volume	19,	no.	34 august	2019 Two Feelings in the Beautiful: Kant on the Structure of Judgments of Beauty Janum Sethi University of Michigan, Ann Arbor © 2019 Janum	Sethi This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019034/> I n	§9	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	Kant	raises	a	question	that	he	flags	as	the	"key	to	the	critique	of	taste".	He	has	already	argued	that	a	judgment	of	beauty	has	an	essential	relation	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure; the	key	question	in	§9 is	whether	"the	feeling	of	pleasure	[das Gefühl der Lust]	precedes	the	judging	of	the	[beautiful]	object	or	the	latter	precedes	the	former"	(5:216).	In	response,	Kant	immediately	rules out	the	former	answer	and	appears	to	commit	himself	to	the	following thesis: JUDGMENT GROUNDS FEELING	(J→F):	A	judgment	of beauty	must	ground	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	a	beautiful object.1 Kant's	reasons	for	asserting	J→F	are	as	follows:	If,	on	the	contrary,	the judgment	of	beauty	were	grounded	in	a	feeling	of	pleasure,	then,	according to	him, it	could	only	amount to	a report	of	one's	subjective liking	for	the	beautiful	object.2	But	a	criterial	feature	of	a	judgment	of beauty,	on	Kant's	view,	is	that	it	is	not	merely	an	expression	of	one's subjective	preference.	Rather,	a	judgment	of	beauty	makes	a	claim	to "universal validity": it claims, that is, that it is correct to	-	or, equivalently,	that	everyone	ought to	-	find	the	judged	object	beautiful.	This	is possible,	Kant	argues,	only	if	the	pleasure	is	a	consequence	of	judging. Unfortunately, J→F immediately	raises	a	problem.	For it is in tension	with	another	thesis	that	Kant	appears	equally	committed	to: FEELING GROUNDS JUDGMENT	(F→J):	A	judgment	of beauty	is	aesthetic,	that	is,	grounded	in	feeling.3 1. I	will	leave	the	sense	of	'ground'	here	ambiguous	for	now,	since	in	order	to further	specify	it,	one	must	commit	oneself	to	a	particular	interpretation	of the	relation	between	the	judgment	of	beauty	and	the	feeling	of	pleasure. 2. "If	the	pleasure	in	the	given	object	came	first,	and	only	its	universal	communicability	were	to	be	attributed	in	the	judgment	of	taste	to	the	representation of the	object, then such	a	procedure	would	be self-contradictory.	For such a	pleasure	would	be	none	other	than	mere	agreeableness	in	sensation,	and hence	by	its	very	nature	could	have	only	private	validity	..."	(5:217). 3. E.g.:	"The	judgment	is	also	called	aesthetic	precisely	because	its	determining ground	is	not	a	concept	but	[a]	feeling	..."	(5:228). janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) feeling	of	pleasure.	As	I	will	explain,	my	view	can	avoid	this	troubling consequence. 1 Accounts of §9 1.1 Guyer's Two-Act View (J1→F → J2) In	Kant and the Claims of Taste,	Paul	Guyer	attempts	to	solve	the	puzzle of	§9	by	claiming that the judgment	of	beauty involves two	distinct acts	of judgment (Guyer,	Claims of Taste, esp.	97–9). In the	first, the subject	submits	the	object	to	her	"estimation"	by	engaging	in	an	act of	"simple	reflection".	If	the	object	is	beautiful,	this	first	act	of	judging gives	rise	to	what	Kant	calls	the	"harmony	of	the	faculties":	the	agreement	between	the	cognitive	faculties	of	imagination	and	understanding	that,	on	Kant's	view, is	tied	to	the	distinctive	pleasure	felt in	the beautiful.	The	feeling	of	pleasure	caused	by	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	then	followed	by	a	second	judgment	-	which	Guyer	considers the	judgment	of	beauty	proper	-	during	which	the	subject	examines the	source	of	her	pleasure	and,	determining	it	to	be	the	harmony	of her	faculties,	judges	it	to	be	universally	valid.	On	Guyer's	view,	then, the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	consequent	on	a	first,	general act	of judging (J1→F); this	pleasure then	serves	as the	object	of the judgment	of	beauty	proper	that	claims	its	universal	validity	(F→J2). Unfortunately, however, §9	makes clear that pleasure	must be a consequence	of	the	judgment of beauty	itself	and	not	some	prior	act	of judging	(5:217).	Guyer	concedes	this,	but	suggests	that	Kant	is	being sloppy	here	by	allowing	a	previously	held	aesthetic	view	-	on	which aesthetic	response	is	tied	to	social	communicability	-	to	creep	into	a mature view	with which that characterization is inconsistent (Ibid., 139–40).	As	many	commentators	have	noted,	however,	it	is	rather	uncharitable	to	attribute	such	an	error	to	Kant	especially	in	the	very	section	that	he	describes	as	"key	to	the	critique	of	taste"	and	"worthy	of full	attention"	(5:216). The judgment 'X is	beautiful',	according to	Kant, is	essentially	different from	a	cognitive judgment like 'X is	a triangle'.	Whereas the latter judgment	relies	on	a	conceptual rule	by	which	one	can	pick	out instances	of	triangles,	the	former	is	aesthetic	-	that	is,	it	is	made	not in	accordance	with	rules	that	specify	what	counts	as	a	beautiful	object, but	rather	on	the	basis	of	the	subject's	feeling.	Properly	translated,	then, the	judgment	'X	is	beautiful'	claims	that	the	feeling	that	the	beautiful object	gives	rise	to	in	the	subject	is	universally	valid. The	puzzle	of	§9	has	to	do	with	reconciling J→F	and	F→J.	A	successful account	of the structure	of	Kant's judgments	of	beauty	must explain,	in	other	words,	how	the	subject's	feeling	of	pleasure	in	a	beautiful	object	could	be	grounded	in,	and	therefore	consequent	on,	her judging,	even	though	Kant	makes	clear	that	she	judges	on	the	basis	of her	feeling	in	the	beautiful. Resolving	this	puzzle	has	been	a	central	goal	for	commentators	in the	last	few	decades	of	work	on	the	Critique of Judgment.	Most	attempts at a solution, however, have required ignoring or	modifying significant	portions	of	Kant's	text.	In	this	paper,	I	will	propose	an	interpretation	that	avoids	these	extreme	measures.	As	I	will	discuss,	Kant's	text indicates	that	he	posits	two	distinct	feelings	in	the	beautiful:	the	first, the	ground	of	judgments	of	beauty	(F1→J);	the	second,	the	feeling	of pleasure	consequent	on	judging	(J→F2).	As	such,	the	two	theses	above are	consistent. In	§1,	I	briefly	rehearse	and	criticize	two	prominent	attempts	to	respond	to	the	puzzle	of	§9.	In	doing	so,	I	hope	to	motivate	the	alternative	account	of	the	structure	of	judgments	of	beauty	that	I	develop	and defend	in	§2.	Finally,	in	§3,	I	argue	that	a	virtue	of	my	account	is	that it	can	help	to	resolve	another	notorious	problem	that	arises	for	Kant's "Deduction"	of	judgments	of	beauty.	Kant	argues	in	the	Deduction	that we are entitled to claim universal validity for judgments of beauty because	they	are	grounded	in	a	state	that	is	a	necessary	condition	of judgment in general. Interpreters have worried that this attempted deduction	has	the	consequence	that	all judgments	must involve	the janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) what	goes	on	when	we	judge	an	object	to	be	beautiful"	(Ibid.,	34).	The suggestion that	an	experience	of	beauty	consists in	being in	a state that	reflexively	approves	of	itself	but	is	otherwise	empty	of	content	is odd,	to	say	the	least.	Adding	to	the	implausibility is	the	fact	that	being	in	the	state	in	question	appears	to	set	the	subject	off	on	a	fruitless regress	-	one	in	which	the	state	she	judges	to	be	universally	valid	is just	the	state	of	judging	to	be	universally	valid	the	state	of	judging	to be	universally	valid...	and	so	on. It	must also be noted that	-	notwithstanding its ability to reconcile the	problematic theses in	§9	-	Ginsborg's	view	bears	an	uneasy relationship to Kant's text. For one, if Kant's view really is that the judgment	of	beauty	consists	in	only	one	act	of	pleasurable	judgment, it	is	strange	that	he	should	say	that	the	"key"	question	of	his	account concerns	whether	"the	feeling	of	pleasure	precedes	the	judging	...	or the	latter	precedes	the	former"	and	seemingly	affirm	the	latter	option (5:216).5 Finally, the austerity of Ginsborg's account of the mental state that	grounds	the	judgment	of	beauty is in	tension	with	Kant's	many 5. These	particular	worries	do	not	arise	for	the	one-act	view	that	Rachel	Zuckert argues for in	Kant on Beauty and Biology, since she	disagrees	with	Ginsborg	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	is	identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure.	On Zuckert's	view,	J→F	correctly	expresses	Kant's	thesis	that	aesthetic	judging	is "transcendentally	prior"	(310)	to	-	that	is,	is	a	necessary	condition	for	the	possibility	of	-	aesthetic	pleasure	in	the	beautiful.	As	for	the	passages	that	suggest	that	feeling	precedes	the	judgment	of	beauty,	Zuckert	argues	that	these are	merely	meant	to	pick	out	an	"order	in	knowledge"	(330)	-	viz.,	that	it	is in	virtue	of	being	conscious	of	her	aesthetic	pleasure that the subject	first expresses	her	experience	of	the	object	as	beautiful.	The	problem	with	Zuckert's	reading,	however,	is	that	it	cannot	do	justice	to	F→J:	as	I	have	discussed, Kant	makes	clear	that	it	is	not	merely	the	case	that	judgments	of	beauty	are expressed	through	feeling,	but	rather	that	the	determining ground	of	such	judgments	-	that	is,	the	basis	on	which	they	are	made	-	is	itself	a	feeling.	