volume	18,	no.	17 september	2018 Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and SelfEffacing Functionality Matthieu Queloz University of Basel © 2018 Matthieu	Queloz This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/018017/> Introduction Bernard	Williams's	last	book,	Truth and Truthfulness,	left	posterity	much to	puzzle	over.	Here	is	the	arch-critic	of	utilitarianism	seeking	to	vindicate the intrinsic value	of truth in terms	of its instrumental value, thereby entrenching himself squarely in the traditional territory of indirect	utilitarianism.	What	is	more,	he	proposes	to	do	so	using	the method	of	genealogy,	which	suggests	a	historical	approach	-	but	he also	denies that the	concept	of truth	has	a	history,	and	prefaces	his historical remarks with an avowedly fictional state-of-nature story. Unsurprisingly, this	has raised	questions.	What separates	Williams's instrumental vindication from indirect	utilitarianism?1	And	how	can genealogy vindicate anything, let alone something which does not have a history?2 These questions	-	and Truth and Truthfulness as a whole	-	have	not	received	the	attention	they	deserve.	One	reason	for this	may	be	that	the	book	was	untimely.	Upon	its	appearance	in	2002, it	seemed	ostensibly	directed	against	over-enthusiastic	forms	of	postmodernism	which soon appeared to	be already	on the	wane.	But a decade	and	a	half	later,	the	advent	of	"post-truth"	politics	vindicated Williams's sense that the	value	of truth	needed	defending.	And this rich	exploration	of	the	point	of	valuing	the	truth	anyway	rewards	engagement	with	the	puzzles	it	raises. My	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	resolve	some	of	these	puzzles	in	order to	develop	an	understanding	of	Williams's	genealogical	method	that reveals	it	to	be	uniquely	suited	to	dealing	with	what	I	call	self-effacing 1. McGinn	(2003). 2. Nagel (2009, 134) expresses puzzlement over the project of vindicating through	genealogy.	Koopman	(2013,	20,	64–5,	74,	87)	even	charges	Williams with	committing the	genetic fallacy.	McGinn	(2003)	finds the	genealogical story redundant, given that instrumental considerations are supposed to vindicate.	Rorty	(2002)	confesses	himself	unable	to	see	the	relation	between the	fictional	and	the	historical	parts	of	the	book.	In	general,	what	exactly	the book's "circuitous" (Elgin	2005,	343)	argument is supposed to	be	has	been contested. Reactions have ranged from hailing it as "the	most interesting set	of reflections	on the	values	of truth	and truth-telling in living	memory" (Hacking 2004, 137) to questioning	whether the book is	more than "a collection	of	loosely	related	essays	on	truth"	(Fleischacker	2004,	382).	The	first monograph	on	Williams	calls	it	"a	collection	of	interesting	intellectual	tributaries	feeding	a	somewhat	elusive	main	channel"	(Jenkins	2006,	163). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) understood	as	continuing	the	pragmatist	tradition	that	has	been	called "Cambridge	pragmatism",	and I	delineate	how the	state-of-nature	fiction	relates	to	historical	considerations.	In	§3,	using	three	challenges raised	by	Colin	McGinn	as	a foil, I show in	what sense	an intrinsic value can be vindicated through pragmatic genealogy. I distinguish this type	of	vindication	from	indirect	utilitarianism,	and	I	argue	that Williams is concerned	with	a form	of self-effacing functionality that genealogy is	uniquely suited to	dealing	with. I conclude	with	an	assessment	of	the	wider	significance	of	Williams's	genealogy	both	for	his own	oeuvre	and	for	further	genealogical	inquiry. 1. What Is Williams's Genealogy a Genealogy Of? It	is	far	from	straightforward	to	say	exactly	what	the	subject	matter	of Williams's	genealogy	is.	Some	commentators	present	it	as	a	genealogy of	truth,	and	the	Italian	translation	of	the	book	is	even	titled	Genealogia della verità.5	Others	urge	that	it	is	a	genealogy	of	truthfulness	as opposed to	truth.6	The	reading	I	offer	in	this	section	splits	the	difference:	it	presents	Truth and Truthfulness as a genealogical explanation	of	why	we might	have	come	to	value	truth	intrinsically,	where	this	means	valuing the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthfulness	intrinsically. Williams's repeated insistence that the concept	of truth	does	not have	a	history	(TT	61,	271)	might	be	taken	to	entail	that	there	cannot be	a	genealogy	of	truth.	But	does	the	fact	that	a	concept	lacks	a	history really	exclude	giving	a	genealogy	of	that	concept?	Williams's	reason for	maintaining	that	the	concept	of	truth	lacks	a	history	is	that	it	is	an indefinable	part	of	a	ramifying	set	of	connected	notions	which	play	a basic role in language and thought.7	This role "is always and	everywhere	the	same"	(TT	61,	271).	Truth	is	a	formal	concept	that	we	cannot 5. Blackburn	(2002)	and	Mordacci	(2016). 6. This	emphasis	on	truthfulness	as opposed to	truth	is	found	in	Honderich	(2003, 140),	Hacking	(2004,	157),	Elgin	(2005,	67),	and	Koopman	(2013). 7. Koopman	ascribes	to	Williams	the	view	that	"the	truth	itself"	does	"not	vary with history" (2013, 69). But	Williams only takes the concept of truth to be historically invariable; the	truth	itself	will	be	the	truth	about	a	matter	to	hand, and	as	historically	variable	as	the	matter	itself	(see	TT	257). functionality: the	phenomenon	whereby a practice is functional, but we	do	not	engage in it for its functionality,	and it is	only functional because	we	do	not	engage	in	it	for	its	functionality.	Key	to	this	reading	will	be,	first,	to	get	clear	about	what	exactly	Williams's	genealogy is	a	genealogy	of;3	and	second,	to	read	Williams	as	a	type	of	pragmatist	-	notwithstanding the fact that 'the pragmatists' is the label he gives to his opponents. Williams's genealogy merits the label of a 'pragmatic genealogy' in two respects: it focuses on the practices revolving	around	truth instead	of	asking	what truth itself is;	and	it	explains	these	practices	in	terms	of	their	point	for	creatures	like	us.	Viewing	Williams's	genealogy	as	a	pragmatic genealogy	allows	us	to	see	it not	as	a	piece	of	erudite	historical	stage-setting,	but	as	a	direct	answer to	Richard	Rorty's	question:	Why should	we	value the truth?	While Rorty concludes that	we	are	better	off	dropping the	notion	of truth altogether,4	Williams's	genealogy	offers	a	contrary	answer	by	displaying the instrumental value	of valuing the truth intrinsically. The genealogy	is	a	perspicuous	derivation,	from	needs	we	have	anyway,	of the	need	for	an	intrinsic	value	of	truth	-	and	in	showing	the	need	for the	value	of	truth	to	be	rooted	in	practical	exigencies,	Williams	proves Rorty	wrong	by	his	own	lights. The	paper	falls into	three	parts,	the	first	two	setting	the	stage	for the	third.	In	§1, I tackle	the	surprisingly	tricky	question	of	what	Williams's	genealogy	is	a	genealogy	of.	The	difficulty,	I	argue,	stems	from the	fact	that	truthfulness	plays	a	double	role	as	both	act	and	object	of valuation.	I	argue	further	that	Williams's	defence	of	the	value	of	truth turns	on	the	idea	that	while	we	cannot	abandon	the	concept	of	truth, we	can	abandon	our	concern for it,	and this is	why	he	eschews the question	of	what	truth	is	for	the	question	of	why we	should	cultivate truthfulness.	In	§2,	I	argue	that	Williams's	genealogical	method	is	best 3. Blackburn (2002) and	Mordacci (2016) present it as a genealogy of truth, while	Honderich (2003, 140),	Hacking (2004, 140), Elgin (2005, 344), and Koopman	(2013)	insist	that	it	is	a	genealogy	of	truthfulness	as opposed to truth. The	reading	I	offer	splits	the	difference. 4. See	especially	Rorty	and	Engel	(2007)	and	Rorty	(1998),	but	also	(1989,	1991). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) Williams's lights, talking about the practical significance of truthfulness.10	Similarly,	the	histories	of	truth	offered	by	Foucault	(1994)	and Shapin	(1994)	are	best	understood	as	being	about	truthfulness.	It	is	a different	enterprise	again,	but	an	equally	viable	one,	to	explain	why	a community	which	did	not	have	a	word	for	truth	might	be	led	to	introduce	one.	Being	able	to	describe	things	as	true	may	function	as	a	device	of	indirect	reference	and	generalisation,	enabling	us	to	endorse	or repudiate	claims	whose	content	we	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	specify: "I	think	that	everything	Wittgenstein	said	is	true";	"Beware:	nothing	he says	will	be	true."11 If	viewing the	concept	of truth	as fundamental	does	not	bar	Williams from	giving	a	genealogy in	principle, it	nevertheless	provides him	with	a	reason	not	to	give	one	in	practice,	because	it	entails	that this	fundamental	concept	of	truth	is	not	what	needs	defending.	What needs	defending	is	our	concern with	the	truth	about	given	subject	matters.	For	many	subject	matters,	such	as	the	distant	past	or	the	intricate workings	of	nature,	this	concern	has	datable	beginnings;	the	corollary is	that	it	may	also	have	an	end.	It	is	this	latter	possibility	which	motivates	Williams's	vindicatory	project	and	its	focus	on	truthfulness.	The contrast	heralded	in	the	title	Truth and Truthfulness	brings	into	focus	a distinction between	a	formal	concept	that	we	cannot	help	but	live	by, and	a	social	and	historical	achievement	that	requires	continual	cultivation.	