Reassessing	the	Case	Against	Evidential	Externalism Giada	Fratantonio	and	Aidan	McGlynn	(University	of	Edinburgh) 1.	Introduction Let	internal	twins	share	'the	same	non-factive	mental	states	to	the	same	degree- the	same	beliefs,	apparent	experiences,	apparent	memories,	and	so	on'	(Silins 2005:	376-7).	We	can	then	ask:	must	internal	twins	have	the	same	evidence	as each	other?	Following	Nicholas	Silins,	we'll	call	an	affirmative	answer	to	this question	Evidential	Internalism	and	a	negative	answer	Evidential	Externalism. Evidential	Externalism	is	not	equivalent	to	the	thesis	that	evidence	is	factive.	One can	consistently	hold	that	evidence	must	be	true	and	that	evidence	must	be shared	by	internal	twins	if	one	holds	that	one's	evidence	consists	of	true propositions	about	how	things	seem	to	one,	for	example.	So	accepting	factivity does	not	suffice	to	make	one	an	Evidential	Externalist.	Accepting	factivity	isn't necessary	either.	For	example,	one	might	hold	that	one's	evidence	is	just	what one	is	non-inferentially	justified	in	believing	and	have	a	reliabilist	conception	of what	such	justification	requires	(e.g.	Goldman	2009);	on	such	a	view,	one's evidence	can	in	principle	contain	falsehoods,	but	external	differences	can	make for	differences	in	what	evidence	twins	possess. Nor	is	Evidential	Externalism	to	be	equated	with	the	thesis	that	in	epistemically favourable	cases,	one	can	have	entailing	evidence	for	propositions	about	one's external	environment:	evidence	that	entails	the	truth	of	the	proposition	it	is evidence	for.1	Again,	we	can	demonstrate	the	point	with	appeal	to	reliabilism;	I may	not	share	the	same	evidence	as	my	internal	twin	due	to	differences	in	our external	environments	giving	rise	to	differences	in	the	reliability	of	the	methods we	each	use,	but	it	may	additionally	be	that	the	best	that	either	of	us	can	hope	for is	to	have	evidence	for	propositions	about	our	environment	that	makes	them very	likely	to	be	true	without	entailing	their	truth	(compare	Silins	2005:	399-400 n11).	That	duly	noted,	the	kind	of	Evidential	Externalism	that	will	be	our	focus here	does	accept	that	epistemically	successful	subjects	will	have	entailing evidence	lacked	by	their	less	successful	internal	twins;	Silins	calls	this	variety	of Evidential	Externalism	Entailing	Evidence	Externalism.	It	is	in	this	sense,	then, that	we	are	engaged	with	the	factive	turn	in	epistemology. Why	should	epistemologists	care	about	the	debate	between	Evidential Internalists	and	Evidential	Externalists?	A	first	reason	is	that	Evidential Internalism	is	sometimes	thought	to	be	implicated	in	central	sceptical	arguments (Williamson	2000:	ch	8;	Silins	2005:	375-6);	crudely	put,	if	my	evidence	for propositions	about	my	external	environment	can	be	no	better	than	that	of	my internal	twin	who's	just	a	brain	in	a	vat,	then	it's	hard	to	see	how	I	can	have knowledge	or	justification	on	that	basis.	A	second	reason,	suggested	by	Silins,	is that	there	may	be	advantages	in	casting	the	general	opposition	between 1	Note	that,	in	contrast	to	the	conventions	we	adopt	here,	the	claim	that	evidence	is	entailing	in this	sense	is	sometimes	labelled	factivity;	see,	for	example,	Pritchard	2012. 2 Internalism	and	Externalism	within	epistemology	in	terms	of	evidence.	In particular,	Silins	notes	that	Evidential	Externalism	articulates	an	externalist position	in	epistemology	that	may	side-step	some	standard	worries	about reliabilism,	at	least	in	the	non-reliablist	versions	we're	focusing	on	(2005:	378-9), and	there	may	be	similar	advantages	for	internalists	too.	If	that's	right,	then perhaps	recasting	the	internalism/externalism	debate	might	enable	us	to	move past	the	longstanding	impasse,	or	at	the	very	least	might	let	us	approach	it	from a	fresh	angle.2	Finally,	one	might	be	interested	in	the	prospects	of	a	particular version	of	Evidential	Externalism,	which	will	naturally	lead	one	to	investigate whether	there	are	any	objections	that	are	effective	against	such	Externalist	views in	general	(McGlynn	2014:	67). For	at	least	these	three	reasons,	epistemologists	should	be	interested	in	the debate	between	Evidential	Internalists	and	Externalists.	And	in	an	influential 2005	paper,	Nicholas	Silins	first	framed	the	opposition	as	we	have	presented	it above,	and	he	offered	an	overarching	assessment	of	the	case	for	Evidential Internalism.	Surprisingly,	he	concluded	that	even	those	sympathetic	to Externalism	need	to	acknowledge	that	there's	a	strong	case	for	Internalism	to	be answered.	In	this	paper,	we	offer	a	reassessment,	focusing	on	the	same arguments	that	Silins	considered-which	remain	the	key	arguments	against Externalism	in	general3-but	concluding	that	to	the	extent	that	he	has	correctly identified	the	strongest	motivations	for	Evidential	Internalism,	the	case	in	its favour	is	weak. The	standard	ways	to	try	to	mount	an	attack	on	evidential	externalism	start	from premises	about	the	kind	of	privileged	access	we	enjoy	to	our	own	evidence:	for example,	the	premise	that	one's	own	evidence	is	transparent	to	one,	in	the	sense that	one	is	normally	in	a	position	to	know	whether	a	given	proposition	is	or	isn't part	of	one's	evidence,	or	that	one	can	sometimes	know	what	one's	evidence	is 'from	the	armchair'.	Silins	takes	such	arguments	to	be	limited;	in	section	2	we offer	an	overview	that	essentially	concurs	with	his	verdict	here.	The	strongest argument	against	Evidential	Externalism,	Silins	suggests,	doesn't	make	a	play with	the	idea	that	one	has	privileged	access	to	one's	evidence	at	all;	rather,	it pays	careful	attention	to	the	way	in	which	endorsing	Evidential	Externalism gives	rise	to	counterexamples	to	the	thesis	that	internal	twins	are	equally justified.	We	examine	this	argument	in	section	3,	concluding	that	it	is	a	failure. Finally,	in	section	4	we	turn	our	attention	to	scepticism.	As	already	noted, Evidential	Internalism	is	implicated	in	standard	sceptical	arguments,	and	so some	have	naturally	drawn	the	conclusion	that	Externalists	are	better	placed when	it	comes	to	resisting	scepticism.	Silins	argues	that	this	tempting	conclusion is	incorrect;	Internalism	is	at	least	well	positioned	to	resist	scepticism,	if	not better	positioned.	We	argue	that	Silins's	argument	for	this	is	also	unsuccessful, thereby	completing	our	argument	that	Silins	has	failed	to	build	a	strong	case	for Evidential	Internalism. 2	For	an	excellent	overview	of	the	general	internalism/externalism	debate	about	justification,	see Littlejohn	2012:	ch	1. 