Zuckert's	view	conflicts	with	this	central	claim;	indeed,	she	is	forced	to	conclude that these	assertions	of	Kant's	are "mischaracterizations	of the	structure	of aesthetic	judging"	(330).	On	my	view,	F→J	is	as	central	to	Kant's	view	as	J→F; in fact,	he	treats the former	as	definitional	of their	status	as	aesthetic judgments	(5:228).	As	such,	I	think	Ginsborg	is	right	to	argue	that	a	one-act	view can	do	justice	to	both	J→F	and	F→J	only	if	it	identifies	the	judgment	of	beauty and	the	pleasure. 1.2 Ginsborg's One-Act View (J↔F) In	"On	the	Key	to	Kant's	Critique	of	Taste",4	Hannah	Ginsborg	rejects Guyer's	two-act	view	of	judgments	of	beauty	and	attempts	instead	to take	Kant's	claims	in	§9	at	face	value.	In	order	to	reconcile	the	theses J→F	and	F→J,	she	suggests	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	is	identical	with the	feeling	of	pleasure	(J↔F).	On	her	"one-act"	view,	to	make	a	judgment	of	beauty	is	to	be	in	a	mental	state	that	reflexively	claims	its	own universal	validity	and	is	"manifest	to	consciousness"	(Ginsborg,	"On the	Key",	41)	through	a	feeling	of	pleasure.	Ginsborg	describes	this	as follows: I	take	my	mental	state	in	perceiving	an	object	to	be	universally	communicable,	where	my	mental	state	is	nothing other	than	the	mental	state	of	performing	that	very	act	of judgment,	that	is,	of	taking	my	mental	state	in	the	object to	be	universally	communicable.	...	The	act	of	self-referentially	taking	my	mental	state	to	be	universally	communicable	with	respect	to	a	given	object	consists,	phenomenologically,	in	a	feeling	of	pleasure	in	that	object	(Ibid., 41). Ginsborg's interpretation succeeds in reconciling the two theses in question	without reading into the	Critique of Judgment two separate acts	of	judging.	If	a	feeling	of	pleasure	is	the	phenomenological	manifestation	of	the	judgment	of	beauty,	then	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	can be	said	to	be	grounded	in	the	judgment	of	beauty	(J→F).	And	since the judging is	phenomenologically	manifest	as	a feeling	of	pleasure, it	counts	as	a	judgment	that	is	aesthetic	and	made	through	pleasure (F→J).	Furthermore,	since	the	pleasurable	state	is	one	that	reflects	on and	claims	its	own	universal	validity,	it	can	be	said	that	the	judgment of	beauty	claims	the	universal	validity	of	the	pleasure. Despite	these	advantages,	the	resulting	proposal	is	-	in	Ginsborg's own words	-	an "unusual and initially counter-intuitive model of 4. In	Ginsborg,	The Normativity of Nature,	32–52. janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) To	accommodate	his view, as	we saw,	Guyer	has to charge	Kant with	extreme	sloppiness	in	§9.	Ginsborg	succeeds	in	absolving	him	of that	charge	only	by	making	much	of	the	discussion	in	that	section	misleading	or	redundant.	She	attempts	to	mitigate	this	by	pointing	to	"differences	between	eighteenth-century	and	twentieth-century	modes	of philosophical	expression"	(Ginsborg,	"On	the	Key",	52),	but	I	think	it is	clear	that	an	interpretation	that	is	able	to	integrate	and	make	sense of	more	of	Kant's	discussion,	if	possible,	is	to	be	preferred.7	In	the	next section,	I	will	propose	such	an	interpretation. 2 Two Feelings in the Beautiful (F1→J→F2) My	goal	in	this	section	is	to	develop	a	view	that	solves	the	puzzle	of	§9 while	incorporating	a	more	robust	conception	of	the	harmony	of	the faculties	that	is	a	central	component	of	Kant's	account. 2.1 The Proposal Let	me	begin	by	noting	that	Kant	states	clearly	that	(1)	the	harmonious free	play	of	the	faculties	is	the	determining	ground	of	the	judgment	of beauty;	and	(2)	this	harmony	can	be	felt	by	the	subject.	At	5:228,	for purposes	to	note	that	Kant	clearly	does	allow	for	such	a	free	harmony	in	the Critique of Judgment. 7. In	Kant's Theory of Taste,	Henry	Allison	follows	Kant's	text	in	assigning	a	significant	role	to	the	harmony	of	the	faculties.	According	to	Allison,	the	faculty of	feeling	is	a	"faculty	of	appraisal"	(69)	through	which	the	subject	senses	her own	mental	state.	On	his	view,	the	subject	is	capable	-	through	her	feeling of	pleasure	or	displeasure	-	of judging "the	capacity	of	a representation to occasion	an	enhancement	or	diminution	of	[her]	cognitive	faculties	in	their cooperative	activity"	(130).	For	Allison,	then,	the	subject	senses	the	harmony of	her	faculties	through	a	feeling	of	pleasure,	and	this	felt	pleasure	grounds the	judgment	of	beauty.	It	is	clear	that	on	his	account,	the	judgment	of	beauty proper	is	based	on	pleasure;	as	such,	it	violates	J→F	and	does	not	provide	a solution to the	puzzle	under	discussion. In	commenting	on the	puzzle,	Allison	says	that	some	version	of	Guyer's	solution	-	"although	it	conflicts	with Kant's	language	in	the	passage	in	question"	-	"seems	called	for	...	and	does provide	a	solution	to	the	...	problem"	(112).	For	reasons	that	will	become	clear in	the	next	section,	I	think	Allison	is	right	to	stress	the	importance	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	but	wrong	to	identify	the	feeling	of	harmony	and	the feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful. descriptions	of	it.	He	characterizes	the	state	as	one	in	which	the	cognitive faculties	of the imagination	and the	understanding	are in	a	harmonious free play.	When	making	an	ordinary	cognitive	judgment,	the imagination	synthesizes	the	manifold	of	intuition	in	a	manner	that	is determined	by	an	appropriate	concept	supplied	by	the	understanding. In this	way, imagination	and	understanding	work together to	generate	an	objective	representation	that	has	both	intuitive	and	conceptual content.	In	the	case	of	beauty,	in	contrast,	the	relation	between	imagination	and	understanding is a "free	play":	on	Kant's	view,	as I	have mentioned,	conceptual	rules	do	not	determine	a	judgment	of	beauty, and	so	the	imagination	synthesizes	freely,	without	direction	by	the	understanding.	But	the	output	of	this	free	synthesis	of	the	imagination	is nevertheless	meant	to	be	in	agreement	with	the	conditions	of	the	understanding;	as	Kant	puts	it,	"the	former	in	its	freedom	is	in	harmony with	the	latter	in	its	lawfulness"	(5:287). The	sensed	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	occurs	in	response	to	representing	a	beautiful	object	is,	on	Kant's	view,	the	fundamental	basis of	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful,	and	as	such,	he	offers	up	many	rich descriptions	of it. For example,	Kant	describes this state in	§9 itself as	one	of the "animation	of	both faculties (the imagination	and the understanding) to an	activity that is indeterminate	but yet, through the	stimulus	of	the	given	representation,	in	unison".	When	she	has	an experience	of	the	beautiful,	he	says,	the	subject	senses	"the	effect	that consists	in	the	facilitated	play	of	both	powers	of	the	mind	(imagination and understanding), enlivened through mutual agreement" (5:219). Ginsborg	must	disregard	these	many	descriptions	of	the	mental	state that	Kant	claims	is	involved	in	making	a	judgment	of	beauty,	since,	on her	view, its	only	content is the reflexive	approval I	have	described above.6 6. Ginsborg recognizes this implication	of	her	view	and	accepts it:	according to her, the possibility of the imagination and understanding harmonizing "freely"	contradicts	Kant's	description	of	their	roles	in	cognition	in	the	Critique of Pure Reason	(Ginsborg,	"On	the	Key",	46,	50).	I	do	not	agree	with	this	criticism,	but	I	will	not	attempt	to	respond	to	it	here.	It	should	be	sufficient	for	our janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) Kant clearly	distinguishes the subject's	awareness	of the	harmony	of her	faculties	from	the	pleasure	that	accompanies	this	awareness: [A]n aesthetic judgment is that whose determining ground	lies	in	a	sensation	[Empfindung]	that	is	immediately connected with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure [mit dem Gefühle der Lust und Unlust unmittelbar verbunden ist]. ...	In	the	aesthetic judgment	of	sense	[i.e., judgments	of the	agreeable] it is that	sensation	which is immediately produced	by	the	empirical	intuition	of	the	object,	in	the aesthetic	judgment	of	reflection	[i.e.,	judgments	of	beauty]	... it is that sensation which the harmonious play of the two faculties of cognition in the power of judgment, imagination and understanding, produces	in	the	subject	insofar	as	in the	given	representation	the	faculty	of	the	apprehension of	the	one	and	the	faculty	of	presentation	of	the	other	are reciprocally expeditious, which relation in such a case produces	through	this	mere	form	a sensation that is the determining ground of a judgment which	for that reason is called aesthetic	and	as	subjective	purposiveness	(without	a	concept)	is	combined with	the	feeling	of	pleasure	(20:224,	my emphases). In	this	passage,	Kant	clearly	distinguishes	two	elements:	the	sensation of the harmonious play	of	the	faculties	-	which	he	identifies	as	the	determining	ground	of	the	judgment	of	beauty	-	and	the feeling of pleasure,	which	he	says	is	combined	with	it. In	fact,	Kant	suggests	in	this	passage	(and	again	at	20:22610)	that	it 10. "The	merely	reflecting	power	of	judgment	...	