We	cannot	give	up	on	the	concept	of	truth,	least	of	all	if	we	are	to hold	on	to	truthfulness	(for	what	would	we	be	true	to?).12	But	we	can give	up	on	truthfulness,	in	the	sense	of	ceasing	to	value	the	finding	and sharing	of	the	truth	in	certain	areas. Williams	aims	to	defend	this	sense 10. Price	(2011,	47,	139).	Of	course,	in	the	practice	of	arguing	about	how	things are,	truthfulness	is	not	the	only	way	to	achieve	outcomes	of	practical	value. There is	something	to	be	said	for	playing	devil's	advocate,	or for	exploring and	defending	implausible	hypotheses.	There	has	been	a	lot	of	work	recently by	people	like	Liam	Kofi	Bright,	Remco	Heesen,	Cailin	O'Connor,	and	Kevin Zollman	on	whether	individuals	need	to	value	the	truth	in	order	to	promote collective	success	at	pursuing	the	truth. 11. Blackburn	(2013,	5)	and	M.	Williams	(2013,	135). 12. See	TT 2–3. help	but	live	by.	This	is	not	an	empirical	claim	-	Williams	takes	it	to follow	from	Davidson's	(1990)	hermeneutical	insight	that	the	concept of	truth	is	essential	to	understanding	something	as	a	believing	or	saying that things	are thus-and-so,	and therefore to	understanding	any kind	of	variation in such	believings	or sayings. In recognising something	as	a	representation	of	things	as	being	thus-and-so,	we	are	always already	relying	on	the	concept	of	truth	in	this	basic	role. Williams thus	holds: (i) that the	concept	of truth	has	no	history; and	(ii)	that	truth	is	an	indefinable	part	of	a	set	of	connected	notions, such	as	belief	and	assertion,	which	have	to	be	learnt	together.8	Does	it follow	that	no	genealogy	of	the	concept	of	truth	can	be	given?	It	certainly	does if	one	equates	genealogy	with	history.	But	on	Williams's own	conception	of	genealogy,	it	does	not	follow.	For	while	genealogy is	potentially	informed	by	history,	it	remains	distinct	from	it.	A	genealogy	of	the	concept	of	truth	can	still	be	given,	but	because	of	(ii),	we should	eschew	attempts	to	spell	out	what	truth	is	in	favour	of	asking why	creatures	like	us	might	have	developed	the	concept	of	truth	(along with	the	concepts	it	is	connected	to);	and	because	of	(i),	the	genealogy has	to	be	a	fictional	developmental	model.	As	a	model,	it	could	start off	with	agents	represented	as	lacking	what	historical	communities	always	already	possess,	and	it	could	represent	as	successively	emerging what	in	fact	has	to	arise	together.	It	might	thereby	exhibit	the	point	of the	concept	of	truth	and	the	basic	human	needs	from	which	it	derives. It	is	a	mark	of	the	power	of	genealogy,	for	Williams,	that	it	allows	us to	tell	a	developmental	story	highlighting	why	X	should	have	arisen even	where	we	find it	barely intelligible that there could	have	been a	development	towards	X.9	There	is	thus	nothing	here	to	prevent	us from	asking such	questions as "What are the concepts of truth and falsity	for?"	(Price	2011,	76).	But	when	Price	argues	that	one	function of	the	concept	of	truth	is	to	encourage	us	to	resolve	disagreements	in order	to	reap	the	benefits	of	arguing	about	how	things	are,	he	is,	by 8. See	Williams	(1997a,	16–9; TT	45–53,	63,	84)	and	his	reference	to	Campbell (1994)	at	1997a,	91n8. 9. A	point	Williams	made	in	a	lecture	cited	in	Fricker	(1998,	165n13). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) of	incomprehension.	The	answer	only	begins	to	make	sense	once	we clarify that	we like to know	what people are talking about. Similarly,	Williams	thinks	that	when	we	say	that	we	value	truth	intrinsically, what	we	mean	is	that	we	value	expressions	of	truthfulness	in	the	broad sense in	which	Williams	uses the term:	expressions	of the	desire to find	out	the	truth;	persistence	in	the	face	of	obstacles	to	inquiry;	imperviousness	to	wishful	thinking	and	self-deception;	and	care	and	discipline	in	forming	one's	beliefs,	in	preserving	the	truth,	and	in	passing it	on	to	others.	The	use	of	metalinguistic	vocabulary	to	refer	to	intrinsic	values	is	best	understood	as	referring	to	human	dealings	revolving around	these	properties.	Hence,	for	Williams,	to	value	the	truth	intrinsically	is	to	value	various	states	and	activities	associated	with	the	truth, in	particular	the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthfulness. But	since	to	value	the	truth	intrinsically	is	to	be	truthful,	truthfulness	is both	act	and	object	of	valuation	on	Williams's	picture. This	means that it	would	be	wrong to conclude that	Williams is concerned	with	truthfulness	as opposed to	truth: [S]ome	may	complain	that	[...]	it	is	simply	these	qualities [involved	in	being	truthful]	that,	so	far,	are	supposed	to bear	the	value.	People	have	spoken	of	the	value	of	truth: is	this	what	they	had	in	mind?	Are	we	right	to	consider only certain	human	attitudes toward the truth,	people's dispositions to	discover it	and	express it?	My	answer is yes	-	it	is	right	only	to	consider	human	attitudes.	Indeed, it	is	part	of	the	naturalistic	outlook	of	this	inquiry	that	it should	be	seen	as	an	exercise	in	human	self-understanding.	(TT	60) Williams	refuses	to	regard	as	an	explanation	a	"metaphysical	account which	represents	the	objects	of	our	knowledge	and	their	value	as	in themselves	entirely	independent	of	our	thoughts	or	attitudes",	or	any other	explanation	"that	sets	truth	and	goodness	even	further	above	us" (TT	61).	Instead,	his	explanation	of	the	value	of	truth	takes	the	form	of of	the	value	of	truth,	expressed	in	the	concern	to	get	one's	beliefs	right (the	set	of	dispositions	Williams	labels	"Accuracy")	and	the	concern	to pass	them	on	to	others	(the	set	of	dispositions	he	labels	"Sincerity"), which	together	form	the	"virtues	of	truth".	He	seeks	to	defend	the	virtues	of	truth	by	exhibiting	their	point	for	us. There	are	two	potentially	confusing	ambiguities	in	Williams's	talk of the value of truth and truthfulness which bear clarification.	Williams	writes	that	he	is	concerned	throughout	the	book	with	"the	value of	truth"	(TT	6).	But	he	hastens	to	add	that,	strictly	speaking,	it	is	not truth	itself	that	bears	value: In	a	very	strict	sense,	to	speak	of	"the	value	of	truth"	is	no doubt	a	category	mistake:	truth,	as	a	property	of	propositions	or	sentences,	is	not	the	sort	of	thing	that	can	have	a value.	[...]	The	phrase	"the	value	of	truth"	should	be	taken as	shorthand	for	the	value	of	various	states	and	activities associated	with	the	truth.	Much	of	the	discussion	will	be directed to the	value	of	what I shall call the "virtues	of truth,"	qualities	of	people	that	are	displayed	in	wanting	to know	the	truth,	in	finding	it	out,	and	in	telling	it	to	other people.	(TT	6–7) Why	can	truth	as	a	property	of	propositions	not	have	value?	After	all, to	take	an	example	Williams	uses	elsewhere,	when	someone	believes against	all	evidence	to	the	contrary	that	her	child	survived	the	crash, the	truth	of	her	belief	is	of	immense	value	to	that	person.	But,	for	Williams,	this is	the	value	of	a	particular	truth	p,	where	the	value	of	p's being	true	just is the	value	of	p,	and	"[t]his is	not	the	value	of	truth, but the	value	of	survival" (1995d,	231).	And	even	when	we	ask	after the	value	of	truth	in	general,	Williams	thinks,	we	are	not	really	asking after	the	value	possessed	by	truth.	This	would	be	like	asking	after	the value	possessed	by	reference	in	general,	or	by	meaning,	or	by	other metalinguistic categories. If	we	were asked to list all the things	we value	intrinsically,	answering	"reference"	would	provoke	blank	stares matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) defending	is	not	our	concept	of	truth,	but	our	concern	for	it.	In	this	context,	Socratic	questions	about	the	nature	of	truth	are	better	transposed into	pragmatic	questions	about the	point	of truthfulness. Instead	of gazing	up	at	truth	itself,	we	should	face	the	deniers	with	our	eyes	set on	human	concern	with	the	truth,	bring	out	how	it	relates	to	the	rest	of human	psychology	and	to	various	social	and	political	issues,	and	show what	concern	with	the	truth	does	for	us.	This	is	the	task	shouldered	by Williams's	genealogy. 2. Williams's Pragmatic Genealogical Method What	does	Williams	understand	by	a	"genealogy"?	In	Truth and Truthfulness,	he	offers	the	following	characterisation:	"A	genealogy	is	a	narrative	that	tries	to	explain	a	cultural	phenomenon	by	describing	a	way in	which	it	came	about,	or	could	have	come	about,	or	might	be	imagined	to	have	come	about"	(TT	20).	On	this	broad	characterisation,	genealogy	is	a	form	of	explanation drawing	on	everything	from	historical references	and	conjectures	to	abstract	and	imaginary	developmental stories	in	order	to	elucidate	something	via	its	genesis. But	what	is	the	purpose	of	the	imaginary	elements?	Their	centrality	to	Williams's	understanding	of	genealogy	comes	out	in	his	article "Naturalism	and	Genealogy",	in	which	he	characterises	genealogy	entirely	in	terms	of	these	imaginary	elements.	He	defines	genealogy	as "a fictional story	which represents a new reason for action as being developed	in	a	simplified	situation	as	a	function	of	motives,	reactions, psychological processes which we have reason to acknowledge already"	(2000,	159).	On	this	narrower	view,	genealogy	has	four	characteristics:	(i)	it	is	a	developmental	narrative	sketching	how	one	can	get from	some	starting	point	at	which	there	is	as	yet	no	X	to	an	end	point at	which	there	is	X;	(ii)	it	explains	the	emergence	of	a	new	reason	for action	in	terms	of	more	primitive	reasons	for	action	which	it	takes	as given;	(iii)	the	transition	from	the	starting	point	to	the	end	point	is	rationally	intelligible	(as	opposed	to	only	causally	intelligible);	and	(iv) the	rational	transition	from	starting	point	to	end	point	is	not	just	a	matter	of	instrumental	reasoning	-	what	makes	genealogies	interesting	is self-understanding	in	the	sense	that	it	starts	out	from	our dispositions to	value	the	truth	and	explains	these	in	terms	of	their	practical	value to us.	