Original	Paper	UDC	130.1:165.242 130.1:53.01 Received	April	12th,	2011 Luca Malatesti University	of	Rijeka,	Faculty	of	Humanities	and	Social	Sciences,	Slavka	Krautzeka	bb,	HR–51000	Rijeka lmalatesti@ffri.hr Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts* Abstract Frank Jackson's knowledge	argument and different conceivability arguments, advanced by Saul Kripke, David Chalmers and Joseph Levine, conclude that consciousness involves non-physical properties or properties that cannot be reductively accounted for in physical terms. Some physicalists have replied to these objections by means of different versions of the phenomenal	concept	strategy. David Chalmers has responded with the master	argument, a reasoning that, if successful, would undermine any reasonable version of the phenomenal concept strategy. In this paper, I argue that the master argument does not advance the debate between the supporters of the anti-physicalist arguments and those of the phenomenal concept strategy. Key words consciousness, qualia, zombies, a posteriori physicalism, phenomenal concept strategy, David	Chalmers's	master	argument 1. Introduction It	is	a	highly	debated	philosophical	issue	whether	or	not	consciousness	can	be accommodated	in	the	physical	world	that	is	described	and	explained	by	natural	sciences.	In	particular,	philosophers	debate	whether	qualia have	a	place	in a	fundamental	physical	domain	or	in	other	domains	that	can	be	based upon	or unified with it.	Minimally,	qualia	can	be	taken	to	be	properties	that	have	to	do with	ways	of	appearing	in	conscious	experiences,	such	as	the	blueness	of	the sky,	the	redness	of	a	rose,	and	the	painfulness	of	a	pain.	Moreover,	qualia are taken	to	ground	differences	between	types	of	conscious	experiences:	a	colour experience	of	red	is	different	from	that	of	blue	or	a	pain	in	the	elbow	because different	qualia	determine	different	ways	of	appearing	in	these	conscious	experiences.	Some	supporters	of	physicalism	admit	the	existence	of	qualia,	at least in the	sense	considered	above,	and	maintain that they	are identical to physical	properties	or	to	properties	that	depend	on	physical	properties.1 * I	am	grateful	to	David	Chalmers	for	reading	and discussing	with	generosity	and	patience	previous	versions	of	my	criticism. I	would like to thank	also	Mario	Alai	for	helpful	comments	on a	previous	draft.	I	presented	parts	and	versions of this paper at the conferences Um i stvarnost,	Institut	za	Filozofiju,	Zagreb,	2009;	The Philosophical Significance of Attention, IUC, Dubrovnik, 2009; Ontologia e conoscenza, University	of	Siena,	Arezzo,	2010;	Mind and World,	Rijeka	2011,	and	at	departmental	talks in	Belgrade	(November	2009)	and	Hull	(March 2010).	I	would	like	to	thank	the	organisers	for inviting	me	or	accepting	my	submissions	and the	audiences	for	helpful	discussions. 1 Physicalists have spelled out this notion of dependence differently, for a critical survey see	Stoljar	2010. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts392 Certain	related	objections	to	these	identifications,	if	cogent,	would	undermine the	different	versions	of	physicalism.	Prominent	amongst	these	criticisms	are the	knowledge	argument	and	a	family	of	conceivability	arguments.2	A	common	feature	of	all	these	reasonings	is	that	they	elicit	and	then	articulate	some intuitions concerning a conceptual distinction	between	qualia and	physical properties	or	properties	depending	on	these	latter	properties.	These	arguments are then	aimed	at	deriving	explanatory or	ontological gaps	between	qualia and	physical	properties	that	should	undermine	physicalism. Some	physicalists,	known	as	a posteriori,	new wave,	or	B-type	physicalists, concede	to	their	opponents	some	of	their	intuitions.	However,	they	deny	that these	intuitions	lead	to	the	anti-physicalist	conclusion.	Their	main	resource	is what	is	known	as	the	phenomenal concept strategy.3	According	to	upholders of this	strategy, the	antiphysicalist	objections	considered	above	result from "cognitive	illusions"	determined	by	certain	features	of	phenomenal concepts. These	are	concepts	that,	allegedly,	we	use	to	think	about	qualia	from	the	firstperson	perspective.	Thus,	for	instance,	if	we	think	about	how	the	colour	of the	sky	appears	to	us	when	we	have	a	conscious	experience	of	it,	we	are	employing	a	phenomenal	concept	referring	to	the	quale	of	the	conscious	colour experience. The	phenomenal	concept	strategy requires that	phenomenal	concepts	satisfy	numerous	conditions.	These requirements	have	emerged in	dealing	with specific	aspects	of	the	different	antiphysicalist	objections	mentioned	above. Thus,	the	prospects	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	are	tied	to	those	of	a theory	of	phenomenal	concepts	that	can	explain	independently	these	requirements.	