Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) 359 –392 © The Author(s) 2013 Reprints and permissions: sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1468795X13480645 jcs.sagepub.com 480645 JCS13310.1177/1468795X13480645Journal of Classical SociologyBjerre 2013 Corresponding author: Jørn Bjerre, Department of Education, Aarhus University, Niels Juels Gade 84, bygning 2110, lokale 239, Aarhus N, 8200, Denmark. Email: jbje@dpu.dk The origin of the inner voice: Durkheim, Christianity and the Greeks Jørn Bjerre Aarhus University, Denmark Abstract While the influence of classical philosophy on sociology has been the subject of several studies, less attention has been given to the question of how the founders of sociology viewed classical philosophy. This article discusses Émile Durkheim's account of the historical role of Greek philosophy as described in his lectures on The Evolution of Educational Thought. It demonstrates how Durkheim makes several erroneous claims concerning Greek morality that, taken together, produced a stereotyped image of the Greeks as intellectual giants but moral dwarfs. Downplaying the historical role of Greek morality, Durkheim attributes one of the most important social facts in connection with the development of Western moral individualism – the inward-oriented morality – to the innovative power of Christian religion. Despite this bias, the great twentiethcentury interpreters of social thought, such as Talcott Parsons, Steven Lukes and Robert A. Jones, have continually referred to Durkheim's historical analyses without questioning his assertions. Sociologists need to cease citing Durkheim as an authority on moral education in the classical world inasmuch as so many of his claims promote a false image of Greek morality and education. Keywords Christianity, conversion, Durkheim, education, Greek philosophy, morality No longer can the term classical in the idea of classical social theory refer only to the founding fathers in the nineteenth century; it must also refer to its more remote origins in classical Greece. (McCarthy, 2003: 13) The political and moral theories of Plato and Aristotle hardly do more than reflect in their systems the political structure of Sparta and Athens respectively. (Durkheim, 1992 [1950]: 59) Article 360 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) Durkheim and the question of origin While the influence of classical philosophy on the foundation of classical sociology has been the subject of several studies,1 less attention has been given to the way in which classical sociologists viewed classical philosophy. This article describes Émile Durkheim's account of the historical role of Greek philosophy, as explicated in his lectures on The Evolution of Educational Thought.2 Although Durkheim makes a series of claims about Greek philosophy that are stereotyped and unfounded, the great twentiethcentury interpreters of social thought such as Talcott Parsons, Steven Lukes and Robert A. Jones have referred to these historical analyses without questioning their claims. Durkheim's relationship to Greek philosophy, however, is not only a matter of intellectual history. It is also relevant to sociology as such, since the issue touches directly on Durkheim's understanding of social institutions and the methodological question of how to study institutions. The issue further relates directly to one of Durkheim's most central theories, namely that religion held a primacy within the field of sociology with regard to all other institutions since it was their point of origin. As for the question of the inner voice of moral self-reflection, Durkheim goes a long way – too long, in fact – in trying to demonstrate that moral self-reflection originated with the advent of Christian religion. Before addressing the issue, I will first introduce the methodological question of origin within Durkheim's work. I will argue that Durkheim treats this question differently in his lectures on education than in his main works. I then review the literature on the relationship between Durkheim and Greek philosophy in order to set the stage for a specific case: the historical role of Greek philosophy in the origin of moral individualism in Western society. This is followed by a presentation of Durkheim's account of the relationship between Christian religion and Greek philosophy. Finally, I assess Durkheim's claims in light of more recent studies of classical philosophy. Do origins originate? The question of origin is central to Durkheim's concept of institution.3 However, his oeuvre contains at least two quite different understandings of 'origin'. In The Division of Labour, Durkheim argues that social facts such as the withdrawal of religion, free thought and individualism do not begin at a particular time and place in history. Explaining by example, he contends that such social facts did not begin with modernity, in 1789, with the Reformation, with Scholastic Philosophy or in the Greek polytheism or the Oriental theocracies (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]: 121). Being a social fact, he argues, they begin nowhere and everywhere within the group sharing the same beliefs. Durkheim seems to have preserved this understanding throughout his career, since it is found in The Elementary Forms, where he again takes up 'the old problem of the origin of religions but under new conditions' (1995 [1912]: 7, original emphasis). By 'origin', Durkheim argues, he does not mean a 'first beginning', or a 'radical instant', since, '[l]ike every other human institution, religion begins nowhere'. Rather than radical instants, Durkheim is searching for origin as defined by '[t]he ever-present causes on which the most basic forms of religious thought and practices depend' (1995 [1912]: 7). Bjerre 361 In his lectures on The Evolution of Educational Thought, delivered during the period between his early and his late grand oeuvre, Durkheim holds a somewhat different view regarding the question of origin. He is not only much less sceptical as regards identifying historical beginnings; he also aims to investigate what he calls 'les germs initial', the historical embryos, of some of the very same social facts that he was investigating in The Division of Labour, such as the origin of moral individualism. A complete review of the implications of the question of origin in Durkheim's work lies beyond the scope of this article. Instead, I will focus here on Durkheim's view of the origin of the inner voice of moral individualism. What Durkheim is describing here is the evolution of one of the most central aspects of modern institutions, the relationship of man to himself. This relationship is marked by a 'perceptual watchfulness over his own being', based on the 'obligation to be examining his conscience constantly ... to analyse, to scrutinise his motives; in a word, to reflect upon himself' (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 283). This attitude was to become one of the central objects of study in twentieth-century sociology.4 Greek philosophy and modern sociology Durkheim's relationship to classical philosophy has been approached differently in the literature. Helen Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that the relationship may be analyzed in four ways: (1) the unacknowledged influence of classical philosophy on Durkheim's thought; (2) the direct references to ancient sources in Durkheim's work; (3) Durkheim's analysis of ancient societies; and (4) the influence of Durkheim on later studies of ancient society and thought (1992: 39). While citing the direct references to ancient sources in Durkheim's work, much literature has claimed the existence of an unacknowledged influence of classical philosophy on Durkheim's thought (Bellah, 1973; Challenger 1994; Karabatzaki-Perdiki, 1988; LaCapra, 1972; Meštrović 1982, McCarthy 2003). These interpretations share the assumption that Durkheim carried out a rethinking of the ancient philosophical traditions from the point of view of modern sociology. Dominick LaCapra (1972) argued that Durkheim's sociology should be understood as a modern reformulation of ancient natural law; while Stjepan Meštrović (1982) has argued that Durkheim stands in the shadow of Plato. This mode of interpretation is also central to Robert Bellah's introduction to Durkheim's texts on morality and society: 'It is as a philosopher of order that Durkheim stands in the tradition of Plato, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Saint-Simon, and Comte' (Bellah, 1973: xviii); Bellah even argues that the influence of ancient philosophy was not only of an intellectual kind. Durkheim used the ancient philosophers as models for himself as an intellectual. While summing up Durkheim's attitude towards the role of the intellectual in society, Bellah writes: 'The sociologist today must be what Plato's Socrates was in times past, the educator of his society' (1973: xxxvii). The analyses of Durkheim's relationship to classical philosophy, however, often have an interpretative intent that goes beyond the mere question of understanding the nature of the relationship. Such analyses may for instance attempt to rescue Durkheim from the functionalist tradition of Talcott Parsons. In George McCarthy's work, 362 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) Parsons is accused of constructing Durkheim as the founder of sociology as a positivistic science, based upon enlightenment ideas (McCarthy, 2003: 12). And the aim of reading Durkheim through the lens of Aristotle, as Douglas Challenger does, is to correct 'the positivistic and functionalistic misreading of Durkheim' that is attributed to the works of Parsons (Challenger, 1994: 14 n. 4). Along the same lines, Meštrović has interpreted Durkheim within the fin de siècle context, while accusing Parsons of creating an abstract, heartless, cerebral version of classical sociology. Parsons, it is argued, represses Durkheim's criticism of enlightenment (Meštrović, 1991).5 Agreeing with the overall argument of Meštrović, both Challenger and McCarthy focus their attention on a different kind of neglect: the American neglect to acknowledge the influence of Greek philosophy on sociology. 'It was the American tradition, and especially the writings of Talcott Parsons, which later repressed these [classical] origins in order to transform sociology into a utilitarian and positivistic science of explanation, prediction, and social control' (McCarthy, 2003: 2; emphasis added). McCarthy sums up the argument by stating that classical sociology constituted a 'romantic break with the Enlightenment and positivism' (2003: 170), and that the 'intellectual and spiritual core of the discipline ... its humanistic soul' was lost in the twentieth century. By reinterpreting classical sociology from the perspective of classical philosophy, the intent was to come closer to an adequate understanding of it; hence, ... sociology was viewed by Marx, Weber, and Durkheim as a form of ancient political science whose purpose was to examine modern social institutions and values in order to cultivate social justice, happiness, and a virtuous life. These are the Greek ideals of phronesis and praxis. (2003: 13) Rather than seeking to form a positivistic science, classical sociology should be viewed as the 'formation of a new phronetic science, which was holistic, integrative, and classical, and based on the Aristotelian synthesis of economics, politics (law), and ethics' (2003: 13). Parsons, Lukes and Jones Several critical points could be made with regard to these interpretations. First, they tend to confuse the documentation of an unacknowledged influence of classical philosophy on Durkheim's thought with his analysis of classical philosophy. This distinction is important: Durkheim was certainly influenced by classical philosophy, but, as Karabatzaki-Perdiki has argued, he 'tends to minimize the influence of classical culture on the formation of modern spirit, overemphasizing the impact of biblical and Christian morality' (1992: 48).6 It may thus not be Parsons who represses the influence of classical culture on Durkheim, but Durkheim himself. Reading The Structures of Social Action in this light suggests that rather than repressing Durkheim's analysis of the classical world, Parsons seems to pass Durkheim's views on rather uncritically; much like later scholars, such as Steven Lukes and Robert A. Jones, as will be noted. Hence, in his early work, Parsons, Bjerre 363 discussing the question of origin and the role of Greek philosophy in the formation of moral individualism, comes so close to Durkheim's version that he even passes on both of Durkheim's views on origin.7 Like the Durkheim of The Division of Labour and The Elementary Forms, Parsons argues that when it comes to the question of the 'origin of the mode of thinking in terms of the action schema in general', the search for origins is fruitless, 'since they [the modes of thinking] seem to be rooted in an experience that may be regarded as universal to all human beings' (Parsons, 1949 [1937]: 51). And like the Durkheim of The Evolution of Educational Thought, Parsons deals with the question of the origin of the inner voice of individualism as an innovation of Christianity rather than of Greek philosophical tradition: Probably the primary source of this individualistic cast of European thought lies in Christianity. In an ethical and religious sense, Christianity has