relates	reflection	immediately only	to	sensation	[Empfindung],	which,	like	all	sensations,	is	always	accompanied with	pleasure	or	displeasure	[mit Lust oder Unlust begleitet ist]	..."	(20:226, my	emphases).	Now,	these	passages	do	not	reappear	in	the	published	Introduction.	But	I	do	not	think	we	need	to	read	this	as	meaning	that	Kant	changed his	mind	about	the	structure	of	aesthetic	judgment	in	the	published	Critique. For	one,	the	First	Introduction	contains	a	number	of	claims	that	do	not	reappear	in	the	(shorter)	published	Introduction	but	have	nevertheless	been	invaluable	for	understanding	the	details	of	Kant's	published	account.	Moreover, example,	he	says:	"The	judgment	[of	beauty] is	also	called	aesthetic precisely	because	its	determining	ground	is	not	a	concept	but	the	feeling	(of	inner	sense)	[das Gefühl (des innern Sinnes)]	of	that	unison	in	the play	of	the	powers	of	the	mind,	insofar	as	they	can	only	be	sensed."8 Now,	despite	their	other	differences,	most	commentators	assume	that "the	feeling	...	of	that	unison"	of	the	faculties	just	is	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful.9	They	assume,	in	other	words,	that	the	harmony of	the	faculties	is	manifest	to	the	subject	through	a	feeling	of	pleasure. Reading	this	commitment	into	§9	gives	rise	to	the	puzzle	that	is	the topic	of	this	paper.	For	after	denying	there	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	precedes	the	judgment	of	beauty,	Kant	continues: [S]	Thus it is the	universal communicability	of the state of mind	in	the	given	representation	which,	as	the	subjective	condition	of	the	judgment	of	taste,	must	serve	as	its ground	and	have	the pleasure in the object as a consequence (5:217,	my	emphases). The	problem	posed	by	sentence	[S]	is	as	follows:	if	the	"state	of	mind" that	is	referred	to	in	this	sentence	as	the	determining ground	of	the	judgment	of	beauty	is	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	and	is	itself	pleasurable (F→J),	how	can	Kant	go	on	to	suggest	that	the	feeling	of	pleasure	occurs	only	as	a	consequence	of	the	judgment	(J→F)? I	want	to	argue	here	that	Kant	does not	in	fact	identify	the	feeling	of the	harmony	of	the	faculties	with	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful.	In	the	following	passage	from	the	First	Introduction,	for	example, 8. Kant	also	refers	to	"a	feeling	of	the	free	play	of	the	powers	of	representation" in	§9	itself	(5:217). 9. This is true	on	both	Guyer's	and	Ginsborg's	views,	as I	have	discussed.	Allison	is	also	explicitly	committed	to	this	claim,	as	mentioned	in	n.	7.	So,	for example,	are	Béatrice	Longuenesse	(whose	view	I	contrast	with	my	own	in	n. 15),	Linda	Palmer	("A	Universality	Not	Based",	26;	29;	36)	and	Melissa	Zinkin ("Pleasure	of	'Mere	Reflection'",	437).	Zuckert	notes	that	Kant	does	not	in	fact identify	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	as	pleasure,	but	concludes that	"it	seems	likely	...	that	it	is"	(Zuckert,	Beauty and Biology,	313n47). janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) ... in what way do we become conscious of a mutual subjective correspondence of the powers of cognition with	each	other in the judgment	of taste	-	aesthetically, through mere inner sense and sensation, or intellectually,	through	the	consciousness	of	our	intentional	activity through	which	we	set	them	in	play?	(5:218) He	answers	that	the	harmonious	relation	between	the	faculties	"can make	itself	known	only	through	sensation	[Empfindung]"	(5:219),	and adds: The	animation	of	both	faculties	(the	imagination	and	the understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate but yet,	through	the	stimulus	of	the	given	representation,	in unison,	namely	that	which	belongs	to	a	cognition	in	general, is the sensation whose	universal	communicability is postulated	by	the	judgment	of	taste	(5:219,	my	emphasis). The	implication	is	clear.	Recall	once	again	that	in	sentence	[S],	Kant claims	that	it	is	the	"universal	communicability	of	the	state	of	mind"	in representing	the	beautiful	object	that	grounds	the	judgment	of	beauty and	has	the	pleasure	as	its	consequence.	In	the	passage	above,	he	says that	the	judgment	of	beauty	"postulates"	-	that	is,	is	made	on	the	basis of	-	the	universal	communicability	of	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of the	faculties.	If	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	distinct from	the	feeling	of	pleasure,	as	I	have	suggested,	this	is	all	perfectly consistent. My	proposal,	then,	is	as	follows:	We	can	solve	the	puzzle	of	§9	once we	allow	that,	for	Kant,	there	are	two	distinct	feelings	involved	in	an aesthetic	judgment	of	the	beautiful.	The	first	is	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	which	is	the	aesthetic	determining	ground	of	the judgment	of	beauty	(F1→J).	The	second	is	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the beautiful,	which	is	its	consequence	(J→F2). 12 12. Guyer briefly considers the possibility of an interpretation like mine, although	without	noting	the	passages	I	cite	here	in	support	of	it	(Guyer,	Claims of Taste, 90).	He immediately rules it out, however, on the grounds that it is	the	case	for	aesthetic	judgments	in general	-	both	judgments	of	the agreeable, which report one's merely subjective pleasure in an object,	as	well	as	judgments	of	beauty	-	that	the	pleasure	they	involve is	combined	with	and	grounded	in	a	sensation	that	is	distinct	from	the pleasure	itself. In	the	case	of	judgments	of	the	agreeable,	Kant	identifies	the	relevant	sensation(s)	as	the	one(s)	produced	by	intuiting	the object	-	the taste sensations, for	example,	caused	by	eating	a	chocolate	that	gives	one	pleasure.11 In	the	case	of	judgments	of	beauty,	he says,	the	relevant	sensation	that	gives	rise	to	pleasure	is	the	sensation of	the	harmony	of	one's	faculties.	This	indicates,	however,	that	just	as taste	sensations	are	distinct	from	and	give	rise	to	the	pleasure	in	eating chocolate,	so	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	distinct from	and	gives	rise	to	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful. Reading	a	distinction	between	the	sensation	of	harmony	and	the feeling	of	pleasure	back	into	§9,	we	can	see	that	there	Kant	explicitly identifies	"the	state	of	mind	in	the	given	representation"	-	which,	in sentence [S]	above,	was	meant to	be the	ground	of the judgment	of beauty	and	have	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	as	a	consequence	-	as	the "feeling	of	the	free	play	of	the	powers	of	representation"	(5:217).	If	the feeling	of	harmony	and	the	feeling	of	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	are	two distinct	feelings,	as	suggested	in	the	passage	above,	there	is	no	longer any	problem	in	reading	[S]	literally:	once	disambiguated,	it	says	simply	that	the	feeling	of	harmony	must	be	the	ground	of	the	judgment	of beauty	and	have	the	feeling	of	pleasure	as	its	consequence. In	fact,	towards	the	end	of	§9,	Kant	explicitly	raises	and	responds to	the	question	of	how	we	come	to	be	aware	of	the	harmony	of	the faculties	when	making	a	judgment	of	beauty.	Here	is	how	he	puts	the question: as	we	have	seen,	Kant returns to	specifying the	structure	of	aesthetic judgment	in	§9	of	the	body	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	and	his	comments	there seem to require and confirm the view	expressed	by these	passages in the First	Introduction. 11. See	also	A29	in	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	where	Kant	says	that	a	"pleasant taste"	[Wohlgeschmack]	is	grounded	in	"a	feeling	(of	pleasure	and	displeasure) as	an	effect	of	the	sensation	[of	taste]". janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) pleasure	and	displeasure?	I	address	this	worry	in	§2.4;	for	now,	I	return to	completing	the	discussion	of	my	proposal. I	have	been	arguing that the feeling	of	harmony	and the feeling of	pleasure	are	distinct	feelings	for	Kant.	Distinguishing	them,	I	think, also	helps	to	clarify	another	aspect	of the	opening	paragraphs	of	§9. As I	mentioned,	Kant	begins the	section	by	arguing	that	pleasure in the	beautiful	could	not	precede	the	judgment	of	beauty.	If this	were the	case,	he	explains,	the	subject's	basis	for	judgment	would	consist in	the	immediate	sensory	pleasantness	of	the	judged	object:	the	kind of	pleasure	she	might	take	in	a	piece	of	chocolate,	say,	that	she	finds tasty.	But	a	judgment	that	a	piece	of	chocolate	is	tasty	has,	according	to Kant,	"merely	private	validity":	that	is,	it	expresses	a	merely	subjective preference.	For	the	empirical	fact	that	she	feels	immediate	pleasure	in the	chocolate	does	not	give	the	subject	any	grounds for	demanding that	others	do	so	as	well. In	contrast,	as I	have	already	emphasized,	Kant takes it to	be	criterial	of	a	judgment	of	beauty	that	it	has	"universal	validity":	it	does not	express	a	merely	subjective	preference	for	the	beautiful	object,	but rather	claims	that	everyone	ought	to	find	it	beautiful.	Kant's	point	in §9,	I	want	to	suggest,	is	that	such	a	claim	cannot	be	legitimate	if	the basis	for	the	subject's	judgment	of	beauty	in any way	involves	her	feelings	of	pleasure.	