Surely,	a posteriori	physicalists	have	offered	elaborated	accounts	of phenomenal	concepts	aimed	at	supporting	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy and	showing	that	it	is	more	than	an	ad hoc	manoeuvre.4 However,	David	Chalmers	has	recently	advanced,	in	the	form	of	a	dilemma, a	master argument for	the	conclusion	that	the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy is	doomed	to	failure,	no	matter	which	account	of	phenomenal	concepts	the a posteriori	physicalist	might	provide.5	The	conclusion	of the first	horn	of this	dilemma	is	that	phenomenal	concepts	cannot	account	for	our	epistemic situation	in	relation	to	qualia	when	we	think	about	them	from	the	first-person perspective.	The conclusion of the second horn of	Chalmers's dilemma is that	phenomenal	concepts	cannot	be	accounted	for	in	terms	of	properties	in the	fundamental	physical	domain	or	in	other	domains	that	can	be	based on	or unified with	or	necessitated by	these	physical	properties.	Both	conclusions	are clearly	unpalatable	for	the	physicalist	who	endorses	the	phenomenal	concept strategy. I	will	argue	that	the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy	can	stand	this	criticism.	In fact, I	will	offer	another	dilemma	against	Chalmers's	master	argument that shows	that	his	reasoning	cannot	advance	the	debate	between	the	a posteriori physicalist	and	the	anti-physicalist.	However,	even	if	my	reply	is	successful, it	is	based	on	a	general	and	schematic	understanding	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	that	is	required	by	the	specific	objection	mounted	by	Chalmers. Whether	or	not	the	physicalist	can	offer	an	adequate	account	of	phenomenal concepts	that	can	satisfy	all	the	requirements	needed	for	the	formulation	of the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	is	an	issue	that	is	not	tackled	here. I	will	proceed	as	follows.	Firstly,	I	briefly	illustrate	the	anti-physicalist	arguments	and	the	responses	offered	by	the	supporters	of	the	phenomenal	concept strategy.	This	illustration,	thus,	involves	an	account	of	the	requirements	put on	phenomenal	concepts	in	order	to	defend	physicalism.	Secondly,	in	section SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts393 3,	I	describe	Chalmers's	master	argument.	In	section	4,	I	argue	that	Chalmers's	dilemma	is	not	undermined	by	an	accusation	of	equivocation	moved	by some	supporters	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy.	Finally,	in	section	5,	I advance	my	dilemma	against	Chalmers's. 2. The phenomenal concept strategy In this	section, I illustrate	briefly the	antiphysicalist	arguments	and the	explanatory	desiderata	that	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	puts	on	phenomenal	concepts	in	order	to	block	these	objections.	Some	abbreviations	will	be helpful	in	this	illustration	and	in	the	remainder	of	this	paper.	Let	us	assume that	P	describes	the	complete	microphysical	truth	of	the	world.	Thus,	P	is	an extremely	long	conjunction	of	sentences	that	specify	in	details	all	the	fundamental microphysical properties of every microphysical entity across time and	space.	In	addition,	let	us	use	Q	as	a	true	statement	concerning	a	fact	involving	qualia.	For	instance,	Q	might	state	that	a	certain	conscious	experience has	a	certain	quale. Frank Jackson's	knowledge	argument against	physicalism	goes	as follows. Mary is a super scientist who knows P.	Thus, in particular she knows all the	physical	facts	about	colour	and	colour	vision.	However,	she	has	gathered this	knowledge	without	having	any	conscious	colour	experience,	given	that she	is	confined	from	birth	in	a	black	and	white	environment.	Freed	from	this environment, she sees for the first time	a	coloured	object; let	us say	a red rose.	According	to	the	supporters	of	the	knowledge	argument,	by	seeing	the rose,	Mary	discovers	the	quale	of	the	conscious	experience	of	red.	Thus,	she discovers	the	fact	Q	that	her	conscious	experience	has	a	certain	quale.6	Given that	she	already	knew	all	the	physical	facts	concerning	her	conscious	colour experience,	Q cannot	be	a	physical	fact	and	the	quale	of	her	experience	cannot	be	a	physical	property. The	physicalist	that	supports	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	concedes	that Mary	learns	something.	So,	he	is	not	endorsing	a priori	physicalism,	the	view that	facts	about	qualia	would	be	a priori	entailed	by	complete	physical	story P and,	thus,	that	Mary	will	know	everything	about	these	properties	before	her release.7	Moreover,	the	supporters	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	assume that	Mary	acquires	new	beliefs	concerning	qualia.	This	further	concession	to the	supporter	of	the	knowledge	argument	contrasts	with	certain	"deflationist" views	of	Mary's	new	knowledge.	According	to	the	supporters	of	these	latter accounts,	Mary's	new	knowledge	is	not	propositional	knowledge.8	However, the	supporter	of the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	maintains	that	conceding 2 For the knowledge argument, see Jackson 1982 and Jackson 1986. Jackson no longer endorses	this	argument,	see	Jackson	2007.	Influential	versions	of	conceivability	arguments have	been	offered	in	Kripke	1971,	Chalmers 1996,	and	Levine	2001. 