always been deeply individualistic. That is, its ultimate concern has been with the welfare, above all in the next world, of the individual immortal soul. All souls have always been for it, as it were, 'born free and equal'. (Parsons, 1937: 53) And it is this individualism that 'sharply marks off all Christian thought from that of classical antiquity prior to the Hellenistic age', where we find: '[t]he spiritual absorption of the individual in the social unit which was self-evident to a Plato or even an Aristotle' (Parsons, 1937: 53). In his influential work on Durkheim, Steven Lukes devoted a chapter to The Evolution of Educational Thought, where the main arguments are presented without any critical discussion about their historical adequacy (Lukes, 1985: 379ff.). Robert A. Jones, in his detailed study of Durkheim's social realism, also quotes the same exact passages from The Evolution of Educational Thought on the question of conversion and Greek morality that I will analyse below, again without questioning their validity (Jones, 1999: 48). Durkheim's view concerning the roots of modern education within Judeo-Christian educational morality has embedded itself in the academic literature and continues to be used in even the most current debates.8 Durkheim and the Greeks: Continuity of naming or explaining? In order to further explore the question of the continuity of Greek philosophy within Durkheim's sociology, I will introduce the distinction between two types of continuities: a continuity of explaining and a continuity of naming.9 We may speak of a 'continuity of explaining' between modern sociology and classical philosophy, if sociology continues the work of explaining social phenomena from within the philosophical tradition (same objects, same assumptions). If sociology, on the other hand, seeks to explain the same phenomena as the philosophers, but does so based on a methodological break with the assumptions of the philosophical tradition, we may only speak of a 'continuity of naming', since the sociologist seek to explain what the philosophers only have named (same objects, different assumptions). 364 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) There is no reason to question the existence of a continuity of naming between classical philosophy and classical sociology. In the research on the unacknowledged influence of classical philosophy on Durkheim's thought, however, scholars such as Meštrović (1982), Karabatzaki-Perdiki, Challenger and McCarthy often imply a continuity of explaining. Yet this is done only by downplaying what is obvious – that Durkheim developed a science on very different terms than the philosophical predecessors. The fact that Durkheim was studying institutions and values in order to cultivate social justice, happiness and a virtuous life does not imply that he was not using techniques and methods of scientific inquiry unknown to the Greeks. Durkheim was no more a philosopher of phronesis and praxis than a positivistic scientist. Parsons and Lukes assume that Durkheim is well read within the classical literature, but as they are referring to his analysis of ancient societies, they feel no need to suspect a continuity of explaining. Parsons and Lukes basically assume what Durkheim himself assumed: that it was the role of science and sociology to explain what the philosophers had only named, such as the concept of soul and the duality of human nature. While Durkheim viewed the works of Plato and Aristotle as the 'first attempt at sociology' because they were the first to apply 'reflection to things of a social order', they lacked an adequate method in order to be viewed as proper sociologists (Durkheim in Bellah, 1973: 3). Plato and Aristotle investigated society in order to organize them as perfectly as possible, while the sociologist studies them 'simply to know them and to understand them' (Durkheim in Traugott, 1978: 71, emphasis in original). Durkheim's understanding of his own work on this point has been the object of criticism. Karabatzaki-Perdiki has argued that although Durkheim saw his project as being an empirical analysis of the objects of the normative theories of Greek philosophy, he himself develops his theories along the exact same lines, thus producing rather than simply describing new models of the good society. Durkheim's model, she argues: 'is also a normative model'. This is ... not simply because moral factors are so central to it, but because it represents Durkheim's conception of the 'good' society and individual. It has, we claim, precisely the same epistemological status as Plato's ideal models, and each can be judged both in terms of the values which it embodies and its sociological plausibility as a possible model of harmonious and stable social life. (Karabatzaki-Perdiki, 1988: 541) Karabatzaki-Perdiki explains these similarities by demonstrating how an unacknowledged, as well as an acknowledged, influence from classical philosophy has informed not only Durkheim's understanding of the relationship between society and the individual, but also the functionalistic conception of society (Karabatzaki-Perdiki, 1992: 41). While citing the work of Gouldner (1965, 1970), Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that Plato's metaphysics should be acknowledged as the foundation of not only Durkheim's social theory, but Parsons' functionalism. Like the modern theories, Plato, it is argued, views the different functions of society as a matter of organic relationship. Bjerre 365 Although Karabatzaki-Perdiki demonstrates the existence of a continuity of naming between Greek philosophy and modern sociology, the assertion that they have the same epistemological status is unconvincing, as this overlooks the immense differences of method between the two approaches.10 In order to understand why Durkheim did not acknowledge a possible continuity of explanation between Greek philosophy and modern sociology, the perspective needs to be turned from the acknowledged influence of Greek philosophy on Durkheim towards his own interpretation of philosophy. Durkheim: In the shadow of religion It is in his lectures on The Evolution of Educational Thought that we find Durkheim's most complex analysis of the historical role of classical philosophy and Greek antiquity.11 The lectures served as an introduction to pedagogy. However, they contain much more than a mere introduction. Durkheim is investigating the origin and evolution of a certain type of thought and morality that had come to influence modern society in general and modern education in particular. The aim of Durkheim's historical analysis is to approach the acute questions of his time concerning the curriculum of the future. Durkheim's argument for approaching these issues from a historical perspective reflects his views on the interplay between past, present and future. One cannot approach questions about the future curriculum except by evaluating the present. Yet the present 'is no more than the extrapolation of the past', and thus 'by itself nothing' (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 15). In order to act in relation to questions of the future, we need a knowledge of the present that can be achieved only by an institutional analysis. This is because the future of the institutions, 'the directions in which they develop, their vigour at various stages in their subsequent existence, all these depend crucially upon the nature of the first germs from which they originate' (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 19). Based on such hermeneutical considerations, Durkheim argues for the importance of understanding the relationship between ancient and modern thought, while assessing the historical implications of the different stages of development in between; these development stages include the medieval and Renaissance system of education, the realist pedagogy and the influences of the Jesuits on French education. In order to structure this historical account, Durkheim makes a distinction between two civilizations: the Greco-Roman and the Christian. According to Durkheim, the educational focus on nature and the development of logic derived from classical civilization. Classical civilization is unique, he argues, since all other cultures begin with the study of man, only later arriving at the study of nature and of the world (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 281). Only classical civilization moves in the opposite direction; hence, '[a]ll the great thinkers of Greece from Thales to the Sophist ... were physicists' (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 281). While the Greeks viewed man from the perspective of sacred nature, 'Christian civilization developed in the reverse direction.' With Christianity, 'it is the mind ... which is regarded as sacred.' This is because 'the soul, this principle of our inner life, is a direct emanation of the divine. As for the world, it is ... something profane'. Based on this account, Durkheim makes the claim that the Greeks, even Socrates, saw the human mind 366 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) as having a profane character, while the world was viewed as sacred (1977 [1938]: 281–282). According to Durkheim, the evolution of educational thought thus develops from being preoccupied with things – the preoccupation of classical civilization – towards a preoccupation with human nature and the mind in the medieval age. In the Renaissance and humanist movements, the study of man becomes the study of the classical age (Renaissance), and of language in itself (the humanists). It was with the development of science, secularization and the realist movement within pedagogical thinking that the two great civilizations finally converged towards a modern mode of education. In the following, I discuss Durkheim's argument concerning the role of Christianity and the Greeks in relation to the historical origin of moral individualism.12 While Karabatzaki-Perdiki has already begun this work, pointing to several historical biases in The Evolution of Educational Thought, 13 further investigations are necessary. Durkheim's argument: Philosophy versus Christianity When it comes to the modern understanding of the school as an institution, according to Durkheim, it is generally believed that the school should 'provide a morally cohesive environment which closely envelops the child and which act on his nature as a whole' (1977 [1938]: 30). This belief, Durkheim argues, could only have originated within a Christian culture, where education is viewed as a matter of 'a general orientation of the mind and will'. In Greek culture, on the other hand, education was viewed as a matter of acquiring 'certain specific abilities or habits of the mind' (1977 [1938]: 30). It was Christianity that provided the moral framework of individual accountability that was necessary for the development of the institution of the school as a moral environment. For Durkheim, education as a general orientation of the mind is a Christian innovation in more than one sense: it was with the rise of Christian morality that this idea was conceived, and it was with the development of the Church that this notion of education became organized. Durkheim, however, does not stop with a simple distinction between two types of morality and education. He also analyses the historical interplay between the two cultures: since the origins of the Church were 'Greco-Latin', Durkheim points out, the Church 'could not but remain faithful to its origins' (1977 [1938]: 21). In order to communicate its central ideas and feelings, the Church had to educate and preach, and in order to do this, it needed a culture, 'and at this time there was no other culture than the pagan' (1977 [1938]: 23). Herein lies the dilemma of Christianity: The Church was dependent on a culture whose ideas 'conflicted with those which were at the basis of Christianity' (1977 [1938]: 25). While the Church was dependent on the culture of the Greco-Latin world, it offered something back to the people of that world, namely a 'moral consolation which they could not find elsewhere' (1977 [1938]: 21); while adapting its ideas and practices to the languages and thinking of the Greco-Latin world, Christianity offered a completely new way of conceiving man as a moral subject. The morality of ancient Greece, Durkheim argues, was oriented towards external competences. The innovation of Christianity was to orient the moral consciousness of man towards the unity of his person.14 Bjerre 367 Habitudes or habitus? The aim of education From the French text, Durkheim's argument may be summed up by referring to the distinction between 'habitudes' and 'habitus' (unfortunately, this distinction disappears in the English translation). Durkheim distinguishes between a Greek and Roman morality with their education based on several 'habitudes', and a Christian morality and education based on a single 'habitus'. According to this distinction, the innovation of Christianity was that it generated a system of morality based upon a moral unity within the individual. In antiquity, neither morality nor education was directed towards any such idea of an inner whole. Rather, ancient education, based as it was on an externally defined virtue ethics, was aimed at ... the passing on to the child of a certain number of specific talents. ... It was a question of inculcating in the pupil certain portions of knowledge and