Adolf Reinach: An Annotated Bibliography BARRY SMITH When the present volume *Nas first conceived, it was confidently believed that a survey of the literature on Reinach's thought could be kept within comfortable limits. It rapidly became clear, however, that this was not the case. Reinach's discoveries in the sphere of speech act theory have, it is true, gone almost unnoticed. Reinach has nevertheless enjoyed an enduring notoriety among those working in the philosophy of law, and ever since its appearance in 1913, Reinach's work on a Die apriorischen Grundlagen des biirgerlichen Rechtes" has served as the principal representative of phenomenologic31, aprioristic and ontological/realist approaches in this discipline. His name accordingly appears in the majority of the more substantial general treatises in the discipline (or at least in those treatises and reference works published in countries whose law and philosophy have been influenced by the Germanic tradition: Edwards' great Encyclopedia of Philosophy does not contain even a mention of Reinach). The goal of completeness has therefore been abandoned in what follows, and items containing merely passing references to Reinach's work have been listed only where they are of particular historical importance or bear evidence of some more substantial influence. The list has been compiled with the assistance of N. Bokhove, A.G. Conte and M.-E. Conte, J. Crosby, N. Duxbury, J. Joerden, S. Paulson, H. Spiegelberg and the indefatigable librarians of the University of Erlangen. § 1 WORKS BY REINACH Under the Sigil Ana 379, C I (Reinach) the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek has preserved a short review (by Reinach?) of F. Berolzheimer, System der Rechtsund Wirtschaftsphilosophie, vol. I (Munich: Beck, 1904), the original publication and author of which has not been traced. Two further questions concerning possible Reinach publications remain unanswered: 1) In a letter to Conrad of September 1910 Reinach refers to his plans to publish an article to be entitled "Natur und Freiheit", but this has not been found; 2) Dietrich von Hildebrand, in his Moralia (1980, p. 247), refers to a 'nicht erhalten gebliebenen Aufsatz [by Reinach] tiber Gesinnung'. Further details as to Reinach's Nachlass can be found on p. 27 above, and in Ave-Lallemant 1975. Speech Act and Sachverhalt, edited by Kevin Mulligan © Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 299 1905 Uber den Ursachenbegriff im ge/tenden Strafrecht, Leipzig: Barth (Dissertation, Munich). Psychology, Reinach argues, is capable of assisting in the clarification of the legal meaning of the concept of cause via appeal to the notion of a psychic regularity. This same notion can help also in the clarification of the probable intent of specific laws. From the point of view of Reinach's later philosophy, the work may be seen as a study of the legal determinations [Bestimmungen] of positive law and of the development of aids for their practical interpretation. There is as yet however no suggestion of his doctrine of the a priori structures underlying legal formations. 1910 !.~>William James und der Pragmatism us", Welt und Wissen. Hannoversche Blatter fiir Kunst, Literatur und Lev.!n ( Beilage zum Hannoverschen Courier), no. 198, 28.9.1910, repr. in Reinach (forthcoming); English translation in this volume. 1911 "Kants Auffassung des Humeschen P *oblems", Zeitschrift fiir Philo sophie und philosophische Kritik, 141, 176-209, repr. in Reinach 1921, 1-35. 1911a "Die obersten Regeln der Vernunftschltisse bei Kant", Kant-Studien, 16, 214-33, repr. in Reinach 1921, 36-75. 1911 b "Zur Theorie des negativen Urteils", in A. Pf~nder, ed., Miinchener Philosophische Abhandlungen (Festschrift for Theodor Lipps), Leipzig: Barth, 196-254, repr. in Reinach 1921,56-102. 1912/13 "Die Oberlegung; ihre ethische und rechtliche Bedeutung", Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 148, 181-96, 149, 30-58, repr. in Reinach 1921, 121-65. 1913 "Die apriorischen Grundlagen des btirgerlichen Rechtes", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, I/2, 685-847, and as Separatum, 1913 and 1922; repr. in Reinach 1921, 166-350 and as Reinach 1953. 1914 "'Paul Natorps Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode", Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen, no. 4, 193-214, repr. in Reinach 1921, 351-76. Natorp had claimed that the I can never be an object of consciousness and thus it cannot form part of the subject-matter of psychology. The latter is restricted to the contents of consciousness, i.e. to all of that of which one is conscious. Reinach argues that it is grounded in the essence of cogitationes that they can exist only as experiences of an I. Thus he defends the Cartesian view according to which the cogito is the starting poing of our knowing, and he insists that the I is present in each and every experience. However, the pure I as distinct from the empirical person is not a thing with characteristics; Natorp may therefore be correct in his view that it 'does not admit of any explanation'. But this does not rule out the clarification of the ways in which it interrelates with other elements in essential structures. In grasping itself the I is both bearer and end-point of a grasping act. Un300 like Natorp, who insisted that each relation must have two terms, Reinach sees no difficulty here, since intentionality is not a relation in the usual sense. (Cf. Brettler, pp. 95f.) 1921 Gesammelte Schriften, herausgege ben von seinen Schi.ilern (mainly by Edith Stein), with an Introduction by Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Halle: Niemeyer. 1921 a "Vortrag tiber Phanomenologie '' (lecture delivered in Mar burg in 1914 ), first publ. in Reinach 1921, 3 79-405, repr. in Reinach 1951. 1921 b "Uber das Wesen der Bewegung" (prepared by E. Stein from seminar notes in Reinach's NachlafS), first publ. in Reinach 1921, 406-61. Contains an analysis of continuity and of the essence of traversing of space, the results of \Vhich are then applied to Zeno's paradoxes. A motion is a continuous process; it should not be thought of as a series of single part-processes somehow combined together. Reinach asserts that it is self-evident that all real motion requires a bearer, but denies that this implies that all perception of motion involves the perception of a bearer. 1 can speak of motion and intend motion without at the same intending something that moves. (Cf. Brettler, pp. 90f.) 1921 c "Anhang" (extracts on impersonalia from Reinach's Nachlafi), first publ. in Reinach 1921, 117-20. 1921 d "Bruchsttick einer religionsphilosophischen Ausftihrung" {28 Sept.-3 Oct. 191 7), Section 1, "Das Absolute", in Reinach 1921, xxxi-xxxvi. 1928 Gensh8gaku ni tsuite, {Tetsugaku ron so [Collection of Philosophy] 2), Tokyo: Iwanami. Japanese trans. of 1921 a, with introductory note by Renz6 Ikegami. 1934 Los fundamentos aprioristicos del derecho civil, Barcelona: Libreria Bosch, Spanish trans. of 1913 by Jose' Luis Alvarez. See Alvarez M. Taladriz 1934. 1951 Was ist Phiinomenologie?, ed. with a foreword by H. Conrad-Martius, Munich: Kosel. 1953 Zur Phiinomenologie des Rechts. Die apriorischen Grundlagen des burgerlichen Rechts, mit einer Vorbemerkung von Anna Reinach, Munich: Kosel, new edition of Reinach 1913. 1966 ''What is Phenomenology?", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1921 a by David Kelly, Philosophical Forum, 1, 231-56. 1969 "Concerning Phenomenology", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1921a by Dallas Willard, The Personalist, 50, 194-211. 