3 Amongst recent proposals, see Carruthers 2000, Papineau 2002, Perry 2001, and Tye 2000,	although	Tye	has	recanted	in	Tye	2009. 4 For a discussion of these conditions, see Malatesti	2008. 5 Chalmers	2007. 6 Or whichever other fact that is taken to be problematic	for	physicalism. 7 This	view	is	advanced,	for	instance,	in	Dennett	2007. 8 See,	for	instance,	Lewis	1990. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts394 that	Mary	acquires	propositional	knowledge	does	not imply that	qualia	are not	physical	properties. According	to	the	supporter	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy,	the	individuation	of	Mary's	beliefs	is	a	function	of	the	individuation	of	concepts	occurring in	them.	In	turn,	the	individuation	of	concepts	is	a	function,	besides	of	their referent,	of	their	cognitive	content.	And	finally,	distinct	concepts	can	co-refer. So,	when	Mary	sees	a	coloured	object,	she	acquires	phenomenal	concepts	that co-refer	with	her	scientific	concepts	that	concern	qualia.	Thus,	this	reply	to the	knowledge	argument	requires	that	Mary's	new	beliefs	involve	phenomenal	concepts	that	are	a priori	detached	from	physical	concepts.	Moreover, these	concepts	to	be	possessed	require	having	a	relevant	type	of	experience. Finally,	her	phenomenal	concepts	refer	to	physical	properties. The	phenomenal concept strategy is also used to resist conceivability arguments against physicalism.	Saul	Kripke advanced seminal versions	of these objections.9	More	recently,	David	Chalmers,	Frank	Jackson,	and	Joseph	Levine have	developed	theirs.10	These	reasonings	are	based	on	the	conceivability	of	the instantiation	of	P without	that	of	Q.	An	illustration	of	this	assumption	is	given by	the	case	of	philosophical	zombies.	These	are	hypothetical	creatures	that	lack consciousness	and	share	with	us the	properties that, according to the	different	versions	of	physicalism,	should	describe	and	explain	consciousness.	Thus, there	is	at	least	a	conceptual gap	between	the	physical	story	P	and	qualia. Conceivability	arguments	against	physicalism	come	in	an	ontological	and	an epistemic	form.	The	ontological	versions	of	the	conceivability	argument	supported	by	Kripke,	Chalmers	and	Jackson,	concludes that the	conceivability of	zombies	implies	an	ontological gap.	In	fact,	these	arguments	are	aimed	at proving	that	the	conceivability	of	zombies	implies	the	modal	conclusion	that it	is	metaphysically	possible	that	P	is	true	and	Q is	false. This	conclusion is then	taken	to	be	damaging	to	physicalism	because	physicalists	would	admit that	P	should	imply	Q as	a	matter	of	metaphysical	necessity.11 The	supporters	of the	phenomenal	concept strategy	have	offered replies to these	arguments	by	exploiting	phenomenal	concepts.	They	maintain	that	zombies	are	conceivable	in	virtue	of	certain	features	of	these	concepts.	However, this	does	not	imply	that	it	is	metaphysically	possible	that	qualia	are	not	physical	properties.	To	show	this,	they	have	offered	several	alternative	accounts	of the	relevant	features	of	phenomenal	concepts.12	Without	entering	into	details here,	it	is	enough	to	say	that	they	aim	at	accounting	for	the	fact	that	phenomenal	concepts	offer	peculiar	modes	of	thinking	about	qualia.	These	features are then taken to explain	why, although	phenomenal concepts are	a priori detached	from	the	relevant	physical	concepts,	it	is	metaphysically	impossible that	their	referents	are	not	physical. Finally,	in	the	epistemic	version	of	the	conceivability	argument,	the	conceptual	gap illustrated	by	zombies is taken to lead to	an	explanatory gap that separates	Q from	P	in	a	way	that	undermines	physicalism.13	In	particular,	the conceivability	of	zombies	supports	an	intuition	concerning	the	arbitrariness of	the	psychophysical	identities	concerning	qualia.	Despite	we	might	be	convinced	that	a	quale	is	a	certain	physical	property	N,	it	would	still	appear	to	be arbitrary	why	this	is	so.	There	might	be	a	persistent	intuition	that	N	could	not have	been	that	quale.	Let	us	assume	for	instance	that	the	physicalists	maintain that	the	characteristic	way	in	which	we	are	aware	of	a	toothache	is	identical to	the	activation	of	a	certain	group	of	neurons.	According	to	some	supporter of	the	epistemic	gap,	it	would	still	be	possible	to	wonder	why	that	specific neural	activation	is	that	pain	(and	vice	versa).	However,	such	an	intuition	is SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts395 not	prompted	in	the	case	of	other	informative	or	explanatory	identities.	Once we	know	that	Tully	=	Cicero,	there	is	no	similar	explanatory	gap	left. Therefore, some supporters of phenomenal concept strategy maintain that phenomenal	concepts,	besides	being	a priori	detached from	scientific	concepts,	involve	a	special	relation	to	their	referents.	This	relation	explains	the intuition	of	distinctness	that	differentiates	the	identities	of	qualia	with	physical	properties	from	other	a posteriori	identities. There	are	also	desiderata	that	the	theory	of	phenomenal	concepts	has	to	satisfy.	