COMPUTABLE RATIONALITY, NUTS, AND THE NUCLEAR LEVIATHAN S. M. Amadae Liberal democracy was saved only by nuclear weapons. ... NATO adopted the doctrine of MAD (mutual assured destruction), according to which ȱȱȱĴȱ ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȬȱȱ ǯȱdzȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱĚ ȱǯ -Yuval Noah Harari, Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow A rational decision process will be understood ... to refer to the entire reasonȬ ing activity that intervenes between the receipt of a decision stimulus and the ultimate decisions. ... Such an approach forces rational behavior to be ȱȱȱ¢ȱǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ tional player as a suitably programmed computing machine. -Ken Binmore, Essays on the Foundations of Game Theory ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱȱȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱȱȱǰȱǰȱȱǯ -Paul Erickson et al., How Reason Almost Lost Its Mind ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȬ rity concerns drove the development of decision technologies such as game theory, bounded rationality, operations research, and systems analysis.1 Recollecting such history is important because it enables us to see how these decision theories-game theory in particular-were Ȭȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĚǯȱȱȱȱȱ "Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear Leviathan," in The Decisionist Imagination: Democracy, Sovereignty and Social Science in the 20th Century," ed. by Daniel Bessner and Nicolas Guilhot New York: Bergahn Books, 2018. ŗŝŚȲȊȲS. M. Amadae ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ǰȱ ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ  ǰȱ neither the agents modeled nor the analysts using the models need an intelligible grasp of the problems they are solving in order to identify solutions. The mindless strategic rationality of game theory came to deȬ ęȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȬ foundly entangled with the strategic posture it recommends. ȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ to observers because deterrent threats achieve credibility at the price of absurdly endangering constituents with apocalyptic terror. Far from the ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ sanctioned by game theory is not MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), but rather NUTS (Nuclear Utilization Targeting Selection), referring to ȱȱ Ȭęȱǯ2ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢Ȭ metrically hold nuclear weapons in reserve to multilaterally counter a ȱĴǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ on coercive bargaining, threatening to introduce nuclear warheads into Ěǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ security because, according to strategic rationality, credible deterrence depends on preparing and intending to wage an omnicidal nuclear ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ tisons intelligibility, or understanding of the problem it aims to solve, enables it to rationalize mobilizing and maintaining resources for ends that defy both moral reasoning and purposive action. This alienating logic of unintentional, and not necessarily intelligible, choice informing nuclear deterrence has been elevated to the standard understanding of classical western instrumental rationality, with detrimental conseȬ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ  ȱ ȱȱ ȱ Ȭ Ȭȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ Ȃȱȱ and collective action, including the exercise of national sovereignty. Section one introduces recent historiography to show how Cold ȱ ȱ ¢ȯȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ game theory, and rational choice-erased the role of understanding, ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȬǯȱȱȬ ization of rational choice foreclosed on the idea of informed citizens who participate in a process of democratic will formation to oversee executive decisions. Section two investigates the entanglement of the content of game theory with the nuclear security posture it recȬ ommends. The substance of game theory grounds nuclear strategy, Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŝś ęȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęȱ and win a nuclear war. Section three investigates how prominent soȬ cial theorists use game theory as a way to unify our understanding ȱȬȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǯȱȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱ

ȂȱLeviathanǯȱ	ȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǰȱěȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱȱ enact corporate agency without the need for actors to be aware of their ȱȱ£ȱȱȱǯ3 Given the limited view of agency ȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱ game theory as a tool for institutional design and public policy forȬ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱ the introduction of appropriate incentives.4 The conclusion counters contemporary complacency over game theory and atomic warfare, emphasizing that both strategic rationality and the US nuclear weapȬ ons program are more entrenched than ever.ś As this paper shows, ȱ ¢ȂȱȱȱȬǰȱ ȱ ȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ nations to prepare omnicidal measures to engage in nuclear combat in which they can only achieve their end by perpetually threatening, or actualizing, the complete destruction of humanity. The alternative ȱȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱȱ rationality and interpersonal social commitments that insist on intelȬ ligibility as a criterion of purposive agency. How Rationality Lost Its Mind Nuclear deterrence, as a topic of analysis, is typically left to experts. ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȭ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ consultants with mastery of abstract decision theory.6 Although their Ȭȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȬ ǰȱȱȬęȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȬ cision theory was game theory, formalized by John von Neumann and ȱȱȱȱŗşŚŚȱTheory of Games and Economic Behavior.7 Game theory spans both strategic rationality, which refers to individȬ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ŗŝŜȲȊȲS. M. Amadae Ȭȱȱȱǯ8ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ consistently exhibit preferences over whether, for example, she prefers to travel to London, Singapore, or Cairo in all pairwise comparisons.

