EPISTEMIC	CONTRASTIVISM (penultimate	version	of	an	entry	for	the	Routledge	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	2017) Peter	Baumann Contrastivism	about	knowledge	is	the	view	that	one	does	not	just	know	some proposition.	It	is	more	adequate	to	say	that	one	knows	something	rather	than something	else:	I	know	that	I	am	looking	at	a	tree	rather	than	a	bush	but	I	do not	know	that	I	am	looking	at	a	tree	rather	than	a	cleverly	done	tree	imitation. Knowledge	is	a	three-place	relation	between	a	subject,	a	proposition	and	a contrast	set	of	propositions.	There	are	several	advantages	of	a	contrastivist view	but	also	certain	problems	with	it. 1. Contrastivism 2. Pro	Contrastivism 3. Contra	Contrastivism 1. Contrastivism According	to	an	orthodox	view,	knowledge	is	a	binary	relation	between	a	subject	and a	proposition.	Contrastivism	about	knowledge	(or	"contrastivism")	is	the	view	that 2 knowledge	is	rather	a	ternary	relation	between	a	subject,	a	(true)	target	proposition and	a	(false)	contrast	proposition	(or	a	set	of	contrast	propositions)	which	is incompatible	(but	cf.	Rourke	2013,	sec.2)	with	the	target	proposition.	The	form	of	a knowledge-attributing	sentence	is	"S	knows	that	p,	rather	than	q"	rather	than	"S knows	that	p"	(see	Sinnott-Armstrong	2004	and	2008,	Schaffer	2004a,	2005,	2007a, 2007b,	2008,	Karjalainen	and	Morton	2003,	Morton	2013;	see	also	Morton	2011	and Schaffer	2012a).	To	say,	for	instance,	that	Jean	knows	that	there	is	a	dog	in	front	of her,	is	elliptical	and	short	for	the	claim	that	Jean	knows	that	there	is	a	dog	in	front	of her	rather	than,	say,	a	cat.	This	is	compatible	with	Jean	not	knowing	that	there	is	a dog	in	front	of	her	rather	than	a	wolf. Contrastivism	shares	certain	similiarities	with	relevant	alternative	views according	to	which	knowledge	does	not	require	that	the	subject	can	rule	out	all alternative	possibilities	but	only	the	"relevant"	ones.	Relevant	alternatives	views, however,	typically	stick	with	a	binary	analysis	of	knowledge	(see,	e.g.,	Dretske	1970). Some	contrastivists	embrace	contextualism,	the	view	that	the	meaning	of	a knowledge	sentence	varies	with	the	context	of	the	speaker;	they	claim	that	the	set	of contrast	propositions	is	determined	by	the	speaker's	context	(see,	e.g.,	Schaffer	2005; for	a	non-contextualist	contrastivism	see	Sinnott-Armstrong	2002,	2004). Before	epistemologists	developed	contrastivist	accounts	of	knowledge	(and	other epistemic	relations)	philosophers	of	science	proposed	contrastivist	accounts	of explanation	or	causation	(see,	e.g.,	Hitchcock	and	Schaffer	in	Blaauw	2013b). Recently,	some	authors	have	developed	contrastivist	accounts	of	practical	reasons 3 and	of	related	notions	(see	Snedegar	2013	and	Sinnott-Armstrong	1996,	2006;	see also	Sinnott-Armstrong,	Driver	and	Snedegar	in	Blaauw	2013b).	There	are	also contrastivist	views	about	justification	or	confirmation	(see	Fitelson	in	Blaauw	2013b and	Sinnott-Armstrong	2002,	2004,	2006,	ch.5)	or	about	belief	(see	Blaauw	2013a and	Baumann	2008,	appendix). 2. Pro	Contrastivism Contrastivists	take	some	encouragement	for	their	views	from	data	about	ordinary usage	of	terms	like	"knowledge"	(see,	e.g.,	Schaffer	2008	or	2005,	sec.3).	However, recent	experimental	data	have	not	led	to	much	agreement	here	(see	Schaffer	and Knobe	2012	but	also	Pinillos	2011,	DeRose	2011,	Gerken	and	Beebe	2016). Other	kinds	of	arguments	seem	to	carry	more	weight.	