THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO P attt November 29 ,____________jg 63 Robin Sommers Smith_________ / £ F j l A - . / f 3 < / _____________ Author Birth Date An A n a ly s is o f th e Concept o f Truth________________________________________________ T itle o f Dissertation P hilosophy__________________________________Ph.D.________________ December. 1965 Department or School Degree Convocation Permission is herewith granted to the University o f Chicago to make copies of the above title, at its discretion, upon the request o f individuals or institutions and at their expense. 12-) 16 /'6 5 _____________________ S', _____ Date filmed Number o f pages Signature o f writer Extensive Quotation or Further Reproduction o f This Material by Persons or Agencies Other than the University o f Chicago May N ot Be Made without the Express Permission o f the Writer. S h o r t T i t l e : I r r e g u l a r n u m b e r in g □ O v e r s iz e d s h e e t s □ pa .d i By cash D By thesis deposit □ D a t e b i l l e d . THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY BY ROBIN SOMMERS SMITH CHICAGO, ILLINOIS DECEMBER, 1965 TABLE OF CONTE? .S Chapter I . INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH .................................................................................... A P r e p o s it io n a l Theory o f Truth Two Ordinary-Language A nalyses Im p lica tio n s fo r the A n a ly s is o f Truth I I . MEANING A3 USE: WORDS AND RULES................................. The "Meaning o f a Word" "Use" Function and Purpose Conventions and M e a n in g -a s -P o ss ib ility R ules o f Use P r e s c r ip t iv e and D e sc r ip tiv e R ules R ules: Theory and P r a c t ic e The Nature o f Word-meaning I I I . MEANING AS USE: SENTENCES AND A C T IO N ................... Sentences as Meanings S en ten ces: Function and Form Sentences: Use and A ctio n Language-games and A ctio n s Language-games and B a sic A c t iv i t i e s C onclusion: Sentences and Meaning IV. THE PHILOSOPHIC PROBLEM OF TRUTH ................................. Some Form ulations o f th e Problem Method and th e Nature o f P h ilo so p h ic Problems P h ilo so p h ic Problem o f Truth V. ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH................................. That which i s True or F a lse Truth-games and T ruth-claim s Language-games and Truth-games Meaning, Truth and th e Concept o f a P ro p o s it io n Truth and Function BIBLIOGRAPHY CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE ANALYSIS OF TRUTH This study i s an exam ination o f the problem o f tru th w ith in the co n tex t o f the "use" view o f meaning. In t h is chapter w i l l be o u tlin e d b r ie f ly my reasons for th in k in g th a t such a study i s d e s ir a b le . I s h a l l d isc u ss two typ es o f a n a ly s is o f the problem, a " p rop osition a l" th eory and two "ordinary language" th e o r ie s , and argue b r ie f ly th a t th ey are not e n t ir e ly adequate fo r d e a lin g w ith a l l a sp ec ts o f th e problem o f tr u th . Concluding the chapter i s an o u tlin e o f th e manner in which th e problem i s to be pursued in the rem aining ch a p ters . Throughout the e n t ir e study two p r in c ip le s w i l l be taken as g iv e n - - ( l ) th a t th e meaning o f a word i s i t s u s e , and (2 ) th a t p h ilo so p h - ic problems are con cep tu al problem s. Chapters I I through V thus c o n s t i - tu te an e x e r c ise in a n a ly t ic ph ilosophy as d e lim ited by th ese two p r in c i - p le s . Both o f th e se p r in c ip le s , however, a lthough tr e a te d as a x io m a tic , are them selves in te r p r e te d . That i s , they are not tr e a te d as proved p ro p o s itio n s whose proof i s assumed a lon g w ith them, b u t, r a th e r , as sp e c - ify in g a type o f p h ilo so p h ic approach th a t i s open to more than one in t e r - p r e ta t io n , one o f which i s developed in t h is study. The a n a ly s is o f tr u th g iven in th e l a s t chapter i s th e r e fo r e th e r e s u lt o f a p h ilo so p h ic e x e r c is e th a t has taken as i t s lim it in g p r in c i - p le s th e s e two v ie w s , one concerning th e nature o f word-meaning and one concerning the nature o f ph ilosophy i t s e l f . 1 2 A P r o p o s it io n a l Theory o f T ruth E x p o sitio n . In W it tg e n s te in 's T r a e ta tu s L o g ic o -P h i lo s o p h ic u s '*' s ta te m e n ts are h e ld t o be u lt im a te ly a n a ly z a b le in t o sim p le s ta te m e n ts th a t correspon d t o s im p le f a c t s . I f th e sim p le f a c t s are a c t u a l , e x i s t e n t f a c t s , th e n th e sta tem en t i s t r u e . I f th e y are m ere ly l o g i c a l l y p o s s ib l e f a c t s , and are n o t a c t u a l ly e x i s t e n t , th en th e s ta te m e n t i s f a l s e . The p o s s ib le f a c t co rresp o n d in g to a se n te n c e c o n s t i t u t e s th e meaning o f th e se n te n c e and th e a c t u a l f a c t , i f th e r e i s one, e s t a b l i s h e s i t s t r u th . The p o s s ib le f a c t i s c a l l e d a " p r o p o s it io n ," and th u s: propo- s i t i o n = m eaning o f a se n te n c e : p o s s ib le f a c t . The a c t u a l or e x i s t e n t f a c t , on th e o th er hand, cannot be s a id t o be th e tr u th o f th e p r o p o s it io n b u t , r a th e r , th e correspon d en ce o f an a c tu a l f a c t w ith a p o s s ib le one e s t a b - l i s h e s th a t th e p r o p o s it io n i s tr u e . What has m eaning i s what i t i s p o s s ib le (p e r m is s ib le ) t o s a y , th a t i s , what i s c o r r e la te d w ith p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f f a c t s . Whether a s e n - te n c e e x p r e s s e s p o s s ib le f a c t s must be d eterm in ed by w hether i t may be a s s e r te d t o be tr u e or f a l s e . That som eth in g may be tr u e or f a l s e i s e s - s e n t i a l t o i t s meaning som eth in g . The word "Satz" in th e E n g lis h t r a n s la t io n o f th e T r a e ta tu s i s t r a n s la t e d " p r o p o s it io n ," th e l o g i c a l term , b u t i t a l s o may be t r a n s la t e d " se n te n c e ," th e gram m atical term . W it tg e n s te in i s n o t u s in g th e term am b igu ou sly , though , s in c e he c o n s id e r s th e se n te n c e t o be " e s s e n t i a l ly ," i . e . , l o g i c a l l y , r e d u c ib le t o th e p r o p o s it io n . ^Ludwig W it tg e n s te in , T r a e ta tu s L o g ic o -P h ilo so p h ic u s (London: R ou tled ge and Kegan P a u l, 1 9 2 2 ). 3 The tr u th -v a lu e s o f p r o p o s it io n s are determ ined by th e tr u th - v a lu e s o f t h e ir c o n s t itu e n t e lem en tary p r o p o s it io n s . The sen se or meaning o f a l l p r o p o s it io n s depends upon th e se n se o f e lem entary p r o p o s it io n s . S o , th e T raeta tu s b eg in s w ith a d is c u s s io n o f th e r e la t io n s h ip betw een names and th in g s , s in c e i t h o ld s th e m eanings o f names to be e lem en ts o f th e sen se o f e lem en tary p r o p o s it io n s . Names are view ed as having th in g s (" o b je c t s " ) fo r t h e ir m eanings, and are combined to g e th e r in sen ten ces in such a way as to r e f l e c t or p ro - j e c t th e com bination o f " ob jects" in to " f a c t s , " The "object" i s th e meaning o f th e name, and th e " fact" i s th e sen se o f th e p r o p o s it io n . ("Meaning" i s l im ite d in th e T ra eta tu s to a s p e c ia l r e la t io n betw een name and o b je c t , th e r e la t io n o f naming. To speak o f th e "meaning" o f se n te n c e s r e q u ir e s another word, " sen se ." T his removes th e am bigu ity o f "m eaning," w hich i s q u ite d i f f e r e n t fo r a word and a se n te n c e , and t h i s d if f e r e n c e i s in d ic a te d by th e use o f th e two te r m s .) The sen se o f a sen ten ce i s sa id to show i t s e l f in th e se n te n c e . The meaning o f a name can be shown by p u tt in g i t in se n te n c e s w hich , how- e v e r , cannot be th em selves understood u n t i l th e name, as w e l l as each o f th e o ther c o n s t itu e n t names, i s known to mean a p a r t ic u la r o b je c t . To know th a t a p r o p o s it io n has s e n se , th e n , depends upon knowing th a t p a r t i c - u la r o b je c ts are meanings o f i t s p a r t ic u la r names. I f we had b e fo re us an u n a n a ly za b le , p r im it iv e , e lem entary p rop - o s i t i o n , i t s e lem en ts would be names. I f we a ls o had b e fo r e us th e f a c t p ic tu r e d by th e p r o p o s it io n , we would be a b le to c o r r e la te i t s o b je c ts w ith th e names composing th e p r o p o s it io n . S in ce th e sen ten ce r e f l e c t s th e p a r t ic u la r f a c t , i t has a s tr u c tu r e in common w ith i t . Now, every o b je c t in th e f a c t has a l o g i c a l form th a t i s in te r n a l to i t and th a t d eterm ines a l l th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f i t s com bination in to f a c t s . The ob - j e c t , however, determ ines on ly th e "form11 o f th e f a c t s i t e n te r s in to . That i s , i t i t s e l f on ly determ ines which f a c t s i t may en ter in t o , not th o se in to which i t a c t u a l ly does e n te r . The names o f o b je c ts a cco r d in g ly can n ot, through t h e ir sy n ta c - t i c a l l im it a t io n s , t e l l an yth in g about w hich elem entary p r o p o s it io n s are in f a c t tru e; th ey can t e l l on ly which elem entary p r o p o s it io n s are p o s s i - b le . These p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f syn tax are p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f f a c t s . The tr u th o f p r o p o s it io n s l i e s in th e e x is t e n c e o f f a c t s , w h ile th e form o f f a c t s , th e ir l o g i c a l s tr u c tu r e , c o n s t i t u t e s m erely th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f f a c t s . In t h i s way, t h i s p r o p o s it io n a l th eo ry a v o id s sa y in g th a t a s e n - te n c e has meaning in v ir tu e o f an a c tu a l s t a t e o f a f f a i r s w ith which i t i s c o r r e la te d , i . e . , th a t to mean som ething i t must be tr u e . The sen se o f a sen ten ce i s on ly th e p o s s ib le f a c t i t "m irrors" (or "shows fo r th " ) . P r o p o s it io n s have a common fo rm --th e " gen era l form o f p r o p o s it io n [P; N (I T ) ] ; and a common m a te r ia l-elem en tary , u n analyzab le p r o p o s i- t io n s . Their meaning i s th u s dependent upon th e nature o f th e meaning o f elem entary p r o p o s it io n s ( c o r r e la t io n w ith " fa c ts" ) and on th e nature o f th e meaning o f compound p r o p o s it io n s (sh a r in g th e common lo g ica l/g ra m m a ti c a l s tr u c tu r e o f compound p r o p o s it io n s ) . T heir tr u th depends upon t h e ir having a m e a n in g - i .e . , b ein g a p o s s ib le f a c t , and th e r e b e in g an a c tu a l , e x i s t e n t f a c t correspon d in g to i t . C r it iq u e This p r o p o s it io n a l th eo ry con n ects meaning and tr u th through th e con cep t o f a " p r o p o s it io n ," w hich may be d e fin e d b o th as ( l ) "the meaning 5 o f a se n te n c e ," and (2 ) " that -which i s tru e or f a l s e ." The th eo ry o f f e r s an ex p la n a tio n o f how th e se two con cep ts are e q u iv a le n t . In t h i s s e c t io n w i l l be d isc u sse d very b r i e f l y , f i r s t , how th e T raeta tu s concept o f a p r o p o s it io n as "the meaning o f a sen ten ce" would seem t o be in com p atib le w ith a view o f meaning as u se , and secon d , how th e T raeta tu s con cep t o f a p r o p o s it io n as " that which i s tr u e or f a ls e " and th e r e la te d correspondence typ e o f th eory o f tr u th a l s o would seem t o be in com p atib le w ith a view o f meaning as u se . The T ra eta tu s th eo ry o f meaning i s in com p atib le w ith a use view o f meaning in a t l e a s t two fundam ental ways: ( l ) in r e s p e c t to words as names, and (2 ) in r e s p e c t to sen ten ces as sh a r in g th e " gen era l form o f p r o p o s it io n ." l ) S in ce th e meanings o f names are b a s ic to th e sen se o f s e n te n c e s , i t may be asked what an example o f a name would b e . S in ce names as under- stood in th e T raeta tu s cannot be d e fin e d or an alyzed i t i s c le a r th a t few , i f any, nouns o f any n a tu r a l language would be names in t h i s s e n s e . "Name" may be understood to b e , in W ittg e n s te in 's term in o lo g y , a "form al co n cep t," p ro p er ly rep resen ted by a v a r ia b le th a t may be s u b s t itu te d fo r by words th a t are p r im it iv e and whose meanings are o b je c ts th a t may be p o in ted t o . That th e name i s in d e f in a b le and th a t th e o b je c t may be p o in ted to are th e c r i t e r ia o f both the m ean in gfu ln ess o f th e name and th e e x is te n c e o f the o b je c t . In t h i s view language i s b a s ic a l ly composed o f names in r e la t io n to each o t h e r - t h e o r e t i c a l ly , we may an a lyze ev ery th in g we say in to e l e - mentary p r o p o s it io n s composed o f names in p a r t ic u la r l o g i c a l s t r u c tu r e s . Whether or n ot such a n a ly ze s are p o s s ib le in p r a c t ic e , in t h i s th eo ry l i n g u i s t i c m eaning i s view ed as dependent upon i t s a n a ly z a b i l i t y in to (" elem en tary" ) p r o p o s it io n s made up o f names o f u n a n a ly z a b le , u lt im a te o b j e c t s . Now, t h i s s p e c i f i c i t y o f meaning t h a t , through names, u n d e r lie s a l l l i n g u i s t i c m eaning, i s in c o n tr a s t t o th e view o f meaning as d e f in a b le th rou gh "use." The n o t io n o f meaning as u se g iv e s an a l t e r n a t iv e view o f th e fo u n d a tio n o f m eaning. R ather than depending upon a b a s is o f names th a t c o r r e la te w ith u lt im a te o b je c ts o f some s o r t , m eaning, in th e u se v ie w , depends upon a c t i v i t i e s o f use o f w ords, on ly one ty p e o f w hich are names or a n a ly z a b le in to names. 2 ) W ittg e n s te in c la im s to g iv e th e e s se n c e o f language in th e T r a e ta tu s ; by h i s own d e f in i t i o n t h i s i s t o g iv e what i s common to a l l w ell-fo r m ed e x p r e s s io n s o f la n g u a g e , and y e t th ere i s no a llo w a n ce w ith in such a th eory fo r common se n te n c e s such as commands, fo r in s ta n c e . He c la im s to have reduced g e n e r a l p r o p o s it io n s and th o se o f th e form "A b e - l i e v e s p , " to c o n c a te n a tio n s o f e lem en tary p r o p o s it io n s , b u t j u s t as im- p o r ta n t are se n te n c e s such a s "Scram!" as w e ll a s w a rn in gs, sw earin g , e t c . , w hich cannot be so a n a ly ze d . Having no way o f e x p la in in g th e mean- in g o f such s e n te n c e s , i t becomes d o u b tfu l whether we are any lon g er t a l k - in g about language i t s e l f a t a l l . Here a g a in , w hether or n ot i t i s p o s s ib le in p r a c t ic e t o reduce a l l s e n te n c e s t o a " gen era l form o f p r o p o s it io n ," in t h i s th eo ry l i n g u i s - t i c meaning i s v iew ed as " e s s e n t ia l ly " o f t h i s form . T his view o f th e s tr u c tu r e o f s e n te n c e s (and , h en ce , in t h i s th e o r y , o f a l l l i n g u i s t i c mean- in g ) i s in c o n tr a s t a g a in t o a u se ty p e o f view o f m eaning. The a c t i v i t i e s o f language se r v e th e fu n c t io n in a u se ty p e o f view th a t th e n o t io n o f s e n t e n t ia l s tr u c tu r e does in th e T ra eta tu s th e o r y . R ather than depending 7 upon an e s s e n t i a l form or s tr u c tu r e , s e n t e n t ia l m eaning, in a use v ie w , i s a fu n c t io n o f a c t i v i t i e s . In th e s e w ays, in r e s p e c t to c o n ten t and t o form , th e T r a e ta tu s 1 trea tm en t o f a " p ro p o sitio n " a s "the m eaning o f a sen ten ce" i s incom pat- ib le w ith a view o f meaning as u s e . The th eo ry o f tr u th o f th e T ra eta tu s cannot be e n t ir e ly s a t i s f a c - to r y i f th e th eo ry o f meaning i s n o t . By fo c u s in g on th e th eory o f tr u th now, how ever, i t w i l l be seen t h a t , as a correspondence th e o r y , i t i s a ls o in co m p a tib le w ith a view o f meaning as u se . The n o t io n o f a p r o p o s it io n as " th a t w hich i s tr u e or f a ls e " i s in te r p r e te d in th e T ra eta tu s a s a " p o s s ib le f a c t ." There i s an o b v io u s ly im portant r e l a t io n betw een f a c t s and t r u th , and t h i s th eo ry o f f e r s an e x - p la n a t io n o f t h i s r e la t io n as correspon d en ce through common " lo g ic a l s tr u c tu r e ." Thus, tr u th i s view ed as a r e la t io n betw een e n t i t i e s o f two c a t e g o r i e s - l i n g u i s t i c and m a te r ia l . The r e l a t io n i s betw een two k in d s o f f a c t s and i s p o s s ib le b ecau se th e " stru ctu re" o f l i n g u i s t i c f a c t s can m ir- ror th e s tr u c tu r e o f a l l o th er f a c t s , b o th p o s s ib le and a c t u a l . ( R u s s e l l , in h is v e r s io n o f th e p r o p o s it io n a l th e o r y , says th a t f a c t s are n e ith e r tru e nor f a l s e , th ey j u s t a r e . Of c o u r se , l i n g u i s t i c f a c t s a r e , t o o , but th e s e f a c t s are th e r u le s and u sa g es o f lan gu age , and th e m eanings o f th e l i n g u i s t i c f a c t s th a t are s e n te n c e s are th e p r o p o s i- t io n s whose l o g i c a l s t r u c tu r e s m irror o th er f a c t s . There are th in g s th a t j u s t a r e -f a c t s , and th e r e are th in g s th a t are tr u e or f a l s e as w e l l - - p r o p o s it io n s . ) The n o t io n o f a " p ro p o sitio n " a s " th a t w hich i s tru e or f a ls e " i s in te r p r e te d in th e T ra eta tu s a s a " p o ss ib le f a c t ," w hich , in tu r n , i s eq u ated "with "the m eaning o f a se n te n c e ." Truth i s th e r e la t io n betw een p o s s ib le f a c t and a c t u a l , e x i s t e n t f a c t , or betw een "words and th e w o rld ," meaning and r e a l i t y . T h is "correspondence" th eo ry t r e a t s t r u th as a p red - ic a t e o f th e meaning (" se n se " ) o f a s e n te n c e . When a p r o p o s it io n i s "true" th e r e i s a c o r r e la t io n betw een i t and an a c tu a l f a c t . Truth i s a c o r r e la t io n o f meaning w ith s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s th a t a re ex tra -m ean in g . The p h ilo s o p h ic co n cep t o f a p r o p o s it io n i s co n n ected , in t h i s and oth er t h e o r ie s , w ith th e drawing o f a d i s t in c t io n betw een l i n g u i s t i c s ig n s and t h e ir m eaning. A se n te n c e as su ch , i t i s r ea so n ed , cannot be tr u e or f a l s e b ecau se i t i s composed m erely o f marks or sou nd s, w h ich , a_s marks or sou nd s, cannot be e i th e r tr u e or f a l s e . T h ere fo r e , i t must be th e meaning o f th e s e " signs" th a t i s tr u e or f a l s e . In t h i s way, th e n o t io n o f some- th in g th a t i s th e s o r t o f th in g th a t can be tru e or f a l s e may come t o be d e fin e d as a m eaning. In t h i s s o r t o f employment o f th e p h ilo s o p h ic concept o f a propo- s i t i o n , th e problem o f tr u th i s v iew ed as one o f f i r s t id e n t i f y in g and n a i l in g down what s o r t o f th in g "true" i s p r e d ic a te d o f , and then exam in- in g i t t o s e e how i t i s d i f f e r e n t when "true" i s in f a c t p ro p er ly p r e d i- c a ted o f i t . A s e n te n c e comes in t h i s way to be d e fin e d as a u n it o f m eaning, a s i n g l e , u n ita r y th in g o f which "true" may be p r e d ic a te d . I t seems to be a requ irem ent fo r th e a n a ly s is o f t r u th th a t what i s capab le o f b e in g tr u e be a u n it o f meaning whose tr u th may be t e s t e d - som ething whose tr u th or f a l s i t y may be v a l id a te d , a t l e a s t t h e o r e t i c a l l y . T h is p u ta t iv e requ irem ent may le a d to th e a d o p tio n o f a n o t io n l i k e th a t o f a p r o p o s it io n in which i s in v o lv e d what m ight be term ed a " m ea n in g -freeze ," i . e . , th e p r o p o s it io n i s d e f in e d a s a u n it o f m eaning t h a t i s independent o f c o n te x t and whose tr u th i s th u s t h e o r e t i c a l ly d eterm inab le once and fo r a l l . The p r o p o s it io n in th e sen se o f a u n it o f meaning may become dependent in t h i s way upon supposed requirem ents o f th e p r o p o s it io n in th e sen se o f th a t w hich i s tr u e or f a l s e . P r o p o s it io n a l th e o r ie s o f t h i s s o r t t r e a t tr u th as a p r e d ic a te . That i s , th e problem o f tr u th i s seen as c e n te r in g on th e term " tru e ," w hich i s p r e d ic a te d o f s e n te n c e s . An attem p t to e x p lic a te "true" then le a d s to s p e c i f i c a t io n o f th e s o r t o f sen ten ce o f which i t i s p r e d ic a te d . T his s o r t o f sen ten ce (a " sta tem ent" ) th en may be tr e a te d as a vague, natu r a lla n g u a g e shorthand fo r a " p r o p o s it io n ," i . e . , a meaning fro ze n in tim e and space through com plete s p e c i f i c a t io n , w hich th e r e fo r e may be d e - term ined , in th e o r y , t o be e ith e r tr u e or f a l s e . In g e n io u s ly , th e T raeta tu s view avo id s sa y in g th a t what i s f a l s e must be m ean in g less w h ile s im u lta n eo u sly h o ld in g th a t th e meaning o f a sen ten ce i s th e name o f a f a c t . T his i s done through th e n o tio n o f a p o s - s ib le f a c t as a " p r o p o s it io n ," but a p r o p o s it io n i s a l o g i c a l m ean in g--th e r e a l meaning o f words o f n a tu r a l language whose r u le s are a r b itr a r y and id io m a tic . How a meaning i s ex p ressed -th e a r b itr a r y l i n g u i s t i c r u le s - i s unim portant; what th e meaning i s th a t i s e x p r e s se d --th e p r o p o s it io n - - i s th e im portant a sp e c t o f meaning so fa r as tr u th i s concerned. The p r o p o s it io n i t s e l f , however, has a l o g i c a l s tr u c tu r e th a t i s a d i s t i l l a - t io n o f l i n g u i s t i c s tr u c tu r e s -th e p r o p o s it io n i s th e "essence" o f la n - g u a g e ^ ) . The c o r r e la t io n s betw een a p r o p o s it io n and a f a c t , when a prop- o s i t io n i s t r u e , are m e a n in g -r e la tio n s; The "names" th a t have a s tr u c tu r e in th e p r o p o s it io n are c o r r e la te d w ith t h e ir "m eanings," o b je c ts th a t have a s tr u c tu r e in a " fact" in th e w orld , and th e t o t a l p r o p o s it io n names a f a c t through l ik e n e s s o f s tr u c tu r e and c o r r e la t io n o f names and o b je c t s . 10 L ik en ess o f s tr u c tu r e i s a l o g i c a l m atter and, h en ce , a m atter o f m eaning. I t i s , in t h i s th eo ry , to "mean" (c o r r e la te w ith ) an a c tu a l f a c t th a t con - s t i t u t e s what tr u th i s ; i f th e c o n s t itu e n t names o f a p r o p o s it io n "mean" " ob jects" but th e l o g i c a l s tr u c tu r e does not c o r r e la te w ith the s tr u c tu r e co n n ectin g th e se o b je c ts in to a f a c t , th en the la c k o f such c o r r e la t in g l in e s c o n s t i t u t e s f a l s i t y . The T raeta tu s th eory o f tr u th i s in com p atib le w ith a use view o f meaning in a t l e a s t one fundam ental r e s p e c t : as a correspondence th eo ry i t r e l a t e s language to th e w orld in a manner th a t i s in com p atib le w ith meaning viewed as u se . Some view o f th e nature o f meaning i s in v o lv e d in any correspondence th eo ry o f tr u th , becau se one o f th e two s id e s o f th e c o r r e la t io n i s a m e a n in g -e n t ity . We have seen above how th e T raetatu s th eo ry o f meaning i s in com p atib le w ith a view o f meaning as u se . F u rth er , s in c e th e r e la te d th eo ry o f tr u th i s a correspondence type o f th e o r y , i t i s in e x tr ic a b ly connected w ith a view o f meaning in which th ere are mean- in g c o r r e la t io n s co n n ectin g meanings w ith what th ey mean. T h is so r t o f view o f meaning, w hich , as we have se e n , i s in com p atib le w ith meaning as u se , would seem to be req u ired by any correspondence view o f tr u th . I t i s d i f f i c u l t to im agine how a correspondence view o f tr u th cou ld be formu- la te d w ith o u t a view o f meaning o f t h i s g en era l ty p e . In any c a se , th e T ra eta tu s th eory o f tr u th i s in com p atib le w ith a u se view o f meaning b e - cause i t does in v o lv e t h i s type o f view o f meaning. Two Ordinary-Language A n alyses Two w r it e r s , who r e j e c t the T ra eta tu s th eo ry o f meaning and advo- c a te th e view th a t the meaning o f a word i s i t s u s e , have d e a lt w ith th e problem o f tr u th in q u ite d i f f e r e n t w ays. J . L. A u stin and P . F . S traw son, 11 w h ile a g ree in g on th e "use"-view o f meaning and on the problem o f tr u th as b ein g the problem o f th e use o f the word " tru e ." n e v e r th e le s s o f f e r q u ite v a r ia n t a n a ly se s in t h e ir d eb a te , "Truth."'1' The Debate A u stin A u stin b eg in s h is a n a ly s is o f th e problem o f tr u th by d e f in in g t h i s problem as "the u s e , or c e r ta in u s e s , o f th e word 'tr u e '" (p . 1 1 ) . In h is r e b u t t a l , Straw son pounces, in e f f e c t , on t h is l im it a t io n to " cer- t a in uses" by c o n c e n tr a tin g h is a tta c k on A u s t in 's confinem ent o f the problem to f a c t u a l s ta te m e n ts . A u stin reach es t h is l im it a t io n , how ever, through a sk in g th e q u e s t io n , "What i s i t th a t we say i s tru e or fa ls e ? " and lo o k in g fo r an answer th a t w i l l t e l l what i s tru e p r im a r ily : " It seems rea so n a b le to ask whether th ere i s n ot some use o f ' i s t r u e ' th a t i s prim ary, or some g e n e r ic name fo r th a t which a t bottom we are alw ays sa y in g ' i s tr u e '" (p . 1 1 2 ) . . He th en g iv e s reason s fo r r e j e c t in g th e p r e - d ic a t io n o f "true" o f an yth in g ex c e p t what he c a l l s a " sta tem en t." His d e f in i t io n o f " sta tem en t," though, i s unusual: "A sta tem en t i s made and i t s making i s a h i s t o r ic e v e n t , th e u tte r a n c e by a c e r ta in speaker or w r ite r o f c e r ta in words (a se n te n c e ) to an aud ience w ith r e fe r e n c e to a h is t o r ic s i t u a t io n , ev e n t or what not" (p p . 113-11*0 . S en ten ces are used to make s ta te m e n ts , and "a sen ten ce i s made up o f w ords, a sta tem en t i s made in words" (p . 11*0. So, a sta tem en t fo r A u stin i s e v id e n t ly n o t a k ind o f sen ten ce J . L. A ustin and P . F . Straw son, "Truth," P roceed in gs o f the A r is t o t e l i a n S o c ie t y , Supplem entary Volume, XXIV (1 9 5 0 ), H l 156 . 12 b u t, r a th e r , something made by means o f a kind of sen tence (s in c e not a l l sen ten ces can be used to make sta tem en ts) . And, the use of a sen tence to make a statem ent i s understood by A u stin to be i t s u tte r a n c e , considered as an even t in tim e. The fu rth er q u a l i f ic a t io n th a t i t be "-with referen ce to a h is t o r ic s i t u a t io n , even t or -what n o t," i s the p art o f A u s t in 's d e f - in i t i o n th a t comes c lo s e s t to most d e f in it io n s o f "statem ent" (and a ls o " p ro p o sitio n " ). In d e f in in g "statem ent" he has re fe rred to th a t to which th e statem ent r e f e r s , "a h is t o r ic s i t u a t io n , ev en t, 'thus co n fin in g s t a t e - ment' to ' fa c tu a l s ta tem en t.'" This d e f in i t io n o f the term in v o lv e s , th en , not only a d is t in c t io n between sen ten ces and statem ents and a p ecu lia r view o f what the "use" o f a sentence c o n s is t s in , but a ls o a view o f the r e f e r e n t ia l meaning o f sta tem en ts. Thus, th e b a s ic in g r e d ie n ts o f a correspondence theory o f tr u th are found in A u s t in 's d e f in i t io n o f th a t which may be tru e or f a l s e - th e s ta te m e n t--s in c e t h is d e f in i t io n con ta in s a view not on ly o f the l i n g u i s t i c r e la t io n s h ip s o f the s ta te m e n t--to sen ten ces and th e ir u se --b u t o f i t s r e la t io n s h ip to e x t r a l in g u is t ic even ts or " fa c ts ." Having argued fo r the primacy o f statem ents as what are capable o f being tr u e , and fo r what statem ents a re , A u stin asks th e q u estio n , "When i s a statem ent true?" I f i t be answered, "When i t corresponds to th e f a c t s ," t h is answer, though not wrong, may be m is lea d in g , A u stin sa y s . He th e r e fo r e s e t s fo r th h is view o f what t h is correspondence w ith the f a c t s c o n s is t s in . Communication, he n o te s , req u ires sym bols, such as w ords, and th a t which the words are "about": " th is may be c a l le d the 'w o r ld ." ' The world must " ex h ib it . . . s im i la r i t i e s and d is s im ila r - i t i e s " or , o th erw ise , "there would be noth ing to say" (p . 115). F u rth er- more, "there i s no reason why th e world should not in clud e the words, in 13 every sense ex cep t th e sense o f th e a c tu a l statem ent i t s e l f -which on any p a r tic u la r o cca sio n i s being made about the world" (p . 1 1 5 ). These are the gen era l requirem ents fo r communication-th ere must be symbols and the world which th ey are "about," and th e world may be con sid ered to in c lu d e th e sym bols, except in th e sen se o f th e a c tu a l s ta t e ment i t s e l f , (S in ce A u stin has d efin ed a statem ent as an u ttera n ce con- s id ered as a tem poral ev en t, i t i s hard to see how i t can be con sid ered as o u ts id e , or n ot in clud ed in , th e w orld . He i s a sk in g th a t a d is t in c t io n be made between a tem poral even t th a t i s a statem ent and a tem poral ev en t or s i tu a t io n th a t i s " in the world" and i s what the statem ent i s "about." There does not seem to be anyth ing e l s e th a t d is t in g u is h e s th e two s o r ts o f e v e n ts , and on the b a s is o f which one i s a ssig n ed to th e world and th e other r e je c te d from i t , except th a t one i s an u ttera n ce and th e other i s n o t . ) These requirem ents having been g iv e n , th ere are s t i l l fu rth er r e - quirem ents-e v id e n t ly to be con sid ered as s p e c ia l , rather than g e n e r a l, r u le s or requirem ents o f communication-th a t are n ecessary in order to r e - so lv e th e problem of tr u th . These requirem ents are two s e t s o f conven- t io n s : "D e sc r ip tiv e conventions c o r r e la t in g th e words (= sen te n c e s ) w ith th e typ es o f s i t u a t io n , th in g , e v e n t , e t c . , to be found in th e w orld ," and "D em onstrative conventions c o r r e la t in g the words (= sta tem en ts) w ith th e h is t o r ic s i t u a t io n s , e t c . , to be found in th e world" (p . 1 1 6 ). In terms o f th e se two s e t s o f conventions A u stin th en answers h is q u estio n o f when a statem ent i s sa id to be tru e: "A statem ent i s sa id to be tru e when th e h is t o r ic s ta t e o f a f f a ir s to which i t i s c o r r e la te d by the dem onstrative conventions ( th e one to which i t 'r e f e r s ' ) i s o f a type w ith which th e sen ten ce used in making i t i s co r r e la te d by th e d e s c r ip t iv e conventions" I k (p . 1X 6), " 'I s o f a typ e -with ■which.,'" A u s t in e x p la in s , "means ' i s s u f - f i c i e n t l y l i k e th o se standard s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s w ith w hich '" ( fo o tn o te , P. 1 1 6 ) . D em onstrative co n v e n tio n s , th en , c o r r e la te s ta tem en ts w ith sp e - c i f i c s i t u a t io n s in tim e in th e w orld . T h is c o r r e la t io n i s th e r e fe r r in g r e l a t io n . D e s c r ip t iv e c o n v e n tio n s , on th e o ther hand, c o r r e la te sen ten ces w ith ty p es o f s i t u a t io n in the w orld . T h is r e la t io n by means o f d e s c r ip - t iv e co n ven tion s i s made p o s s ib le by th e s i m i l a r i t i e s e x h ib ite d in th e w orld . A sta tem en t i s s a id to be tr u e when th e ev en t r e fe r r e d to by th e sta tem en t i s " s u f f i c i e n t ly l ik e " th e ty p e d e sc r ib e d by the se n te n c e . So t h i s th eo ry o f tr u th depends upon a r e la t io n betw een r e fe r r in g and d e s c r ib - in g , a r e la t io n o f c l a s s i f i c a t i o n in w hich a p a r t ic u la r s i t u a t io n i s judged to be (o r n o t b e , i f th e sta tem en t i s f a l s e ) c l a s s i f i a b l e as o f th e c e r ta in typ e d e sc r ib e d . T his th eory i s a s p e c i f i c a t io n o f what "correspondence w ith the fa c ts " c o n s is t s in . "Correspondence" has been d e fin e d in term s o f a r e l a - t io n s h ip between two s e t s o f " co n v en tio n s." A u stin em phasizes th a t th e correspondence in h is th eo ry i s "purely con ven tio n a l" and im p lie s no "mir- roring" o f th e World in w ords. A p ic tu r e may be tr u e to i t s o r ig in a l , he n o te s , b u t n o t tr u e o f i t , and i t i s the tr u th o f s ta tem en ts w ith which th e th eory o f tr u th i s concerned . (A lthough i t i s correspondence w ith th e " fa cts" th a t A u stin c la im s to be c la r i f y in g or s p e c ify in g in h is th e o r y , he speaks in h is fo rm u la tion o f " s itu a t io n " ra th er th an o f " fa c ts ." " F act," he s a y s , i s m is le a d in g , and he a n a ly z e s th e phrase " fa c t th a t" as "a compendious way o f speak ing about a s i t u a t io n in v o lv in g b oth words and world" [p . 