ȱ ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ȱ¢ȱŗşŞŖȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȃ¡ǰȱ formalized rationality was the only way to prepare for the vicissiȬ ȱ ȱ ĚǯȄśŘȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ěȱ  ȱ ȱ with game theory for its failure to generate a science of warfare by ȱ ŗşŜŖǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Gaming Agency dedicated to gaming simulations to analyze how Ěȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ǯśřȱ ȱ ŗşŝŝǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ wrote a report identifying the American national security state as a ȱȱǯśŚ Nuclear strategists modeled deterrence itself using game theory, and the body of thought comprising it was and remains strategic rationality.śś Game theory thus provided deciȬ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Ȭ ȱǰȱ ¡ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ and understanding.śŜȱȱȱ¢ȱȬȱ¡ȱȱ sponsor the initial development of game theory to solve logistical and ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱȱȱȱęǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱŗşŞŖȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱŗşŞŖǯśŝ Possibly their enthusiasm followed from their propensity to believe that marȬ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱǯ Von Neumann and Morgenstern formalized game theory to be an Ȭȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ conceivable circumstances throughout the lifetime of rational agents.śŞ Every consideration of worth, insofar as it impinges on choice, can be, the authors insist, encapsulated into this formalism. Strategic ratioȬ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ¢ȱ ȱ ęǯȄśş Game ¢ǰȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ¢ȱ£ȱȱȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ nal.60 Therefore, only outcomes, and not principled or ethical means, ĴȱȱȬǯ61 Even if individuals can form coalitions to compete against other actors, once spoils are obtained, every group must disintegrate into individuals who compete among each other. ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȃ¢ȱęǰȱ ¢ǰȱȱȄȱ ȱ ȱȱęȱȱǰȱ equilibrium, as though by an invisible hand. ŗŞŘȲȊȲS. M. Amadae ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¡ȱȱ£ȬȱȬ petition.62ȱȱȱȬ£Ȭȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱ rational actors would no longer have a clear template for action that results in predictable outcomes. To address this obvious limitation, game theorists consider repeating interactions in which a history of ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱDZȱȱȱ point outcome from which no single actor has any incentive to diȬ verge given the choices that all other actors made. Ĵ¢ȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȬ rists end up endorsing these characteristic limitations. Rules and norms are not deemed to guide action, but rather to merely describe behavȬ ioral regularities.63ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱhow our dominant form of social science and public policy analysis has so roundly accepted that purȬ posive agency can dispense with the meaning of action as a primary motivator.64 The fact that we use this theory of rationality to inform our nuclear security policy and to solve the challenge of credible deterrence ȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ¢ȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ no coincidence that the theory of rationality governing the US nuclear ȱȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ rational action used to inform individual and collective action, as well ȱȱȱȱȬǯȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱȱǰȱ strategic rationality accounts for the most prosaic choices and the most DZȱȱȱȱȱǯ MAD, NUTS, and Game Theory ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ¢ȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ǯȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȬȱȱȱȱ war rewrites the social contract between citizens and government. ȱ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ appearance of legitimacy given the impossibility of realizing this promise.