Transactions of The Luventicus Academy supplement dedicated to the dissemination of the works of Juan José Luetich Rosario – September 12th, 2012 Cogito ergo sisto, pertino ergo sum. IN PREVIOUS ISSUES of this volume, the problem of the human being who places his attention on entities other than himself was proposed. The solution to that problem identifi ed two actions: perceiving and grouping, which taken together are the same as thinking. In this issue, we deal with the subject of self-perception and that of the perception of others. These two new proposals shall respectively receive the names of the mirror problem and the peer problem. Solving each of these problems-as shall be seen-will lead the thinker to a conclusion. The Mirror Problem Among the entities that are a part of the universe, there are some that have a special characteristic. Those are the mirrors, meaning that they have refl ective surfaces, such as puddles of water or polished metal knives. It is because of these entities that the human being is aware of his own existence. It is worth mentioning that, while the existence of other beings is directly perceived, the existence of oneself is perceived indirectly. And when man recognizes himself as a being that perceives and groups entities together, he says: "I think." The Peer Problem After recognizing himself as a thinking being, a time will come when the human being fi nds another who is capable of doing the same, his peer. This will cause him to defi ne a new set, H, of which he is himself an element. Then he says: "I belong." All of Aristotle's senses are involved in perceiving another: the extended sense (tact), the chemical senses (taste and smell) and the wave senses (sight and hearing). Any of these will allow us to detect in another a "slightly different" being, that is, a being "with great similarities." The fi rst three are those used by a newborn to recognize its mother. The higher senses mature later in life. The proposal made here is relevant to that second stage in a person's development. Of these two titles it so happens that, just as thinking of entities other than oneself must be divided into two actions, so does thinking of oneself also need to be unfolded into: (i) thinking of oneself and of the other, and (ii) forming a set with the other. Conclusions: 1. The solution for the Mirror Problem ends by affi rming: "I think." However, this is followed by the observation that: "I am also on the board". And, as shown in the previous issue, to be on the board (tabula) is to exist. The concluVolumen I – Issue 3 ISSN 1666-7573 Online version: www.luventicus.org/transactions/jjluetich (continued on page 2) MAIN ARTICLE Gnoseology The process of knowledge consists of fi ve stages: one in which the human being passively associates entities at the level of the senses, and four actions (sentio, conglobo, speculo, congrego) which, in pairs, will produce defi nitions. The process of knowledge, which is the subject of gnoseology, then consists in perception and defi nition. The theory presented here borrows several elements from Rene Descartes own theory. (page 2) BACK PAGE INTERVIEW WITH JOTAJOTA Sitting on a park bench in the French Garden of Independence Park, we speak to Juan Jose Luetich about the origin of myths and of the common elements between myths and opinions. Myth and Opinion BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE After getting his title as a Music Teacher, his calling led him to explore many levels within the educational system: pre-secondary, secondary, pre-tertiary, tertiary, precollege, college and postgradual. Juan José Luetich, teacher PRINTING NOTES About this publication Transactions is a serial publication by the Luventicus Academy, an NGO created to promote information, education, science and culture. This supplement is dedicated to the dissemination of the works Juan José Luetich. The verb eμnai, which is used by Parmenides in "The Way of Truth," has two Indo-European roots in its history ("inactively being" and "actively being"), which had been confused before classic times. At the same time, another root, that of the latin verb "to stay", was reduplicated to give rise to the verb "to stay present". The theory of knowledge presented in this article is entirely consistent with this history. LINGUISIC NOTE The Etymology of Being (I) (page 3) (I think, therefore I exist; I belong, therefore I am.) Transactions of The Luventicus Academy – Suppl. JJL – Vol. I – No. 3Page 2 Gnoseology IN THIS ARTICLE a theory of knowledge is presented based on the defi nitions used in the "Glossary of Ontology" of the previous issue and on the conclusions of the front page article in this issue. The Whole is perceived by the human mind as being made up of elements of variable diversity. At fi rst sight, elements are associated by mathematical (quantity), physical (status) or chemical (substance) affi nity. This affi nity is established by ideas that precede sensory experience and can trace their