For	in	the	latter	case,	her	grounds	would	involve	the immediate	pleasantness	of	a	sensation,	rather	than	its	universal	communicability.14	Any	interpretation	that	makes	the	determining	ground of	judgments	of	beauty	a	state	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	is 14. Kant	expresses	a	similar	point	in	the	case	of	the	pleasure	or	displeasure	that accompanies	the	representation	of	a	possible	action	in	the	Metaphysics of Morals.	He	distinguishes	there	between	a	pleasure	that	"precedes	[vorhergeht]	the representation	of	the	[moral]	law",	which	he	characterizes	as	"pathological", and	the	pleasure that "can	only follow" from	recognition	of the law,	which alone	counts	as	genuinely	moral	(6:399).	As	I	see	it,	Kant	makes	the	parallel point	in	§9	that	any	pleasure	that	precedes	a	judgment	of	beauty	could	only be	"pathological"	-	that	is,	a	merely	contingent,	psychological	response	to	an object	akin	to	pleasure	in	the	agreeable	-	whereas	genuine	pleasure	in	the beautiful	must	follow	upon	a	judgment	of	beauty. Let me pause to clarify an important terminological point here. Kant	moves	between	referring	to	the	feeling	of	harmony	as	a	sensation [Empfindung] and as a feeling [Gefühl],	without apparently intending any	difference	in	meaning.	The	same	is	true	for	pleasure,	which	he	refers	to	as	a	sensation	(e.g.	20:229;	5:204),	as	well	as	(more	frequently) a	feeling.	In	§3	of	the	Analytic	of	the	Beautiful,	Kant	says	that,	in	order to	avoid	confusion,	he	intends	to	reserve	the	term	'feeling'	for	a	sensation	that "must	always	remain	merely	subjective	and	absolutely	cannot	constitute	a	representation	of	an	object"	(5:206).	In	other	words, the	term	'feeling',	for	Kant,	designates	a	type	of	sensation	in	virtue	of which	a	subject	is	made	aware	of	a	merely	subjective	state	of	herself rather than	of a	property that can	be	ascribed to	an	object.	Thus, a sensation of greenness, for example, counts as an "objective sensation"	since	it	affords	the	subject	awareness	of	a	property	she	ascribes to objects she cognizes as green; in contrast, the sensation of pleasure is	a "subjective	sensation"	or feeling, through	which the	subject becomes	aware	merely	of	her	own	state,	rather	than	of	a	property	she can	ascribe	to	objects.13	Now,	since	the	sensation	of	the	harmony	of the	faculties	is	a	sensation	by	which	the	subject	becomes	aware	of	the state	of	her	own	cognitive	faculties	rather	than	a	property	of	objects, it	properly	counts	as	a feeling	by	Kant's	definition. I refer to it	here as	a	sensation	when	Kant's	text	does	so,	and	as	a	feeling	on	all	other occasions.	I	choose	the	latter	by	default	because	it	brings	out	the	aesthetic	character	of	the	judgment	of	beauty	(which	Kant	emphasizes,	for example,	in	the	passage	quoted	above	from	5:228).	My	doing	so	may give	rise	to	a	worry,	however:	Does	Kant	allow	for	any	feelings	besides appears	to	conflict	with	Kant's	claim	in	§12	that	consciousness	of	the	"subjective	purposiveness"	of	a	beautiful	object	is	identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure itself.	I	address	this	in	§2.3,	where	I	argue	that	the	latter	claim	is	compatible with	the	interpretation	I	defend	in	this	paper. 13. Kant also characterizes feelings this way in the Prolegomena, where he refers	to	the	warmth	of	a	room,	the	sweetness	of	sugar	and	the	repugnance	of wormwood	as	feelings	which	"are	merely	subjective	and	which	must	therefore never	be	attributed	to	the	object"	(4:299n). janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) between	her	faculties.	She	then	reflects	on	this	relation,	comparing	it with	the	relation	that	is	a	condition	on	judgment	in	general.17	This	reflection	issues	in	the	judgment	of	beauty,18	in	which	the	subject	claims that	the	harmonious	state	of	her	faculties	in	representing	the	beautiful object is	universally	valid	-	that is, that anyone	who represents the object	ought	to	share	that	state	(I	will	have	more	to	say	about	what	is meant	to	ground	this	claim	in	§3).	This	judgment	is	accompanied	by the	feeling	of	pleasure.19	In	sum,	the	judgment	as	a	whole	has	the	following	structure:	Feeling	of	harmony	→ Reflecting	judgment	→ Feeling	of	pleasure. In	the	remainder	of this	section, I	work	out further	details	of the account	I	am	proposing	by	responding	to	a	number	of	potential	questions and objections. In §2.2, I relate the universal validity of the harmony	of the faculties to the	universal validity	of	pleasure in the beautiful.	In	§2.3,	I	respond	to	the	objection	that	my	view	is	ruled	out by	passages	in	which	Kant	identifies	consciousness	of	the	"subjective 17. Kant's claim that	experiences	of	beauty involve this	kind	of reflection	may seem	to	grossly	over-intellectualize	them,	since	it	seems	to	require	that	a	subject	have	knowledge	of	the	conditions	of	judgment	in	order	merely	to	find	an object	beautiful.	We	can	go	some	way	towards	mitigating	this	concern	by	noting	that	the	subject	need	only	judge	something	to	the	effect	that	her	faculties are	working well	as	she	represents	the	beautiful	object. 18. I	do	not	mean	to	suggest	here	that there	are two	acts	of judging	-	the	first, reflection;	the	second,	the	judgment	of	beauty	-	as	on	Guyer's	view.	Rather, there	is	only	one	activity	of	reflective	comparison	that	culminates	in	a	judgment	of	beauty.	This	is	exactly	parallel	to	determining	judgments,	in	which an	activity	carried	out in	accordance	with	conceptual	rules	culminates in	a determining	judgment	that	subsumes	the	object	under	a	concept. 19. It	should	be	granted	that	at	times	Kant	seems	to	suggest	that	the	judgment of	beauty	is	phenomenologically	manifest	as	-	and	so,	identical	to	-	the	feeling	of	pleasure,	as	Ginsborg	suggests.	(I	discuss	some	of these	passages in §§2.3	and	2.4	below.)	So	far,	I	have	treated	the	two	as	distinct	for	the	sake	of simplicity	and	clarity,	but	my	view	is	compatible	with	either	possibility.	If	the judgment	of	beauty is identical to the feeling	of	pleasure, then	rather than the	feeling	of	harmony	giving	rise	to	both	the	pleasure	and	the	judgment,	as I	have	been	claiming,	it	would	ground	a	single	state	of	pleasurable	judgment. Importantly,	however,	this	single	state	of	pleasurable	judgment	would	not	itself	exhaust	the	experience	of	beauty,	as	on	Ginsborg's	view,	but	would	rather be	made	on	the	basis	of	the	independent	awareness	of	the	harmonious	state of	one's	faculties. itself	pleasurable, I	want to	argue, runs	afoul	of this	point.15	On	my view,	in	contrast,	the	feeling	of	harmony	is	not	itself	pleasurable,	but is	rather	the	ground	of	both	the	judgment	of	beauty	and	the	pleasure in	the	beautiful.16	Unlike	feelings	of	pleasure,	the	feeling	of	harmony	is an	awareness	of	the	state	of	the	subject's	cognitive	faculties	that	-	as	I will	explain	in	§3	-	does	give	the	subject	grounds	to	demand	that	others	agree	with	her	judgment	of	beauty. Armed	with the	distinction	between the feeling	of	harmony	and the	feeling	of	pleasure,	I	can	now	fully	specify	what	I	take	the	structure of	Kant's	judgments	of	beauty	to	be.	Of	relevance	here	is	the	fact	that Kant	characterizes	such	judgments	as	"reflecting"	judgments	-	on	his view,	they	involve	an	act	of	reflection	in	which	the	subject	compares	the relation	her	faculties	are	brought	into	by	a	given	representation	with the relation they	must	be in for judgment in	general to	be	possible (20:220;	see	also	20:211).	Bearing	this	in	mind,	I	argue	that,	for	Kant, judgments of beauty involve the following stages: When the subject	perceives	a	beautiful	object,	she	senses	the	harmonious	relation 15. This is the case on the interpretations defended by Guyer, Ginsborg and Allison.	It	is	also	an	important	difference	between	my	account	and	the	one suggested	by	Béatrice	Longuenesse	in	"Kant's	Leading	Thread".	Longuenesse suggests that the pleasure in the beautiful is a "two-fold" pleasure: a firstorder	pleasure	in	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	combined	with	a	second-order pleasure	in	the	universal	validity	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	(207–9).	My account resembles Longuenesse's insofar as	we	both identify two feelings in	the	beautiful.	A	crucial	difference,	however,	is	that,	according	to	me,	the feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	a	sui generis	feeling	that	is	not	itself pleasurable.	This is important, I think,	because	it	respects	Kant's insistence in	§9	that	a	judgment	made	on	the	basis	of	pleasure	could	have	only	subjective	validity.	On	whether	Kant	allows	for	feelings	distinct	from	pleasure	and displeasure, see	§2.4	below.	That the	harmony	of the faculties is	not itself pleasurable	will	also	be	key	for	the	solution	to	the	problem	for	Kant's	deduction	that	I	go	on	to	offer	in	§3. 16. Admittedly,	Kant refers to	pleasure	as the	determining	ground	of the judgment	of	beauty	on	at	least	two	occasions	(20:225,	5:191).	In	this	paper,	however,	I	proceed	on	the	assumption	that	his	most	careful	statement	of	the	structure	of	judgments	of	beauty	is	presented	in	§9,	where,	as	we	have	seen,	he explicitly	asks	whether	pleasure	precedes	the	judgment	of	beauty	and	argues unequivocally	that	it	cannot	do	so.	