The Collision of Language and Metaphysics in the Search for Self-Identity: on "Aha�kāra" and "Asmitā" in Sā�khya-Yoga Marzenna JAKUBCZAK Kraków ABSTRACT The author of this paper discusses three major points: (1) a significant feature of linguistic analysis in the classical Indian philosophical tradition; (2) the role of the religious practice (īśvara-pranidhāna) in the search for true self-identity in Sā�khya and Yoga schools (darśana-s) with special reference to their gnoseological purposes; and (3) some possible readings of "aha�kāra" and "asmitā" displayed in the context of Sā�khya-Yoga phenomenology and metaphysics. The collision of language and metaphysics refers to the risk of paralogism caused be the common linguistic procedures making the subject define its identity within the semantic order (that is verbal conventions and grammatical rules) which do not reflect the actual metaphysical situation of the self, though it determines one's self-understanding in the empirical sense. Whereas Sā�khya-Yoga aims at recognizing, reorganizing and, finally, going beyond these procedures regarded as the obstacles on the path towards selfknowledge and liberation from metaphysical ignorance. 1. IS The GRAMMATICAl AnAlYSIS USefUl on The PATh of lIBeRATIon? even though neither Sā�khya nor Yoga is famous for their special concern with grammar (vyākara�a), or linguistic analysis, both classical darśanas share a general view of the Indian grammarians that language has both phenomenal and metaphysical dimensions, which can be uncovered only if one uses it in a correct and insightful manner mas tered thanks to some i g n o r a n c e-c l e a r i n g a c t i v i t i e s. Yogasūtra (III.17), which refers to the way language is generated and understood, A R G U M e n T Vol. 1 1/2011 pp. 37–48 www.argument-journal.eu 38 Marzenna JAKUBCZAK recommends that one should concentrate on a distinction (pravibhāga) between three elements: a word (śabda, or pada), the meaning (padārtha, or artha), and presented-idea (pratyaya, or sm�ti) in order to efface ignorance (avidyā). The yogin makes a virtue out of a natural inclination to fuse and confuse these three distinct components by using it as a starting-point for an exercise in concentration and meditative-absorption (samādhi).1 In this way, Patañjali argues, a yogin can have knowledge of the language of all living beings.2 of course, there is no a single language that is used by all living beings. So, what Patañjali suggests pointing to this rare vibhūti, or supernatural power, is that a yogin becomes omniscient (sarvavid) thanks to overcoming all the limits that every language imposes upon the perceiving being. When commenting on sutra (III. 17) Vyāsa states that the bond between these three elements: śabda, artha and pratyaya, is merely a v e r b a l c o n v e n t i o n (sa�keta) consisting in wrong identification of one with another. Therefore, the author of Yogabhā�ya recommends grammatical analysis (vyākara�īya), so that one can grasp the difference between these elements and thereby avoid mixing verbs (kriyā-vācaka) and nouns (kāraka-vācaka). however, in the context of YS,	any mental activity involving naming or denoting (vyapadeśa), and every reflection based merely on the analysis of words is called vikalpa, or conceptualization (YS	I. 9), which is recognized as the afflicted, troubling fluctuation of mind (kli��a citta-v�tti). Vikalpa, contrary to a valid cognition (pramā�a), never reaches the right insight into reality, because it i m p l i e s i g n o r i n g t h e d i f f e r e n c e between the words and their meaning, or intended-objects and presented-ideas (YS, YBh, TV I. 41). That is why the author of YS	warns us against undue trust of language and conceptualization (savitarka). nevertheless, the risk of wrong usage of the words may only be eliminated through purifying the mind and freeing it from all gross and subtle objects. And here again, a careful grammatical analysis proves to be the best means for initial purification. 1 Cf. The	Yoga-Sūtra	of	Patañjali.	A	New	Translation	and	Commentary, trans. G. feuerstein (1989: 105–106). 