The	Rationality	of	Perception	*	Susanna	Siegel	Eastern	Division	APA	2018. Two	epistemic	problems,	one	at	each	interface ! between	individual	and	cultural	milieu	(Whit): Can	the	epistemic	status	of	a	culturally	entrenched	presumption	be transmitted	to	an	individual	who	unreflectively	absorbs	it? ! within	an	individual's	mind,	between	perceptual	experience	and	beliefs,	etc: Can	the	epistemic	status	of	an	individual's	prior	outlook	be transmitted	to	a	perceptual	experience,	when	the	outlook	shapes	the experience? RP	argues	that	such	transmission	is	possible.	The	epistemic	basing	relation	operates in	places	where	it	hasn't	much	been	studied. The	intra-personal	problem The	interface	where	it	occurs	is	the	location	of	a	large	varied	family	of	phenomena. "Cognitive	penetration"	is	used	to	cover	influences	on	perception,	where • perception	can	include:	early	vision,	perceptual	judgment,	perceptual experience,	introspective	beliefs	about	these	things. • influencers	can	include:	belief,	skill,	expertise,	fear,	desire,	preferences. • mechanisms	of	influence	include	or	exclude:	feature-based	attention imagery. 1.	How	psychologically	realistic? Nagel:	The	intra-personal	problem	only	arises	for	experiences	that	are	influenced	in a	psychologically	unrealistic	way. Firestone	and	Scholl	(2016)	cast	doubt	on	cognitive	penetration	of experience,	by	giving	us	reason	to	expect	current	and	future	putative experimental	evidence	for	it	to	face	"a	small	number	of	experimental	pitfalls". Reply: F&S	do	not	undermine	reasons	to	think	that	a	range	of	cognitive	factors	can influence	perceptual	experience	in	ways	that	could	lead	to	cases	like	mine. ! As	they	define	it,	cognitive	penetration	is	supposed	to	happen	only	if	the	mind has	no	fundamental	division	into	between	perception	and	cognition.	But	the hypothesis	that	perceptual	experience	can	be	hijacked	doesn't	entail	anything about	the	architecture	of	the	mind.	So	even	if	they	showed	that	there's	no cognitive	penetration	of	the	sort	that	threatens	the	idea	of	perceptual	modules, that	wouldn't	be	evidence	against	effects	on	perceptual	experience. ! F&S	themselves	grant	the	existence	of	some	cognitive	effects	on	perceptual experience	where	attention	alters	perceptual	processing,	such	as	the	cocktail party	effect. So	although	they	claim	to	undermine	the	idea	that	perceptual experience	can	be	cognitively	penetrated,	they	allow	some	cognitive	influences on	experience. 2 ! The	supposed	"experimental	pitfalls"	include	possibilities	we	knew	a	priori	could be	alternatives	to	effects	on	perception	(or	experience),	such	as	false introspective	belief,	just	post-perceptual	belief,	and	effects	of	attention	at	the onset	of	perceiving	(eg,	turning	your	head,	opening	your	eyes). Some	evidence	for	cognitive	effects	on	perceptual	experience ! Attention	influences	perceptual	processing	As	many	critics	have	pointed	out (Block,	Carrasco,	Lupyan,	Mole,	Wu,	Clark),	there	are	many	ways	for	attention can	alter	perceptual	processing,	even	when	it	is	driven	by	cognition	and	skill, and	these	alterations	affect	perceptual	experience. o Which	features	you	attend	to	(e.g.,	faces,	red	things,	motion)	is	driven by	both	cognition	and	skill	(e.g.	musical	and	athletic	skill	radically alter	what	you	see	and	hear,	even	after	perception	begins). ! Memory	color:	Grey	bananas	look	more	yellow	that	grey	non-bananas.	Even intra-perceptual	processes	can	be	epistemically	appraised	as	rational	or irrational	(Z.	