Jonathan	Schaffer	has presented	a	couple	of	linguistic	arguments	(see	Schaffer	2004a,	77-79,	2005,	sec.3). First,	even	though	knowledge	ascriptions	often	have	an	explicitly	binary	form	there	is reason	to	assume	that	there	is	a	hidden	variable	for	contrasts	because	there	are	also explicitly	ternary	forms	of	knowledge	ascriptions.	Second,	there	are	phenomena	of binding	by	quantifiers	which	suggest	a	hidden	variable	for	contrasts	("On	every	test, Jones	knows	that	the	substance	is	A"	is	analyzed	along	the	lines	of	"For	every	test	and for	every	alternative	substance	in	the	test,	Jones	knows	that	the	tested	substance	is	A rather	than	the	alternative").	Third,	contrast	preservation	under	ellipsis	also	suggests a	hidden	contrast	variable:	If,	e.g.,	Holmes	knows	that	Mary	stole	the	bicycle	rather 4 than	the	wagon,	then	"Holmes	knows	that	Mary	stole	the	bike,	and	Watson	does	too" preserves	the	contrast	in	the	case	of	Watson.	Fourth,	focus	differences	suggest	hidden variables	for	contrasts:	"Mary	STOLE	the	bike"	suggests	a	contrast	with	borrowing etc.	while	"Mary	stole	the	BIKE"	suggests	a	contrast	with	wagon	etc.	Fifth,	the assumption	of	hidden	contrast	variables	can	explain	surface	paradoxes	(see	also Schaffer	2004a,	81).	Suppose	that	Jill	can	distinguish	between	dogs	and	cats	but	not between	dogs	and	wolfs.	Facing	a	dog,	one	wants	to	say	both	that	she	knows	that there	is	a	dog	(rather	than	a	cat)	and	that	she	does	not	know	that	there	is	a	dog (rather	than	a	wolf).	For	a	detailed	critique	of	all	these	arguments	by	Schaffer	see Rickless	2014. A	further,	semantic	argument	concerns	the	relation	between	knowledge	and questions	(see	Schaffer	2005,	sec.1-3,	2007a,	2007b	and	Sawyer	2014,	sec.2): Knowing	some	proposition	is	knowing	the	(correct)	answer	to	a	(contextually	salient) particular	question.	Since	"all	well-formed	questions	are	multiple-choice	questions" (Schaffer	2007a,	240),	the	known	answer	to	a	question	is	contrastive	in	nature,	and thus	also	the	knowledge	of	the	corresponding	proposition.	One	might	wonder whether	"knowing	is	knowing	the	answer"	(Schaffer	2007b,	383).	Even	if	knowing only	requires	knowing	the	answer	(still	a	controversial	claim)	it	is	not	obvious	that knowledge	inherits	contrastivity	from	the	latter	or	from	the	contrastive	nature	of	the question.	Apart	from	that,	not	everyone	does	agree	that	all	questions	are	multiplechoice	questions. 5 Adam	Morton	has	argued	that	since	tracking	of	objects	is	contrastive	(I	can	see	that you	went	into	the	kitchen	rather	than	the	bathroom	but	I	cannot	see	which	part	of	the kitchen),	the	corresponding	knowledge	is	contrastive,	too	(see	Morton	2013,	sec.1-2). Similarly,	since	evidence	is	contrastive	(I	have	evidence	that	I	am	talking	to	Chuck rather	than	Jill	but	not	that	I	am	talking	to	Chuck	rather	than	his	twin	brother),	the corresponding	knowledge	is	contrastive,	too	(see	Morton	2013,	sec.3).	However, since	characteristics	of	a	necessary	condition	of	some	X	need	not	be	characteristics	of X,	too,	it	would	be	interesting	to	see	more	detailed	arguments	here	(see	also	Sawyer 2014,	sec.2	here	with	respect	to	perceptual	knowledge). Contrastivism	also	offers	solutions	to	major	epistemological	problems	like	the following	skeptical	puzzle	(containing	plausible	premises	and	an	implausible conclusion):	Jay	does	not	know	that	he	has	not	been	deceived	by	some	Cartesian demon	into	falsely	believing	that	he	has	hands;	if	he	does	not	know	the	latter,	then	he does	not	know	that	he	has	hands;	hence,	Jay	does	not	know	that	he	has	hands	(see,	for many,	DeRose	1995,	1).	