modes of behaviour. ... Of dressing it up in a kind of external suit of armour, different pieces of which could be forged quite independently. (Durkheim, 1977: 28) It is here, in the French text, that Durkheim uses the distinction between habitudes and habitus; thus arguing that education in antiquity was based on the idea 'd'inculquer à l'élève telles habitudes, telles connaissances' (Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 36–37; emphasis added). Christianity, on the other hand, 'consists essentially in a certain attitude of the soul, in a certain habitus of our moral being' (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 29; emphasis in original).15 Durkheim uses this proclaimed innovation of Christianity to address his audience of future teachers directly, demanding that they, too, should aim at the unity of person (1977: 37); and that 'it is this more profound condition which we must get at if we are truly to do our job as educators' (1977 [1938]: 28). This assertion continues to appear in contemporary debates on French education.8 Structurally related to the habitudes/habitus distinction concerning the inward relation of the self is another distinction concerning the relation of society towards the child. According to Durkheim, the Christian moral educational system was structured towards a defined common goal, whereas in antiquity, 'there was no common motive or goal' (1977 [1938]: 28). Conversion: A Christian invention? According to Durkheim, it was Christianity that turned education from being based on having no common goal and inculcating different habitudes towards the common goal of developing a single moral habitus within the pupil. In order to back up this claim, he argues that it is within Christianity that we first see 'the emergence of an idea which was totally unknown in the ancient world [que l'Antiquité a totalement ignorée] and which by contrast played a substantial role in Christianity: the idea of conversion' (1977 [1938]: 29).16 368 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) Durkheim defines 'conversion', or, more precisely, 'true conversion' ('La vraie conversion'), in the following way: '... a profound movement as a result of which the soul in its entirety, by turning in a quite different direction, changes its position, its stance, and as a result modifies its whole outlook on the world' (1977 [1938]: 29).17 Through the invention of conversion, Christianity changes education from being a matter of acquiring a certain amount of true beliefs or knowledges towards moving 'the deepest recesses of the soul', in a way that is 'concentrated towards one and the same goal' (1977 [1938]: 29). In the phenomenon of conversion, Durkheim identifies the very idea of modern education, namely the conversion of the soul towards the demands of society. The notion of duty By pointing to education and morality as a matter of converting the deep recesses of the soul, Durkheim bolsters his argument that the modern notion of duty was undeveloped until the advent of Christianity. Thus, according to him, the notion of duty ... was unknown to the moralists of Greece and Rome [Les moralists ... l'avaient ignore] or, at any rate, they only had a very vague and flimsy notion of it; for there is no term or locution either in Greek or in Latin which corresponds to the concept of duty. (Durkheim 1977 [1938]: 209)18 Rather than being a matter of duty, morality for the Greeks was a matter of following 'a seductive ideal'. Only with the development of Christianity did morality become a matter of following the imperative demand of an absolute law. What Durkheim here attributes to Christianity is central to the understanding of the phenomenon of morality as such in Durkheim's work.19 According to Durkheim, morality is the inner voice commanding respect for societal rules, and it was with Christianity that this inner voice originated. By forming these two distinct types of morality, Durkheim has acquired the method for analysing the evolution of educational thought, since he is able to identify the struggle between an outward-oriented, goalless aesthetic and an inward, goal-oriented holistic morality, throughout the history of education. Whenever education is oriented towards Greek and Roman ideals, it has a tendency towards a formalistic, virtue-oriented showoff, based on external competences and egoistic motives. When education is based on Christian values, it tends to develop into a serious, inward, duty-oriented holistic affair. This may be summed up in Table 1. Table 1. Durkheim's theory of the two types of moral orientations. Attention Conversion Orientation Goal Morality Notion of duty Object Claim Greek and Roman Partial/Habitudes No Outward No common goal Egoistic No Things Local Christian Holistic/Habitus Yes Inward Common goal Altruistic Yes Man/ Mind Universal Bjerre 369 Durkheim's view of the Greeks in other works Having summed up Durkheim's argument, it is useful to highlight his view of Greek philosophy generally and its role in the development of modern individualism in the rest of his oeuvre. Durkheim is outspokenly enthusiastic about the role of the Greeks in the development of reason and science. In The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, the Greek philosophers are viewed as innovators of a new, rational way of reflecting on nature and society. However, when discussing the role of the Greeks in relation to the development of modern morality, Durkheim is more reserved. In his lectures on Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, 20 the philosophers are viewed as conservative on political and moral issues. Hence Durkheim's statement that Plato and Aristotle do little more than reflect the political structures of Sparta and Athens, respectively (Durkheim, 1992 [1950]: 59). As for the question of morality, Christian religion is viewed as the force of innovation, reflecting a whole new morality, based on individualism. Science and philosophy in Athens certainly inspired 'an individualist movement', but as Durkheim adds, 'we cannot say they derived from it' (1992 [1950]: 59). The historical role of Christianity in the evolution of the Western mind is that it was inward-oriented: 'The Christian form of religion [le culte chrétien] is an inward one.' In Christianity, 'outward observances' ('pratiques matérielles') and 'external constraints'('contrôle extérieur') are replaced by 'inward faith' (Durkheim, 1992 [1950]: 58). Related to the previously discussed question of a possible continuity between Durkheim and the Greeks, it should be noted here that while Durkheim views the Greek philosophers as the cultural heroes of modern science, since they invented reason,21 according to him, the Greeks themselves did not grasp the real nature of their endeavour (hence, they were not sociologists). The achievement of Greek philosophy, however praiseworthy, positions the Greek philosophers in Durkheim's interpretation alongside religious thinkers; but the Greek thinkers lack the same power of moral innovation that came with the Christian religion. In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Durkheim thus defines religion as 'the primitive way in which societies become conscious of themselves and their history' (1992 [1950]: 160); a definition that echoes The Elementary Forms, where religion is defined as the means by which 'individuals imagine the society of which they are members' (1995 [1912]: 227). It is through this lens that he views the Greek philosophers: the Greeks were the first to imagine society by the use of rational language.22 But while the Greeks invented the idea of a rational explanation of the cosmos, and were thus forerunners of scientific thought and the spiritual heroes of a new era, they existed within the traditional societal and religious order of the city-state, and were isolated from a moral, institutional framework that could support their ideas. Morality and education in antiquity In the following, I will argue that Durkheim's account of Greek morality and education reproduces some of the common stereotypes of his time; and that he makes several false claims about moral thinking in antiquity in order to back up these stereotypes. 370 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) Durkheim's argument is historically complex; in order to present my argument, it is therefore necessary to delve into questions concerning Greek and Christian ethics, history and education. My argument is that, contrary to Durkheim's methodological and empirical claims, Greek and Christian culture cannot be viewed as two distinct civilizations; and that the innovation of Christianity – rather than being a moral innovation – lies in its ability to popularize moral ideas and organize educational environments. First, I begin by showing how Durkheim reproduces a stereotype common to the fin de siècle, but also that his own teacher, Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges, did not share this stereotype. I then present a counterargument to Durkheim's claim that Greek and Christian culture can be viewed as two distinct civilizations by drawing on historical sources, and by focusing on central ethical notions of Greek philosophy such as paideia and the prosoche. Drawing on research on medieval theology, I will demonstrate that rather than being two separate complexes of ideas, as Durkheim assumes, the separation between philosophy and Christianity occurs rather late in the history of the Church. After this contextualization of the argument, each of Durkheim's claims will be discussed: (1) that the Greeks lacked ideas of ethical holism, conversion or authority; (2) that they viewed man as profane; (3) that they had no notion of duty and were generally amoral; (4) and that they had no schools. A fin de siècle stereotype If we return to the fin de siècle, it was a common stereotype to view the Greeks in the manner of Durkheim. The argument that the Greeks had no sense of duty was found in popular works such as G. Lowes Dickinson's The Greek View of Life (first edition, 1896): 'The good man', Dickinson argues, 'was the man who was beautiful – beautiful in soul. ... Duty emphasises self-repression; the Greek view emphasised self-development' (Dickinson, 1912: 149–150). A contemporary of Durkheim, Cecil Fairfield Lavell, viewed it as a commonplace 'to say that the supreme weakness of the Greeks was moral', while praising their 'intellectual and aesthetic greatness' (1911: iii). This description captures the structure of Durkheim's argument as presented above; as does Lavell's next point: this picture 'is rarely questioned', Lavell goes on, and it is often based on a 'contrast between Hellenism and Hebraism' that 'is too often made absolute'. Hence, 'the Greeks were intent on knowledge and beauty: the Hebrews on righteousness and reverence for divine law. Yet it is curious to note how little there is to support any such absolute contrast' (1911: iii). As we have seen, Durkheim makes this exact distinction by referring to Greek and Christian civilizations as two distinct first seeds: while Greek civilization expanded on the part of intellectual development, it was less developed in terms of moral education. In Durkheim's account, Greek culture was adopted by Christianity. Hellenism was an intellectual tool for the justification of Christian morality. But as we shall see, using Lavell's words, Durkheim makes the contrast between Hellenism and Hebraism too absolute, downplaying the moral aspects of Greek philosophy as such, and the moral aspects that were transferred to Christianity from Greek philosophy in particular. Bjerre 371 Durkheim versus Fustel de Coulanges Durkheim was well schooled in classical studies. Among other sources, he profited from having Numa Denis Fustel de Coulanges as his teacher (Lukes, 1985: 58ff.). Durkheim's view of Greek morality, however, was fundamentally different from that of Fustel de Coulanges. Similar to subsequent twentieth-century interpretations of the moral revolution in antiquity, Fustel de Coulanges believed that the idea of an inward morality and duty could already be found within Greek philosophy. According to him, it was Socrates who loosened the question of duty from its ancient religious roots, promoting a notion of duty that was related to the human soul ('le principe du devoir est dans l'âme de l'homme') (Fustel de Coulanges, 2001 [1864]: 485). Durkheim's argument – that the moral theories of Plato and Aristotle hardly do more than reflect the political structure of Sparta and Athens, respectively – is not only contrary to Fustel de Coulanges' work but, when evaluated from the perspective of modern scholars on Greek antiquity, inadequate. Modern scholars, such as Walther Burkert, view philosophy as 'the most original achievement', arguing that it meant a 'change and revolution' within 'the static structures of Greek religion' (Burkert, 1985: 305). With respect to Christianity, Fustel de Coulanges sees it as a continuation of Greek philosophy, since Christianity first and foremost meant a social transformation that completed what had begun at least six or seven centuries earlier (Fustel de Coulanges, 2001 [1864]: 335).23 The important innovations of Christianity, according to Fustel de Coulanges, are that it taught that only a part of man belonged to society, distinguished between private and public, and concerned itself with the duty of men separate from the law. Though these innovations