. INTRODUCTION The claim that education ought to be directed to the cultivation of virtues enjoys both venerable precedent and growing contemporary popularity. Many contemporary philosophical virtue theorists have begun to restore the sense of an intimacy between virtue, character, and "the good life," and, in turn, philosophers of education explore the ways that educational practice could contribute to the cultivation of virtuous character. Certainly many philosophers and educationalists will agree with Ben Kotzee that it is "obvious" that education ought to "form good intellectual character" (2014, p. 8). I am sympathetic to this claim, but also sensitive to the worries of those skeptics who ask about the practical, pedagogical, and philosophical issues it raises. Central among these concerns of such skeptics is what sorts of virtues should be educated for, 8OOb28obYFË1⁄2}bn8O1⁄21⁄2}81⁄2È21⁄2Âbb1⁄2}Oμ1⁄2μ8Ybμ1⁄2buμ1⁄2μ}8Èb Yb1⁄2obY8Ynnb2bYObÊ8OOÂ1⁄2μnμ8ËO8YY81⁄2bÈ21⁄2Âbμ¢ My purpose in this chapter is to contribute to the revival of aretaic conceptions of education, but in a way sensitive to those skeptics' concerns.

Ê2bμμËVnnb288OOÂ1⁄2n1⁄2}bμbOoOÈ21⁄2Âbn1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8}Â1⁄2ËV then show its integral role in a range of familiar educational practices and OOb2μV8Yo8ËYbμO2Fb}ÉOb21⁄28b1⁄22bO}bYbYÂO81⁄2881⁄21⁄21⁄2ÂYbμ and conceptions marginalize or militate against the cultivation and exercise of this virtue. The chapter ends by suggesting that educational attitudes, practices, and systems can be appraised according to the extent to which they are conducive to the cultivation and exercise of virtues and vices: or more simply, whether they are edifying or corrupting. Ðμ8o8O8Èb81⁄2Fbn2bFbuuV μ1⁄22boÊu1⁄2b2μμÂO}8μ¬OoYbOb-8Y¬}Â1⁄2Ë-É1⁄2}1⁄2}b1⁄2b2¬1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8V-821⁄2Ën22b8μμn brevity, and partly because repetition dulls the mind. 2. CONFIDENCE AND HUMILITY ËO8μ1⁄2}81⁄2}Â1⁄2Ëμ8È21⁄2Âbn21⁄2}b88ubb1⁄2nOoYbOb¢Ð1⁄2 o2μ1⁄2u8ObV 1⁄2}Âu}V 1⁄2}μu}1⁄2 μÂYYY¢,ËO8ËboYμ 1⁄2}81⁄2 1⁄2}bμb 4 Educating for Intellectual Humility Ian James Kidd 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 54 19-10-2015 15:15:36 Educating for Intellectual Humility 55 1⁄2É§Â81⁄2bμ82bO1⁄228μ1⁄2bYÉ1⁄2}b81⁄2}b2¢ÐOoYb1⁄2b2μb281⁄2bμ with a sense of assumptive capability, unlike their humble peer who demurs, }bμ1⁄281⁄2bμV8YÂμF8O¢+b}μ}b2μ}8ÈbOYobY1⁄2}μO1⁄228μ1⁄2FË b1⁄2}b2YbμO2FuOoYbOb8Y}Â1⁄2Ë8μμuÈ21⁄2Âbμi1⁄2}bn2b2 ÂuÂμÂV1⁄2}b81⁄21⁄2b2ÂuÂμYÉi2μËFËYbËu}Â1⁄2Ë1⁄2μ μ1⁄281⁄2Âμ8μ8È21⁄2Âb¢Ð1⁄2}Âu}μÂO}O1⁄228μ1⁄2ÈbÈbÉμnOoYbOb8Y}Âity are well established in everyday thought and talk, we risk prejudging their relationship if we automatically accept them. As Socrates taught us, there is, very often, no good reason to defer uncritically to people's typically implicit, everyday grasp of complex concepts such as virtues. ,}b2b81⁄2μ}nOoYbOb8Y}Â1⁄2Ë μFb1⁄21⁄2b2ÂYb2μ1⁄2Y nÉb distinguish between a person's capacities (cognitive, physical, social) and their associated OoYbOb in them. Such a distinction will often be hard to draw, but it is genuine nonetheless for the reason that it is one thing for a person to possess certain capacities, but quite another for them to enjoy O22bμYu OoYbOb  1⁄2}b 8YV  n8O1⁄2V 1⁄2}b 8ub n 8 b2nbO1⁄2Ë O88FbFÂ1⁄2μbÈb2bËÂOoYb1⁄2b2μμ}ÂYFbn8821⁄28ËbÉ1⁄2}8 YOÂnb81⁄2}Ë ¢,}b2bbÈ81⁄2n2μnOoYbObÉÈ82ËFÂ1⁄2u}1⁄2 OÂYbOoYbOb1⁄2}81⁄2bpossesses those capabilities, that they are stable and reliable, that one can access and control them as one desires, and so on. ,}bμbn2μn1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OoYbObÉn1⁄2bFbO1⁄28YμYnoOÂ1⁄2 to recognize but will, of course, become more visible when they are lost or 8Ou*n2bÊ8bVn8b2μbËμ8}u}Ybu2bbnOoYbObbÊOb1⁄2 É}bOb21⁄28μ1⁄2Â81⁄2μ28uOb21⁄28b2μμiFbn2b8ÂFO8ÂYence, say, or around bullying colleagues. 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OoYbObμ1⁄2}b2bn2bObÊVO1⁄2ub1⁄2V8YÂ1⁄28Ëb2bYV but also essential to the proper recognition and exercise of one's capaci1⁄2bμ¢,}bμOb8Yμ1⁄22bu1⁄2}nb μOoYbObμ}8bμ8b2μ μμbμbn the activities and projects they could plausibly undertake, the situations in and persons with whom they could live and work, and their wider sense of 1⁄2}b22μbO1⁄2μ8Y8F1⁄2μ¢YbbYV1⁄2}bO2ÂO82bnOoYbObμbu8tively illustrated by the fact that an effective way to oppress other persons μ 1⁄2b2Yb1⁄2}b2OoYbObVn2 μ1⁄28ObVFËμÂFbO1⁄2u1⁄2}b1⁄2μ1⁄2281⁄2bubμ nYb2u81⁄2iμÂO}8μOb2ËV2YOÂbV8Y¬u8μu}1⁄2u¢-1⁄2μn21⁄2}bμb 2b8μμ1⁄2}81⁄2ÐY282b2u}1⁄2ËYbμO2FbμOoYbOb8μ¬8uYVÉ1⁄2}Â1⁄2 which there would not be any such thing as living a life" (quoted in Williams, 2006a, p. xviii-xix). ,}bO81⁄2}81⁄2OoYbObμ8uYμ2bqbO1⁄2bY1⁄2}b2bμ1⁄2ub1⁄2bËμ among philosophers of education. The British philosopher of education, R. S. Peters, argued that through education a student ought to gradually ¬b82 1⁄2}b 2u}1⁄2 1⁄2 OoYbOb  K1⁄2}b2L FbbnV-FË 8O§Â2u 8Y8μ1⁄2b2ing the "capacity to make a reasonable case" for what they believe (2009, ¢Ï ¢,}b1⁄2b8O}b2μ}ÂYV8YYμ(b1⁄2b2μV nμ1⁄2b21⁄2}b2μ1⁄2ÂYb1⁄2 μ¬OoYbOb }μÉÉb2μV-1⁄2}b2bFËYbÈbu1⁄2}b¬μbnOoYbOb¢¢¢bObμμ82Ë n2Fbu8O}μb2-gV¢ÁÏ ¢nμVbYÂO81⁄28YOoYbObOb82Ë pull together, for it is precisely through educational practice and experience 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 55 19-10-2015 15:15:36 56 Ian James Kidd that a student can develop the capacities, habits, and dispositions that are 2b§Â2bYn2OoYb1⁄21⁄2bbO1⁄2Â88O1⁄2È1⁄2Ëi1⁄2}μbnO82bnÂËn2uVO21⁄2cally evaluating, and reasonably expressing beliefs and convictions to other equally educated peers. The double achievement of both a "capacity" and a "right" to belief 82μ821⁄281⁄2μ1⁄2bn2OoYbOb1⁄2}Â1⁄2Ë¢	b282Y38μYμ1⁄2uÂμ}bμ Fb1⁄2Ébb 1⁄2É 1⁄2Ëbμ n OoYbOb¢,}b o2μ1⁄2 μ ¬2b8μ8Fb OoYbObV- u2ÂYbY  2bqbO1⁄2 8Y YbFb281⁄2V OÂYu 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8Ë and ethically mature engagement with a community of peers. The second is 1⁄2}b¬OoYbObnFu1⁄22ËV-21⁄2bY8μμÂ1⁄2VF8μV8Y2bÂYOb8Y sustained by the derogation or exclusion of alternative perspectives (1995, ¢ÁÏ3⁄4 ¢Yb8ËVbYÂO81⁄2μ}ÂYO}8bubFu1⁄2bYOoYbObFË8nn2Yu acquaintance with facts, ideas, and degrees of knowledge and understanding 1⁄2}81⁄2bÊμb1⁄2}bFu1⁄2bY81⁄2Â2bn1⁄2}81⁄2OoYbOb¢38μ81⁄2b28YYμ1⁄2}81⁄21⁄2}b n8O1⁄21⁄2}81⁄22b8μ8FbOoYbObμ8O}bÈbY1⁄2}2Âu}bYÂO81⁄2ÈbbYb8È2É1⁄2} 1⁄2}b2μV OÂYubb2μ8Y 1⁄2b8O}b2μV YO81⁄2bμ 1⁄2}81⁄2 OoYbOb μ¬8 μO8 μ1⁄281⁄2b¢¢¢2b81⁄2bY1⁄2YμOÂμμV1⁄2}b2ÎuV8Y2bqbO1⁄2-ÁÏÏ1FV¢ Ï ¢

