er view and some of the very ; its statement have involved. OFFICES AND GOD

Philip Hugly and Charles Saywood

University ofNebraska, Lincoln, U.S.A Here is Anselm's Proslogion III argument: [That than which a greater cannot be thought] exists so truly [really] that it cannot even be thought not to exist. For there can be thought to exist something whose non-existence is inconceivable; and this thing is greater than anything whose non-existence is conceivable. Therefore, if that than which a greater cannot be thought could be thought not to exist, then that than which a greater cannot be thought would not be that than which a greater cannot be thought--a contradiction. ([1], p. 94) In [2] Pavel Tich presents an interpretation of this argument and raises doubts about one ofthe premises. We contend that TichY's interpretation of Anselm is wrong. The argument Tichy comes to raise doubts about isn't Anselm's. I TichY's argument is founded on these propositions ([2], p. 415-416); (A) An individual office that instantiates necessary existence is greater than any other that does not. Let 'H' abbreviate 'that than which a greater cannot be conceived'. (B) Necessary existence is a requisite of H. (C) H is occupied. (0) The occupant of H exemplifies necessary existence. (A) plus the assumption that there are individual offices that enjoy necessary existence is said to entail (B). (B) and (C) are said to entail (D). (D) is supposed to correspond to Anselm's 29 conclusion that a being than which nothing greater can be conceived cannot be conceived not to exist; i.e., God necessarily exists. i The terminology needs to be explained in familiar terms. Tichy nowhere explicitly defines 'individual-office' but an examination of Section I of his paper will bear out the following analysis: An individual-office is a property 0 of individuals such that for each possible world wand time t at most one individual is 0 in w at t. An individual a occupies an individual-office 0 in a possible world w at a time t iff a alone is 0 in w at t. An individual-office is total iff, for every wand t, some individual a occupies 0 in w at t. An individual-office enjoys necessary existence iff it is total. A second-order office is any property A of properties of individuals such that, for each wand t, at most one individual-office is A in w at t. H is a second-order office. Existence is a second-order property. In what follows Greek letters range over individual offices, > is the second order greater-than relation, T is the second order property being total. The argument Tichy ascribes to Anselm is founded on these propositions: PI. (3$) ('1') '1'1- $

At least one individual office is surpassed by no individual

office. .

At least one individual office is total, i.e., always occupied in

every possible world.

If $ is always occupied in every possible world and 'I' isn't, 4>

is greater than '1'.

At most one individual office is unsurpassed.

P3 is equivalent to TichY's premise (A). P2 is equivalent to the thesis Tichy uses to derive (B) from (A). PI and P4 are equivalent to the two theses Tichy uses to derive (C): 30 30 an which nothing greater can be lceived not to exist; i.e., God to be explained in familiar terms. defines 'individual-office' but an of his paper will bear out the lividual-office is a property f2I of lch possible world wand time t at 'J) at t. An individual a occupies an ible world w at a time t iff a alone I-office is total iff, for every wand :)s f2I in w at t. An individual-office ff it is total. any property A of properties of or each wand t, at most one at t. H is a second-order office. property. , letters range over individual er greater-than relation, T is the , total. ;cribes to Anselm is founded on ice is surpassed by no individual :e is total, i.e., always occupied in ~1/»'lfJ 'Very possible world and 'If isn't, I/> x::t'lf* -7 $ 'If] e is unsurpassed. 's premise (A). P2 is equivalent to :rive (B) from (A). PI and P4 are i Tichy uses to derive (C): First [Anselm] argues that some individual-offices or "natures" are surpassed by no others .. Secondly, he argues that there cannot be more than one such nature. ([2J, p. 416). What can be derived from PIP4? This proposition: Exactly one individual office is unsurpassed and it is always occupied in every world. We think (E) is equivalent to Tichy's (D). For Tichy cashes out his (C) ('H is occupied') in this way: "there is a unique individual office than which a greater individual office cannot be conceived". ([2J, p. 416). :rhis corresponds to (31/» [(a) a} I/> t\ ('If)«a) a:} 'If -7 I/> 'If)]. (B) says that unique individual-office is total. Putting these together yields our (E). Now it is clear that (E) does not capture Anselm's Proslogion III conclusion, which says that that than which a greater cannot be thought cannot be conceived not to exist, i.e., God necessarily exists. (E) says there is exactly one individual office <jl such that I/> is greater than all other individual offices and, for any possible world wand time t, there is an individual a which occupies I/> in w at t. In so far as one can translate Anselm in terms of individual-offices at all, Anselm surely wants a stronger conclusion than that. He would want (F) There is exactly one individual office $ greater than all others and some individual a such that for every world wand time t, a occupies <jl in w at t. But (F) does not follow from PlP4. ITI According to Tichy, Anselm asserted PI and P4 as conclusions of arguments in Monologion IV, asserted P3 in Proslogion III, and considered P2 too obvious to warrant 31 argument. Anselm's Proslogion III argument is fairly represented by (A) - (D) only if each of these claims is correct. Each of these claims depends on TichY's implicit identification of Anselm's beings with natures, and TichY's further identification of Anselm's natures with individual offices. The latter identification is not plausible. Tichy cites the following passage from Monologion IV as evidence for his ascription of P4 to Anselm: Assume [he says] that they are many and equal ... [T]hey cannot be equal through different things but only through the same thing ., . [But then] they would be less than that through which they are great. For whatever is greater through another is less than that other through which it is great. Therefore, they would not be so great that nothing else is greater than they. ([2], p. 416) . Tichy correctly interprets the term 'thing'as referring to natures. Under this interpretation the argument in the passage comes to this: I I (1) If two or more natures are equally greater, then there is another nature distinct from each through which each-is greater. I (2) Any nature through which another nature is greater is

