The Perception of Virtue forthcoming in, The Epistemology of Non--‐visual Perception. Eds. B. Brogaard and D. Gratzia. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Jennifer Matey Introduction It is good to be virtuous. But there are different types of virtues. They differ in the types of ends they are valued relative to. For example, whereas compassion is widely taken to be a moral virtue in terms of which one might judged to be a good person, open--‐mindedness is valued for making one a good knower. Other virtues, like persistence, can't easily be categorized as either moral or epistemic because they make us both good persons and good knowers. I'm interested in a different kind of case in which virtues count as both moral and epistemic. In the case I am interested in, virtues that are more often thought to be moral virtues turn out to also play a special kind of epistemic role. Having good character, I want to show, can make one a better perceiver and in turn a better knower. The specific type of knowledge that I'm interested in is knowledge about another person's character. I want to show that cultivating virtuous moral character can make us better perceivers of the moral character of others. One way to be a better perceiver of something involves being better at seeing it in terms of the qualities that are distinctive of it qua the type of thing that it is. Virtues are character traits that are set apart from other character traits at least in part by the fact that they have positive value. Insofar as a trait like courage is a virtue then, part of what it is to be courageous is to have a valuable trait. Here, I argue that emotions play a perceptual or quasi--‐perceptual role in representing virtue and the structure of our character helps us to have the right emotional responses to the virtuous character of others. The argument is developed in four stages. Section one presents the view that emotions give us a kind of perceptual or quasi--‐perceptual access to evaluative properties. Section two discusses the specific category of esteeming emotions, which some philosophers have argued represent that toward which they are felt as having positive value. Some studies show that we esteem people when we recognize that they have virtuous character traits. Assuming that virtuous character traits are traits that have positive value, in esteeming in respect of good character we represent those character traits to be virtues. Section three grounds this in a realist account of value that is consistent with a naturalist account of the perception of that value. Sections four and five discuss the epistemic role that the perceiver's character can play in their ability to perceive virtue. 2 1. Emotion and perception Emotion and perception share enough relevant similarities that some propose emotion to be a type of perceptual or quasi--‐perceptual state.1 According to the perceptual view of emotion, just as vision is a modality sensitive to color and hearing for sound and pitch, emotions are a perceptual modality sensitive to evaluative properties, properties that evaluate in a normative, prudential or aesthetic way. Some might have found this initially counter--‐intuitive since there isn't a specific perceptual organ devoted to emotion. And unlike perceptual experiences in other modalities such as vision, emotions often depend on other perceptual experiences. Being afraid of a spider in the shower depends on your experience of the spider. Nonetheless, perception and emotion share some important commonalities, and whether or not we want to call them perceptions proper, emotions are similar enough in the relevant ways to play an epistemic role akin to perceptual experiences. For instance, emotions are intentional states, which is to say that emotions represent what they are directed toward as being some way. They are assessable for accuracy. A common view among philosophers of emotion, is that emotions represent what they are directed toward as having some evaluative property. Fear evaluates what it is felt toward as being dangerous, disgust evaluates it's object as corrupt. But we typically recognize just two categories of intentional mental states: perceptions and cognitive states (beliefs, judgments). And when we look at the other functional profiles of emotions, they resemble perceptions a lot more than they do cognitive states. The fact that emotions more closely resemble perceptual than cognitive states can be brought out by considering the category of irrational emotions.2 Irrational emotions are those that persist even while we have beliefs that the object they are directed toward does not have whatever evaluative property the emotion represents the object to have. Phobias are one example. The arachnophobe may continue to feel terrified of an ordinary house spider despite knowing that the house spider poses no threat. And this is similar to the way that, in the Muller--‐Lyer illusion, our visual experience of the two lines as being unequal lengths persists despite the fact that we know the lines are the same length. If emotions were belief--‐ like rather than perception--‐like, we would expect irrational emotions to resolve once we come to the contrary belief that the object doesn't actually have the evaluative property that we experience it to have. In fact, emotions do persist despite changes in evidence and background beliefs, at least far more frequently than beliefs do. Emotions also seem to play the same role as perceptual experiences in causing