As	such,	I	think	we	cannot	take	those	passages	where	he	nevertheless	refers to	pleasure	as	a	determining	ground	at face	value. janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) The	subjective	universal	communicability	of	the	kind	of representation	in	a	judgment	of	taste	...	can	be	nothing other	than	the state of mind in the free play of the imagination and the understanding	(so	far	as	they	agree	with	each	other as	is	requisite	for	a	cognition	in	general):	for	we	are	conscious	that	this	subjective	relation	suited	to	cognition	in general	must	be	valid	for	everyone	and	consequently	universally communicable	.... Now, this	merely subjective (aesthetic)	judging	of	the	object,	or	of	the	representation through	which	the	object	is	given,	precedes the pleasure in it, and is the ground of this pleasure ... but on that universality of the subjective conditions of the judging of objects alone is this universal subjective validity of satisfaction, which we combine with the representation of the object that we call beautiful, grounded	(5:217–8,	my	emphases). 2.3 "Subjective Purposiveness" and Pleasure I	also	need	to	address	what	may	seem	to	be	a	significant	textual	obstacle	to	my	view:	the	fact	that	it	appears	inconsistent	with	passages in which Kant says alternatively that the "representation" (20:228, 20:248),	the	"consciousness"	(5:222)	or	even	the	"concept"	(20:230)	of the "subjective purposiveness" of a beautiful object is identical	with the	feeling	of	pleasure.	Since	what	it	means	for	an	object	to	be	"subjectively	purposive"	is	just	for	it	to	be	such	that	representing	it	puts	one's cognitive	faculties	into	harmony,	it	is	not	unreasonable	to	assume	that "consciousness	of the subjective	purposiveness" is	nothing	over	and above	the	feeling	of	harmony.	And	since	Kant	claims	that	the	former	is identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure,	it	would	follow	that	so	is	the	latter. But	this	would	spell	trouble	for	my	view,	since	it	turns	precisely	on	denying	that	the	feeling	of	harmony	is	identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure. Let	me	schematize	the	worry	before	responding	to	it.	In	what	follows,	SP	refers	to	consciousness	of	the	subjective	purposiveness	of	an purposiveness"	of a	beautiful	object	with the feeling	of	pleasure. In §2.4, I	discuss	the	worry	that	Kant	does	not	make	room	for	any	feelings	besides	pleasure	and	displeasure.	Finally, in	§2.5, I	make some comments	about	the	relation	between	the	feeling	of	harmony	and	the feeling	of	pleasure. 2.2 The Universal Validity of Pleasure Kant	makes	clear	that,	on	his	view,	the	judgment	of	beauty	claims	the universal	validity	not	only	of	the	feeling	of	harmony,	but	of	the	feeling of	pleasure	itself.	In	§11,	for	example,	he	says: the	relation	of	the	powers	of	representation	to	each	other insofar	as	they	are	determined	by	a	representation	...	is combined	with	the	feeling	of	pleasure	that	is	at	the	same time	declared	to	be	valid	for	everyone	through	the	judgment	of	taste	(5:221). Since	I	follow	Kant	in	claiming	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	only	a consequence	of	the	judgment	of	beauty,	can	my	view	accommodate	the claim	that	the	judgment	itself	"declare[s]"	the	universal	validity	of	the pleasure?	I	think	it	can.	As	we	have	seen,	Kant	says	that	the	judgment of	beauty	claims	that	the	feeling	of	harmony	produced	by	a	beautiful object	is	universally	communicable.	It	claims,	that	is,	that	the	state	of the	subject's	faculties	in	representing	the	beautiful	object	-	one	of	mutual	agreement	between	the	imagination	and	the	understanding	-	is one	that	any	subject	appraising	that	object	can	and	ought	to	share. Now,	so	long	as	the	pleasure	felt in	the	beautiful	object is	a	pleasure	in	the	feeling	of	harmony	that	is	claimed	to	be	universally	valid, it	follows,	for	Kant,	that	it	is	itself	universally	valid.	As	such,	it	can	be said	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	claims	the	universal	validity	of	the feeling	of	harmony	and	at the same time	and	on that basis	establishes	the universal	validity	of	the	subject's	pleasure	in	the	harmony.	This	is	just what	we	see	Kant	say	in	§9: janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) of	the	state	of	her	own	faculties;	when	she	represents	subjective	purposiveness,	on the	other	hand,	she	goes	beyond	this	and	ascribes	a (subjective)	property	to	the	object	she	judges	beautiful.20	Whereas	the former	gives	one	grounds	for	a	judgment	of	beauty,	the	latter	-	as	Kant makes	clear	in	the	Third	Moment	(5:236)	-	is	part	of	the	content	of	the judgment	itself.21	If	this	is	right,	consciousness	of	subjective	purposiveness	is	not	identical	with	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	one's	faculties: assumption	(2)	that	underpins	the	objection	should	be	rejected. When	Kant	claims,	then,	that	the	consciousness,	or	representation, of the subjective purposiveness of an object is even identical with pleasure,	I	suggest	we	read	him	as	saying	that	the	judgment	of	beauty itself	can	be	said	to	be	expressed	through	pleasure.22	His	point	in	these passages,	in	other	words,	is	that	in	feeling	a	pleasure	that	she	takes	to be	universally	valid,	the	subject	in	effect	expresses	her	judgment	that the	object	is	beautiful	or,	equivalently,	subjectively	purposive.	This	is precisely	what	he	says	at	5:189:	"pleasure	can	express	nothing	but	[the object's]	suitability	to	the	cognitive	faculties	that	are	in	play	in	the	reflecting	power	of	judgment,	insofar	as	they	are	in	play,	and	thus	merely a	subjective	formal	purposiveness	of	the	object"	(my	emphasis).	This is	compatible	with	the	ground	for	the	judgment	of	purposiveness	being an	independent	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	is	not	itself pleasurable:	as	is	the	case	on	my	view. 20.	At	5:222,	Kant	also	allows	the	ascription	of	subjective	purposiveness	to	"the play	of the	cognitive	powers	of the	subject in the	case	of	a representation through	which	an	object	is	given".	I	do	not	take	his	meaning	here	to	be	significantly	different,	however,	from	the	passages	in	which	he	speaks	of	ascribing subjective	purposiveness	directly	to	the	beautiful	object.	In	either	case,	I	take him	to	be	referring	to	a	judgment	that	the	object	(or	its	representation)	gives rise	to	the	harmonious	free	play	of	the	faculties.	My	suggestion	here	is	that making	such	a	judgment	goes	beyond	merely	feeling	that	harmony. 21. Zuckert	makes	a similar	point	against	Guyer's	understanding	of	purposiveness	(Zuckert,	Beauty and Biology,	332n19). 22. This	fits	well	with	passages	in	which	Kant	claims	that	pleasure	functions	as the	"predicate" in	a judgment	of	beauty	(5:191;	5:288;	5:289).	On	this	point, see	Aquila	("A	New	Look")	and	Rind	("What	Is	Claimed",	83–4).	I	return	to this	point	in	§2.4	below. object,	HF	to	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	and	PL	to	the feeling	of	pleasure. Objection: (1)	SP = PL.	[20:228,	230,	248,	5:222] (2)	SP = HF.	[By	assumption] (3)	⇒ HF = PL To	begin	to	respond	to	the	objection, let	me	note	that	endorsing	(3) commits Kant to an explicit inconsistency. For, as we have already seen,	he	also	clearly	asserts	both	(4)	and	(5): (4)	HF	is	the	determining	ground	of	a	judgment	of	beauty. [e.g.	5:228] (5)	PL	cannot	be	the	determining	ground	of	a	judgment	of beauty,	but	rather	must	be	its	consequence.	[5:217] Together,	these	entail: (6)	HF ≠	PL. As	I	have	argued	so	far,	the	fact	that	Kant	endorses	and	argumentatively	defends	(4)	and	(5)	in	response	to	the	"key"	question	of	§9	strongly indicates that	he is indeed	committed	to	(6).	The	only	way	to	avoid saddling	his	view	with incoherence, then, is to resist (3). I	will	now suggest	that	the	correct	way	of	doing	so	is	to	deny	(2):	that	is,	to	reject the	assumption	that	consciousness	of	subjective	purposiveness	(SP)	is identical	with	the	feeling	of	harmony	(HF). To begin with, note that in the passages cited by the objection, "subjective	purposiveness"	is	primarily	ascribed	to	the	beautiful	object. At 20:228, for example,	Kant says that it is "the representation of a subjective	purposiveness	of	an	object"	that	is	"even	identical	with	the feeling	of	pleasure".	To	represent	an	object	as	subjectively	purposive, however,	is	plausibly	to	do	more	than	merely	feel	the	harmony	of	the faculties.	Through	the	feeling	of	harmony,	the	subject	becomes	aware janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) pleasure	and	displeasure.	For	one,	as	I	noted	above,	he	there	characterizes sensations	of	warmth	and sweetness	as feelings, precisely	on the	grounds	that	these	sensations	"are	merely	subjective	and	...	must therefore	never	be	attributed	to	the	object"	(4:299n).	