118 ] . ) 15 S traw son 's C r itiq u e o f A u stin A u s t in 's th eo ry attem p ts to sa lv a g e a correspondence th eory o f tr u th w h ile r e j e c t in g a th eory o f meaning in w hich th ere i s co n ceived to be a correspondence betw een words and th e ir m ea n in g s--o b je c ts in th e w o rld . Straw son i s working from a s im ila r view o f the nature o f meaning: He w ish es to r e j e c t th e "correspondence" th eo ry o f th e meaning o f words and to view th e meanings o f words as t h e ir "use." I t i s th e use o f "true" which th ey b o th contend to be th e problem o f t r u th , but Straw son d is a g r e e s n o t o n ly w ith A u s t in 's a n a ly s is o f the u se o f "true" but a ls o w ith h is id e n t i f i c a t io n o f t h i s problem w ith th e problem o f th e a n a ly s is o f " fa c t - s t a t in g d is c o u r s e ." S traw son 's c r i t iq u e i s d iv id e d in to th r e e s e c t io n s , on s ta te m e n ts , f a c t s and correspon d en ce. In regard to A u s t in 's trea tm en t o f " sta tem en ts ," Straw son p o in ts ou t: "'My sta tem en t' may be e i th e r what I say or my sa y in g i t . My sa y in g som ething i s c e r t a in ly an e p iso d e . What I say i s n o t . I t i s th e l a t t e r , not th e form er, we d ec la r e t o be true" (pp. 1 2 9 -3 0 ) . A l- though "the u se o f . . . ' t r u e ' alw ays g la n ce s backwards or forw ards t o the a c tu a l or en v isaged making o f a sta tem en t by someone," th e word does n ot " ch a ra c ter ize such . . . ep iso d es" (p . 1 3 1 ). S eco n d ly , f a c t s , a ccord in g to S traw son , are m isunderstood by A u s t in , who r e f e r s to th e second term o f the correspondence as " th in g ," " even t," " s itu a t io n ," " s ta te o f a f f a i r s ," and " fe a tu r e ," as w e ll as " fa c t ." Strawson b e l i e v e s A u stin to be c o r r e c t in em phasizing th a t th e c o n v e n tio n a lly e s ta b - l i s h e d r e la t io n s betw een words and th in g s r e fe r r e d t o , and betw een words and typ e o f th in g s d e sc r ib e d , are d i f f e r e n t r e la t io n s . Strawson contends fu r th e r , however, th a t in sta tem en ts th a t are " re feren ce-cu m -d escr ip tio n " 16 (w hich , a ccord in g to S traw son , n ot a l l sta tem en ts a r e ) s t a t in g i s n e ith e r o f th ese r e l a t io n s -n e ith e r r e fe r r in g (or d em on stratin g) nor d e s c r ib in g - - b u t both a t o n ce . In a " re feren ce-cu m -d escr ip tio n " sta tem en t, th e " th in g , p erso n , e t c ." r e fe r r e d to by th e r e fe r r in g p a rt o f th e sta tem en t and which th e d e - s c r ib in g p a r t " f i t s or f a i l s t o f i t " i s what th e sta tem en t i s "about." There can be no other re la tu m , Straw son con ten d s, and to ask fo r one i s a " lo g ic a l ly fundam ental typ e-m istak e" (p . 13*0A lthough we say th a t "a sta tem en t corresponds to . . . th e f a c t s , as a v a r ia n t on sa y in g th a t i t i s t r u e , we never say th a t a sta tem en t corresponds to the th in g , p erso n , e t c . , i t i s about" (p . 1 3 5 ) . T h erefo re , a lth ou gh i t i s not wrong to say th a t th e f a c t a sta tem en t s t a t e s i s what makes i t t r u e , t h i s f a c t i s n o t an o b je c t o f any k in d , i t i s n ot " in th e w orld ," but i s i t s e l f s ta te d by th e sta tem en t and so cannot be th a t to w hich th e sta tem en t i s c o r r e la te d when i t i s tr u e (p . 1 3 5 ). S traw son 's c r i t i c i s m o f A u s t in 's trea tm en t o f " fa cts" fo c u se s on h is view th a t f a c t s are " in th e w orld ," l i k e th e o b je c ts th a t sta tem en ts a re about. As fo r A u s t in 's eq u atin g " fa c ts" w ith " s i t u a t io n s " and " s ta te s o f a f f a ir s " : " It i s tru e th a t s i t u a t io n s and s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s are n o t seen or heard (any more than f a c t s a r e ) , but are ra th er summed up or taken in a t a g lan ce (p h rases which s t r e s s th e co n n ectio n w ith sta tem en t and ' t h a t ' - c la u se r e s p e c t iv e ly ) , i t i s a ls o tr u e th a t th ere i s a sen se o f 'ab ou t' in w hich we do t a lk ab ou t, do d e s c r ib e , s i t u a t io n s or s t a t e s o f a f fa ir s " (p . 1 3 7 ) . These e x p r e s s io n s , however, are " su b s ta n t iv a l e x p r e ss io n s to a b b r e v i- a t e , summarize and connect" (p . 1 3 8 ) . They are d e v ic e s fo r con n ectin g a " s e r ie s o f d e s c r ip t iv e sta tem en ts" w ith "the rem ainder o f my d isco u rse" (p . 17 1 3 8 ) . "A s i t u a t io n or s t a t e o f a f f a ir s i s , ro u g h ly , a s e t o f f a c t s n ot a s e t o f th in gs" (p . 1 3 8 ). When we speak about a s i t u a t io n , i t i s th e "sub- je c t" o f a sta tem en t and, th e r e fo r e , cannot be a ls o th a t w hich makes th e sta tem en t tr u e . S traw son 's view i s th a t on ly th in g s and e v e n ts are " in th e w orld ," and th a t th e o n ly r e la t io n o f a sta tem en t to such th in g s i s th e "about"r e la t io n . He s e e s the correspondence th eory o f tr u th as r e a l l y an attem p t t o e lu c id a te th e f a c t s t a t in g typ e o f d is c o u r s e , w h ile th e problem o f tr u th i s p rop erly th e problem o f our use o f " tru e ." And, when we u se " tru e ," " fa c t ," e t c . , we are " ta lk in g w ith in , and not ab ou t, a c e r ta in frame o f d is c o u r se ," s o , th e "problem about the use o f ' t r u e ' i s t o se e how t h i s word f i t s in to th a t frame o f d isco u rse" (p . 1^ 2). Strawson b e l i e v e s , th e n , th a t th e terms o f A u s t in 's correspondence r e la t io n are wrong. He b e l i e v e s fu r th e r th a t th e c o n v en tio n a l type o f c o r - respondence la i d out by A u stin i s a ls o wrong. The fundam ental co n fu sio n o f th e th eory i s betw een what th e sem antic c o n d it io n s are fo r a sta tem en t "p i s true" to be tr u e , and what i s a s se r te d when a c e r ta in sta tem en t i s s ta te d t o be tru e ( i . e . , what "p i s true" a s s e r t s ) . I t i s as "absurd," Straw son s a y s , to cla im th a t in making a sta tem en t "p i s true" one i s a s s e r t in g th a t th e sem antic c o n d it io n s fo r i t s tr u th are f u l f i l l e d as i t i s t o c la im th a t in making th e sta tem en t "p" one i s a s s e r t in g f u l f i l lm e n t o f th e s e c o n d it io n s . I f A u s t in 's th eo ry o f "true" were c o r r e c t , in d e c la r in g a sta tem en t to be tr u e we would e i th e r be ta lk in g about th e meanings o f th e words o f a s t a t e - ment "p" or sa y in g th a t th e speaker has used th e words in th e sta tem en t c o r - r e c t l y . S in ce we are doing n e ith e r o f th e se t h in g s , Straw son con clud es th a t A u s t in 's w hole th eory must be d isp en sed w ith (pp . 1 4 3 - ^ ) . Not o n ly i s A u s t in 's a n a ly s is o f th e u se o f "true" m istaken accord in g 18 to Straw son, b u t he i s a l s o m istaken in id e n t ify in g t h is problem w ith the problem o f th e a n a ly s is o f f a c t s t a t in g d is c o u r s e . A lthough th e r e s t r i c t io n o f " sta tem en t," " true," and " fa lse" t o the f a c t s t a t i n g type o f d isc o u r se may be a l l r ig h t "in some p h ilo s o p h ic a l c o n te x ts ," A u s t in 's approach to the a n a ly s is o f t h i s type o f d isco u rse i s not (p . 1 5 3 ). "Mr. A u s t in 's d e s c r ip - t io n o f the c o n d it io n s under which a statem ent i s tr u e , regarded as an a n a l- y s i s o f the f a c t s t a t i n g u s e , a p p lie s only to a f f ir m a t iv e su b je c t -p r e d ic a te sta tem en ts. . . . I t does n o t apply t o n e g a t iv e , g en era l and e x i s t e n t i a l sta tem en ts n o r , s tr a ig h tfo r w a r d ly , t o h y p o th e tic a l and d is ju n c t iv e s t a t e - m ents. I agree th a t any language ca p a b le o f th e f a c t s t a t in g use must have some d e v ic e s fo r perform ing the fu n c t io n to w hich Mr. A u stin e x c lu s iv e ly d ir e c t s h is a t t e n t io n , and th a t o th e r typ es o f sta tem en ts o f f a c t can be understood o n ly in r e la t io n to t h i s type" but "nothing i s ga in ed by lumping them a l l to g e th e r Under a d e s c r ip t io n ap p rop riate on ly to one, even though i t be the b a s ic , type" (p p . 15^ -5 5 ). S traw son 's c r i t iq u e o f A u s t in r ev o lv es around th ree major o b je c - t io n s : ( l ) "True" i s n o t properly view ed as p red ic a te d o f a s e n te n c e , prop- o s i t i o n or a n yth in g e l s e ; (2 ) the u se o f "true" i s n ot co n fin ed to f a c t - s t a t in g d isc o u r se ; and, ( 3 ) in u s in g "true" we are not a s s e r t in g th a t the c o n d it io n s do in fa c t o b ta in which m ust ob ta in i f we are " co rrec tly " to d e- c la r e a sta tem en t to be t r u e . These th ree p o in ts c o n s t i tu te th e major r e - j e c t io n s in v o lv e d in h is own th eory o f tr u th . Straw son S traw son 's own th eo ry i s g e n e r a l ly c a l le d th e "perform atory" th eo ry o f t r u th , a lth o u g h even in h is o r ig in a l paper in A n a ly s is he sa y s: "This i s a misnomer. A perform atory word, in A u s t in 's s e n s e , I tak e to be a verb , 19 th e u se o f w hich , in th e f i r s t person p r e se n t in d ic a t iv e , seems to d e sc r ib e some a c t i v i t y o f th e sp ea k er , b u t in f a c t i s th a t a c t i v i t y . C lea r ly th e u se o f ' i s t r u e 1 does n o t seem to d e sc r ib e any a c t i v i t y o f th e sp eak er . . . . The p o in t o f u s in g A u s t in 's word a t a l l i s th e f a c t th a t th e phrase ' i s t r u e ' can som etim es be r e p la c e d , w ith o u t any im portant change in mean- in g , by some such phrase as ' I confirm i t , ' which i s perform atory in th e s t r i c t s e n s e . " I s true" i s not i t s e l f , th en , a perform atory phrase but can , "som etim es," be rep la ced by c e r ta in perform atory p h ra ses . In h is symposium p ap er, Straw son ta k es b a s ic a l ly t h i s same p o s i t io n , a lth ou gh he d is c u s s e s a d d it io n a l u s e s - f o r which m ight be s u b s t itu te d th e a d d it io n a l phrases "I grant i t " and "I corrob orate i t . " In t h i s paper he a ls o r e f e r s to "the a s s e r t iv e d e v ic e which i s th e s u b je c t o f t h i s symposium ( th e word ' t r u e ')" (p . 1 5 0 ) , but m od ify in g t h i s c h a r a c te r iz a t io n by t r e a t - in g "true" as a d e v ic e fo r r e a s s e r t io n w ith o u t a c tu a l r e p e t i t io n o f a s ta tem en t. T h is i s a change from h is o r ig in a l paper in A n a ly s is , in which he says " is true" i s n o t a s s e r t iv e in any sen se b u t , r a th e r , a " l in g u is t ic perform ance." The p a r t ic u la r typ e o f l i n g u i s t i c perform ance i s d escr ib ed a t one p la c e in t h i s e ssa y as analogous w ith th e u se o f th e e x p r e ss io n " D itto ." So , in h is second lo o k a t th e problem o f t r u th , Strawson e v id e n t ly f e e l s th a t he had exaggerated th e n o n -a sse r t iv e ch a ra cter o f " is tr u e ," w hich (a s m ight be gath ered e a s i l y from i t s cla im ed resem blance to " D itto" ) r e a s s e r t s w ith o u t a c tu a l r e p e t i t io n . Toward th e end o f h is paper, Strawson m o d if ie s h is p o s i t io n . Here he s a y s , "I have no w ish to ch a lle n g e th e r e s t r i c t i o n , in some p h ilo s o p h ic a l P . F . Straw son, "Truth," r e p r in te d in P h ilo sop h y and A n a ly s is , ed . M argaret Macdonald (O xford: B a s i l B la c k w e ll, 195M> P. 275 . 20 c o n te x ts , o f th e words 's ta te m e n t,' ' t r u e , ' ' f a l s e , ' to what I have m yself e a r l ie r c a l le d the ' f a c t s t a t in g ' type o f d isc o u r se . What tr o u b le s me more i s Mr. A u s t in 's own in c ip ie n t a n a ly s is o f t h is type o f d is c o u r se . I t seems to me such as to fo r c e him to carry the r e s t r ic t io n fu rth er than he w ish es or intends" (p . 1 5 3 ). A u s t in 's C ritiq u e o f Strawson A u s t in 's paper in c lu d es a c r it iq u e o f Straw son's th eory as p re - sen ted in h is i n i t i a l paper in A n a ly s is . This theory he se e s as having two main p a rts: "that ' i s tr u e ' i s n ot used in ta lk in g about . . . an yth in g" (p . 1 2 7 ), and th a t to say th a t S i s true i s "to confirm or grant . . . the a s s e r t io n , made or taken as made a lrea d y , th a t S" (p . 1 2 7 ). The f i r s t part o f t h i s theory i s wrong according to A ustin because " is true" i s used in ta lk in g about sta tem en ts. The second p a rt i s wrong b ecau se, a lthough th ere i s a perform atory a sp ect to many ordinary sta tem en ts, th ey may a ls o be statem ents th a t are tru e or f a l s e . (A ustin in d ic a te s th a t "statem ent" would b e s t be reserved for what i s tru e or f a l s e , and not be extended to u t t e r - ances o f a c e r ta in grammatical form. He i s u sin g the word in th a t sense h e r e . ) A u stin c r i t i c i z e s Straw son's th eory on the ground th a t "he co n fin es h im se lf to th e case where I say 'your statem ent i s tr u e ' or som ething s im i- la r , . . . but what o f th e case where you s ta te th a t S and I say n oth ing but ' look and s e e ' th a t your statem ent i s true? I do not se e how t h is c r i t - i c a l c a se , to which n oth ing analogous occurs w ith s t r i c t l y perform atory u tte r a n c e s , cou ld be made to respond to Mr. S traw son's treatm ent" (p . 1 2 8 ). In r ep ly to t h i s Strawson says: "The man who looks and se e s th a t the statem ent th a t there i s a ca t on th e mat i s tr u e , see s no more and no l e s s 21 than the man who looks and sees th a t th ere i s a ca t on the mat, or th e man who look s and see s th a t th ere i s indeed a c a t on th e mat. B ut, th e s e t - t in g s o f the f i r s t and th ir d ca ses may be d if f e r e n t from th a t o f the s e c - o n d ." A u s t in 's o b je c t io n , Strawson sa y s , serv es to emphasize the "im- portance o f th e 'o c ca sio n '" o f th e use o f "true" and to minimize "(what I was in c lin e d to over-em phasize) th e perform atory character o f our uses o f it" (pp. 1 4 9 -5 0 ). Critique A ustin and Strawson have covered qu ite thoroughly p o ssib le ob jec- tio n s to each o th er 's treatm ents o f tru th . A u stin 's theory is a type of correspondence theory and thus tr e a ts tru th as a r e la t io n between words and the world. This treatm ent i s open to the fundamental c r it ic ism th a t i t confuses tru th w ith fa c t s ta t in g , or the nature of the meaning of a type of statem ent. Strawson's th eory , on the other hand, takes the view th at the cen- t r a l fa c t about the meaning of "true" i s i t s a sse r t iv e or rea sser tiv e func- t io n . He claim s th at a n a ly sis o f the meaning of statem ents o f fa c t i s , a t b e s t , ta n g en tia l to the problem of truth as such. This treatment i s open to the fundamental c r it ic ism th a t th ere is more involved in the use of true b esid es i t s performatory asp ects . In taking the p o s it io n th a t the a n a ly s is o f fa c t s ta t in g is i r r e le - vant, Strawson r e je c ts a dichotomy o f words and world o f the type th at A ustin (as w e ll as some lo g ic a l p o s i t iv i s t s ) a ccep ts. T his, of course, elim in ates the p o s s ib i l i t y of tr e a tin g tru th as a r e la t io n between words and world. C onsistent w ith th is po in t of view , Strawson's treatment of "facts" i s qu ite a t variance w ith A u stin 's , which i s c lo se ly sim ilar to I th a t o f " a ctu a l f a c t s " in th e T r a e ta tu s . S traw son h o ld s , on th e c o n tr a r y , t h a t , w h ile f a c t s are what make sta tem en ts t r u e , th ey are n o t a n y th in g in th e "w orld ." A lth ou gh th e r e i s som eth ing in th e w orld w hich a (p u rp o r ted ly ) f a c t s t a t i n g sta tem en t i s "about," t h i s i s o f no r e le v a n c e t o th e e lu c id a - t io n o f "true" (p . 135 ); and i s not i t s e l f th e f a c t (p . 1 3 6 ) . Straw son i s sa y in g , i n other w ords, t h a t an a b o u t -r e la t io n i s d i f f e r e n t from a t r u t h - r e l a t io n , and a ls o from a m e a n in g -r e la t io n . T h is view i s b ased on th e view th a t n e ith e r tr u th nor m eaning are r e la t io n s o f any kind w h a tso ev er . The a b o u t -r e la t io n i s o f s ig n if ic a n c e o n ly in the e lu c id a t io n o f f a c t s t a t i n g d is c o u r s e , and "true" must be view ed a s w ith in t h i s type o f d is c o u r s e , n o t a s about i t (p . lh 2 ) . For Straw son , th e co n v en tio n s o f " tr u e " --o f t h i s p a r t ic u la r w ord -- r e p la c e , in e f f e c t , any r u le s o f t r u th . For him , th e r e are no r e le v a n t con- v e n t io n s or r u le s e x ce p t m ea n in g -eo n v en tio n s , and th e s e a r e n o t , in a g en - e r a l w ay, r e le v a n t to th e problem o f tr u th ; in d eed , a cco rd in g t o S traw son , t o th in k so would be to commit A u s t in 's m istak e o f eq u atin g tr u th and f a c t - s t a t in g . The o n ly m ean in g-eon ven tion s th a t are r e le v a n t to th e problem , a c - cord ing t o S traw son , are th o se o f " tr u e ." Now, t h i s im p lie s a q u ite narrow , l im ite d d e f in i t i o n o f what i s in c lu d ed in th e m eaning o f th e word " t r u e ," s in c e t h i s meaning does n o t in c lu d e r e f e r r in g t o s ta tem en ts s a id to be "true n or, th e r e fo r e , t o th e m eaning o f any s ta te m e n ts . S tra w so n 's view ta k e s as th e fundam ental u se o f "true" i t s s im p le s t u se in a se n te n c e ; "True!" (= " D itto !" ) This i s a very narrow view o f what " the meaning o f a word, x" con s i s t s in . Furtherm ore, S traw son 's a n a ly s is does n o t in c lu d e th e a sp e c t o f th e ord in ary usage o f " tru e ," " tru th ," e t c . , in w hich p a rt o f what we mean by 23 say in g th a t something i s true i s th a t i t s b ein g so i s , in some sen se or o th er , beyond our c o n tr o l- in th a t i t i s n on-convention al in n atu re. Even grantin g th a t -what we (m ean in gfu lly ) say may be l im ite d , not only by the range o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a p a r tic u la r language, but a ls o by the necessary l im ita t io n s o f any language, due to "the ways th in g s are" (both in regard to o u rse lv es and to th e world a t la r g e ) -even gran tin g th ese l im ita t io n s of language i t s e l f , tr u th i s spoken o f as lim ite d in a stronger s e n s e - i t s c r i t e r ia being spoken o f as o u tsid e th e scope o f con ven tion s. There are no such c r i t e r ia in Straw son's treatm en t. A u s tin 's th eory d e fin e s tru th as a type o f r e la t io n between two so r ts o f m ean in g-rela tion s (them selves conn ecting words and f a c t ) . These conventions o f meaning invo lved in f a c t s t a t in g d isco u rse e x p la in , for A u stin , the nature o f tr u th . A ccording to him, we use "true" to r e fe r to s itu a t io n s in which th e se l in g u i s t i c conventions are used . This th eory o f fe r s a d e sc r ip t io n o f what i s in vo lved in f a c t s t a t in g and th en , in e f f e c t , d e fin e s tru th as the f u lf i l lm e n t o f th e claim s o f a fa c tu a l sta tem ent. That i s , in saying th a t th e a c tu a l s ta te o f a f f a ir s must be "of a type" w ith the (typ e o f ) s ta te o f a f f a ir s expressed in the sen ten ce , A istin i s saying th a t th e sen tence must mean something a c tu a lly e x is t e n t . In speaking o f a c o r r e la t io n between words and th e w orld, A u stin s e t s up n am in g-rela tion s between sen tence and e x tr a -s e n te n t ia l " fa c t." C haracteriz ing th ese r e la t io n s as "conventional" might mean th ey are a r b i- tra ry and n on -n ecessary-and A ustin in ten d s t h i s to be understood: "A statem ent no more need s, in order to be tr u e , t o reproduce th e 'm u lt ip l ic - i t y , ' say , orthe 's tr u c tu r e ' or 'form' o f th e r e a l i t y , than a word needs to 2k be ec h o ic or w r it in g p ic to g r a p h ic . To suppose th a t i t d o e s , i s to f a l l once a g a in in to th e error o f rea d in g back in to th e w orld th e fe a tu r e s o f language" (p . 119) . As i s a ls o i l lu s t r a t e d by t h i s p a ssa g e , he in ten d s to say fu r th e r th a t tr u th c o n s is t s in a r e la t io n betw een c e r ta in m eaningco n v en tio n s . The fo llo w in g p assage i l l u s t r a t e s t h i s in a somewhat d i f - fe r e n t l i g h t : "Even when a language does 'm irror' [ fe a tu r e s d e s c r ie d in th e w orld] very c lo s e ly (and does i t ev er? ) th e tr u th o f sta tem en ts rem ains s t i l l a m atter . . . o f the words used b e in g th e ones c o n v e n tio n a lly ap- p o in ted fo r s i t u a t io n s o f the ty p e to which th a t r e fe r r e d to b elon gs" (p . 1 2 0 ) . B ein g tr u e , th e n , c o n s is t s in th e proper or c o r r e c t a p p lic a t io n o f t h i s typ e o f m ean in g -con ven tion s. D e sp ite A u s t in 's in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e r e le v a n t m ean in g-ru les as co n v en tio n s , h is view i s a correspondence ty p e o f th eory th a t in t e r p r e t s th e se con ven tion s as c o r r e la t in g words and th e w orld . No doubt th e r e are some such co n v en tio n a l c o r r e la t io n s betw een words and th e w orld , b u t A u s t in 's in te r p r e ta t io n o f them as e x p la in in g tr u th r e s u l t s in b egg in g th e q u e s tio n . S traw son 's a n a ly s is co n stru es th e " conventions o f th e u se o f 't r u e '" v ery n arrow ly , as c o n s is t in g e x c lu s iv e ly o f th e perform atory a s p e c ts o f i t s use (th e "occasion" fo r use not b e in g co n sid ered a s in v o lv e d in i t s u s e , and th e problem o f th a t to which th e term i s a p p lie d a ls o b e in g co n sid ered as u n in vo lved in i t s u s e ) . S traw son 's view o f what th e problem o f tr u th i s would seem to be extrem ely narrow, because i t would seem th a t i t i s n o t j u s t a problem about how to u se " tru e ," but what t h i s u se im p lie s and how i t i s r e la te d t o other a sp e c ts o f language-gam es in w hich i t i s in c lu d ed . A u s t in 's a n a ly s i s , on th e other hand, co n stru es c e r ta in m eaning25 co n ven tion s as b e in g th e con ven tion s r e le v a n t t o tr u th , and does n o t a llo w fo r d i f f e r e n t ia t in g tr u th from th e m achinery o f f a c t s t a t in g . A u stin ap- proaches th e problem o f tr u th as one o f "the u se o f ' t r u e ' " but in te r p r e t s "true" as used to d e s ig n a te ca se s in which c e r ta in meaning con ven tion s are a p p lie d to s i t u a t io n s to which th ey a r e , in f a c t , a p p lic a b le . There i s no s im i la r i t y o f l o g i c a l s tr u c tu r e in v o lv e d in t h i s v iew , b u t fo r t h i s n o t io n i s s u b s t itu te d a " con ven tion al" c o r r e la t io n betw een sta tem en ts and what th ey are ab ou t. "True," a cco rd in g to A u s t in , means th a t m ea n in g -re la tio n s o f t h i s s o r t o b ta in . The d is p a r ity betw een A u s t in 's and S traw son 's v ie w s su g- g e s t s th a t each d e a ls w ith on ly one a sp e c t o f th e concept o f tr u th . And, th e ir agreem ent on th e fo rm u la tio n o f th e problem (a s "the use o f ' t r u e '" ) obscures th e d is p a r ity o f t h e ir in te r p r e ta t io n s o f t h i s fo rm u la tio n -fo r A u stin th e "use" o f th e term in v o lv e s th e whole co n tex t o f f a c t s t a t in g d i s - c o u r se , w h ile fo r Straw son i t i s l im ite d to what would seem to be one s o r t , or perhaps one a sp e c t o f i t s m eaning. Im p lic a t io n s fo r th e A n a ly s is o f Truth Having now examined th e T racta tu s p r o p o s it io n a l th eory and two o r d i- nary language a n a ly se s o f tr u th and seen some o f th e rea so n s none o f them i s w h olly s a t i s f a c t o r y , what are th e im p lic a t io n s fo r th e problem of th e a n a l- y s i s o f tru th ? In t h i s s e c t io n I s h a l l d is c u s s what I tak e th e se im p lic a - t io n s to b e , and o u t l in e what I s h a l l attem pt to do in th e fo llo w in g chap- t e r s . I t was argued above th a t th e n o tio n o f a p r o p o s it io n , which i s funda- m ental t o th e T r a c ta tu s 1 a n a ly se s o f both meaning and tr u th , i s in c o n s is t e n t w ith th e v iew , a ccep ted in t h i s s tu d y , th a t meaning i s u s e . W riting from a 26 s im ila r p o in t o f vie-w, both A u stin and Straw son renounce t h i s n o tio n o f a p r o p o s it io n , and i t embodies a view o f meaning which W it tg e n s te in ' s la t e r As was d is c u s se d on pp . 4 5 , however, th e n o tio n i s a d u a l one, b e in g d e f in a b le b o th as "the meaning o f a sen ten ce" and as " that which i s tr u e or f a l s e ." W hile th e T r a c ta tu s 1 n o t io n o f a p r o p o s it io n i s in c o n s i s t - e n t w ith th e p o in t o f view o f th e study a t hand, i t w i l l be argued th a t th e n o tio n o f "the meaning o f a s e n te n c e " i s n ot o n ly c o n s is te n t w ith , but im portant t o , a u se view o f m eaning. S econ d ly , i t w i l l be argued th a t th e n o tio n o f som ething th a t i s t r u e or f a l s e i s im portant in th e a n a ly s is o f th e problem o f t r u t h . The c r i t iq u e o f the a n a ly se s o f A u stin and Straw son su g g e sts c e r ta in requ irem ents fo r an in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e use th eo ry o f meaning and fo r th e fo rm u la tio n o f th e problem o f tr u th : A view o f meaning should in c lu d e th e q u estio n o f th e n a tu re o f th e meaning o f s e n te n c e s , as c o n tr a ste d w ith th a t o f words. S eco n d ly , th e problem o f tr u th should be in te r p r e te d as in v o lv - in g "depth grammar" as w e ll a s " su rface grammar." In th e term s o f t h i s stu d y , th e problem o f tru th i s one o f what th e con cep t o f tr u th i s . T his req u ir es exam in ation , i t w i l l be argued, n o t on ly o f th e "use o f 't r u e , '" b u t o f th e u se o f sta tem en ts s a id to be tr u e . T h erefo re , in Chapters I I and I I I w i l l be d evelop ed an in t e r p r e ta - t io n o f th e use view o f meaning w ith th e s p e c ia l purpose o f d ev e lo p in g a view of th e nature o f s e n t e n t ia l m eaning. And, in Chapter IV w i l l be d e - veloped a view o f th e g en era l n atu re o f p h ilo s o p h ic prob lem s, in order to in te r p r e t th e fo rm u la tio n o f th e problem o f tr u th a s "the use o f ' t r u e . '" u se view o f meaning1 was e x p l i c i t l y d eveloped to c o u n te r a c t . P h ilo s o p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s (New York: M acm illan C o ., 1 9 5 3 ). 27 The in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e meaning o f words and se n te n c e s g iv e n in C hapters I I and I I I w i l l r e s u l t in v iew in g sen ten ces as th e fundam ental u n it s o f m eaning, in a manner somewhat s im ila r to ''p r o p o s it io n s . '1 The i n - te r p r e ta t io n o f p h ilo so p h ic problem s g iv e n in Chapter 4 w i l l r e s u l t in t r e a t in g tr u th as a problem about a ty p e o f use o f a typ e o f s e n te n c e , and th e n o tio n o f " that which i s tru e or f a ls e " i s used in th e a n a ly s is o f t r u th . Thus, a lth ou gh th e T racta tu s n o tio n o f a p r o p o s it io n i s in c o n s i s t - e n t w ith a u se view o f m eaning, i t s two c e n tr a l a s p e c t s , "the meaning o f a sen ten ce" and " that w hich i s tru e or f a l s e ," w i l l be argued to be th e o r e t ic con cep ts u s e f u l in th e a n a ly s is o f tr u th . The th eo ry o f tr u th d evelop ed in Chapter V r e s u l t s from a view o f th e meaning o f a sen ten ce as an a c t io n form ing p a r t o f an a c t i v i t y , and a view o f tr u th as an a c t i v i t y o f a s s e r t io n s (a typ e o f a c t io n or s e n te n c e ) . CHAPTER I I MEANING AS USE: WORDS AND RULES T h is chapter w i l l examine th e meaning and im p lic a t io n s o f th e c o n te n tio n th a t "the meaning o f a word i s i t s u se ." An in te r p r e ta t io n o f t h i s view w i l l he d evelop ed from th e a n a ly s is , f i r s t , o f th e su b je c t p h ra se , "the meaning o f a word," and, secon d , o f th e p red ic a te d term , "u s e ." The in te r p r e ta t io n thus developed v iew s words as " p o ss ib le mean- ings" th a t presuppose se n te n c e s or " actu a l m eanings." The n o tio n o f "the meaning o f a s e n t e n c e i . e . , th e n o tio n o f th e meaning o f a sen ten ce as d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t from th e meaning o f w o r d s - is thus h e ld to be n e c - e ssa r y as a working p h ilo s o p h ic co n cep t, i f th e view o f th e meaning o f words as t h e ir u se i s in te r p r e te d ad eq u a te ly fo r d e a lin g w ith th e prob- lems o f t h i s stu d y . The"Meaning o f a Word" In "The Meaning o f a Word," 1 J . L. A u stin a s s e r t s th a t th e "gen - e r a l q u e s t io n , 'What i s th e meaning o f a word?'" i s "spurious" (p . 2 5 ) , and, in d eed , a "nonsense q u estion " (p . 2 6 ) . He argues th a t p h ilo so p h ers are le d to ask i t on a model w ith q u e s tio n s o f the form: "What i s th e meaning o f (th e word) 'x '? " and th a t th e error in th e g e n e r a liz e d form "What i s th e meaning o f a word?" i s exposed i f th e model i s changed to "What i s an 'x 'J" Then, " i t becomes very d i f f i c u l t to form u late any '*'j . L. A u s t in , "The Meaning o f a Word," P h ilo so p h ic a l Papers (O xford: C larendon P r e s s , 1961) , pp. 23-1+3. 28 29 g e n e r a l q u estio n w hich cou ld impose on us fo r a moment. Perhaps 'What i s an y th in g? ' . . . In th e same way, we should n ot perhaps be tem pted to g e n e r a liz e such a q u e s tio n as 'Does he know th e meaning o f th e word "rat"?' 'Does he know th e meaning o f a word?' would be s i l l y " (p . 2 6 ) . In co n n ectio n w ith t h i s t h e s i s , A u stin g iv e s two l i s t s , one o f "specim ens o f sen se" and another o f "specim ens o f nonsense" (p . 2 3 ) . The specim ens o f sen se are a l l q u e s tio n s a sk in g what th e meaning o f a p a r t i c - u la r word, phrase or sen ten ce i s . The specim ens o f nonsense in c lu d e d i f - f e r e n t forms o f th e q u e s tio n , "What i s th e 'm eaning' o f words?" and o f "What i s th e meaning o f 'What i s th e "meaning" o f w ords?'" A u s t in 's sp e - cimens o f nonsense sound co n s id era b ly more n o n se n s ic a l than e i th e r o f th e se epitom e s e n te n c e s , but in f a c t on ly two o f th e specim en se n te n c e s can r e a l ly be s a id t o be "nonsense," V iz . , "What is th e -m e a n in g -o f - ( th e - w o r d - ) - ' r a t '?" and "What i s th e 'm eaning' o f ( th e word) 'r a t '? " These two sen ten ces (which are d i f f e r e n t ways o f a sk in g "What i s th e 'm eaning' o f 'x '?" and which a re not covered by th e epitom e se n te n c e s g iv e n ) are non- s e n s ic a l - -a lth o u g h "'What i s th e meaning o f 'x '?" does make s e n se . S in ce b oth "meaning" and "rat" (or th e v a r ia b le "x") are in in v e r te d commas in A u s t in 's se n te n c e , i t combines in a n o n se n s ic a l fa s h io n two d i f f e r e n t q u e s - t io n s : ( l ) "What i s th e meaning o f 'm eaning'?" and (2 ) "What i s th e mean- in g o f 'x '? " That i s , the q u e s tio n red u ces to : "What i s the meaning o f 'm eaning' in so fa r a s i t r e l a t e s e x c lu s iv e ly to th e word 'r a t '? " The answer i s , o f c o u r se , t h a t th ere i s no such m eaning, or a sp e c t o f th e m eaning, o f "meaning." Thus, th e q u e s tio n i s nonsense because th e meaning o f "meaning" p rec lu d es i t u se in such a way. The q u e s tio n i s nonsense b ecause any answer t o i t -i f t o th e p o in t--w o u ld be n on sen se, not b ecause th e q u e s tio n i t s e l f i s "m ean ingless." 