Trivially,	this	theory	should	sit	well	within	a	general	theory	of	concepts and	their	cognitive	significance.	Clearly,	this	is	not	a	small	requirement,	given the lack	of	general	agreement	on	the	nature	of	concepts.	However,	another requirement,	that	can	be	called	the	physicalist constraint, is	more	important for	the	present	discussion.	The	account	of	phenomenal	concepts,	in	order	to back	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy,	should	postulate	neither	ontologically irreducible	mental	entities	nor	entities	that	cannot	be	reductively	explained	by physical	entities.	The	majority	of	physicalists,	in	fact,	would	assume	that	their doctrine	extend	well further	qualia	and involve	all	our	mental life.	So, the phenomenal	concept	strategy	cannot	involve	mental	entities	that	escape	the physical	ontology	and	reductive	explanations.	Otherwise,	whatever	the	utility	of	this	response	in	blocking	certain	anti-physicalist	arguments	concerning consciousness,	it	would	introduce	phenomenal	concepts	or	their	features	as new	embarrassing	entities	for	the	a posteriori	physicalist. The elaboration of different physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts aimed	at satisfying the	desiderata	of the	phenomenal	concept strategy represent	an	interesting	development	in	the	debate	on	the	place	of	qualia	in	the natural	world.14	However,	David	Chalmers	has	offered	an	objection	of	such	a generality	and	strength	that,	if	sound,	would	undermine	any	possible	version of	this	strategy. 3. David Chalmers's master argument Chalmers	targets	the	consistency	of	a	set	of	assumptions	endorsed	by	the	supporters	of the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy.	As	we	have	seen, they	accept that	zombies	are	conceivable.	In	addition,	they	maintain	that	certain	features of	phenomenal	and	scientific	concepts	explain	the	conceivability	of	zombies without	making	reference	to	or	implying	the	existence	of	non-physical	prop- 9 Kripke	1971. 10 Chalmers	1996,	Jackson	1994a,	Jackson	1998 and	Levine	2001. 11 The conclusion that physicalists should accept that psychophysical identifications are necessary	was	part	of	Kripke's	conceivability arguments targeted	against the	early identity theorists	of	the	1950s,	such	as	J.	J.	C.	Smart and U. T. Place, who maintained that these identifications were contingent. Nowadays, many	physicalists	accept	that	what	they	take to be the fundamental relation between the physical and the mental is metaphysically necessary,	see	Papineau	2002,	pp.	75–76. 12 Phenomenal concepts are taken to be: recognitional concepts, in Loar 1990 and Carruthers	2004;	concepts	that	play	very	distinct conceptual roles from	physical concepts	because	are	associated	to	very	different	mental faculties,	in	Hill	1997	and	Hill	and	McLaughlin B. 1999; indexical concepts involving a demonstrative reference to physical properties, in	Perry 2001 and Ismael 1999; quotational	concepts	that	include	their	referents,	in Papineau	2002. 13 Levine	2001. 14 For a collection of the most significant accounts,	see	Alter	and	Walter	2007. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts396 erties	of	conscious	experiences.	Finally,	as	required	by	the	physicalist	constraint,	this	explanation	should	be	given	in	physical	terms. Chalmers invites us to consider	C, the relevant psychological or semantic story	that	the	supporter	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	should	be	able	to offer	to	account	for	phenomenal	concepts.	Thus,	C	has	to	be	an	account	that concerns	physical,	functional,	intentional	and	epistemic	properties that	plausibly	explains	all	the	mental	or	semantic	features	required	by	the	phenomenal concept	strategy	to	block	the	different	anti-physicalist	arguments. Chalmers	advances	his	dilemma	by	considering	whether	or	not	is	conceivable that	P	and	C obtain	together.	So,	one	option	is	that	we	can	conceive	that	P	can hold	without	C,	so	(P	and	not	C)	is	conceivable.	Alternatively,	(P and	not	C) is	not	conceivable.	According	to	Chalmers,	these	two	possibilities	lead	to	two horns	of	a	dilemma	for	the	supporter	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy.	Let us	consider	the	first	horn. Chalmers	argues	that	if	(P and	not	C)	is	conceivable,	then	C	is	not	physically explicable.	This	would	mean	that	the	account	C	of	phenomenal	concepts	involves	facts	or	properties	that	escape	the	explanatory	resources	admitted	by the	physicalist.	Thus,	we	would	get	an	explanatory gap	between	the	physical processes	and	the	relevant	features	of	phenomenal	concepts	exploited	by	the phenomenal	concept	strategy.	Chalmers's	argument	relies	here	on	the	assumption	that	physicalists	should	be	committed	to	the	idea	that	if	P	can	reductively explain	C,	then	it	should	be	"transparent"	why	C	obtains	when	P	obtains.15 This	view	of	reductive	explanation	can	be	illustrated	with	the	case	of	water. The	concept	of	water	can	be	analysed	a priori	as	referring	to	whatever	is	the clear,	odourless	liquid	around	here	that	fills	the	oceans	and	lakes	etc.	