Life	in	A	Cage:	On	Nonhuman	Persons The	Philosopher's	Magazine,	January	2017,	76:72-77 Kristin	Andrews Tommy	was	a	child	actor,	starring	in	a	Hollywood	movie	and	performing	live	in	New	York.	It sounds	like	a	dream	come	true,	but	as	for	many	child	actors,	as	he	got	older	things	started	going wrong.	Tommy's	downfall	wasn't	due	to	financial	excess	or	substance	abuses.	Rather,	he	just	grew	up into	a	normal	guy.	And	he	was	treated	like	any	normal	guy	of	his	kind	in	our	culture-he	was	locked away	in	a	cage.	Tommy	was	left	behind	bars	in	a	small	concrete	cage,	prisoner	in	a	dark,	damp	shed, fed	and	watered,	but	kept	in	hiatus	until	someone	might	want	to	use	him	again.	You	see,	Tommy	is	a chimpanzee,	and	chimpanzees	are	property	under	the	law.	There	are	some	regulations	regarding	how we	handle	them-much	like	the	regulations	regarding	hazardous	materials.	But	Tommy	doesn't	have any	legal	rights	because	he	is	not	a	legal	person. The	Nonhuman	Rights	Project,	headed	by	lawyer	Stephen	Wise,	has	been	filing	lawsuits	on behalf	of	Tommy	and	other	chimpanzees	who	are	being	held	in	horrific	conditions.	In	one	such	case,	NY County	Supreme	Court	Justice	Barbara	Jaffee	decided	against	considering	chimpanzees	legal	persons under	the	common	law,	writing,	"the	parameters	of	legal	personhood...	[will	be	focused]	on	the	proper allocation	of	rights	under	the	law,	asking,	in	effect,	who	counts	under	our	law."	Justice	Jaffee	didn't want	to	make	this	decision	solely	by	legal	fiat.	She	suggests it	is	a	matter	of	public	policy	that	needs	to be	decided	by	society,	rather	than	the	court.	This	leaves	room	for	philosophers	to	enter	the conversation,	and	consider	whether	chimpanzees	are metaphysical	persons,	regardless	of	how	the common	law	concept	is	understood. On	John	Locke's	influential	account,	a	person	is	"a	thinking	intelligent	being,	that	has	reason and	reflection,	and	can	consider	itself	as	itself,	the	same	thinking	thing,	in	different	times	and	places." While	this	might	sound	like	a	good	starting	position,	it	is	both	too	weak	and	too	strong.	Consider	the case	of	KC,	a	human	who	became	famous	after	a	brain	injury	caused	him	to	lose	the	ability	to	engage	in mental	time	travel.	KC	wasn't	able	to	re-experience	his	past	events	or	to	imagine	his	future	ones,	and so	in	this	sense	he	wasn't	able	to	consider	himself	the	same	thinking	thing	in	different	times	and places.	But	when	given	economic	decision-making	tasks,	he	was	able	to	discount	future	rewards	in	the same	way	typical	people	do.	Furthermore,	he	had	an	average	IQ	and	his	cognitive	capacities	remained otherwise	relatively	unimpaired.	It	would	be	very	strange	to	consider	KC	as	not	a	person	due	to	his inability	to	remember	his	past	or	project	into	his	future.	This	shows	that	the	Lockean	view	is	too	strong. But	it	might	also	be	too	weak.	In	a	recent	Animal	Sentience	article,	Mark	Rowlands	argues	that	we	don't need	something	like	mental	time	travel	to	unify	our	mental	life;	rather	in	virtue	of	experiencing the world	intentionally,	minded	creatures	implicitly	consider	themselves	the	same	thing	across	time.	Given this	argument,	anything	with	intentional	mental	states	fulfills	Locke's	requirements.	This	would	make personhood	widely	distributed	throughout	the	animal	kingdom,	and	given	some	recent	research	on plant	neurobiology,	maybe	even	in	plants	as	well.	This	conclusion	suggests	that	there	may	be something	more	to	our	concept	of	personhood	than	what	Locke	has	in	mind. What	else	might	that	be?	David	DeGrazia	lists	rationality,	self-awareness,	moral	agency,	and	autonomy as	properties	typically	associated	with	personhood	(1997).	In	a	later	article	he	adds	linguistic competence,	sociability,	and	capacity	for	intentional	action	to	the	list	(2007). Sarah	Chan	and	John Harris	argue	that	a	person	is	anyone	capable	of	valuing	their	own	existence	(2011).	