Williams's	approach	is	thus	naturalistic	in	a	sense	akin	to	what Huw	Price	calls	subject naturalism:13	it	approaches	the	value	of	truth	via human	dispositions	to	truthfulness,	and	these	in	turn	via	their	point relative	to	basic	human	needs. Even	once	we gain	hold of the idea that the intrinsic valuing of truth	manifests	itself	in	truthfulness	and	involves	the	valuing	of	truthfulness,	and	that	truthfulness	therefore	plays	a	double	role	as	both	act and	object	of	valuation,	there	remains	a	second	hazardous	ambiguity in	the	phrase	'the	value	of	truthfulness'.	It	can	be	used	in	an	appositional	or	a	possessive	sense.	In	the	appositional	sense,	it	picks	out	one among	our	values,	namely	that	of	truthfulness.	Reference	to	the	"value of	truthfulness"	is	then	a	reference	to	our	valuing the truth,	manifested in	our	seeking,	preserving,	and	telling	it,	i.e.,	in	our	being	truthful	(e.g., TT	13).	By	contrast,	the	possessive	sense	concerns	the	value	that	truthfulness	possesses	for	creatures	like	us.	It	refers	to	the	practical value of our valuing the	truth, i.e., the	practical	value	of truthfulness	(e.g.,	TT 15). With	these	clarifications	in	place,	we	can	state	precisely	what	Williams's	genealogy is a	genealogy	of. It is a	genealogical	explanation of	why	we	might	have	come	to	value	truth	intrinsically	-	where	this means	valuing	the	various	states	and	activities	expressive	of	truthfulness intrinsically	-	which is given in terms	of the	practical value	of valuing	truth	intrinsically. It	thus	misses	Williams's	point	to	say	that	the	book's	title	is	"ironically	misleading"	in	promising	a	treatment	of	truth.14	It	is	a	treatment of	truth,	only	one	that	carries	with	it	the	claim	that	the	way	to	meet those	who	would	give	up	on	truth	is	not	to	ask	what	truth	is,	or	which theory	of	truth	we	should	adopt,	but	why we	should	cultivate	the	virtues	aiming	at	truth,	and	what	we	have	to	lose	if	we	do	not.	What	needs 13. See	Price	(2011,	189). 14. Elgin	(2005,	344). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) developments	are	only	weakly,	and	which	are	not	at	all,	anticipatable on	the	basis	of	generic	human	needs.	We	are	thus	led	by	these	structural insights to look, as	Williams does, for the historical	moments around	which	truthfulness	came	to	be	extended	to	the	distant	past,	or when	it	grew	into	a	demand	for	authenticity. Genealogies	have to start somewhere, and in	doing so they	will have to take certain things for granted.15 Williams is unapologetic about	this:	"critical	reflection	should	seek	for	as	much	shared	understanding	as	it	can	find	on	any	issue,	and	use	any	ethical	material	that, in	the	context	of	the	reflective	discussion,	makes	some	sense	and	commands	some	loyalty.	Of	course	that	will	take	things	for	granted,	but	as serious	reflection	it	must	know	it	will	do	that"	(2011,	117).	Nevertheless, Williams	tries	to	take	as little for	granted	as	possible.16	He	starts	out from	a	state-of-nature	model	depicting	a	basic	and, in	human	terms, entirely	generic	epistemic	predicament:	human	beings	need	information	about the	environment, its risks, and its	opportunities (TT 58); but	already	the	sheer	fact	that	they	are	in	different	places	at	different times	means that there	are strong	pragmatic	pressures	on them	not just	to	rely	on	their	senses	in	acquiring	it,	but	to	cooperate,	in	particular	by	engaging	in	an	epistemic division of labour	whereby	information	is pooled	(TT	42);	this	in	turn	means	that	they	need	to	cultivate	the	dispositions	that	make	good	contributors	to	the	pool:	centrally,	accuracy and	sincerity	in	some	prototypical	form.	But	since	the	practical	value	of these	dispositions	largely	consists	in	their	advantageousness	to	others, accuracy and sincerity	need to come to	be regarded as traits	worth having for their own sake	-	as virtues	-	if the practice of effective 15. See	Blackburn	(2002)	and	Hall	(2014,	556). 16. "We	must	be	cautious,"	he	writes	elsewhere,	"in	dogmatically	asserting	that some	given	elements	must	be	universal	[...].	However,	even	if	we	do	not	offer	any	rich	body	of	what	are	claimed	to	be	substantive	universal	necessities, there	is,	in	the	area	of	action	and	its	ethical	surroundings,	a	set	of	very	basic ideas	which,	at	the	least,	lay	an	extremely	heavy	burden	of	proof	on	anyone who	claims	to	find	a	society	in	which	these	conceptions	were	not	operative" (2006b,	67).	See	also	Williams	(2011,	170),	where	he	advocates	a	naturalistic and	historical	conception	of	human	nature. precisely	that	the	individual	cannot	reason	his	way	from	the	starting point	to	the	end	point	on	his	own.	The	end	point	is	instrumentally inaccessible to	the	individual	reasoner	(in	this	case,	as	we	shall	see	in	§3, because it involves the	creation	of	an intrinsic	value).	Williams's	genealogy	of	truthfulness exhibits	all	four	characteristics	of	the	fictional story,	but	it	also	recognises	a	need	for	philosophy	to	involve	itself	in history	(TT	93)	-	hence	the	broader	characterisation	of	genealogy. Williams's	genealogy	deploys	a	narrative	device	he	calls	the	"State of	Nature"	(TT	21).	It	differs	from	homonymous	scenarios	in	political philosophy in that it already contains "a small society	of	human	beings,	sharing	a	common	language,	with	no	elaborate	technology	and no	form	of	writing"	(TT	41).	But	it	is	not,	for	all	that,	a	representation of	any	actual	society,	nor	even	a	conjectural	representation	of	the	early hominid condition. The State of	Nature,	Williams insists, is not the Pleistocene	(TT	27).	We	do	not	read	off	what	to	put	into	the	State	of Nature	from	the	fossil	record.	In	fact,	the	State	of	Nature	does	not	even have	to	be	possible	(TT	30). I	suggest	that	the	State	of	Nature	is	most	illuminatingly	described not	as	a	fiction,	but	as	a	model,	which	abstracts	as	much	from	past	human	societies	as	from	present	ones.	The	purpose	of	this	model	is	not, in the first instance, to identify the	historical origins of truthfulness, but	to	identify	its	structural	origins.	It	serves	to	localise	and	bring	out the	function	of	the	virtues	of	truth	relative	to	certain	contingent	facts about human beings and their environment. It contributes to	what Williams	elsewhere	calls	a	"structural	description"	(1997b,	24)	of	truthfulness	and	its	roots	in	certain	basic	needs.	It	is	only	in	a	second	step that these	structural insights	can then	be	deployed to shed light	on truthfulness's	actual	history.	The	structural	insights	into	the	necessity of	a	certain	prototypical	form	of	truthfulness	lead	us	to	expect	that	any society	will	always	already	possess	an	instantiation	of	this	prototype. In	light	of	this	prototype	and	its	basic	point,	moreover,	functional	analogies	will	become	visible	between	different	phenomena,	so	that	the prototype	helps	us identify	different instantiations	of truthfulness in the	historical	record.	The	same	structural	insights	also	indicate	which matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) himself.17	As	Williams's	subtitle	acknowledges,	his	genealogical	method	was largely inspired	by	Craig, whose	genealogy is recognised	as exemplifying	a	form	of	pragmatism	(Weinberg	2006).	Williams	adopts it	nearly	wholesale	to	expand	on	the	willingness	of	informants	to	be truthful,	thereby	falling	squarely	into	the	tradition	which	Cheryl	Misak calls	"Cambridge	pragmatism"	(2016). One	can	distinguish	truth-denying	from	truth-affirming	pragmatists.18 Williams	argues	against	the	former	(as	represented	by	Rorty),	but	on grounds that place him squarely among the latter	-	not merely because	he affirms truth, but because	his approach to it is pragmatist in all but name. A truth-affirming pragmatist strives "to illuminate the concept of truth by considering its linkages	with inquiry, assertion,	and	the	acquisition	of	belief"	(Misak	2016,	28).19	Williams,	in	line with	the	pragmatist	idea	that	the	best	understanding	of	philosophy's subject	matter	is	agent-centred,	elucidates	truth	in	terms	of	the	various "states and activities associated	with the truth" (TT 7). He eschews questions	such	as	what	truth	is,	asking	instead	after	the	role	of	truth	in various	human	dealings,	such	as	language	learning,	believing,	asserting,	inquiring,	communicating,	and	cooperating.	Part	of	what	licenses the	application	of	the	label	to	Williams,	then,	is	that	he	elucidates	truth in	terms	of	what	we do	with	truth:	the	human	dealings	expressive	of truthfulness. What	also	licenses	the	label's	application	is	that	Williams	raises	a pragmatist	question	in	the	reverse	direction,	namely	what truthfulness does for us.	He	argues	that	truthfulness	"gets	its	point	ultimately	from the	human	interest,	individual	and	collective,	in	gaining	and	sharing true information" (TT 126).	Williams's	genealogy	can thus	be	understood	without	distortion	as	a	pragmatic genealogy	-	an	explanation 17. Misak (2016) traces these under-appreciated strands of pragmatism from Peirce	to	Wittgenstein.	See	also	Misak	and	Price	(2017). 18. Misak	(2016,	ix)	and	M.	Williams	(2013,	129;	2016,	223). 19. See	Wiggins	(2002,	316)	and	Misak	(2015,	264). information	pooling	is	to	avoid	succumbing	to	free	riders	(TT	59).	