Let	us abbreviate	this	by	saying	that	water	is	the	waterish stuff.	The	reductive	explanation	of	facts	concerning	water	in	terms	of	low-level	truths	concerning	H2O is	"made	transparent"	by	the	fact	that	from	P	we	would	be	able	a priori to determine	that	H2O	satisfies	the	properties	of	waterish stuff. On	the	other	horn	of	Chalmers's	dilemma,	if	(P	and	not	C)	is	not	conceivable, then	C does	not	explain	our	epistemic	situation	with	regard	to	consciousness. By	"epistemic	situation	of	an	individual"	Chalmers	means	all	the	truth-values,	justification,	and	cognitive	significance	of	the	beliefs	of	the	subject.	According	to	Chalmers,	if	(P	and	not	C)	is	not	conceivable,	then	P	and	C	has	to be	conceivable.	However,	he	thinks	that	this	would	imply	that	zombies,	being our	physical	duplicates,	satisfy	C,	and	thus	that	they	would	have	the	epistemic situation	with	relation	to	qualia	that	involves	also	the	use	of	phenomenal	concepts.	But,	zombies	do	not	share	our	epistemic	situation	in	relation	to	qualia, in	fact	by	hypothesis	they	lack	these	features.	If	zombies	satisfy	C	and	do	not share	our	epistemic	situation,	then	C	cannot	characterise	how	we	think	from the	first-personal	perspective	about	qualia.	Thus,	Chalmers	concludes	that	C would	not	deliver	an	account	of	phenomenal	concepts.	Let	us	now	consider an	attempt	at	undermining	this	dilemma. 4. A charge of equivocation It	has	been	argued	that	Chalmers's	dilemma	is	based	on	an	equivocation	in	the use	of	the	description	C.16	This	equivocation	is	revealed	by	using	what	could be called the "the concept of phenomenal concept strategy".	According to this	response,	there	are	two	ways	of	thinking	about	phenomenal	concepts	that determine	two	corresponding	ways	of	thinking	the	story	C.	These	two	ways of	thinking	are	tied	up,	respectively,	to	first-personal	concepts	and	third-personal	concepts	used	to	think	about	the	phenomenal	concepts	involved	in	C. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts397 To	illustrate	these	two	ways	of	thinking	let	us	introduce	a	convention.	Phenomenal	concepts	will	be indicated	with letters in	bold	while the	qualia to which	they	refer	with	letters	in	italics.	So,	with	B we refer	to	a	phenomenal concept	and	with	B to	a	quale to	which the	phenomenal	concept indicated with	B refers. With the first-personal mode of presentation	of	phenomenal concepts,	a	certain	subject	thinks	about	concept	B as	the	phenomenal	concept of	quale	B, and	she	thinks	about	this	quale	B	by using the	phenomenal	concept B. On	the	other	hand,	with	the	third-personal mode of presentation	of	phenomenal	concepts,	the	subject	thinks	about	B as	the	phenomenal	concept	referring	to B, and	she	is thinking	about	B	by	using	some	physical	concept	N. According	to	the	supporters	of	the	charge	of	equivocation,	the	first	horn	of Chalmers's	dilemma,	that	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	(P	and	not	C)	is	conceivable,	goes	through	because	we	think	about	C	using	first-personal	modes of	presentation	of	phenomenal	concepts.	In	fact,	phenomenal	concepts	such as	B cannot	be	derived	by	physical	descriptions,	and	thus	we	can	conceive of	the	instantiation	of	P without	property	B,	similarly	the	non-derivability	of concept	B will	imply	the	non-derivability	of	C from	P,	and	thus	the	fact	that (P	and	not	C)	is	conceivable.	In	the	second	horn,	based	on	the	assumption	that (P	and	not	C)	is	not	conceivable,	C	involves	third-personal	modes	of	presentation	of	phenomenal	concepts.	In	this	case,	it	should	not	be	surprising	that	we cannot	conceive	the	separation	between	P	and	C;	in	fact	C	is	a	physical	story and	thus	has	to	be	part	of	story	P. The	charge	of	equivocation is	not	a	decisive	one.	Chalmers's	dilemma	can be	reformulated	as	a	new dilemma	by	taking	into	account	the	first	and	thirdpersonal	mode	of	presentation	of	C	based,	respectively,	on	the	first-personal and	third-personal	modes	of	presentation	of	phenomenal	concepts	considered above.	So,	the	disjunction	of	the	new	dilemma	would	be	that	C	can	have	a first-personal	or	a	third-personal	reading.	If	we	have	the	first-personal	reading	of	C,	then	the	conclusion	of	the	first	horn	of	Chalmers's	master	argument follows.	If	we	have	a	third-personal	reading	of	C,	then	the	conclusion	of	the second	horn	will	follow. Some	defenders	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	have	tried	to	dismantle this	new	dilemma.17	However,	the	accusation	of	equivocation	appears	to	ignore	a	central	requirement	that	Chalmers	puts	on	the	formulation	of	the	account	of	phenomenal	concepts	C.	He	explicitly	requires	that	such	an	account has	to	be	"topic	neutral",	meaning	that	it	cannot	involve	explicit	reference	to phenomenal	properties	or	states	and	phenomenal	concepts	that	refer	to	them. In	particular,	phenomenal	concepts	cannot	be	used	in	articulating	C.	Thus,	C cannot	involve	ways	of	thinking	about	qualia	offered	by	using	phenomenal concepts.	