Belief-that	and	Belief-in: Which	Reductive	Analysis? Uriah	Kriegel Forthcoming	in	A.	Gzrankowski	&	M.	Montague,	Non-Propositional	Intentionality	(OUP) Abstract.	Let	propositionalism	be	the	thesis	that	all	mental	attitudes	are	propositional.	Antipropositionalists	typically	point	at	apparently	non-propositional	attitudes,	such	as	fearing	a	dog and	loving	a	spouse,	and	play	defense	against	attempts	at	propositional	analysis	of	such attitudes.	Here	I	explore	the	anti-propositionalist's	prospects	for	going	on	the	offensive,	trying	to show	that	some	apparently	propositional	attitudes,	notably	belief	and	judgment,	can	be	given non-propositional	analysis.	Although	the	notion	that	belief	is	a	non-propositional	attitude	may seem	ludicrous	at	first,	it	is	admirably	defended	by	Franz	Brentano,	whose	analysis	I	propose	to expound,	update,	and	deepen	here.	The	basic	strategy	can	be	thought	of	as	follows.	First, although	the	grammar	of	belief-that	reports	clearly	suggests	a	propositional	attitude,	the grammar	of	belief-in	reports	suggests	instead	an	'objectual'	attitude.	Second,	with	some ingenuity	all	belief-that	reports	can	be	paraphrased	into	belief-in	reports.	Third,	given	certain general	considerations,	this	paraphraseability	recommends	the	view	that	the	psychological reality	of	belief	states	is	objectual	rather	than	propositional.	Nonetheless,	I	will	argue,	there	are two	very	real	costs	associated	with	this	non-propositional	analysis	of	belief. Introduction On	the	face	of	it,	some	of	our	psychological	attitudes	are	propositional	and	some	are objectual.	Judging	that	the	weather	is	nice	is	propositional,	liking	ice	cream	is objectual.1	Some	philosophers	have	claimed	that	this	is	an	illusion,	and	in	fact	all attitudes	are	propositional.	Thus,	John	Perry	writes: The	phenomenon	of	intentionality	suggests	that	attitudes	are	essentially	relational	in nature:	they	involve	relations	to	the	propositions	at	which	they	are	directed...	An	attitude 2 seems	to	be	individuated	by	the	agent,	the	type	of	attitude	(belief,	desire,	etc.),	and	the proposition	at	which	it	is	directed.	(Perry	1994:	387-8) Other	philosophers	have	insisted	that	not	all	attitudes	are	propositional	–	some	are objectual.	Here	is	Michelle	Montague: Simply	put,	objectual	attitudes	resist	a	propositionalist	analysis.	Mary	loves	Nancy.	She	seeks the	fountain	of	youth.	She	has	you	in	mind.	She	contemplates	the	sky.	She	wants	Nancy's	car. These	intentional	attitudes	appear	to	be	relations	that	hold	simply	between	thinkers	and non-propositional	objects,	rather	than	between	thinkers	and	propositions.	(Montague	2007: 507) Very	few	philosophers	have	held	that	in	fact	no	attitudes	are	propositional	–	that	all are	objectual.	Perhaps	Hume	held	this	view.	One	philosopher	who	certainly	did	is Franz	Brentano.	Brentano	explicitly	writes	that	'All	mental	references	refer	to things'	(Brentano	1911:	291),	where	a	'thing'	is	an	individual	object	or	concrete particular.	His	argument	for	this	cannot	be	appreciated	without	a	detailed	account of	his	entire	philosophy	of	mind.	Short	on	space,	here	I	will	restrict	myself	to	his case	for	the	thesis	that	judgment	is	an	objectual	attitude.	This	thesis	would	already be	of	first	importance,	since	judgment	and	belief	are	customarily	taken	to	be	the paradigmatic	propositional	attitudes.	This	seems	antecedently	very	plausible:	you can	love	Jane,	but	you	cannot	judge	Jane	(in	the	relevant	sense),	or	judge	that	Jane. And	yet,	I	will	argue,	Brentano's	case	for	an	objectualist	account	of	judgment	is surprisingly	compelling.	Although	the	case	has	some	local	holes	in	it,	I	will	argue that	they	can	be	filled	reasonably	satisfactorily. I	start,	in	§1,	with	some	background	on	Brentano's	notion	of	judgment,	as	it emerges	from	his	classification	of	mental	states.	In	§2,	I	offer	an	initial	exposition	of his	objectualist	account	of	judgment	for	analytic	philosophers.	In	§3,	I	reconstruct and	tighten	Brentano's	case	for	the	objectualist	account.	In	§4,	I	consider	some	key objections. 1. Judgment	in	Brentano's	Taxonomy	of	Mental	States 3 The	task	of	Chap.	5-8	of	Book	II	of	Brentano's	Psychology	from	an	Empirical Standpoint	(Brentano	1874)	is	to	identify	the	'fundamental	classes'	of	mental	states. His	assumption	is	that	the	mental	domain	is	structured	by	genus/species	relations, so	that	some	kinds	of	mental	state	are	species	of	others.	For	example,	color experience	is	a	species	of	visual	experience,	which	in	turn	is	a	species	of	perceptual experience.	The	highest	genus	is	simply	mental	state.	What	Brentano	calls	the 'fundamental	classes'	are	the	classes	or	kinds	of	mental	state	which	are	species	of only	one	higher	genus.	That	is,	they	are	species	only	of	the	genus	mental	state. (Compare	color	experience,	which	is	a	species	of	the	genus	mental	state	as	well,	but also	of	other	genera,	such	as	visual	experience	and	perceptual	experience.)	What Brentano	seeks	in	his	'fundamental	classification,'	then,	are	the	highest	mental genera	save	the	highest	one,	i.e.	the	second-to-highest	mental	genera. According	to	Brentano,	there	are	three	such	classes:	presentation	or apprehension	(Vorstellung),	judgment	(Urteil),	and	'interest'	(Interesse)	or	'emotion' (Gemütsbewegungen)	(Brentano	1874:	198).	He	also	claims	that	judgment	and interest	are	'grounded	in'	presentations	(1874:	80,	198),2	but	appears	to	also	allow	a presentation	to	occur	without	grounding	other	states.	Unlike	presentation, judgment	and	interest	are	each	divided	into	two	opposing	kinds:	judgment	into acceptance	(Anerkennung)	and	rejection	(Verwerfung),	interest	into	love	(Liebe)	and hate	(Hasse).3	Let	us	consider	each	class	in	turn.4 The	fundamental	class	Brentano	calls	judgment	covers	any	mental	state	that in	the	first	instance	presents	what	it	does	as	true	or	false	(veridical	or	falsidical, accurate	or	inaccurate,	and	so	on):5 By	'judgment'	we	mean,	in	accordance	with	common	philosophical	usage,	acceptance	(as true)	or	rejection	(as	false).	(Brentano	1874:	198) Importantly,	this	includes	not	only	the	products	of	conceptual	thought,	such	as	belief and	judgment	in	the	more	familiar	sense,	but	also	perceptual	experience.	A	visual experience	of	a	yellow	lemon	has	veridicality	conditions	in	the	same	sense	belief	has 4 truth	conditions.	Both	are	in	the	business	of	getting	things	right.	Accordingly, Brentano	writes	that	'all	perceptions	are	judgments,	whether	they	are	instances	of knowledge	or	just	mistaken	affirmations'	(Brentano	1874:	209).	What	characterizes judgment	is	this	kind	of	truth-directedness.	Note	well:	this	is	an	idiosyncratic	use	of the	term	'judgment,'	but	it	does	not	undermine	the	significance	of	the	thesis	that	all judgments	are	objectual	attitudes.	As	a	universal	thesis,	it	applies	also	to	judgments in	the	more	familiar	sense,	that	of	a	product	of	conceptual	thought	canonically reported	with	the	use	of	'that'-clauses.	In	other	words,	judgments	in	the	familiar sense	form	a	subset	of	judgments	in	Brentano's	sense;	so	Brentano's	objectual account	of	the	latter	is	eo	ipso	an	objectual	account	of	the	former. Brentano's	second	fundamental	class	covers	a	large	group	of	phenomena, including	emotion,	affect,	the	will,	and	algedonic	experiences	of	pleasure	and	pain. Brentano	laments	the	absence	of	a	satisfactory	name	for	this	class,	and	calls	it alternately	'interest,'	'emotion,'	or	(often)	'phenomena	of	love	and	hate'	(Brentano 1874:	199).	What	unifies	the	phenomena	in	this	category	is	that	they	present	what they	do	as	good	or	bad.	