Isaac	Newton	(1642-1727) Zvi	Biener Article	summary Isaac	Newton	is	best	known	as	a	mathematician	and	physicist. He	invented	the	calculus,	discovered universal	gravitation,	and	made	significant	advances	in	theoretical	and	experimental	optics.	His master-work	on	gravitation,	the	Principia,	is	often	hailed	as	the	crowning	achievement	of	the scientific	revolution.	His	significance	for	philosophers,	however,	extends	beyond	the	philosophical implications	of	his	scientific	discoveries.	Newton	was	an	able	and	subtle	philosopher,	working	at	a time	when	science	was	not	yet	recognized	as	an	activity	distinct	from	philosophy.	He	engaged	with the	work	of	Rene	Descartes	REP	link	and	G.	W.	Leibniz	REP	link,	and	showed	sensitivity	to	the	work of	John	Locke	REP	link,	Francis	Bacon	REP	link,	Pierre	Gassendi	REP	link,	and	Henry	More	REP link,	to	name	just	a	few.	In	his	time,	Newton	was	not	perceived	as	a	scientific	outsider,	but	as	an active	and	knowledgeable	participant	in	philosophical	debates. Nevertheless,	Newton's	work	helped	precipitate	the	separation	of	physics	from philosophy.	The Principia	defined	a	program	for	physical	research	that	persists	to	this	day,	but	its	early	reception, particularly	among	Cartesians	and	Leibnizians,	was	difficult.	To	defend	this	program	from	criticism, Newton	and	his	successors	portrayed	their	work	as	essentially	autonomous	from	the	philosophical demands	of	their	contemporaries,	thus	creating	modern	science. Even	without	the	Principia,	Newton's	place	in	history	would	have	been	guaranteed	by	his	work	in optics	and	mathematics.	Newton	discovered	that	white	light	was	composed	of	rays	from	the	entire visible	spectrum	and	ingeniously	measured	a	microscopic	property	of	light	he	called	"fits,"	a forerunner	to	our	"wavelength."	His	work	in	pure	mathematics	was	ground-breaking:	he	invented the	calculus	(independently	of	Leibniz	REP	link)	and	advanced	both	algebra	and	analytic	geometry. His	overall	success	in	natural	philosophy,	which	in	his	hands	was	applied	mathematics,	was	largely due	to	his	unparalleled	skill	as	a	mathematician. Newton	also	engaged	in	activities	that	belong	to	neither	modern	science	nor	modern	philosophy.	His work	on	biblical	chronology,	interpretation	of	ancient	prophecies,	and	alchemy	took	up	much	of	his intellectual	efforts,	but	this	work	was	largely	ignored	in	the	century	after	his	death	by	an Enlightenment	REP	link	ideology	occupied	with	painting	its	own	past.	Newton	was	partly responsible	for	this	historiographical	blindspot.	He	kept	most	of	his	'esoteric'	beliefs,	such	as	his rejection	of	the	Trinity,	hidden.	He	promoted	a	public	image	that	placed	him	in	the	tradition	of	Galileo REP	LINK	and	Huygens,	figures	more	narrowly	focused	on	physico-mathematics	than	he	was. 1	Life	and	Primary	Philosophical	Texts Isaac	Newton	was born	on	December	25,	1642	in	Woolsthorpe,	Linconshire.	In	1654,	he	began	his education	at	the	King's	School,	Grantham.	He	was	admitted	to	Cambridge	in	1661	and	began	working on	mathematics	in	1664.	Newton's	earliest	philosophical	writings	are	his	Cambridge	student	notes (Certain	Philosophical	Questions	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(1983),	1661–1664	and	'Waste	Book'	Link	to Newton,	I.	(1965),	1664/5).	They	are	eclectic	and	span	topics	from	the	nature	of	imagination	to "oyly	bodies." In	the	summer	of	1665,	after	receiving	his	BA,	Newton	traveled	to	Woolsthorpe	but	was	unable	to return	until	the	spring	of	1667,	due	to	an	outbreak	of	the	plague	in	Cambridge.	In	the	academic solitude	of	Woolsthope,	Newton	established	the	fundamentals	of	the	calculus,	worked	out	basic problems	concerning	the	moon's	motion,	and	experimentally	demonstrated	the	heterogeneity	of white	light.	The	year	of	1665-6	is	often	called	his	"miracle	year."	He	received	his	MA	in	1668	and became	Lucasian	Professor	of	Mathematics	in	1669. Newton	published	his	finding	on	the	nature	of	light	and	colors	in	a	series	of	papers	in	the Philosophical	Transactions	of	the	Royal	Society	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(1958)	(1672–1676).	In	them	he also	articulated	his	conception	of	a	natural	philosophy	established	by	means	of	mathematics	and experiment,	one	that	four	decades	later	he	would	later	call	his	"experimental	philosophy"	(see	LINK TO	SECTION	2).	Sometime	between	1668	and	1684,	Newton	also	authored	a	work	known	as	"De Gravitatione."	Link	to	Newton,	(2004)	Although	it	was	unpublished	in	his	lifetime,	it	contains Newton's	most	nuanced	critique	of	Cartesian	philosophy	and	a	nascent	formulation	of	the	principles on	which	the	Principia	was	based. Newton	began	work	on	the	Principia	in	1684,	after	prompting	from	Edmond	Halley.	