Jenkin:	experiences	are	based	on	reasons	when	they	result	from memory	color,	core	cognition,	and	some	cross-modal	interactions.) ! Imagery	can	be	contribute	to	perceptual	experience	Macpherson's	(2011) mechanism	of	memory	color,	hearing	a	story	about	motion	can	cause	motion aftereffects. Given	these	kinds	of	effects	on	perceptual	experience,	we	shouldn't	take	my	cases	to be	psychologically	unrealistic	on	the	grounds	that	in	general,	perceptual	experiences unfold	without	any	influence	from	prior	outlooks. We	should	not	wait	for	psychology	to	tell	us	whether	cases	like	mine	happen	before we	explore	their	epistemic	implications. 2.	Hijacking Jill	fears	that	Jack	is	angry	and	suspects	he	is.	When	she	sees	him,	he	looks	angry	to her,	due	to	hear	fearful	suspicion. Q:	Does	Jill's	visual	experience	of	Jack	as	angry	give	her	just	as	much	reason	to believe	her	eyes	as	she	could	have	if	her	experience	weren't	influenced	by	her fearful	suspicion	that	Jack	is	angry? Yes.	Pautz.	Phenomenal	conservatism,	access	internalists. What	else	should	Jill	believe? No.	Nagel.	Markie,	McGrath	(internalists),	reliabilists	(Lyons,	Ghijsen) Similarity	to	wishful/fearful	thinking,	confirmation	bias Both	Yes	and	No.	Distinctions	needed.	Railton:	rational	but	unreasonable I	call	experiences	that	give	rise	to	this	problem	'hijacked	experiences',	to	capture	the idea	that	prior	outlooks	(which	sometimes	can	steer	perception	perfectly	well)	have more	weight	in	determining	which	experience	you'll	have	than	properly	perceptual inputs	(such	as	Jack's	face). 3 Railton	finds	the	image	misleading,	as	it	suggests	to	him	a	type	of	force	that's both	unusual	and	outside	the	mind.	–Reply:	Inside	the	steering-system,	and steering	has	gone	awry.	But	maybe	a	metaphor	that	does	justice	to	the weights	would	be	better. 3.	Is	No	more	plausible	than	Yes? I	acknowledge	the	force	of	Yes,	but	ultimately	I	defend	No.	Pautz	asks: Then	how	come	you	don't	split	your	credence	equally	between	Yes	and	No? • Distributing	credence	and	stopping	there	would	be	fundamentally	unilluminating.	It	wouldn't	identify	the	good-making	or	bad-making	features. Take	a	position	vs.	understand	the	reasons	for	taking	it. • If	one	were	to	divide,	why	divide	equally?	It	can	be	hard	to	tell	what	the relative	forces	are	that	pull	in	each	direction. • I	felt	pulled	me	more	strongly	toward	No	by	a	long	pattern	of	real-world cases	that	include	not	just	situations	analogous	to	Jill's,	but	also	live disagreements	about	the	epistemic	status	of	that	situation. I	defend	the	Downgrade	Thesis:	Jill's	experience	contributes	less	to	her	reason	to believe	her	eyes	than	it	could,	if	it	weren't	hijacked	by	her	fearful	suspicion. I	argue	that	the	Downgrade	thesis	is	well	explained	by	the	Rationality	of	Perception. Rationality	of	Perception:	Both	perceptual	experiences	and	the	processes	that	give rise	to	them	can	be	rational	or	irrational. For	instance,	the	relationship	between	Jill's	suspicion	and	her	experience	can make	her	experience	irrational,	and	that's	why	it's	downgraded. Inferential	modulation	thesis:	Perceptual	experiences	(such	as	Jill's)	can	be	the conclusions	of	inferences	from	prior	outlooks	(such	as	Jill's	suspicion). Other	modes	of	hijacking	by	prior	outlooks	include:	inferring	poorly	from one's	experience,	selective	intake	of	information,	bypassing	(=	failing	to	use) perceptual	experience,	closing	off	perceptual	inquiry	too	soon. Pautz:	What	intuitive	force	does	the	Downgrade	thesis	have? I	was	pulled	toward	No	by	a	cultural	phenomenon:	the	long	pattern	of	massive indignance	to	a	well-known	strand	of	brutality	in	American	society. This	same	phenomenon	also	led	me	to	address	both	scaled-up	version	of	the same	epistemic	problem. Two	steps	took	me	to	No. (i)	Start	with	a	type	of	situation	–	brutal	yet	culturally	normal	–	in	which:	there	