3	Other	objections	have	been	proposed	to	specific	varieties	of	Evidential	Externalism,	but	we leave	those	more	narrowly	targeted	arguments	aside	here;	see	Pritchard	2012	and	McGlynn 2014:	chapter	4	for	relevant	discussion. 3 2.	Access	Arguments As	noted	in	the	introduction,	arguments	for	Evidential	Internalism	have	tended to	try	to	show	that	it	is	supported	by	a	thesis	about	the	nature	of	our	access	to our	own	evidence.	Silins	considers	two	access	arguments.	The	first	is	grounded on	the	following	transparency	thesis: (Transparency):	For	any	proposition	P,	if	one	is	suitably	alert	and conceptually	sophisticated,	then	one	is	in	a	position	to	know	whether	or not	one's	evidence	includes	P.	(2005:	380) Let's	suppose	that	Gary	is	in	the	good	case-he's	mistaken	about	a	few	things,	but mostly	he's	pretty	epistemically	successful-and	let's	contrast	Gary	with	his internal	twin	Barry	who	is	in	the	bad	case;	he's	'a	radically	deceived	brain	in	a	vat, as	deceived	as	can	be	given	that	he	has	the	same	non-factive	mental	states	as Gary'	(2005:	375).	Now,	according	to	this	first	access	argument,	if	both Transparency	and	Evidential	Externalism	are	true,	then	Barry	could	be	in	a position	to	know	that	he	is	in	the	bad	case.	That's	because	a	suitably	reflective subject	like	Barry	can	figure	out	that	if	Evidential	Externalism	is	right,	then	he's only	in	the	good	case	if	he	has	entailing	evidence:	for	example,	if	his	evidence	for some	proposition	P	includes	P	itself	(Williamson	2000),	or	that	he	sees	that	P (Pritchard	2012).	And	given	Transparency,	he's	in	a	position	to	know	that	he doesn't	have	any	such	evidence,	allowing	him	to	correctly	infer	that	he's	in	the bad	case.	But	subjects	in	the	bad	case	aren't	in	a	position	to	know	that	they	are; as	Williamson	memorably	puts	the	point,	'Part	of	the	badness	of	the	bad	case	is that	one	cannot	know	how	bad	one's	case	is'	(2000:	165).	Defenders	of Transparency	thus	take	this	argument	to	show	that	that	Evidential	Externalism is	false	and	Evidential	Internalism	is	true. However,	Silins	concedes	that	this	does	not	constitute	a	knockdown	objection	to evidential	externalism,	since	it	relies	on	questionable	assumptions.	In	particular, Silins	points	out	that	Williamson	has	a	well-known	argument,	the	anti-luminosity argument,	which	aims	to	show	that	Transparency	is	false.4	The	upshot	is	that	if this	is	the	only	argument	in	favour	of	Evidential	Internalist,	as	Williamson	seems to	suggest	(2000:	172-3),	then	the	motivations	for	the	view	look somewhat insecure. However,	Silins	argues	that	contrary	to	what	Williamson	suggests,	the	case	for Evidential	Internalism	need	not	make	any	play	with	Transparency.	In	particular, he	constructs	a	novel	access	argument	in	favour	of	Internalism	which	does	not rely	on	such	a	strong	access	thesis.	In	the	remainder	of	this	section,	we'll consider	this	second	access	argument,	and	we'll	argue	(in	line	with	Silins's	own conclusion)	that	it	ultimately	fares	not	much	better	than	the	argument	from Transparency. 4	See	Williamson	2000:	chapter	4,	and	see	McGlynn	2014:	chapter	7	for	an	overview	of	the argument	and	the	subsequent	literature	on	it. 4 Instead	of	starting	from	Transparency,	Silins's	second	access	argument	relies	on the	following	thesis: (Armchair	Access):	It	is	sometimes	the	case	that:	one's	evidence	includes some	proposition	E,	and	one	knows	from	the	armchair	that	one's	evidence includes	E.	(Silins,	2005:	381) Silins	takes	armchair	knowledge	to	be	knowledge	that	'does	not	constitutively depend	on	one's	having	had	any	particular	sense	experience	or	type	of	sense experience'	(2005:	380,	italics	in	original).	Now,	according	to	this	second	access argument	against	Evidential	Externalism,	Externalism	is	false	because	when	we conjoin	it	with	Armchair	Access,	it	leads	to	unacceptable	conclusions	about	what we	can	know	from	the	armchair.	We'll	develop	the	argument	as	Silins	does	by focusing	on	a	particular	variety	of	Evidential	Externalism,	E=K,	according	to which	one's	total	evidence	consists	of	all	and	only	the	propositions	which	ones knows	(Williamson	2000:	chapter	9),	though	there	will	be	an	analogous	problem for	other	versions	of	Externalism.5 Consider	the	following	scenario.	Gary	is	in	a	room	looking	at	a	dial	reading	0.4. Now,	recall	from	above	that	Gary	is	in	the	good	case,	and	so	on	this	basis	he	can acquire	perceptual	knowledge	that	the	dial	reads	0.4.	It	then	follows	from	E=K that	the	proposition	that	the	dial	reads	0.4	is	part	of	Gary's	evidence.	If	we	have	a suitable	witness	for	Armchair	Access	on	our	hands	here-an	issue	we'll	return	to soon-Gary	can	know	that	the	proposition	that	the	dial	reads	0.4	from	the armchair.	Furthermore,	assuming	that	E=K	is	true,	there	seems	to	be	no	in principle	barrier	to	Gary	knowing	that	it's	true	from	the	armchair,	and	so knowing	in	particular	that	if	P	is	part	of	his	evidence,	then	P	is	true.	But	now	the Externalist	seems	to	be	in	trouble.	As	Silins	writes: [w]e	should	[...]	expect	that,	if	Gary	puts	the	two	pieces	of	armchair knowledge	together	and	infers	what	they	entail,	he	will	also	have armchair	knowledge	of	what	follows	from	the	two	pieces	of	armchair knowledge. That	is,	assuming	the	truth	of	a	plausible	closure	principle	for	armchair knowledge,	it	follows	that	Gary	is	in	a	position	to	know	from	the	armchair	that the	dial	reads	0.4.	And	this	seems	absurd;	it's	not	possible	to	know	this	kind	of contingency	about	one's	immediate	perceptible	environment	from	the	armchair. So	if	Armchair	Access	is	plausible,	Silins's	access	argument	seems	to	show	that Evidential	Externalism	is	dubious. Silins	himself	is	reluctant	to	draw	such	a	strong	conclusion.	He	observes	that	the argument	is	parallel	to	the	notorious	McKinsey	paradox,	concerning	the incompatibility	between	Content	Externalism	and	Privileged	Access.	Let's	take Content	Externalism	to	be,	roughly,	the	thesis	that	the	content	of	our	thoughts	is determined	by	factors	external	to	us,	and	Privileged	Access	to	be	the	thesis	that 5	See	in	particular	the	discussion	of	the	'Access	Problem'	for	epistemological	disjunctivism	in Pritchard	2012. 5 one	can	know	what	one	is	thinking	from	the	armchair.6	The	McKinsey	paradox (McKinsey	1991)	seems	to	show	that	Content	Externalism	and	Privileged	Access are	incompatible,	since	together	they	lead	to	the	absurd	conclusion	that	we	can know	contingent	facts	about	our	environments	from	the	armchair.	For	example, suppose	that	I	am	thinking	that	water	is	wet.	Privileged	Access	entails	that	I	can know	from	the	armchair	that	I	am	thinking	that	water	is	wet.	