Instead,	C	has	to	be	an	account	of	physical,	functional,	intentional and	epistemic	properties	thought	of	as	such. Some	supporters	of	the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy	have	objected	to	this requirement of "topic-neutrality".18 Without engaging with this response, 15 This account of reductive explanation is given	in	Chalmers	2006,	and	also	in	Jackson 1994b. See, for objections, Block and Stalnaker	1999	and the replies in	Chalmers and Jackson	2001. 16 Papineau	2007,	Carruthers	and	Veillet	2007, and	Balog	2012. 17 Carruthers and Veillet 2007 and Papineau 2007. 18 See	Balog	2012. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts398 here	it	is	enough	to	note	that	Chalmers's	requirement	appears,	at	least	prima facie, to be reasonable insofar as it	would undermine immediate rebuttals of	the	first	horn	of	his	dilemma.	Moreover,	it	is	a	plausible	assumption	that the	physicalist	should	be	committed	to	articulating	C	without	mentioning	or thinking	about	qualia	as	understood	by	using	phenomenal	concepts.	Finally, in	the	next	section	I	offer	a	criticism	of	Chalmers's	dilemma	that,	although it	exploits	different	ways	of thinking	about	phenomenal	concepts,	does	not violate	the	requirement	of	the	"topic	neutrality"	of	C. 5. A dilemma against Chalmers's master argument A	counter-dilemma	can	be	mounted	against	Chalmers's	dilemma	by	considering	whether	or	not	he	can	concede	that	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	is successful	in	blocking	the	conceivability	arguments	against	physicalism.	The first	horn	is	simply	that	if	Chalmers	does	not	concede	that	the	phenomenal concept	strategy	blocks	the	conceivability	arguments,	then	there	would	be	no need	of	his	master	argument.	The	debate	would	then	concern	whether	or	not phenomenal	concepts	can	be	used	by	physicalist	to	block	these	objections. On	the	other	horn,	if	Chalmers	concedes	the	efficacy	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy,	then	it	seems	that	there	is	a	way	out	his	dilemma.	Conceding that the phenomenal concept strategy blocks the conceivability arguments based	on	zombies,	offers	a	mode	of	presentation	of	C. This	way	of	thinking can	be	called	an	explanatory mode of presentation, from	now	on	indicated	as EMP. The EMP	enables	us	to	think	about C as	concerning:	the	psychological,	intentional,	epistemic	features	in	virtue	of	which	a	physical	property	N	is given	to	a	subject	in a way that	offers	to	her	grounds	for	conceiving	that	N	is not	given	in	the	same way	to	her	physical	duplicate. In fact, if the	phenomenal concept strategy	works, someone	who	endorses it	can	be	aware	that	her	conceiving	a	difference	between	her	and	zombies	is due	to	some	of	her	psychological	workings	or	certain	epistemic	or	semantic features. The	EMP	is	"topic	neutral"	as	required	by	Chalmers.	In	this	description	phenomenal	concepts	are	not	explicitly	attributed.	Instead,	C	involves	whatever features	the	supporters	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	assume	will	play a	central	role	in	explaining	the	conceivability	of	zombies,	despite	the	facts that they	are	metaphysically impossible	and	that	qualia	are	reductively	explainable	in	physical	terms.	In	particular,	C	would	explain	why	we	can	conceive	that	there	is	a	difference	between	us	and	the	zombies,	although	they	are our	physical	duplicates.	In	addition, this	way	of	thinking	about	C	does	not involve	the	use	of	phenomenal	concepts.	This	last	point	can	be	emphasised by	considering	the	fact	that	it	is	conceivable	a	physically	omniscient	being who	does	not	satisfy	C,	and	thus	cannot	conceive	zombies.	It	seems	that	this creature	would	be	able	to	use	C	to	explain	our	idiosyncratic	capacity	to	conceive	zombies. Let	us	now	think	about	Chalmers's	master	argument	with	the	EMP	in	place. The	physicalist	should	be	committed	to	the	claim	that	(P	and	not	C) is	not conceivable.	In	fact,	under	the	EMP,	C	contains	a	story	that	would	explain why	we	find	conceivable	that	zombies	differ	from	us.	From	knowing	P, we would	then	be	able	to	grasp	a priori	how	physical	properties	would	fulfil	this explanatory	role	involved	in	C.	Thus,	the	supporter	of	the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy	should	accept	the	assumption	that	the	entailment	of	C	from	P would	be	accessible	a priori. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts399 According	to	Chalmers,	if	the	supporters	of	the	phenomenal	concept	strategy maintain	that	(P	and	not	C)	is	not	conceivable	and,	thus,	that	(P	and	C)	is	conceivable,	they	should	conclude	that,	given	a	zombie	Z,	(Z and	C)	is	conceivable.	The	argument	for	this	conclusion	can	be	spelled	out	as	follows: (1) (P	without	Q)	is	conceivable	(i.e.	zombies	are	conceivable). (2) (P	entails	C)	is	a priori. Therefore: (3) (P	and	C	without	Q)	is	conceivable	(i.e.	zombies	that	satisfy	C	are	conceivable). The	supporters	of the	phenomenal	concept	strategy	endorse	both	premises. So,	they	should	also	accept	that	zombies	satisfy	C.	