TEORIE VĚDY / THEORY OF SCIENCE / XL / 2018 / 2 CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS OF NEUROECONOMICS: SEVERAL TASKS FOR SOCIAL SCIENTISTS Abstract: Neuroscience is a fascinating discipline – its dynamic progress has led to the emergence of new interdisciplinary research programmes with great potential. One of these research areas is neuroeconomics. As will be shown in this article, this discipline, which is diffi cult to clearly characterize and defi ne, is faced with many problems. Th is paper argues that social scientists should be interested in the problems and tendencies in social neuroscience for several reasons. Neuroeconomics, and other disciplines inspired by neuroscience, will compete with their parent disciplines in many fi elds of interest. On one hand it will be necessary for scientists to defi ne and defend the irreplaceable roles of their disciplines, but also critically evaluate the potential of new approaches on the other. In the context of this discussion, which reopens questions about the scientifi c status of economics and its roles, this paper introduces the main problems related to neuroeconomics. Th is paper concludes that these problems represent a wide domain for social scientists and methodologists of science. Keywords: decision-making; methodology; neuroeconomics; philosophy of economics; philosophy of science Výzvy a problémy neuroekonomie: několik úkolů pro společenské vědce Abstrakt: Neurověda je fascinující disciplínou – její dynamický rozvoj podněcuje vznik nových interdisciplinárních výzkumných programů s velkým potenciálem. Jednou takovou oblastí je i neuroekonomie. Jak se ukáže v článku, tato disciplína, kterou je obtížné jednoznačně vymezit a určit její defi nici, se potýká se spoustou problémů. Článek argumentuje, že by se společenští vědci měli těmito problémy a tendencemi v sociální neurovědě zabývat, a to hned z několika důvodů. Neuroekonomie, a také další neurovědou inspirované disciplíny, budou svým mateřským oborům konkurovat v mnoha oblastech, přičemž bude nezbytné, aby vědci byli schopni na jedné straně defi novat a obhájit nezastupitelné role svých disciplín, na straně druhé kriticky vyhodnocovat potenciál nových přístupů. V kontextu této diskuze, která znovu otevírá otázky ohledně vědeckého statusu ekonomie a jejích rolí, článek vymezuje základní problémy, s nimiž se neuroekonomie potýká. Práce dospívá k závěru, že tyto problémy představují široké pole působnosti pro společenské vědce a metodology vědy. Klíčová slova: fi losofi e ekonomie; fi losofi e vědy; metodologie; neuroekonomie; rozhodování MICHAL MÜLLER Department of Applied Economics, Faculty of Arts Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic Křížkovského 12, 771 80 Olomouc email / michal.muller@seznam.cz ////// studie / article //////////////////////////////////////////// 158 Introduction1 Th is article is a survey study that reviews several comments on the problematic aspects of neuroeconomics. Moreover, this paper refl ects on these problems in order to provide an overview of the contemporary challenges that emerge in a neuroeconomic research programme and defi nes several tasks for social scientists and methodologists of science. I have identifi ed two main reasons for this refl ection. Th e fi rst reason concerns the fact that anyone who starts studying economics in detail is confronted not only with mainstream economics (and all the other approaches that try to compete with mainstream economics within this discipline), but also with new fi elds of scientifi c research that deviate considerably from the traditional methods used in economics. In addition, these new approaches go beyond economics and enter into other disciplines such as psychology, the cognitive sciences, or neuroscience. Even the latter-mentioned neuroscience is infl uencing these alternative approaches in diff erent ways, and various neuro-disciplines have emerged as a result. Th e situation is oft en confusing and there is little time to focus on all of these tendencies. Some supporters of neuroscience2 believe that neuroeconomics has the potential to contribute to economics, and possibly that it could even achieve better results than traditional economic theories (especially for predictions). It is very problematic to assess the benefi ts of 1 A part of this article is based on extension and accuracy improvements of my two other texts. Th e fi rst one is a short sketch of an idea to systematize problematical aspects of neuroeconomics which was published as a conference paper: Michal Müller, "Real People in Economics and the Challenge of Neuroscience," in Knowledge for Market Use 2017: Economics – Decisions, Behavior and Normative Models, ed. Pavla Slavíčková (Olomouc: VUP, 2017), 122–27. Th e second one is chapter eight from a dissertation dealing with the problem of risk: Michal Müller, "Riziko jako ekonomicko-fi losofi cký problém: Epistemologie, vnímání rizika, etické důsledky," PhD diss., Palacký University Olomouc, 2018. 2 For example: Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec, "Neuroeconomics: Why Economics Needs Brains," Scandinavian Journal of Economics 106, no. 3 (2004): 555–79; Colin F. Camerer, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec, "Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics," Journal of Economic Literature 43, no. 1 (2005): 9–64. Th is article was supported by the project IGA_FF_2019_009 "Current research, technological and philosophical trends and their impact on selected areas of economy and management" of the Palacký University Olomouc. Michal Müller 159 these new approaches due to several reasons.3 In addition to the complexity of neuroscientifi c research, it is necessary to mention, as an example, manipulative marketing practices and inadequate argumentation. Everything is exacerbated by the fact that the fundamental problems connected to economics (and other social sciences) that cause an impossibility of exact predictions (especially the refl exive character of economic processes or arms races) still persist.4 I am convinced that both economists and philosophers of economics need to take an interest in these new approaches, whether they agree with them or not, for the practical reasons indicated by Hastie and Dawes.5 Neuroeconomics will compete with recent research and it seems that neuroscientists will be successful in obtaining research grants and in attracting both scientists and students beyond the fi eld of decision-making research.6 Economists, in my opinion, must respond to this situation. Firstly, they should be able to critically evaluate the potential of alternative research programmes. Secondly, they should be able to defend the irreplaceable role of economics that cannot be substituted by new approaches. Th e second reason is related to the establishment of new laboratories and research centres beyond scientifi c faculties. I believe that further development of these workplaces can be expected in the future and social scientists will increasingly be attracted to new research opportunities. Social scientists will participate in neuroscientifi c research for diff erent reasons. Some of them will be fascinated by these new disciplines and become interested in 3 Th ere is a wide range of literature concerning the problematical aspects of neuroeconomics. See for example anthology Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen, eds., Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope? (London: Routledge, 2012). 4 In discussing the philosophy of economics, there are serious doubts about the accuracy of economic laws. Philosophers of economics oft en talks about inexact laws, for example, Alex Rosenberg even claims that economic laws do not exist at all, that there are only generalizations that we consider to be laws. Th is is based especially on the refl exive character of natural selection. Th is refl exive process relates to the continual search for better adaptations. All patterns that relate to strategies within the arms race at the biological level will eventually come to end. Strategies relating to interpersonal interactions which are important for the social sciences are even less stable, which makes prediction problematic. See for example Alexander Rosenberg, "If Economics Is a Science, What Kind of Science Is It?," in Th e Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, eds. Harold Kincaid and Don Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 55–67; Alexander Rosenberg and Daniel M. McShea, Philosophy of Biology: A Contemporary Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2008), 43; Petr Špecián, "Potřebuje ekonomie psychologii?," Teorie vědy / Th eory of Science 37, no. 3 (2015): 279–301. 5 Reid Hastie and Robyn Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World: Th e Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making (Los Angeles: SAGE, 2010), 297. 6 Ibid., 297. Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 160 them. Th ese academics will see the possibilities to enrich the social sciences with neuroscientifi c fi ndings and they will believe in the progress of their disciplines. I think that even economists and other social scientists who are not interested in these neuroscientifi c tendencies will be confronted with the possibility to take part in this kind of research in the future. We will witness the emergence of many neuro-disciplines. I suppose that social scientists may also be attracted to neuroscience because of purely pragmatic and career reasons, especially in countries where it is not so prestigious to be a social scientist and where the total income of all academic staff is substantially dependent on obtaining grants. Th is tendency may lead to a situation where there will be laboratories without people who have been trained in empirical research. Moreover, if the most talented social scientists leave the social sciences, we can assume a further decline in the prestige of these disciplines. Th is article introduces the main problems related to neuroeconomics and points out that these problems represent a wide domain for social scientists and methodologists of science. In other words, this article tries to provide an answer to the following question: what can I do as a social scientist or methodologist of science when I am confronted with the possibility to participate in neuroscientifi c research? Th e answer is based on a survey of related theoretical and methodological studies. Before we start with the problems of neuroeconomics it is necessary to mention that the wider context of this discussion is related to behavioural economics. Moreover, as will be shown in the fi rst section, there are authors who consider neuroeconomics as a part of behavioural economics, although this is but one of a range of views. Furthermore, the notion of neuroeconomics as an extension of behavioural economics is criticized by several authors as will be shown in later parts of this paper. Th ese critics will argue that neuroeconomics should make an eff ort to unify its parent disciplines, not only to simply repeat behavioural experiments with neuroimaging technologies. Although most behavioural economists endeavour to improve the empirical realism of neoclassical economics and point out that there are many unrealistic assumptions of economic models, Gerd Gigerenzer and Nathan Berg show that behavioural economists rely on "as-if" arguments as well as neoclassical economics. Behavioural economists defend models that fail as a realistic description of psychological processes.7 Alternatively, Gigerenzer 7 Nathan Berg and Gerd Gigerenzer, "As-if Behavioral Economics: Neoclassical Economics in Disguise?," History of Economic Ideas 18, no. 1 (2010): 133. Michal Müller 161 suggests the concept of ecological rationality, which is related to the success of cognitive strategies in environments of the world.8 In the same tenet, as we will see later, several neuroeconomists and philosophers of science observe that neuroeconomic research based only on the extension of behavioural economics with neuroimaging does not provide a description of real decision-making processes due to the many reductions found in laboratory conditions. Although some other problematic aspects of behavioural economics and neuroeconomics have the same roots, especially those of them related to the need to defend the relevance of additional information about the inner states of decision-makers to economics, discussions within neuroeconomics are diff erent and more complicated in many ways. In the context of these problems it is relevant to ask if something like neuroeconomics (in the meaning of the ability to meet its goals) really exists as an independent and acknowledged scientifi c discipline. As we will see, neuroeconomics exists in several diff erent ways. Th is fact makes an analysis of this discipline more complicated. Moreover, in contrast to behavioural economics, neuroeconomics faces a very hard problem based on eff orts to make a synthesis of neuroscience with methods, models, and abstractions as employed in the natural sciences and other social scientifi c disciplines like economics and psychology. In the case of neuroeconomics, the problems of behavioural economics are extended and intensifi ed by this fact and put into the context of state-of-the-art technologies. In accordance with these problems, the fi rst section of this article comments on the unclear defi nition of neuroeconomics and its several approaches that can be identifi ed through an analysis of neuroeconomic rhetoric and the declarations of research goals by diff erent research groups. Th e second part deals with the diff erences between economics and neuroeconomics. In the third section, I discuss the main theoretical and methodological problems connected with neuroeconomics. Th e discussion proposes possible tasks for social scientists and methodologists in order to deal with the challenges of neuroeconomics. 8 Gerd Gigerenzer and Th omas Sturm, "How (Far) Can Rationality Be Naturalized?," Synthese 187, no. 1 (2012): 255. Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 162 1. Defi nition and Rhetoric of Neuroeconomics – Refl ection of Coveted Interdisciplinarity When we talk about neuroeconomics, the fi rst problem we immediately come across is its defi nition. Th e label "neuroeconomics" is used for a variety of approaches that have emerged in last three decades. Although there are several commonalities in these approaches, such as employing neuroimaging technologies and some form of interdisciplinary connection to economics, psychology, and neuroscience, the goals and methods of these approaches diff er. In this respect, Roberto Fumagalli mentions four approaches to neuroeconomics. Th e fi rst is based on the declaration of interdisciplinarity and eff orts to unify several disciplines into a single unifi ed discipline, with which it will be possible to make a model of decision-making. Th e second approach applies economic theory to neuroscientifi c modelling. Th e third perspective of neuroeconomics can be characterized as an extension of behavioural economics. Th e fourth approach mentioned by Fumagalli is the application of neuroscientifi c techniques within an economic framework of decision-making.9 In this paper I use the term neuroeconomics for the entirety of neuroeconomic research programmes that may have diff erent approaches, and I distinguish between these neuroeconomic approaches in the cases where it is necessary for the identifi cation and specifi cation of the analysed problem. Th e distinction between these approaches is only schematic; each research group may relate to diff erent goals and methodologies. Moreover, these approaches may be combined and modifi ed. From the perspective of the commonalities of the neuroeconomic approaches, and from the perspective of this article, I consider as adequate the defi nition provided by Vasily Klucharev, who understands neuroeconomics as a synonym for the neurobiology of decision-making. Th is defi nition does not put too much stress on the economic dimension of this discipline. Moreover, in the context of the ambitions of research groups, Klucharev distinguishes between core neuroeconomics, which is the neurobiology of decision-making that studies the neural mechanisms of decision-making, and the more ambitious extended 9 Roberto Fumagalli, "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroeconomics: Economics and the Revolutionary Challenge from Neuroscience," (PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2011), 22–23. Michal Müller 163 neuroeconomics that tries to develop a unifi ed theory of decision-making by connecting evolutionary, neurobiological, and social approaches.10 Th e beginnings of neuroeconomics has been connected to many optimistic statements about its character, goals, and potential to revolutionize economics. Nevertheless, the unifi cation of neuroeconomic parent disciplines represents a signifi cant and unsolved problem. According to Roberto Fumagalli, neuroeconomics is a highly fragmented discipline that does not foster unifi cation.11 Fumagalli points out that despite its advances, neuroeconomics has not achieved substantial progress regarding the interdisciplinary goals defi ned in its initial phase of research.12 He is convinced that there are several reasons to have doubts about any attempts to develop a single unifi ed model within neuroeconomics. Th e fact that diff erent branches of neuroeconomics13 diverge in their research goals, or the fact that there are dissimilarities in the interpretations of choice models provided by economists and neuroeconomists are among these reasons.14 In the context of the above, it is important to point out that unifi cation eff orts within neuroeconomics represent a signifi cant philosophical problem. Paul Glimcher, in this respect, claims that neuroeconomics "as a philosophical entity has to emerge in the same way that physical chemistry, biochemistry, and neuroscience emerged during the past century" and that the mere use of technology in neuroeconomics to scan brains does not represent an interdisciplinary synthesis. Th e solution of the unifi cation problem requires philosophical eff orts.15 In Klucharev's terms it is possible to say that the goals of extended neuroeconomics have not been met. It seems that, with regard to the recent state of neuroeconomics, it is more suitable to understand neuroeconomics as the neurobiology of decision-making with an aspiration to extend its domain. Th e vision of neuroeconomics, its goals, and approaches are created within scientifi c communication. Th erefore, the rhetoric of neuroeconomics represents an important topic and is the problematical aspect of this research 10 Vasily Klucharev, "Introduction to Neuroeconomics: Origin of Neuroeconomics," National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2014, YouTube video, accessed December 26, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vU2kxbMVxlI/. 11 Roberto Fumagalli, "Five Th eses on Neuroeconomics," Journal of Economic Methodology 23, no. 1 (2016): 77. 12 Ibid., 78. 13 I will comment on methodological distinctions of neuroeconomic approaches in the third section. 14 Fumagalli, "Five Th eses on Neuroeconomics," 79–80. 15 Paul W. Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), xiii. Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 164 programme. An analysis of neuroeconomics in the context of its rhetorical advantages and disadvantages is given by Uskali Mäki.16 From this analysis, two main tendencies can be distinguished – legitimate scientifi c communication related to a critical evaluation of neuroeconomic potential, and manipulative marketing. An important advantage in communication is the use of scientifi c rhetoric that is supported by the authority of prestigious scientifi c journals. Neuroeconomic texts also have the opportunity to appeal to scientifi c progress and to increase realism within the foundations of economics. Th ere is also an emphasis on interdisciplinarity and the already mentioned unifi cation of neuroeconomic parent disciplines. Moreover, it is possible to mention the form of articles that uses a variety of colourful diagrams and brain schemes as a great tool for attracting attention.17 Yet besides these rhetorical fi gures that scientists use both to defend their research programmes and for marketing, there is also argumentation that is inaccurate, and that which raises tempestuous reactions with many economists. Mäki shows that there are neuroeconomists who assert that it is possible to directly measure ideas and feelings.18 An example of this rhetoric is an article by Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec.19 Mäki is convinced that accepting this assertion as a true statement should be connected with a radical solution to the mind-body problem, and it seems that it is not easy to justify this radical solution.20 Th is issue will be commented on to a larger extent in the third part of this paper. A very common rhetorical fi gure employed by pioneers in neuroeconomic research is laying stress on the revolutionary character of neuroeconomics. Th is aspect of argumentation is analysed by Roberto Fumagalli in his dissertation.21 Fumagalli points out that neuroeconomics is not revolutionary in any meaning of the word. Although he believes that the contributions of neuroeconomics will lead to better predictive and explanatory models of choice, he is convinced that these potential improvements will not cause revolutionary changes in economic theory.22 16 Uskali Mäki, "When Economics Meets Neuroscience: Hype and Hope," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012). 17 Ibid., 10–11. 18 Ibid., 12. 19 Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, "Neuroeconomics," 556. 20 Mäki, "When Economics Meets Neuroscience," 12. 21 Fumagalli, "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroeconomics." 22 Ibid., 17. Michal Müller 165 Excessive rhetoric may represent one factor in why social scientists are not able to express a willingness to cooperate. Neuroeconomics is able to provoke great enthusiasm and attract scientists even beyond its parent disciplines. Yet manipulative marketing is also a reason for its rejection. Moreover, as Paul Glimcher points out, substantial diff erences between the theoretical approaches of social scientists and the theoretical approaches of natural scientists oft en leads to both groups insisting on their own theories while the insights of other groups are of no interest.23 I think that this a priori rejection, for example by economists, can lead to the isolation of the discipline. Neuroeconomics will still fi nd many supporters due to its undeniable attractiveness, yet these admirers may be blind to its excesses. Neuroeconomics needs both scientists and academics who are able to ensure suffi cient critical discussion. With regards to neuroeconomic rhetoric, Douglas Bernheim recommends neuroeconomists to better and more specifi cally express their visions, both to avoid exaggerated statements and to accumulate suffi cient evidence of success.24 Although neuroeconomics uses modesty as one of its rhetorical fi gures, Mäki points out that this modesty is especially employed when supporters of neuroeconomics talk about the usefulness of concrete fi ndings for economic theory or business.25 Along with an analysis of the rhetoric of economics advocated by McCloskey,26 it seems that an analysis of the rhetoric of neuroeconomics may represent a helpful activity that can reveal important information about the arguments employed within this research programme. Serious neuroeconomic rhetoric should consider the fact that there are several neuroeconomic approaches and that those approaches associated with greater ambition are not yet successful in achieving their goals. Supporters of the extended form of neuroeconomics should be cautious in their statements, as their inadequate argumentation may cast a bad light on entire research programmes that include several approaches. Yet despite the rhetorical excesses connected with the initial phase of neuroeconomic research, neuroeconom23 Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis, 4. 24 Douglas B. Bernheim, "Neuroeconomics: A Sober (But Hopeful) Appraisal," in National Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper, 55, accessed July 5, 2018, http://www.nber.org/ papers/w13954/. 25 Mäki, "When Economics Meets Neuroscience," 11. 26 For example: Deirdre N. McCloskey, Th e Rhetoric of Economics (Madison: Th e University of Wisconsin Press, 1998). Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 166 ics is experiencing increasing popularity,27 which indicates that its recent rhetoric is more successful. 2. Relationship between Economics and Neuroeconomics and Defi nition of Th eir Roles As the previous section indicates, the relationship between economics and neuroeconomics and determining the neuroeconomic relevance to economics is not easy to interpret. Many discussions of these issues start with the very serious criticism provided by economists Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, whose arguments neuroeconomists try to overcome. Gul and Pesendorfer are convinced that the data neuroeconomics is able to obtain has no relevance to economics because these disciplines deal with diff erent issues and use diff erent abstractions.28 Th ese authors argue that neuroscience cannot reject economic models because economic models make no assumptions and draw no conclusions about brain physiology. Neuroeconomics cannot therefore represent a revolutionary approach that could change economics, as it has no tool to deal with economics and its subject of interest.29 Data that neuroscience is able to produce is redundant and unnecessary for economics because it is suffi cient to use revealed preferences 27 Th e growing popularity of neuroeconomics in the academic environment indicates not only an increasing number of studies and laboratories, but also an institutional formation of discipline in university study programmes which explicitly include the term neuroeconomics in the name of the study fi eld ("Neuroeconomics," in Maastricht University, accessed December 20, 2018, https://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/education/master/research-mastercognitive-and-clinical-neuroscience-specialisation-neuroeconomics, "Doctoral Program in Neuroeconomics," in University of Zurich, accessed December 20, 2018, https://www.oec. uzh.ch/en/studies/phd/neuroecon.html, "Master's Business Economics: Neuroeconomics," in University of Amsterdam, accessed December 20, 2018, http://ase.uva.nl/content/masters/ business-economics-neuroeconomics/business-economics-neuroeconomics.html), respectively study programmes, that include neuroeconomics, but it is not offi cially mentioned in the name of the study programme ("Graduate Studies," in Institute for the Study of Decision Making, NYU, accessed December 20, 2018, https://isdm.nyu.edu/graduate-studies/, "Social and Decision Neuroscience PhD Program," in Caltech, accessed December 20, 2018, http:// www.hss.caltech.edu/academics/graduate-studies/social-and-decision-neuroscience-phdprogram, "Master's Programme 'Cognitive Sciences and Technologies: From Neuron to Cognition'," in Higher School of Economics, accessed December 20, 2018, https://www.hse.ru/ en/ma/cogito/). 28 Faruk Gul and Wolfgang Pesendorfer, "Th e Case for Mindless Economics," in Th e Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, eds. Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 4. 29 Ibid. Michal Müller 167 to predict choices.30 Gul and Pesendorfer stress that neuroeconomists ignore "the fact that economists, even when dealing with questions related to those studied in psychology, have diff erent objectives and address diff erent empirical evidence."31 Moreover, according to Gul and Pesendorfer, neuroeconomists believe that the development of psychology and neuroscience will enable neuroeconomics to answer philosophical questions.32 As a result of these eff orts, neuroeconomists, according to Gul and Pesendorfer, change the traditional relationship between economics and an economic agent to the relationship between a therapist and a patient. Th is approach leads us to the complex issue of paternalism. Gul and Pesendorfer are convinced that neuroeconomic "therapists" defi ne "what is happiness" which strictly contradicts with the standard economic approach. Neoclassical economics is based on separating the role of an economist as a social scientist and the role of an economist as a potential adviser. In this context, neuroeconomics is a framework for paternalistic interventions.33 Th e issue of so-called "light" or "libertarian" paternalism raises a broad debate in the context of neuroeconomics and behavioural economics. I believe it is appropriate that Gul and Pesendorfer mention this issue because there are a number of ethical questions related to paternalistic interventions. Specifi cally, the issue of autonomy is highly discussed.34 One of the neuroeconomists who reacted to the critique of neuroeconomics by Gul and Pesendorfer is Colin Camerer, who analyses the second argument related to the statement that rational choice theory is fl exible enough to describe anomalies in behaviour by conventional language of 30 Clithero, Tankersley, and Huettel call this criticism "Behavioral Suffi ciency argument." See John A. Clithero, Dharol Tankersley, and Scott A. Huettel, "Foundations of Neuroeconomics: From Philosophy to Practice," PLoS Biology 6, no. 11 (2008): 2349. 