are massive	protests	and	indignation	after	someone	(almost	always	a	man,	usually white,	often	armed	and	often	a	police	officer)	is	acquitted	for	using	force	(often lethal)	against	someone	else	who	is	black	(usually	a	man	or	a	boy),	on	the	grounds 4 that	the	shooter's	belief	that	that	man	or	boy	posed	imminent	severe	danger	was reasonable. The	protests	come	mostly	from	people	who	live	regularly	with	the	threat	of this	kind	of	violence	against	them,	their	siblings,	cousins,	etc.	and	who therefore	navigate	the	consequences	of	being	perceived	as	threatening. You	could	see	the	acquittals	vs	protests	as	a	living	disagreement	about whether	the	beliefs	were	reasonable.	What's	culturally	normal	is	both	the legal	legitimacy	of	these	beliefs	as	reasonable,	and	the	refusal	to	accept	that epistemic	categorization	of	them,	on	the	grounds	that	the	fear	deemed reasonable	by	legal	institutions	is	an	unreasonable	cultural	myth	of	the dangerous	black	boy	or	man,	operating	in	the	minds	of	individuals. Some	instances	in	the	pattern: 2014	Ferguson.	In	explaining	to	a	grand	jury	why	it	was	reasonable	for	him to	shoot	his	gun	at	18	year	old	Michael	Brown,	Darren	Wilson	describes Brown	as	having	"the	most	intense	aggressive	face.	The	only	way	I	can describe	it,	it	looks	like	a	demon,	that's	how	angry	he	looked." 1973	riots	in	Queens.	Officer	Thomas	Shea	(first	NYC	police	officer	tried	for murder	while	on	duty)	acquitted	for	shooting	to	death	10	y.o.	Clifford	Glover. Claimed	the	4th	grader	was	reaching	for	a	gun,	but	no	gun	was	ever	found. 1964	Harlem	riots.	Officer	Thomas	Gilligan	shot	and	killed	15-y.o.	James Powell	in	Yorkville.	They	claimed	he	had	a	knife,	but	no	knife	was	ever	found. Other	cases	never	became	part	of	public	political	life	but	show	the	same pattern	of	acquittal	and	indignance. (ii)	Consider	whether	the	massive	reactions	would	be	any	different	if	the	protestors knew	that	the	shooters	had	hallucinated	cues	for	danger	(menacing	look,	gun,	etc) as	opposed	to	forming	that	belief	in	response	to	what	they	correctly	see. When	I	focus	on	the	cultural	myth	operating	in	individual	minds,	it	doesn't	seem	to matter	whether	it	takes	the	form	of	perceptual	experience	or	just	belief. ! It	doesn't	seem	incumbent	on	someone	to	whom	the	fear	was	directed	to	excuse the	officers	upon	learning	they	their	racist	outlook	had	reached	all	the	way	to their	perceptual	experiences. ! If	a	racist	hallucinates	me	as	dangerous,	I	have	several	reactions.	I'm	terrified (especially	when	the	guy	is	armed),	angry,	offended,	and	I'm	more	inclined	to think	the	hallucinator	has	an	epistemic	problem	than	I	am	to	think	they're	being reasonable	because	their	twisted	outlook	has	infiltrated	all	the	way	to	their perceptual	experience.	It	redounds	poorly	on	him	if	the	hallucinator	can't	see	an ordinary	shoplifting	teenager	for	what	he	is. This	reaction	is	incompatible	with	Yes. Assumption:	many	protestors	share	it. 5 Pautz:	"Unlike	the	Gettier	case,	the	Downgrade	thesis	just	doesn't	enjoy	consistent intuitive	support". Interpretation:	(i)	to	have	rational	force,	intuitions	should	be	relatively	stable across	people.	(ii)	Yes-intuitions	have	that	kind	of	stability. On	(ii):	Many	people	share	my	reaction	to	the	influence	of	cultural	myth	described earlier,	and	that	reaction	is	incompatible	with	Yes. On	(i):	The	Gettier	intuition	isn't	the	only	model	for	philosophically	useful	intuitions. ! Philosophical	problems	often	have	a	structure	where	two	things	seem	plausible yet	they	can't	both	be	true.	