[Final manuscript. Published at Oxford University Press] WORKING FROM WITHIN The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism Sander Verhaegh ii iii It is understandable [...] that the philosopher should seek a transcendental vantage point, outside the world that imprisons [the] natural scientist and mathematician. He would make himself independent of the conceptual scheme which it is his task to study and revise. "Give me πoυ στω [a place to stand]", Archimedes said, "and I will move the world." However, there is no such cosmic exile. [...] The philosopher is in the position rather, as Neurath says, "of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea". W. V. Quine (notes for Sign and Object, November 5, 1944) iv Table of Contents Preface xi List of Abbreviations xv 1. Introduction 1 PART I: NATURE 2. Naturalizing Epistemology 25 3. Naturalizing Metaphysics 59 4. In Mediis Rebus 89 PART II: DEVELOPMENT 5. Sign and Object 127 6. Analytic and Synthetic 169 7. Science and Philosophy 231 8. Conclusion 265 Appendices 269 Bibliography 311 Index 353 v Extended Table of Contents Preface xi List of Abbreviations xv 1. Introduction 1 1.0. Summary 1 1.1. Historical background 1 1.2. Naturalism and analytic philosophy 5 1.3. Working from within 7 1.4. Reading Quine in historical context 9 1.5. Plan 11 PART I: NATURE 2. Naturalizing Epistemology 25 2.0. Summary 25 2.1. Introduction 25 2.2. From certainty to straight psychology 29 2.3. Two strategies 35 2.4. Self-sufficient sensory languages 37 2.5. Quine's response to the sceptic 41 2.6. Reinterpreting "Epistemology Naturalized" 44 vi 3. Naturalizing Metaphysics 59 3.0. Summary 59 3.1. Introduction 60 3.2. Internal and external existence claims 63 3.3. Two distinctions 68 3.4. Quine on metaphysical existence claims 72 3.5. Scientific sense and metaphysical nonsense 77 3.6. Conclusion 81 4. In Mediis Rebus 89 4.0. Summary 89 4.1. Introduction 89 4.2. Three commitments 91 4.3. A quirk of usage 97 4.4. Deflation, deflation, deflation 102 4.5. The bounds of science 105 4.6. Immanence and transcendence 108 4.7. Artificial languages 112 4.8. Conclusion 114 PART II: DEVELOPMENT 5. Sign and Object 127 5.0. Summary 127 vii 5.1. Introduction 127 5.2. Philosophical background 130 5.3. Starting at the middle 133 5.4. The nature of metaphysical judgments 135 5.5. A pragmatic interpretation of positivism 138 5.6. The philosopher's task 141 5.7. Two problems 144 5.8. "Two Dogmas" 148 5.9. Language and knowledge 151 5.10. Conclusion 154 6. Analytic and Synthetic 169 6.0. Summary 169 6.1. Introduction 169 6.2. Narrow and wide holism 172 6.3. Mathematical objects and mathematical knowledge 179 6.4. The principle of tolerance 181 6.5. A behavioristically acceptable definition 184 6.6. Triangular correspondence 189 6.7. Quine on asemiotism 191 6.8. "The whole of science" 198 6.9. Maximal integration 201 6.10. Universal revisability 205 6.11. Maximal inclusion 213 6.12. Conclusion 210 viii 7. Science and Philosophy 231 7.0. Summary 231 7.1. Introduction 231 7.2. Ordinary language and the language of science 233 7.3. Philosophy and science; science and philosophy 240 7.4. The reception of Quine's naturalism 244 7.5. Adopting an 'ism' 248 7.6. Conclusion 255 8. Conclusion 265 Appendices 269 A1. Editorial Introduction 271 A2. Logic, Mathematics, Science (1940) 274 A3. Sign and Object; or, The Semantics of Being (1944) 282 A4. A Letter to Nelson Goodman (1949) 289 A5. The Present State of Empiricism (1951) 294 A6. The Sophisticated Irrational (1965) 306 Bibliography 311 Index 353 ix Preface This book is the result of almost nine years of thinking and writing about Quine's naturalism. The project started with a term paper on the Carnap-Quine debate for Jeanne Peijnenburg's inspiring course on the history of analytic philosophy in 2008 and gradually evolved into a dissertation about the relation between holism and naturalism in Quine's philosophy, which I defended in Groningen in 2015. Encouraged by the warm support of my colleagues and a number of fellow Quine scholars, I spent the last two years revising and extending the manuscript. Having acquired a serious case of 'archive fever', a significant chunk of this period was spent at the W. V. Quine Papers at Houghton Library, Harvard University. Using his published corpus as well the thousands of letters, notes, draft manuscripts, lectures, grant proposals, teaching materials, and annotations collected at the archives, I have aimed to write a book that reconstructs both the nature and the development of Quine's naturalism. The notes, letters, and lectures that have most influenced my views about (the development of) Quine's naturalism are transcribed and collected in the appendix. Parts of this book have been published elsewhere. I thank the respective journals for granting me permission to reprint these papers: Quine's Argument from Despair (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22(1), 150-173. (chapter 2) Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal-External Distinction (2017). Erkenntnis, 82(4), 873-890. (chapter 3) x Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism (2017). Journal for the History of Philosophy, 55(2), 317-342. (sections 4.1-4.2, 6.2, and 6.6) Quine on the Nature of Naturalism (2017). The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 55(1), 96-115. (section 4.5) Sign and Object: Quine's Forgotten Philosophical Book Project (forthcoming). Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1693-z. (chapter 5) Quine's 'Needlessly Strong' Holism (2017). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 61(1), 11-20. (sections 6.8-6.11) Setting Sail: The Development and Reception of Quine's Naturalism (forthcoming). Philosophers' Imprint. (chapter 7) Still, this book aims to be more than a collection of papers. Many sections have been revised, extended, and rewritten for the purposes of this book. Moreover, an introductory chapter, a conclusion, several new sections (i.e. 4.3-4.4; 4.6-4.8; 5.5; 6.3-6.5; 6.7), and seven appendices have been included to fill the gaps and to present a comprehensive account of Quine's naturalism. Much of this research has been funded by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (grants 322-20-001 and 275-20-064). My research visits to Harvard University, Houghton Library, Bethel, CT, and the Harvard University Archives have been funded by a Kristeller-Popkin Travel Fellowship from the Journal of the History of Philosophy, a Rodney G. Dennis Fellowship in the Study of Manuscripts from Houghton Library, and a Travel Bursary from the Evert Willem Beth Foundation. I am very grateful for this financial support. Finally, it is my great pleasure to thank the many people without whom I could not have completed this book: Jeanne Peijnenburg, Allard Tamminga, Lieven Decock, Gary xi Ebbs, Hans-Johann Glock, Peter Hylton, Gary Kemp, Fred Muller, Martin Lenz, and two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press for their comments on earlier versions of this book; Harvard's Department of Philosophy, Nyasha Borde, Monique Duhaime, Juliet Floyd, Warren Goldfarb, Leslie Morris, Mark Richard, Thomas Ricketts, and the staff at Houghton Library and the Harvard University Archives for their warm welcome during my research visits; Douglas and Maryclaire Quine for welcoming me into their house to examine the remaining 57 boxes of unprocessed archive material; Hannah Doyle, Lucy Randall, Richard Risomaki, Leslie Johson, and Tharani Ramachandran at Oxford University Press and Newgen for smoothly guiding my manuscript through the editing and production process; Jody Azzouni, Richard Creath, Fons Dewulf, Dagfinn Føllesdal, James Levine, Eric Schliesser, Andrew Smith, Serdal Tumkaya, Thomas Uebel, Wim Vanrie, the members of the EPS seminar in Tilburg, the members of the PCCP and the WiP seminars in Groningen, and audiences in Amsterdam, Athens, Bloomington, Bologna, Calgary, Chicago, Denver, Edinburgh, Groningen, Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Modena, Munich, Rotterdam, Tampa, Tilburg, and Zürich for their comments on various papers and chapters in various stages; Reto Gubelmann, Frederique Janssen-Lauret, Gary Kemp, and Sean Morris for their wonderful Quine workshops in Denver, Glasgow, Manchester, and Zürich; and Douglas B. Quine (W. V. Quine Literary Estate), and Catherine Z. Elgin (Literary executor for Nelson Goodman) for granting me permission to publish some of Quine's and Goodman's papers, notes, and letters as appendices to this book. Of course, the above individuals do not necessarily agree with my conclusions and they are not responsible for any residual errors or omissions. A note on citation and transcription: Unless specified differently, the unpublished documents I refer to in this book are part of the W. V. Quine Papers, collection MS Am 2587, Houghton Library, Harvard University. In the main text and in the footnotes, I refer to these xii documents by citing dates (if known) and item numbers. A letter of Quine to the American Philosophical Association, for example, could be referred to as (January 1, 1950, item 31). For quick reference, the item numbers are listed in the List of Abbreviations (pp. xiii-xxii). The items' full titles and box numbers are provided in the bibliography. In transcribing Quine's autograph notes, drafts, and letters, I have aimed to minimize editorial interference and chosen not to correct ungrammatical shorthand. In referring to Quine's published work, I use