2 Yogasūtra (III.17):	śabdārthapratyayānām	itaretarādhyāsāt	saṅ	ka	ra�	tatpravibhāgasa�yamāt	sarvabhūtarūtajñānam. The	Collision	of	Language	and	Metaphysics	in	the	Search	for	Self-Identity 39 2. WhAT IS ACTUAllY The God ThAT Sā�KhYA And YoGA do oR do noT BelIeVe In? now, before we master "the language of all living beings" and have an accomplished mind of diminished fluctuations (nirvicāra sa	mā	pat	ti, YS I.41), like a clear jewel assuming the colour of any near object, we can try to get a closer look at the Sanskrit grammatical structure and metaphysical connotations of some important terms occurring in the oldest preserved texts of Yoga and Sā�khya. The selection of the terms is, naturally, determined by the theme of the panel.3 While Patañjala Yoga, often called "Sā�khya with God" (seśvara), seems appropriate for this session, referring to grammar and God in classical Sā�khya, codified by Īśvarak���a in Sā�khyakārikā (c. 450 Ad), may seem odd because it is commonly thought to be atheistic or non-theistic. But should we simply follow this popular slogan? In fact, what we can learn about God from the passages of Yuktidīpikā, as well as Gau�apāda's and Mā�hara's commentaries to SK is that īśvara is not a cause of the world.4 Sā�khya is svābhāvika, which means that it believes the world arises spontaneously from its own inherent nature; therefore, the process of the so-called creation of the world needs no additional transcendental cause and reason. nevertheless, Sā�khya philosophers do not openly and unequivocally deny a category of God as such but rather confine themselves to rejecting a strong metaphysical concept of God as Creator and Ruler of the world. Yd even suggests that God acquires the instrument of understanding (buddhi) and also adopts a material body to take over the power, which belongs to that body. God takes a bodily form, for instance the body of a divine warrior, like Śiva (Yd 72.9–10), or the great seer being the incorporation, or embodiment of God.5 3 An early version of this paper was presented at the panel on "Grammar and the Gods: When Metaphysics and language Rules Collide", during the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (Chicago, nov 2, 2008). Then it was slightly developed and re-edited thanks to some valuable comments and hints I owe to Arindam Chakrabarti (University of hawai'i, USA) and Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad (lancaster University, UK). Though their critical remarks inspired me greatly, any errors or mistakes are my own. 4 The Yuktidīpikā (68.20–74.15) considers the following causes of the world, which all are subsequently rejected: the atoms (paramā�u), the Self (puru�a), God (Īśvara), work (karman), fate (daiva), time (kāla), chance (yad�cchā) and absence (abhāva). God, like the Self, is here defined as non-active (akart�), but his existence as such is not rejected at the same time. Cf. Yuktidīpikā	(1998). 5 The commentary argues that God can take a body of dignity (māhātmyaśa	rī	rā	di	pa	rigra	hāt,	Yd 72.13) which is Āpta 'authoritative' (Yd 45.10–11) like Īś	va	ramahar�is, that is the great seers who are [incorporations of] God, and who are "devoid of blemishes such as pas40 Marzenna JAKUBCZAK on the other hand, Patañjala darśana has been commonly recognized as "Sā�khya with God"6 due to the fact that the author of Yogasūtra (c. 300 Ad) refers to īśvara or īśvara-pra�idhāna in eleven aphorisms (YS I.23–29; II.1–2, 32, 45). In the first pāda, where the dynamics of yogic practice (abhyāsa) is elucidated, meditation on īś	va	ra seems to be a means to samādhi, though not the highest samādhi enabling distinguished discernment (viveka-khyāti). Whereas in the second pāda, both in the context of the three-step kriyā-yoga and as one of the five niyama-s included in the practice of a��aṅga-yoga, it is just a means for purification of the sattva-buddhi7 and effacement of the impact of karmāśaya. Besides, īśvara-pra�idhāna is mentioned in the third chapter of YS	where the methods of inducing the supernatural powers (siddhi-s) are discussed. Generally speaking, Patañjali considers īśvara to be the Self distinguished by the empirical consciousness (citta) in the course of discriminative discernment (viveka-khyāti), and an i d e a l m o d e l o f t h e e m p i r i c a l s e e r present permanently in ourselves in the form of inward consciousness (citi), but accessible only through meditative effort and one-pointed, intentional samādhi (ekāgra). Such a concept of the ideal preceptor, or the perfect inner guru, lets us suppose that īśvara, in the context of yogic pedagogy, is a counterpart of jīvan-mukta whose doctrine was not developed by Patañjali	otherwise. As G. J. larson rightly suggests, īśvara for classical Yoga is c o u n t l e s s i m p e r s o n a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s that can only manifest or reveal itself in the presence of perfectly pure sattva (prak���a-citta-sattva); therefore, "worship" or "prayer" in the Patañjala sion, whose opinions are free from doubt, who see things that cannot be reached by the senses". for a detail analysis of the idea of God in the commentaries to Sā�khyakārikā	cf. Johannes BRonKhoRST (1983: 149–164). Bronkhorst gives three readings of the term īśvaramahar�ī�ām (152–153): (1) if we read it as a dvandva compound, it means 'to God and the great seers'; (2) when read as a karmadhāraya compound, it means 'to the great seers, who are [incorporations of] God'; and (3) 'to the seers, who are Gods' (this last option Bronkhorst rightly considers inapplicable). 6 Patañjali's philosophy has been called "Sā�khya with God" at least since Sāya�a mādhava's Sarvadarśanasa�graha and the Sarvasiddhāntasaṅgraha (14th century) or even since Śaṅkara (8th century). however, f. edGeRTon (1924: 38) argues that Yoga, originally, did not refer to Patañjali's philosophy, because it is not a "system" of belief or of metaphysics, and it was always just a way, a method, of getting something, and not one of the Sā�khya schools. Moreover, as Bronkhorst (1981: 309–320) tries to convince us, Yoga in an early date referred rather to nyāya and/or Vaiśe�ika instead of Patañjali's views presented in Yogasūtra, therefore, the expression 'seśvara sā�khya' may have referred to the Pāñcarātra system. 7 These two understandings of īśvara-pra�idhāna are also clearly distinguished by T. S. RUKMAnI (1999: 738). The	Collision	of	Language	and	Metaphysics	in	the	Search	for	Self-Identity 41 Yoga ought to be understood as a profound meditation and longing (bhakti-viśe�a) for the e t e r n a l e x c e l l e n c e (śāś	va	tika	utkar�a) of p e r f e c t e m b o d i m e n t (prak���a-sattva).8 Thus, the difference in attitude to God between Sā�khya and Yoga does not prove to be so big as one might initially think, since the systems share basic metaphysical assumptions and skepticism towards the idea of an Almighty God Creator being the highest entity. And more importantly, they both accept a similar conception of t h e e m b o d i e d S e l f, which can manifest itself as a distinguished and perfect subject perceived as īśvara. Therefore, when we consider the idea of God in the context of these two schools, we must make the analysis of "subject" and "self-identification" our starting point. While doing so we must refer to semantic, cognitive, and ontological perspectives on subjectivity. 3. ABoUT GRAMMAR of "AhA�KāRA" And "ASMITā" There are numerous terms naming different aspects of subjectivity recognized by Patañjali and Īśvarak���a, such as dra���, sāk�in, citta, buddhi, manas, anta�karā�a, puru�a, svāmin, bhokt�, ātman etc., but here I am going to discuss only two of them, namely aha�kāra	and asmitā. They are worth analyzing even more carefully than others in the present paper due to a crucial role they play in the cosmological, psychological and, above all, soteriological context of Sā�khya-Yoga tradition. At first glance, both terms seem to be equivalent, as they come from the grammatical category of the first-person singular pronoun, and the verb "to be" conjugated as "(I) am". In his commentary to YS (III.47) when explaining the nature of five afflictions (kleśa-s), Vyāsa clearly identifies both terms.9 The issue of wrong self-understanding and a delusive subjectivity based on the concept of "I" (aha�kāra), and "mine" (mamakā	ra), or egotism (abhimāna) and I-am-ness (asmitā), has been quite common in the Indian thought. It first came up in the older Upani�ads10 and then is carefully discussed in Buddhism11 and in nyāya. But at least since Pañaśikha Sā�khya distinguishes "I-sense" (aha�kāra) as a separate in8 The phrase "eternal excellence" was suggested by G. J. lARSon in his paper The Eccentric God of Yoga: A New Approach to 'Worship' and 'Prayer' presented at 4th dharma Association of north America Conference (Washington dC, nov. 17–19, 2006). 