Ŝś The state achieves such an appearance by downplaying the role of nuclear weapons in ȱȱ ȱȱȱ£ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬȱǯ66ȱȱ most sectors of even US civil society are under the impression that nuclear policy has been and is structured to the end of deterring nuȬ clear war consistent with a policy, and the reality of, mutual assured posture Delete: ", and the reality of," Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŞř destruction (MAD), its actual policy stance is, in fact, NUTS. Deudney ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ£DZȱ ȃȱ ȱ of mutual assured destruction gradually became supplemental and then supplanted by nuclear utilization targeting theory and strateȬ ȯ ȱȱȱȱȱdzȱǯȄ67 The reality of NUTS-i.e., the US preparedness to engage in all levels of nuclear ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱǰȱ¢ȱǰȱȬ liferation, and escalation-is not made manifestly clear to the public because this would erode the remaining legitimacy from the social contract.68 Not only does government hold citizens hostage as the ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ nuclear engagement far beyond the outcome that would result from ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱĴȬ ing their alert status. There are four bodies of literature that provide evidence that nuȬ clear deterrence and game theory are coextensive with each other, that rational deterrence theory is the same as rational decision theory. One is the historical record of practice and engagement.Ŝş The second is the ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ on the one hand that the abstract formal theory of rational deterrence is game theory and on the other that the war gaming simulations used ȱȱȱȱěȱȱ ȱȬȱȱ and simulations that were indistinguishable from how actual scenarȬ ios would be handled.70 Third is the literature of strategic practice that ȱ ȱǰȱȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ problem of deterrence was viewed in terms of strategic rationality.71 ǰȱ ȱ ę¢ǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ with theoretically exploring problems of nuclear deterrence, most imȬ portantly the credibility problem.72 Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ Ě is important to all four bodies of literature. Those who follow his lead modeled the nuclear security ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ game.73ȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱȃȱȂȱȬ lemma didȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱȱȱȱǰȂȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱ mathematics of optimization to psychological laboratories to probȬ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱǯȄ74ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ ǯȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȂȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱĚȱ  ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ Replace ',' with ':' ŗŞŚȲȊȲS. M. Amadae remain silent, seemed apt to capture the problem of the "Reciprocal ȱȱȱĴǰȄȱȱȱȱǯŝś However, on the other ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȬȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȱȬ ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱ££ȱȱ the core of game theory.76 Given their inability to intentionally collabȬ orate, rational actors achieve suboptimal, and therefore inscrutable, results. ȱ ȱ Ȃȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵ¢ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ ȱDZȱȱȱ silent, or to confess. Four possible outcomes obtain, depending on the Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȬ ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ goes free while the one who remains silent serves a lifetime sentence. ȱ¡ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȱȂȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱěȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȬ ȱȱǯȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱǻȱȱȱǼȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱǼǯȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱ from the worst outcome of lifetime imprisonment (Table 6.1). ȱ ȱ ȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱĴȱǻȱŜǯŘǼȱȱȱȱȱȱǻȱŜǯřǼǰȱȱ ¢ȱȱĴȱěȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ at best dominance and at worst mutual ruin rather than singular deȬ feat. As the analysis goes, in an arms race, regardless of what the USSR ǰȱȱȱȱĴȱěȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ Ȃȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ ǰȱ ȱ the worst possible outcome for the other agent. These preferences are consistent with an aggressor or revisionist state.77 Joe Silent   Silent 1 year, 1 year ȱȱȱǰȱ  ǰȱȱȱ 10 years, 10 years Table 6.1:ȱȱȂȱ "both actors achieve" Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŞś USSR Defend Ĵ US Defend security, security surrender, victory Ĵ victory, surrender destruction, destruction Table 6.2:ȱȱȱȱȱĴȱǻǰȱǯǯǰȱǰȱStrategy of Ě) USSR Disarm Arm US Disarm peace, peace submission, dominance Arm dominance, submission precarity, precarity Table 6.3: Nuclear Arms Race (see, e.g., Campbell and Sowden, Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation)

ȱȱȱȱȱȱDZȱǰȱȬ tomatic deterrence, institutional deterrence, and the assertive stance of escalation dominance, which he calls nuclear strategism. According to strategic rationality, which is presented as a comprehensive and Ȭȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ Ȭ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ ity and intention to wage nuclear war. Additional features of nuclear ǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱęȱȱǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ land invasion into Europe. However, now that US conventional arms ȱȱĜȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱȱȱȬ aration of nuclear weapons from conventional weapons.şŘ This would ȱȱȱȱDZȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ paredness and capability to resort to nuclear warfare, deterrence-or, ¢ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȂȱȬ ȯ ȱȱ¢ǯȱ¢ǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱĴǰȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǯȱ Actors are motivated to avoid harm because it is directly contrary to their interests. The overall strategy of developing and maintaining the physical and institutional infrastructure to perpetuate nuclear threats Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗŞş ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ¡ȱȱȱȱǯȱ  ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱ ¡ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȬ ing, understanding, and recognition can provide reasons and causes for action. From a Uni!ed Social Ontology to a Uni!ed World Order ȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ explain all levels of agency, from the biological and human to the corpoȬ rate and sovereign. Theorists posit that all coherent purposive agency must obey the dictates of rational choice. The state, originally analyzed ¢ȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ¡ȱȱȱ and politics.şřȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ ȱ£ȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȬǰȱ that exerting the most singular impact on life planetwide, is how and ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱ ǰȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱĚȱȂȱȱ¢ȱȱ devastating and credible threats of harm. The rational choice approach to politics, collective action, and warfare is realist in the sense that it ȱ£ȱęȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȱȬ dled strategic pursuit of ends.şŚ This realism permeates the analytic decision technology of strategic rationality itself because it promotes an understanding and practice of communication that denies intention, ǰȱ ȱ ¢ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ ence of signaling asymmetric information of what world states obtain, ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȂȱǯşś ȱȱȱȱHow Reason Almost Lost Its Mindǰȱȱȱ ǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬȬ hand with the abandonment of mindless rationality.şŜȱ  ǰȱȱ as the nuclear security dilemma remains as pressing as during any ȱȱȱȱǰȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ęȱ ȱȱȱȱ Ȭęȱ¢ǯşŝ Now strategic ratioȬ ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȬȱȱȱȬ rity and logistical planning, as well as a paradigm for rational action, but also serves as a means to provide a unifying logic of action that spans across all levels and types of agency. Thus, rational decision theȬ ory is applied to evolving organisms, cognition, language, individual nation state ŗşŖȲȊȲS. M. Amadae agency, collective agency, hybrid systems of human and robotic acȬ tors, formal and informal institutions, and arriving at sovereign deȬ cisions. The theorist Fancesco Guala refers to this broad application ȱȱȱȱȱȃęȱȱ¢ǯȄşŞ Economist Herbert ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ encompass both animal and human behavior.şş Rather than being a relic of the past, robotic rationality has become so normal that those ȱȱȱȱȯĴȱȬ Ȭ ing, commitment to principles as opposed to only being incentivized by outcomes, solidarity and team reasoning, shared intention, and Ȭȱ ǰȱ ȱ ¡ȯȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ prospective casualties are mind, intention, and intelligibility. The paradigm of computational rationality comfortably sustains the position that mind is an illusion that will gradually fall away.100 Some urge us to grasp that we are in the midst of a fourth revolution. ȱȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ have given way, so too will our view that we are categorically distinct ȱęȱǯ101ȱ  ǰȱȱȱȱ ȱĴȱȱȱ strategic rationality as a template for human intelligence, we already ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬȱ ȱȬ prehension of the meaning of actions is irrelevant to rational choice.102 Furthermore, insofar as this model of rationality presents a normative ǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ hension of how following the rules they are incentivized to follow ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱęǯ103 ǰȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱ¢ȱĚȱȱȱȬ ȱȱ¢ȱȂȱȱȱǯ The titles of two recent papers convey the trend toward viewing the ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱDZȱȃȱ ¢DZȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ¡£Ȅȱȱȃȱ¢DZȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱǰȱ ȱǯȄ104 This branch of research, referred to as computational rationality, uses exȬ pected utility theory as the basis for how organisms, including peoȬ ple, register external states of the world in brain states.