31 Gul and Pesendorfer, "Th e Case for Mindless Economics," 4. 32 Ibid., 6. 33 Ibid. 34 See Daniel M. Hausman and Brynn Welch, "Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge," Journal of Political Philosophy 18, no. 1 (2010); Mark D. White, Th e Manipulation of Choice: Ethics and Libertarian Paternalism (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). In the context of fi nding solutions, how to avoid ethical implications see Georege Loewenstein and Emily Haisley, "Th e Economist as Th erapist: Methodological Ramifi cations of 'Light' Paternalism," in Th e Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, eds. Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 168 preferences, beliefs, and constraints.35 Unfortunately, Camerer puts aside the fi rst argument of "diff erent question, diff erent abstractions" because it is based on the defi nition of economics as a discipline that excludes non-choice data.36 Although Camerer admits that conventional economic language can actually approach many neural phenomena, he considers it more eff ective to accept the constructs of other disciplines because the language of economics is clumsy. Th e other part of Camerer's argument is based on an attempt to point out that neuroeconomics has essentially the same aspirations as the theory of rational choice and is not in opposition. Neuroeconomists believe in the potential of broadening this theory by observing variables that are considered unobservable within the framework of rational choice theory.37,38 In order to provide a more detailed explanation of this approach, Camerer uses the analogy of the theory of the fi rm. In the past there were only models where a fi rm was represented as a combination of capital and labour without any consideration of its agents' interactions, exchanges, wage effi ciency, social networks, culture, etc. However, we are now experiencing a new theory of the fi rm which has already overcome the fi ction based on maximizing profi t as the sole purpose of the company. According to Camerer, the same situation is associated with neuroeconomics because the neuroeconomic theory of the individual replaces the fi ction of a maximizing individual with a more detailed description of how components such as regions of the brain, cognitive control, or neural circuits communicate and interact with each other and how it all aff ects the behaviour of an individual.39 I think that in the context of refl ection about character and the roles of economics and neuroeconomics, the fi rst argument mentioned by Gul and Pesendorfer, that economics and neuroeconomics employ diff erent abstractions and answer diff erent questions, is very important. Th is dichotomy is analysed by Emrah Aydinonat in his refl ection about the explanatory relevance of neuroeconomics. Aydinonat agrees with Gul and Pesendorfer that there 35 Colin F. Camerer, "Th e Case for Mindful Economics," in Th e Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, eds. Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 45. 36 Ibid., 44 37 Ibid., 45. 38 In this context, Camerer mentions that Glimcher and Rustichini also consider mathematical, behavioural, and mechanistic approaches to a choice as a goal of neuroeconomics, which is very similar to the approach of a rational choice theory. See Paul W. Glimcher and Aldo Rustichini, "Neuroeconomics: Th e Consilience of Brain and Decision," Science 306, no. 5695 (2004): 452. 39 Camerer, "Th e Case for Mindful Economics," 46. Michal Müller 169 are situations where the "diff erent question, diff erent abstraction" argument is valid and neuroeconomics is really irrelevant to economics. Nevertheless, there are also situations where neuroeconomics can be relevant. According to Aydinonat, neuroeconomics is more than inspirational and should be judged not only by its ability to improve economic explanations or models, but also by its ability to understand economic phenomena.40 Although in all cases economics and neuroeconomics answer diff erent questions, we can distinguish between situations where neuroeconomics is relevant for economics and situations where the reverse is true. Both examples can be found in a paper by Camerer and his colleagues.41,42 Th is does not mean, however, that neuroeconomics can only provide partial information on how specifi c conditions and contexts aff ect particular people in specifi c situations, but it seeks to examine how certain types of states and contexts aff ect behaviour in general.43 Aydinonat concludes his refl ections on the relevance of neuroeconomics by stating that "[i]f economics were right about everything, neuroeconomics fi ndings concerning neural level mechanism could have been ignored safely," yet even in this case, the ignorance of neuroeconomics is illogical because the information related to lower level mechanisms enhances our general understanding of economic phenomena.44 Paul Glimcher alleviates this heated discussion by stating that that a number of negative approaches to neuroeconomics (including Gul and Pesendorfer) are reactions to a single view of neuroeconomics that is mainly popularized by articles by Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec. Glimcher also 40 Emrah N. Aydinonat, "Neuroeconomics: More than Inspiration, Less than Revolution," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012), 60. 41 Th e fi rst example of Camerer et al. describes a driver who has car accident because of sleep. Th ese authors say that the economic theory considers this fact as a choice by the driver which is connected with utility. Th ey are convinced that biological mechanisms explain this situation better. Nevertheless, Aydinonat shows that Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec call choice something which is considered within economic theory as a consequence. See Camerer, Loewensteina, and Prelec, "Neuroeconomics," 563; Aydinonat, "Neuroeconomics," 61–62. 42 Th e situation where neuroeconomic data is relevant is a situation where two people refuse to buy peanuts that are sold at a reasonable price. Person A is allergic to peanuts, so it is impossible to convince her to buy it. Person B has consumed too many peanuts during the last year and he got sick, which means that he could not be convinced to buy it. Economic theoretical models cannot distinguish between these situations. See Camerer, Loewensteina, and Prelec, "Neuroeconomics," 563; Aydinonat, "Neuroeconomics," 62–63. 43 Ibid., 63. 44 Ibid., 67 Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 170 admits that in the context of positive economics, Gul and Pesendorfer are right – neuroscientifi c data is irrelevant to economics. However, Glimcher does not agree with the conclusion that Gul and Pesendorfer derive and considers it to be speculative. Gul and Pesendorfer are convinced that economics should remain unrelated to psychology and neuroscience.45,46 According to Glimcher, neuroeconomic parent disciplines must be unifi ed in a similar way to how biology and chemistry gave rise to biochemistry, or in a similar way to how other disciplines have become unifi ed as we know from the history and philosophy of science. However, achieving this linkage is not possible without understanding the philosophical issues. Th ese metaphysical questions are signifi cant, despite the fact that many scientists do not pay attention to them because they believe that empirical research is suffi cient.47 With regard to the discussion on the relationship between economics and neuroscience, Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski are convinced that the "idea of a direct connection between economics and neuroscience is misguided" because neuroscience and economics "can only be integrated via psychological theories of decision-making."48 Findings of neuroscience must be interpreted in the context of well-developed psychological theories. Th ese fi ndings have no evidential or explanatory relevance to economics per se.49 Within mechanistic research, functional localisation is signifi cant, but it does not explain anything. When we see that something happens in the brain during an activity, it does not mean that this observation explains that specifi c behaviour. Psychological variables are a necessary connecting 45 Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis, xiv. 46 Gul's and Pesendorfer's critique is also commented by several other authors. For example, Jack Vromen tries to point out in which way neuroscientifi c data can be considered useful for economics. See Jack Vromen, "Where Economics and Neuroscience Might Meet," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012). Despite his agreement with Gul and Pesendorfer that neuroscience deals with diff erent questions and employs diff erent abstractions, and despite his conviction that neuroeconomics does not represent revolutionary approach, Alessandro Antonietti is still convinced that "analysis of the psychological and neural correlates of fi nancial choices" may be useful in eff orts to "improve our comprehension of the causal chain connecting the former to the latter." Alessandro Antonietti, "Do Neurobiological Data Help Us to Understand Economic Decisions Better?," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012), 107–8. 