What Is Wrong with Secession? ((It is a draft. PLEASE do not cite without permission. I will be indebted to you if you recommend an academic journal or book to the peer-review process that would submit this comprehensive article.)) Pouya Lotfi Yazdi1 (Graduate in Philosophy) Abstract In this article, it is argued that the right to secede represents a political act and both necessarily and multilaterally, a right to secede is a right to territory. Next, to tackle the trouble related to secession, some normative strategies on nationalist concerns of secession are suggested. Moreover, an institutional argument of the Remedial Right Theories is criticized and a noninstitutional argument against unilateral or consensual secession is presented. Lastly, the legal aspect of this theory will be discussed philosophically. Well, what is wrong with secession? Keywords Secession, Remedial Right Theories, RCRSUCCS, Multilateralism, Heterogeneous Nationalism, Legalization Multilateral, neither Unilateral nor Bilateral The writer would argue that for some countries and nations, it is morally unbearable to tolerate both consensual and unilateral rights to secede.2 Nonetheless, the theory could be morally defensible iff a theory of secession normatively would be 1. philosophically all-things-considered 2. a premise for other philosophical, political, and legal arguments, 3. other various countries and nations require the theory both theoretically and practically. 3&4 Straightforwardly, the right to secede is the right to secede as a right to territory:5 1 I (hereafter: The writer) would like to thank some activists who have been providing critique of the writer's thoughts, during these years. Likewise, the writer is indebted to philosophers, social and political scientists and legal scholars who directly sent their works to the writer. Lastly, this article is dedicated to the people of writer's country. The writer's mail: lotfiyazdi@gmail.com 2 The writer's footnote: There are two methodological notes: Before all else, the normativity of secession represents the realm of philosophers and my theory (hereafter: The theory) which is a pure philosophical theory on secession in itself, and it is not an empirical debate (except these footnotes:11,14,15,22). Moreover, this article allows only four types of sentences: 1. the writer's innovative ideas, 2. quotations, 3. interpretations, and 4. Footnotes. The writer has named this methodology "Microscopic Analyticity " which means Philosophy is not a game. 3 For possibility of secession, see: (Glaser, 2003), (Buchanan, 1991a:332-9), (Lindsay & Wellman, 2003b:115-20), (Abbott in Lehning Ed., 1998), (Beran, 1983), (Ker-Lindsay, 2014). The writer's footnote: The writer is an anti-secessionist, to be precise, the writer very hardly tolerates secession. 4 For generalization in secession, see: (Corlett, 1998:123-4). 5 For the right to secede as a right to territory, see: (Brilmayer, 1991, 2000), (Buchanan, 1991b:11,24, 2017a), (Wellman, 1995:144-5), the opposite view (Caney in Lehning, Ed., 1998:151). "A theory of secession necessarily depends upon a theory of legitimate sovereignty over territory." (Brilmayer, 1991, p. 199) The writer will put forward this quotation as the core idea of secession. Without this clarification, secession is a fallacious political concept which makes it indistinguishable from other political concepts. For instance,6 a/some group(s) withdraw(s) from an existing state and constitute(s) an independent state so that we can consider them secessionists. Consequently, those secessionists would like to maintain their state without the interference of other people who may or may not inhabit the corresponding territory. Additionally, it is true that they probably do not insist on overthrowing the current state; however, without territorial withdrawal, those acts could be partially recognized overthrowing a state and building up a new state. This means that, withdrawing from and overthrowing a state without a territory can be identified as a revolution.7 Therefore, every unique secessionist act necessarily has to consider a right to secede territorially. Nevertheless, territorial claims are about current claims of territory, but territorial concerns of secession are precisely about changing the territories and requiring some actions for the future of those territories. In this case, it is neither unilateral nor bilateral. The right is not legally or politically a relation between a state and secessionists. Conversely, secessionists, remainders and the state altogether comprise the segments of the relation. Ontologically, this relation would represent the first-order relation, and by adding up international institutions, incomers, and refugees, then the new relation is known as a second-order one. In other words, the former draws the relation as a triangular or more accurately, multilateral normative political fact which has connections between the sides. Well, Imagine those territories without an established state that straddles the borders; individuals who inhabit a territory ought to contribute to the territory as a whole.8 Contribution to the territory endures an intuitional idea that every particular citizen possesses the same right as the other citizens of a country where each centimeter does not belong to private ownership. For example, a northern citizen of a country who owns her house in a northern city asserts no right regarding a street in her neighborhood more than a southern citizen who possesses her house and other properties in a southern city of that country. This example also has a legal dimension which shows that when a citizen is a foreigner, she does not have the same right in regards to the abovementioned street as she has to obtain official permission to enter other counties. The territorial concerns of secession were discussed in the first part of the theory. Some potential reproofs will be presented in the next paragraphs. The first reproof is that understanding the right to secede as a right to territory has to be multilateralism, except the cases such as usurpation by foreigners, annexation, 6 For similar analysis, see: (Buchanan, 1991a:326-7, 1991b:10). 7 For secession and other political concepts, see: secession and/or intervention (Roth, 2015), (Fabry, 2013:94-100), and/or revolution (Buchanan, 1991a:326-7, 1991b:10, 2017b), and/or civil disobedience (Buchanan, 1991b:10), and/or emigration (ibid:10-2), (Beran, 1977:266) and/or referendum (Pavkovic, 2004:702-4), (Jovanovic, 2007:171,184-94), (Kymlicka, 2000:221-2). 