For this	to	be	the	case,	people	need	to	be	able	to	make sense	of	them	as	values	"from	the	inside"	(TT	91),	which	requires	being	able	to	articulate and	connect	them	to	other	values	and	emotions.	But	while	the	functionalist	abstraction	of	the	State	of	Nature	can	reveal	that	this	is	so,	it cannot	show	how	these	generic	demands	have	actually	been	satisfied now	and	around	here.	Nor	can	it	help	us	understand	the	"enormous degree"	to	which	truthfulness	was	"changed,	transformed,	differently embodied, extended and so on by historical experience" (Williams 2007,	132).	This	is	the	reason	why	the	perspicuous	representation	of what	truthfulness	does	for	us	needs	to	be	enriched	with	historical	and cultural information that is invisible from the a priori standpoint of functional	reflection.	We	need	to	incorporate	increasingly	local	needs into	our	model	of	truthfulness's	development	in	order	to	account	for the	elaborations	that	our	instantiations	of	the	virtues	of	accuracy	and sincerity	have	undergone. On	such	a	reading,	Williams's	genealogy	is	a	pragmatic	genealogy: an	explanation	of	why	we	came	by	a	certain	conceptual	or	evaluative practice	in	terms	of	what it does for us,	given	our	needs.	Historical	considerations	only	come	in	to	explain	the	various	respects	in	which	the practice	we	actually	have	differs	from	the	generic	functional	model	of the	practice	we	require,	given	our	needs.	This	allows	us	to	take	his	genealogy	as	a	direct	response	to	Rorty's	question	of	why	we	should	value	the	truth.	The	answer	it	yields	is	that	we	should	value	it	because	doing	so	is	highly	functional	for	us,	given	some	of	our	most	basic	needs. If	Williams	offers	a	pragmatic	genealogy,	he	has	more	in	common with	his	avowed	opponents	than	he	admits.	The	immediate	objection to	this	is	that	the	book	is	explicitly	directed	against	"the	pragmatists" (TT	59)	who	encourage	us	to	relinquish	talk	of	"truth".	But	pragmatism is	a	broad	church,	and	much	effort	has recently	gone into	highlighting	the	more	truth-affirming	strands	of	pragmatism.	These	lead	from Peirce to Ramsey,	Wittgenstein, E.	J. Craig, and, I submit, Williams matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) (2) The Utilitarianism Challenge: "the functional account looks	like	a	thinly	disguised	form	of	utilitarianism,	an	argument	to	the	effect	that	truthfulness	is	good	because	it increases	the	general	level	of	human	well-being." (3)	The Redundancy Challenge:	"once	this	is	seen	the	genealogy	itself	becomes	theoretically	redundant."21 McGinn's first challenge, that instrumental considerations in favour	of	truthfulness	do	nothing	to	vindicate	its	intrinsic	value,	renders acute	the	question	of	just	what	Williams's	genealogy	aims	to	achieve. One	thing	Williams	offers	is	a	negative	vindication	of	truthfulness:	his genealogy	does	not	excavate	anything	to	suggest	our	endorsement	of truthfulness	to	be	radically	self-deceived,	thus	clearing	truthfulness	of suspicion	and	marking	it	out	as	stable	under	reflection.	Another	thing he	offers	is	a	naturalistic	vindication	of	truthfulness:	the	genealogy	enables	us to	make	sense	of truthfulness in terms	of the	rest	of	nature, in	particular	in	terms	of	basic	needs	of	cooperation	and	communication.	Both	of	these	vindications	ensure	that	we	can	remain	confident in	truthfulness [...] in the sense that	we can understand it and at the same	time	respect	it,	support	it	and	live	within	it.	We	can also urge it against alternative creeds whose own selfunderstandings (as divine revelations, for instance) are themselves not going to survive a genealogical inquiry. (2014,	410) Yet, as the preceding section brought out,	Williams also offers a pragmatic	vindication	of	truthfulness.	His	genealogy	reveals	the	point of	truthfulness,	which	it	is	shown	to	possess	relative	to	needs	so	basic that	they	would	be	at	work	in	anything	recognisable	as	a	human	society.	It	is	with	respect	to	these	needs	that	truthfulness	proves	its	worth. 21. McGinn	(2003,	§1). of	why	we	might	have	come	to	value	the	truth	in	terms	of	the	point of valuing	the	truth.20 3. McGinn's Three Challenges and Self-Effacing Functionality Against the background of these remarks on	Williams's object and method,	we	can	turn	to	the	vindicatory	power	of	pragmatic	genealogy, its	relation	to	indirect	utilitarianism,	and	its	application	to	self-effacing functionality.	A	helpful	way	into	these	questions	is	the	critique	of	Williams's	genealogy	advanced	by	Colin	McGinn,	which	I	shall	use	as	a foil.	McGinn	not	only	highlights	the	resemblance	of	Williams's	genealogical	method	to	just	the	kind	of	utilitarianism	of	which	Williams	was an	arch-critic,	but	also	calls	into	question	the	method	of	pragmatic	genealogy	more	widely.	We	learn	much	about	the	contours	of	Williams's genealogy	by	determining	whether	it	stands	up	to	McGinn's	critique. According	to	McGinn,	Williams's	genealogy	is	vulnerable	to	the	following	three	challenges: (1)	The No Intrinsic Value Challenge:	"showing	the	function that a virtue serves can	only give it instrumental value, not intrinsic value [...]. Since Williams insists, rightly, that	truthfulness	has	an	intrinsic	value,	[...]	his	functional story	fails,	by	his	own	standards,	to	capture	that	intrinsic value;	so	it	does	nothing,	really,	to	vindicate	the	intrinsic value	of	truthfulness." 20. Belabouring	the	question	of	how	to	label	Williams's	genealogy	may	seem	to run	counter to	his	own	deep	suspicion	of labels.	He repeatedly	makes the point	that	they	stand	in	the	way	of	truthful	inquiry,	recounting	how,	after	a lecture	Ryle	had	given	in	Germany,	a	student	had	said:	"I	was	very	impressed by	your	lecture	and	would	like	to	join	your	school.	Unfortunately,	I	am	a	Kantian"	(1995c,	186;	2007,	130).	But	in	picking	out	his	target	by	the	label	of	pragmatism,	Williams inevitably risks	obscuring the	pragmatism	pervading	his own	enterprise.	It	is	in	correcting	for	this	that	the	value	of	labelling	Williams as	a	Cambridge	pragmatist	lies	-	it	derives	its	value	not,	as	one	might	think, from	the	importance	we	attach	to	labels,	but	from	the	potential	disvalue	of attaching	importance	to	labels. matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) necessity	-	a	matter	of	having	strong	instrumental	reasons	to	acquire something, given the needs and purposes one already has. Consequently,	we	might	call	it	the	condition	of	Practical Exigency.	As	for	the second	condition,	we	might	call	it	the	condition	of	Conceptual and Affective Embeddedness:	valuers	of	truthfulness	must	be	able	to	make sense	of truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	value	"from	the	inside"	(TT	91),	as	Williams put	it,	which	means	that	they	must	have	the	conceptual	and	emotional resources	necessary	for	them	to	relate	truthfulness	to	other	things	that they	value,	such	as	nobility	or	freedom	from	manipulation,	and,	crucially,	to	their	emotions.23	This	indicates	a	contextualist	conception	of intrinsic	value	that	differs	markedly	from,	for	instance,	G.	E.	Moore's conception	of intrinsic	value in	Principia Ethica (1993),	where	Moore tries	to	identify	intrinsic	goods	by	asking	whether	they	are	"such	that, if	they	existed	by themselves,	in	absolute	isolation,	we	should	yet	judge their	existence	to	be	good"	(236–7).	On	Williams's	account,	by	contrast, something	can	have	intrinsic	value	only	if	the	agent	possesses	"some materials	in	terms	of	which	he	can	understand	this	value	in	relation	to other	values	that	he	holds"	(TT	92).	Williams	mentions	the	example of	Ancient	Greece,	where	truthfulness	was	made	sense	of	in	terms	of ideas	of	honour	and	shame	(1997a,	26;	TT	115);	at	other	times,	truthfulness	was	connected	with	freedom,	absence	of	manipulation,	equality,	and	self-respect.	Merely	seeing	the	benefits	of	valuing	something intrinsically is	not	enough	actually to	do	so.	But if	both	the	Practical Exigency	and	the	Conceptual and Affective Embeddedness	conditions	hold, [...]	we	have	not	simply	adopted	an	illusion	or	a	pretence of there being an intrinsic good. In fact, if these conditions hold, that would be a very odd thing to say, implying as it does that there is something further	which would	count	as	its	really	being	an	intrinsic	good,	of	which these	conditions	offer	only	a	surrogate	or	mock-up.	If	the 23. Williams	(1973,	ch.	13).	See Goldie	(2009)	regarding	the	connection	Williams draws	between	values	and	emotions,	and	Kusch	(2009)	regarding	Williams's view	of	values	as	coming	in	socially	shared	webs	and	systems	and	as	making sense	only	in	relation	to	each	other. And	as	Williams	urges	against	the	deniers,	that	is	very	much	a	reason not	to	give	it	up. It	is	here	that	McGinn's	first	challenge	gets	a	grip.	A	pragmatic	vindication	may	be	fine	as	far	as	it	goes,	but	it	does	not	go	far	enough; showing what function something serves can give it instrumental value,	but	not	intrinsic	value;	hence,	the	genealogy	fails	to	vindicate the	idea	that	truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable.	This	is	a	line	of	argument	which	Williams	himself	acknowledges	when	he	admits	that	his considerations	only	show	that	we	need	to	treat	truthfulness	as	though it	had	intrinsic	value	-	they	do	not	and	cannot	show	that	truthfulness does	in	fact	have	intrinsic	value	(TT	90). But	what	McGinn	fails	to	see	is	that	Williams	is	not	trying	to	give truthfulness intrinsic value	-	he is trying to vindicate the intrinsic value it	already has. It is true that the	genealogy	can	only	show	that, given	certain	basic	needs,	human	beings	need	to	treat	truthfulness	as an	intrinsic	good;	but	it	does	not	follow	that	this	amounts	to	mere	pretence.	