oYbOb bb2ubμ 8μ 8 ObÊË μO8 8Y 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8§Â81⁄2Ë¢ 1⁄2 μ cultivated and expressed through shared social practices in the context of 8O1⁄2È1⁄2bμ8Y2bO1⁄2μ1⁄2}81⁄2}8Èb8bμO88FË1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8Ybμin2 example, arguing, believing, and convincing. This is why the dynamics of OoYbOb8nnbO1⁄2μ2nÂYË8b2μ μO88O1⁄2Ë1⁄28Èu81⁄2b8YqÂ2μ} É1⁄2} 1⁄2}bμO8É2YVbμbO8ËuÈb 1⁄2}81⁄2 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OoYbObμ1⁄22ÂO1⁄2Â2bμÂ2O88O1⁄2Ën2281⁄288ubOË¢2bÈb2VμÂO}OoYbObO8Ob82Ë FbbÊObμμÈb2YboOb1⁄2ibO8Fb822u81⁄22bbi8Y1⁄2}bμbOμ1⁄21⁄2Â1⁄2b misestimates of a quality upon which personal agency and social life fundamentally depend. This being so, it is crucial that persons can manage or 2buÂ81⁄2b1⁄2}b21⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OoYbObV8Y1⁄2}μμÉ}b2bμbb82bn2È21⁄2Âbμ¢ There are doubtless many virtues that contribute to the regulation of intel- bO1⁄2Â8OoYbObn281⁄2b8μ1⁄21⁄2É2b8μμ¢,}bo2μ1⁄2μ1⁄2}81⁄21⁄2}bÈ21⁄2Âbμ1⁄2bY not to be rigidly sealed off from one another. At least within "real-world" practical and social contexts, the activity of one virtue will tend to call other virtues into play, for instance, if being just by standing up for an unfairly oppressed group demands courage. The second is that the regulation of 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8 OoYbOb bObμμ82Ë ÈÈbμ 1⁄2b2b2μ8 1⁄2b28O1⁄2μ 8Y relationships, not least with peers and teachers, and this straightaway makes a role for virtues such as trust, respect, and empathy. Still, the fact that many virtues play a role does not exclude the possibility that certain virtues play a special role, and I suggest that humility has 8μbO82b1⁄2}b88ubb1⁄2nOoYbOb¢b382Y ¢bμVμbb 8OμbObO1⁄2Fb1⁄2ÉbbOoYbOb8Y}Â1⁄2ËVFÂ1⁄2É}b2b}bμbbμ8 "intimate relation," I see a deeper identity between them (2012, p. 698). A state of intellectual humility is identical to well-regulated or calibrated OoYbOb1⁄2}81⁄2μ1⁄2bu281⁄28F28Yb2μ1⁄22ÂO1⁄2Â2bn2buÂ81⁄2Èb8O1⁄2È1⁄2bμ1⁄2}81⁄2 μOμ1⁄21⁄2Â1⁄2Èbn8uY8YqÂ2μ}unb¢ 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 56 19-10-2015 15:15:37 Educating for Intellectual Humility p 

OμbËV1⁄2}bV}Â1⁄2Ëμ8È21⁄2Âbn21⁄2}b88ubb1⁄2nOoYbOb¢ Although there are many possible ways to cash out that claim, let me focus ÂÉ}81⁄21⁄28b1⁄2Fb1⁄2}bμ1⁄221⁄281⁄2¢,}μμ1⁄2}bYb81⁄2}81⁄2OoYbOb has levels at which it operates and that intellectual humility requires a speO8μbμ1⁄2È1⁄2Ë1⁄21⁄2}bμbbÈbμ¢,}bo2μ1⁄2bÈbμ8ub1⁄28OoYbOb: the conoYbOb8b2μÈbμ1⁄2μ1⁄2}b2Ou1⁄2ÈbO88O1⁄2bμ8YbÊb2bObμVμμ and training, and perhaps their general "self-trust" in their status and ability as an intellectual agent, able to pursue and attain truths about the world, say (cf. Zagzebski, 2012). But agents, of course, do not act alone; they must typically engage with and rely upon others, and this points to the next level. The second level is ObO1⁄2ÈbOoYbObU1⁄2}bOoYbObÈbμ1⁄2bY1⁄2}ers, including peers, teachers, and the social communities with which one bu8ubμ¢,}bμbu}1⁄2Fbn82Ë n28μ1⁄28bÂμObO1⁄2Èbμib2}8μ the delegates to a conference or more formalized institutional or professional collectives, such as the faculty of an academic department or the OÂ1⁄2Ën}μ}b2μnμObOb¢ bO1⁄2ÈbOoYbObu}1⁄21⁄28b1⁄2}b n2n8OoYbOb1⁄2}bOb1⁄2bOb8YuYÉnOb8uÂbμV2 the integrity of one's institution, or in the civility, fair-mindedness, or professionalism of one's fellow inquirers. But both agents and collectives must also μ}82b8nÂ21⁄2}b2VYbbb2OoYbObV8Y1⁄2}μ1⁄2μ1⁄21⁄2}b1⁄2}2Y8Yo8bÈb¢ This is the level of Ybb OoYbObU 1⁄2}b OoYbOb Èbμ1⁄2bY bÊO1⁄2ËV or perhaps more typically implicitly, in the deeper social, intellectual, and historical foundations upon which individual and collective activities and 2bO1⁄2μ2bμ1⁄2¢+ÂO}YbbOoYbObu}1⁄21⁄28b1⁄2}bn2n82FÂμ1⁄2μbμbn possibility of making intellectual progress within a given agenda of inquiry, 28YbbOoYbOb1⁄2}bnÂY8b1⁄28μÂF1⁄2ËnbÈb1⁄2}bμ1⁄2YnoOÂ1⁄2 2Fbμ1⁄2}81⁄2b1⁄2}b81⁄2}n§Â2Ë¢Ð1⁄2b281⁄2ÈbËVYbbOoYbObOÂY be invested in the richness of the intellectual heritage that shapes the agenda n §Â2Ë 8Y μbOobμ 2bbÈ81⁄2 2FbμinO}8b 8bμ}1⁄21⁄2 μ n81⁄2} ¬μ1⁄28Y82YμnÉ21⁄2}-qÉun21⁄2}b¬}b21⁄28Obn}Â88O}bÈb- b1⁄2-nÉ}O}1⁄2}b1⁄2b8O}b2μ1⁄2}b¬ÈuOÂμ1⁄2Y8-ÁÏÏsV¢3⁄4  ¢

b82ËVYbbOoYbObO8FbÈbμ1⁄2bY8ËYnnb2b1⁄21⁄2}uμiY μ 2Y8bY 2Yb2V μOb1⁄2oO 2b8μV +21⁄2 μ 281⁄28 2u2bμμi8Y }bμ 1⁄2 "ground" the intellectual and cultural activities of a given culture. Many decisive episodes in the history of philosophy could, perhaps, be interpreted 1⁄2b2μn28YO8μ}n1⁄2μVFËμμ2FËu8Vn8OÂ1⁄2Â2b μYbbOoYbOb¢ The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor, for instance, has characterized 1⁄2}bbb2ubObnYb2YO1⁄22bμnμbOÂ82}Â8μ8μ8μμnOoYbOb¬Y μμ8Èu8O1⁄2V-OÂbYÉ1⁄2}8bÉnÂYYbbOoYbOb in human "powers of moral ordering," partly through ambitious projects of bYÂO81⁄2Èb8YμO82bn2ÁÏÏ V¢Á Vg3⁄4VÁ ¢ ,}bμb 1⁄2}2bb bÈbμn 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OoYbOb82bb1⁄2}b2 μ}82ËYb82cated from one another nor rigidly stable. Indeed, these levels interact and O}8ubVbμbO8ËμOb8μμ2u8nOoYbOb81⁄2bbÈbO8}8Èb effects upon the others. If a male philosopher becomes cognizant of the 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 57 19-10-2015 15:15:37 58 Ian James Kidd }bbn O1⁄2 ubYb2 F8μV 1⁄2}b }μ OoYbObu}1⁄2 Fb bu81⁄2ÈbË 8nnbO1⁄2bYin2 μ1⁄28ObV FË 2bOuÎu 1⁄2}b Â1⁄2b8F1⁄2Ë n }μ 22 OoYbOb1⁄2}b821⁄281⁄2Ë8YubYb2bÂ1⁄2281⁄2Ën}μbnV}μbb2μ8Y Ob8uÂbμV8Y1⁄2}b}μ}O81⁄228Y1⁄2μbbVb¢u¢Vbμ8YÂ1⁄2O}μV ÁÏÁV8Y+8ÂVÁÏ3⁄4 ¢1⁄2μ8μ1⁄22Âb1⁄2}81⁄2OoYbObO8Fb2bμ1⁄22bYVbÈb if the loss is likely to be quicker than the restoration, and even though the 2bμ1⁄22bYOoYbObÉbËFb2bn28ub¢ ,}b O1⁄2ubOË 8Y n28u1⁄2Ë n OoYbOb μ 8 21⁄281⁄2 8μbO1⁄2 n }Â1⁄2Ë¢1⁄2bÊ8μÉ}Ë88uuOoYbObμYnoOÂ1⁄2V21⁄281⁄2V8YV hence, why there is real work for the virtue of humility to do. An intellectually humble person is alert to the contingency and fragility of their OoYbOb8Yμ8OÉbYubμ1⁄2}bbbYn21⁄2μ8O1⁄2Èb88ubb1⁄222buÂlation. A main way to do this is to develop and employ robust practices of OoYbObO8F281⁄2. By that term, I refer to cognitive and social prac1⁄2ObμÉ}μbÂ2μb μ 1⁄2u8Âub8ub1⁄28V ObO1⁄2ÈbV8YYbbOoYbObV and these can take many different forms: for instance, basic fact-checking, debate and argumentation, psychological studies, historical inquiry, and, of course, philosophical practice. In each