The	deep	nature	of	this	category	thus	contrasts	with	the truth-directedness	of	judgment	and	is	characterized	by	goodness-directedness: Just	as	every	judgment	takes	an	object	to	be	true	or	false,	in	an	analogous	way	every phenomenon	which	belongs	to	this	class	takes	an	object	to	be	good	or	bad.	(Brentano	1874: 199;	see	also	1874:	239) Wanting	a	beer	presents	beer	as	good,	but	so	does	taking	pleasure	in	the	beer, wishing	for	beer,	liking	beer,	deciding	on	beer,	and	so	on.	In	truth,	the	modern technical	notions	of	'pro	attitude'	and	'con	attitude'	are	perfect	terms	for	Brentano's positive	('love')	and	negative	('hate')	kinds	of	interest	state. Brentano's	other	fundamental	class	is	presentation	or	apprehension.6	This	is supposed	to	be	an	intentional	state	that	in	itself	presents	what	it	does	neither	as true	or	false	nor	as	good	or	bad,	but	in	an	entirely	neutral	manner.	Its	most	general characterization	is	thus	this:	'We	speak	of	a	presentation	whenever	something appears	to	us'	(Brentano	1874:	198).	This	is	the	sense	in	which	presentation 5 grounds	judgment	and	interest:	every	state	of	judgment	or	interest	is	also	a presentation,	but	not	every	presentation	is	either	a	judgment	or	an	interest.	For	to present	something	as	true	or	good	you	must	present	it	at	all,	but	you	can	present something	without	presenting	it	as	true	or	good.	Paradigmatic	examples	of	this	are acts	of	merely	entertaining	or	contemplating	something	–	when	you	contemplate something,	it	appears	to	you	neither	as	true/false	nor	as	good/bad;	it	just	appears	to you.	Importantly,	however,	any	mental	state	that	encodes	commitment	neither	to the	truth/falsity	nor	to	goodness/badness	of	what	it	presents	(e.g.,	supposition)	will qualify	as	a	mere	presentation	in	Brentano's	classification.7 The	notion	of	presentational	mode	is	crucial	to	Brentano's	classification.	The idea	is	that	different	kinds	of	mental	state	present	what	they	do	in	different	ways. The	difference	between	them	is	not	in	what	they	present	but	in	how	they	present. Importantly,	Brentano's	presentational	modes	are	not	Frege's	–	they	are	not	aspect of	a	state's	(fine-grained)	content,	but	of	its	attitude.	When	you	judge	that	2+2=4, you	are	mentally	committing	to	the	truth	of	2+2=4.	But	this	commitment	is	built	into the	attitude	you	are	taking	toward	2+2=4,	it	does	not	show	up	in	the	content	of	your judgment.	We	might	put	this	by	saying	that	the	judgment	that	2+2=4	does	not present	2+2=4	as	true,	but	rather	presents-as-true	2+2=4.	Presenting-as-true	is	a mode	or	modification	of	the	presenting.	Similarly	for	the	other	presentational modes.	When	you	deny	that	2+2=5,	you	are	mentally	committing	to	the	falsity	of 2+2=5,	but	the	commitment	is	built	into	the	attitude	of	your	denial:	your	denial	does not	present	2+2=5	as	false,	but	rather	presents-as-false	2+2=5.	Likewise,	your	love of	ice	cream	presents-as-good	ice	cream	(rather	than	presenting	ice	cream	as	good) and	your	disapproval	of	jingoism	presents-as-bad	jingoism	(rather	than	presenting jingoism	as	bad). Brentano's	notion	of	judgment,	then,	is	the	notion	of	a	mental	state employing	the	presentational	mode	of	either	presenting-as-true	or	presenting-asfalse.	This	includes	mental	states	that	we	do	not	normally	count	as	judgments,	such as	perceptual	experiences,	but	in	addition	it	includes	what	we	do	normally	count	as 6 judgments	–	conceptual	thoughts	committed	to	the	veracity	of	their	contents.	All those	states,	according	to	Brentano,	are	objectual	attitudes. 2. The	Belief-In	Theory	of	Judgment The	core	of	Brentano's	theory	of	judgment	can	be	represented	as	the	conjunction	of two	theses.	The	first	is	that	all	judgments	are	existential,	the	second	that	the existence-commitment	involved	in	existential	judgments	is	an	attitudinal	property	of theirs.	That	is: EXISTENTIAL	::	For	any	judgment	J,	J	is	an	existential	judgment. ATTITUDINAL	::	For	any	existential	Judgment	E,	E's	existence-commitment	is	an attitudinal	property	of	E. In	this	section,	I	offer	a	preliminary	explanation	and	motivation	of	the	two	theses. The	remainder	of	the	chapter	will	consider	the	case	for	them	in	more	detail. According	to	EXISTENTIAL,	every	judgment	is	in	the	business	of	affirming	or denying	the	existence	of	something.	Thus	the	judgments	that	there	are	marine mammals	and	that	there	are	no	flying	dogs	are	paradigmatic.	We	are	accustomed	to think	that	not	all	judgments	are	like	this	–	some	are	in	the	business	of	doing	more than	just	affirming	or	denying	the	existence	of	something.	Many,	it	is	natural	to think,	involve	an	element	of	predication:	rather	than	commenting	on	what	there	is, they	make	a	claim	about	what	something	is	like,	what	properties	it	has.	Thus,	the judgment	that	all	dogs	are	cute	predicates	cuteness	of	dogs,	thereby	'claiming'	that dogs	have	a	certain	property,	not	(just)	that	they	exist.	Brentano,	however,	insists that	predication	is	an	accident	of	language	that	does	not	reflect	the	psychological reality	of	judgments.	(More	on	that	in	§4.)	In	reality,	judging	that	all	dogs	are	cute	is just	judging	that	there	is	no	non-cute	dog.	It	thus	comments	on	what	there	is	after	all. To	show	that	this	generalizes,	Brentano	systematically	goes	over	the	four types	of	categorical	statement	in	Aristotle's	square	of	opposition	(A,	E,	I,	and	O)	and 7 shows	that	they	are	all	reducible	or	'traceable	back'	(rückführbar)	to	existential statements	(Brentano	1874:	213-4,	1956:	121): (A) <All	dogs	are	cute>	is	traceable	to	<There	is	not	a	non-cute	dog>. (E) <No	dogs	are	cute>	is	traceable	to	<There	is	not	a	cute	dog>. (I) <Some	dogs	are	cute>	is	traceable	to	<There	is	a	cute	dog>. (O) <Some	dogs	are	not	cute>	is	traceable	to	<There	is	a	non-cute	dog>. Brentano's	talk	of	statements	'being	traceable	back'	to	other	statements	suggests	he has	something	like	paraphrase	in	mind:	'All	dogs	are	cute'	is	paraphraseable	into 'There	is	not	a	non-cute	dog.'	Such	statements	can	express	judgments,	or	they	can	be embedded	into	corresponding	statements	that	report	judgments:	'S	judges	that	all dogs	are	cute'	is	paraphraseable	into	'S	judges	that	there	is	no	non-cute	dog.'8 Once	all	categorical	statements	are	shown	to	paraphrase	into	existential ones,	it	is	easy	to	show	that	hypotheticals	follow	suit	(Brentano	1874:	218).9	For example: (H)	<If	some	dog	is	three-legged,	then	it	is	cute>	is	reducible	to	<There	is	not	a non-cute	three-legged	dog>. Conclusion: The	reducibility/traceability	(Rückführbarkeit)	of	categorical	statements	(Sätze),	indeed	the reducibility	of	all	statements	which	express	a	judgment,	to	existential	judgments	is	therefore indubitable.	(Brentano	1874:	218) More	cautiously,	all	statements	of	Aristotelian	logic	turn	out	to	be	disguised existentials.	We	will	have	to	consider	other	types	of	statement	in	§3. According	to	EXISTENTIAL,	then,	all	acts	of	judging	are	forms	of	mentally committing	to	something's	existence	or	nonexistence.	According	to	ATTITUDINAL, now,	the	existence-commitment	which	existential	judgments	carry	is	an	aspect	of their	attitude	rather	than	content.	On	this	view,	mental	commitment	to	the	existence of	x	is	not	an	aspect	of	what	the	judgment	presents	but	of	how	it	does	the	presenting. 8 In	other	words:	an	existential	judgment's	commitment	to	the	existence	of	x	is	not	a matter	of	presenting	x	as	existent,	but	a	matter	of	presenting-as-existent	x.	Thus,	to judge	that	some	dogs	are	cute	is	to	perform	a	mental	act	that	presents-as-existent cute	dogs,	that	is,	presents	cute	dogs	in	an	existence-affirming	manner.10 The	attitudinal	account	of	mental	existence-commitment	is	unsurprising given	that,	for	Brentano,	what	characterizes	judgment	in	the	first	instance	is	the attitudinal	property	of	presenting-as-true.	