the	term	'sexual	orientation'	and	related	terms),	and having	a	particular	sexual	orientation	is	based	upon	what	sex[es]	and gender[s]	of	persons	one is (or is	not)	disposed to sexually engage with	under	these	conditions.	Importantly,	these	particular	categories of	sexual	orientation	do	not	reference	one's	own	sex	or	gender.10 In	what	follows,	I	assume	non-eliminativism	about	sex	and	gender. I	use	the	terms	'male'	and	'female'	to	refer	to	sex	categories,	though	I do	not	assume	that	these	terms	exhaust	or	refer	to	discrete	sex	categories.	Similarly, I	use the terms 'man'	and 'woman' to	refer to	gender categories,	though	I	do	not	assume	that	these	terms	exhaust	or	refer	to discrete	gender	categories. 2. Methodology and Framework This	section	clarifies	my	project's	methodology	and	framework.	I	first discuss	the	project's	methodology,	and	then	turn	to	the	purposes	guiding	my	analysis	of	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	Finally,	I	distinguish	between	the	central	target	of	my	analysis	-	the	everyday	concept of	sexual	orientation	-	and	three	distinct	but	closely	related	concepts. Methodology: The Engineering Project In	her	work	on	gender,	Haslanger	points	out	the	importance	of	distinguishing	between	three	projects	that	ask	a	question	of	the	form,	What is	x?	One	project	is	conceptual:	it	asks	only	about	the	content	of	our	ordinary	concept	of	x.	Another	is	naturalistic:	it	asks	which	natural	kind 10.	Acknowledging that some people wholly lack dispositions to sexually engage	with other persons on the basis of sexor gender-attractions	will include asexuality	with regard to sex and	gender among the class of sexual orientations. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) replace	our	former	concept.	This	tension	is	fine;	I'm	not	sure	anything important	hangs	on	whether	my	project is	described	as	providing	a revised	or	replacement	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	Either	description	can	point	to	what	does matter	-	that	as	an	engineering	project,	my project	consists	of	two	parts: (I) Elucidating	purposes	ideally	served	by	our	concept	of sexual	orientation,	and (II) Re-engineering	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	(and the	corresponding	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation)	in light	of	the	purposes	described	in	(I).15 Having	now	described	the	methodology	of	my	project,	I	will	turn	to describing	purposes	that	(I	argue)	are	ideally	served	by	our	concept	of sexual	orientation	and	clarifying	my	central	target	concept.	I	will	then spend	the	remainder	of	the	paper	reconstructing	this	concept	and	its corresponding	taxonomic	schema	in	a	way	that	fulfills	these	purposes. Framework I: Purposes I	propose	that the following	purposes	are ideally	served	by	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation: (i) Clarifies the criteria for ascribing sexual orientation, as	well	as	how	these	criteria	translate	into	a	taxonomic schema	of	sexual	orientation; (ii) Is consistent with relevant social-scientific research	-	in particular, research concerning sex and gender; 15. These	parts	could	be	conceptually	divided into two	projects,	one	of	which looks for suitable concepts in light	of assigned	purposes, and the	other	of which	engineers	revised	(or	new)	concepts	that	meet	these	purposes	(should suitable	ones	not	be found	elsewhere).	For simplicity, I am including	both projects	under	the	heading	of	the	'engineering	project'. purposes. In	doing	so	we	will	want to	be responsive to some	aspects	of	ordinary	usage	(and to	aspects	of	both the	connotation	and	extension	of	the	terms).14 In	this	way,	engineering	projects	may	range	in	the	descriptiveness and	prescriptiveness	of	their	conceptual	construction.	Given	the	purposes	that	projects	assign	to	their	target	concepts,	they	might	prescribe no	revision	to	an	everyday	concept,	or	prescribe	revisions	that	(among other	things)	preserve	features	of	the	everyday	concept.	These	latter projects	are	descriptive	insofar	as	they	elucidate	and	maintain	certain features	of	the	everyday	concept,	but	prescriptive	insofar	as	they	propose	revisions	to	the	everyday	concept	in	light	of	certain	purposes. Haslanger acknowledges that, because	of this	flexibility, an	engineering	project	will	confront	issues	regarding	how	conceptually	conservative	it	intends	to	be	-	i. e.,	whether	it	intends	to	retain,	revise,	or eliminate the everyday concept. My project is somewhat conservative	in	one	sense	but	not	another.	While	-	for	reasons	I	will	soon	explain	-	it	attempts	to	preserve	the	general	extension	of	our	everyday concept	of	sexual	orientation,	it	does	not	attempt	to	preserve	many	of the	connotations	associated	with	the	term	'sexual	orientation'	or	the concepts	associated	with	our	current	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation. Given	this,	my	project	will	clarify	and	minimally	revise	our	everyday concept	of	sexual	orientation,	but	also	eliminate	and	replace the	everyday	concepts	associated	with	the	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation. Some	might take	my proposed concept of sexual orientation to constitute	a	new,	distinct	concept	replacing	the	former	concept,	rather than	revising	it.	I	can	see	both	sides	of	this	issue.	Insofar	as	my	account attempts	to	be	responsive	to	our	ordinary	usage	of	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation	while	revising	the	concept's	content,	it	may	be	thought merely	revisionary.	But	insofar	as	this	revised	content	implies	a	new taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation	and	significantly	changes	the	connotations	of	the	term	'sexual	orientation', it	may	be	thought	to	entirely 14. Haslanger	(2000),	33. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) sex	and	gender	-	especially	with	regard	to	sexual	orientation	-	regularly	create	difficulties	for	queer,	gender-nonconforming,	and	intersex persons,	as	well	as	their	partners.	How	should	gender-nonconforming, transgender,	or	intersex	persons	(or	their	partners)	describe	their	sexual	orientations?	How	can	or	should	non-discrimination	laws	address these	sexual	orientations?	The	current	categories	of	sexual	orientation offer little to	no	flexibility	or clarity for these individuals. For these reasons,	the	current	categories	reinforce	cisnormativity	as	well	as	heteronormativity.	That	is,	because	the	current	categories	place	queer	orientations	in	a	vast	minority	and	have	no	place	at	all	for	many	transgender	or	intersex	individuals	(or	persons	attracted	to	these	individuals), they	perpetuate	prejudices	that	sexual	orientations	and	gender	identities	that	do	not	meet	standard	binaries	of	homosexual/heterosexual and	cisgender	man/cisgender	woman	are	somehow	deviant,	dysfunctional, or even nonexistent.18 Ideally, our concept of sexual orientation	would	get rid	of	or	at least	diminish these	harms	by	achieving purposes	(iii)–(iv)	above,	and	do	so	(at	least	in	part)	by	employing	the tools	articulated	in	purposes	(i)–(ii). In	addition	to	guiding	my	project,	purposes	(iii)–(iv)	also	impose certain constraints. In particular, they constrain the project to construct	a	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	is	feasible	for	public	uptake. Only	such	a	concept	can	move	us	toward	achieving	these	social	and political	purposes.	So,	rather	than	rebuilding	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation	from	scratch,	I	restrict	myself	to	engineering	a	concept	that clarifies	and	improves	upon	the	pre-existing	structure	of	our	everyday concept	and	-	on	the	basis	of	this	clarification	and	improvement	-	rebuilds	and	expands	the	sexual-orientation	taxonomy. To	put	this	slightly	differently:	I	am	not	out	to	develop	a	theoretically	ideal	or	purely	stipulative	concept	and	then	argue	that	the	term 'sexual	orientation'	should	be	attached	to	my	concept	rather	than	the 18. Consider,	for	example,	the	well-recognized	phenomenon	known	as	"bisexual erasure"	(a	tendency	to	explain	away	or	simply	deny	evidence	that	persons are	attracted	to	both	men	and	women,	or,	on	alternative	accounts, females and	males).	(See,	e. g.,	Greenesmith	[2010].)	See	also	Stein's	(1999)	critiques of	the	binary	operationalization	of	sexual	orientation	in	scientific	studies. (iii) Reduces	or	eliminates	the	presumption	that	cisheterosexuality16	is	the	normatively	standard	sexual	orientation	and	all	queer	sexual	orientations	are	normatively deviant;17	and (iv) Is conducive for establishing legal and social protections	for	persons	who	have	queer	sexual	orientations. These	purposes	are	not	merely	stipulative;	someone	could	disagree with	me	concerning	whether	these	purposes	should	guide	our	concept of	sexual	orientation.	I	take	each	of	them,	though,	to	be	rooted	in	everyday	political	and	social	realities. My	reasons	for	adopting	(i)–(ii)	are	both	theoretical	and	practical. As	I've	shown,	sexual	orientation	is	understood	in	a	variety	of	conflicting	ways	-	there	is	disagreement	about	how	to	articulate	the	criteria for	ascribing	sexual	orientation	(e. g.,	in	terms	of	genderor	sex-attraction),	as	well	as	corresponding	disagreement	about	the	taxonomy	of sexual	orientation.	There	also	are	regular	confusions	between	sex	and gender,	which suggests that these	understandings	are	not informed by recent research concerning the	distinction	between sex	and	gender.	This	alone	immediately	reveals	a	need	for	an	elucidation	of	the concept	and	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation,	and	possibly	a	revision ensuring	their	consistency	with	relevant	research	on	sex	and	gender. More	practically,	clarifying	the	criteria	for	ascribing	sexual	orientation	(and	how	they translate into	a taxonomic	schema	of	sexual	orientation)	is	a	key	ingredient	in	developing	a	concept	that	serves	the social	and	political	purposes	stated	in	(iii)–(iv).	Confusions	between 16. As	will	become	clear	in	the	subsequent	section,	because	I	understand	sexual orientation as concerning both sex and gender, I reject the idea that heterosexuality	picks	out	a	specific	sexual	orientation.	I	believe	that	talk	about "heterosexuality" in ordinary discourse is usually talking about "cisheterosexuality"	-	that	is,	the	attraction	of	a	cisgender	woman	to	a	cisgender	man or	vice	versa. 17. I use the term 'queer' here to mean something like "not cisheterosexual". For	reasons	that	hopefully	become	clear,	I	intentionally	avoid	terms	such	as 'same-sex',	'homosexual',	etc. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) orientation that they fail to recognize.	Given this, I	will	not	address sexual	identity	in	what	follows. The second is romantic or emotional attraction. Some characterizations of sexual orientation	-	for example, that of the	American	Psychological Association	-	understand sexual orientation in terms of "emotional,	romantic,	and/or	sexual	attractions".21	I	grant	that	romantic and	emotional	attractions	are	often	reliable	evidence	of	sexual	orientation,	and	can	be	themselves	the	target	of	discrimination.	But	it	seems that	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	is	distinct	from	the	concepts	of romantic	and	emotional	attraction	in	that	it	primarily	concerns	sexual behavior.	This	is	why,	for	example,	I	think	we	correctly	call	"asexual" persons	who	are	disposed	to	never	engage	in	sexual	behaviors,	even though they	may experience a range of romantic and emotional attractions.	The	fact	that	asexuality	is	considered	(even	by	asexual	persons)	to	be	a	single	category	within	the	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation, despite asexuals reporting a	wide range of romantic and emotional	attractions,	suggests	that	these	latter	attractions	are	captured	by concepts	other	than	concepts	of	sexual	orientation.22	(There	is	even	a distinct taxonomy	for these	romantic	and	emotional	attractions,	e. g., 'biromantic',	'panromantic'.) Conversely, we can imagine that someone	-	or even every person	-	who	has	sexual	attractions	that	lead	us	to	ascribe	a	sexual	orientation	to	them	could	completely	lack	romantic	or	emotional	attractions. In	short,	it	is	not	difficult	to	think	of	examples	in	which	persons	with seemingly	the	same	sexual	orientation	have	vastly	differing	romantic or	emotional	attractions,	as	well	as	examples	in	which	sexual	orientation	is	unaccompanied	by	romantic	or	emotional	attractions. Given	cases	like	these,	I	assume	in	what	follows	that,	while	romantic	and	emotional	attractions	might	fall	under	a	concept	of	sexuality broadly	construed,	the	concepts	associated	with	these	attractions	are distinct from the concept of sexual orientation. For this reason,	my 21. American	Psychological	Association	(2008). 