This	easily	generalizes	with	respect	to	subjects,	propositions and	sceptical	scenarios.	The	conditional	premise	is	usually	supported	by	some principle	of	epistemic	closure	under	known	entailment	(schematically	and	roughly:	If S	knows	that	p,	and	if	S	also	knows	that	p	entails	q,	then	S	knows	that	q).	Given knowledge	of	the	relevant	conditional	(If	I	have	hands,	then	I	have	not	been	deceived by	some	Cartesian	demon	into	falsely	believing	that	I	have	hands),	the	second, conditional	premise	of	the	skeptical	argument	follows. 6 The	contrastivist	has	an	elegant	solution	for	this	skeptical	paradox	(see	Schaffer 2004,	80,	2004b,	2005,	sec.5).	If	one	makes	the	relevant	contrasts	explicit,	then	the premises	and	the	alleged	conclusion	have	to	be	reformulated.	It	turns	out	then	that Jay	does	not	know	that	he	has	hands	rather	than	being	deceived	by	some	Cartesian demon	into	falsely	believing	that	he	has	hands;	however,	it	also	turns	out	that	Jay knows	that	he	has	hands	rather	than,	say,	stumps.	No	sceptical	argument	goes through	and	the	paradox	is	resolved.	By	limiting	the	scope	of	both	common	sense	and scepticism,	the	contrastivist	can	make	the	two	views	compatible	with	each	other: Subjects	do	know	ordinary	propositions	like	I	have	hands	but	cannot	know	that	they are	not	in	a	sceptical	scenario.	The	contrastivist	can	do	this	while	holding	on	to	a principle	of	closure	(for	a	contrastivist	closure	principle	see	especially	Schaffer 2007a). The	contrastivist	response	to	scepticism	is	in	some	ways	very	similar	to contextualist	responses	and	is	as	controversial	as	the	latter	(see	the	exchange between	Luper	2012	and	Blaauw	2012).	Does	common	sense	not	contain	stronger claims	("I	just	know	that	I	have	hands,	period!")	than	the	weaker	contrastive	ones ("Sure,	I	know	that	I	have	hands	rather	than	wings!")?	And	is	not	the	point	of scepticism	its	damaging	effect	on	ordinary	knowledge	claims	rather	than	just	the denial	that	one	can	know	that	one	is	not	in	some	extravagant	sceptical	scenario? Finally,	it	has	been	argued	that	contrastivism	can	capture	and	describe	the	stage and	progress	of	inquiry:	It	can	explain	in	detail	what	is	known	and	what	is	not	(yet) known	–	which	(multiple-choice)	questions	can	be	answered	at	a	certain	stage	and 7 which	not	(see	Schaffer	2004a,	81,	2005,	237).	Contrastivism	thus	describes	the epistemic	abilities	and	accomplishments	of	subjects	in	more	detail	than	binary accounts. 3. Contra	Contrastivism There	are	alternatives	to	contrastivist	explanations	of	the	way	people	talk	about knowledge.	Some	people	argue	that	the	relevant	contrasts	concern	knowledge's content,	correctly	characterizable	as	adjunctive	("p	rather	than	q";	see	Blaauw	2008, sec.2),	as	conjunctive	("p	and	not	q";	see	Jespersen	2008	and	also	Kallestrup	2009, sec.1),	or	as	conditional	("if	p	or	q,	then	p";	see	van	Woudenberg	2008,	283,	passim; see	against	this	kind	of	strategy	Schaffer	2008). A	more	serious	threat	to	contrastivism	is,	perhaps,	the	objection	that	the contrastivist	leaves	something	important	out	when	they	ascribe	knowledge	that	p, rather	than	q:	The	subject	might	typically	work	with	the	assumption	that	either	p	or	q is	true	(see	Becker	2009,	253-254).	