It lies beyond the scope of the present paper to consider whethcr Plato himself believed or wished his audiencc to bclieve that Socrates managed to refute Thrasymachus's posit~on, either 111 Bh ci ;l;whc:c i: the Republic. Benjanzin Gibbs Unive r s i~ o/ Waikato Aristotle, egoism and the virtuous person's point of view' STEPHEN GARDINER According to the traditional interpretation, Aristotle's ethics, and ancient virtue ethics more generally, is fundamentally grounded in selfinterest , and so in some sense egoistic. Most contemporary ethical theorists regard egoism as morally repellent, and so dismiss Aristotle's approach. But recent traditional interpreters have argued that Aristotle's egoism is not vulnerable to this criticism. Indeed, they claim that Aristotle's egoism actually accommodates morality. For, they say, Aristotle's view is that an agent's best interests are partially constituted by acting morally, so that the virtuous person sees morality as essential to her happiness. (Call this 'the Constitutive Thesis'.) In this paper, I argue that the Constitutive Thesis is unpersuasive, both from a theoretical standpoint and (for similar reasons) as an interpretation of ~r is tot le . ' It is unpersuasive because it is much more demanding in both I would like to thank audiences at the 1999 ASAP conference, and at the University of Canterbury (especially Derek Brovme and Philip Catton). I am also indebted to Dougal Blyth and Tim Chappel1 for their very usefd witten comments, and to T.H. Irwin and Jennifer Whiting for helphl discussion of an earlier draft. ' I do not consider all interpretations of Aristotle that have been, or might be offered. I~LImXable readings have been put forward over the years, and a survey of all of them is far beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I focus on the views of T.1 I. Invin and John McDowell. These are arguably the two m j o r contemporary positions amongst those who believe that the question of self-interest makes sense, and is a live one, for Aristotlc. Of come, another prominent set of interpreters ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM respccts than scvcral noncgoist altcrnativcs. My argument builds on an objcction originally offercd by John McDowell. McDoweIl claimcd (1) !!x! !k Pcc~s !~ ! !~~~vP Th qiq reql~ires that thcre arc indcpendent standards of sclf-interest that can be agrced upon in advancc by all parties to thc disputc , both virtuous and nonvirtuous; and (2) that thcre arc no such standards. I argue that McDowell is mistaken. The orthodox position requires much lcss than McDowell claims if it makes an appeal to the distinctivcness of the virtuous person's point of view. Howcver, unfortunately for traditionalists, thc price o f this point of view defencc is high. First, to be even remotely plausible, the revised orthodox view must be almost frighteningly complex. Second, once this complexity is exposed, the orthodox view is much less plausible than its major rivals, in particular those which appeal directly to moral reasons. The paper is divided into five sections. Thc first explains the orthodox position and the Constitutive Thcsis. The second introduces McDowell's criticism and the point of view defence. The third section explains the costs o f this reply. The fourth considers several ways o f mccting these costs, finding each unsatisfactory. Finally, the fifth section considers two ways in which the orthodox position might be weakened in order to avoid some of the problems, but argues that both should be rejectcd. I . Egoism, inclusivism and altrusitic action Generally speaking, a position is egoistic if it subscribes to the claim that each person does or must or should do whatever promotes some denies questions about the relative roles of self-interest and morality make sense for Aristotlc, usually because they take our concept of morality to have emerged only in the Modem period). Though this position is of considerable intcrest, i t does not fall within the scope of this paper. (The position is put forward by Anscombe, 'Modem Moral Philosophy', a seminal paper. See also Maclntyre, Aje r L'irt~ie; and Williams, Ethics and the Limits ofPhilosophl;). benefit for h e r s e ~ f . ~ But the particular form of egoism of interest here is a thesis about the rational justification o f action:' namely, that each person ought to do whatever promotes some benefit for herself because it promotes some benefit for herself:: Let us caii this view 'jusi;Gc;ai"ry Egoism'. According to Justificatory Egoism, an agent has a basic justificatory reason for acting in a given way if and only if acting in such a way promotes some benefit for that agent. Now, Justificatory Egoism conflicts with two facts about our moral experience . First, it seems immensely plausible that in ordinary life good people sometimes perform altruistic actions: that is, actions which involve the sacrifice of their own interests, and which are genuinely done for the sake of others. Second, such behavior seems, at least at first glance, to be entirely reasonable. Given these facts, it seems unlikely that an egoistic account o f altruistic action can be correct. Furthermore, since the facts have a * For an excellent discussion of s o m relcvant issues see Kraut, Arislolle. ' This question is importantly different &om the question of what motivates an agent in acting virtuously. (For example, it would presumably be possible for an agent to perform the actions she would be rationally justified in performing but do them because they also happen to be most in her interest. Then her motivating reason for acting as she does would be different from her justifjlng reason.) These questions are closely connected on s o m theories of ethics and moral psychology, and practically inseparable within those with a Humean flavour. But these are rnatters of great philosophical conkoversy h c h will not be addressed here. I try to avoid the issue entirely in this paper, by presupposing nothing about the connection between justifjlng and motivating reasons. My assumption is that such a connection is something that must be specified and argucd for independently. (For the distinction between motivating and justifjlng reasons see Brink, Moral Realism, 42.) For examplc, egoism m y be offcred as an empirical, conceptual, or normative theory of human behavior. (As an empirical or conceptual thesis, it is usually referred to as 'psychological egoism'; as a nomntive thesis, i t is usually called 'rational egoism'.) Various versions of each thesis have been attributed to the ancients. Thc thesis with which wc shall be primarily concerned is a kind of nomt ivc thesis. high epistemic status, they create a general presumption against Justificatory Egoistn. This presumption constitutes a burden of proof that all versions o f jusrir!catory Egcjisiii iiiiist ~dd icss , including eu:',"imcnis!ic versions. Traditional interpreters o f Aristotle claim that Aristotle's cornmitrnent to eztdaimonia should be interpreted as a comlnitment to a version o f Justificatory Egoism. On this view, Aristotle's appeal to eudaimonia is simply an appeal to what benefits an agent, and so to that agent's interests. Given this, Aristotle's essential claim is that an agent's being virtuous promotes that agent's interests. And it is the appeal to interests that explains eudaimonia's foundational role in Aristotelian virtue ethic^.