8 For secession and territorial rights, see: (Wellman, 1995:150-64), (Brilmayer, 2015), (Buchanan in Moore and Buchanan Eds., 2003:232), territory as whole (ibid:234-5). colonization, and occupation. By these exclusions, a multilateral territory is a joint land or equity sharing9 which is morally and fairly the right for those who live in or beyond those arguable territories and boundaries that are noncolonial. Let the writer insist on another reproof, which demonstrates that there is no correlation between one's private property and owning a public park or seaside which is located near one's home. States do not permit to exchange those legitimate places as they belong to all the citizens of the country. Multilateral decisions should be made as they are considered equity sharing properties. For instance, a person could be born in a house near the sea or the desert by chance; therefore, this fact leads us to know that the right to secede as a right to territory is a public right. The writer partially agrees that in case we privatized the land exclusively10, we could acknowledge the right to secede as a right to territory unilaterally or bilaterally; whereas, interestingly the weakness of Libertarian views in social and political philosophy has been recognized. Furthermore, focusing on territory only from its economic aspect is equal to ignoring some of its moral aspects. In the next sections, one of the moral features of territory called Martyr Argument will be argued.11 Here is one more reproof that the right to secede is not only a fabulous solution of the legitimacy of boundaries, territorial struggles and debates, but also, in most situations, it is an abysmal solution: "Secession would not be a way of rectifying boundaries, because there are no truly natural boundaries ... A secession or partition converts a domestic ethnic dispute into a more dangerous international one" (Horowitz, 2003b, p. 10) It should be mentioned that natural boundaries can be formed when the whole people of a country participate in a political or semi-political action and they name themselves as people of a country or a nation. Accordingly, there could be natural boundaries to avoid secessionist incentives.12 Remember that state of a particular territory does not have to be a colonial one. In any case, for the natural or unnatural boundaries of every country, secession is permissible only in the theory. All in all, does the right to secede, ipso facto, as a right to territory which is multilateral, create a trade-off among nation? 9 For equity sharing, see: (Christiano, 2006:97-9), (Haeri Yazdi, 1994), (Kant, 1996:416-9), (Stilz, 2009:198-210). The writer's footnote: The writer follows the idea of equity sharing as a basis for the right to secede as a right to territory. 10 For the proponent of this view, see: (Rothbard in Gordon Ed., 1998:84). 11 For various definitions of martyrdom, see: (Luban in Besson & Tasioulas, Eds., 2010:577), (Tamir in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:230), (Hirschman, 1970:126). The writer's footnote: First of all, the thought of Martyr Argument came to the writer's mind in a discussion some years ago, and the writer had to present a pure ethical argument without referring to a culture, history and heritage. In addition, the writer has studied the Hirschman's definition very recently and the writer thinks that Hirschman would claim that there is a similarity between martyrdom and secession and both of them are remorseless. However, the writer will argue that secession is normatively based on the Martyr Argument. 12 For secession and boundaries, see: (Christiano, 2006). Understanding the Heterogeneous Ethnic Nationalism or CivicTerritorial Nationalism To avoid secession, we have to reevaluate the relationship between nationalism and secession in different political systems, such as unitary or federal states.13 The first plan is to ask why we have to recognize the challenges of a country or a group of countries that roughly and culturally have reciprocal relations with each other; and identify them as global struggles which may or may not be considered as other countries' problems in the future and which are unfair. The secessionist advocacy is an unforgivable, unforgettable and deplorable decision to make for the latter countries as we ought not to interfere in those theoretically or practically as it meddles with imperialistic liberal or illiberal wrapping.14 The second policy is representing the truth that heterogeneous citizens in particular realms have also made their countries heterogeneous.15 Open-mindedness toward nationhood means considering it as a collection of races, religions, languages, ethnicities, customs, traditions, and histories, and therefore, this collection plays a tremendous description of the nationhood. It is undisputedly ironic if the critics eliminate this nationhood and interpret ethnic nationalism16 only as a homogenous concept. Said otherwise, inclusive explanation of nationhood has to face some normative definitions of nationhood that define it as a heterogeneous nation in those countries that reasonably call and identify themselves as a nation. It is advisable to include other types of nationalities like civic-territorial; otherwise, it will be a doubtful and disputable meaning of nationhood. There are countries where nationhood is merely constructed by the differences among their people that they call themselves a nation. Nations are not only purely cultural-genetic, but also social-political. By adding up civic-territorial nationalism on the one side and heterogenous ethnic nationalism on the other side, the definition of nationhood could conceal all of the nations, normatively. Nonetheless, for these nationalities, overthrowing the democratic states, infringing different citizens' rights, defaming the dissimilar civilizations, and ceding the lands of other countries to be independent, irredenta and imperiling are undeniably immoral. You can call these tactics and strategies as destroying different magnificent civilizations or thwarting their accomplishments and developments. Technically, if nationalism is built by ethnicity, it would be called 13 For secession and federalism, see: (Norman, 2006:77-173), (Jovanovic, 2007:64-79), (Kymlicka in Lehning Ed., 1998:135-8, 2000:213-6, in He & Galligan & Inoguchi Eds., 2007:45-6), (Bauböck, 1997:20-32). 14 For similar empirical view, see: (Chandhoke, 2014b:51). The writer's footnote: The writer's country is an exceptionally suitable example to know that how a country has been devastated by the all of permanent secessionist temptations of some countries. 15 For empirical heterogeneity, see: (Van Dyke in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:52), (Smith, 1998:40), (Horowitz, 1985:267-72, 2003a:53-5). 16 For civic-territorial nationalism and ethnic nationalism, see: (Liu, 2016:373), (Sorens, 2008:327), (Norman, 2006:57-66), (Miller, 1995:188-9), (Gans, 2003:7-29), (Smith, 1991:82-3,117-9), (Coppieters in Coppieters & Sakwa Eds., 2003:9-10), (Gilbert in Lehning Ed., 1998:207-8), (Spencer & Wollman, 2002:101-5), (Kymlicka in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:64-5). ethnic nationhood: Homogeneous and heterogeneous. If nationalism is built up by civic-territorial strategies, it would be called civic-territorial nationhood. In other words, a nation could be the former or the latter. Precisely, there can be the models of nationhood: 1. Heterogeneous ethnic nationhood (that heterogeneity is undoubtedly polyethnic), 2. Heterogeneous civic-territorial nationhood (that heterogeneity could be polyethnic or multinational), 3. Homogenous nationhood (There is no difference between homogenous civic-territorial nationhood and homogenous ethnic nationhood in homogenous nationhood. From a philosophical point of view, both of them lead to the same meaning; therefore, there is no variation between them in terms of content; plus, our concern is regarding