evaluative beliefs, as well as in providing their contents. For instance, moral beliefs are often accompanied by motivations to act in certain ways. This makes sense if moral beliefs are in many cases caused by emotions since emotions, but not beliefs, 3 are thought to be inherently motivational. We wouldn't expect moral beliefs that aren't accompanied by emotions to have the same motivational force. Evidence about moral motivation from people who rate high in psychopathic traits is consistent with this difference in motivation. Those with such traits have emotional deficits, and particularly with 'moral emotions' such as the ability to feel empathy for others. And people lacking in these emotions have difficulty forming their own moral beliefs. When they do, they rely on other means such as testimony. But even though psychopathic people can profess to have moral beliefs, when they do they are not typically motivated by them.3 Presumably this is because these beliefs do not have their typical emotional causal source. People high in psychopathic traits also have problems grasping moral concepts such as 'right' and 'wrong'.4 For instance, psychopathic individuals have difficulty drawing the distinction between moral wrongs and mere conventional wrongs. 5 Moral wrongs are those that cause harm to individuals whereas conventional harms involve mere violations of social norms. Most people easily make distinctions between moral wrongs and mere conventional violations by early childhood, but psychopathic individuals take all wrongs to be of the conventional sort. It is thought that the lack of so called 'moral' emotions is what underlies the psychopathic person's inability to grasp the moral understanding of 'right' and 'wrong'. If emotions cause and provide some of the evaluative content for our moral beliefs, then it would make sense that those with psychopathic traits have the cognitive deficits regarding moral beliefs that they have. The difficulties that psychopathic individuals have with grasping and using moral concepts could be seen as analogous to the difficulty that colorblind people have with color concepts.6 The role of emotion in causing and providing content for evaluative beliefs is also demonstrated in work by Haidt and colleagues.7 In one study they asked subjects to judge whether it was morally acceptable for a brother and sister to have sex on vacation if all of the potential negative consequences were mitigated (i.e. they use birth control, don't tell anyone...). Even when subjects were not able to point out any reasons in virtue of which it would be wrong for the brother and sister to have sex, subjects almost always claimed that it was still wrong.8 It is natural to assume that it is the reaction of disgust that causes subjects to make the moral evaluation that they do and that the content of the emotion of disgust also explains the content of the subjects' moral evaluations. Moreover, this study reveals that, as in the case of perception, people trust the deliverance of their emotional experience even when they don't have cognitive sources of support for their beliefs such as other beliefs. The fact that people lacked evidence in the form of beliefs for their moral judgments did not have any bearing on their faith in them. And this suggests that we afford emotions and other perceptions a similar epistemic role as basic evidential sources in justifying our moral beliefs. I think this suffices to show that emotions are intentional experiences that play an analogous role to other perceptual experiences vis--‐a--‐vis beliefs. For instance, emotions are sensitive to evaluative properties, which they give us experiential 4 awareness of. They also seem to cause and provide content for our evaluative beliefs about their intentional objects and this suggests that they might well be considered adequate justification for those beliefs. The next section focuses on the specific case of esteeming emotions.9 2. Esteem as the representation of value Esteeming emotions are often directed toward people we admire and respect. They vary in intensity and quality and include: fondness, liking, caring for, and loving as well as others. Among philosophers who discuss emotions, there is a tradition of taking esteeming emotions to evaluate objects they are felt toward to have value. For instance, in On the Origin of Right and Wrong, Franz Brentano claimed that love and hate are ways of experiencing the goodness and badness of perceptual objects. "We call a thing good when the love relating to it is correct. In the broadest sense of the term, the good is that which is worthy of love, that which can be loved with a love that is correct."10 Later, in The Foundation and Construction of Ethics, he writes, "When we call certain objects good and others bad we are merely saying that whoever loves the former and hates the latter has taken the right stand."11 David Velleman, in Love as a Moral Emotion, claims that love is the proper experience when confronted with the dignity of another, a special kind of intrinsic value particular to persons. "I am inclined to say that love is likewise the awareness of a value inhering in its object; and I am inclined to describe love as an arresting awareness of that value."12 Graham Oddie follows this tradition in Value, Reality and Desire, nominating desire as the source of value data but adds that emotions either involve desire or can be analyzed entirely in terms of desire. "It is plausible that emotions all have a desirative