Content Externalism	entails	(let's	suppose)	that	if	I	have	any	thoughts	about	water,	then	I have	interacted	with	H2O.	Given	that	the	case	for	Content	Externalism	rests	on	a priori	philosophical	argumentation,	it	seems	that	I	can	come	to	know	that	it	is true	from	armchair	as	well.	Finally,	given	a	closure	principle	for	armchair knowledge,	it	follows	that	I	can	have	armchair	knowledge	that	I	have	interacted with	H2O.	And	this	seems	absurd. A	number	of	responses	have	been	offered	to	this	'paradox'	since	McKinsey's paper	was	published,	and	it's	widely	accepted	that	while	there's	a	potential puzzle	here	for	Content	Externalism,	given	the	plausibility	of	Privileged	Access, there's	no	fatal	problem	in	the	offing.7	And	as	Silins	points	out,	given	the (intentional)	similarities	between	the	McKinsey	paradox	and	his	access	problem for	Evidential	Externalism,	it	seems	hard	to	resist	drawing	a	similar	conclusion concerning	the	latter: Just	as	the	McKinsey	argument	poses	a	puzzle	for	the	content	externalist, rather	than	a	strong	objection	to	the	view,	the	new	access	argument	poses a	puzzle	for	the	evidential	externalist,	rather	than	a	strong	objection	to the	view.	(Silins	2005:	384) We	agree	that	there's	no	strong	objection	here,	but	in	fact,	we	want	to	suggest that	Silins's	argument	may	not	even	be	as	successful	against	Evidential Externalism	as	the	parallel	argument	is	against	Content	Externalism.	That's because	it's	not	clear	to	us	that	Armchair	Access	really	does	underwrite	the argument	Silins	presents.	As	stated,	the	thesis	only	says	that	one	is	'sometimes' able	to	know	that	one's	evidence	contains	a	proposition	E	from	the	armchair;	it's got	the	force	of	an	existential	generalization,	and	that's	what	makes	the	claim seem	so	plausible.	Notice,	however,	that	Silins's	argument	assumes	that	we	are licensed	to	pick	particular	propositions	about	Gary's	environment,	such	as	the proposition	that	the	dial	in	front	of	him	reads	0.4,	as	witnesses	to	this	existential. Silins	is	aware	that	there's	an	issue	here,	and	he	tries	to	plug	the	gap	in	his argument	by	insisting	that	it	would	be	ad	hoc	for	the	Evidential	Externalist	to hold	that	such	contingencies	about	one's	external	environment	can't	be witnesses	to	Armchair	Access: 6	It	is	worth	mentioning	that	the	notion	of	Privileged	Access,	as	it	appears	in	McKinsey's	paper and	much	of	the	subsequent	literature,	is	stated	in	terms	of	'a	priori'	knowledge	rather	than 'armchair	knowledge'.	However,	since	McKinsey	and	others	in	this	literature	intend	for	'a	priori' knowledge	to	include	knowledge	on	the	basis	of	introspection,	this	seems	like	unfortunate	and possibly	misleading	terminology:	see,	for	example,	Nuccetelli	1999,	Brown	2004:	23-4,	and Farkas	2008:	130	for	relevant	discussion. 7	For	a	useful	overview	of	responses	to	the	paradox,	see	Kallestrup	2012:	ch	5. 6 It	would	be	ad	hoc	for	the	externalist	to	accept	that	we	sometimes	have armchair	access	to	our	evidence,	yet	insist	that	we	never	have	armchair access	to	our	environmentally	sensitive	evidence.	After	all,	it	would	be	ad hoc	for	a	content	externalist	to	say,	we	have	privileged	access	to	some	of our	mental	states,	just	not	to	any	of	our	environmentally	sensitive	mental states.	No	such	restrictions	are	built	into	the	plausible	thoughts	about how	we	can	access	our	evidence	or	mental	states.	(2005:	381) However,	Silins	offers	nothing	in	support	of	this	charge	of	ad	hocery.	In particular,	he	doesn't	say	anything	that	might	reassure	us	if	we're	concerned	that the	only	reason	Armchair	Access	seems	so	plausible	as	he	states	it	is	because when	we	consider	whether	there	are	any	witnesses	to	its	existential,	we	tend	to think	of	unproblematic	candidates.	It's	not	clear	to	us	that	there	is	any	access thesis	that	is	both	plausible	and	which	genuinely	underwrites	Silins's	argument; Armchair	Access	itself	is	plausible	as	stated,	we	suspect,	precisely	because	it makes	a	relatively	weak	and	innocuous	claim,	one	with	no	anti-Externalist mileage	in	it.	Here	we	find	a	potential	contrast	with	the	McKinsey	paradox;	the claim	that	one	is	typically	able	to	know	from	the	armchair	that	one	is	thinking that	water	is	wet	both	seems	extremely	plausible	and	suffices	to	get	the	paradox rolling.8 To	sum	up,	Silins's	novel	access	argument	aims	to	show	that	Evidential Externalism	and	Armchair	Access	are	incompatible,	as	together	they	lead	to absurd	conclusions	concerning	what	we	can	know	from	the	armchair.	Since Armchair	Access	is	plausible,	that	puts	pressure	on	Evidential	Externalism,	in	the same	way	as	the	McKinsey	reasoning	puts	pressure	on	Content	Externalism,	to the	extent	that	we	find	Privileged	Access	plausible.	In	this	section,	we	have agreed	with	Silins	that	his	novel	access	argument	is	no	more	problematic	for Evidential	Externalism	than	the	McKinsey	paradox	is	for	Content	Externalism, but	we've	further	contended	that	Silins	may	have	overstated	the	incompatibility between	Evidential	Externalism	and	Armchair	Access.9 3.	The	Supervenience	Argument The	strongest	argument	in	favour	of	Evidential	Internalism	over	Externalism, Silins	suggests,	doesn't	make	a	play	with	any	kind	of	thesis	about	our	access	to our	own	evidence	at	all.	In	this	section,	we'll	lay	out	Silins's	argument	and	the assumptions	it	rests	on.	The	target	again	is	Evidential	Externalism,	which	we restate	as	a	reminder: 8	It	is	worth	stressing	that	some	versions	of	Evidential	Externalism	do	accept	a	more	expansive access	claim;	for	example,	epistemological	disjunctivism,	stated	in	terms	of	evidence,	entails	that in	paradigm	cases	of	perceptual	knowledge,	one	has	entailing	and	reflectively	accessible	evidence. So	even	if	the	considerations	we	have	offered	in	this	section	show	that	Entailing	Evidence Externalism	is	not	in	general	vulnerable	to	Silins's	access	argument,	they	may	leave	some varieties	of	Externalism	facing	a	challenge.	Disjunctivists	have	their	own	responses	to	that challenge	(e.g.	Pritchard	2012:	46-52);	whether	that	response	is	adequate	is	a	topic	for	another occasion. 9	In	unpublished	work,	one	of	us	(Fratantonio)	puts	forward	a	second,	complementary	response to	Silins's	Access	Argument,	one	which	puts	pressure	on	the	notion	of	armchair	knowledge involved	in	the	Armchair	Access	thesis. 7 (Evidential	Externalism):	It's	possible	that:	A	and	B	are	internal	twins	and A	and	B	do	not	have	the	same	evidence.	