greater than that nature. i

(3) Thus, there is at most one nature such that no nature

is greater than it.

Tichy identifies P4 with the conclusion of this argument.

What is the through relation and what are the terms of that relation? Anselm's answer is platonic. "For whatever things are said to be just, when compared one with another, whether equally, or more, or less, cannot be understood as just, except through the quality of justness, which is not one thing in one instance, and another in another." (Monologion 1) If a pair of properties are equally greater, then there is a form (nature) through which (by participation in which) each is greater. Following this line of interpretation, for each nature n which is a nature ofindividuals, if n is greater then there is another nature of natures of individuals N through which n is greater. Recasting these ideas in terms of offices I 32 32 ')siogion III argument is fairly ly if each of these claims is correct. s depends on TichY's implicit beings with natures, and TichY's mselm's natures with individual ltion is not plausible. g passage from Monologion IV as )f P4 to Anselm: lat they are many and equal ... lual through different things but ne thing ... [But then] they would lrough which they are great. For through another is less than that it is great. Therefore, they would nothing else is greater than they. ts the term 'thing'as referring to rpretation the argument in the 'es are equally greater, then there istinct from each through which ¥hich another nature is greater is :t one nature such that no nature conclusion of this argument. ,n and what are the terms of that is platonic. "For whatever things l compared one with another, or less, cannot be understood as ality of justness , which is not one mother in another." (Monologion e equally greater, then there is a b (by participation in which) each line of interpretation, for each )f individuals, ifn is greater then latures of individuals N through ng these ideas in terms of offices we see that no individual office can be greater through another individual office. Rather an individual office can be greater only through some second order office or some second order property. So we can at most take the natures of which Anselm speaks to be offices and not just individual offices. But then the conclusion, (3), of Anselm's Monologion IV argument is the conclusion that there is at ~ost one greatest office, in which case P4 is not an item asserted by Anselm. Further, if we replace P4 by (x)(y) [(z) z:lx A (z)} y • 4 X = y] where the variables now range over all offices, (E) no longer follows. I IVI

I The closest Anselm comes to asserting P2, as a premise in his argument, is when he asserts, as part of his Proslogion III argument, this proposition: I I (i) [T]here can be thought to exist something whose nonexistence is inconceivable. Supposing that the beings here referred to are individual-offices and that what cannot be conceived not to exist necessarily exists, (i) comes to I (ii) There can be thought to be individual-offices enjoying necessary existence. But (ii) and P2 plainly differ and, further, P2 does not follow from (ii). It thus appears that P2 does not correspond to anything Anselm premised in his krgument. Now, P2, put in Anselm's terms, comes to this: P2' There are beings which cannot be conceived not to exist. To this Anselm would assent, for God is, he holds, such a being. But Anselm also holds ~hat God alone cannot be conceived not to exist (cf. the Appendix to Monoiogion, Chapter IV). Thus, the only ar~ment which Anselm could have given for P2' would have been precisely his Proslogion III argument extended by one existential generalization. I 33 I I ! I Thus, had the Proslogion III argument premised P2' it would have been flatly circular. But ~t isn't. References II [lJ Jasper Hopkins and Herbert W. Richardson, eds. & trans., Anselm ofCanterbury, Vol. I (London: SCM Press, 1974). ' I I [2] Pavel Tichy, "Existence and God" Journal of Philosophy, vo1. LXXVI, August 1979, 403-420.