1973 "Zur Phanomenologie der Ahnungen" (MS dated Embagneux, 26 July 1916) in Brettler, 245-4 7, with English translation, "On the Phenomenology of Premonitions", 242-44. The act of apprehending {knowing) and the state of conviction, Reinach here argues, 301 contrast with one another clearly enough, if one considers that the case of apprehending concerns a temporally punctual act which cannot endure more or less, whereas we can live in a conviction as long as we like. Furthermore a set of convictions often comes to life in us without being founded in an act of apprehending or at any time having been so founded. Observed from this point of view, there is no doubt that we have to class premonitions with the founding structures, not with the founded ones i.e. to those which by their essence are open to being founded. Through premonitions we grasp or believe ourselves to grasp the previously hidden. And in premonition a conviction also can be founded, which in strength and inner certainty need be in no way inferior to the conviction based upon knowing. (trans. p. 244, slightly amended) 1973a "Bruchstiick einer religionsphilosophischen Ausfiihrung", Section 2. "Struktur des Erlebnisses", and Section 3. "Skeptische Erwagungen", in Brettler, 250-51; with English translation, •'Fragment of a Treatise on the Philosophy of Religion", 248-49. 1976 "Kant's Interpretation of Hume's Problem", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1911, by J.N. Mohanty, Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 1, 161-88 (this issue repr. as K.R. Merrill and R.W. Shahan, eds., David Hume. ManySided Genius, Norman: University of Oklatoma Press). 1978 Excerpts from Reinach 1921 a in Italian translation in Adriano Bausola, ed., Questioni di storiografia filosofica: II pensiero contemporaneo, 4, vol. I, Brescia: La Scuola, 41-42. 1981 "On the Theory of the Negative Judgement", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1911 b, by Don Ferrari, A letheia, 2, 15 -64. 1982 "On the Theory of the Negative Judgement", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1911 b by Smith, in B. Smith, ed., 315-77, incorporating translation of Reinach 1921c. 1983 "The A priori Foundations of the Civil Law", Eng. trans. of Reinach 1913 by J .F. Crosby, Aletheia, 3, 1-14 2. {forthcoming) &imtliche Werke, a new edition of Reinach's works, including a reprint of Reinach 1910 and other additional material, Munich: Philo sophia. Ach, NarziB Ajdukiewicz, Kazimierz 302 § 2 WORKS ON REINACH 1913 Uber die Erkenntnis a priori, insbesondere in der Arithmetik, I. Teil, Leipzig: Quelle and Meyer. On Reinach and Sachverhalte, (pp. 39-49). 1948 "Change and Contradiction", as trans. in K.Ajdukiewicz, The Scientific World-Perspective and other Essays, 1931-1963, Dodrecht/ Boston: Reidel, 1978, 192-208 (pp. 198f.). Alvarez M. Taladriz, J. Amselek, Paul 1934 "Prologo" to Reinach 1934, pp. 5-18. 1964 Methode phenomenologique et theorie du droit, with preface by Charles Eisenmann, Paris: Ubrairie generate de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 1964a Perspectives critiques d 'une reflex ion epistemologique sur Ia theorie du droit: Essai de phenomenologie juridique, Paris: Ubrairie generate de Droit et de Jurisprudence. 1972 "La phenomenologie et le droit", Archives de philosophie du droit, 17, 185-259, Eng. trans. as "The Phenomenological Description of Law", in M. Natanson, ed. vol. 2, 1973, 367-449. 1986 "Philosophie du droit et the orie des actes de langage", in P. Amselek, -ed. Theorie des actes de langage (pp. 135, 147), Paris: P.U.F., 109-63. Ave-Lallemant, Eberhard 1971 Phiinomenologie und Realitiit. Vergleichende Baeyer, Alexander von Baratta, Alessandro Untersuchungen zur 'Miinchen-Gottinger' und 'Freiburger' Philnomenologie, Habilitationsschrift, Munich (mimeographed). 1975 Die Nachliisse der Miinchener Phiinomenologen in der Bayerischen Staatsbibliothek, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz (pp. 171-80). Catalogue of Reinach's Nachlass with a biographical sketch. 1968 "Bemerkungen zum Verhaltnis von juristischer und philosophischer Hermeneutik", Archiv fUr Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, 54, 27-4 2. Includes some discussion of Reinach's theory of legal determinations. 1969 Adolf Reinachs Phiinomenologie. Zum Verhiiltnis von phiinomenologischer Forschung und Geschichtlichkeit, Dissertation, Bern. See especially the treatment of the distinction between the a priori theory of law and natural law; the former is descriptive, the latter normative. 1959 "Natura del fatto e diritto naturale", Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 36, 177-228; German translation as "Natur der Sache und Naturrecht", in A. Kaufmann, ed., 103-63 (pp. 125,139 of trans.). 303 Bassenge, Friedrich 304 1930 "Hexis und Akt. Eine phanomenologische Skizze",Philosophischer Anzeiger, 4, 163-68. The distinction between hexis and act runs through the entire realm of intentional experiences. Examples of hexeis are: being acquainted with, knowing, being convinced, believing, loving, wanting, etc. Examples of acts: perceiving, recognising, deciding, converting, promising, etc. The distinction is not merely a matter of temporal structure (the distinction of interval and point). If one contrasts an action (Tat) with, e.g., a state or hexis of being in love, then that which is decisive in this contrast is not the temporal punctuality of the execution of the action. An act, like an action, is a 'punctual clicking into place' (Einschnappen ), and what is primary here is not so much the punctuality as the clicking into place. An action, too, can be described from the outside as the clicking into place of a new external situation. Cognition would then correspondingly be the clicking into place of a new knowledge-situation, decision the clicking into place of a new will-situation, etc. The new distributions of knowledge and will which thereby result are clearly hexial, and thus it is tempting to see the hexis in general as a phenomenon which is in every case the sequel to an act. Hexeis such as knowledge, will and the like, would then simply be the results of cognitive or resolutive acts, as the new external situation is a result of the action. But clearly not all being can be traced back in this way to a becoming. 1 ust as every action already presupposes some situation does not create the world but rather changes it so every act of cognition presupposes some knowledge, and from this point of view the hexis is prior to the act. 1930a Das Versprechen. Ein Beitrag zur Philosophie der Sittlichkeit und des Rechts, Dessau: Dtinnhaupt, Berlin: 1 unker and Dtinnhaupt (Dissertation, Leipzig). Somewhat superficial criticism of Reinach 1913, defending a view of the Battifol, Henri Becker, Oskar Binder, Julius Bloch, Ernst Blumenfeld, W. Bobbio, Norberta Bodenheimer, Edgar promise along the lines of the old expression-ofintention theory. 193 7/38 "Zur Philosophie des Eigentums", Archiv fur Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, 31 , 3 24-51. Historical study, setting out from the criticism of Reinach's a priori theory of property. 1949 Problemes de base de philosophie du droit, Paris: Librairie generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (p. 194f.) 1923 "Beitrage zur phanomenologischen Begrtindung der Geometrie und ihrer physikalischen Anwendung", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 6, 385-560. On Reinach 1921 b (p. 544 ). 1915 Rechtsbegriff und Rechtsidee, Leipzig: A. Diechert, repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1974 (pp. 2, 128). 1925 Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin: Georg Stilke, (pp. 49-64, 48, 724f, 730, 909f.), repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1967. On Reinach's comparison of propositions of law and mathematics: every jurist who reads these ideas for the first time 'faBt sich unwillktirlich an den Kopf (p. 152). 1961 Naturrecht und menschliche Wiirde, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp (pp. 164-68: 'Reinach und phanomenologische Rechtsschau; Auswahl unter Leerformen'). 1931 Urteil und Beurteilung, (Archiv fiir die gesamte Psychologie, dritter Erganzungsband), Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt (pp. 81-86 "Das negative Urteil "). 1934 L 'indirizzo fenomenologico nella filosofia sociale e giuridica, Turin: Istituto giuridico della R. Universita (pp. 70ff. ). 1969 "Phanomenologie und Rechtsquellenlehre", in T. Wtirtenberger, ed., 72-92. See Reinach, for all his faults, as having laid the foundation for a deeper treatment of the a priori dimension (of 'sachlogische Strukturen') in law (p. 79f. ). 