(Silins	2005:	378) Rather	than	eliciting	a	clash	with	any	kind	of	claim	about	our	access	to	our evidence,	Silins's	supervenience	argument	aims	to	spell	out	how	Evidential Externalism	conflicts	with	the	following	thesis: (Equal	Justification):	Necessarily,	if	A	and	B	are	internal	twins,	then	A	is justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2	just	in	case	B	is	justified to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2. As	stressed	in	the	introduction,	Silins's	point	isn't	just	that	Evidential Externalism	leads	to	counterexamples	to	Equal	Justification	(though	he	does think	that	is	already	a	potential	problem),	but	rather	that	the	counterexamples can	take	a	particular	form.	While	Silins	concedes	that	the	Evidential	Externalist may	welcome	the	result	that	the	subject	in	the	good	case	can	be	more doxastically	justified	than	the	subject	in	the	bad	case,	he	thinks	that	even	they will	recoil	from	the	conclusion	that	the	subject	in	the	bad	case	might	come	out ahead.	But	that's	a	consequence	of	their	position,	Silins	argues,	given	only assumptions	that	are	very	plausible	in	their	own	right.	These	assumptions	are	as follows: (Assumption	1):	If	the	probability	of	P	on	one's	evidence	is	n,	then	one's degree	of	confidence	in	P	ought	to	be	n. (Assumption	2):	If	one's	degree	of	confidence	ought	to	be	n,	and	one's actual	degree	of	confidence	diverges	from	n,	then	one's	actual	degree	of confidence	is	less	than	fully	justified	insofar	as	it	diverges	from	what	it ought	to	be.	(Silins	2005:	387)10 So	one's	degree	of	confidence	that	P	ought	to	match	the	evidential	likelihood	of	P for	one,	and	if	it	doesn't,	then	one's	degree	of	confidence	is	less	than	fully justified.	In	fact,	Silins	implicitly	appeals	to	a	natural	generalisation	of Assumption	2,	which	we'll	label	Assumption	2': (Assumption	2')	If	one's	degree	of	confidence	ought	to	be	n,	and	one's actual	confidence	diverges	from	n,	then	one's	actual	degree	of	confidence is	less	than	fully	justified	insofar	as	it	diverges	from	what	it	ought	to	be, and	is	more	or	less	justified	depending	on	how	much	it	diverges	from what	it	ought	to	be. We	can	see	why	the	final,	additional	clause	is	needed	by	examining	how	Silins argues	that	Evidential	Externalism	leads	to	counterexamples	to	Equal Justification.	For	now,	we're	only	concerned	with	his	argument	that	Evidential Externalism	entails	that	the	subject	in	the	good	case	can	be	more	justified	than 10	While	the	formulations	are	taken	straight	from	Silins,	the	labels	are	ours. 8 the	subject	in	the	bad	case;	we'll	turn	to	the	more	controversial-sounding	result shortly. Suppose	that	Gary	has	the	proposition	that	there	is	a	black	spider	in	front	of	him as	part	of	his	evidence.	Gary's	evidence	entails	that	he's	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	being deceived	into	thinking	that	there's	a	black	spider	in	front	of	him.	His	internal twin	in	the	bad	case,	Barry,	can't	have	the	same	proposition11	as	part	of	his evidence,	since	there	isn't	a	black	spider	in	front	of	Barry;	his	evidence	will instead	include	(say)	that	it	appears	to	him	that	there's	a	black	spider	in	front	of him.12	Since	Gary's	evidence	is	entailing,	the	evidential	probability	for	him	that he's	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	being	deceived	into	thinking	that	there's	a	black	spider	in front	of	him	is	1.	Let	us	suppose	that	the	evidential	probability	of	that	same proposition	for	Barry	is	less	than	.9.	Since	Gary	and	Barry	are	internal	twins,	they share	the	same	degrees	of	confidence,	and	in	particular	each	is	.99	confident	that he	is	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	being	deceived	into	thinking	that	there's	a	black	spider in	front	of	him.	Silins	concludes	(2005:	388): The	upshot	is	that	one	can	be	more	justified	in	the	good	case	than	the	bad case,	if	Evidential	Externalism	is	true. As	promised,	we	can	see	the	need	for	Silins	to	rely	on	Assumption	2'	here,	rather than	on	Assumption	2	as	he	states	it.	Silins's	own	statement	only	allows	us	to conclude	that	neither	Barry	nor	Gary's	degree	of	confidence	is	fully	justified;	it	is the	additional	clause	present	in	Assumption	2'	that	enables	us	to	conclude	that Gary	is	more	justified	than	Barry	in	the	example	described. Silins's	argument	from	Externalism	to	the	more	controversial-sounding	result that	Barry	can	be	more	justified	than	Gary	is	just	as	straightforward.	This	time, suppose	that	Gary	remembers	and	knows	that	he	had	a	banana	with	breakfast this	morning,	but	he's	not	maximally	confident	that	he	did	since	he	recognises that	his	memory,	while	reliable,	is	not	infallible.	So	Gary	slightly	misjudges	the force	of	the	evidence	he	has,	and	so	has	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.9	when	his evidence	actually	gives	the	proposition	a	probability	of	1.	Barry's	evidence	is	that it	seems	to	him	that	he	had	a	banana	with	breakfast	this	morning,	and	this,	we'll suppose,	gives	the	proposition	that	he	did	an	evidential	probability	of	.9.	Let's also	suppose	that	both	Gary	and	Barry	have	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.9. By	Assumption	1,	Barry's	degree	of	confidence	is	just	as	it	ought	to	be,	while Gary's	is	not.	By	Assumption	2,	Barry's	degree	of	confidence	is	more	justified than	Gary's.	Since	Gary	is	in	the	good	case	and	Barry	is	in	the	bad	case,	we	can 11	Of	course,	if	Gary	and	Barry	are	distinct	subjects	then	we	aren't	dealing	with	precisely	the	same proposition.	As	Silins	notes	(2005:	399	n6),	Barry	may	have	to	be	Gary	in	a	different	world,	since it's	plausible	that	they	share	non-factive	but	de	se	beliefs.	These	complications	won't	matter	to any	of	the	points	made	in	the	text. 12	This	description	of	Barry's	evidence	in	the	bad	case	isn't	mandated	by	Evidential	Externalism, but	it	is	very	natural	and	it	has	been	suggested	by	prominent	Externalists	(e.g.	Williamson	2000: 198-9	and	Pritchard	2011:	244).	Pritchard	develops	a	much	more	fine-grained	taxonomy	of	good and	bad	cases	in	his	2012,	and	we	don't	mean	to	suggest	that	he	would	accept	this	description	of the	subject's	evidence	in	all	the	variants	of	the	bad	case	that	he	considers. 9 conclude	that	a	subject	in	the	bad	case	can	have	a	more	justified	degree	of confidence	than	their	internal	twin	in	the	good	case.13 Why	think	that	this	conclusion	is	problematic?	Silins	suggests	that	the	following thesis	is	plausible: (The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better):	Necessarily,	if	B	is	in	the	bad	case	and	A	is an	internal	twin	of	B	in	the	good	case,	B	is	not	more	justified	in	believing	P than	A. Notice,	though,	that	this	claim	concerns	justification	in	believing,	whereas	Silins's assumptions	and	the	conclusion	we	have	drawn	from	them	concern	the justification	of	degrees	of	confidence.	