Richard	Garner	and	Richard	Joyce The	End	of	Morality:	Taking	Moral	Abolitionism	Seriously. New	York:	Routledge, 2019.	Pp.	xxiii+221.	ISBN:	978-0-8153-5860-2	(pbk) This	is	a	collection	of	twelve	original	essays	exploring	the	consequences	of	moral error theory. The central topic is the case for and against abolitionism about morality,	or	the	view	that	it	would	be	advisable	to	do	without	engaging	in	moral thought altogether. Yet some of the papers also explore alternatives to the abolitionist view. And several papers consider the empirical case for abolitionism	based	on specific case studies, such as social oppression, feminist critique	and	climate	change.	It	is	possibly	in	this	last	group	of	papers	that	readers will find most that is genuinely novel in this book. Many of the core contributions,	on	the	other	hand,	consist in the	re-elaboration	of ideas that	are either	already	familiar	from	the	recent	literature	or,	when	they	transcend	it,	only do	so	in	embryonic	form. Moral error theory is by now an established part of the philosophical 'mainstream'.	This is	mainly	due	to	the	great	strides	made	over	the last	twenty years by a small vanguard of scholars, including Richard Garner and Richard Joyce, the joint editors	of this volume.	One	mark	of the 'arrival' of	moral error theory	as	part	of	mainstream	philosophy	was	the	publication	in	2007	of	a	special issue in	Ethical	Theory	and	Moral	Practice,	devoted to J.	L.	Mackie's	1977	work Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, a collection which was then subsequently published by Springer in book form under the title	A	World	without	Values in 2 2010. Where the primary focus of the 2007/2010 papers was the intrinsic plausibility	of a	moral error theory, the	primary focus	of	The	End	of	Morality	a decade later is	what follows from its	acceptance. It is therefore	only	natural to consider Joyce and Kirchin's 2007/2010 volume and Garner and Joyce's 2019 volume	as	a	complementary	pair.	And	there is	much,	apart from	the topic, that the two volumes have in common. There is a significant (but not excessive) overlap	among the contributors.	Thus,	both the two	editors	and	Caroline	West appear	in	both	collections. Both	volumes	also	include	the	reproduction	of	work written a considerable time before this topic became fashionable. Thus, in the present volume we find extracts of an unpublished monograph by Jordan Howard	Sobel	and	selections	from	a	work	by	Ian	Hinckfuss	initially	published	in 1987 and reprinted here under its intended title 'To Hell with Morality'. Although the	contents	of these two	pieces	are	arguably	of	more	historical than philosophical	interest	given	all	the	things	that	have	happened	since,	the	editors are to	be thanked for	doing their	bit as custodians	of the	philosophical record. Apart from that, it is only fair to report that I found the general quality of the papers in	the	2007/2010	volumes	to	be	higher	than	those in	the	2019	volume. Most	probably,	this	is	because	the	literature	on	the	'What	next?'	question	is	at	an earlier	stage	of	development	in	2019	than	the	literature	on	the	'For	and	against' question	was	at	in	2007. Even so, in a relatively short space of time those writing on the 'What next?' question	have	come	to	form	a	cluster	of	identifiable 'camps',	three	of	which	are represented here. The clear way in which it reveals how the error theoretic landscape	has	already	begun	to	crystallize	in	this	way	is	one	of	the	most	useful 3 services provided by this book. First and foremost, then, we have the abolitionists, who argue that we do better by abolishing moral thought altogether, the most unambiguous proponents of which in this volume are Garner,	Hinckfuss,	and	Joel	Marks.	The	most	obvious	challenge	for	abolitionism, as	repeatedly	noted	by the	authors, is to	show	that	by 'abolishing'	morality	we are	not	just	reinventing	it	under	another	name	(such	as	what	Bernard	Williams called	'ethics').	