If	all	positive	judgments	present-as-true and	all	truth	is	existential,	it	stands	to	reason	that	positive	judgments	should	turn out	to	be	characterized	by	presenting-as-existent. More	generally,	if	the	commitment	to	something's	existence	or	nonexistence does	not	show	up	in	judgments'	content,	then	the	content	is	exhausted	by	the individual	object	whose	existence	is	affirmed	or	denied.	If	a	judgment	that	a	threelegged	dog	exists	simply	presents-as-existent	a	three-legged	dog,	then	what	is presented	(in	that	mode)	is	exhausted	by	a	certain	kind	of	individual	object:	a	threelegged	dog.	On	this	view,	then,	judgment	turns	out	to	be	an	objectual	rather	than propositional	attitude.	To	that	extent,	Brentano's	theory	of	judgment	casts	it	as continuous	with	such	states	as	loving	Jane	and	fearing	a	dog.	Judgments	are	always directed	at	some	sort	of	individual	object,	but	present-as-existent/nonexistent	that object.	The	object	at	which	one's	judgment	is	directed	can	be	quite	complicated	–	a cute	dog,	a	cute	flying	dog,	a	three-legged	non-cute	flying	dog,	etc.	–	but	in	any	case what	is	presented	by	the	judgment	is	always	some	kind	of	individual	object.	It	is never	any	entity	of	a	different	ontological	category,	such	as	a	proposition	or	a	state of	affairs	(Brentano	1930:	108).	Accordingly,	for	Brentano	the	truthmakers	of existentials	are	not	states	of	affairs	consisting	in	things'	existence,	but	the	things themselves.	He	writes: ...	the	being	of	A	need	not	be	produced	in	order	for	the	judgment	'A	is'	to	be...	correct;	all	that is	needed	is	A.	(Brentano	1930:	85) 9 In	a	slogan:	the	truthmakers	of	(positive)	existentials	are	not	existences	but existents.11	The	reason	this	is	possible	is	that	the	content	of	judgments	is	exhausted by	individuals,	not	individuals'	existence. It	might	seem	odd	to	posit	a	cognitive	attitude	directed	at	objects	and	not propositions	or	states	of	affairs.	Typical	objectual	attitudes	such	as	love	and	fear	are emotional	attitudes,	and	the	suspicion	may	arise	that	the	objectual	structure	is special	to	such	attitudes.	But	in	fact,	we	do	speak	not	only	of	belief-that	but	also	of belief-in	–	as	in	'Jimmy	believes	in	Santa	Claus.'	Belief-in	is	clearly	a	cognitive objectual	attitude:	the	content	of	Jimmy's	state	is	exhausted	by	some	individual object,	Santa	Claus,	the	commitment	to	whose	existence	comes	in	at	the	level	of attitude,	through	the	attitude	of	believing-in.12	So	essentially,	Brentano's	theory	of judgment	can	be	summarized	thus: BIT	::	All	positive	judgments	are	occurrent	acts	of	believing-in;	all	negative judgments	are	occurrent	acts	of	disbelieving-in.13 Judging	that	some	dogs	are	cute	is	just	performing	a	mental	act	that	presents-asexistent	a	cute	dog,	that	is,	occurrently	believing	in	a	cute	dog;	judging	that	no	dogs can	fly	is	just	performing	a	mental	act	that	presents-as-nonexistent	a	flying	dog,	that is,	occurrently	disbelieving	in	a	flying	dog. To	be	sure,	because	of	a	long	philosophical	tradition	of	treating	propositional attitudes	as	fundamental	in	cognition,	it	is	natural	for	us	today	to	think	of	'S	believes in	x'	as	shorthand	for	'S	believes	that	x	exists.'14	For	Brentano,	this	gets	the	order	of analysis	exactly	wrong.	The	more	fundamental	notion	is	belief-in,	precisely	because it	captures	correctly	the	psychological	structure	of	judgments,	in	particular	the	locus of	existence-commitment	in	the	attitude	rather	than	content.	Accordingly,	Brentano would	propose	to	take	'S	believes	in	x'	as	fundamental	and	consider	'S	believes	that	x exists'	a	cumbersome	and	misleading	way	of	saying	the	same	thing.	This	allows	us	to paraphrase	the	reports	of	Aristotelian	categorical	and	hypothetical	judgments	more straightforwardly: 10 (A*)	'S	judges	that	every	dog	is	cute'	ó	'S	disbelieves	in	a	non-cute	dog' (E*)	'S	judges	that	no	dog	is	cute'	ó	'S	disbelieves	in	a	cute	dog' (I*)	'S	judges	that	some	dog	is	cute'	ó	'S	believes	in	a	cute	dog' (O*)	'S	judges	that	some	dog	is	not	cute'	ó	'S	believes	in	a	non-cute	dog' (H*)	'S	judges	that	if	a	dog	is	three-legged	then	he	is	cute'	ó	'S	disbelieves	in	a three-legged	non-cute	dog' Here,	'ó'	just	means	'can	be	paraphrased	into.'	The	arrow	is	bidirectional	because paraphraseability	is	a	symmetric	relation:	if	'p'	is	a	good	paraphrase	of	'q,'	then	'q'	is an	equally	good	paraphrase	of	'p.'	It	is	the	philosophical	substance	of	Brentano's theory	of	judgment	that	in	each	case	it	is	the	right-hand-side	report	that	captures correctly	the	structure	of	judgment,	even	though	it	is	the	left-hand-side	report	that is	more	common	in	everyday	speak. I	call	Brentano's	theory	of	judgment	the	Belief-In	Theory,	or	BIT	for	short.15 According	to	BIT,	all	judgments	are	conscious	acts	of	(dis)believing	in	something (some	kind	of	individual	object).	Brentano's	terminology	is	different,	of	course.	He calls	the	cognitive	objectual	attitude	that	embodies	mental	commitment	to something's	existence	'acceptance'	or	'acknowledgement'	(Anerkennung)	and	the cognitive	objectual	attitude	embodying	commitment	to	nonexistence	'rejection'	or 'denial'	(Verwerfung).	However,	the	associated	verbs	('accepting,'	'acknowledging,' 'rejecting,'	'denying')	can	perfectly	grammatically	take	propositional	complements. 'Believing	in'	and	'disbelieving	in'	have	this	advantage,	that	they	can	only	take objectual	complements.	They	are	thus	better	for	expressing	Brentano's	theory.16 Whatever	the	terminology,	a	crucial	aspect	of	BIT	is	that	judgment	is	an objectual	attitude: OBJECTUAL	::	All	judgments	are	objectual	attitudes. OBJECTUAL	follows	from	EXISTENTIAL	and	ATTITUDINAL	given	that	(dis)belief-in	is	an objectual	attitude.	We	may	formulate	the	master	argument	as	follows: 1) All	token	beliefs	are	existential	(EXISTENTIAL); 11 2) All	existential	beliefs	are	beliefs-in	(ATTITUDINAL); 3) All	beliefs-in	are	objectual	attitudes;	therefore, 4) All	token	beliefs	are	objectual	attitudes	(OBJECTUAL). On	the	emerging	view,	the	sole	business	of	cognition	is	to	manage	one's	belief	in some	objects	and	disbelief	in	others.	Obviously,	this	is	an	extremely	heterodox	view of	cognition,	which	would	require	a	very	good	argument	indeed.	I	now	turn	to consider	the	case	for	it. 3. The	Case	for	the	Belief-In	Theory In	the	Psychology,	Brentano	spends	considerable	time	and	effort	arguing	that judgment	is	not	essentially	predicative.	For	example,	he	argues	that	since	perception is	a	kind	of	judgment,	and	perception	is	not	essentially	predicative	(sometimes	we just	perceive	a	thing),	judgment	need	not	be	predicative	(Brentano	1874:	209). However,	these	arguments	establish,	at	most,	that	some	judgments	are	not predicative	(and	therefore	potentially	non-propositional).	They	cannot	establish that	all	judgments	are	objectual	rather	than	propositional	attitudes,	as	OBJECTUAL requires.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	there	is	no	direct	argument	for	OBJECTUAL	in	the Psychology.	Nonetheless,	in	some	of	Brentano's	(posthumously	published)	letters, dictations,	and	lecture	notes,	one	can	identify	a	case	for	EXISTENTIAL	and	ATTITUDINAL, hence	for	OBJECTUAL. The	starting	point	of	Brentano's	argument	is	a	simple	dispensability consideration.	In	a	1906	letter	to	his	student	Anton	Marty,	he	writes: ...	every	assertion	affirming	your	entia	rationis	[notably,	propositions]	has	its	equivalent	in an	assertion	having	only	realia	[i.e.,	concrete	individual	objects]	as	objects...	