Intuitions	in	this	structure	can	retain	their	force	even when	the	opposing	intuitions	has	some	force	as	well. ! Two	kinds	of	rational	force:	provide	justification	vs.	facilitate	discovery Gettier	intuition:	justifies	denying	JTB,	but	contributes	little	to	subsequent discoveries.	Didn't	open	new	questions,	or	help	analyze	knowledge. Downgrade	intuition:	it	opens	the	question	of	the	scope	of	epistemic appraisal	in	the	mind,	even	if	it	exists	alongside	intuition	favoring	Yes. Inferentialist	hypotheses	let	us	see	what	mental	agency	might	look like	if	experiences	could	be	conclusions	of	inferences. 4.	Two	kinds	of	fictional	cases	in	philosophy When	Nagel	asks	whether	my	cases	are	psychologically	realistic,	she	brings	into focus	two	kinds	of	fictional	cases	in	philosophy. Psychologically	realistic	fictions vs. Psychologically	unrealistic you're	seeing	a	banana hedgehogs	control	your	mind Dialectical	role	for	(even)	unrealistic	fiction:	potential	counter-examples	to putatively	necessary	truths. M.	Huemer:	"Phenomenal	conservatism	is	a	necessary	truth,	not	a	contingent one.	There	is	no	possible	world	in	which	phenomenal	conservatism	is	false." Skepticism	and	the	Veil	of	Perception. An	unrealistically	fictional	hijacked	experience	that's	downgraded	(w/out defeaters)	would	refute	phenomenal	conservatism. Dialectical	role	for	(exclusively)	realistic	fiction:	illuminate	what	may	sometimes	be our	own	epistemic	situation. Nagel:	with	only	unrealistic	cases	"our	answer	to	the	rational	problems	of hypothetical	Charlie	will	not	address	the	real-world	rational	problems	of	the	figures 6 who	inspired	him...[such	as]	what	goes	epistemically	wrong	in	vanity,	racism	and pseudo-science". Reply:	I	don't	think	my	analysis	is	the	right	kind	of	theory	to	help	us	understand what	goes	epistemically	wrong	in	racism	or	pseudo-science.	To	understand	those things,	we	need	tools	far	beyond	those	in	analytic	epistemology.	E.g.	for	racism	in the	US,	we'd	need	a	big	dose	history	and	structural	(economic)	and	cultural	analyses of	how	myths	are	formed	and	perpetuated.	RP	is	just	a	small	piece	of	the	picture. ***** Nagel	says	hijacked	experiences	are	unrealistic.	Pautz	says	it's	implausible	as	well	as unpopular	to	say	that	they	lead	to	epistemic	downgrade.	He	also	argues	that	even	if the	Downgrade	thesis	were	true,	Jill's	perc.	beliefs	would	still	be	"perfectly	rational". 5. Pautz's	introspective	work-around	argument P1.	Hijacked-S	knows	she	is	having	a	redness-roundness	experience. P2.	If	Hijacked-S	knows	she	is	having	a	redness-roundness	experience,	then she	has	reason	to	believe	there's	a	red	round	thing	there. Conclusion:	Hijacked-S	has	reason	to	believe	there's	a	red	round	thing	there. This	conclusion	"undermines	the	claim	that	in	every	core	hijack	case,	the	subject's believing	the	content	of	her	experience	is	irrational...Her	belief	might	be	perfectly rational". =	Deflate	the	significance	of	epistemic	downgrade. Reply:	If	you	don't	draw	this	inference,	then	the	belief	isn't	formed	on	the	basis	of the	introspective	belief. Introspection-first	thesis:	People	tend	to	form	external-world	beliefs	on	the	basis	of introspective	beliefs,	not	their	experiences	(and	background	external-world	beliefs). Cf.	criticism	of	early	foundationalism	according	to	which	introspective	beliefs were	basic,	and	abductive	responses	to	skepticism. A	Pautz-esque	objection:	Focus	just	on	the	fact	that	the	introspective	judgment,	if the	hijacked	subject	formed	it,	would	give	them	reason	to	think	there's	something red	and	round	there.	Doesn't	that	show	that	they	have	perfectly	good	reason	to believe	their	eyes	–even	if	they	don't	use	it?	(Pautz:	"Even	you	don't	carry	out	this inference,	you	could	do	so	easily.") Reply:	No.	