^ The general presumption against Justificatory Egoism has two implications for this account o f Aristotle's e ~ d a i m o n i s m . ~ First, the presumption applies directly. If eudaimonism is egoistic, being morally virtuous is justified only if it promotes the agent's own interests. In other words, being just or generous, and being virtuous more generally, is rationally defensible only insofar as having such character-traits contributes to the satisfaction o f one's own interests. On this view, altruistic actions are justified only if they are authorized by virtues justified in this way. Hence, to be plausible as an ethical theory, the orthodox interpretation must address the general presumption. Second, a related textual presumption applies when eudaimonism is attributed to Aristotle. For most commentators, including most orthodox interpreters, agree that there is strong textual evidence that Anstotle's moral virtues authorize altruistic For example, T.H. Irwin, a prominent orthodox interpreter, claims that Aristotle is committed to the view that 'the good that is realized in a happy life must be relative to the intercsts of the particular agent'. And by this, he seems to mean that Aristotle advocates the happy life because th~s is the life that is in the agent's interests. See Irwin, 'Prudence'. "he presumption need not carry over if the ancients have a very different understanding of the moral virtues than we do, as some believe is the case. Still, most of the writcrs considered here do nor take this view. ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM actions. Hence, the orthodox interpretation must offer an account o f eudaimonism which explain how this can be so. The most popular way to deal with both presumptions is to offer a more detailed account o f the connection between ~ e i C i l ~ i ~ i i ~ i i ~ d ZC:II! virtue by endorsing a constitutive account o f eudaimonia, and of the value o f moral virtue. According to the constitutive account, Aristotle is an egoist of an especially sophisticated kind:' he argues that '[the] genuine moral virtues are parts o f the agent's good, not merely causally effective instrumental means to itl."n this view, it is not the case that an agent should bc virtuous because this is the best way to secure some other good the agent values that is otherwise independent of virtue; rather, virtue is valuable to the agent for its own sake, as it is itself one o f the goods that the agent ought to seek to secure for herself. The virtues make a constitutive , not merely instrumental, contribution to the agent's overall good. Now, the introduction of this sophistication does not amount to a rejection o f egoism. Instead, 'It implies only that [eudaimonists] require us to change our conception o f what our interest consists in, not simply our view of what will be causally effective in securing our interest, as we previously understood it' (Irwin, 'Prudence', 286). The idea, then, is this. Aristotle does maintain that morality must ultimately be justified in terms of the agent's own interests. However, he also believes that the moral virtues are themselves constitutive parts of the agent's good, and so at least partly constitutive o f her interests. Hence, the possession o f the moral virtues, and the performance of whatever altruistic actions this entails, is to The textual debate centers on Aristotle's account of Friendship, in Nicornirc,hran Ethics Bk 9, especially chs. 8-9. (Other relevant passages include 1106a15-24; 114025-8.) In addition to i tem mentioñd abovc, an extensive literature includes: Annas, 'Plato and Aristotle on Friendship', and 'Self-Love in Anstotle'; Kahn, 'Anstotle and Altruism'; Kraut, 'Comments on Annas'; and Invin, ..4i+colle j. First Principles. (In t h s volume Adnane Rini's contribution also discusses friendship in Nicunrilclrean Ethics Bks 8-9. [Ed.]) Irwin, 'Pñdcnce', 286. See also Ach l l , 'Anstotle on Eudairnonia'. be justified in terms of an appropriately expanded understanding of the agent's interests. Let us call this position, 'Expanded Interests v..>-:---:--t u u a t 1 1 w L t I a I I t ' (E:Ej. 2. McDowell's criticism In a seminal article, '7-he Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics', John McDowell claims that therc is a deep problem with the justificatory structure proposcd by the orthodox interpreters. Egoists are com~nitted to justifying the best life on the grounds that it is the most desirable in terms of self-interest. However, McDowell claims that, in disputes about which lifc is best, this will commit the defender of orthodoxy to saying that: The requisite idea of the most desirable lifc must involve canons of desirability acceptable to all parties in the disputes, and intelligible, in advance of adopting one of the disputed theses, to someone wondering what sort of life he should lead.' Hence McDowell claims that Expanded lnterests Eudaimonism depends on there being criteria for assessing whether a life is in a person's interest that are prior to, and independent of, a particular view about what constitutes 'living as a good person w o ~ l d ' . ' ~ He goes on to claim that there are no such independent canons of desirability, so that the orthodox view must fail. In order to resist McDowell's argument, the orthodox interpreter might deny that she needs any canons at all. However, this option is unattractive, for two reasons. First, it would frustrate the attempt to find a nonvacuous ' McDowcll, 'Role ofEudaimonia'. 368 l o He also believes that the orthodox interpreter will claim (i) that such criteria will need to be constructed out of desires; and ( i i ) that this will be done by grounding those desires in an account of human nature that is similarly prior and independently identifiable. ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM theoretical grounding for the virtues. If there are no standards, one would have equal reason to call just any account o f what one should (or does) d o '?nldential'." This is unattractive because it suggests that Aristotelian virtue ethies merely adds theoretical veneer to whatever set of moral claims one antecedently favoured, and so is intolerably conservative. Second, the claim that there are simply no standards or canons to determine whether or not a conception of the good life is really in our interests comes into serious conflict with our comlnonsense intuitions about self-interest. For surely there are at least some standards for the application of the term 'self-interest' to which any account of something recognizable as prudential must conform; and surely those standards exclude some possible views. These objections make it reasonable to rule out the 'no standards' view." A better strategy for the orthodox interpreter to employ against McDowell's eriticism would be to accept the need for standards o f some kind, but argue that such standards do exist and do justify the orthodox view. How might one defend this position? The first possibility would be simply to use commonsense standards of prudence to offer an argument for the virtuous life on egoistic grounds. There is something to be said for this strategy. (For example, Brad Hooker has recently argued that an agent does seem to have reason based on his own good to be virtuous because being virtuous counts as some kind of positive achievement.") Nevertheless , overall it seems unlikely to work. First, reasons thus identified are I ' Standards or canons are not the only possible rational groundings. For example, one might also appeal to pa rad im, exemplars or prototypes. (l thank Derek Browne for this point.) I assum here that McDowell intends 'standards' in a broad sense, to include other possibilities of this sort. ' * It is perhaps worth making clear that the need for standards does not mle out desire-satisfaction view of the good life. For example, someone who says that the good life for a person is the life in which her actual desires are satisfied is offering a standard. l 3 Hooker, 'Moral Virtue'. See also Sumncr, 'Is Virtue its Own Reward?'. unlikely to have the status that we normally associate with moral reason^.'^ Sccond, the idca that moral virtue is an achievement presumably comes s ~ m p l y from our comrnonsensc attitudes about the worth of virtue. Eur these attitudes are usually called into question by egoists, who tend to regard them as deeply mysterious. Hence, it is unlikely to be enough for an egoist to rest her defense of moral virtue on these grounds. hlore needs to be said (as Socrates finds out in the Republic). A more promising stratcby for the orthodox interpreter is to attempt to take the sting out o f McDowell's requirement by rejecting McDowell's characterization of the kind of standards required, and arguing for a more moderate version. This strategy is promising because McDowell's requirement does indced seem too extreme. In particular, it is not clear why the orthodox interpreter must accept canons of desirability that are independent in the strong sense that MeDowell demands. hlcDowell demands that the canons are ( I ) acceptable to all parties in the dispute; and (2) intelligible in advance o f adopting one o f the disputed theses to someone wondering what sort of life she should lead. But these demands seem too strong, for two reasons. First, the claim that thc canons need to be acceptable to all parties is ambiguous. On the most reasonable interpretation, i t means only that the canons are ultimately acccptable. Unfortunately, not much follows from this. It seems to require at most only that the canons are true or rationally favored in some sense, so that all parties will in principle be able to accept them. But this does not entail that the canons can be recognized as true from just any perspective. In particular, since acceptability may be a function of existing bcliefs, and so dependent to some extent on a pcrson's perspective. some people may have false beliefs which prevent them from endorsing the correct canons. 1 4 There are several worries here. llooker ('Moral Virtue') is primarily concerned with the relative importance of moral reasons ris-(1-vis other reasons; Sumner ('Is Virtue its Oun Reward?') considers whether the positive contribution ofvirtue to selflinterest would be merely contingenr. I A RISTOTLE AND EGOISM / I Second, similar reasons cast doubt on the need for advance intel- ! ligibility from all perspectives. Since intelligibility is a function of existing L^I:,Cn ,., 2-c! rn d~p~nr l rn t to some extent on a person's perspective, some people may have false beliefs which prevent them even from understanding the correct canons. These problems for McDowell's requirements suggest that the orthodox interpreter should claim that it is possible to recognize the correctness of the appropriate canons of prudence from the unique, particularly-favored perspective of the virtuous person, but not from the perspective of the nonvirtuous person. The idea would be that the virtuous person has a privileged conception of self-interest and that this conception fully justifies her virtue, but that either the conception itself, or the justification, o r both, are available to her only after her conception of her interests has been transformed by rational reflection.15 The nonvirtuous person, lacking this transformation in her perspective, and so the appropriate canons, would be unable to recognize that the canons are true. Call this 'the Point of View Defence' (PVD). The Point of View Defence has several advantages for the orthodox view. First, it fits well with Expanded Interests Eudaimonism. For on that view, of course, the agent's understanding of her own interests changes as she becomes virtuous. All that the Point of View Defence needs to add is the claim that it changes so much as to become partially or wholly unrecognizable as such to the nonvirtuous person. Second, i t fits well with, and goes some way towards accommodating, the emphasis placed by eudaimonists on the transformation undergone by the nonvirtuous person's point of view when she becomes v i r t u o u ~ . ' ~ For the Point of View Defence claims that the virtuous person's (correct) account of prudence is so l 5 One will m n t to refine this claim to accommodate thc fact that for Anstotle the continent and incontinent people also have s o m , albeit imperfect, pasp of right action. But I l a v e these sophistications aside here. I6 This characteristic of ancient cudaimonism is emphasized by Julia Annas as a criticism of the traditional view in Annas, 'Prudence and Morality'. .