Now,	Kant	is	not always	consistent	in	whether	he	considers	sensations	that	correspond to	secondary	qualities	to	be	subjective	or	objective.23	Regardless,	the important	point	for	my	purposes	here	is	that	his	usage	in	the	Prolegomena - where	he	employs	the	same	definition	of	'feeling'	that	he	does in	the	Critique of Judgment - suggests	that	he	does	not	operate	with	an understanding	of	the	term	that	in	principle	only	picks	out	determinations	of	pleasure	or	displeasure. In	fact,	there	is	yet	another	instance	in	the	Prolegomena where	Kant uses	the	term	'feeling'	to	characterize	a	subject's	awareness	of	herself that does not obviously involve any pleasure or displeasure. In the context	of	a	discussion	of	self-consciousness,	he	says	that	a	subject's awareness	of	herself	in	apperception	does	not	amount	to	awareness	of the	properties	of	an	object,	but	rather	expresses	merely	a	"feeling	of	an existence"	[Gefühl eines Daseins]	(4:334n,	my	emphasis).	Now,	as	Kant emphasizes	in	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	a	subject's	awareness	of	herself	in	apperception	consists	in	awareness	of	her	own	activity	of	thinking,	rather	than	of	any	property	that	she	can	ascribe	to	an	object	(even to	herself	as	an	object).24	This	explains	why	Kant	would	characterize such	awareness	as	a	feeling:	since	it	consists	in	awareness	of	the	subject	rather	than	of	any	property	of	an	object,	it	satisfies	the	definition of feeling	discussed	above.	But	there	is	no	reason	to	think	that it involves	any	feelings	of	pleasure	or	displeasure;	indeed	this	would	be	very far	from	Kant's	description	of	what	a	subject's	awareness	of	herself	in 23. In	the	Critique of Pure Reason,	for	example,	Kant	suggests	that	colors,	tastes,	etc. are	subjective	sensations	that	"do	not	allow	any	object	to	be	cognized"	(A29/ B44).	However,	in	§3	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	as	we	have	seen,	he	calls	the sensation	of	greenness	an	objective	sensation,	on	the	grounds	that it	constitutes	"perception	of	an	object"	(5:206). 24. See	Critique of Pure Reason,	A402,	B406–7,	B429–30. 2.4 Feelings Other than Pleasure and Displeasure I	have	been	arguing	that,	for	Kant,	the	feeling	of	harmony	is	a	sui generis	feeling,	distinct	from	the	feeling	of	pleasure	and	displeasure.	This brings	with	it	a	worry,	however:	Does	Kant	allow	for	any	feelings	distinct	from	pleasure	and	displeasure?	It	may	appear	that	he	rules	out this	possibility	in	the	First	Introduction,	where	he	says	that	"there	is only	one	so-called	sensation	that	can	never	become	a	concept	of	an object, and this is the feeling	of pleasure and	displeasure" (20:224). This	admittedly	puts	pressure	on	my	claim	that	the	feeling	of	harmony is	a	distinct	sensation	that	pertains	merely	to	the	state	of	the	subject rather	than	to	objects. Let	me	begin	by	noting	some	factors	that	I	think	mitigate	the	worry. As	I	have	already	discussed,	Kant	defines	a	feeling	as	any	sensation	by which	the	subject	becomes	aware	of	her	own	subjective	state,	rather than	of	properties	she	can	ascribe	to	objects.	His	definitions	of	pleasure and	displeasure	in	§10	of	the	Critique of Judgment,	on	the	other	hand,	are narrower: The consciousness of the causality of a representation with	respect	to	the	state	of	the	subject,	for	maintaining	it in	that	state,	can	here	designate	in	general	what	is	called pleasure; in contrast to	which displeasure is that representation that contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own opposite (hindering	or	getting	rid	of	them) (5:220). To	claim	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	the	only	possible	feelings, then,	would	be to claim that the	only state	of	herself that a subject can	be	aware	of	that	does	not	amount	to	awareness	of	the	properties of	a	cognized	object	is	a	state	that	either	tends	to	maintain	the	representational	state	the	subject is in	(i.e.,	pleasure),	or	tends	to	prompt her to change the representational state she is in (i.e., displeasure). But does Kant really think that this is the only possible subjective state	one	can	be	aware	of?	There is	evidence that	at least	as late	as the	Prolegomena, Kant is	willing to countenance feelings other than janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) 2.5 The Relation Between the Feeling of Harmony and Pleasure Another	question	that	may	arise	for	my	proposal	is	the	nature	of	the relation	between	the	two	feelings	I	have	argued	it	is	necessary	to	distinguish.	Does the feeling	of the	harmony	of the faculties cause the feeling	of	pleasure?	Or	is	the	feeling	of	pleasure	intentional	-	that	is, about	the	feeling	of	harmony? This	question	is	the	analogue	of	one	that	has	been	much	discussed in	the	secondary	literature.	Though	other	commentators	do	not	distinguish	the	feeling	of	harmony	from	the	feeling	of	pleasure	as	I	do,	they have	disagreed	about	whether	pleasure	is	merely	the	causal	effect	of the	faculties	being	in	harmony	or,	alternatively,	whether	it	has	intentional	content	and	is	about	the	harmony	of	the	faculties.27	In	response, most	commentators	note	that	Kant	is	far	from	clear	on	this	issue	and, indeed, that textual support can	be found for	either reading.	A	first point	in	favor	of	the	causal	reading	is	Kant's	language:	the	feeling	of pleasure,	he	says, is "aroused"	by	(5:190)	or	"immediately	connected with"	(20:224)	the	harmony	of	the	faculties.28	Even	more	significantly, he	appears to rule	out the intentionalist reading	at	5:206,	where,	as I	have	already	mentioned,	he	says	that	the	feeling	of	pleasure	"does not	serve	for	any	cognition	at	all,	not	even	that	by	which	the	subject cognizes	itself". Nevertheless,	proponents	of	the	intentionalist	reading	have	argued that	treating	pleasure	merely	as	an	effect	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	turns	the	judging	of	beauty	into	an	empirical	exercise	wherein	the subject	attempts	to	determine	the	causal	origin	of	her	own	feeling	of 27. Guyer	argues	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	merely	the	causal	effect	of	the harmony	of the faculties;	making	a judgment	of	beauty,	on	his	account, involves	determining	whether	one's	pleasure	in	fact	has	this	causal	origin	(Guyer,	Claims of Taste,	94–7;	134,	147).	Most	other	commentators,	including	Aquila ("A	New	Look"),	Allison	("Pleasure	and	Harmony";	Kant's Theory of Taste,	53–4; 122),	Ginsborg	("On	the	Key",	42–5;	96)	and	Zuckert	("Kant's	Theory	of	Pleasure";	Beauty and Biology,	esp.	231–48)	disagree	with	Guyer	on	this	issue	and argue	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	has	intentional	content. 28.	More	precisely	(and	in	line	with	my	view),	Kant	says	that	pleasure	is	immediately	connected	with	the	sensation	of	harmony,	which	he	once	again	identifies as	the	determining	ground	of	the	judgment	of	beauty	(20:224). apperception	is	like.25	This	provides	further	evidence,	then,	that	Kant allows	for	feelings	that	are	not	reducible	to	pleasure	or	displeasure. How, then, should	we	understand	Kant's claim in the First Introduction	that	pleasure	and	displeasure	are	the	only	sensations	that	can never	become "a concept of an	object"?	My suggestion is that	Kant here	means	to	refer	to	the	specific	role	that	he	takes	pleasure	and	displeasure	to	play	with	respect	to	aesthetic	judgments.	As	I	mentioned in	§2.3	above,	Kant	sometimes	refers	to	pleasure	as	playing	the	role of	a	"predicate"	in	aesthetic	judgments:	in	feeling	a	pleasure	that	she takes	to	be	universally	valid,	he	suggests,	the	subject	in	effect	expresses	her	judgment	that	the	object	that	gives	rise	to	the	pleasure	is	beautiful.26	In	such	judgments,	Kant	indicates,	the	feeling	of	pleasure	plays the	role	played	by	a	concept	in	an	objective	judgment.	In	subsuming a	particular	object	under	the	concept	"triangle",	for	example,	the	judgment	"This	is	a	triangle"	claims	universal	validity:	it	claims,	that	is,	that it	is	correct	to	-	or,	equivalently,	that	any	subject	ought	to	-	apply	the concept	"triangle"	to	the	given	object.	Similarly,	in	feeling	a	pleasure that	she	judges	to	be	universally	valid,	the	subject	in	effect	judges	that any	subject	ought	to	combine	the	representation	of	the	beautiful	object	with	a	feeling	of	pleasure. As I understand it, then, we need not read Kant as claiming at 20:224 that pleasure and displeasure are the only subjective sensations	tout court,	but	rather	that	they	are	the	only	sensations	that	play the role	of "subjective	predicates" in	aesthetic judgments. In fact, in the	very	sentence	preceding,	he	characterizes	aesthetic	judgments	in general	as	judgments	"whose	predicate	can	never	be	cognition",	going on to identify the "predicate" in	question	as	pleasure	or	displeasure (20:224).	Once	again,	this	is	compatible	with	the	determining	ground of judgments	of	beauty	being	the independent	awareness	that	one's faculties	are	in	harmony,	as	is	the	case	on	my	view. 25. See	Critique of Pure Reason,	B132–6. 26.	20:224;	5:191;	5:288;	5:289. janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) In	addition	to	resolving	the	problem	of	§9,	distinguishing	the	feeling	of	harmony	from	the	feeling	of	pleasure	can	remove	a	crucial	worry	for	Kant's	"Deduction"	of	judgments	of	beauty.	I	explain	how	in	the next	section. 3 The Deduction of Judgments of Beauty A	virtue	of	my	view is that it can	also	help to resolve	another longstanding problem for Kant's account of judgments of beauty. That problem	has	to	do	with	Kant's	"Deduction"	of	judgments	of	beauty,	in which	Kant attempts to answer the	question	of	what entitles a subject	who	judges	an	object to	be	beautiful to	claim	that	others	ought to	agree	with	her judgment.	