22. See	Emens	(2014). everyday concept. Instead, I am constraining my conceptual engineering so that it is responsive to our ordinary usage by generally preserving	the	extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orientation.19 I	will	say	more	about	this	soon,	but in	particular, this	means that	I	limit	my	concept	to	one	that	primarily	concerns	sex-attraction and	gender-attraction.	I	have	no	qualms	if	someone	wants	to	describe this	restricted	project	as	building	a	ladder	that	we	climb	in	order	to eventually	kick	away	and	move	on	to	a	different	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	It	is	a	ladder	that	I	think	we	must	climb.	And	-	I	would	suggest	-	this	pragmatic	approach	to	a	conceptual	project	is	well	suited for	any	project	that	hopes	to	balance	theoretical	aims	with	a	political and	social	agenda.20 Framework II: Target Concept Given	my	project's	constrained	scope,	it	is	important	to	get	a	sense	of the	everyday	concept's	extension.	To	this	end,	I	will	now	argue	that	we should	distinguish the everyday concept of sexual orientation from three	other,	closely	related	concepts. The	first is sexual identity,	which I	understand to refer to an individual's	self-identification	with	regard	to	sexual	orientation.	Because sexual identity concerns sexual	orientation in this	way, the concept of	sexual	identity	is	sensitive	to	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	But we	also	acknowledge	that	someone	can	be	self-deceived	or	in	denial about their sexual orientation (or even lack the concepts	necessary for	self-identification),	while	still	being	truly	said	to	have	the	sexual 19. I	say	"generally"	because	it	is	unclear	to	me	whether	our	everyday	concept	of sexual orientation extends to certain	non-cisheteronormative	pairings and simply	fails	to	place	them	within	its	taxonomy,	or	whether	it	fails	to	extend to	these	pairings.	My	project	secures	this	extension.	It is	also	worth	noting that	this	constraint	is	not	an	unusual	move	in	metaphysics	-	e. g.,	Haslanger (2000)	and	Sider	(2011)	also	constrain	their	conceptual	engineering	to	a	particular	phenomenon	in	light	of	certain	proposed	purposes.	It	is	also	a	move that	is	explicitly	discussed	in	recent	literature	on	conceptual	ethics,	such	as Plunkett	(2015)	and	Burgess	&	Plunkett	(2013). 20.	Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	pressing	me	to	clarify	this	point. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) Admittedly, the cultural distinction	we	make	between sexual orientation	and	sexual	druthers	seems	somewhat	arbitrary.	It	is	not	clear why	attraction to certain sexes	or	genders is considered relevant to one's	sexual	orientation,	but	not	attraction	to	a	certain	hair	color,	race, or	economic	status.	But	sex	and	gender	are,	for	better	or	worse,	particularly	salient	social	categories	with	respect	to	sexual	orientation.	As a	result,	we	find	ourselves	in	the	position	of	classifying	persons'	sexual orientations	on	the	basis	of	their	sexand	gender-attractions,	and	not on	the	basis	of	other	sexual	attractions.	And	this	makes	persons	with particular	sexand	gender-attractions	more	vulnerable	to	discrimination	than	persons	with	attractions	to	persons	with	a	certain	hair	color or	economic	status. Again,	I	am	not	generally	preserving	the	everyday	concept's	extension	for	its	own	sake,	but	in	order	to	fulfill	certain	purposes.	And	the purposes	that	I've	proposed	are,	I	think,	best	served	by	maintaining	the distinction between sexual druthers and sexual orientation (understood	in	terms	of	attraction	to	persons	with	certain	sexes	or	genders). No one is interested in creating nondiscrimination laws to protect people	attracted to	blondes	or	baritones.	We	are, though, interested in	creating	legal	and	social	protections	for	queer,	transgender,	gendernonconforming,	and	intersex	persons.	And,	as	mentioned	before,	I	am here	assuming	that	an	account	of	sexual	orientation	should	be	aimed at better realizing these	political and social purposes. So, given the pragmatic interests	guiding the	boundaries	of "sexual	orientation", I think	that	I	can	best	fulfill	purposes	(iii)–(iv)	by	retaining	these	boundaries	and	separating	sexual	orientation	from	sexual	druthers.	For	this reason,	I	will	hold	fixed	that	sexual	orientation	primarily	concerns	sexand gender-attractions,	and	not	other	sexual	attractions. That	said,	one	might	worry	that	even	once	we	take	on	board	the distinction	between	sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers,	it	remains vague because many of the traits that are objects of druthers also (at	least	in	part)	construct	gender.	In	other	words,	the	worry	goes,	if sexual	orientation	concerns	attraction	to	persons	of	a	certain	gender, and	gender	is	a	social	construction	that	concerns	(e. g.)	performativity project is not directly concerned	with emotional or romantic attraction.	That	is,	my	analysis	is	not	concerned	with	emotional	or	romantic attractions	that	have	no	effect	upon	one's	dispositions	toward	sexual behavior, and	only indirectly concerned	with those that have an effect. Should,	for	example,	someone's	romantic	attractions	significantly influence	these	dispositions,	their	romantic	attractions	will	be	part	of what	forms	their	sexual	orientation	under	my	account	insofar	as	they have	this	influence.	Any	concern	with	attraction	in	what	follows	will focus	upon	sexual	(and	I	mean	sexual!)	attraction	regardless	of	whether	other	forms	of	attraction	accompany	it.	To	this	end,	talk	of	attraction in	what	follows	generally	can	be	understood	as	shorthand	for	dispositions	to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors.23 The	third	concept	to	distinguish	from	sexual	orientation	is	what	I call	sexual druthers,	which	refers	to	specific	preferences	of	sexual	partners	within	potential	partners	according	to	one's	sexual	orientation. This	is	often	referred	to	as	someone's	"type".24	Height,	hair	color,	body structure, and voice quality are all examples of traits about	which people	may	have	sexual	druthers.	In	order	to	generally	preserve	the extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	I	do	not	include sexual druthers in	my account of sexual orientation, and instead focus	upon	preferences	of sexual	partners	with regard to sex and	gender	categories. 23.	Michael	Rea	raises	the	interesting	question	of	what	this	distinction	(between emotional/romantic	attraction	and	sexual	orientation)	implies	for	someone who	lacks	dispositions	to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors	(perhaps,	e. g.,	due	to chronic	deficiency	of sex	hormones),	but	who	has	higher-order	desire for sexual intimacy.	Does	having only this higher-order desire preclude such a	person from	having	a sexual	orientation? I	would	answer "No"	-	not so long	as	we	consider	asexuality	a	sexual	orientation.	Asexuality	is	generally understood	as the lack	of sexual	attraction,	or lack	of	first-order	desire to have	sexual	contact	with	someone	else.	(See,	e. g.,	The	Asexual	Visibility	& Education	Network	(2012).)	Asexuals	can	and	often	do	experience	romantic or	emotional	attractions,	though.	And	they	might	have	higher-order	desire to	experience	first-order	sexual	desire	or	sexual intimacy.	A	person in the situation	that	Rea	describes	seems,	for	these	reasons,	to	be	best	categorized as	asexual. 24.	Of	course,	a	single	person	may	have	multiple	"types". robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) experience	no sexor gender-attractions?	These	questions	press	on our	ordinary concept, and its embedded	assumption that there is a clear	line	between	sexual	druthers	and	sexual	orientation.	Happily,	I take	no	such	position.	Borderline	cases	like	these	make	it	clear	that	our social	categories	have	fuzzy	edges	and	do	not	cut	at	deep	joints.	But we	would	be	mistaken	to	expect	that	they	would. For	my	purposes,	what is important is that	-	though the separating	line	can	be	fuzzy	-	the	majority	of	cases	show	that	there	clearly	is a	distinction	between	sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers.	I	leave it to future papers to further discuss borderline cases, and	whether these	cases	ought	to	affect	the	extension	of	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation; the following	will aim toward	a	general account	of sexual orientation that	preserves the central	bases	of sexual	orientation	as it is	ordinarily	understood	-	namely, sexand	gender-attraction.	For this reason, I	will assume that	-	just as sexual	orientation concerns romantic	and	emotional	attractions	only insofar as they	affect sexual attraction	-	sexual	orientation	concerns	sexual	druthers	only insofar as features	that	are	the	object	of	druthers	go	into	constructions	of	gender (or	insofar	as	primary	or	secondary	sex	characteristics	that	are	objects of	sexual	druthers	affect	sexual	behavioral	dispositions). 3. Bidimensional Dispositionalism In	what	follows,	I	propose	a	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	is	designed	to	satisfy	purposes	(i)–(iv).	However,	I	first	address	two	issues that	constrain	and	shape	my	concept	of	sexual	orientation:	the	distinctions	between	sex	and	gender	and	between	behaviorism	and	dispositionalism.	I	then	state	my	proposal	and	discuss	its	implications,	as	well as additional philosophical questions pointing to further expansion on	my	proposal.28 28.	Specifically, I	will	address	the	application	of	discrete	vs.	continuous	categories	of	sex	or	gender	and	essentialism	vs.	constructionism	to	accounts	of	sexual	orientation. (behaviors,	dress,	etc.)	or	social	status,	then	the	distinction	between sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers	is	vague.	I	agree	with	this	point, but	still	insist	that	there	are	cases	where	sexual	orientation	and	sexual druthers	come	apart	-	that	is,	cases	where	someone	is	attracted	to	a particular	feature	that	lacks	gendered	connotations.25 In	fact,	it	may	be	that	some	persons	lack	any	genderor	sex-attractions,	and	are	solely sexually	attracted	to	persons	with	non-gendered features such as wealth or red hair. That is, there	may be persons whose	sexual	attractions	are	based	only	on	what I've termed	sexual druthers.26	This,	of	course,	puts	pressure	on	the	distinction	between sexual	orientation	and	sexual	druthers	-	why	don't	we	think	that	being (e. g.) solely attracted to redheads is a sexual	orientation?27	And if	it	is	not,	what	sexual	orientation	do	such	persons	have,	since	they are not asexual (i. e., having no sexual attractions to anyone), but 25.	Whether	or	not	certain	druthers	have	gendered	connotations	should	be	assessed	from	a	subjective	perspective.	It	could	be,	for	example,	that	someone has	a	druther	(or,	if	you	prefer,	fetish)	for	a	particular	shoe	color	because	for that person this	shoe	color is	associated	with	aspects	of	sexual	engagement that	express their	sexual	orientation.	While	such	druthers	might	appear to others	to	have	no	gendered	connotations,	they	have	these	connotations	for the	persons	who	have	them.	For	this	reason,	I	think	that	an	account	of	sexual orientation	should	concern	such	gender-laden	druthers,	albeit	indirectly,	as expressions	of	persons'	underlying	sexual	orientations. 26.	Thanks	to	David	Black	for	bringing	this	possibility	to	my	attention. 27. A	more	common	example	of	a	similar	phenomenon	is	pedophilia,	or	exclusive attraction to pre-pubescent children regardless of their sex or gender. Is pedophilia a sexual orientation? Those inclined to think that it is	not a sexual	orientation	might	think	that	it	is	instead	a	sexual	disorder,	which	(unlike sexual orientation) is something that should be subject to psychiatric and	medical	treatment.	Those	inclined	to	think	that	it	is a	sexual	orientation, though, can	maintain that sexual orientation concerns sexand gender-attractions.	On	a	plausible	view	of	sex-categories,	these	categories	are	based	on continuous	and	fluid	groupings	of	primary	and	secondary	sex	characteristics. Because	these	characteristics	undergo	significant	change	during	puberty,	it	is arguable	that	humans	shift	sex-categories	during	puberty.	These	possibilities are	surely	not	exhaustive,	and	I	acknowledge	that	this	is	a	difficult	(as	well	as a	morally	and	emotionally	loaded)	case.	Undeniably,	there	are	a	host	of	similar	difficult	cases	that	beg	for	further	discussion.	Length	limitations	and	the freshness	of	this	topic	to	philosophical	debate	constrain	me	from	providing more	than	an	extremely	general	discussion	of	sexual	orientation	in	this	paper. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) think	that	understanding	sex	as	an	anatomical	category	entails	understanding	it	as	purely	"natural"	or	culture-independent.	Our	sex	categories	seem	to	(in	some	way)	track	anatomical	features	associated	with reproductive	functions,	but	these	very	anatomical	categories	of	reproductive	roles	could	be	(at	least	partially)	the	result	of	cultural	practice. As	I	see	it,	one	can	maintain	that	both	sex	and	gender	categories	are (at	least	partially)	culturally	constructed	while	distinguishing	between them	on	the	grounds	that	they	are	constructed	upon	different	physical and	social features	and	aimed	at fulfilling	different	purposes.	Given this,	I	see	little	to	be	gained	by	adopting	the	unification	view. Of	course	much	more	can	be	said,	but	for	the	sake	of	brevity	I	will now	turn	to	the	cisnormative	view.	A	pathway	to	challenging	this	view was	famously	laid	by	Simone	de	Beauvoir,	who	marked	sex	as	a	biological	category	and	gender	as	a	category	concerning	the	social	position	(e. g.,	exploitation	and	oppression)	experienced	by	those	exemplifying	femininity.31	While	the	details	of	de	Beauvoir's	ideas	have	been challenged	in	contemporary	discussions,	her	sex/gender	distinction	is the	standard	view	in	psychology,	sociology,	and	queer	and	women's studies,	as	well	as	in	feminist	philosophy.32 Given	this,	it	would	be	fairly	uncontroversial	for	me	to	simply	assume	this	distinction	moving	forward	in	my	account	of	sexual	orientation.	It	is	worth	saying	explicitly,	though,	that	not	only	is	the	distinction	theoretically	useful,	dividing	what	seem	to	be	distinct	phenomena, but	it	is	also	politically	and	socially	advantageous.	For	one,	it	provides a	helpful	framework	through	which	to	understand	the	gender	identity 31. Sveinsdóttir	(2011),	48.	As	de	Beauvoir	famously	said,	"One	is	not	born,	but rather	becomes,	a	woman."	I	will	adopt	Haslanger's	view	that	'sex'	refers	to a classification on the basis of anatomy (e. g., primary sex characteristics), though	this	is	compatible	with	these	classifications	having	vague	boundaries, or	boundaries	heavily	influenced	by	socio-political	interests.	I	am	also	sympathetic	with	Haslanger's	view	that	gender	is	not	merely	a	social	construct,	but is	defined	in	terms	of	social	relations	(Haslanger	[2012],	39). 32. For an	overview	of recent	philosophical approaches to sex and	gender, as well as the interaction between philosophical approaches and other (e. g., psychological,	political)	approaches to sex	and	gender, see	Mikkola (2012) and	Haslanger	(2012). Preliminary Issues Sex and Gender As	mentioned, previous characterizations of sexual orientation typically	and	without	argument	equate	and	assume	binary	categories	of sex	and	gender.	They	often	also	analyze	sexual	orientation	in	terms of	either	sex-attraction to the	exclusion	of	gender-attraction,	or	vice versa.	These	assumptions	lead	to	understandings	of	sexual	orientation according	to	which	sexual	orientation	is	unidimensional	-	tracking	either	sexor	gender-attraction,	but	never	both	independently	of	each other	-	and	limited	to	a	small	number	of	discrete	sub-categories. The	position	that	there	is	no	distinction	between	sex	and	gender might	be	understood	in	two	ways:	as	the	claim	that	sex	(taken	as	anatomical)	wholly	determines	gender,	or	that	gender	(taken	as	socio-political	or	psychological)	wholly	determines	sex.	The	former	-	call	it	the "cisnormative	view"	-	is	much	more	prevalent	than	the	latter	-	call	it the "unification	view"	-	which	has a small presence	within feminist theory	and	other	academic literature.29 In this	paper, I am	primarily concerned	with	rejecting	the	cisnormative	view.	While	I	find	the	unification	view	provocative,	I	also	think	it	incorrect.	Much	of	the	motivation	for	the	view,	it	seems,	comes	from	the	conviction	that	we	should not posit sex/gender along a	nature/culture	binary, because this binary	has	historically	provided	justification	for	women's	oppression,	or because	-	as	Linda	Alcoff	rightly identifies	-	"in	an important	sense, everything	is	natural".30	But	(as	Alcoff	also	points	out)	it	is	confused	to 29.	See, e. g., Butler (1990), Wittig (1992), or Halpern (2002). Butler and	Wittig	(both	feminist	theorists)	argue	that	sex	classifications	follow	laborand politically-driven	gender	classifications.	Wittig,	for	example,	writes,	"No	biological, psychological, or economic fate determines the figure that the human female	presents in society: it is civilization as a	whole that produces this	creature."	(For	dissenting	discussion	of	these	views,	see	Alcoff	[2005].) In	contrast,	Halpern	(a	psychologist)	emphasizes	sex	differences	in	cognitive capacities,	meaning	that	one	who	understands	gender	as	a	primarily	psychological	feature	might	argue	based	on	Halpern's	research	that	sex	differences follow	gender	identity. 30.	Alcoff	(2005). robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) For	example,	someone	may	be	attracted	only	to	transgender	men	who have not had genital or top surgery, or only to cisgender	men and women.	And	given	that	we	recognize	that	conferral	of	sexual	orientation	tracks	both	genderand	sex-attraction,	we	also	should	recognize that	it	tracks	various	combinations	of	these	attractions.	For	this	reason, I	place	a	further	constraint	on	my	account	of	sexual	orientation: (b) The	account	must	permit individuals' sexual	orientations to	be	based	on	both	gender-attraction	and	sex-attraction. Someone	perfectly	happy	with	(a)	may	still	resist	(b),	and	argue that	sex-attraction	(or	gender-attraction)	should	be	taken	as	a	mere sexual	druther,	allowing	sexual	orientation	to	remain	unidimensional.	Consider,	for	example,	someone	who	is	attracted	to	women	and not	men,	but	is	only	attracted	to	cisgender	women.	Why	think	that this latter attraction is anything	more than a sexual druther? That is,	why should	we think that someone attracted only to cisgender women has a different sexual orientation than someone attracted to both transgender and cisgender	women?	This line of argument might	suggest	that,	while	we	preserve	the	extension	of	our	ordinary sexual-orientation concept,	we should	make the relevant criterion for	ascribing	sexual	orientation	only	gender-attraction	(or	only	sexattraction),	and	also	categorize	sexual	orientations	along	only	one	of these	dimensions. There are a number of considerations against thinking of sexattractions (or	gender-attractions)	as	mere	sexual	druthers.	The two most	weighty	(and	related)	considerations	are:	(i)	the	frequency	with which	people	experience	sexual	attraction	not	only	to	individuals	with particular gendered features, but also to individuals	with particular primary	and	secondary	sex	characteristics,	and	(ii)	the	need	to	recognize the	community	of	persons	who	are	exclusively (or	strongly)	attracted	to	transgender	individuals,	or	who	are	themselves	transgender and	seeking	persons	with	these	attractions. or anatomical transition of (e. g.) gender-nonconforming, androgynous,	and	transgender	individuals.	That	is,	because	it	separates	sex	as an	anatomical	category from	gender	as	a	category	of	social situatedness,	it	creates	the	possibility	for	understanding	how	the	two	can	be combined	in	a	variety	of	ways.	It	also	creates	an	avenue	for	addressing the	ways in	which	gender	categories	can	be	altered to	combat	patriarchal	social	structures.	If,	for	example,	gender	is	defined	in	terms	of social	situatedness	such	that	(as	Haslanger	argues)	to	be	a	woman	is (in	part) to	be in	a	position	of	systematic	social	oppression, then	acknowledging	this	clarifies	the	changes	that	should	and	can	be	made	to our	gender	categories	if	we	are	to	establish	gender	equality.33 For	all	of	(but	certainly	not	only)	these	reasons,	I	hold	that	the	following constraint	on	an	account	of sexual	orientation	will	move	us closer	to	achieving	what	were	earlier	established	as	the	purposes	ideally	served	by	a	concept	of	sexual	orientation: (a) The account	must be compatible	with the	distinction	between	sex	and	gender. If the cisnormative assumption and unification view of sex and gender	are	dismissed	-	and I think they	should	be	-	then the	unidimensional	view	of	sexual	orientation	also	should	be.	The	distinction between	sex	and	gender	allows	for	various	combinations	of	sex	and gender	across individuals,	making it clear that	an	account	of sexual orientation should be sensitive to the fact that individuals	may be sexually	attracted	to	persons	with	various	sex/gender	combinations.34 33. See,	e. g.,	Haslanger	(2000). 34. I	take	it	to	be	a	fairly	uncontroversial	assumption	that	we	can (though	an	individual	need	not)	experience	sexual	attraction	to	purely	anatomical	features	as well	as	gendered	features.	(I	acknowledge	that	the	boundary	between	these features	is	slippery.)	Given	this,	we	can	already	begin	to	see	how	sexual	orientation	is	significantly	dependent	upon	both	biological	traits	and	particular social contexts. For example, if we hold that one's sexual orientation concerns	(at	least	in	part)	gender-attraction,	and	that	gender	is	merely	a	social construct,	this	sexual	orientation	will	be	dependent	on	placement	in	a	context	that	has	gender-constructs. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) important for	ensuring legal	and	social	protections for	persons	with these	attractions,	insofar	as	we	can	reasonably	expect	that	(e. g.)	many partners of transgender persons will encounter discrimination that they	would	not	if	partnered	with	cisgender	persons.	Without	concepts that	capture	these	attractions	as	part	of	individuals'	sexual	orientations, it	becomes	difficult	if	not	impossible	to	guarantee	the	protections	that such	individuals	deserve.	For	all	of	these	reasons,	I	maintain	(ii),	and disagree	with	the	position	that	either	sexor	gender-attraction	should be	classified	as	mere	sexual	druthers. Of course, adopting (a) and (b) does not resolve the issue of whether	sex	or	gender	(and	therefore	sexual	orientation)	should	be understood	in	terms	of	discrete	or	continuous	categories.	I	revisit	this issue in	discussing	my	account's implications.	But it is	worth	noting here	that	this	neutrality	is,	I	think,	appropriate	for	a	general	account of	sexual	orientation.	Understanding	sexual	orientation	categories	as discrete	or	continuous	should	piggyback	on,	and	not	decide,	whether we	understand	sex	and	gender	categories	as	discrete	or continuous. And	the	debate	over	this	issue	has	not	reached	a	clear	consensus. For	similar	reasons,	my	project	does	not	take	a	precise	stance	on which features are the basis of sex and gender categories. As seen from	my	discussion	so	far, I	do	assume	that	sex	and	gender	are	real (i. e., non-eliminativism), that sex and gender are distinct, and that sex	categories	are	related	to	anatomical	features	while	gender	categories	are	related	to	relational	and	social	features.	(Of	course,	there	may be	overlap in the features that	provide	the	basis for	sex	and	gender ascriptions	-	what's important is that they are not identical.) More specific	theories	of	sex	and	gender	can	be	filled	into	the	forthcoming schematic	understanding	of	sexual	orientation	(and	its taxonomy). I purposively	build	this	flexibility	into	my	account	in	order	to	construct a	concept	of	sexual	orientation	(and	of	its	taxonomy)	that	can	be	structurally	preserved	even	when	the	number	or	understanding	of	recognized	sex	and	gender	categories	undergoes	shift.37 37. Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	pressing	me	to	clarify	this	feature	of	my project. The	first	consideration	is	fairly	straightforward:	it	is	simply	the	observation	that,	in	addition	to	attraction	to	particular	genders,	persons can	also	be	exclusively	interested	in	partners	with	particular	sex	characteristics. It is	not	unusual, for	example, for	persons to	become	uninterested	in	pursuing	a	relationship	with	someone	upon	discovering that	they	are	transgender	or	intersex. At	first, one	might	be tempted to chalk	up	all scenarios like this to	transphobia	or	other	prejudices,	and	not	these	persons'	sexual	orientations.	However, there	also	are	numerous	cases	within the	growing	"trans-oriented"	community	of	persons	who	experience	strong	or exclusive sexual attraction to transgender persons.35 These persons report feeling	misplaced	among the	current	categories	of sexual	orientation,	identifying	neither	as	straight	nor	as	gay.	Some,	for	example, consider	themselves	a	"different	kind	of	gay"	-	indicating	that	the	current	taxonomy	of	sexual	orientation	simply	fails	to	capture	their	sexual orientation,	since they	experience	strong	or	exclusive	attraction	specifically	to	persons	who	are	not	cisgender.	