case, and in different ways, a person is identifying and testing the grounds n21⁄2}b2OoYbOb* YbbYVb1⁄2ËuO8ËV 1⁄2}b2un1⁄2}b 1⁄2b2n2¬}Â1⁄2Ë-2bbV81⁄2V8Y+8μ21⁄2μ1⁄2}b1⁄2b2n2¬b821⁄2}-2 "ground," and the history of Western epistemology evinces a series of metaphors of "grounds" and "foundations" for belief or certainty. Moreover, 2bÈ8b1⁄22}b1⁄22Oμn}Â1⁄2Ën1⁄2b8Ë1⁄2}μ8μμO81⁄2i8μÉb1⁄28n "getting a good grounding" in a new subject, for instance. +ÂO}28O1⁄2Obμ n OoYbObO8F281⁄2 O8 1⁄28b8Ë n2μ 8Y 82b highly shaped by professional and social context. I might seek formal and μËμ1⁄2b81⁄2OO8F281⁄2nËOoYbObFËμÂF1⁄21⁄2uÂFO81⁄2μn2bb2 review or by seeking structured academic training with a supportive superÈμ2¢ 2u}1⁄2μbb2bn28μ1⁄28bÂμO8F281⁄2Vb2}8μFË asking for feedback after giving a talk or by running my ideas past the barista who makes me coffee every day. Many of the norms and practices of the social culture of modern academia can be interpreted in terms of 28O1⁄2Obμ n2 OoYbObO8F281⁄2in28 2 n28V μ1⁄28bÂμ 2 μËμ1⁄2b81⁄2Oi8Y 1⁄2}bË 8 2bqbO1⁄2 1⁄2}b n8O1⁄2 1⁄2}81⁄2V YÈYÂ8ËV }Â8 Fbuμ tend to be rather poor at intellectual self-improvement, such that externally structured intersubjective practices of correction are our best prospects (see, e.g., Ahlstrom-Vij, 2013). To conclude this section, our intellectual activities, and therefore our social lives, depend crucially upon our being able to exercise our intellectual capacities, and this in turn requires that we can invest them with the 82281⁄2b Ybu2bbμ n OoYbOb¢ -n21⁄2Â81⁄2bËV OoYbOb μ ObÊV contingent, and highly shaped by situational and intersubjective factors, and it operates at the psychological, social, historical, and even metaphysiO8 bÈbμ¢  1⁄2} 1⁄2}81⁄2 }Â1⁄2Ë O8 FbuÉ1⁄2} 1⁄2É μu}1⁄2μU ,}b o2μ1⁄2 μ 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 58 19-10-2015 15:15:37 Educating for Intellectual Humility 59 1⁄2}bObÊVOY1⁄28V8YO1⁄2ub1⁄2μ1⁄281⁄2ÂμnÂ2OoYbObV8Y1⁄2}b second is the need to embrace attitudes and practices that enable its man8ubb1⁄2¢,}bμb μu}1⁄2μ 8μ 1⁄2 1⁄2 1⁄2}b 1⁄22Â1⁄2} ÂYÉu31⁄21⁄2ubμ1⁄2b μ curt warning that it is "terribly hard work" for a person to try seriously to "dismantle . . . the bYoObnK1⁄2}b2L2Yb-gÏV¢Á1 ¢ In the following two sections, I further develop these remarks by offering a more systematic account of the virtue of intellectual humility. 3. CONFIDENCE CONDITIONS The virtue of humility consists of two pairs of components. First, the humFbb2μμYμμbY1⁄22bOuÎb1⁄2}b2bbÈ81⁄2OoYbObOY1⁄2μn2 8uÈb8μμb21⁄2VFbbnV2OÈO1⁄2V8Y1⁄2}bbÊ1⁄2b1⁄2n 1⁄2}b2 nÂob1⁄2 of them. Second, they then act on this recognition by using it to regulate their intellectual conduct accordingly. In this section, I focus upon the "recognition-disposition" and the idea of OoYbOb OY1⁄2μ. Importantly, these two dispositions only optimally function through mutual interaction, and genuine humility, therefore, requires them both. The starting point for this disposition is the idea that assertions, beliefs, and convictions always depend upon certain conditions that ought to be fulobYn8uÈb8ub1⁄2O8bu1⁄281⁄2bË8μμb21⁄2VFbbÈbV28O1⁄2É1⁄2}OoYbOb¢ The conditions underlying a given intellectual act will often be fairly obvious, because an assertion or belief will typically be about8uÈb1⁄2OiμÂO}8μ b22Y82Â1⁄22Ën82u2 1⁄22ÂμO81⁄21⁄2b2Ëi8Yμ1⁄2ÂμOb21⁄28 Y2bO1⁄2μ¢-n21⁄2Â81⁄2bËV1⁄2}b2b82b8Ë1⁄2}b2O8μbμÉ}b2b1⁄2}bÂYb2Ëu OY1⁄2μ 82b2b YnoOÂ1⁄2 1⁄2 Yb1⁄2nËV 8Y 1⁄2}μ μ 81⁄2}b2 2b8μÉ}Ë humility often requires real cognitive work. ,}b2b 82b 1⁄2}2bb F28Y 1⁄2Ëbμ n OoYbOb OY1⁄2μ 1⁄2}81⁄2 828b 1⁄2}b bÈbμnOoYbObYb1⁄2obY1⁄2}b8μ1⁄2μbO1⁄2¢,}bo2μ1⁄282bagential condi tionsU,}bμb2bqbO1⁄21⁄2}bn8O1⁄21⁄2}81⁄2Â21⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8O88O1⁄2bμ82bOY1⁄2bY FË}ËμO8VOu1⁄2ÈbV8YbÊb2b1⁄28n8O1⁄22μiμbμ2Ën8OÂ1⁄2bμVOu1⁄2Èb 8F1⁄2bμVo2μ1⁄2}8YbÊb2bObμV28O1⁄2O88Y2nbμμ81⁄228uV8Yμ ¢Ð8ub1⁄2u}1⁄2Âμ1⁄2nË1⁄2}b2OoYbObFË1⁄2uÂ1⁄2É}81⁄21⁄2}bËÉ or have experienced, which explains why a standard response to a person É}8bμÉY2ÂÂμÂ8O8μμ1⁄2§Âb2Ë1⁄2}b2u2ÂYμn2OoYbObi ¬3}81⁄28bμ ËÂ 1⁄2} 1⁄2}81⁄2 - ¬8Èb ËÂ bÈb Fbb 1⁄2}b2b -i8Y 8μ why formalized systems of accreditation, such as CVs, are so useful. The second are collective conditionsU1⁄2}bOoYbObμ1⁄2}81⁄282bÂμ1⁄2obYFË appeal to the collectives with whom we live, work, and think. I might be OoYb1⁄2ËO8μ8FÂ1⁄21⁄2}bÈ21⁄2Âbn}Â1⁄2ËFbO8Âμb1⁄22Âμ1⁄2ËOstructively critical peers and can draw upon the richness and support of the OÂ1⁄2ËnÈ21⁄2Âbbμ1⁄2buμ1⁄2μ¢Ð8ub1⁄2O8Âμ1⁄2nË1⁄2}b2OoYbOb ObO1⁄2ÈbËFËYbF81⁄2uÉ1⁄2}Ob8uÂbμV2bμb1⁄2uÉ21⁄2bb2μV8YoY- ubOÂ28ubb1⁄28YY2bO1⁄2n2nbÉ§Â2b2μi8YV8u8VÉb1⁄2bμ1⁄2 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 59 19-10-2015 15:15:37 60 Ian James Kidd Â2ÂYub1⁄2μnbb μOoYbObFË8μun 1⁄2}bËÉ1⁄2}μb2μV have read that book, or have worked with this group, and so on. ,}b1⁄2}2Y8Yo81⁄2Ëbμ82bYbbOoYbObOY1⁄2μ¢,}bμμF1⁄2Ë and intelligibility of our intellectual activities and ambitions inevitably relies upon certain background conditions. Many theorists have explored differb1⁄2μμFbFbO1⁄2μnYbbOoYbObi¬828YuμV-Lebenswelt, projects n §Â2Ëi8Y 1⁄2}b2 }μ1⁄22O8V 1⁄228μObYb1⁄28V 8Y }bbuO8 μ1⁄22ÂO1⁄2Â2bμ¢+ÂO}OY1⁄2μu2ÂYYbbOoYbObVn2μ1⁄28ObV1⁄2}bμsibility of rational inquiry into the nature of reality, and often a community u}1⁄2ËFbOb8É82bn1⁄2}bμbYbbOY1⁄2μÉ}b1⁄2μOoYbObμ μ}8b2 μ1⁄2¢ 8bμ}1⁄21⁄2V n2 μ1⁄28ObV nÂY  1⁄2}b8Ë¬ÈObμ-1⁄2}81⁄2 8YbÂ1⁄2}b¬OÈb2μ81⁄2n}Â8Y-8F8μμn2YbbOoYbOb the rationality and conviviality of our species (2004, ch. 8). But perhaps he ÉÂY}8Èbμ1⁄2μbn1⁄2}81⁄2OoYbOb}8Y}b2bOuÎbY1⁄2}81⁄21⁄2}b28ubn those voices was less plural, and more parochial, than he appreciated. Ð 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8Ë }ÂFb b2μ μ YμμbY 1⁄2 2bOuÎb 1⁄2}b Oodence conditions that underlie assertions, beliefs, and convictions, whether their own or those of others. In this chapter, though, I focus only upon ¬μbnY2bO1⁄2bY-}Â1⁄2Ë¢+ÂO}2bOu1⁄2}8μ1⁄2É8μbO1⁄2μU1⁄2}bo2μ1⁄2μ2bOognition of the conditions that are relevant to a given assertion (and so  V8Y1⁄2}bμbOYμ2bOu1⁄2n1⁄2}bbÊ1⁄2b1⁄21⁄2É}O}1⁄2}bËnÂo1⁄2}μb OY1⁄2μ¢ bu}1⁄2μ8Ë1⁄2}b}ÂFb2bOuÎbÉ}81⁄2OY1⁄2μ1⁄2}bËbbY 1⁄2nÂo8YÉ}b1⁄2}b21⁄2}bËY2OÂYnÂo1⁄2}bV8YVnOÂ2μbVμÂO}2bOognition ought to be consistently applied and reliably achieved. It is an act of humility to recognize such underlying conditions and the extent, if any, 1⁄2É}O}bnÂoμ1⁄2}b¢1⁄2μ81⁄21⁄2}μ1⁄21⁄2}81⁄21⁄2}b2È21⁄2ÂbμÉÂY8Ë8 cooperative