If	you	grant	the	Downgrade	thesis,	then	the	subjects'	epistemic	situation includes	forces	that	pull	her	in	opposite	directions,	doxastically. The	fact	that	the	experience	is	hijacked	pressures	them	not	to	believe	their eyes.	Introspective	judgment	(if	formed)	pressured	to	believe	her	eyes. So	what	they've	got	is	a	conflict.	Why	think	the	introspective	belief	overpowers	the hijacked	experience,	as	Pautz	assumes?	We're	back	where	we	started	–a	simple question	(Yes/No)	has	no	simple	answer. 7 Perhaps	Pautz	thinks	that	if	the	introspective	belief	is	justified,	then	the	experience couldn't	be	downgraded	in	having	red-roundness	content.	But	that	content	plays	no obvious	role	in	justifying	the	introspective	belief. (See	footnote	12,	chapter	3.3). 6.	Is	Yes	more	plausible	than	No? Seamless	transitions Pautz:	Seamless	transitions	favor	Yes	over	No	-more	so	than	the	other	cases. Unhijacked	tomato-hallucination	"	seeing	a	tomato. Hijacked	tomato-hallucination	"	unhijacked	tomato-hallucination. Equal	Justification:	no	epistemic	change	in	either	seamless	transition. Downgrade	Thesis:	the	un-hijacked	experience	has	more	epistemic	power	than	the hijacked	experience. Pautz:	"In	my	experience,	people	I've	discussed	these	cases	with	treat	them the	same.	In	both	cases,	such	an	out-of-nowhere	increase	in	your	confidence with	no	change	in	your	phenomenal	life	would	be	totally	capricious." "If	you	just	happened	to	increase	your	confidence	in	the	proposition	that	a red	and	round	thing	is	there	[just	after]	the	seamless	transition,	you	actually had	a	reason	to	do	so". Reply:	seamless	transitions	provide	no	new	traction	beyond	the	original	cases. In	these	transitions,	you	have	no	inkling	of	the	difference	between	your	situation before	and	after.	--For	Pautz	that's	the	counter-intuitive	part.	No	changes	in epistemic	status	without	any	"changes	in	your	phenomenal	life". And	that	was already	a	feature	of	the	original	cases. 7.	Can	pain	be	rational	or	irrational? Williamson:	Too	much	self-pity,	and	you	take	an	itch	to	be	a	pain. Experience:	itch Introspective	belief:	I'm	in	pain #	False Pity-driven	pain:	Too	much	self-pity	turns	an	itch	into	a	pain. Experience:	pain Introspective	belief:	I'm	in	pain #	True Causal	routes	from	fear	to	pain	are	realistic:	fear	can	cause	stress	hormones	which can	intensify	pain.	But	those	feedback	loops	don't	show	that anyone	is	responding inferentially	to	their	itches	or	self-pity. Pautz	thinks	I'm	committed	to	the	possibility	of	inferring	a	pain	from	an	unjustified belief	that	you	have	a	pain	in	your	leg.	He	then	says	the	Downgrade	thesis	implies that	the	pain	is	unjustified.	And	he	finds	both	results	implausible. 8 Reply:	Pautz	overestimates	the	scope	of	the	Downgrade	thesis,	RP,	and Inferentialism.	These	theses	are	meant	to	analyze	the	problem	of	hijacked perceptual	experiences. ! Perceptual	experiences	can	be	hijacked	only	because	there's	such	a	thing as	a	perceptual	inputs	to	a	perceptual	experience	(even	if	some	such experiences,	such	as	hallucinations,	have	no	perceptual	inputs).	There	is not	obvious	analog	to	perceptual	inputs	in	the	case	of	pain	or	itches. ! Unlike	bodily	sensations,	perceptual	experiences	are	directed	toward	the external	world. Pautz	may	think	that	I'm	forced	into	allowing	inferences	to	pain	experiences	from beliefs,	even	if	my	central	theses	only	treat	perceptual	experiences.	