the humankind, whose rights are the same in both of them). The key difference between polyethnic and multinational nationhood is that polyethnic nations have a common heritage and/or history with each other and/or identify themselves as a nation; however, in multinational nationhood, there is no such relation. The third initiative to block secession is first of all, to preserve ancient countries as an antiquity as they represent common heritages of human being. Next, if there are any differences in any territory, we ought to meticulously construct that nationhood because of the normative fact that it is parallel with the human values, which is much valuable for an unplanned pluralistic nation.17 Consequently, it was the second part of the theory that has been overlapped with nationalism. There are some worries about this overlapping that will be demonstrated in the following paragraphs. The writer recommends that the first negative aspect of this overlapping is forgetting differential nationalities. A prima facie reason to pluralistic nationalities is the burden of our obligation that is not endangering them, especially the inheritances. A philosopher concedes that: "The lamentable fact is that until very recently there have been almost no serious attempts to develop democratic states that recognize a plurality of nations within them" (Buchanan, 2004, p. 392) The writer whole-heartedly confirms that states have to legally and practically respect human rights of citizens of a heterogeneous or homogenous country as an ethnic nation or a civic-territorial nation. It should be noted that interpreting nationhood as only homogenous is not sufficient and only recognizing this kind of nationalism is hegemonic. The second objection is that if there is a primary relation between nations and their territories which would emerge from human rights, then the human rights of those who have been indigenous in some territories conquered by newcomers should not be violated.18 It is a normative strategy based on justice,19 and it is thought to compensate for the rights of people if it is the matter of distributive justice or regaining their 17 For some objections against civic-territorial nationalism, see: (Norman, 2006:60-1). 18 For secession and violence, see: (Buchanan, 2017a), (Pavkovic, 2008:28-31), (Horowitz, 2003b:5-6), (Berkebile, 2017), (Jovanovic, 2007:x-xii). 19 For secession and territorial justice, see: (Buchanan, 1991b:114-24, 2017a), (Miller, 1997:277-81), (Catala, 2017), (Dietrich, 2013). territories if it is about retributive justice. The writer thinks of this strategy as more respectful compared to advocating and operating a movement on secession in ancient countries. Another objection is that if someone prevents these moderately valuable attitudes toward differential nationalities, parochialism and tribalism20 would emerge: "The most devastating objection against nationalist thesis is its tendency to exclude n0nmembers ... this form of a state will be a "tribal" state" (Chandhoke, 2008, p. 11) It is thinkable that we should perceive this quotation as a general reproof to any fundamental theses that would understand the right to secede based on nationalist claims, especially the homogenous ones. Normatively, it is not possible for some countries with a hundred ethnicities to run secession that is constructed by the falsehood of parochialism and tribalism.21 Another burning question is raised here and that is whether there is homogeneity that we should morally destroy and re-build with heterogeneous nationhood or it is naturally preferable to have a homogenous nationhood to tackle those secessionist incentives. One of the answers to this question is that normatively, there is no such nationhood that could remain a blocker to avoid secessionists' incentives because every single difficulty of the heterogeneous nationhood could emerge for the homogenous one.22 More accurately, why the contribution of territory represents an intuitional fact that supports the right to secede as a right to territory multilaterally? Remedial Cure for Remedial Situations of Unilateral or Consensual Cases of Secession (RCRSUCCS) The primary right theories23 have played an important role in infringing the remainders' rights.24 Identical properties of a person individualistically or a group of 20 For tribal nationalism, see: (Glover in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:11-30), (Popper, 1966), (Brilmayer, 2000:285-6). 21 For some arguments of similar view, see: (Midtgaard, 2007:303-8). 22 For the same empirical claim, see: (Sorens, 2014:270). 23 For the Primary Right Theories, see: (Buchanan, 1997b:35, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:248, in Goodin et al Eds., 2007:758), (Brando & Morales-Gálvez, 2018:4-8), Hybrid Theories (Pavkovic, 2000:488-9), (Pérez & Sanjaume, 2013:5). 24 For objections against the Primary Right Theories, see: (Buchanan, 1997b:44-60), 1. The New Set Minority Problem (Horowitz in Moore Ed., 1998:199), (Lister, 2016:154-6), 2. The Global Anarchy Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:102-4), 3. The Soft Paternalism Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:101) (Pavkovic, 2003:75), on The Liberal Paradox (Buchanan, 1991b:34-5), 4. The Non-Seceding Part Problem (Pavkovic, 2004:696), The Supermajority Reply (Antic, 2007:153-5), 5. The Erga Omnes Problem (Day, 2012:29), 6. The Domino Theory Problem (Beran, 1984:29-30), reply (Caney in Lehning, Ed., 1998:16970), 7. The Strategic Bargaining Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:100, in Moore Ed., 1998a:21), reply (Boykin in Gordon Ed. 1998:69-70), 8. Compensation Problem (Buchanan, 1991b:104-14), reply (Gauthier, 1994:365-7), (Nielsen, 1993:36), 9. Problems of Self-Determination (Brilmayer, 1991:184,192-3), (Vidmar, 2010:37-8), (Hannum, 1998:776,779), (Buchanan in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:352, 2004:332), citizens collectively are their instrument to become an integral identity, to be as a bearer of the right to secede. There are two important different views of the Primary Right Theories that: On the one side, there is/are a/some feature(s) that primarily has/have made a group's willingness as a right to secede that is/are the Ascriptivist Right Theories.25 Nonetheless, there are some arguments against these theories that the writer thinks that ignoring a territory multilaterally, the Chandhoke and the writer of this study's thoughts on nationalism, and the RCRSUCCS are those significant arguments.26 The most important interpretation of this theory is the Nationalist Right Theories, based on which the right to secede could be true iff a group of those who objectively and/or subjectively identify themselves as a nation and/or an encompassing group decide to withdraw their rights from territory unilaterally and have a desire to construct a state and govern themselves, independently.27 (Chandhoke, 2008:18-9), (Kymlicka in Besson & Tasioulas Eds., 2010:384), reply (Copp in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:281-2). 25 For the Ascriptivist Right Theories, see: (Margalit & Raz, 1990), (Caney, 1997, in Lehning, Ed., 1998), (Moore 1997, in Moore Ed., 1998a:2,7, in Moore Ed. 1998b, 2000, 2001, 2006), (Nielsen, 1993, in Moore Ed., 1998), (Miller, 1995, 1997, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003). 