Gary	Varner	(2012) argues	that	a	person	must	be	rational,	self-conscious,	and	a	full-blown	moral	agent,	and	that	persons have	the	following	four	concepts	from	which	to	construct	a	linguistic	self-narrative:	self,	birth,	death, and	personality. From	Locke's	thin	view,	we	can	build	a	very	thick	one,	consisting	of	ten	proposed	properties: 1. Consciousness	or	sentience 2. A	sense	of	self	that	persists	through	time;	self-awareness 3. Rationality 4. Intentionality,	autonomy,	free	will 5. Sociability 6. Moral	agency 7. Values	one's	own	existence 8. Linguistic	capacity 9. Narrative	story	of	one's	own	life 10. Personality What	should	we	do	with	this	menu	item	account	of	personhood?	Certainly	it	can't	be	that	a	person must	have	all	of	these	properties. That	would	entail	excluding	some	individuals	we	already	think	are persons-not	just	KC,	but	young	children	whose	autonomy	and	rationality	is	quite	weak,	as	well	as cognitively	diverse	adults	with	acute	language	impairments	or	memory	problems. DeGrazia	has	raised	additional	worries	about	these	kind	of	menu	accounts	of	persons.	For	one,	these properties	come	in	degrees,	or	at	least	some	of	them	do.	Someone	can	have	a	more	or	less sophisticated	linguistic	system-enculturated	apes	might	be	able	to	comprehend	spoken	English without	being	able	to	produce	it,	and	orcas	might	have	social	norms	without	being	full	blown	moral agents.	In	addition,	the	properties	don't	all	hang	together;	one	can	be	conscious	without	being	social, perhaps,	or	without	being	a	moral	agent	or	having	a	narrative	sense	of	self.	But	even	worse,	according to	DeGrazia,	is	that	on	the	menu	account	calling	someone	a	person	doesn't	tell	us	anything	that	we didn't	already	know.	The	notion	of	person	is	descriptively	redundant,	at	least	as	far	as	the	non-moral properties	go,	and	doesn't	offer	any	explanatory	power.	The	act	of	labeling	only	masquerades	as offering	a	better	understanding	of	the	entity	deemed	a	person. Finally,	the	menu	account	of	person can't	help	us	with	the	question	we	thought	we	were	interested	in,	namely	whether	other	animals	like Tommy	might	be	persons.	It	can't	help	us	decide	borderline	cases. To	begin	to	respond	to	this	set	of	concerns,	we	can	consider	what	we	use	the	personhood	concept	for. We	call	individuals	persons	to	make	sense	of	them,	and	this	makes	persons	a	social	group,	like	women and	hippies	and	Germans.	Consider	the	following	example	of	understanding	an	individual	as	a	person. When	the	SETI	project	announces	that	Earth	has	received	a	radio	signal	consisting	of	a	long	string	of prime	numbers,	we	will	infer	that	some	kind	of	a	person	sent	that	message,	and	that	categorization	will cause	to	us	to	suppose	it	is	possible	that	the	sender	has	other	properties	in	addition	to	rationality	and engineering	skills.	It's	likely	they	are	conscious,	that	they	can	use	some	kind	of	a	language,	and	that they	value	their	own	existence.	None	of	those	claims	are	obvious	from	the	fact	that	they	sent	this message,	but	are	probable	given	what	else	we	know. This	leads	us	to	examine	the	structure	of	the	personhood	menu	items.	It	isn't	that	they	are	all properties	that,	once	attained,	create	persons.	Rather,	if	persons	make	up	a	social	group,	then	the	list of	properties	can	be	understood	as	describing	the	stereotype	of	person.	While	stereotypes	that	are inaccurate	may	lead	to	racist	and	sexist	judgements	about	people,	many	of	our	stereotypes,	like stereotypes	about	anarchist	youth	being	more	likely	to	be	vegetarian	than	the	general	public,	or Chinese	people	being	more	collectivist	than	Americans,	are	accurate.	