If	the	corresponding	(multiple-choice)	question ("p	or	q?")	provides	information	and	testimonial	knowledge	to	the	subject	that	one	of the	two	is	true	(see	Montminy	2008,	130-131),	then	there	is	still	a	good	case	for	a binary	knowledge	attribution	(the	subject	knows	that	p	by	disjunctive	syllogism). Schaffer	has	replied	that	the	subject	need	not	be	aware	of	the	question	and	also	does not	need	to	trust	the	would-be	informants	(see	Schaffer	2005,	250,	fn.20;	see	also Steglich-Petersen	2015	on	the	role	of	presuppositions). 8 A	further	objection	says	that	contrastivism	makes	knowledge	"too	easy"	in	many cases.	Somebody	who	has	next	to	no	clue	about	Mongolia	could	still	know	that	Ulan Bator	rather	than	Vatican	City	is	the	capital	of	Mongolia	(see	Montminy	2008,	130132).	Intuitions	diverge	on	this:	Some	(see,	e.g.,	Schaffer	2005,	257)	hold	that	this	is not	so	implausible.	As	long	as	one	does	not	deny	the	difficulty	of	knowing	some things,	it	might	be	fine	to	accept	the	easiness	of	knowing	some	other	things. A	related	objection	(see	Becker	2009,	255-256)	says	that	the	contrastivist	analysis is	vulnerable	to	a	problem	of	"lucky	questions".	For	instance,	someone	who	finds themselves	unwittingly	in	fake	barn	county	but	happens	to	look	at	one	of	the	few veritable	barns	might	thus	count	as	knowing	that	there	is	a	barn	rather	than	a farmhouse	in	front	of	them.	However,	the	belief	that	there	is	a	barn	is	true	only	by luck	and	thus	cannot	qualify	as	knowledge.	This	constitutes	another	way	in	which knowledge	might	come	"too	easily",	given	contrastivism.	The	contrastivist	could	reply that	while	the	subject	does	not	know	that	there	is	a	barn	rather	than	a	fake	barn	in front	of	them,	they	still	know	that	it	is	a	barn	rather	than	a	farmhouse.	Apart	from that,	the	contrastivist	could	embrace	the	view	that	knowledge	is	compatible	with	this kind	of	luck.	A	contrastivist	account	of	belief	might	offer	additional	resources	to escape	this	objection:	The	belief	that	that's	a	barn	rather	than	a	farmhouse	might	not qualify	as	lucky. Even	if	contrastivism	is	somewhat	plausible	one	might	wonder	whether	all knowledge	is	contrastive.	What	for	instance	is	the	contrast	proposition	for	knowledge that	2+2=4?	2+2=4	rather	than	what?	There	does	not	seem	to	be	a	plausible	answer 9 to	this	question.	Similar	things	can	be	said	about	basic	logical	knowledge	(I	know	that everything	is	self-identical	rather	than	what?)	or	semantic	knowledge	(I	know	that vixen	are	female	foxes	rather	than	what?).	It	does	not	help	to	say	that	in	such	cases the	contrast	proposition	is	simply	the	negation	of	the	target	proposition;	this	would trivialize	contrastivism	and	make	it	collapse	into	a	binary	view	(see	Morton	and Karjalainen	2008,	272	but	also	cf.	Buenting	2010).	So,	contrastivism	might	only	have some	plausibility	for	certain	kinds	of	knowledge,	like	knowledge	based	on discriminatory	cognitive	abilities	(e.g.,	perceptual	ones),	but	not	for	others	(see Becker	2007,	83,	Baumann	2008,	sec.1,	and	Luper	2012,	56;	on	the	role	of discrimination	here	see	Schaffer	2004b,	Morton	and	Karjalainen	2008,	and	Sawyer 2014,	sec.2). Finally	(echoing	certain	objections	against	contextualism),	one	could	point	out	that normally	subjects	are	blind	to	the	contrastivity	of	knowledge	attributions.	Does	the contrastivist	then	have	to	offer	a	convincing	error	theory	which	explains	the systematicity	of	the	mistake?	It	might	be	an	open	empirical	question	whether	people are	or	are	not	aware	of	contrastive	effects.	Apart	from	that,	one	might	also	simply accept	and	even	defend	the	claim	of	semantic	blindness	(see	Schaffer	and	Szabó	2014, 533-535). But,	one	might	follow	up,	how	is	thought	and	communication	about	knowledge possible	when	speakers	and	hearers	are	blind	to	the	existence	of	a	third	relatum?	