9 Īśvarak���a uses this term three times aham (SK	61, 64, 66) and aha�kāra (SK	22, 24, 25). 10 Cf. M. STeIneR (1927: 109–114). 11 Cf. R. o. fRAnKe (1913: 44). 42 Marzenna JAKUBCZAK strument, which functions as activity or kriyā of the empirical consciousness rather than its static cosmological principle. Whereas asmitā,	more often used in the Yoga school, has a rather static connotation. This distinction is also confirmed by the grammatical structure of both two-word compounds. In the case of aha�kāra, first-person pronoun is followed by a suffix formed of a verbal root, and as such it can cover two major catego ries of meaning: that of the verbal action itself,12 and that of a participant of action, or agent.13 In the case of asmitā, a verb conjugated in first person singular is followed by a suffix tā (feminine), which is, together with tva (neuter), a very common ending to form abstract nouns meaning "being such, the quality of being so and so".14 3.1. A h a � k ā r a In aha�kāra composed of aham "I", and kāra, the latter component is not unequivocal and has several different meanings, especially when it occurs in conjunctions. What is more, kāra can be derived either from √k�	'to do, make, perform, accomplish, cause, prepare, work, employ, use, utter, pronounce', or from √k� 'to pour out, scatter, throw, cast, disperse', and also 'to hurt, injure', or 'to kill'. If we include all these connotations recorded in Monier-Williams' Sanskrit-English Dictionary, the term kāra envelops the following meanings: a) 'making, doing, working, making a sound, utterance'; b) 'a maker, doer'; c) 'an act, action, effort, exertion, determination, religious austerity'; d) 'a master, lord'; and also e) 'killing, slaughter'; f) 'bringing down, humiliation'. now, taking into account the philosophical usage of this term in Sā�khya-Yoga tradition, I suggest that we distinguish between three main readings of aha�kāra, which may be called: (1) c o s m o l o g i c a l, (2) p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l, and (3) s o t e r i o l o g i c a l. All of them 12 like in phutkāra 'puffing, blowing'. 13 for instance in vārttikakāra 'composer of vārttikas', or 'commentator'. As G. A. TUBB notices, the formulas of analysis in ordinary language used by the commentators to explain k�t formations follow very closely the treatment of these formations in Pā�ini's grammar. Cf. G. A. TUBB and e. R. BooSe (2007: 50). 14 PāṄInI, A��ādhyāyī (5.1.119), cit. after TUBB and BooSe (2007: 177). It is worth mentioning that both suffixes tā and tva	are identical in meaning, so we cannot distinguish between these abstract nouns; for instance both śuklatā and śuklatva mean 'being white, whiteness', both aśvatā and aśvatva mean 'being a horse, horseness'. however, when it comes to the philosophical technical terms, there may be some subtle difference in meaning, i.e. aha�tā being pure "I", undifferentiated consciousness (Kashmir Shaivism), aha�tva - being "I" (ego), individuality, mine-ness (Rāmāya�a	3.5.31). The	Collision	of	Language	and	Metaphysics	in	the	Search	for	Self-Identity 43 are accepted to be complementary rather than competitive or exceptive, though they capture the ego-maker from quite different perspectives. In the first suggested reading aha�kāra	means 'cry' (aham!). The uttering "I" is here regarded as a key stage of the world creation. It plays a similar role to an original being from Vedic cosmogony who, when about to create the world, cries out "here am I". In this meaning, aha�kāra is not a psychological category, but a cosmic and evolutionary principle, or tattva derived from buddhi, and in turn producing the five sense-capacities, the five action-capacities, inner