305 Bosanquet, Bernard Brettler, Lucinda Vandervort Brimo, Albert 306 1914 "Critical Notice: Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und [p] hiinomenologische Forschung, Erster Band, herausgegeben von E. Husser!", Mind, 23, 587-97 (pp. 594-6). Bosanquet accuses Reinach of confusion in regarding the legal obligation created by e.g. a social act of promising as prior to the moral duty to observe a promise. 'None the less for this difference of opinion,' he goes on, 'I recognise the excellent work done here in bringing home the difficulties of a full and clear statement in answer to such questions as "What is the essence of a promise? of representation? of property?"' (p. 596) 1973 The Phenomenology of Adolf Reinach: Chapters in the Theory of Knowledge and Legal Philosophy, Dissertation (under R. Klibansky ), McGill. Extremely useful synoptic treatment, making clear the groundlessness of many of the more superficial criticisms of Reinach's realist theory of cognition, of his theory of a priori structures and of his philosophy of law. Consider, for example, Brettler's comparison of Reinach and J.L. Austin: There are numerous points where Austin's work in the end confirms Reinach's conclusions, but by contrast the former shows itself to be fragmentary, to lack a sufficiently global approach to the speech act. The stages of analysis presented by How to Do Things with Words appear to fall from a phenomenological point of view within the stage of concept and word analysis preliminary to analysis of the essences themselves. {p. 190) 1964 De l 'unite des doctrines phenomenologiques et axiologiques dans Ia theorie generale du droit, Toulouse: Annales de la Faculte du Droit. 196 7 Les grands courants de Ia philo sophie du droit et de l'etat, Paris: A. Pedone (pp. 375ff.: "La vision phenome'nologique du Droit: L'eidetique juridique de Husser! a Adolphe Reinach"). Brodmann, Erich Burkhardt, Armin Conrad-Martius, Hedwig Conte, Amedeo G. Conte, Maria-Elisabeth Cossio, Carlos 1921 Recht und Gewalt, Berlin and Leipzig: W. de Gruyter (pp. 83f). 1986 Soziale Akte und Textillokutionen, Ttibingen: Niemeyer. A detailed comparison of Reinach on social acts with the accounts of Searle and Austin who are criticised for committing the 'ontological fallacy': they find forces in utterances. 1921 "Einleitung" to Reinach 1921, v-xxxvii. 1951 "Vorwort" to Reinach 1951, 5-17. 1957 Das Sein, Munich: KoseL Especially ch. A.2, "Das sachverhaltsimmanente Sein", on PHinder and Reinach (pp. 19-31 ). 1983 "[Reinach as a Philosophical Personality] ", Eng. trans. of extracts from Conrad-Martius 1921 by J.F. Crosby, Aletheia, 3, xxx-xxxi. 1962 Saggio sulla completezza degli ordinamenti giuridici, Turin: Giappichelli (p. 104). 1970 "Studio per una teoria della validita", Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, 4 7, 33154 (pp. 341ff.). 1981 "Variationen tiber Wittgensteins Regelbegriff', in R. Haller, ed., Sprache und Erkenntnis als soziale Tatsache, Vienna: Halder-Pichler-Tempsky, 69-78. 1985 Nove studi sui linguaggio normativo (19671978), Turin: Giapichelli,(p. 49). 1983 "La pragmatica linguistica", in C. Segre, ed., Intomo alia linguistica, Milan: Feltrinelli, 94-128 (p. 98). 1952 "las posibilidades de la logica juridica segun la logica de Husserl. El manejo fenomenologico en Adolf Reinach", Revista de Ia Facultad de Derecho (Buenos Aires), 1294-1306. 1960 "La norma y el imperativo en Husserl. Notas analiticas para su estudio", Anuario de Filoso[ia del Derecho (Madrid), 7, 5 1-169, Part IV: "El manejo fenomenologico de Adolf Reinach" (pp. 125-38). Parts I and II of this paper are 307 Crosby, John F. Crosby, John F. and Seifert, Josef Davie, George Dempe, Hellmuth 308 published under the same title in Revista Brasileira de Filosofia, 10, 1960, 43-90 and translated as "La norme et l'imperatif chez Husserl" in Melanges en l'honneur de Paul Roubier. Tome 1: Theorie generale du droit et droit transitoire, Paris: Dalloc and Sirey, 1961, 145-98. The Spanish and Latin American literature on Reinach has been dealt with in what follows only cursorily. This applies in particular to the work of Cossio. The influence of Reinach's a priori theory of law is clear e.g. from Cossio's "Phenomenology of the Decision" in G. Ireland, eta/., eds., 354-400. 1964 Le teoria egol6gica del derecho y el concepto juridico de libertad, 2nd ed., Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot (p. 353). 1982 "Towards Deriving What Ought to Be in the Nature of What Is", in E. Morscher and J. Seifert, eds., Vom Wahren und Guten, Salzburg: St. Peter, 187-204. 1983 "A Brief Biography of Reinach", Aletheia, 3, ix-x. 1983a "Reinach's Discovery of the Social Acts", Aletheia, 3, 143-94. 1981 "Introduction [to Reinach 1981] ", Aletheia, 2, 9-14. 1977 "Edmund Husserl and 'the as yet, in its most important respect, unrecognised greatness of Hume"', in G. Morice, Ed., David Hume. Bicentenary Papers, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 69-76. 1928 Uber die sogenannten Funktionen der Sprache. Ein Beitrag zur Sprachphilosophie im Anschluj3 an die Sprachtheorie Karl Biihlers, Dissertation (under P.F. Linke), Jena, repr. as Was is Sprache? Eine sprachphilosophische Untersuchung im Anschluj3 an die Sprachtheorie Karl Biihlers, Weimar: Bohlaus Nachfolger, 1930 (p. 45: on the relation between assertion and conviction in Reinach's 1911 b). Diedler, Daniel Do bretsberger, Josef Dombois, Hans Donius, Charles Dreier, Ralf Edlin, Gregor (Eikema) Hommes, Hendrik Jan (van) Elsenhans, Theodor 1975 La theorie de l'a priori en droit d'Adolf Reinach, memoire pour le diplome d'etudes superieures, Universite de Paris-11 (mimeographed). 1927 "Die Begriffsbestimmung des Rechts in der phanomenologischen Rechtsphilosophie", Zeitschrift fiir offentliches Recht, 6, 246-58 (pp. 249ff. ). Also in Rudolf Aladar Me tall, ed., 33 Beitriige zur reinen Rechtslehre, Vienna: Europa-Verlag, 1974,47-60. 1954 "Das Problem des Naturrechts" (first published in Norwegian), Ger. trans. in W. Maihofer, ed., 444-62 (p. 453). 1957 "Existentialisme, phenomenologie et philosophie du droit", Archives de philo sophie du droit, 2, 221-31. Brief survey of existentialist and phenomenological philosophy of law. 1965 Zum Begriff der 'Natur der Sache', Berlin: de Gruyter. Esp. § 16 (pp. 60-66) on institutional and phenomenological legal theory. The phenomenological method rests on the premiss that there is an agreement between the a priori and the empirical realm. Reinach's concepts are therefore not presuppositionless, but can be reduced to empirical ones. 1932 Rechtsphilosophische Scheinprobleme und der Dualismus im Recht, Berlin-Grunewald: Rothschild, Beiheft 27 to Archiv fur Rechtsund Wirtschaftsphilosophie (pp. 121, 13 7, 180). 1966 "De betekenis van Edmund Husserls transcendentale fenomenologie voor de rechtswetenschap", in De fenomenologische methode in de rechtsfilosofie, (Handelingen van de Vereniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, L/1) Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink, 5-32 (pp. 6, 10ff., 28). 1972 Hoofdlijnen van de geschiedenis der rechtsfilosofie, Deventer: Kluwer (pp. 227f.), Eng. trans. Major Trends in the History of Legal Philosophy, Amsterdam and New York: NorthHolland (pp. 260f.). 1915 "Phanomenologie, Psychologie, Erkenntnistheorie", Kant-Studien, 20,224-75. Argues that, 309 Emge, Carl August Engisch, Karl 310 despite all protests to the contrary, the phenomenological method is not able to exclude empirical elements. Thus in order to verify the results of Reinach's analysis, the reader must call to mind various actual cases in which he has made or received promises, and he can never rule out the possibility that this verification will not itself be subject to future correction. This casts doubt on the claim that a single exemplification of the relevant structure is a sufficient basis for the grasping of the essences involved. 1924/25 "Uber die Zusammenhange zwischen Soziologie und Rechtswissenschaft einerseits, zwischen Religionsphilosophie und Geschichtsphilosophie und Rechtsphilosophie andererseits, eine Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie", Archiv fiir Rechtsund Wirtschaftsphilosophie, I: 17, 524-69, II: 18, 30-57, III: 18, 271317 and also as a book: Vorschule der Rechtsphilosophie, Berlin: Rothschild. See II, pp. 31, 54, on the treatment of the tie between essential structures in law and more general structures in society. 