role in enabling humility. For instance, it surely takes courage, discipline, and trust to engage in the self-directed critical practice that Wittubμ1⁄2bO8bY¬Yμ81⁄2u1⁄2}bbYoObn2Yb¢- 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8}Â1⁄2ËμOb82Ë8YnoOÂ1⁄2È21⁄2Âb1⁄2}81⁄2Yb8Yμ2b8Outive work. The humble person has to be alert to their assertions, beliefs, 8YOÈO1⁄2μV1⁄2Yb1⁄2nË8Y1⁄228O1⁄2}bO}8uuOoYbObOY1⁄2μ that underlie them, and to do all of this alongside their everyday cognitive work. Certainly humility cannot take the form of one-off episodic intellectual housekeeping, even if it will periodically require fairly robust self-appraisal of a sort common in Western antiquity and then revived during the early modern period in the form of "meditations," "regimens of the mind," and other signs of a "shift toward . . . intellectual virtue" in the context of "distempers of the whole mind and . . . cultivating regimens"  2b8ÂVÁÏV¢sV  ¢Ðbμμb1⁄28Ob1⁄2n1⁄2}bμb8O1⁄2Èb28O1⁄2Obμ nOoYbObO8F281⁄2ÉFbeducation. +bOoO8ËVμÂuubμ1⁄21⁄2}81⁄21⁄2}b2b82b1⁄2}2bbÉ8Ëμ1⁄2}81⁄2bYÂO81⁄2O8O1⁄22FÂ1⁄2b1⁄21⁄2}bOÂ1⁄2È81⁄2n8O88O1⁄2Ë1⁄22bOuÎbOoYbObOY1⁄2μ¢ First, education can inform8b2μ8FÂ1⁄21⁄2}bn8O1⁄28YObÊ1⁄2ËnOodence conditions, most obviously by providing information about the range of things about which one could offer assertions and form beliefs. A student 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 60 19-10-2015 15:15:37 Educating for Intellectual Humility 61 must have an initial sense of the possible objects of assertion, belief, and OÈO1⁄2nμ}bμ1⁄2bF82Â1⁄2}b1⁄28μnYb1⁄2nËu1⁄2}bOoYbOb conditions that underlie them. Second, education can inspire a respect for OoYbObOY1⁄2μ8Y1⁄2}bbbY1⁄2nÂo1⁄2}bμ1⁄2}81⁄21⁄2}bËOb1⁄2μbb 1⁄2}b1⁄22Â1⁄2}(b1⁄2b2μ μO8n21⁄2}b1⁄2¬b821⁄2}b2u}1⁄2-1⁄2OoYb1⁄2Fbbn8Y 38μ μYμ1⁄2O1⁄2Fb1⁄2Ébb2b8μ8FbOoYbOb8Y1⁄2}bOoYbObn bigotry. A student might gradually come to feel delight at providing grounds n2}b28μμb21⁄2μ8YFbbnμ8YoY1⁄2}81⁄2μ}b1⁄2b2YO1⁄2μ}b2bb2μÉ}8b OoYb1⁄28μμb21⁄2μÉ1⁄2}Â1⁄2nÂou1⁄2}bbObμμ82ËOY1⁄2μ¢ÐY1⁄2}2YV bYÂO81⁄2O8YÂO1⁄28μ1⁄2ÂYb1⁄21⁄228O1⁄2ObμnOoYbObO8F281⁄2in 82uÂuVYbF81⁄2uV8Yμi8YVn8O1⁄2V8Ën882bYÂO81⁄2828Otices already have this purpose (such as dialectical exchange, receiving and responding to feedback, and so on). Education can contribute to the cultivation of intellectual humility by informing, inspiring, and inducting students into the dispositions and capac- 1⁄2bμ1⁄2}81⁄282b2b§Â2bYn1⁄2}bË82b1⁄22bOuÎb1⁄2}b2bbÈ8Ob8YnÂob1⁄2n 1⁄2}bOoYbObOY1⁄2μ1⁄2}81⁄2ÂYb2b1⁄2}b28μμb21⁄2μVFbbnμV8YOÈOtions. Such educative experiences will also hopefully cultivate other virtues, OÂYu1⁄2}bbμ1⁄2}81⁄22buÂ81⁄2b1⁄2b2b2μ8bÊO}8ubμiμÂO}8μ1⁄22Âμ1⁄28Y bYbYbμμibμbO8Ë uÈb 1⁄2}81⁄2 b82u 1⁄2 2bOuÎb OoYbOb conditions requires sustained engagement with peers who are almost certain 1⁄2nnb2O}8bubμ1⁄2V8YO21⁄2OμμnVÂ2OoYbOb¢ Though the recognition-disposition is necessary to humility, it is, by 1⁄2μbnVμÂnoOb1⁄2n28nÂ8OOÂ1⁄2n1⁄2}81⁄2È21⁄2Âbn21⁄2}b2b8μ1⁄2}81⁄21⁄2Ybμ not distinguish humility from several of its associated vices. A person might, n2μ1⁄28ObVFbb2nbO1⁄2ËuY81⁄22bOuÎuOoYbObOY1⁄2μ8Y1⁄2}b bÊ1⁄2b1⁄21⁄2É}O}1⁄2}bËnÂo1⁄2}bVFÂ1⁄28μ2b8FËn81⁄28O1⁄2Â8Ë8O1⁄21⁄2}b basis of that recognition. For instance, an arrogant person could plausibly FbYbμO2FbY8μ μbbÉ}2bOuÎbμ 1⁄2}81⁄2 1⁄2}bËY1⁄2 nÂo 1⁄2}bOoYbObOY1⁄2μ n28 Ob21⁄28 O8VFÂ1⁄2 u2bμ 1⁄2}μ8Y8bμ μ1⁄22u 8μμb21⁄2μ8ËÉ8Ëibu}1⁄2 μ8ËV 1⁄2}bËÉFb1⁄21⁄2b2VFÂ1⁄2Y 1⁄28O1⁄2 1⁄2¢ Â1⁄2ËμV1⁄2}b2bn2bV1⁄2822ÉËOμ1⁄22ÂbYn 1⁄2 μOobY1⁄21⁄2}b2bO- u1⁄2n1⁄2}bnÂob1⁄2n2bbÈ81⁄2OoYbObOY1⁄2μiÉ}81⁄2μ8μ needed is a further disposition to act upon that recognition by using it to guide or direct how one conducts oneself intellectually. In the next section, I explain the second pair of components that make up the virtue of humility: the disposition to regulate one's intellectual conduct. 4. INTELLECTUAL CONDUCT I take the idea of intellectual conduct to be crucial to our understanding of intellectual virtue and especially of its relation to education. By that term, I refer to a person's manner of conducting, directing, and managing their intellectual activities, including how they form beliefs, articulate claims, and especially how they engage with other persons, ideas, and traditions. 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 61 19-10-2015 15:15:37 62 Ian James Kidd Intellectual conduct includes a range of affective, behavioral, and cognitive dispositions and manifests in posture, tone, and bodily and verbal language and might also be understood in terms of style or demeanor. The way in which a person conducts themselves intellectually will be expressed in how they phrase their claims, voice their concerns, state their worries, present their criticisms, hold to their convictions in the face of challenge, and so on. bu}1⁄2bu1⁄281⁄2bË8μ}É1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OYÂO1⁄2μYμ1⁄2uÂμ}bYn2 μO8OYÂO1⁄2VuÈb1⁄2}b2FÈÂμ2Ê1⁄2Ë1⁄2b81⁄2}b2in}ÉVn2 μ1⁄28ObVbu}1⁄2Yμ1⁄2uÂμ}É}81⁄2ObO8bY¬OYÂO1⁄2n1⁄2}bÂYb2standing" from a broader sense of personal and social conduct. The answer is that the expectation of a sharp distinction between intellectual and social conduct ought to be rejected, given the centrality of our intellectual activities and commitments in our practical and social activities and engagements. A main reason why ethics and epistemology are so deeply interpenetrated is that everything we do in the social world involves epistemic concepts and OOb2μiÉbYubV YÂF1⁄2V Ob21⁄281⁄2ËV 8Y μ i8 n8O1⁄2 2bOuÎbY FË the Pyrrhonian and early modern skeptics. My sympathies clearly lie with "regulative" or "responsibilist" conceptions of the nature of epistemology and of its relation to ethics (cf. Kidd, 2012). Central to my general view of the virtuous inquirer is that they are disposed to regulate their intellectual conduct, and this is something that I suspect is therefore a component of all of the intellectual virtues. Each intel- bO1⁄2Â8È21⁄2Âb}8μ1⁄2μμ}82bY8YμbOoOnÂO1⁄2μVÉ}O}O8Fb¬8bY- in various ways, but each is a component of the more general regulative activity of aspiring to, if not achieving, good intellectual conduct, intellectual virtuousness, or whatever one wishes to call it (see, e.g., Roberts and 3YÁÏÏ V821⁄2 ¢ Clearly there are many different forms of intellectual conduct, and perceptions and preferences vary between individuals and across history and