The	Principia (1687)	Link	to	Newton,	(1997)	used	novel	mathematical	techniques	and	a	novel	theory	of	force	to show	that	diverse	phenomena	such	as	free	fall,	planetary	orbits,	the	tides,	and	cometary	motion	were all	due	to	the	action	of	a	single	force:	universal	gravity.	The	goal	of	the	work	was	to	finally	settle	a central	question	of	early-modern	natural	philosophy:	was	the	sun	or	the	earth	at	the	center	of	the "System	of	the	World"?	With	the	theory	of	gravity	at	hand,	Newton	was	able	to	answer	that	question: it	was	the	sun	–	or	more	accurately,	a	point	very	close	to	it	–	that	was	truly	at	the	center. Although	the	Principia	was	immediately	hailed	as	a	mathematical	success,	many,	particularly	on	the continent,	were	skeptical	that	it	had	properly	established	the	existence	of	the	gravitational	force	(See LINK	TO	SECTION	2).	With	an	eye	toward	convincing	his	critics,	Newton	began	revising	the	Principia in	the	1690s.	The	revisions	were	ultimately	abandoned	and	a	second	edition	postponed	until	1713, but	Newton's	extant	drafts	-	particularly	the	"Classical	Scholia"	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(2001)	and "Tempus	et	Locus"	Link	to	McGuire,	J.	E.	(1978)	-	provide	unparalleled	access	to	his	views	on	the ontology	of	space,	time,	and	force	(see	LINK	TO	SECTION	4). Newton	hoped	to	convince	his	critics	that	his	method	in	the	Principia	was	sound	by	revising	the causal	and	inductive	principles	to	which	the	argument	for	universal	gravitation	appealed	(see	LINK TO	SECTION	3).	In	the	first	edition	of	the	Principia	they	were	labeled	as	"Hypotheses,"	but	in	the second	(1713)	they	were	enshrined	as	"Rules	of	Philosophizing."	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(2004).	The rules	were	highly	influential	for	scientific	methodology	in	the	18thand	19th-centuries,	particularly in	England	and	Scotland.	Newton	also	added	a	"General	Scholium"	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(2004).	to	the second	edition	that	articulated	his	views	on	God's	relation	to	creation.	The	scholium	exemplifies	most profoundly	Newton's	devotion	to	arguments	from	design	and	his	belief	that	the	Principia	was	a	work in	natural	theology.	Similar	sentiments	were	diffused	throughout	his	work	in	alchemy	and	biblical interpretation.	However,	the	alchemical	work	was	known	to	only	a	few	confidants,	and	the	biblical work	published	only	posthumously,	as	Chronology	of	Ancient	Kingdoms	Amended	Link	to	Newton,	I. (1728)	(1728)	and	Observations	upon	the	Prophecies	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(1733)	(1733). Newton	also	engaged	in	correspondence	that	clarified	his	views	for	his	contemporaries.	Most	notable are	his	exchanges	with	the	theologian	Richard	Bentley	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(2004).	(1694)	and	Roger Cotes	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(1959–77),	the	editor	of	the	second	edition	of	the	Principia	(1712),	on	the nature	of	matter	and	the	inductive	and	conceptual	basis	of	the	laws	of	motion. The	success	of	the	Principia	elevated	Newton's	social	standing.	He	was	elected	to	represent Cambridge	in	Parliament	in	1689	and	1701,	and	became	Warden	of	the	Mint	in	1696	and	its	Master in	1699.	In	1703	he	was	elected	President	of	the	Royal	Society	and	was	knighted	in	1705. In	the	1710s,	Newton	formulated	a	fourth	"Rule	of	Philosophizing"	and	modified	the	existing	three (see	LINK	TO	SECTION	3).	He	authored,	but	chose	not	to	publish,	a	set	of	definitions	intended	to precede	those	rules	(the	so-called	"Body	and	Void"	Link	to	McGuire,	J.	E.	(1966)	drafts,	1715– 1716).	In	the	third	edition	of	the	Principia	(1726)	all	four	rules	strike	a	decidedly	cautious,	epistemic note.	They	foreswear	uncritical	realism	about	ontology	and	uncritical	confidence	in	the	results	of physical	inquiry.	The	position	is	also	articulated	in	Newton's	correspondence	with	Leibniz	Link	to Koyré,	A.	and	Cohen,	I.	B.	(1962)	(through	the	mediation	of	Abbé	Conti,	1715),	the	Leibniz-Clarke correspondence	Link	to	G.	W.	Leibniz	and	Clarke,	Samuel	(1980)	(1715–1716), and	his	drafts	for Pierre	Des	Maizeuax's	printing	of	the	Leibniz-Clarke	correspondence	link	to	Koyré,	A.	and	Cohen,	I. B.	(1962)	(1719–1720).	The	Leibniz-Clarke	correspondence	is	particularly	noteworthy	since	it	spells out	the	Leibnizian	and	Newtonian	positions	on	the	nature	of	space,	time,	God,	matter,	and	physical action. Newton's	queries	to	the	Opticks	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(1730)	are	also	philosophically	rich,	and	were expanded	with	each	edition	of	the	work	(1704,	1706,	and	particularly	1717).	In	them,	Newton reiterated	his	commitment	to	natural	theology	and	addressed	most	directly	his	belief	that	all	gross matter	was	composed	of	insensibly	minute,	atomic	particles.	