The	question	arises in	the	case	of judgments	of	beauty	because	it	is	Kant's	view,	as	we	have	seen,	that	such judgments	are	not	determined	by	concepts.	A	subject	can	legitimately demand,	for	example,	that	others	agree	with	her	when	she	judges	of some	shape	X	that	it	is	a	triangle,	if	she	can	cite	the	criteria	that	pick out	triangles,	and	prove	that	X	meets	them.	On	Kant's	view,	however, it	is	not	possible	to	specify	a	set	of	features	that	any	and	all	beautiful objects	must	have.	Rather,	judgments	of	beauty	are	made	on	the	basis of	the	subject's	feeling,	which	she	nevertheless	claims	everyone	ought to	share.	But	what	could	possibly	entitle	her	to	make	such	a	claim? Now, in the	Deduction	(§38,	5:289–92),	Kant	argues that	as long as	she	has	made	a	pure	judgment	of	beauty,31	a	subject	is	entitled	to claim	that	others	agree	with	her	judgment.	A	full	explanation	of	the argument	of	the	deduction	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	The	following	sketch	of	it,	however,	should	be	sufficient	to	bring	the	problem into	view: 1. The pleasure in the beautiful is grounded in the harmony	of	the	faculties. 31. That is,	as long	as	she	does	not	allow	the	sensory	pleasantness	and/or	the suitability of the object for some practical or moral end to influence her judgment. pleasure.	Such	a	psychological	exercise	is	at	odds,	however,	with	the normative	status	that	Kant	clearly	accords	judgments	of	beauty.29	As textual	support	for	the	intentionalist	reading,	commentators	point	out that	Kant	clearly	says	that	the	subject	can	become	aware	of	the	relation between	her	cognitive	faculties	through	feeling.30 Now,	the	account	I	have	been	developing	here	has	the	resources to	split	the	difference	between	the	causal	and	intentionalist	readings. Kant	clearly	does	allow	that	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	can	be	aesthetically	sensed;	as	mentioned	above,	he	characterizes	this	sensation as	the	"sensible	representation	of	the	state	of	the	subject"	(20:223,	see also	5:291). I	have	argued,	however, that this	sensation	is	not identical	to	the	feeling	of	pleasure;	rather,	as	Kant	goes	on	to	say,	pleasure is	combined	with	it.	On	my	view,	then,	it	is	the feeling of harmony	that undeniably	has	intentional	content: through	it, the	subject	becomes directly aware of the state of her cognitive faculties. This commitment	-	in	contrast	with	views	on	which	the	feeling	of	pleasure	itself	is intentional	-	is	compatible	with	Kant's	claim	that	the	subject	does	not cognize	anything	through	pleasure,	not	even	her	own	state. It	is	true,	however,	that	the	intentionalist	reading	finds	some	support	in	the	passages	I	have	discussed	in	which	Kant	suggests	that	the judgment	of	beauty	itself	can	be	expressed	through	pleasure,	or	that pleasure	plays	the	role	of	a	"predicate"	in	a	judgment	of	beauty.	Ultimately, I	believe that	Kant's text	does	not fully settle the issue.	The virtue	of	my	account,	however,	is	that	it	can	reflect	this	ambiguity	and is	not	forced	to	choose	between	causal	and	intentionalist	construals of	pleasure.	On	my	view,	the	subject	becomes	aware	of	the	harmony of	her	faculties	through	an	independent	feeling	that	does	have	intentional content; this is consistent	with the feeling of pleasure being caused	by	the	feeling	of	harmony	and/or	being	about	the	harmony	of the	faculties. 29.	See	Ginsborg,	"On	the	Key",	38. 30.	See	20:223.	Allison	appeals	to	this	consideration	against	Guyer,	for	example (Allison,	"Pleasure	and	Harmony",	468). janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) Now, an important assumption that underlies the dilemma and generates its first horn is that the harmony of the faculties is itself pleasurable.	But	that	is	precisely	the	claim	that	I	have	denied	in	this paper.	In	§2,	I	argued	that	there	are	two	feelings	in	an	experience	of the	beautiful:	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	which	is	not itself	pleasurable,	and	an	independent	feeling	of	pleasure	that	is	consequent	on	it.	If	this	is	correct,	then	the	dilemma	as	stated	above	is	a false	one.	For	if	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	not	itself	pleasurable, then	Kant	can	claim	that	it	is	a	necessary	condition	of	all	judgments without	generating	the	absurd	entailment	that	all	judgments	are	pleasurable.	And	this	would	remove	one	of	the	biggest	obstacles	thought to	face	Kant's	deduction. Of	course,	if	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	accompanies	every	judgment,	the	question	can	still	be	asked	why	it	should	give	rise	to	pleasure	only	in	the	case	of	the	beautiful.	Couldn't	the	dilemma	be	restated, in	other	words,	as	turning	on	whether	the	awareness	of	the	harmony of	the	faculties	is	always	accompanied	by	the	feeling	of	pleasure,	even	if it	is	not	identical	with	it? In this case, however, the entailment can be blocked by appealing	to	secondary	features	that	distinguish	the	aesthetic	case	from	the cognitive	one.	Though	both	involve	the	same	harmonious	relation	between the	cognitive faculties,33 this relation	comes	about	differently attempts to rescue the	deduction as it is presented in §38 are	-	or indeed, can	be	-	successful.	This	is	because,	as	he	sees	it,	the	only	way	to	block	the entailment	that	all	judgments	are	pleasurable	is	to	find	a	relevant	distinction between	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	that	accompanies	cognition	from	the harmony	that	accompanies	aesthetic	judgments	of	beauty.	But	then	what	is true	of	the	former	-	that	it	is	a	condition	on	cognition	-	need	not	be	true	of the	latter,	and	the	deduction	fails.	On	my	view,	as	will	become	clear,	the	need to	distinguish	cognitive	harmony from	aesthetic	harmony	does	not	arise. I discuss	this	further	in	n.	33. 33. This	is	a	key	advantage	of	a	view	that	distinguishes	the	feeling	of	harmony and the feeling	of	pleasure.	On	such	a	view, there is	no	need to	differentiate	aesthetic	from	cognitive	harmony	in	order	to	avoid	the	first	horn	of	the supposed	dilemma	posed	by	the	deduction.	Instead,	we	can	preserve	Kant's claim that there is just	one species	of	harmony that is instantiated in	both the	cognitive	and	the	aesthetic	case	and	that	is	always	universally	valid	with 2.	The	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	a	necessary	condition	of judgment	in	general. 3.	The	necessary conditions	of judgment in	general are valid	for	all	judging	subjects. 4.	So,	the	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	valid	for	all	judging subjects. Kant's general strategy in the deduction of judgments of beauty, then	-	as in	his other deductions	-	is transcendental.	His argument relies on the claim that the	harmony	of the faculties is a necessary condition	of	judgment	in	general,	since	the	agreement	of	imagination and	understanding	is	necessary	for	any	act	of	cognition	to	occur.	From this	it	is	meant	to	follow	that	-	unlike	in	the	case	of	judgments	based merely	on	sensory	pleasantness	-	the	mental	state the	subject takes pleasure in in	a judgment	of	beauty is	one that	any judging	subject must	be	able	to	share.	If	her	state	is	genuinely	determined	merely	by the	conditions	on judging,	Kant	argues,	she is	entitled to	claim	that all	judging	subjects	ought	to	be	in	that	state.	And	this	is	supposed	to entitle	her	to	claim	that	all	other	subjects	ought	to	feel	the	pleasure she	does. Now,	there	are	obviously	many	gaps	in	Kant's	argument	as	I	have stated	it	here.	Rather	than	attempting	to	fill	in	these	gaps,	however,	I will	focus	on	one	problem	for	the	deduction	that	many	commentators have	taken	to	tell	decisively	against	it.	The	problem	has	been	put	in the form	of the following	dilemma:	Either the	harmony	of the faculties	is	a	necessary	condition	of	judgment	in	general,	or	it	is	not.	If	it	is, and	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is identical	to	a	feeling	of	pleasure, then every judgment	-	not	merely judgments of beauty	-	should	be pleasurable.	But	this	is	absurd.	On	the	other	hand,	if	the	harmony	of the faculties is	not a condition	on judgment in general, then	Kant's argument fails to	provide	the	necessary	entitlement for the	claim	of universal	validity	made	by	a	judgment	of	beauty.32 32. For	a	helpful	discussion	of	various	attempts	to	respond	to	the	dilemma,	see Rind, "Can	Kant's	Deduction Be Saved?" Rind concludes that none of the janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) to	the	requirements	of	the	understanding.	Such	an	unexpected	discovery	could	quite	plausibly	be	regarded	as	grounds	for	pleasure. On	my	view,	then,	Kant's	deduction	can	be	saved	from	the	charge of	absurdity levied in the	first	horn	of the	so-called	dilemma	above. The	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	a	necessary	condition	of	judgments	of beauty	as	well	as	cognitive	judgments,	and	is	not	itself	pleasurable.	In the	case	of	cognitive judgments, the	harmony	is	brought	about	as	a result	of	the	subject's	rule-governed	activity	of	synthesis	in	accordance with	concepts,	and	the	output	is	a	determinate	judgment	(for	example, "X is	a	triangle"),	not	a	feeling	of	pleasure.	