30 A u s t in 's paper i s an attem pt to show th a t only q u estio n s ask in g fo r th e meaning o f s p e c i f i c words are " sen se1; w h ile a l l "general" q u es- t io n s about meaning are nonsense because they may be reduced to th e epitom e q u estion : "What i s the meaning o f a word?" B ut, in so fa r as any p h ilosop h er asks t h i s q u estio n , i t i s synonymous w ith "What i s th e mean- in g o f words?" ra th er th a n --a s A u stin t r e a t s i t -"What i s th e meaning o f any o ld word?" T his i s b es id e th e p o in t s in c e i t tak es "any word" as syn- onymous w ith " ju st any word whatsoever" rath er than as a phrase s p e c ify in g the s o r t o f meaning asked fo r by th e q u estio n . The s o r t o f o b je c t io n th a t A u stin r a is e s to ask ing "What i s the meaning o f a word?" would im ply, i f i t were v a l id , strange th in g s about th e nature o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning. I t would imply th a t the nature o f mean- in g i t s e l f cannot be in v e s t ig a te d s in c e every word has a unique meaning, one having noth ing in common w ith a l l other words. But, what words may be sa id to have in common i s , o f cou rse , not what they mean, b u t, r a th e r , th a t they mean. I t i s the f a c t th a t each one does have a p a r tic u la r mean- ing th a t causes i t to be c l a s s i f i e d as a word. I t i s a t t h is p o in t th a t we then ask th e fu rth er q u estio n , "What i s the meaning o f a word?" i . e . , "What c o n s t itu te s t h i s f a c t in v ir tu e o f which a word i s so c la s s if ie d ? " This q u estio n c a l l s fo r an ex p la n a tio n o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning in g en era l and word-meaning in p a r t ic u la r . The q u estio n i s thus perhaps more c le a r ly framed a s , "How, or in what way, do words have meaning?" in order to avoid m istak ing th e q u estion fo r a sk in g , "What do a l l words mean?" which i s , o f cou rse, absurd. We are lo o k in g , th en , fo r a c h a r a c te r iz a t io n o f the manner in which any word means, and in v ir tu e o f which i t i s a word. Such a d e sc r ip tio n i s ventured in 31 th e view th a t "the meaning o f a word i s i t s u se ." "Use" i s here g iven as ch a r a c te r iz in g th e manner in which a word has a meaning. "Use" "Use" i s a very common word th a t probably i s used in a greater v a r ie ty o f ways and co n tex ts than "mean," "meaning," e t c . The view th a t "the meaning i s the use" may be viewed as r e s u lt in g from th e fo llo w in g argument: "In order to determ ine the meaning o f a word, i t must be seen how the word i s u sed . When i t i s seen how i t i s u sed , th a t i s to see i t s meaning. To know how i t i s u sed , i s to know i t s meaning in th e f u l l e s t sen se ." T his seems a c lea r and stra igh tforw ard argument. A word ob- v io u s ly has meaning on ly in so fa r as i t i s used co n v en tio n a lly in c e r ta in ways w ith in a language. There are p i t f a l l s in the argument, however, and some o f them may be tra ced to the h ig h ly f l e x i b l e meaning o f "use." Consider the sta tem en ts: 1) The meaning o f a word c o n s is t s in how i t i s used . 2 ) The meaning o f a word c o n s is t s in i t s u se . The d if fe r e n c e between th ese two statem en ts might appear to be n e g l ig ib le . Statem ent 1 , however, i s most n a tu r a lly in terp re ted as rep ea tin g what was sa id in th e preceding paragraph: A word has meaning only in so fa r as i t i s used co n v en tio n a lly in c e r ta in ways. Statem ent 2 i s som ething e l s e aga in , and req u ires fu rth er argument to e s t a b l is h i t . This i s not to sa y , o f cou rse , th a t " it s u se ," r e fe r r in g to th e use o f an yth in g , never can be employed id io m a tic a lly as synonymous w ith "how i t i s used ," but in some co n tex ts th e two statem ents would be d i f f e r e n t and d if f e r e n t s o r ts o f i n - fere n c es might be drawn from them. Statem ent 1 i s accep tab le because any p a r tic u la r word c le a r ly has 32 the meaning i t has because co n v en tio n a lly i t has been used in c e r ta in ways. What i t means, or what i t s meaning i s , however, would appear to be another problem. I t i s t h is second problem to which statem ent 2 appears to be a s o lu t io n . I t might be construed as a g en era l s o lu t io n to any in - stance o f th e q u e s tio n , "What does t h i s (p a r t ic u la r ) word mean?" I t i s apparent what i s meant by say in g th a t how any word has meaning i s through being used in th e ways th a t i t i s used . I t i s fa r l e s s apparent what might be meant by say in g th a t th e meaning o f any word " i£ i t s u se ." Statem ents 1 and 2 taken to g eth er p resen t a c r u c ia l is s u e in th e "use" view o f meaning. One d if fe r e n c e between them has been d iscu sse d : Statem ent 1 i s in te r p r e ta b le as an answer to a g en era l q u estio n about the meaning o f any word or th e meaning o f a l l words: statem ent 2 can be taken to be in answer to th e same q u e s t io n - in which case i t would be id e n t ic a l in meaning w ith statem ent l - o r to be in answer to what th e meaning o f any p a r tic u la r word i s . What statem ent 2 m ight mean and imply in t h is second sen se i s not im m ediately e v id e n t . In order to in v e s t ig a te i t , i t w i l l be u s e fu l to examine a second s e t o f sta tem en ts: la ) To -understand the meaning o f a word i s t o understand how to use i t . 2a) To understand th e meaning o f a word i s to understand how i t i s used . I t w i l l be n o tic e d th a t e ith e r o f th ese statem ents might seem to imply or be im plied by e ith e r statem ent 1 or 2 . I f the meaning o f a word c o n s is t s in how i t i s u sed , then to understand t h is meaning would be to understand how to use the word. And i f th e meaning o f a word c o n s is t s in i t s u se , then to understand t h is meaning would be to understand how i t i s I 33 u sed . I f one understands how a word i s used , he must a ls o understand how to use i t . To understand how to use a word, however, does not imply th a t one understands how i t i s u sed . That th e se are d if f e r e n t i s ev id en t from th e f a c t th a t a judgment th a t someone understands how to u se a g iven word i s based on h is c o r r e c t use o f i t , whereas a judgment th a t someone under- stands how a word i s used would be based on h is d e sc r ip t io n o f i t s char- a c t e r i s t i c s o f u s e . "To understand th e meaning" in sta tem ent la thus r e - f e r s to th e understanding o f a d if f e r e n t so r t o f th in g from the su b je c t o f understanding in 2a . I t ap p ears, th en , th a t "meaning" i s used in d if f e r e n t ways in sta tem en ts la and 2a . In la "meaning" r e fe r s to som ething the understand- in g o f which i s evidenced by co r r e c t u se . In 2a "meaning" i s something the understanding o f which i s evidenced by the d e s c r ip t io n , ra th er than th e a c t o f u se , o f sen ten ces th a t would be taken as ev idence fo r understanding meaning in l a . S u f f ic ie n t ev idence fo r "understanding the meaning o f a word" in the sen se o f la cou ld c o n s is t e n t ir e ly o f sen ten ces in corp oratin g the word. S u f f i c ie n t ev idence fo r "understanding the meaning o f a word" in th e sen se o f 2a would in c lu d e sen ten ces or phrases in co rp o ra tin g th e word, but which would be w ith in q u o ta tio n marks and which would serv e as m a te r ia l fo r a n a ly s is o f th e u se o f th e word. The d if fe r e n c e here i s th a t la r e fe r s to the co n d itio n s o f speaking and understanding a word, th a t i s , u sin g i t . Statem ent 2 a , on th e other hand, r e fe r s to th e d e sc r ip t io n o f th e se c o n d it io n s . In order to c la r i f y the meanings o f words o f ordinary language, i t i s ob v iou sly u s e fu l to r e a l - iz e th a t they have whatever meanings th ey have by v ir tu e o f th e ir u se , th a t t h i s i s the source o f th e ir m eanings. This i s what i s form ulated in la . Statem ent 2a , on th e other hand, seems to say th a t there i s another way in 3^ which we may be sa id t o understand th e meaning o f a word-t h a t o f b e in g a b le to e x p la in how i t i s u sed . T his may be in te r p r e te d as eq u atin g t h i s s o r t o f u n derstan d in g w ith th e m echanics o f i t s u s e , ra th er th an th e a c t o f use o f i t . S tatem ents 1 and 2 are about th e meaning o f words w hereas la and 2a are about th e u n derstand ing o f (th e meanings o f ) words. W ith t h is d i f - fe r e n c e , 1 and la o th erw ise share a r e fe r e n c e to sou rce o f m eaning, and 2 and 2a share a r e fe r e n c e to th e nature o f any p a r t ic u la r m eaning. The common e lem en ts in th e se two p a ir s o f sen ten ces may be ex p ressed as: lb ) To have meaning i s t o have a c o n v e n tio n a l use ( l and l a ) . 2b ) A meaning i s a co n v en tio n a l u se (2 and 2 a ) . That 1 seems t o im ply 2 , and th a t la seems t o imply 2 a , i s due t o th e apparent eq u iv a le n c e o f lb and 2b , p a r t ly co n cea led w ith in th e se o th er s ta te m e n ts . S tatem ent lb form u la tes an answer to th e q u e s t io n , "What i s th e source o f m eanings": 2b form u la tes an answer t o the q u e s t io n , "What i s a meaning?" The c o n tr a s t betw een lb and 2b b r in g s out th e need to a v o id a g e n e t ic f a l l a c y in w hich source and product are id e n t i f i e d , or a t l e a s t confused w ith one a n o th er . S tatem ents la and 2a show th e need to d is t in g u is h a l s o betw een th e th eory o f a p r a c t ic e ( 2a ) and the p r a c t ic e i t s e l f ( l a ) . As th e d is c u s s io n o f them b r in g s o u t, what i s sa id about th e source o f meaning o f words may be transform ed im properly in to a sta tem en t about th e nature o f p h ilo so p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n . The f i r s t p a ir o f sta tem en ts fo c u se s on "how used" a s opposed to "use"; th e second p a ir on "understanding how to use" as opposed to "under- sta n d in g how used" and th e th ir d on "source o f meaning" as opposed to "meaning." They show how "use," b e s id e s b e in g in some c o n te x ts s u b s ta n t ia l ly 35 synonymous w ith "how u s e d / ' may a ls o be in te r p r e te d ( in th e co n tex t o f "understanding how used") as th e unique job o f th e p h ilo so p h ic in v e s t ig a - t io n o f m eaning, and, in a more g en era l sen se ( i n 2b) as meaning i t s e l f . From co n s id er in g th e se va r io u s se n se s o f "use," i t may be seen th a t i t i s d e s ir a b le th a t a u se th eory o f meaning be e s ta b lis h e d on a th e o r e t ic framework th a t p rov id es a d i f f e r e n t ia t io n o f: ( l ) th e source o f meaning from meaning i t s e l f , and (2 ) the p r a c t ic e or e x e r c is e o f la n - guage from th e th eory o f t h i s p r a c t ic e . F u n ction and Purpose A use view o f meaning i s in o p p o sit io n to v iew s in w hich, im p lic - i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , meaning i s id e n t i f i e d w ith some s o r t o f "object" named by a word. The fo r e g o in g p a ir s o f sta tem en ts a l l c o n tr a d ic t such naming th e o r ie s o f meaning. A u se view i s a ls o in o p p o s it io n to th e o r ie s o f meaning in which words are tr e a te d as v e h ic le s o f th e purposes o f th e ir u se r s . Consider th e sta tem en ts: 1 c ) The meaning o f a word c o n s is t s in how i t fu n c t io n s . 2 c ) The meaning o f a word c o n s is t s in i t s fu n c t io n . These sta tem en ts have been ob tained from 1 and 2 by s u b s t itu t in g " fu n ctio n ," in two o f i t s v a r io u s form s, fo r th e two d if f e r e n t forms o f "use" in 1 and 2 . The sen se o f "use" as more or l e s s synonymous w ith "function" i s th e dominant sen se in th e f i r s t th r e e p a ir s o f sta tem en ts d is c u s se d , but i s not an unambiguous synonym fo r "use" in th e se s ta tem en ts . I f i t w ere, th ere would be a c lo s e p a r a l l e l betw een 1 and l c , whereas th ey a c tu a lly d i f f e r co n s id e r a b ly . One in v o lv e s an im plied user or u sers o f w ords, which l c does n o t , and u s u a lly would n ot be so construed because o f th e d if f e r e n c e in th e fu n c t io n s o f " fu n c tio n " and " u s e ." The im p lic a t io n o f a speaker or speakers in 1 shows why a sen se o f "use" in v o lv in g "purpose" cou ld be thought to be in v o lv e d in or im p lied by sta tem en t 1 . This sen se o f "use" i s found in th e p hrases "used for" and "used to ," and q u estio n s o f th e purpose o f th e use o f words would be fu r th er q u e s tio n s beyond th a t im p l ic i t ly answered by sta tem en t 1 , s in c e "how" in d ic a te s th a t " function" i s the sen se o f "use" h ere . I f "purpose" were im m ediately in v o lv e d , th e sta tem en t would have to be changed to read , "The meaning o f a word c o n s is t s in why i t i s u s e d ." With t h i s change, i f 1 and 2 were taken as e q u iv a le n t , 2 cou ld be con stru ed as "The m eaning o f a word c o n s is t s in i t s purpose." A s im ila r s i t u a t io n e x i s t s in th e second p a ir o f s ta te m e n ts . S t a t e - ment l a , "To understand th e meaning o f a word i s t o understand how to use i t , " in d ic a te s aga in th e sen se o f "use" as " fu n c tio n ." In 2a , "To under- stand th e meaning o f a word i s t o understand how i t i s u sed ," "how" ag a in in d ic a te s th e sen se o f " fu n c tio n ." " F unction ," however, mpy be read in to 2a -as "To understand th e meaning o f a word i s to understand how i t fu n c tio n s" - -b u t not in to l a , where "how to use i t" cannot be t r a n s la te d in to a phrase c o n ta in in g " fu n ctio n ." A speaker i s im p lied h ere , a l s o , and so th e se n se o f "purpose" i s a ls o to th a t e x te n t im p lied . In th e th ir d p a ir o f s ta te m e n ts , " function" may be s u b s t itu te d fo r th e s in g le word "use" in both o f them. S tatem ent lb , "To have meaning i s to have a c o n v en tio n a l u se ," may be tr a n s la te d in to "To have meaning i s to have a c o n v en tio n a l fu n ction " (or " fu n ctio n e s ta b lis h e d by con ven tion " ); and 2b , "A meaning i s a co n v en tio n a l u s e ," becomes "A meaning i s a c o n v en tio n a l fu n c - t i o n " (or " fu n ctio n e s ta b lis h e d by co n v en tio n " ). S in ce lb and 2b were sa id 37 to ex p ress the common elem ents in th e preced ing s e t s o f sta tem en ts ( l and 2 ; la and 2a ) , i t i s cu r io u s and s ig n i f ic a n t th a t lb and 2b both can be reform ulated w ith " function" w h ile 2 and 2a cannot. An " in te n tio n a l" a sp e c t o f th e use th eory i s im p lied by th e idiom s employed in 2 and 2a . T his a sp e c t o f th e use th eory i s , fu r th e r , not con fin ed to q u estio n s about th e source o f m eaning, but i s in v o lv ed a ls o in q u estio n s about th e understanding o f meaning (2a) and th e nature o f meaning (2 ) . The se n se s o f "use" as " function" and as "purpose" are q u ite d i f - f e r e n t , a lth ou gh n ot alw ays d i s t i n c t . To d e sc r ib e the fu n c tio n o f some- th in g i s to d esc r ib e th e o p era tio n o f one elem ent w ith in a com plex. To d escr ib e a purpose, on th e other hand, i s to d e sc r ib e what the end o f a ta sk i s : th e reason s fo r doing som ething, o r , som etim es, th e a c tu a l r e - s u l t s o f th e doing or o p era tin g o f som ething. T his i s n o t to say th a t th e q u estio n s o f how and why som ething i s used never o v er la p . They do, in f a c t , fr e q u e n tly over lap to such an e x te n t th a t to ask th e one q u estio n i s to a sk , a t th e same t im e , th e o th e r . To d esc r ib e a fu n c tio n may in - v o lv e the d e s c r ip t io n o f a purpose, and, c o n v e r se ly , t o d esc r ib e a purpose may in v o lv e d e sc r ib in g a fu n c t io n , but they are d is t in g u is h a b ly d i f f e r e n t ty p es o f d e s c r ip t io n . Both o f chese se n se s o f "use" are im p lic i t in speak ing o f "the use" o f words. Of co u rse , i t would alw ays be d i f f i c u l t to d is c u s s th e fu n c tio n o f a w ord --th e m echanics o f i t s u se -w ithout r e fe r e n c e to a c tu a l or p o s- s ib le purposes fo r u sin g i t . Perhaps in some ca ses i t even would be impos- s i b l e . And, in speaking o f th e source o f the meaning o f a word, we may say th a t i t has what meaning i t has as a r e s u l t o f i t s b e in g used in c e r ta in 38 w ays. We may a ls o say th a t i t has what meaning i t has as a r e s u l t o f b e in g used fo r c e r ta in p u rp o se s . A t o o l such as a hoe i s made in a c e r ta in form in order to serv e c e r ta in p u rp o ses. I f i t i s used fo r i t s purpose, h o e in g , th en the form in which i t was made c o n tr ib u te s to i t s f u l f i l l i n g i t s purpose. Would one say th a t a hoe i s th e sort o f t o o l i t i s because i t i s u sed in c e r ta in ways? Or, would one say th a t i t i s a hoe b ecau se i t i s used fo r c e r ta in purposes? The ways in w hich a hoe i s used and th e purposes fo r which i t i s used are n ea r ly in d is t in g u is h a b le . T his t o o l has a p a r t ic u la r form in w hich i t was p u rp ose ly made in order to s u i t i t fo r u se in p a r t ic u la r ways fo r p a r t ic u la r p u rp oses. We may c a l l a " t o o l ,1' though, an y th in g th a t i s used to b r in g about som eth ing. Som ething l i k e a rock or a hunk o f s t e e l , fo r in s ta n c e , may be c a l le d a " too l" in so fa r as i t i s used fo r a purpose o f b r in g in g som ething ab ou t. When such o b je c ts a re c a l le d t o o l s i t i s w ith r e fe r e n c e to such u ses fo r a purpose. I t does not make s e n s e , in a g en era l c o n te x t , to say th a t rocks are t o o l s , a lth ou gh i t does make sen se in any c o n te x t to say th a t any m a te r ia l o b je c t such as a rock may be used as a t o o l . B u t, a hoe i s a t o o l whether i t ever i s used as one or n o t, w h ile a rock i s one on ly when i t i s used as one. The p o s s i b i l i t y o f use th a t i s b u i l t in to th e hoe w arrants c a l l in g i t a t o o l . Such a p o s s i b i l i t y i s n o t b u i l t in to a ro ck , b u t , r a th e r , i s seen in i t whenever i t i s c a l le d a t o o l . When a rock i s a c tu a l ly b e in g used as a t o o l - f o r th e purpose o f h o e in g , fo r e x a m p le -it may be c a l le d a t o o l . B u t, when i t i s not a c tu a lly b e in g used fo r t h i s purpose, th en t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y or other p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f u se are r e fe r r e d to - a r e in d ic a te d by th e e x p l i c i t or im p l ic i t co n tex t--w h en i t 39 i s c a l le d as t o o l . A rock may be c a l le d a t o o l on ly in r e fe r e n c e to s p e - c i f i c , a c tu a l in s ta n c e s o f i t s use as a to o l; b u t , in g e n e r a l , i t may be s a id on ly th a t a rock may be used as a t o o l fo r v a r io u s p u rp o ses, i . e . , th a t i t i s a p o s s ib le t o o l . So, t o say th a t th e meaning o f words i s th e ir u se and in te r p r e t them on an an a logy w ith t o o l s , s t i l l le a v e s open th e q u e s tio n s o f w hether and in what ways l i n g u i s t i c meaning i s s im ila r t o p o s s ib le and to a c tu a l t o o l s - t o o l s w ith b u i l t i n purposes and o b je c ts w ith p o s s ib le u se s as t o o l s . C onventions and M e a n in g -a s -P o s s ib ility To speak o f th e meaning o f words a t a l l may seem to im ply a d i s - t in c t i o n betw een words and t h e ir m eanings. We fr e q u e n tly speak in other c o n te x t s , as w e l l , o f th e "meanings o f w ords," commonly sa y in g th in g s l i k e "What does th a t word mean?" "I d o n 't know th e meaning o f th a t ," e t c . But what i s a word as d is t in g u is h e d from i t s meaning? There are words such as a re found in Lewis C a r r o ll 's nonsense v e r se s th a t could be c a l le d "meaning- l e s s w ords." B u t, s in c e th ey are m ean ingless i t would be b e t te r fo r most purposes n o t to c a l l them words a t a l l , A reason th ey m ight be c a l le d words i s th a t th ey lo o k and sound l i k e th em --th ey can be pronounced and have some s e r ie s o f l e t t e r s found in a c tu a l words in our lan gu age. P resen ted w ith " l i b i t , " how ever, one would be l e s s in c l in e d to c a l l t h i s s e r ie s o f l e t t e r s a word, even i f p r in te d as one w ith in som ething th a t lo o k s l i k e a sen ten ce o f some s o r t . So, what m ight be c a l le d a word depends to a la r g e e x te n t on the c h a r a c t e r is t ic s o f groups o f sounds and l e t t e r s th a t do have meaning in our lan gu age. We are n o t in c l in e d to c a l l any m ean in g less sound a "m eaningless w ord." T h is i s our tendency b ecause ''-word" in many c o n te x ts i s e q u iv a le n t to "m eaningful sound" (or th e w r it te n symbol fo r o n e ). When we ask about th e meaning o f w ords, we are u s in g "word" in th e sen se o f " a r t ic u la te d sound or th e symbol fo r i t . " B u t, in u s in g i t in t h i s sen se i t i s p o in t - l e s s t o s p e c if y a word as opposed to p a rt o f o n e - i t s s y l l a b l e s , fo r in - s ta n c e --b e c a u se both th e whole word and each o f i t s component sounds or l e t t e r s are a r t ic u la t e d sounds or th e symbols fo r them. So , a word i s not tr e a te d as such u n le s s i t i s known to be m ean in g fu l. A word i s n ot d i s - t in g u is h a b le from i t s meaning u n t i l i t i s known to be a word, u n t i l i t i s known to have a m eaning. So, to speak o f th e meanings o f words m ight seem to have more p o in ts o f s im i la r i t y w ith th e u se o f a rock as a t o o l than w ith th e u se o f a hoe. This m ight seem to be th e case b ecau se a word may be sa id to have no more meaning "in i t s e l f , " th a t i s , as a mere a r t ic u la te d sound, than a ro ck , in i t s e l f , i s a t o o l o f any s o r t . What makes a sound a word i s i t s use as a meaning; what makes a rock a hammer i s i t s use as a hammer. On account o f t h is seem ing s im i la r i t y , i t i s u s e fu l t o em phasize th e con ven tion s o f th e u se o f words in d is c u s s io n s o f t h e ir m eaning. F or, w h ile a m anufactured t o o l such as a hammer has th e use i t has because i t was d esig n ed fo r th a t purpose, a word has th e meaning i t has b ecau se i t has been e s ta b lis h e d by c o n v en tio n . Both m anufactured t o o ls and words are t o o ls in a d i f f e r e n t sen se from th a t in w hich a rock may be sa id to be a t o o l . I t i s on ly in i t s fu n c t io n in g , in i t s a c tu a l use as a t o o l , th a t a rock i s a t o o l . A word, on th e co n tra ry , i s a word b ecause i t i s conven- t io n a l l y used as one; s im i la r ly , a t o o l i s a t o o l because i t has been b u i l t fo r such a purpose. A word c a r r ie d i t s meaning a lon g w ith i t in th e way th a t a t o o l such as a hammer c a r r ie s i t s purpose a lo n g w ith i t . 41 I t i s u s e fu l to em phasize th e con ven tion o f u se in order to b r in g ou t th e p h ilo s o p h ic a l ly im portant sen se o f "■word" in -which i t c a r r ie s i t s meaning a lon g w ith i t . T his i s made p o s s ib le by con ven tion : th e word has a u se " b u ilt in" or e s ta b lis h e d by co n v en tio n , as a t o o l has a use b u i l t in by d e s ig n . 1 The analogy drawn here betw een words and t o o l s may be m is le a d in g in q u ite d i f f e r e n t w ays. One d i f f i c u l t y w ith i t i s t h a t , taken as a c lo s e a n a lo g y , i t m ight su g g e st th a t words have f ix e d , unchangeable m eanings, w hereas new ways o f u s in g words are c o n s ta n t ly b e in g d e v is e d . A nother, ra th er d i f f e r e n t , d i f f i c u l t y w ith th e an a lo g y , i f taken as a c lo s e one, i s t h a t , w h ile a word must be used a n a lo g o u sly w ith i t s co n ven tion o f u se ( i f i t i s to rem ain th e same w ord), a t o o l , on th e o th er hand, may be used in innum erable ways o th er than th o se fo r which i t was made ( e . g . , a hoe may be used as a b e a n -p o le , a d arn in g -n eed le as a w eapon). The f i r s t o f th e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s in v o lv e s what i s a ra th e r im port- an t q u e s tio n in th e p h ilo so p h y o f lan gu age, v i z . , th a t o f th e c r e a t io n o f n o v e l m eanings out o f e s ta b lis h e d m eanings. The con ven tion o f u se o f a word i s a h ig h ly f l e x i b l e group o f analogous s o r t s o f u se , and what counts as analogous som etim es may be q u ite fa r f e t c h e d . A new use o f a word must be analogous to some degree w ith i t s co n ven tion o f u s e , however, or e l s e i t i s sim ply a new word e n t ir e ly . The shape or form o f a word th a t l i e s in i t s con ven tion o f u se i s n e v e r th e le s s su b je c t to m o d if ic a t io n should th e u ses o f a word be ex ten d ed . The shape o f a r e a l t o o l , on th e other hand, im poses f ix e d l im it a t io n s upon i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f u se . In so fa r as th e use o f t h i s analogy in t h i s chapter i s concerned , i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to n o te t h i s a sp e c t o f th e in e x a c tn e ss o f the ana logy betw een words and t o o l s , a lth ou gh th e r e remain more g e n e r a l (and probably q u ite com plex) problems about c r e a t io n o f n o v e l meanings out o f e s ta b lis h e d on es. The second o f th e d i f f i c u l t i e s m entioned-v i z . , th a t r e a l t o o l s may- be used in r a d ic a l ly d i f f e r e n t ways from th o se fo r w hich th ey w ere d es ig n ed , w h ile words c a n n o t--su g g e s ts th a t i t would be d e s ir a b le to s p e c if y s o r t s o f th e "uses" o f words and t o o ls th a t are to be understood as in v o lv e d in th e ana logy in th e p r e se n t c o n te x t . The use o f a hoe as a b ea n -p o le or a darn- in g -n e e d le as a dagger are u ses th a t should be understood as exc lu d ed from th o se u se s r e le v a n t to th e analogy in th e p r e se n t c o n te x t . I t i s on ly th o se u ses th a t are c h a r a c t e r i s t ic a l ly th o se o f p a r t ic u la r t o o ls th a t are here b e in g p o in ted to as s im ila r to th e u ses o f w ords. I f a word i s u sed by someone in a co m p le te ly n o v e l way, th en i t i s n o t th e same word but j u s t th e same sound (or w r it te n s ig n ) o f a word. S im ila r ly , i f a hoe i s used as a b e a n -p o le , i t i s a b e a n -p o le -a b ea n -p o le made ou t o f a h oe-and i s d e f in a b le as such on th e b a s is o f i t s u s e . The p h y s ic a l form o f th e hoe makes i t r e c o g n iz a b le as such by anyone fa m ilia r w ith h o e s , but whether i t i s more to th e p o in t to d e s ig n a te i t as a hoe or a b ean -p o le i s a m atter o f th e con- t e x t or c ircu m stan ces o f i t s u se . h2 R ules o f Use The n o tio n o f a "convention o f use" may be viewed, as in answer to the g en era l q u estion o f why a word has a meaning. T h is convention o f use may in clud e a number o f s e n s e s , so th a t , s t r i c t l y sp eak in g , th e meaning o f some words may be a "family"'1" o f s e n se s , each sen se i t s e l f made up o f a fam ily or s e t of p a r t ic u la r u s e s . So, in order to determ ine th e meaning o f a word, i t i s n ecessary to look a t a l l th e uses o f i t . But , how can t h i s be done? I t can be done b ecause i t i s p o s s ib le to i s o la t e types o f use (which may or may not b e -d if f e r e n t enough t o be con sid ered as "senses" o f the word). T h is , in tu rn , i s p o s s ib le because i t i s p o s s ib le to rec o g - n iz e , im p lic i t ly or e x p l i c i t l y , th e r u le s fo r the use o f the word. ("Rule i s being used here in a very broad se n se , a s in c lu d in g "law" and " prin - c ip l e ." ) To recogn ize such r u le s " im p lic it ly " i s , o f cou rse , sim ply to use a word in accordance w ith i t s r u le s . To reco g n ize them " e x p l ic i t ly ," on th e other hand, i s a c tu a lly to form ulate th e r u le s , to d escr ib e th e use of a word in s te a d o f m erely u s in g i t . I f one knows how to u se a word, one i s able to a c t in accordance w ith i t s r u le s o f u se . In t h i s sen se , one may be sa id to be " fo llo w in g ru les" whenever he u ses a word c o r r e c t ly . In many c o n te x ts , though, "to fo llo w a ru le" im plies a c o n sc io u s , d e lib e r a te a p p lic a t io n o f th e r u le . "To fo llo w a ru le" in t h i s sen se i s not a p a rt of th e a c t iv i t y o f language ^The term "family" has d isad vantages in a use theory o f meaning b e- cause i t in v o lv e s the n o tio n o f h e r e d ity , im plying th a t the source o f s im i- l a r i t i e s in meaning i s to be found in common a n c e s to r s . I am u sin g th e term here on ly as W ittg e n ste in , I b e l ie v e , intended i t to be understood , v i z . , as d escr ib in g or su g g estin g th e a sp e c ts o f fam ily resem blance (a s in W ittg e n ste in , P h ilo so p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s , I , 67) and w ithout i t s e l f in - v o lv in g any view of the source o f th e meaning o f words. 3 as such . The "rules" o f language are d e s c r ip t iv e - th e y are form u lation s o f procedures "follow ed" w ith in a p a r tic u la r language. To be con sciou s o f what th e se procedures are i s not p r e r e q u is ite to speaking and understand- in g th e language. I t i s only in th a t one a c ts c o n s is t e n t ly w ith the r u le s when speaking the language th a t one may be sa id to a c t according to them. The a c t iv i t y o f language i s th a t from which the r u le s may be read . P r e sc r ip t iv e and D e scr ip tiv e R ules R ules may be e ith e r p r e s c r ip t iv e or d e s c r ip t iv e . Language b e in g a human a c t iv i t y and in s t i t u t io n , there i s an im portant sen se in which th e r u le s o f language may be considered as p r e s c r ip t iv e . I t has been empha- s iz e d th a t the r u le s o f language are con ven tion s, and any convention in - v o lv e s c o n s tr a in t o f some k in d . There are some customs or con ven tio n s, though, th a t are not form ulated as p r e sc r ip t iv e r u le s -methods o f h a r v e s t- in g g ra in , fo r example. C onstraint in th ese cases may seem ju s t l ik e th e c o n s tr a in t o f n e c e s s ity or n a tu ra l law s. So, h a rv estin g methods may be thought by th e ir p r a c t it io n e r s to be determ ined by n e c e s s ity ju s t as p re - c i s e ly as the seasons determ ine growing p er io d s . The r u le s o f language, a l s o , are conventions in the sen se in which methods o f h a rv estin g a re . Hence, th ey are n e ith e r p r e s c r ip t iv e nor d e s c r ip t iv e o f n a tu ra l p r o c e sse s . This c h a r a c te r is t ic o f l i n g u i s t i c law s, th e ir con v en tio n a l a sp e c t , su g g ests the sense in which th e r e i s n e ith er in e v i t a b i l i t y about l i n g u i s t i c r u le s nor t o t a l a r b itr a r in e s s in them. The laws o f language are n e ith e r p u rely ca p r ic io u s nor are they d e sc r ip t io n s o f unchangeable f a c t s . The mechanisms o f language are alw ays to some ex ten t determ ined by th e s i t u a - t io n s in which language i s u sed , ju s t as methods o f reap ing are determ ined to some e x te n t by th e n atu ra l laws in vo lved in the s tru c tu re and p ro p e r tie s kb o f g r a in . B ut th e r e i s n o t any s o r t o f a b s o lu te n e c e s s i t y - s u c h a s law s o f lo g i c or law s o f n a tu re th a t cannot be o th er than th e y a r e --w h ic h d i c - t a t e s th e r u le s o f la n g u a g e . The r u le s o f language a r e c o n v e n tio n s l i k e th o se o f r e a p in g , n o t l i k e th e p u r e ly c o n v e n tio n a l ones o f a h a r v e s t d a n ce , and may be s a id to be n e ith e r d e s c r ip t iv e nor p r e s c r ip t iv e . P r e s c r ip t iv e la w s , o f c o u r se , may be d e s c r ib e d , and th e r u le s o f lan gu age may be d e sc r ib e d w ith o u t r e fe r e n c e to w hat s o r t o f r u le s l i n g u i s - t i c r u le s a r e . But in th e p h ilo s o p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n o f th e problem s o f m eaning, th e n atu re o f th e r u le s th e m se lv e s sh ou ld be c o n s id e r e d , s in c e we a re concerned in t h i s c a s e n o t w ith a p a r t ic u la r m eaning or m eanings b u t w ith th e n a tu re o f l i n g u i s t i c m eaning in g e n e r a l . T h is p h ilo s o p h ic q u e s t io n i s a fu r th e r q u e s t io n beyond th a t o f d eterm in in g what th e r u le s fo r th e u se o f a p a r t ic u la r word a r e . R u les; Theory and P r a c t ic e There may be a th e o r y o f any p r a c t ic e - a s o f a n y th in g e l s e . A p o s i t io n in w hich " th eo ry " i s v iew ed a s in h e r e n t ly n o n s e n s ic a l may r e s t som etim es on an ap p aren t s im i l a r i t y w ith q u e s t io n s o f th e s o r t d is c u s s e d in P r e s c r ip t iv e and D e s c r ip t iv e R u le s . I t i s n o t u n usu al fo r th e n o t io n o f th e fo l lo w in g o f r u le s a s c o n sc io u s g u id es to be co n fu sed w ith th e im- p l i c i t fo l lo w in g o f law s fo rm u la ted in , e . g . , law s o f n a tu r e . That l i n - g u i s t i c p r a c t ic e does n o t r e q u ir e d e l ib e r a t e a p p l ic a t io n o f r u le s o f gram- mar, e t c . , may be ta k en a s im p ly in g th a t th e p r a c t ic e o f lan gu age does not in v o lv e any r u le s a t a l l . That i s , th e f a c t th a t lan gu age i s a p r a c - t i c e may be ta k en a s a n t i t h e t i c a l t o i t s h av in g a th eo ry ; th e d e s t r u c t io n o f th e n o t io n o f th e " a p p l ic a t io n o f r u le s ," th rou gh i t s a m b ig u ity , may be b-5 thought to d estro y a ls o th e n o tio n o f a n a ly s is in to p r in c ip le s th a t i s th e h ea r t o f " theory ." I t may be m is lea d in g to speak o f p h ilo so p h y as a m e t a a c t iv i t y - or to speak when doing p h ilo sop h y as though i t w e r e - i f by " m e ta -a c t iv ity '1 i s meant d isc o u r se on another l e v e l and in another vocab u lary than o rd in - ary d is c o u r s e . T his v iew , however, ought to be d is t in g u is h e d from th e view th a t p h ilosop h y must not be " th e o r e t ic a l ." "Theory" i s used in some c o n te x ts to d is t in g u is h "pure" from "ap- p lie d " knowledge or " p r a c tic e ." I t may a ls o be used to mean an hypoth- e s i s , w hich sen se i s c lo s e ly r e la te d to a n o th er , perhaps more fundam ental s e n se , th a t o f a sy ste m a tic view o f th e p r in c ip le s o f som eth ing. In t h i s l a s t s e n