Moreover,	it's	entirely	implausible	that	the case	Silins	described	is	a	counterexample	to	The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better,	as stated.	Recall	that	Gary's	evidence	entails	that	he	had	a	banana	with	breakfast this	morning	and	he's	.9	confident	that	he	did,	while	both	the	degree	of confidence	Barry	ought	to	have	and	his	actual	degree	of	confidence	is	.9.	It	would be	surprising	if	we	could	conclude	from	this	that	Barry	is	more	justified	in believing	the	relevant	proposition	than	Gary	is;	if	anything,	there's	some inclination	to	say	the	exactly	opposite. Our	diagnosis	of	what	goes	wrong	in	Silins's	argument	is	that	he	too	freely	moves back	and	forth	between	talk	of	the	degree	to	which	one	is	justified	in	believing	P and	the	degree	to	which	one's	degree	of	confidence	or	belief	that	P	is	justified.14 On	the	one	hand,	Silins's	two	assumptions,	as	quoted	above,	are	explicitly	put	in terms	of	'one's	degree	of	confidence',	and	Equal	Justification	is	stated	in	terms	of being	'justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2'.	On	the	other,	the	crucial 'plausible'	thesis	The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better	is	put	in	terms	of	being	less	or more	justified	in	believing	a	proposition	P. We	can	bring	out	the	difference	between	these	two	notions	of	doxastic justification	with	the	following	example	(appropriated	from	Zardini	2013:	387). We	have	no	evidence	whatsoever	concerning	whether	Barack	Obama	had	eggs for	breakfast	this	morning.	So	the	evidential	likelihood	of	both	the	proposition that	he	did	have	eggs	and	its	negation	is	.5	for	us.	Our	degree	of	confidence	that he	had	eggs	for	breakfast,	given	our	evidence,	should	plausibly	be	around	.5; 13	Silins	notes	that	not	everyone	will	accept	his	first	assumption,	but	he	suggests	that	it's	not strictly	required	for	his	argument:	'[a]s	long	as	one	ought	to	be	more	confident	in	some propositions	in	the	good	case	than	in	the	bad	case,	one	will	sometimes	underestimate	one's evidence	in	the	good	case,	and	overestimate	one's	evidence	in	the	bad	case'	(2005:	391).	Silins doesn't	expand	much	on	the	point,	but	presumably	the	idea	is	that	even	if	one's	degree	of confidence	that	P	need	not	match	the	evidential	likelihood	for	one	that	P,	it's	very	plausible	that	a subject	in	the	good	case	might	have	a	lower	degree	of	confidence	than	her	entailing	evidence justifies,	and	there's	nothing	that	stops	her	sharing	that	lower	degree	of	confidence	with	her internal	twin	who	portions	her	confidence	perfectly	to	her	inferior	evidence.	Since	our	objections to	the	supervenience	argument	don't	require	us	to	take	issue	with	either	of	Silins's	original assumptions,	we'll	leave	this	alternative	version	of	the	argument	aside	in	what	follows. 14	This	suggestion	about	where	Silins's	argument	goes	wrong	has	been	made	before	in	the literature:	see	Kennedy	2010:	85-6	Dunn	2012:	442	fn10.	However,	neither	Kennedy	nor	Dunn develops	the	point	in	much	detail,	and	they	both	prefer	less	general,	more	involved	responses.	In our	view,	those	alternative	responses	are	not	necessary. 10 we're	justified	to	the	extend	that	we	regard	it	as	no	more	likely	than	not.	In contrast,	the	degree	to	which	we're	justified	in	believing	that	he	had	eggs	for breakfast	is	minimal.	That's	to	say,	we're	not	at	all	justified	in	believing	this; what	we're	justified	in	doing	is	suspending	judgment	on	the	matter. This	example	also	serves	to	bring	out	the	fact	that	the	two	assumptions	that	the supervenience	argument	rests	on	are	only	plausible	because	they	concern	one's degrees	of	confidence,	rather	than	the	degrees	to	which	one	is	justified	in believing.	It's	plausible	enough	that	one's	degrees	of	confidence	in	a	proposition ought	to	match	its	evidential	probability	for	one,	and	that	they	are	unjustified	to the	extent	that	there's	a	mismatch.	But	as	the	above	example	illustrates,	the degree	to	which	one	is	justified	in	believing	a	proposition	typically	won't	match that	proposition's	evidential	probability	for	one,	nor	is	there	any	sense	in	which it	ought	to	or	in	which	one	is	more	justified	if	it	does.15 Likewise,	and	this	is	crucial,	The	Bad	Case	is	Never	Better	is	only	remotely plausible	when	it	is	stated,	as	Silins	in	fact	states	it,	in	terms	of	the	degree	to which	one	has	justification	to	believe.	The	subject	in	the	bad	case	is	doing	so badly	not	because	of	how	she	polices	her	epistemic	life,	but	because	of	the uncooperative	nature	of	her	external	environment,	and	by	the	Evidential Externalist's	lights	these	environmental	factors	bear	on	what	evidence	she	has, and	so	on	the	epistemic	standing	of	her	attitudes.	Given	this,	and	given	that	we're currently	working	under	the	assumption	that	it's	not	transparent	to	one	what one's	evidence	is,	it's	no	surprise	that	she	might	do	better	than	her	internal	twin in	portioning	her	degree	of	confidence	in	some	proposition	to	her	evidence; that's	just	what	Silins's	examples	serve	to	bring	out.	What	might	be	more surprising	and	troubling	is	the	idea	that	the	subject	in	the	good	case	could	be	less justified	in	believing	a	proposition	than	her	twin	in	the	bad	case	despite	her superior	evidence.	But	as	we've	seen,	that's	not	the	conclusion	that	we	can	derive from	Silins's	assumptions. The	switch	from	talk	of	degrees	of	confidence	or	belief	to	talk	of	degrees	of justification	to	believe	can	be	seen	quite	clearly	in	the	following	passage	(2005: 389): If	Evidential	Externalism	is	true,	it	turns	out	that	Gary's	partial	belief	in	B is	misplaced	by	a	wide	margin,	whereas	Barry's	partial	belief	in	B	is	not misplaced	at	all.	Indeed,	Barry's	confidence	is	causally	based,	in	the	right way,	on	the	weaker	evidence	he	has,	whereas	Gary's	fails	to	be	adequately adjusted	to	his	stronger	evidence.	Since	Gary	underestimates	his	evidence, and	Barry's	partial	belief	is	properly	adjusted	to	his	own	evidence,	the subject	in	the	good	case	is	less	justified	in	believing	B.16 15	Which	is	not	to	say	that	the	latter	doesn't	determine	the	former;	in	the	example	in	the	text,	for example,	that	the	proposition	that	Obama	had	eggs	for	breakfast	has	an	evidential	probability (for	us)	of	.5	arguably	is	what	makes	it	the	case	that	we're	justified	in	believing	this	proposition to	around	degree	0. 16	Thanks	to	Lukas	Schwengerer	for	drawing	our	attention	to	this	passage. 