47 Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis, xv–xvi. 48 Jaakko Kuorikoski and Petri Ylikoski, "Explanatory Relevance Across Disciplinary Boundaries: Th e Case of Neuroeconomics," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012), 119–20. 49 Ibid., 120. Michal Müller 171 link between neuroscience and economics.50 It seems that neuroscience itself cannot provide a platform for the unifi cation of disciplines of diff erent levels of analysis and that the development of the social sciences is essential for this unifi cation. However, as it will be shown in the following section, the relationship between mental phenomena and neuronal activity is not clear as to how it relates to philosophical problems. 3. Scientifi c and Philosophical Nature of Neuroeconomics and its Relation to Methodological Disunity and Technical Problems As it has been shown in the previous section, neuroeconomics fundamentally diff ers from economics. In this section I point out that, although in many respects neuroeconomics is closer to the natural sciences, it also relates to the important philosophical problem of the relationship between mind and body. Even if we go to the lower level of explanation, it is obvious that views on the neuronal architecture are not unifi ed across neuroeconomic research programmes. At the end of this section I will point out that technological barriers represent obstacles to addressing these issues. 3.1 Scientifi c Nature of Neuroeconomics Th ere are several characteristics of neuroeconomics that diff er from neoclassical economics. It involves, for example, increasing the realism of theories, a descriptive approach, and an attempt to connect it with a prescriptive approach, or inductive modelling. As was already mentioned in the fi rst section, neuroeconomics places an emphasis on increasing realism as one of its rhetorical advantages. Nevertheless, neoclassical economics is oft en associated with antirealism (instrumentalism) which is known primarily from Milton Friedman's essay.51 Realism in economics has been deeply analysed by Uskali Mäki.52 Although many philosophers of economics agree that issues of the relationship between theory and reality are important, their views diff er as to whether it is relevant when dealing with realism in economics. For example, Daniel Hausman does not think that Mäki's detailed interest 50 Ibid., 125. 51 Milton Friedman, "Th e Methodology of Positive Economics," in Essays in Positive Economics, Milton Friedman (Chicago: Th e University of Chicago Press, 1953). 52 See for example Uskali Mäki, "Some Nonreasons for Nonrealism about Economics," in Facts and Fiction in Economics. Models, Realism, and Social Construction, ed. Uskali Mäki (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 172 in realism has a great importance because most economic theories do not postulate "unobservables."53 However, due to the development of neuroscience, unobservable entities emerge. It is obvious that neuroeconomics is connected with terms such as neurons, mental states, mental processes, and so forth. Neuroeconomics seeks to cope with the following task: to affi rm that theories and models based on the methodology of the natural sciences and by their descriptive approach can provide better predictions than instrumentalist theories, whose only criterion is predictive power. Th e aim of neuroeconomics is to link the description and the prescription. Similar to behavioural economics, neuroeconomic empirical research is based on the descriptive approach. Individual researchers try to defend their position by placing it in the context of a prescriptive approach. At the same time, they point out that attempts to naturalize the phenomena of one level of analysis to a more fundamental level are not connected with eff orts to replace a normative approach by a purely descriptive one. As Glimcher, Dorris, and Bayer show, neuroeconomics seeks to unify the prescriptive and the descriptive approaches to overcome the tensions we fi nd in the history of economic thought. Neoclassical economic theories aim to defi ne optimal decision making and employ the assumption of rational decision makers who maximize utility. Th ese prescriptive economic theories are in contradiction with descriptive insights of behavioural economists and scientists who describe anomalies within economic theory.54 Nevertheless, both approaches have their advantages. While the prescriptive model is characterised by its advantages of parsimony and effi ciency, the descriptive model has the advantage of its predictive power. Although neuroeconomics is only in its beginnings, which are associated with many problems, it tries to create a model that would be at least in some ways a combination of both approaches.55 Th ere are also diff erences in the approach to modelling. Moana Vercoe and Paul J. Zak comment on deductive and inductive modelling in their 53 Daniel M. Hausman, "Laws, Causation, and Economic Methodology," in Th e Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, eds. Harold Kincaid and Don Ross (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 54 One of the famous anomalies was described by Maurice Allais who pointed out to the fact that even supporters of expected utility theory are not able to decide in accordance to their theory. See Maurice Allais, "Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomesde l'ecole Americaine," Econometrica 21, no. 4 (1953): 503–46. 55 Paul W. Glimcher, Michael C. Dorris, and Hannah M. Bayer, "Physiological Utility Th eory and the Neuroeconomics of Choice," Games and Economic Behavior 52, no. 2 (2005): 213–14. Michal Müller 173 study. Economists usually propose mathematical models of behaviour. Th ese models are then employed to derive theorems related to causal mechanisms. Empirical analysis is used in the following phases to test the causal claim. Th is approach, characterised mostly by its deductive character, leads to situations where there are many models that have not yet been empirically tested. Moreover, many models explain data with the same success. Unlike this approach, neuroeconomics is rather orientated to inductive modelling, which is based on an eff ort to identify physiological mechanisms responsible for behaviour. Th is approach is based on the assumption that physiological states aff ect human decision-making. Neuroeconomists, in an eff ort to support an inductive approach, argue with the results of experiments that point to deviations from the deductively based equilibrium theory.56 3.2 Philosophical Nature of Neuroeconomics Neuroeconomics can also be characterised by its philosophical problems. Th ese problems especially infl uence scientists to accept or refuse a specifi c methodology. Th e fi rst philosophical problem relates to psycho-physical causality. Th e mind-body problem and questions related to psycho-physical causality have a direct impact on the acceptance or refusal of recent scientifi c tendencies in economics, especially behavioural economics and neuroeconomics. Th is refusal can be both ideological and philosophical. It is also not hard to imagine disagreements between supporters of behavioural economics and neuroeconomics. While some will accept the "mindful approach" from the position of behavioural economics, at the same time they can disagree with neuroscientifi c concepts that are based on forms of eliminative materialism. To illustrate the ideological refusal of neuroeconomics, it is possible to note that, for example, Ariel Rubinstein is unwilling to accept neuroeconomics due to his position on the mind-body problem. He fears "the approach in economics in which decision makers become machines with no souls."57 A philosophical analysis is provided by Giuseppe Lo Dico who shows that, for neuroeconomists, neurobiology represents a physical "anchor point" of economic and psychological constructs. Nevertheless, neuroeco56 Moana Vercoe and Paul J. Zak, "Inductive Modeling Using Causal Studies in Neuroeconomics: Brains on Drugs," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012), 33–34. 57 Th e reason for refusal eliminative scientifi c approaches can be also ideological. Ariel Rubinstein, "Comments on Neuroeconomics," Economics and Philosophy 24 (2008): 486. Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 174 nomic rhetoric does not suggest that neuroeconomists want to eliminate the vocabulary of psychology and economics and replace it with neurobiological, but rather they try to replace the "as if assumptions" of these disciplines.58 Under this approach, entities of economics and psychology are considered to be physical entities, which means, according to Lo Dico, that the approach of neuroeconomists is based on the "mind-brain type identity theory," a philosophical approach which is based on a priori claim, not on a posteriori empirical evidence. Lo Dico admits that neuroeconomists do not identify their approach explicitly to identity theory, but he is convinced that for many neuroeconomists this attitude is typical. An example is, according to Lo Dico, a statement from Glimcher et al.59 Th ese authors point out that the expected utility function is a neural property. Th e theory of the identity of types is a very ambitious assumption, which, according to Lo Dico, has not been proven by neuroeconomists. Th e main reason is based on the fact that although this approach is evident in their rhetoric, they do not pay attention to the analysis of this philosophical position and its consequences. Correlating data from neuroeconomic studies is not empirical evidence of identity and it is not proof of a successful reduction of the mental to the neural. Th e acquired correlations between activity in a given neural region and behavioural reality may not indicate that this activity is necessary for a given mental phenomenon.60 Neuroeconomics is thus confronted with metaphysical issues, and it will be necessary to deal with them in the future to successfully unify neuroeconomic parent disciplines. As we have noted above, even neuroeconomists like Glimcher are of the opinion that these metaphysical issues are signifi cant.61 Another problem emerges in the context of diff erent opinions about the neural architecture of the brain. At this point, it is important to remember, together with Fumagalli,62 that neuroeconomics is not a unifi ed research programme. Diff erent concepts of mind (or the brain and its functions, respectively) lead to diff erent approaches in neuroeconomics. In this con58 Giuseppe Lo Dico, "Neuroeconomics, Identity Th eory, and the Issue of Correlation," Th eory & Psychology 23, no. 5 (2013): 576–90. 