- - . transformed that i t need not even be fully recognizable as an account of prudence to the nonvirtuous person. 3. Challenging thc point of view dcfcnce Still, the Point of View Defence is not the end of the story. Though it makes it easier for the orthodox interpreter to resist McDowell's criticisms, it makes i t harder both to defend Expanded lnterests Eudaimonism as a philosophical position, and to show that it is really Aristotle's position. The basic point is the same in both cases. EIE offers an egoistic justification of virtue. But to be persuasive, either in theory or as a historical interpretation , the proponent of EIE must do more than simply clainl that the virtuous person has a transformed and expanded conception of self-interest which justifies her conception of the good life. I t must show that this is in fact the case. And this, we shall sce in a moment, is no easy task. The basic point can be made more vivid by identifjing a contrast position. Expanded Interests Eudaimonism must distinguish itself from a nonegoistic alternative which has many of the same features. In particular, it must distinguish itself from any alternative which claims that because the commonsense conccption of one's interests is transfonned in light of virtue, the demands o f expanded interests and moral virtue are extensionally coincident. For such an alternative will maintain that the virtuous person has a distinctive point of view, and that this transforms her conception of her interests, but deny that the virtuous person's life is thus to be justified on self-interested grounds. This raises a theoretical challenge to contcmpory proponents of EIE. But the theoretical challenge also has a historical corollary. For two of the major competitors to the orthodox intcrpretation do take positions of roughly this kind. McDowell's Aristotle asserts that moral virtue and enlightened self-interest are coextensive in their demands, whilst Richard Kraut claims that Aristotle believes at least 'that one should always promote one's good lo some I r ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM extent'." Both maintain that the virtuous person has a distinctive point o f 1 view and that this transforms her conception of her interests, but deny that her life is thus to be justified purely on self-interested grounds. In light of these rival views, it is vital that EIE defend its centrai jusrirrlcaiu~~ l a i i i i . Exactly what claims must Expanded Interests Eudaimonism defend in order to flesh out its distinctive position? The claims fall into roughly four groups. EIE requires (A) that there is something that counts a s the agent's expanded interests; (B) that the agent's expanded interests are realized in a morally virtuous life; (C) that they can in some sense be recognizable as the agent's interests for reasons to some extent independent o f the particular moral claims that the virtuous person aceepts;l%nd (D) that they are in fact what justifies the particular moral elaims.19 I More precisely, we can fill out those groups as follows: " See Kraut, Aristotie, 84; italics in original. l 8 By 'moral claim' here, 1 mean only moral propositions or theses, v i ew about moral issues. Moreover the sense of independence at stake need not be so strong as that the reasons must nuke no reference to the moral elaim. All that is required is that the reasons musr nor be exhãrsted, norfiri1.v consrirutrd, by the moral claim. The rationale for this is that the egoist account must be able to distinguish itself from a nonegoist alternative which accepts that the virtuous agent can recognize and act on the particular moral claim on which the Point of View Defence depends, but denies that the egoist's elaim about expanded interests are true. l 9 This point suggests a way in which MeDowell's original criticism was not strong enough: even if the orthodox interpreter does endorse some set of mutually acceptable canons intelligible in advance, these need not be identical with the canons that justify the virtuous person's life to the virtuous person. For example, it might turn out that even the agent's commonsense conception of her own interests is best realized by being virtuous. In that case, m n y nonvlrtuous people will be attracted to virtue for that reason. But that does not show that it is t h ~ s fact about the wrtuous life that justifies it to the virtuous person. ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM ( A ) Expanded interests (B) Virtue (EIE I) There is something that counts as the expanded conception of I ~ P ~ g ~ n t ' l : i n t ~ r ~ ~ t ~ (EIE2) The expanded conception o f the agent's interests is in principle recognizableZo as a conception o f the agent's interests. (EIE3) The agent's expanded interests are such that it makes sense to talk o f better and worse satisfaction of them. (EIE4) The expanded conception o f the agent's interests is in principle recognizable as the conception of her interests which the agent should endorse. 20 The phrase 'in principle recognizable' deserves some comment. For Expanded Interests Eudaimonism in general, i t refers simply to some suitable epistemic position. But the Point of View Defence singles out the virtuous person's position as epistemically privileged, and so suggests that the virtuous person herself plays this role. A more complicated possibility might be defended by an indirect egoist. I t might be argued that the virtuous person is epistemically privileged only in recognizing the moral claims. not in recognizing either the expandcd conception of her Interests or its justificatory role (or both). Such views seem in conflict with the spirit of the PVD, since some hrther privileged epistemic standpoint must be posited. They also seem to conflict with Aristotle's demand that the virtuous person do the virtuous action for the right reason. Hence, I would be inclined to strengthen the episternic requirements by stipulating: (1) that the virtuous person be able to recognize the pertinent fact: (2) that she does actually recognize thrs fact; and (3) that it is this fact and her recognition of it that ultimately explains her choice of the virtuous life. However, I leave such considerations aside here to allow for the possibility of an indirect egoist eudaimonism. (On this kind of view, see Gottlieb, 'Aristotle's Ethical Egoism'.) (EIES) The agent's expanded interests are realized in a morally virtuous life. (EIE6) The agent's expanded interests are realized only in a morally virtuous life. (C) Independence (EIE7) The expanded conception of the agent's interests is in principle recognizable as a conception of her