If	pragmatic	considerations	show	that	regarding	truthfulness	as an	intrinsic	good	is	instrumentally	necessary,	the	question	is	whether we	can	and	do	so	regard	it;	if	yes,	we	will	have	been	vindicated	in	doing so.	Williams	takes	the	following	two	conditions	to	be	sufficient,	albeit not	necessary,	for	X	to	be	an	intrinsic	good: It	is	necessary	(or	nearly	necessary)	for	basic	human	purposes	and	needs	that	human	beings	should	treat	X	as	an intrinsic	good. They	can	coherently	treat	X	as	an	intrinsic	good.22 The	first	thing	to	note	about	these	two	conditions	is	that	they	are	not necessary	conditions	-	Williams	is	not	committed	to	the	claim	that	all intrinsic	goods	are	goods	that	humans	need	to	treat	as	intrinsic	goods. But	he takes this to	be true	of	some	intrinsic	goods,	and	where this is	the	case,	realising	it	will	help	explain	why	they	are	intrinsic	goods. Furthermore, the necessity at issue in the first condition is	practical 22. TT	92;	also	Williams	(2006b,	ch.	8). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) applications	of	this	general	contrast	(2006a,	135).	Williams	proposes	to explain	the	notion	of	being	an	intrinsic	good	in	terms	of	people	valuing it as	an	intrinsic	good	(for	instance,	by	saying	that	an	intrinsic	good	is what	a	wise	or	rational	person	would	value	as	an	intrinsic	good),	just as	we	explain	being	an	end	in	terms	of	someone	pursuing	it	as	an	end (this is not to identify intrinsic goodness	with final goodness: some things, like	natural beauty and	works	of art, are valued intrinsically without being	pursued as ends [2006a, 135–6]).	Hence, "something is intrinsically	good if	we	need to	value it	as intrinsically	good,	and we	can	make	sense	of	our	doing	so"	(2006a,	136).	This	just	is	for	it	to fulfil the	Practical Exigency and	Conceptual and Affective Embeddedness conditions. The core of the answer to	McGinn's first challenge, then, is that functionality	is	not	supposed	to	give	truthfulness	intrinsic	value,	but to vindicate it as the intrinsic good it already is.	Williams only has to	show	that	we	need	to	value	truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	good	and that	we	can	make	sense	of	our	doing	so.	He	achieves	this	by	deriving from	more	basic	needs	a	need to	value the	dispositions	of	accuracy and	sincerity	for	their	own	sake,	and	by	tracing	out	the	connections of	truthfulness	to	others	things	we	value.	To	do	this	is	to	construct	an intrinsic	good	-	not	in	the	sense	of	creating	it	ex nihilo,	but	in	the	sense of	drawing	together	and	establishing	connections	between	considerations	that	are,	for	us,	already	there. The book thereby pursues a	wider concern	-	to show that, in a seeming paradox, "intrinsic values [...] have their uses" (TT 127). In an atmosphere dominated by	what	Williams perceives as undue "scientism",24	many	are	suspicious	of	intrinsic	values,	and	are	attracted by	theories like	utilitarianism	partly	because	these	promise	to	make sense	of	so	much	of	the	world	in	instrumental	terms,	which	can	seem like the	only	naturalistically intelligible form	of	value.	Any	such	theory	has	to	be	grounded	in	some	intrinsic	values;	but	at	least	they	are kept	to	a	minimum.	Williams,	by	contrast,	makes	us	comfortable	with 24. Williams	(2006b). conditions	are	satisfied,	then	we	shall	have	constructed	an intrinsic	good.	(TT	92) The	mistake	of	describing	Williams	as	holding that	we should treat truthfulness	as if it	were	an intrinsic	value	when	really it is	only	an instrumental	value	is	the	failure	to	notice	that	he	need	allow	no	sense to	the	term	'intrinsic	value'	except	one	in	which	it	is	true	that	truthfulness	is	an	intrinsic	value. In	order	better	to	grasp	this line	of thought, it	helps	to	step	back from	his	genealogy	for	a	moment	to	understand	the	conception	of	intrinsic	value	in	relation	to	which	Williams	develops	his	own,	which	is Christine	Korsgaard's.	Korsgaard contrasts "intrinsic"	with "extrinsic" on	the	one	hand,	and	"final"	with	"instrumental"	on	the	other	(1996, 249).	She	maintains	that	these	are	different	contrasts	between	different classes	of things. For	Williams,	however, it is	only the intrinsic/ extrinsic	contrast	which	captures	a	difference	between	things,	namely those	which	have their	value in themselves	and	those	which	derive it	from	something	else;	the	final/instrumental	contrast	distinguishes ways in	which	we	value	things,	namely	as	means	or	as	ends. Williams	derives two ideas from	Korsgaard. First, the contrast to "valuing	something	as	an	end"	should	be	a	broader	category	than	just "valuing	it	as	a	means".	It	should	be	something	like	"valuing	derivatively",	of	which	instrumental	valuing is	only	a	species	-	one	may	value going	to	the	concert	as	a	way	of	having	a	good	evening,	but	this	does not	mean that	we value it only as a	means (2006a, 122–3). Second, "intrinsic	goodness"	as	it	occurs	in	the	intrinsic/extrinsic	contrast	is	a matter	of	how	we	explain	goodness,	and in this	context,	an intrinsic good	is	one	whose	goodness	is	self-explanatory	(2006a,	124). Williams	urges	us	to	"give	up	the	unrewarding	idea	of	intrinsic	goodness	being	self-explanatory"	(2006a,	136).	Instead,	intrinsic	goodness should	be	recast	in	the	same	terms	as	the	contrast	between	final	and instrumental,	as	a	matter	of	the	way	in	which	we	value	things.	The	fundamental	contrast	then	becomes	that	between	valuing intrinsically	and valuing derivatively.	Valuing	as	an	end	and	valuing	as	a	means	are	just matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) Let us now turn to McGinn's second challenge, that Williams's functional story	constitutes	a thinly	disguised form	of	utilitarianism. This	need	not	be	problematic	in	itself,	but	it	would	be	a	problem	by Williams's	own	lights,	since	the	form	of	utilitarianism	his	vindication most closely resembles is the indirect utilitarianism he himself impugned as unstable under reflection.28 Turning	Williams's objection back	on	himself,	we	might	say	that	the	attempt	to	justify	the	disposition	to	value	truthfulness	intrinsically	on	purely	instrumental	grounds leads to a tension	between the spirit being justified and the spirit justified. Under reflection,	such	a	structure is	bound to	unravel.	This is not	for	the	reason	we	encountered	above:	that	we	need	to	be	able	to make	sense	of	the	spirit	being	justified	from	the	inside.	The	reason	it	is unstable	under	reflection	is	that	it	tries	to	combine	the	following	two incompatible	thoughts: (1)	Truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable. (2)	Truthfulness	is	only	instrumentally	valuable. Indirect	utilitarianism	typically	tries	to	relieve	the	tension	by	appealing	to	a	distinction	between	theory	and	practice:	we	might	think	(2)	in what	Joseph	Butler	called	the	"cool	hour"	of	reflection,	yet	in	the	thick of	the	action,	we	focus	firmly	on	(1).	But	on	Williams's	own	account, the	distinction	possesses	"no	saving	power"	(1995b,	165).	How	is	his own	story	any	different? One	difference	is	that	because	Williams	does	not	share	the	utilitarian's	commitment	to	there	being	only	one	really intrinsically	valuable type	of thing ("well-being" in	McGinn's	version),	Williams is free to maintain	that	the	two	thoughts	being	combined	are	really	these: (1)	Truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable. (2′)	Truthfulness	is	instrumentally	valuable. 28. Williams	and	Smart	(1973)	and	Williams	(1995b,	ch.	13;	TT	90–1;	2011,	ch.	6). intrinsic	values	-	partly	by	showing that they	can	be	made	sense	of without	deteriorating	into	pretence,	and	partly	by	showing	that	intrinsic	valuing	is	instrumentally	indispensable. Nevertheless,	there	are	limitations	to	pragmatic	genealogies'	vindicatory	force.	They	come	into	view	as	soon	as	one	asks:	A	vindication for whom?	Williams's	genealogy	yields	pragmatic reasons, individual and	collective,	to	cultivate	the	virtues	of	truthfulness,	and	shows	why, beyond	a	certain	critical	mass,	communication	will	not	survive	failure in that respect	-	there	are	only	so	many	deceivers the institution	of truthfulness	can	take.	Yet	realising	this	does	not	provide	someone	who has	a	strong	inclination	to	deceive	with	a	reason	to	desist. It	merely constitutes	an	external	justification	which	gets	no	internal	hold	on	the deceiver.25	The	thought	that if everyone were like the deceiver, he could not exist	will	only	get	a	grip,	and	turn	the	external	justification	into	an	internal	one,	to	the	extent	that	he	otherwise	shares	in	the	ethical	life,	because	this	imagined	universalisation	is	an	essentially	ethical	thought.26 The	genealogy	offers	reasons	for	those	who	already	see	truthfulness	as intrinsically	valuable	to	continue	to	do	so.	It	is	in	line	with	the	aim	Williams	formulates	for	ethical	discourse:	"not	to	control	the	enemies	of the	community	or	its	shirkers	but,	by	giving	reason	to	people	already disposed	to	hear	it,	to	help	in	continually	creating	a	community	held together	by	that	same	disposition"	(2011,	31).	The	genealogy	is	not	an instrument	of	conversion.	But	it	can	promote	self-understanding,	and thereby	strengthen	the	confidence	of	those	who	are,	in	some	measure, already	disposed	to	be	truthful.27 25. Williams	(1973,	252–3). 