sense (manas), and the five subtle elements (tanmātras). This cosmogony-oriented understanding is characteristic of the early pre-classical and theistic phase of Sā�khya school development when aha�kāra was even identified with Prajāpati, the mythical father of creation who produces the world as sacrificial food for himself by knowledge, austerity and self-formulation. By placing the I-making principle in the sequence of the creation stages, early Sā�khya acknowledges the ancient speculations on c r e a t i o n-b y-n a m i n g or f o r m a t i o n-b y-f o rm u l a t i o n, which consider name and form (nāma-rūpa) to be inseparable. This early meaning of aha�kāra	is positive: the original being naming himself 'I' is originally incomplete and needs to be completed in creation.15 Interestingly, in the Indian grammarian tradition of Pā�ini no sharp distinction is drawn between the verbs "knowing" and "doing". This is so not because the Indian grammarians simply ignore this distinction, but because they are aware of a deeper truth that the two are not dichotomous.16 As f. Staal aptly noticed while analyzing the ritual function of mantra, language is not something with which you n a m e something, but it is something with which you d o something.17 however, in the later stages of Sā�khya tradition this perspective undergoes a radical change. In SK and YS "the doer" and "the knower", or the agent of doing and the subject of knowledge are clearly distinguished. While the activity of any kind characterizes the nature (prak�ti) and all its sattva-rajas-tamas manifestations, the power of knowing, or consciousness (cit) comes only from the Self (puru�a). The second meaning of aha�kāra, which I call p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l, or epistemic, is 'I-making', or 'individuality-making', but also 'indi15 Cf. A	Sanskrit-English	Dictionary	(1993: 124, 253, 274, 301). 16 See B�hadāra�yaka, Śvetāśvatara Upani�ads, and Mok�adharma. B�h. (I.4, 17): "In the beginning, this (world) was just the self, one only. he desired, 'would that I had wife, then I may have offspring. Would that I had had a wealth, then I would perform rites'." 17 This is true in many other cases of verbs too. It is said, for example, that the word "to exist" or "to be" (as) is to be used in the sense of 'to become' (bhuvi), and "to become" (bhū) in the sense of 'to be' (as	bhuvi	bhū	sattāyām).	Cf. Kamalalar MIShRA 1981: 10–11. 44 Marzenna JAKUBCZAK vidual's making' in the sense 'making by the individual'. one could also render it as "I-sense". This reading of aha�kāra	indicates the significance of the phenomenal consciousness in the process of perception. here, aha�kāra instead of "creating" is rather responsible for "reflecting" or "projecting" the empirical self on nature, prak�ti, and consequently imposing on the world the individual point of view. More precisely, all the mental and physical objects, including the agent of the empirical perception, i.e. the mind-and-senses complex, are themselves manifestations, or projections of the ego-principle. Thus, aha�kāra	is unique in marking the common meeting point for the knower and the known, or knowable, alike. It stands for the intentionality of mind and plays a crucial role in the process of perception. In the statement "I know that I am the knower of objects", the self implied by the first "I" is the pure seer (puru�a) which is the reflector of the buddhi or the empirical ego. This non-objectified ultimate self enables the embodied ego to operate as the present subject. Whereas the second "I" implies the subject of the phenomenal experience (bhoga) being the illusory self. But who, after all, is the cogniser of the contact between the seer and the seen? It is "I" (aham) who am its cogniser, because I think I am the body etc., as well as that I am the knower. But aha�kāra is also the product of that union. Therefore, how can I know that union? In fact, I come into being or I come to know the union after the contact (sa�yoga) takes place. during each act of knowing, the knower and the known appear united; after that by analysis we know that t h e r e a r e s e p a r a t e e n t i t i e s