59 Glimcher, Dorris and Bayer, "Physiological Utility Th eory," 220. 60 Lo Dico, "Neuroeconomics, Identity Th eory," 576–90. 61 Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis, 30. 62 Roberto Fumagalli, "Th e Disunity of Methodologies: A Methodological Appraisal," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012), 20–21. Michal Müller 175 text, Fumagalli63 mentions disapproval of Glimcher, Doris, and Bayer64 with Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec,65 who assume that human decision making is a product of two systems, cognitive and aff ective (emotional) that co-exist as independent entities within the neural architecture, resulting from their diff erent evolutionary origins. Glimcher et al. on the other hand, are convinced that this idea, which was characteristic of the initial phase of research, is indefensible with the growing evidence of data, and it is better to prefer a coherent look at the neural architecture, which is rooted deeper in evolutionary theory than dualistic concepts.66 Scott Huettel believes that although the dual-process approach was useful in psychology, it is not suitable for decision neuroscience. Based on studies carried out for example by Bechara et al.,67 it is possible to state that some areas of the brain (such as the orbitofrontal cortex) can become important in diff erent contexts for both cognitive and emotional contributions.68 Th is dissimilarity in the view of the neuronal architecture is also considered one of the conceptual challenges of neuroeconomics.69 Proponents of neuroeconomics must not only defend their reductionist stance on the mind-body problem, but also deal with complex issues related to the neuronal brain architecture. A major challenge remains the replacement of the dual-process framework with a new concept that would better refl ect the fi ndings of current research. 3.3 Problem of Methodological Disunity Th e fi rst problem worth mentioning, as has been indicated in previous sections, is the disunity of methodologies. Not only can neuroeconomics be defi ned in a variety of ways in the context of its goals and the characteristics their proponents consider important, but a variety of methodological approaches can also be distinguished. Roberto Fumagalli points out that the situation is complicated by the fact that diff erent researchers (in some cases 63 Fuamagalli, "Th e Disunity of Methodologies," 21. 64 Glimcher, Dorris, and Bayer, "Physiological Utility Th eory," 216. 65 Camerer, Loewenstein, and Prelec, "Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform Economics." 66 Glimcher, Doris, and Bayer, "Physiological Utility Th eory," 216. 67 Antoine Bechara, Hannah Damasio, and Antonio Damasio, "Emotion, Decision Making and the Orbitofrontal Cortex," Cerebral Cortex 10, no. 3 (2000). 68 Scott A. Huettel, "Ten Challenges for Decision Neuroscience," Frontiers in Neuroscience 4 (2010): 1. 69 See David V. Smith and Scott A. Huettel, "Decision Neuroscience: Neuroeconomics," Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Cognitive Science 1, no. 6 (2010). Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 176 even the same researchers) employ dissimilar approaches and methods in diff erent papers.70 Two groups of neuroeconomic research are distinguished by Don Ross and Glen Harrison. Th e fi rst group Ross calls "neurocellular economics," the second group he calls "behavioral economics in the scanner."71,72 While Don Ross73 and Glen Harrison74 recognize the potential in neurocellular economics, they are very sceptical about behavioural economics in the scanner. According to Ross, neurocellular economics can be characterized as a programme that "uses the mathematics of economic equilibrium analysis to write down models of brain cell activity for the sake of refi ning and comparatively testing hypotheses about neural learning that originate from computational neuroscience."75 Within this approach, the brain is similar to the market. It can be characterized as "massively distributed information-processing networks over which executive systems can exert only limited and imperfect governance."76 Neurocellular economics is based on research conducted by Paul Glimcher77 et al. Harrison and Ross point out that the potential of this approach is based on its empirical hypothesis that "dopamine signals in the ventral striatum and medial prefrontal cortex constitute a 'common currency' of reward that has many properties in common with the mainstream economist's concept of utility."78 Glimcher is convinced that eff orts to establish neuroeconomics must be based on a search for two objects; the neural and psychological correlates of utility and the mechanism that transforms this correlate of utility into choice.79 According to Glimcher, there is empirical evidence which 70 Fumagalli, "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroeconomics," 25–26. 71 Don Ross, "Two Styles of Neuroeconomics," Economics and Philosophy 24, no. 3 (2008): 473. 72 Jack Vromen in this context mentions "Glimcher et al. style" and "Camerer et al. style" neuroeconomics. Nevertheless, Vromen is convinced that the diff erences between these styles of neuroeconomics are not as dramatic as they at fi rst seem. For his argumentation see Jack J. Vromen, "Neuroeconomics as a Natural Extension of Bioeconomics: Th e Shift ing Scope of Standard Economic Th eory," Journal of Bioeconomics 9 (2007): 145–67. 73 Ross, "Two Styles of Neuroeconomics," 473. 74 Glen Harrison and Don Ross, "Th e Methodologies of Neuroeconomics," in Neuroeconomics: Hype or Hope?, eds. Caterina Marchionni and Jack Vromen (London: Routledge, 2012). 75 Ross, "Two Styles of Neuroeconomics," 474. 76 Ibid., 473. 77 Paul W. Glimcher, "Choice: Towards a Standard Back-Pocket Model," in Neuroeconomics: Decision Making and the Brain, eds. Paul W. Glimcher, Colin F. Camerer, Ernst Fehr, and Russell A. Poldrack (London: Elsevier, 2009). 78 Harrison and Ross, "Th e Methodologies of Neuroeconomics," 87. 79 Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis, 416. Michal Müller 177 suggests a two-stage mechanism of choice, and the task of neuroeconomics will be to explore the degree to which these stages are separable. Moreover, Glimcher claims that there are also fi ndings that may indicate the fi rst revision of economics by neuroeconomics.80 Yet on the contrary, behavioural economics in the scanner is based on repeating experiments conducted within behavioural economics, whereby the brains of participants are indirectly examined through brain-imaging technologies. Th ese experiments involve settings which are characteristic of game theory (Prisoner's Dilemma, ultimatum games and so forth). Harrison and Ross connect this approach with many shortcomings.81 Ross claims that advocates of this style of neuroeconomics commit similar logical mistakes to many behavioural economists. Th e most common mistake is based on the fact that behavioural economists in the scanner assume a reduction at two levels. In the initial phase, the institutionally embedded person becomes a lonely mind in the laboratory which is oft en the mistake of behavioural economists. Aft er that, this lonely mind is then reduced to a single "decontextualized lone neurotransmitter system in the head."82 3.4 Technical Problems Another necessary fact to consider is that neuroeconomics relates to several technical constraints and diffi culties with interpretations of data. Perhaps some of the above-mentioned problems will be solvable in the future as newer technology becomes available. Among the variety of techniques used in neuroscience research, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is the most commonly applied device, in particular the blood oxygen level dependent fMRI which "relies on blood fl ow dynamics in response to changing neural events."83 In the light of the complexity of neuroscientifi c research and the need to use a number of statistical tools, Reid Hastie and Robyn Dawes note that neuroscientifi c studies seek to capture increased brain activity in diff erent conditions. However, it is important to realize that many brain regions are active during individual tasks that experimental participants are exposed to. Further, it is possible to say that if we are alive, the entire brain is 80 Ibid., 416–17. 81 Harrison, "Neuroeconomics." Ross, "Two Styles of Neuroeconomics." 82 Ross, "Two Styles of Neuroeconomics," 481. 83 Sebastian Markett, "Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI)," in Neuroeconomics. Studies in Neuroscience, Psychology and Behavioral Economics, eds. Martin Reuter and Christian Montag (Berlin: Springer, 2016), 381. Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 178 active. Th e studies show the relative activity of the brain regions under different experimental conditions using various statistical criteria to determine activity of the key area.84 Th e problems of neuroimaging techniques are discussed in more detail by Robert Savoy85 and Russell Poldrack.86 Savoy reminds us that functional magnetic resonance is not a simple tool. For this purpose, he mentions animal physiological studies that have revealed diff erent data. In addition, it is necessary to be able to correctly interpret the data acquired.87 Savoy concludes that there is only one solution – rely on the mechanism of scientifi c correction which will consist of replicating the experiments. Given the huge amount of high-cost research, it cannot be assumed that it would be easy to repeat and investigate all experiments. Th us, it is clear that before there is more data available, it will be necessary to look sceptically at the results of current research.88 Poldrack considers it an important question whether cognitive processes can be inferred from data provided by neuroimaging techniques. It is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of inferences. Th e forward inference is based on the eff ort to determine brain activity in the context of an experimental situation. On the contrary, reverse inference is related to the determination of concrete cognitive process based on specifi c activity in the brain. Poldrack points out that this inference is not deductively valid, but it can provide some information and it can be helpful in formulating new hypotheses. However, it should be noted that the usefulness of this approach is greatly limited by the selectivity of activation in the areas of interest.89 Although careless use of reverse inference is considered problematic, neuroscientists try to overcome this constraint. Florian Hutzler is convinced that this view of reverse inference is overly pessimistic, and he tries to come up with a revised formulation of reverse inference that points to the fact that it cannot be considered as a fallacy per se.90 Th ere are, of course, many other errors associated with fMRI research. Lieberman and Cunningham mention that 84 Hastie and Dawes, Rational Choice in an Uncertain World, 302. 85 Robert L. Savoy, "Experimental Design in Brain Activation MRI: Cautionary Tales," Brain Research Bulletin 67, no. 5 (2005). 86 Russell A. Poldrack, "Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred from Neuroimaging Data?," Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10, no. 2 (2006). 87 Savoy, "Experimental Design in Brain Activation MRI: Cautionary Tales," 361–62. 88 Ibid., 366. 89 Poldrack, "Can Cognitive Processes Be Inferred from Neuroimaging Data?," 59. 90 Florian Hutzler, "Reverse Inference Is Not a Fallacy Per Se: Cognitive Processes Can Be Inferred from Functional Imaging Data," NeuroImage 84 (2014): 1061. Michal Müller 179 fMRI analysis involves hundreds or thousands of false positives which is the result of noise in situations where there is no true eff ect. Th e task of statisticians is then to fi nd methods to avoid these errors. Moreover, these authors note that another mistake, related to the situations when we are not able to recognize a true eff ect, is more serious in behavioural research because these errors are not reported in neuroimaging.91 However, technological constraints and diffi culties in interpretation are also connected with other neuroimaging devices, for example with electroencephalography.92 Discussion It is not problematic to agree with Daniel Hausman that the extent of neuroscientifi c and behavioural contributions to economics is an empirical question that will be answered in the future.93 It is a logical conclusion. But there are other questions. What should I do as a social scientist at the present level of knowledge when I am confronted with the possibility to take part in these innovative research projects? What are the specifi c tasks for social scientists? Before dealing with specifi c tasks relating to problems that will be hard to solve without the involvement of social scientists, let me mention the tasks based on interdisciplinary cooperation. Th ese are the topics I described in this paper – the eff ort to unify parent neuroeconomic disciplines, to defi ne the relevance of neuroeconomic data in economics, and to solve philosophical, methodological, and technical problems. Refl ections of these problems can be developed while replicating experiments, representing another signifi cant task. In many articles it is possible to fi nd passages where authors put stress on the necessity to replicate experiments.94 Th e importance of replication is multiplied by the fact that, for example, in psychology many of 91 Matthew D. Lieberman and William A. Cunningham, "Type I and Type II Error Concerns in fMRI Research: Re-Balancing the Scale," Social Cognitive and Aff ective Neuroscience 4, no. 4 (2009): 423. 92 See Roberta Grech et al., "Review on Solving the Inverse Problem in EEG Source Analysis," Journal of NeuroEngineering and Rehabilitation 5 (2008), 25. 93 Daniel M. Hausman, "Mindless or Mindful Economics: A Methodological Evaluation," in Th e Foundations of Positive and Normative Economics, eds. Andrew Caplin and Andrew Schotter (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 125. 94 See, e.g., Lieberman and Cunningham, "Type I and Type II Error Concerns in fMRI Research," Colin F. Camerer et al., "Evaluating Replicability of Laboratory Experiments in Economics," Science 351, no. 6280 (2016). Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 180 the replicated studies do not achieve signifi cant results.95 During this study I mentioned Savoy's opinion that serious fl aws in research may be detected in the processes of scientifi c correction. It is sure that all the problems that have been described are diffi cult to solve with armchair theorizing. With respect to all the mentioned problems, it seems that we can get closer to the answers in the process of critical experiment replication. It is a logical conclusion which we can intuitively accept. Unfortunately, there are serious obstacles in practice. Th e fi rst obstacle was noted by Savoy – it cannot be assumed that all experiments will be replicated due to the costs of research. Th e second obstacle may be related to the fact that replicating experiments can be considered by scientists as not as attractive as innovative research. Although no one claims that the replication of an experiment is secondary scientifi c activity, and most scientists are aware of its importance, the pressure on new discoveries and the achievement of prestigious results is not in line with this awareness. I suggest that replicating experiments should be a task for social scientists who are interested in neuroscience and want to contribute to this discipline. With replication it is possible to get fi rst-hand experience with empirical research. Moreover, neuroeconomic studies should not be blindly repeated. Researchers should be aware of the challenges and problems that neuroeconomics is facing with regards to replicating experiments. Replication could lead not only to scientifi c correction – pointing to badly conducted research and misconceptions, but also to the possibilities of designing new research. Moreover, social scientists can help in formulating scientifi c questions that will be truly benefi cial to the individual parent disciplines of neuroeconomics. Th ere are also tasks and important activities that are linked to the work of social scientists: 1) Th e fi rst important comment relates to the importance of social sciences. Exploring social reality is an important part of science and should not be pushed into the background and it should not be considered less signifi cant than exploring the world of the natural sciences. Th e importance of the social sciences is also illustrated by the example of neuroscience. It is economics, as a social scientifi c discipline with its characteristic methodology, that inspired neuroscience and stimulated its development. Klucharev, for example, describes neuroscience as a self-centred discipline, because there 95 Open Science Collaboration, "Estimating the Reproducibility of Psychological Science," Science 349, no. 6251 (2015), aac4716. Michal Müller 181 are neurobiologists who think that by analysing certain areas of the brain it is possible to explain the processes of human decision-making. It is precisely economics that brings into neuroscience a dynamic element.96 In this respect, social scientists should remain social scientists and strive to develop their discipline, but also to realize its limits. Th e development of the social sciences and their traditional approaches can be helpful in the development of the natural sciences. As we have already mentioned, Kuorikoski and Ylikoski believe that further development of neuroeconomics, among other things, will be conditioned by the improvements of psychological theories.97 Social scientists should defend themselves from those approaches of neuroeconomics that use manipulative rhetoric based on the misinterpretation of the methods of social sciences and a naive belief that neuroeconomics can overcome its parent disciplines in a revolutionary manner. Developing the social sciences and fi nding a way to contribute to neuroscience is one of the ways to achieve a synthesis of parent neuroeconomic disciplines. It is also necessary to evaluate which of the goals of the diff erent neuroeconomic approaches are achievable. For this purpose, an analysis of the scientifi c rhetoric and its arguments is necessary. Th is task belongs to the typical fi elds of interest of social scientists, and the insights of several philosophers of economics were mentioned in this paper, such as Mäki, Fumagalli, Ross, Aydinonat and others, who are trying to look at neuroeconomics without prejudices and provide constructive criticism. 