26 For objections against the Ascriptivist Right Theories, see: 1. Overlapping Problem (Moore, 1997:9102), 2. Strife Problem (Vidmar, 2010:37), (Buchanan, 2017a), reply (Catala, 2013:80-3), 3. Infeasibility Objection (Buchanan in Couture, Nielsen & Seymour Eds., 1998c:291-3, 2004:382), (Bauböck, 1997:10), (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998:36), (Moore in Moore Ed., 1998b:138) 4. The Equal Respect Objection (Wellman in Frey & Wellman Eds., 2003:268-9), (Brilmayer, 2000:285), (Bauböck, 1997:56), (Buchanan in Couture, et al Eds., 1998c:293-9), 5. The Polyethnic Rights Objection and Vanity Secession (Kymlicka, 2000:215-6), (Buchanan in Couture, et al Eds., 1998c:300-1), 6. The Nation Concept Problem (Chandhoke, 2014a:5-6), (Philpott, 1995:365), 7. Problems of National SelfDetermination: (Buchanan, 1991a:328-9, 1998c:299-307), Paradoxes (Slattery, 1994:710-2), Irrelevancy (Chandhoke, 2014a:9), (Copp, 1979:71-3), e.g. Jihadis (Chandhoke, 2014a:7), e.g. Nazis (Buchanan, 1991b:56), Non Sequitur (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998:36), Cycle of Violence (Jenne, 2006:29), Indeterminacy Problem (Moore, 1997:905-7), (Sorens, 2014:270), The Balkan Objection (De-shalit, 1996:916-20), (Miller in Matravers and Pike Eds, 2003:312-4), 8. Instability Problem (Moore, 1997:907-10, in Moore Ed., 1998a:4), (Bauböck, 1997:4), 9. Patriotism Problem (ibid:6-8). 27 For the arguments for the Ascriptivist Right Theories and the related replies, see: (Moore, 2000:23941), 1. The Culture Goods Argument and its weaknesses (Philpott, 1995:373-4), (Miller in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:269-70), (Buchanan in ibid:249-51), 2. Non-Institutional Argument and its weaknesses (Lee, 2015), 3. Identity Argument and its weaknesses (Lee, 2012), (Moore, 2000:240-4), (Weinstock, 2000:254-6), 4. Instrumental Argument and its weakness (Buchanan in Moore and Buchanan Eds., 2003:251-2, 2004:388-92), (Wellman, 2005:38-9), (Lee, 2019), reply (Caney in Lehning Ed., 1998:155-7), 5. The Kantian Argument and its weaknesses (ibid:158-60), 6. Well-Being Argument and its possible reply (Caney, 1997:361-9, in Lehning, Ed., 1998:161-7), 7. Rousseauean Argument and its weaknesses (ibid:167), 8. The Distributive Justice Argument (Miller, 1997:277-81), reply (Caney in Lehning, Ed., 1998:168-9), (Weinstock, 2000:256-7), 9. The Encompassing Group Argument (Margalit & Raz, 1990) reply (Buchanan, 1997b:54-5), (Kapitan, 2008), 10. Divorce Analogy Argument (Nielsen, 1993:35-6), reply (Blahuta, 2001), (Ewin, 1994:350), (Aronovitch, 2000:29-31). Moreover, the writer believes that the other types of the Ascriptive Right Theories like Communitarian Right Theories28 have suffered from the same weaknesses; therefore, it does not matter if one insists on other identities or not. On the other side, Plebiscitarian Right Theories explain that an individual or a group of people have the secession right iff they represent their willingness through a/some plebiscitary political act(s).29 At first, these theories appear to be more interesting than the Ascriptivist Right Theories because they are based on democratic values such as consent or association, and therefore, perhaps proponents of these theories ponder on the opponents who appear to be eleutherophobic.30 Although those are anarchically chaotic, democratically arbitrary and dramatically inapplicable; multilateral aspects of territory and RCRSUCCS are sufficient to defeat these theories.31 In addition, other interpretations like Republican Right Theories32 have focused on the non-domination freedom and have presented the right to secede as a solution of arbitrary domination of political power although they replace the willingness of freedom with the willingness of association or consent. They would not get this point that a country is a multilateral territory and it is owned by the people of that country as a whole, and only the RCRSUCCS is advisable. 28 For the Communitarian Right Theories as the Ascriptivist Right Theories, see: (Pavkovic, 2003:7980), (Gilbert in Lehning Ed., 1998). 29 For the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Beran, 1977:266, 1983, 1984, 1988, 1992:253, 1993:484, in Lehning Ed., 1998), (Philpott, 1995, in Moore Ed., 1998), (Wellman, 1995, 2005), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:43-68), (Gauthier, 1994), (Lefkowitz, 2008), (Copp in McKim and McMahan Eds.,1997, 1998), (Reinikainen, 2019:10-5), (Cavallero, 2017:128-31,135-9). 30 For arguments for the Plebiscitarian Right Theories and the related replies, see: 1. The Value of Political Self-Determination Argument (Wellman, 2005:34-64), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:44-8), (Cavallero, 2017:133-4), its reply (Buchanan in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:352, 2004:332-3), 2. Consent Argument (Beran, 1984:23-7, 1988:317-8), reply (Caney in Lehning, Ed., 1998a:151-54), (Buchanan, 1991a:328, 1991b:70-3, in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:369-73, in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997a:314-5, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:253-4), (Birch, 1984) (Brilmayer, 1991:184-5), (Wellman, 1995:155-6, 2005:8-9,17), (Dowding in Lehning Ed., 1998:77), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:49-50), 3. The Democratic Value Argument: As a majority (Philpott, 1995:355-62), its reply (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 1998a:19-20), as an equal respect (Copp in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997:277-300), reply (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 1998a:20-1, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:256-7), (Cavallero, 2017:132-3), 4. The Freedom of Association Argument (Gauthier, 1994), (Lefkowitz, 2008:496-500), its reply (Wellman, 2005:16-7), (Cavallero, 2017:131-2), as The Pro Tanto Defence Argument (Cavallero, 2017:134-9), reply (Buchanan, 2017a), 5. Samaritanism Argument (Wellman, 2005:11-25,55-8), its reply (Lefkowitz, 2008:494-6), 6. Divorce Analogy Argument (Gauthier, 1994), reply (Blahuta, 2001), (Aronovitch, 2000:29-31). 31 For objections against the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Sorens, 2014:269-74), (Beran in Lehning Ed., 2005:46-55), (Moore, 2000:232-9), 1. The Domino Theory Problem (Patten, 2002:559), (Beran, 1984:29-30), (Kamanu, 1974:366-70), reply (Caney in Lehning Ed., 1998:169-70), 2. The Equality and Democracy Conflict Problem (Patten, 2002:573-5), 3. The Global Anarchy Problem (Philpott, 1995:355), 4. The Dissenters Problem (Philpott, 1995:378-80), 5. The New Set Minority Problem (McGee, 1994:27), (Sorens, 2014:274-5), 6. The Open Borders Problem and its reply (Rothbard in Gordon Ed., 1998:84-8), 7. The Self-Determination Character Problem (Altman & Wellman, 2009:48-50), 8. Hirschman's Argument (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 1998a:22), 9. The Irrelevancy to Territorial Claims Problem (Catala, 2015:588-94). 