26. Williams's	commitment	to	reasons internalism	shines	through	here:	A	has	reason	to	φ	only	if	there	is	a	sound	deliberative	route	from	A's	subjective	motivational	set	S	to	A's	φ-ing	(Williams	2001,	91).	He	even	reads	Kant's	theory	as a limiting	case	of	reasons internalism	(1995c,	220n3). In	seeking	to	ground his	derivation	of	the	need	for	truthfulness	in	maximally	widely	shared	needs, Williams's genealogy likewise constitutes a limiting case of internalism. Thanks	to	A.	W.	Moore	for	the	pointer. 27. See	Queloz	(2018)	for	further	discussion. matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) Some	have	nevertheless	questioned	that	we	can	be	"aware	at the same time	of	the	intrinsic	quality	of	a	value	and	of	its	instrumental	quality"	(Hartmann	and	Saar	2004,	392)	in	the	way	Williams	suggests.30	Yet, upon closer inspection, his genealogy avoids this question anyway: the	instrumental	value	is	not	located	at	the	same	level	as	the	intrinsic value;	while	what	is	intrinsically	valuable	is	truthfulness	itself,	it	is	the valuing	of	truthfulness	as	intrinsically	valuable	which	is	instrumentally valuable. This act/object distinction is also crucial to answering	McGinn's third	challenge:	that	once	we	recognise	the	allegedly	"utilitarian"	nature	of	the	genealogy,	it	becomes	redundant:	a	functional	account	can be	given	directly,	without	the	developmental	story.	But	this	is	precisely what	Williams	is	at	pains	to	deny,	and	what	sets	his	genealogy	apart from	more	reductionist	forms	of	functionalism.	We	must	distinguish between:	(i)	a	purely	functional	account	of	why	we	engage	in	our	actual	practice;	(ii)	a	purely	functional	account	of	why	a	prototype	of	the practice	would	arise	in	a	state-of-nature	model;	and	(iii)	a	historically informed	account	of	why	we	engage in	our	actual	practice. It is	not entirely	clear	whether	McGinn	means	to	suggest	that	if	we	do	(i),	then (ii)	and	(iii)	are	redundant;	or	that	if	we	do	(ii),	then	(iii)	is	redundant. But	either	way,	Williams	disagrees,	since	his	position	is	that	(i)	is	misguided	and	that	both	(ii)	and	(iii)	are	required. Williams	takes	(i),	the	purely	functional	account	of	why	we	engage in	our	actual	practice,	to	be	misguided.	One	may	well	be	impressed	by the	functionality	of	many	practices,	and	it	is	accordingly	tempting	to conclude	that	the	motives	upholding	them	are	themselves	functional or	instrumental	motives.	But,	for	Williams,	this	would	be	a	mistake:	"In relation	to	institutions,	practices,	expectations,	and	values	that	actually	exist,	of	justice,	promise-keeping,	truthfulness,	and	so	on,	functional accounts	are	simply	false;"	it	is	"just	not	true",	he	continues,	"that	the 30. Hartmann	and	Saar	take	Williams	to	be	reacting	to	what	they	perceive	as	a problem	by	integrating	"an	instrumental	component	[...]	into	the	very	definition	of	intrinsicness",	i.e.	maintaining	that	"'intrinsic'	just	means	'non-egocentric'	or	'not	merely	self-interested'"	(2004,	393).	I	offer	a	different	reading	of Williams's	conception	of	intrinsic	value	above. On	the	indirect	utilitarian	account,	the	recognition	of	truthfulness's	instrumental	value	is	achieved	at	the	cost	of	its	intrinsic	value.	But	with (2′), there is	no longer	a	contradiction, since the instrumental	value ascribed	is	not	exclusive.	The	recognition	of instrumental	value	coexists	harmoniously	with	that	of intrinsic	value. Another	difference is that	while	Williams	offers	a two-level	view that is	structurally	similar	to	indirect	utilitarianism,	the	repartition	of the justificatory weight	across	the	two	levels	of	the	utilitarian,	(1)	and (2), is	very	different from	its repartition	across	Williams's two levels, (1)	and	(2′).	The	indirect	utilitarian	can	agree	that	people's	motivations in	being	truthful	should	be	that	truthfulness	is	a	good	thing	in	its	own right,	but	what	really justifies	thinking	in	this	way	is	the	consideration, offered	at	the	more	reflective	second	level,	that	this	is	ultimately	more conducive	to	well-being.	For	Williams,	by	contrast,	the	bulk	of	the	justificatory	weight	lies	on	the	first	level:	the	fact	that	truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable	carries	more	authority	than	the	fact	that	things	go better	if	we	think	this	way.	The	latter	fact	yields	in	the	first	instance	an explanation rather	than	a	justification,	even	if	a	vindicatory	one. The	propensity	to	conceive	of	intrinsic	and	instrumental	value	as mutually	exclusive	is	not	specific	to	utilitarianism.	It	also	manifests	itself	in	the	view	that	there	is	nothing	more	to	be	said	about	a	good	once we	have	recognised	its intrinsic	value	-	it is	valuable,	and	that	is	all. On	this	view,	an	explanation	that	exhibits	truthfulness's	instrumental relations	to	other,	less	refined	values	will	appear	to	besmear	it	-	to	imply	that	truthfulness	has	no	intrinsic	value	(really).	Once	again,	however, this	appears	so	only if	we	conceive	of the	distinction	between intrinsic	and	instrumental	as	an	exclusive	one:	either	we	make	sense of	a	value	on	its	own	terms,	which	we	treat	as	irreducible,	or	we	view	it purely	as	a	means	to	an	end	and	reduce	its	value	to	that	of	something else.29	But	this	sets	up	a	false	dichotomy.	Nothing	forces	us	to	choose, and	once	one	rids	oneself	of	the	exclusive	conception,	it	becomes	evident	that	myriad	things	unite	both	aspects. 29. Williams	(1997a,	24;	TT	90). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) motives	do	these	movements	of limbs	become	recognisable	as	practices.	And	when	these	reasons	and	motives	make	no	reference	to	the practice's functionality, the	attempt to	explain the	practice in	purely functional	terms	will	appear	to	distort	the	practice,	to	mistake	it	for	a pastiche	version	marked	by	single-minded instrumentalism. If there is	something	functional	about	a	practice	which	is	not	understood	in functional	terms,	we	must	find	a	place	for	functionality	within	an	explanation	which	holds	on	both	to	the	practice	and	to	the	non-functional	understanding	of	it. Second,	the	state-of-nature	model itself	reveals	that	the	presence of	non-instrumental	motivations	to	be	truthful	is	one	of	the	functional requirements	on	the	practice	of	truthfulness,	which	means	that	the	functionality	of truthfulness cannot	be accounted for in	purely functional terms. Instrumental	motives for being truthful cannot render the practice	stable	enough	to	fulfil	its	function:	the	instrumental	value	of accuracy, to	some	extent,	but to	a	greater	degree	that	of	sincerity, is largely	a	value	for others.	A	functionally	motivated	practice	of	truthfulness	would	therefore	be	overly	vulnerable	to	free	riders.	The	practice of	truthfulness	can	be	stable,	and	possess	instrumental	value,	only insofar	as	it	is	intrinsically	motivated.	It	needs	to	outgrow	its	functionality in	order	to	be	functional,	which	is	to	say	that	it	needs	to	be	driven	by non-functional	motives.	And	once	these	are	effective,	they	may	well possess	more	authority than	the functional	motives for	having those non-functional	motives. What	Williams's	genealogy	shows	is	that	while	truthfulness	needs to	be	sustained	by	non-instrumental	motives,	awareness	of	the	instrumental or functional	motives for engaging in truthfulness is not required.	No	instrumental	valuing	of	truthfulness	is	needed	to	reap	its instrumental	value.	(2′)	might	however	be	read	this	way,	so	to	preempt this	reading,	the	genealogy	is	best	represented	as	issuing	in	the	following	two	beliefs: dispositions	of	truthfulness	that	we	have,	or	that	anyone	else	has	had, can	be	adequately	explained	in	functional	terms"	(TT	34–5).	Because pure	functionalism	only	traces	out	instrumental	reasons	for	action,	it misses	both	the	fact	that	something's	being	a	form	of	truthfulness	also constitutes	a	new reason for action,	and	that	this	must	be	so	if	the	practice is to be functional. By focusing	only on the instrumental value, an explanation	of truthfulness in purely functional terms	misses its intrinsic	value,	and	it	misses	the	functional	connection	between	the instrumental	and	the intrinsic	value.31	Moreover,	a	purely functional analysis	is	also	blind	to	whatever	non-functional	aspects	truthfulness has	acquired in the	course	of its	history.	Cultural	variation	between groups	and	cultures implies that even if certain functional relations were the same	across these	variations, truthfulness	would	nevertheless also have been shaped	by different contingencies in each case. What	truthfulness	needs	to	be	is	only	a	very	partial	guide	to	what	it actually	is. Can	the	pure functionalist	not	shrug this	off	by	saying that	he is simply	not	interested	in	these	non-functional	aspects?	I	think	not,	because	I	take	Williams's	claim	to	be	that	the	non-functional	aspects	of the	practice are essential both to its individuation and to an	understanding	of	its	functionality. First,	the	non-functional	aspects	of	a	practice	can	be	completely	ignored	only	at	the	cost	of	treating	the	participants'	understanding	of	the practice	as	external	to	it,	as	a	mere	epiphenomenon.	But,	for	Williams, we	cannot	treat	the	understanding	of	the	practice	as	epiphenomenal while	retaining	the	practice	as	an	object	of	investigation,	because	that understanding	is	integrally related	to	the	practice	itself.32	If	we	tried	to pick	out	the	practice	without	covertly	having	recourse	to	its	interpretation	by the	practitioners,	all	we	would	be left	with	are	sets	of	motions	whose	classification	into	distinguishable	practices	would	seem arbitrary.	