2) Th e second way to contribute relates to the attitudes as seen from the other side. Th is is an attempt to use the knowledge of neuroscience for the development of the social sciences, especially economics. Social scientists have several ways to contribute. One possible contribution relates to collaborating on developing a decision theory that would be able to bridge the diff erences between these two disciplines. Th e second contribution concerns the endeavour to apply data that is available from past research. Th is second contribution is connected particularly to disciplines such as management or marketing where neural data can provide direct useful information without the necessity to develop a complex economic theory. Th e emphasis on searching for practical applications of neuroeconomic research is based on the fact that these studies are associated with large fi nancial investments. 96 Vasily Klucharev, "Introduction to Neuroeconomics: Neuroeconomics as a Multidisciplinary Field," National Research University Higher School of Economics, 2014, YouTube video, accessed December 26, 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0dJ7zG0cRlo/. 97 Kuorikoski and Ylikoski, "Explanatory Relevance," 119–20. Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 182 Moreover, social scientists have experience in dealing with complex social reality and they are sensitive to the limitations of the social sciences in order to make concrete predictions. Regarding the ability to predict real-world choices, Scott Huettel notes that neuroeconomics faces an empirical challenge based on generalizing choice outside of laboratory conditions. Current neuroeconomic contributions in areas such as marketing, game theory, or fi nance attempts to uncover potential regularities, but these laboratory insights do not provide predictions about choices in the real world. Huettel calls these conceptual infl uences "weak decision neurosciences." Th e challenge of neuroeconomics is to achieve "strong decision neuroscience," which is not an easy task.98 Social scientists, aware of the diffi culties that arise in exploring complex social reality, can provide valuable insights and draw attention to the uncritical acceptance of research results that fall more into the fi eld of "weak decision neuroscience." 3) Another point is related to the previous one. Although the beginnings of neuroeconomics have been associated with overwhelming claims about the possibility of a revision of economics, the aim of neuroeconomics should not be to replace economics. Social scientists should be able to defend the idea that potentially "naturalized disciplines" cannot completely replace social sciences. Even neuroscientists like Glimcher do not believe "that all of economics can be reduced to neuroscience."99 Moreover, the domain of economics is wider than the area of decision theory. It is necessary to take into account the relationship between economics and economy, public policy, or political philosophy. In this context, David Smiths and Scott Huettel remind us that neuroeconomic criticism is based on the fact that economic modelling operates with complex collective phenomena (for example, fi nancial markets, voting behaviour, price bubbles) that emerge with the interaction of individual decisions.100 It is diffi cult to defi ne the contribution of neuroscientifi c data in eff orts to deal with these collective phenomena. Moreover, as Glimcher points out, it is necessary to answer, among others, the following question: "are all concepts at the level of economics emergent or is it the case that some concepts are reducible (as is, or aft er modifi cation) while others are emergent?"101 Unfortunately, this metaphysical question remains 98 Huettel, "Ten Challenges for Decision Neuroscience," 5. 99 Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis, 25. 100 Smith and Huettel call this argument the "Emergent Phenomenon argument." Smith and Huettel, "Decision Neuroscience." See also Clithero, Tankersley, and Huettel, "Foundations of Neuroeconomics," 2349–50. 101 Glimcher, Foundations of Neuroeconomic Analysis, 30. Michal Müller 183 unanswered. It is therefore the task of social scientists to perceive the links between their traditional disciplines and new interdisciplinary research programs. As it was shown in the second section, neuroeconomists oft en make exaggerated statements about the relations of these disciplines without a real understanding of economics. In the context of the development of these new approaches, for social scientists it will be more important than ever before to be able to defi ne the importance of their disciplines for society and to show that they cannot be easily replaced. Furthermore, the social sciences can help in the development of the natural sciences. Th e development of neuroscience and the emergence of social neuroscientifi c disciplines, such as neuroeconomics, is proof of that. Conclusion In spite of its interdisciplinary character and its declared ambition to unify its parent disciplines in a single fi eld of scientifi c interest, neuroeconomics represents a rather fragmented research programme that can be characterized from the perspective of individual approaches in diff erent ways. However, the views on the dissimilarities of these approaches diff er, and it is possible to defi ne the basic goals, ambitions, and visions of neuroeconomics. At least equally problematic is the question of the relationship between economics and neuroeconomics, respectively the discussion about the relevance of psychological and neural data to economics. It is clear from the debate, which off ers diff erent views on this relationship and points to various problems, that current neuroeconomics is fundamentally diff erent from economics, especially in the fact that both disciplines are confronted with other research questions and are using other abstractions. However, a wide range of authors points to the fact that this distinction is not a signifi cant obstacle to the potential contribution of neuroeconomic data to economics. Nevertheless, the problems of neuroeconomics can also be seen in a number of technical constraints and interpretation diffi culties connected with the necessity to employ advanced statistical methods. In this article, I attempted to briefl y outline the basic problems and challenges of neuroeconomics, as I believe that economists, social scientists, and philosophers of economics who are interested in neuroeconomics should be familiar with them. As a result of the development of neuroscience and the emergence of new laboratories and cognitive research centres, social scientists and academics will increasingly be confronted with the possibility of participating in "neuro-research," or will be faced with the question of the Challenges and Problems of Neuroeconomics 184 relevance of these approaches to their discipline. Th e recent dismal situation of social scientists in some countries, whose profession is not considered as prestigious as in the case of the natural sciences, can lead to ill-considered support of attractive research programmes without thorough critical philosophical refl ection. In this paper, I made an eff ort to answer the question related to the potential contribution of social scientists and defi ne their possible tasks within this research program. I have proposed several domains of possible tasks. Th e fi rst group deals with the analysis of neuroeconomic rhetoric and interdisciplinary challenges related to eff orts to unify economics, psychology, and neuroscience into a single discipline and to lay the foundations for the emergence of neuroeconomics as a new entity. It has been suggested that this unifi cation cannot be done without a philosophical contribution, as mere empirical research that only produces new data, is not suffi cient in this respect. Adequate rhetoric and accurate improvements to arguments may lead to this discipline becoming more serious, and constructive interdisciplinary cooperation will meet the unifi cation challenge. Another domain is connected to tasks to defi ne the relation between economics and neuroeconomics, or to draw the relevance of neuroeconomic data to economics. Several tasks relate to methodology and the problems of interpreting the data. In this respect, it will be necessary to analyse diff erent neuroeconomic approaches, their goals, ambitions, and successes in their implementation. Neuroeconomics faces a series of conceptual challenges, including, for example, the diff erent approaches to the neural brain architecture. Th ese problems may be refl ected with replicating experiments, which will not only be seen as a mere repetition of already conducted research, but as replication in the context of eff orts to deal with neuroeconomic challenges. Besides cooperation with neuroeconomists in the above-mentioned domains, the specifi c contribution of social scientists lays in further developing their disciplines, improving their theories and in highlighting the most important aspects. Social science, as a discipline that studies dynamic processes in the complex world of human interactions, may inspire neuroeconomics and complete neuroeconomics by this element. Moreover, awareness of this characteristic of reality supports the critical attitude toward all revolutionary claims about the naturalization of the social sciences. Finally, it should be the social scientist who really confi rms that there are ways these new neuroeconomic approaches can contribute to improvements in economics. Michal Müller 185 Bibliography: Allais, Maurice. "Le comportement de l'homme rationnel devant le risque: Critique des postulats et axiomesde l'ecole Americaine." Econometrica 21, no. 4 (1953): 503–46. Antonietti, Alessandro. 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