Not	only	are your	judgments	equivalent	to	judgments	about	concrete	objects	(reale	Gegenstände),	the latter	are	always	available	[for	paraphrasing	the	former].	Hence	the	entia	rationis	are entirely	unnecessary/superfluous	(unnütz)	and	contrary	to	the	economy	of	nature. (Brentano	1930:	84;	see	also	Brentano	1956	§17) 12 The	argument	proceeds	in	two	steps.	First:	every	indicative	statement	that expresses	a	judgment	can	be	paraphrased	into	an	existential,	meaning	that indicatives	ostensibly	expressing	beliefs-that	can	be	paraphrased	into	ones ostensibly	expressing	beliefs-in.	Second:	the	ontological	commitments	associated with	a	belief-in	are	always	more	economical	than	those	associated	with	its corresponding	belief-that;	for	propositions	and	the	like	entia	rationis	are	more ontologically	extravagant	than	concrete	objects	and	the	like	entia	realia. Accordingly,	positing	beliefs-in	to	the	exclusion	of	beliefs-that	is	both	feasible	and commendable:	feasible	in	virtue	of	the	availability	of	paraphrase,	commendable	in virtue	of	ontological	parsimony.	The	upshot	can	be	summarized	thus:	the conjunction	of	EXISTENTIAL	and	ATTITUDINAL	delivers	significant	ontological economies,	and	should	be	adopted	on	that	basis.	In	what	follows,	I	consider	first	the feasibility	claim	(§3.1),	then	the	commendability	claim	(§3.2). 3.1.	Dispensing	with	Beliefs-that	is	Feasible In	Brentano,	the	first	step	of	the	argument	relies	on	producing	the	paraphrases	for categorical	and	hypothetical	statements	in	Aristotelian	logic	(as	seen	in	§2).	One may	wonder	whether	paraphrases	will	be	available	when	we	move	to	modern	logic. I	now	turn	to	consider	two	particularly	important	cases:	singular	statements	and 'molecular'	or	'compound'	statements.	I	will	argue	that	all	admit	of	reasonably plausible	existential	paraphrases,	with	the	potential	exception	of	certain	molecular statements. Start	with	such	singular	statements	as	'Beyoncé	is	famous.'	These	have	the form	'a	is	F,'	which	does	not	immediately	fit	into	any	of	A,	E,	I,	or	O.	Leibniz,	who	also rejected	the	separation	of	subject	and	predicate	(Leibniz	1686	§8),	construed singulars	as	having	the	A	form.	So,	'Beyoncé	is	famous'	amounts	is	analyzed	as	'All Beyoncés	are	famous,'	which	is	Brentano's	hands	amounts	to	'There	is	not	a	nonfamous	Beyoncé.'	Sometimes	Brentano	sounds	like	a	Leibnizian	on	this,	but	on	other occasions	he	seems	to	treat	singulars	rather	as	having	the	I	form.17	This	analyzes 13 'Beyoncé	is	famous'	as	'Some	Beyoncé	is	famous,'	and	ultimately	as	'There	is	a famous	Beyoncé.'	In	this	second	approach,	unlike	the	Leibnizian	one,	'a	is	F'	commits to	the	existence	of	something	rather	than	to	the	nonexistence	of	something.	If	we follow	Russell	(1905)	in	taking	the	existence	of	a	to	be	a	precondition	for	the	truth of	'a	is	F,'	the	Brentanian	tack	should	appeal	to	us	more	than	the	Leibnizian. But	what	does	'There	is	a	famous	Beyoncé'	exactly	mean?	A	traditional descriptivist	about	names	would	take	'Beyoncé'	to	pick	out	whichever	individual satisfies	a	description	that	lists	certain	central	properties	of	Beyoncé's.	Call	an individual	that	instantiates	all	the	relevant	properties	Beyoncésque.18	Within	the descriptivist	framework,	then,	'There	is	a	famous	Beyoncé'	means	'There	is	a	famous Beyoncésque	individual.' It	is	less	clear	how	this	would	work	within	a	direct-reference	approach	to names.	According	to	the	latter,	'Beyoncé'	does	not	refer	by	courtesy	of	any description.	Rather,	it	picks	out	whatever	object	is	appropriately	related	to	it	(where it	is	the	burden	of	the	theory	to	tell	us	exactly	what	the	relevant	relation	is).19 Within	this	framework,	it	is	harder	to	see	how	an	existential	paraphrase	might work.20	On	the	other	hand,	a	direct-reference	theorist	might	simply	paraphrase 'Beyoncé	is	famous'	into	'There	is	famous-Beyoncé,'	where	'famous-Beyoncé'	is	used as	a	name.	Statements	of	the	form	'There	is	N'	(where	'N'	ranges	over	proper	names) are	awkward,	but	ultimately	they	mean	the	same	as	'N	exists,'	which	is	not awkward.'	So	the	idea	is	essentially	to	paraphrase	'Beyoncé	is	famous'	into	'FamousBeyoncé	exists.'	There	is	still	an	open	question	as	to	what	the	apparent	name 'Famous-Beyoncé'	refers	to,	but	let	us	bracket	this	issue	here	(see	Kriegel	2015	for	a detailed	discussion).21	Once	we	accept	'There	is	famous-Beyoncé'	as	awkward-butgrammatical,	there	is	every	reason	to	think	that	it	paraphrases	faithfully	'Beyoncé	is famous.' I	conclude	that	singulars	are	amenable	to	existential	paraphrase,	pending trouble	in	ultimately	understanding	what	such	names	as	'Famous-Beyoncé'	refer	to. The	more	complicated	case	is	presented	by	compound	or	molecular	statements.	We 14 can	simplify	the	task	somewhat	by	focusing	on	how	to	handle	conjunction	and negation,	since	every	binary	truth-function	is	definable	in	terms	of	those	two. In	separation,	they	are	quite	easy	to	handle.	When	it	comes	to straightforward	conjunctions	of	the	form	p	&	q,	such	as	'Some	cat	is	white	and	some dog	is	brown,'	at	least	two	options	are	open.	One	paraphrases	them	into	atomic existentials	about	mereological	sums,	such	as	'There	is	a	sum	of	a	white	cat	and	a brown	dog.'	The	judgment	expressed	here	is	a	belief	in	the	relevant	sum.	The	other option	is	to	treat	conjunctions	as	expressing	a	plurality	of	simultaneous	(atomic) judgments.	On	this	approach,	in	truth	we	do	not	make	one	judgment	expressed	by 'Some	cat	is	white	and	some	dog	is	brown.'	Instead,	we	simultaneously	perform	two judgments	–	an	occurrent	belief	in	a	white	cat	and	an	occurrent	belief	in	a	brown dog	–	and	we	use	conjunctive	statements	to	express	such	multiplicity	of	judgments. In	a	way,	the	first	option	appeals	to	belief	in	a	mereological	sum,	the	second	to	a mereological	sum	of	beliefs-in. As	for	simple	negation,	in	the	Aristotelian	system	there	are	two	separate cases:	the	E	form	('No	dogs	are	cute')	and	the	O	form	('Some	dogs	are	not	cute').	The former	Brentano	handles	through	the	attitude	of	disbelief,	which	he	takes	to	be	a	sui generis	attitude	irreducible	to	belief.	It	is	common	today	to	take	'S	disbelives	in	cute dogs'	to	be	just	a	flowery	way	of	saying	'S	believes	that	there	are	no	cute	dogs,'	but as	we	have	seen,	Brentano	adopts	a	nonreductive	account	of	disbelief	that	runs	the other	way,	considering	'S	believes	that	no	dogs	are	cute'	to	be	a	misleading	report that	would	be	better	put	as	'S	disbelieves	in	a	cute	dog.'	As	for	such	negations	as 'Some	dogs	are	not	cute,'	we	have	seen	that	Brentano	construes	them	as	expressing a	special	kind	of	positive	judgment,	in	our	case	a	belief	in	an	uncute	dog.22 ge Things	get	more	complicated	when	we	combine	conjunction	and	negation	operators in	a	single	statement.	Consider	first	statements	of	the	form	p	&	~q,	such	as	'Some	cat is	cute	and	no	dog	can	fly.'	Here	there	is	no	mereological	sum	whose	existence	could be	taken	to	be	asserted	–	at	least	on	the	assumption	that	there	is	no	such	thing	as 15 the	sum	of	a	cute	cat	and	an	absence	of	a	flying	dog	(indeed	of	cats	and	absences	in general!).	Accordingly,	the	only	live	option	is	to	take	'Some	cat	is	cute	and	no	dog can	fly'	to	express	a	sum	of	two	distinct	judgments,	the	belief	in	a	cute	cat	and	the disbelief	in	a	flying	dog. Unfortunately,	the	opposite	happens	with	statements	of	the	form	~(p	&	q), such	as	'It	is	not	the	case	that	some	cat	is	cute	and	some	dog	can	fly.'	Here	there	is only	one	judgment	that	can	be	said	to	be	expressed.	That	judgment	is	a	disbelief	in the	mereological	sum	of	a	cute	cat	and	a	flying	dog.	The	unpalatable	result	here	is that	Brentano	has	no	unified	account	of	p	&	~q	and	~(p	&	q).	