32 For the Republican Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Pérez Lozano, 2014). Next, other interpretations such as Libertarian Right Theories were embodied by not only the core weaknesses of other Plebiscitarian Right Theories, but also the general agreement on the unsolvable problems of Libertarian views and reducing the values of territory to its economic affairs.33 The second group of theories is the Remedial Right Theories34 that completely outweigh the Primary Right Theories.35 They are considered the well-settled theories.36 Nonetheless, the writer's view is that presenting the leading noninstitutional deontological reason is essential for the theory to criticize an institutional remedial one.37 33 For the Libertarian Right Theories as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories, see: (Kreptul, 2003), (Rothbard in Gordon Ed., 1998), (McGee, 1994). 34 For the Remedial Right Theories, see: (Buchanan, 1991b, 1997b:34-5, in Moore Ed., 1998a:25, in Lehning Ed., 1998b:228-31, in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:247-8, 2004:367, in Petit Ed., 2007:758, 2014:19-20, 2017a), (Seymour, 2007), (Birch, 1984), (Kamanu, 1974:361-2), (Chandhoke, 2014a:6-7, 2014b:69), (Brilmayer, 1991, 2000), (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998, 2006), (Christiano, 2006:99-100), (Hannum, 1998:776-9). 35 For the arguments for the Remedial Right Theories and the related replies, see: (Buchanan, 1991b, 2004:369-71, 2017a), (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998:41), 1. Rectifying Past injustices Argument (Brilmayer, 1991:189-92), (Buchanan, 1991b:67-70, in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:367-9, 2004:355-7, in Goodin et al Eds., 2007:758-9, 2017a), reply (Bishai in Lehning Ed., 1998:96-7), (Philpott, 1995:376), (Miller in Moore & Buchanan Eds., 2003:268), (Catala, 2013:77-9), 2. The Cultural Preservation Argument (Buchanan, 1991b:52-64, in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:355-64), (Hannum, 1998:776-7), reply (Corlett, 1998:121), 3. Self-defense Argument (Buchanan in Kymlicka Ed., 1995:364-7, 1997b:37, in Goodin et al Eds., 2007:759-60), reply (Bishai in Lehning Ed., 1998:96), 4. The Discriminatory Redistribution Argument (Buchanan, 1991a:330-1, 1991b:38-45, in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997a:312-3, in Goodin et al Eds., 2007:760-2), reply (ibid), (Bishai in Lehning Ed., 1998:97-8), 5. The Violations of Intrastate Autonomy Argument (Buchanan, 2004:357-9), its weakness (Buchanan, 2014:16-7), 6. Permanent Minority Argument and its problem (Buchanan, 2004:360-3). The writer's footnote: The writer disagrees with The Cultural Preservation Argument because there is no possible danger for the minority cultures in a heterogeneous nationalism or civic-territorial nationalism; moreover, the Discriminatory Redistribution Argument, the Violations of Intrastate Autonomy Argument and the Permanent Minority Argument are too problematic to be considered as a premise for the right to secede. Furthermore, the writer has revised the Remedial Right Theories as RCRSUCCS; Therefore, we have to care about the arguments associated with this theory. 36 For similar view, see: (Wellman, 2006), (Norman, 2003:198). 37 For objections against the Remedial Right Theories, see: 1. The Blameless Dissenter Problem (Lister, 2016:161-2), 2. The Violence Paradox (Costa, 2003:83-4), 3. The Doctrine of Self-Determination Problem (Buchheit, 1978:223), its reply (Buchanan, 2004:372, 2017a), (Brilmayer, 2000:284), 4. Statist Problem and its reply (Buchanan, 2004:371-2), 5The Arbitrary and Internally Inconsistent Problem (Catala, 2017), 6The Group Problem (Brando & Morales-Gálvez, 2018:3). The writer's footnote: Look at the rest of this article for replies to the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th objections against this theory. Some contemporary writers have argued for an institutional democratic right to secede,38 and some of them have reflected it in their works.39 Allen Buchanan argues that: "1. ... secession from a legitimate state is impermissible. 2. A state is legitimate if and only if it is democratic (and respects human rights). 3. (Therefore) Secession from a democratic (human rights-respecting) state is impermissible (except in cases where there is a negotiated secession or secession as the result of the exercise of a constitutional right) ... democratic institutions ... block secessionist claims" (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 1998, p. 29-30) There is no doubt that democracy is instrumentally and valuably the most high-quality political system among current political styles even though there are some misunderstandings. First of all, the lack or shortage of democratic rights does not in itself contain a permission to withdraw a territorial right unilaterally. It means that we have to strive for a democratic state that should include the other reasonable moral rights. In brief, a right to retain this reasonable political state with a democratic constitution and respecting other human rights is a right for different particular states. It is our moral and political duty to establish this political system. A right to this or that state is not a right to this or that territory, unilaterally. Needless to say, there is a correlation between a right to secede as a right to territory and a right to democracy because a right to secede concludes a right to territory and a right to a new independent state. Conversely, there is a partial overlapping between a right to secede and a right to democracy. Imagine that A is a territory that includes three parts; J, K, and L, and the political system by which A is governed is a dictatorship. Every distinct act of people of K who are fascinated by the undeniable democratic values to overthrow the dictator state and replace it with a democratic system shows their striving to be a moderate state and not an independent state. Next, having a pure and nonindependent right to a state does not equal having a right to a territory. It is clear that if one enjoys a moral right which is prohibited because of the existing dictatorship, the dictatorship infringes one's moral right; but it is not inherently permitted that someone can withdraw one's rights of territory unilaterally. It ought to be decided multilaterally, e.g. as the RCRSUCCS. If a person does not care about this permitted situation, every unique act of K for a right to democracy that will produce an independent state and a right to that territory will violate the J and L's moral rights. People of A as a whole should endeavor to be volunteers for a democratic state and avoid this or that independent state. Moreover, imagine a situation in which a group of people who had been living in a territory with other groups of people for thousands of years and owned a state which had a low or medium-level quality of democratic values for a hundred years, then they lost their democracy and they live in a nondemocratic state now. This situation never means that that group is allowed to secede except in the RCRSUCCS. Practically and intrinsically, it is ridiculous to abandon those hundred years of a democratic state and become hopeless. 38 For the institutional aspects of secession, see: (Buchanan, 1997b:31-4, 2004:345-8, 2017a), (Norman in Moore Ed., 1998:44-54), (Wellman, 2005:157-80), (Seymour, 2007), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:548), (Philpott, 2000:114-5), (Lefkowitz, 2018), ideal and nonideal theory (Lee, 2015), (Buchanan, 1991a:324-6, 1997b:61, Lehning Ed., 1998b:249-50, 2004:346), (Bauböck, 1997:12-13), (Nielsen in Moore Ed., 1998:130-2), (Wellman, 2005:168-172). 