This	failure	is	also	reflected within academic literature,	where a variety of terms	have	been suggested	for	these	individuals	(e. g.,	'MSTW' ['men	sexually	interested	in transwomen'],	'gynemimetophilia'/'andromimetophilia').36 While	-	unsurprisingly	-	none	of	these	terms	have	caught	on,	the community of trans-oriented persons (and the research concerning this	community)	suggests	that	individuals	can	have	exclusive	sexual preference	for	transgender	persons	that	is	not	caused	by	social	prejudice.	Similarly,	one	would	expect,	individuals	can	have	unprejudiced exclusive	preference	for	cisgender	persons.	Recognition	of	these	possibilities	is	not	only	important	for	trans-oriented	persons;	it	is	also	important	for	transgender	persons	who	may	experience	rejection	by	both "straight"	and	"gay"	potential	partners,	and	who	are	seeking	someone who	is	(though	perhaps	are	not	exclusively)	trans-oriented.	It	is	also 35. See	www.transoriented.com	or	the	most	recent	work	of	British	journalist	and transgender rights	activist	Paris	Lees	on the	question, 'Is trans-oriented	an emerging	sexual	orientation?' 36.	See,	e. g.,	Weinberg	&	Williams	(2010);	Money	&	Lamacz	(1984). robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) psychological	states,	except	perhaps	states	that	can	be	in	turn	reduced to	behavior.	We	can	understand	this	view	-	behaviorism	-	as	the	following	claim: A person's sexual orientation is determined solely by their	observable	sexual	behavior.38 In	other	words,	under	a	behaviorist	account,	an	individual's	sexual orientation	is	decided	simply	by	looking	at	their	sexual	behaviors,	and seeing	what	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	persons	they	sexual	engage	with. For	example, if they	only	sexually	engage	with	cisgender	men,	their sexual	orientation	is	ascribed	accordingly. An immediate difficulty for behaviorism is determining	what behaviors and span of time are relevant to someone's sexual orientation.	Even	setting	this	aside,	though,	three	more	egregious	problems remain.39	First,	behaviorism	doesn't	allow	that	individuals	can	behaviorally repress their sexual orientations. Consider, for example, the case	of	Episcopal	Bishop	Gene	Robinson,	a	cisgender	man	who,	after privately	identifying	himself	as	gay	during	seminary,	was	married	and faithful	to	a	cisgender	woman	for	fifteen	years.40	Cases	like	these	are extremely	common	within the	LGBTQ	community	-	under	extreme social	pressure	to	conform	to	cisheteronormativity,	many	individuals enter	so-called	"straight"	relationships	and	so	behaviorally	(if	not	also psychologically) repress their sexual	desires.	Additionally,	homeless LGBTQ	persons are often forced into prostitution, thereby sexually engaging	with	individuals	of	sexes	and	genders	that	these	persons	do not	necessarily	find	sexually	desirable.41 38.	Alternatively,	Edward	Stein	describes	this	as	the	view	that	"a	person's	sexual orientation	is	indexed	to	his	or	her	sexual	behavior"	(Stein	[1999],	42). 39.	For	further	discussion	of	the	merits	and	demerits	of	behaviorism,	see	Stein (1999). 40.	Robinson	(2012). 41. Ray	(2006). Conditions	(a)	and	(b)	are	also	intended	to	be	neutral	with	regard to	whether	we can in the future adopt further dimensions	of sexual orientation,	and	subsequently	expand	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	As	discussed	previously,	my	current	project is limited to these two	dimensions	because	it	aims	to	construct	a	readily	accessible	but politically	and	socially	beneficial	concept	of	sexual	orientation. Behaviorism and Dispositionalism The	previous subsection	argued that	we should take sexual	orientation	to	involve	both	sexand	gender-attraction.	But	it	is	not	clear	how to assess these attractions in order to determine someone's sexual orientation.	The	task	of	clarifying	the	criteria	for	ascribing	sexual	orientation	and	how	these	criteria	translate	into	a	taxonomic	schema	of sexual	orientation,	then,	is	not	complete. The following	part	of	my	project	continues this task. It is	primarily	descriptive	in	nature,	though	it	will	also	contain	a	prescriptive	element.	It	is	centrally	aimed	at	further	elucidating	criteria	for	ascribing sexual	orientation	as	well	as	articulating	(in	light	of	social	and	political	motivations)	criteria	for	placing	individuals	within	a	taxonomy	of sexual	orientation. The	following	discussion	will	compare	two	main	approaches	to	this task:	behaviorism and ideal dispositionalism.	Both	of these	approaches, I	will argue, fail to	provide	an	acceptable	analysis	of sexual	orientation	because	both	insist	on	overly	rigid	conditions	for	ascribing	sexual orientation	-	behaviorism	insists	on	rigid	actual	conditions,	and	ideal dispositionalism	insists	on	rigid	ideal	conditions.	I	conclude	by	demonstrating	how	a	different form	of	dispositionalism	-	call it	ordinary dispositionalism	-	captures an intuitive balance between actual and ideal	conditions	for	ascribing	sexual	orientation. Behaviorism One way of understanding sexual orientation is as nothing over and above (i. e., as reducible to) one's observable behaviors -	that is, as something solely concerning behavior and not at all concerning robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) in	terms	of	individuals'	dispositions to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors	with a	certain	class	of	persons	(rather	than	their	actual	sexual	behaviors), and that	concern	psychological	states	only insofar	as they influence individuals'	behavioral	dispositions. After	assuming	this	shift	to	talk	of	dispositions,	though,	significant and	difficult	questions	remain.	A	standard	account	of	dispositions	tells us	that: Something	x	has	the	disposition	to	exhibit	manifestation m in response to being situated in stimulating circumstance	c iff,	if	x were	to	be	situated	in	c, it	would	exhibit	m.43 That	is,	for	example,	a	match	is	disposed	to	light	(i. e.,	is	flammable) in	response	to	being	in	a	certain	circumstance	if	and	only	if,	were	the match	in	that	circumstance,	it	would	light.	Applying	this	to	sexual	orientation,	we	can	let	x	range	across	the	domain	of	human	persons,	and let	m	be	engagement	in	sexual	behavior	(broadly	construed)	with	persons	of	a	certain	sex	and	gender.	But	determining	what	c	should	be	is	a much	more	complicated	task.	And	without	specifying	c,	dispositionalism	gives	us: A person's sexual orientation is determined solely by what sex[es] and	gender[s]	of	persons	S is	disposed to sexually	engage	under	certain	stimulating	circumstances. This claim is enough to get us to the	position that there is some particular scrutability basis of sexual orientation	-	namely, relevant sexual	behavioral	dispositions.	Without	specifying	the	conditions	under	which	these	relevant	dispositions	manifest,	though,	we	have	not made	much	headway	beyond	behaviorism.	To	assign	actual	conditions to c would make the view indistinguishable from behaviorism	-	if the	manifesting conditions are actual conditions, then the relevant 43. Choi	(2008),	796.	For	simplicity,	I	have	removed	the	variable	ranging	across times. But,	by	behaviorist	lights,	it	is	correct	to	categorize	these	individuals' sexual orientations according to their coerced	behaviors, rather than	according	to	their	(freely	or	forcibly)	behaviorally	repressed	desires.	It	seems	obvious	to	me	that	this	is	a	bad	result.	Because	sexual behavior	can	be	-	and,	for	LGBTQ	persons,	frequently	is	-	coerced	by societal pressures,	we	must understand sexual orientation as something	"deeper"	than	observable	behavior.	Even	if	influenced	by	social pressures,	sexual	orientation	cannot	be	explicitly forced	upon	someone	by	these	pressures.42	To	deny	this	is	to	do	an	injustice	to	a	large number	of	LGBTQ	persons,	especially	in	countries	where	queer	sexual	behavior	can	result	in	prison	or	even	death. Two	other,	related	problems	for	behaviorism	regard	its	implications for voluntary celibates and persons	who are not sexually active, as well	as	sexually	active	persons	in	situations	lacking	a	variety	of	potential	sexual	partners	(e. g.,	prisons).	Behaviorism	wrongly	dictates	that persons	in	the	first	situation	either	lack	sexual	orientations	or	ought	to be	classified	as	asexual,	and	that	the	sexual	orientations	of	persons	in the	second	situation	should	be	determined	with	no	regard	to	the	extremity	of	their	circumstances.	These	too	are	bad	results,	and	ones	that blatantly	conflict	with	the	general	extension	of	our	everyday	concept of	sexual	orientation. Ideal Dispositionalism A	plausible	account	of	sexual	orientation	should	account	for	situationally specific sexual behaviors. Behaviorism fails to do this.	And yet behaviorism	admittedly captures something important about sexual orientation:	our concept	of sexual	orientation tracks (with	qualifications)	sexual	behavior,	and	not	selfor	other-identification,	emotions, or	purely	psychological	states.	But	insisting	that	it	concerns	only	actual behavior	is,	as	we	have	seen,	riddled	with	problems.	For	this	reason,	I propose	that	analyses	of	sexual	orientation	should	move	toward	dispositional	accounts	-	that	is,	accounts	that	define	sexual	orientation 42. See, for example, the near-universal recognition of the total failure of socalled	"reparative	therapy". robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) While	I	think	that	this	type	of	proposal	rightly	pushes	against	behaviorism's rigid focus	on	actual conditions, I also think that the	extreme	shift	to	"ideal"	conditions	would	create	two	different	problems. First,	this	view	legitimizes	a	worrisome	cross-cultural	projection of	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation.	The	ideal	conditions	for	(e. g.) ancient	Greeks	to	realize	their	sexual	desires	might	vastly	differ	from the ideal conditions for (e. g.) a contemporary European or North American.46 If, for example, political power dynamics	were significantly	built	into	their	sexual	desires,	then	the	ideal	conditions	for	ancient	Greeks	acting	on	sexual	desires	might	be	unlike	the	conditions we	think	of	as	ideal	for	acting	on	our	sexual	desires	-	perhaps	they would	include	a	specific	political	scenario.	Likewise	for	any	culture in	which	sexual	desires	largely	concern	(e. g.)	social	status,	wealth,	or particular	survival	skills,	not	to	mention	ones	where	the	recognized sexes	or	genders	differ from	those	built into	our	concept	of	sexual desire.47	And	yet the	"ideal	conditions"	view	suggests that	our	concept of sexual orientation can be aptly applied	within all of these widely	ranging	"ideal	conditions". In	other	words, the	view	implies that	we	can	ascribe	sexual	orientation	(as we understand it)	to	all	human	beings	across	cultures	by	holding	fixed	their	sexual	desires	and projecting	them	into	corresponding	"ideal	conditions",	regardless	of how	foreign	these	conditions	are	to	the	conditions	that	correspond to	contemporary	concepts	of	sexual	desire.	But	given	how	tightly	our concept	of	sexual	desire	is	entwined	in	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	I	am	doubtful	that	sexual	orientation	can	be	cross-culturally applied	to	this	extent.	For	this	reason,	this	approach	would	seem	to 46. For	example,	Miriam	Reumann's	(2005)	American Sexual Character	develops a	compelling	case	for	the	existence	of	uniquely	American	sexual	desires	and patterns,	shaped	by	uniquely	American	politics,	social	life,	gender	roles,	and culture,	as	well	as	racial	and	economic	divides.	The	main	takeaway	for	the purpose	of this	paper is that it	would	be	naïve	-	and, in fact, simply incorrect	-	to	assume	that	sexual	desire	has	a	universal	and	cross-culturally	consistent	character. 47. Interestingly,	Stein	addresses	this	possibility	later	in	his	book	amidst	a	discussion	of	essentialism	and	constructionism. dispositions	should	be	those	dispositions	manifested	in	actual	conditions	-	that is,	actual	behaviors.	And this is	precisely	what	we	want to avoid.	To capture the	general extension	of	our everyday concept, we	will	need	a	different	theory	of	what	circumstances	manifest	these dispositions	-	one	less	narrow	than	"actual	conditions",	and	more	informative	than,	say,	"all	the	physical	facts". In	Edward	Stein's	The Mismeasure of Desire, he	proposes	that	the	dispositions relevant to	determining	sexual	orientation	manifest "under ideal conditions".44	He	goes	on	to	say,	"Conditions	are	ideal	if	there	are no	forces	to	prevent	or	discourage	a	person	from	acting	on	his	or	her [sexual]	desires, that is,	when there is sexual freedom	and	a	variety of	appealing	sexual	partners	available."45	According	to	Stein,	then,	we can	understand sexual orientation in terms	of the sexual behaviors someone	would	engage	in	if	nothing	-	nothing at all	-	were	stopping them.	