s e , "theory" must be in v o lv e d to some e x te n t in any k ind o f i n - v e s t i g a t i o n - - ^ any attem pt to answer q u e s tio n s o f a h igh er d egree o f gen - e r a l i t y than th a t o f "What i s th e meaning o f 'r a t '? " A te c h n ic a l d i s t in c t io n may be made betw een a th eo ry as a system a- t i v e view o f the p r in c ip le s o f som ething and as a n o t io n o f how to do some- th in g . When one speaks o f a " th eory" o f a p r a c t ic e or a c t i v i t y i t m ight mean e i th e r a sy ste m a tic view o f th e p r in c ip le s in v o lv e d or a view o f how to go about perform ing th e a c t i v i t y . As fa r as th e is s u e s now b e in g co n sid ered a re con cerned , to view language as a p r a c t ic e or a c t i v i t y i s u s e f u l in c o n s id e r in g , among eth er m a tte r s , th e nature o f th e laws or r u le s o f language and th e n atu re o f l i n - g u i s t i c meaning. In other w ords, v iew in g language as an a c t i v i t y or p ra c- t i c e in th e p resen t co n tex t i s fo r th e purpose o f d ev e lo p in g a " system atic view o f th e p r in c ip le s " o f lan gu age, i . e . , a " theory ." I t i s in t h i s sen se th a t a "theory" o f language i s being sought h ere . A sy s te m a tic view o f th e k6 p r in c ip le s o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning w i l l be sought through c o n s id e r in g la n - guage as an a c t i v i t y . The Mature o f Word-meaning The a n a ly s is o f "use" on pages 31-35 su g g ested the d e s i r a b i l i t y fo r a u se th eo ry o f meaning to d is t in g u is h betw een: ( l ) th e p r a c t ic e and th e th eory o f l i n g u i s t i c m eaning, and (2 ) th e source and product o f mean- in g . In regard to th e f i r s t o f th e se p o in t s , i t may be sa id t h a t , lo o k in g a t language a s a p r a c t ic e , th e use o f words c r e a te s l i n g u i s t i c m eaning, and "the meaning i s th e use" i s in te r p r e ta b le in t h i s co n te x t as e x p la in - in g th e c r e a t in g o f meaning; w h ile in a p h ilo so p h ic view (a "theory" in th e se n se o f a " sy stem a tic view o f th e p r in c ip le s ," as d isc u sse d in th e p reced in g s e c t io n ) th a t ta k es th e "use" o f words a s fundam ental to th e e x - p la n a t io n o f l i n g u i s t i c m eaning, language as a p r a c t ic e ta k es a c e n tr a l p o s i t io n , and "the meaning i s th e use" i s in te r p r e ta b le in t h i s c o n te x t as e x p la in in g th e nature and p o s s i b i l i t y o f meaning. In regard to th e second p o in t l i s t e d above (reg a rd in g th e d e s ir a - b i l i t y o f d is t in g u is h in g betw een th e source and product o f m eaning), i t w i l l be argued in th e fo llo w in g d is c u s s io n th a t "the meaning o f a se n te n c e ," a s d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t from th e meaning o f w ords, i s d e s ir a b le in a u se th eo ry o f m eaning. That th e u ses o f words are e q u iv a le n t to t h e ir meanings was taken as g iv e n a t th e o u ts e t o f t h is stu d y . We have se e n , however, th a t a " use" may r e fe r to an a c tu a l employment o f a word in a s e n te n c e , th e manner in which i t fu n c t io n s in v a r io u s sen ten ces and c o n te x ts , o r , a g a in , th e "usage" th a t c r e a te s a con v en tio n o f u se . Furtherm ore, th ere are c e r ta in u ses o f w ords-e . g . , ir o n ic u s e s -th a t are n ot a t a l l e q u iv a le n t to th e ir m eanings. ^7 I t i s th e r e fo r e n ecessa ry to d e f in e e x a c t ly in what sen se o f "use" i t makes sen se to say th a t th e meaning o f a word i s i t s u se . The u se th eo ry was developed in resp o n se to what were h e ld to be in ad eq u acies and in a c c u r a c ie s in th e T racta tu s th e o r y , and r e la te d t h e o r ie s , in which th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f meaning was h e ld to l i e in o b je c ts in th e world w ith which words are c o r r e la te d , and in th e l o g i c a l s tr u c tu r e common to p r o p o s it io n s and to t h i s w orld o f o b je c ts arranged in to f a c t s . So , in t h i s ty p e o f th e o r y , th e nature o f meaning was tw o -fo ld : I t was composed o f "sem antic" and " sy n ta c tic" e lem en ts th a t to g e th e r ex p la in ed th e p o s s i - b i l i t y o f meaning by e x p la in in g th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f s e n te n c e s . I f a u se th eory i s to be v ery v a lu a b le as a th eory o f meaning i t should e x p la in n ot on ly words-th e "sem antic" e le m e n ts , but s e n te n c e s - fo r which " sy n ta c tic " elem en ts were in trod u ced in th e o r ie s r e la te d to th a t o f th e T r a c ta tu s . B u t, t here i s no need fo r a d i s t in c t io n betw een " sem antic" and " sy n ta c tic " in a use theory o f the meaning o f w ords. I f th e meaning o f words i s t h e ir u se , th e " ru les o f use" or "conventions" d e sc r ib e t h e ir manner o f u se in sen ten ces a t th e same tim e th a t th ey d e sc r ib e th e "mean- in g s ." "Semantic" and " sy n ta c tic" c o l la p se to g e th e r in to "use." Another way o f sa y in g t h i s i s to say th a t th e r u le s o f use o f words are th e same as th e r u le s o f the c o n s tr u c t io n o f s e n te n c e s . There i s no double s e t o f r u le s , one fo r words and one fo r s e n te n c e s , in term s o f which words and sen ten ces may be d e fin ed and d is t in g u is h e d from one an oth er . In f a c t , i t i s n o t n ecessa ry to d is t in g u is h betw een words and sen ten ces as meanings in t h i s typ e o f v ie w , co n sid ered in i t s e l f (w ith o u t r e fe r e n c e to other v iew s o f meaning th a t do make such a d i s t i n c t i o n ) . That i s , "the u se o f words" in so fa r as i t i s e q u iv a le n t to words as 1+8 m eanings sim p ly i s th e u se o f words in s e n te n c e s . A sen ten ce i s a case o f th e use o f w ords. So, th e sen se in w hich th e meaning o f a word i s " i t s use" may he d efin ed in term s o f th a t w hich c o n s t i t u t e s an a c tu a l u se o f w ord s--a s e n - te n c e . A word by i t s e l f i s m erely a p o s s ib le m eaning, and o f im portance to a g en era l th eory o f meaning on ly as embodying th e con ven tion s or r u le s whose p r a c t ic e i s th e a c t iv e use o f w ords. B u t, as a c tu a l m eanings, words must be in u s e , which i s t o be in use as p a r ts o f s e n te n c e s . That i s , th e r u le s o f th e use o f a word c o n s t i t u t e what m ight be c a l le d a "pos- s ib l e m eaning," w h ile an a p p lic a t io n o f th e s e r u le s (a use o f th e word) m ight be c a l le d an " a ctu a l m eaning." The words o f a sen ten ce are n o t to be t h e o r e t i c a l ly d is t in g u is h e d from th e meaning o f th e sen ten ce because th e words to g e th e r sim ply are th a t m eaning. In so fa r as "the words" are tak en as d e s ig n a t in g th e marks on a page or the sounds spoken, how ever, th ey may be s a id to be the "sign" o f th e se n te n c e , d is t in g u is h in g th e sen ten ce as a s ig n (or "symbol") from th e sen ten ce as a m eaning. T his d i s t in c t io n i s u s e f u l in c e r ta in c o n te x t s , b u t to th e problem s p r e s e n t ly under d is c u s s io n "the words" o f se n te n c e s are r e le v a n t as meanings ra th er than as " s ig n s ." The d i s t in c t io n som etim es drawn betw een "token-words" and " typ e- words" i s s im ila r ly ir r e le v a n t to th e p r esen t d is c u s s io n . Each occurrence o f th e word "x" may be d es ig n a ted a " token-w ord ," n u m erica lly d i f f e r e n t from every o th er appearance o f "x ." S in ce th e sounds (or w r it te n form s) o f a l l such tokens are s im ila r , th ey may be used as a "type-w ord." One m ight speak o f token-w ords as " occu rren ces," "appearances," or " u ses" o f typ e-w ord s. B e s id e s t h i s s o r t o f " use," w hich i s rou gh ly e q u iv a le n t to an " u tter a n c e ," th e r e i s a ls o th a t "use" w hich c o n s is t s in th e p a tte r n o f u se o f th e tok en -w ords. Such a p a tte r n o f use i s what has been r e fe r r e d to above as a " con ven tion o f u s e ." To sp eak , th e n , o f th e "use" o f token words i s to speak o f appearances or u tte r a n c e s (spoken or w r it te n ) o f what a re r e c o g n iz a b le as sta n d in g fo r a type-w ord . They a re r ec o g n ized as such because o f s im i la r i t y o f a u ra l or v is u a l form , but t h i s form r e - f l e c t s a p a tte r n or s im ila r or analogous "uses" o f th e token-w ords which may be equated w ith th e type-w ord . A type-w ord i s a m eaning, a con v en tio n o f u s e , crea ted by means o f u tte r a n c e s o f token-w ords. The p a tte r n o f use o f token-w ords o f s im ila r p r in te d and spoken form c o n s t i t u t e s a ty p e - word. I t i s th e se type-w ords w ith w hich we are now concerned. (E lim in a tin g d is t in c t io n s - s u c h as ty p e -to k e n , s ign -m ean in g--b y r u lin g out one s id e as " ir r e le v a n t ," amounts to d e f in in g th e problem w ith which I w ish to d e a l . There are o th e r , r e la t e d problem s to which th e s e r e je c te d d is t in c t io n s may be r e le v a n t , or perhaps even in d is p e n s a b le . They are ir r e le v a n t to the p resen t in q u iry in th a t th e problem under in v e s t ig a - t io n i s d e f in a b le through s p e c i f i c a t io n o f what term s are n o t w ith in i t s fram e, what d i s t in c t io n s c o l la p s e in r e la t io n to i t . ) One d i f f i c u l t y in th e exam ination o f the r e la t io n s h ip s betw een words and sen ten ces l i e s in th e f a c t th a t words in one sen se d e r iv e t h e ir meanings from se n te n c e s ( in th a t th ey d e r iv e t h e ir meanings from t h e ir use in s e n te n c e s ) w h i le , on th e other hand, se n te n c e s d e r iv e t h e ir meanings from words ( in th a t th ey are composed o f them ). I f sen ten ces are view ed as a c tu a l m eanings, and wards are viewed as r e q u ir in g use in se n te n c e s in order t o a cq u ire a c tu a l m eaning, th en th e d e r iv a t io n o f th e meaning o f 50 sentences could be sa id to l i e in the words whose use produces them. In th is c a se , the d er iv a tio n o f the meaning o f words could be viewed as the d er iv a tio n o f l in g u is t ic meaning in gen era l. "D erivation," " so u rce ," or " o r ig in " of meaning, as used h ere , are meant to re fer to a type o f r e la t io n sh ip between a sp ects o f language, rather than to h i s t o r ic a l q u estion s o f , e . g . , etym ology. Words are some- tim es sa id to be the b u ild in g m ateria ls o f sen ten ces , but w ith the c o l - lapse o f "syntactic" and "semantic" in to one term, "use," th ere a r is e s the problem o f what i s to be considered to be the fundamental u n it o f meaning, th a t in terms o f whose use th e meaning o f any asp ect o f language i s d e f in - able . I f i t i s asked what th e d er iv a tio n or o r ig in o f the meaning o f a p a rticu la r word i s , such a q u estion may be answered by referen ce to the word's convention o f u s e - i . e . , "It means th is because i t i s (has been) used th is way." B ut, i f i t i s asked what the d er iv a tio n o f the meaning of words in general i s , then to re fer to the e x isten ce o f conventions would be to beg the q u estio n , because "words" here i s to be taken in the sen se , not of " a r ticu la ted sounds," but o f "meanings." Words as meanings are the embodiment o f the conventions o f meaning, and conventions cannot be sa id to be the o r ig in o f convention s. The f i r s t q u estion i s an h is t o r ic a l one, w h ile the second might be ch aracterized as about the " p o ss ib ility " of meaning. In "the use o f words," we might answer, l i e s th e p o s s ib i l i t y of meaning. I t has been argued in th is chapter th a t words as such are " p o ssib le meanings," b u t, a ls o , th a t they are not a c tu a l meanings except in u se -i . e . , as parts o f sen ten ces . They are p o ss ib le meanings because they have p o s s ib le u ses 51 in sen ten ces. Thus, th e p o s s ib i l i t y o f the meaning o f words might be sa id to l i e in the p o s s ib i l i t y o f th e ir use in sen ten ces. "Use," in so fa r as i t i s th e source o f l in g u is t ic meaning, i s de- fin ed in th is way as "use in or as a sen tence." A l l types o f uses of words, a l l a sp ects of the use o f words, are not among those which are the meaningful u se s , v i z . , th ose in which the word is used as part of a sen- ten ce . Sentences are the source o f meaning in th a t i t i s use in or as sen - tences in which the p o s s ib i l i t y o f meaning l i e s . The nature of "the meaning o f a sentence" w i l l be examined in Chapter I I I . So far i t has been contended only th a t such a notion i s fu n- damental to exp lanation o f word-meaning. The notion o f a sen ten ce-of an e n tity o f meaning d is t in c t from and d if fe r e n t from words--has been char- a c te r iz e d , in th is chapter, as th a t in terms of which the "use of words" may be id e n t if ie d w ith "the meaning o f words." As w i l l be developed in the fo llo w in g chapter, t h is view of the sentence i s intended to sp ec ify the manner in which "use" i s meaning, and the manner in which words and sentences are r e la ted to th e ir larger "contexts," a term whose sense w i l l a lso be sp e c if ie d in Chapter I I I . CHAPTER I I I MEANING AS USE: SENTENCES AND ACTION I t has been argued in the preceding chapter th a t the n otion o f a sentence as a meaning d is t in c t and d if fe r e n t from words or p o ss ib le mean- ings i s d er iv a b le from a use theory o f word-meaning. This chapter w i l l attem pt to d e fin e what i s important about th is n o tio n . As th e preceding chapter presented a view of a way in which the meaning o f a word may be sa id to be i t s "use" ( v i z . , as a convention o f u s e ) , th is chapter w i l l p resen t a view o f how th e meaning of a sentence may be sa id to be i t s "use"-v i z . , as the fu n ctio n of an a c tio n . I t w i l l be argued th a t the n otion o f an a c t io n , o f the type a sentence i s , may be in terp reted as in - v o lv in g an " a c t iv ity ," or language-game, o f which i t forms p a r t. I f i t i s asked, "What i £ a sentence?" th ere are a number of an- swers th a t are eq u a lly c o rr e c t. For, a sen tence i s many th in g s --a s e r ie s o f words, one o f the grammatical stru c tu res accepted in the language as sen ten ces , a form, a fu n c tio n , a (manufactured) t o o l , and a ls o an a c tio n and part o f one or more a c t i v i t i e s . The problem of th is chapter i s to determ ine what i s c h a r a c te r is t ic o f sen tences as m eanings, s t r i c t l y speak- in g . Sentences as Meanings As observed in the preceding chapter, i t would u su a lly be p o in t- l e s s to c a l l any m eaningless sound a m eaningless "word," s in c e i t would 52 53 be thought to be a meaning i f i t were thought to be a word. To speak o f "m eaningless sen ten ces" i s s im ila r ly a r t i f i c i a l and not u su a lly o f much v a lu e , because in most co n tex ts "sentence" means "meaningful s e r ie s of words," and i t i s i t s m eaningfulness th a t lead s one to c a l l i t a sen ten ce . One m ight, o f cou rse , c a l l a s e r ie s o f words a sen tence w ithout s u f f i c ie n t ev id en ce-because i t looked or sounded l ik e a sen ten ce-and subsequently say i t was r e a l ly m ean in g less. N e v er th e le ss , th e judgment th a t i t was a sen ten ce , whether j u s t i f i e d or n o t , would be based on th e b e l i e f or assump- t io n th a t i t d id not mean something in the way other sen ten ces do. I t i s not of much value in the p resen t con tex t to d is t in g u is h b e - tween th e "sign" o f a s e n te n c e - i t s v i s ib le or au d ib le c h a r a c te r is t ic s - and th e "meaning" o f a sen ten ce . When we do speak o f th e "meaning o f sen - tences" i t might seem from the s tru ctu re o f the phrase th a t the sen ten ce i s something independent o f i t s meaning. B ut, where we commonly speak o f the "meaning o f sen tences" i s in co n tex ts in which sen tences are being con- tr a s te d w ith other s o r ts o f m eaningful th in g s -words, m athem atical propo- s i t i o n s , e t c . I t i s m eainly in co n tex ts in which words and sen ten ces are tr e a te d as m eaningful th a t phrases w ith th e stru c tu re "the meaning o f x" a r i s e . Thus, both "words" and "sentences" are them selves s o r ts o f mean- in g s -b u t, a lthough i t i s more accu rate to d is t in g u is h between th e s ig n o f the word and the word i t s e l f (a symbol or meaning) than to speak o f a d is t in c t io n between a word and i t s meaning, in th e case o f sen ten ces th ere i s , b e s id e s the d is t in c t io n between the s ig n s and the symbols o f i t s w ords, the fu rth er d is t in c t io n between th ese words and th e sen ten ce i t - s e l f . Without t h is d i s t in c t io n , i t would seem th a t any s e r ie s o f words would be t h e o r e t ic a l ly in d is t in g u ish a b le from a s e r ie s c o n s t itu t in g a sen ten ce . B u t, as was d iscu ssed in the preceding ch ap ter, the words o f a 5^ sen ten ce , as m eanings, and th e meaning o f the sentence i t s e l f are in te r p retab le as id e n t ic a l e n t i t i e s . When th e "sign" o f a sen tence i s d is t in g u ish e d from i t s "meaning" (or th e "proposition" expressed by i t ) , th e d if fe r e n c e between how and what a sen ten ce means may be in tended . A ls o , though, i t may be intended to d is t in g u is h between "arb itrary signs" and th e ir "meanings." In the p resen t v iew , th ese two d is t in c t io n s are not to be equated . The manner or means and the product in l in g u i s t i c meaning are not to be id e n t i f ie d , r e - s p e c t iv e ly , w ith words and sen te n c e . In t h is ch ap ter , then , "the meaning o f a sentence" i s to be under- stood as synonymous w ith "a sen ten ce as a meaning." Senten ces: Function and Form S e n te n tia l Form The T ractatus attem pted to d efin e th e meaning o f sen ten ces in terms o f a common form --th e "general form o f p ro p o s itio n ." A sen ten ce was viewed as having a ( l o g i c a l ) form p ecu lia r to a l l sen te n c es . Even i f such a common form could be d isco v ered , however, i t would not n e c e s s a r ily be what i s e s s e n t ia l to s e n te n t ia l meaning. In th is chapter i t w i l l be argued th a t , on th e contrary , a l l meaning u lt im a te ly may be d efin ed in terms of fu n c tio n , rather than of form. I t was observed in th e preceding chapter th a t the conventions of the use o f words should be emphasized in order to e x p la in the sense in which a word has a "form"-th a t i s , as the t o t a l i t y o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s of i t s u se . A word can be sa id to have a "form" on ly in t h is m etaphorical sen se , o f co u rse , but sen ten ces have the p e r ce p tib le forms exp ressed in form ula- t io n s o f " syn tactic" or "grammatical" r u le s , as w e l l . The c h a r a c te r is t ic 55 forms o f sen ten ces g e n e ra lly are what t e l l us which s e r ie s o f words are sen ten ces and which are n o t. That i t i s the s y n ta c t ic a l c o n fig u ra tio n s of words th a t are th e means by which id e n t i f ic a t io n o f sen ten ces i s made, however, i s a d if f e r e n t m atter from th e problem of what i s e s s e n - t i a l to sen ten ces as meanings. There are a t le a s t two separate q u estion s th a t may be expressed as "What i s a sentence?" the q u estio n s o f id e n t i f ic a t io n and o f n atu re. I t i s im portant to recogn ize th a t they req u ire d if fe r e n t ty p es o f an- sw ers, because the q u estio n o f id e n t i f ic a t io n i s a p r a c t ic a l one and th a t o f nature a th e o r e t ic one. I f the form o f a sen tence i s viewed as c o n s t itu t in g i t s meaning, t h is form could not be in terp re ted as the con ven tion a l sy n ta c tic forms o f se n te n c e s , u n le s s , as was d iscu ssed in Chapter I , th ere could be found a s e n te n t ia l schema or common form. The breakdown of s e n te n t ia l typ es g iven in grammar books i s a g e n e r a liz a t io n o f th ose conventions by which sen ten ces are recogn ized as sen ten ces--a p r a c t ic a l problem o f id e n t i f i c a - t io n . B ut, to take the form o f sen ten ces as what i s e s s e n t ia l to th e ir meaning i s th e o r e t ic a l ly m istaken , because i t i s to confound th a t by which we d ec id e what has meaning (form ) w ith meaning i t s e l f ( fu n c t io n ) , i . e . , the p o s s ib i l i t y o f meaning (co n v en tio n s) w ith the a c t iv i t y (p rocess or fu n c tio n ) o f meaning i t s e l f . I t has been argued th a t a word has a meaning in the sense th a t i t has a s e t o f p o s s ib le u se s . That i s to say th a t words, excep t in the sense o f th e ir w r itte n or spoken s ig n s , are p o s s ib le fu n c t io n s . i i the case o f sen te n c es , however, th ere i s a "form" th a t i s l i t e r a l l y a co n fig u ra tio n of words. The convention o f use o f a word rep la ces as "form" th e d esig n o f a t o o l . There i s a form o f any g iven sen ten ce , however, w hich, even though i t might be a thoroughly conventional one, i s rea l and not m etaphorical. The source of the "form" o f a word i s in conventional usage. A convention of use ("usage" ) , th a t i s , crea tes the p o ss ib le uses th at make up any word as a meaning. The source o f the form of a sen tence, on the other hand, might seem to l i e in the agency o f the speaker. A speaker uses words to construct sentences for p articu lar p u rp oses--to f u l f i l l c er - ta in fu n ctio n s. In th is sen se , a sentence might be sa id to have a p a r t ic - ular form because i t was constructed for a p articu lar purpose, as a hammer i s , But, the "because" here may be in terpreted as making referen ce to e ith er the sou rce, in th is sen se , or the p o s s ib i l i t y . The form of a sen - tence i s a composite o f the (forms of th e) words th a t are in i t . The sen - tence has the form i t has because i t was designed for cer ta in purposes. The p o s s ib i l i t y o f th is form l i e s , however, in the conventions th a t make symbols out of sounds. So, the purposes o f a speaker are f u l f i l l a b ie b e - cause the words e x is t to express h is "meaning"- i . e . , the intended meaning. The ex isten ce of l in g u is t ic conventions makes i t p o ssib le for an intended meaning to be expressed as a s e n te n tia l meaning. The p o s s ib i l i t y o f s e n te n tia l form thus l i e s in the esta b lish ed conventions o f words. The source o f the form of a sen tence, however, might seem to l i e not in the usage of words which has made them capable o f meaning, but in the in ten tio n s or purposes of the speaker or w riter constructing the sen ten ce, s in ce a speaker uses words to construct sen- ten ces w ith p articu lar purposes. But, w hile i t i s c er ta in ly correct to observe th a t , in one se n se , the source of the form of any sentence i s i t s speaker, th is fa c t i s r e a lly irre lev a n t to the fa c t th a t the sentence has 57 a meaning, and th at th is meaning i s what i t i s . The source, o r ig in or d eriva tion of meaning th at i s o f importance for the problem a t hand is th at in which the p o s s ib i l i t y o f meaning l i e s . I f the form of a sen - tence i s taken as equ ivalen t to i t s meaning, then the p o s s ib i l i t y o f the form i s found in the conventions of the use of words. The d is t in c t io n between "type" and "token," d iscussed in the pre- ceding chapter in r e la t io n to word-meaning, a lso needs to be in terpreted for sentence-m eaning. The datable occurrences o f a p articu lar sen tence, "tokens" of i t , should not be id e n t if ie d w ith "actual" meanings or sen - te n c e s , but, in stead , a sentence as a meaning may be id e n t if ie d w ith the notion o f a sentence- "type." Like tokens of words, tokens of sentences have patterns of use (although there would not be much point in d escr ib - ing them as "conventions of use") and th ese may be sa id to c o n stitu te sen ten ce-" typ es." "Actual" meanings are patterns o f use in the same sense in which words, "possible" meanings, are. The "meanings" th at are words, phrases or sentences a l l are patterns of u s e , and, th us, "types" as con- tra sted w ith "tokens," but the patterns o f words and phrases are parts of patterns of sen ten ces. "Conventions of u se" are derived from patterns of sen ten ces, however, and i t i s th is aspect of the use of words th a t I wish to suggest by the term "possible meaning." "Actual" meaning, on the other hand, i s intended to suggest th a t sentences are the fundamental uses of language, those in terms of which other uses are e x p lica b le . I t was argued in the preceding chapter th a t words are not the fundamental e n t i t ie s o f meaning, and i t was suggested th a t, in stea d , sen- tences are. Why not paragraphs, though, or some other d iv is io n of la n - guage? Sentences are fundamental, I b e lie v e , because: ( l ) words, phrases I 58 and sentences are the parts of language th a t have p attern s of u se , w hile the uses or fu n ction s involved in paragraphs, e ssa y s , language-games, e t c . , have as forms in common, p a ttern s, only those o f sen tences and parts of them, and, th er e fo re , sentences or c er ta in parts o f them are funda- mental; (2 ) i t i s sentences rather than some su b -d iv is io n o f them, th at are fundamental, because (a s argued in Chapter I I ) words and phrases oc- cur only in sen ten ces, have meaning only in r e la t io n to them, and may be defined only in terms of them. I t might appear th a t sen ten ces, in con trast to words, have mean- ing in is o la t io n , i . e . , ou tsid e the context o f a language-game, s in ce some (probably most) sentences u ttered in is o la t io n convey some meaning not conveyed by s in g le words u ttered in is o la t io n . (This i s p a rtly resp o n sib le for the tem ptation to view sentences by them selves as "complete," or even " fix e d ," meanings,) Why do we th ink o f such sentences as conveying "some meaning," though? The meanings o f the words o f a sentence are s p e c if ie d in meaning by th e ir use in the sen ten ce. Their senses are made s p e c if ic to some de- gree by being put in to the context o f a sen ten ce, and in th is way a sen - tence " fixes" the meanings of i t s words to various d egrees. Thus a sen - tence out o f context has a somewhat more d e f in ite meaning than does a word out o f c o n te x t - i t s sense i s c lear to some degree, depending upon the par- t ic u la r sen tence. As d iscu ssed in Chapter I , some correspondence th eo r ie s o f tru th may be sa id to involve a "meaning-freeze" in the notion of a p ro p o sitio n . I f the meaning o f ju s t c er ta in sen ten ces--th o se capable o f being e ith er 59 true or f a l s e -could be ex a ctly s p e c if ic , complete and f ix e d , then the notion o f a m eaning-freeze in p rop osition s perhaps might be appropriate for the purposes o f -these correspondence th e o r ie s . But, although there i s greater s p e c i f ic i t y in sentences than in words, and sentences are capable o f a high degree of s p e c i f ic i t y , there i s an important sense in which the meanings o f sentences are not t o t a l ly independent o f the con- te x t of a language-game. The fu n ctio n a l nature of meaning involves in te r r e la t io n s of sen - tences w ith some c o n te x t(s ) . I t w i l l be argued below th at besid es the im- mediate con tex t, the language-game in which the sentence plays a r o le , there are other language-games in which the same and sim ilar sentences play r o le s , and these contexts a lso contribute to the meaning o f the sen - ten ce . n e v e r th e le ss , there are sen ten ces-e . g . , "All men are fo o ls" - th at might seem to have context-independent meanings. Such sen ten ces, viewed ou tsid e any immediate language-game, have a meaning in a sense th at sentences of more vague, le s s sp e c if ie d m eaning--e, g . , "Was i t down there?" do n ot. The meanings o f sentences o f the la t t e r kind are more dependent upon th e ir immediate contexts than are those of the former kind, whose meanings are more com pletely determined by the larger context (o f other language-games in which the same and sim ilar sentences play r o le s ) . Thus, although there i s a sense in which certa in sentences may be sa id to be context-independent-v i z . , in th at th e ir meanings are independent of the context of any immediate language-game (a t le a s t to a great degree) but are determined by language-games which are not a t a given time being "played," there i s another sense in which sentences are always to some d e- gree co n tex t-d ep en d en t--v iz ., in th at there i s one or more language-game 6o in r e la t io n to which the sentence has a meaning. (There i s another type of s e n te n c e - -e ,g ., " I t 's raining"--w hich a lso seems to he context-independent, hut in a d if fe r e n t way. This type of sentence might he sa id to he independent o f any language-game a t a l l because i t could conceivably never be used w ith in any l in g u is t ic context a t a l l . This i s a more complex matter than th a t of sentences l ik e "All men are fo o ls ," but the reasons for holding th a t th is so rt of sentence a lso i s context-dependent in a fundamental way w i l l be c lear when the notion of "basic a c t iv i t ie s " i s developed below, since th ese sentences are d ir e c t ly dependent upon "basic a c t iv i t i e s ," and only in d ir e c t ly upon re la ted l in g u is t ic a c t i v i t i e s . ) I f the "meaning of words" i s th e ir u se , as in terpreted in the pre- ceding chapter, then to in terp ret the meaning o f sentences as th e ir form could involve a notion of the sentence as a con figu ration or structure made out of oth er, conventional form s--words. The meaning of such a form could be sa id to l i e in i t s created d esign , as the meanings of i t s con- s t itu e n t forms l i e in th e ir conventional "forms," or p o ss ib le fu n ctio n s. The meaning o f a sentence in th is in terp re ta tio n would l i e in a s e t of p o ss ib le fu nctions which i t s form makes p o s s ib le . There remains the p o s s ib i l i t y th at the nature of s e n te n tia l mean- ing i s to be found in such a "form" conceived as the t o t a l i t y o f p o te n tia l fu n c tio n s . S en ten tia l Function I f the meaning of a sentence (a sentence as a meaning) i s a "func- tio n ," i t must be qu ite d if fe r e n t from the so rt of fu n ction th a t i s the meaning of a word. A word, as d iscussed in Chapter I I , Is sim ilar to a I 61 t o o l -s p e c i f i c a l ly , s im ila r to an im provised to o l such as a stone which comes to be c a lle d a to o l on account o f i t s use to do som ething, and only in so fa r as i t has been so used. A sen ten ce , on the other hand, -would seem to be s im ila r to a designed t o o l , such as a hammer. But, on ly the words o f a sentence ( i . e . , th e com posite form made up. of. the word-forms) are r e a l ly analogous to a designed to o l such as a hammer. Indeed, th e meaning o f a sentence i s more c lo s e ly analogous to th e a c t o f u sin g a designed t o o l . The meaning, which i s n e ith er an e n t i t y , a common form, nor a fam ily o f p o ss ib le fu n c tio n s , in vo lves both ( l ) th a t th ere be a to o l designed to be used for c er ta in purposes and (2 ) th a t th ere be an a c t o f u s e . The words o f the sentence are put to g e th er , l ik e a t o o l , in to a form su ita b le for c er ta in fu n ctio n s or jobs; th is form, though, i s the form o f an a c t io n . Thus, the meaning i s a c tu a l in th a t i t i s an a c tio n . The fu n ctio n o f th e words o f a sen tence and th e fu n ctio n o f the sentence i t s e l f need not be d if fe r e n t ia te d . The words are the "form" of th e sen ten ce , but the sentence i t s e l f i s an a c t io n , not an ob ject or q u a si- o b jec t. Thus, th e words are not elem ents in th e stru ctu re o f an o b je c t , but elem ents o f the a c tin g asp ect o f th e sen ten ce. So, as an a c t io n , a sentence has an a sp ect th a t i s the doing or a c tin g as w e ll as another a s - p ect th a t i s th e deed, a c tio n or what has been done. The words togeth er form the a c tin g a sp ect o f a sen ten ce . The fu n ction in g o f the words i s eq u iva len t to the fu n ctio n in g o f th e sen ten ce , because the a sp ect o f the sentence th a t has a fu n ctio n _is th e words. The a c t io n , on the other hand, i s the r e s u lt o f the use o f words, o f the a c t in g . I t i s t h is which i s the asp ect o f the sentence th a t i s i t s "meaning." The meaning i s the a sp ect o f an a c tio n (th e sen ten ce) th a t i s 62 th a t which i s done, the r e s u l t o f th e a c tin g , th e "action" i t s e l f . Thus, a sentence as an a c t io n may be viewed as a com posite of means and ends, o f the a c tin g and th e a c tio n or r e s u l t s . The "sign" and the "proposition" th a t i t s ig n i f i e s are b e tte r conceived of as a sp ects o f a sen ten ce , which i s i t s e l f an a c tio n and not an ob ject or q u a s i-o b je c t . The "type" and th e "token" both may be in terp reted as a c t io n s , th e "token" as a d atab le one and the "type" as one s p e c if ia b le in terms o f a context of one or more language-gam es. These a lso might be sa id to be two a sp ects of any given sen ten ce , but i t is th e a c tio n in the sense a p p lica b le to the "type" th a t i s id e n t if ia b le as a meaning as a fu n c tio n --th a t w ith which th is study i s concerned. Since a sentence i s created out of con vention s, the a c tio n is one made by means of conventions and i s a stru ctu re o f conventions. So, the ("grammatical") form of a sentence i s made l i t e r a l l y out of words, but i t i s not l ik e a stru ctu re or form made o f a "m aterial" o f words or "semantic" meanings, and y e t i t is_ th e form o f som ething- v i z . , an a c tio n . Words are the m a ter ia l of meaning in th e sense th a t they are the p o t e n t ia l i t y o f meaning. An a c tio n th a t i s a sentence i s one made p o ss ib le by th e e x isten ce o f th ese conventions and made a c tu a l by th e ir u se . U sage, though, i s a body o f a c tio n s and the "rules o f use" th a t may be ab stracted from t h is body o f a c tio n s are not them selves a c tu a l meanings b u t, ra th er , are d e sc r ip t iv e o f th ese a c t io n s . T herefore, meaning should not be ex - p la ined e x c lu s iv e ly in terms o f r u le s o f th e u se o f words. There i s no e s s e n t ia l nature o f a_ word, nor even a means o f id e n t i - fy in g one, s in ce what s ig n i s a word and what i s not i s merely a m atter o f convention , o f what i s so used. B ut, there can be sa id to be an e s s e n t ia l nature o f words c o l l e c t iv e ly , o f the m ateria l o f meaning as a w hole. This 63 e s s e n t ia l nature may be sa id to be one o f conventions e s ta b lish e d through usage. This i s to d e fin e the nature o f th e r u le s o f use o f words. These r u le s d e scr ib e the e s ta b lish e d p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f the r e la t io n s h ip s between words. Thus, they d escr ib e th e manner o f the co n stru ctio n o f sen te n c es . The o b serva tion th a t th ese r u le s o f th e use o f words are r u le s d escr ib in g conventions i s an ob servation about th e nature of th e r u le s , rather than an ob servation about the words th em selves. F or, th ere could be noth ing common to the meaning o f a l l words (or o f a l l s e n te n c e s ) , but there i s som ething common to th e manner o f th e ir meaning-v i z . , th e common nature o f th e r u le s d escr ib in g how th ey mean. In th e case o f sen ten ces , a l s o , the manner in which th ey mean i s d escrib ed by th e r u le s o f th e use o f words, s in ce words are th e m a ter ia l o f s e n te n t ia l meaning. The r u le s o f the use o f words d escr ib e the p o s s i - b i l i t i e s o f sen te n c es , i . e . , the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a c t io n of a c e r ta in k ind . Meaning should be exp la in ed not in terms o f th e r u le s o f use o f words, but in terms o f a c t io n . The m a n ife sta tio n o f meaning depends upon a c t io n , so th e d e f in it io n o f words as w e ll as sen ten ces should be in terms o f a c t io n . In th e preceding chapter words were d efin ed in terms o f th e ir r e la t io n s h ip to sen te n c es , s in ce i t was contended th a t the concept o f a word was dependent upon th a t o f a sen ten ce . I f sen ten ces are in terp re ted as a c t io n s , words are u lt im a te ly d e fin a b le as parts o f th ese a c t io n s - th e s ig n s or r ep resen ta tio n s o f l in g u is t i c r u le s . Sentences; Use and A ction S in ce a c tio n i s an in sep arab le a sp ect of "use," i t i s im portant to examine how i t i s in vo lved in m ean in g--of both words and sen te n c es . 