39 For the Buchanan's criticizing the Philpott & Copp's theorizing, see: (Buchanan in Moore Ed., 1998:16-21,30), another similar debate (Catala, 2013:83-9). These institutional replies are against both remedial and primary arguments that desire to create a right to secede upon democratic values. Altogether, after these two institutional objections, the writer paints the theory as a noninstitutional one. In this section, the third part of the theory of secession is discussed. The noninstitutional deontological argument is that a just territory where is uncolonized means a multilateral territory, a mere fact because one cannot compensate for the harms and the rights of losers, and it appears that this fact demonstrates the state of affairs. As a result, there are no utilities and consequences of those acts and/or compensation and/or rules. They are about the moral properties of those and nothing about consequences. In addition, they are about ignoring the transgression of those moral properties that show this condition as a state of affairs. It should be mentioned that rights are constructed on the moral properties, and here, the right to secede which is based on a moral property is a remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral or consensual cases. The fundamentality of human rights is not about contributing or sharing or compensating the merits and demerits, but it is about the mere ends of human beings and their respectful personhood. The writer presents an argument that is called Martyr Argument which is the pivotal part of the theory and it is constructed as follows: One cannot redress for the value of a young martyr who was murdered while defending a noncolonizer country; a person who lived in a village located in the borderline that was assailed by another country. He passed away not only for defending his village and its people in an unjust war, but also for defending the whole country. As a matter of fact, his blood has made the boundaries morally valuable. As a result, based on this argument, unilateral secession is considered a transgressor of other people's rights. We can proudly claim that maybe those borders represent moral sainthood as this innocent martyr died for defending and not attacking, for moral values and not immoral religious purposes, and for a noncolonizer and not a colonizer country. Each inch of the country is painted by the blood of this innocent martyr. Once more, those borders are under attack in an unjust war and indeed he has died for his village and the whole country. The important points of the argument are mentioned below: A is a noncolonizer country that is forced to enter an unjust war started by B, B represents an offensive country, X is an innocent young person who lives in A, and his village is near the borderline where the war takes place. Z is a secessionist part of A. B attacks A, X passes away while defending A that includes Z, After his death, Z would secede from A, But X passed away as a result of defending A, Defending A as a whole territory is contrary to withdrawing of a part of that territory, Because unilateral withdrawing of Z from A is destroying A as a whole country where defended by X, The abovementioned destroying that defending a noncolonizer country by an innocent martyr is moral contrary to incentives of Z to be an independent territory, Then, how Z could compensate and solve this contrary? It is undeniably true that it is morally impossible. Owing to the fact that there is nothing one can do about compensating for the life of an innocent martyr as it is about the moral state of the martyrdom and transgressing of martyr's blood, Then, it is not morally possible to redress the life of that martyr, As a consequence, unilateral secession is morally unpermitted, except in the theory. One may argue that there are huge numbers of borders and countries which are forcibly involved in wars that have been changed during the hundreds or thousands of years. Said otherwise, the current conditions of countries and their borders are not the same as the past. As a result, the writer has put the Martyr Argument on ice until it can be replaced with other arguments; nevertheless, the writer thinks that this reproof reinforces the theory and does not undermine it because one has to distinguish the legitimacy or illegitimacy of that argument in different cases and also has to determine to which country and border the argument belongs. We ought to prioritize our moral responsibilities step by step. Following this thought, it will be argued that only the RCRSUCCS would be permissible. We can expand the reproving to not only the history of countries and their borders which should be legitimate and justified for using the Martyr Argument, but also to the noncolonizer countries that are the defensive side of the new unjust wars. Hence, if A is the most ancient, rich, and democratic country in the world; and it knowledgeably, consciously, democratically joins B, where is the newest and poorest country with the lowest quality of democratic standards in the globe, by super-majority of voters to be a part of B and B welcomes A; then, in another case, Martyr Argument is morally sufficient to avert A from seceding from B. We have to acknowledge and treat B as a present-day country that the secession of every part of it from B is permitted iff it is known as the first permitted way of the remedial cure for remedial situations of unilateral cases (RCRSUC), e.g., we can point to the situation after testing other political solutions, in hard cases such as genocide and so on or in the second permitted way of the remedial cure for remedial situations of consensual cases (RCRSCC) through a multilateral, democratic, negotiated and conservative procedure with a supermajority vote of all citizens of B to secede a part (or more than one part) of B from B. In the first permitted way (RCRSUC), the list of those violent cases includes: 1. The self-defense of a huge number of people against persistent serious and horrendous injustice and the in practice grave violation of basic human rights that could not be rectified by other political or legal solutions. The escaping ways for these people are unfeasible and unreasonable. For instance, the international justice court to condemning the murders for their cruelties means the court is not sufficient and no moral person would advise remaining in that territory because there is undoubtedly de facto condition of recurring felonies. 