Are they	then	even	talking	or	thinking	about	it	at	all	(in	the	full	sense)?	On	the	other	hand, how	is	thought	about	knowledge	possible	when	they	are	not	blind	to	the	contrasts: 10 Would	not	normal	subjects	be	overloaded	by	the	additional	complexity?	And	how then	is	communication	possible	if	(as	perhaps	usual)	the	contrasts	the	speaker	has	in mind	are	not	made	explicit	to	the	hearer	(and	vc.	vs.)?	Can	one	simply	rely	on	the	idea that	normally	speakers	and	hearers	share	the	same	context	and	thus	the	same	set	of contrast	propositions?	At	least	some	of	these	open	questions	can	only	be	answered	on an	empirical	basis. See	also:	CONTEXTUALISM,	EPISTEMOLOGICAL;	EPISTEMIC	RELATIVISM;	KNOWLEDGE,	CONCEPT	OF; RELEVANT	ALTERNATIVES;	SCEPTICISM;	SUBJECT-SENSITIVE	INVARIANTISM References	and	further	reading Baumann, P. (2008) 'Contrastivism Rather than Something Else? On the Limits of Epistemic	Contrastivism',	Erkenntnis	69:	189-200. (Critique	of contrastivism, including the	claim	that	contrastivism	does	not	apply to	all kinds	of	knowledge;	includes	an	appendix	on	contrastivism	about	belief) ------ (2012) 'PS: Response to Schaffer's Reply', S. Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge,	Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	425-431. (Response	to	a	reply	by	Schaffer	to	the	author's	criticism) Becker,	K.	(2007)	Epistemology	Modalized,	New	York	&	London:	Routledge. 11 (Important	monograph	on	modal	epistemology	and	reliabilism;	includes	a	brief	passage on	contrastivism	(80-86)) ------	(2009)	'Contrastivism	and	Lucky	Questions',	Philosophia	37:	245-260. (Presents	the	Lucky	Questions	objection) Blaauw,	M.	(2008)	'Contra	Contrastivism',	Philosophical	Issues	18:	2-34. (Criticizes	Schaffer's	rejection	of	the	adjunction	strategy	in	Schaffer	2008) ------ (2012) 'Defending Contrastivism', International Journal for the Study of Skepticism	2:	59-64. (Replies	to	Luper's	critique	of	contrastivist	responses	to	scepticism) ------ (2013a) 'Contrastive	Belief',	M.	Blaauw (ed.),	Contrastivism	in	Philosophy,	New York:	Routledge,	88-100. (Perhaps	the	most	detailed	attempt	to	apply	contrastivism	to	beliefs) ------	(ed.)	(2013b)	Contrastivism	in	Philosophy,	New	York:	Routledge. (Representative	anthology	on	contrastivism	in	different	areas	of	philosophy) Buenting,	J.	(2010)	'An	Epistemic	Reduction	of	Contrastive	Knowledge	Claims',	Social Epistemology	24:	99-104. (Proposes	to	analyze	the	contrast	proposition	as	the	negation	of	the	target	proposition and	argues	that	a	binary	account	results	from	this) DeRose,	K.	(1995)	'Solving	the	Skeptical	Problem',	Philosophical	Review	104:	1-52. (Important	discussion	of	recent	Cartesian	skepticism;	develops	a	contextualist	response) ------ (2011) 'Contextualism,	Contrastivism,	and	X-Phi	Surveys',	Philosophical	Studies 156:	81-110. 12 (Discussion of experimental work relating to contrastivism and contextualism; also comments	on	Schaffer	and	Knobe	2012) Dretske,	F.	(1970)	'Epistemic	Operators',	Journal	of	Philosophy	67:	1007-1022. (Classic	paper	on	closure	as	well	as	on	relevant	alternatives) ------	(1972)	'Contrastive	Statements',	Philosophical	Review	81:	411-437. (On	contrasts;	in	many	ways	a	precursor	of	some	aspects	of	contrastivism) Gerken,	M.	and	Beebe,	J.R.	