Stereotypes	present	statistical information	about	a	group. For	a	neutral	definition	of	stereotype,	we	can	appeal	to	one	from	social	psychology:	"a	stereotype	is	a set	of	beliefs	about	the	personal	attributes	of	a	social	group."	These	beliefs	are	about	the	frequency	of certain	properties	among	group	members	compared	with	non-group	members;	properties	include what	group	members	believe,	what	they	prefer,	what	the	tend	to	do,	how	intelligent	they	are,	what their	typical	social	roles	are,	what	their	abilities	are,	and	so	forth.	Olympic	speed	skaters	are	more	likely to	place	value	on	health	and	athletic	achievement,	they	tend	to	work	hard	and	have	fit	bodies.	When we	have	a	robust	stereotype	of	a	group,	learning	that	an	individual	is	a	member	of	that	group	raises questions	in	the	categorizer's	mind	about	the	possibility	that	the	individual	might	have	some	of	these other	properties	as	well.	The	social	psychologist	Lee	Jussim	argues	that	not	only	do	we	use	stereotypes in	this	way,	but	that	it	is	rational	to	do	so,	because	when	we	have	little	information	about	a	target individual,	the	stereotype	gives	us	some	guidance	on	how	to	proceed.	This	is	not	to	say	that	we	should privilege	the	stereotype	over	individuating	information;	knowing	that	someone	is	a	person	shouldn't lead	us	to	think	that	they	can	speak	when	we	already	know	they	have	language	impairments. If	we	consider	that	the	menu	items	reflect	our	stereotype	of	person,	then	we	can	agree	that	the properties	associated	with	personhood	come	in	degrees	and	that	the	properties	do	not	necessarily hang	together.	For	many	properties	the	relationship	will	be	statistical. For	example,	knowing	that someone	is	a	rational	problem	solver	raises	the	likelihood	that	that	they	are	also	someone	who	can think	about	their	past	and	future,	but	having	the	one	property	does	not	guarantee	having	the	other. Consciousness	or	sentience,	however,	will	likely	be	necessarily	related	to	many	of	these	properties. Moral	agency,	sociality,	and	valuing	one's	existence	are	all	properties	that	are	difficult	to	imagine	in	the absence	of	sentience. Descriptive	redundancy	is	avoided	with	the	stereotype	of	person,	because	calling	someone	a	person adds	probabilistic	descriptive	information	about	the	likelihood	that	they	have	additional	properties. When	I	call	Tommy	a	thing,	when	I	consider	him	to	be	private	property,	I	think	of	him	like	other	kinds	of property,	and	treat	him	appropriately. Like	an	old	sofa	I	don't	want	anymore,	it	makes	sense	to	store Tommy	in	the	garage	until	I	know	what	to	do	with	him.	But	when	I	call	Tommy	a	person,	I	change	my default	attitudes	and	treat	him	as	if	he	might	be	rational,	enjoy	social	relations,	and	value	his	own existence.	For	an	old	sofa,	I	don't	even	have	to	wonder	if	it	might	be	suffering	in	the	garage.	But	by calling	Tommy	a	person,	I	am	forced	to	ask	that	question.	Calling	someone	a	person	shifts	the	burden of	proof. The	final	challenge	to	address	is	whether	we	can	use	the	personhood	stereotype	to	decide	whether Tommy	is	a	person.	Here	I	think	it	is	useful	to	consider	other	debates	about	group	membership	based on	stereotype	profiles.	Consider	the	recent	popular	debate	about	transgender	women.	Some	criticized transgender	women	who	consider	themselves	women	because	they	are	not	'real	women.'	But	it	was quickly	pointed	out	that	there	are	many	ways	to	be	a	woman.	And	indeed,	what	the	debate	needed was	a	consideration	of	the	woman	stereotype;	without	this	information	it	is	impossible	to	argue	that one	is	a	woman.	Given	the	stereotype,	we	can	see	that	there	are	various	profiles	for	being	a	woman, and	that	some	of	the	properties	are	fulfilled	to	different	degrees,	and	some	of	the	properties	are fulfilled	not	at	all. As	in	the	transgender	woman	discussion,	we	need	to	use	the	stereotype	of	person	in	order	to determine	whether	Tommy	is	a	person.	