culture. Many classic texts in the history of philosophy could be read as YbμO21⁄2μnYnnb2b1⁄2n2μn 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OYÂO1⁄2in1⁄2}bÈ21⁄2Âbμ8Y conduct that characterize the Stoic sage, a Confucian "consummate person," and other exemplars of virtue. A very rich example is the Analects n nÂOÂμi8bY1⁄2bYObO1⁄2nμ8ËuμVFμb2È81⁄2μV8YbμYbμV 281⁄2}b2 1⁄2}88FÉ21⁄21⁄2bFË 1⁄2}b8μ1⁄2b2iÉ}O}nnb2 2O}YbμO21⁄2μ of the attitudes, speech, and behavior of the virtuous aspirant (see, e.g., Fb2YuVÁÏ ¢ b1⁄2288u1⁄2}bμbÈ21⁄2ÂbμμÉ}81⁄2}8ÈbO8bY1⁄2blectual humility: to have an active awareness of "abilities that one does not possess," to "love" and "stand in awe" of the "teachings of the sages" and ¬81⁄2§Â1⁄2ËV-8Y1⁄28É8Ëμ¬oY81⁄2b8O}b2K8YLbÂ81⁄2b1⁄2}b-μ}ÂFb 2bOu1⁄2nObO1⁄2Èb8YYbbOoYbObÁÏÏ3⁄4V¶¶gpV ¢ÁÏV1¢gV ¢ÁÁ* On¢*Âμ}uVÁÏ3⁄4 ¢+ÂO}1⁄2bÊ1⁄2μYbμO2Fb1⁄2}bb2μÉ}μÉbOYÂO1⁄2bYi b1⁄2}O8ËVμO8ËV1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8Ëi8YÉ}bÊbobμ8È21⁄2ÂÂμnb¢ 2 2bμb1⁄2 Â2μbμV  nOÂμ Ë Â 1⁄2}b μbOoO 8μbO1⁄2μ n uY OYÂO1⁄2 1⁄2}81⁄2 2bqbO1⁄2 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8 }Â1⁄2ËV 1⁄2}b O2b nÉ}O} μ 2bqbO1⁄2ÈbË 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 62 19-10-2015 15:15:37 Educating for Intellectual Humility 63 2bμYu 1⁄2 1⁄2}b2 O}8uu nÂob1⁄2n 1⁄2}b OoYbOb OY1⁄2μ 2bevant to their assertions, beliefs, and convictions. A crucial difference between the humble person and their arrogant or meek peers is that they O8bnnbO1⁄2ÈbË2buÂ81⁄2b1⁄2}b2OYÂO1⁄28YVμV8ÈY1⁄2}bbÊObμμÈbOoYbOb n1⁄2}b822u81⁄28Y1⁄2}bYboOb1⁄2OoYbObn1⁄2}bbb¢,Fb1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8ËÉbOYÂO1⁄2bYμV1⁄2}b2bn2bV821⁄21⁄2}8ÈbÉb88ubYOoYbObV and this is the particular contribution of the virtue of intellectual humil- 1⁄2ËV8uμYb1⁄2}b2È21⁄2Âbμ2bbÈ81⁄21⁄2OoYbObO8F281⁄28Y1⁄21⁄2}b2 aspects of intellectual life. Such conduct-regulation can take three related forms, distinguished by 1⁄2}b8μbO1⁄2nÂ2 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8 OYÂO1⁄2 1⁄2}81⁄2 μFbu 2buÂ81⁄2bY¢,}bo2μ1⁄2 μ 828μ82buÂ81⁄2UμbOoO8ËV88ub1⁄2 μμbn828μ8n1⁄2}bμOb8Y strength of their intellectual capacities, and it will most obliviously take the n2n ÂYOÂμÂ2YÉu28Yun 1⁄2}b2 OoYbOb¢,}b μbOY μ 81⁄21⁄21⁄2ÂYb2buÂ81⁄2: Much of our intellectual life is structured by attitudes, either positively or negatively valenced, toward a range of objects, including other agents and certain collectives, but also ideas, styles of argument, types of evidence, whole disciplines, entire intellectual traditions, and so on. Such attitudes ought to be regulated, because they constitute our preemp1⁄2Èb8Yn1⁄2bÂ2bqbO1⁄2Èbμbμbn1⁄2}bμ8Obn1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8μμF1⁄2bμi1⁄2}b structures of intelligibility, salience, and cogency that shape our intellectual life, including what one welcomes or resists, derogates or demeans, praises 221⁄2bμV8Yμ¢+ÂO}81⁄21⁄21⁄2ÂYbμ82bn1⁄2bbÊO1⁄2Ëμ1⁄281⁄2bYi8Yμ1⁄2uÂμ}bYÐb2O8}μ}b2Ob}8Y8μ1⁄2b22b8YuV¬Âμ1⁄2μ8Ë 1⁄2 1⁄2}b}μ1⁄22Ën}μ}Ë-i21⁄2}bËu}1⁄2FbO1⁄2 Ob21⁄282b82μV jokes, or facial expressions. The regulation of agential and collective intellectual attitudes is an essential aspect of good intellectual conduct, especially because our capacity to cultivate certain virtues is crucially premised upon our engaging with persons, ideas, and approaches very different from our own. It is, after all, a poor sort of tolerance that only speaks to its friends. The third form of conduct-regulation is 8F1⁄22buÂ81⁄2. Typically, individuals will organize and direct their inquiries according to a certain μb1⁄2 n 8F1⁄2μi1⁄2É21⁄2b 1⁄2}b Ybo1⁄2Èbu28} 8 821⁄2OÂ82 b2son, say, or to restore the reputation of a neglected thinker. Many features of modern academic training can be understood as formalized structures for ambition-regulation, including doctoral supervision that ought to guide 8 μ1⁄2ÂYb1⁄2 1⁄2}2Âu} 1⁄2}b2Obμμbμn Yb1⁄2nËuV 2bμb82O}uVYbouV 8Y completing a focused and achievable project of work. Ambition-regulation can take different forms. It might involve adjusting an ambition, perhaps by focusing upon a single text by an author rather than an entire corpus, or alternatively abandoning an ambition newly recognized to be beyond one's 8F1⁄2bμV2o8Ë1⁄2OÂYÈÈbadoptingbÉ8F1⁄2μin2μ1⁄28ObV nb2b8ÎbμV1⁄2b μμÂ22μb8YYbu}1⁄2V1⁄2}81⁄2bn8O1⁄2nÂoμ1⁄2}b2bbÈ81⁄2OoYbObOY1⁄2μ1⁄28n82}u}b2Ybu2bb1⁄2}8bμÂμbO1⁄2bY¢,}b fact that a person could adopt a particular ambition does not automatically 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 63 19-10-2015 15:15:37 64 Ian James Kidd entail that they should therefore adopt it, because the choice of which ambi1⁄2μ1⁄2Â2μÂbμ8nnbO1⁄2bYFË828ubn1⁄2}b2OμYb281⁄2μi1⁄2}b}ÂFb person, therefore, has an acute sense of the ambitions that are legitimately 8È88Fb1⁄21⁄2}buÈb1⁄2}bOoYbObOY1⁄2μ1⁄2}bËnÂo¢ÐO1⁄2μn}Âity might involve adjusting, abandoning, or adopting ambitions and are not OobY1⁄28F8Yu2Éb8bu8F1⁄2μi1⁄2}81⁄2μ8bu81⁄2Èbμbμbn }Â1⁄2Ë1⁄2}81⁄2É81⁄21⁄22bμμ1⁄2¢Â1⁄2ËO8V81⁄2b8μ1⁄2ËÈbÉVamplify, as well as attenuate, one's ambitions. Although this may seem counterintuitive, 1⁄2}b2bμi1⁄22bb81⁄28b82b21⁄2iuY2b8μ1⁄2Ybnb2ÂO21⁄2O8Ë1⁄2 everyday usage, especially if good reasons are given for doing so. These three forms of conduct-regulation should be understood as inteu281⁄2bY8μbO1⁄2μn8 μubuF8 2buÂ81⁄2ÈbbYb8È2i1⁄2}81⁄2nconducting oneself well intellectually-rather than as isolated aspects of a more diffuse activity. Many virtues are required for the attainment of good conduct, of course, but, to repeat another caveat, I am focusing upon humility. Indeed, since a person's appraisal, attitudes, and ambitions are united in her intellectual life, one should expect such "integration," especially given that, for instance, a change in one's self-appraisal will typically affect one's attitudes toward others and one's ambitions. A person who suddenly enjoys a newnÂYμbμbn8ub1⁄28OoYbObu}1⁄2FbOb2b8μμb21⁄2Èb82ÂY1⁄2}b2μ8Y1⁄28b8bÉËbÊ8YbYμb1⁄2nFY8F1⁄2μi1⁄2}Âu}VnOÂ2μbV they ought to take care not to lapse into arrogance or dogmatism. The intellectually well-conducted person should therefore evince a certain integrity, unity, and perhaps beauty. Consider Wittgenstein's uncharacteristically warm praise of Søren Kierkegaard as a "profound thinker," and, in fact, "a saint." Although the meaning of this remark is unclear, it 8ÂμFË2bqbO1⁄2μ31⁄21⁄2ubμ1⁄2b μOÈO1⁄21⁄2}81⁄28¬2nÂY1⁄2}b2-μ1⁄2 