Only	when	interpreted	as	expressions	of	certain	reasons	and 31. This	is	illuminatingly	brought	out	by	Craig	(2007,	200). 32. See	Moran	(2016,	322–4). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) has in fact	outgrown	the	purely instrumental	prototype.	We	can	call this	the	phenomenon	of	self-effacing functionality: Self-Effacing Functionality: The practice is functional, but only insofar as it is sustained	by	motives	that	are	autonomous,	i.e.	not	conditional	on the	practice's functionality in	any	given	case.	The practice	must	outrun	its	functionality	in	order	to	be	functional.	When	this	condition	is	met,	the	functionality	of	the practice	will	be	either	secondary	or	entirely	absent	from the	participants'	minds	as	they	engage	in	it,	but for functional reasons.	In	this	sense,	the	functionality	is	self-effacing. More	precisely,	a	practice	is	self-effacingly	functional	only	if	it	meets the	following	conditions: (a)	Functionality:	the	practice	is	functional,	i.e.	it	makes	a useful	difference	to	the	lives	of	those	who	engage	in	it; (b)	Autonomy: the practice is sustained by	motives that are	not	conditional	on	its	functionality	in	any	given	case; (c)	Dependence: the	practice	can	be	functional	only insofar as	it	satisfies	(b),	i.e.	it	would	be	unstable,	redundant,	or otherwise	ineffective	if	sustained	merely	by	motives	conditional	on	functionality	in	any	given	case;	and (d)	Explanatory Connection:	the	practice	fulfils	(b)	because of	(c),	i.e.	there	is	an	explanatory	connection	between	its autonomy	and	its	dependence	on	autonomy. We can call this the FADE structure: Functionality, Autonomy, Dependence, and an Explanatory connection between the latter two. Functionality	will	indeed	fade	from	view	in	a	practice	which	exhibits this	structure,	overshadowed	or	completely	eclipsed	by	autonomous (1)	Truthfulness	is	intrinsically	valuable. (2′′)	The	attitude	expressed	in	(1)	is	instrumentally	related to	certain	human	needs	if	widely	shared	and	known	to	be shared. It	is	only	the fact that	we	value	truthfulness	intrinsically	which	is	shown to	have	instrumental	value,	even	if	we	never	value	truthfulness	instrumentally.	The	genealogy	relates	"a	value	which	gives	us	some	reasons for action to other reasons for action	which [...]	we have 'anyway'" (Williams	2000,	160)	-	but	while	the	relation	between	them	is	an	instrumental relation, the reasons for action are not instrumental reasons.	It	is	by	being	"bloody-minded	rather	than	benefit-minded"	(TT 59) that	we reap the	benefits,	and the	genealogy	helps	explain	why this	must	be	so. This	puts	even	more	distance	between	Williams's	genealogy	and the	problem	of reflective instability.	The	genealogical account	finds in truthfulness	an instrumental	value	which	derives solely from the intrinsic	valuing	of	it.	Functionality	is	not	part	of	the	content	of	the	motives,	but	is	possessed	by	them.33	Functionality	helps	explain	why	we value	what	we	value,	but	it	is	what	we	value	which	motivates	and	justifies	what	we	do. This is	why	we should	opt for genealogy in the form	of (ii), the application	of	the	purely	functional	apparatus	to	an	abstract	model	of truthfulness,	if	we	are	neither	to	overemphasise	nor	to	overlook	functionality. State-of-nature genealogy is called for when dealing with a	practice	that	needs	to	outgrow	its	own	functionality	in	order	to	be functional,	i.e.	that	needs	to	be	sustained	by	motives	that	do	not	refer to	its	functionality.	Applying	the	purely	functional	apparatus	to	a	prototypical	version	of	the	practice	and	seeing	its	inability	to	account	for the	practice's	functionality	enables	us	to	understand	why	the	practice 33. Craig's reading of	Williams, by contrast, seems to retain the idea of "functional	motivations"	(2007,	200). matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) uses	without	the	insight	into	the	use	leading	us	to	lose	our	grip	on	the intrinsic	value	(TT	93). What	about	(iii),	the	part	of	the	genealogy	which	involves	itself	in history?	On the interpretation	offered	here, it is required	because	a priori reflection	can	take	us	only	so	far:	from	highly	general	demands on	human	beings to	a schematic	understanding	of	what is required to	meet	these	demands;	but	to	cover	the	remaining	distance	between what	should	be	the	case	and	what	is	actually	the	case,	we	need	to	take more socio-historically local developments into account.	While the model	shows	that	truthfulness	needs	to	be	valued	intrinsically,	it	cannot	help	us	specify	the	material	needed	to	do	so.	History	is	required to	understand	the	ideas	in	terms	of	which	we	came	to	make	sense	of truthfulness.	Moreover, these ideas are the products of various historical	forces,	and	their	contingent	historical	extensions	and	elaborations	cannot	be	anticipated	a priori.	Generic	needs	cannot	account	for the	extension	of truthfulness to the	distant	past around the time	of Thucydides	(TT	ch.	7),	or	for	the	fashioning	of	Sincerity	into	the	ideal of	personal	authenticity	in	the	course	of	the	Romantic	era	(TT	ch.	8). Here	we	need	to	draw	on	a	historical	understanding	of	the	more	local needs that came to	bear	on truthfulness.	This is the	point at	which "philosophy,	in	order	to	do	its	business,	must	move	into	history"	(TT 173).	This	is	not	to	say	that	genealogy	becomes "history,	correctly	practiced"	(Nehamas	1985,	246n1).34	Williams	denies	that	what	he	is	offering	is	anything	like	the	historian's	craft;	he	wants	only	to	"mention	a few	of the	historical	divergences"	and	to	"trace	some	features	of the structure	that	give	rise	to	the	variations"	(TT	95)	of	the	prototype	of truthfulness	outlined	in	the	State	of	Nature.	Finally,	the	state-of-nature story	gives	us	only	a	prima facie	reason	to	continue	to	value	truthfulness intrinsically. Certain incentive structures	-	for instance, in a society systematically rewarding truthfulness	with	material	benefits	-	could 34. This	understanding	of	genealogy	as	a	species	of	history	is	endorsed	by	Geuss	(1999,	22–3),	Owen	(2007,	143),	Merrick	(2009),	and	Migotti	(2016).	See Queloz	(2017a)	for	a	more	general	discussion	of	what,	on	Williams's	account, engaging	with	history	can	do	for	us. motives carrying more authority than instrumental considerations. The	FADE	structure	helps	explain	why	this	state	of	affairs	is	not	just	a matter	of	historical	accident,	but	grounded	in	solid	functional	reasons. The	FADE	structure	is	not	the	same	as	the	structure	familiar	from Critical	Theory,	where	awareness	of	a	practice's functionality is radically incompatible	with full-blooded engagement in it.	With self-effacingly	functional	practices,	the	point	is	only	that	the	functionality	of the	practice	is	not	in	itself	enough	to	sustain	it,	and	so	it	is	a	functional requirement	on	the	practice	that there	be	non-instrumental	motives for engaging in it.	This	need	not	mean that	becoming	aware	of the instrumental	motives	for	engaging	in	the	practice	has	a	destabilising effect, as	Williams's own example of truthfulness shows. Note also that	we	are	only	dealing	with	self-effacing functionality	when	the	functionality	of	the	practice	depends	on	there	being	non-functional	motives, and	when	there	is	an	explanatory connection	between	this	fact	and	the non-functional	motives	sustaining it.	This	distinguishes	self-effacing functionality from	practices	which fulfil conditions (a) and (b) only because	the	participants	fail	to	realise	the	practice's	functionality	and engage in it because they have been taught to do so. It also distinguishes it from	practices	which fulfil conditions (a) and (b) and	do so for functional reasons, but	which are in principle sustainable by instrumental	motives	alone:	we	eat	sweet	fruit	not	just	because	doing so	serves	some	further	end,	such	as	our	health,	but	because	we	like	to eat	sweet	fruit;	this	intrinsic	liking	for	sweet	fruit	might	well	turn	out to	have	functional	origins;	but	if	we	suddenly	ceased	to	like	sweet	fruit, the	practice	would	not	necessarily	break	down;	it	could	be	sustained by	instrumental	concerns	alone.	Hence,	the	functionality	of	the	practice	is	not	truly	self-effacing,	but	only	contingently	effaced.	In	sum:	a practice is self-effacingly functional if it is functional	but	we	do	not do	it	for	its	functionality,	and	it	is	functional	only	because	we	do	not do	it	for	its	functionality.	As	Thomas	Nagel	notes,	this	is	"a	common feature	of	ethical	norms,	from	promise-keeping	to	property	rights	to the	rule	of	law"	(2009,	132).	Genealogy	is	uniquely	suited	to	describing	self-effacing	functionality.	It	shows	that	intrinsic	values	have	their matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) which	allow	us	to	answer	distinctively	philosophical	concerns	about truthfulness:	What is the point of truthfulness? How does it relate to the rest	of	human	psychology?	What	other ideas	and	values is it tied	up	with?	And	once	all	this	becomes	transparent	to	us,	should	we continue	to	cultivate	it?	These	are	the	questions	to	which	Williams's genealogy	forms	the	answer.	The	questions,	in	that	combination,	are clearly those	of	philosophy	before they	are those	of	any	other	discipline;	and	as	Williams	learned	from	Collingwood,	our	understanding of	the	questions	should	guide	our	understanding	of	the	answers.36 Conclusion: The Wider Significance of Williams's Genealogy Williams's genealogy can thus be defended against McGinn's challenges	on	all	fronts.	