interests for reasons not exhausted by the particular moral claims that the virtuous person accepts. (EIER) The expanded conception of the agent's interests is in principle recognizable as the conception of her interests that the agent should endorse for reasons not exhausted by the particular moral claims that the virtuous person accepts. (D) Jirst1j7cntion (EIE9) The expandcd conception of the agent's interests justifies the set of moral claims that the virtuous person accepts. (EIE 10) The fact that the expanded conception o f the agent's interests 21 justifies these moral claims is ultimately thc primary reason that the virtuous person's life is more choiceworthy than any other. The most important observations to made about this list are as follows 2 ' By 'the prirrnry reason', I mean that i t is a decisive consideration in favor of that life. (There rrny be other reasons why the virtuous person's life is nmre choiceworthy, but these would not be sufficient either individually or collectively to make that life more choiceworthy in general.) First, the main point of producing the list (which may not be exhaustive) is simply to show that there are a significant number of claims on i t . manv of which are not even vaguely trivial Hence, the fnrt t h a t !hey are essential to the revised orthodox view suggests that showing that view to be correct will be a considerable, and perhaps overwhelming, task. Second, since some nonegoistic versions of eudaimonism are in a position to make almost all of these claims-at least (EIE1)-(EIE8), and perhaps even (EIE9)-there is particular pressure on the orthodox interpreter to make plausible the last, and main, justificatory claim (EIEIO). This is the claim essential to justificatory egoism: namely, that it is the fact that the virtuous person's life (including the moral claims she acts on) is justified by her expanded interests that is the ultimate reason why the virtuous person's life is more choiceworthy than any other. Now, there is a way in which these points may, on reflection, seem obvious . After all, if correct, the list simply states the essence of Expanded Interests Eudaimonism in its more sophisticated form. Nevertheless, the list is important because it is not clear that orthodox interpreters have recognized the trouble i t brings. Consider the following more specific points. First, Justificatory Egoism is not a completely plastic theory: it cannot be moulded to fit just any set of facts about moral life that one happcns to encounter. Instead, i t has a certain internal integrity because the concepts that play a subsidiary role in it, such as 'interests', and 'prudence', have a certain internal integrity. In particular, since it is not the case that just anything could count as a person's interests, or in a person's interests, then i t is not the case that just any set of practical prescriptions could be justified on egoist grounds. Nor would any self-respecting egoist want this fo be the case: this would render the doctrine vacuous and so unable to do the (justificatory) work i t is intendcd to do. Second. given that one must preserve the internal integrity of Justificatory Egoism, i t will not be enough to show merely that the virtuous person accepts a certain preference ordering for actions to bc performed, and that this ordering is rationally favored. Instead, i t is essential to show that the ordering can be called apñdenrial ordering, and that i t is favored I ARfSTOTLE AND EGOISM over other orderings because of its preferability on prudential grounds.22 The orthodox interpreter must show that expanded self-interest plays the essential justificaton/ role in Aristotle's theory in general, and in thc justification of altruistic action in particular. Third, for Expanded Interests Eudaimonism to justify altruistic action, expanded self-interest needs to be independent of the moral claims that need to be justified. This requirement becomes perspicuous when one remembers that EIE must offer a defense of altruistic action that is distinct from that offered by nonegoistic accounts. Nonegoist accounts typically claim that altruistic action is defensible simply because some moral claims are true and have appropriate weight. Hence, EIE cannot be reducible to the position that sorne rnoral claims arc true and have appropriate weight. Some reason must be given for thinking that it is in an agent's inrerest to recognize, endorse and act on these moral claims. Fourth, the independence requirement is especially important once the Point of View Defense is employed. According to the PVD, the agent needs already to accept the point of view of the virtuous person in order to endorse moral virtue. But for the reasons given above, the orthodox interpreter cannot say that the role of the point of view of the virtuous person is simply to identi@ some moral claims as true and having appropriate weight. Instead, the PVD must forge an appropriate connection between the accepted moral claims and expanded self-interest. But the PVD faces an additional challenge on this point. For it must provide some reason for thinking that it is in an agent's interest to recognize, endorse and act on the moral claims that does not undermine the justificatory role of expanded '' For thc fact that the expandcd conception of her interests is the conception of her interests that the virtuous person accepts is not enough to show the superior desirability of the virtuous person's life. Since the vicious person also has a conception of her interests which (in some sense) justifies her life from her point of view, thc orthodox interpreter must defend the advisability of taking up the virtuous person's point of view. Hence, he must show that the virtuous person's expanded conception ofher interests is the conception to be favored. 253 self -interest. That is, there must be an appropriate gap between the epis- [entic role of the moral claims in generating expandcd self-interest, on the one hand. and the role of expanded self-interest inju.~/ifuin_p morality, on the other. For the justification of morality on self-interested grounds will be viciously circular if the moral claims go further than merely identifying cxpandcd sclf-interest and play too direct a rolc in justifying expanded self-interest. The task of bridging the gap between the epistemic role of the moral claims in generating expanded self-interest, and the rolc of expandcd selfinterest in justifying morality looks daunting. In the next two sections, five strategies are considered. I argue that none are satisfactory. 