component; so the value theory of experience I am advocating here can happily appropriate the insights of the broad tradition which identifies a particular emotion or emotions in general as a source of value data....experiencing the value of a person might take the form of loving rather than desiring (although as we will see the nature of love might be analyzed in terms of desire.)"13 I follow this tradition in taking esteem to be a way of finding value in the object of our esteem. One trait in respect of which persons become objects of our esteem is 5 for their character. That we like people with good character seems intuitively correct. Moreover, this makes evolutionary sense since most virtues are pro--‐social traits in respect of which a person would be a valuable ally or mate. But in addition to the intuitive and theoretical reasons, empirical studies confirm that we tend to like people when they appear to be virtuous. For instance, in one study by Lewandowski et al.14, individuals were asked to rate a series of positive, negative and neutral character traits in terms of their desirability. The rated traits were then paired with photographs of random people. In this latter condition the subjects were asked, "how much would you like to be friends with this person" and "how much would you like to date this person". Positive trait information was highly correlated with desire for friendship and then dating. It seems reasonable to assume that we want to be friends with people whom we like and that esteem for a subject also leads us to find them to be more attractive as dating partners. In a similar study by Knitten et. al.15, members of a rowing team were asked to rate each other on a 0--‐99 scale for talent, effort, liking and physical attractiveness at the beginning and conclusion of an 18 month period over which teammates got to know one another through training and competition. Ratings of physical attractiveness, talent, effort, liking and respect were all highly correlated. Better 'team players' received better ratings on all of the measures. The same correlations were found in a follow--‐up study in which students in an archaeology course were asked to rate one another both before and at the end of the course on familiarity, intelligence, effort, liking and physical attractiveness. The same correlations were found in this study. Here, a woman who was uncooperative and lazy was universally disliked and a woman who was considered to be hardworking was universally liked. What I'm proposing is that esteeming emotions are perception--‐like states that represent what they are directed toward as being valuable. When it comes to persons, one of the traits in respect of which we esteem someone is for their good character. And in liking people on behalf of their good character, we take the traits and the people who possess them to be good. 3. Naturalism and value perception We can be better or worse at perceiving. One way to be a better perceiver of something involves representing it in more detail. The ideal case involves representing it in respect of the specific qualities that are distinctive to it qua the type of thing that it is. Virtues are character traits that are distinguished at least in part by the fact that they have positive value. So representing virtuous traits as valuable, as when we feel esteem for others in respect of their moral courage, is one way of being better perceivers of those traits. 6 This claim relies on the assumption that character traits can have real value and that in esteeming a person in respect of their virtue we are put into contact with that value. On a widespread picture, perception involves being put into contact with a perceptible feature of the natural world via a process that reliably tracks that feature. Moreover, the epistemic value of perception depends on the reliability of the process and that is usually grounded in a causal relation between the represented property and an experience that represents the property. So if emotion really is epistemically on par with other modes of perception, then there should be an account of value that is consistent with naturalism. And since causation is involved, it would most likely be an account that locates value in the material nature of the perceptual object. Moreover, the causal process leading from the evaluative property in the object to the perceiver's emotional response should enable us to explain why the perceiver has the emotional response that they have by appeal to the appropriate features of the object. Naturalist accounts of value are probably most familiarly attributed to those working within Aristotelian virtue traditions such as Hursthouse and Foot.16 This is the view that for every evaluative property there will ultimately be some material feature or set of material features that the evaluative property is determined by17. So whenever the material conditions for the evaluative property are present the evaluative property will be instantiated in virtue of those properties. In the case of virtue, one reasonable view is that the value of virtuous character traits is grounded in the material features of the person and the behavioral manifestation of the character trait in question. It is these material features that our responses of esteem track, and that determine the value that our esteem represents. A reliable causal process between those material conditions for the evaluative property and our emotional response can be explained by appeal to the