Second,	we	have	the	fictionalists,	who	argue	that	we	do	better	by putting literally false	moral thoughts to use as a convenient fiction. The	most prominent	defense	of	this	view	has	been	provided	by	Joyce,	whose	discussion	in this volume concedes that a fictionalist	menu	might	be	better	prepared	with a sprinkle of ad hoc abolitionism thrown in. Either way, the most obvious challenge for fictionalism is that it seems to require a certain amount of psychological acrobatics in handling the human costs of morality as makebelieve,	with	the	inevitable	danger	of	evaluative	schizophrenia	that	this	arguably entails. Third, we have the conservationists, who argue that we do better by hanging	on to	moral thought	with all its faults, the idea	being that the general usefulness of sticking to what we've got outweighs the intellectual value of aspiring	to	not	believe falsely.	Or:	almost sticking	to	what	we've	got.	For in the chapter	that	comes	closest	to	endorsing	the	conservationist	line,	Björn	Eriksson and Jonas Olson propose a 'negotiationist' alternative that, much like Joyce's revised	view, sprinkles a	bit of abolitionism	on the	menu to cater for	different tastes.	The	obvious	pattern	that	emerges	from	all	of	this	is	that	none	of	the	three error-theoretic options just mentioned is recommendable for consumption in unadulterated form. Instead, the error theorist does better by considering a mixture	of	strategies	depending	on	the	circumstances.	The	chapter	that	arguably 4 comes best to terms with the contextual vagaries of this challenge, both philosophically and in terms of its sensitivity to empirical evidence, is Jessica Isserow's	'Minimizing	the	Misuse	of	Morality'.	Yet	serious	empirical	sensitivity	to the	contextual	complexities	of	these	matters	is	also	on	display	among	the	three authors who have been tasked with providing 'case studies' of moral error theory	in	practice,	namely	Nicolas	Olsson	Yaouzis	(on	oppression),	Caroline	West (on feminism) and Thomas Pölzler (on climate change), and occasionally elsewhere. All	in	all,	the	moral	error	theorists	we	meet	in	this	volume	strike	me	as	a	friendly bunch.	Although	nothing systematic is said to confirm this impression, they	all seem	to	be	secular	naturalists	with	a	commitment	to	human	and	other	sentient well-being; basically egalitarian; generally drawn towards broadly consequentialist reasoning; and sincerely concerned to combat oppression, domination	and	the	destruction	of	our	natural	environment.	Moreover, they	all seem perfectly serious about promoting these values and to argue for their pursuit by	others. The	obvious	puzzle, as already	noted, is	why	we should	not read	these	recommendations	as	a	convoluted	form	of	tacit	moralizing.	In	spite	of repeated	attempts	to	address	the	puzzle	by	various	authors,	I	confess	to	having no	clearer	sense	of	what	the	answer	is	at	the	end	of	the	book	than	I	had	at	the beginning.	I	had	three	specific	concerns	on	this	score,	each	of	which	I	hope	does the	spirit	of	the	volume	justice	by	taking	moral	abolitionism	seriously. The first is a point about the use of historical examples to illustrate the error theorist's	predicament,	which	on	more	than	one	occasion	is	either	misleading	or 5 tendentious.	One	case	will	have	to	suffice.	Hinckfuss	argues	that	we	do	better	by abolishing morality because of the tendency of moral thought to reinforce 'elitism' and inflexible social hierarchies. To this end, he briskly reviews Nietzsche's genealogical critique	of	morality in	On	the	Genealogy	of	Morals. Yet his use of Nietzsche in the present context is doubly misleading. First, in the material quoted, Nietzsche is not rejecting	morality in virtue of its elitist and hierarchical tendencies.	On the	contrary,	Nietzsche is	bemoaning the loss	of	an ethics	of	nobility	(and	hierarchy)	exhibited	by	the	Ancients	and its	unfortunate replacement	by	the	egalitarian	ethics	of	Christianity	as	a	result	of	what	Nietzsche notoriously calls the 'slave revolt'. In this respect, the 'morality' rejected by Nietzsche is	pretty	much	indistinguishable from	the 'post-morality' favoured	by Hinckfuss. Second, the issue that both Hinckfuss and Nietzsche have with the 'morality' they claim to reject consists in a substantial conflict of values, not a disagreement about the existence of moral facts or properties, or the metaphysical	grounding	of	the	Categorical	Imperative.	(Of	course,	both	Hinckfuss and Nietzsche also have skeptical points to make about realist moral metaphysics,	but	these	are	made	under	separate	cover.)	