abbreviations (listed in the List of Abbreviations) as well as the year in which the paper or book was first published. If the paper is incorporated in one of Quine's collections of papers, the page numbers will refer to this collection. The first page of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", for example, will be referred to as (TDE, 1951a, 20). The details of Quine's published work cited in this book are provided in the bibliography. In his autobiography, The Time of My Life, Quine argues that science and history of science appeal to very different tempers: "An advance in science resolves an obscurity, a tangle, a complexity, an inelegance, that the scientist then gratefully dismisses and forgets. The historian of science tries to recapture the very tangles, confusions, and obscurities from which the scientist is so eager to free himself" (TML, 1985a, 194). I hope this book accomplishes a bit of both; although I will show that Quine faced many tangles, confusions, and obscurities in developing his naturalism, I also hope to convey that the system he created is one of great clarity and elegance. Sander Verhaegh June 2018 xiii List of Abbreviations This section provides a list of abbreviations used in this book to refer to W. V. Quine's published and unpublished work. Detailed references can be found in the Bibliography. A complete list of Quine's publications up to approximately 1997 (including reprints and translations) can be found in Yeghiayan (2009). For an overview of papers, books, reprints, and translations after 1997, see Douglas B. Quine's website http://www.wvquine.org. Most of Quine's unpublished papers, letters, lectures, and notebooks can be accessed at Houghton Library, Harvard University. The documents' call numbers, box numbers, and item numbers are provided in the Bibliography. A finding aid for much of Quine's unpublished work can be found at http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hou01800. Archival sources from Quine's Unprocessed Papers, Quine's Library, and the Papers of Nelson Goodman are not listed here because they are not properly itemized. Details about these sources are listed in the Bibliography. Archival sources Item 31 Correspondence with the American Philosophical Association (1936-1986) Item 40 Correspondence Apthrough As- (various dates) Item 86 Correspondence with Lars Bergström (1988-1996) Item 96 Correspondence with Evert Willem Beth (1947-1964) Item 205 Correspondence with the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1955-1979) xiv Item 224 Correspondence with Alonzo Church (1935-1994) Item 231 Correspondence with Joseph T. Clark (1951-1953) Item 234 Correspondence Co- (various dates) Item 248 Correspondence with Columbia University (1949-1970) Item 254 Correspondence with James Bryant Conant (1951-1979) Item 260 Correspondence with John Cooley (1932-1962) Item 270 Correspondence with Richard Creath (1977-1998) Item 287 Correspondence with Donald Davidson (1957-1997) Item 293 Correspondence with Grace De Laguna (1950-1954) Item 306 Correspondence Dithrough Do- (various dates) Item 315 Correspondence with Burton Dreben (1948-1997) Item 336 Correspondence Erthrough Ez- (various dates) Item 370 Correspondence with Philipp Frank (1951-1967) Item 420 Correspondence with Nelson Goodman (1935-1994) Item 471 Correspondence with Harvard University, Department of Philosophy (19301994) Item 473 Correspondence with Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences (19311998) Item 475 Correspondence with Harvard University, Grants (1931-1988) Item 479 Correspondence with Harvard University, President's Office (1937-1998) Item 499 Correspondence with Carl Gustav Hempel (1936-1997) Item 529 Correspondence with Christopher Hookway (1988) Item 530 Correspondence with Paul Horwich (1991-1992) Item 545 Correspondence with the Institute for Advanced Study (1955-1965) Item 553 Correspondence Irthrough Iz- (various dates) xv Item 570 Correspondence with the Journal of Symbolic Logic (1936-1996) Item 616 Correspondence with Imre Lakatos (1964-1974) Item 637 Correspondence with Michelle Leonelli (1966-1998) Item 643 Correspondence with Clarence Irving Lewis (1929-1996) Item 675 Correspondence with Joseph Margolis (1967 and undated) Item 724 Correspondence with Hugh Miller (1948-1952) Item 741 Correspondence with Charles W. Morris (1936-1947) Item 755 Correspondence with John Myhill (1943-1985) Item 758 Correspondence with Ernest Nagel (1938-1964) Item 885 Correspondence with Hilary Putnam (1949-1993 Item 921 Correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation (1945-1980) Item 958 Correspondence Sc- (various dates) Item 972 Correspondence with Wilfred Sellars (1938-1980) Item 1001 Correspondence with B. F. Skinner (1934-1998) Item 