emotion's 'cognitive base'.18 According to Deonna and Teroni, the cognitive base of an emotion includes any mental states that act as reasons for the emotion including perceptual representations of the person and his or her virtuous actions. These perceptual representations will themselves be reliable. The cognitive base acts as a causal intermediary between the value in the perceptual object and our emotional response to it. Moreover, the cognitive base not only causes the emotional response but it also supplies the emotion with its intentional properties; the fear we experience is about the spider, the perception of which gives rise to our fear. When we perceive an act of compassion and respond with favorable feelings of esteem, the esteem is directed toward the action and actor whose behavior we have perceived and the emotion is correct when the object that is provided by way of the cognitive base exemplifies the evaluative property that the emotion represents it to have.19 What I am claiming is that we perceive the virtue of another when we respond to manifestations of virtuous character by liking the person in respect of that character. Perceiving character traits as valuable is a way of taking them to be virtues. And perceiving a virtue as a virtue is a way of more clearly seeing that character trait for what it is. The better we get at this the better epistemic position 7 we are in with respect to our understanding of others. The remainder of this chapter concerns the epistemic role that cultivating good character can play in making perceivers into better perceivers, and perhaps better knowers, about the character of the people we encounter. 4. Character and virtue I have argued that esteeming someone in respect of their character can be a way of recognizing the quality of their character. Now I aim to show that cultivating virtuous character traits in ourselves can make us more sensitive perceivers of others' character. Although I have defined virtue as a type of character trait that is valuable, I have not said much about what character traits are. I take character traits to be relatively stable, enduring and coherent sets of related dispositions. For a disposition to be stable means that while it may not always manifest in the same behavior from situation to situation, one possessing the character trait will consistently exhibit behaviors that conform to the trait. An honest person may not tell the truth in every circumstance but will nonetheless behave in a way consistent with honesty by revealing as much of the truth as is appropriate to the circumstance. For a character trait to be enduring means that the person who possesses it will manifest a relatively fixed pattern of behavior that persists across the lifespan. I am not saying that character traits are unchangeable, but they are deeply ingrained. Finally, a person with a specific character trait will manifest a set of three types of dispositions for engaging with the world: They will be disposed to be perceptually attentive to and to apprehend situations a certain way, they will be disposed to feel and desire for certain things relative to each situation, and based on these emotions they will be disposed to behave in certain ways. Having a character trait implies that there is integrity among these different sets of dispositions insofar as different dispositions associated with each set will nonetheless reflect one in the same character trait. A person who has a virtuous character trait will therefore manifest these related dispositions with respect to that trait. The person will be disposed to notice aspects of their social and behavioral context that are relevant to the manifestation of the virtue and which call for a certain response. For instance, the courageous person will be attuned to situations in a way that is sensitive to danger but will nonetheless notice where and which action is called for. The person will also be disposed to have a specific kind of emotional response to those features of circumstances. For instance the virtue of courage involves not only experiencing the proper amount of fear to the circumstance but also having the desire for a certain end which the courageous recognizes as good. The third dispositional category concerns response and behavior. To be a courageous person it is not enough to have the attentive and emotional dispositions particular to courage. The courageous person will not only 8 feel the proper amount of fear, but she will act in spite of this fear in accord with her desired end. The psychological structure constituted by these related dispositions should also manifest in an appropriate attunement to, and responsiveness to, virtue in others. For instance, insofar as the virtuous agent is attentive to situations that call for virtuous responses in themself, they will be likely to recognize when virtuous responses are called for in others. And insofar as the virtuous agent knows which responses would be virtuous for them, they also knows which behaviors are required of others. For instance, the honest person will know when a situation calls for a person to reveal the truth and will be attuned to features that would distinguish a tactless comment from an honest one. Finally, as I mentioned, a person with the character structure associated with virtue will be disposed to have certain emotional responses consistent with virtue. Among these would be feelings of esteem and approval for virtuous behavior in others, and disapproval at the manifestations