4. Five strategies The challenge for Expanded Interests Eudaimonism is keeping expanded self-interest and the moral claims close enough together to support the Point of View Defence, but far enough apart that the moral claims d o not play too direct a role in justifying altruistic action. The orthodox interpreter will presumably argue that endorsing2' at least some moral claims is a necessary condition of recognizing expanded self-interest because endorsing these moral claims improves an agent's epistemic situation by giving her access to a further prudential value. If this is so, we will want answers to three questions: I . How does an agent come to cndorsc the initial moral claims? 21 Why doesn't just entertaining the moral claims give epistemic access? Why does one actually have to endorse them? Can't one see without endorsing the claims that if they were true, they would reveal extra values and expanded selfinterest ? One problem with this proposal is that i t makes it unclear why the nonvirtuous person would be unable to entertain the claims, as the Point o f View Defense requires. A RISTOTLE AND EGOISM 2. How does the endorsement of these claims facilitate epistemic access to expanded self-interest? 3. Eo-:; do:. :r.pzcded sf!f-interest itself endorse the moral claims and their role in a full conception of virtue through a change in the appropriate conception of self-interest? The five strategies emerge from considering these questions. Consider first the question of the initial endorsement of the moral claims. The First Strategy would be to claim that the moral claims come in via commonsense conceptions of self-interest. But this is implausible. First, it would seem to imply that the nonvirtuous person ought also to endorse the claims, and so to have access to the further prudential values and expanded self-interest. Second, as mentioned above, though there is a case for a weak justification of moral concern via commonsense conceptions of self-interest, an egoist will question the rationality of commonsense conceptions of self-interest in precisely this area. Hence, to include the moral claims on the basis of commonsense conceptions of selfinterest would beg a crucial question. Third, even if the strategy were independently plausible, it would imply a reduced need for the Point of View Defence. For at least some moraI claims would already be acceptable on the grounds of commonsense conceptions of self-interest. If the orthodox interpreters reject the commonsense conceptions of self-interest as a basis for the initial moral claims, some other basis must be provided. The orthodox interpreter cannot appeal to expanded selfinterest itself to generate the moral claims, as the moral 24 claims are supposed to provide epistemic access to it, not vice versa. Hence, there are hvo remaining possibilities (which become the Second and Third 24 If the correct conception of expanded self-interest were already available, endomd , and generating the moral claim, then the focus of the debate would be on justifying the enlarged conception, and the virtuous person's distinctive point of view, on nonmoral grounds. This is a possible w y of defending one kind of egoistic eudaimonism, but does not fit well with the Constitutive Thais. Strategies). Unfortunately, both threaten to undercut the role of selfintercst . The Second S t r a t e 9 would be to appeal tn qnme third ronrmtjon of self-interest. But this would be a difficult position to defend, and in any case, an unreasonably complicated one. The Third Strategy would be to say that the moral claims must be accepted via some standard of endorsement other than self-interest. This creates two problems. First, if there are reasons to cndorse some nioral claims that arc independent of self-interest, it is not clear what role is left for expanded sclf-interest to play. Since thc original motivation for Expanded Interests Eudaimonism was to account for the independent appeal of virtues which make moral claims on us, much of its original appeal seems to disappear. Second, it is unclear what the new standard of endorsement will be. But the most plausible candidate is simply moral value itself. Unfortunately, this makes the strategy of EIE seem even more redundant. It is worth dwelling on the threat of redundancy for a moment? since this position may have some intuitive appeal to defenders of EIE. Consider the following objection. Surely, it might be said, the idea of the Point of View Defence is to say (a) that the virtuous person recognizes the importance of acting morally, (b) that in recognizing this the virtuous person becomes motivated to act morally, and (c) that this leads the virtuous person to see acting morally as in her interests. Hence, the independence of morality, far from making the Point of View Defence redundant, is a necessary presupposition of the Point of View Defence. For the independence of morality is captured by (a) and, to a lesser extent, jb), and these are presupposed by the essential claini of the Point of View Defencc, (c). Why then is there a threat of redundancy? The threat of redundancy is created by the concessions, in (a) and (b), that some moral claims ought to be recognized and acted on simply because thcy arc true moral claims. For the claim that that there arc true moral claims which ought to be recognized and acted on simply because they are true moral claims is, in essence, simply the core claim of nonegoistic rivals to Expanded Interests Eudaimonism. The sophisticated version of EIE is, of course, distinct from the nonegoist positions because it I ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM adds more to the core nonegoist claim. EIE asserts in addition that the agent's ultimate justification for actually acting on moral claims is that thev are endorsed by an expanded conception of self-interest that is revealed to the agent once she has endorsed some morai ciaims as true. Nevertheless, at this point, these extra claims render EIE less, rather than more attractive than the nonegoist alternative. On the one hand, the extra claims require considerable hrther defense. On the other hand, and this is the absolutely crucial point, there is little reason left for developing such a defence if the core nonegoist claim is accepted. For a nonegoistic position 1 which claimed that the ultimate reason actually to act on the moral claims I is simply that they are true andshould be acted on would be a simpler and thereby more attractive position than this version of EIE. Once the crucial claim is conceded, there seems no justificatory role left for expanded interests to play.25 The Fourth Strategy is to claim that moral claims play a metaphysical role in generating expanded