(2016) 'Knowledge	in	and	out	of	Contrast',	Noûs	50:	133164. (Critical	discussion	of	experimental	work	relating	to	contrastivism) Hughes, M. (2013) 'Problems for Contrastive Closure: Resolved and Regained', Philosophical	Studies	163:	577-590. (Defends	principles	of	contrastivist	closure) Jespersen,	B.	(2008)	'Knowing	that	p	rather	than	q',	Sorites	20:	125-134. (Discusses	the	conjunctive	analysis	of	contrastive	knowledge	attributions) Johnson, B.C. (2001) 'Contextualist Swords, Skeptical Plowshares', Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research	62:	385-406. (Contains	some	remarks	on	the	contrastivist	nature	of	relevant	alternative	accounts	of knowledge) Kallestrup, J. (2009) 'Knowledge-wh and the Problem of Convergent Knowledge', Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research	78:	468-476. (Discusses interrogative knowledge-wh ascriptions and the problem of "convergent knowledge"; also discusses conjunctive strategies of analyzing contrastive knowledge attributions) 13 Karjalainen, A. and Morton, A. (2003) 'Contrastive Knowledge', Philosophical Explorations	6(2):	74-89. (Early	proposal	of	contrastivism	by	two	of	its	major	defenders) Kelp, C. (2011) 'A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge', Philosophical Studies	152:	287-292. (Criticizes	Schaffer's	contrastivist	closure	principle) Kvanvig, J. (2007) 'Contexualism,	Contrastivism,	Relevant	Alternatives',	and	Closure, Philosophical	Studies	134:	131-140. (Contains	a	discussion	of	contrastivist	closure) Luper,	S.	(2012)	'Contrastivism	and	Skepticism',	International	Journal	for	the	Study	of Skepticism	2:	51-58. (Critique	of	contrastivist	repsonses	to	scepticism) Montminy,	M. (2008) 'Cheap	Knowledge and	Easy	Questions',	Grazer	Philosophische Studien	77:	127-146. (Critique	of	contrastivism;	includes	the	objection	that	it	makes	knowledge	"too	easy") Morton,	A.	(2011)	'Contrastivism',	S.	Bernecker	and	D.	Pritchard	(eds.),	The	Routledge Companion	to	Epistemology,	London	etc.:	Routledge,	513-522. (Exposition	and	defense	of	contrastivism) ------ (2013) 'Contrastive Knowledge', M. Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy, New	York:	Routledge,	101-115. (Exposition and defense of contrastivism; includes a discussion of the contrastivity of tracking	and	of	evidence) 14 Morton, A. and	Karjalainen, A. (2008) 'Contrastivity and Indistinguishability',	Social Epistemology	22:	271-280. (Discussion of different kinds of contrastive expressions and of closure; defense of a restricted	contrastivism	about	beliefs	on	pp.278-279) Pinillos, N.Á. (2011) 'Some	Recent	Work in Experimental Epistemology',	Philosophy Compass	6:	675-688. (On	relevant	experimental	work;	also	on	Schaffer	and	Knobe	2012) Rickless,	S.C.	(2014)	'The	Contrast-Insensitivity	of	Knowledge	Ascriptions',	Philosophy and	Phenomenological	Research	88:	533-555. (Detailed	critique	of	Schaffer's	linguistic	arguments	for	contrastivism) Sawyer,	S.	(2014)	'Contrastive	Self-Knowledge',	Social	Epistemology	28:	139-152. (Defends	contrastivism	about self-knowledge	and	about	perceptual	knowledge;	argues for	contrastivism	about	belief	in	sec.3) Schaffer,	J.	(2004a)	'From	Contextualism	to	Contrastivism',	Philosophical	Studies	119: 73-103. (An	early	defense	of	contrastivism	by	one	of	the	most	important	contrastivists;	contains linguistic	arguments	for	contrastivism) ------ (2004b) 'Skepticism, Contextualism, and Discrimination', Philosophy and Phenomenological	Research	69:	138-155. (Discusses	contrastivism	with	respect	to	scepticism	as	well	as	discriminatory	abilities) ------ (2005) 'Contrastive Knowledge', T.S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne (eds.),	Oxford Studies	in	Epistemology,	vol.1,	235-271. 