He	sketched	a	broad	vision	for	an inductively-based	experimental	philosophy.	While	the	Principia	set	the	framework	for	the development	of	terrestrial	and	celestial	mechanics,	the	vision	outlined	in	the	queries	set	the framework	for	natural	science	more	broadly.	In	no	small	measure	because	of	the	tremendous influence	of	the	work,	natural	science	became	identified	with	the	search	for	the	forces	of	nature. In	the	1700s	and	1710s,	Newton	was	also	embroiled	in	a	priority	dispute	with	Leibniz	over	the invention	of	the	calculus.	Although	Newton	made	his	mathematical	breakthroughs	in	the	1660s,	he reported	on	them	only	briefly	in	the	Principia	and	did	not	publish	them	fully	until	1704	(as	addenda to	the	Opticks),	a	full	twenty	years	after	Leibniz's	first	calculus	publication.	Newton	reviewed	the dispute	anonymously,	but,	of	course,	in	his	own	favor	in	the	anonymously	published	"An	Account	of the	Book	Entitled	Commercium	Epistolicum"	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(1715)	(1715). 2	Newtonian	Mathematical	and	Experimental	Method When	Newton	entered	Cambridge	in	1661,	the	scholastic-Aristotelianism	REP	Link:	Aristotelianism in	the	17th	century	that	had	dominated	intellectual	life	in	Europe	was	already	severely	weakened. Although	no	doctrine	emerged	as	a	clear	replacement,	a	group	of	approaches	we	now	label	as	broadly 'mechanical'	was	gaining	acceptance.	Its	advocates,	among	them	Descartes	REP	link	and	Hobbes	REP link,	sought	to	explain	all	physical	phenomena	by	appeal	to	only	bodily	motion	and	contact	action, with	bodies	understood	only	through	mathematically-tractable	properties	like	size	and	shape. At	the	same	time,	another	more	'experimental'	approach	was	also	gaining	acceptance,	particularly	in England.	Rooted	in	the	writing	of	Francis	Bacon	REP	link,	this	approach	eschewed	any	a	priori commitments	to	the	nature	of	matter	and	causation,	and	instead	promoted	broad	and	open-ended experimentation.	It	aimed	at	letting	experiments	themselves,	not	antecedent	philosophical considerations,	determine	which	features	of	the	natural	world	were	relevant	for	physical explanation. Newton	combined	elements	of	both	approaches.	We	see	the	combination	in	his	1672	paper	on	light and	colors	Link	to	Newton,	I.	(1958).	Newton	argued	that	he	had	established	with	certainty	that white	light	was	composed	of	rays	that	refracted	differentially	when	passed	through	a	prism,	and	that to	each	degree	of	'refrangibility'	corresponded	a	different	color.	The	claim	to	certainty	jarred	his contemporaries.	Christiaan	Huygens	objected	that	Newton	had	not	shown	the	true	nature	of	colors, since	he	had	not	provided	a	mechanical	'hypothesis	by	motion'	to	explain	them.	For	Huygens,	no explanation	was	complete	that	did	not	appeal	to	the	fundamental	ontology	of	matter	and	motion. Robert	Hooke	objected	that	Newton's	account	improperly	assumed	a	corpuscular	theory	of	light. Hooke	held	that	Newton's	account	of	light	could	not	be	certain,	since	alternate	accounts	- particularly	Hooke's	own	wave	theory	of	light	-	could	explain	the	phenomena	just	as	well. Newton	responded	that	he	did	not	intend	to	offer	an	account	of	the	fundamental	nature	of	light	but that	he	nevertheless	had	indubitably	established	that	light	had	certain	"immutable	qualities"	that exemplified	well-defined	mathematical	relationships.	The	juxtaposition	of	the	two	claims	lies	at	the heart	of	his	philosophy	of	science.	Newton	held	that	by	bracketing	off	questions	about	underlying natures	one	could	focus	on	higher-level,	mathematically-tractable	entities	and	properties	(like	'ray' and	'refrangibility')	whose	characteristics	experiments	could	establish	with	certainty.	What	could	not be	established	with	certainty	was	to	be	bracketed	off.	For	him,	it	was	better	to	make	true	claims about	higher-level	items	than	to	make	speculative	claims	about	their	lower-level	bases.	Moreover, experiments	themselves	showed	both	which	entities	and	properties	to	focus	on	and	which	to	bracket off. Newton	exemplified	this	attitude	most	famously	in	his	defense	of	universal	gravitation	(the	idea	that any	two	bodies	mutually	attract	with	a	force	directly	proportional	to	their	masses	and	inversely proportional	to	the	square	of	the	distance	between	them).	His	adversaries	claimed	that	he	failed	to establish	the	existence	of	universal	gravitation	because	he	did	not	explain	its	nature-particularly	its ability	to	act	at	a	distance-by	appeal	to	fundamental	mechanical	properties	and	contact	action.	For Newton,	however,	universal	gravitation	stood	independently	of	whatever	its	deeper	explanation	was (if	there	was	one).	