While	it	is	not	clear	that	Stein	is	attempting	to	capture	the	general	extension	of	our	ordinary	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	his	proposal	suggests	that	one	way	to	fill	out	the	dispositional	schema	above is	as	follows: A person's sexual orientation is determined solely by what sex[es] and	gender[s]	of	persons	S is	disposed to sexually	engage	under	ideal conditions. In	other	words,	Stein	suggests	that	sexual	orientation	is	determined by	how	someone	would	sexually	behave	if	we	held	fixed	their	sexual desires	and	ensured	that	nothing is	stopping	them	from	acting	on	those desires.	We	can	then	consider	whether	Stein's	suggestion	can	be	used to	capture	the	extension	of	our	ordinary	concept	of	sexual	orientation by	specifying	that	the	relevant	features	of	these	sexual	behaviors	are the	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	the	persons	that	they	involve. 44. Stein	(1999),	45.	My	emphasis. 45. Stein	(1999),	45. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) Ordinary Dispositionalism The problems facing behaviorism and ideal dispositionalism may be avoided	by appealing to conditions somewhere between "actual" and "ideal" conditions. One possibility	-	which I here tentatively adopt	-	incorporates an adaptation of Sungho Choi's notion of "ordinary"	manifestation	conditions	for	a	given	disposition.	Choi	argues that	it	is	possible	to	articulate	manifesting	conditions	for	dispositions that	will	not	be	subject	to	the	standard	counterexamples	to	analyses of	dispositions	(e. g., "masked"	or	"finkish"	dispositions),50	but	which also	will	not	be	vacuous	(e. g.,	"if	it	were	struck,	then,	unless	the	match didn't	light,	it	would	light").51	He	proposes	that	this	challenge	is	met by	examining	the	purpose	behind	our	concept	of	a	given	disposition, which in turn reveals	what	manifesting conditions are conceptually connected to that disposition. To put this slightly differently: Choi suggests	that	whatever	conditions	those	having	the	concept	consider "ordinary"	manifesting	conditions	for	that	disposition	are	the	relevant manifesting	conditions	for	that	disposition. In	a	slight	divergence	from	Choi,	I	suggest	instead	that	the	relevant manifesting	conditions	for	the	dispositions	determining	sexual	orientation	are	not	the	conditions	that	those	who	possess	the	concept	consider "ordinary",	but	the	conditions	under	which	people	in fact apply	the term	'sexual	orientation'	(and	relevantly	associated	terms).52	Or,	more 50.	A	"finkish"	disposition	is	one	whose	stimulus	conditions	also	remove	the	disposition	-	for	example,	a	glass's	disposition	to	break	is	finkish	if,	every	time it	is	struck,	God	hardens	the	glass	so	that	it	is	no	longer	disposed	to	break. A	"masked"	disposition	is	one	that	is	simply	prevented	from	manifesting	under the stimulus conditions	-	for	example, a	glass's	disposition to	break is masked	if	it	is	bubble-wrapped	when	it	is	struck.	See	Choi	&	Fara	(2014). 51. Choi	(2008). 52. I	remain	neutral	on	the	question	of	whether	this	sort	of	account	should	be	applied	widely	across	all	types	of	dispositions.	Perhaps	some	of	the	manifesting conditions	for	some	dispositions	can	be	given	a	purely	physics-based	explanation,	for	example.	Here,	I	only	commit	to	an	account	for	determining	the ordinary	manifesting	conditions	for	the	dispositions	relevant	for	determining sexual	orientation.	(Thanks	to	Michael	Rauschenbach	for	raising	this	issue.) get	the	extension	of	our	concept	wrong,	extending	it	beyond	its	appropriate	reach.48 Second,	there	are	some	empirical	reasons	to	think	that	sexual	desires	cannot	be	"held	fixed"	independently	of	someone's	actual	social context,	and	that	these	desires	would	not	remain	constant	when	projected into ideal circumstances. In	particular,	when surrounded	by a	vast	variety	of sexual	partners	and lacking	any inhibitions, there is evidence suggesting one's sexual desires	-	and so, one's sexual behaviors	-	will	undergo	significant	alteration	from	what	they	were under ordinary circumstances. In particular, social psychologists have	discovered	that	sexual	desires	frequently	increase	or	decrease (depending	on	other	characteristics	of the individual) in	situations with	high	sexual	opportunity.	The	corresponding	principles,	known as the "satisfaction principle" (high opportunity decreases desire) and the "adaptation principle" (high opportunity increases desire) are	perfect	examples	of	why	we	should	doubt	that	individuals'	sexual desires	would	remain	constant	when	they	are	placed	in	a	situation with	complete	sexual	freedom	and	availability.49	But	if	these	desires undergo	significant	shift, then	we	should	expect	that	an	"ideal	conditions"	account	of	sexual	orientation	will frequently	dictate	ascriptions of sexual orientation that conflict with our everyday understanding	of	sexual	orientation. To	put	this	in	slightly	stronger	terms: there is some reason to think that it	would significantly change the subject from	what	we	were	originally talking	about	when	we	were talking	about	sexual	orientation. 48.	One	might	respond	on	Stein's	behalf	that	our	concept	of	sexual	orientation (and	other	cultures'	related	concepts)	should	be	understood	as	socially-historically	constrained,	such	that	it	may	not	be	cross-culturally	applied.	While this	is	not	clear	from	Stein's	text,	and	I	would	still	have	concerns	about	the view	(see	the	following	argument),	I	do	think	that	this	would	improve	the	account.	In	my	own	proposal	-	and	as	we	will	soon	see	-	I	attempt	to	develop a	way	of	ensuring	this	social-historical	sensitivity	by	looking	to	ordinary	language	use	as	a	guide	to	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions. 49. See,	for	example,	Gebauer,	Baumeister,	Sedikides,	&	Neberich	(2014). robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) Central	to	this	proposal	is	the	idea	that	finding	the	ordinary	manifesting	conditions	for	a	disposition	means	looking	to	the	(often	pragmatic)	goals	determining	application	of	the	term	referring	to	that	disposition. In	the	case	of	sexual	orientation,	then,	the	manifesting	conditions	for	the	behavioral	dispositions	relevant	to	determining	sexual orientation	must	be	understood	within	the	framework	of	the	purposes behind	the	everyday	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	-	finding potential	partners,	establishing	laws	(be	they	protective	or	discriminatory),	predicting	behavior,	enabling	scientific	research	of	sexual	attraction,	and	so	on.56	These	purposes	determine	the	"ordinary"	conditions under	which	the	term	is	applied	-	that	is,	they	are	the	conditions	corresponding	to	the	operative	concept. Importantly, using these conditions as the relevant manifesting conditions for a	particular	disposition	does	not	mean forfeiting any revision	to	the	everyday	operative	concept.	It	simply	means	that	these conditions are built into the revised concept, guaranteeing that the everyday	concept's	extension	is	generally	preserved.	These	conditions only	provide constraints	on the	eligible criteria for ascribing sexual orientation	-	they do not determine these criteria,	much less determine	the	taxonomy	resulting	from	them. More needs to be said about what these ordinary conditions are	-	that is,	what	are the	conditions	corresponding to the	everyday operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation?	Or,	in	other	words,	what	conditions	lie	behind	our	ascriptions	of	sexual	orientation? 56.	While	these	purposes	at	bottom	will	result	in	the	same	behaviors	as	the	purposes	behind the	manifest concept	of sexual	orientation, they importantly differ in the interpretation	of those	behaviors.	Whereas	those	applying	the term	'sexual	orientation'	may	take	themselves	to	be	(e. g.)	identifying	moral failing	or	categorizing	psychological	defects,	this	is	simply	using	fictions	as a	mask for	what	Haslanger	calls the "explicitly social content	of the	operative	concept".	So	too,	those	applying	the	term	may	take	the	manifesting	conditions relevant to sexual orientation to be anything from "having certain genetics" to "being	cursed	by	God",	but these	cannot	be the	conditions	we are	concerned	with.	We	are	instead	concerned	with	the	conditions	that	actually determine	application	of	the	term	'sexual	orientation',	regardless	of	what someone	thinks	they	are	doing	when	applying	it. simply,	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions	just	are	the	conditions	under	which	ascriptions	of	sexual	orientation	typically	take	place. Here	I	follow	Haslanger,	who	makes	a	useful	distinction	between "operative" and "manifest" concepts:	The	operative concept	of "cool", for	example,	is	"the	concept	that	actually	determines	how	we	apply	the term	to	cases,	i. e.,	(roughly)	being	such	as	to	conform	to	the	standards of	the	in-group".53	In	contrast,	the	manifest	concept	of	cool	is	"the	concept	that	users	of	the	term	typically	take	themselves	to	be	applying,	i. e., being intrinsically	or	objectively	cool".54	By	defining "ordinary"	manifesting conditions in terms	of the concept those applying the term take	themselves	to	have,	Choi	restricts	our	search	for	these	conditions to	the	conditions	attached	to	manifest	concepts.	But	these	conditions may be nonexistent (i. e., "intrinsic coolness") or severely	mistaken. Better, I think, is	to	identify	the	"ordinary"	conditions	as	those	corresponding	to	the	everyday	operative	concept	-	that	is,	the	conditions corresponding	to	applications	of	the	relevant	terms. Consider,	for	example,	a	match's	disposition	of	flammability.	Using this	adaption	of	Choi,	we	look	at	the	operative	concept	of	"flammability"	and	find	that	the	purpose	of	it	is	to	determine	whether	a	match	will light	when	it is	struck	in	normal	temperatures,	when	dry,	etc.	These conditions,	that	is,	determine	how	we	apply	the	term	'flammable'	to	a match.	Because	of	this,	they	are	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions	c in	the	statement	'A	match	is	disposed	to	light	in	response	to	being	situated	in	stimulating	circumstance	c iff,	if	the	match	were	to	be	situated in	c, it	would	light.'55 53. Haslanger	(1995),	102. 54.	Haslanger	(1995),	102. 55. One	might	worry	that	this	account	is	circular	-	that	it	relies	on	the	"ordinary manifesting	conditions" that identify	a	disposition	by	appealing	to the	concept	of	that	very	disposition.	Choi	(2008)	argues	that	this	objection	fails.	As he	points	out,	because the	ordinary	conditions for	a	disposition are	understood	as	"extrinsic	conditions	that	are	ordinary	to	those	who	possess	the	dispositional concept", those persons	need	no knowledge	of a conceptual account	of	the	disposition	in	question. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) corresponding	to	exclusive	attraction	to	women.57	This	sort	of	case	illustrates	that	we	expect	an	explanatory	relation	to	hold	between	one's sexual	orientation	and the	sex	or	gender	of the	persons they	are	attracted	to. (II) The operative concept assumes attraction to certain persons	while	having	a	reasonable	diversity	of	potential	sexual	partners. This	generalization	is	far	from	Stein's	suggestion	that	sexual	orientation	is	based	on	attractions	with	no restriction	on	sexual	partners.	But it	captures	why	we	do	not	consider	behaviors	in	outlying	circumstances	where	potential	partners	are	extremely	limited	or	homogenous	(e. g., prisons,	boarding	schools,	deserted islands)	as reliable indicators	of one's	sexual	orientation. (III) The	operative	concept	assumes	that	one	is	willing	and	able to	sexually	engage	with	other	persons. We	refuse	to	ascribe	sexual	orientations	to	someone	on	the	basis of	their	actual	sexual	behaviors	if	(e. g.)	they	are	voluntarily	celibate, subject to sexual contact	without consent, or possess a	prohibitive medical	condition.	These	scenarios	indicate	that	it	is	also	important to	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	that	the	behaviors	relevant to ascribing sexual orientation are ones that are engaged in willingly and	with the	physical and	psychological ability to engage or	not	engage	in	the	behavior.58	It	might	also	explain	why	we	judge 57. Or	because	Elijah	thinks they	are	women.	This	would	leave	room	for	cases	in which,	e. g.,	someone	attracted	to	cisgender	men	is	attracted	to	someone	they take	to	be	a	cisgender	man,	but	who	is	anatomically	female. 