He	must	trot	out different	treatments	for	different	combinations	of	conjunction	and	negation.	That	is something	of	an	embarrassment. Worse,	neither	account	can	handle	a	statement	of	the	form	~(p	&	~q),	such as	'It	is	not	the	case	that	there	are	flying	dogs	but	no	cute	cats.'	On	the	one	hand,	it would	be	implausible	to	take	such	a	statement	to	express	a	disbelief	in	the mereological	sum	of	(a)	a	flying	dog	and	(b)	the	absence	of	a	cute	cat.	For	then	its negation	would	have	to	be	taken	to	express	a	belief	in	that	sum,	and	hence	in	an absence	(which	would	commit	the	believer	to	the	reality	of	absences).	On	the	other hand,	nor	does	'It	is	not	the	case	that	there	are	flying	dogs	but	no	cute	cats'	seem	to express	a	disbelief	in	the	co-occurrence	of	two	separate	judgments,	a	belief	in	a	cute cat	and	a	disbelief	in	a	flying	dog.	For	what	the	subject	rejects	are	not	beliefs themselves.	(For	all	she	knows	the	beliefs	may	well	exist!)	To	that	extent, statements	of	the	form	~(p	&	~q)	can	be	handled	neither	by	the	'(dis)belief	in	sums' strategy	not	by	the	'sum	of	(dis)beliefs'	strategy. Brentano's	approach	to	this	problem	is	to	treat	such	statements	as	rejections not	just	of	co-occurring	judgments	but	of	co-occurring	true	or	correct	(richtig) judgments.	On	this	view,	'It	is	not	the	case	that	there	are	flying	dogs	but	no	cute	cats' is	to	be	paraphrased	into	'There	is	no	sum	of	a	correct	belief	in	flying	dogs	and	a correct	disbelief	in	cute	cats.'	The	judgment	expressed	here	is	the	disbelief	in	such	a sum	of	correct	judgments.	The	idea	is	that	no	one	could	correctly	both	believe	in	a 16 flying	dog	and	disbelieve	in	a	cute	cat	–	and	this	is	what	a	statement	of	the	form	~(p &	~q)	really	expresses.	What	is	expressed	here	is	in	reality	a	second-order	judgment –	which	is	not	that	surprising	given	that	we	are	trying	to	account	for	second-order negation. One	might	reasonably	complain	that	we	are	left	here	with	a	distressingly balkanized	treatment	of	negation:	we	have	seen	different	devices	for	handling	~p, p&~q,	~(p&q),	and	~(p&~q).	These	devices	are:	a	sui	generis	attitude	of	disbelief, single	statements	expressing	sums	of	different	judgments,	single	judgments	about mereological	sums	of	objects,	and	second-order	judgments	about	correct	first-order judgments.	This	level	of	disunity	looks	like	a	major	cost	of	Brentano's	theory	of judgment,	the	complaint	might	be. However,	it	would	seem	that	once	we	have	introduced	the	device	of	secondorder	judgment	about	correct	first-order	judgment,	it	can	be	applied	retrospectively to	handle	uniformly	all	four	cases:	~p	can	be	understood	as	expressing	a	disbelief	in a	correct	judgment	that	p,	p&~q	can	be	understood	as	expressing	a	judgment	that	p and	a	disbelief	in	a	correct	judgment	that	q,	and	~(p	&	q)	can	be	understood	as	a disbelief	in	a	sum	of	correct	judgments	that	p	and	that	q. There	is,	however,	another	objection	to	which	Brentano's	account	of	negation is	susceptible.	Recall	that	Brentano's	paraphrases	are	not	intended	as	technical moves	facilitating	the	regimentation	of	a	formal	language.	They	are	intended	to capture	the	deep	psychological	reality	of	our	cognitive	life.	Arguably,	however,	it	is psychologically	unrealistic	to	think	that	'No	dogs	are	purple'	actually	expresses	the second-order	judgment	that	there	is	no	correct	belief	in	a	purple	dog.	For	harboring such	a	second-order	judgment	would	seem	to	require	the	possession	of	such concepts	as	BELIEF	and	CORRECTNESS,	yet	a	child	may	well	believe	that	no	dogs	are purple	without	possessing	those	concepts.	Furthermore,	certain	beliefs	that	appear simple	enough	that	a	child	could	have	them	are	cast	as	extraordinarily	complex	in Brentano's	theory,	again	making	the	theory	psychologically	unrealistic. 17 A	good	example	is	disjunctive	judgments,	such	as	would	be	expressed	by 'Some	cat	is	white	or	some	dog	is	brown.'	Chisholm	(1976:	92)	suggested	on Brentano's	behalf	that	we	posit	disjunctiva,	in	this	case	the	individual	which	is	either a	white	cat	or	a	brown	dog,	and	say	that	'Some	cat	is	white	or	some	dog	is	brown' expresses	an	occurrent	belief	in	this	disjunctivum.	However,	Brentano	himself would	likely	frown	on	disjunctiva	just	as	much	as	on	absences	('negativa,'	as	he called	them).	Instead,	he	exploits	the	definability	of	disjunction	in	terms	of	negation and	conjunction: ...	anyone	who	says	'There	is	an	A	or	there	is	a	B	or	there	is	a	C'	expresses	the	following:	in contemplating	that	A	is	not	and	B	is	not	and	C	is	not,	he	considers	such	a	combination	of thoughts	incorrect.	(Brentano	1930:	70) We	know	that	'p	V	q'	is	equivalent	to	'~(~p	&	~q).'	So	we	can	paraphrase	'Some	cat is	white	or	some	dog	is	brown'	into	'It	is	not	the	case	that	no	cat	is	white	and	no	dog is	brown,'	and	then	into	'There	is	no	mereological	sum	of	a	correct	disbelief	in	a white	cat	and	a	correct	disbelief	in	a	brown	dog.'23	However,	it	is	quite	plausible	that a	child	could	grasp	the	notion	that	some	cat	is	white	or	some	dog	is	brown	well before	she	has	the	cognitive	resources	to	grasp	the	idea	of	a	mereological	sum	of correct	disbeliefs. ge In	conclusion,	although	Brentano	himself	rests	his	case	for	the	paraphraseability	of all	statements	into	existentials	mainly	on	consideration	of	categorical	and hypothetical	statements,	he	has	some	options	for	existential	paraphrases	of	singular and	compound	statements	as	well.	The	paraphrases	may	not	always	be	elegant,	and sometimes	entrain	real	costs,	notably	the	contrast	between	the	relative	simplicity	of believing	(e.g.)	that	some	baby	or	some	dog	is	cute	and	the	evident	complexity	of disbelieving	in	a	mereological	sum	of	a	correct	disbelief	in	a	cute	baby	and	a	correct disbelief	in	a	cute	dog.	Still,	it	is	already	remarkable	that	an	existential	paraphrase	is always	available.	It	would	therefore	not	be	unreasonable	to	indulge	Brentano	and grant	him	the	first	step	of	his	argument:	dispensing	with	belief-that	is	feasible. 18 3.2.	Dispensing	with	Beliefs-that	is	Commendable Paraphraseability	is	a	symmetric	relation:	if	'blah'	paraphrases	into	'bleh,'	then equally	'bleh'	paraphrases	into	'blah.'	Accordingly,	in	showing	that	all	predicative statements	paraphrase	into	existential	ones,	we	would	also	be	showing	that	all	the relevant	existentials	paraphrase	into	predicatives.	So	the	paraphrase	by	itself	does not	demonstrate	that	all	seemingly	predicative	judgments	are	in	fact	existential.	It could	be	equally	well	taken	to	suggest	that	the	relevant	seemingly	existential judgments	are	in	fact	predicative. Someone	might	respond,	on	Brentano's	behalf,	that	interpreting	the paraphraseability	as	showing	that	all	judgments	are	existential	brings	with	it increased	theoretical	unity;	the	opposite	interpretation	does	not.	In	one	version,	the claim	would	be	that	although	all	predicatives	paraphrase	into	existentials,	there	are also	some	extra	existentials	for	which	no	predicative	paraphrase	is	available.	In another	version,	the	claim	might	be	that	existentials	as	a	class	are	simply	more homogeneous	than	predicatives.	However,	both	claims	are	suspect.	On	the	one	hand, it	is	doubtful	that	there	are	existentials	that	cannot	be	put	in	predicative	form,	given the	availability	of	such	first-order	predicates	as	'exists,'	'is	existent,'	and	'is	real.'	As for	the	claim	that	existentials	are	inherently	more	homogeneous	than	predicatives, it	is	hard	to	evaluate	such	claims	in	the	absence	of	explicit	measures	of	the	relevant homogeneity.	