The	theory's	inductive	grounding	in	empirical	evidence,	not	fundamental	natures, was	sufficient	for	establishing	that	it	really	existed	and	had	the	mathematically-tractable	properties ascribed	to	it.	Regarding	a	deeper	explanation,	Newton	preferred	to	"feign	no	hypotheses." In	the	case	of	gravity,	the	role	of	mathematics	in	establishing	the	inductive	link	between	evidence	and theory	is	particularly	noteworthy.	In	Books	I	and	II	of	the	Principia,	Newton	articulated	a	general theory	of	motion	that	allowed	given	motions	to	measure	the	theoretical	parameters	of	the	force	laws causing	them,	and	theoretical	parameters	of	force	laws	to	entail	the	resulting	motions.	One	of	his innovations	was	to	use	inferences	that	held	both	approximately	and	exactly,	with	the	exact	inference being	a	special	case	of	the	approximate. In	Book	III	of	the	Principia,	Newton	used	these	general	inferences,	alongside	data	about	actual motions,	to	determine	which	forces	actually	existed.	He	used	an	iterative	process	of	increasingly accurate	approximations	to	approach	real-world	motions	piecemeal.	In	this	process,	a	motion described	by	an	initial	approximation	provided	approximate	information	about	the	force	law responsible	for	it.	In	essence,	it	"measured"	the	parameters	of	that	force	law.	Then,	by	taking	the approximately	measured	force	law	to	hold	exactly,	each	approximation	provided	a	baseline	for	the next,	iterative	approximation.	The	next	approximation	was	then	used	to	measure,	now	even	more finely,	the	parameters	of	the	force	law	that	could	cause	the	more	finely	specified	motion.	The	process was	then	repeated.	Newton's	argument	for	universal	gravitation	was	not	that	these	approximations were	able	to	get	increasingly	closer	to	actually	observed	motions.	Rather,	it	was	that	each	step	in	the approximation	sequence	measured	the	very	same	force	law:	the	inverse-square	law	of	universal gravitation.	The	iterative	process	provided	repeated	confirmation	that	the	same	force	was responsible	for	all	celestial	motion.	In	the	Principia,	Newton	had	only	carried	the	approximation procedure	so	far,	but	the	subsequent	development	of	his	theory	confirmed	his	initial	conclusions. This	complex	interplay	of	mathematics	and	observational	data	was	lost	on	nearly	all	of	his contemporaries.	It	constituted	a	truly	new,	mathematical	and	experimental,	natural	philosophy. 3	Universality,	Certainty,	and	The	Rules	of	Philosophizing Newton's	refusal	to	ground	natural	philosophical	explanations	in	fundamental	ontology	was	not without	methodological	problems.	The	"Rules	of	Philosophizing"	address	these	problems. Newton	showed	in	the	Principia	that	free	fall	on	Earth	and	the	motion	of	the	moon	were	both	due	to an	inverse-square	force	directed	at	the	center	of	the	earth.	He	also	showed	that	the	motions	of	the moons	of	Jupiter	and	Saturn	were	due	to	inverse-square	forces	directed	at	the	centers	of	Jupiter	and Saturn,	and	that	the	motions	of	the	planets	were	due	to	inverse-square	forces	directed	at	the	center of	the	sun.	Since	all	these	forces	had	the	same	mathematical	form,	and	since	we	call	the	cause	of falling	bodies	on	Earth	"gravity,"	Newton	argued	that	they	are	all	instances	of	"gravity."	In	addition, since	all	bodies	on	earth	gravitate	towards	the	Earth,	the	same	must	be	true	everywhere:	all	bodies must	gravitate.	More	sophisticated	considerations	regarding	cometary	motion	and	the	mutual perturbations	of	the	planets	further	showed	that	the	gravitational	force	extends	to	all	distances,	so	it is	everywhere.	Since	the	gravitational	force	affects	everything	and	is	present	everywhere,	Newton concluded	that	it	was	truly	universal.	He	also	demonstrated	that	the	gravitational	force	is proportional	only	to	a	body's	mass,	and	no	other	property. Is	the	inference	to	universality	justified?	First,	how	do	we	know	that	the	same	force	affects	all	bodies? Perhaps	the	force	that	explains	free-fall	on	Earth	and	the	force	that	explains	Saturn's	motion	around the	Sun	are	mathematically	similar,	but	physically	different.	Perhaps	each	planet	has	a	force	peculiar to	itself.	Second,	how	do	we	know	that	all	bodies	gravitate?	Perhaps	there	are	bodies	that	do	not. Perhaps	some	bodies	respond	only	to	Jupiter's	force,	but	not	to	Saturn's.	Third,	how	can	we	know that	this	force	is	truly	everywhere,	to	the	farthest	reaches	of	the	universe? Newton	was	clearly	cognizant	of	these	questions.	He	offered	"Rules	of	Reasoning"	(called "Hypotheses"	in	the	first	edition)	that	instruct	us	to	discard	the	possibilities	they	raise.	