origins to the very structure of the human brain. In order to simplify the problem, let us consider the case of similarity in form, which is a type of mathematical affi nity. (0) From each group of like elements, the mind takes only one, in a passive attitude at the level of the senses (the outermost organs of consciousness) which entails no defi nition whatsoever. What follows are the four actions that make up the process of knowledge (see the series of diagrams in the following column). In them the human being quits the passive attitude to intervene and contribute. (I) The mind focuses attention on some of the elements that have been identifi ed. In this action (sentio = to perceive), the universe is defi ned. (II) The mind groups together the elements of the universe by involving mental processes that result in the defi nition of concepts (conglobo = to group). (III) An element with a refl ective surface allows the human being to become aware of his own existence. This action (speculo = to look into the mirror, to contemplate) places the thinking being himself upon the board also and the universe is broadened. (IV) The presence of another being who is capable of perceiving and grouping elements, and who can be seen refl ected in the same mirror (second broadening of the universe), will cause the thinking being to defi ne a new set in which he is also included (congrego = to gather). These actions are simple actions that can be associated to produce other, more complex ones and simplify the statements. Thus, for example: sentio + conglobo = cogito. The complex action of thinking (= cogito) results from the sum of perceiving and grouping. On the other hand, belonging (= pertino) results from the sum of seeing oneself in the mirror and gathering together with the peer: speculo + congrego = pertino. It is then clear that, in this context, the verb "to belong" identifi es an action. (continued on page 3) PRIMERA PLANA Cogito ergo sisto, pertino ergo sum. sion then is: "If I think, I exist." 2. The solution for the Peer Problem ends by affi rming: "I belong." Followed by the observation: "I am also within a set." And, as shown in the previous issue, to belong to a set is to be (being something). The conclusion now is: "If I belong, I am." The two aforementioned conclusions were expressed in the form used by Augustine of Hippo: "Si fallor, sum," that is, "If I fail, I exist." While the form used by Rene Descartes is equally valid: "Cogito ergo sum," provided it is interpreted as "From the fact that I think, I conclude that I am." Both statements attest to the existence of the self itself and are therefore unidirectional, in the sense that they should not be interpreted backwards. That is why the following expressions are false: "I exist if I fail", and, "I exist because I think." The conclusions reached from the problems presented in this article may then be formulated as follows. The Mirror Problem Cogito ergo sisto. I think, therefore I exist. cogito ⇒ sisto The Peer Problem Pertino ergo sum. I belong, therefore I am. pertino ⇒ sum Formally, the unidirectional connector uses the implication symbol: "⇒." (viene de página 1) Ask Jotajota Miguel Ángel from Lima (PE) asks: -What is the best defi nition for "the divisor of a number"? -First we should remember that in the article called "To be and to belong" we spoke of "the natural divisors of a natural number n". In that case, the defi nition A3 ("natural numbers that reduce n such that the results also belong to the set") is the more elaborate one. This defi nition, for example, makes it simpler to introduce the concept of "prime number." In fact, according to it, a natural number is a prime number when it does not have any divisors. However, the label of "best" should never be applied to a defi nition: given any two clear defi nitions, neither can be better than the other. Although it is true that if a defi nition is established for a specifi c application-as is the case with A3 when used to study prime numbers-, it may be more practical for that purpose than others, we should still abstain from using the adjective "best." Send your question to: jjluetich@luventicus.org Lab Computational Chemistry www.luventicus.org/lab SPONSORED BY Transactions of The Luventicus Academy – Suppl. JJL – Vol. I – No. 3 Page 3 The Etymology of Being (I) THE GREEK VERB eμnai (eʺmo = I am, eμ = you/ thou are, ®sto(in) = he is, ®smTMn = we are, ®stTM = you/ye are, eʺso(in) = they are) had the same two senses in ancient times as the verb "to be" has in English today, that is, those mentioned in the "Glossary of Ontology" of the previous issue (1a and 1b). [The from used for the third person singular, could use an n (®stin) at the end, as in the stanzas of Parmenides' poem that were included in the fi rst issue.] In Latin this also happened sometimes with the verb esse (sum = I am, es < ess = you/thou are, est = he is, sumus = we are, éstis = you/ye are, sunt = they are). These Latin and Greek verbs are derived