58.	Of	course,	some	(and	perhaps	all)	asexual	persons	will	never	be	in	a	situation in	which	they	are	willing	to	engage	in	sexual	behavior.	In	that	case,	we	can determine	that,	because	it	is	impossible	for	them	to	meet	condition	III,	they do not have any sexual behavioral dispositions that	would be	manifested under	the	ordinary	conditions	-	that	is,	they	are	asexual.	This	distinguishes asexuals	from	(e. g.)	voluntary	celibates. My	primary	goal in	moving	away	from	actual	or ideal	conditions, and toward the	conditions	corresponding to the	everyday	operative concept	of	sexual	orientation,	is	to	escape	the	rigidity	of	both	behaviorism	and	ideal	dispositionalism.	I	want	to	avoid	a	view	that	ascribes sexual	orientation	on	the	basis	of	only	observable	behaviors,	or	only behaviors	within	unattainable,	potentially	culturally	distant	ideal	conditions.	This is	not to	say that the	operative	concept is	without substance. But I will not pretend to articulate necessary and sufficient conditions	corresponding	to	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	-	nor do I	maintain that such conditions exist. The conditions corresponding	to	our	ascriptions	of	sexual	orientation	admit,	no	doubt, of	borderline	and	vague	cases.	My	primary	concern	is	to	capture	the core	elements	of	these	conditions	in	order	to	generally	preserve	the extension	of	our	everyday	concept	of	sexual	orientation. And I do think that a number of things can	be said to elucidate the conditions under which we typically confer sexual orientation. In	particular, I	propose	the following	as	conditions	constraining	our ascriptions	of sexual orientation	-	that is, as conditions corresponding	to	the	operative	concept	-	reminding	the	reader	to	think	of	these as	generalities	that	admit	of	exception	and	vagueness,	rather	than	as strict	rules	of	use. (I) The	operative	concept	assumes	attraction	to	persons	of	a certain sex or gender (at least partially) because they are that	sex	and/or	gender. For	example:	Say	that	Elijah	has	strong	sexual	druthers	for	persons with	long	hair,	but	has	no	preference	between	men	or	women	as	sexual	partners.	Elijah	lives	in	a	town	where	the	only	people	with	long	hair happen	to	be	women.	As	a	result,	it	is	true	to	say	that	Elijah	is	attracted only	to	women.	But	because	he	is	not	attracted	to	them	because they are	women,	we	would	not	say	that	Elijah	has	the	sexual	orientation robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) Bidimensional Dispositionalism [BD]:	A	person	S's	sexual	orientation	is	grounded60	in	S's	dispositions	to	engage in	sexual	behaviors	under the	ordinary	condition[s] for these	dispositions,61	and which	sexual	orientation	S	has is	grounded	in	what	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	persons	S	is disposed	to	sexually	engage	under	these	conditions.62, 63 In other words, I propose that	-	whatever the categories we place within 'sexual orientation'	-	their ascription should be based on	the	sex[es]	and	gender[s]	of	the	persons	someone	is	disposed	to 60.	I	use the term 'grounded'	here in the loose	sense	of 'dependent	on'	or 'explained	by'.	One	may	also	be	able	to	understand	it	in	terms	of	'built	on',	which (roughly)	means	'less	fundamental	than'	or	'accounted	for	in	terms	of'.	(See Bennett	[forthcoming].) 61. I remain neutral on the debate over	whether properties can have dispositional	essences	or	if	all	dispositions	reduce	to	categorical	properties.	For	my purposes	here,	I	don't	have	a	dog	in	that	fight. 62.	As	Shamik	Dasgupta	pointed	out,	someone	might	be	concerned	that	BD,	as stated,	does	not	ensure	that	the	dispositions	relevant	to	sexual	orientation are particularly "deep" or "self-disclosing". Sexual orientation, one	might think, deserves	protection	because it is deep and, in this	way, outside (or mostly	outside)	a	person's control.	While I	acknowledge this	worry, I	disagree	with	the idea	that	sexual	orientation	must	be	particularly	"deep"	to merit	special	protections.	Whether	or	not	sexual	orientation	has	these	features	is	orthogonal	to	its	merit	for	protection.	Even	if	every	person	shifted sexual orientation every	week (and even if	we could do so by choice), I would insist that sexual orientation deserves protections. However, one might	worry	that,	even	apart	from	questions	of	protections,	sexual	orientation	is	a	"deep"	and	unchangeable	(or	nearly	unchangeable)	feature	of	who someone is. I	want to remain	neutral	on this	question,	and	so the formulation	of	BD	allows	but	does	not require	someone's sexual	orientation to undergo	frequent	shifts. 63.	By 'sex[es] and	gender[s]	of	persons...' I do	not	mean to imply that there must	be	any	particular	persons	of	this	sex	and	gender,	or	particular	persons with	whom	S	is	disposed	to	sexually	engage.	That	is,	S	could	be	disposed	to engage	with	persons	who	are	cisgender	women	even	if	there	were	no	cisgender	women,	or	even	if	there	were	no	particular	cisgender	women	with	whom S	is	disposed	to	engage. abnormal	sexual	behavior	that	occurs	under	the	influence	of	alcohol or	narcotics	(and	therefore	is	nonconsensual)	to	be	an	unreliable	indicator	of	sexual	orientation. Again,	(I)–(III)	are	generalizations	of	the	conditions	that	I	think	are built	into	the	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	and	they	therefore	will	admit	of	occasional	exceptions	or	borderline	cases.	They	remain,	though,	useful	guidelines	explaining	why	we	consider	extreme circumstances poor guides to determining sexual orientation, and how	we	can	reliably	ascribe	sexual	orientation	to	persons	without	appealing	to	"ideal"	conditions. Someone	may	here	object	that,	in	appealing	to	the	conditions	underlying	our	operative	concept	of	sexual	orientation	in	order	to	construct a revised concept of sexual orientation, I appear to be doing mere	conceptual	analysis.	To	this, I	would	again	emphasize	that	my project	is	necessarily	in	part	descriptive	because	it	aims	to	generally preserve the	extension	of	our everyday	operative concept	of sexual orientation.	But	it is	prescriptive	insofar	as	I	am	out	to	precisify	and revise	this	concept	in	order	for	it	to	more	efficiently	and	ethically	serve the	purposes	assigned	to	it.	Noticeable	revisions	concern	decisively	including	both	sexand	gender-attraction	as	criteria	for	ascribing	sexual orientation	and	-	as	we	will	now	see	-	distancing the	concept from concerning the relation	between	a subject's	own	sex	or	gender	and the	sex	or	gender	of	the	persons	they	are	attracted	to.	These	revisionary	aims	are	importantly	distinct	from	projects	that	intend	to	radically revise	the	conditions	determining	concept	deployment.59 Bidimensional Dispositionalism Putting	together	the	previous	discussions	of	gender/sex	and	behaviorism/dispositionalism,	we	arrive	at	my	positive	proposal: 59. See	Haslanger	(1995),	114. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) orientation should "reduce or eliminate the presumption that cisheterosexuality	is	the	normatively	standard	sexual	orientation	and	all queer	sexual	orientations	are	normatively	deviant",	and	be	"conducive for establishing legal and social	protections for	non-cisheterosexual persons".	The	categorization	shift	proposed	by	BD	moves	us	closer	to accomplishing	both	of	these	tasks. First,	BD	promotes	the	aims	of	purpose	(iii)	because	BD	eliminates the distinction between cisheterosexuality and queer sexual orientations and provides a taxonomic schema capable of recognizing persons outside the gender or sex binary.	On	the	former	point,	on	BD,	there	are	no	such	sexual orientations	as	(e. g.)	"homosexual"	or	"heterosexual".	And	there	is	no distinction	in	the	sexual	orientations	of	(e. g.)	a	cisgender	man	and	a transgender	woman	who	both	are	exclusively	attracted	to	women.	The statistical	divide	between	cisheterosexuality	and	queer	sexual	orientations	simply	disappears,	because	these	categories	disappear,	and	their members	are	reorganized	into	new	categories.	While	this	will	not	of itself	eliminate	discriminatory	attitudes,	it	does	change	the	concept	of sexual	orientation	such	that	it	does	not	simply	fall	out	of	the	concept that	cisheterosexuality	is	statistically	standard	and	all	else	is	deviant.	It also	removes	the	connotation	that	"sexual	orientation"	is	what	distinguishes (e. g.) the	so-called "straight"	and "queer"	communities. I	believe	that	this	is	a	socially	and	politically	beneficial	result,	encouraging dismantling	the	divide	between	these	communities. On	the	latter	point,	BD	does	not	build	in	either	discrete	or	binary gender or sex categories, and so has the flexibility to adopt a variety	of	sex	and	gender	taxonomies.	With	this	flexibility, it is	capable of	providing	taxonomic	recognition	for	persons	outside	of	the	sex	or gender binaries (e. g., genderqueer or intersex persons), as	well as their	sexual	partners. Second,	BD	achieves	(or	at	least	moves	toward	achieving)	purpose (iv)	by	providing	the	conceptual	tools	for	lawmakers	to	secure	protections	for	sexual	orientation	under	pre-existing	protections	against	genderand	sex-discrimination.	That	is,	because	sexual	orientation	makes no	reference	to	one's	own sex	and	gender	on	BD,	any	discrimination sexually	engage	with	under	ordinary	conditions	for	ascribing	sexual orientation.64 This analysis recasts sexual	orientation	as	pertaining to	bidimensional	attraction	-	that	is,	as	pertaining	to	both	sexand gender-attraction.	But,	importantly,	BD	does	not	require	that,	in	order	to	be	ascribed a sexual	orientation, someone	must	have	a certain sex-attraction	or gender-attraction.	One could	be	neutral as to	one	or	both, or	be attracted	to	neither	(i. e.,	be	asexual	with	regard	to	sex	and	gender).	All of	this	would	be	revealed	by	their	dispositions	to	engage	(which	could be	dispositions	to	never	engage)	in	sexual	behavior	with	certain	persons	(at	least	partially)	on	the	basis	of	their	sex	and	gender.65 By emphasizing only these dispositions, BD understands sexual orientation	solely in terms of the sex[es] and gender[s] of the persons one is disposed to sexually engage, without reference to the sex or gender of the person so disposed. Under this framework, for example, a cisgender man	and	transgender	woman	disposed	to	sexually	engage	only	with cisgender	women	have	the	same	sexual	orientation,	and	so	too	for	a cisgender	man	and	gender-nonconforming	female	disposed	to	engage only	with	men. In	emphasizing	this	shift in	our	categories	of	sexual orientation,	BD	rejects	the	idea	that	sexual	orientation	can	be	classified	in	terms	of	a	relation	between	persons	of	the	"same"	or	"opposite" sex	or	gender. This taxonomical	shift is important to	the	fulfillment	of	purposes (iii)–(iv).	Recall	that	these	purposes	stated	that	an	analysis	of	sexual 64.	While	I	will	not	address	this	issue	here,	we	arguably	should	also	acknowledge that	these	dispositions	themselves	come	in	a	range	of	strengths,	which	would add	another	dimension to	sexual	orientation. (Thanks to Justin	Christy for this	suggestion.) 65. I	expect	that	we	are	often	attracted	to	certain	persons	because	they	have	characteristics	that	are	associated	with	particular	genders,	and	not	because	of	the totality	of	their	gender	expression.	For	my	purposes,	this	sort	of	connection	is sufficient	to	allow	for	the	explanatory	connection	between	gender	and	attraction,	though	it	leaves	many	open	questions	regarding	what	(if	anything)	is	essential	to	particular	gender	expressions,	and	more	generally,	how	we	should think	about	the	constitution	of	gender	expressions.	I	leave	these	questions	to persons	working	in	the	metaphysics	of	gender. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) One	worry	about	BD	is	that	it	does	not	give	us	enough	epistemic access	to	our	own	sexual	orientations.	How	will	we	know	our	sexual orientation	if	it	would	require	being	placed	under	circumstances	that we	are	not	actually	in?	How	could,	say,	a	lifelong	celibate	priest	know that	they	would	take	certain	actions	if	they	were	under	these	"ordinary circumstances"?	