μË8b2μÉ1⁄2}2nÂY1⁄2}Âu}1⁄2μin28ËÉObYYbÈOÂY}8Èb 1⁄2}μbiFÂ1⁄2V281⁄2}b2V1⁄2}81⁄282nÂY1⁄2}b2μ8b2μÉ}μbnb¬bÊ2bμμbμ- 2μ¬bFb81⁄2On¢¢¢1⁄2}bμb1⁄2}Âu}1⁄2μ-+O}F8ÂμnbYVÁÏÏ V¢gn ¢ To succeed in making one's life an "emblem" of one's thoughts through YμObY OYÂO1⁄2 2b§Â2bμ 8Y bÊ2bμμbμ È21⁄2ÂbμiO82bnÂbμμV μ8ËV 2 1⁄22Â1⁄2}nÂbμμi8YμO8FbFb8Â1⁄2nÂn21⁄2}81⁄22b8μOn¢ b2VÁÏÏg8 ¢ Such beautiful conduct might be grounded in the aspiration to good conduct as well as the achievement of it, especially since accepting that one still falls short, while still striving, can express humility, tenacity, and other virtues. So whether by aspiration or achievement, a well-conducted person approves of Pascal's self-directed advice to "seek my . . . dignity" in the "ordering of my thought," and live according to the principle that "to think Éb¢¢¢μ1⁄2}bF8μO2Obn281⁄2Ë-gÏV¶¶3⁄4VÁÏ ¢ Y 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8 OYÂO1⁄2 μ Fbμ1⁄2 Âμ1⁄2281⁄2bY 28O1⁄2O8Ë FË 8b8 1⁄2 bÊb82μiμÂO}8μμ8ubμV1⁄2b8O}b2μV2bu}1⁄2bbYb2μμOn¢78uÎbFμV 2010). An exemplar might be an especially inspiring spiritual leader or a great intellectual hero from history whom one admires and wishes to emu- 81⁄2b¢+ÂO}ouÂ2bμO8FbbÊb82μF1⁄2}n1⁄2}battainment of good conduct 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 64 19-10-2015 15:15:37 Educating for Intellectual Humility 65 or, more modestly, of the aspiration to be well-conducted, and so, in this 81⁄21⁄2b2μbμbV8bÊb82bbY1⁄2Fb8¬μ81⁄2Ë-ouÂ2bμÂO}8μb2bu882Y evidently was for Wittgenstein. 1⁄28ËV1⁄2}Âu}V1⁄2}bμbbÊb82μu}1⁄2OÂYbb μ1⁄2b8O}b2μib2}8μ 8Éμb1⁄2Â1⁄2228O}82μ81⁄2O bO1⁄2Â2b2¢Ob8YÈμbY1⁄2}81⁄21⁄2Â1⁄22μÂu}1⁄21⁄2 "fashion the Carriage" and "form the Mind" of their pupils by exemplify- u¬uY8F1⁄2μ8Y(2Obμn2b21⁄2Âb-1⁄2}81⁄2u28YÂ8ËYÂOb1⁄2}b ¬8Èb8Y1⁄281⁄2nÉ}81⁄2 μ ÊObb1⁄2-1V¶s ¢+ÂO}bÊb82Ë instruction requires a sustained and attentive personal and pedagogic relationship, structured by an at least implicit appreciation of the exemplary nature of the teaching and within which exemplary conduct can be demonstrated by the tutor and discerned by the pupil (see, e.g., Yolton, 1998, and Wanderer, 2013). Education can contribute to the cultivation of good intellectual conduct μbÈb28É8ËμVFÂ1⁄2ÉYμOÂμμÂμ1⁄21⁄2}2bb¢,}bo2μ1⁄2μ1⁄2}81⁄2bYÂO81⁄2O8 inform students about good and bad forms of intellectual conduct, explaining what it is, what makes it so, and so on. A tutor might, for instance, correct the aggressive attitudes of a tutee, or a doctoral supervisor might seek to soften a supervisee's tendency to be uncharitable toward their "rivals." The second is to inspire students to pursue and take pleasure in good intellectual conduct, evident in Confucius's efforts to teach students to appreciate the "harmonious ease" of good conduct as "beautiful," and so something to Èb8YbÂ81⁄2bÁÏÏ3⁄4V¶¢Á ¢,}μO8Fb8μb8μË8μ28μu8μ1⁄2ÂYb1⁄2n2 their fair-mindedness or humility, or, of course, rebuking them for arrogance or unfairness. The third way is that education can induct students into robust practices for the regulation of their appraisal, attitudes, and ambitions, for instance FËnnb2u1⁄2}bÉ}81⁄2}bÉbËO8bY8¬bÈb2bYu8Ë-n¬Oscious correction and instruction" within physical and social environments suitably "framed" for the shaping of "mental and moral disposition" (2012, ¢ V ¢ The process of education can, therefore, afford structured opportunities for the cultivation and exercise of a student's disposition to regulate 1⁄2}b21⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8OYÂO1⁄2inÉ}81⁄21⁄2μVÉ}Ë1⁄2μuYV8YÉ}Ë1⁄2Âu}1⁄2 1⁄2Fb ÈbYiFËF1⁄2}1⁄2}b2b1⁄2O8 μ1⁄22ÂO1⁄28Y28O1⁄2O8Ybμ1⁄2281⁄2¢ Such good conduct requires many dispositions and capacities, of course, OÂYu8O88O1⁄2Ë1⁄22bOuÎb1⁄2}b2bbÈ8Ob8YnÂob1⁄2nOoYbOb OY1⁄2μin2O81⁄22b2Ë2buÂ81⁄2bËOYÂO1⁄2nO81⁄2u8ÂubË OoYbObV1⁄2b8μ1⁄2FbO8ÂμbV1⁄2}81⁄2O8μbV8u281⁄28FÂ1⁄2n8O1⁄2μ8FÂ1⁄2 my capacities and character that are essential to good conduct. Èb2 1⁄2}b 8μ1⁄2 nbÉ μbO1⁄2μV  }8Èb nnb2bY 8 8OOÂ1⁄2 n 1⁄2}b È21⁄2Âb n intellectual humility and indicated how it can be cultivated through education. My aim was not to offer a systematic account, but rather to secure 1⁄2}bO81⁄2}81⁄21⁄2μ8È21⁄2Âb¢+1⁄2V1⁄2ÉFbÂμbnÂ1⁄2F2bqËOμYb2μb 2bYO1⁄28Fb FbO1⁄2μin2 }Â1⁄2ËV qua virtue, has a bad reputation 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 65 19-10-2015 15:15:37 66 Ian James Kidd among philosophers. Typically, the objections are, in quick succession, that humility requires ignorance of one's abilities and achievements, encourages a self-abnegating stance of imposed servility, and requires paradoxical μbn81⁄21⁄22FÂ1⁄21⁄2bμbnn8§Â81⁄2ËYbobY1⁄2b2μn1⁄2}bYμ82F81⁄2 nb2μ828μb2b21⁄2 μbbV b¢u¢V2Èb2V gV 8Y2bFb2uVÁÏÏpV part 1). Such objections are typically directed at the particular conceptions n}Â1⁄2Ë1⁄2}81⁄2qÉbYn21⁄2}b }2μ1⁄281⁄228Y1⁄21⁄2}b3bμ1⁄2V281⁄2}b21⁄2}8 to humility tout court. Further east, especially in Confucian philosophy, there are alternative conceptions of humility that are less vulnerable to this set of objections, thereby softening their force (see, e.g., Pardue, 2013, and Rushing, 2013). More generally, it should be clear that the intellectually humble perμ}8ÈbYbμO2FbY μYbobY2bOμbË  1⁄2b2μn 1⁄2}b2ÉbYub8Y ÂYb2μ1⁄28Yuin2μ1⁄28ObVn828ubnOoYbObOY1⁄2μi8Y1⁄2}b2 having an active and acute sense of the scope and strength of their intellec1⁄2Â8O88O1⁄2bμ¢Â1⁄2ËV1⁄2}bV2b§Â2bμb1⁄2}b2u28Ob2μbn8F8μbb1⁄2 and there is no obvious paradox in the claim that a person can cultivate a capacity to identify facts about themselves through personal and collective effort. Indeed, that is surely a primary purpose of education, a fact recog- ÎbYFËObV(b1⁄2b2μV 8bμ}1⁄21⁄2V8Y1⁄2}b2μ¢ There are, however, a set of more imposing obstacles to humility in the O1⁄2bÊ1⁄2nbYÂO81⁄2V8Y1⁄2}bË82b1⁄2}b1⁄2On1⁄2}bo8μbO1⁄2¢ 5. EDUCATION, CORRUPTION, AND EDIFICATION