11 There	are	a	couple	of	different	issues	in	this	passage	that	need	disentangling. First,	there's	an	insinuation	that	Gary's	confidence	is	not	causally	based,	in	the right	way,	on	his	evidence;	it's	hard	not	to	hear	the	contrast	in	the	second sentence	as	strongly	suggesting	this.	But	there	are	two	problems	with	this.	Recall, firstly,	that	Silins	sets	up	his	example	by	stipulating	that	Gary	'remembers	and knows'	that	he	had	a	banana	with	his	breakfast	this	morning	(2005:	389),	and	it's not	clear	that	this	is	compatible	with	Gary	failing	to	base	his	confidence	properly on	his	evidence	in	the	right	way.	Second,	it's	not	clear	why	underestimating	one's evidence	should	render	it	the	case	that	one	has	failed	to	base	one's	confidence	on one's	evidence	in	the	right	way.	Perhaps	these	worries	will	be	silenced	when	we understand	'in	the	right	way'	in	the	right	way,	but	Silins	doesn't	say	much	about this	notion. The	more	important	issue	is	that	the	move	from	facts	about	Gary	and	Barry's 'partial	beliefs'	to	comparisons	between	the	degree	to	which	each	is	justified	in believing	invites,	rather	than	avoids,	the	kinds	of	worries	that	we	have	raised.	It doesn't	follow	from	the	fact	that	B	is	more	justified	in	her	degree	of	confidence	in P	than	A,	in	the	sense	that	she	has	better	adjusted	her	degree	of	confidence	to	her evidence,	that	B	is	more	justified	in	believing	P	than	A	is.	To	go	back	to	our earlier	example,	we're	fully	justified	in	having	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.5	that Obama	had	eggs	this	morning	even	though	we're	not	justified	at	all	in	believing that	he	did.	If	Obama	has	entailing	evidence	that	he	had	eggs	this	morning,	but cautiously	only	forms	a	degree	of	confidence	of	.9	that	he	did,	then	his	degree	of confidence	is	further	away	from	what	it	should	be,	according	to	Assumption	1, than	ours	is,	and	in	that	sense	is	less	justified.	But	clearly	he's	not	less	justified	in believing	that	he	had	eggs	than	we	are. Silins	has	a	fallback	point,	which	he	develops	in	response	to	a	different	objection to	his	argument,	but	which	is	equally	relevant	given	the	criticism	we	have	made. He	suggests	that	there's	an	alternative	route	to	seeing	the	problem	with Evidentialism	Externalism	that	the	supervenience	argument	is	trying	to	bring out,	since	we	can	note	that	if	Externalism	is	true,	'counterintuitive	assessments of	beliefs	in	the	good	case	turn	out	to	be	correct'	(2005:	390): Intuitively,	our	ordinary	partial	beliefs	are	just	fine	as	they	are:	we	are neither	more	nor	less	confident	in	our	ordinary	beliefs	than	we	should	be. If	Evidential	Externalism	is	true,	however,	we	are	sometimes	less confident	than	we	should	be,	given	our	evidence.	Although	the	view	does not	have	skeptical	consequences,	it	implies	that	there	are	flaws	in	places where	apparently	there	are	none. Silins	goes	on	to	argue	that	it	may	even	be	that	we're	typically	less	confident	than we	ought	to	be,	if	evidential	externalism	is	true.	Now,	it's	crucial	that	we	realize that	Silins's	point	is	not	that	if	evidential	externalism	is	true	then,	for	all	we	know, we're	sometimes	(or	typically)	less	confident	that	we	ought	to	be	given	our evidence.	That	conclusion	seems	to	be	a	consequence	of	any	account	of	evidence that	allows	that	we	may	not	always	be	able	to	recognise	precisely	what	our evidence	is	and	to	what	degree	it	supports	a	given	proposition,	and	recall	that Silins	is	explicitly	trying	to	offer	an	argument	against	Evidential	Externalism	that 12 does	not	rely	on	any	such	claim	about	our	access	to	our	evidence.	Rather,	Silins's point	is	that	Evidential	Externalism	commits	us	to	holding	that	this	possibility	is in	fact	realized,	perhaps	on	a	rather	wide	scale.	The	reason	is	that	according	to the	version	of	Externalism	that	Silins	focuses	on,	Entailing	Evidence	Externalism, 'it	can	be	easy	to	be	in	possession	of	evidence	which	obviously	entails	contingent propositions	about	the	environment'	(2005:	378).	Given	Silins's	assumptions, whenever	we	form	degrees	of	confidence	in	these	contingent	propositions	that fall	short	of	1	we'll	have	underestimated	our	evidence,	and	so	our	attitudes	will be	less	than	fully	justified. It's	not	clear	to	us	that	there's	much	for	the	Evidential	Externalist	to	worry	about here.	Silins's	own	conclusion	on	the	matter	is	as	follows	(2005:	390): Here	the	externalist	might	have	to	conclude	that	most	of	our	ordinary partial	beliefs	are	somewhat	at	fault,	despite	the	fact	that	our	ordinary beliefs	seem	fine	as	they	are. That's	probably	right,	but	this	doesn't	strike	us	as	a	particularly	unpalatable bullet	to	have	to	bite.	Unless	we	think	that	one's	evidence	is	transparent	to	one, it's	hard	to	see	why	we	would	expect	our	ordinary	degrees	of	confidence	to	be typically	right	on	the	money,	and	it's	unclear	why	fairly	small	shortcomings	in our	degrees	of	confidence	should	be	regarded	as	significant;	Silins	is	surely	right that	we	think	that	our	degrees	of	confidence	are	'just	fine	as	they	are',	but	it's unclear	that	this	means	that	we	think	that	they	are	always	precisely	where	they should	be	given	our	evidence;	rather	we	think	that,	exceptional	cases	aside,	the discrepancies	aren't	big	enough	to	matter. 4.	Evidence	and	Scepticism Finally,	we	turn	to	the	topic	of	scepticism.	As	we	noted	in	the	introduction,	it	has often	been	observed	that	standard	arguments	for	scepticism	seem	to	take Evidential	Internalism	for	granted	when	establishing	the	lemma	that	one's current	evidence	is	not	different	to	and	no	better	than	it	would	be	were	one	in	a suitable	sceptical	scenario.	That	suggests	that	one	natural	way	to	undermine such	sceptical	arguments	is	to	adopt	Evidential	Externalism.	Given	that	few	of	us want	to	be	landed	with	sceptical	conclusions,	this	seems	to	put	Externalism	at	a considerable	advantage.	Silins	contests	this	claimed	advantage,	arguing	that	the Evidential	Internalist	is	at	least	as	well	placed	to	resist	drawing	sceptical conclusions	as	the	Externalist.	This	section	critically	evaluates	Silins's	argument. The	sceptical	reasoning	in	question	contends	that	one	isn't	justified	in	believing that	one	isn't	a	handless	brain	in	a	vat.	This	isn't	something	one	has	a	priori justification	to	believe,	and	so	one's	justification	had	better	be	experiential.	But given	Evidential	Internalism,	one's	evidence	can	be	no	better	than	that	possessed by	one's	internal	twin	who	is	a	handless	brain	in	a	vat,	and	the	kind	of	evidence available	to	one's	envatted	twin	isn't	good	enough	to	justify	one	in	believing	that one	isn't	envatted: 13 To	motivate	this	claim,	the	skeptic	may	stress	that	the	hypothesis	entails you	have	the	experiences	you	do.	