It	might	seem	as	though	any	compelling	account	of sexual orientation	will	make it possible for someone to know their own	sexual	orientation,	and	BD	does	not	do	this.67 This	objection,	though,	makes	a	substantive	assumption:	that	the correct	metaphysical	analysis	of	sexual	orientation	must	bend	to	a	demand	for	epistemological transparency	(or	something	close	to	transparency). And I see no reason to think this. In fact, we have good reason to deny it, given the	many examples of repression and selfdeception	of	sexual	orientation	under	(e. g.)	social,	religious,	or	familial	expectations.68	And	this	does	not	mean	that	we	have	no	idea	what our	sexual	orientations	are	-	in	general,	people	seem	to	have	a	"good enough"	idea	of	their	sexual	attractions	and	how	they	do	or	would	act under	certain	circumstances	that	they	also	have	a	"good	enough"	idea of	their	sexual	orientation	to	seek	out	specific	(or	no)	sexual	partners. Insofar,	too,	as	we	think	that	persons	have	some	manner	of	epistemic privilege	in	self-assessments	of	desire,	attraction,	and	so	on	-	features that	inform	and	direct	their	behavioral	dispositions	-	we	can	maintain that	persons	also	have	some	manner	of	epistemic	privilege	in	self-ascriptions	of	sexual	orientation. Another	worry	for	BD	concerns	the	relation	between	sexual	dispositions	and	sexual	desires.	Why,	someone	might	ask,	should	we	go to	the	trouble	of	analyzing	sexual	orientation	in	terms	of	dispositions and	all	their	metaphysical	baggage,	when	we	can	much	more	simply analyze	it	in	terms	of	sexual	desire,	understood	as	an	occurrent	mental	state? 67.	Thanks	to	Peter	Finocchiaro	for	raising	this	objection. 68.	Indeed,	the	testimony	of	many	queer	persons	suggests	that	discovery	of	one's own	sexual	orientation	can	be	a	long	and	difficult	process. against	someone	in	response	to	their	sexual	orientation	can	be	re-described	as	discrimination	on	the	basis	of	their	gender	or	sex. This conceptual shift is, in fact, ripe for public uptake. Supreme Court	Chief	Justice	John	Roberts	recently	articulated	a	similar	shift	in thought	during	oral	argument	in	Henry v. Hodges,	a	case	concerning the	legalization	of	same-sex	marriage.	Justice	Roberts	re-described	the same-sex	marriage	question	in	terms	of	sex	discrimination,	and	(perhaps rhetorically)	asked	why the issue	could	not	be	decided	on the basis	of	pre-existing	protections	against	sex	discrimination: I'm	not	sure	it's	necessary	to	get	into	sexual	orientation	to resolve	this	case....	I	mean,	if	Sue	loves	Joe	and	Tom	loves Joe,	Sue	can	marry	him	and	Tom	can't.	And	the	difference is	based	on	their	different	sex.	Why	isn't	that	a	straightforward	question	of	sexual	discrimination?66 As	Justice	Roberts	here	notes,	cases	of	sexual	orientation	discrimination	can	be	easily	re-described	in	terms	of	gender	or	sex	discrimination	by	holding	fixed	that	multiple	individuals	share	the	same	sexor gender-attractions,	and	yet	some	are	discriminated	against	simply	because	they	have	a	particular	sex	or	gender	in	addition	to	those	attractions.	BD	goes	a	step	further	by	saying	that	the	sexand	gender-attractions	-	again,	understanding	these	attractions	in	terms	of	behavioral dispositions	under	ordinary	conditions	-	are	all	that	matter	for	sexual orientation.	My	own	sex	and	gender, for	example,	do	not	matter	for my	sexual	orientation.	And	so,	if	I	am	discriminated	against	for	having the	attractions	constituting	sexual	orientation	X	and	a	man	who	has sexual	orientation	X	is	not	discriminated	against,	I	can	recast	this	discrimination	as	gender	discrimination	and	appeal	to	pre-existing	laws prohibiting	this	discrimination	as	the	basis	for	my	legal	protection. 66.	Liptak	(2015).	This	argument	in	favor	of	legalizing	same-sex	marriage	on	the basis	of	pre-existing	laws	against	sex-discrimination	also	was	the	central	argument	of	an	amicus curiae	brief	filed	by	a	number	of	legal	scholars	in	Henry v. Hodges, Supreme	Court	Case	No.	14–556. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 21 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) desire	(and	the	corresponding	behavioral	dispositions)	would	not	be able	to	accommodate	this	case. If	instead	one	prefers,	for	example,	a	pleasure-based	theory	of	desire,	then	the	formulation	will	be	too	narrow	to	capture	the	concept	of sexual	orientation.	Not	everyone	receives	pleasure	from	sexual	behavior.	Still	other	theories	of	desire	(e. g.,	attention-based	or	holistic)	are too	broad	to	capture	the	concept.69	And	so	on,	I	would	argue,	for	the other	main	candidate	theories	of	desire.	Of	course,	one	could	simply appeal	to	a	"common	understanding"	of	desire,	but	I	am	skeptical	that there	is	any	such	thing. Third,	one	might	worry that	desires	are too	context-sensitive to capture	the	general	(though	perhaps	not	necessary)	stability	of	sexual	orientation.	Earlier,	I	argued	that	we	should	not	use	Stein's	"ideal conditions"	as	the	relevant	manifesting	conditions	for	sexual	behavioral	dispositions,	because	we	have	good	reason	to	think	that	someone's	desires	would	be	significantly	altered	in	a	scenario	with	wholly unrestricted access to a huge variety of sexual partners.	Whatever these	desires	(and	the	corresponding	behaviors)	are,	I	argued,	they are	not	reliable	indicators	of	someone's	actual	sexual	orientation.	But, similarly,	I	think	there	are	cases	where	someone's	actual	desires	are not	reliable	indicators	of	their	sexual	orientation.	For	example,	it	is reasonable	to	expect	that	someone	in	a	context	lacking	a	reasonable variety	of	potential	partners,	such	as	a	prison,	may	undergo	shifts	in sexual	desire.	And	yet	we	would,	I	think,	still	deny	that	these	shifted	desires	are	reliable	indicators	of	their	sexual	orientation,	or	that these	shifts	in	desire	constitute	a	shift	in	their	sexual	orientation.	Perhaps, to	avoid	this	result,	one	could insist that the	desires	relevant to	sexual	orientation	are	those	that	one	would have	in	the	ordinary conditions that I've	described.	But, in that	case,	we've	only	moved from	behavioral	to	psychological	dispositions;	we	haven't	gotten	rid of	dispositions,	or	pinpointed	particular	mental states	determining sexual	orientation. 69.	For	an	overview	of	these	(and	other)	theories	of	desire,	see	Schroeder	(2014). The	first	and	most important response is, I think, to	emphasize that in	order to	achieve the	pragmatic	goals	discussed	earlier, it is important to avoid an account that wholly psychologizes sexual orientation.	While	I leave	open	that	the	behavioral	dispositions	for which persons need political and social protections have categorical psychological bases, these bases	will not be the focus of a socio-politically	oriented	account	of	sexual	orientation.	For	these	purposes, someone	with the	psychological features	of	a "heterosexual" but	queer	behavioral	dispositions	can	and	should	be	protected	from anti-queer prejudice. In other	words, given the	pragmatic goals of my	account,	the	questions	of	whether	or	which	psychological	states ground	the	behavioral	dispositions	at	issue	are	interesting	questions for	neuroscientists,	but	not	ones	that	should	guide	a	politically	motivated	account	of	sexual	orientation. Second,	given	the	current	main	contending	theories	of	desire,	an account	in	terms	of	desire	either	amounts	to	a	problematically	restricted	dispositional	view	or	else	creates	new	(and	worse)	problems.	Suppose,	for	example,	that	one	is	partial	to	an	action-based	theory	of	desire,	articulated	in	terms	of	dispositions.	In	this	case,	sexual	desires	just are	the	categorical	basis	of	the	kinds	of	behavioral	dispositions	that	I have	been	talking	about.	At	first,	it	might	seem	like	this	view	would	be co-extensive	with	my	own,	but	preferable	because	it	is	articulated	in familiar	terms	(desire)	rather	than	in	the	technical	language	of	dispositions.	This	thought	would	be	mistaken.	A	sexual-desire	view	of	sexual orientation would not be co-extensive with my own, because ordinary	dispositionalism	allows	sexual	behavioral	dispositions	to	have	a range	of	categorical	psychological	bases	(or	no	categorical	basis),	and certainly	does	not	restrict	the	relevant	dispositions	to	ones	grounded in	the	mental	states	that	we	would	categorize	as	"sexual	desire".	For example,	if	someone	is	attracted	to	women	on	the	basis	of,	say,	a	constant	curiosity	about	what	it	is	like	to	have	sex	with	women,	but	not because	of	desire-like	attitudes	typically	considered	sexual	attraction, my	account	does	not	rule	out	that	this	person	can	be	classified	as	sexually	women-oriented.	A	view	of	sexual	orientation	restricted	to	sexual robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 22 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) Discrete/Continuous Categories BD	requires	that	we	acknowledge	that	sexual	orientation	is	bidimensional,	pertaining	to	both	sexand	gender-attraction.	Within	this	bidimensionality,	though,	we	can	and	should	ask	whether	our	categories of	sexual	orientations	will	be	discrete	or	continuous.	The	most	common current categories of sexual orientation are uniformly	discrete. In	ordinary	discourse,	we	typically	hear	two,	or	at	best	three,	discrete categories: "heterosexual", "bisexual", and "homosexual". Expanding our	concept	of	sexual	orientation	to	include	both	sex	and	gender	will increase the	number	of sexual	orientation	categories.	But it	will	not of	itself	revise	these	categories	such	that	they	are	no	longer	discrete, since	it	will	not	of	itself	revise	our	categories	of	sex	and	gender	to	no longer	be	discrete	(much	less	binary). Suppose someone accepts, for example, a sex binary (male and female)	and	a	gender	binary (men/women). In that case,	under	BD, they	would	have four categories for attraction	qua sex and four for attraction	qua	gender,	arriving	at	sixteen	discrete	categories	of	sexual orientation.	Consider	the	following	example	of	how	one	might	retain discrete	categories	of	sexual	orientation	under	BD,	where 'attraction' can	be	taken	as	a	useful	shorthand	signaling	dispositions	to	engage	in sexual	behavior: Illustration 1: Discrete Categories Sex-Attraction (Assumes	two	sexes	-	male/female) Gender-Attraction (Assumes	two	genders	-	men/women) A:	Not	attracted	to	either	sex	qua	sex 1: Not attracted to either gender qua gender B:	Attracted	to	males 2:	Attracted	to	men C:	Attracted	to	females 3:	Attracted	to	women D:	Attracted	to	males	and	females 4:	Attracted	to	men	and	women My respondent might be fine with accounting for sexual orientation in terms of dispositions to desire rather than dispositions to behavior, strange as it	may seem.	But framing sexual	orientation in this	way	would	not	avoid	yet	another	problem	for	any	desire-based account: dispositions to desire	would underdetermine sexual orientation because desire underdetermines sexual orientation. Consider someone	who is behaviorally disposed to sexually engage	with certain	persons,	but	does	not	possess	the	emotional	or	cognitive	features of	sexual	desire.	(Again,	we	could	imagine	that	they	are	motivated	to sexually	engage	with	persons	on	the	basis	of	curiosity,	free	of	desire.) That is, they don't (e. g.) feel sexual yearnings, spend time thinking about	sexual	behavior	or receive	particular	pleasure from	sexual	behavior.	Does	this	person	have	a	sexual	orientation?	It	seems	to	me	that they	do,	suggesting	that	desires	are	not	necessary for	sexual	orientation. But	are	they	sufficient?	Consider	too	the	unlikely	but imaginable case	of	someone	who	feels	desire	for,	say,	cisgender	men,	but is	disposed	only to	sexually	engage	with	women. In this	case,	and	particularly for the socio-politically	motivations	discussed	above, I	would argue	that	this	person's	sexual	orientation	is	one	of	orientation	toward women	and	not	cisgender	men.	But	I	admit	that	intuitions	about	our concept's	extension	may	get	fuzzy	with	regard	to	both	of	these	hypotheticals	-	I	can	only	report	my	own.	I	suspect	that	one's	response	may come	down	to	whether	one tends to think	about	sexual	orientation as something	predominately action-oriented	or	predominately internal.	But	more	importantly	(given	that	this	is	an	engineering	project),	I support	the	former	view	as	better	equipped	to	achieve	the	social	and political	purposes	behind	the	concept	of	sexual	orientation,	and	as	not clearly	in	conflict	with	the	general	extension	of	our	everyday	concept. Even	with this	advantage,	BD is	only the	beginning	of	a full	analytic	account	of	sexual	orientation.	It	remains	neutral	on	a	number	of important	and	closely	related	philosophical	questions.	I	turn	now	to these	questions,	which	will	highlight	where further research	can	expand	philosophical	discussion	of	sexual	orientation. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 23 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) Sex-Attraction (Assumes	two	sexes	-	male/female) 1:	Not	attracted	to	either	sex	qua	sex 2:	Attracted	to	males 3:	Attracted	to	females 4:	Attracted	to	males	and	females Under this view, a category within sexual orientation might be "MA-1",	heuristically	referring	to	someone	who	-	under	ordinary	conditions	-	is	disposed	to	engage	in	sexual	behaviors	with	persons	who present	as	(roughly)	androgynous	or	masculine,	regardless	of	their	sex. BD	remains	neutral	on	the	issue	of	discrete	vs.	continuous	categories	of	sexual	orientation.	