The	rules delimit	what	inferences	we	can	legitimately	make	in	the	course	of	natural	inquiry	(Newton,	1997,	p. 794–6): Rule	1	No	more	causes	of	natural	things	should	be	admitted	than	are	both	true	and	sufficient	to	explain	their	phenomena. Rule	2	Therefore,	the	causes	assigned	to	natural	effects	of	the	same	kind	must	be,	so	far	as	possible	the	same. The	first	two	rules	recommend	ontological	minimalism	and	answer	the	first	problem	above.	Given, for	example,	that	the	forces	towards	the	Earth	and	Saturn	have	the	same	mathematical	form	and	can account	for	observed	motions	around	the	two	planets,	the	two	rules	entail	that	unless	we	have	good reason	to	suppose	that	they	are	not	of	the	same	kind,	we	should	discard	the	possibility.	The	third	rule (added	in	the	second	edition),	addresses	the	second	and	third	problems: Rule	3	Those	qualities	of	bodies	that	cannot	be	increased	and	diminished	and	that	belong	to	all	bodies	on	which	experiments	can	be made	should	be	taken	as	qualities	of	all	bodies	universally. The	rule	licenses	inductive	generalizations	from	a	limited	set	of	instances	to	all	instances:	since	we can	find	no	terrestrial	or	celestial	body	that	fails	to	respond	to	the	gravitational	force	in	proportion	to its	mass,	we	can	conclude	that	this	is	true	for	all	bodies	everywhere,	even	ones	for	which	we	have	no evidence.	Moreover,	since	bodies	respond	to	the	gravitational	force	at	all	distance	we	have encountered,	we	can	conclude	that	they	respond	to	the	gravitational	force	at	all	distances.	The "increased	and	diminished"	criterion	is	meant	to	capture	those	qualities	which	no	natural	process can	change,	qualities	that	are	therefore	inseparably	connected	to	bodies.	Newton	believed	this	rule was	"the	foundation	of	all	natural	philosophy." Newton	reiterated	the	idea	that	inherently	risky	inductive	generalizations	can	nevertheless	yield certain	conclusions	in	the	third	edition.	He	made	explicit	there	a	tenet	he	had	held	for	years: Rule	4:	In	experimental	philosophy,	propositions	gathered	from	phenomena	by	induction	should	be	considered	either	exactly	or	very nearly	true	notwithstanding	any	contrary	hypotheses,	until	yet	other	phenomena	make	such	propositions	either	more	exact	or	liable to	exceptions. The	rule	tells	us	that	although	philosophical	claims	are	inherently	open	to	revision	in	light	of	new experience,	claims	that	have	been	established	on	the	basis	of	induction	can	still	be	taken,	at	least	for the	time	being,	as	certain	or	very	nearly	so.	Newton's	claims	to	certainty,	even	when	they	seem categorical,	always	contain	the	implicit	caveat:	until	shown	otherwise.	His	clear	recognition	of	the reviseability	and	developmental	nature	of	natural	philosophy	is	striking	in	comparison	to	the	claims of	some	of	his	seventeenth-century	predecessors	to	have	authored	complete	and	definitive	accounts of	the	natural	world. 4	Space,	Time,	and	God Newton's	conception	of	absolute	space	and	time	has	been	the	subject	of	debate	for	centuries.	The Principia's	"Axioms,	or	Law	of	Motions"	and	the	definitions	that	precede	them	require	a	distinction between	relative	(or	apparent)	and	absolute	(or	true)	motion.	Relative	motion	is	the	motion	of	a body	with	respect	to	another	body,	taken	to	be	at	rest.	Absolute	motion	is	the	motion	of	a	body	with respect	to	the	immobile,	infinite	container	of	all	that	exists,	absolute	space.	Considerations concerning	time	mirror	those	concerning	space. "Relativists"	from	Leibniz	to	Mach	argued	that	absolute	space	is	ontologically	gratuitous.	They	held that	all	motion	is	relative	motion,	and	that	the	positive	claims	of	Newtonian	mechanics	can	be recovered	with	appropriately	formulated	relative	quantities.	Nevertheless,	they	often	treated considerations	regarding	force	as	if	there	was	a	privileged,	true	state	of	motion	associated	with	each body.	In	the	scholium	to	the	definition	of	the	Principia,	Newton	argued	this	"true	motion"	cannot	be defined	by	means	of	relative	quantities.	It	must	be	understood	as	motion	with	respect	to	absolute space.	The	debate	was	not	wholly	clarified	until	the	concept	of	"inertial	frame"	was	introduced	in	the 19th	century.	We	now	know	that	Newtonian	dynamics	only	requires	a	class	of	privileged	inertial frames	(or	more	minimally,	spatial	trajectories),	which	can	be	understood	without	positing	an absolute	space. Newton	himself	was	concerned	with	the	ontological	status	of	absolute	space	and	time.	He	held	that all	existence	was	spatio-temporal	existence,	and	thus	that	space	and	time	were	"necessary	affections" of	all	beings,	including	God.	But	space	and	time	were	not	necessary	per	se.	Rather,	God's	necessary and	infinite	being,	since	it	was	necessarily	spatio-temporal,	necessitated	the	existence	of	space	and time.	Whether	the	necessitating	relation	is	causal,	logical,	or	otherwise	constitutive	is	a	subject	of interpretation.	