1005 Correspondence with J. J. C. Smart (1949-1998) Item 1014 Correspondence with Ernest Sosa (1970-1995) Item 1200 Correspondence with Paul Weiss (1937-1972) Item 1213 Correspondence with Morton White (1939-1998) Item 1221 Correspondence with Donald Cary Williams (1940-1994) Item 1237 Correspondence with Joseph Henry Woodger (1938-1982) Item 1239 Correspondence with the World Congress of Philosophy (1952-1998) Item 1244 Correspondence with Morton G. Wurtele (1938-1997) Item 1263 Correspondence concerning requests to publish or for copies (1950-1959) Item 1355 Editorial correspondence with D. Reidel Publishing Company (1960-1982 and undated) xvi Item 1391 Editorial correspondence concerning Mathematical Logic (1939-1940) Item 1401 Editorial correspondence concerning Methods of Logic (1947-1950) Item 1422 Editorial correspondence concerning Ontological Relativity (1968-1988) Item 1423 Editorial correspondence concerning On Translation (1956-1959) Item 1443 Editorial correspondence concerning On What There Is (1948-1975) Item 1401 Editorial correspondence concerning Theory of Deduction (1946-1949) Item 1488 Editorial correspondence concerning Word and Object (1952-1960) Item 1489 Editorial correspondence concerning Word and Object (1959-1980 and undated) Item 1490 Editorial correspondence concerning Words and Objections (1966-1974) Item 2388a Quine's Annotated Copy of Putnam's Meaning and the Moral Sciences (undated) Item 2441 Epistemology Naturalized; or, the Case for Psychologism (1968) Item 2498 In conversation: Professor W. V. Quine. Interviews by Rudolf Fara (1993) Item 2733 Russell's Ontological Development (1966-1967) Item 2756 Stimulus and Meaning (1965) Item 2829 A Short Course on Logic (1946) Item 2830 Theory of Deduction (1948) Item 2836 Foreword to the Third Edition of From a Logical Point of View (1979) Item 2884 Questions for Quine by Stephen Neale (1986) Item 2902 For Rockefeller Lecture (1968) Item 2903 For Symposium with Sellars (1968) Item 2928 The Inception of "New Foundations" (1987) Item 2948 Kinds (1967) Item 2952 Levine Seminar Questions for Quine (1982) xvii Item 2954 Logic, Math, Science (1940) Item 2958 Mathematical Entities (1950) Item 2969 Nominalism (1937) Item 2971 The Notre Dame Lectures (1970) Item 2994 Ontological Relativity (1967) Item 2995 Ontological Relativity (1968) Item 3011 The Place of a Theory of Evidence (1952) Item 3015 The Present State of Empiricism (1951) Item 3102 Word and Object Seminar (1967) Item 3158 Philosophy 148 (1953) Item 3169 Early Jottings on Philosophy of Language (1937-1944) Item 3170 Erledigte Notized (various dates) Item 3181 Ontology, Metaphysics, etc... (1944-1951) Item 3182 Philosophical Notes (various dates) Item 3184 Pragmatism, etc... (1951-1953) Item 3225 Miscellaneous Papers (1925-1931) Item 3236 Papers in Philosophy (1930-1931) Item 3254 General Report of my Work as a Sheldon Traveling Fellow 1932-1933 (1934) Item 3266 Philosophy 148 (ca. 1947) Item 3277 Oxford University Lectures (1953-1954) Item 3283 Oxford University Lecture: Philosophy of Logic (1953-1954) Published work xviii ANM Animadversion on the Notion of Meaning (1949) AWVQ Autobiography of W.V. Quine (1986) CA Carnap (1987) CB Comment on Berger (1990) CCE Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays (2008) CD Contextual Definition (1995) CGC A Comment on Grünbaum's Claim (1962) CLT Carnap and Logical Truth (1954) CPT Carnap's Positivistic Travail (1984) CNT Comments on Neil Tennant's "Carnap and Quine" (1994) CVO Carnap's Views on Ontology (1951) DE Designation and Existence (1939) EBDQ Exchange Between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine Following Davidson's Lecture (1994) EESW On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World (1975) EN Epistemology Naturalized (1969) EQ Existence and Quantification (1968) FHQP Four Hot Questions in Philosophy (1985) FLPV From a Logical Point of View (1953/1961) FM Facts of the Matter (1977) FME Five Milestones of Empiricism (1975) FSS From Stimulus to Science (1995) GQW Nelson Goodman, W. V. Quine and Morton White: A Triangular Correspondence (1947) GT Grades of Theoreticity (1970) xix IOH Identity, Ostension, Hypostasis (1946) IQ The Ideas of Quine. Interview by B. Magee (1978) ITA Indeterminacy of Translation Again (1987) IV Immanence and Validity (1991) IWVQ Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine. Interview by L. Bergström and D. Føllesdal (1994) LAOP A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem (1939) LC Lectures on Carnap (1934) LDHP Lectures on David Hume's Philosophy (1946) LP Linguistics and Philosophy (1968) ML1 Methods of Logic. First edition (1950) ML4 Methods of Logic. Fourth edition (1982) MSLT Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory (1953) NEN Notes on Existence and Necessity (1943) NK Natural Kinds (1969) NLOM Naturalism; Or, Living within One's Means (1995) NNK The Nature of Natural Knowledge (1975) NO Nominalism (1946) OI Ontology and Ideology (1951) OME On Mental Entities (1953) ONAS On the Notion of an Analytic Statement (1946) OR Ontological Relativity (1968) ORE Ontological Relativity and other essays (1969) ORPC Ontological Remarks on the Propositional Calculus (1934) ORWN Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers (1964) xx OW Otherworldly (1978) OWTI On What There Is (1948) PL Philosophy of Logic (1970/1986) PPE The Pragmatists' Place in Empiricism (1975) PPLT Philosophical Progress in Language Theory (1970) PR Posits and Reality (1955) PT Pursuit of Truth (1990/1992) PTF Progress on Two Fronts (1996) QCC The Quine-Carnap Correspondence (1932-1970) QD Quine in Dialogue (2008) QSM Quine Speaks His Mind. An interview by E. Pivcevic (1988) QU Quiddities (1987) QWVO Quine/'kwain/, Willard Van Orman (b. 1908) (1996) RA Responses to Articles by Abel Bergström, Davidson, Dreben, Gibson, Hookway, and Prawitz (1994) RC Reply to Chomsky (1968) RCP Reply to Charles Parsons (1986) RE Reactions (1995) RES Responses to Szubka, Lehrer, Bergström, Gibson, Miscevic, and Orenstein (1999) RGE Response to Gary Ebbs (1995) RGH Reply to Geoffrey Hellman (1986) RGM Responding to Grover Maxwell (1968) RHP Reply to Hilary Putnam (1986) RJV Reply to Jules Vuillemin (1986) xxi RMW Reply to Morton White (1986) ROD Russell's Ontological Development (1966) RR The Roots of Reference (1973) RRN Reply to Robert Nozick (1986) RS1 Reply to Stroud (1968) RS2 Reply to Stroud (1981) RSM Reply to Smart (1968) RST Reply to Stenius (1968) RTD Reply to Davidson (1968) RTE Responses to Essays by Smart, Orenstein, Lewis and Holdcroft, and Haack (1997) SCN Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism (1947) SLP Selected Logic Papers (1966/1995) SLS The Scope and Language of Science (1954) SM Stimulus and Meaning (1965) SN Structure and Nature (1992) SSS The Sensory Support of Science (1986) STL Set Theory and its Logic (1963/1969) TC Truth by Convention (1936) TDE Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951) TDR Two Dogmas in Retrospect (1991) TI Three Indeterminacies (1990) TML The Time of My Life (1985) TR Truth (1994) TT Theories and Things (1981) xxii TTPT Things and Their Place in Theories (1981) VD Vagaries of Definition (1972) VITD On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma (1981) WDWD Where Do We Disagree (1999) WB The Web of Belief (with J. S. Ullian 1970/1978) WIB What I Believe (1984) WO Word and Object (1960) WP The Ways of Paradox and other essays (1966/1976) WPB What Price Bivalence? (1981) WRML Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic (1941) WW The Way the World Is (1986) xxiii Bibliography Archival Sources: W. V. Quine Papers The unpublished papers, letters, lectures, and notebooks listed below are stored at the Harvard Depository and can be accessed at Houghton Library. A catalogue of Quine's unpublished work can be found at http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hou01800. The references are ordered by item number. Quine, W. V. and American Philosophical Association (1936-1986). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 001, Item 31. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Correspondence Apthrough As-. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 002, Item 40. Quine, W. V. and Bergström, L. (1988-1996). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 003, Item 86. Quine, W. V. and Beth, E. W. (1947-1964). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 004, Item 96. Quine, W. V. and Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences (1955-1979). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 007, Item 205. Quine, W. V. and Church, A. (1935-1994). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 008, Item 224. Quine, W. V. and Clark, J. T. (1951-1953). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 008, Item 231. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Correspondence Co-. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box xxiv 009, Item 234. Quine, W. V. and Columbia University (1949-1970). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 009, Item 248. Quine, W. V. and Conant, J. B. (1951-1979). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 009, Item 254. Quine, W. V. and Cooley, J. C. (1932-1962). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 009, Item 260. Quine, W. V. and Creath, R. (1977-1998). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 009, Item 270. Quine, W. V. and Davidson, D. (1957-1997). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 010, Item 287. Quine, W. V. and De Laguna, G. A. (1950-1954). Correspondence, W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 010, Item 293. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Correspondence Dithrough Do-. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 011, Item 306 Quine, W. V. and Dreben, B. (1948-1997). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 011, Item 315. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Correspondence Erthrough Ez-. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 011, Item 336. Quine, W. V. and Frank, P. (1951-1967). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 013, Item 370 Quine, W. V. and Goodman, N. (1935-1994). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 016, Item 420. Quine, W. V. and Harvard University, Department of Philosophy (1930-1994 and undated). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 018, Item 471. xxv Quine, W. V. and Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences (1931-1988). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 018, Item 473. Quine, W. V. and Harvard University, Grants (1931-1988). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 018, Item 475. Quine, W. V. and Harvard University, President's Office (1937-1998). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 018, Item 479. Quine, W. V. and Hempel, C. G. (1936-1997). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 019, Item 499. Quine, W. V. and Hookway, C. (1988). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 020, Item 529. Quine, W. V. and Horwich, P. (1991-1992). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 020, Item 530. Quine, W. V. and Institute for Advanced Study (1955-1965). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 020, Item 545. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Correspondence Irthrough Iz-. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 021, Item 553 Quine, W. V. and Journal of Symbolic Logic (1936-1996). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 021, Item 570. Quine, W. V. and Lakatos, I. (1964-1974). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 023, Item 616. Quine, W. V. and Leonelli, M. (1966-1998). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 024, Item 637. Quine, W. V. and Lewis, C. I. (1929-1996). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 024, Item 643. Quine, W. V. and Margolis, J. (1967 and undated). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers xxvi (MS Am 2587): Box 025, Item 675. Quine, W. V. and Miller, H. (1948-1952). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 027, Item 724. Quine, W. V. and Morris, C. W. (1936-1947). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 027, Item 741. Quine, W. V. and Myhill, J. (1943-1985). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 028, Item 755. Quine, W. V. and Nagel, E. (1938-1964). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 028, Item 758. Quine, W. V. and Putnam, H. (1949-1993). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 31, Item 885. Quine, W. V. and Rockefeller Foundation (1945-1980). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 033, Item 921. Quine, W. V. and Rodriguez-Consuegra, F. (1987-1994). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (Ms Am 2587): Box 033, Item 923. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Correspondence Sc-. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 034, Item 958. Quine, W. V. and Sellars, W. (1938-1980). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 034, Item 972. Quine, W. V. and Skinner, B. F. (1934-1998). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 036, Item 1001. Quine, W. V. and Smart, J. J. C. (1949-1998). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 036, Item 1005. Quine, W. V. and Sosa, E. (1970-1995). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 036, Item 1014. xxvii Quine, W. V. and Weiss, P. (1937-1972). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 042, Item 1200. Quine, W. V. and White, M. (1939-1998). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 043, Item 1213. Quine, W. V. and Williams, D. C. (1940-1994). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 043, Item 1221. Quine, W. V. and Woodger, J. H. (1938-1982). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 044, Item 1237. Quine, W. V. and World Congress of Philosophy (1952-1998). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 044, Item 1239. Quine, W. V. and Wurtele, M. G. (1938-1997). Correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 044, Item 1244. Quine, W. V. (1950-1959). Correspondence concerning requests to publish or for copies. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 045, Item 1263. Quine, W. V. (1960-1982 and undated). D. Reidel Publishing Company, Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 049, Item 1355. Quine, W. V. (1939-1940). Mathematical Logic. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 050, Item 1391. Quine, W. V. (1947-1950). Methods of logic. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 051, Item 1401. Quine, W. V. (1968-1988). Ontological relativity. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 052, Item 1422. Quine, W. V. (1956-1959). On translation. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 052, Item 1423. Quine, W. V. (1948-1975). On what there is. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers xxviii (MS Am 2587): Box 052, Item 1443. Quine, W. V. (1946-1949). Theory of deduction. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 053, Item 1467. Quine, W. V. (1952-1960). Word and object. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 054, Item 1488. Quine, W. V. (1959-1980 and undated). Word and object. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 054, Item 1489. Quine, W. V. (1966-1974). Words and objections. Editorial correspondence. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 054, Item 1490. Quine, W. V. (undated). Quine's annotated copy of Putnam's Meaning and the moral sciences. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 119, Item 2388a. Quine, W. V. (1968). Epistemology naturalized; or, the case for psychologism. Typescript with manuscript additions. Prepared March 1968. Presented at The New School of Social Research, April 28, 1968. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 085, Item 2441. Quine, W. V. (1993). In conversation: Professor W. V. Quine. Interviews by Rudolf Fara. Printout with autograph manuscript revisions. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 086, Item 2498. Quine, W. V. (1966-1967). Russell's ontological development. Autograph manuscript, typescript carbon. Presented at a symposium of the American Philosophical Association, June 29, 1966. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 090, Item 2733. Quine, W. V. (1965). Stimulus and meaning. Autograph manuscript. Prepared September 1125, 1965. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 091, Item 2756. Quine, W. V. (1946). A short course in logic. Typescript mimeograph. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 097, Item 2829. xxix Quine, W. V. (1948). Theory of deduction. Typescript mimeograph. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 097, Item 2830. Quine, W. V. (1979). Foreword to the third edition of From a logical point of view. Autograph manuscript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 098, Item 2836. Quine, W. V. (1986). Questions for Quine by Stephen Neale. Autograph manuscript, Manuscript, Typescript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 101, Item 2884. Quine, W. V. (1968). For Rockefeller lecture. Autograph manuscript. Presented at Rockefeller University, February 5, 1968. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 101, Item 2902. Quine, W. V. (1968). For symposium with Sellars. Autograph manuscript. Presented at the Summer Institute of Philosophy, Southampton, Long Island, July 11, 1968. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 101, Item 2903. Quine, W. V. (1987). The inception of "New foundations". Autograph manuscript. Presented at Oberwolfach, March 1987. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 102, Item 2928. Quine, W. V. (1967). Kinds. Autograph manuscript. Prepared September 22, 1967. Presented at Brooklyn College, October 17, 1967. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 102, Item 2948. Quine, W. V. (1982). Levine seminar questions for Quine. Autograph manuscript, Typescript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 102, Item 2952. Quine, W. V. (1940). Logic, math, science. Typescript. Presented at the Harvard Logic Group, December 20, 1940. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 102, Item 2954. Quine, W. V. (1950). Mathematical entities. Typescript. Presented at New York University, November 26, 1950. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 102, Item 2958. Quine, W. V. (1937). Nominalism. Autograph manuscript. Presented at the Harvard xxx Philosophy Club, October 25, 1937. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 103, Item 2969. Quine, W. V. (1970). The Notre Dame lectures. Autograph manuscript. Presented at the University of Notre Dame, May 11-15, 1970. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 103, 2971. Quine, W. V. (1967). Ontological relativity. Typescript. Prepared March 1967, presented at the University of Chicago and Yale University, May 1967. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 103, Item 2994. Quine, W. V. (1968). Ontological relativity. Typescript with autograph manuscript revisions. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 103, Item 2995. Quine, W. V. (1952). The place of a theory of evidence. Typescript. Presented at Yale University, October 7, 1952. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 104, Item 3011. Quine, W. V. (1951). The present state of empiricism. Autograph manuscript. Presented at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, May 26, 1951. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 104, Item 3015. Quine, W. V. (1967). Word and object seminar. Autograph manuscript. Presented at Ohio State University, January 9-13, 1967. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 106, Item 3102. Quine, W. V. (1953). Philosophy 148. Typescript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 107, Item 3158. Quine, W. V. (1937-1944). Early jottings on philosophy of language. Collection of notes. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 108, Item 3169. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Erledigte notizen. Collection of notes. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 108, Item 3170. xxxi Quine, W. V. (1944-1951). Ontology, metaphysics, etc... Collection of notes. Box 108, Item 3181. Quine, W. V. (various dates). Philosophical notes. Collection of notes. Boxes 108 and 109, Item 3182. Quine, W. V. (1951-1953). Pragmatism, etc.... Collection of notes. Box 109, Item 3184. Quine, W. V. (1925-1931). Miscellaneous papers. Collection of authograph student papers. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 110, Item 3225. Quine, W. V. (1930-1931). Papers in philosophy. Collection of authograph student papers. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 111, Item 3236. Quine, W. V. (1934). General report of my work as a Sheldon Traveling Fellow 1932-1933. Typescript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 112, Item 3254. Quine, W. V. (ca. 1947). Philosophy 148. Autograph manuscript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 115, Item 3266. Quine, W. V. (1953-1954). Oxford University lectures. Autograph manuscript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 116, Item 3277. Quine, W. V. (1953-1954). Oxford University lecture: Philosophy of logic. Autograph manuscript. W. V. Quine Papers (MS Am 2587): Box 118, Item 3283. Archival Sources: Quine's Unprocessed Papers Quine's unprocessed archive is stored at Douglas B. Quine's house in Bethel, Connecticut. The will soon be added to the W. V. Quine Papers at Houghton Library. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available inventory of Quine's unprocessed archive yet. The references are ordered by box number. xxxii Quine, W. V. (1924-1932). Correspondence between Quine and his parents. Box 21: Quine parents EasyClasp File: 1924-1932. Quine, W. V. (1933-1965). Correspondence between Quine and his parents. Box 21: Quine parents EasyClasp File: 1933-1965. Quine, W. V. (1933-1999). Datebooks. Box 45: Address Books, Datebooks, Diaries, Notepad. Archival Sources: Quine's Library Quine's library is stored at the Harvard Depository and can be accessed at Houghton Library. A catalog of Quine's library can be found at http://hcl.harvard.edu/libraries/houghton/collections/modern/printed_acquisitions_1213.cfm. The references are ordered by call number. Quine, W. V. (undated). Quine's copy of Dewey, J. (1925). Experience and nature. Item AC95.Qu441.Zz929d. Quine, W. V. (undated). Quine's copy of Kuhn, T. (1962). The structure of scientific Revolutions. Item AC95.Qu441.Zz962k. Quine, W. V. (undated). Quine's copy of Popper, K. (1962). Conjectures and refutations. Item AC95.Qu441.Zz962p. Archival Sources: Papers of Nelson Goodman xxxiii Nelson Goodman's archive is stored at the Harvard University Archives. Unfortunately, there is no publicly available catalogue of Goodman's papers. Goodman, N. and Quine, W. V. (ca. 1935-1994). Correspondence. Papers of Nelson Goodman. Accession 14359, unlabeled box, unlabeled folder. Published Literature Almeder, R. (1998). Harmless naturalism: The limits of science and the nature of philosophy. Chicago: Open Court. Alspector-Kelly, M. (2001). On Quine on Carnap on ontology. Philosophical Studies, 102(1), 93–122. Ammerman, R. R. (1965). Classics of analytic philosophy. New York: McGraw-Hill. Ariew, R. (1984). The Duhem Thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 35(4), 313–325. Arnold, J. & Shapiro, S. (2007). Where in the (world wide) web of belief is the law of noncontradiction. Noûs, 41(2), 276–297. Baldwin, T. (2007). Pragmatism and analysis. In M. 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