21⁄2O82bqbO1⁄21⁄2}bμ1⁄281⁄2bn2bÈ8u288YμO8OÂ1⁄2Â2bμ8 integral feature of the philosophical enterprise, evident in the earliest and u2b81⁄2bμ1⁄2 ouÂ2bμ n 1⁄2}b2bb 8Y }bμb 1⁄228Y1⁄2μV OÂYu +O281⁄2bμ μ castigation of the Sophists and Confucius's calls for revival of the "rites." Such critiques typically included commentary on contemporary educational practices and conceptions coupled to proposals for the establishment of YbYO81⁄2bY μO}μ 8Y bYÂO81⁄2Èb OÂ1⁄2bμ¢ ,}b 82Yb n OÂ2ÂμV for instance, was an "academy" to cultivate the "ethical teachings of the school" by placing students within an environment in which they could FbOb¬8OOÂμ1⁄2bY1⁄2K1⁄2}bLÈ21⁄2Âbμ-*μ1⁄2V ÁV¢ÁV1Á ¢ In this section, I argue that several contemporary educational attitudes and conceptions marginalize or militate against the cultivation of intellectual humility (and likely other virtues, too, though that further claim is not my concern here). This is a preparatory survey pending future investigation, and it is inspired by other "aretaic" criticisms of contemporary attitudes and conceptions (see, e.g., Battaly, 2013, and Cooper, 2008b). Though these attitudes and conceptions are diverse, their effect, both individually and col- bO1⁄2ÈbËVμ81⁄22bb2μUo2μ1⁄2VnbYÂO81⁄28μ882b8n21⁄2}bOÂ1⁄2È81⁄2 of virtue; second, of the ideal of educators as exemplars; and third, of the 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 66 19-10-2015 15:15:37 Educating for Intellectual Humility 1  b1⁄2b22μbnbYÂO81⁄28μb8Fui8μ	8b}2 μÁÏ3⁄4V¢Áp3⁄4 }bnÂ }28μbi8¬nÂY8b1⁄282b1⁄281⁄2-1⁄2É82Y1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8uYμ¢Ð1⁄2}Âu} ËYμOÂμμ2bqbO1⁄2μ8μbOoOOOb2É1⁄2}}Â1⁄2Ë8Y1⁄2}b88ubb1⁄2 nOoYbObV1⁄28uμÉ1⁄2}8μb1⁄2nÉYb2OOb2μ28μbYFË1⁄2}b2O21⁄2Oμ nYb2 bYÂO81⁄2¢b1⁄2b nOÂμÂ nÂ2 8μbO1⁄2μ nYb2 bYÂO8tion that I judge to militate against or marginalize humility as calibrated OoYbOb¢ ,}bo2μ1⁄282bperformative conceptions of education that prioritize stanY82YÎbYbÊ881⁄2n2§Â81⁄2o8Fb§Â81⁄2bμVμÂO}8μu28Ybμ8YYÂb pass rates, often to the exclusion of all else. Performativism marginalizes teaching for virtues in general, because it imposes, incentivizes, and entrenches a myopic focus upon cognitive qualities and achievements with obvious measurable performative criteria, in several ways. For a start, humil- 1⁄2ËμVb8ËÈ21⁄2ÂbμVYnoOÂ1⁄21⁄2§Â81⁄2nË2¬b8μÂ2bV-μb1⁄2}uÐ2μtotle recognized when he remarked upon ethics being an "inexact science" (see further Kotzee, this volume). This being so, virtues like humility tend not to feature in the standardized lists of performative criteria for students 1⁄2Â2μÂb8YbYÂO81⁄22μ 1⁄2 821⁄2¢bÊ1⁄2VÉ1⁄2}b2n281⁄2ÈbbYÂO81⁄2V humility is only likely to be acknowledged insofar as it contributes demonstrably to improved performance. This means that humility is valued only contingently and instrumentally, rather than as an independently valuable virtue and a component of good intellectual conduct. Finally, the invariably standardized character of performative education precludes the formation of the rich and personalized pedagogic relationships that the cultivation of virtues, especially via exemplary demonstration, properly requires (see Markie, 2008). Performativism is, then, hostile to educating for virtues in general, including humility. The second are instrumentalist conceptions of education that direct curricular content and pedagogic practice toward the training of students with the skills and knowledge deemed necessary to national economic interests É}81⁄2 8bμ}1⁄21⁄2Yμ828uuËYÂFFbY 1⁄2}b¬μb2ÈOb YÂμ1⁄22Ë-OOb1⁄2 of education). Instrumentalism also marginalizes virtues, but incorporates 8821⁄2OÂ82}μ1⁄21⁄2Ë1⁄2}Â1⁄2ËVn281⁄2b8μ1⁄21⁄2}2bb2b8μμ¢ bVbYÂO81⁄2Èb focus is placed on information, skills, knowledge, and dogmatic pedagogy 281⁄2}b2 1⁄2}8 OÂ1⁄2È81⁄2bY bÊObbObμn O}828O1⁄2b2i1⁄2}81⁄2 μV È21⁄2Âbμi8Y μ1⁄2Âdents are rewarded for their ability to rapidly and reliably absorb those cognitive skills, rather than their commitment to the improvement of their O}828O1⁄2b2μi1⁄2}bË 1⁄2b28Îb88F1⁄2 1⁄2FbObOu1⁄2Èb+Éμμ82Ë knives. Two, as recent history shows, instrumentalist educational systems tend to exclude or derogate the humanistic disciplines, such as history and philosophy, which are the natural and nourishing home of the projects of edifying self-education that are required if one is to aspire to and attain good ethical and intellectual conduct. The project of perfecting one's intel- bO1⁄2Â8OYÂO1⁄2Ybμ1⁄2qÂ2μ}É1⁄2}8bYÂO81⁄2Èb8YμO8bÈ2ment dominated by rote learning of practicable skills dictated by concerns 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 67 19-10-2015 15:15:37 68 Ian James Kidd about economic productivity. Three, the instrumentalist privileging of eco- O8Y¬28O1⁄2O8-bbYμbÈ1⁄28FËOqO1⁄2μÉ1⁄2}1⁄2}bYb8Yμn1⁄2blectual humility. For instance, there are, prima facie, good economic reasons 1⁄2u2b1⁄2}b2b8μ8FbOoYbObnμOb1⁄2μ1⁄2μÉ}É82n1⁄2}bbÈ2mental costs of carbon-intensive economic activities and of the mechanized form of the global food system. Four, instrumentalist education erodes the ideal of teachers as exemplars of virtue, since what a student expects is 8bnoOb1⁄21⁄228μ1⁄21⁄2b2nÉbYubV8Y1⁄2}81⁄2Ybμ1⁄2V  1⁄2μbnV2b§Â2b them to be exemplars of good intellectual conduct, much less the beautiful, "saint-like" sage described in the ancient virtue traditions. Alongside the performative and instrumentalist conceptions, there are two further factors that are hostile to the cultivation and exercise of humility. The third feature of education hostile to humility is the contemporary zeal for the cultivation and protection of "passion" on the part of students concerning their beliefs and convictions. A cult of passion encourages 881⁄21⁄21⁄2ÂYbnÂn21⁄2obY8μμ81⁄2b OoYbOb 1⁄2}81⁄2 8obμ 8 μ1⁄2ÂYb1⁄2 μ 8ub1⁄28OoYbObÉ}b8μÂnËu1⁄2}b2μμF1⁄2Ën2FÂμ1⁄2O21⁄2O8 appraisal by either their peers or their teachers. In practice, this disables both the recognition-disposition and the regulation-disposition, in several É8Ëμ¢, μ1⁄2821⁄2V 1⁄2 μb8281⁄2bμÉ}81⁄2822Ë 28nÂ21⁄2 ÁÏÏpV ¢ 1p  O8μ 8 ideal of sincerity from an ideal of correctness, placing all emphasis upon the former to the neglect of the latter. If all that matters is the intensity of passion of one's sincere belief that p, rather than the issue of p's truth, then the Èb2ËYb8nOoYbObOY1⁄2μ1⁄2Fb2bOuÎbY8YnÂobYi8Y1⁄2}Âμ n}Â1⁄2Ëiμμ1⁄2¢ The erosion of the ideal of correctness is, next, accelerated by the prevalence of relativism, constructivism, postmodernism, and other doctrines of "truth-denial," as Bernard Williams dubs them (2002, ch. 1). If there are no truths to be accurate about, since all "truths" are "constructions" or "mere 1⁄22Â1⁄2}μV-1⁄2}b1⁄2}b2bμbbY1⁄2μÉb81⁄2Èb21⁄2}b2bOu1⁄2nOoYbOb OY1⁄2μ 2 1⁄2}b 2buÂ81⁄2 n 1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8 OYÂO1⁄2¢ 2 OÂY 1⁄2 8b any sense for education to instill in students a "fundamental orientation" toward intellectual goods such