6kWords in i s o la t io n are merely p o s s ib le meanings and have no a c tu a l meaning except when used in sen ten ces . That i s , words have no meaning e x - cep t in u se , and i t i s in sen ten ces th a t th e r e le v a n t type o f use i s made. (Of cou rse , words may be "used" in other ways-a la rg e number, perhaps- - b e s id e s th e b a s ic way in which they are used as meanings in s e n te n c e s .) In in v e s t ig a t in g what i s e s s e n t ia l to t h i s b a s ic type o f use o f words, i t should a ls o be seen what i s e s s e n t ia l to a c tu a l, as opposed to merely p o s- s i b l e , m eanings. I f words are u sed --n o m atter whether in th e b a s ic manner or some o th er-an a c t io n i s perform ed, an a c t o f u se . I f , for example, someone were tau ght how to en un ciate aloud the p r in ted words o f a language he d id not understand a t a l l , th ere would be a sen se in which he could be sa id to be "using" the words-in speaking th e ir sounds. T his i s an illu m in a tin g case s in c e , fu r th e r , th ere would be a sen se in which th e words spoken had meaning, but c le a r ly not on account o f th e ir pronu nciation by t h is non- comprehending read er. The words as p r in ted on the page e ith e r do or do not have meaning, o f co u rse , r eg a r d le ss o f whether or not th ey are read , s i l e n t l y or a loud , by anyone. U tterance i s n ot m eaningful u se , although i t may be a necessary p art o f th e means to m eaningful u se . U tterance i s c le a r ly an a c t , as w e l l , and th is a c t th er e fo re i s not one o f m eaningful u se . The sen se in which th e words as spoken would have meaning in the case g iven would be as used by the o r ig in a l w r iter rather than th e a c tu a l speaker. The so r t o f use th a t i s r e le v a n t to th e p h ilo so p h ic problem o f meaning i s not use as u tteran ce by anyone-th e o r ig in a l w r iter any more than a read er. M eaningful u se i s an a c t o f a d if fe r e n t s o r t . One knows th a t an a c tio n th a t i s a sen tence has been performed, u s u a lly , when one has heard (or seen ) the u tteran ce o f con ven tion a l sounds (or w r itte n s ig n s ) in a s e r ie s th a t meets th e grammatical co n d itio n s for a sen tence in the language in u se . T h is , however, i s a t e s t used in id en - t i f i c a t i o n . I t i s how a s e r ie s o f words a c tu a lly i s commonly id e n t i f ie d as having a meaning o f the s e n te n t ia l ty p e . The p h ilo so p h ic q u estio n now under in v e s t ig a t io n , though, i s not "How i s a sen ten ce to be id e n t if ie d ? " b u t, r a th e r , "How i s a sen tence to be defined?" The problem o f d e f in it io n in v o lv es "use" in a d if f e r e n t way from th e way in which i t i s in vo lved in id e n t i f ic a t io n . In id e n t ify in g a word or s e r ie s o f words as a sen ten ce , one i s e x e r c is in g a s k i l l - a b a s ic s k i l l in vo lved in using language, s in ce to recogn ize what s e r ie s o f words con- s t i t u t e sen ten ces i s to recogn ize what might p lay a p art in an im aginable language-gam e. To d e fin e a sen ten ce , however, i s to d e scr ib e , in s te a d , the nature of t h is s k i l l i t s e l f , as w e l l as th a t o f o th er , r e la te d s k i l l s - - i . e . , i t s r e la t io n s h ip to th e t o t a l a c t iv i t y o f language. "Use," in a l l i t s s e n se s , im p lies a u ser . "Function," in c o n tr a s t , r e fe r s pu rely to the manner o f op era tio n , w ith out h in t o f any kind o f agen t. But "use" c a r r ie s w ith i t th e idea o f someone (or, in rare case.s, som ething) who employs th e th in g u sed , in a d d itio n to the idea o f th e fu n c- t io n in g o f th e th in g . So, for "use," a c t io n i s in volved in two ways: There i s the a c tio n o f something on i t s surroundings or f i e l d o f a c tio n ; and, th ere i s the a c - t io n o f an agent th a t puts th e th in g i t s e l f in to a c t io n . In the case of words, i t i s more to the p o in t to speak o f them as being used than o f th e ir 66 fu n c tio n in g , s in c e , fundam entally, th ey are human t o o l s , in th e sense d i s - cussed in Chapter I I . Being fundam entally to o ls used by humans, th ey are to o ls in more than the m etaphorical sen ses in which " to o l'1 i s s tre tch ed to cover anything serv in g as a means to an end. This a sp ect o f the analogy does not m i l i t a t e , however, a g a in st r ec o g n it io n o f a fundamental d i s t in c - t io n between agency and operation or fu n c tio n in g . S im ila r ly , the fa c t th a t both agency and fu n ctio n in g may be tr e a ted as a c t io n s should not ob- scure the d is t in c t io n between them. I t might be argued th a t usin g a t o o l , e . g . , pounding w ith a ham- mer, i s more properly la b e lle d an "act" than an " action ." When the two terms are con trasted , "action" i s sometimes used to d esig n a te the process o f a fu n ctio n being performed, w h ile , in c o n tr a s t, "act" sometimes d es- ig n a tes what i s done by someone. "Act" in th is usage in v o lv es the notion o f human agency, and, more im portant, i t o ften in c lu d es both the process o f doing and the r e s u l t o f i t . These terms do n o t, however, have c le a r ly sep arate fu n ctio n s in ordinary speech. So, as they are being used h ere, "act" i s to be under- stood as d esig n a tin g only the process o f a fu n ctio n b e in g performed, and "action" as the r e s u lt s brought about by th is p ro cess , or the combination o f process and r e s u l t s . There are "uses" th a t are them selves a c t io n s - "tokens" or occur- rences o f words or sen ten ces , as w e ll as "uses" th a t are th e r u le s or conventions o f l in g u is t i c meaning-"types." The former may be c a lle d the "signs" o f language, and in t h is sen se the "uses" o f words togeth er are id e n t ic a l w ith the u ttera n ces o f a sen ten ce . On the other hand, th e a c tio n th a t i s the type o f a sentence i s th a t in terms o f which the typ es o f i t s 6 7 ■words are d efin a b le . I t i s w ith action s o f th is so r t th a t we are now con- cerned. Any meaning--word or sen tence-i s a product and fu n ction ( in the sense of "a q u a lity , t r a i t or fa c t so r e la ted to another th a t i t i s de- pendent upon and v a r ies w ith th a t other," Webster's Mew World D ic tio n a ry ) of a c tio n s . The d i f f i c u l t i e s in seeing what these meanings c o n s is t in are due in part to the fa c t th a t, on the one hand, th ere are the other action s of the immediate context of any given sentence and, on the other hand, there are the action s which determine the usage which in turn determines the form of a given sen tence. The analogous asp ects or parts of the la t t e r a ction s may be id e n t if ie d as the words of a language, w hile action s o f the former kind c o n stitu te what may be ca lled the "language-game," in which any given sentence i s involved . These two re la tio n sh ip s th a t a sentence has to other sen ten ces-- analogies w ith action s in other language-games and d ir e c t re la tio n sh ip s w ith action s co n stitu tin g the immediate environment or con tex t- together account for i t s meaning. They are both r e la t io n sh ip s o f one action (the sentence) to other a c tio n s . They are, a ls o , both r e la t io n sh ip s of th is ac- t io n to language-games. Language-games and A ctions The notion o f a language-game serv es , among other th in g s , to empha- s ize two important fa c ts about language--th at i t s nature or e s s e n t ia l char- a c t e r is t ic is th a t of an a c t iv i ty and th a t i t may be viewed, rather than as a s e t of words p lus sy n ta c tic r u le s , as a group of in ter r e la ted a c t i v i - t i e s . In the most fundamental way the p o s s ib i l i t y o f meaning l i e s in the p o s s ib i l i t y of in d e f in ite numbers o f language-games. What does a c tu a lly 68 mean, furthermore, does so because o f the ex isten ce of in te r r e la te d a c t iv - i t i e s , language-games. In Chapter I I were d iscussed "rules of the use o f words" and now i t may be. asked ( l ) whether th ese ru les are a lso the ru les o f languagegames , (2) whether there are a lso ru les of the use of sentences and, i f so , (3 ) whether th ese are the ru les o f language-games. I f a sentence i s taken apart, analyzed, we may describe the uses o f every word in i t , and a lso the m od ification s of the words upon each other and the lim ita tio n s placed on each word in th is way (the "senses" to which cer ta in of the words are lim ite d ) . In th is way, the ru les o f the construction of the sentence would be presented. One problem now at hand i s to determine whether or not a complete d escr ip tio n o f th is kind for every sentence p a r tic ip a tin g in a languagegame would co n stitu te the ru le s of the language-game i t s e l f . I f the ru les o f the use o f words describe the p o s s ib i l i t i e s of sen ten ces, they describe the p o s s ib i l i t i e s o f action of one kind, v i z . , of l in g u is t ic meaning, and, th erefo re , they a lso would describe th e p o s s ib i l i t i e s of the a c t iv i t i e s formed by th ese a c tio n s , v i z . , language-games. To speak, though, as in the f i r s t sentence of the foregoing para- graph, of a "complete d escr ip tio n of [th e ru les governing] every sentence p a r tic ip a tin g in a language-game" is r e a lly m islead in g, s in ce i t would seem to imply a notion of language-games as fix ed in content, as f in ish ed e n t i t ie s or p rocesses. A b e tter notion of a language-game, as an in s tr u - ment of meaning theory, would be, in stead , a notion o f a s e t o f p o s s ib i l i - t i e s . A game such as chess may be described through l i s t in g i t s formal r u le s - th is i s the game of ch ess. This should be d istin g u ish ed from an 69 a c tu a l (p lay in g o f a) game which a p p lie s th ese r u le s (as w e ll as o th ers , e . g . , laws o f lo g ic ) . Ju st as a_ game o f chess should be thus d is tin g u ish e d from th e game, an a c tu a l language-game, such as i s embodied in a conver- sa tio n or part o f one, should be d is tin g u ish ed from the s e t o f p o s s i b i l i - t i e s r e s id in g in the r u le s o f the language-game. The a c tu a liz a t io n o f the s e t o f p o s s i b i l i t i e s th a t c o n s t itu te s a language-game tak es p lace in sen tences (and other a c tio n s ) w hich, to g e th e r , form a c tu a l language-gam es, or p a r ticu la r in sta n ces o f language-gam es. These are in sta n ces o f a p p lic a tio n o f r u le s o f meaning. The notion o f a language-game i s the notion o f an a c t iv i t y . Any a c t iv i t y may be seen to be made up of a c t io n s . To describ e an a c t iv i t y , however, we would d escr ib e i t s governing p r in c ip le s or r u le s ( in the sense d iscu ssed in Chapter I I ) . To d escrib e sim ply the a c tio n s c o n s t itu t in g one in sta n ce o f the a p p lic a tio n of the r u le s , one "playing," would be to de- s c r ib e , not the a c t iv i t y , but one in stan ce o f i t . Although an a c t iv i t y is formed out o f a c t io n s , i t i s i t s e l f describ ed through d e sc r ip t io n of the p r in c ip le s or r u le s o f the a c t io n s . F a ilu re to mark a d is t in c t io n between th e a c t iv i t y and i t s in sta n ces would lead to regarding a language-game as s im ila r to a fo o tb a ll game rather than to the game o f fo o t b a l l . For example, a p a r ticu la r fo o tb a ll game may be sa id to be composed o f th e sum of the a c tio n s tak in g p lace in i t ; the game conceived o f as w ithout one o f th ese a c tio n s would be another game. The r o le o f a sentence in a language-game i s not l ik e t h i s , though, and i t s nature or d e fin in g c h a r a c te r is t ic s would not be d iscovered on such a lim ite d conception o f language-games. The r e la t io n o f a sentence to a language-game i s , ra th er , one of 70 a c tio n to r u le s--b eca u se a language-game i s a s e t o f p o s s ib i l i t i e s th a t are never exhausted , i . e . , th ere i s never a la s t p o ss ib le "playing." I f , however, a sentence i s viewed s o le ly in r e la t io n to the language-gam e-i t s immediate c o n tex t--th en only those asp ects o f i t s meaning th a t are g en era lly known as i t s "sense" in the g iven con text are concerned. I f t h is were what the meaning of a sentence co n s isted in , then the r u le s of any s in g le language-game would s u f f ic e for gen eratin g a s e n te n t ia l meaning. Thus, although th e r e la t io n o f a sentence to i t s immediate context in a language-game i s a r e la t io n o f t h is a c tio n to the r u le s o f th is a c t iv i t y , the meaning o f the sentence (th e sentence as a meaning) cannot c o n s is t e n t ir e ly in t h is r e la t io n s h ip . The notion of a language-game should in - vo lve more than the n otion of the m atrix o f meaning of i t s elem ents ( a c - t io n s ) . The meaning o f any sen ten ce , on th e contrary, i s derived from a number of u ses o f language in a number o f language-games. A ll th ese uses in a l l th ese language-games are described by the r u le s , the form ulations of the con ven tion s, o f the use o f words. Thus, the two ca teg o r ie s of r e - la t io n sh ip s th a t a sentence has to other s e n te n c e s - -v iz . , analogous sen - ten ces in other language-gam es, and the sen tences o f the language-game a t h an d--together account for i t s meaning. Or, a ls o , i t may be sa id th a t meaning i s produced by the in te r a c tio n of r u le s - th e r u le s o f o th er , a n a l- ogous language-games and th ose o f the immediate language-game. I t was pointed out a t the o u tse t of th is s e c t io n th a t a languagegame ( l ) i s b e tter viewed as a group of in te r r e la te d a c t iv i t i e s rather than as a s e t o f words p lus sy n ta c tic r u le s , and (2 ) serves to emphasize th a t the nature or e s s e n t ia l c h a r a c te r is t ic o f language i s th a t o f an 71 " a c tiv ity ." Some im p lica tions of the f i r s t po in t having now been d i s - cussed , the second w i l l now be examined. The im p lica tion s of th is asp ect o f the p h ilosop h ic notion o f a language-game are perhaps somewhat more b asic to the nature o f meaning in gen era l. An a c t iv i t y may be defined as formed out o f a c t io n s . A ctions seen as w ithout referen ce or r e la t io n to each o th er , however, would be mere events in time and space. I t i s when the u tteran ce o f (th e form o f) a sentence i s seen as an a c tio n in an a c t iv i t y th a t i t i s seen as a sen - tence . How, a language-game, as we have seen , may be defined as a s e t o f p o s s ib i l i t i e s of l in g u is t ic a c tio n . In any instan ce o f the operation of the r u le s of a language-game (which are not them selves ever defined once and for a l l , s in ce the boundaries la id out by ru le s are merely r e la t iv e to whatever a c t iv i t y i s under in sp ec tio n ) any a c tu a l u tteran ce may be in - terp reted as an a c tio n by a referen ce to the a c t iv i t y . (Of course, through reco g n itio n o f a conventional form of sen ten ce, one might id e n t ify the words as a sen ten ce, but th is merely would be to see i t as a p o ss ib le func- t io n in some language-game. ) The in ter p r e ta tio n o f an a c tio n as a fu n ction in an a c t iv i t y i s com plicated by the fa c t th a t an in stan ce of a languagegame i s a s e r ie s o f events progressing in time and thus i s a co n tin u a lly evo lv in g stru ctu re . The t o t a l r e la t io n sh ip of any a c tio n to the other a ctio n s o f the language-game i s thus not determ inable a t the time when the a c tio n i s made. A given form of words may be in terp reted as an a c tio n , not because of th e fa c t th a t i t i s analogous in form w ith the forms of other a c tio n s in other a c t i v i t i e s , but because i t performs a (p o ss ib ly novel) fu n ction '72 in the a c t iv i t y going on. An utterance i s in terp re ta b le as an actio n only in sofar as i t forms part o f an a c t iv i t y . In order for a form of words to co n stitu te a sentence i t must have a fu n ction in some language game . This does not n e c e ssa r ily imply, however, th at an a c t iv i t y f i r s t must be id e n t if ie d before the words may be id e n t if ie d as fu n ction in g t o - gether as an a c tio n . The a c tio n may be seen as im plying or su ggestin g the a c t iv i t y . In such a ca se , the sentence may be sa id to express a r u le or r u le s of th e a c t iv i t y , and suggest others th at together may amount to the ru les o f the p o s s ib i l i t i e s of a c tio n s th a t c o n stitu te a language-game. The utteran ce o f the form of a sentence immediately sug- g e s ts language-games o f which i t might form a p a r t--th e i n i t i a l a c tio n . The ru les o f a language-game, in other words, are ru le s only in the sense o f d escr ip tio n s; they are not p r e sc r ip tiv e ru le s th at are fo llow ed , nor do they t e l l what had to occur, but, ra th er , what simply did occur. What might occur i s lim ited only by the p o s s ib i l i t i e s of analogous languagegame s . So, to tr e a t sen tences as a c tio n s has im p lica tion s beyond those o f tr e a tin g language as composed of in ter r e la ted a c t i v i t i e s . I f a sen- tence i s properly defin ed as an a c tio n , then , as such, i t i s known to be involved in and connected w ith a larger context o f a c tio n , and i s , ( l ) fundam entally a fu n ctio n and not an o b jec t, and (2 ) a human deed, p ra c tice or performance, as d is t in c t from a natu ra l occurrence. Returning to the th ree r e la ted q u estion s posed a t the o u tse t o f t h is s e c tio n (see p. 6 8 ) , from the po in t o f view th at now has been ou t- lin e d , "the ru les of the use of words," in terp reted as comprising 73 d e scr ip tio n s o f the analogous fu n ctio n s o f sen ten ces , must be eq u iva len t to a d e scr ip tio n o f th e p r in c ip le s o f a l l p o s s ib le language-games and, th er e fo re , eq u iv a len t to the p r in c ip le s o f a l l p o ss ib le sen te n c es . "Rules of the use o f words" tak es in a l l language and i s a comprehensive term for l in g u is t ic r u le s . "Rules of sentences" might be thought to be ambiguous in th a t i t might r e fer e ith e r to the r u le s o f th e co n stru ction o f sen - ten ces or to th e r u le s o f the "use" or fu n ctio n in g o f sen ten ces . I t i s p o in t le s s from the p resen t p o in t o f v iew , though, to so d if fe r e n t ia te b e - tween the fu n ctio n o f words in a sentence and the fu n ction o f the sentence i t s e l f . The fu n ctio n o f a sentence ju s t i s th e fu n ctio n of i t s words. How the words o f a sentence work togeth er i s id e n t ic a l w ith how the sen - tence fu n ctio n s in i t s con tex t. "Rules o f language-games" may be eq u a lly w e ll equated w ith r u le s of words or o f sen ten ces , depending upon whether the p o s s i b i l i t i e s or a c tu a lity o f meaning i s to be s tr e s se d . The r u le s o f language-games in gen era l are the r u le s o f words, but th ese in turn depend upon the ru le s of p a r ticu la r language-games composed o f complete a c t io n s - s e n te n c e s . Thus, although a l l th ree typ es o f ru les may be seen to be e s s e n t ia l ly eq u i- v a le n t , each i s e s s e n t ia l to illu m in a te fundamental a sp ects o f language. Consequently, to d e fin e a word properly i s to d e f in e , a t the same tim e, sen tences and language-gam es, s in c e the r u le s o f a l l are id e n t ic a l . To speak of the "use o f words," however, i s to speak about p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f sen tences or meanings, w hile to speak of sen ten ces , on the other hand, i s to speak o f a c tu a l, fu n ction in g meanings in the context of a languagegame . Here the c en tra l term i s "sentence" and i t s d e f in it io n lin k s " lan- guage -games," on the one hand, w ith "words," on the oth er. To understand t h is i t w i l l be u se fu l to r e c a l l th at d if fe r e n t ia - t io n of ac tio n s from natural events in volves a p articu lar type of d i f f e r - e n t ia t io n between language (and other types of human a c t iv i t i e s ) and the world. Prima f a c i e , events or occurrences of natural phenomena are in - d istin g u ish a b le from human a c tio n s . An event is in terp retab le as an a ction only in sofar as i t forms part of an a c t iv i t y . Of course, any events w hatsoever, including a c tio n s , may be viewed as natural even ts , in so far as they may be described by laws o f nature. To describe action s as such, however, i t i s not s u f f ic ie n t to describe the natural laws involved . To d escr ib e an a c tio n , e . g . , of welding by a mechanic, i t would be inadequate merely to describe the p h ysica l laws in - volved in the welding process and, fu rth er , i t would be inadequate even i f the p h y sio lo g ica l laws involved in the movements of the mechanic were added. These laws would describe the a c tio n only as a bare even t. To de- scribe i t as an a c tio n i t would be necessary to make reference to the general a c t iv i t y o f rep a iring or b u ild in g o f which the action was part. Symbolic ac tio n s such as sentences may be described in sim ilar terms. Such an actio n does not take i t s character as an a c tio n from the symbolism c o n stitu tin g i t s form, b u t, ra th er , from i t s ro le in an a c t iv - i t y . Language-games and B asic A c t iv i t ie s The view o f meaning th at now has been outlined centers on the idea of " a c t iv it ie s ." As treated here, "language-games" are a c t iv i t i e s th at include both l in g u is t ic and n o n -lin g u is t ic a c tio n s . I t w i l l be seen why th is i s the case , i f one considers a language-game involv ing orders or commands. The nature o f sentences th a t are commands is ex p licab le in 75 terms of the actio n s made in response to them. These actions th erefore are part o f the language-game, the t o t a l context in which the a c tio n op- erates . t Thus, a " lin g u is t ic action" i s one th at occurs in a "languagegame ," but th is type o f a c t iv i ty i s not carried on s o le ly by means of words (although there might be p articu lar instances of language-games in which a l l the action s were sen ten ces). Not a l l the elements o f languagegames are l in g u is t ic a c tio n s . Language-games are only one type of a c t iv ity among a m ultitude of human a c t iv i t i e s , but they are re la ted to n o n -lin g u is tic a c t iv i t i e s in sp e c ia l ways. Meaning i s generated in language-games, l in g u is t ic a c t i v i - t i e s , but i t i s a medium o f a c t iv i t i e s as w e ll as a product of them. Most (perhaps even a l l ) a c t iv i t i e s require language for the performance of some action s o f the a c t iv i t y . Language i s to th is exten t required as a medium of the a c t iv i t i e s . On the other hand, language i s i t s e l f an a c t iv i ty . S t r ic t ly speak- in g , meaning i s not the product o f the a c t iv ity of language, s in ce i t i s th at a c t iv i t y . However, l in g u is t ic meaning is a product of n o n -lin g u is t ic a c t iv i t i e s . "Language-games" are r e a lly one aspect o f many a c t iv i t i e s . They are d istin g u ish a b le a c t iv i t i e s th a t may be iso la te d for cer ta in purp o s e s - e . g . , in order to pursue the ph ilosophic in v e s tig a tio n o f meaning. But, they are them selves interwoven w ith other a c t iv i t i e s and are funda- m entally the means, or part o f the means, for conducting these other a c - t i v i t i e s . In order to d is tin g u ish these language-relevant a c t iv i t i e s from language-games them selves, I s h a ll c a l l them "basic a c t iv i t i e s ." These I a c t i v i t i e s are th e fo u n d a tio n s o f th e g en era tio n o f meaning. I f la n - guages are spoken o f (q u ite m is le a d in g ly ) as "system s o f s i g n s , " and i f l i n g u i s t i c meaning i s d escr ib ed in term s o f d is c r e t e c a te g o r ie s o f r u le s , sem antic and s y n t a c t ic , then th e a s s ig n in g o f meanings to th e s ig n s may come to be seen as how s ig n s are connected w ith "the w orld ," w ith what i t i s th ey are ab ou t. I f , in s te a d , we look a t meaning in th e co n te x t o f " b a sic a c t i v i t i e s , " th e co n n ectio n s betw een words and th e w orld appear as more in d ir e c t , in g e n e r a l, than n am ing-connections (w hich even them- s e lv e s , p erh ap s, appear more d ir e c t than th ey o fte n r e a l ly a r e ) . The co n n ectio n s betw een words and what th ey are about are gen erated out o f th e a c t io n s perform ed by means o f w ords, even in th e s im p le s t c a se s o f naming. Thus, se n te n c e s are gen era ted out o f b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , and t h i s g e n e r a tio n o f meaning i s p a r t ly a m atter o f c r e a t in g r e la t io n s h ip s betw een th e l i n g u i s t i c a c t io n s and th e a c t io n s o f th e b a s ic a c t i v i t y . The f a c t th a t meaning i s gen erated as a product o f a c t i v i t i e s i s secondary to th e f a c t th a t i t i s a medium o f a c t i v i t i e s . Meaning as a means to a c t io n i s fundam ental to th e th eo ry o f m eaning. Meaning as a product o f a c t io n i s u s e f u l m ain ly in e x p la in in g th e o r ig in or g en era tio n o f m eaning, and i s in e s s e n t ia l in in te r p r e t in g i t s n a tu re . "Basic a c t i v i t i e s , " th en , are fundam ental a c t i v i t i e s ca r r ie d on in some ca se s and to some e x te n t w ith th e a id o f language. The r u le s govern ing b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , however, are n ot th o se o f meaning. More im- p o r ta n t , th e r u le s o f meaning are n ot p a r t o f th e r u le s o f b a s ic a c t i v i - t i e s . To co n sid er th e r u le s o f meaning i s n ot to s in g le out a c e r ta in c la s s o f r u le s out o f th o se govern ing b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , b u t, r a th e r , to co n sid er one a sp e c t o f th e se a c t i v i t i e s , v i z . , one type o f a c t i v i t y among a l l th o se th a t are means to th e p u r su it o f th e b a s ic a c t i v i t y . 