were of extreme importance for the development of modern individualistic morality, they did not constitute a break with Greek morality. As for the question of moral universality, usually attributed to Christianity,24 Fustel de Coulanges seems to interpret it as a development of the religious and moral ideas of the Hellenistic world. Thus, he argues that since Anaxagoras, a fifth-century sophist accused of atheism, there had existed the idea of a god of the universe who received the homage of all men (2001 [1864]: 338). While Durkheim's view of Greek morality reflects the stereotypes of his time, his own teacher thus seems to have had a somewhat different view. This difference cannot be explained simply by the fact that Durkheim is presenting an extremely complex matter for his student, which demands didactic reduction. Rather, it is the way in which this reduction is carried out that demonstrates how Durkheim structured his understanding of Greek morality. Platonism for the people Arguing for continuity between classical culture and early Christianity is not to say that there is an identity between them. Greek philosophy was seeking to unite rationality and spirituality, whereas Christianity sought a spiritual shortcut past the challenges of rationality. This is already reflected in the spirit of critique among some of the early converted Christian philosophers. As Charles Norris Cochrane has argued, this critique may be summed up as a relation between 'science' and 'faith', a relationship which sometimes led Christians to indulge in 'such extravagant language as to leave the impression that their opposition to "science" was an opposition to reason itself' (1957: 222). Thus 372 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) Tertullian contrasts the 'academic wisdom' of Greece with 'the simple and uncultivated soul' of Christianity (1957: 223). The spiritual shortcut used by the early Christians soon came to be regarded as a shortcoming. Hence, the Christian philosopher Athanasius argued that the superstition of his day was due to the fact that the Christians 'have turned from the cultivation of the mind, rejecting the heritage of philosophy ... in order to immerse themselves in mere sensationalism' (Cochrane 1957: 315). Similarly, Augustine, in his work On the True Religion, argued that 'the essential part of Platonic doctrines overlapped with the essential part of Christian doctrine' (Hadot, 2002: 251; Hankey, 2003: 217). Thus, 'Christianity has the same content as Platonism: the key is to turn away from sensible reality in order to contemplate God and spiritual reality' (Hadot, 2002: 250–251). These discussions within Christian philosophy suggest that the central difference between Christianity and classical philosophy cannot be represented, as does Durkheim, as a question of whether the Greek philosophers lacked morality or spirituality. The central question was whether the Greeks – through an excess of intellectuality – made the path to knowledge too exclusive. The innovation of Christianity was related not so much to the philosophical content of the teaching as to the complexity of how it was presented. Christianity could be taught to the masses. Unlike classical philosophy, it was not dependent on the acquisition of knowledge and the cultivation of the self. This point was later popularized by Nietzsche, in the statement: 'Christianity is Platonism for the people' (Hadot, 2002: 252).26 The notion of paideia In the following we shall examine how Durkheim's claim about the Christian origin of moral educational thought ignores the notion of paideia, which, according to Henri-Irénée Marrou, was central to the understanding of education in antiquity. 'For the Greeks, education – παιδεία – meant, essentially, a profound and intimate relationship, a personal union between a young man and an elder who was at once his model, his guide and his initiator' (Marrou, 1956: 31). Paideia is important in relation not only to the understanding of Greek education, but also in relation to the understanding of early Christianity. According to Werner Jaeger, Christianity adapted the notion of paideia from Greek philosophy. Beginning with Plato, 'philosophy had become paideia, the education of man. And that was how Origen understood Christianity. It was the greatest educational power in history and was essential in agreement with Plato and philosophy' (Jaeger, 1961: 65).27 Also, Clement of Alexandria establishes a close link between philosophy, paideia and Christianity, as analysed by Pierre Hadot, who argues that not only did Christianity view itself as a philosophy, but the tendency was 'already at work in the Jewish tradition, particularly in Philo of Alexandria' (Hadot, 1995: 128–129). Not only did the second-century Christians, the so-called 'Apologists', view Christianity as a philosophy, they 'thought of it as the philosophy. They believed that that which had been scattered and dispersed throughout Greek philosophy had been synthesized and systematized in Christian philosophy' (Hadot, 1995: 128, original emphasis). The analysis of the notion of paideia demonstrates that Durkheim may be right when he argues that Christianity is able to provide a more unified teaching as well as environment for education than the Greek philosophies. Moreover, the analysis also shows that Bjerre 373 the central notions – what Durkheim views as Christian innovations – are Christian interpretations of Greek ideas, which seems to indicate that the success of Christianity was due to its ability to systematize and organize – rather than any ostensible innovation in the realm of morals. The servant of theology If we follow the cited research on ancient philosophy and education, it becomes evident that it makes no sense to distinguish between Greek intellectuality and morality in the way Durkheim does, since Greek philosophy viewed education as both an intellectual and a moral process. It was part of the same project, and it had little to do with philosophy in the modern sense. Ancient philosophy was a way of living according to reason, which had both intellectual and moral implications. In both early Christian and Stoic philosophy, reason is connected to the project of attaining the right attitude towards oneself. It becomes an inner voice to guide action, as it is found in the Stoic attitude, the prosoche. According to the prosoche, the individual should be 'on the lookout for signs within himself of any motives for action other than the will to do good. ... The "attentive" person lives constantly in the presence of God ... joyfully consenting to the will of universal reason' (Hadot, 1995: 130). Hence, when Durkheim speaks of the development of man's 'perceptual watchfulness over his own being, based on the obligation to be examining his conscience constantly... to analyse, to scrutinise his motives; in a word, to reflect upon himself' (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 283), it may be argued that he is referring to a form of relationship of the self to the self that derives from classical philosophy and unfolds in both the Stoic movement and early Christianity; and was taken over by later movements within the monastic Middle Ages. According to Hadot's argument, it was due to the transformation that philosophy underwent in the scholastic theology of the medieval university that education and philosophy lost their character of being a way of life (Hankey, 2003: 199). Instead, philosophy became 'the servant of theology' (Hadot, 2002: 255). On first sight, this argument seems to be in line with Durkheim's assessment of the role of Greek philosophy as an intellectual instrument for Christian spirituality. However, the crucial point here is when Christian spirituality reduced philosophy to its servant. Durkheim works from the assumption that it is from the very beginning, while the evidence indicates a much later development. Durkheim's statement that Christianity needed a culture, and therefore turned to classical philosophy, makes the presumption of the existence of two distinct civilizations acting upon each other. In contrast, we argue that it was two versions of the same civilization. Consider Wayne Hankey's argument, summing up Hadot's research: ... so thoroughly was the self-understanding of the ancient schools, as well as their structures, aims, and techniques taken into Christianity, that [Christianity] represents itself as the true philosophy. Episcopal curiae resemble philosophical schools; ancient and medieval monasteries identify their practice of Christianity contra mundum as philosophia and preserve essential features of philosophy as a way of life which has been lost to us. (Hankey, 2003: 198) 374 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) As Jean Leclercq – whom both Hadot and Hankey cite – states in his classical study on the subject: In the age of medieval monasticism, just like in antiquity, philosophy did not designate a theory or a mode of knowledge [manière de connaître] but a lived wisdom, a mode of living in accordance with reason: that is, in accordance with the Logos. (1952: 360, my translation) This focus on 'lived reason' – as found in prosoche – remains the aim of education, from its development in classical philosophy to a long way into the Middle Ages, when, according to both Hadot and Leclercq, this understanding of philosophy was repressed by 'the mediaeval scholastic idea'. However, according to Hankey, later studies have shown 'how the ancient idea of philosophy was retrieved by the lay intellectuals of the Middle Ages and Renaissance' (2003: 199). According to Hankey, it was not until Thomas Aquinas that philosophy became the servant of theology. Aquinas' point of departure is the Aristotelian philosophy that had become known through the Arab philosophers. 'Thomas followed both [the Arab philosophers] and his Augustinian predecessors by distinguishing between the modalities of faith and reason.' According to Hankey, however, '[f]or the first time in the Latin Middle Ages', and 'in opposition both to the Arabs and the Augustinians, Thomas made a humbled but quasi-autonomous philosophy into the servant of revealed theology' (2003: 219). Taken together with the evidence for the continuity of Greek philosophy within the morality and education of the Latin Middle Ages, the fact that the distinction between faith and reason – subordinating reason to faith – was used only after the introduction of Aristotelian philosophy in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries calls into question the Durkheimian postulate of two distinct civilizations. When Durkheim argues that the Church, from the very beginning, was obliged to borrow 'profane elements' from classical civilization, he is adopting a Christian notion of profanity that evolved much later, a notion based on the ability to separate the element of sacred faith from the profane instrument of reason (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 25). Durkheim thus reduces classical culture to a reservoir of profane, linguistic and intellectual skills used by Christianity, rather than interpreting Christianity as a continuation of classical culture, where reason was related to spiritual truth and moral models for living: reason was a way of living and thus a moral as much as an intellectual project. The 'Hellenocentric' perspective The conclusions of Leclercq, Hadot and Hankey resemble those of Jaeger, who also argued that Christianity turned to Greek philosophy in order to find the intellectual tools that could justify its belief. However, Jaeger also asserted that Christianity took shape while developing as a philosophy. To support this claim, he points to the fact that the Christian idea of mission took form by adapting the 'classical rhetoric of protreptic, the art of speech used to persuade students to a specific education', that 'the word "conversion" stems from Plato, for adopting a philosophy meant a change of life in the first place', and that Christian missionaries 'borrowed their arguments from these predecessors' (Jaeger, 1961: 10). Even the notion of dogma (δόγμα) derives from the Hellenistic schools, where dogma denoted the philosophical knowledge that was advanced; and the Bjerre 375 concept of Church, ekklesia, derives from the Greek notion of polis.28 The Christian spiritual communities known as ekklesia developed as the Greek polis religion was collapsing, and a new structure of 'megalopolis' developed (Burkert, 1985: 337). It may be argued that Jaeger is as eager to demonstrate the 'Hellenocentric' origin of modern morality as Durkheim was Judeo-Christian-centric. However, Jaeger's evidence poses a challenge to Durkheim's theory of two distinct 'initial germs'. Contemporary scholars such as Burkert support Jaeger's claim that the 'intellectual struggle between Christianity and the classical world ... required a common basis', and that this common basis was 'the Greek philosophical tradition' (Jaeger, 1961: 10–11). Burkert thus argues that since Plato, 'there has been no theology which has not stood in his shadow. ... Since Plato and through him, religion has been essentially different from what it was before' (Burkert, 1985: 321–322). Contrary to Durkheim, Dickinson and other fin de siècle scholars, who view Christianity as a distinct civilization, Christianity is interpreted by Jaeger, Hadot and other twentiethcentury scholars as a movement within the Hellenistic world. The