At	the	very	least,	the	envisaged	argument	would	require supplementation	in	the	form	of	(i)	providing	a	measure	of	class	homogeneity	for statements	and	(ii)	showing	that,	as	a	class,	existentials	score	higher	on	this measure	than	predicatives. Brentano's	own	argument,	in	the	quoted	1906	letter	to	Marty,	is	not	from unity	but	parsimony	('the	economy	of	nature').	The	idea	seems	to	be	that	if	some judgments	are	predicative,	then	their	contents	are	propositional,	which	would require	us	to	embrace	propositions	in	our	ontology,	and	their	truthmakers	are states	of	affairs,	which	we	would	have	to	embrace	as	well	in	our	ontology.	In 19 contrast,	Brentano	seems	to	claim,	existential	judgments	do	not	require	a propositional	content,	and	their	truthmakers	can	be	individual	objects. The	notion	that	judgments	may	not	require	propositions	as	content	is potentially	greatly	advantageous,	given	the	force	of	worries	about	the	'unity	of	the proposition'	prominent	in	recent	philosophy	of	mind	and	language	(King	2007).	But the	parsimony	Brentano	pursues	most	vigorously	concerns	truthmakers.	The truthmaker	of	a	belief	that	some	dogs	are	cute,	it	is	natural	to	say,	is	the	fact	(or	the obtaining	state	of	affairs)	that	some	dogs	are	cute.	In	contrast,	the	truthmakers	of the	belief	in	cute	dogs	are	simply	the	cute	dogs.	Each	and	every	cute	dog	out	there makes	true	the	belief	in	cute	dogs.24	Thus	the	truthmakers	of	beliefs-in	are individual	objects	rather	than	facts	or	states	of	affairs.	Other	things	being	equal, then,	the	thesis	that	all	beliefs	are	beliefs-in	paves	the	way	to	a	nominalist	ontology that	dispenses	with	facts	and	states	of	affairs.	This	too	is	greatly	advantageous,	given worries	about	so-called	Bradley's	regress	attending	a	state-of-affairs	ontology.25 I	develop	this	nominalistic	side	of	Brentano's	proposal	more	fully	in	Kriegel 2015;	what	I	want	to	stress	here	is	that	the	1906	letter	to	Marty	suggests	that	that nominalist	ontology	is	the	motivation	for	the	BIT	theory	of	judgment. The	key	to	delivering	nominalism	is	the	notion	that	beliefs-in	are	made	true by	individual	objects,	not	by	existential	states	of	affairs	(of	which	such	objects	are constituents).	It	might	be	objected	that	the	belief	in	dogs	is	made	true	not	by	each dog,	but	rather	by	each	dog's	existence	–	where	a	dog's	existence	is	a	state	of	affairs (the	fact	that	the	dog	exists).	But	Brentano	explicitly	rejects	this	in	the	same	letter	to Marty: [T]he	being	of	A	need	not	be	produced	in	order	for	the	judgment	"A	is"	to	be	...	correct;	all that	is	needed	is	A.	(Brentano	1930:	85) It	is	the	object,	and	not	(the	fact	of)	the	object's	existence,	that	makes	true	the relevant	existential.	In	a	slogan:	the	truthmakers	of	existentials	are	not	existences but	existents. 20 What	is	the	reason	to	take	the	object	itself,	rather	than	its	existence,	to	make true	the	existential	judgment?	One	reason	is	parsimony	of	course.	But	Brentano	also adduces	a	separate	argument.	It	is	an	argument	from	infinite	regress,	presented	in that	letter	to	Marty	(Brentano	1930:	85-6)	and	a	subsequent	letter	to	Hugo	Bergman (Bergmann	1946:	84),	as	well	as	in	a	1914	dictation	(Brentano	1930:	108).	Suppose for	reductio	that	belief	in	my	dog	Julius	is	made	true	not	by	Julius,	but	by	Julius' existence.	Then	in	addition	to	Julius,	we	must	add	to	our	ontology	the	state	of	affairs of	Julius	existing.	In	adding	this	state	of	affairs	to	our	ontology,	now,	we	are	clearly committing	ourselves	to	its	existence.	And	committing	to	the	existence	of	the	state of	affairs	of	Julius	existing	is	a	matter	of	believing	in	that	state	of	affairs.	The question	arises	then	of	what	makes	this	new	belief	true.	One	view	is	that	it	is	made true	by	the	state	of	affairs	of	Julius	existing	itself.	The	other	view	is	that	it	is	made true	by	not	by	the	state	of	affairs	of	Julius	existing,	but	by	the	existence	of	that	state of	affairs	(that	is,	by	the	state	of	affairs	of	the	state	of	affairs	of	Julius	existing existing!).	If	we	take	the	former	view,	then	we	allow	beliefs	in	certain	items	to	be made	true	by	those	items	themselves,	rather	than	by	their	existences;	so	we	might as	well	allow	already	the	belief	in	Julius	to	be	made	true	by	Julius	himself,	rather than	by	Julius'	existence.	If,	however,	we	take	the	belief	in	the	state	of	affairs	of Julius	existing	to	be	made	true	by	the	existence	of	that	state	of	affairs,	then	we	are including	in	our	ontology	a	new,	second-order	state	of	affairs,	namely,	that	of	Julius' existence	existing.	This	ontological	commitment	of	ours	requires	us	to	believe	in	that second-order	state	of	affairs	–	and	off	we	are	on	a	vicious	regress.	The	only	nonarbitrary	way	to	avoid	the	regress	is	to	recognize	dogs	themselves	as	the truthmakers	of	first-order	beliefs	in	dogs. In	summary,	the	BIT	theory	of	judgment	has	the	advantage	of	dispensing with	states	of	affairs	as	the	kind	of	entities	our	judgments	are	answerable	to.	More precisely,	what	we	have	here	is	a	dispensability	argument	to	the	effect	that	the conjunction	of	EXISTENTIAL	and	ATTITUDINAL	results	in	a	doubly	parsimony-enabling theory	of	judgment:	there	is	(i)	no	need	to	posit	propositions	to	account	for	the 21 structure	of	judgments,	and	(ii)	no	need	to	posit	facts	and/or	states	of	affairs	to account	for	the	truth	of	(true)	judgments. ge The	argument	is	that	we	should	adopt	the	conjunction	of	ATTITUDINAL	and EXISTENTIAL	because	doing	so	will	provide	downstream	benefits.	The	argument	is powerful,	but	has	two	limitations.	First,	it	offers	no	motivation	for	either ATTITUDINAL	or	EXISTENTIAL	in	separation	from	the	other,	and	second,	it	present	no upstream	considerations	offering	independent	support	for	either	ATTITUDINAL	or EXISTENTIAL.	Now,	in	the	entire	Brentano	corpus	I	do	not	believe	there	is	any independent	argument	of	the	sort	for	EXISTENTIAL.	But	for	ATTITUDINAL	there	are	at least	two. The	more	explicit	argument	appears,	to	my	knowledge,	only	in	Brentano's lecture	notes	from	his	logic	courses	in	Vienna	at	1878-9	and	1884-5	(Brentano	1956 §15).	Those	who	maintain	that	an	existential	judgment's	existence-commitment	is an	aspect	of	content,	Brentano	reasons,	have	the	following	picture	in	mind.	When you	judge	that	the	Pope	is	wise,	you	put	together	the	concept	of	Pope	and	the concept	of	wisdom.	Likewise,	when	you	judge	that	there	is	a	pope,	or	that	the	Pope exists,	you	put	together	the	concept	of	Pope	and	the	concept	of	existence.	But	note, says	Brentano,	that	you	cannot	judge	that	the	Pope	is	wise	without	acknowledging (annerkenen)	the	Pope,	that	is,	presenting-as-existent	the	Pope.	By	the	same	token, you	cannot	judge	that	the	Pope	exists	without	acknowledging	the	Pope.	But	once	one has	acknowledged	the	Pope,	there	is	no	point	in	additionally	judging	that	the	Pope exists	–	there	is	nothing	in	the	latter	not	already	in	the	former.	Since	the commitment	to	the	Pope's	existence	is	already	built	into	the	acknowledging,	that commitment	is	merely	replicated	in	the	act's	content. One	objection	might	be	that	acknowledgement	is	not	built	into	judgment	the way	Brentano	claims.	For	example,	one	may	judge	that	Alyosha	Karamazov	is emotionally	wise	without	acknowledging	Alyosha	in	the	relevant	sense	(the	sense	of presenting-as-existent).	However,	for	Brentano	such	statements	as	'Alyosha 22 Karamazov	is	emotionally	wise'	are	elliptical	for	the	hypothetical	'If	there	were	an Alyosha	Karamazov,	he	would	be	emotionally	wise'	(see	Brentano	1911:	273).	As	we saw	in	§2,	this	in	turn	expresses	only	a	negative	judgment,	namely,	that	there	is	not a	non-emotionally-wise	Alyosha.	