of vice. The honest person is disposed to esteem witnessed acts of honesty and will likewise regard dishonesty unfavorably. Crucially, notice that the perceptual attunement to virtuous behavior in others provides the perceptual component that becomes the cognitive base for the appropriate emotional response of esteem. For the possessor of a virtue, the affective response of esteem should arise naturally from the confrontation with the virtue in another. The esteem is directed toward the perceived in respect of the natural properties in them that manifest their virtuous acts. Those natural properties constitute the value that the virtuous perceiver, in esteeming the virtue of that person, represents that character trait to have. I am not saying that recognizing virtue in others requires that one possess the trait in question. There are other ways to come to know about virtue. Another way that we might recognize virtue is as a result of evaluative beliefs that we form through rational methods such as inference or testimony. For instance, one can come to believe through observing the testimony of others that dishonesty is morally problematic or come to believe that honesty consists in a certain type of behavior. These judgments can have top down influences on our emotional states, causing us to feel disapproval at dishonest actions or to feel esteem for honest people. But forming evaluative beliefs about character in a way that brings into play our own character, as on the model that I have described here, confers several advantages over the application of moral beliefs. Namely, it increases the likelihood that character trait will be represented as virtues and as well as the reliability of those representations when they arise. Some have observed that normative judgments about value, specifically moral value, are intrinsically motivating and so depend in some sense on emotions.20 In the strongest version of this view, what it is to make a moral judgment is just to have the appropriate feelings of approval or disapproval toward the intended target. On a weaker version of the view, moral judgments involve emotional dispositions. 9 Although beliefs about virtue can influence us to have the appropriate emotional responses to virtue, developing moral beliefs does not guarantee that the corresponding emotion will be manifest. Recall that psychopaths appear to develop moral beliefs based on testimony. But they do not appear to have the appropriate emotions to match these beliefs. The psychopath can categorize actions as right or wrong, and may believe that it is 'wrong' to exploit other people but simultaneously feel no aversion to doing so. He or she lacks the motivational disposition that is a feature of moral judgments because they lack the required emotional representations. One might say that in these cases what appear like normative judgments are actually not genuine moral judgments at all. P possessing the character structure associate with virtue, on the other hand, increases the likelihood that one have the right emotional stances toward objects of moral evaluation and therefore it increases the likelihood that one will recognize virtue as virtue when it is confronted. Moreover, which specific acts will count as virtuous or vicious is highly context dependent. 21 A behavior that might count as honest in one situation, may qualify as tactless in a different context. And as situations increase in complexity, it will be harder to accurately determine by application of rules and principles, which actions count as virtuous or vicious. This becomes particularly obvious as our cognitive resources become loaded by other demands or when we are pressured to make quick decisions. On the other hand, insofar as character traits are associated with automatic dispositions, they are routinely taken to be responsive to the complexities that arise in the context of practical action. And there is reason to think that emotional responses grounded in these dispositions will be more reliable both insofar as there will be an increased likelihood that they will arise when a virtuous trait is encountered, as well as in increasing the accuracy of these representations when they arise. 5. Liking the vicious? In this final section, I want to discuss a potential counter--‐example. I have argued that we tend to esteem people in virtue of their good character; in doing so we represent their character as valuable and so as virtuous. Furthermore, such cases count as providing perception--‐like contact with virtue. And to the extent that we cultivate good character in ourselves, we can also become better at detecting virtue in others. However, it might also be noted that people are often drawn to individuals with questionable character. If it turns out that people are as attracted to vice as much as to virtue, then esteem may not in the end provide the reliable kind of access to the value of character traits that the perceptual model advanced here requires. I will consider two versions of this counter--‐example and argue that both cases actually lend support for the view I've developed, rather than evidence against it. One way of developing the counter--‐example is to appeal to common cultural ideas about what people find appealing. Consider the common trope in film and popular 10 culture of the outsider character, a 'bad--‐boy'.22 These characters are outsiders to social norms, often norms regarding common morality. Moreover, the outsider archetype is simultaneously taken