novelty of Christianity was its ability to popularize ideas and cause social transformation rather than to introduce a whole new form of inward morality. We may therefore offer the preliminary conclusion that Greek philosophy played a much more central role in the origin of the inner voice than assumed by Durkheim. With this preliminary conclusion as our point of depature, we will now discuss Durkheim's claims in more detail. The first claim concerns the status of the education of the whole man. Greek holism Evidence against Durkheim's claim regarding the lack of Greek holism can be found in the work of Marrou, who demonstrates that 'Classical Greece wanted education to concern itself with the whole man' (1956: 219). As a discussion of the Greek notion of education, paideia, may show, it is wrong to state – as Durkheim does – that Greek education was externally oriented: that is, aimed at inculcating different pieces of knowledge and skills. According to Plato, paidiea meant bringing quite different elements of education into a harmonious whole; intellectual education should be seen as one element along with the training of the body (γυμναστική) and mousikē (μουσική), as Plato argues in The Republic (376e). Central to the Greek paideia was the question of how to bring these different elements into the right combination, in order to achieve the right balance. In a dialogue with Socrates, Glaucon thus acknowledges that 'excessive emphasis on athletics produces an excessively uncivilized type, while a purely literary training leaves men soft' (Plato, The Republic, 410d). It is by the harmonic adjustment of the different parts of the soul that a man becomes virtuous, reflecting the Greek conception of the self-controlled man (σοφóς). This notion of balance is directly related to an idea of holism. In the dialogue, Socrates thus argues that man should bring together the different parts for the benefit of the whole (Plato, The Republic, 442c). Rather than being focused, as Durkheim puts it, on dressing the student up 'in a kind of external suit of armour', Plato lets Socrates argue that man is educated when he has bound the different elements of the soul 'into a disciplined whole, 376 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) and so become fully one instead of many'; only then will he 'be ready for action of any kind' (παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ πρά ττειν ἤδη) (Plato, The Republic, 443e). This view on education was central not only to the educational thought of Plato, but also to that of Aristotle, Isocrates and others. In his Sens lectures, Durkheim himself mentions the holistic concept of the soul found in Aristotle: 'As Aristotle says, we live not by one faculty but with the entire soul' (Durkheim, 2004 [1884]: 59). Isocatres argues that physical training and philosophy should aim at forming a synthesis, since the aim of education isn't knowledge as such, but rather the ability to judge within the practical situations of everyday life: Once they [the teachers] have acquainted them [the students] with these matters [physical and philosophical skills] and brought their knowledge of them to a state of perfection ... [t]hey force them to link together in practice the various lessons they have learned. (Joyal et al., 2009: 101, emphasis added) This notion of a harmonious linkage of the different skills is related to the moral idea of tying together the different parts of the soul. This is based in the idea of a separation of the body and the soul. As the philosophical movement developed, this problem became more and more important. In Cicero – and the Stoic movement – the problem of the harmonious whole occupies a central role. The notion of the beauty of the soul that according to Dickinson proves that the Greeks were not moral philosophers relates to a notion of beauty achieved through the development of a harmony within. It is not a mere aesthetic question, but related to ethical standards of the good, as well as to social ideals. This clearly demonstrates that Durkheim's distinction between habitudes and habitus is erroneous; and that there is no support for Durkheim's claim that the idea of holism is a Christian innovation. The aim of the Greek paideia was as much the habitus of the child as it was a matter of decorating the child with unrelated habitudes. Education and conversion In the following we shall demonstrate that, contrary to Durkheim's direct claims that the Greeks were ignorant of the notion of conversion, and that conversion was an invention of Christianity, the opposite seem to have been the case. The Christian notion of conversion derived from Greek philosophy, where it was related to the idea of paideia. As Diskin Clay has argued: ... our very words 'education' and 'conversion' go back to Socrates' allegory, which tells how a fettered prisoner is turned around by a philosophical conversion and let out of the cave. ... For education (educatio in Latin) is 'leading out,' and 'conversion' (conversio in Latin) is turning around. (Clay, 2000: 231; cited in Ward, 2011: 86) Bjerre 377 According to Plato's account of paideia in The Republic, education is not a matter of adding something to the mind that was not there before, as if adding sight to the eye. Rather, it is a matter of the very act of turning the eye that is already there around (Plato, The Republic, 518d). The mind, 'the organ by which [man] learns', according to Plato, 'is like an eye which cannot be turned from darkness to light unless the whole body is turned [ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι στρέφειν]; in the same way, the mind as a whole [ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ] must be turned away [περέιακτέον] from the world of change' (Plato, The Republic, 518c).29 Again, Plato's focus is neither on an exterior armature, nor on particular parts of the soul, but on the soul as such. Education is now viewed as an effort to turn the whole soul around (μεταστραφήσεται) (The Republic, 518d). The word μεταστραφήσεται is the futurum indicative passive of the verb μεταστρέφω. Here the passive form denotes that the meaning is not 'to turn about', but to turn oneself about, as in changing one's ways. The later Christian use of the word 'conversion' derived from this philosophical notion (Nock, 1933: 179). In the Christian New Testament, the word 'μεταστραφήσεται' is used to denote change from sunlight to darkness (Acts 2:20), whereas the reference to conversion (in Acts 15:3), is made by the word 'ἐπιστροφή', denoting a turning about.30 The centrality of conversion in Plato's philosophy of education clearly disproves Durkheim's claim that the Greeks were ignorant of this notion. This is despite the fact that it could be argued, following Burkert, that we are dealing with different types and degrees of conversion. In relation to the later mysteries, Burkert has argued that 'even if they supposed a change in orientation when an individual turns to worship', it does not have the same meaning as the Christian conversion (1987: 14). In relation to the famous story of Apuleius on the initiation of Lucius to Isis, Burkert argues against A.D. Nock, asserting that this is not a real conversion, since it does not 'result in withdrawal from the world and worldly interests' (1987: 17). In connection with this it must be remembered that Burkert is not talking about philosophy here, but about the mystery cults; and that the Platonic philosophy, as argued above, contains a clear notion of turning away from worldly interests. Second, contrary to Burkert's argument, we argue here that conversion cannot be defined as the turning away from worldly interests. This is only one type of conversion among others. Types of conversion As argued by Nock, it is 'the reorientation of the soul of an individual' that is the defining trait when we are talking about conversion. It is not the question of the way in which this reorientation is shaped, but the presence of the personal experience 'that the old was wrong and the new is right' (Nock, 1933: 7). Withdrawal from the world is one common type of conversion, and certainly not the only type. This discussion of different types of conversion suggests that not only are Christianity and the philosophies both concerned with conversion, it is the same type of conversion, namely the withdrawal from worldly interests, as a means of subsequently acting in the social world on a different background. Both Christianity and philosophy were oriented towards putting knowledge obtained by withdrawal from the world to use within the world. This fact is perfectly demonstrated in the allegory of the cave, where the 378 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) withdrawal from the world is seen as an educational process seeking to correct one's understanding of the world so as to enhance one's ability to 'act rationally either in public or private life' (Plato, The Republic, 517c). Summing up, we may say that conversion to philosophy as a way of life was a serious matter. It was a question not just of decorating the mind with certain ideas, but of acquiring principles and knowledge to live by. The Greek philosophers were hardly ignorant of conversion; on the contrary, conversion stood at the very centre of the philosophical movement. Hadot concludes: 'To live in a philosophical way meant, above all, to turn toward intellectual and spiritual life, carrying out a conversion which involved "the whole soul"' – which is to say, the whole of moral life' (2002: 65).31 Long before Plato, the Greeks had known conversion-like decisions; 32 and from its emergence in the Pythagorean and Orphic movements, through the rhetoric and philosophical movements to popular movements such as Epicureanism and Stoicism in the Hellenistic period, conversion seems to have been a central theme in Greek reflections on ethics and education. The profanity of man The question of conversion sheds a different light on Durkheim's claim that it was only with the advent of Christianity that the mind came to be regarded as sacred. Durkheim insists that in Greece, 'the human mind ... was regarded as something profane and of little value' (1977 [1938]: 281). In order to assess this claim, we need to investigate how the notion of the soul was perceived by the Greeks. According to Gabor Katona (2002), the Greek notion of the soul developed in several stages, beginning with 'a fragmented, multi-soul-word descriptions of Homeric man'. The pre-Socratic philosophers unified 'man's perceptual-cognitive-emotive acts in a more coherent concept of psyche' that was fully developed in the Socratic notion of the soul; since with Socrates, the idea of psyche is conceived of 'as a unified core of behavior, a representative of the entirety of the person after death, and an antagonist of the body' (Katona, 2002: 39).33 There are different views on when the notion of the division between σῶμα and ψυχή appears for the first time. Nevertheless, around 500 bc it is known from the Pythagorean tradition. Within this tradition, there existed different versions of the soul, ranging from materialist to spiritualist (Katona, 2002: 38). According to Bruno Snell (1953), Heraclitus (about 500 bc) was the first to write on the soul as an entity opposed to the body. By the soul, Heraclitus denoted a deep, intangible waterish inner entity that in itself is undiscovered (Heraclitus, n.d.: Fragment 42), thus implying the need for self-examination (n.d.: Fragment 101), as well as the possibility of growth (n.d.: Fragment 45). Related to this evolution of the notion of the soul is the idea of its immortality, the question of self-awareness, and the virtue of caring for the soul.34 The Greek preoccupation with the soul included the idea of the divinity of the soul; hence the doctrine of salvation of Pythagoras, as well as the 'Orphic' salvation, are connected with the idea of freeing the soul from its imprisonment. Plato, who studied both Heraclitus and Pythagoras, accepted this division; in Timaeus, he thus argues, that 'God created the soul before the Bjerre 379 body and gave it precedence ... and made it the dominating and controlling partner' (Plato, Timaeus, 34). Plato viewed the ψυχή as the immaterial principle of life, the self-mover. However, as E.R. Dodds pointed out, Plato was too realistic a thinker not to confront the question of 'psychological conflict (στάσις)' (Dodds, 1951: 213). This conflict is explained by the division of the soul in The Republic and the allegory of the charioteer in 'The Phaedrus'. As Katona writes in summing up the issue of different version of the body–soul relationship within Plato's work: According to Dodds, the soul-concept emerging in the Phaedo was the result of the Socratic synthesis of two separate traditions: the idea of the detachable occult self of shamanistic tradition and the idea of a rational soul (nous) of Socrates' ethical reflections. [Hence, the] struggle between body and soul in the early dialogues reappears as an inner struggle between different parts of the soul in later dialogues. (2002: 40) Aristotle in his On the Soul, argues against the soul/body distinction, asserting that the soul is the cause and the first principle of the living body ('παντάπασιν ἕνα γενόμενον ἐκ πολλῶν, σώφρονα καὶ ἡρμοσμένον, οὕτω δὴ πρά ττειν ἤδη') (415b). Aristotle thus refuses to 'identify the soul with the intellect' or 'restrict the realm of the soul to mental operations. Soul, as