1928 "Das A priori und die Rechtswissenschaft", Archiv fiir Rechtsund Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 21, 519-36 (p. 535). 1971 Auf der Suche nach der Gerechtigkeit. Hauptthemen der Rechtsphilosophie, Munich: Piper, (esp. pp. 19f. on essential insight and pp. 22327, a generous summary of Reinach's philosophy of law): We cannot deal with all the details of Reinach's work, but risk only the following general criticism, that the 'eternal laws' of the a priori theory of law are either analytic judgements or they are not evident (p. 227). 1983 "Formale Logik, Begriff und Konstruktion in ihrer Bedeutung und Tragweite ftir die Rechtswissenschaft", in GUnter Kohlmann, ed., Festschrzft fiir Ulrich Klug zum 70. Geburtstag, vol. I, Rechtsphilosophie, Rechtstheorie, Cologne: Deubner, 33-54 (pp.37f.). Falkenberg, Gabriel Fasso, Guido Fechner, Erich Friedmann, Wolfgang Garcia-Baro, Miguel Gardies, Jean-Louis 1982 Lugen. Grundzzige einer Theorie der sprachlichen Tiiuschung, Ttibingen: Niemeyer {Linguistische Arbeiten, 86). 1984 "Unaufrichtigkeit und Unredlichkeit", Mitteilungen des Deutschen Germanistenverbandes, 31, 15-19. Refers to Reinach's 'pioneering attempt' to produce a taxonomy of speech acts. 1970 Storia della filosofia del diritto, vol. III, Ottocento e novecento, Bologna: 11 Mulino (pp. 303ff.); French trans., Histoire de Ia philosophie du droit, X/Xe et xxe siecles, Paris: Librairie generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1976, (pp. 197f.). 1956 Rechtsphilosophie-, Ttibingen: Mohr (Siebeck) (Reinach's 'logical rationalism': p. 41). 1967 Legal Theory, 5th ed. {1st ed. 1949), London: Stevens and Sons {pp. 208, 360). 1971 "Fenomenologia e scienza del diritto", Rivista internazionale di filosofia del diritto, ser. 4, 48, 327-53 {pp. 331f.), Eng. trans. as "Phenomenology and Legal Science", in M. Natanson, ed., vol. 2, 343-65 (pp. 347f.). Reinach as anticipator of later French phenomenology of law. 1983 "Adolfo Reinach o la plenitud de la fenomenologfa", El Olivo, 7, 217-31. A clear introduction to the realist phenomenology to which. Reinach contributed. Describes Reinach's 1911 a as an 'extremely discreet' objection to or improvement on what is described as Husserl's claim that the singular-ideal distinction coincides with the real-ideal distinction. 1962 "Le droit, l"apriori', l'imaginaire et !'experience", Archives de philo sophie du droit, 7, 1 71-97. Gar dies attempts to axiomatise positive law as Hilbert axiomatised Euclidean geometry and thereby to obtain alternate sets of legal postulates analogous to those of non-Euclidean geometry. 311 Geyser, Josef Goyard-Fabre, Simone Gralla, Erhardt Gutzwiller, Max Gysin, Arnold Habbel, Irmingard Haesaert, Jean Haff, Karl 312 1965 "La philosophic du droit d' Adolf Reinach", Archives de philosophie du droit, 14, 17-32. Regards as questionable Reinach's claim that legal structures are irreducible. 1972 Essai sur les fondements a priori de Ia rationalite morale et juridique, Paris: Librairie generale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (esp. pp. 173-85). 1976 "De quelques voies de communication entre 1' 'etre' et le 'devoir-etre' ",Revue philosophique, 3, 275-92. Contains an account of the relation between Reinach's and Searle's derivations of 'ought' from 'is'. 1913 "Beitrage zur logischen und psychologischen Analyse des Urteils", Archiv fiir die gesamte Psychologie, 26,361-91. A critique ofReinach 1911 b. 1972 Essai de critique phe nomenologique du droit, Paris: Klincksieck. 1966 Das Problem der inhaltlichen Volkerrechtswidrigkeit internationaler Vertriige, Munich Dissertation 1924 "Zur Lehre von der 'Natur der Sache"', Festgabe der juristischen Fakultiit der Universitiit Freiburg, Freiburg (Schweiz): Weizinger, as repr. in A. Kaufmann, ed., 14-32 (pp. 26f.). 1933 "Tatbestandsanalyse des Versprechens. Eine Untersuchung zur philosophischen Rechtslehre", Abhandlungen der Fries schen Schule, 5, 581611 . An extremely thorough, sympathetic criticism of Reinach's theory of the promise, incorporating discussions also of Hobbes, Hume and Bassenge. 1960 Die Sachverhaltsproblematik in der Phiinomenologie und bei Thomas von Aquin, Regensburg: Habbel. 1948 Theorie generale du droit, Brussels: Bruylant (63ff.). 1924/25 "Die Bedeutung der Rechtspsychologie fur die moderne Rechtsfindung", Archiv fur Rechtsund Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 18, 13342. All law is positive law; it is nonsensical Hartmann, Leopold Hartmann, Nicolai Heck, Philipp Henkel, Heinrich to speak of pre-positive legal elements or structures (p. 135). 1926 Sind Naturgesetze veriinderlich? Eine phiinomenologische Untersuchung, Halle: Niemeyer. See p.8f. (on Sachverhalte) and p. 34 (on the opposition between species and determination in Reinach 1911a). Part One is a presentation of Linke's ideas on foundation relations and on natural necessity. 1913 I 14 Review of val. I of Husserl's Jahrbuch, Die Geisteswissenschaften, 35, 971-7; repr. in Hartmann's Kleinere Schriften, III, Berlin: de Gruyter, 1948, 365-68. Includes a somewhat ironical summary of Reinach's work on the phenomenology of law. 1924 "Die reine Rechtslehre und die jungosterreichische [= Kelsen] Schule der Rechtswissenschaft", Archiv fiir civilistische Praxis, N .F. 2, 173-94 (p. 193). 1977 Einfiihrung in die Rechtsphilosophie, 2nd ed., Munich: C.H. Beck (pp. 296-308). Hering, Jean 1921 "Bemerkungen tiber das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 4, 495-543 (p. 499). Hildebrand, Dietrich von 1916 "Die Idee der sittlichen Handlung", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 3, 126-251 (Dissertation, Munich, revealing especially the influence of Reinach 1911b). 1930 Metaphysik der Gemeinschaft, Regensburg: Habbel, 2nd ed., 1975 (pp.22-34). A development of Reinach's theory of social acts. 1955 "Die rechtliche und sittliche Sphare in ihrem Eigenwert und in ihrem Zusammenhang", in D. von Hildebrand, Die Menschheit am Scheideweg, Regensburg: Habbel, 86-106. Contains an exposition and development of Reinach's philosophy of law. 313 Hippel, Ernst von Holldack, Felix Hruschka, Elisabeth Hruschka, Joachim Htibener, Wolfgang Husserl, Edmund 314 1960 What is Philosophy? Milwaukee: Bruce, 2nd ed., Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1973 (p. 17). 197 5 "[Selbstdarstellung] ", in L.J. Pongratz, ed., Philo sophie in Selbstdarstellungen, vol. 2, Hamburg: Meiner, /7-127 (pp.78-80). 1980 Moralia (Gesam1nelte Werke 9), Regensburg: Habbel. 1983 "[Reinach as a Philosophical Personality]", written as an introduction to Reinach 1921, first published in Aletheia, 3, xv-xxvi. 1925 Review of Schreier 1924, Archiv [iir o[[entliches Recht, 9, 119-24 (includes comparison of Reinach and Schreier). 1919 Grenzen der Erkenntnis ausliindischen Rechts, Leipzig: Meiner. See esp. the comparison between laws and mathematical propositions; the work includes also a discussion of Reinach on Oberlegung (pp. 50, 78f.). 1967 Die phiinomenologische Rechtslehre und das Natu"echt, Dissertation, Freiburg (Switzerland). Detailed treatment of Reinach's philosophy of law. 1965 Die Konstitution des Rechtsfalles. Studien zum Verhiiltnis von Tatsachenfeststellung und Rechtsanwendung, Berlin: Duncker and Humblot. Sees Reinach as a representative of a strict ontological realism in law. 1972 Das Verstehen von Rechtstexten. Zur hermeneutischen Transpositivitiit des positi}len Rechts. Munich: C.H. Beck (65f.). 1975 "Die Logik der Negation als ontologisches Erkenntnismaterial", in H. Weinrich, ed., Positionen der Negativitat (Poetik und Hermeneutik, VI), Munich: Fink, 105-140 (pp. 134f. is a discussion of Reinach and Sigwart on the locus of negation). 1917 "Adolf Reinach", Frankfurter Zeitung und Handelsblatt, no. 33 7, Erstes Morgen blatt, 6.12.1917,p.1. Husserl, Gerhart Ingarden, Roman 1919 "Adolf Reinach" (obituary article) KantStudien, 23, 147-49. 