to be a sex symbol precisely on account of his or her outsider status. Although it isn't entirely clear how heavily we want to rely on common tropes in the context of philosophical theory construction or disconfirmation, I nonetheless take it to count in a theory's favor if it can help to make better sense of the cultural data. And the view that I have developed can do this. The first thing to point out about this counter--‐example is that it rests on the false premise that when we like such characters, we like them in respect of their moral vices (though I will allow that in some cases we may like them in spite of them). Examples of characters who easily fit the example might include James Dean, Elvis Preseley, and Muhammad Ali. When we think of alluring rebels we do not think of people like Ted Bundy, or Joseph Stalin who would more aptly count as villains. An obvious difference between these sets is that, while the former are violators of social norms, the latter group consists in those who violate not merely social but also genuine and uncontroversial considered moral beliefs about right and wrong. We like those who defy social convention, particularly when those conventions stifle or impede genuine moral progress. Challenging social conventions also seems to employ virtues such as courage, authenticity and open--‐mindedness. It is these qualities and not moral vices, I would suspect, we are drawn to in liking those who transgress social norms. But some have appealed to more scientific empirical findings to further argue that people are attracted to vice. 23 "Dark triad" personality styles, which include narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism, are characterized by the presence of traits such as: callousness, deceit, exploitativeness, manipulativeness, entitlement and low empathy. And results of two types of studies seem to link these traits to increased desirability. In the first set of studies, photographs of people high in these traits turned out to be rated as more attractive than others low in these traits. In another set of studies, people rating high in these traits were shown as tending to have more sexual partners across their lifespan than people who rated lower in them. 24 In order for these empirical findings to support a counter--‐example, they must support the view that the gains in mating success and desirability that the traits associated with the "dark triad" personality styles confer occur because those vicious traits themselves are the object of our esteem; the causal connection between the esteem felt for the person must align with the causal account about the perception of character that I have developed. But the empirical findings do not support that reading. Rather, when we look more comprehensively at what we know about the dark--‐triad personalities, it is clear that these traits facilitate desirability and mating success in quite a different way. It is not the vicious traits themselves that are the object of appeal. 11 For instance, people who rate high in narcissism and psychopathy do tend to put more effort into physical presentation and grooming, on average. So it makes sense that in photographs they would get higher ratings on attractiveness. In fact, when people are shown photographs of the same individuals without their self--‐ adornment, they are judged as no more physically attractive than typical subjects. 25 I think it is unlikely that here vicious traits are being represented as valuable. Rather, I think that if character traits are being tracked in these evaluations at all, they are value neutral traits such as vanity. But there is also overwhelming evidence that people with vicious personalities seek more short--‐term relationships than long--‐ term relationships, are less discriminating in partners, and also engage in other deceptive behaviors that make them more successful at securing partners. 26 These facts go a long way in explaining why they tend to have more sexual partners than neuro--‐typicals. For instance, the manipulative exploitative social style and superficial charm characteristic of the dark triad helps these individuals to make positive initial impressions. 27 On the one hand, we wouldn't expect vice to be on full display in the earliest stages of getting to know someone. Even neuro--‐typicals are on their best behavior, so--‐to--‐speak, when they meet a new potential partner. Those skilled in deception are likely to be particularly good at concealing vicious traits. Add to this that the personality styles we are referring to often come coupled with positive traits like extraversion and low--‐neuroticism, and the appeal becomes more apparent. Deceptive individuals can also claim feelings or intentions that are insincere but effective in seduction. Some vicious traits might even initially present as virtues: narcissistic entitlement and self--‐aggrandizement can falsely come off as confidence, impulsive behavior and lack of concern for consequences can look like courage, and desire for social dominance could initially seem to be strength or fortitude. 