interests. Suppose we say that what makes moral virtue in our interest is that wc do cndorse the moral eIaims for the undisclosed independent reasons. Then, the mere fact of our endorsement produces expanded self-interest. The advantage of this metaphysical interpretation is that it solves the immediate problem. We have independent values being endorsed, and so becoming part of expanded self-interest. Nevertheless, overall it is far from satisfactory. Consider four closely-connected problems. First, all the substantive work is done by the admission that there are independent reasons to acccpt moral claims. In particular, i t is the independent reasons which determine the content of morality. The metaphysical interpretation ensures the compatibility of morality with self-interest, but does not justify any particular set of rnoral claims rather than any other set. Indeed, the metaphysical interpretation suggests that claims that are endorsed have implications for self-interest whatever their content, because it is the fact of their 25 The possibility that the role of self-interest hcre is not justificatory (as rcquircd by EIE), but motivational is addressed below. 257 .. endorsement (not their content) than makes them in a person's interests. Second, the nletaphysical interpretation makes it hard to argue for taking 2, 9f tho ,.;4 s , ~ , . ~ ..,.-"-..y~ --:-* -0 , . . . ...c,-2 t . . -:JG:: i-.e:::: ": Z j . i:;c1C ii j i i c ~ i i ~ i ciairn inai the virtuous life has a superior, or even secure, position with respect to other lives which endorse different moral claims. For all we know the virtuous life is merely one amongst many lives which come to embody expanded self-interest through the conferral of self-interest on certain endorsed aims. Third, the view is in any case implausible. The nletaphysical interpretation asserts that once the moral claims are accepted, they forni part of expanded self-interest. But why should we believe that it is the case? Why should we believe that endorsement automatically confers selfinterested

These points imply that even on the metaphysical interpretation, Expanded Interests Eudaimonism is less appealing than a nonegoist close alternative. For a nonegoistic explanation of the endorsement of moral claims, where it is the moral reasons themselves and their weight which provide a secure and superior status to moral virtue, is simpler and less mysterious than the metaphysical interpretation. The question of the initial endorsement of moral claims thus seems threatening to the plausibility of Expanded lnterests Eudaimonism. Nevertheless, this is not the end of the line for the orthodox view. For EIE may still play an important role in the lufer stages of moral development. Consider the following. The orthodox interpreter could claim that a person must accept only a few moral claims to gain epistemic access to expanded self-interest, and that the role played by these claims in morality as a whole is comparatively small. Perhaps endorsing the initial set of moral claims leaves out much that is important, or perhaps it leaves the initial moral claims in an inferior position with respect to other goods. For example, perhaps the initial set of moral claims is in danger of being crowded out by othcr goods, such as pleasure nor honour, which initially seem more 26 One possibility would be to adopt McDowell's account of derived selfinterest . But this is unlikely to be congenial to the orthodox project. I ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM important. Then, the role of expanded self-interest is to complete morality, and give it the appropriate status. Thir po:sihi!i!y !?:inns nn the i s s ! ~ a h n ~ ~ t how the moral claims play their designated epistemic role. How does endorsing or recognizing some moral claims provides epistemic access to more prudential facts, and so to expanded self-interest? First, one option, the Fifth Strategy, is to maintain that the role of the moral claims is purely the epistemic one of facilitating the identification of a further set of independent prudential facts. Hence, endorsing the moral claims has ramifications that change what we believe to be in our interests. Unfortunately, this purely epistemic role seems , extremely mysterious. Why should endorsing some moral claims lead us to I new views about self-interest? It is not enough for Expanded Interests Eudaimonism to assert that it does. Some explanation is required. Second, one such explanation is offered by contemporary desireor preferencei 1 based theories of well-being. These theories typically have a phase where the agent's actual desires or preferences are sanitized in some way, so that their content changes to reveal the agent's 'real' or 'reflective' desires or preferences. Unfortunately, the sanitation tends to be mainly formal. All that is done is to dispose of such things as inconsistencies, and errors in information. But this kind of change seems insufficient to be called 'transformation', and in any case seems unlikely to produce a distinct and robust virtuous person's point of view. 5. Two (partial) retreats In light of the problems raised above, the orthodox interpreter may be tempted to retreat a little. As it has been understood thus far, Expanded Interests Eudaimonism needs to claim: (1) Expanded self-interest justifies morality (2) Expanded self-interest is a version of self-interest (3) Expanded self-interest is the best conception of self-interest. But a weak version of EIE might give up one of these claims. One option would be to accept ( I ) and (2), but deny (3)." For example, suppose that there are internal and indcpcndent standards of self-interest iviiizh siipport [Lj . 1 hese may still may provlde e~ther limited or no grounds on which to judge the relative merits of different conceptions of self-interest vis-a-vis one another, as better or worse. Perhaps all that can be said from the point of view of self-interest is (hat different conceptions are or are not conceptions of self-interest. or (more optimistically)'that thcre are a numbcr of conccptions of self-interest which fall within an acceptable range. In these scenarios, there need be no 'best' eonception of self-interest. Hence, i t may turn out that commonsense self-interest does not support morality and altruistic action, whilst expanded self-interest does, but there is no reason based on self-intercst to choose between them. Nevertheless. the proponent of EIE may well be able to accept this position. For it still asserts Justificatory Egoism insofar as i t says that the virtuous life is justified by self-interest; and this is most of what's wanted. All that is missing is the ability decisively to defend the virtuous life on self-interest grounds against at least some alternatives. The problems for this position are twofold. First, there is the absence of external justification itself. This implies that the nonvirtuous person lacks a decisive reason to deveIop moral virtue, and perhaps that even the virtuous person lacks decisive reason to believe it a good thing that she is virtuous. Second, it makcs EIE even closer to some of its major rivals. For McDowell and others believe that external justification is impossible, or at least that Aristotle believcd this. But proponents of the traditional view usually find this idea unsatisfactory, and in fact consider i t a major motivation to pursue E I E . ~ " 2 7 I n a way, this option involves simply conceding the ob~ections made against the metaphy.sic:~l interpretat~on earlier, and so might naturally be married with tha t interpretation. 