from the Indo-European root *h1és-. The forms for this verb, which arise from comparison of several languages, are: *h1és-mi = I am, *h1és-si = you/thou are, *h1és-ti = he is, *h1s-mós = we are, *h1s-th1é = you/ye are and *h1s-énti = they are. The irregularities for the Latin verb are shown in the following table. The second and third person singular are regular: *h1és-si > *h1ési > es, *h1és-ti > est. The second and third person plural followed a longer route: *h1s-th1é > *h1sté > *sté > *este > estis, *h1s-énti > *sénti > *sonti > sunt. What happened to the fi rst person plural is harder to reconstruct. According to the suggestion made by Leonard R. Palmer (1906–1984) in his book, "The Latin Language", changes in the third person plural would have had an infl uence over the evolution of the fi rst person plural: *h1s-mós > *smós > *somos > sumus, and that, in turn, would have dragged the fi rst person singular along with it: *h1és-mi > *ésmi > sum. Howsoever this history might have been, it is obvious that the plural and singular fi rst persons have interacted. Nonetheless, no irregularities appear in the Greek verb. Another very important Indo-European root in philosophy is *steh2- < *stHeh2-, from which the latin verb stāre = to stay, (stō = I stay, stās = you/thou stay, stat = he stays, stāmus = we stay, stātis = you/ye stay, stant = they stay) derives. No Greek verb is directly derived from this root. But for the form that resulted from the reduplication, *sísteh2- < *stísteh2-, stay present, (*sísteh2-mi = I stay present, *sísteh2-si = you/thou stay present, *sísteh2-ti = he stays present, *sísteh2-mos = we stay present, *sísteh2-th1e = you/ye stay present y *sísteh2-enti = they stay present), there is one. It is the verb stånai (Òsthmi < sstami (Homeric, sth) = I present myself, Òsthq = you/ thou present yourself, Òsthsi(n) = he presents himself, Òstamen = we present ourselves, Òstate = you/ye present yourselves, st si(n) = they present themselves). The interesting thing is that the same root resulted in the Latin verb sístere = to appear, to present, to stand (sistō = I appear, sistis = you/thou appear, sistit = he appears, sístimus = we appear, sístitis = you/ye appear, sistunt = they appear). The root *steh2-, would reference to stay in the case of beings that perform the action speculo (those which actively are). For those beings that not perform the action speculo (those which inactively are), there was another root, *bh2u- < *bh2uH-. Both roots were already being confused in the late Indo-European, that is, the difference (which was much more than just a subtlety) between the action of appearing of inanimate entities (those that inactively are) and the action of appearing of animate entities (those that actively are) was not noted by that time. The greek verb f¥ein (f¥v, f¥eiq, f¥eiq, f¥omen, f¥ete, f¥oysi(n)), is derived from the root *bh2uwhich had the meaning of to arise, to emerge. In Latin, traces of this root are still found in the form fuí of the verb esse. Everything that has been said so far is shown in the following diagram, where the theory of knowledge that was described in the main article can be seen to be entirely consistent with the structure of Indo-European verbs: (1) to be and to stay are independent ideas (roots) [in the "Glossary" it said: "(the elements in the grey region) 'stay there' but they not are"]; (2) the verb "to exist" arises from the reduplication of the verb "to stay" (differentiation between to be and to be present) and therefore the idea of "to exist" is a subsequent idea to that of "to be", which probably served to distinguish "to stay present" from "to stay" [in the "Glossary" it said: "essence is more than mere existence"]; (3) in Indo-European there were two verbs for "to be", one for inanimate entities and another for animate entities [in the front page article a different proposal is made for each one of them, cogito versus pertino, which resolves three, by no means minor, issues: the sense that should be given to the words «inanimate», when associated to «Nature», «soul» and «thinking»]. MAIN ARTICLE Gnoseology Gnoseology is the fi eld that studies the process of knowledge, which consists of two actions: perception and defi nition, successively applied to entities different of the thinking being and to the thinking being himself (and his peers). Together with semiology and anthropology, it is part of that body of knowledge called the humanities, which is not the nucleous of philosophy (ontology-dialectics-logic) but is linked to it because its subject is directly related-although in a different way-with being. Semiology is mostly concerned with the action cogito; anthropology, with the action pertino. Many theories of knowledge have been developed throughout the history of Western thought. Each philosopher has created or adhered to one. The theory showcased in this article owes some of its elements to Plato, to the great French philosopher Rene Descartes-in whose honor the title