1974/75 "Adolph Reinach", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 35, 571-74: English translation of Husserl 1919 by L. V. Brettler (see also Brettler, 252-54). 1983 "[Reinach as a Philosophical Personality] ", Eng. trans. of Husserl 1919 by J .F. Crosby, Aletheia, 3, xi-xiv. 1925 Rechtskraft und Rechtsgeltung. Eine rechtsdogmatische Untersuchung. I. Genesis und Grenzen der Rechtsgeltung, Berlin: Springer (dedicated to 'meinem Vater'). Husserl comments on the superiority of Reinach's intuitive approach over the formalism of Kaufmann and Schreier (p. viif.). He sees Reinach's failure to reach his proclaimed goal of an a priori foundation of law as due to an inadequate range of examples. The material to which Reinach appeals is limited to the then current German civil law and does not take sufficient account of comparative law. 1964 "Zur Lehre von den sogenannten Doppelwirkungen im Recht", in Recht und Welt: Rechtsphilosphische Abhandlungen, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 217-48. Credits Reinach with having been the first to show that claims and obligations are a unique type of non-physical and non-psychical temporal object (p. 235). 1969 Person, Sache, Verhalten, Zwei phiinomenologische Studien, Frankfurt: Klostermann (pp. 5n, 55n.). 1921/22 Review of Reinach 1921, Ruch Filozoficzny, 6, 116-17. 1931 Das literarische Kunstwerk. Eine Untersuchung aus dem Grenzgebiet der Ontologie, Logik und Literaturwissenschaft, Halle: Niemeyer; Eng. trans. by G.G. Grabowicz as The Literary Work of Art, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973. On Reinach on the concepts of Sachverhalt and Gegenstand. 1964/65 Der Streit urn die Existenz der Welt, Niemeyer: Ttibingen, 2 vols., the 2nd in 2 parts. See esp. 315 ch. XI of vol. II/ 1 , "Die Form des Sachverhalts. Sachverhalt und Gegenstand" (includes extensive critique of Reinach, 1911 b) and §62 of vol. II/2, which contains a criticism of Reinach on movement. Ireland, Gordon et al., eds. 1948 Latin-American Legal Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Isay, Hermann Jones, J. Walter 1929 Rechtsnorm und Entscheidung, Berlin: Vahlen ( esp. pp. 4 2-4 7, on phenomenological jurisprudence). 'Reinach's results are completely unacceptable . . . However his basic idea is correct, that the phenomenological method must be made fruitful for the investigation of those conscious experiences which yield the legal order of social life' (p. 44f.). 1940 Historical Introduction to the Theory of Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, repr. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1970. 'Perhaps no one has cut himself off from the facts of experience so sharply as Reinach, for whom the foundations of positive law belong to a realm which is not only distinct from the world of Nature but also independent of human understanding, of human organization, and of all the actual course of human or rna terial occurrences.' (p. 213) Jorrin, Miguel 1939 "La fenomenolog!a y el derecho", Revista de Ia Universidad de Ia Habana, (pp. 180-189). Kantorowicz, Hermann 1919/20 Review of Reinach 1913, Logos, 8, 111-15. The review is critical of Reinach's view that propositions of a priori law can be synthetic, but approves of his account of the relation between a priori law and positive law. See Muscheler 1984. Karelitzki, Arnold 1914 Urteil und Anerkennung. Ein Beitrag zur 316 Phiinomenologie der Erkenntnis, Dissertation, Munich, 103 pp. Karelitzki expresses his thanks to Daubert, PHinder and Scheler (in that order), but the body of the work makes clear his indebtedness also to Reinach. Karelitzki draws a distinction between two kinds of knowledge: 1. perceptual knowledge (and Kaufmann, Arthur Kaufmann, Arthur, ed. intuitive knowledge in general), which relates to Tatbestii.nde, and 2. knowledge bound up with Meinen, which relates to Sachverhalte. In the case of the observing consciousness of objects we have to do with a receptive taking up [Aufnehmen] of the object ... In the case of meaningful intending des sinnvollen Meinens] the act of consciousness is formed in such a way as to be directed toward the objects in an essentially different way. The mind operates here as it were with a different sort of organ of sense: the objects are not intuited through the inner eye, but rather contacted via the inner sense of touch. The intending subject in effect reaches out towards the object with his mental index finger. (p. 35) Acts of Meinen may be one-rayed or manyrayed. Further: the mental index finger can bend and transform from case to case in quite peculiar ways, for now it is not merely a matter of straightforward pointing to an object or of coming into contact with it, but rather of uncovering or displaying a given matter or of grasping it ... It is only this intentional unfolding [meinende Ausmachen] in regard to an object that makes room for truth and falsehood; that which I unfold with my acts of meaning can be true or false, according to whether things really do stand so and so with the objects (pp. 45f.) At the end of his work Karelitzki promises a separate study of the problem of the relation between the Sachverhalt and its underlying matter. 1961 Das Schuldprinzip. Eine strafrechtlich-rechtsphilosophische Untersuchung, Heidelberg: Winter (passim). 1971 RechtsphilQsophie im Wandel, Frankfurt: Athenaum (passim). 1965 Die ontologische Begriindung des Rechts. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft. 317 Kaufmann, Felix Kaufmann, Fritz Kelsen, Hans Koebner Koyre, Alexander Kraft, Julius KrauB, Heinrich (S.J.) 318 1922 Logik und Rechtswissenschaft. Grundrift eines Systems der reinen Rechtslehre, Ttibingen: Mohr (Siebeck), repr. Aalen: Scientia, 1966 (pp. 81f.). Kaufmann sees Reinach's first step towards a phenomenological philosophy of law as having failed, though it opened up important new questions. 1929 Die philosophischcn Grundprobleme der Lehre von der Strafrechtsschuld, Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke. 1959 [untitled] in H.L. van Breda, ed., Edmund Husser/ 1859-1959: Recueil commemoratif pub lie a I 'occasion du centenaire de Ia naissance du philosophe, The Hague: Nijhoff, 40-4 7 (p. 40f.). 1965 "Eine phanomenologische Rechtstheorie", Osterreichische Zeitschrift fiir dffentliches Recht 15, 353-409 (p. 353). Review of Amselek, 1964. 1922 Review of Reinach 1921, Literarisches Zentralblatt fiir Deutschland, 73, 964-65. 1922 "Bemerkungen zu den Zenonischen Paradoxien", Jahrbuch fiir Philo sophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 5, 603-28. French trans. "Remarques sur les paradoxes de Zenon", in Koyre 's Etudes d 'histoire de Ia pensee philosophique, Paris: Gallimard, 1971, 9-35. Draws on Reinach's analysis of motion in his 1921 b, arguing that Zeno-like paradoxes \\'ill arise wherever the two elements of infinity and continuity are found together (p. 628). 1926 "Die wissenschaftliche Bedeutung der phanomenologischen Rechtsphilosophie", Kant-Studien, 31, 286-96. Positivist critique; argues that Reinach's synthetic a priori propositions of law are in fact analytic; they are held to be synthetic only because they are 'erschaut'. 1954/55 "Naturrecht, positives Recht und apriorische Rechtslehre", Stimmen der Zeit, 80, 228-32. Very sympathetic summary of Reinach 1913; argues that, because he concentrates too much on the essential laws governing institutions and Kubes, Vladimir Landsberg, Ernst Larenz, Karl ignores those governing human nature, Reinach exaggerates the freedom of positive law in relation to the underlying 'natural' structures. 1982 "Zu heutigen rechtsphilosophischen Theorien und die kritisch-ontologische Auffassung des Rechts", Archiv fiir Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, Supplementa I, part 1, 429-75. Contrasts Reinach's 'objektivistisch-realistische Richtung' with the 'existentialist' and 'transcendental phenomenological' approaches of G. Husserl, F. Kaufmann and F. Schreier. 1986 Ontologie des Rechts, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot (Schriften zur Rechtstheorie, Heft 118), (p. 170, pp. 252-254). 