ŗŖś Life forms ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȬȱȱȱȱȱȃȬȬ cessing mechanisms by selecting an optimal program for a bounded ȱ ȱ¡£ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱǯȄ106 According Computable Rationality, NUTS, and the Nuclear LeviathanȲȊȲŗşŗ ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱęȱȱȱScienceǰȱȃȱęȱȱ ęȱȱǻǼǰȱȱǰȱȱȱȱȬ converging on a shared view of the computational foundations of inȬ ǯȄ107 Along the same lines, economist Herbert Gintis argues that game theory can explain action all the way down to the way that cognition functions. He observes that "expected utility maximization ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȁȱ Ȃȱ ¢Ȅȱȱ ȃȱ ¢ȱ ęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢Ȭ £ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱǯȄ108 These ęȱǰȱȱȱȱǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĚȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱęǯŗŖş ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡¢ȱǯȱ	ȱ theoretic modeling has been applied extensively in evolutionary biolȬ ogy, and lessons learned from these models have been used to draw conclusions about the possibility of and basis for human cooperaȬ tion.110 Game theoretic accounts of individual human and collective action are integrated into public policy.111 Rational choice theory inȬ forms the applied schools of law and economics, public choice, and institutional design.112 Game theory has also been extensively applied in international relations theory spanning nuclear deterrence and heȬ ȱ¢ȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢£ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ they are not enforceable.113 ȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱȱ ȱǰȱ ȱ possibly predict, political and economic phenomena. However, from the time of its founding, game theory also stood as a normative theory of rational choice with prescriptive implications for individual and ȱȬǯ114 Thus, if, as its advocates propose, game theory is both a normatively valid theory of instrumental action and a descriptively informative account of agency, then it is not surprising ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ǰȱ from the nonhuman biological to individual and collective action to superordinate action of organized groups including companies and ǰȱȱ¢ȱȬȱ¢ǰȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ tenets of rational action.ŗŗśȱ  ǰȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ descriptive modeling of agency and normative theories of agency ȱĚȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢DZȱǻŗǼȱ ȱDzȱǻŘǼȱȬȱȱDzȱǻřǼȱȱ¢ȱ within institutions designed using (a) analytic rational choice and (b) ŗşŘȲȊȲS. M. Amadae behavioral experiments that rely on orthodox game theory to provide a template for perfectly rational conduct; and (4) sovereign bodies which are structured to conform to the theoretical results learned from rational choice modeling. Game theorists address all these expressions of agency with their singular model for action.116 Modeling individual competition, collecȬ tive action, and institutions as games is staple in rational choice. More interesting for purposes here is the application of rational choice theȬ ory to the sovereign function of governance, particularly by way of the Ȃȱǯ117 Revisiting the conceptualization of the state as Leviathan, contemporary political theorists have used game theory to provide an analysis of the state of nature and the maintenance of ȱȱěȱ¢ȱ ǯ118 According to this new assessment, strategic rationality governs all purposive conduct and must account for the exercise of collective sovereignty from the micromotives of inȬ dividual choice.ŗŗşȱ	ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱȱ ǰȱęȱ common ground with him in their approach, which associates moȬ ȱ ȱȱȬȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱ ȱȱ ǯȱ  ǰȱ ¢ȱȱ ȱ ȱ ȱęĴȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱĴȱȱȱ¡ȱȬ ȱȱȱ ǰȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱęȱȱȱ ǯ120 ȱȱ Ȭȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ Ȭ  ȱ Ȃȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱěȱ¢ȱȱȬ ory.121ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱȂȱȱȱȱȂȱȱ ȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ ȱȬ ęȱǰȱ¢ǰȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ǰȱȱ¢ȱ rational, motivating forces, game theorists impute to individuals ȱ Ȭȱ ȱ ȱ¡£ȱ ¡ȱ ¢ǯ122ȱȱ

ȱ ǰȱǰȱȱȱǯȱGame Theory: A Critical IntroductionǯȱDZȱǰȱŘŖŖŚǯ Hausman, Daniel H. Preference, Value, Choice and Welfareǯȱǰȱ DZȱȬ bridge University Press, 2011. Heath, Joseph. Communicative Action and Rational ChoiceǯȱǰȱDZȱȱ Press, 2001.