In	the	case	of	beauty,	as	I have	discussed,	the	synthesis	of	the	imagination	is	not	determined	by a	concept,	but	is	nevertheless	discovered	to	be	in	harmony	with	the understanding.	Kant	can	consistently	claim,	then,	that	it	is	exclusively when	the	faculties	are	unintentionally	put	into	harmony	as	they	freely "play"	with	the	representation	of	the	beautiful	object	that	pleasure	is aroused.	But	since	the	harmonious	state	the	faculties	are	unintentionally	put into is the	very	same	state they	must	be in for	cognition in general,	Kant	can	argue	that	pleasure	in	the	beautiful	is	grounded	in	a universally	valid	state	and	is,	therefore,	itself	universally	valid. Conclusion To	sum	up,	I	have	defended	an	interpretation	of	Kant's	account	of	judgments of beauty on	which the experience of the beautiful involves two	separate	feelings:	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties,	and the feeling of pleasure. Distinguishing these two feelings, I argued, helps resolve two long-standing puzzles concerning	Kant's account. The	first	puzzle	is	the	one	presented	by	Kant's	apparently	conflicting claims	that	the	judgment	of	beauty	both	is	made	through	feeling	and grounds	the	feeling	in	the	beautiful. I	argued	that	it is	the	feeling	of harmony	that	grounds	judgments	of	beauty,	and	the	feeling	of	pleasure that is	consequent	on	them,	and	as	such, that	Kant's	claims	are	consistent.	The	second	puzzle	concerns	Kant's	deduction	of	judgments	of taste,	and	the	worry	that	if,	as	he	argues,	the	harmony	of	the	faculties is	a	necessary	condition	of	all	judgments,	then	all	judgments	should in the two cases. First, as I have already	discussed, the	harmony in the	case	of	beauty	comes	about	freely:	the	activity	of	the	imagination is	not governed	by a concept	of the	understanding. Second, and	of a	piece	with	this,	the	faculties	in	the	case	of	beauty	are	said	to	be	in play:	their	agreement	is	brought	about	not	by	the	subject's	intentional cognitive activity, but rather	unintentionally. The	product	of the free synthesis	of	the	imagination	that	is	triggered	by	its	attempt	to	represent	the	beautiful	object	just	happens	to	accord	with	the	conditions	of the	understanding.34	As	Kant	puts	it,	in	an	experience	of	beauty,	"the imagination	...	is	unintentionally	(unabsichtlich)	brought into	accord with	the	understanding	...	through	a	given	representation	and	a	feeling	of	pleasure	is	thereby	aroused"	(5:190). In	other	words, the	gap	that	my	view	opens	up	between	the	harmony	of the faculties	and	the feeling	of	pleasure	allows for the	conjecture	that	it	is	only	when	the	harmony	is	discovered	to	occur	while the	faculties	are in	a	state	of free	play	that	pleasure	is	aroused.	This conjecture	strikes	me	as	defensible:	we	can	see	why	there	would	be no	cause	for	pleasure	when	the	imagination	synthesizes	a	triangle,	say, under the	direction	of the	understanding's concept "triangle"	and is for	that	reason	in	harmony	with	the	conditions	of	the	understanding. As	Kant	says,	when	it	is	"a	concept,	which	unite[s]	understanding	and imagination	in	the	judging	of	the	object	into	a	cognition	of	the	object, then	the	consciousness	of	this	relationship	[is]	intellectual"	(5:219).	In the	case	of	the	beautiful,	as	we	have	seen,	Kant	claims	that	since	no concept of the understanding is adequate to a beautiful object, the latter	triggers	a	free	synthesizing	on	behalf	of	the	imagination	that	is nonetheless	discovered,	through	the	feeling	of	harmony,	to	conform respect	to	the	object	that	produces	it.	As	such,	the	worry	raised	by	Rind	in "Can	Kant's	Deduction	Be	Saved?"	(14–6)	does	not	arise. 34. There	are	obviously	genuine	questions	here	about	how	Kant	can	claim	that the	manifold	synthesized	by	the	imagination	in	an	experience	of	beauty	is	in accordance	with the lawfulness	of the	understanding,	even though the	understanding	does	not	succeed	in	bringing	the	beautiful	object	under	a	concept.	But	responding	to	these	questions	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper. janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) Allison,	Henry.	Kant's Theory of Taste.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001. Allison, Henry. "Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse and Ginsborg."	Inquiry	46	(2)	(2003):	182–94. Ameriks,	Karl. Interpreting Kant's Critiques.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press,	2003. Aquila,	Richard	E. "A	New	Look	at	Kant's	Aesthetic Judgment."	KantStudien	70	(1–4)	(1979):	17–34. Caranti,	Luigi.	"Logical	Purposiveness	and	the	Principle	of	Taste."	KantStudien	96	(3)	(2005):	364–74. Crawford,	Donald	W.	Kant's Aesthetic Theory.	Madison:	University	of Wisconsin	Press,	1974. Ginsborg,	Hannah.	The Normativity of Nature: Essays on Kant's Critique of Judgment.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2015. Guyer,	Paul.	Kant and the Claims of Taste.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1979,	2nd	edition	1997. Guyer, Paul. "The	Harmony	of the Faculties	Revisited." In	Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy,	edited	by	Rebecca	Kukla, 162–93.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2006. Guyer,	Paul.	"One	Act	or	Two?	Hannah	Ginsborg	on	Aesthetic	Judgement."	The British Journal of Aesthetics	57	(4)	(2017):	407–19. Longuenesse, Béatrice. "Kant's Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of	Taste:	On	Henry	Allison's	Kant's Theory of Taste." Inquiry 46 (2) (2003):	143–63. Longuenesse, Béatrice. "Kant's Leading Thread in the Analytic of Beautiful."	In	Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy,	edited	by	Rebecca	Kukla,	194–219.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University Press,	2006. Meerbote,	Ralph.	"Reflection	on	Beauty."	In	Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, edited	by	Ted	Cohen	&	Paul	Guyer,	55–86.	Chicago:	University	of Chicago	Press,	1982. Palmer,	Linda.	"A	Universality	Not	Based	on	Concepts:	Kant's	Key	to the	Critique	of	Taste."	Kantian Review	13	(1)	(2008):	1–51. turn	out	to	be	pleasurable.	The	worry	disappears	on	my	view,	since	I argue	that	the	feeling	of	the	harmony	of	the	faculties	is	not	identical	to the	feeling	of	pleasure;	rather,	its	occurrence	when	the	faculties	are	in free	play	is	the	ground	of	the	feeling	of	pleasure	that	is	meant	to	be	a distinctive	element	of	the	experience	of	beauty.35 Bibliography Primary Sources References	to	The Critique of Judgment	are	given	using	the	volume	(5) and	page	number	in	the	Akademie	edition	(Kant's Gesammelte Schriften, edited	by	the	Prussian	Academy	of	Sciences,	Berlin:	Walter	de	Gruyter, 1902–).	References	to	the	First	Introduction	are	identified	by	volume number	(20). I	mainly	consulted	the	translations	by	Paul	Guyer	and Eric	Matthews (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press, 2000)	and Werner	S.	Pluhar	(Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing	Company,	1987). The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. by	Mary	Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press,	1996. Critique of Pure Reason.	Trans.	Paul	Guyer	and	Allen	Wood.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press,	1998. Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics. Trans. Gary Hatfield. Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2004. Secondary Sources Allison,	Henry. "Pleasure	and	Harmony in	Kant's	Theory	of	Taste:	A Critique	of	the	Causal	Reading."	In	Kants Ästhetik/Kant's Aesthetics/ L'esthétique de Kant, edited	by	Herman	Parret, 466–83.	Berlin	and New	York:	Walter	de	Gruyter,	1998. 35. I	am	especially	grateful	to	Hannah	Ginsborg	for	her	guidance	and	feedback on	multiple	versions	of	this	paper.	For	their	very	helpful	comments,	discussion	or	advice, I	would	also like	to	thank	Richard	Booth,	Sarah	Buss,	Yoon Choi, Ishani	Maitra, Laura	Ruetsche,	Tad	Schmaltz,	Daniel	Warren, Jessica Williams,	Rachel	Zuckert,	participants	at	the	2017	Mentoring	Workshop	for Pre-Tenure	Women	in	Philosophy,	audiences	at	the	North	American	Kant	Society	Midwest	Study	Group	and	the	Pacific	APA,	as	well	as	two	anonymous referees	for	this	journal. janum	sethi Two Feelings in the Beautiful philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	19,	no.	34	(august	2019) Rind,	Miles.	"What	Is	Claimed	in	a	Kantian	Judgment	of	Taste?"	Journal of the History of Philosophy	38	(1)	(2000):	63–85. Rind,	Miles.	"Can	Kant's	Deduction	of	Judgments	of	Taste	Be	Saved?" Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie	(84)	(2002):	20–45. Vandenabeele, Bart. "The Subjective Universality of Aesthetic Judgments Revisited." The British Journal of Aesthetics 48 (4) (2008): 410–25. Zinkin,	Melissa.	"Kant	and	the	Pleasure	of	'Mere	Reflection'."	Inquiry	55 (5)	(2012):	433–53. Zuckert,	Rachel.	"A	New	Look	at	Kant's	Theory	of	Pleasure."	The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism	60	(3)	(2002):	239–52. Zuckert,	Rachel.	Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the Critique of Judgment.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2007.