2. The second permitted way is the unjust seizure of a sovereign territory like usurpation by foreigners, annexation, colonization, and occupation. Strongly, the writer believes that only these two reasons are permissible. The second permitted way (RCRSCC) that has to occur in multiple steps as mentioned in the previous paragraphs cannot be acceptable for the ancient heterogeneous countries because they are normatively the heritages of humankind, and encouraging the citizens of those countries to stay together is a criterion. There are past and future generations that get involved into the timeless ancient realms. Next generations who live in the hypothetical secessionist region would like to be a part of an antiquity and not a newly-established country, and the remainders of the former territory would suffer from the political acts of their ancestors. Moreover, those who lived in the past had spent their lives on this or that country in different ways and before we could reach their level of success, we culturally have to retain their accomplishments. If a group of people secede from a country or join another country as an irredentist without these two allowed political models of secession, those political acts violate the other populace rights atrociously. It is clear that using violence for a right to secede as a manifesto or using it practically in the theory, would not be permissible. Let the writer manifest that the right related to every inch of a territory which has been independent unilaterally or consensually without all-things-concerned arguments that are presented by this article, forcibly or non-forcibly, can be considered a right for the remainders to regain that/those territory/territories morally and legally.40 To the extent that, theoretically and practically, each country that has suffered from secession or irredentism, and the ones that have experienced secession or irredentism or they will experience it in the future, and those secessionists or irredentists do not practice the theory: RCRSUCCS and then, the remainders in all of those cases, have to regain the lost territories; however, there are some priorities for regaining a territory: First of all, we have to avoid adding more transgression of basic human rights and violence. Moreover, we have to start a morally justifiable negotiation on the regaining of the lost territories with those colonizers or secessionists. Next, we have to present all-things-considered arguments and evidence that prove our claim. Additionally, it is necessary to involve international organizations and courts to assess the process. It was claimed that it is feasible that secession comes into existence as a remedial cure. It is believed that the main reason for insisting on the theory as a remedial cure for remedial situations unilaterally or consensually is that in most cases other compatriots are impeccable, and the right to secede leads to the dissatisfaction of the remainders that believe their multilateral territorial rights are contravened by the secessionists. However, secessionists may valuably dwell on the secession and argue that they are entitled to do such things in hard cases where the secessionists are temporarily or permanently justifiable to be independent and withdraw from a territory. It is presumed that if other political improvisations are prepared rationally, we should choose those improvisations. To illustrate, humanitarian intervention, revolution, civil disobedience, and referendum of constitutional law are good instances of those solutions for those conditions. These solutions do not involve the bloodshed of victims or the transgression of blameless remainders' rights. 40 For similar view, see: (Margalit & Raz in Goodin and Pettit Eds., 1990:442). The writer would not present which political tool is prior to the others and what is its political aspects; on the contrary, the main concern is that secession could be used as the latest remedial cure in necessary situations where other political tools do not work at all. Said otherwise, here the only concern is secession which is not a good strategy to solve our political puzzles. It means that if one acknowledges that every unique secession movement is shown as a movement that withdraws a territory belonging to the whole country with many amoral and moral troubles that have been obtained by remainders, secessionists, states and international observers, then, one would earn this position that it is a bad political solution that has to be used in circumstances that lets the writer call them fatalistic waves. Moreover, it has been advised that if one would like to escape from secessionist motivations should immediately transplant, deport or transfer some groups of people who do not similarly like the majority of a country to other countries which are nationally or ethnically or religiously similar, in both consensual or unilateral aspects. Let the world become more tribalistic if one would like to save one's sovereignty, territory, and nation. The writer avoids creating templates for this tribalistic animal husbandry. Based on those normative facts, it is strange when one recognizes those movements and one urges and/or compels weaker countries to use this political method. However, if secessionists do not attend all-things-considered arguments (the RCRSUCCS), then the remainders and states are justifiable to defend themselves morally and legally. Additionally, there is a moral relation between victims and tyrants in those horrendous situations. If victims are victimized by a state and not by other people, then it appears that those remainders are profoundly unhappy with cruelties, powerlessly rescue losers from oppressions and motivationally restrain persecutors from persecution. In those atrocities, moral wrongness supervenes upon tyrants and not the remainders,41 especially in undemocratic states since those states are undemocratic and the citizens are not a part of state decisions and acts. They have to strive to build up a democratic state instead of violating other remainders' rights by secessionists' prompting. As an outcome of discriminations and ferocity and mostly due to wield legal authority fitting punishment is our reflection of this situation, both by international courts and/or national supreme courts. Next, the situations in which secession in the RCRSUC is permanent are explained. In the RCRSUC, victims can secede immediately; although, the temporary secession can be more effective. This is leading us to consider secession in the RCRSUC as a conservatively temporary antidote. Imagine R, a vast country in which three ethnic groups live: X, Y, Z, which occupy 70%, 20%, 10% of the territory and population. Because of a disagreement, X unjustifiably attacks Z, targeting 60% of its population and this turpitude makes X commit an infringement on absolute rights of Zs. 18% of Ys approve the strike and only 2% of Ys disagree with the strike. In this no-win situation, ethnic cleansing will presumably occur if nobody engages in the trouble. Practically, Z ought to secede from X and Y in a short time if it is considered an adequate answer to proscribe Xs. The main reason is that genocide is going to arise strategically and timely among many individuals. Probably international society is going to intervene in this massacre that forbid Xs; however, unfortunately, it is not clear whether the huge number of Xs would turn to crime and other political provisions 41 For comparing, see: (Chandhoke, 2014a:6). like intervention or revolution are adequate or not. It is obvious that Zs have to secede from Xs and Ys at once. There are no political, cultural, national or societal reasons to prohibit this moral choice. Respecting and saving moral beings are the first-order obligations. Altogether, in the