It	is	clear,	however,	that	Newton	thought	God's	presence	in	space	allowed	Him	to	be immediately	aware	of,	and	in	command	of,	creation.	In	material	related	to	the	Classical	Scholia,	he approvingly	cited	Stoics	who	held	that	"a	certain	infinite	spirit	pervades	all	space	into	infinity,	and contains	and	vivifies	the	entire	world:	and	this	spirit	was...	supreme	divinity,	according	to	the	Poet cited	by	[Paul	the	Apostle],	in	him	we	live	and	move	and	have	our	being"	(Newton	2001	LINK,	p. 120). Newton	also	believed	God	supported	the	frame	of	nature	more	specifically.	For	example,	he	held	that God	exercised	his	providence	by	using	comets	to	distribute	matter	and	motion	throughout	the universe.	Thus	stars	that	have	been	"exhausted	bit	by	bit	in	the	exhalation	of	light	and	vapors"	could be	"renewed	by	comets	falling	into	them"	and	"kindled	by	their	new	nourishment"	(Newton	1997 LINK,	p.	937).	Comets	were	also	involved	in	human	history	and	the	continual	destruction	and renewal	of	the	world.	Newton	speculated	that	the	conflagration	expected	at	the	end	of	days	could	be caused	by	a	comet	falling	into	the	sun	and	inflaming	it,	and	the	subsequent	renewal	by	a	comet drawing	a	moon	of	Jupiter	or	Saturn	away	from	its	orbit	to	create	a	new	'earth.'	Gravity	itself provided	evidence	for	God's	intervention.	Given	the	attractive	nature	of	the	force,	"a	continual miracle	is	needed	to	prevent	the	Sun	and	fixed	stars	from	rushing	together"	(reported	by	David Gregory	in	Newton	1959–77	LINK,	Vol	3,	p.	336). The	last	point	is	most	significant.	Newton	took	the	coherence	and	stability	of	the	universe	to	be evidence	of	God's	design.	The	task	of	natural	philosophy,	for	him,	was	to	reason	"from	particular Causes	to	more	general	ones,	till	the	Argument	end[s]	in	the	most	general,"	that	is,	God.	Knowledge was	not	to	be	gathered	for	its	own	sake,	but	for	the	proof	and	celebration	of	the	deity	(Newton	1730 LINK,	p.	404).	This,	he	thought,	was	"a	duty	of	the	greatest	moment"	("Untitled	Treatise	on Revelation,"	The	Newton	Project	).	There	is	no	question	that	his	life's	work	was	directed	to	this	end. See	Also: Alchemy Cosmology Field	theory,	classical Mechanics,	classical Natural	Theology Optics Scientific	method Space Theories,	scientific List	of	Works: Manuscript	sources	at	Cambridge	University	Library:	http://cudl.lib.cam.ac.uk/collections/newton. (High	quality	scans	of	the	majority	of	extant	Newton	manuscripts;	Latin	and	Enligh.) The	Newton	Project:	http://www.newtonproject.sussex.ac.uk/.	(The	project	provides	transcriptions of	many	Newtonian	works.	The	focus	is	on	alchemical	and	religious	works,	but	others	are	well represented.	Many	of	the	primary	works	listed	below	are	available	here.) Newton,	I.	(1687).	Philosophiae	naturalis	principia	mathematica.	London:	Joseph	Streater	(for	the Royal	Society);	2nd	edn,	Cambridge,	1713;	3rd	edn,	London:	Guil.	&	Joh.	Innys	(for	the	Royal	Society), 1726.	(Latin	editions	of	Newton's	master-work	on	the	laws	of	motion,	gravitation,	and	celestial mechanics.) Newton,	I.	(1715).	'An	Account	of	the	Book	Entitled	Commercium	epistolicum',	Philosophical Transactions	29	(342):	173–224.	Reprinted	in	Hall	1980	and	partially	in	Newton	(2004).	(Newton's anonymous	review	of	his	priority	dispute	with	Leibniz.	Also	contains	an	account	of	the methodological	differences	between	the	two	thinkers,	as	Newton	understood	them.) Newton,	I.	(1728).	Chronology	of	Ancients	Kingdoms	Amended.	London:	J.	Tonson	in	the	Strand,	and	J. Osborn	and	T.	Longman	in	Pater-noster	Row.	(A	posthumously	published	text	devoted	to	the	dating of	Greek,	Persian,	Jewish,	and	Assyrian	historical	and	purportedly	historical	events. Newton's	use	of mathematically-based	evidential	reasoning	here	mirrors	his	use	of	it	in	celestial	mechanics). Newton,	I.	(1730).	Opticks,	or	a	Treatise	of	the	Reflections,	Refractions,	Inflections	and	Colours	of	Light. 4th	edn;	New	York:	Dover,	1952.	(Newton's	groundbreaking	work	in	optics.	Apart	from	experiments and	theoretical	discussion	of	light	and	colors,	it	contains	the	famous	"Queries"	in	which	Newton speculates	about	the	ultimate	nature	of	matter,	force,	and	future	progress	of	natural	philosophy.) Newton,	I.	(1733).	Observations	upon	the	Prophecies	of	Daniel,	and	the	Apocalypse	of	St	John.	London; repr.	W.	Whitla,	Sir	Isaac	Newton's	Daniel	and	the	Apocalypse	with	an	Introductory	Study...	of	Unbelief, of	Miracles	and	Prophecy.	London:	John	Murray,	1922.	(A	posthumously	published	study	in	biblical interpretation.	Although	it	was	cleansed	of	Newton's	heterodox	opinions	before	publication,	it provides	clear	insight	into	his	theological	priorities). Koyré,	A.	and	Cohen,	I.	B.	(1962).	