therein as the knower and the knowable. In other words, while capturing these two in one conception we undergo the illusion and ignorance. We think "I can know myself" because the faculty of self-awareness, or light of consciousness is reflected in the sattvic aha�kāra. That is why although "I-sense" is the result of the contact and its instrument, I understand that I am both the seer and the seen. In the third s o t e r i o l o g i c a l reading, aha�kāra	is the w r o n g "I", or egotism, which requires bringing down one's delusive self and mastering it through spiritual determination and, finally, "killing" or "resolving" it back unto unmanifest and unindividualized form of nature (pradhāna). here, the emphasis is placed on the illusory aspect of the "I"-maker. The emergence of aha�kāra stands for the bifurcation of subjectivity into the empirical "I" and the transcendental true self. And this splitting up is the root cause of ignorance (avidyā) and all mundane suffering (du�kha). Wrong self-identification, namely the identification of the ego with the true self (puru�a), leads to a mistaken self-understanding and disables the realization of the true knowledge and freedom from misery. To achieve the ultimate The	Collision	of	Language	and	Metaphysics	in	the	Search	for	Self-Identity 45 soteriological goal, Sā�khya advocates dissolving aha�kāra through discriminative cognition (viveka-khyāti) of prak�ti - both the manifest and unmanifest - and puru�a. one may gain access to the state of liberation (mok�a) only through the "implosion" of one's ego, which as a result of the analysis of tattvas arising in the form of discrimination (nāsmi na me nāham - SK	64), which means that I am not what I thought myself to be under the delusion in the state of bondage; I am neither my body nor the contents of my consciousness and nor even ego itself. In this way, one attains the knowledge of the distinction between the unchangeable and ultimate true self and the mutable phenomenal self, functioning only as a p r o v i s o n a l a n d t r a n s i t i o n a l s u b j e c t. Thus, the wrong "I", on the one hand, makes individuality as such possible - both objective and subjective - and introduces the element of subjectivity and self-reflection into the unconscious material world but, on the other hand, it enables the transcendental consciousness of puru�a to evoke the personal dimension and, in consequence, to release the subject from the false self-identity with the I-sense. 3.2. A s m i t ā now, let us consider asmitā, coming from first-person conjugation of the verb to	be followed by the abstract noun ending tā. This term is more typical of Yoga than Sā�khya system, quite the opposite to aha�kāra	being more often used in the Sā�khya texts. While in SK	it does not have a single occurrence, Patañjali refers to asmitā several times. firstly, when he talks about an advanced stage of meditation (sa�prajñāta-samādhi, YS I.17, I.41, III.47). At this stage one is aware only of himself (ekātmika), which means that the only object (vi�aya) of perception is the subject of knowing himself, the present "I", or the grasper (grahīt�). Secondly, Patañjali uses this term when explaining the doctrine of ignorance (avidyā) to name one of its manifestations (kleśa - YS	II.3, 6). And thirdly, asmitā is referred to in the context of the emergence of the empirical consciousness (YS	IV.4). So, even though the etymology of this term does not seem as problematic as aha�kāra, and the literal meaning is clear: "I-am-ness", or "being I, the quality of being I", here too three different readings may be distinguished. one pointed ego-consciousness, which may be also called pure I, or I-hood. This state of consciousness is achieved when the self-identification excludes everything considered to be mine, like "my body", "my feelings", "my sensations" etc., apart from ego itself; then "I" appears dis46 Marzenna JAKUBCZAK tinguished from its attributes, and any external objects associated with, referred to, or intended by ego. This "I" expressed as asmitā	is identified with pure sattvic buddhi devoid of all disturbing fluctuations. The second reading of asmitā may be e