In	spite	of	some	valiant efforts to keep these issues apart (Blackford's chapter is a case in point), this tendency to cite substantial conflicts of values to illustrate the predicament of the moral error theorist reappears quite frequently throughout the volume, sometimes	at the cost if	muddling	up	discussions	of issues that are	potentially more	interesting	on	their	own	terms.	Moeller's intriguing	discussion	of	Taoism, 'carnivalism' and 'negative ethics' is another	unfortunate	victim	of this general tendency. 6 My	second	concern	is	one	about	the	choice	of	case	studies	to	test	the	abolitionist claim.	On	a	positive	side,	this	volume	contains	a	pleasingly	large	number	of	case studies. So even if the detail in which these case studies are pursued could sometimes	be	improved,	there	is	nothing	wrong	about	the	sheer	amount	of	them. The	issue	is instead	one	about	what justifies	the	choice	of	these	case	studies in particular,	as	opposed	to	other	candidates	the	discussion	of	which	would	either corroborate or undermine the abolitionist response. In particular, I would suggest that	more attention could be paid to the kind of case that	would lend itself	to	be	used	as	a	potential	'falsifier'	of	abolitionism.	The	kind	of	case	I	have	in mind is	one	where there is	historical	evidence that the	question	of	whether	or not to abolish moral thought from some area of discourse has actually been explicitly discussed during the course of practical decision	making outside the context of philosophical debate, within the latter of which participants will inevitably	bring	substantial assumptions	about the connections	between	ethics and	meta-ethics to the table.	While some of the examples used in the volume could	in	principle	qualify	for	this	theoretical	role,	most	of	them	do	not.	Yet	we	do have	such	examples	to	hand.	For	example,	there	is	a	substantial	body	of	work	on the	significance	of	moral	thought	(or its	absence) in	the	context	of	professional life, from the strategic deliberation of corporate CEOs to the doctor-patient relationship	in	public	and	private	health	care.	Indeed,	one	influential	hypothesis from	the	ethics	of	finance	is	that	systematic 'shocks'	such	as	the	2008	'financial crisis'	have	been	aided	and	abetted	by	a	culture in	which	key	stakeholders	are generally	incentivized	to	think	about	their	professional	roles	in	morally	'mute'	or purely	amoral terms.	Whatever the	merits	of this	and	related	hypotheses, they have the obvious advantage of not only being empirically tractable, but also 7 having been systematically studied to the extent that some of the results are actually being operationalized (for better or	worse) in	medical training and in business schools. Future work on the 'What next?' question would do well to attend to these, and analogous, examples before drawing general conclusions about	when, and	where,	we	would	be	better	off by abandoning	all, or	most, of moral	thought	from	social	life. My third concern is about exactly	what abolitionism is. It	would be natural to expect	this	volume	to	focus	especially	on	producing	further	clarity	on	this	topic, so it is somewhat disappointing to record that it falls noticeably short in this respect.	What	the	volume	could	really	have	done	with,	I	think,	is	a	contribution that sets	out the range	of	alternatives	of	what	abolitionism	could	be,	maps	out the logical connections between them, and begins to say something clear and definite about their comparative merits. Why does the volume not contain a contribution	of	this	kind?	I	can	only	speculate,	but	one	obvious	hypothesis	that	it is a function of a corresponding lack of clarity about what is actually to be abolished.	I	shall	close	this	review	by	very	briefly	articulating	four	alternatives	of what	that	might	be	(the	list	is	not	exhaustive). First, we may be asked to reject the ends and aspirations with which moral thought	has	historically	been	associated,	each	of	us	perhaps	aspiring	instead	to the evaluative profile of the leading character in Bret Easton Ellis's American Psycho.	