"Newton	and	the	Leibniz-Clarke	Correspondence	with	Notes	on Newton,	Conti,	and	Des	Maizeaux."	Archives	International	d'Histoire	des	Sciences,	15:63–126.	(A collection	of	primary	texts	related	to	Newton's	involvement	with	the	Leibniz-Clarke	correspondence, as	well	as	his	personal	correspondence	with	Leibniz). Newton,	I.	(1958).	Isaac	Newton's	Papers	and	Letters	on	Natural	Philosophy	and	Related	Documents. Ed.	I.B.	Cohen,	assisted	by	R.E.	Schofield,	Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard	University	Press.	Second	revised edition	1978.	(Contains	the	publications	on	light	from	1672–1676)	(Collected	facsimiles	of	Newton's 1670s	papers	concerning	light	and	colors,	subsequent	letters	concerning	them,	and	a	variety	of	text concerning	chemistry,	atomism,	and	the	aether.	Includes	Fontenelle's	"Eloge"	of	Newton.) Newton,	I.	(1959–77).	The	Correspondence	of	Isaac	Newton.	Eds	H.W.	Turnbull,	A.	Scott,	A.R.	Hall	and L.	Tilling,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	7	vols.	(Full	transcriptions	of	all	extant correspondence	by	or	to	Newton.) Newton,	I.	(1962).	Unpublished	Scientific	Papers	of	Isaac	Newton.	Eds	A.R.	Hall	and	M.B.	Hall, Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press;	repr.	2nd	edn,	1978.	(A	variety	of	early	papers	in	mechanics, the	first	full	tract	on	the	calculus,	and	'De	Gravitatione') Newton,	I.	(1965).	The	Background	to	Newton's	Principia:	A	Study	of	Newton's	Dynamical	Researches in	the	Years	1664–84.	Ed.	J.W.	Herivel,	Oxford:	Clarendon	Press.	(Contains	transcriptions	of	the	De motu	drafts	leading	up	to	the	Principia,	as	well	as	a	detailed	study	of	their	evolution.) McGuire,	J.	E.	(1966).	"Body	and	Void	and	Newton's	De	Mundi	Systemate:	Some	new	sources."	Archive for	the	History	of	Exact	Sciences,	3:206–248.	Reprinted	in	McGuire	(1995),	Ch.	3.	(Newton's	draft definitions	intended	for	the	third	edition	of	the	Principia	(1726),	as	well	as	a	detailed	study	of	their significance	for	Newton's	evolving	thought.) Newton,	I.	(1967–81).	The	Mathematical	Papers	of	Isaac	Newton.	Ed.	D.T.	Whiteside,	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press,	8	vols.	(The	authoritative	presentation	of	Newton's	extensive	work	on mathematics,	with	extensive	historical	and	analytical	commentary.) Newton,	I.	(1972).	Isaac	Newton's	Philosophiae	naturalis	principia	mathematica.	The	Third	Edition (1726)	with	variant	readings.	Eds	A.	Koyr	and	I.B.	Cohen,	with	assistance	of	A.	Whitman,	Cambridge, MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2	vols.	(A	comparison	of	all	three	latin	editions	of	the	Principia,	as	well as	Newton's	manuscript	sources.) McGuire,	J.	E.	(1978).	"Newton	on	Place,	Time,	and	God:	An	unpublished	source."	British	Journal	for the	History	of	Science,	11:114–129.	(Contains	"Tempus	et	Locus,"	an	important	1690s	document	in which	Newton	presents	his	ontology	of	space	and	time.) Newton,	I.	(1983).	Certain	Philosophical	Questions:	Newton's	Trinity	Notebook.	Eds	J.E.	McGuire	and	M. Tamny,	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press.	(Newton's	notebook	from	his	student	days	in Cambridge.	It	is	eclectic	and	far-reaching,	but	decidedly	juvenilia.) Newton,	I.	(1984).	The	Optical	Papers	of	Isaac	Newton.	vol.	1,	ed.	A.E.	Shapiro,	Cambridge:	Cambridge University	Press.	(Authoritative	presentation	of	Newton's	early	published	and	unpublished	material on	optics	and	optical	experiments,	alongside	extensive	historical	and	analytical	commentary) Newton,	I.	(1997).	Isaac	Newton's	Mathematical	Principles	of	Natural	Philosophy,	trans.	I.B.	Cohen	and A.	Whitman,	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press.	(The	authoritative	english	translation	of	the Principa.) Newton,	I.	(2001).	"Newton's	Scholia	from	David	Gregory's	Estate	on	the	Propositions	IV	through	IX Book	III	of	his	Principa,"	ed.	and	trans.	Volkmar	Schüller.	In	Lefevre,	W.,	editor,	Between	Leibniz, Newton,	and	Kant:	Philosophy	and	Science	in	the	Eighteenth	Century.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer	Academic Publishers.	See	also	McGuire,	J.	E.	and	Rattansi,	P.	M.	(1966).	"Newton	and	the	'Pipes	of	Pan'	".	Notes and	Records	of	the	Royal	Society	of	London,	21(2):108–143.	(Contains	the	so-called	"Classical	Scholia," Newton's	1690s	unpublished	additions	to	Book	III	of	the	Principia.	In	them,	Newton	finds	ancients precedents	to	the	law	of	universal	gravitation.) Newton,	I.	(2004).	Isaac	Newton:	Philosophical	Writings.	Ed.	Andrew	Janiak.	Cambridge:	Cambridge University	Press.	(Contains	a	newer	translation	of	'De	Gravitatione,'	and	excerpts	from	other	works, including	the	General	Scholium	to	the	Principia.	The	recommended	starting	point	for	a	philosophical study	of	Newton.) G.	W.	Leibniz	and	Clarke,	Samuel	(1980).	Leibniz	and	Clarke:	Correspondence.	Edited,	with Introduction,	by	Roger	Ariew,	Hackett	Publishing	Co.	Inc.	Indianapolis/Cambridge,	2000.	(The famous	correspondence	between	Leibniz	and	Clarke.	It	details	the	Leibnizian	and	Newtonian	position on	a	variety	of	subjects,	including	space,	time,	matter,	God,	and	the	nature	of	physical	action.) Further	Reading: Janiak,	A.	and	Schliesser,	E.,	editors	(2012).	Interpreting	Newton:	Critical	Essays.	Cambridge University	Press.	(Collected	recent	essays	on	a	variety	of	Newtonian	topics,	including	metaphysics, method,	historical	influence,	and	relations	with	contemporaries.) Cohen,	I.	B.	and	Smith,	G.	E.,	editors	(2002).	The	Cambridge	Companion	to	Newton.	Cambridge University	Press.	(Collected	essays	that	aim	to	cover	the	basics	of	Newtonian	studies.	A recommended	introduction	to	the	secondary	literature.) Biener,	Z.	and	Schliesser,	E.,	editors	(2014).	Newton	and	Empiricism.	Oxford	University	Press. (Collected	essays	on	Newton's	reading	of	and	reading	by	"empiricist"	philosophers	such	as	Bacon, Locke	and	Hume,	as	well	as	discussions	of	Newton's	"empirical"	methods	in	the	17th,	18th,	and	19th centuries.) McGuire,	J.	E.	(1995).	Tradition	and	Innovation:	Newton's	Metaphysics	of	Nature.	Kluwer	Academic Publishers,	Boston.	(Classic	essays	focusing	on	Newton's	complex	metaphysical	beliefs	as	expressed in	a	variety	of	published	and	unpublished	sources.) Shapiro,	A.	E.	(1993).	Fits,	Passions,	and	Paroxysms:	Physics,	Method,	and	Chemistry	and	Newton's Theories	of	Colored	Bodies	and	Fits	of	Easy	Reflection.	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge [England];	New	York,	NY,	USA.	(An	in-depth	study	of	Newton's	optics,	by	the	leading	authority	on	the matter. A	great	introduction	to	Newton's	methods	and	thought	outside	of	celestial	mechanics.) Janiak,	A.	(2008).	Newton	as	Philosopher.	Cambridge	University	Press,	New	York.	(A	study	of Newton's	metaphysics	of	nature	and	its	relation	to	physical	inquiry.	Recommended	for	non-technical readers.) Harper,	W.	(2011).	Isaac	Newton's	Scientific	Method:	Turning	Data	into	Evidence	about	Gravity	and Cosmology.	Oxford	University	Press,	Oxford.	(A	careful	reconstruction	of	Newton's	argument	for universal	gravitation,	as	presented	in	the	beginning	propositions	of	Book	III	of	the	Principia.	Requires some	technical	background	knowledge.) Ducheyne,	S.	(2011).	The	Main	Business	of	Natural	Philosophy:	Isaac	Newton's	NaturalPhilosophical Methodology.	Archimedes.	Springer,	New	York,	1st	ed	edition.	(A	thorough	analysis	of	Newton's metaphysics	and	method,	taking	into	account	works	in	both	mechanics	and	optics,	as	well	as	a variety	of	unpublished,	religious,	and	alchemical	sources.) Rynasiewicz,	R.	(1995).	"By	Their	Properties,	Causes	and	Effects:	Newton's	Scholium	On	'Time,	Space, Place	And	Motion-I.	The	Text,	Ii.	The	Context."	Studies	in	History	and	Philosophy	of	Science,	26(1, 2):133–153,	295–321.	(A	classic	study	of	Newton's	"scholium	on	space	and	time."	Required	reading for	those	interested	in	Newton's	metaphysics	of	space.) DiSalle,	R.	(2006).	Understanding	Space-Time:	The	Philosophical	Development	of	Physics	from	Newton to	Einstein.	Cambridge	University	Press,	Cambridge,	UK.	(A	historical-philosophical	account	of Newton's	place	in	the	broader	trajectory	of	physical	inquiry,	from	Newton	to	the	20th	century. Particular	emphasis	is	paid	to	Newton's	relationship	with	Kant.) Hall,	A.R.	(1980).	Philosophers	at	War:	The	Quarrel	Between	Newton	and	Leibniz.	Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press.	(A	highly	readable	account	of	Newton's	battles	with	Leibniz	over	the calculus	and	conceptual	issues	related	to	metaphysics	and	physics.) Bertoloni	Meli,	D.	(1993).	Equivalence	and	Priority:	Newton	Versus	Leibniz.	Clarendon	Press,	Oxford. (A	detailed	study	of	Leibniz's	hand-written	notes	on	the	first	edition	of	Newton's	Principia. Mandatory	reading	for	understanding	Newton's	and	Leibniz's	relationship.) Koyre,	A.	(1968).	Newtonian	Studies.	Chicago,	IL:	University	of	Chicago	Press.	(Classic	essays	from	the foremost	mid-century	authority	on	Newton.) Westfall,	R.S.	(1980).	Never	at	Rest:	A	Biography	of	Isaac	Newton.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University Press.	(The	most	thorough	intellectual	biography	of	Newton,	also	available	abridged	as	The	Life	of Isaac	Newton,	1993.) Wilson,	C.	(1989).	"The	Newtonian	Achievement	in	Astronomy,"	in	R.	Taton	and	C.	Wilson	(eds) Planetary	Astronomy	from	the	Renaissance	to	the	Rise	of	Astrophysics.	Cambridge:	Cambridge University	Press.	(A	critical	summary	of	the	contributions	Newton's	Principia	made	to	planetary astronomy.)