1925 "Zur ewigen Wiederkehr des Naturrechts", Archiv fii r R echtsund Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 18, 347-76. Concludes with very positive remarks on Reinach (p. 376). 1930 Die Methode der Auslegung des Rechtsgeschiifts, Leipzig, repr. Frankfurt: Metzner (pp. 42ff., 57). The reprint contains a "Nachwort" in which Larenz points out that his earlier discussions of phenomenological philosophy of Jaw 'were still influenced by legal positivism, and to the extent that my remarks were directed critically against Reinach and G. Husserl they were unjust to these authors' (p. 108). 1931 Rechtsund Staatsphilosophie der Gegenwart. Berlin: Junker and Diinnhaupt {pp. 44-56). Valuable discussion. 1969 "Der Rechtssatz als Bestimmungssatz", Festschrift fiir Karl Engisch zum 70. Geburtstag, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 150-60. 1969a "Originare Rechtssachverhalte", in T. Wtirtenberger, ed., 13 2-5 1. On Reinach's treatment of the opposition between orders and determinations [Bestimmungen] (pp. 136ff.). 1975 Richtiges Recht. Grundzilge einer Rechtsethik, Munich: Beck (pp. 61, 191). 1983 Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 5th ed., Berlin/Heidelberg/New York/Tokyo: Springer (pp. 82f., 108-115, 246). 319 Legaz y Lacambra, Luis Leibholz, Gerhard Leinweber, Adolph Linke, Paul F. Lipps, Hans 320 1953 Filosofia del derecho, Barcelona: Bosch (pp. 126f. ). German trans. as Rechtsphilosophie, Neuwied am Rhein: Luchterhand, 1965 (pp. 61, 16 7-1 71 of translation). 1929 Das Wesen der Repriisentation, Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter (pp. 19, 22: on Reinach's apriorism). 1965 Gibt es ein Natu"echt? Hamburg: Cram, de Gruyter and Co. (pp. 39-47, 115, 118, 128). Leinweber defends a position according to which eternal legal structures exist, but finite beings cannot gain insight into them. He criticises Reinach's apriorism because it does not take into account the biological and historical/cultural conditions of human knowledge. 1914 Review of Milnchener Philosophische Abhandlungen, Gottingische gelehrte Anzeigen, no. 1' 1-22. 1916 "Phanomenologie und Experiment in der Frage der Bewegungsauffassung", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 2, 1-20. 1925 "Bemerkungen zur Theorie der Pradikation", Philosophischer Anzeiger, 1, 57-71, repr. in Lipps Werke IV, 177-92 (p. 189). 1928 Untersuchungen zur Phiinomenologie der Erkenntnis, vol. 2, Aussage und Urteil, Bonn: F. Cohen, repr. as Werke 1.2, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976 (p. 39f. of the reprint is a criticism of Reinach's concept of negative Sachverhalt). 1931 Beispiel, Exempel, Fall und das Verhiiltnis des Rechtsfalles zum Gesetz, Berlin: Springer, repr. in Lipps Werke IV, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977, 36-65 (p. 57). 1937 "Bemerkungen tiber das Versprechen", Bliitter fiir deutsche Philosophie, 11, 1-7, repr. in Lipps Werke IV, 97-106. Includes criticism of Reinach's and Bassenge's theories of the promise. 1937/38 "Verantwortung, Zurechnung, Strafe", Archiv fiir Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, 31, 1677 5, repr. in Lipps Werke V, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1977,72-81. 1944 Die Verbindlichkeit der Sprache. Arbeiten zur Sprachphilosophie und Logik, 3rd ed. = Werke IV. 1954 Die Wzrklichkeit des Menschen, repr. as Werke v. Llamb{az de Azevedo, Juan 1940 Eidetica y Aporetica del Derecho, Prolegdmenos a Ia Filosofia del Derecho, Buenos Aires: Espasa Calpe; Eng. trans. as "The Eidetics and A pore tics of the Law" in Gordon Ireland, et al., eds., 401-58. A defence of the Bestimmung theory of legal norms. Maihofer, Werner Maihofer, Werner, ed. Marcie, Rene Montoro Ballestoros, Alberto Mulligan, Kevin 1958 "Die Natur der Sache", Archiv fiir Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, 44, as repr. in A. Kaufmann, ed., 52--86 (pp. 65-68). 1965 ~-•Droit nature! et nature des choses", Archiv fiir Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, 51 , 241-64 (pp. 241ff., 261). 1962 Naturrecht oder Rechtspositivismus?, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2nd ed. 1972. 1960/61 "Reine Rechtslehre und klassiche Rechtsontologie"' Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur offentliches Recht, N.F. 11, 395-411 (pp.410f.). On Reinach's lecture "Dber Phanomenologie" ( 1921 a) as manifesting the rediscovery, after millennia, of an a priori in re. 1969 Rechtsphilosophie. Eine Einfilhrung, Freiburg: Rombach (passim). 197 5 "Significado y fun cion de Ia teo ria fundamental del derecho", in La Filosofia del Derecho en Espana, Anales de Ia Catedra Francisco Suarez (Granada), 15, 215-46. 1980 Representation and Ontology in AustroGerman Philosophy, Dissertation, Manchester. 1984 "Wie die Sachen sich zueinander verhalten inside and outside the Tractatus", in B.F. McGuinness and A. Gargani, eds., Wittgenstein and Contemporary Philosophy (= Teoria, 5), Pisa; ETS, 145-74. 321 Mulligan, Kevin, Simons, Peter M. and Smith, Barry Munch, Fritz Muscheler, Karlheinz 1984 "Truth-Makers", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44, 287-321. Defence of a correspondence theory of truth along the lines of Reinach and the early Husserl, but dispensing with the category of states of affairs. 1918 "Die wissenschaftliche Rechtsphilosophie der Gegenwart in Deutschland (nach ihren allgemein-philosophischen Grundlagen)", Beitriige zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus, 95-143 fpp. 123ff.). Criticises uses of the a priori in the philosophy of law. 1984 Relativismus und Freiheit. Ein Versuch ilber Hermann Kantorowicz, (Freiburger Rechtsund Staatswissenschaftliche Abhandlungen ), Heidelberg: C.F. Muller J uristischer Verlag (pp. 5665). Muscheler shows how Kantorowicz's review of R.einach is of central importance in his development, Kantorowicz, having 'entirely adopted the essential point of certain of Reinach's ideas. Central to both is the working out of the category of the objective, ideal sense of social acts' (p. 63). Natanson, Maurice, ed. 1973 Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, 2 vols., Evanston: Northwestern University Press. Nauhaus, Walter 1924 Zur Kritik des Konventionalismus, Dissertation, Jena (under P.F. Linke), Cf. Use of Reinach's theory of number (p. 71) and of Sachverhalt (passim: see n.8) Neisser, Hans P. 1959/60 "The Phenomenological Approach in Social Oesterreicher, John M. Olivecrona, Karl 322 Sciences", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 20, 198-212. Reinach's a priori judgements are in fact analytic (p. 211 ). 1952 "Adolf Reinach, Seeker of the Absolute", in J .M.Oesterreicher, Walls are Crumbling, New York: Devin-Adair, 87-118; French trans. Sept philosophes juifs devant le Christ, Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1955. Biographical treatment; somewhat speculative. 1971 Law as Fact, 2nd ed., London: Stevens and Sons (p. 162f.): Ortega y Gasset, Jose Otaka, Tomoo Peschka, Vilmos What Reinach says amounts to a very clear statement, in a philosophical language, of the common view. It is particularly valuable because it brings out the difference between rules of conduct and rules of rights and duties and legal qualities. But I cannot see that it is anything more than a restatement. (p. 162) 1982 Investigaciones Psicoldgicas, in Ortega y Gasset, Obras Completas, 10, Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 333-445. What are described as objetos estructurales or objetos totales are Reinach's Sachverhaltc (p. 379f.). Philosophers have concerned themselves a great deal with true judgements 'but not with the rest of their body, with the renlainder that makes a judgement a judgement, whether it is true or false' (p. 395f.). Ortega gives a lucid account of what is in effect Reinach's distinction between meaning (Jl;feinen) and presenting ( Vorstellen) and asks whether, 'thanks to this distinction, which appears to be of no importance, we shall not possess the key to a whole new philosophy of language' (pp. 396-400). At p. 434 the notion of degrees of belief is introduced, doubt and probability being described as modalities or modifications of belief, though Ortega refers to Husser! and not to Reinach here. Garc1a-Bar6 {1983) points out that Reinach 's influence on Ortega is by no means limited to his Psychological Investigations. 