15 (Exposition	and	defense	of	contrastivism;	contains	a	discussion	of	question-relativity	as well	as	scepticism	and	closure;	discusses	contrastivism	about	belief	in	sec.4) ------	(2007a)	'Closure,	Contrast,	and	Answer',	Philosophical	Studies	133:	233-255. (The	most	detailed	proposal	of	a	principle	of	contrastivist	closure) ------ (2007b) 'Knowing the	Answer',	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological	Research 75: 383-403. (On interrogative knowledge-wh ascriptions and the problem of "convergent knowledge;	defends	the	claim	of	the	question-relativity	of	knowledge) ------ (2008)	'The	Contrast-Sensitivity	of	Knowledge	Ascriptions',	Social	Epistemology 22:	235-245. (Defends contrastivism and criticizes the conjunction, conditional and adjunction strategy) ------ (2012a) 'What Is	Contrastivism?', S.	Tolksdorf (ed.),	Conceptions	of	Knowledge, Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	353-356. (Brief	exposition	and	defense	of	contrastivism) ------ (2012b) 'Contrastive Knowledge: Reply to Baumann', S. Tolksdorf (ed.), Conceptions	of	Knowledge,	Berlin:	de	Gruyter,	411-424. (Reply	to	Baumann's	critique	of	contrastivism) Schaffer,	J.	and	Knobe,	J.	(2012)	'Contrastivism	Surveyed',	Noûs	46:	675-708. (Discusses	contrastivism	and	its	alternatives	with	respect	to	experimental	data) Schaffer, J. and Szabó, Z.G. (2014) 'Epistemic Comparativism: A Contextualist Semantics	for	Knowledge	Ascriptions',	Philosophical	Studies	168:	491-543. (Proposes	a	semantics	of	knowledge	attributions) 16 Sinnott-Armstrong, W. (1996) 'Moral Skepticism and Justification', W. SinnottArmstrong	and	M.	Timmons (eds.),	Moral	Knowledge?	New	Readings	in	Moral Epistemology,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	3-48. (One	of	the	earliest	defenses	of	contrastivism,	especially	moral	contrastivism,	by	one	of the	most	important	contrastivists) ------ (2002)	'What's	in	a	Contrast	Class?',	Analysis	62:	75-84. (One	of	the	first	expositions	and	defenses	of	contrastivism	about	justification) ------ (2004) 'Classy	Pyrrhonism',	W. Sinnott-Arnstrong (ed.),	Pyrrhonian	Skepticism, Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	188-207. (Defends	contrastivism	about	justification	while	accepting	scepticism	about	the	relevant contrast	class) ------ (2006)	Moral	Skepticisms,	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. (Important monograph on moral epistemology defending moral contrastivism and contrastivism about justification in detail; accepts scepticism about the relevant contrast	class) ------	(2008)	'A	Contrastivist	Manifesto',	Social	Epistemology	22:	257-270. (Defends	the	author's	own	version	of	epistemic	contrastivism) Snedegar, J. (2013) 'Reason	Claims and	Contrastivism	about	Reasons',	Philosophical Studies	166:	231-242. (Defends	contrastivism	about	practical	reasons) Steglich-Petersen,	A.	(2015)	'Knowing	the	Answer	to	a	Loaded	Question',	Theoria	81: 97-125. (Criticizes	Schaffer	for	neglecting	the	role	of	presuppositions	in	knowledge	attributions) 17 Swinburne,	R.	(2001)	Epistemic	Justification,	Oxford:	Clarendon. (Mainly on epistemic justification but contains a brief remark (34) suggesting contrastivism) van Woudenberg, R. (2008) 'The Knowledge Relation: Binary or Ternary?', Social Epistemology	22:	281-288. (Argues	for	a	binary	account	and	for	the	conditional	strategy) PETER	BAUMANN