was chosen-, to the English thinker John Locke (1632–1704), and to the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant. The contents of the article was summarized in the diagram. (continued from page 2) Ask Jotajota (cont.) Alexander from Medellín (CO) asks: -What is the difference between semantics and semiology? -Semantics is the study of the relationship between words and their meaning. Therefore, since words are a kind of sign and their sense is a kind of meaning, semiology enclose semantics. Taking into account what was said in the "Glossary of Ontology" of the previous issue, semantics is also closely related to ontology. For example, when we ask: "What is a sport?" both, semantics and ontology will provide answers. The fi rst tends to be a dictionarylike defi nition while the second is more rigorous, encompassing and clarifying. Send your question to: jjluetich@luventicus.org to be inactively *bh2u- *h1esto be actively f¥ein to arise esse to be e nai to be to be (1a) existir (1b) *steh2to stay st re to stay *sísteh2to stay present stånai to present oneself sístere to appear de nition perception gnoseology conclusion se m io lo gy an th ro po lo gy si st o co gi to pe rt in o su m se nt io co ng lo bo sp ec ul o co ng re go Indo-European Latin Greek *h1és-mi sum e mo *h1és-si es e *h1és-ti est ®sto *h1s-mós sumus ®smTMn *h1s-th1é éstis ®stTM *h1s-énti sunt e so Transactions of The Luventicus Academy – Suppl. JJL – Vol. I – No. 3Page 4 During a beautiful early spring afternoon at the beginning of September, we fi nd ourselves in the French Garden of Independence Park, in Rosario. We are here to speak with Juan Jose Luetich about philosophy, sitting on a park bench, surrounded by meticulously trimmed bushes, close to the fountain head. -We have received many new comments and questions regarding the subjects covered in the fi rst two issues. It is encouraging to see that so many people are interested in philosophy. I am one of those who believes that a system of ideas that overcomes the current ways of thinking can improve the world. -I share in that hope, and I am going to invest all of my strength into making this project a reality. -What is the origin of myths? -Myths are the products of a time in which accounts were not recorded in writing. The problem then was how to preserve them. And tradition had shown us that writing songs was a good solution for that, since musical rhythm and rimes-both of them, repetitious in nature-, would cause you to remember the words (the lyrics). On the other hand, the subject of a song is better remembered when it is presented in the form of simple ideas joined together in unusual ways. The art of ingeniously stating complex ideas in simple terms is that of the poets. That is why rhythm (and/or rhyme) and poetic language have been joined since then. The problem with poems is not in the rhythm/ rhyme-in spite of the artifi ciality of that recourse-but in the poetic language itself. Because if whoever receives the message that was coded by the poet has no knowledge of the code technique used, he may decode it in his own way and interpret almost anything from it. A good poet tries to avoid this by allowing only the interpretations he wants, but it is clear that this is not always accomplished. -What do myths and opinions have in common? -Their multiplicity. Myths have multiple interpretations, those that are wanted and those that are unwanted by the poets. While opinions are, by defi nition, numerous. And multiplicity-which may come from reproduction, in the case of something that can be reproduced (for example, an article that is mass produced), or by counterfeiting, in the case of something that is irreplaceable (for example, a work of art)-entails devaluation. Observe that diversity (the existence of many different things) is wealth; however, multiplicity (the repetition of the same) is abundance, not wealth. The concept of abundance is more encompassing. Let us consider two real-life examples: currency, compared to the goods and services for which it can be exchanged, will lose value during an infl ationary process; a counterfeit statue, while its falseness remains unknown, will have a certain value, but that value will be lost as soon as it becomes apparent that it is counterfeit, because there could be thousands of counterfeit statues, while the original one is unique. -Is it then simply a matter of quantity? -Yes, in principle. But then there is a matter of names. We can give a name to the original sculpture: for example "the largest of Gerbino's Venuses." [I say this because I am looking at one of the sculptures in the fountain from here.] But if we were to replicate that sculpture, what name would we give each replica? If I raise a rabbit, I can give it a name. If the rabbit reproduces and I fi nd a thousand, almost identical rabbits in my yard someday, I may be able to recognize him, but I would not be able to name the others. They would be hidden in the crowd. That is why the