1928 "Horitsu no Shakaiteki Kozo ", Krijo-Hogakukaironshii, vol. 1., 1928, 97-205, (pp. 112, 124, 175, 188). 1931 "Theorie und Praxis in der Rechtswissenschaft", Zeitschrift fur 6ffentliches Recht, 10, 82-102 (p. 92: comparison of Reinach and Schreier). 1961 "Die existentialistische Rechtsphilosophie", Acta Juridica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, t.III, fasc. 1-2, 17-56. 196 7 "Le phenomenologisme dans la philosophie du droit moderne", Archives de philosophie du droit, 12, 259-86. 323 Petraschek, Karl Poulantzas, Nicos A. Radbruch, Gustav 324 1974 Grundprobleme der modernen Rechtsphilosophie, Budapest: Akademiai Kiad6 (the original Hungarian version appeared in 1972), esp. pp. 39-43, "Is and ought from the point of view of existential and phenomenological philosophy of law" (on the seminal nature and unparalleled importance of Reinach's contribution to the is/ought problem). 1931 "Rechtsphilosophie", in H. Sacher, ed., Staatslexikon, Freiburg: Herder, IV, 620-39 (pp. 633f., on the "Rationalistisch-aprioristischnormative Richtung"). 1963 "Notes sur la phenomenologie et l'existentialisme juridi1_ues", Archives de philosophie du droit, 8, 213--35. Sees all supposed a priori legal propositions as mere tautologies. Fails to recognise the ontological dimensions of Reinach's theory of a priori structures. 1965 Nature des Chases e: Droit. Essai sur Ia dialectique du fait et de Ia valeur, Paris: Librairie generale du Droit et de Jurisprudence (pp. 29-3 2: "Les essence aprioriques du droit selon les juristes phenomenologiques: la theorie de Reinach''). 1905 Review of Reinach 1905, Deutsche Literaturzeitung, Nr. 35, 2155-56. Radbruch criticises Reinach's psychologism. He begins by pointing out that the problem of causality in the penal law is treated by Reinach merely as a test-case for certain methodological intuitions. Juridical interpretation which can be compared to philological interpretation is for Reinach a rna tter of the reproduction of the thoughts of the law-giver; thus it presupposes that one finds out his psychic nature. But Reinach's theory of interpretation is not merely incomplete, since it says nothing about who or what this 'law-giver' is; it is also incorrect. For whoever seeks to interpret the law exclusively on the basis of the psychology of the law-giver will have to come to terms with the fact that the latter has in certain circumstances not been thinking at all, or that he has been thinking Reale, Miguel Recasens Siches, Luis Riezler, Erwin with contradictory results. And even in such circumstances the judge still has to come to a clear and consistent decision, and then his decision has nothing to do with the intentions of any law-giver. These intentions are indeed not the instrument of interpretation, as they are for Reinach, but rather the result. For all his mistaken conclusions, however, Reinach's work is an 'interesting symptom' of the ruling state of turmoil in juridical methodology. 1914 Grundziige der Rechtsphilosophie, Leipzig: QueUe and Meyer (p. 34f. identifies Reinach's philosophy of law as a theory based on the 'Natur der Sache'). 1973 Rt:chtsphilosophie, 8th ed., E. Wolf and H.-P. Schneider, eds., Stuttgart: K. F. Koehler (pp. 116, 240). 1953 Filosofia do Direito, vol. I, Torno I: Propedeutica filos6fica ad usum jurisprudentiae, Torno II: Ontognoseologia juridica, SID Paulo: Saraiva. (Vol. II not published.) Italian trans. Filosofia del diritto, Turin: G. Giappichelli, 1956. 1929 Direcciones contemporaneas del pensamiento jurzaico, Barcelona/Buenos Aires: Labor (pp. 213-36). 1963 Panorama del pensamiento juridico en el siglo XX, 2 vols., Mexico: Editorial Pornia (pp. 253-65). 1921 Das Rechtsgefuhl. Rechtspsychologische Betrachtungen, 1st ed., Munich/Berlin/Leipzig (p.77), 2nd ed., Munich: Biederstein, 1946 (p. 85). Superficial critique of Reinach's theory of the a priori sphere of legal formations, confusing Reinach's use of the term 'analytic' with that of Kant. Riezler holds that the a priori axioms applicable to the legal sphere are not themselves legal propositions, but rather propositions of logic having no specifically legal content. 325 Ritzel, Hermann Rodig, Jtirgen Runkel Salomon, Max Sauer, Wilhelm Schambeck, Herbert Schapp,Jan Schapp, Wilhelm 326 1924 "Apriorisches im Recht", Archiv fiir Rechtsund Wirtschaftsphilosophie, 17 (= Kant FS), 264-84 (pp. 266ff.). Detailed treatment, but resting once more on the mistaken presupposition that Reinach's theory of the a priori is identical with that of Kant. 1916 "Ober analytische Urteile: Eine Stu die zur Phanomenologie des Begriffs", Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 3, 25 3-344. Esp. § 1 0, "Meinen und Vorstellen" (pp. 286 -99). 1969 Die Denkform der Alternative in der Jurisprudenz, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York: Springer. Include~ )emi-formal treatment of legal states of affairs. 1919 "Ober Adolf Reinachs apriorische Grundlagen des btirgerlichen Rechtes, insbes. seine Theorie tiber das We sen unsittlicher Versprechen", Zeitschrift fur Rechtsphilosophie, 2, 384-89 (positive summary of Reinach's theory of social acts). 1925 Grundlagen zur Rechtsphilosophie, SerlinGrunewald: Rothschild, 2nd ed. (pp. 46-49, 64f.). Critique of Reinach: phenomenology can only describe problems, not solve them. 1929 Lehrbuch der Rechtsund Sozialphilosophie, Berlin-Grunewald: Rothschild; 'there is no place in the phenomenological system of pure law for justice and therefore for the essence of law' (p. 75). 1964 Der Begriff der 'Natur der Sache'. Ein Beitrag zur rechtsphilosophischen Grundlagenforschung, Vienna: Springer (pp. 127-29). 1968 Sein und Ort der Rechtsgebilde. Eine Untersuchung iiber Eigentum und Vertrag. The Hague: Nijhoff. Especially ch. 2, "Die rechtsphanomenologischen Untersuchungen von Reinach und W. Schapp" (pp. 25-51). 1930/3 2 Die neue Wissenschaft vom Recht. Eine phiinomenologische Untersuchung, 2 vols., BertinGrunewald: Verlag ftir Staatswissenschaft und Geschichte. 1959 "Erinnerungen an Husserl", in H.L. van Breda, ed., Edmund Husser/ 1859-1959: Recueil commemoratif publie a /'occasion du centenaire de Ia naissance du philosophe, The Hague: Nijhoff, 12-25 (p. 16). Scheler, Max 1957 "Absolutsphare und Realsetzung der Gottesidee", Schrzften aus dem Nachlafi, /, Zur Ethik und Erkenntnislehre (Gesammelte Werke, 10), M. Scheler, ed., Bern: Francke (pp. 204: on Reinach's account of negation). Schmitz, Hermann 1964ff. System der Philosophie (in several volumes), Bonn: Bouvier. See esp. vols. 111/4 (1977), pp. 369, 372, 385 (on Sachverhalte) and IV (1980), p. 268 (on Reinach and Frege on negation). Schmucker, Franz Georg 1956 Die Phiinomenologie als Methode der WesensSchreier, Fritz Schwarz, Balduin Seidler, Ernst Seifert, Josef erkenntnis unter besonderer Berocksichtigung der Auffassung der Miinchen-Gottinger Phiinomenologenschule, Dissertation, Munich. Loose account of the philosophical credo of Munich phenomenologists, as illustrated, e.g., in Reinach 1921a. 1924 Grundbegriffe und Grundformen des Rechts. Entwurf einer phiinomenologisch begrii.ndeten forma/en Rechtsund Staatslehre, Leipzig and Vienna: Franz Deuticke (passim). Confuses Reinach's a priori legal structures with concepts. 1934 Der Irrtum in der Philosophie. Untersuchungen iiber das Wesen, die Formen und die psychologische Genese des I"tums im Bereiche der Philosophie mit einem t.iberblick iiber die Geschichte der Irrtumsproblematik in der abendliindischen Philo sophie, Munster: Aschendorff, esp. 1, 3 "Das gegenstandliche Korrelat der Erkenntnis" (pp. 24ff.). 1918 Review of Reinach 1913, Osterreichische Zeitschrift fur offentliches Recht, 3, 607-9. 1973 Leib und Seele. Ein Beitrag zur philosophischen Anthropologie, Salzburg/Munich: Pustet (p. 1 04f., on vernehmungsbediirftige Akte ). 327 Selz, Otto Smith, Barry 328 1976 Erkenntnis objektiver Wahrheit, 2nd ed., Salzburg: Pustet. 1976a Was ist und was motiviert eine sittliche Handlung?, Salzburg: Pustet. 