the first actuality of the body, was also the principle of life' (Katona, 2002: 42). The question of profanity and divinity of the soul cannot be settled by this statement, since divinity is not a quality of the soul as much as a potential of it. Divinity is achieved through the perfection of the soul. Cochrane (1957) observes that according to Aristotle, the human psyche ranks between god and beast. When corrupted, it produces 'the semblance of a beast', but as the rational part attains a certain degree of perfection, it may 'deserve the epithet "divine"' (Cochrane, 1957: 111). As we have seen, although there did not exist a single clear understanding of the soul, Durkheim's claim that the Greeks viewed the human mind as something profane and of little value makes little sense in light of massive counter-evidence. From the time of the Pythagoreans onward, the Greeks had a notion of ψυχή that – though perceived as a problem – was viewed as potentially divine, related as it was to rationality, immortality and godlike spiritual realities. The notion of duty In concluding this assessment of Durkheim's representation of Greek morality and education, let me return to his claim that the Greeks did not have any clear notion of duty. This claim, as we have seen, is part of a fin de siècle stereotype. Today, however, it is generally accepted that the Greeks in fact had a notion of duty, albeit not identical to our modern notion of it (as found in the Protestant notion of Pflicht). Within the Stoic movement, we find the term ta kathēkonta, 'usually translated as "the duties"' or as 'appropriate actions' (Hadot, 1998: 188). These 'appropriate actions' may 380 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) be interpreted as 'social and political obligations linked to human life in a city' (Hadot, 1998: 190), such as to marry and to take part in political life, but also – as I have already argued – they are related to one's attitude (Hadot, 2002: 134). Anthony A. Long translates 'performing appropriate acts' as connected to doing what is demanded by reason (1986: 190). Contrary to modern ethics, such as that of Kant, the Stoic conception of reason was connected with the achievement of happiness, rather than mere Pflicht and Wille. Long observes that Kant was indeed inspired by the Stoics (1986: 208). Long's argument seems to support Durkheim's assertion that it was with Christianity that the idea of duty developed, since the argument implies that in order to be able to speak of duty, we must have a spiritual reality that commands men to act against their own needs and feelings of happiness. Only this type of command, according to Durkheim, can give rise to 'the idea of man rising above his nature and freeing himself from it by taming it and subjecting it to spiritual laws'; duty is thus connected with the notion of going against one's own nature. According to Durkheim, the Greeks had no impetus to go against their nature since they tended to view nature as 'a source of information about the laws of life' (1977 [1938]: 209). Based on this distinction, it becomes quite clear why Durkheim attributed the origin of moral individualism to Christian religion, since it is with the idea of raising man above the nature within himself and making him act in accordance with reason and collective defined rules – rather than merely following one's nature – that he achieves moral autonomy. The problem, however, is that while it is true that the Stoic philosophers – such as Cicero – viewed nature as a source of ethics, this does not imply that ascetic practices were not widespread in Greece. As argued by Michel Foucault, it is wrong to view the Greek art of living in relation to the search for happiness without acknowledging that one cannot learn 'the art of living, the techne tou biou, without an askesis' (1984: 364). It was an integral part of classical Greek thought that 'the "ascetics" that enable one to make oneself into an ethical subject was an integral part... of the practice of a virtuous life' (Foucault, 1985: 77). The idea of raising man above the nature within himself is related to the Greek notion of happiness, since in order to be happy, one had to act in accordance with something other than the mere 'natural impulses', namely reason and other collective defined rules. While the Greeks did not use the concept of duty in a direct sense, as in Pflicht, there are several reasons to contest the argument that they had no clear notion of duty. First, the absence of a noun that translates into 'notion of duty' does not rule out the possibility that other grammatical forms could have operated as a translation. W.H.S. Jones clearly shows that while the concept of 'duty' did not exist as a noun in Greek language, the verbal form of doing one's duty was well developed in classical Greece in exactly the form Durkheim is implying when he defines duty as the act of raising man above the nature within himself and making him act in accordance with reason and collectively defined rules. If we regard the voice of duty, ... as a call to subordinate the lower instincts to the higher, then it must be admitted that the Greeks had a keen sense of duty, and felt an obligation, not only to fulfil a law of harmonious development, but to an external divine power, which, however, was believed to be working for the good of the world. (Jones, 1906: 114) Bjerre 381 Second, the notion of duty can also be deduced from the Greek epics and tragedies, not to mention Greek philosophy, where examples of duty-like feelings and efforts abound: hence, when 'Achilles considers death a fit penalty for his having failed in his duty to his friend', when 'Oedipus is driven to blind himself by the discovery of the sin which he has committed', and 'Antigone willingly sacrifices all, even her life, in her devotion to the great unwritten laws' (Jones, 1906: 114), we are dealing with acts based on a feeling of obligation to a set of rules by which one is compelled, rules derived from the authority of the divine powers. Where these examples are all based on a mythological interpretation, we find a different but related case of moral obligation within the philosophical tradition in the trial against Socrates. What makes Socrates so important here is that he embodies the definition of 'true virtue' given by Durkheim himself, namely a behaviour where 'one externalizes some inner part of oneself' (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 208). Morality, in Durkheim's own sense, is being true to one's inner voice, in so far as it corresponds to the authority of either divine command or rational justification. According to Durkheim, the religious system of the command of God is the model from which evolved the modern acceptance of the command of reason. Socrates versus Abraham In the following, I will use the trial of Socrates to dispute Durkheim's claim that the intuitive, inner voice first arises with Christianity. As we shall see, something very similar already existed in Greek philosophy, although its relationship to rationality was very different than the inner voice of the Judeo-Christian religions, as will be shown by comparing the story of the trail of Socrates with the story of God's call to Abraham. The command of God within the Judeo-Christian tradition was decoupled from reason. In contrast, Greek thought – while accepting the inner voice – committed it to critical examination by the use of reason: 'When a visitation of the daimonion occurs ... Socrates knew that X is a command from the infinitely wise god' (Vlastos, 1991: 285, original emphasis), but such a command did not lead to blind action. Rather, it caused Socrates to stop and reflect, searching for a meaning that would satisfy not only a transcendent, intuitive calling but also the slowly evolving structure of the mind as a rational order, avoiding inconsistencies. Vlastos compares the reaction of Socrates to God's command with Abraham's reaction to the structurally identical Old Testament story of Abraham's sacrifice of his son Isaac. Here Abraham is commanded: 'Take thou thy son... and offer him as a burnt offering' (Vlastos, 1991: 285). According to the story, Abraham would have indeed sacrificed his son had the angle of god not stopped him. Socrates, however, would use a different method: he would stop himself, stop action and begin reflection. The difference is that Abraham 'could have taken, and did take, the surface content of the sign he got from God as its real meaning'. Socrates, being a philosopher, could not do that. A calling to philosophy was different from a religious calling, since it was rationally oriented. Socrates' notion of ethics was both intuitive and rational. He conducted himself according to 'examination' of his own life: that is, through conscious deliberation and reflection. However, Socrates knew – in accordance with his rational life – that his own conception of rationality was limited in 382 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) relation to knowledge and rationality as such, which was the realm of truth that he experienced intuitively as the voice of God, or his daemon – and that he therefore should be open to this voice. Socrates and the concept of moral duty In order to explain the case of Socrates, Durkheim – in his reply to objections made to his 1906 lecture on 'The Determination of Moral Facts' – argues that Socrates 'was ahead of his time while at the same time expressing its spirit' (Durkheim, 1953: 65). However, in The Evolution of Educational Thought, Socrates is treated primarily as the first philosopher to turn reflection towards the mind itself (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 281), without discussing the implication of this in relation to Greek morality and the understanding of duty. Socrates' notion of duty combines the command of a spiritual authority with the command of reason. In The Apologia, Socrates thus makes it quite clear that a divine power commands his actions. He feels that he cannot evade this command. Interpreters have connected this fact with the fact that Socrates refused to escape prison. Thus, Hadot argues that Socrates 'prefers death and danger to renouncing his duty and his mission' (2002: 35). Here we are dealing with two notions of 'duty': the sense of duty related to the laws of the city; and the sense of duty that derives from a higher, spiritual realm. These two types of duties are related but not identical. Contrary to Durkheim's statement, the Greek understanding of duty at the time of Socrates was in no way obscure. In its most elementary form, it was connected to the polis and its laws – which again were related to religion. Within the polis, everyone was expected to fulfil his duties. Among other things, Socrates was prosecuted for offending the gods and breaking the laws of the city. Therefore, Socrates also defends himself by arguing that he was doing his duty as a soldier, where he felt bound to the post he was assigned by the call of duty. There is a comparison between how he acted as a soldier and how he acts as a philosopher; later 'god gave me a station', Socrates argues, with 'orders to spend my life in philosophy [τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ τάττοντος (...) φιλοσοφοῦντά με δεῖν ζῆν ...]' (Plato, The Apologia, 28e).35 Socrates is bound in his call to philosophy, unable to leave his post. Not only does Socrates feel that he must submit himself to the powers of the laws of the city and those of the divine calling, he feels bound to find a consistency within his life, between his actions and thoughts: 'You will find that throughout my life, I have been consistent in any public duties that I have performed and the same also in my personal dealings' (Plato, The Apologia, 33a). I interpret this demand for consistency as indicative of Plato's understanding of unity of the soul.36 This notion of duty – the duty to act as a unity – finds many later expressions. In its most extreme form we can point to Durkheim's contemporary, Jean-Marie Guyau, who argues that 'morality is nothing but the unity of being. Immorality, on the contrary, is a splitting up [un dédoublement], an opposition of the different faculties which limit one another' (1905: 109, my translation). Guyau here expresses in precise form the problem of Greek morality and duty. To do one's duty required that one act as a united whole. This Bjerre 383 unity could only be achieved through rational reflection and required knowledge of the laws and customs of society, as well as sometimes even the will of a spiritual calling. This discussion shows why Greek philosophy, in contrast to Durkheim's understanding, contains more than just a moral philosophy, but it is a moral philosophy before anything else. Greek philosophy is occupied with reason because it demands that reason should guide action – while knowing all the corners of the human soul. Socrates stands as a great transitional figure in the development of a universalistic philosophical notion of duty because he developed the philosophical attempt to form the rules for acting in accordance with reason while navigating between the different – often contradictory – callings from within (the different parts of the soul) and from without (spiritual beings and the laws). The amorality of the Greeks I have now assessed Durkheim's principal claims concerning Greek morality. We can conclude that he promotes a stereotyped distinction between