ancients speak of "what is hidden" in the sense of "that which is unnamable." -I have always admired the acuteness of the ancients. The image of something hidden is a good one. I cannot think of one better for the numerous. -I like to think of that which is hidden as "that which is forgotten", that is, "that which cannot be kept." If something is hidden, it cannot be named, therefore, it cannot be kept and is forgotten. This is what happens with false structures. You quickly forget they exist. They return to the chaos of the unnamable things. -I liked that image very much. Thank you for sharing it. We walked several meters, to the corner of Balcarce and Pellegrini avenue. We said goodbye and I returned to my studio to make a clean draft of my notes. Juan Jose Luetich, once again, left me in thought. I think the subject of this dialog deserves a space in the next one. INTERVIEW WITH JOTAJOTA Myth and Opinion About this publication Transactions is a serial publication about the foundations and philosophy of science of The Luventicus Academy, an NGO promoting information, education, science and culture. This supplement is dedicated to the dissemination of the works of Juan José Luetich. The articles published in this issue are: "Cogito ergo sisto, pertino ergo sum" (2005), "Gnoseology" (2006) y "The Etymology of Being" (1996 –2006). Página web: www.luventicus.org/transactions. Correo electrónico: transactions@luventicus.org. Juan José Luetich, teacher by vocation, by choice, by training, by certifi cation and by exercising the trade, began his career when, while still very young, he received the title of Music Professor (specialty: The Piano), recognized by the Superior Government of the Province of Santa Fe. While taking his specialization courses he taught Music Theory at the "Josefi na Prelli" Conservatory. During his time as a university student, he served as a teacher in the "Rosario Study Center and worked as a private tutor. The subject matters he covered were: Language and Mathematics for introductory high school courses; Mathematics, Physics, Cosmography, Chemistry, Merceology, Biology, Language and Literature, for high school and precollege level; Algebra, Analytical Geometry, Calculus, Differential Equations, Numeric Methods, Discrete Mathematics, FORTRAN Programming, Statistics, Probabilities, Mechanics, Calorimetry, Acoustics, Optics, Electricity, Magnetism, Quantum Physics, Astronomy, Electrical Engineering, Digital Circuits, Biological Physics, Statistics, Materials Science, Civil Structures, Industrial Installations, General Chemistry, Inorganic Chemistry, Organic Chemistry, Biological Chemistry, Analytical Chemistry, Thermodynamics, Physical Chemistry, Chemical Kinetics, Transport Phenomena, Reactor Design and Control Theory, for students in various faculties and for university students seeking careers in engineering, systems, architecture, agricultural sciences, veterinarian sciences, medicine, dentistry, pharmacy and biochemistry. During his postgraduate studies he also gave private classes in Partial Derivative Equations, Callculus of Variations, Finite Elements, Fluid Mechanics, Continuum Mechanics, Statistical Physics, Thermal Machines, Quantum Chemistry and Organic Synthesis. After founding the Luventicus Academy, he gave various online courses: Numbers Theory, Geometric Inequalities, Finite Differential Equations, Differential Geometry, Topology, Atomic Models, Solid State Theory, Computational Chemistry, Non-Lineal Systems and LISP Programming. In other institutions he currently teach or has taught the following subjects: Physics, Chemistry and Information Technology, in a mid level school (for Administration and Humanities); Research Paper and Presentation Techniques, at a Philosophy school (pre-tertiary level); Algebra and Geometry, Professional Techniquesl and Chemical Technologies for a higher technical degree in Electronics; Quantitative Techniques (Operational Investigation) and Research Methodology, at a Business Sciences faculty (university level); Unitary Processes (Reactor Analysis), at a Chemistry and Engineering faculty (university level); Air Transport of Contaminants, for a Master in Chemistry (postgraduate level). Juan Jose Luetich also became interested in didactic matters and wrote countless articles that encompass his observations and proposals, among them one regarding the teaching of chemistry to blind students. He has given classes in English for scientifi c and technical subjects. He is the author of various textbooks and has directed a great many graduate and postgraduate theses. He has also worked in creating and modifying study plans. In that respect, he has been consulted by institutions within the country and abroad. The Luventicus Academy Príncipe Pedro Building Buenos Aires 633, 2nd Floor S2000CEA Rosario, Argentine Republic +54 341 4487316 www.luventicus.org academy@luventicus.org ©2012 Juan José Luetich Printed in the workshops of Tecnigráfi ca Germán Schultze (gschultze@luventicus.org)