as truth: For no such truths exist toward which to be oriented, fundamentally or in any other way. ,2Â1⁄2}Yb8u}1⁄21⁄28b82bμbOoOn28Y1⁄2}μμVo8ËV1⁄2}b¬μOentistic" conviction that there are truths to be recognized and respected, but ËÉ1⁄2}1⁄2}bY8nμOb1⁄2oOÉbYub8Y§Â2Ë¢nμV1⁄2}bbÊOb1⁄2 OOb2u1⁄2}bYbÈb28ObμnμObObVbO8FbbÈbi¬8μμ81⁄2bË-8Y ¬μOb2bË-iÉ}81⁄2bÈb2bbμVn21⁄2}b2bμ§Âbμ1⁄2nOoYbObOcerning beliefs and convictions in the ethical, aesthetic, and other spheres of nb¢,}bμObnOoYbObV8YV}bObVn}Â1⁄2ËVμ1⁄2}b2bn2b28YO8Ë delimited, and the result is, in Wittgenstein's words, that students come to suppose that "scientists exist to instruct them" in the realm of truth, while ¬b1⁄2μ8YÂμO8μ-O8Ëb1⁄2b21⁄288Y¬uÈb1⁄2}bb8μÂ2b-iÉ1⁄2} the result that the very idea that humanistic scholars and disciplines might 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 68 19-10-2015 15:15:37 Educating for Intellectual Humility 69 have truths of their own to convey "does not occur" (1980, p. 36). In such cases, humility is impaired either by the rejection of truth or by the restriction of truth to the delimited domain of science, in a way that collapses or Oobμ 1⁄2}bF8μμ n2 1⁄2}bYμμ1⁄2μ 1⁄2 2bOuÎb OoYbOb OY1⁄2μ and regulate one's conduct accordingly. The fourth obstacle to the cultivation and exercise of humility are the practical realities of modern education, which create sub-optimal conditions n2bYnËubYÂO81⁄2¢ FÈÂμbÊ8bμV1⁄2n8821⁄2bbYμbOnËuV include increasing class sizes, bureaucratization of educational practice and policy, top-down imperatives to be "relevant" or have "impact," and the decline, especially in higher education, of one-on-one-teaching (see, e.g., Schuster and Finkelstein, 2006, and Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004). Doubt- bμμbYÂO81⁄22μYnnb2b1⁄2OÂ1⁄22bμ8YμËμ1⁄2bμÉ8YY1⁄2}b2ÉμbOoO bêtes noiresVμÂO}8μ1⁄2}b*bμb82O} ÊObbOb28bÉ21⁄2}b-¢¢Ð8 FbO1⁄2 1⁄2 μÂO} YbÈbb1⁄2μ μ 1⁄2}b2 bu81⁄2Èb bnnbO1⁄2  1⁄2b8O}ui1⁄2 least of how they render practically impossible the "constant Attention" 8Y¬821⁄2OÂ82Ð1⁄21⁄2b1⁄2-1⁄2}81⁄2ObÂYubYbμμb1⁄281⁄282b1⁄28ObYÂO81⁄2¢ Such pressures and constraints preclude the formation of the rich, trusting, and sustained relationships between students and their teachers and among teachers as colleagues. They also erode the edifying, humanistic conception of education as an arena for the cultivation and exercise of the virtues that are, for Plato and for Confucius, the grounds of social and civic life. Such transformations, at least at the academic level, have a further negative effect and it takes the form of an increasing incredulity on the part of students to the very ideanbYÂO81⁄22μibO1⁄2Â2b2μV1⁄2Â1⁄22μiFbubÊb82μ of good intellectual conduct that they ought to emulate. My sense is that most of my students regard my aspiration to good intellectual conduct as part-and-parcel of my role as a teacher of philosophy, but the closely related idea that they might, let alone ought, embrace the project of cultivating vir1⁄2ÂÂμOYÂO1⁄2μbbμ1⁄21⁄2}b8μi1⁄2§Â1⁄2b38μÁÏÏ1FV¢Ï i¬μÂμpect" or, worse, "priggish." The idea that education ought to edify, therefore, appears as a possible project to be considered by "student-consumers" facing a diverse menu of educational "options," rather than an essential or 1⁄2bu28Ob1⁄2n1⁄2}bÂ2μÂ1⁄2n8qÂ2μ}u8YuYnb¢ These four obstacles to virtue in general, and to humility in particular, are Âμ1⁄28μbbO1⁄28Yi281⁄2}b2Yb2bμμuËiÈb2Ë8Ë2bOÂYFbYb1⁄2obYÉ1⁄2}2b81⁄2Èbb8μb¢ b21⁄28n1⁄2}bμbFμ1⁄28Obμ82b}μ1⁄2b1⁄2È21⁄2Âbuberal, such as performativism, while others, such as the "cult of passion," are μbOoO8Ë}μ1⁄2b1⁄2}Â1⁄2Ë¢+ÂO}bYÂO81⁄28OOb1⁄2μ8Y81⁄21⁄21⁄2ÂYbμ u}1⁄2Yμ8Fb}Â1⁄2ËY2bO1⁄2ËVb2}8μFË821⁄2oO8Ë822Éu8μ1⁄2ÂYb1⁄2 μ μbμbn1⁄2}b28ubnOoYbObOY1⁄2μ1⁄2}81⁄21⁄2}bËÂu}1⁄21⁄22bμbO1⁄2V2 they might disable it indirectly by creating a wider social and educational culture within which educating for virtues appears idle, indulgent, "priggish," or eccentric and, thus, excluded from the moral imagination of those individuals and of their society. 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 69 19-10-2015 15:15:37  Ï Ian James Kidd Interestingly, such concerns about education are often expressed using a charged rhetoric of corruption: of "the mission of humanistic scholarship" n2821⁄2}8ÂμμF8ÂÁÏÏV¢3⁄4Ï 2nμO}82μ μ1⁄281⁄2Âμ8μ¬OÂμ1⁄2Y8μ- of a "complex intellectual inheritance" for Stefan Collini (2012, p. 199). These and other critics use this rhetoric of corruption to refer, at least partly, to the tendency of the educational systems they challenge to encourage 8Yb8Fb8È82b1⁄2Ënb1⁄2}O88Y1⁄2bbO1⁄2Â8ÈObμiË8Vμboμ}bμμV On21⁄2Ëi281⁄2}b21⁄2}88O22bμYuμb1⁄2nÈ21⁄2Âbμ¢ μÂuubμ1⁄2 1⁄2}81⁄2Éb might describe educational systems that are conducive to the cultivation and exercise of vices as corrupting, and those conducive to virtues as edifying. My judgment is clearly that much of modern education is corrupting, at least as concerns the virtue of intellectual humility. I therefore align myself É1⁄2}ÂμμFÂ8V V 8Y 1⁄2}b2 O1⁄2b282Ë O21⁄2Oμ¢ ,}μ Ybμ 1⁄2V of course, imply that students are thereby debarred from cultivating their virtues, since education is only one place where they can do that. But, of course, educational institutions will often be one of the best places for students to learn to cultivate and exercise their virtues. If so, the corruption of such edifying spaces by performativism and related conceptions is a source n μb2Âμ OOb2ibμbO8Ë nV 8μ821⁄2bYbuub2 ObÉ82bYV 1⁄2}b deep tendencies that are corrupting education are also busily corrupting many other areas of human life (see Cooper, 2002). If these concerns are correct, then contemporary educational systems are n8uÉ}81⁄28ËÉ21⁄2b2μμOb81⁄2§Â1⁄2ËYb1⁄2obY8μbn1⁄2μ282Ë purposes: to induct, inspire, and instruct students in the self-educative project of cultivating and exercising the virtues that are integral to a good and qÂ2μ}unb¢YbbYV1⁄2}bn8O1⁄21⁄2}81⁄2O8μn2μÂO}bYnËubYÂO81⁄282b8μ historically familiar as complaints about the corrupting reality brings with 1⁄282O8YYb2bμμuμbμbn}Â1⁄2Ëi1⁄2}μ1⁄2bVn}ÉÂO}1⁄2}b2b μ1⁄2FbYb8YnYÂF1⁄28FÂ1⁄2É}b1⁄2}b2ÉbO88μ2b1⁄21⁄2}bOoYbOb to do it. 1 NOTE  nnb2Ë1⁄2}8μ1⁄22μ1⁄2nnb2Ð}μ1⁄222V8μ	8b}2V8ÈY ¢ b2V *ÂbË2ÂV	F*Fb21⁄2μV+828} bV8Y88ËÂμ2bnb2bbn21⁄2}b2 comments and encouragement. This paper was written during an Addison Wheeler Fellowship. 6244-716-1pass-PI-004-r03.indd 70 19-10-2015 15:15: