HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT An International Journal Executive Editors: Janet Coleman and lain Hampsher-Monk, Politics Dept. Amory Building, Exeter University, Exeter EX4 4RJ. England History of Political Thought seeks to provide a forum for the interpretation and discussion of political thought in its historical context. It is intended to foster exchange and communication between scholars in the Englishspeaking world and those on the continent and elsewhere . The journal is devoted exclusively to the historical study of political ideas and its associated methodological problems. Studies dealing with ancient , medieval , renaissance, early modem and recent political thought are invited. The primary focus is on research papers but from time to time reviews and surveys designed to familiarise students with the 'state of studies' concerning a particular thinker or area of research will be included . History of Political Thought is published thrice yearly by Imprint Academic, 61 Howell Road, Exeter EX4 4EY England. CONTENTS Page 1 Editorial 3 33 37 43 73 83 89 Articles: Toleration and Truth Dr. Samuel Parr and Dr. Joseph Priestley: A Notable Friendship Godwin, Holcroft and the Rights of Man The London Ministers and Subscription, 1772-1779 The Beginnings of Priestley's Materialism Documents: Jeremy Bentham on Richard Price George Cadogan Morgan at Oxford 91 Richard Price: 'A Sketch of Proposals' Review: 107 David Williams, Incidents in my own life which have been thought of some importance, ed. Peter France. Inside Back Cover Notes to Contributors and Subscribers Martin Fitzpatrick H.J. McLachlan M. Philp John Stephens Alan Tapper Yoshio Nagai D.A. Rees D.O. Thomas Martin Fitzpatrick THE BEGINNINGS OF PRIESTLEY'S MATERIALISM Alan Tapper The mature materialism of Joseph Priestley's Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit of 1777 is based on three main arguments: that Newton's widely-accepted scientific methodology requires the rejection of the 'hypothesis' of the soul; that a dynamic theory of matter breaks down the active/passive dichotomy assumed by many dualists; and that interaction between matter and spirit is impossible. In Matter and Spirit it is the first two arguments which are given greatest prominence; but it is the third argument which first brought Priestley to take materialism seriously. It was an argument which had persistently troubled him in his dualist years, but it was not until 1774 in the Examination that (as he tells us) he 'first entertained a serious doubt of the truth of the vulgar hypothesis' (III, 202).' Underlying this fact is an episode of some complexity. The Examination was Priestley's reply to the three Scottish Common Sense philosophers, Thomas Reid, James Beattie and James Oswald, with appendices on Richard Price and James Harris. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind of 1764 was Priestley's main concern, and the subject of the debate was not the nature of mind but scepticism, realism and the 'Theory of Ideas'. The 'sceptics' under discussion were Berkeley and Hume. Both Reid and Priestley thought Berkeley and Hume had denied the reality of the external world, and both wished to reinstate external reality. Priestley thought the sceptical challenge could be met without any great difficulty. It was, he held, based on a misunderstanding of the canons of scientific reasoning: the assumption that whatever can not be demonstrated is not worthy of rational belief. It is quite sufficient if the supposition (of an external world] be the easiest hypothesis for explaining the origin of our ideas. The evidence of it is such that we allow it to be barely possible to doubt of it; but that it is as certain as that two and two make four, we do not pretend (III, 46-7) . 1 All references in the text are to The Theological and Miscellaneous Works of Joseph Priestley, 25 volumes in 26, edited by John Towill Rutt (London, 1817-32; reprinted New York, 1972). The full title of the Examination is An Examination of Dr Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense; Dr Beattie's Essay on the Nature and Immutability of Truth; and Dr Oswald's Appeal to Common Sense in Behalf of Religion. ENLIGHTENMENT AND DISSENT Number 1, 1982 74 A. TAPPER Priestley's realism was 'representative' realism He took th L k of Id~as-the theory that all our percepti~ns are m:di~~de~n Theory sensations-to be one of the best establish d h" o us by philosophy, and he could see nothing in Be~ke~~y teve~ents of modem undermining that achievement. or ume capable of Reid, by contrast, thought that Berkele d H upheaval in philosophy and that orde ~an . ume had brought about an abolishing the whole tradition of 'id r ã samty ~~uld on!y be restored by Democritus and Aristotle. The det: eas -a. tradttt~n whtch goes back to required a new conception of the pence of re~ltsm ag~mst Humean scepticism The capacity to perceive reality hadot~e;s an ~p~ratiOns of the hu?Ian mind. of the mind and this . e coun e as one of the native powers representativ~ ideas. The~;~ tsõot to _be_ explicated by reference to principal source of Humean scepf;c. Id~ã tsl m fact , to be regarded as the the Theory entire! innoce . .ts~. nest ey, on the other hand, thought his theory of causãion and ~~u~~tts vte":, Hume's s~epticism stemmed from of causal relations is onl one reaso!lmg. For Retd, Hume's 'destruction ' produced by the Theory ~f Ide~:.sualty m the general 'destruction of worlds' Reid appealed to common sense to su h" b . . . perceive reality directly. In Priestle 's pport h ~s ehef 1~ t?e mmd's ability to fraught with sceptical implication y IteJ.es, t ts appealts t~self a manoeuvre reasoning to furnish us with a reali:t 1~sp~ted the suffictency of scientific regard as knowledge a lot of mere .~o; -~tew, and thereby compelled us to the arbitrary constitution of our nat~~* tÕ~tv;l)e~uã;ons , ~epe?din_g upon to be possible, some pro osition ' . e a ows t at , ~~ sctence is foundational but he confi p ~ must be tãen as self-evtdent and and predicat~ must be 'dl_l!s self-evtdence to analytical propositions-subject 1 Iuerent names for the same thi ' (III 17) ~ã~~~ar~~;o&~si~~ns of ?Jathematics ('twice two is fou~~ fall ~ithi~ ~~ . ' er sctences-metaphysics morals th I sctence and politics-can produce no bi ' ' eo ogy' natural whic~ can be accepted as self-evid~~~f~a e d~Iementa'!' propositions' relatively circumscribed a eal to c . ccor mg _to ~nestley , Reid's successors, Beattie and os:Id ommo? ~eñe . m_evttably leads his primary truths of religion' and th to ~~large tts Juñd~ctt?n to include 'the truth (' that to us is truth which wee/:;; t~ñes of Chnstt_amtr (Oswald) or all Beattie [III, 72]) . a we must belteve , he quotes from 2 _G~org~ <;ampbell was quick to observe that Pri 1 * distmgmshmg acceptable self-evidence nor had h es~ ey had failed to supply any criterion for Cf The Philosophy of Rhetoric (Londõ , 1850), 3;. given any non-mathematical examples of it. PRIESTLEY'S MATERIALISM 75 Only a part of Reid's Inquiry consists of assertions based on self-evidence or common sense. That there is no external world is self-evidently false , Reid argues; but that 'ideas' do not exist is not self-evident. Reid's argument against the existence of ideas depends in part on his claim that belief in ideas leads to an 'absurd' denial of external existence: put this way, the argument is designed to give pause to any followers of Hume and Berkeley who value common sense. But against the followers of Locke, his argument has to consist of a demonstration that belief in ideas does entail a denial of matter, and this side of Reid is more difficult to reconstruct. Reid believes that this demonstration has already been performed by Berkeley and Hume, and he takes the demonstration, together with the argument from common sense, as constituting a reductio ad absurdum of the Theory of Ideas. Priestley's purpose is to show that Reid's 'demonstration' is a failure . The Theory of Ideas is , in his opinion, entirely innocent of the sceptical progeny Reid accused it of fathering. Reid's appeal to common sense is not only dangerous; it is also unnecessary. The Reid-Priestley debate about ideas has a number of aspects, but it revolves around a central proposition: that sensations and ideas (if ideas exist) do not resemble the qualities of external objects. Reid thinks this is a truth discovered by Berkeley and Hume, which served as the 'innocent mother' when the Theory of Ideas begat the sceptical denial of external reality. Throughout the Inquiry Reid also assumed that ideas must resemble objects if they are to represent them; for him, then, ideas must be images of external things. 3 The main point in Priestley's Examination is his denial that ideas must resemble what they represent. In arguing thus, he openly concedes that they do not resemble their objects. Reid, he says, has suffered himself to be misled .. . merely by philosophers happening to call ideas the images of external things; as if this was not known to be a figurative expression denoting not that the actual shapes of things were delineated on the brain, or upon the mind, but only that impressions of some kind or other were conveyed to the mind by means of the organs of sense and their corresponding nerves, and that between these impressions and the sensations existing in the mind there is a real and necessary, though at present an unknown connexion (Ill , 36). Priestley is defending the Lockean claim that 'ideas' mediate perceptions. Lockean mediation is usually thought of as twofold: ' ideas' both represent their objects and they stand as part of a causal explanation of perception. Perception is to be thought of as the outcome of the causal sequence object- ' On this aspect of Reid see Selwyn Grave, "The 'Theory of Ideas"' in Thomas Reid: Critical Interpretations, eds. Stephen F. Barker and Tom L. Beauchamp (Philadelphia, 1976), 55-61. 76 A . TAPPER (physiological) impression-sensation or idea. In defending ideas, Priestley defends this causal theory, and he seems to assume that by so doing the representation issue is also satisfied. He does, indeed, talk about two aspects of mediation in the first two (of six) 'fallacies' which he sees as 'the principal source of [Reid's] mistakes' , but these aspects are both presented in causal rather than representational terms. (1) Because he cannot perceive any resemblance between objects and ideas, he concludes that the one cannot produce the other. (2) Because he cannot perceive any necessary connexions between sensations and the objects of them, and therefore cannot absolutely demonstrate the reality of external objects, or even of the mind itself, by the doctrine of ideas, he rejects that doctrine altogether, and has recourse to arbitrary instincts (III, 34). The first point here shows that Priestley thought Reid's denial of likeness between objects and ideas was aimed at refuting the causal rather than the representational aspect of mediation . The second point highlights a different dimension of the debate about ideas. The Inquiry contains a subsidiary attack on the Theory of Ideas which turns not on the issue of resemblance between objects and ideas but on conditions governing causal relations between body and mind. Reid's ' resemblance' argument can be phrased as running: 'no representation without resemblance' . His subsidiary argument claims that we can only speak of causal relations between two entities when we can discern the mechanism of 'necessary connexion' between cause and effect. Priestley quotes Reid: 'We are inspired by the sensation, and we are inspired by the corresponding perception, by means unknown. ' 4 For Reid, we cannot know that objects cause ideas because we do not know of any means by which they do so. Priestley thought this argument fallacious. Priestley and Reid disagree about perception partly because they dispute whether ideas must be images, but also because they dispute whether it is necessary to know the mechanism by which a putative cause produces its effect. 4 The Works of Thomas Reid, ed. W. Hamilton , 7th ed., 2 Vols (Edinburgh, 1872). I , 188. Reid is certai!llY occasionalist with regard to physical transactions. In nature, he says, 'we neither perceive the agent nor the power, but the change only .. . ' Real efficiency belongs only to the 'm~taphysical cause', 'the agent behind the scene', which for him must be supernatural agency. lbtd. , II , 523. His denial of physical action on mind is similarly inspired. Reid , however, felt no doubts about the reality of mind's action on matter. PRIESTLEY'S MATERIALISM 77 However, while it is easy to distinguish between these two argume.nt~ in ~he Inquiry Priestley's way of handling the arguments blurs the distmction betwee~ them, even as he talks about Reid's 'two fallacies ' . He reads. 'no representation without rese~blance' as t~ntamount to 'no causal r~lat10ns without resemblance' . In th1s way the first argument becomes , hke the second, a causal argument. And, for Reid, the second argument rests on the assumption that mind and body are so di~similar that ther~ could be no intervening mechanism by means of which they c~uld mteract. Both arguments then involve the question of resemblance. Pnestley contends that both lack 'of r~semblance between cause and effect, and ignorance of mechanisms , is no barrier to knowledge of causation. The disagreement between Reid and Priestley about mec?anist?s .affects not only their attitude to the causal t.heory of perce~t10n: It. 1s also fundamental to their positions for and agamst free-will . (Pnestle~ wlll .argue that 'correspondences' show motives to be causally bound t? actiOns, JUSt as objects are bound to ideas.) In t?e abs~nce (as h~ thmks) .of a wellauthenticated mechanism of perception, Reid feels entitled to cla1m ~hat t?e 'images' allegedly transmitted by the nerves are mer~ fi~tioñ , of n? e~Idential value. Hartley's theory of nervous 'vibrations' IS hke~Ise. dismissed as conjectural. He adds that these 'theories' are equally lãkmg I~ explanãory force: 'If any man will s?ow hõ the mind ~ay perceive ~ages m t.he g~a5m, I will undertake to explam how tt may percetve t~e ~ost distant obJe.cts . On Priestley's account of causal reasoning, these obJe~tions carry no w~tght. The 'correspondences' between objects and sens~t10ns provtde ev~dence of causation which cannot be overruled by gaps m our understandmg of the perceptual process. I know . . . that the eye is the instrument of vision, because without it nothing can be seen .. . I am equally certain that t~e b~ain i~ necessã to all perception because if that be disordered, thmkmg e1ther entirely ceases, or is proportionably disturbed (III , 38). The philosopher is entitled to f~shi?n h~pothes:s .about the causã mechanism and these cannot be dtsmissed 1f they smt the phenomena (ibid.). It i~ interesting to note in passing that Reid's :hetoric against ideas- 'unphilosophical', 'no foundation i~ fact or obse~atton', etc.-corr.e~ponds closely to Priestley's language agamst the soul m M~tter and Spt~tt . The difference between them is that for Priestley, unlike Re1d , not all conJectures are unphilosophical. Priestley is committed to t?e view.that ide~s are , b.ut the soul is not, a philosophical conjecture. A ph1losophtcal conJecture ~s õe which conforms to the first two of Newton's 'Rules of Reasomng m ' Ibid . , I, 157 ; quoted by Priestley at III , 38. 