We	can	use	it	to	construct	his	personhood	profile. The	science	of	chimpanzee	minds	is	not	very	old,	but	we	already	know	a	lot	about	chimpanzees.	We know	that	they	have	different	personalities	and	that	they	use	gesture	and	sound	to	communicate	in the	wild.	We	know	that	different	chimpanzee	groups	have	different	cultural	behaviors,	and	that chimpanzee	males	will	patrol	the	edges	of	their	territories	and	attack	and	sometimes	kill	members	of neighboring	groups.	We	know	that	chimpanzees	have	a	hierarchical	social	structure,	but	that	some members,	such	as	infants,	have	special	privileges.	We	know	that	chimpanzees	use	complex	tool	sets	to fish	for	termites.	We	know	that	chimpanzees	can	pass	delay	of	gratification	tasks,	mirror	selfrecognition	tasks,	and	mindreading	tasks-even	false	belief	tasks.	We	know	that	chimpanzee	facial expressions	are	correlated	with	emotional	expression,	and	that	chimpanzees	can	recognize	emotion	on others'	faces.	We	infer,	as	the	best	explanation	of	their	range	of	behavior,	that	chimpanzees	are conscious.	However,	we	don't	know	whether	they	value	their	own	existence,	and	it	is	likely	that	they lack	the	kind	of	life	narrative	Gary	Varner	thinks	is	required	for	personhood	(but	so	does	KC). And,	if	we	look	at	chimpanzees	held	in	captivity,	we	see	they	act	in	ways	that	suggest	they	don't	want to	be	there.	For	example,	Bruno,	a	chimpanzee	who	learned	American	Sign	Language	(ASL)	at	the University	of	Oklahoma	with	Roger	Fouts,	was	sent	to	a	biomedical	facility	after	funding	ran	out	for	the communication	study.	Many	years	later,	Mark	Bodamer,	one	of	the	members	of	the	language	project, came	to	visit	Bruno. Bruno	had	no	one	to	talk	to	all	those	years	in	the	biomedical	facility,	and	when	he saw	Mark	he	began	to	sign.	What	did	he	say?	KEY	OUT. Two	years	ago,	a	group	of	chimpanzees	at	the	Kansas	City	Zoo	made	a	break	for	it.	Randy	Wisthoff,	the director	of	the	zoo,	reports	the	they	were	led	by	one	chimpanzee	who	first	set	a	log	against	the	wall	to be	used	as	a	ladder,	and	then	"beckoned	to	another	six	chimps	to	join	him." Tommy	almost	certainly	doesn't	want	to	live	in	his	barren	cage.	If	he	had	been	taught	ASL,	or	if	he	had a	means	of	escape,	he	would	be	using	those	tools	to	gain	his	freedom.	But	he	can't	speak	for	himself, so	that	leaves	us	to	speak	for	him.	Categorizing	Tommy	as	a	person	means	he	should	be	given	a	habitat in	which	he	can	flourish,	where	he	has	the	opportunity	to	be	social	if	he	wants,	to	go	outside	or	to	stay inside,	to	act	as	he	chooses.	Tommy	is	not	a	normal	chimpanzee,	and	what	is	good	for	a	wild chimpanzee	would	likely	be	terrifying	for	Tommy.	We	have	the	obligation	to	provide	sanctuary	housing for	Tommy	so	that	he	can	fulfill	his	enculturated	chimpanzee	needs	as	best	as	possible.	Chimp	Haven	is one	such	sanctuary,	and	here	he	could	join	other	former	entertainers,	along	with	chimpanzees	retired from	biomedical	facilities. Personhood	is	not	a	redundant	category,	and	we	need	an	analysis	of	the	category	in	order	to determine	category	membership.	Seeing	that	chimpanzees	have	a	personhood	profile	allows	us	to argue	that	chimpanzees	like	Tommy	are	the	kind	of	individuals	who	should	count	under	the	law	who deserve	rights	under	the	law.	If	chimpanzee	personhood	is	a	matter	of	public	policy	that	needs	to	be decided	by	society,	then	learning	more	about	the	person	profiles	of	chimpanzees	will	be	essential	in making	this	case.	As	the	public	learns	what	scientists	have	come	to	see,	and	with	public	conversations about	what	counts	as	a	person,	our	society	can	make	another	ethical	transformation	that	will	be recognized	by	the	courts.	But	without	the	metaphysical	personhood	concept	to	rely	on,	we	will	have	a difficult	time	showing	that	chimpanzees	should	count	as	persons	under	the	law.