But	the	questions	surrounding	the	issue	require	much	closer	attention,	and	my	hope	is	that	further	research	on sex	and	gender	will allow	an	expansion	of	BD that specifies sexual orientation	as	continuous.	It	would	thereby	become	more	equipped	to recognize	sexual	diversity	and	fulfill	the	need	for	an	account	of	sexual orientation	that	eliminates	the	idea	that	cisheterosexuality	is	the	"standard"	sexual	orientation	and	all	else	is	"deviant". Essentialism/Constructionism As	stated,	BD	is	also	neutral	on	the	question	of	essentialism	vs.	constructionism about sexual orientation. Roughly, essentialism is the view	that	sexual	orientation	is	something	necessary	or	unifying	about humans	as	a	kind	or	as	particular	humans	(thereby	applying	cross-culturally),	whereas	constructionism	is	the	view	that	sexual	orientation is	socially	constructed	(thereby	culturally	specific),	and	may	not	(depending	on	the	type	of	construction)	in	any	sense	"carve	at	the	joints" of	reality.71 71. See	Haslanger	(1995)	for	a	wonderful	look	at	how	different	levels	and	kinds of	social	constructions	correspond	to	what	we	admit	into	our	ontology. Under a view such as this, a category within sexual orientation might be "C2",	which refers to someone	who	-	under ordinary conditions	-	is disposed to engage in sexual behaviors only	with transgender	men	who	have	not	had	genital	surgery.	One	could	also	easily add	'intersex'	to	the	left-hand	column,	'genderqueer'	to	the	right-hand column,	and	so	on.	The	element	I	mean	to	emphasize	in	such	a	view is the insistence	upon	discrete	categories for	sex	and	gender,	which leads	to	discrete	categories	of	sexual	orientation. If	instead	(as	I	prefer)	one	understands	gender	(and	perhaps	sex) to refer to a continuous spectrum, then sexual orientation	will also refer	to	a	continuous	spectrum.	Of	course,	within	ordinary	discourse, we typically	have	heuristic	markers	along	continuous	spectrums for pragmatic	purposes	(e. g.,	'tall'	or	'hot').70	But	it	is	generally	understood that these	markers are	merely heuristic, and do not refer to neatly closed	categories.	This	could	easily	be	applied	within	discourse	about sexual	orientations.	The	following	illustrate	a	view	under	which	sex categories	are	discrete	but	gender	categories	are	continuous,	resulting in	continuous	categories	of	sexual	orientation: Illustration 2: Continuous Categories Gender-Attraction	[Attraction	may	be	represented	at	one,	no,	or	multiple	locations	on	the	diagram]: 70.	In	other	words, I	prefer	an	account that rejects	epistemicism	about	gender categories,	just	as	most	of	us,	I	think,	would	reject	epistemicism	about	'tall'	or 'hot'. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 24 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) framework	related	to	sexual	orientation	are	socially	constructed,	but they	refer	to	real	properties	(or	traits,	if	you	prefer)	of	individuals	that are	in	part	socially	formed	and	in	part	biologically	determined.75 Moderate	constructionism's	main	benefit is	allowing the	possibility	of	cross-cultural	behaviors	and	biological	traits	loosely	translating onto	a	contemporary	framework	-	namely,	the	framework	of	the	"ordinary	conditions for	ascribing	sexual	orientation"	-	while	maintaining	that	the	contemporary	understanding	of	sexual	orientation	should not	be	applied to cultures lacking the	concept	of sexual	orientation within that culture. But I also worry that moderate constructionism gives	too	prominent	of	a	place	to	biology,	and	underestimates	the	degree to	which	sexual	orientation is	socially	constructed. In	any	case, I	currently	have	only	tentative	opinions	about	these	issues,	and	so	I have	chosen	to	here	state	BD	as	neutral	on	issues	of	essentialism	and constructionism.76 4. Conclusion and Implications Although I've	gone to lengths to clarify	what issues I do	not take a firm	position on, I do not	mean to leave the impression that BD is an	uncontroversial	thesis.	To	clarify	this,	I	will	briefly	state	its	central implications. First, to adopt BD is to reject our current taxonomy of sexual orientation. The assumptions that sexual orientation is always onedimensional	-	concerning either sex-attraction or gender-attraction, 75. I predict that	whether you consider this a realist or fictionalist account of sexual	orientation	will	largely	depend	on	whether	you	are	a	realist	or	fictionalist about certain social kinds.	Within the distinction of ideaand objectconstruction, this view	would incorporate elements of each.	While sexual orientation	classifications	would	be	considered	idea-constructions,	the	way that	we	are	socially	and	politically	impacted	by	these	classifications	(whether our self-identity aligns with our sexual orientation or not) incorporates a large	dose	of	object-construction	into	our	understanding	of	persons	as	sexually	oriented	beings.	(For	more	on	this issue,	see	Haslanger	&	Sveinsdóttir [2011].) I am	partial to the idea that there is	a	balance	between these	constructions	and	biological	influence	in	determining	sexual	orientation. 76.	For	an	interesting	perspective	on	the	need	for	recognizing	individuals'	agency	in	determining	their	sexual	orientations,	see	Behrensen	(2013). One	common	form	of	essentialism	is	biological	essentialism	-	often	heard	in	the	sentiment	"Born	This	Way"	-	which	claims	that	sexual orientation is	a	biologically	determined feature	of	a	person.72	While BD	is	compatible	with	this	view,	to	hold	both,	one	must	hold	to	biological	determination	of	gender-attraction.	That	is,	if	sexual	orientation	is to	be	genetically	determined	and pertain	to	gender-attraction,	biological essentialism faces the difficult challenge of explaining	how	gender	could	be	(at least	partially)	socially	constructed,	and	yet	genderattraction	be	biologically	determined.73	For	this	reason,	it	seems	that BD	-	though	compatible	with	biological	essentialism	-	is	unlikely	to be	paired	with	it. I	do	not	have	space	here	to	discuss	alternative	forms	of	essentialism	about	sexual	orientation,	other	than	to	say	that	I	think	it	will	be difficult	to	find	a	form	of	essentialism	that	agrees	with	contemporary theories	of	gender,	which	almost	always	incorporate	some	degree	of constructionism.74 For this reason, I tentatively lean toward a	moderately constructionist view according to which our social context (which	may	be	self-selected	to	some	extent)	directs	the	manifestation of	and	categories	for	the	manifestation	of	biological	tendencies	toward certain	sexual	attractions.	On	this	view,	the	concepts	and	interpretive 72. See,	for	example,	LeVay's	(2011)	analysis	of	sexual	orientation	as	"the trait that predisposes us to experience sexual attraction to	people	of the same sex as ourselves	(homosexual,	gay,	or	lesbian),	to	persons	of	the	other	sex	(heterosexual	or	straight),	or	to	both	sexes	(bisexual)"	(emphasis	added).	By	identifying	sexual	orientation	with	the	(according	to	him,	biological)	trait	that	predisposes	us	to	have	certain	attractions,	LeVay	adopts	a	biological	essentialism about	sexual	orientation. 73.	Of	course,	one	could	also	insist	(against	the	prevalent	view)	that	gender	is biologically	determined. 74.	One interesting line of inquiry would be whether Charlotte	Witt's "uniessentialist"	account	of	gender,	which	combines	both	individual	essentialism and	social	construction,	could	be	applied	to	sexual	orientation.	On	this	view, certain	properties	of	someone,	such	as	their	gender,	can	be	essential	to	that person	as	a	social	individual,	which	Witt	views	as	one	of	the	three	parts	in	the trinitarian	ontology	of	"selves"	(i. e.,	human	organism,	person,	social	individual).	If	one	is	willing	to	adopt	Witt's	ontology	of	"selves",	perhaps	a	case	could be	made	for	sexual	orientation	as	an	essential	property	of	a	social	individual. robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 25 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) implications	of	our	answers	-	remain	unexplored.	BD	only	begins	to map	this	promising	philosophical	landscape.77 References Alcoff, L.	M. (2005). "The	Metaphysics of	Gender and Sexual	Difference". In	Barbara	S.	Andrew, Jean	Keller	&	Lisa	H.	Schwartzman (eds.), Feminist Interventions in Ethics and Politics: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory.	Rowman	&	Littlefield	Publishers. American	Psychological	Association	(2008).	Answers to Your Questions: For a Better Understanding of Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality. Washington,	DC.	URL	= www.apa.org/topics/sorientation.pdf. The	Asexual	Visibility	&	Education	Network	(2012).	General FAQ. URL =	http://www.asexuality.org. Behrensen,	M.	(2013).	"Born	That	Way?	The	Metaphysics	of	Queer	Liberation". APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Issues 12 (2):2–7. Bennett,	K.	(Forthcoming).	Making Things Up. Oxford	University	Press. Burgess, A. & Plunkett, D. (2013). "Conceptual Ethics I". Philosophy Compass 8	(12):	1091–1101. Butler,	J.	(1990). Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. Routledge. 77.	Many	thanks	to	David	Black,	Justin	Christy,	Shamik	Dasgupta,	Esa	Diaz-Leon, Peter	Finocchiaro,	Vera	Flocke,	Katharine	Jenkins,	Sarah-Jane	Leslie,	Rachel McKinnon,	David	Plunkett,	Michael	Rauschenbach,	Michael	Rea,	Cat	SaintCroix, Father Raphael Mary Salzillo, Sami Sumpter, Elizabeth Victor, Ted Warfield, and audiences at Princeton	University, Notre	Dame, UC Irvine's Perspectives on	Gender	Conference, the	New	York Society for	Women in Philosophy,	the	2015	Central	APA,	and	the	Berkeley	Social	Ontology	Group for	helpful	feedback	and	conversation	during	the	development	of	this	paper. Special	thanks	as	well	to	two	anonymous	referees	at Philosophers' Imprint for insightful	comments,	and	to	the	Princeton	University	Center	for	Human	Values'	Political	Philosophy	Graduate	Student	Research	and Travel Fund.	As	is the case	with	most philosophy papers, to call this paper "single-authored" does	not	do	justice	to	the	vast	amounts	of	time	and	energy	that	others	have generously	donated	to	help	me	develop	these	ideas. but	never	a	combination	of	the	two	-	and	that	sexual	orientation	concerns	the	sex	or	gender	of	both	potential	partners	are	deeply	embedded	within	the	concepts	associated	with	these	categories.	For	this	reason,	the	current	concepts	of	"homosexual"	and	"heterosexual"	do	not pick	out	sexual	orientations	under	BD.	These	terms	inherently	refer	to a	relation	between	the	sexes	(or	genders)	of	sexual	partners,	whereas BD	focuses	exclusively	on	the	sex	and	gender	of the	persons	one is attracted	to. Second, BD implies	-	but does not necessitate	-	that we should reject biological essentialism about sexual orientation. This again comes on the heels of BD's incorporation of both sexand genderattraction	in	its	analysis	of	sexual	orientation.	Third,	and	also	for	this reason,	BD	implies	that	the	categories	of	sexual	orientation	ought	to be	continuous,	rather	than	discrete.	Contemporary	research	suggests that	the	categories	of	gender	(and	perhaps	sex)	are	continuous,	and	so any	dispositions	related	to	gender	(including	the	ones	at	issue	in	BD) must	be	sensitive	to	this	continuous	scale.	This	has	political	and	social implications, as it raises	questions about	how to	understand sexual orientation	as	a	protected	class	or legal	decisions	concerning	sexual orientation,	and	it	puts	pressure	on	the	idea	that	cisheterosexuality	(or any	sexual	orientation)	is	normative	or	non-deviant. Fourth,	because	BD	appeals	to	the	"ordinary	conditions"	for	ascribing sexual orientation, it requires that	we hesitate in ascribing any category	of sexual	orientation to	an individual	on the	basis	of their behavior	without	first	carefully	considering	their	social	context.	This hesitation is particularly required when considering persons under (e. g.)	religious,	situational,	or	familial	pressures	to	partner	with	someone	of	a	certain	sex	or	gender,	as	well	as	any	cross-cultural	applications	of	our	categories	of	sexual	orientation. Finally, I also hope to have shown that the issues surrounding sexual	orientation	need	further	philosophical	analysis.	A	vast	number of	questions	about	essentialism,	dispositions,	choice,	reduction,	and social	kinds	and	properties	-	not	to	mention	the	political	and	ethical robin	a.	dembroff What Is Sexual Orientation? philosophers'	imprint – 26 – vol.	16,	no.	3	(januray	2016) LeVay,	S. (2011).	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