similar cases, a group of people can unilaterally secede from other parts of the territory as soon as they can. Another noncolonial hypothetical case is when the supermajority of a country parts and the population of a country are recognized as M, N, and L that would like to separate from a minority part and the population of that country, identified as U. In this case, M, N, L cannot unilaterally secede from U, unless through RCRSUC. In addition, they must not consensually secede from U on condition that it is permissible as RCRSCC. There is another note, but it is not focal point of secession. The point is that secession is not only business of ethnic groups, but also, it could be a concern of other kinds of groups i.e. there could be religious or social or other types of groups who are motivated to secede from a country. The writer has categorized these groups as the Plebiscitarian Right Theories and it is true the Martyr Argument has to apply to these groups; and the writer thinks it satisfy the criteria. The ultimate point of this part of the theory is that we have to keep in mind the untrue judgments of the RCRSUC of secession. The writer ought to highlight a note that is connected to the RCRSUC. We have to keep in mind that those attacks and transgressions should not maintain any connection to secession, the varieties of which appear to be reasons for those secessionists to withdraw their territory unilaterally and construct a new state permanently. In a practical reason: F is an absolute majority population and territory of a country, M is a minority population and territory of that country, Ns are others, M unjustifiably, immorally and unilaterally would secede from F, that is not advised in the theory, F attacks M with the consent of Ns, Ceteris paribus, Consequently, there is a former connection between the transgressions and secession, Secession should not to be permitted. Because in this case, the act of secession is self-defeating. Therefore, in this situation, the writer recommends other political solutions. As a result of the theory, it appears that the RCRSUCCS could not be presented easily and practically, but one could only imagine the right to secede ethically in the RCRSUCCS. We ought to persuade everyone to follow this theory and foil the acts of those who do not account for this moral defense. It was noted in this article that the theory is considered as a curative rule of two models of circumstances. What is the legal aspect of the RCRSUCC? Legalization of Secession The constitutional aspect of the theory forces the writer to think that the constitutionalizing of secession42 remains a futile striving. There are horrific cases in which the states do not extremely obey the law and breach the law. It is unwise for us to think that in the RCRSUC, a brutalist state will obey the rules within the bounds of constitutions, even though if we would constitutionalize secession as the RCRSCC, a multilateral, democratic, negotiated and conservative procedure with the supermajority votes of the whole country, would become a ridiculous and pointless provision since we are required to codify the numerous provisions. From the philosophical aspect of international law, it is fruitful to institutionalize the right to secede in the international legal systems.43 In the case of RCRSUCC, we require an international observer that obeys the extreme moral codes and has generated those codes through the well-entrenched provisions. There is a moral algorithm to fathom that whether a right to secede is morally permissible for an exceptional case which can be feasible in international law or not. The algorithm is as follows: 1. A case satisfies the RCRSUCCS theory, 2. If 1 is true, then it has to be permitted in the international law both practically and morally, 3. Whether there is or could be a case that satisfies RCRSUCCS theory, then we shall declare it as a provision in international law. 4. International law and organizations shall impose this law, 5. In every particular case, we very conservatively have to ask if this case can be convincing as a type of RCRSUCCS theory, 42 For constitutional secession, see: (Sunstein, 1991, 2001), (Buchanan, 1991:127-49, 2017a), (Weinstock, 2000, 2001), (Pérez & Sanjaume, 2013:5-7), (Kreptul, 2003:55-62), (Jovanovic, 2007), (Corlett, 1998:121-6), (Ewin, 1995:348-9), (Aronovitch, 2000:33-5); opponents (Sunstein, 1991, 2001), 1. The Perverse Effects Problem (Sunstein, 1991:648, 2001:355), (Philpot, 2000:127-30) 2. Strategic Bargaining Problem (Sunstein, 1991:666), reply (Shorten, 2014:100-12), 3. The Legal Forms Inconsistency Problem (Sunstein:2001:354), 4. The Impartial Enforcement Criterion Problem (Philpot, 2000:125-6), 5. The Possibility of Realization Problem (ibid:130); proponents (Shorten, 2014), (Norman, 2003, 2006:181-214), (Kreptul, 2003:87-92), (Jovanovic, 2007:182-95), (Weinstock, 2001). 43 For the international legal secession, see: (Buchanan in McKim and McMahan Eds., 1997a, 1997b:32,41-4, in Lehning Ed., 1998b, 2004, 2014, 2017a,), (Philpott, 2000:115-25), (Altman & Wellman, 2009:58-67), (Weller, 2008:23-6), (Vidmar, 2010), (Day, 2012), (Weinstock, 2000:257-60), (Copp, 1998), (Kohen, Ed., 2006), (Lefkowitz, 2018); problems (Copp, 1998:232-5), 1. Metropolitan Power Problem (Buchanan, 2017a), 2. The Saltwater Decolonization Problem (ibid), 3. Impartial Enforcement Criterion Problem (Philpott in Moore Ed., 1998:86, 2000:116-9), 4. Trial Order Doctrine Problem (Roth, 2015:411-3), 5. The Preserve Effects Problem (Philpott in Moore Ed., 1998:89-92, 2000:119-23), 6. The Deliberative Democracy Problem (Buchanan, 2004:359-60), 6. Realization Problem (Philpott in Moore Ed., 1998:92-3, 2000:123-5), (Chandhoke, 2010); a proponent (Buchanan in Hannum & Babbitt Eds., 2006). 6. This legal right should not be arbitrary. It has to be regarded for those who live in that especial country as a whole. Other states, international organizations and their benefits are valueless. As a result, it is a momentous idea to see the ideal observer that focuses on an especial country and does not focus on the others. 7. 1-6 appear to be like the international courts that are reasonably justified to distinguish the truth from lies. Conclusion The writer thinks that the theory Multilateralism, National Debates of Secession, Weaknesses of the Institutional Democratic Secessionist Arguments, Martyr Argument, Regaining, Double Remedialism, Last Solution, Animal Husbandry, Supervenient Note, the Temporary or Permanent, U Minority, differential groups, Self-defeating, and Legalization is a panacea for the territorial, national, rightful and legal questions, troubles and debates of secession philosophically. The writer believes no philosophical theory that can escape from the theory that is mentioned in this article. It appears that the theory has discovered "what is wrong with secession?" morally. Bibliography Abbott, P. (1998). The Lincoln Propositions and the Spirit of Secession. In P. Lehning (Ed.), Theories of Secession (pp. 179-204). London: Routledge. Altman, A., & Wellman, C. H. (2009). Secession. In A Liberal Theory of International Justice (pp. 4368). New Yorke: Oxford University Press. Antić, M. (2007). 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