77 M eaning-ru les have t o do on ly w ith one such "enabling" a c t i v i t y . The n o tio n o f an a c t i v i t y , i t has been remarked, i s r e l a t iv e to th e pur- p o ses a t hand. The r u le s o f meaning have to do w ith (some o f ) th e same phenomena th a t c o n s t i t u t e a b a s ic a c t i v i t y , which i s i t s e l f d e f in a b le in term s o f another s e t o f r u le s d e s c r ib in g th e same phenomena in another r e s p e c t . B a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , c a r r ie d on probably w ith o u t e x c e p tio n p a r t ly by means o f m ea n in g -ru le s , are th em selves th a t fo r w hich m ean in g-ru les are u sed . The a c t io n s c a r r ie d on w ith in th e s e a c t i v i t i e s are d e sc r ib a b le as such by r u le s r e la t in g them to th e s e a c t i v i t i e s . The same e v e n ts or phe- nomena may be d e sc r ib e d in r e la t io n to other m a tte r s , in c lu d in g th e con - v e n tio n s o f m eaning, b u t , as su ch , th ey are n o t th e same a c t io n s . As an example o f a b a s ic a c t i v i t y and r e la te d language-gam es, co n sid er a case in w hich I am b u ild in g a shed . I measure beams and p la n k s, saw and hammer, d ig support h o le s , pour cem ent, e t c . I m ight e n g a g e in a number o f language-gam es w ith m y s e lf , w ith a h e lp e r , w ith a hardware s a l e s - man. These language-gam es are in te r p r e ta b le by r e fe r e n c e to th e b u ild in g o f th e shed . I f I were d ir e c t in g my h elp er to mark o f f measurements on a beam, I m ight c a l l out th e f ig u r e s to him and, in order to c l a r i f y where th ey were to be marked o f f , he m ight ask q u e s tio n s about where th e f in is h e d beam was to be p la c e d , e t c . In t h i s c o n te x t , th e marking o f th e beam may be co n sid ered as a b a s ic a c t i v i t y . The whole a c t i v i t y o f b u ild in g th e shed m ight be viewed as a b a s ic a c t i v i t y in another c o n te x t , e . g . , one in w hich I d is c u s s w ith a hardware salesm an th e b e s t s o r t s o f lumber to be purchased fo r th e sh ed . In t h i s case th e language-gam es would be r e la t e d 78 t o th e w hole complex o f a c t i v i t i e s th a t are to be in v o lv e d in th e b u i ld - in g o f th e shed . What i s t o be id e n t i f i e d as a b a s ic a c t i v i t y depends upon th e language-gam es fo cu sed upon. C on clu sion : S en ten ces and Meaning We c a l l , a t v a r io u s tim es and in v a r io u s s i t u a t io n s , a l l r e la t io n s betw een se n te n c e s and, h en ce , betw een w ords, "meaning." In t h i s ch ap ter th e r e has been o u t l in e d a view o f th e n atu re o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning as l y - in g in a c t io n s d e f in e d as made by means o f th e u se o f w ords, and d e t e r - mined a s a c t io n s by t h e ir fu n c t io n s in l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s , " language- g a m es." In t h i s way, th e r e le v a n t sen se o f "meaning" has been s p e c i f i e d . S in ce t h i s d e f in i t i o n i s in term s o f th e fu n c t io n o f a l i n g u i s t i c a c t io n , th e n o t io n o f a language-gam e has been examined in order t o c l a r - i f y i t s e le m e n ts , s e n te n c e s . T h is n o t io n may be d e sc r ib e d as th a t o f a s e t o f in t e r r e la t e d r u le s fo r th e use o f w ords. Such a s e t o f r u le s o f a c t io n em bodies c e r t a in p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a c t io n , by d e s c r ib in g ty p es o f in t e r r e la t io n s betw een c e r ta in l i n g u i s t i c and n o n lin g u is t ic a c t io n s . The r u le s o f language-gam es are e q u iv a le n t to th e r u le s o f s e n - te n c e s and o f th e use o f w ords. These r u le s , w hich d e sc r ib e human a c t i v - i t i e s , are n e ith e r a r b itr a r y nor n e c e s sa r y , but in v o lv e b o th " fa c ts o f nature" and n o n -n ecessa ry custom s. T h is co n ju n ctio n i s r e f l e c t e d in th e n o tio n o f a language-gam e as composed o f b oth l i n g u i s t i c and n o n l in g u is - t i c a c t io n s , perform ed in and l im ite d by th e human environm ent. The n o tio n s o f " action " and " a c t iv ity " are c e n tr a l t o th e i n t e r - p r e ta t io n o f th e u se view o f meaning o u t lin e d in C hapters I I and I I I . The co n cep t o f a s e n te n c e , an a c t io n o f a p a r t ic u la r ty p e , i s th e con cep t o f a u n it o f m eaning, in term s o f w hich r u le s (and w ords) are d is t in g u is h e d 79 and ou t o f -which language-gam es are c o n s tr u c te d . The "meaning o f a s e n - t e n c e " (or "a sen ten ce as a m eaning") i s th u s fundam ental in t h i s view o f m eaning, b e in g used a s a t h e o r e t ic con cep t fo r th e e x p la n a tio n o f m eaning. The n o tio n o f "the meaning o f a sen ten ce" i s o b v io u s ly q u ite d i f - f e r e n t from th a t o f th e " p ro p o sitio n " in th e T ra c ta tu s and r e la t e d t h e o r ie s . I t i s s im ila r in an im portant r e s p e c t , th ou gh , v i z . , a s v iew in g th e s e n - te n c e as th e b a s ic u n it o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning and fu n dam en ta lly d i f f e r e n t from w ord-m eanings. In Chapter I were d is c u s se d th r e e a n a ly se s o f tr u th and t h e ir r e l a - t io n s h ip s t o meaning a s u s e . The view o f meaning o u t lin e d in t h i s stu d y w i l l have a p p l ic a t io n in a new a n a ly s is o f tr u th . I t has a p p l ic a t io n a l s o , how ever, in th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f th e nature o f th e problem o f tr u th and o f th e n atu re o f p h ilo so p h ic m ethod. Thus, o f th e p r in c ip le s taken a s g iv e n in t h i s s t u d y - v i z . , th a t th e nature o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning l i e s in u se and th a t p h ilo s o p h ic problem s are c o n c e p tu a l- th e second now w i l l be i n t e r - p r e te d . CHAPTER IV THE PHILOSOPHIC PROBLEM OF TRUTH Some F orm u lation s o f th e Problem Among th e p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f what th e p h ilo s o p h ic a n a ly s is o f tr u th m ight y ie ld a re: 1 ) When a sta tem en t i s t r u e , 2 ) When we may say a s ta tem en t i s t r u e , 3 ) When we say a sta tem en t i s t r u e , 4 ) When th e word "true" i s u sed . One i s a fo rm u la tio n o f what t r a d i t i o n a l ly has been tak en a s th e p h ilo s o p h ic problem o f tr u th . T h is fo rm u la tio n has been in te p r e te d in a v a r ie t y o f w ays, in c lu d in g 2 , 3 and k. I f 2 and 3 are co n sid ered e q u iv a le n t to one a n o th er , meaning b e - comes th e c r i t e r io n o f tr u th in th a t th e c r i t e r ia o f " tru e" having mean- in g in a p a r t ic u la r c o n te x t would be tak en a l s o as th e c r i t e r ia o f tr u th in t h i s same c o n te x t . I f i t i s m istak en t o view th e s e two s e t s o f c r i - t e r ia as e q u iv a le n t , though , th e problem th en a r i s e s o f what th e c r i t e r ia o f tr u th are and w hat, i f any, r e la t io n th ey bear to th e co n v en tio n s th a t are th e c r i t e r ia (a s w e l l a s th e m edia) o f m eaning. Two m ight r e f e r t o stand ard s o th er than th o se o f u s a g e . I t a llo w s fo r drawing a d i s t in c t io n betw een what i s in f a c t tr u e and what i s sa id to be t r u e . I t has been argued in th e p rece d in g ch a p ters th a t th e co n v en tio n s o f usage th a t make m eaning p o s s ib le are n e ith e r o f a co m p le te ly 80 81 a r b itr a r y nor o f a com p lete ly n ecessa ry n a tu re . T his does not p reclu de th e p o s s i b i l i t y , however, th a t the con ven tion s o f a p a r t ic u la r word might be e x c lu s iv e ly o f one k ind or th e o th e r . One o f th e most im portant ques- t io n s in th e ca se o f th e word ''tru e1' i s : Are th e r u le s o f i t s use d e te r - mined by som ething more than a r b itr a r y standards o f usage? I m p lic it in many d eb ates about tr u th - in c lu d in g th a t betw een A u stin and Straw son- i s a co n fu sio n o f sta tem en ts o f th e ty p e o f 1 and 2 w ith th o se o f th e type o f 3 aQ£l 4 , That i s , th e r e i s a confounding o f the q u e stio n o f which standards o f tr u th are co n v en tio n a l w ith th e q u e s tio n o f which standards o f tr u th w i l l g iv e th e tr u th . In th e case o f Straw son, th ere i s a ls o d e lib e r a te id e n t i f i c a t io n o f th e con ven tion s o f the a p p lic a - t io n o f "true" w ith th e con ven tion s o f tr u th , which i s coupled w ith a r e - ,1 e c t io n o f th e q u e s tio n o f what standards o f tr u th w i l l g iv e the tr u th . S tatem ents 1 and 2 , th en , a llo w fo r b e in g in te r p r e te d as r e fe r r in g to e x t r a l in g u is t i c stan d ard s, w h ile 3 an<3- ^ are q u estio n s about l i n g u i s t i c u sa g e . The standards o f r u le s o f tr u th may or may n o t be id e n t ic a l w ith th o se r u le s (or some p a rt o f them) th a t are th e con ven tion s o f m eaning, but i t i s th e job o f th e p h ilo so p h ic a n a ly s is o f tr u th to e s t a b l is h and n ot assume such an id e n t i f i c a t io n , s in c e i t i s fa r from com m onsensical. The d if fe r e n c e between th e two p a ir s o f sta tem en ts i s in v o lv ed in r e j e c t in g th e problem o f "truth" as a p h ilo so p h ic one, and con ten d in g t h a t , in s te a d , th e problem o f "true" i s th e p rop erly p h ilo so p h ic one. In th e debate d isc u sse d in Chapter I , A u stin s e t s up th e problem w ith r e f e r - ence to P i l a t e ' s p r e te n tio u s "What i s tru th?" "Truth" b ein g an a b s tr a c t noun i s l i k e l y to le a d one a s tr a y , A u stin b e l i e v e s , and th e use o f "true" or " is tru e" w i l l be l e s s treach erou s to a n a ly ze . T h is , o f co u rse , g iv e s 82 th e problem s t i l l o th er t w i s t s . Most im p ortan t, i f t r u th i s p u t in to a d j e c t iv a l form fo r a n a ly s i s , i t e a s i l y may appear to be som ething p red - ic a te d o f la r g e u n it s o f m eaning- e . g . , " se n te n c e s" or " p r o p o s it io n s ." A sking what "true" means le a d s to t r e a t in g i t a s a p ro p erty o f sem an tic u n it s o f some k in d , such a s t h e s e . J u s t a s fo rm u la tin g th e problem as "What i s tru th ?" p u ts a c e r ta in c a s t on th e m a tter , so fo rm u la tin g i t as "How i s ' t r u e ' used?" a ls o p u ts a c e r ta in c a s t on i t - v i z . , th e problem i s put in to th e c la s s o f 3 and 4 and th u s comes t o be t r e a te d as a sea rch fo r l i n g u i s t i c r u le s or co n v e n tio n s . There are a t l e a s t two ty p es o f fo rm u la tio n o f th e problem o f t r u th , th e n , th o se th a t may be in te r p r e te d are r e f e r r in g t o e x t r a l i n - g u i s t i c c r i t e r ia and th o se th a t im ply p u re ly l i n g u i s t i c c r i t e r i a . I t i s im portant to n o te , however, th a t v e n tu r in g an answer to th e q u e s t io n o f l i n g u i s t i c c r i t e r ia d oes n o t d isp o se o f q u e s t io n s o f th e other ty p e . I t should be shown why th e p h ilo so p h ic q u e s t io n i s form u la ted in one way r a th er than o th e r s . Method and th e N ature o f P h ilo so p h ic Problem s To i s o l a t e th e problem o f tr u th r e q u ir e s som eth ing more than p ro - t e s t a t io n s o f th e m odest c la im s o f p h ilo so p h y when i t ta k e s " tru e" a s th e proper item fo r in v e s t ig a t io n . What c o n s t i t u t e s a p h ilo s o p h ic problem c l e a r ly must have some r e l a t io n to what i s v iew ed as c o n s t i t u t in g the proper p h ilo s o p h ic m ethod, b u t th e n atu re o f any p h ilo s o p h ic problem i s n ot im m ediately e v id e n t from th e g e n e r a l view th a t "meaning i s u s e ." To e s t a b l i s h a method fo r in v e s t ig a t in g th e g e n e r a l n a tu re o f t r u th (o r any oth er p h ilo so p h ic p rob lem ), some view o f th e g e n e r a l n atu re o f meaning i s n ot enough. I t i s fu r th e r n e c e ssa r y th a t th e a n a ly s is o f m eaning be 83 e s ta b lis h e d as a method o f p h ilo so p h y , and th a t th e g e n e r a l natu re o f t h i s ty p e o f a n a ly s is be o u t lin e d . That th e d e l in e a t io n o f th e nature o f a proper p h ilo s o p h ic prob- lem i s a d i f f e r e n t s o r t o f ta s k from th a t o f o u t l in in g a p h ilo s o p h ic method i s e v id e n t from c o n s id e r in g th a t problem s are m a te r ia l fo r in v e s - t ig a t i o n by some m ethod. I f p h ilo so p h y were to be d e f in e d in term s o f i t s m a tte r , i t would be th e stu d y o f a c e r ta in body o f p rob lem s. T his would be a u s e f u l d e f i n i t i o n , how ever, on ly i f ''problem s" were u n derstood as in c lu d in g n o t on ly th e g e n e r a l d e s ig n a t io n o f any problem , b u t a ls o i t s s p e c i f i c fo r m u la t io n s , i . e . , th e v a r io u s manners in w hich i t has been or may be p o se d . I t was argued in Chapter I I th a t th e r e may be a th eo ry o f th e p r a c t ic e th a t i s lan g u a g e , j u s t as th e r e may be a th eo ry o f a n y th in g e l s e . A th eory o f language in w hich meaning i s seen as u se i s n o t i t - s e l f , o f c o u r se , a p h ilo s o p h ic m ethod. To t r e a t t h is th e o r y o f language as im plying a p h ilo s o p h ic method m ight be done w ith th e id ea th a t language i s th e m a te r ia l o f p h ilo s o p h ic i n q u i r y - i . e . , th a t the problem s o f p h i- losop h y are a l l m a tters o f lan gu age. Methods o f a n a ly z in g language are m odeled to a la r g e e x t e n t , o f c o u r se , on t h e o r ie s o f th e nature o f la n - guage. In t h i s way, th e developm ent o f a th eo ry o f language becomes c en - t r a l t o e s t a b l i s h in g a method fo r p h ilo so p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n . S o , in d ic a - t io n s o f th e in t e r p r e t a t io n o f th e u se view adhered to by any p a r t ic u la r a n a ly t ic p h ilo so p h er may be found in h is methods o f d e a lin g w ith v a r io u s p h ilo s o p h ic prob lem s. In order to e s t a b l i s h a s u it a b le m ethod, I s h a l l co n s id er th e n a - tu re o f p h ilo s o p h ic problem s in g e n e r a l and th en co n sid er what s o r t o f 8J+ method th e n atu re o f th e s e problem s s u g g e s t s . I t i s on ly a f t e r b oth o f th e se m a tters have been co n s id ered th a t fo rm u la tio n o f th e p a r t ic u la r p ro b lem --th a t o f t r u th - -c a n be attem pted w ith a c le a r id ea o f what i s a s - sumed by th e fo rm u la tio n and what rem ains to be so lv e d . I t has been argued in th e p reced in g ch ap ters th a t th e n o t io n o f a word i s d e r iv a t iv e from th a t o f a se n te n c e , th a t meaning i s b a s i c a l l y s e n t e n t ia l , and th a t se n te n c e s in s o fa r a s th ey a re m eanings may be i n t e r - p r e te d as a c t io n s . What does t h i s in t e r p r e ta t io n o f th e view th a t meanr in g i s u se su g g e s t or im ply about th e nature o f p h ilo so p h ic problem s? Other in t e r p r e t a t io n s , such as th o se d is c u s s e d in Chapter I , have been lin k e d w ith th e view th a t th e n atu re o f p h ilo s o p h ic problem s i s fu n - d am en ta lly l i n g u i s t i c . C onnected w ith th e s e two f a c t o r s - t h e view o f meaning as u se and th e view th a t p h ilo so p h ic problem s are fu n d am en ta lly l i n g u i s t i c - h a s been th e fu r th e r c o n te n t io n th a t a s u ita b le p h ilo s o p h ic method i s one w hich exam ines th e "use" o f " p h ilo sop h ic" term s or co n cep ts in t h e ir " ord in ary ," e x tr a -p h ilo s o p h ic h a b ita t s . Between t h i s view o f m ethod, on th e one hand, and, on th e o th e r , th e u se th eo ry o f m eaning and th e l i n g u i s t i c th eo ry o f th e natu re o f p h i l - o so p h ic prob lem s, th e l in k s are somewhat ten u o u s. They may c o n s i s t in v iew s and argum ents o f one k ind or another t h a t in v o lv e t r e a t in g c e r ta in t e r m s - in d iv id u a l words o r , a t m ost, p h r a s e s - th a t have commonly been c en - t r a l t o fo rm u la tio n s o f " tr a d it io n a l" p h ilo s o p h ic prob lem s, as th e proper o b je c ts o f p h ilo s o p h ic in q u ir y . In t h i s way, t r a d i t io n a l problem s o f te n are d isp o se d o f , in e f f e c t , by , f i r s t , ta k in g t h e ir c e n tr a l term s a s ob- j e c t s o f in q u iry --rem o v in g them to t h e ir "ordinary" h a b ita t s and in v e s - t ig a t i n g th e s o r t o f u se th ey have th e r e - -a n d , secon d , con c lu d in g th a t in 85 th e p h ilo s o p h ic q u e s t io n s a t hand th e s e term s are used im p rop erly , i . e . , in c o n s is t e n t ly w ith t h e ir u se in ord in ary d is c o u r s e . The r e j e c t io n o f t r a d i t io n a l p h ilo s o p h ic q u e s t io n s i s n o t made out o f hand by such a n a ly t ic p h ilo so p h e r s but i s a r e s u l t o f a n a ly se s o f t h i s k in d made o f c e n t r a l p h ilo s o p h ic term s. A r e s u l t o f t h i s p ro ced u re , how ever, i s th a t th e q u e s tio n s in v e s t ig a t e d by th e s e p h ilo so p h e r s are a l - most e x c lu s iv e ly q u e s t io n s about th e u se o f w ord s--sh ow in g what i s wrong w ith t r a d i t i o n a l p h ilo s o p h ic u s e s and a d v o ca tin g o th er u se s consonant w ith ord in ary u sa g e . T his approach i s n ot e n t i r e ly s a t i s f a c t o r y fo r a t l e a s t two r e a - son s: Cl) m eanings o f s in g le term s are n o t th e s o le problem s o f p h i lo s - ophy (and are fr e q u e n t ly on ly among th e i n i t i a l ones in v o lv e d in th e i n - v e s t ig a t io n o f c e n tr a l p h ilo s o p h ic prob lem s); (2 ) the method o f i n v e s t i - g a t io n , based upon a to o l im it e d in t e r p r e t a t io n o f th e u se view o f mean- in g ( in which th e r e i s an i n s u f f i c i e n t trea tm en t o f th e meaning o f s e n - t e n c e s ) i s i t s e l f to o l im it e d . Thus, n e ith e r th e d e l in e a t io n o f problem s nor th e method o f in v e s t ig a t in g them i s e n t i r e ly ad eq u ate , and fo r s im i- la r r e a s o n s , v i z . , t h e ir r e la t io n s h ip s t o in t e r p r e ta t io n s o f th e use view o f meaning th a t go l i t t l e fu r th e r than th e use o f w ord s. In th e fo l lo w in g s e c t io n s w i l l be o u t l in e d , f i r s t , a view o f th e ch a ra c te r o f p h ilo s o p h ic problem s and, secon d , an extended method fo r p h ilo so p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n . The N ature o f a P h ilo so p h ic Problem The fo rm u la tio n o f a problem d e te r m in e s , a t l e a s t to some e x t e n t , th e methods employed in a ttem p ts t o s o lv e i t . For t h i s r ea so n , th e o r ie s o f th e nature o f p h ilo so p h y i t s e l f c o n ta in v iew s both o f th e g e n e r a l 86 ch a ra cter o f p h ilo s o p h ic problem s and o f th e method t o be used to in v e s - t ig a t e them. In order to in t e r p r e t th e second la r g e assum ption o f t h i s s tu d y - - v i z . , th a t p h ilo so p h ic problem s are c o n cep tu a l p r o b le m s - it 'w ill be u s e - f u l to co n s id er two la r g e c a te g o r ie s w ith in w hich p h ilo so p h y m ight f in d i t s prob lem s, v i z . , phenomena and c o n c e p ts . (By 'phenomena" I mean "ob- s e r v a b le s ," o b je c ts o f p e r c e p t io n , what i s o b serv a b le th rou gh th e s e n s e s . By "concepts" I mean in stru m en ts o f th o u g h t, as ex p r e sse d in lan gu age. See n ex t p a ra g ra p h .) I t i s w ith in th e com petence o f any n a tu r a l language to r e f e r to b o th . So, th e a n a ly s is o f language does n o t l im i t p h ilo s o p h ic in q u ir y t o on ly th o se a s p e c ts o f lan gu age th a t have to do w ith c o n c e p ts , nor to th o se th a t have t o do w ith phenomena, s in c e many co n cep ts are o f or about phenomena. Thus, t o d e f in e p h ilo s o p h ic problem s as co n cep tu a l i s n o t to e l im in a te a s p e c ts o f language th a t d e a l w ith phenomena. "Concepts" a re t o o l s or in stru m en ts o f th ou ght and a re ex p ressed in our a c t io n s . Perhaps p re-em in en t among th e s e a c t io n s are l i n g u i s t i c a c t io n s , e lem en ts o f lan gu age-gam es. The m eanings o f l i n g u i s t i c a c t io n s , i . e . , s e n te n c e s as m eanings, a re fa b r ic s o f c o n c e p ts . I t m ight be m is le a d in g to say th a t co n cep ts are m eanings o f w ords, though, b ecau se t h i s way o f p u t t in g i t m ight make i t seem th a t a con cep t i s th e meaning o f a_ word. T his i s , perhaps u n fo r tu n a te ly , h ard ly ever l i k e l y to be th e c a s e . There i s , fo r exam ple, th e co n cep t o f mean- in g , w hich i s ex p ressed n o t on ly in what we do w ith th e word "meaning" bu t in what we do w ith m eanings. There are a l s o co n cep ts such as "cause" th a t can be d e f in e d perhaps on ly a lo n g w ith th e co n cep t o f " e f fe c t" (and , in d eed , fo r some purposes i t m ight be more to th e p o in t t o speak o f "the 87 concept o f c a u s e -a n d -e f fe c t" ) . I t i s l e s s m is le a d in g to sa y , th e r e fo r e , th a t con cep ts are e x h ib ite d in s e n t e n t ia l m eanings in a v a r ie ty o f w ays, many o f w hich may be q u ite com plex. To a n a lyze how we u se c e r ta in con cep ts i s t o e lu c id a te what th e se con cep ts a r e . Why shou ld n o t p h ilo so p h ic a n a ly s is be l im it e d , th e n , to a n a ly s is o f con cep ts i f p h ilo so p h ic problem s are con cep tu a l? B ecau se, fo r one th in g , co n cep tu a l and phenomenal language a re so c lo s e ly i n t e r - woven in ord inary sp eech , and, more im p ortan t, because phenomena in f lu e n c e our c o n c e p ts , and, c o n v e r se ly , con cep ts d ir e c t the o b serv a tio n o f phenom- ena . Thus, con cep ts may be in v e s t ig a te d through in v e s t ig a t in g p e r t i - n en t a s p e c ts o f lan gu age, b u t th e p e r t in e n t a s p e c ts might in c lu d e phenom- en a l as w e l l as co n cep tu a l a sp e c ts o f sp eech . In ad op tin g th e view th a t p h ilo so p h ic problem s are c o n cep tu a l, th en , and stu d y in g th e s e problem s in th e use o f p e r t in e n t p a r ts and a sp e c ts o f lan g u a g e , we are n o t , in so d o in g , l im it in g th e f i e l d o f in q u iry to a n y th in g l e s s than th e Whole o f n a tu r a l lan gu age. To study th e w orkings o f lan gu age, though, in v o lv e s stu d y in g l i n - g u i s t i c phenomena, v i z . , s ig n s and th e manner in which th ey are used ( in r e la t io n to each o th er and to other t h in g s ) . P h ilo so p h ic problems are concerned w ith th e s e phenomena, however, o n ly in so fa r as th ey m a n ifest con cep ts p e r t in e n t to th e problem s. In th e view o f th e p r e se n t s tu d y , "words" are n o t e q u iv a le n t t o th e s e phenomena (even though th ey are c o - e x t e n s iv e ) , s in c e words a s such are m erely c o n v e n tio n a lly s in g le d out from s e n te n c e s , and r e p r e se n t on ly th e s m a lle s t u n it s o f meaning h e ld in common betw een a l l s e n te n c e s c o n ta in in g them . There b ein g n oth in g 88 fundam ental about words as m ean ings, th ey a re n ot th e phenomena o f la n - guage th a t are r e le v a n t to p h ilo s o p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n o f meaning. The r e le v a n t e n t i t i e s o f language are m eanings, i . e . , s e n te n c e s - - ev en ts o f which th e s ig n s h e ld in common, w ords, are m erely an a s p e c t . So, t o s e t fo r th a p h ilo so p h ic problem in v o lv e s d e c id in g which sen ten ces or ty p es o f se n te n c e s are r e le v a n t t o th e problem . The o b je c ts o f study are p a r t ic u la r u ses o f lan gu age. S in ce th e r e i s q u ite o f te n no one-one correspondence betw een a con cep t and a word, i t i s n o t enough to examine a l l th e s o r ts o f s e n - te n c e s in which a word o s te n s ib ly naming a s in g le con cep t ap p ears. The s o r ts o f language-gam es where th e se se n te n c e s appear and th e r e l a t i o n - sh ip s o f th e se n te n c e s to o th er elem en ts o f th e s e language-gam es are o fte n fundam ental in e x h ib it in g th e co n cep t. S in ce language-gam es o f te n in c lu d e a c t io n s o ther th an s e n te n c e s , r e la t io n s h ip s o f th e se n - te n c e s to th e se elem en ts are a ls o im portant in such an in v e s t ig a t io n . Indeed , th e r e la t io n s h ip s betw een l i n g u i s t i c and n o n l in g u is t ic e lem en ts o f a language-gam e are o fte n o f fundam ental im portance s in c e th ey may su g g e st th e lin k s o f th e language-gam e to a la r g e r c o n te x t o f one or more b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s . S in ce i t i s b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s th a t u se and g en era te m eaning, i t i s th e r e la t io n s h ip o f con cep ts t o b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s th a t should be th e u lt im a te fo cu s o f th e p h ilo so p h ic method o f co n cep tu a l a n a ly s i s . Language i s th e m a te r ia l o f p h ilo so p h y , th e n , b ecause i t m ani- f e s t s c o n c e p ts , and th e se o f te n are embodied in th e in t e r r e la t io n s o f a v a r ie ty o f a c t i v i t i e s . I f language i s fundam entally s e n t e n t ia l and s e n - te n c e s are fundam entally a c t io n s w ith in a c t i v i t i e s , th en p h ilo so p h ic 89 problem s are problem s about c e r ta in a s p e c ts o f l i n g u i s t i c a c t i v i t i e s - - v i z . , th o se th a t m a n ife s t th e meaning o f c o n c e p ts . S in ce meaning i s d e f in a b le in term s o f th e a c t io n s th a t may be perform ed by means o f i t , th e r e i s a sen se in w hich c o n c e p ts , as w e l l as w ords, have m eanings. There are n o n l in g u is t ic a c t io n s th a t may be p e r - formed in p a r t by means o f c o n c e p ts- in d eed , m ost human a c t io n s probably in v o lv e con cep ts o r ig in a t in g in a c t i v i t i e s in v o lv in g lan gu age . Even s k i l l s such a s d r iv in g a car or perhaps even p itc h in g a b a s e b a l l may be argued to e s s e n t i a l l y in v o lv e c o n c e p ts . The "uses o f w ords," o r , more a c c u r a te ly , s e n te n c e s , are th e ma- t e r i a l fo r p h ilo s o p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n in s o fa r as th ey r e f l e c t th e fu n c - t io n s o f c o n c e p ts . S o , i t i s n o t b ecau se words "stand for" co n cep ts th a t th e study o f meaning i s c r u c ia l in p h ilo so p h y , b u t , r a th e r , b ecause i t i s th e meaning o f co n cep ts th em se lv es th a t i s th e concern o f p h ilo so p h y . That i s , i t i s th e r e la t io n s h ip o f a con cep t to o th er con cep ts and other th in g s th a t i s o f i n t e r e s t , and t h i s i s i t s "meaning." The ways we say t h in g s - t h e mechanisms o f l i n g u i s t i c m ean in g --are o f i n t e r e s t in s o fa r as th e y il lu m in a te th e ways we co n ce iv e t h in g s . L in g u is t ic meaning i s a phenomenon, i . e . , i t i s m a n ife s ted in o b serv a b le f a c t s , b u t , a l s o , i t i s a c o n c e p t - -o r , more a c c u r a te ly , a s e t o f in t e r r e la t e d c o n c e p ts , which c lu s t e r around "mean." I f th e s e con cep ts were adequate in ev ery way, fo r a l l p u rp o se s , th e r e would be no need fo r p h ilo s o p h ic th e o r ie s o f m eaning. On th e o th er hand, i f a l l co n cep ts were adequate in ev ery way th e r e would be no p h ilo s o p h ic problem s a t a l l . C onceptual adequacy in v o lv e s n o t o n ly c l a r i t y and c o n s is te n c y o f r e la t e d co n cep ts b u t a ls o adequacy in d e a lin g w ith th e r e la t e d phenomena. 90 S o , in order to c l a r i f y co n cep ts i t i s n e c e ssa r y t o exam ine them in r e l a - t io n to phenomena a s w e l l a s to other c o n c e p ts . On th e b a s is o f th e above a n a ly s is o f th e n atu re o f co n cep ts and th e ir r e la t io n s to l i n g u i s t i c and r e la t e d m eaning, co n cep ts are means to a c t io n t h a t are r e f l e c t e d in l i n g u i s t i c and r e la t e d a c t io n s . T h e r e fo r e , co n cep tu a l problem s are problem s a r i s in g ou t o f th e m eanings o f co n cep ts - i . e . , a r i s in g in co n n ec tio n w ith a c t io n s r e s u l t in g from th e use o f con - c e p t s . These problem s may be approached through exam in ation o f th e m il ie u o f a c t i v i t i e s in w hich con cep ts are u sed . P h ilo so p h ic Method Language-games are fundam ental t o th e view o f th e meaning o f s e n - te n c e s d evelop ed in Chapter I I I . The n o t io n o f a language-gam e was d e - f in e d th e r e in s o fa r as req u ired by th e th eo ry o f m eaning. Now i t w i l l be co n sid ered how t h i s con cep t i s in v o lv e d in th e a n a ly s is o f p h ilo s o p h ic p rob lem s. I f p h ilo so p h ic methods are t o be d ir e c te d toward e x p l ic a t in g con - c e p t s , t h i s may be done in p a rt through d e s c r ip t io n o f th e r e le v a n t meanin g a c t io n s - t h e I n te r r e la t io n s h ip s o f se n te n c e s c o n ta in in g th e w o rd (s) "naming" th e co n cep t, and th o s e , as w e l l , whose fu n c t io n in g in la n g u a g e - games i s in terd ep en d en t w ith th e s e s e n te n c e s . To l i m i t in v e s t ig a t io n to th o se se n te n c e s th a t a c t u a l ly c o n ta in (or m ight c o n ta in , i . e . , may be tr a n s la te d in to se n te n c e s th a t do c o n ta in ) th e n am e(s), would be t o i n - v e s t ig a t e on ly one a s p e c t o f language-gam es in w hich th e s e words have m eaning, w hereas t h e ir m eaning i s c o m p le te ly d e sc r ib e d on ly w ith r e f e r - ence to th e t o t a l c o n te x t . 91 The r e le v a n t m ean in g-action s are not th e on ly requirem ents o f con cep tu a l a n a ly s is , however, s in c e language-gam es have been in te r p r e te d as c o n ta in in g , a t l e a s t som etim es, a c t io n s other than l i n g u i s t i c o n es . (P o in t in g i s an example o f such an a c t io n . ) There may b e , as w e l l , ex tra -sy m b o lic a c t i v i t i e s (" b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s " ) th a t form a c o n te x t 'fo r a language-gam e. The a c t i v i t i e s th a t gen erate m e a n in g -a c t iv it ie s or la n - guage -games should be th e primary fo cu s o f in v e s t ig a t io n s o f p h ilo so p h ic problem s, s in c e , fu n dam en ta lly , th ey gen erate th e r e le v a n t co n cep ts . Thus, p h ilo so p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n should attem pt to i s o la t e th e se " b asic a c t iv i t i e s " th a t gen erate the co n tex ts in which the r e le v a n t con- ce p ts are found, and th en a n a lyze how th e concepts fu n c t io n . In stu d y in g th e s e fu n c t io n s , th ere are th r e e l e v e l s o f a c t i v i t y to be in v e s t ig a te d : ( l ) r e la t io n s h ip s betw een con cep ts w ith in in d iv id u a l language-gam es; (2 ) r e la t io n s h ip s o f th e se con cep ts w ith o th e r , n o n l in g u is t ic a c t io n s and other phenomena; and (3 ) r e la t io n s h ip s between such language-gam es and th e r e s u lta n t in t e r r e la t io n s h ip s o f th e co n cep ts . These rep re se n t th e most im portant a sp e c ts o f " b asic a c t iv i t i e s " as r e la te d to language-gam es. The aim o f such a p h ilo so p h ic method i s , f i r s t , t o determ ine what s o r t s o f a c t io n s may be performed by means o f p a r t ic u la r con cep ts (and in many c a se s what other a c t io n s may be performed on account o f th e se a c - t io n s ) and, secon d , through th e e x p lic a t io n o f concepts thus a rr iv ed a t , to a ttem pt to d e a l w ith p h ilo so p h ic is s u e s in which they are in v o lv e d . In e f f e c t , th e n , the exam ination o f th e meaning or fu n c tio n o f con cep ts le a d s to form u la tion s o f r u l e s , which may be a p p lied th en to th e problem s in w hich th e se con cep ts are in v o lv e d . 92 The P h ilo so p h ic Problem o f Truth P h ilo so p h y , -whatever e l s e i t may b e , i s a search fo r t r u th . T h erefo re , any th eo ry o f th e nature o f p h ilo so p h ic problem s im p lie s some view o f tr u th , s in c e in th e fo rm u la tio n s o f p h ilo s o p h ic problem s l i e view s o f where tr u th may b e , th a t i s , what q u e s tio n s m ight be answ ered. The problem o f tr u th h o ld s a c e n tr a l p o s i t io n in any p h ilo so p h ic p o in t o f v iew , s in c e , fu n d am en ta lly , a p o in t o f view i s a n o tio n o f tr u th . A n o tio n o f tr u th must be among th e f i r s t p r in c ip le s , e x p l i c i t or n o t , upon which a p h ilo so p h ic p o in t o f view s ta n d s . S im ila r ly , any th eory o f th e proper method o f p h ilo sop h y (a p a rt from any view o f p h i lo s - ophic problem s) im p lie s some view o f t r u th , s in c e a n o tio n o f a proper method i s a n o tio n o f how t o carry on th e sea rch fo r tr u th . That tr u th i s a con cep t w ith an in tim a te co n n ectio n to s e n t e n t ia l meaning i s e v id e n t from th e freq u en t ways in which tr u th and s e n t e n t ia l meaning have been c lo s e ly a s s o c ia te d in a n a ly t ic t h e o r ie s . I n te r p r e ta - t io n s o f t h i s so r t may be view ed as r e la te d to th e f a c t th a t th e lo c u s o f th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t r u th , i . e . , th a t w hich has th e c a p a c ity o f b e in g tru e or f a l s e , must have m eaning. And, i t has been argued, what has meaning p re-em in en tly i s s e n te n c e s . In t h i s way, " th a t which i s tru e or fa ls e " may come to be tr e a te d as a s e n t e n t ia l m eaning. The problem o f tr u th o f te n has been approached by a sk in g , f i r s t , "What s o r t o f th in g may be true?" and, secon d , "What does th e tr u th o f such a th in g c o n s is t in?" That i s , f i r s t what i s p o s s ib ly tru e i s s in g le d o u t, and th en what i s a c tu a l ly t r u e . Now, when th e answer to th e f i r s t q u e stio n i s g iv en as some s o r t o f s ta tem en t, p r o p o s it io n , e t c . , t h i s may le a d to seek in g an e x p la n a tio n o f th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f tr u th in th e 93 meanings o f s ta te m e n ts , e t c . The p o s s i b i l i t y o f tr u th , however, need not be sought in t h i s d ir e c t io n a t a l l . (We p r e d ic a te "true" o f v a r io u s s o r ts o f th in g s - -p ic t u r e s , i s t o r ie s or a cco u n ts , m easurem ents, c o p ie s , l i n g u i s t i c m eanings, b e l i e f s , d e s c r ip t io n s , works o f a r t , e t c . In th e p resen t study we are m ainly con- cerned w ith on ly one a p p lic a t io n o f " tru e ," in sen ten ces o f th e form: "p i s true" fp sta n d in g fo r a s e n te n c e ] . S in c e , in th e view o f t h is stu d y , sen ten ces are th e fundam ental u n its o f m eaning, whenever "true" i s p red - ic a te d o f any l i n g u i s t i c meaning i t i s u lt im a te ly p red ica ted o f se n te n c e s . The n o n l in g u is t ic th in g s o f which "true" i s sometimes p r e d ic a t e d - e .g . , tru e c o p ie s , measurements, p ic tu r e s -do not p resen t problems o f th e type d isc u sse d in most o f t h i s s tu d y , which i s th e r e fo r e alm ost e x c lu s iv e ly concerned w ith tr u th as p red ica ted o f se n te n c e s . In Chapter V i t w i l l be argued th a t th e view o f tr u th developed fo r "true" as p red ica ted o f sen - te n c e s ex ten d s to "true" as p red ic a te d o f other s o r ts o f t h in g s .) The q u e s tio n "What s o r t o f th in g may be tr u e ? " may be tr e a te d as a sk in g on ly fo r the typ e o f sen ten ces o f which "true" i s p r e d ic a te d . The s o r t o f " p o s s ib il ity " th a t th e s e sen ten ces e x h ib it i s m erely th a t "true" i s gram m atically a p p lic a b le to them. There i s no need to t r e a t sen ten ces o f t h i s kind as having in t r i n s ic p r o p e r tie s m y ster io u s ly connected w ith " tru th ." There i s no need , e i t h e r , t o go on and id e n t i f y such p r o p e r tie s w ith th e meaning o f th e se s e n te n c e s , reason in g th a t whatever i s tru e or f a l s e must be m eaningfu l and th e r e fo r e the " p o s s ib il ity " o f tr u th must be "meaning." T his would be s im ila r to arguing th a t whatever reproduces s e x u a lly i s l i v in g and th e r e fo r e th e " p o s s ib i l i ty " o f sex u a l rep rod u ction c o n s is t s in having l i f e . Rather than approach th e problem o f tru th in t h i s way a t a l l , i t i s p r e fe r a b le sim ply to b eg in by a sk in g , f i r s t , what l i n g u i s t i c phenomena are most c lo s e ly or im m ediately a s so c ia te d w ith " tru e ," and then ask what th e se r e la t io n s h ip s c o n s is t in , what c h a r a c te r iz e s them. Perhaps th e whole approach a s s o c ia te d w ith " p o s s ib i l i ty " and " a c tu a lity " in th e prob- lem o f tr u th i s unnecessary and has th e e f f e c t o f a b o rtin g a s o lu t io n b e j fo r e i t i s f u l l y d evelop ed . The q u e s tio n o f what so r ts o f th in g s are tru e i s s u s c e p t ib le o f in te r p r e ta t io n as e q u iv a le n t to th e q u estio n o f what a l l tr u e sta tem en ts a r e , i . e . , a sk in g fo r a l i s t o f a l l " tru th s ." We are here engaged, though, n ot in a search fo r t r u th s , in s ta n c e s o f tr u th , b u t, in s te a d , the a n a ly s is o f t r u th , th e con cep t. We are th e r e fo r e concerned w ith th e use o f th e con cep t o f t r u th , in c lu d in g th e im p lic a tio n s o f say in g th a t c e r - t a in sen ten ces are tr u e . Q uestions having to do, in s te a d , w ith j u s t i f i - c a t io n fo r sa y in g t h i s are another m a tter . We are n ot concerned w ith w hich sen ten ces ought to be sa id to be tr u e , but w ith what i s done w ith them when th ey are sa id to be tr u e . I t i s n ot th e problem of what d is t in g u is h e s tr u e s ta tem en ts , s t a t e - ments in f a c t t r u e , from f a l s e sta tem en ts th a t i s th e concern o f t h i s stu d y . R ather, our problem i s th a t o f what d is t in g u is h e s sta tem en ts sa id to be tru e and /or used as tru e from other s o r ts o f s ta tem en ts . For t h i s purpose, se n te n c e s m erely capable o f tr u th are the r e le v a n t m ea n in g -en ti- t i e s . The e n t i t i e s w ith which we are here concerned are in s ta n c e s o f "that which i s tr u e or f a l s e ," one sen se o f " p r o p o s itio n ." In t h i s s e n se , the n o tio n o f a p r o p o s it io n i s here b ein g used as a working con- cep t in th e p h ilo so p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n o f t r u th . 