a hedonistic, ego-centred Greek philosophy, on the one hand, and an ascetic, altruistic religion of Christianity, on the other. He makes this distinction explicit, though indirectly en passant, while speculating upon the motives of the Renaissance humanists who engaged themselves in readings of the Greek texts. While Durkheim defines morality as oriented towards patriotism, love of humanity, feeling of duty or some 'generous enthusiasm', he asks rhetorically whether the motives of the humanists were moral, answering bluntly: Absolutely not. Their motive was an entirely pagan one, one which had been all-powerful in classical culture but which was wholly amoral and whose overwhelming influence Christianity consequently strove to diminish: for them, the supreme goal was to possess a name which was upon everybody's lips [c'est le gout de la renomée, c'est l'amour de la gloire. Leur but supreme, c'est d'avoir un nom qui coure sur les lèvres des hommes]. (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 210–211) Though it is true that the Greeks in the heroic age focused on this type of immortality of the name, it is not exactly historically correct to interpret this as amoral. As a sociological term, 'morality' denotes following rules and adhering to a social group, and thus acting altruistically. Adherence to the group may imply the sacrifice of one's own life, gratification or happiness for the common good. Viewed from this perspective, the Greek motive for gaining reputation was as much a matter of following the societal nomos of a warrior society as an egotistically motivated striving towards personal gratification. Just as when we arrive at the philosophical age, as Karabatzaki-Perdiki accounts, the 'fear of gaining bad reputation' seems to have played a role, both this fear of a bad reputation and the goal of immortality of the name have to do with the 'consensual conformity to established laws' (KarabatzakiPerdiki, 1988: 126 n. 31); and with the individual effort of conforming to the ideals of society. To judge such ideals as amoral just because they don't conform to the 384 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) conformity of one's own morality is a normative judgement rather than a sociological claim. The institutional question: The Greek school Let us conclude with Durkheim's final claim: that Greek culture did not have proper schools. As Durkheim argues: 'It had teachers but it did not have schools' (1977 [1938]: 31). Since, as already mentioned, the Greek paideia does not meet the modern ideas of school, it may therefore be asserted that the Greeks had no schools in the modern sense. As we shall see, however, this interpretation is somewhat of an overstatement of the facts. The Spartan educational system focused on competences rather than literary skills.36 It corresponded to the earliest forms of education in Athens, which emphasized the transmission of skills in farming and other trades. With the adoption of the Phoenician writing system about 900–800 bc, however, Greek educational practices altered. Education came to focus on the learning of letters (grammata). The earliest account of a 'school' is found in Herodotus, who reports from Chios en passant of children (paides) learning the letters (grammata) (Joyal et al., 2009: 13–14). There exist several approaches to the study of Greek education: the classical approach of Marrou focuses on the development of the state-sponsored schools, centred on the role of teacher, such as the paidotribes, the grammatistes and the sophist.37 The first Greek school was a primary school aimed at reading and writing, taught by the grammatistes. It began as a form of private elite education but during the fifth century became public. A system of education developed that remained relative stable within the whole Hellenistic period, when the primary school was followed by a secondary school (12–16 years) and the so-called 'rhetor school'. Laura Ward has argued that Marrou's focus downplayed 'other Greek practices with educational effects', since 'the public display of laws, participation in rites of initiation, and symposia are largely left unexplored'; and that both Marrou and other historians tend to 'provide a picture of Athenian education that excludes many of the practices that inculcated a sense of democratic and civic values in Athenian youth' (Ward, 2011: 17, 24). With the development of democracy, the learning of letters became more and more central, since democracy required that male citizens play a role in the Assembly (Marrou, 1956: 39; cf. Ward 2011: 18). The Sophist movement developed around the Assembly in Athens, aiming at 'training men in the use of language' (Joyal et al., 2009: 46). One of the striking aspects concerning the physical environment of Greek education was that it was conducted around a large sports arena (Nielsen, 1993), such as the palaistra and the gymnasion. These venues were often – publicly owned – prestigious buildings (Nielsen, 1993: 79). The primacy of the physical aspect was related to the fact that education here, as in Sparta, was a part of military training. Both the curriculum and the architectural organization of the gymnasion were transformed as more focus was placed on intellectual development; thus, the library moved into the gymnasion (Nielsen, 1993: 79ff.). As an institution, the gymnasion played a central role in the spread of Greek culture and philosophy within the Roman world. However, their curriculum gradually changed. The physical and musical parts of the education was lost, if not directly related to military Bjerre 385 training; and the focus became the intellectual education in philosophy, literature and rhetoric. The Roman Senate, however, on several occasions prohibited the teaching of Greek philosophy (Nielsen, 1993: 83). Durkheim's claim that the Greeks had teachers but no school is supported by Marrou's focus on the role of the teacher and by Ward's argument that other informal arenas were central in Greek education. In Durkheim's view, the philosophical schools were more part of an intellectual market than a formally organized school system. Though this may be viewed as a somewhat reductive claim, it captures the fact that in Greece, the content of the teaching was more pluralistic and less systematic than the Christian schools. The Greek educational effort did not seek, as did the Christian schools, to create an environment where the student could escape the profane world outside for a period of time. The Greek educational milieu was wholly unlike Durkheim's reference to the convict and the monastic institutions. Yet the fact that Durkheim may be correct in his assessment of the plurality of educational forms in Greece only supports our general claim: that the central innovation of Christianity was the systematization and organization of moral education and not the invention of the 'inner voice' as such. Conclusion The aim of this article is not to argue that The Evolution of Educational Thought should no longer be read as one of the most stimulating sociological books on education. Rather, we have argued that in order to appreciate it most productively, a more critical reading is necessary. Sociologists need to cease citing Durkheim as an authority on moral education in the classical world inasmuch as so many of Durkheim's claims, as demonstrated here, promote a false image of Greek morality and education. We have shown that Durkheim's claim that Greek philosophy and Christianity should be held as two distinct civilizations neglects the fact that Christianity was the product of the Hellenistic world. Durkheim makes several wrong claims in order to support his methodological strategy. First, he argues that Greeks were ignorant about the idea of conversion; this makes no sense in light of the evidence that the notion of conversion is central to the educational thought of Plato and many of the philosophical schools. Second, Durkheim's claim that the Greeks viewed the mind and man himself as profane and of little value also makes no sense, since the notion of the divinity of the soul, based on a separation of the soul and the body, was common within the philosophical schools. Third, Durkheim's assertions about duty, altruism and spiritual authority being absent in Greek philosophy are less concretely assessed, since it is correct that the notion of duty as Pflicht is a modern phenomenon. Nevertheless, in antiquity, the notion of duty develops from the experience of a spiritual reality being in conflict with the desires of the body; thus the motive of following the command of spiritual reality and performing acts of askesis was well known. Fourth, Durkheim's argument that the Greeks viewed education as a process of acquiring unrelated habitudes, without having a notion of a moral habitus, ignores the whole tradition of Greek paideia – that is, the search for a harmonious whole within the student – a tradition attested by the writings of Plato, Aristotle and Isocrates, among others. 386 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) While the claims concerning Greek moral education have been rejected, it is difficult to make an unambiguous conclusion regarding Durkheim's claim that the Greeks had teachers but no school. None of the evidence reviewed here contradicts Durkheim's overall claim that education within the Christian schools took on a structurally different form than the schools of the classical world. The school of the Middle Ages established environments of its own, set apart from the profane world outside. However, it is an exaggeration to say that there were no schools in the classical world. Taken together, the false claims or exaggerations provide a stereotyped – if not false – image of the Greeks as intellectual giants but moral dwarfs. It is this image that is used to bolster Durkheim's argument that the inward moral orientation of Western individualism originated in Christian religion. Contrary to Durkheim's argument, we have shown that the appeal of Christianity lay not in the novelty of inner self, but in its ability to popularize philosophy and systematize and organize a form of living in accordance with its principles. Since Durkheim uses the distinction between classical philosophy and Christianity as the structuring principle of the institutional analysis of The Evolution of Educational Thought, this may have further consequences for assessing his work. This is certainly a question for further research. It may be argued, as Anne Warfield Rawls has done, that '[t]here is a certain arrogance involved in reading a classical text and assuming that the reader is able to see contradictions that the writer overlooked' (Rawls, 2004: 22 n. 27). However, we only show due respect to a critical thinker by examining his or her work critically. It is through the critical analysis that we can fully appreciate the qualities of The Evolution of Educational Thought, a work that for many reasons deserves such a treatment. The value of the book lies, among other things, in its general method of studying educational institutions; its view on the aim of education and the curriculum of the future, a view that remains relevant to modern education; and its exposition of Durkheim's views on the role of secondary education, the relationship between theory and practice, his views on the need of a new kind of rationalism and its insights into the structure of the modern mind. This makes his work most relevant to contemporary debates on the education of teachers as well as on the curriculum and role of the school in modern society. This article is also a commentary on McCarthy's statement that the term classical – in classical social theory – must refer to its more remote origins in classical Greece, as well as the founding fathers in the nineteenth century. If we are to accept this statement, we must also acknowledge that Durkheim's relation to the classical thinkers was of a dual nature: as a philosophical and moral thinker, Durkheim stands clearly within the tradition of the Greek philosophers. However, as we have seen, Durkheim himself does not acknowledge this. Using the terms expounded earlier in this article, we may conclude that while he acknowledges a continuity of naming between classical philosophy and his own sociology, he – contrary to McCarthy's argument – refuses to acknowledge a continuity of explaining. He refuses to acknowledge the influence of classical philosophy on his own thought. More research should be done on this question. Why indeed does Durkheim so persistently distance himself from classical philosophy? As we have seen, Karabatzaki-Perdiki goes too far in claiming that his theories should be attributed the Bjerre 387 same epistemological status as Plato's ideal models. The facts do not support such a conclusion because the entire scientific foundation of method and reflection found in Durkheim's sociology was (for good reason) non-existent in Plato's work. Durkheim's own understanding of his work, as well as the most common view within modern sociology, is that since his own work had a scientific basis, which philosophy did not have, there exists no significant continuity of explaining. We have thus raised several questions for further study into Durkheim's intellectual formation and the intellectual context within which he was working and teaching. Further study can help us understand a central question: how could such a brilliant thinker, so well schooled in Greek thought, have overlooked the moral, individualistic and conversion-centred aspects of Greek philosophy? Notes 1. In the following I will focus on Bellah (1973); Challenger (1994); Karabatzaki-Perdiki (1988); McCarthy (2003); and Meštrović (1982). 