It	vindicates	truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	value	and, in	the	process,	makes	clear	what	this	means;	it	is	not	a	form	of	indirect utilitarianism,	but	differs	from	it	in	just	the	way	required	to	avoid	the problem	of	instability	under	reflection;	and	its	functionalist	elements do	not	render the	genealogical	elements	redundant,	but	rather	combine	with them to	make sense	of	why truthfulness	must	outgrow	a state	of	mere	functionality.	By	way	of	conclusion,	I	would	like	to	consider	the	wider	significance	of	this	genealogy	in	the	light	of	Williams's conception	of	what	philosophy	should	aim	for. The	"principal	aim	of	all	moral	philosophy",	Williams	maintains,	is that	"of	truthfully	understanding	what	our	ethical	values	are	and	how they	are	related	to	our	psychology,	and	making,	in	the	light	of	that	understanding,	a	valuation	of	those	values"	(1995a,	581).	We	can	now	see that	Williams's	genealogical	method	is	directly	subservient	to	this	aim. It	helps	us	make	sense	of	our	values	as	responses	to	more	basic	human needs;	and	it	facilitates	a	valuation	of	them	by	helping	us	determine the	extent	to	which	they	have	helped	us	to	live.	This	is	not	the	sort	of valuation	which	yields	ethical	truths	directly	-	it	does	not,	for	instance, tell	us	whether	to	be	truthful	in	a	given	situation.	The	general	insights it	yields	are	that	certain	basic	features	of	human	psychology	demand 36. Williams	(2006b,	ch.	24). in principle discharge the function performed by the intrinsic valuing.35	Historical	developments	can	both	add	to	and	subtract	from	our reasons	to	value	truthfulness,	both	generically	and	in	specific	areas. Williams	acknowledges	this	when	he	writes	that	there	is	no	one	reason	to	value	truthfulness	(TT	263–5),	and	his	genealogy's	involvement in	history	serves	to	do	justice	to	this	idea.	The	state-of-nature	considerations	indicate	one	widely	shared	instrumental	reason	to	value	truthfulness	intrinsically,	but	the	later	parts	of	the	book	point	to	other	reasons,	more	closely	tied	up	with	our	history	and	our	own	ideals,	such as	the	ideals	of	liberalism.	While	the	instrumental	reasons	laid	out	in the	State	of	Nature	do	not	give	us	a	reason	to	prefer	truthfulness	about the	distant	past	over	myth, for	example, liberalism	does.	Liberalism, on	Williams's	view,	both	enables	and	encourages	truthful	history;	but it	also	specially	needs	it.	This	may	seem	like	a	joke,	given	that	truthful history tends to	soak in	suspicion large	parts	of the	progressive	narratives	liberalism	tells	about	itself.	But,	for	Williams,	liberalism	is	ultimately	kept	afloat	by	the	liberalism	of	fear,	and	the	fear	in	question	is fuelled	by	historical	consciousness	of	past	atrocities.	It	is	in	this	sense that	liberals	have	a	special	reason	to	prefer	truthful	history	over	myth. We	should	be	wary	of	reading	Williams's	genealogy	as	superimposing, in the form	of	(ii)	and	(iii), the	products	of	different	disciplines, such	as	game	theory	and	historiography.	This	would	rightly	invite	concerns	-	voiced	by	Rorty (2002) and	echoed	by	Koopman (2013, 70– 1)	-	about	how	such	disparate	elements	could	coherently	be	stitched together.	We	should	see	pragmatic	genealogy	instead	as	an	exercise in	philosophical	model-building	which,	while	informed	by	other	disciplines,	responds	to	concerns	that	are	recognisably	those	of	philosophy.	A	pragmatic	genealogy	is	a	dynamic	model	starting	out	from	an abstract	representation	of	a	basic	predicament	which	is	then	gradually de-idealised	in	the	direction	of	our	actual	situation	by	tracing	out	how it	might	develop	in	response	to	generic	and	local	needs.	The	purpose	of such	a	genealogy	is	to	render	perspicuous	those	formative	influences 35. Thanks	to	an	anonymous	reviewer	for	pressing	me	on	this	point. matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) genealogical reflection, giving it a bill of health. Yet it derives additional	significance	from	two	further	facts. One	is that	truthfulness is	a	thick concept	-	a	concept	that is	both world-guided	and	action-guiding.	Thick	concepts	offer	both	more	and less stability than thin ones like good and right. They offer	more stability insofar	as they	help	stabilise the	practice they	are involved in by	rendering	judgements	straightforwardly	true	(2011,	222).	Yet	thick concepts	also	offer	less	stability	insofar	as	they	are	particularly	liable to be unseated by reflection. Reflecting on a thick concept,	we are more	likely	to	find	considerations	that	lead	us	to	cease	to	live	by	that concept (1995c, 207). Truthfulness's being stable under reflection is therefore	specially	significant	in	showing	that	there	are	thick	concepts capable	of	surviving	reflective	scrutiny.	This	invites	us	to	identify	more such	concepts	through	further	genealogical	inquiry. Finally, the	other fact from	which	a	genealogy	that	takes	truthfulness	as	its	object	derives	special	significance	is	that	truthfulness	is	a driving	force	of	genealogical	reflection	itself.	In	exhibiting	truthfulness as	stable	under	such	reflection,	Williams	demonstrates	that	genealogical	reflection	will	not	peck	into	the	dust	the	tree	that	supports	it.	This is	a	markedly	different	result	from	that	of	his	great	predecessor	as	a genealogist	of truthfulness,	Nietzsche.	Nietzsche	denounced the	unconditional	will	to	truth	fostered	by	Protestant	Christianity	as	doomed to	erode	its	own	basis.37 Truth and Truthfulness,	by	contrast,	shows	us that	the	roots	of	our	sense	of	the	value	of	truth	reach	far	deeper.	While the	application	of	the	virtues	of	truth	to	various	areas	depends	on	continual	cultivation, these	virtues	are	also	firmly	anchored	in	basic	human	needs	-	they	derive	their	point	from	the	need	to	gain	and	share information.	The	upshot	is	a	combination	of	encouragement	and	admonition;	encouragement	because	it	suggests	that	truthfulness	is	capable	of	withstanding	its	own	scrutiny,	and	thus	of	providing	a	stable basis from	which to engage in genealogical reflection	more	widely; 37. Nietzsche	(1998,	III,	§27).	But	even	Nietzsche	does	not	think	we	should	give up on truthfulness altogether. See Queloz (2017b, manuscript) for discussions	of	the	continuities	between	Nietzsche's	views	and	Williams's. that	certain	dispositions	or	concepts	be	present	in	society	in	some	form, while	leaving	it	open	which	form	this	should	be.	This	does	not	mean that	one	can	then	reason	one's	way	from	the	insights	into	the	practical necessity	of	having those	dispositions to the	beliefs involved in having those	dispositions.	The	beliefs involved in	having these	dispositions	are	not	typically	beliefs	about	dispositions,	but	about	the	social world.	Yet	such	a	genealogy	can	show	us	that	there	is	good	reason	for us to live	a life that involves	certain	conceptual	and	evaluative	practices.	It	does	not	demonstrate	the	truth	of	statements	made	using	these concepts; it	only	vindicates the	disposition to accept these	statements. Moreover,	the	vindication	it	offers	is	addressed	only	to	those	already disposed	to	treat	truthfulness	as	an	intrinsic	value,	who	already	possess	the	material	necessary	to	making	sense	of	it	as	such.	Genealogy does	not	convert	shirkers,	but	it	can	strengthen	wavering	confidence. The importance	of	strengthening	our	confidence in	our	concepts and	values	emerges	when	we	consider	together	two	of	Williams's	central convictions: that	we	should	aim for truthful self-understanding; but	that	our	ideas	are	unlikely	always	to	survive	truthful	scrutiny.	Williams	holds	that	ethical	thought,	in	particular,	"should	stand	up	to	reflection" and "its institutions and	practices should	be capable	of becoming	transparent"	(2011,	222);	yet	he	is	also	inclined	to	agree	with Nietzsche's	diagnosis	of	the	condition	of	modernity	as	"one	in	which we, at once, have a morality which is seriously unstable under genealogical	explanation;	are	committed	(by	that	very	morality,	among other	things)	to	transparency;	and	find	very	little	to	hand	in	the	way	of an	alternative"	(2000,	160).	As	Williams	had	already	put	it	nearly	two decades	earlier,	in	response	to	the	assumption	of	much	ethical	theory that	we	have	too	many	ethical	ideas:	"Our	major	problem	now	is	actually	that	we	have	not	too	many	but	too	few,	and	we	need	to	cherish	as many	as	we	can"	(2011,	130). Part	of	the	wider	significance	of	Williams's	vindicatory	genealogy of	truthfulness	thus	derives	from	the	contribution	it	makes	to	the	cherishing	of	our	ethical	ideas:	it	shows	one	such	idea	to	be	stable	under matthieu	queloz Williams's Pragmatic Genealogy and Self-Effacing Functionality philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	18,	no.	17	(september	2018) Fricker,	Miranda.	1998.	"Rational	Authority	and	Social	Power:	Towards a	Truly	Social	Epistemology."	Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society	98 (2):	159–177. Geuss,	Raymond.	1999.	"Nietzsche	and	Genealogy."	In	Morality, Culture and History,	1–28.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Goldie,	Peter.	2009.	"Thick	Concepts	and	Emotion."	In	Reading Bernard Williams,	edited	by	Daniel	Callcut,	94–109.	London:	Routledge	& Kegan	Paul. Hacking,	Ian.	2004.	"Critical	Notice."	Canadian Journal of Philosophy	34 (1):	137–148. Hall,	Edward.	2014.	"Contingency,	Confidence,	and	Liberalism	in	the Political	Thought	of	Bernard	Williams." 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