1979 Das Leib-Seele-Problem in der gegenwiirtigen philosophischen Diskussion. Eine kritische Analyse, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft {pp. 39f.). 1983 "Is Reinach's 'Apriorische Rechtslehre' more important for positive law than Reinach himself thinks?", Aletheia, 3, 197-230. 1987 Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Realism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1913 Uber die Gesetze des geordneten Denkverlaufs, vol. I, Stuttgart: Spemann. 1978 "An Essay in Formal Ontology", Grazer Philosophische Studien, 6, 39-62. On the controversy between Reinach and Ingarden concerning negative states of affairs. 1978a "Wittgenstein and the Background of Austrian Philosophy", in Wittgenstein and his Impact on Contemporary Thought, Vienna: Holder-PichlerTempsky, 31-35. On early Sachverhalt-ontologies. 1978b "Law and Eschatology in Wittgenstein's Early Thought", Inquiry, 14, 425-41. Includes some remarks on the phenomenology of law. 198 2 "In traduction to Adolf Reinach 'On the Theory of the Negative Judgement", in B. Smith, ed., 280-313. 1983 "Meinen und Vorstellen in der literarischen Gegenstandskonstitution", in G. Wolandt, ed., Kunst und Kunstforschung. Beitrage zur A*sthetik, Bonn: Bouvier, 49-61. On Reinach's theory of Meinen and its implications for the understanding of what is involved in the reading of fiction. 1984 "Acta cum fundamentis in re", Dialectica, 38, 157-78. Smith, B. ed. Smith, B. and Mulligan, K. Somlo, Bodog (Felix) Spiegelberg, Herbert Stammler, Rudolf Stavenhagen, Kurt 1984a "Phanomenologie und angelsachsische Philosophie", Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger, 37, 387-405, review dealing i.a. with Reinach's theory of speech acts and its historical background. 1984b "Ten Conditions on a Theory of Speech Acts", Theoretical Linguistic 11 , 311-30. 1987 "Materials towards a History of Speech Act Theory", in A. Eschbach, ed., Karl Buhler's Theory of Language, Amsterdam: Benjamins. 1982 Parts and Moments. Studies in Logic and Formal Ontology, Munich: Philosophia. 1982 "Pieces of a Theory", in Smith, ed., 15109. 1927 Juristische Grundlehre, 2nd ed., Leipzig: Meiner, repr. Aalen: Scientia (passim). (Somlo was G. Lukacs' Doktorvater.) 1933 "Sinn und Recht der Begrtindung in der axiologischen und praktischen Philosophie", in Neue Miinchener Philosophische Abhandlungen. Alexander Pfiinder zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag, E. Heller and F. Low, eds., Leipzig: Barth, 100-42 (p. 116). 1930 "Uber das Wesen der Idee: Eine ontologische Un tersuchung", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 11, 1-238. 1935 Gesetz und Sittengesetz. Strukturanalytische und historische Vorstudien zu einer gesetzesfreien Ethik, Zurich and Leipzig: Niehaus. 1960 The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction, The Hague: Nijhoff, pp. 195205 (3rd revised ed., 1982, pp. 191-200). 1922 Lehrbuch der Rechtsphilosophie, Berlin and Leipzig: de Gruyter (p. 48). 1925 Absolute Stellungnahmen. Eine ontologische Untersuchung iiber das Wesen der Religion, Erlangen: Philosophische Akademie, repr. New York: Garland, 1979. On p. vii Stavenhagen writes: 'The investigations which follow arose 329 Stein, Edith 330 in the author's reflection upon the sadly incomplete philosophy of religion of A. Reinach. I wan ted especially to determine the correctness and sense of the proposition that 'certain elements, which admit of an infinite intensification [die unendliche Steigerung fiihig sind], correspond to objectives which contain these elements to a degree which no longer admits of intensification' {from Reinach 1921 d). 1931 Achtung als Solidaritiitsgefuhl und Grundlage von Gemeinschaften, Abhandlungen der Herder-Gesellschaft und des Herder-lnstituts zu Riga, 4. 7, Riga: Lofler. 1933 "Charismatische Personlichkeitseinungen", in E. Heller and F. Low, eds., Neue Milnchener Philosophische Abhandlungen (Pfander FS), Leipzig: Barth, 36-68 (pp. 40-44 on Reinach's theory of social acts). 1957 Person and Personlichkeit. Untersuchungen zur Anthropologie und Ethik, edited from the NachlaB by H. Delius, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. Esp. the discussion of heard tones as forming a secondary temporal continuum (p. 51), and the appendix, "F ormale interpersonale Aktionen {1951 )" (pp. 299305) on the genesis of obligation in speech actions. 1922 "Beitrage zur philosophischen Begrtindung der Psychologie und der Geisteswissenschaften", Jahrbuch ftir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 5, 1-283. Employs Reinach's analysis of continuity in his 1921 b in a discussion of the continuum of qualities formed by feeling-states (p. 30). 1925 "Eine Untersuchung tiber den Staat", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 7, 1-123 (pp. 24f., 32f.). Stein's conclusions regarding the state and law are for the most part 'only consequences' of Reinach's legal philosophy. She deals in particular with the distinction between orders and determinations [Bestimmungen] in relation to actions of the state. Stella, Giuliana Theunissen, Michael Troller, Alois Verdross, Alfred Victor, Rene Waldenfels, Bernhard Waldstein, Wolfgang Walther, Gerda 1965 Aus dem Leben einer jildischen Familie, Freiburg: Herder, esp. pp. 172-219. 1983 "[Reinach as a Philosophical Personality] ", Eng. trans. of parts of Stein 1965 by J .F. Crosby, Aletheia, 3, xxvii-xxix. 1985 "Determinazione giuridica del soggetto attraverso la promessa", in S. Cotta, ed., II soggetto ed il diritto, L'Aquila: Japadre. 1965 Der Andere. Studien zur Sozialontologie der Gegenwart, Berlin: de Gruyter (passim, esp. pp. 3 76-92, on Reinach's theory of social acts); Eng. trans., The Other, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984. 1965 Uberall g;Ultige Prinzipien der Rechtswissenschaft, Frankfurt and Berlin: Metzner (pp. 250 ff.). Criticises Reinach because he does not devote sufficient attention to the structures of human existence from out of which legal formations grow. 1971 Die Begegnung von Philosophie, Rcchtsphilosophie und Rechtswissenschaft, Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe {pp. 87, 142f., 196). 1963 Abendliindische Rechtsphilosophie, 2nd ed., Vienna: Springer (p. 193). 1935 Het wezen van het recht (Handelingen van de Vereeniging voor Wijsbegeerte des Rechts, XXIII/ 1 ), Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink. Booklet on phenomenological philosophy of law, praising Reinach esp. for his clarity (pp. 1521). 1971 Das Zwischenreich des Dialogs. Sozialphilosophische Untersuchungen in Anschlufi an Edmund Husser/, The Hague: Nijhoff (pp. 139, 142, 172). 1967 "Vorpositive Ordnungselements im Romischen Recht", Osterreichische Zeitschrift fiir 6/fentliches Recht und V6lkerrecht, 17, 1-26. 1923 "Zur Ontologie der sozialen Gemeinschaften", Jahrbuch fiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, 6, 1-158 (passim). 331 Wenisch, Fritz Winter, Eggert Wolf, Erik Wtirtenberger, Thomas 1976 Die Philosophie und ihre Methode, Salzburg and Munich: Pustet. Useful introduction to philosophy from the standpoint of Munich phenomenology d Ia Hildebrand. 1980 Ethik und Rechtswissenschaft, Berlin (West): Duncker und Humblot (p. 371-372). 1931 "Recht und Welt. Bemerkungen zu der gleichnamigen Schrift von Gerhart Husser I", Zeitschrift fiir die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 90, 328-46, repr. in Wolfs Rechtsphilosophische Studien, Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972. Contains a brief critical survey of material on phenomenology and law: 'Reinach has been repeatedly criticised, and with reason, for his analyses of legal essences can throw light only on ethical or logical matters but not on matters in the sphere of law' (p. 341 ). 1964 Das Problem der Naturrechtslehre. Versuch einer Orientierung, 3rd ed., Karlsruhe: Milller (pp. 116, 163: Reinach as proponent of a 'regionale Rechtsontologie'). 1955 "Das Naturrecht und die Philosophie der Gegenwart", Juristenzeitung, 10, 1-5, as repr. in W. Maihofer, ed., 1962,429-443 (p. 436). Wiirtenberger, Thomas, ed. 1969 Phtinomenologie, Rechtsphilosophie, Jurisprudenz. Festschrift ftjr Gerhart Husser! zum 75. Geburtstag, Frankfurt: Klostermann.