28 All of this seems to be helpful for securing short--‐term relationships, though the appeal of such individuals is not likely to be long--‐lasting. In fact, rather than presenting a counter--‐example to the view I have offered, considering the appeal of dark--‐triad character traits can help us to hone in on the ways that our own character can facilitate, or in some cases impede our perception of virtue in others. I have argued that possession of virtuous character traits can make us better detectors of virtue in others. But possession of perfect virtue is uncommon. Character traits come in degrees. An honest person may be generally truthful but fail to have the appropriate emotional response on some occasions and so sometimes fail to see in others what they themselves possess only imperfectly. But the more perfectly we embody our virtuous traits, this view predicts, the better we should become at detecting those traits in others. And on the flipside, the view predicts that the further from virtue our character deviates, the worse we would be at recognizing virtue. There is some evidence that this in fact bears out. Studies show that psychopathic individuals are the only group that shows preference for long--‐term partners who also rate high for psychopathy.29 One way of reading this is that psychopaths, unlike non--‐psychopaths, do not adequately distinguish the virtuous from the vicious when selecting mating partners. In lacking virtue, they are 12 poorer than average at detecting it in others. But their mistakes go beyond a failure of recognition. In esteeming others in respect of their vice they mistakenly represent negative traits as having positive value. Perhaps the further from perfect virtue our own character deviates, the bigger mistakes we are wont to make. Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that virtues are a category of character traits that have positive value. When we esteem something, we represent it to have positive value. So esteeming a person in respect of their character traits is a way of apprehending virtuous character traits as virtues.30 Moreover, these feelings of esteem directed at virtue are epistemically perception--‐like in their role in causing, providing content for, and in justifying judgments about the moral properties associated with character. Finally, I have argued, our own moral character can facilitate our perception of virtue by causing us to attend to the right things, recognize the right behaviors, and have the right emotional responses to virtue in others. And that makes having moral virtue, epistemically as well as morally advantageous. 13 References Blair, R. J., E. Colledge, & D. G. Mitchell (2001). "Somatic markers and response reversal: Is there orbitofrontal cortex dysfunction in boys with psychopathic tendencies?" Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology 29, 499–511. Brentano, F. (1973) The Foundation and Construction of Ethics. Trans. E. Schneewind. 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Philosophical Explorations. 9(1): 29-43. Sinhababu, N. (2017) Humean Nature: How Desire Explains Action, Thought, and Feeling. Oxford University Press: Oxford. Tye, M. (2008). "The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory". Revue Internationale de Philosophie 243, 25-50. Velleman, J. D. (1999). "Love as a Moral Emotion", Ethics, 109 (2): 338-374. 15 1 For defense of the perceptual theory of emotion see Deonna (2006). Doring (2007), Johnston (2001), Prinz (2004), Tye (2008), Goldie (2009). 2 For more in--‐depth discussion of irrational emotions in relation to the perceptual 2 For more in--‐depth discussion of irrational emotions in relation to the perceptual and cognitive theories of emotion see Deonna and Teroni (2012) 3 See discussion in Nichols (2002) 4 Hare (1993); Eichler (1965); Joyce (2006); Kennet and Fine (2008) 5 Blair et. al. (2001) 6 as Neil Sinhababu observes, "without color experience one can only achieve a partial grasp of color concepts by sharing a public language with those who can see" Sinhababu (2017) 7 Haidt p. 814 (2001) 8 See also Prinz (2006) 9 Alternatively, some identify related emotions with moral judgments. For instance see, Prinz (2006) 10 Brentano p. 11 (1969) 11 Brentano p. 90(1973) 12 Velleman p. 360 (1999) 13 Oddie p. 77 (2005) 14 Lewandowski. et. al. (2007) 15 Kniffin et. al. (2004) 16 See, for example Foot's Natural Goodness and Hursthouse's On Virtue Ethics 17 This view is put forward by Deonna and Teroni (2012). See especially Chapter 4. 18 Deonna and Teroni (2012) See especially Chapter 6 & 8. 19 Although this is not meant to be an exhaustive defense of a naturalistic account of value and it's emotional perception I think that it suggests that a promising account is available. 20 For example see Prinz 2006, Nichols 2002. 21 I am assuming that the trait of honesty is not reducible to truthfulness. The honest person reveals only as much of the truth as is called for. 22 I am taking this concept to be gender neutral. Perhaps one female manifestation is the femme fatale. 23 This conclusion is drawn by Steve Conner in an article published in Independent, "Why Women really do love self--‐obsessed psychopaths" 24 Jonaso et. al. (2009) 25 Holtzman & Strube (2012) 26 Jonason et. al. (2009) 27 Jonason et. al. (2009) 28 Positive traits associated with dark--‐triad personality styles are discussed in Jonason et. al. (2009). It seems to be an open question which positive traits associated with dark--‐triad personalities are genuinely separate positive traits (i.e. extroversion) and which are vices that we mistake for virtues in conditions insufficient knowledge (i.e. where the drive for social dominance confers power.) 16 29 Jonason et. al. (2015) 30 Again, I am happy to call this a case of quasi--‐perception. I only intend to highlight the way in which emotion functions analogously to the way perception does in the ways that I have discussed.