As I	suggested	above, I take it	as	pretty	much	axiomatic that this is	not what	our	error	theoretic	friends	have	in	mind. 8 Second,	we	may	be	asked	to	stop	employing	moral	terms,	including	the	so-called 'thin' ones of right and	wrong; good and bad and the so-called 'thick' ones of courage,	cowardice,	or	charlatan.	There	is	some	evidence	that	this	is	what	some authors	in	the	volume	have	in	mind,	including	Joel	Marks,	who	suggests	that	we do better to think in terms of what people desire. This is at least a testable proposal,	but	one	which	is	subject	to	at	least	two	important	qualifications.	First, and	as several author in the	volume	point	out,	not all uses	of	paradigmatically moral	terms	are	moral	uses	of	these	terms.	Some	such	uses	make	better	sense	as interpreted	against	the	background	of	some	alternative	social	parameter,	such	as a	game.	Second,	and	as	none	of	the	authors	in	the	volume	seem	to	make	anything significant	of	at	all,	not	all	uses	of	non-moral	terms are	non-moral	uses	of those terms.	Thus,	one	potential	reason	why	we	might	get	along	better	by	talking	about what	people	desire	is	that	we	implicitly	assume	that	it	is	morally	bad	to	frustrate people	from	getting	what	they	want.	The	scope	for	further	examples	of	this	kind is	virtually	endless. Third, we may be asked to give up on some of the inferential dispositions normally	associated	with	moral	terms,	such	as	the	disposition	to	infer	that	if	it	is wrong	for	someone	to	be	prevented	from	getting	what	they	want,	this	would	be wrong regardless of what anyone, including them, happen to desire. It is arguably	inferential	dispositions	like	these,	with	their	obvious	connection	to	the Categorical Imperative, that is the primary target of	most of the arguments in this book, including not only those of the abolitionists (Hinckfuss, Garner, Marks), but also those of the fictionalists (Joyce) and the ecumenical conservationists (Eriksson and Olson). So perhaps if we identify abolitionism 9 with this alternative, we shall finally have hit the nail on the head. Even so, however,	we	shall	have	to	proceed	with	caution,	and	for	the	same	kinds	of	reason as before. First, and as recently argued	by Stephen Finlay and others, it is not obviously compulsory to interpret all moral thought as being inflexibly committed	to	the	allegedly	problematic	inferential	commitments	associated	with the Categorical Imperative. Second, there are ways for people to exhibit inferential commitments very	much like those associated	with the Categorical Imperative	that	have	nothing	essentially	to	do	with	the	moral	content	(if	any)	of what they assert, for example when – during the course of a long business negotiation	– I reveal	myself to	be	exceedingly	stubborn	or inflexible in	what I am prepared to accept. The topic of	what constrains the interpretation of our inferential dispositions is a very difficult one about which much more could usefully	be	said	(and	in	due	course	hopefully	will	be). Fourth, we	may be asked to abandon the ontological commitments that error theorists attribute to moral thought, such as the postulation of a set of irreducibly normative, mind independent and extensionally specifiable 'facts' and 'properties'. There is some evidence that this is what's bothering at least some of the authors in this book, but on the whole such ontological considerations	tend	to	play	a	secondary	role	in	their	arguments,	at	least	on	this occasion.	The	point	is	obviously	controversial,	but	I	think	this	is	probably	for	the best. From the	point	of view	of	practical	deliberation, and for the 'What	next?' theorist	as	well	as	for	everyone	else,	the	troubling	question	is	what	to	care	about and	which	ends	to	promote.	Provided	we	can	earn	the	right	to	have	the	courage of our convictions in this respect,	we should arguably resist the temptation of 10 letting the content of our practical commitments rest on an academic power struggle	focused	on	the	ownership	of	theoretical	terms.	Either	way,	whoever	gets to	be in charge in the	error-theorists' 'post-moral'	universe, let's	hope it is	not the	terminological	thought	police.	On	this	topic,	as	on	the	two	issues	raised	in	the immediately preceding paragraphs, there is much scope for valuable future contributions	to	this	expanding	field	of	philosophical	debate. Hallvard	Lillehammer Birkbeck,	University	of	London h.lillehammer@bbk.ac.uk