78 A. TAPPER Philosophy' , namely, 'We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances', and, 'to the same natural effects we must , as far as possible, assign the same causes' (Motte 's translation). Pri~stle~'s view of cãsal reasoning rules out, for him, the possibility of õcaswnah.sm or parallelism: we know that mind and body do interact. Reid 's different v1ew makes the denial of interaction a possibility. Priestley's two mai~ J?Oints against Reid-Reid's first two 'fallacies'-are seen by him as nulhfymg the force of the Inquiry, but his examination also mounts a counterõeñive ~hie~ seeks t? drive Reid into the occasionalist camp, or, further still, I!lt? 1deahsm. It .Is from this counter-offensive that Priestley's early matenahsm largely denves. In a section entitled 'Mr Locke's Doctrine not so favourable to ~erkeley's Th~ory as Dr Reid's ', he assembles various passages fro!D, the In:quuy where Re1d approaches occasionalism. In these passages Re1d s d.ualism IS so .absolute as to make interaction doubtful. Mind and body are so different , Re1d says, that 'we can find no handle by which one may lay hold of the other' {III, 48). 6 And , following Berkeley, he asserts that 'sensations and ideas in our minds can resemble nothing but sensations and ideas i~ other minds' (i~id.). 7 Dissimilarity has here become not a contingent fact , d1s~overed by careful attention to the phenomenology of sensations, but a necessity! consequent ':lpon the nature of the mind and matter. Priestley quotes a third passage which goes to the source of Reid's dualism: 'I take it for granted, upon the testimony of common sense, that my mind is a substance . . . and my reason convinces me that it is an unextended and indivisible substance; and hence I infer that there cannot be in it anything that resembles extension' {III, 47). 8 Reid's dualism, it seems, is based on the traditional c?ñrãt betw~e!l ~atter's complexity and mind's 'simplicity'. Substances so diSSimilar, he IS mchned to suggest, are unable to interact* and if Reid himself hesitates to draw this conclusion, Priestley will draw it fo; him . Priestl~y. goe~ on ~o argue. that this 'occasionalism' leads readily to Berkeley s 1deal!s":I. H1s reasomng here rests on the principle which underlies the lat~r f!!atenahsm of Matter and Spirit , the principle of simplicity as embodied m Rule I of Ne~ton's 'Rules of Reasoning'. If all our perceptions añ th.oughts w~uld remam exactly as they are if matter did not exist, then behef m a matenal world is otiose. If occasionalism is true , then the external world, 6 Ibid. , 187. 7 Ibid., 132. 8 Ibid. , 210. PRIESTLEY'S MATERIALISM can be of no proper use to give us sensations and ideas. It must be (God] himself who impresses our minds with the notices of external things, without any real instrumentality of their own; so that the external world is really a superfluity in the creation (III , 47). 79 Deny interaction and it follows that 'this external world, which has been the subject of so much controversy, can have no existence' , for a wise God would create nothing superfluous. Priestley's 'counter-offensive' rests not just on the principle of simplicity, but also on the proposition that interaction between dissimilars is impossible. By now it may be beginning to appear that this proposition conflicts with his whole defence of the Theory of Ideas, but this apparent conflict can be examined in a moment. The proposition also forms the basis of Priestley's early materialism, and we can now see how this materialism followed from his encounter with Reid. Priestley was willing to regard Berkeley's idealism as a serious option-he could not dismiss it as contrary to common sense. He tells us that 'when I first entered upon metaphysical inquiries, I thought that either the material or immaterial part of the universal system was superfluous' (III, 201), and Reid's Inquiry seems to have returned him to the same point. Despite the problem of interaction, Priestley could not deny that interactions between mind and matter did occur. It is, for him, more certain t):lat there are causal relations between matter and mind than that the mind is or is not material (III, 154), whereas for Reid the mind's immateriality is the fundamental certainty. The Theory of Ideas itself requires that there is a material world producing ideas in the mind. The causal theory of perception , and the theory of causal reasoning underlying it, are Priestley's primary concerns; to protect them involves rejecting idealism. But beyond this, he thinks that the principle of simplicity can also be enlisted against idealism. The chief defect of Berkeley's scheme is that it supposes a multitude of divine interpositions which , while not impossible, is not 'consonant to the course of nature in other respects' {III, 23) . The view that ideas are caused by their objects 'is recommended by the same simplicity that recommends every other philosophical theory, and needs no other evidence whatever'. It 'exhibits particular appearances