2. The Evolution of Educational Thought. Lectures on the Formation and Development of Secondary Education in France is the English translation of the courses L'évolution pédagogique en France. The lectures were delivered from 1904 to 1913 (Lukes, 1985: 379) and published posthumously, with an introduction by M. Halbwachs, 1938; translated by P. Collins in 1977. 3. In the second preface (from 1901) to Les règles de la méthode sociologique, where sociology is defined, Durkheim expresses the importance of the question of origin by arguing that sociology is 'la science des institutions, de leur genèse et de leur fonctionnement', the science of institutions, their origin and functioning (Durkheim, 1988 [1894]: 15). 4. Sociologists such as Michel Foucault, Nikolas Rose, David Riesman and Anthony Giddens, among others, have described the importance of this reflection of the self on itself in their accounts of the development of modern morality. 5. This interpretation of Parsons, as argued by Fish (2004), neglects the element of human emotion in Parsons' early main work. 6. In this reference, I will overlook the insinuation made by Karabatzaki-Perdiki that Durkheim's motive was that he was 'a Jew'. Interestingly enough, however, Durkheim himself uses the same type of argument in relation to Montaigne, who 'stands oddly amongst his contemporaries ... (which derives perhaps from his Jewish origins)' (1977 [1938]: 289). 7. Later on, Parsons alters his view on Ancient Greece and its relevance for Occidental culture, while also discussing the role of Ancient Judaism in the development of Occidental individualism. 8. In his thoughts on the crises and a new educational model, Franck Giol thus cites Durkheim's argument that the concern of education is 'un «changement d'habitus» que l'École avait pour objectif de faire advenir chez l'élève', while using Durkheim's argument that within the education of secular modernity, it is 'l'histoire de la pédagogie elle-même qui doit être considérée comme un processus de sécularisation d'un même projet de «conversion lente»' (Giol, 2010: 5). 9. In relation to this question, Anne Warfield Rawls has argued that while Durkheim seeks to solve the same problems as the philosophers, he does it in quite another way, emphasizing a scientific method. The consequence is that Durkheim studies philosophy as a social fact, just like he studies other social facts such as religion. Durkheim, she argues, views philosophers such as Plato and Kant as naming, rather than explaining, what they describe (Rawls, 2004: 99). In a critical response, Susan Stedman Jones has argued against Rawls' interpretation, that Durkheim does not simply treat philosophy 'as a 'folk narrative'. Rather, Stedman Jones 388 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) argues, Durkheim should be viewed as 'running with a torch handed to him by Kant and Renouvier' (2006: 39). 10. Historians have argued that although the Greeks used the word 'scientific', it differed so radically from modern science that 'two different concepts are needed; Greek "science" should perhaps be designated as scientia' (Cochrane, 1957: 148). 11. Durkheim's exact use of concepts such as 'antiquity', 'the writings of the ancients', 'classical civilization' and 'Greek thought' are somewhat imprecise. Generally, he uses the concept of antiquity to denote the pre-Christian era of Greek and Latin civilization. 12. Since Christianity emerges within Jewish society, it is rather strange that Durkheim may argue that Christianity 'stands at the origin' (1977 [1938]: 18) of any institution, without considering the fact that early Christianity was a Jewish phenomenon. 13. According to Karabatzaki-Perdiki, Durkheim argues that Plato was unknown in the Middle Ages, while only Aristotle was known (Durkheim, 1977 [1938]: 164). This may be a 'slip of the mind', says Karabatzaki-Perdiki (1992: 45), but it nevertheless reflects the general bias towards Aristotle found in much of Durkheim's work. Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that Durkheim was more critical towards Plato than towards Aristotle, whom he treated with more respect (1992: 42). In opposition to Durkheim, Karabatzaki-Perdiki argues that both Aristotle and Durkheim owe much more to Plato than is acknowledged in Durkheim's work (1992: 41, 43). 14. Durkheim speaks of 'la personnalité dans ce qui fait son unité fundamental ... un état profond' (1990 [1938]: 37). 15. 'Le christianisme consiste essentiellement dans une certaine attitude de l'âme, dans un certain habitus de notre être moral' (Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 37). 16. 'C'est là ce qui explique l'apperation d'une idée que l'Antiquité a totalement ignorée et qui, au contraire, a joué dans le christianisme un rôle considerable : c'est l'idée de conversion' (Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 37). 17. 'C'est un mouvement profond par lequel l'âme tout entière, se tournant das une direction toute nouvelle, change de position, d'assiette et modifie, par suite, son point de vue sur le monde' (Durkheim, 1938 [1938]: 37). 18. 'La principale, celle qui peut être considérée comme la caractéristique de cette nouvelle éthique, qui est devenue la nôtre, c'est l'idée de devoir. Les moralistes de la Grèce et de Rome l'avaient ignorée, ou, en tout cas, en avaient un sentiment bien obscur et bien faible; car, ni en latin, ni en grec, il n'existe de mot qui rende l'idée de devoir, ni d'expression qui en tienne lieu. Ils concevaient la morale non sous la forme d'une loi impérative qui commande' (Durkheim, 1990 [1938]: 242). 19. In Moral Education, Durkheim thus argues that morality is 'a system of commandments', and that 'at the root of the moral life there is, besides the preference for regularity, the notion of moral authority' (Durkheim, 1961: 31). Lussier sums up Durkheim's understanding of morality in the following way: '... a moral action implies obeying a rule that commands (a) simply because it commands; (b) because there is respect for it; (c) because it appears to be worthy of respect' (2002: 40). That which one respects solely because it is worthy of respect is in Durkheim's terminology that which is sacred (2002: 43). 20. These lectures were given in 1890, 1900, 1904 and 1912. 21. This may be viewed as a Western conceit, since it may be argued that there have existed other rational traditions and scientific traditions that predate the Greeks. 22. 'In our Western world,' Durkheim writes in The Elementary Forms, 'only with the great thinkers of Greece did logical life for the first time become clearly conscious of itself' (1995 [1912]: 438). 23. According to Fustel de Coulanges, Socrates and the Sophist movement stand out as a turning point in Greek religion, ethics and notions of duty. Since Socrates, we have 'separated morals from religion'; before Socrates, Bjerre 389 ... men never thought of a duty except as a command of the ancient gods. He showed that the principle of duty is in the human mind. In all this, whether he wished it or not, he made war upon the city worship. ... He founded a new religion, which was the opposite of the city religion ... the revolution which the Sophists had commenced, and which Socrates had taken up with more moderation, was not stopped by the death of the old man. Greek society was enfranchised more and more, daily, from the empire of old beliefs and old institutions. (Fustel de Coulanges, 2001 [1864]: 306-307) Plato proclaims, with Socrates and the Sophists, that the moral and political guide lies within ourselves; that tradition is nothing, that reason must be consulted, and that laws are just only when they conform to human nature (Fustel de Coulanges, 2001: 307). 24. Christianity developed a notion of God that was not restricted to a single people, but universal for all men. 25. Thus Tertullian, in a familiar outburst, was to ask: 'What has Athens to do with Jerusalem, the Academy with the Church? ... We have no need for curiosity since Jesus Christ, nor for inquiry since the Evangel.' 'Tell me', he adds, 'what is the sense of this itch for idle speculation? What does it prove, this useless affectation of a fastidious curiosity, notwithstanding the strong confidence of its assertions?' (Cochrane, 1957: 223) 26. The idea that the innovation of Christianity lay first and foremost in its power of social transformation accords with a view of Christianity from the outside by contemporary observers. Hence, Pliny 'understood Christianity as a "political association" to be forbidden as a possible threat to the legitimate power of the state' (Martin, 1987: 125). Durkheim acknowledges this fact himself, arguing that 'Christianity was supremely the religion ... of the humble ..., of the poor whose poverty was both material and cultural' (1977 [1938]: 21). Burkert has argued that the central point in the development of Christianity was that it asked only 'faith' of its converts, rather than material operations according to traditional prescriptions, the adherence to a specific political unity (the polis) or the acquiring of certain knowledge, as did other Greek philosophies. This Christian concern for the poor, combined with the 'inclusion of the family as the basic unit of piety', Burkert argues, and the economic cooperation of the Christian ekklesia, was 'quite uncommon in pagan religion' (1987: 51). 27. Paideia meant education, not only of an intellectual kind, but of the body (γυμναστική) as well as music (μουσική). Not only music, but also every other activity that was related to the Muses. 28. While it is true, as Jaeger states, that the Greek ekklesia was originally related to the assembly of the Greek polis, it is questionable whether this meant that 'the ideals of the political philosophy of the ancient Greek city-state', as Jaeger argues, 'entered the discussion of the new Christian type of community, now called a church' (1961: 15). Burkert argues that while the concept of polis is adapted by Christianity, the Christian concept of ekklesia 'had no equivalent in pagan religion', since it required a different level of involvement, economic cooperation and 'the inclusion of family as the basic unit of piety. ... To educate the children in the fear of God suddenly became the supreme duty ... the ekklesia became a self-reproducing type of community that could not be stopped' (1987: 51–52). 29. Plato also uses the notion of ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ in 436b of The Republic. 30. Without discussing the difference between the prefix 'μετα' and 'epi', A.D. Nock relates the notion of conversion found in The Republic (518d) to the Christian concept of epistrophe, as do other scholars, such as Michel Foucault in his study of Greek ethics. Foucault writes that 'the theme of the epistrophē is a typically Platonic one' (1994: 96). 390 Journal of Classical Sociology 13(3) 31. An example of this type of conversion is the story of Polemo, the third leader of the Academy after Plato and Xenocrates: '... after a night of debauchery, Polemo entered Xenocrates' school one morning on a dare with a band of drunken comrades. Seduced by the master's discourse, Polemo decided to become a philosopher' (Hadot, 2002: 98). 32. Hadot emphasizes the inward, holistic nature of the philosophical life, arguing that this orientation towards the soul had even more ancient roots. The Greeks had known since the time of Homer and Hesiod that it is possible to modify people's decisions and inner dispositions by the careful choice of persuasive words; and in the time of the Sophists, the rules of the art of rhetoric were constituted in accordance with this tradition. Like spiritual exercises by which an individual tried to influence and modify himself, philosophical spiritual guidance utilized rhetorical techniques in order to provoke conversion and bring about conviction. (2002: 217) 33. According to Vlastos, this notion is Pythagorean and Platonic rather than Socratic. 'For Socrates our soul is our self.' The whole notion of an independent soul lost in the human body aiming at returning home is strictly a Pythagorean idea (Vlastos, 1991: 55f.). 34. According to Burkert, the 'concern for a perfect knowledge of being' was related to the question of 'being sure of its object and at the same time care for the soul' (1985: 322). 35. A later translation reads: '"God appointed me", Socrates argues, "as I supposed and believed, to the duty of leading the philosophic life, examining myself and others"' (Plato, 1993). 36. The educational systems of Sparta and Athens reflected two different social systems. The Spartan educational system focused on the education of the male child, while also educating females. Education of boys was aimed primarily at inculcating the right spirit of toughness in order to raise the boy as a professional soldier. However, it also included training in social skills and organization (Marrou, 1956: 14). Not much value was placed on literacy, unless for practical use (Joyal et al., 2009: 27). And it may be argued that rather than dealing with education, we are dealing with an 'initiation into society' (Joyal et al., 2009: 16). 37. 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