In	particular,	since	the	skeptical hypothesis	predicts	that	you	have	an	experience	as	of	having	hands,	you should	respond	to	your	experience	as	of	having	hands	by	raising	your confidence	in	the	skeptical	hypothesis,	just	as	you	should	increase	your confidence	in	any	hypothesis	when	you	discover	that	something	it predicts	is	true.	And	given	that	you	should	raise	your	confidence	that	the skeptical	hypothesis	is	true	in	response	to	your	experience,	your experience	does	not	provide	you	with	justification	to	believe	that	the skeptical	hypothesis	is	false.	(2005:	396) The	Evidential	Externalist	has	a	quick	response	they	can	make	here,	contending that	one	has	evidence,	lacked	by	one's	twin	in	the	sceptical	scenario,	that	is	not entailed	by	the	sceptical	hypothesis,	and	which	in	fact	entails	that	the	sceptical hypothesis	is	false.	So	one	can	have	justification	to	believe	propositions	about the	external	world,	including	that	one	is	not	a	brain	in	a	vat	(though	as	Silins notes,	the	externalist	may	still	owe	us	an	account	of	the	details).	Assuming	this response	to	the	argument	is	satisfactory	and	that	the	Internalist	cannot	match	it, Externalism	seems	to	have	the	edge	here. Let's	concede,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	the	Externalist	has	something plausible	to	say	about	how	one	is	able	to	have	justification	for	one's	beliefs	about the	external	world	in	the	good	case.	The	apparent	advantage	over	Evidential Internalism	starts	to	look	suspect,	Silins	argues,	when	we	ask	the	Externalist whether	one's	unfortunate	envatted	twin	also	has	justification	for	their	beliefs about	the	external	world.	It's	natural	to	think	that	the	Externalist	must	deny	this, since	if	they	concede	that	one's	twin	does	have	justification,	then	they'll	need	to say	how	this	is	possible	despite	the	twin	lacking	the	kind	of	entailing	evidence that,	according	to	the	Externalist,	we're	able	to	possess	when	things	go	well.	And it's	unclear	how	the	Externalist	could	have	any	resources	for	meeting	that explanatory	burden	that	aren't	in	principle	available	to	the	Internalist	too. Better,	then,	for	the	Evidential	Externalist	to	deny	that	one's	envatted	twin	even has	justification	for	their	beliefs	about	the	external	world.	However,	Silins doesn't	think	that	the	path	is	clear	for	the	Externalist	to	deny	this.	First,	doing	so would	require	them	to	also	deny	the	thesis	Equal	Justification,	discussed	in	the previous	section: (Equal	Justification):	Necessarily,	if	A	and	B	are	internal	twins,	then	A	is justified	to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2	just	in	case	B	is	justified to	degree	n1	in	believing	P	to	degree	n2. The	Externalist	will,	we	suspect,	have	few	qualms	about	denying	this	thesis. However,	Silins	notes	that	the	Externalist	is	forced	to	also	deny	the	following thesis	concerning	outright	belief: (Outright	Equal	Justification):	Necessarily,	if	A	and	B	are	internal	twins, then	A	is	justified	simpliciter	in	having	an	outright	belief	in	P	just	in	case	B is	justified	simpliciter	in	having	an	outright	belief	in	P. 14 The	Externalist	has	a	story	about	why	this	thesis	is	false,	as	we	have	already	seen in	the	passage	from	Silins	quoted	above;	one's	evidence	in	the	good	case	entails that	the	sceptical	hypothesis	is	false,	while	one's	twin's	evidence	in	the	bad	case is	predicted	by	the	sceptical	hypothesis,	and	so	it's	a	mistake	to	think	that	the former	can	be	justified	in	believing	something	only	if	the	latter	can	be	too. However,	Silins	has	offered	an	argument	in	favour	of	Outright	Equal	Justification, and	so	the	Externalist	who	wants	to	hold	that	one	has	justification	to	believe	one has	hands	while	one's	envatted	twin	does	not	has	some	work	to	do.	Here	we	take up	that	challenge	on	the	Externalist's	behalf. Silins's	argument	for	Outright	Equal	Justification	starts	from	the	following premise: (Suspension):	Necessarily,	if	one	lacks	justification	to	believe	P,	and	one lacks	justification	to	believe	~P,	then	one	has	justification	to	suspend judgment	in	P.	(Silins	2005:	392) In	fact,	Silins	implicitly	relies	on	a	slightly	stronger	thesis,	to	the	effect	that having	justification	to	believe	P,	having	justification	to	believe	~P,	and	having justification	to	suspend	judgment	on	whether	P	exhaust	the	options,	so	that	if	we can	rule	out	any	two	of	these	for	some	subject	and	a	proposition	P,	then	we	can conclude	that	the	third	is	the	case.	Let's	grant	Suspension	even	in	this	stronger form	for	the	sake	of	argument. Recall	Gary	and	Barry,	internal	twins	in	a	good	case	and	a	sceptical	scenario respectively,	both	of	whom	believe	that	there	is	a	dial	in	front	of	them.	What Silins	tries	to	show	is	that	if	Gary	has	justification	to	believe	this	(as	the	antisceptical	Externalist	supposes),	then	Barry	does	too.	According	to	Silins,	it	can't be	the	case	that	Gary	is	justified	in	believing	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	Gary while	his	internal	twin	Barry	is	justified	in	believing	that	there	is	not	a	dial	in front	of	Barry.	Likewise,	Silins	holds,	it	can't	be	the	case	that	Gary	is	justified	in believing	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	Gary	while	Barry	is	justified	in	suspending judgment	on	whether	there	is	a	dial	in	front	of	Barry.	Given	these	two	claims, since	Gary	is	justified	in	believing	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	it	follows	that Barry	is	neither	justified	in	believing	there	isn't	a	dial	in	front	of	Barry	nor	in suspending	judgment	on	this.	An	application	of	Suspension,	generalised	as discussed	in	the	previous	paragraph,	delivers	the	desired	conclusion	that	Barry has	justification	to	believe	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	him	(Silins	2005:	392-3). It	seems	clear	where	the	Evidential	Externalist	will	want	to	resist	this	argument. It's	the	premise	that	it's	impossible	for	Gary	to	be	justified	in	believing	the proposition	in	question	while	his	internal	twin	Barry	is	justified	in	suspending judgment;	as	we	noted	earlier,	following	Silins	himself	in	the	passage	quoted above,	the	Externalist	has	at	least	the	beginnings	of	an	account	of	why	Gary's entailing	evidence	is	good	enough	for	him	to	have	justification,	while	Barry's weaker	evidence	is	not	good	enough.	However,	Silins	offers	the	following	point in	support	of	his	crucial	premise: 15 [S]uppose	Barry	did	suspend	judgment	in	the	proposition	that	there	is	a dial	in	front	of	him,	despite	the	fact	that	there	seems	to	be	a	dial	in	front	of him,	and	despite	the	fact	that	no	defeating	evidence	is	available	to	him.	