What	would force	me	into	that? (a)	Pains	have	to	have	accuracy	conditions	("Otherwise	you'll	hold	a	sensedatum	theory	of	pain") (b)	If	a	state	has	accuracy	conditions,	then	it	must	be	possible	for	the	state	to be	an	inferential	response	to	other	things. Reply:	Pautz	ignores	disanalogies	between	pains	and	perceptual	experience,	and corresponding	instability	in	the	accuracy-condition	approach	to	pain. Why	it's	hard	to	be	an	intentionalist	about	pain-experience: ! If	the	property	represented	is	bodily	damage,	that	doesn't	reflect phenomenology. ! if	the	property	represented	reflects	phenomenology,	it's	intrinsic	(Pautz's dissertation	and	2010,	and	Chalmers	2006	via	Pautz). ! But	if	there	are	no	illusory	pain-experiences,	then	experientially	representing the	pain	property	(eg	attributing	it	to	your	leg)	entails	that	your	leg	instantiates the	property.	So	the	property	seems	to	be	relational.i It's	hard	to	find	a	good	candidate	for	the	property	that	could	be	presented	in	painexperience,	on	an	intentionalist	view. In	addition,	if	there	are	no	illusory	pain-experiences,	then	some	would	say there	isn't	really	anything	that	these	experiences	are	accurately	representing. None	of	these	problems	arise	in	trying	to	find	contents	of	perceptual	experiences. Pautz	ignores	these	differences.	He	assumes	that	pains	and	perceptual	experiences are	the	same	sort	of	state	when	he	says: "You	can	just	immediately	know	that headaches	can't	be	assessed	for	rationality.	Don't	we	likewise	have	at	least	some immediate	a	priori	reason	to	think	that	visual	experiences	are	also	not	assessable for	rationality?" 9 Reply:	This	is	a	denial	of	a	position,	not	a	reason	to	deny	a	position.	It	rests	on assimilating	pain	to	perceptual	experience. 8.	Naïve	realism Russell	held	a	relational	theory	of	belief,	but	presumably	thought	that	beliefs	so construed	could	be	conclusions	of	inference.	So	perhaps	propositional	contents aren't	needed	for	a	state	to	be	eligible	as	the	conclusion	of	an	inference. 9.	Downgrade:	reliabilism	vs	inference If	the	Downgrade	thesis	is	true,	what	explains	why	experiences	are	downgraded	by perceptual	hijacking? Inferentialism:	when	experiences	are	the	conclusions	of	inferences,	bad-making features	of	the	inference	(anti-justified	premises,	poor	reasoning,	etc)	can	explain why	the	experience	is	downgraded. Reliabilist	challenge	to	Inferentialism:	Inference	is	irrelevant.	The	sole	bad-making feature	of	both	experiences	and	beliefs	is	failure	to	belong	to	a	truth-conducive process	that	determines	that	epistemic	status	of	the	experience	or	belief. Observation:	I	am	sure	it	is	possible	to	develop: ! reliabilist	constructive	defenses	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	(Ghijsen) ! debates	between	inferentialist	and	reliabilist	modes	of	RP	as	extensive	as	the original	debates	between	reliabilism	and	evidentialism. I	didn't	want	to	take	on	the	reliabilist	reconstruction	or	recapitulate	these	older debates,	for	several	reasons. • the	inferentialist	attempt	at	constructive	defense	lets	us	see	if	we	can	find mental	agency	in	the	basement	of	the	mind	–	processes	that	generate perception	and	perceptual	experience.	In	contrast,	according	to	reliabilism, flawed	mental	agency	can	never	be	a	fundamental	epistemic	flaw,	so	closes off	inquiry	into	the	scope	of	mental	agency	in	the	mind. • It	seemed	premature	to	argue	abductively	for	RP,	when	there's	so	much explain	about	the	content	of	the	hypothesis	in	the	first	place. o Are	experiences	the	right	kind	of	thing	to	have	epistemic	status o Could	inferences	affect	experiences	in	the	ways	they	effect	beliefs. What's	most	needed	is	a	proof	of	concept. • It	struck	me	that	reliabilism	didn't	have	an	obvious	way	to	account	the	badmaking	features	of	some	inferences	that	exhibited	bad	kinds	of	circularity. That's	the	part	Nagel	criticizes. Suppose	you	have	belief	X.	Belief	X	hijacks	your	perception.	On	the	basis	of	an experience	hijacked	by	belief	X,	you	strengthen	the	belief. 