Such	negative	judgments	are	orthogonal	to	the argument,	since	negative	existentials	do	not	commit	to	anything's	existence (obviously:	they	rather	involve	commitment	to	nonexistence). Another	objection	might	be	that	acknowledgement	only	appears	to	be	a distinctive	attitude.	In	truth,	to	acknowledge	something	amounts	to	judging	that	the thing	has	the	property	of	existing.	In	other	words,	just	as	Brentano	claims	that belief-that	reports	should	be	paraphrased	into	belief-in	reports,	the	present	objector claims	we	should	do	the	inverse.	What	this	objection	shows,	I	think,	is	that	deeper (nonlinguistic)	considerations	are	called	for	to	show	that	existence-commitment	is an	attitudinal	rather	than	content	property. Brentano's	main	argument	for	this	is	implicit	in	the	Psychology.26	The	basic point	is	that	acts	of	judging	and	acts	of	contemplating	or	entertaining	can	have	the same	content	(Brentano	1874:	205).	Yet	the	judging	commits	the	subject	to	the reality	of	what	is	judged,	while	the	contemplating	fails	to	commit	to	the	existence	of the	contemplated.	Therefore,	the	existence-commitment	cannot	come	from	the content,	which	is	shared.	It	must	come	from	some	other	difference	between	judging and	contemplating.	The	best	candidate,	says	Brentano	(1874:	221-2),	is	an attitudinal	difference:	the	judging	presents	the	judged	in	a	way	that	the contemplating	does	not	present	the	contemplated,	and	that	way	of	presenting encodes	(if	you	please)	commitment	to	the	relevant	object's	existence. Consider	an	episode	in	which	I	am	told	that	some	starveling	is	immasked. First,	I	am	unsure	what	was	said.	Then	I	reason	that	by	the	sound	of	it,	'starveling' must	be	a	word	for	someone	who	starves	and	'immasked'	a	word	for	someone	who is	wearing	a	mask.	What	happens	next	is	that	I	apprehend	or	contemplate	the	notion that	some	starving	person	is	wearing	a	mask.	At	this	point	I	am	committed	neither to	the	existence	nor	to	the	nonexistence	of	such	a	person.	After	some	thinking, 23 however,	I	realize	that	there	are	so	many	hungry	people	around	the	world	that	it	is rather	probable	at	least	one	of	them	is	wearing	a	mask	right	now.	I	then	come	to accept	the	existence	of	an	immasked	starveling.	In	this	stretch	of	inner	life,	the change	that	happens	when	I	no	longer	merely	contemplate	but	also	believe	in	an immasked	starveling	is	not	a	change	in	what	is	presented	to	me,	but	in	how	it	is presented.	What	is	presented	throughout	is	a	starving	person	wearing	a	mask.	But first	he	is	presented	in	a	way	that	does	not	commit	to	his	existence	and	then	in	a way	that	does.	The	existence-commitment	is	thus	an	aspect	of	the	way	the presenting	is	done	–	what	I	have	called	an	attitudinal	property. To	my	mind,	this	more	implicit	argument	of	Brentano's	is	cogent,	and demonstrates	that	existence-commitment	is	indeed	not	a	content	property,	but likely	an	attitudinal	property.27	It	is	worth	mentioning,	though,	that	there	is	another argument	for	ATTITUDINAL	close	to	the	surface	in	the	Psychology.	Consider	the Kantian	claim	that	'existence	is	not	a	property,'	which	Brentano	cites	approvingly: In	his	critique	of	the	ontological	argument	for	the	existence	of	God,	Kant	made	the	pertinent remark	that	in	an	existential	statement,	i.e.	in	a	statement	of	the	form	'A	exists,'	existence	'is not	a	real	predicate,	i.e.	a	concept	of	something	that	can	be	superposed	(hinzukommen)	on the	concept	of	a	thing.'	'It	is,'	he	said,	'only	the	positing	of	a	thing	or	of	certain	determinations [read:	properties],	as	existing	in	themselves.'	(Brentano	1874:	211) If	there	is	no	such	thing	as	a	property	of	existence,	any	attribution	of	existence	to something	would	be	attribution	of	a	property	that	nothing	has.	Accordingly,	any existential	belief	that	attributed	existence	to	something	would	perforce	be misattributing	and	therefore	mistaken.	But	in	fact	not	all	existential	beliefs	are mistaken:	it	is	correct,	for	example,	to	believe	in	ducks.	So	(correct)	commitment	to something's	existence	cannot	involve	attribution	of	a	property	of	existence.	If commitment	to	Fs'	existence	is	not	a	matter	of	attributing	existence	to	Fs,	it	must instead	be	built	into	the	very	nature	of	the	attitude	taken	toward	Fs.	This	is	the attitude	of	believing-in,	an	attitude	whose	very	nature	is	to	present-as-existent. 24 I	conclude	that	the	case	for	both	EXISTENTIAL	and	ATTITUDINAL	is	stronger	than one	might	initially	suspect.	As	noted,	together	they	entail	OBJECTUAL.	And	all	three theses	together	constitute	BIT,	Brentano's	Belief-In	Theory	of	judgment.	The	theory is	very	unusual,	but	apparently	more	defensible	than	may	initially	appear.	Its greatest	cost,	it	seems	to	me,	is	the	gap	between	the	apparent	simplicity	of	certain (notably	compound)	judgments	and	the	evident	complexity	Brentano's	theory attributes	to	them. 4. Objections	and	Replies Given	how	unusual	Brentano's	view	is,	it	is	surprising	that	the	case	for	it	should	be as	solid	as	it	is.	Nonetheless,	a	number	of	objections	suggest	themselves.	Let	us consider	the	more	pressing. Clearly,	Brentano's	theory	goes	against	our	intuitions	as	twenty-first-century philosophers	'brought	up'	on	a	certain	conception	of	the	structure	of	judgment	and belief:	as	having	a	subject-predicate	structure	akin	to	the	structure	of	the	sentences used	to	express	them.	But	just	as	clearly,	Brentano	would	reply	that	these	intuitions of	ours	lie	downstream	of	theorizing	and	therefore	cannot	be	used	to	support	the theory.	We	philosophers	have	the	intuition	because	we	have	accepted	the	theory, not	the	other	way	round.	We	should	reject	the	intuition	along	with	the	theory.	The objector	may	insist,	however,	that	the	intuition	does	not	come	only	from philosophical	theory,	but	also	from	the	structure	of	language,	as	used	well	before exposure	to	any	theory.	It	is	the	subject-predicate	structure	of	indicatives	that suggests	a	similar	psychological	structure	in	the	judgments	they	express. This	is	a	reasonable	claim,	to	which	Brentano	responds	by	trying	to	explain why	linguistic	expressions	of	judgments	have	the	structure	they	do	(despite judgments	having	a	completely	different	structure).28	Ultimately,	the	explanation	is that	language	and	judgment	have	different	functions:	the	primary,	original	function of	language,	he	claims,	is	to	facilitate	communication	(Brentano	1956:	25-6), 25 whereas	the	primary	function	of	thought	and	reasoning	is	the	acquisition	and management	of	knowledge.	Insofar	as	structures	derive	over	time	from	functions, there	is	no	reason	to	expect	the	latter	to	converge	where	the	former	diverge. The	objector	may	press	that	certain	systematicity	phenomena	could	not	be explained	within	the	Brentanian	framework.	If	the	structure	of	language	and thought	mirror	each	other,	we	can	understand	why	no	person	is	in	a	position	to judge	that	Mary	loves	John	without	being	in	a	position	to	judge	that	John	loves	Mary (Fodor	1975).	Brentano,	in	contrast,	has	no	resources	to	explain	this	–	he	must	treat as	miraculous	the	simultaneous	emergence	of	the	capacities	to	make	both judgments.	For	the	belief	in	a	Mary-loving	John	and	the	belief	in	a	John-loving	Mary have	strictly	nothing	in	common	in	their	contents.29 This	is	indeed	a	very	serious	problem	for	Brentano,	but	perhaps	he	could respond	as	follows.	As	we	have	already	seen,	the	fact	that	an	intentional	state	is	nonpropositional	does	not	mean	that	it	does	not	mobilize	concepts.	Thus,	even	though fear	is	an	objectual	attitude,	what	a	subject	can	fear	depends	on	the	concepts	in	the subject's	possession:	if	S1	possesses	the	concept	of	a	Rottweiler	while	S2	only possesses	the	coarser-grained	concept	of	a	big	dog,	their	fears	of	the	same	object might	be	type-different	intentional	states.	