95 As such a working co n cep t, " th a t which i s tr u e or f a ls e " m ight be in te r p r e te d as embodying th e " p o s s ib i l i t y o f tru th " in th e se n se th a t i t r e f e r s to any phenomenon t o w hich "true" may be a p p lie d . T h is con- c e p t i s u s e f u l in th e a n a ly s is o f t r u th , how ever, because i t r e p r e s e n ts a p re-em in en t a sp e c t o f the u se o f " tru e ," v i z . , th a t i t r e f e r s to s e n - te n c e s o f some k in d . I f we can d is c o v e r and d e s c r ib e th e nature o f th e se se n te n c e s in s o fa r as "true" i s p r e d ic a te d o f them , th e i n i t i a l s t e p , a t l e a s t , w i l l have been taken in e x p l ic a t in g th e con cep t o f t r u th . To r e tu rn now to th e fo rm u la tio n s o f th e problem o f tr u th g iv e n on page 8 0 , i t may be seen t h a t , as d eveloped in t h i s c h a p te r , th e i n i - t i a l q u e s tio n to be asked in a n a ly z in g t h i s problem would in c lu d e an answer o f th e form o f sta tem en t 4 . That i s , i t would t e l l when or how "true" i s u se d . I t has been argued , how ever, t h a t th e m eaning o f th e co n cep t o f tr u th may be sa id t o be the c e n tr a l i s s u e , and t h i s i s not f u l l y e x p ressed in th e use o f " tru e ." T h is p o in t o f view i s s im i la r , I th in k , t o th a t con n ected w ith th e d i s t in c t io n drawn by W ittgenstein^" b e - tw een " su rfa ce grammar" and "depth grammar." The d is c u s s io n in t h i s ch ap ter o f th e nature o f p h ilo so p h ic problem s and method may be s a id to amount to an in t e r p r e ta t io n o f what d ep th grammar c o n s is t s in . The oth er th r e e fo rm u la tio n s g iv e n on page 80 a l l in v o lv e r e f e r - ence to a " sta tem en t." I t has been argued th a t "what i s tru e or f a l s e ," e n t i t i e s to w hich th e concept o f tr u th i s a p p lie d , should be th e i n i t i a l o b j e c t s o f in v e s t ig a t io n . I t w i l l be argued in th e n e x t c h a p te r , how ever, th a t th e se e n t i t i e s are not " sta tem e n ts ," s t r i c t l y sp ea k in g , a t a l l . 1 W it tg e n s te in , P h ilo s o p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s , I , 6 6 k . 96 Perhaps th e m ost fundam ental m atter a r i s in g from c o n s id e r in g th e se fo u r fo rm u la tio n s o f th e problem i s th e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f 1 and 2 as im p ly in g n o n l in g u is t ic stand ard s or r u le s , and 3 and 4 a s im p ly in g l i n q u i s t i c r u le s , in s t e a d . S in ce r u le s o f meaning cannot govern t r u th , i t must be determ ined what r u le s do govern tr u th . T h is i s in v o lv e d in 1 and 2 (and i t i s im portant to n o te th a t " ru les g o vern in g tru th " i s n o t n e c e s s a r i ly synonymous w ith " ru les o f v e r - i f i c a t i o n " ) . B e s id e s t h i s q u e s t io n , th e r e i s an e q u a lly le g it im a t e q u es- t io n in v o lv e d in 3 and 4 o f how r u le s o f m eaning (or se n te n c e s c o n ta in in g "true" and r e la t e d s e n te n c e s ) ex p ress (a s opposed t o g o v ern ) tr u th . The problem o f t r u th , a s d e f in e d in t h i s ch a p ter , w i l l n o t be r e - so lv e d by b e in g a s s ig n e d t o one c a teg o r y or th e o th e r -l i n g u i s t i c or nonl i n g u i s t i c , I t i s in th e v ery nature o f th e problem th a t both are i n - v o lv e d in i t . Many o f th e paradoxes surrounding th e problem o f tr u th r e - f l e c t t h i s d ou b le natu re o f th e problem . Many o f them a r i s e from th e fundam ental paradox t h a t , w h ile i t i s a p p a ren tly m eanings, in some s e n se , th a t are sa id to be t r u e , t r u th i t s e l f would n o t seem to be governed by r u le s o f m eaning, nor e x p la in e d by them. In th e fo llo w in g c h a p te r , an a n a ly s is o f tr u th w i l l be i n i t i a t e d by c o n s id e r in g th e e lem en ts o f t h i s fundam ental paradox. CHAPTER V ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH "That w hich i s True or F a l s e " To in v e s t ig a t e th e con cep t o f t r u th in accordance w ith th e p r in - c ip l e s d evelop ed in th e p reced in g c h a p te r , we may b eg in by a sk in g what s o r t s o f th in g s may be sa id t o be tru e (o r f a l s e ) . For rea so n s m entioned in th e p reced in g c h a p te r , t h i s in v e s t ig a t io n w i l l fo cu s on l i n g u i s t i c t h in g s , but we s h a l l see th a t n o n l in g u is t ic th in g s sa id t o be tr u e p la y an im portant p a rt in th e in v e s t ig a t io n . When we p r e d ic a te "true" o f a se n te n c e i t i s p r e d ic a te d o f i t a s a meaning (n o t as an u tte r a n c e o f w o rd s). Only se n te n c e s o f a c e r t a in gram m atical form are sa id to be tr u e - v i z . , s ta te m e n ts . S in ce in th e view o f t h i s stu d y se n te n c e s as mean- in g s are f u n c t io n s , ty p e s o f s e n te n c e s a re c h a r a c te r iz e d by s im ila r fu n c - t io n s . Thus, a lth o u g h gram m atical form i s an in d ic a t io n o f some s im i la r - i t y o f fu n c t io n s , i t i s t o th e se fu n c t io n s th a t we must lo o k fo r what i s common to (or a t l e a s t s im ila r in ) a l l s ta te m e n ts . One fu n c t io n common to a l l s ta tem en ts i s th a t th ey are cap ab le o f b ein g tr u e (or f a l s e ) . T r a d it io n a l ly , a l l se n te n c e s o f sta tem en t form are sa id to have th e c a p a c ity t o be tru e or f a l s e and to be n e c e s s a r i ly one or th e o th e r , in f a c t . There a r e , how ever, some u se s o f sta tem en ts th a t would seem n o t to make any cla im to t r u t h - e . g . , s ta tem en ts in v o lv e d in jo k e s , f i c t i o n , ir o n y . In t h i s study sta tem en ts th a t do make a t r u th - cla im w i l l be term ed " a ss e r t io n s" or " tr u th -c la im s ." 97 98 In view o f t h i s stu d y , th ere i s some a c t iv i t y in terms o f w hich any m eaningfu l l i n g u i s t i c ev en t i s in te r p r e ta b le as an a c t io n . S o , an a s s e r t io n i s in te r p r e ta b le as such by r e fe r e n c e to a p a r t ic u la r a c t i v i t y in which i t has th e fu n c t io n o f making a tr u th -c la im . Now, any a c t i v i t y in v o lv in g a s s e r t in g may in v o lv e , o f co u rse , a c tu a l u se o f th e words ,'tr u e ,' b u t i t need n ot alw ays do so . To a s s e r t p i s e q u iv a le n t to a s s e r t in g th a t p i s t r u e , in th a t th e r e s u l t s o f th e one are e q u iv a le n t to th o se o f th e o th e r , e x c e p t th a t in some c a se s "p i s true*' em phasizes th a t an a s s e r t io n i s b e in g made- i . e . , th a t a s t a t e - m ent-form i s b e in g used to make a tr u th -c la im . What a s s e r t in g c o n s is t s in i s n o t sa y in g th a t a sen ten ce i s tru e but u s in g a sen ten ce as t r u e . T his fu n c t io n or job i s th a t o f making a tr u th -c la im , e x p l i c i t l y or im p l i c i t l y , which i s d i f f e r e n t , o f c o u rse , from a c t u a l ly b e in g tr u e . T h erefo re , s in c e a s s e r t io n s , sta tem en ts th a t make a tr u th -c la im , are d i s t i n c t from "true s ta te m e n ts ," th e fu n c t io n o f making a tr u th -c la im i s not th e fu n c t io n o f b e in g tr u e . As th e d is t in g u is h in g marks o f an a s s e r t io n are n o t th o se o f b ein g tr u e , th e ta sk o f e x p l ic a t in g th e con cep t o f tr u th i s a d i f f e r e n t ta sk from th a t o f exam ining tru e sta tem en ts and th e ir r e la t io n s h ip s t o other th in g s th a t determ ine them as tr u e . I f th ere cou ld be d isco v ere d c e r ta in c h a r a c t e r is t ic s common to a l l tru e sta tem en ts (or perhaps on ly shared fa m ily re sem b la n ce s) , th e se would n ot d e f in e th e con cep t o f tr u th . The q u e s tio n o f th e n atu re o f tr u th , o f what i t i s to be tr u e , i s am- biguous s in c e i t may be in te r p r e te d as b e in g about a con cep t or about the phenomena, tru e s ta te m e n ts . I t i s the concept w ith which we are here concerned , and i t i s c h a r a c t e r is t ic s o f s ta tem en ts th a t make a tr u th -c la im (r a th e r than tru e s ta te m e n ts ) th a t d e f in e t h i s con cep t. 99 Truth-gam es and T ru th -c la im s The d is t in g u is h in g c h a r a c t e r i s t ic s o f tr u th -c la im s are to he sou gh t in th o se a c t i v i t i e s in w hich th ey fu n c t io n . L et us c a l l such a c - t i v i t i e s in w hich tr u th -c la im s fu n c t io n " tru th -gam es." Truth-gam es m ight be ( l ) a typ e o f language-gam e, (2 ) a t y p e .o f b a s ic a c t i v i t y , or (3 ) some o th er typ e o f a c t i v i t y . As d e f in e d in Chap- t e r I I I , language-gam es are in stru m en ts o f b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s . I f t r u th - games were a ty p e (o r fa m ily ) o f language-gam es then th e r e would be no u ses o f tr u th th a t were n o n l i n g u i s t i c . That i s , " tru e" would be p r e d i- ca te d only o f s e n te n c e s . I t has been noted in Chapter IV, however, th a t th e r e are o th e r , n o n l in g u is t i c th in g s sa id to be tr u e . T h ere fo r e , t r u th - games are n ot lan gu age-gam es. I f tru th -gam es were a c t i v i t i e s o f a type d i f f e r e n t from b a s ic a c - t i v i t i e s , th en th ey would be a c t i v i t i e s th a t n e ith e r use nor g en era te language-gam es. S in c e th e m ost obvious exam ples o f tr u th -c la im s are sta tem en ts in language-gam es such as th o se in v o lv in g p r o o fs , tru th -gam es may be in c lu d ed in th e broad ca teg o r y o f b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , as d e f in e d in Chapter I I I . In order t o d is c o v e r th e d is t in g u is h in g c h a r a c t e r is t ic s o f t r u th - gam es, l e t us exam ine some ty p e s o f a c t i v i t i e s th a t would seem to be tru th -g a m es. The most ob v iou s exam ples o f tru th -gam es would seem t o be found in p ro o fs (o r a ttem p ts a t p r o o fs ) o f v a r io u s s o r t s -m athem atical and s c i e n t i f i c a s w e l l as l e s s r ig o ro u s ch a in s o f rea so n in g employed in everyday s i t u a t io n s . For exam ple, w h ile d r iv in g I m ight say to m y s e lf , "The t r a f f i c i s h eavy . I 'd b e t t e r slow down." These sen ten ces form a language-gam e a r i s in g ou t o f th e a c t i v i t y o f d r iv in g . Each sen ten ce i s 100 used, as tr u e in th a t a c la im to tr u th i s e s s e n t i a l t o i t s f u n c t io n . I t may a ls o be observed th a t each se n te n c e fu n c t io n s t o s u g g e s t ( " e n t a i l " or "imply" in a broad s e n se ) other a c t io n s . That i s , th e f i r s t s ta tem en t ("The t r a f f i c i s h ea v y ." ) s u g g e s ts th e second (" I 'd b e t t e r slow down.") in th a t th e two s ta tem en ts c o n s t i t u t e an a b b rev ia ted argument; th e second se n te n c e su g g e s ts th a t I l e t up th e p r e ssu r e o f my fo o t on th e a c c e le r a to r and perhaps s h i f t t o a low er g e a r . (Both o f th e s e n o n l in g u is t ic a c t io n s , i f perform ed, a ls o would be p a rt o f th e tr u th -g a m e .) C ases o f th e above typ e are th o se in w hich " tru th -c la im s" are c l e a r ly b e in g made becau se in fe r e n c e s are b e in g drawn from c e r ta in s t a t e - m ents - th o s e making c la im s th a t such in fe r e n c e s a re w arranted , th o s e mak- in g tr u th -c la im s . In order to determ ine w hich c h a r a c t e r i s t ic s o f t h i s ty p e o f truth-gam e are common to a l l tru th -g a m es, i t w i l l be u s e f u l t o co n s id er a type o f a c t i v i t y in w hich i t would seem th a t tr u th -c la im s are made b u t in w hich i t would seem th a t th e s e tr u th -c la im s do not e n t a i l one an oth er in any way an alogou s t o th a t d is c u s s e d . An a c t i v i t y o f t h i s ty p e would seem to be any d e s c r ib in g a c t i v - i t y . We may d is t in g u is h exam ples o f d escr ib in g -g a m es in which s ta tem en ts are "used as t r u e ," in th a t i t i s p a r t o f a d escr ib in g -g a m e to u se tr u e s ta te m e n ts , but in w hich th e se s ta tem en ts would n o t seem to e n t a i l each oth er in any s e n s e . To tak e a s im p le exam ple, co n s id e r a group o f s ta tem en ts made by me to a v i s i t o r to my v i l l a g e . As we s t r o l l downtown I p o in t ou t t o him v a r io u s b u i ld in g s - t h e p o s t o f f i c e , th e p u b lic l ib r a r y , an un usu al monu- ment in th e square, a lu n ch co u n ter , e t c . A l l th e s ta tem en ts I u se in t h i s a c t i v i t y , a lon g w ith other a c t io n s such as p o in t in g w o r d le s s ly to 101 c e r t a in p o in ts o f in t e r e s t , ta k in g c e r ta in r o u te s t h a t I th in k w i l l be in t e r e s t in g fo r v a r io u s r e a so n s , beh avin g c a u t io u s ly when c r o s s in g dan- gerou s c o r n e r s , a l l th e s e a c t io n s make a s o r t o f p ic tu r e o f th e v i l l a g e . They are r e la t e d to each other p r im a r ily in th a t th ey a l l have to do w ith some a s p e c t o f th e v i l l a g e . P o s s ib ly I m ight n ot make any two sta tem en ts r e la t e d to each o th er in th e manner in which th e s ta tem en ts in th e d r iv - in g language-gam e were r e la t e d . I am n ot p r e se n t in g arguments o f any s o r t , b u t s im p ly a group o f f a c t s (or what I b e l ie v e to be f a c t s ) about th e v i l l a g e . In p r e se n t in g f a c t s , though , one u ses s ta tem en ts (and oth er a c t io n s ) "as tr u e ." Y e t, in t h i s ca se th e s ta tem en ts are r e la t e d t o each oth er n ot a s e lem en ts in ch a in s o f r e a so n in g , but as e lem en ts in a d e - s c r ip t io n or p ic tu r e . The e lem en ts (s ta te m e n ts and o th er a c t io n s ) in th e d r iv in g la n - guage-game were s a id to fu n c t io n t o su g g e st or e n t a i l o th er a c t io n s . In th e d escr ib in g -g a m e t h i s cannot be s a id to be the c a se ; th e s ta tem en ts are n o t l o g i c a l l y r e la t e d . We m ight ta k e an even more d i f f i c u l t exam ple, and im agine t h a t , a f t e r show ing my fr ie n d th e v i l l a g e , I ta k e him fo r a r id e in th e cou n try . We are both t ir e d and th e r e i s no c o n v e r sa tio n e x - c e p t o n ce , when he e x c la im s , "Look, th a t barn i s round! " T h is sta tem en t would seem t o have no r e la t io n s h ip t o any l i n g u i s t i c c o n te x t , and a l s o n o t t o a tru th -gam e. D e sc r ib in g games are n o t tru th -gam es b ecau se th e e lem en ts o f d e - s c r ip t io n s a r e n ot r e la t e d to each o th er by l o g i c a l r u le s . There i s n o n e th e le s s a sen se in w hich th e s e e lem en ts are t r u t h c la im s - in t h a t th e w hole d e s c r ip t io n makes a tr u th -c la im . That i s , th e in d iv id u a l s t a t e - m ents make an in d ir e c t tr u th -c la im s in c e th e whole d e s c r ip t io n i s r e la t e d 102 to a v a r ie t y o f a c t i v i t i e s th a t are in te r p r e ta b le on ly in r e fe r e n c e to th e d e s c r ip t io n . There m ight b e , fo r exam ple, v iew s about th e r e l a t iv e com forts o f th e v i l l a g e which I expound to my f r ie n d , and which cou ld in v o lv e truth-gam es having lo g i c a l r e la t io n s h ip s w ith th e d e s c r ip t io n I had g iv e n him o f the v i l l a g e . In th e ca se o f h is i s o la t e d remark, "Look, th a t barn i s round!" which i s a s in g le s e n te n c e d e s c r ip t io n , t h i s i s a sen ten ce used as tr u e on ly in th e sen se th a t i t i s p o t e n t ia l ly an e l e - ment in a tru th -gam e. D e scr ib in g i s an a c t i v i t y th a t i s in te r p r e ta b le as a p a rt or a sp e c t o f a tru th -gam e, b u t n ot as i t s e l f a tru th -gam e. Thus, th e s t a t e - ments in a d escrib in g-gam e are "used as tr u e ," but n ot d i r e c t ly , in r e - la t io n to each o th e r , but in d ir e c t ly , as p o t e n t ia l e lem en ts th a t make a tr u th -c la im in a tru th -gam e. To a c tu a lly u se a sen ten ce a s tru e i s to u se i t as an elem en t in an a c t i v i t y in w hich i t has w ith a t l e a s t one other elem ent o f th e a c t i v - i t y a m u tua lly dependent r e la t io n , such th a t i f one i s tr u e th e other i s f a l s e , th e o th er f a l s e . In any truth-gam e th e r e must be a t l e a s t two e l e - ments r e la te d to each o th er in such a m u tually dependent manner. There m ight be any number o f other sta tem en ts having a r o le in a truth-gam e but n ot th e r o le o f making a tr u th -c la im . There m ight be q u ite a v a r ie ty o f r e la t io n s h ip s betw een th e elem en ts o f a truth-gam e b e s id e s th e m u tua lly dependent r e la t io n s h ip s th a t make i t a tru th -gam e. A l l th e s e elem ents are p a r ts o f th e tru th -gam e, but n o t the p a r ts th a t determ ine i t as a tru th -gam e. As d e fin e d h e r e , "use as true" (" a c tu a l u se as true" i s to be un- d erstood u n le s s the phrase i s s p e c i f i c a l l y l im ite d as " p o te n t ia l" ) i s n o t 103 opposed to "use as f a l s e ." I t m ight be thought th a t th e r e are ty p es o f a c t i v i t i e s such as ly in g-gam es and propaganda-games in which " sen ten ces are used a s f a l s e ." L et us im agine a propaganda-game in which my a c t io n s are d ir e c te d toward co n v in c in g an aud ience th a t some p a r t ic u la r war i s j u s t i f i e d on our s id e . "They began sh o o tin g f i r s t , " I l i e , and produce f a l s i f i e d ev id en ce to back up by sta tem en t. S in ce b oth my sta tem en t and the "evidence" I produce are l i e s , I am d e l ib e r a t e ly u s in g a f a l s e s t a t e - ment and perform ing o th er a c t io n s in order to d e c e iv e . F a ls e sta tem en ts used as propaganda and l i e s in any c o n te x t , though, are n ot m erely f a l s e but fa ls e h o o d s . W ith in any c o n te x t in which l i e s are used th ey are sta tem en ts used as t r u e , n e v e r th e le s s , in th e sen se th a t th ey are m u tua lly dependent upon each oth er w ith in th e ly in g -gam e, ( i f th ey were n ot used as tr u e in t h i s s e n s e , th en th ey cou ld not perform th e fu n c t io n o f l y i n g . ) W ithin i t s im m ediate language-gam e a l i e i s a sen ten ce used as tr u e , a l - though r e la t io n s h ip s o f t h i s language-gam e to o th er , b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s d is c lo s e th a t th e language-gam e i s p art o f a d e c e iv in g a c t i v i t y . When an a c t i v i t y i s c h a r a c te r iz e d by in t e r r e la t io n s h ip s o f i t s e lem en ts , as we have done here w ith th e n o tio n o f a tru th -gam e, one d i f - f i c u l t y th a t a r i s e s i s th a t th ere m ight be some a c t i v i t i e s in w hich no p a ttern i s d is c e r n a b le . I m igh t, fo r exam ple, ob serve someone r e p e a t in g to h im s e lf , "Since th e r e are w atch es, th e r e must be w a ter ." Upon in v e s - t ig a t io n I m ight p o s s ib ly d isc o v e r th a t th e speaker i s drunk, in which case what he i s sa y in g makes no sen se because he i s in cap ab le o f th in k in g c le a r ly . S im ila r ly , I m ight d isc o v e r th a t he i s th e town i d i o t , in which ca se what he i s sa y in g makes no sen se fo r th e same rea so n . Or, I m ight d isc o v e r th a t he i s a fo r e ig n e r j u s t le a r n in g th e lan gu age, and b e l ie v e s ioU "watches" to mean " r iv e r s ." In t h i s ca se he makes no sense because h is instrum ents o f ex p ress io n are not im m ediately in te r p r e ta b le by o th ers around him. B u t, w ith adequate in v e s t ig a t io n o f h is r e la te d a c t io n s , one should be a b le to d is c o v e r , as I d id , th a t he i s perform ing m eaningfu l a c t io n s . In the f i r s t two c a s e s , however, in which i t turned out th a t he was drunk or s tu p id , th e r e was no in te r n a l c o n s is te n c y in h is a c t io n s , in c lu d in g h is u t te r a n c e s . T his s o r t o f s i t u a t io n i s im portant in th e p resen t co n tex t b e - cause th ere are ca ses in which someone t r i e s to use tr u e sta tem en ts in a truth-gam e, but f a i l s to some degree and produces lo g i c a l in c o n s is te n - c ie s . S in ce truth-gam es have n ot been d e fin ed in terms o f th e in te n t io n s o f p a r t ic ip a n ts in them, but ra th er in terms o f th e r e la t io n s h ip s betw een th e ir e lem en ts , i t m ight seem th a t a l l truth-gam es a r e , by our d e f i n i - t io n , a c t i v i t i e s in w hich th e r e la t io n s h ip s between th e sta tem en ts are a l l lo g i c a l ly c o n s is te n t . T his would be somewhat s im ila r to say in g th a t on ly a c t io n s o f th e w inning s id e c o n s t itu te p la y in g c h e s s . The a c t io n s o f a lo s in g p layer m ight d i f f e r from th o se o f th e w inning p layer in th a t c e r ta in r u le s o f lo g ic were v io la te d by th e lo s in g p la y e r . For exam ple, he m ight p lan an a tta c k in which some o f th e moves c a n c e lle d out other moves. We would s t i l l sa y , however, th a t he was p la y in g c h e s s , as long as he was fo l lo w - ing th e s p e c ia l r u le s o f th e game o f c h e ss . The f a c t th a t he i s u sin g them in a f u t i l e manner does n o t change th e f a c t th a t he i s p la y in g c h e ss . The "ru les" o f truth-gam es are r u le s in th e sen se th a t i t can be dem onstrated th a t th ey are fo llo w e d in most c a s e s . Someone p la y in g a 105 truth-gam e m ight use th e r u le s o f tr u th in improper w ays, b u t we would say he was engaging in a truth-gam e as lon g as th e r e cou ld be seen some manner in which th e e lem en ts appeared (perhaps on ly to one p a r t ic ip a n t ) to be lo g i c a l l y r e la t e d . The case would be s im ila r t o a language-gam e in which a p a r t ic ip a n t m isunderstood many o f th e r e le v a n t r u le s o f gram- mar. For any s o r t o f a c t i v i t y th e r e are b o r d e r lin e c a se s in which i t i s d o u b tfu l whether or n o t th ey should even be c a l le d a c t i v i t i e s , s in c e th ey la c k a coh erent s tr u c tu r e . A sid e from extrem e ca ses o f t h i s ty p e , how- e v e r , we id e n t i f y an a c t i v i t y as a truth-gam e by an a logy w ith other tru th -gam es. Included among a c t i v i t i e s o f t h i s k ind are l o g i c a l l y in v a l id s tr u c tu r e s o f sta tem en ts th a t are n e v e r th e le s s c l a s s i f i e d as truth-gam es because c e r ta in m e a n in g -r e la tio n sh ip s betw een t h e ir e lem en ts d is c lo s e th a t c e r ta in elem en ts are b e in g used as m u tua lly dependent. In any g iv e n language-gam e th a t e x p r e sse s a truth-gam e th e r e are l i k e l y to be a number o f m ea n in g -r e la tio n sh ip s among v a r io u s elem en ts o f th e language-gam e th a t in d ic a te th a t c e r ta in sta tem en ts are used as m u tua lly dependent. I f tr u th -c la im s are r e la te d in th e "m utually dependent" manner d e f in e d , i . e . , when one tr u th -c la im in a truth-gam e i s a tru e s ta tem en t, any r e la te d tr u th -c la im must a ls o be a tr u e s ta tem en t, and i f one i s f a l s e , th e other must be f a l s e , th en th e r e la t io n s h ip s betw een tr u th - cla im s may be sa id to be l o g i c a l r e la t io n s h ip s . T ru th -cla im s are th e d e - f in in g elem ents o f tru th -g a m es. That i s , i t i s by r e fe r e n c e to th e e x i s - te n c e o f tr u th -c la im s in an a c t i v i t y th a t i t may be c h a r a c te r iz e d as a tru th -gam e. So , th e r u le s o f lo g i c are o f some im portance in c h a r a c te r - iz in g tru th -gam es. 106 Formal lo g i c d is t in g u is h e s betw een " v a lid ity " and " tru th ," th e form er a p p ly in g t o form al d ed u c tiv e arguments and th e l a t t e r t o p r o p o s i- t i o n s , th e e lem en ts o f l o g i c a l argum ents. Thus, in a v a l id argument i f th e p rem ises are tru e th e n th e c o n c lu s io n must be t r u e . A "sound" argu - ment i s a v a l id d e d u c tiv e argument a l l o f whose p rem ises are tr u e . In - d u c tiv e argum ents, on th e o th er hand, are u s u a lly term ed " correct" or " in c o r r e c t ," ra th er th an " va lid " or " in v a lid ." Formal l o g i c i s a c c o r d in g ly d e f in e d as th e stud y o f th e r u le s o f " v a lid ity " and " co rrec tn ess" when b oth d ed u ctiv e and in d u c t iv e branches are in c lu d e d . T ruth , in th e term s o f t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , i s another m atter w ith w hich lo g i c does n o t concern i t s e l f . In th e p r e se n t a n a ly s is o f th e con cep t o f t r u th , how ever, we are n ot in v e s t ig a t in g th e c o n d it io n s under w hich s ta tem en ts are in f a c t t r u e , b u t , r a th e r , th e use o f t r u th -c la im s . S ta tem en ts o f lo g i c d e sc r ib e th e in t e r r e la t io n s h ip s o f s ta tem en ts in s o fa r as th ey are t r u e . S ta tem en ts are tr e a te d in l o g i c as p o s tu la te s : t h e ir im p lic a t io n s , when th ey are assumed to be tr u e , a re s tu d ie d . L ogic may be in te r p r e te d as i s o la t i n g th e tr u th -c la im s in tr u th - games and a n a ly z in g them ap art from th e o th er e lem en ts o f tru th -g a m es. S in ce tr u th -c la im s are th e d e f in in g e lem en ts o f tru th -g a m es, l o g i c a l r u le s e x p ress th e r u le s o f th e con cep t o f t r u th . R u les o f lo g i c are f o r - m a lized sta tem en ts o f th e meaning o f th e con cep t o f t r u th , r e s u l t in g from a n a ly s is o f t r u th -c la im s . The a c t i v i t y o f lo g i c i s in t h i s sen se an a n a ly s is o f th e con cep t o f tr u th , and i t s laws are d e s c r ip t iv e o f th e meaning o f t h i s co n cep t. So, lo g i c i s th e a c t i v i t y o f d is c o v e r in g th e meaning o f t r u th . I t i s th e 107 d isc o v e r y o f th e im p lic a t io n s o f th e use o f th e con cep t o f t r u th . I f one ■wishes t o say -what th e con cep t o f tr u th i s , we can say th a t i t i s th e c h a r a c t e r i s t ic p r o c e s se s o f tru th -g a m es. I f one w ish es t o " d e fin e th e meaning" o f t r u th , we can p o in t to th e d is c o v e r ie s o f lo g i c as such a d e f i n i t i o n , a lth o u g h an im p e r fe c t , in com p lete one. The u se s o f tr u th -c la im s d i s c lo s e th e meaning o f tr u th , b u t th ey have m eaning, im p lic a t io n s , beyond t h e ir p r e se n t a c tu a l u s e . I t may be assumed th a t th e con cep t o f tr u th has a s p e c ts th a t have n o t y e t been d i s - cov ered . I t i s th e job o f lo g i c t o e x p lo r e th e se a s p e c ts o f th e con cep t o f tr u th . Language-games and Truth-gam es "Rules o f meaning" d e sc r ib e a c t i v i t i e s o f language by d e s c r ib in g th e in t e r r e la t io n s o f m e a n in g -e n t i t ie s , s e n te n c e s . "Rules o f ( th e con - cep t o f ) t r u th ," on th e o th er hand, may come to be con fu sed w ith th e se becau se what th e y d e sc r ib e are a ls o in t e r r e la t io n s o f ( c e t t a i n ) m eaninge n t i t i e s . A lth ou gh th e e n t i t i e s r e le v a n t to tr u th are a l s o m eaning-en- t i t i e s , th e r u le s o f tr u th are n ot r u le s o f m eaning. I t i s th e r u le s th a t d i f f e r and n o t th e e n t i t i e s w hich th ey govern . How t h i s i s p o s s ib le w i l l be e v id e n t i f i t i s remembered how ev en ts are in te r p r e ta b le a s a c t io n s : in r e s p e c t to a c t i v i t i e s in w hich th ey fu n c t io n . What th e e n t i t i t e s o f meaning a r e , v i z . , s e n te n c e s - -a r e such in r e s p e c t t o th e a p p ro p r ia te a c t i v i t i e s , language-gam es. In r e - sp e c t t o o th er m a tters th e s e same e n t i t i e s a r e , e . g . , u t te r a n c e s , sound d is tu r b a n c e s in th e atm osphere, gram m atical form s, e t c . In th e ca se o f t r u t h e n t i t i e s , " tr u th -c la im s ," th e r u le s o f th e con cep t o f tr u th d e - s c r ib e r e la t io n s h ip s betw een m e a n in g -e n t it ie s in th e c a p a c ity o f tr u th 108 e n t i t i e s . As m eanings, th e se sen ten ces are in stru m en ts o f a ty p e o f b a s ic a c t i v i t y , tru th -gam es. As such , th ey are in te r p r e ta b le as tr u th - cla im s in r e la t io n to th e se a c t i v i t i e s . S in ce th e r u le s o f tr u th are d i f f e r e n t from th e r u le s o f meaning and govern se n te n c e s in s o fa r as th ey are p a r ts o f tru th -g a m es, i t would seem th a t "p i s true" must d i f f e r from "p" in m eaning. A ccord ing to th e in te r p r e ta t io n o f t h i s s tu d y , however, "p" in "p i s t r u e " i s an " a sse r - t io n ," and does n o t stand fo r a l l s ta tem en t-fo rm s. "p i s true" s ig n a ls th a t a truth-gam e i s go in g on and th a t th e a s s e r t io n "p" forms a p art o f i t as a tr u th -c la im . I f "p" i s used in a way th a t im p lie s th a t "p i s t r u e ," th en "p " i s e q u iv a le n t to "p i s tr u e ." To u se a sen ten ce as tru e in v o lv e s i t in th e same r e la t io n s h ip s to o ther se n te n c e s in th e argument as i t would have i f i t were s ta te d e x p l i c i t l y to be t r u e , "p" co n sid ered o u ts id e any c o n te x t , w ith o u t b e in g sa id to be tru e or used as t r u e , i s n ot an a s s e r t io n a t a l l , i . e . , th e q u e s tio n o f tr u th i s ir r e le v a n t . "p" here i s e i th e r some o th er s o r t o f s ta tem en t-e . g . , f i c t i v e , i r o n ic , e t c . -or a mere sta tem en t-form . In e i th e r c a s e , th e q u e s tio n o f tr u th would be ir r e le v a n t . N e v e r th e le s s , to say a sta tem en t i s tr u e i s t o say th a t i t i s a p a r t ic u la r so r t o f s ta tem en t-an a s s e r t io n or t r u th - c la im . Thus, "p i s true" says th a t "p" has a c e r ta in s o r t o f jo b , one governed by t r u t h r u le s , and form ing p a rt o f an a c t i v i t y w ith in th e t o t a l m e a n in g -a c t iv ity . On th e o th er hand, an a s s e r t io n "p " m erely shows or im p lie s t h i s . So th e meaning o f "p i s true" does d i f f e r from an a s s e r - t io n "p" in t h i s s e n se . The p r e d ic a te " is tru e" does n o t , however, a t t r ib u t e any m eaningr u le s or m e a n in g -r e la tio n s t o "p" in a d d it io n to th o se govern ing "p" as 109 an a s s e r t io n . In other w ords, t h i s d if f e r e n c e in meaning i s not a d i f - feren ce about meaning; what "p i s tru e" p r e d ic a te s o f "p" i s n ot a type o f m ean in g-ru les b u t, r a th e r , t r u t h r u le s . Thus, a lth ou gh th e meaning o f "p i s true" d i f f e r s from th a t o f "p," " is true" does n o t mean a type of meaning. As was noted a t th e o u tse t o f t h i s ch a p ter , th ere are n o n l in - g u i s t i c th in g s o f which "true" i s p r e d ic a t e d - b e l ie f s , p ic t u r e s , m easure- m ents, e t c . These c a se s are in te r p r e ta b le in term s o f th e a n a ly s is o f th e concept o f tr u th th a t has been o u t l in e d . B e l i e f s are tr u th -c la im s th a t are r e la te d to a c t i v i t i e s in which one en g a g es . T heir r e la t io n s h ip s may be to ( n o n l in g u is t ic ) a c t io n s perform ed as w e ll as to sta tem en ts made, and th e se a c t i v i t i e s are in te r p r e ta b le as tru th -g a m es. B e l i e f s and other n o n l in g u is t ic e n t i t i e s o f w hich tr u th i s p red ic a te d are t r u th - cla im s in the same sen se in w hich a s s e r t io n s may b e - in t h e ir l o g i c a l r e - la t io n s h ip s to o ther e lem en ts in an a c t i v i t y . S in ce truth-gam es are b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s which need n ot alw ays be conducted by means of lan gu age- games, t h e ir d e f in in g e lem en ts may be a c t io n s o f any type as lon g as they are "used as tru e" in th e sen se d e f in e d . T his view o f tr u th may now be summarized: "Truth i s a concept m a n ifested in th e use o f a c t io n s in what I c a l l " tru th -gam es." These a c - t i v i t i e s are d i s t i n c t from language-gam es s in c e th ey are one type o f " basic a c t i v i t y ," which has been d e fin ed as an a c t i v i t y th a t gen era tes and u ses m eaning. M e a n in g -a c t iv it ie s or language-gam es are products o f b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , one typ e o f which i s tru th -g a m es. The concept o f a 110 sta tem en t s a id to be tru e i s th a t o f an a s s e r t io n used as a " tru th -cla im " in a tru th -gam e. "Using a sen ten ce as true" or "making a tru th -c la im " i s d e fin e d as u s in g a sen ten ce as an elem ent in an a c t i v i t y in w hich i t has w ith a t l e a s t one o th er elem ent o f the a c t i v i t y a m u tually dependent r e - l a t i o n , i . e . , i f one i s tr u e th e other i s a ls o t r u e , or i f f a l s e , th e other f a l s e . " A ctiv ity " in t h i s d e f in i t i o n , i . e . , a "truth-gam e," i s to be understood , however, t o in c lu d e l o g i c a l l y in v a lid s tr u c tu r e s o f s t a t e - ments which are n e v e r th e le s s truth-gam es because m e a n in g -r e la tio n sh ip s betw een th e ir e lem en ts d is c lo s e th a t c e r ta in elem en ts are b e in g used as m u tu ally dependent. So, in a g iv en language-gam e th a t e x p r e sse s a tr u th - game th e m e a n in g -r e la t io n sh ip s r e v e a l which sta tem en ts are "used as t r u e ," i . e . , w hich s ta tem en ts are b e in g used as m utually dependent. The con cep t o f tr u th (a s m an ifested p a r t ic u la r ly by th e use o f sta tem en ts sa id to be tr u e ) i s th e concept o f th e in te r r e la t io n s h ip s o f tr u th -c la im s in tru th -gam es. I t i s thus th e con cep t o f a type o f job perform ed in one typ e o f b a s ic a c t i v i t y . Whether th e sta tem en ts we u se as tr u e and a s s e r t to be so a re or are n o t , th e concept o f tr u th rem ains th e same. The sta tem en ts we use as t r u e , th e a c t i v i t i e s we engage in , change c o n t in u a lly . We u se immensely complex methods to v e r i f y s ta tem en ts about su b -n u clear p a r t i c l e s , fo r exam ple, and employ com p lica ted m achinery to app ly th e s e m ethods; b u t, what i s meant by th e con cep t o f tr u th does n ot change, even though the tru th -gam es in w hich i t i s m a n ifested do. What changes i s "the tr u th " - - o r , p ro p er ly , what i s accep ted as th e tr u th . The nature o f what i t i s to be t r u e , what th e con cep t means, does not change. I l l Meaning, Truth and th e Concept o f a P r o p o s it io n In t h i s study have been examined th e im p lic a t io n s o f two v iew s: th a t meaning i s u se , and th a t p h ilo so p h ic problem s are con cep tu a l prob- lem s. A view o f meaning has been developed to in te r p r e t the f i r s t o f th e se t e n e t s , and a view o f p h ilo so p h ic method and th e nature o f concep- t u a l problem s to in te r p r e t th e secon d . The in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e f i r s t in v o lv e s v iew in g th e meaning o f a sen ten ce as th e fundam ental m eaningu n it , d i s t i n c t and d i f f e r e n t from w ords. This con cep t i s an in te r p r e ta - t io n , th e r e fo r e , o f one sen se in w hich the p h ilo so p h ic term " p rop osition " has been em ployed. The in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e second t e n e t in v o lv e s a view o f con cep ts and t h e ir r e la t io n to language th a t le a d s to a form ula- t io n o f th e problem o f tr u th as th a t o f th e u se o f sen ten ces s a id to be tr u e . T his i s an in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e second sen se in which th e term " proposition " has been employed. Both sen se s o f " prop osition " are u s e fu l and , perhaps, n ecessa ry con cep ts fo r p h ilo so p h ic purposes in d e a lin g w ith th e problems o f t h i s stu d y . These two se n se s have been equated in some treatm en ts o f "propo- s i t i o n s ," however, and t h i s i s not d e s ir a b le . The two sen ses have been equated because o f c e r ta in a sp e c ts o f th e problem o f t r u th , w hich may now be examined in th e l i g h t o f th e view o f tr u th th a t now has been o u t lin e d . As was d isc u sse d in Chapter I , th e se two s e n se s may come to be id e n t i f i e d w ith each other b ecause o f th e f a c t th a t what i s tr u e must have meaning. From t h i s the c o n c lu s io n m ight be drawn th a t i t i s se n - te n c e s th a t have meaning and th a t are t r u e o r f a l s e . In terms o f the view developed in t h i s stu d y , how ever, i t may be s a id th a t such an in f e r - ence would in v o lv e a f a i lu r e to d e f in e th e o b je c ts o f tr u th and meaning 112 in term s o f th e ir r e la t io n s to ap p ro p ria te a c t i v i t i e s , and hence a f a i l - ure to d is t in g u is h betw een sen ten ces as m e a n in g -e n t it ie s and sen ten ces as_ t r u t h e n t i t i e s . I t i s a sen ten ce in one c a p a c ity th a t has m eaning, and in another c a p a c ity o f w hich tr u th i s p r e d ic a te d . I t has a ls o been a fe a tu r e o f some p r e p o s it io n a l t h e o r ie s to t r e a t th e n o tio n o f a p r o p o s it io n as in v o lv in g a " m ean in g -freeze ," as d is c u s se d in Chapter I , s in c e "true" has been thought to be an a b so lu te norm in th a t i f a sta tem en t i s tru e i t must be a b s o lu te ly tr u e , or tr u e r e g a r d le s s o f c o n te x t . From our p o in t o f v iew , t h i s view in v o lv e s m isap- p reh en sion s about both th e nature o f tr u th and o f m eaning. S en ten ces co n ceived as m ea n in g s -in -th e m se lv e s , w ith o u t r e fe r e n c e to a c o n te x t in which th ey mean, are m erely p o t e n t ia l meanings or gram m atical form s, in th e view o f th e p r e se n t s tu d y , and any a c tu a l meaning i s by nature con- te x t-d e p e n d e n t. The idea o f tr u th as an a b so lu te norm, from w hich th e idea o f a m ea n in g -freeze may be g en era te d , i s a ls o m istak en . I t i s i n t i - m ately connected w ith th e view o f tr u th as a r e la t io n between meaning and " fact" or " s ta te o f a f f a ir s " in th e w orld . I f tr u th were t h i s s o r t o f r e l a t io n , th en p r e c is io n o f meaning would be e s s e n t i a l . I f i t i s n o t , as has been argued in t h i s s tu d y , th en th e n o tio n o f i t as an a b so lu te norm i s n ot to th e p o in t , and th e n o tio n o f a "m eaning-freeze" becomes u n n eces- sary in th e p h ilo so p h ic in v e s t ig a t io n o f tr u th . The n o tio n o f tr u th as a norm o f norms ( i . e . , a norm a t the top o f a h iera rch y o f norms; an u lt im a te norm) has been in stru m en ts 1 in d i s - suad ing some p h ilo so p h ers from i t s exam ination as s u c h - e .g . , A u s tin , Strawson and P o n tiu s P i l a t e . I f "true" and "truth" are in te r p r e te d as r e fe r r in g to some one, u n i f ie d , u lt im a te norm in term s o f w hich e v e r y - th in g must be judged , i t would seem to be dubious both th a t such a norm 113 cou ld e x i s t and th a t an yth in g could ever he shown to meet i t . Wo u l t i - mate norm i s im p lied by th e ord inary meaning o f " tru e ," however, and th e r e are many truth-gam es in which norms are n ot in v o lv e d . There are many tru th -gam es th a t do in v o lv e , however, s e t t in g up , t e s t in g and ap - p ly in g norms. When a sen ten ce a s s e r t in g "p i s tru e" occurs in a lan gu age- game i t s ig n a ls th a t a truth-gam e i s b e in g ca rr ied on. I f t h i s i s a truth-gam e in which th e use o f norms o f some k ind i s in v o lv e d , "true" in "p i s true" says th a t p i s in agreem ent w ith th e se norms. (Whether or not p a c tu a l ly does m eet th o se norms i s a m atter o f f a c t th a t i s n ot a m atter o f the meaning o f p . B u t, " tru e" means here th a t th e s e norms are m et. "p i s tr u e ," l i k e "p," means what i t does r e g a r d le s s o f th e tr u th o f p .) Truth i s an u lt im a te norm on ly in th a t i t comprehends a l l norms. I t i s n ot a sep a ra te norm above a l l o th e r s , but i s a p p lic a b le to any norm ative tru th -gam e, i . e . , one in w hich standards o f some s o r t are in - v o lved . I t i s som etim es s a id , a l s o , th a t an a s s e r t io n i s "true on ly in t h i s c o n te x t ." H ere, a g a in , t h i s usage som etim es i s taken as im plying th a t th e r e i s an a b so lu te standard o f "truth" in a s t r i c t e s t s e n se . In order fo r an a s s e r t io n to be "true in one con text" but not in a l l , how- e v e r , i t need not be tru e " a b so lu te ly ." I t need on ly be th e case th a t th e r e be some c o n te x ts in w hich th e sta tem en t i s f a l s e . T h is might be th e case b ecau se: ( l ) th e sta tem en t-form in t h i s co n te x t has a meaning d i f f e r e n t from i t s meaning in other c o n te x ts ; or (2 ) the sta tem en t in t h i s c o n te x t has a r o le in a truth-gam e d i f f e r e n t from i t s r o le s in o ther truth-gam e s . 11U T his dual r e la t io n s h ip o f tru th to con text i s a sen se in which th ere i s " r e la t iv i t y o f truth" and the meaning o f tr u th , i . e . , how the concept i s u sed , im p lie s n e ith e r th a t th ere i s nor i s not a h ierarchy o f d egrees o f tru th . The "proposition" as th e "meaning o f a sentence" has been d is - guished from the "sign" o f th e sen ten ce . Indeed, i t i s s u ita b le to d i s - t in g u is h between " u ttera n ces ," spoken or w r it te n , and th e ir meaning or u se . In th e view o f t h is stu d y , though, th e "signs" o f se n te n c e s , " u tte r - an ces ," are mere ev en ts th a t are not a c t io n s in a c t i v i t i e s . P r o p o s it io n a l th e o r ie s in which the meaning or p r o p o s it io n c o rr e - la t e s words and the world are h ig h ly m is lea d in g , i f meaning i s u se . The stru ctu re o f " p ro p o sitio n a l s ign s" i s a co n ven tion a l m atter , but i t i s a su rfa ce m a n ife s ta tio n o f the, in terc o n n ec tio n s o f a c t io n s in language a c - t i v i t i e s . T he.con ven tion a l nature o f meaning reaches deeper than the a r b itr a r y a sp ec ts o f grammatical r u le s . Of cou rse, th ere i s a sen se in which both meaning and tru th are r e la t io n s o f words to th e w o r ld - s e n te n t ia l meanings are about som ething, and, th e r e fo r e , so are true se n te n c e s . The id e n t i f i c a t io n o f meaning and tru th in th e n o tion o f a "proposition" might be in te r p r e te d as a r is in g from t h is g en era l c ircum stance. Language i t s e l f , however, i s an a c t iv i t y in the w orld , and not m erely about i t . The type o f a c t iv i t y th a t con- s t i t u t e s tr u th , and in which tru e sta tem en ts are used as th e elem ents o f th e a c t i v i t y , i s a ls o an a c t iv i t y in the w orld. Meaning i s r e la te d to "the world" through a c t i v i t i e s (" b a sic a c t i v i t i e s " ) , in c lu d in g argumenta c t i v i t i e s or truth-gam es. 115 Thus, i t m ight he sa id th a t meaning i s r e la te d in one r e sp e c t to the world through tr u th , in th a t words have r e la t io n s to e x t r a l in g u is t ic m atters because language i s an instrum ent o f b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , one type of which i s truth-gam es. I t i s n o t, th en , meaning th a t i s the medium through which tru th i s r e la te d to "the w orld ," or what meanings are about. I t i s m islead in g in g en era l, however, to speak about the " r e la - t io n o f words to the w orld ," which in v o lv e s b y -p assin g a fundam ental fa c t about m ea n in g --its gen era tio n in b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s , which are them selves roo ted in the w orld. T h is , I have su g g ested , i s a c e n tr a l a sp ect o f mean- in g , and i t s e x p lic a t io n i s needed in the a n a ly s is o f tr u th , as w e l l . The r e la t io n s o f "words to the w orld" are immensely com plicated as w e ll as in d ir e c t and d ev io u s . These r e la t io n s may be c la r i f ie d and d e lin e a te d through understanding the nature o f meaning and r e la te d a c t i v i t i e s , in - c lu d in g t r u t h a c t i v i t i e s . B ut, as i s i l lu s t r a t e d by the th e o r ie s d i s - cussed in Chapter I , i t i s m islead in g to reverse the d ir e c t io n and approach meaning and tr u th through th e se r e la t io n s , in s te a d . The n o tio n o f a p r o p o s it io n has a ls o been connected w ith a type o f treatm ent o f the problem o f f a l s i t y . I t has been argued th a t what i s f a l s e cannot be m ean in g less , a lthough what i s tru e must be m ea n in g fu l, and t h a t , th e r e fo r e , what i s m eaningful must be what i s p o s s ib ly true or p o s- s ib ly f a l s e - a p r o p o s it io n . In the view o f t h is study t h is whole argu- ment i s based upon an i n i t i a l c o n fu s io n --th a t in vo lved in tr e a t in g what i s m eaningful as an in t r i n s i c a l ly t r u e o r f a ls e o b je c t . " F a lse ," o f cou rse, i s p red ica ted o f a meaning in the same sen se th a t "true" i s - v i z . , as an elem ent o f a truth-gam e. To say th a t some- th in g i s " fa lse" im p lie s th a t i t i s m eaningfu l, th a t i t i s a sen tence or 1X6 m eaning, s in c e " fa ls e " may be p r e d ic a te d on ly o f th e same s o r t o f th in g th a t "true" i s . There i s a sen se in w hich a f a l s e s ta tem en t may be s a id to -b e " p o ss ib ly t r u e " - v i z . , i t s form i s th e same a s th a t o f a tru e s ta tem en t. To say an a s s e r t io n i s f a l s e , how ever, i s to say th a t i t can - n o t be used in w hatever truth-gam e i s in v o lv e d , b ecau se o f (n o t i t s m eaning b u t) i t s t r u th -v a lu e . Wiy i t i s f a l s e and th e manner in w hich t h i s may be e s t a b l is h e d are m a tters o f v e r i f i c a t i o n ; " fa lse " i s n o t sy n - onymous w ith " d isp roved ," any more than "true" i s w ith "proved," The con cep t o f " fa ls e " i s o f a sen ten ce which i s in c o n f l i c t w ith th e r u le s o f some truth-gam e and th e r e fo r e sh ou ld n o t be used in some truth-gam e ( q u it e p o s s ib ly n ot th e same o n e ). To say a form o f words i s p o s s ib ly tr u e or f a l s e i s n o t very u s e - f u l ; on ly a se n te n c e as a meaning may be tr u e or f a l s e but t h i s i s sim p ly b ecau se m eanings are th e means by w hich tru th -gam es are conducted . What i s " p o s s ib ly tru e or f a ls e " i s c o -e x te n s iv e w ith , but n ot e q u iv a le n t t o , " a s s e r t io n s ," a ty p e o f m eaning. In Chapter I , i t was argued th a t tr u th must be independent o f m eaning, in th a t i t cannot c o n s is t in m ea n in g -con ven tion s; and, th a t meaning must be independent o f t r u th , in th a t i t i s som etim es cap ab le o f tr u th but need n ot be e i th e r a c t u a l ly or even p o t e n t ia l ly t r u e . In th e view d evelop ed in t h i s s tu d y , "true" i s p r e d ic a te d o f m eanings th a t a re used as tr u th -c la im s and i t s r u le s are th e r e fo r e d i f f e r e n t from m eaningc o n v e n tio n s . The r u le s o f t r u th and th e r u le s o f meaning have to do w ith th e same e v e n ts or phenomena, but in d i f f e r e n t c a p a c i t i e s , a s a c t io n s d e f in e d in r e l a t io n t o d i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s . Thus, th e con cep t o f a p r o p o s it io n , w hich has f i l l e d an ambiguous 117 p h ilo s o p h ic r o l e , a s u n it o f meaning and a s th a t o f w hich "true" i s p red - ic a t e d , i s a m is le a d in g con cep t s in c e th e s e two s e n se s r e f e r to q u ite d i s t i n c t m a tte r s . A lthough each sen se has a r o le in th e e x p la n a tio n o f th e con cep t o f t r u th , com bining them ob scu res th e n atu re o f t r u th , as w e l l a s o f m eaning. Truth and F u n ctio n I f we lo o k now a t th e d eb ate betw een A u st in and Straw son d i s - cu ssed in Chapter I , t h e ir v iew s may be in te r p r e te d in term s o f th e view d ev e lo p ed in t h i s stu d y . A u s t in 's m o d ified correspondence th eo ry o f f e r s a d e s c r ip t io n o f tr u th a s a typ e o f correspondence betw een " statem ents" and " fa c t s ." T h is co rresp on d en ce , he co n ten d s, i s e f f e c t e d by means o f a c o r r e la t io n b e - tw een two ty p es o f meaning r e l a t io n s , d e s c r ip t iv e and d em on stra tiv e con - v e n t io n s . T his trea tm en t o f tr u th d i f f e r s from a p r o p o s it io n a l c o r r e s - pondence th eory l i k e th a t o f the T ra c ta tu s in v ie w in g th e r e le v a n t mean- in g r e la t io n s as co n v en tio n s th a t have no co n n ec tio n w ith any s o r t o f n e c e ssa r y r u l e s - i n p a r t ic u la r , l o g i c a l r u le s . A u s t in 's view i s n e v e r - t h e le s s o f a correspondence typ e th a t in t e r p r e t s th e s e co n v en tio n s as c o r r e la t in g words and th e w orld . Any correspondence typ e o f view i n - v o lv e s some view o f th e meaning s id e o f th e correspon d en ce in w hich i t may be c o r r e la te d in some way w ith what i t i s ab ou t. Such v iew s o f mean- in g c o n f l i c t w ith th e view o f meaning as u se p resen ted in t h i s stu d y . The sta tem en t s id e o f A u s t in 's correspondence i s s im ila r t o th e p r o p o s i t io n a l s ig n s id e o f th e T ra cta tu s co rresp on d en ce , e x ce p t th a t i t c o n s is t s in th e words a s an " h is to r ic u tte r a n c e ," an u tte r a n c e as a tem - p o r a l o ccu rr en ce , ra th e r than as s ig n s . An " utterance" in t h i s sen se 1X8 A u stin c o n s id e r s t o tie th e "use" o f a s e n te n c e , and to be what i s tru e or f a l s e . A " sta tem en t," accord in g to A u s t in , i s a "use" o f a s e n te n c e , i . e . , i t i s made by means o f a se n te n c e , and th e making o f i t i s an " h is - t o r i c " (tem p o ra l) e v e n t . In t h i s trea tm en t, th e sta tem en t i s s im ila r t o th e p r o p o s it io n , com bining what i s (p o s s ib ly ) tru e and what has a (ty p e o f ) m eaning, b u t th e words as a sen ten ce are c o r r e la te d w ith ty p es o f s i t u a t io n s by d e - s c r ip t i v e c o n v e n tio n s , w h ile the words as a sta tem en t are c o r r e la te d w ith a c tu a l s i t u a t io n s by d em on strative c o n v e n tio n s . These c o r r e la t io n s a r e , a s Straw son p u ts i t , th e c o n d it io n s o f " f a c t s t a t in g d is c o u r s e ." In th e view o f th e p r e se n t s tu d y , an u tte r a n c e in t h i s sen se cannot c o n s t i t u t e a u se . S tra w so n 's c r i t ic i s m o f t h i s i s s im ila r : "'My s ta tem en t' may be e i th e r what I say or my sa y in g i t . My sa y in g som ething i s c e r t a in ly an e p is o d e . What I say i s n o t . I t i s th e l a t t e r , n o t th e form er, we d e c la r e to be t r u e . On th e o th er s id e o f the correspon d en ce, th a t o f "the world" as opposed t o "words," A u s t in p u ts a " fa c t ," w hich i s synonymous fo r him w ith " s ta te o f a f f a ir s " or " c ircu m stan ces." T his i s ra th e r e c c e n tr ic u sa g e , s in c e in ord in ary usage a " fact" i s som ething th a t i s t r u e , w h ile a " s ta te o f a f f a ir s " i s an e x is t e n t s i t u a t i o n . To use th e se term s synon- ym ously i s t o con fu se two q u ite d i f f e r e n t ty p e s o f th in g s --w h a t in p h i lo - so p h ic term s are som etim es d is t in g u is h e d as "truth" and " r e a l i t y ." A " s ta te o f a f f a i r s ," a p a r t o f " r e a l i t y ," j u s t i s , so to sp eak , b u t a " fact" i s a tr u e s ta tem en t. 1 Straw son , op. c i t . , pp. 1 2 9 -3 0 . 119 Straw son, in c r i t ic i s m o f t h i s a sp e c t o f A u s t in 's v iew , con tends th a t "a s i t u a t io n or s t a t e o f a f f a i r s i s , ro u g h ly , a s e t o f f a c t s n o t a s e t o f th in g s ," n e ith e r f a c t s nor s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s b e in g in th e w orld . Strawson a rg u es , anyway, th a t what a sta tem en t i s "about" (w hich i s some- th in g in th e w orld ) cannot be what makes i t t r u e . S tra w so n 's view o f the meaning o f " fa c ts" and " s ta te s o f a f f a ir s " does n ot a g ree w ith th a t ad - vocated in th e l a s t paragraph, b u t, r e g a r d le s s o f th e c o r r e c tn e ss o f t h i s , S traw son 's a s s o c ia te d c r i t ic i s m th a t what a sta tem en t i s about can- not be what makes i t tru e in v o lv e s a cu riou s in te r p r e ta t io n o f th e words and w orld d ichotom y. Straw son se e s th e w orld as composed o f o b je c ts and e v e n ts e x c lu s iv e ly , w h ile f a c t s , s i t u a t io n s , e t c . , are e v id e n t ly m atters o f meaning. What meanings are about are th e se o b je c ts and e v e n ts in th e w orld , w h ile tr u th , f a c t s , o r , a p p a ren tly , an yth in g about o b je c ts and e v e n ts , are m atters o f m eaning. T his view i s an e c c e n tr ic one and o v e r - s im p l i f i e s th e r e la t io n s betw een language and what i t i s ab ou t. To re-duce what language i s about to " o b je c ts and e v e n ts ," e x c lu s iv e o f any r e - la t io n s h ip s among them , i s to o la n g u a g e -cen ter ed , as w e l l as b e in g in a d - equate as a d e s c r ip t io n o f what e x i s t s in th e w orld . On t h i s s o r t o f view o f th e r e la t io n s h ip s betw een language and what i t i s ab ou t, an a n a l- y s i s o f tr u th i s l im ite d to i n t r a l in g u i s t i c r e la t io n s h ip s and, th e r e fo r e , i s l i k e l y to f in d tr u th in some so r t o f m e a n in g -r u le s . To re tu rn to A u stin now, h is trea tm en t o f " fa c ts" as synonymous w ith " s ta te s o f a f f a ir s " i s m is le a d in g and, more im p ortan t, i t su g g e sts an am bigu ity a t th e b a s is o f h is a n a ly s is o f th e problem o f tr u th . That i s , by id e n t i f y in g "what makes a sta tem en t true" ( " f a c t s " ) w ith "what i t 120 i s about" (" s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s " ) , he i s le d to a correspondence ty p e o f th e o r y . He says " fa c t th a t" i s a "compendious way o f sp eak in g about a s i t u a t io n in v o lv in g both words and w orld ." The phrase i s " designed fo r use in s i t u a t io n s where th e d i s t i n c t i o n betw een a tr u e sta tem en t and th e s t a t e o f a f f a i r s about w hich i t i s a tr u th i s n eg le c ted " (p . 1 1 8 ) . B u t, perhaps i f f a c t s and s t a t e s o f a f f a i r s -tr u e sta tem en ts and s i t u a t io n s in th e w orld -were d is t in g u is h e d from each o th er a t th e o u t s e t , th en tr u th need n ot be sought in a r e l a t io n betw een th e s e two ty p e s o f t h in g s , tru e s ta tem en ts and s i t u a t io n s in th e w orld . A u st in d e f in e s th e n a tu re o f th e problem o f tr u th a t th e b e g in - n in g o f h is e s sa y as the "use o f ' i s t r u e ." ' What he understands by "use" i s p a r t ly e x p l i c i t in h is d e f in i t i o n o f th e u se o f a s e n te n c e as i t s u t te r a n c e , and p a r t ly im p l i c i t in h is a n a ly s i s . H is in t e r p r e ta t io n o f th e u se o f a se n te n c e a s i t s tem poral u tte r a n c e i s b e s id e th e p o in t , as has a lr ea d y been d is c u s s e d , b u t what i s more im portant here i s th a t "use" i s in t h i s way d i f f e r e n t ia t e d from "m eaning." I t i s th e use o f a sen ten ce (a s a " sta tem en t" ) ra th er than i t s m eaning, th a t i s tr u e or f a l s e . To d i f f e r e n t i a t e th e meaning o f s e n te n c e s from t h e ir "use" ( in any r e le v a n t sen se o f th e word, one o f w hich i s n o t as " u tter a n c e ," fo r th e rea so n s d is c u s se d in Chapter I I I ) in t h i s way i s m ista k en , in th e view o f t h i s stu d y . I m p l ic i t in A is t in 's a n a ly s is i s a l s o , I b e l i e v e , a view o f th e use o f words th a t i s to o c lo s e t o th a t o f t r a d i t i o n a l r u le s o f grammar - what was r e fe r r e d t o as " su rfa ce grammar" in Chapter I I I . In any c a s e , A u s t in 's trea tm en t o f tr u th as a problem o f th e u s e ' o f s e n te n c e s i s in l i n e w ith th e v iew s o f th e p r e s e n t s tu d y , even though h is rea so n s fo r 121 thus t r e a t in g i t are b e s id e th e p o in t . His view o f th e use o f words and th e r e la t io n o f t h i s t o the u se o f s e n te n c e s , how ever, i s in c o n tr a s t w ith th e in t e r p r e ta t io n o f meaning as use o f th e p r e se n t stu d y . S traw son 's trea tm en t o f th e problem o f t r u th , on th e other hand, appears q u ite d i f f e r e n t from A u s t in ' s , approached from th e v iew p o in t o f t h i s stu d y . To b eg in w ith , h i s fo rm u la tio n o f th e problem , "the use o f ' i s t r u e ," ' i s on ly s u p e r f ic i a l ly th e same as A u s t in 's . What Strawson understands by th e use o f "true" seems to be l im ite d to ra th er su per- f i c i a l a s p e c ts o f i t s u s e , as was d isc u sse d in Chapter I . T h is under- sta n d in g o f "use" in c lu d e s th e view th a t th e use o f " is true" does n ot in c lu d e ta lk in g about a n y th in g . T his i s a c e n tr a l p o in t in S traw son 's a n a ly s i s , and i s c l o s e l y connected w ith h is h ig h ly c ircu m scrib ed t r e a t - ment o f u se . S traw son 's v iew s on "about" have an im portant a p p lic a t io n in h is a n a ly s is o f th e nature o f f a c t s t a t in g d is c o u r s e . He contends th a t when we u se " tru e ," " fa c t ," e t c . , we are " ta lk in g w ith in , and not ab ou t, a c e r ta in frame o f d is c o u r s e ," so th e "problem about th e u se o f 't r u e ' i s to se e how t h i s word f i t s in to th a t frame o f d isco u rse" (p . 1*4-2). Now, th e f a c t th a t in u s in g such words we are ta lk in g w ith in a c e r ta in frame o f d is c o u r s e does not ex c lu d e th e p o s s i b i l i t y th a t we are ta lk in g about so m e th in g --e ith e r som ething w ith in th a t frame o f d isc o u r se or som ething o u ts id e i t . From the v iew p o in t o f t h i s stu d y , how "true" " f i t s in to" th e frame o f d isc o u r se would not exclu d e i t s r e la t io n s h ip s to th in g s "outside" i t - v i z . , th in g s " in th e w orld ," w hatever th ey may b e . These are "about"r e l a t io n s , which are n o t exclu ded from language-gam es, and how words are used i s in te r p r e te d to o narrow ly when i t i s tak en to ex c lu d e them. 122 The perform atory or r e a s s e r t iv e th eo ry o f t r u th th a t Straw son a d voca tes h in g es on th e con cep t o f a " l in g u is t i c perform ance." In th e view o f th e p r e se n t s tu d y , t h i s con cep t i s id e n t i f i e d w ith th a t o f a s e n - te n c e . A perform atory word A u s tin understands to be a verb ( in f i r s t p erso n , p r e se n t in d ic a t iv e ) w hich a lth o u g h seem ing to d e sc r ib e an " a c t iv - ity " o f th e sp ea k er , a c t u a l ly i s th a t " a c t iv i t y ." (" A c tiv ity " here i s s im ila r to " action " a s used in t h i s s tu d y .) In th e p r e se n t s tu d y , a p e r - formance o f t h i s k ind cou ld n o t be a word, b u t , r a th e r , a se n te n c e made by means o f i t . Only a sen ten ce can c o n s t i t u t e an a c t io n , in t h i s s e n se . In th e view o f t h i s s tu d y , any s e n te n c e , in th e proper c o n te x t , as an e lem en t in an ap p rop ria te language a c t i v i t y , may be in te r p r e te d as p r im a r ily a perform ance o f t h i s k in d . T his typ e o f sen ten ce i s a p r im i- t i v e one, in th e se n se th a t i t f a i l s t o have th e complex in te r -c o n n e c t io n s w ith oth er a c t io n s in th e a c t i v i t y th a t se n te n c e s "about" som ething h ave . An e s s e n t i a l p a rt o f th e con cep t o f p erform atory u t te r a n c e s (b o th fo r Straw son and fo r A u stin ; s e e A u s t in 's "P erform ative U ttera n ces" ^ ) i s th e view t h a t th ey can be n e ith e r tru e nor f a l s e , s in c e th ey are p e r fo r - mances and n o t about perform ances or an yth in g e l s e . One does n ot s a y , o f c o u r se , t h a t a perform ance or a c t io n i s " tru e ." T his seems to be i n t e r - p re ted by A u s tin and Straw son a s fo l lo w in g from o r , a t l e a s t , con n ected w ith th e f a c t th a t a perform ance i s n o t about a n y th in g . Truth, how ever, has n o th in g to do d i r e c t ly w ith b e in g about a n y th in g , in th e p r e se n t v ie w , b u t th e n o t io n th a t i t does i s fundam ental to many th e o r ie s b e s id e s th e s e o f A u s tin and Straw son . J . L. A u s t in , "P erform ative U tte r a n c e s ," P h ilo s o p h ic a l Papers (O xford: C larendon P r e s s , 1961) , pp. 22 0 -2 3 9 . 123 To view a sen ten ce as b e in g a performance or an a c t io n o f one kind or another does n ot imply th a t th e r e fo r e i t cannot be t r u e o r f a l s e . We p red ic a te "true" and " fa lse" o f m eaning, but we do not say , e i t h e r , "This meaning i s tr u e ." We do not say th a t a c t io n s are tr u e , b u t we p red - ic a te "true" o f e n t i t i e s s ig n i f ie d by c e r ta in s tr u c tu r e s o f w ords, but an a lyzab le as sym bolic a c t io n s or meaning. I t i s how we use w ords, not what we say about them, th a t d is c lo s e s th e ir meaning in f u l l . The e s s e n t ia l l y s e n t e n t ia l nature o f perform atory u tte r a n c e s i s perhaps rev e a led in S traw son 's su g g e stio n th a t "Ditto."' i s s u b s ta n t ia l ly synonymous w ith " tru e ." " D itto !" i s a sen ten ce analogous w ith th e se n - ten ce "True!" or "That's tr u e ." A " l in g u is t ic perform ance," in th e p r e - sen t v iew , i s a sen ten ce and, i f t h i s i s th e c a se , perhaps to an a lyze "true" as a l i n g u i s t i c performance n e c e s s a r i ly le a d s to a n a lo g iz in g i t w ith a sen ten ce o f some ty p e . H u s, S traw son 's r e j e c t io n o f many o f the p e r t in e n t a sp e c ts o f th e use o f " tru e," p a r t ic u la r ly i t s r e fe ren ce to c e r ta in s e n te n c e s , r e s u l t s in h is treatm ent o f th e concept as a c tu a lly b ein g a se n te n c e , in th e terms o f th e p resen t stu d y . The a n a ly se s o f A u stin and Straw son, as w e l l as th a t o f the T r a c ta tu s , in v o lv e o v e r s im p lif ie d in te r p r e ta t io n s o f th e nature and mech- anisms o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning. The co n c lu s io n s o f th e p resen t study o f fe r ways o f understanding how such o v e r s im p lif ie d view s may be generated out o f f a c t s about th e use o f "true" (and i t s r e la t io n to meaning) through o v e r s im p lif ic a t io n o f th e im p lic a tio n s o f th e se f a c t s . The view o f th e concept o f tr u th developed in t h i s study has been d erived from view s o f ( l ) the nature o f l i n g u i s t i c meaning and ( 2 ) the 12b nature o f con cep tu a l problem s. Meaning has been view ed as th e fu n c t io n - in g o f language-gam es, t o o ls o f b a s ic human a c t i v i t i e s . Concepts have been viewed as elem ents or a sp ec ts o f b a s ic a c t i v i t i e s and th e r e fo r e e x - h ib ite d in language-gam es. W ithin th e co n tex t o f th e s e v ie w s, tr u th has been analyzed as a concept th a t fu n c tio n s in a typ e o f b a s ic a c t i v i t y in which th e d e f in in g elem en ts are lo g i c a l ly r e la t e d . BIBLIOGRAPHY A u stin , J . L. P h ilo so p h ic a l P a p ers . Oxford: Clarendon P r e ss , 1961. _________ . "Truth," P roceed ings o f th e A r is t o t e l ia n S o c ie ty , Supplementary Volume, XXIV (1 9 5 0 ), 111-128. Strawson, P . F . "Truth," P roceed ings o f th e A r is t o t e l ia n S o c ie t y , Sup- plem entary Volume, XXIV (1 9 5 0 ), 129156 . _________ . "Truth," P h ilosophy and A n a ly s is . E d ited by Margaret Macdonald. Oxford: B a s i l B la c k w e ll, 195^. W ittg e n ste in , Ludwig. P h ilo so p h ic a l I n v e s t ig a t io n s . New York: Macmillan Co. , 1953. _________ . T ractatus L o g ic o -P h ilo so p h icu s . London: R outledge and Kegan P a u l, 1922.