18 Perhaps the proponent of EIE could say that there I S reason lo prefer the life with expanded self-interest because there is a nonself-interested reason to choose ARISTOTLE AND EGOISM A second option for modifying the orthodox position would be to give up (a), the claim that it is expanded self-interest that justifies morality. This option may seem appealing to someone who accepts externalism about moral mot~vatlun; tile ciaim that the moiivaiiu~~al I'ulic c ~ f iiifiia: cciisiderations 29 depends on factors external to the moral considerations themselves . For then perhaps the point of Aristotle's alleged appeal to expanded self-interest is not to justify morality, but to provide some motivation for agents to act morally once such a justification is recognized. Unfortunately, this approach is also unattractive. Quite apart from the attractions of internalism about moral motivation and (arguably) of attributing such internalism to Aristotle, to give up the justificatory claim is to give up thc essence of Justificatory Egoism and so change the point of Expanded Interests Eudaimonism entirely. In addition, since (as mentioned earlier) some nonegoist versions of eudaimonism already recognize some extensional coincidence between the virtuous life and an agent's selfinterest , even this version of the orthodox view will have to distinguish itself from its major rivals. between them What might this be? Perhaps one could argue that the reason is that morality is independently valuable and recognized as such, and the life of requires denying this. So one has a reason to choose expanded self-interest on grounds of rational coherence. This is an interesting possibility. Nevertheless, note how much of a justificatory role it concedes to morality itself, rather than to cgoism One must defend at least som moral claims on independent grounds, defend a connection between these and expanded self-interest, and defend the claim that the moral claim thcrrsclvcs give an agent a nonsclf-interest reason to prefer the virtuous life over nonvirtuous alternatives. But at this point one is accepting almost all of what would be required by a nonegoist alternative. 29 This definition is draw from Brink, Moral Realism, 42. Brink attributes externalism to Irwln's interpretation of Aristotlc (and Plato) on the following page. 6. Conclusion In conclusion, even if the orthodox interpreter were to adopt the Point o f View Defence against McDowell's claims about independent canons of desirability, a lot of work would still need to be done to show that Expanded Interests Eudaimonism works. Thus, McDowell's comments do, afler all, provide a foundation for shifting the burden o f explanatory proof towards the orthodox interpreter. The key problems for EIE are in explaining : ( I ) the generation of the moral claims that contribute to the virtuous person's distinctive point of view: ( 2 ) the role played by these claims in generating an expanded conception of self-interest and justifying full virtue; and (3) the preferability of the expanded conception of selfinterest over ordinary conceptions. On all o f these points, EJE is less attractive than a simpler and less mysterious nonegoist position which claims that it is moral reasons themselves and their weight which provide a secure and superior status to moral virtue, and defends the virtuous life over the nonvirtuous life on these grounds. Hence. provided that they do not have similarly deep problems of their own,"' nonegoist versions of eudaimonism are to be preferred to EIE. Sfephen Gardiner Un ive r s ip of Canterbury 'O Onc such problem would arise if the very idca of indcpendent moral claims were incoherent. (This position is taken by the third major school of contemporary Aristotelians and interpreters of Aristotle, inspired by Anscombe. I t deserves to be laken seriously. However, as mentioned in a much earl~er footnote, I do not address this school of thought in this paper as the Constitutive Thesis shares with nonegoist views the assumption that the idea of independent moral claims does make sense.) Do we have duties to our friends? Nicomachean Ethics Buulis 8 aiid 3 ADRIANE A. RINI Do duties and obligations arise out of friendship? Is it morally better to help a stranger than to help your friends? O r is it, perhaps, the other way around? Aristotle, who devotes two books o f the Nicomachean Ethics (hereafter N E ) to the subject of friendship, is generally understood to favor helping friends over strangers, and better friends over lesser friends. In this paper I show why this is too simplistic a reading of Aristotle. The connection between duty and friendship is an important issue in Aristotle's ethics since he discusses friendships often in terms o f such things a s fair exchanges, reciprocity, and expectations o f 'return'. But the precise nature of the connection between duty and friendship is not dealt with in detail in much of the recent literature.' Looking closely a t NE Bks 8 and 9, I want ro consider when and what kinds of duties and obligations arise out of friendship as Aristotle conceives i t . Perhaps a good way to approach the issue is by considering various cases in which duties to friends might be said to arise. Consider the following: ' In threc rccent book-length studics on Aristotle's notions of fncndship or moral responsibility, Price, Love ond Friendship; Meyer, hforol Responsibilip; and Stern-Gillet, Philosophy of Friendship, there is no explicit discussion of the connection between duty and friendship. This connection in fact appears to be ignored in much of the more general literature on the moral importance of friendship, as for instance, Blum, Friendship, Alrrrri.srn and hforalily.