According	to	Chalmers, this	would	be	problematic	for	them.	If	it	is	conceivable	that	we	share	C	with zombies,	C	would	not	be	suitable to	account for	our	epistemic	situation in relation	to	qualia. Supporters	of	the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy	might	take	issue	with	Chalmers's	demand	that	C	should	provide	an	account	of	our	epistemic	situation.19 However,	it	seems	that	we	can	avoid	entering	into	this	dispute,	given	that	a conceiver	in	ideal	conditions	would	not	be	able	to	infer	the	above	conclusion (3)	from	premises	(1)	and	(2).	To	see	why	this	is	the	case,	let	us	consider	the modes	of	presentations	involved	in	these	premises. Premises	(1)	and	(2)	are	based	on	different	modes	of	presentation	of	a	physical property	N.	According	to	the	supporter	of	the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy, premise	(1)	is	conceivable	by	a	thinker	that	satisfies	C	and	thus	thinks	about a	certain	physical	property	N,	that	is	the	quale	that	enters	in	fact	Q,	in	a	way that	offers	her	ground	for	thinking	that	a	zombie	does	not	have	this	property. Thus,	premise (1) is true	by thinking	about	certain	physical	properties, i.e. qualia,	with	the	way	of	thinking	made	available	to	a	thinker	by	instantiating C. Premise	(2),	as	we	have	seen,	should	be	accepted	by	thinking	about	C via the	EMP.	Amongst	other	things,	the	EMP	involves	a	mode	of	presentation	of N thought	of	as	a	physical	property	that,	in	virtue	of	being	given	to	us	in	a certain	way,	we	conceive	as	not	instantiated	in	zombies.	Story	C is	entailed	a priori from	the	physical	story	P,	because	in	thinking	about	it	with	the	EMP, amongst	other	things,	we	think	about	qualia,	and	thus	in	particular	about	the property	N that	enters	in	Q,	as	physical	properties. In	general,	an	argument	of	this	type,	with	different	modes	of	presentations	of the	same	entity	in	its	premises,	might	be	valid.20	However,	the	premises	of	the argument	for	conclusion	(3)	involve	two	modes	of	presentations	of	the	same property	that	a	conceiver,	in	an	ideal	reflective	position,	would	a priori	find out	to	be	incompatible.	The	conceiver	who	masters	the	two	modes	of	presentations	involved	in	premise	(1)	and	(2)	would	be	incapable	to	draw	conclusion (3),	because	he	would	realise	that	he	cannot	conceive	that	(P	and	C	without Q) by employing phenomenal concepts and the EMP in one single act of conceiving.	In	fact,	this	would	amount	to	conceiving	a	zombie	that	satisfies	a psychological	story	C. But C is	a	story that,	thanks	to	the	EMP,	the	conceiver thinks	about	as	what	explains	the	fact	that	a	physical	property	N	is	given	to 19 See	Díaz-León	2010. 20 Consider	for	instance,	that	someone	conceives that	Clark	Kent	does	not	have	the	properties of	Superman	and	that	knows	that	if	someone has	all	the	properties	of	Superman	he	then	can fly.	Of	course,	this	conceiver	would	infer	that it is	conceivable that	someone	has the	properties	of	Superman,	he	can	fly,	and	he	is	not Clark	Kent. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 52	(2/2011)	pp.	(391–402) L. Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts400 him	in	a	way	that	offers	him	grounds	for	conceiving	that N	is	not	given	in	the same	way	to	the	zombie.	Thus	C,	thought	of	by	means	of	the	EMP,	if	applied to	zombies	would	undermine	the	ground	initially	offered	by	phenomenal	concepts	for	conceiving	them.	In	fact,	this	would	amount	to	conceiving	that	zombies	do	not	differ	from	the	conceiver,	given	that	they	would	share	with	him	the physical	property	N,	given	that	they	are	his	physical	duplicates,	and	have	the same	perspective	on	N,	that	is	conferred	by	instantiating	C. An	analogy	might	help	to	clarify	this	point.	A	person	A,	who	sees	a	certain object	O,	might	conceive	that	a	certain	other individual	B	sees	the	same	O differently.	Let	us	now	assume	that	A is	capable	of	thinking	about	the	overall perspective	that	characterises	how	she	sees	O,	let	us	call	it	V,	when	she	conceives	that	B	sees O differently	from	her.	Individual	A	cannot	then	conceive, from	an	ideal	reflective	position,	that B	sees	O	differently	and	that	B	has	the perspective	V.	In	fact,	by	ascribing	V	to	B,	A	would	not	be	able	to	conceive that	B	could	see,	at	the	same	time,	the	object	O	differently	from	her. To	recapitulate,	the	supporter	of	the	phenomenal	concepts	strategy	can	maintain	that	we	are	in	the	position	to	separately	conceive	that	(P	without	Q),	in virtue	of	instantiating	C,	and	access	a priori	that	(P	entails	C),	thanks	to	the EMP. However,	the	conjunction	(P	and	C	without	Q)	cannot	be	conceived	by using	these	modes	of	presentation.	Thus,	if	it	is	conceded	that	the	phenomenal concept	strategy	blocks	the	conceivability	arguments	based	on	zombies,	the supporters	of	this	strategy	should	then	embrace	safely	the	premise	of	the	second	horn	of	Chalmers's	dilemma. 6. Conclusion I	have	argued	that	Chalmers's	dilemma	cannot	advance	the	debate	with	the	a posteriori	physicalists.	