g o t i s m, closely connected with ignorance and a dualist perspective towards self-knowledge. I-amness is understood here as predominance of an ego-centric attitude manifested in all our desires, aversions and habituations (rāga + dve�a + abhiniveśa). of course, this understanding of asmitā	does not have as affirmative a significance as it has in the first reading. A synonymous term to this reading of asmitā is abhimāna, or self-conceit, which could be technically defined as an undue extension (abhi-) of the I-notion to entities foreign to it. SK (24), in turn, identifies abhimāna with aha�kāra	as its function. The self-conceit, similar to the sense of ownership, involves some ambiguity. It brings forth a common feeling of pride, which may be of two basic types. Pride in the first meaning is respect, regard, honour, consideration of oneself and others; this kind of pride gives strength, power and can lead to victory over all obstacles (kleśa-s) and ignorance (avidyā) if one manages to withdraw the destructive aspects of pride, which are egotism, arrogance and selfishness. Without pride in the first meaning, without respect towards oneself and deep trust in one's power and potential, no progress in self-knowledge would ever be possible. Thus, the positive aspect of pride coming from abhimāna is a necessary prerequisite of the auto-soteriological perspective, so common in Indian thought. In the third reading asmitā reveals itself as aviśe�a, or asmitā-mātra that is the subtlest, non-specific or imperceptible dimension of prak�ti. At first glance, it may seem that this reading gets asmitā	pretty close to the cosmological principle of aha�kāra	as tattva. however, the context of usage of the term in YS is definitely epistemic and not ontological. here the individual empirical minds (nirmā�a citta-s) take their beginning. Since there is plurality or diversity (bheda) of the individual mental processes (prav�tti; YS IV.4–5), the existence of one prior and pure intellect (eka-citta) being the initiator of others is accepted. ConClUSIon Sā�khya and Yoga believe that all verbal conventions we are so attached to, including the ways we address ourselves, are manifestations of ignorance. And the language rules are precondition of every conceptualization of our experience unless buddhi becomes purely sattvic and free of The	Collision	of	Language	and	Metaphysics	in	the	Search	for	Self-Identity 47 all kleśa-s. Therefore, the grammatical rules impose some limitations on the self-knowledge as well. The main collision between language and metaphysics of Sā�khya-Yoga, or rather its mystical phenomenology, occurs when the grammatical tools used to express the sense of subjectivity prove to be misleading for the seeker of the true self-identity. Counter intuitively, the language forms (i.e. usage of first person pronoun and the verb am) seem to mask and petrify our wrong self-knowledge, which is to be eradicated thanks to discriminative discernment (viveka-khyāti). The two terms discussed above are not used in the Sanskrit texts consequently. In some places they seem equivalent, while in others they may be clearly distinguished or even contrasted in a sense. Putting it most synthetically, there are two aspects of I-sense, or two stages of selfconsciousness namely: (1) the sense of p u r e s u b j e c t i v i t y, or selfconsciousness (aham asmi	or 'I am') without the consciousness of the object; this is the awareness of m y m e r e e x i s t e n c e and the sense of I without differentiation of myself from others; (2) the sense of intentionality, or the awareness of I as distinct from not-I; this is the consciousness of the object (aham	idam or 'I [am] this'), which is related to or dependent on the consciousness of the "thou" or the object. Thus, the expressions of 'I' may serve in Sā�khya and Yoga both as the sense of intentionality and the sense of subjectivity, which stand for the lower and higher aspects of self-consciousness. BIBlIoGRAPhY BRonKhoRST, Johannes (1981): Yoga and Seśvara Sā�khya. Journal	of	Indian	Philosophy 9, 309–320. BRonKhoRST, Johannes (1983): God in Sā�khya. 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