10 My	guiding	thought	was	that	if	your	original	route	to	belief	X	started	out	truthconducive,	your	route	to	strengthening	X	in	response	to	experience	wouldn't become	any	less	truth-conducive.	And	yet	that	kind	of	strengthening	seemed	bad. I	didn't	say	what	I	meant	by	"strengthen"	here.	Nagel	unpacks	the	notion	in	two ways:	credences	and	resilience,	and	for	each	way	she	says	reliabilists	can	after	all (contrary	to	my	criticism)	explain	what's	bad	about	the	route	to	strengthening. Reply	1:	I	meant	a	third	thing.	I	avoided	discussing	credences	in	this	context because	the	interface	between	experiences	and	credences	is	poorly	understood	on the	standard	assumption	that	experiences	are	binary	rather	than	gradable. Strengthening	belief	that	p	=	strength	of	disposition	to	rely	on	p	in	reasoning	and action.	When	Jill	strengthens	her	belief	that	Jack	is	angry,	she	becomes	less	likely	to ask	him	for	a	favor,	more	likely	to	be	annoyed	if	she	thinks	his	anger	unjustified,	etc. Some	will	say	this	is	just	adjusting	credence,	but	I	think	Jill's	credence	(as measured	by	betting	behavior,	eg)	that	Jack	is	angry	might	stay	the	same while	her	binary	belief	increases	in	strength	in	this	sense. Railton:	a	non-epistemic,	affect-driven	boost	to	the	strength	of	one's assurance. Suppose	strengthening	=	raising	credence	in	the	same	proposition. Nagel:	then	if	the	process	starts	off	making	.97	legitimate	and	you	strengthen	to	.98, you're	not	properly	calibrated.	Degree	of	reliability	has	to	calibrate	with	credences. Reply	2:	In	principle	that's	an	option.	But	is	reliability	as	finely	grained	as credences?	If	it's	too	coarse-grained	to	distinguish	.97	and	.98,	then	either increasing	is	an	epistemic	freebie	or	something	other	than	reliability	is	needed. Suppose	strengthening =	resilience.	Nagel	focuses	on	the	temporal	profile	of	mood but	I	had	in	mind	a	simpler	case.	Starting	at	9am	Jill	thinks	Jack	is	angry.	At	noon	she sees	him	and	has	her	hijacked	experience. When,	at	noon,	Jill	strengthens	the	resilience	of	her	belief	that	Jack	was	angry	from 9am-noon,	she	need	not	be	making	a	prediction	about	Jack's	mood	at	12:30.	Instead, now	it	takes	more	evidence	(or	other	belief-shaping	factors)	than	it	would	have taken	before	noon	to	convince	her	that	all	morning	Jack	has	been	angry. Reply	3:	I	can't	formulate	a	plausible-sounding	reliabilist	analysis	of	strengthening in	this	case,	since	we're	holding	constant	the	reliability	of	the	process	that	generated belief	that	subsequently	gets	strengthened. 10.	Are	hijacked	experiences	perceptual	experiences? Yes.	Perceptual	experiences	=	a	kind	of	phenomenal	state	that	can	be	either	hijacked or	not,	hallucinatory	or	not. 11 Nagel:	No.	Hijacked	experiences	are	pseudo-experiences	because	they	don't	'put	you in	touch	with	the	world'. "Experiences	proper"	put	you	in	touch	with	the	world.	– Hallucinations,	possibly	illusions	aren't	experiences,	and	therefore	aren't Crosstalk.	Even	by	Nagel's	lights	hijacked	experiences	are	experiences	in	my	sense. For	Nagel,	hallucinations,	illusions,	and	hijacked	experiences	form	a	unified epistemic	category.	They're	all	faulty	for	the	same	reason. -Goes	against	the	idea	(granted	even	by	many	externalists	about	J)	that	the evil-demoned	subject	is	justified	believing	that	there's	mustard	in	the	fridge -Blind	to	epistemic	badness	missing	in	a-rational	hallucinations	but	found	in some	hijacked	ones. Bonus:	How	Whit	got	that	way	and	in	what	ways	is	he	unreasonable Q:	What	psychological	mechanisms	mediate	the	cultural	absorption	of	entrenched presumptions? Railton: affective	dimensions	of	processing	information