If	they	meet	the	challenge	created	by	the	conceivability	of	zombies	to	the	project	of	accommodating	qualia	in	the	physical	world, they should also	be able to accommodate	phenomenal concepts.	However, clearly,	two	central	issues	are	left	open. First,	I	have	not	proved	that the	a posteriori	physicalist	can	meet the	challenge	posed	by	the	conceivability	arguments.	Secondly,	my	reply	to	the	quite abstract	challenge	advanced	by	Chalmers	to	any	version	of	the	phenomenal concept	strategy	trades	on	the,	almost	empty,	idea	that	by	possessing	a	phenomenal	concept	a	physical	property	is	"given	to	a	subject	in	a	certain	way". This	is	the	way	that	constitutes	the	ground	for	intuitions	that	generate	certain assumptions for several	dualist arguments,	but that cannot	provide support for	their	conclusions.	However,	it	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	a posteriori physicalist	can	spell	out	this	idea	satisfactorily. References Alter,	T.	and	S.	Walter	(eds.).	2007.	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In Search of a Fundamental Theory.	New	York and	London:	Oxford	University	Press. Chalmers,	D.	2007.	"Phenomenal	Concepts	and	the	Explanatory	Gap".	In	T.	Alter	and	S. Walter,	(eds.).	Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	167–194. Dennett,	D.	2007.	"What	RoboMary	Knows".	In	T.	Alter	and	S.	Walter.	Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	15–31. Díaz-León,	E.	2010.	"Can	Phenomenal	Concepts	Explain	The	Epistemic	Gap?".	Mind	119, 476:	933–951. Hill,	C.	and	B.	McLaughlin	1999.	"There	are	Fewer	Things	in	Reality	than	Are	Dreamt	of in	Chalmers's	Philosophy".	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59:	445–454. Hill,	C.	S.	1997.	"Imaginability,	Conceivability,	Possibility,	and	the	Mind-Body	Problem". Philosophical Studies 87:	61–85. Ismael,	J.	1999.	"Science	and	the	Phenomenal".	Philosophy of Science 66,	3:	351–369. Jackson,	F.	1982.	"Epiphenomenal	Qualia".	Philosophical Quarterly 32:	127–136. Jackson,	F.	1986.	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Malatesti, Thinking about Phenomenal Concepts402 Luca Malatesti Misliti o fenomenalnim pojmovima Sažetak Argument	znanja	Francka Jacksona i razni argumenti zamislivosti, koje zagovaraju Saul Kripke, David Chalmers i Joseph Levine, zaključuju da svijest uključuje ne-fizikalna svojstva ili svojstva koje se ne mogu redukcionistički objasniti fizikalnim terminima. Neki fizikalisti su pružili odgovor na ove prigovore pomoću raznih verzija strategije	fenomenalnih	pojmova. David Chalmers je odgovorio s glavnim	argumentom, zaključivanjem koje bi, ako je uspješno, potkopalo bilo koju razložnu verziju strategije fenomenalnih pojmova. U ovom radu tvrdim da glavni argument ne pridonosi raspravi između zagovaratelja anti-fizikalističkih argumenata i zastupnika strategije fenomenalnih pojmova. Ključne	riječi svijest,	qualia,	zombiji,	a	posteriori	fizikalizam,	strategija	fenomenalnih	pojmova,	glavni	argument Davida	Chalmersa Luca Malatesti Denken über phänomenale Begriffe Zusammenfassung Frank Jacksons Wissensargument sowie diverse Argumente der Vorstellbarkeit – vorgebracht seitens Saul Kripke, David Chalmers und Joseph Levine – schlussfolgern, das Bewusstsein schliesse nichtphysikalische Wesenszüge ein bzw. jene, die sich reduktionistisch vermöge der physikalischen Termini nicht erklären lassen. Die einen und die anderen Physikalisten respondierten auf diese Einwendungen unter Zuhilfenahme von verschiedenartigen Versionen der Strategie	der	phänomenalen	Begriffe. David Chalmers antwortete mit dem Hauptargument, einer Begründung, die, falls erfolgreich, eine jede vernünftige Version der Strategie der phänomenalen Begriffe untergraben würde. In diesem Paper erachte ich, das Hauptargument fördere keine Debatte zwischen den Anhängern der antiphysikalistischen Argumente und denjenigen der Strategie der phänomenalen Begriffe. Schlüsselwörter Bewusstsein, Qualia, Zombies,	A-posteriori-Physikalismus, Strategie der phänomenalen Begriffe, David	Chalmers'	Hauptargument Luca Malatesti Réfléchir sur les concepts phénoménaux Résumé L'argument	de	la	connaissance de Frank Jackson ainsi que les différents arguments de la concevabilité, avancés par Saul Kripke, David Chalmers et Joseph Levine, concluent que la conscience implique des propriétés non-physiques ou des propriétés ne pouvant être expliquées en termes physiques. Certains physicalistes ont répondu à ces objections au moyen de différentes versions de la stratégie	des	concepts	phénoménaux. David Chalmers a répliqué par le maître argument, un raisonnement qui, en cas de réussite, saperait toute version raisonnable de la stratégie des concepts phénoménaux. Dans cet article, j'affirme que le maître argument n'avance pas le débat entre les partisans des arguments anti-physicalistes et ceux de la stratégie des concepts phénoménaux. Mots-clés Conscience,	qualia,	zombies,	physicalisme	a	posteriori,	stratégie	des	concepts	phénoménaux,	maître argument	de	David	Chalmers