I take	it	to	be	very	implausible	that	Barry	would	be	justified	in	suspending judgment	in	the	matter.	(2005:	392) This	point	seems	ineffectual	against	the	Evidential	Externalist,	for	at	least	two reasons.	First,	that	it	appears	to	Barry	in	all	respects	as	if	there's	a	dial	in	front	of him	and	that	he	has	no	defeating	evidence	is	just	what	the	sceptical	hypothesis predicts,	leaving	it	very	unclear	how	Barry	could	be	justified	in	believing	that there	is	a	dial	in	front	of	him	on	this	basis;	recall	once	more	that	this	is	precisely the	line	of	reasoning	which	Silins	puts	in	the	Externalist's	mouth	in	the	passage quoted	above.	Moreover,	it's	very	natural	for	the	Externalist	to	say	that	if	Barry's evidence	is	predicated	both	by	the	hypothesis	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	him and	by	the	hypothesis	that	he's	a	brain	in	a	vat	being	presented	with	a	mere appearance	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	then	Barry	is	justified	in suspending	judgment	on	whether	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	him.	If	there's	a pretheoretical	intuition	to	the	contrary,	the	Externalist	seems	to	be	in	a	strong position	to	insist	that	it	is	trumped	by	theoretical	considerations,	given	that	the Internalist	hasn't	discharged	the	explanatory	burden	of	explaining	how	it's possible	for	Barry	to	be	justified	in	believing	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	him	on the	basis	of	evidence	that	is	predicted	by	the	hypothesis	that	any	appearances	of a	dial	are	misleading. Second,	the	Externalist	can	also	explain	away	the	intuition	about	this	case	that Silins	identifies.	The	question	at	hand	concerns	whether	Barry	has	justification	to suspend	judgment	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of	him,	given	his	evidence	in	the	bad case.	Notice,	however,	that	Silins	invites	us	to	respond	to	this	question	by supposing	that	Barry	in	fact	suspends	judgment	and	then	considering	how intuitive	it	is	to	say	that	he's	justified	in	so	doing.	This	raises	a	number	of	issues, but	in	particular	we	note	that	the	Externalist	will	agree	that	there's	something very	odd	about	Barry	suspending	judgment;	given	what	Barry	(wrongly)	takes his	evidence	to	be,	it	is	natural	for	him	to	believe	that	there's	a	dial	in	front	of him	with	considerable	confidence.	Putting	the	point	in	terminology	familiar	from the	debate	over	the	knowledge	norm	of	assertion	(e.g.	Williamson	2000:	257), the	Externalist	will	agree	that	it's	reasonable	for	Barry	to	believe	that	there's	a dial	in	front	of	him,	and	that	it	would	be	unreasonable	for	him	to	suspend judgment;	but	they	will	insist	that	we	guard	against	conflating	those	claims	with ones	about	what	Barry	has	justification	to	believe.	In	inviting	us	to	suppose	that Barry	in	fact	suspends	judgment	and	then	inviting	intuitions	about	that	scenario, Silins	inadvertently	encourages	precisely	this	conflation-or	so	the	Externalist should	say. The	upshot	is	that	the	Evidential	Externalist	has	a	clear	escape	from	Silins's dilemma.	They	shouldn't	concede	that	subjects	like	Barry	have	justification	for their	beliefs	about	the	external	world,	and	they	should	deny	Outright	Equal Justification	along	with	Equal	Justification.	As	a	result,	they	face	the	burden	of explaining	why	a	subject	in	Barry's	evidential	state	is	justified	in	suspending judgment.	But	given	that	Barry's	evidence	for	believing	there's	a	dial	in	front	of 16 him	is	predicated	by	sceptical	scenarios	in	which	there's	no	dial	in	front	of	him, Externalists	(not	implausibly)	takes	their	burden	to	be	easier	to	discharge	than that	faced	by	the	Internalist,	who	has	to	explain	how	Barry	could	be	justified	on the	basis	of	such	inconclusive	evidence.	If	one	initially	thought	that	the Evidential	Externalist	was	at	a	genuine	advantage	here,	we	contend	that	nothing in	Silins's	discussion	should	change	one's	mind. Conclusion In	this	paper,	we	have	offered	a	comprehensive	reassessment	of	the	case	against Evidential	Externalism	and	for	its	Internalist	rival,	and	we	have	reached	a	very different	conclusion	to	Silins.	Silins	closes	his	paper	by	writing	that	'[t]he	overall case	for	Evidential	Externalism	might	turn	out	to	be	stronger,	but	the	case	for Evidential	Internalism	is	not	weak'	(2005:	398-9).	We	disagree;	re-examining	the arguments	that	Silins	has	advanced	on	the	Internalist's	behalf	suggests	that	the case	for	their	thesis	is	rather	weak	indeed.17 References Brown,	J.	(2004).	Anti-Individualism	and	Knowledge.	Cambridge,	Mass.:	MIT	Press. Dunn,	J.	(2012).	Evidential	Externalism.	Philosophical	Studies	,	158,	435-55. Farkas,	K.	(2008).	The	Subject's	Point	of	View.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Kallestrup,	J.	(2012).	Semantic	Externalism.	Oxon:	Routledge. Kennedy,	M.	(2010).	Naïve	Realism	and	Experiential	Evidence.	Proceedings	of	the Aristotelian	Society	,	110,	77-109. Littlejohn,	C.	(2012).	Justification	and	the	Truth-Connection.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press. McGlynn,	A.	(2014).	Knowledge	First?	Basingstoke:	Palgrave	Macmillan. McKinsey,	M.	(1991).	Anti-Individualism	and	Privileged	Access.	Analysis	,	51,	916. Nuccetelli,	S.	(1999).	What	Anti-Individualists	Cannot	Know	A	Priori.	Analysis	,	59, 48-51. Pritchard,	D.	(2012).	Epistemological	Disjunctivism.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. 17	We	would	like	to	thank	Matt	Jope	and	Lukas	Schwengerer	for	helpful	discussion,	and	Veli Mitova	for	suggestions	that	led	to	improvements.	Parts	of	this	paper	were	presented	at	The Factive	Turn	in	Epistemology	at	the	University	of	Vienna	and	at	the	second	Fallibility,	Rational Belief,	and	Knowledge	workshop	at	the	University	of	Barcelona;	we	are	grateful	to	all	of	the participants	at	those	events	for	their	feedback.	Aidan	McGlynn	would	like	to	gratefully acknowledge	support	from	the	FARBEK	project	FFI2013-45968-P,	funded	by	the	Spanish Ministry	of	Economy	(MINECO). 17 Pritchard,	D.	(2011).	Evidentialism,	Internalism,	Disjunctivism.	In	T.	Dougherty (Ed.),	Evidentialism	and	its	Discontents	(pp.	235-53).	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press. Silins,	N.	(2005).	Deception	and	Evidence.	Philosophical	Perspectives	,	19,	375404. Williamson,	T.	(2000).	Knowledge	and	its	Limits.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Zardini,	E.	(2013).	Luminosity	and	Vagueness.	Dialectica	,	66,	375-410.