as arising from general laws, which is agreeable to everything else we observe (ibid.). Realism is, then, a superior scientific theory. Far from the Theory of Ideas leading to Berkeley's 'scepticism' (as Reid thought), the Theory on Priestley's view, entails the falsity of idealism, and, further , Reid's denial of the Theory leads to idealism. But having thus tried to turn the tables on Reid, Priestley's own opinions also underwent a reversal. The problem of interaction between dissimilars was so great that if it was not alleviated, idealism would retain a measure of appeal. Interaction seemed impossible, and idealism seemed incompatible with the realism assumed by 80 A . TAPPER the Theory of Ideas. Priestley, then , had no alternative but to declare himself a materialist . No problem is presented by interaction between brain and body. Two other difficulties did immediately present themselves: if the mind is the brain, are ideas also material? And, are there any a priori objections to identifying the mind with the brain? On the first point, Priestley took Hartley as his authority; on the second , Locke. He suggests that ideas no more resemble their objects than the stroke of a plectrum resembles the sound it produces. If Reid wishes to deny that objects cause ideas, then he must also deny that the stroke produces the sound. The transferring of this comparison to the doctrine of ideas is very easy. If, as Dr Hartley supposes, the nerves and brain be a vibrating substance, the analogy will hold very nearly; all sensations and ideas being vibrations in that substance, and all that is properly unknown in the business being the simple power in the mind to perceive, or be affected by, those vibrations. And if, as Locke and others suppose, matter itself may be indued with that sentient power, even that difficulty, as far as the present problem is concerned , is removed (III, 36-7). The points were to present more difficulty than Priestley realized: he was to equivocate later about whether ideas are merely brain-processes; and he was to be troubled by the question of how matter might think. It remains to return to the apparent contradiction running through the Examination , both sides of which contribute to the formation of Priestley's materialism. In the defence of ideas he comments that 'it is impossible to say how [the nerves and brain] act upon the mind, or the mind upon them'-but, he adds, this is no ground for denying that they do interact. To reason thus would end in utter scepticism; by such sceptical reasoning 'we may deny every principle in nature' (III , 36). The implication is that science frequently makes progress despite an ignorance of mechanisms. And yet, when we come to the counter-attack on Reid, he asks , to reinforce the problem of interaction, 'how can any thing act upon another but by means of some common property? ' (III , 47). The implication here is that the absence of a mechanism makes causal relations between matter and spirit impossible . Priestley says no more than this , and his commentators have not pursued the matter. However, the 'contradiction' is only apparent. Priestley can be paraphrased as follows: Where we know a priori that there can be no me~hanisms (as in the case of matter and spirit) , there causation can be safely demed . Where we are simply ignorant of any mechanism, there knowledge of causation is a possibility. The difficulty in Priestley's case lies not at the level of these principles of causal reasoning, but at the point where he claims, while PRIESTLEY'S MATERIALISM 81 still trying to be neutral about the nature of mind, that 'correspondences' show that objects do cause ideas. Clearly, if objects are , and ideas are not material , then (for him) objects cannot cause ideas. He is not entitled to adopt even a temporary stance of neutrality towards the ontological question. He wants to claim we cã know that objects cause ideas without knowing. hõ they do s~ , b~t hts own principles require him to show that a mechamsm ts at leãt poss~ble m the cas~ , and only materialism (or idealism) can guarantee tht~ . . It IS ':lot only hts counter-attack on Reid that requires him to adopt matenabsm; hts defence C?f the Theory of Ideas also requires it. The fact that he seems .unawar~ .of thts suggests no more than that the Examination records hts transition to materialism. One other difficulty remains. It is a basic point i~ P~estley 's defence C?f ideas that contra Reid ideas need not resemble thetr obJects. However, hts newly-ad~pted materiaiism holds that objec~s ~ñ id~as .are not .ontologic.ally dissimilar . One is left to conclude that the dtsstmtlanty ts of a dtfferent kmd, presumably qualitative or configura.tional ?i~similarity. It i~ true 9 that Reid argues (in what we have termed hts. substdtary attack on tdeas ) ~om an ontological dissimilarity between obJ~Cts ãd tdeas to the conclusiOn that ideas cannot resemble or represent obJects many way , ?ut we ~a? ~res~me that for Priestley ontological dissimilarity is not the only kmd of dtsstmtlanty. UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA • See ibid.