This	is	because	S1	will	apply	the	concept of	a	Rottweiler	to	the	object	he	fears	while	S2	will	apply	the	concept	of	a	big	dog. Now,	we	can	imagine	a	subject	who	possesses	both	concepts,	but	in	whom	the	two are	disconnected	in	such	a	way	that	the	subject	is	unaware	that	Rottweilers	are dogs.	In	most	subjects	who	possess	both	concepts,	however,	the	two	are	linked	in such	a	way	that	it	is	impossible	for	the	subject	to	fear	a	Rottweiler	without	ipso	facto fearing	a	dog.	The	Brentanian	might	hope	to	produce	a	similar	explanation	of	why every	normal	human	subject	in	a	position	to	contemplate	a	Mary-loving	John	is	also in	a	position	to	contemplate	a	John-loving	Mary.	It	is	far	from	clear	how	the explanation	would	go,	but	it	is	not	inconceivable	that	some	story	could	be	devised. Still,	as	long	as	no	actual	story	is	proffered,	it	remains	an	outstanding	theoretical debt	of	BIT	to	show	that	it	can	recover	the	phenomena	of	systematicity. 26 A	completely	different	objection	is	that	BIT	is	pragmatically	problematic, perhaps	because	its	acceptance	would	complicate	the	conduct	of	inquiry.	More specifically,	it	might	be	claimed	that	predicate	logic	has	worked	very	well	for	us	to formalize	large	tracts	of	science,	but	with	BIT,	predicate	logic	would	have	to	be renounced	wholesale.	This	objection	is	important,	but	all	it	shows	is	that	Brentano owes	us	a	predicate-free	formal	logic	to	go	along	with	his	predication-free	theory	of judgment.	As	it	happens,	Brentano	did	start	on	this	project	(Brentano	1956),	which was	further	developed	by	his	student	Franz	Hillebrand	(Hillebrand	1891).	Suppose a	subject	judges	both	that	(i)	there	is	a	party	and	that	(ii)	if	there	is	a	party	then there	is	booze,	which	leads	her	to	judge	that	(iii)	there	is	booze.	The	validity	of	her reasoning	is	captured	in	traditional	modus	ponens.	Within	the	Brentanian framework,	the	reasoning	is	recast	as	follows:	the	subject	both	believes	in	a	party and	disbelieves	in	a	boozeless	party,	which	leads	her	to	believe	in	booze.	The	task, then,	is	to	reformulate	the	familiar	laws	of	logic,	in	this	case	modus	ponens,	so	that this	reasoning	is	ratified	as	valid.	What	has	been	proposed	by	various	logicians	is	to replace	the	traditional p	à	q p q with Na b Ea Eb This	reads:	a	is	not	without	b	(there	is	not	a	boozeless	party);	a	is	(there	is	a	party); therefore,	b	is	(there	is	booze).	With	this	law	in	place,	we	can	readily	explain	why the	subject's	reasoning	to	the	conclusion	that	there	is	booze	is	valid.	Similarly	for other	logical	laws.	Now,	while	I	have	no	competence	to	affirm	that	Hillebrand's system	works,	I	have	all	the	competence	needed	to	report	that	Peter	Simons	thinks it	does	(see	Simons	1984,	1987). 27 Conclusion I	personally	think	that	Brentano's	theory	of	judgment	is	a	masterpiece	of philosophical	creativity.	Against	the	overwhelmingly	common	philosophical treatment	of	judgment	and	belief	as	propositional	attitudes	with	an	internal structure	mimicking	that	of	sentences,	out	of	the	blue	comes	Brentano	and	argues that	these	are	rather	objectual	attitudes	whose	only	function	is	to	acknowledge	or deny	existence,	or	more	accurately,	present-as-existent	or	present-as-nonexistent some	individual	object.	Given	its	considerable	originality,	I	find	the	case	for Brentano's	theory	surprisingly	solid.	Real	liabilities	loom	around	the	issues	of systematicity	and	the	complexity	of	compound	judgments.	Still,	the	ontological benefits	accruing	to	this	kind	of	theory	–	in	particular,	the	dismissal	of	propositions and	non-concrete	truthmakers	–	will	surely	appeal	to	many	philosophers.30 References § Bradley,	F.H.	1893.	Appearance	and	Reality.	London:	Swan	Sonnenschein. § Brentano,	F.C.	1874.	Psychology	from	Empirical	Standpoint.	Edited	by	O.	Kraus.	Translated	by	A.C. Rancurello,	D.B.	Terrell,	and	L.L.	McAlister.	London:	Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul,	1973. § Brentano,	F.C.	1911.	'Appendix	to	the	Classification	of	Mental	Phenomena.'	In	Brentano	1874. § Brentano,	F.C.	1928.	Sensory	and	Noetic	Consciousness.	Edited	O.	Kraus,	Trans.	M.	Schättle	and	L.L. McAlister.	London:	Routledge	and	Kegan	Paul,	1981. § Brentano,	F.C.	1930.	The	True	and	the	Evident.	Edited	by	O.	Kraus.	Translated	by	R.M.	Chisholm,	I. Politzer,	and	K.	Fischer.	London:	Routledge	1966. § Brentano,	F.C.	1933.	The	Theory	of	Categories.	Edited	by	A.	Kastil.	Translated	by	R.M.	Chisholm and	N.	Guterman.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff,	1981. § Brentano,	F.C.	1956.	Die	Lehre	vom	richtigen	Urteil.	Bern:	Francke	Verlag. § Brentano,	F.C.	1982. Descriptive	Psychology.	Edited	and	translated	by	B.	Müller.	London: Routledge,	1995. § Chisholm,	R.	1976.	'Brentano's	Nonpropositional	Theory	of	Judgment.'	Midwest	Studies	in Philosophy	of	Mind	1:	91-95. 28 § Fodor,	J.A.	1975.	The	Language	of	Thought.	Cambridge	MA:	Harvard	University	Press. § von	Hillebrad,	F.	1891.	Die	neuen	Theorien	der	kategorischen	Schlüsse.	Wien:	Hölder. § King,	J.	2007.	The	Nature	and	Structure	of	Content.	Oxford	and	New	York:	Oxford	University	Press. § Kriegel,	U.	2015.	'Thought	and	Thing:	Brentano's	Reism	as	Truthmaker	Nominalism.'	Philosophy and	Phenomenological	Research	90:	153-180. § Kriegel,	U.	Forthcoming.	'Brentano's	Concept	of	Mind:	Underlying	Nature,	Reference-Fixing,	and the	Mark	of	the	Mental.'	In	C.	Pincock	and	S.	Lapointe	(eds.),	Innovations	in	the	History	of Analytical	Philosophy.	London:	Palgrave-Macmillan. § Kroon,	F.	1987.	'Causal	Descriptivism.'	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy	65:	1–17. § Leibniz,	G.W.	1686.	Discourse	on	Metaphysics.	Trans.	D.	Garber	and	R.	Ariew.	Indianapolis: Hackett,	1991. § Meinong,	A.	1902.	On	Assumptions,	trans.	J.	Heanue.	Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press, 1983. § Montague,	M.	2007.	'Against	Propositionalism.'	Noûs	41:	503-518. § Perry,	J.	1994.	'Intentionality.'	In	S.	Guttenplan	(ed.),	The	Blackwell	Companion	to	the	Philosophy of	Mind.	Oxford:	Blackwell. § Pitt,	D.	2004.	'The	Phenomenology	of	Cognition;	or	What	Is	It	Like	to	Think	that	P?'	Philosophy and	Phenomenological	Research	69:	1-36. § Russell,	B.	1904.	'Meinong's	Theory	of	Complexes	and	Assumptions.'	Mind	13:	509-524. § Russell,	B.	1905.	'On	Denoting.'	Mind	14:	479-493. § Searle,	J.R.	1983.	Intentionality.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	UP. § Simons,	P.M.	1984.	'A	Brentanian	Basis	for	a	Leśniewskian	Logic.'	Logique	et	Analyse	27:	279-307. § Simons,	P.M.	1987.	'Brentano's	Reform	of	Logic.'	Topoi	6:	25-38. § Sutton,	J.	2007.	Without	Justification.	Cambridge	MA:	MIT	Press. § Textor,	M.	2007.	'Seeing	Something	and	Believing	IN	It.'	In	M.M.	McCabe	and	M.	Textor	(eds.), Perspectives	on	Perception.	Frankfurt:	Ontos. § Whitehead	A.N.	and	B.	Russell	1913.	Principia	Mathematica.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University Press. 1	To	my	knowledge,	the	expression	'objectual	attitude'	comes	from	Forbes	2000;	and	the	expression 'propositional	attitude'	from	Russell	1904.	But	the	concepts	far	predate	the	expressions. 2	It	is	not	immediately	clear	that	in	claiming	that	judgment	and	interest	are	grounded	in	presentation, or	have	presentation	as	their	grounds/foundations	(Grundlage),	Brentano	has	in	mind	the	notion	of grounding	currently	widely	discussed.	One	similarity	is	that	Brentanian	grounding	is	a	matter	of ontological	asymmetric	dependence,	or	what	Brentano	calls	'unilateral	separability':	a	mental	state 29 can	be	a	presentation	without	being	a	judgment,	but	it	cannot	be	a	judgment	without	also	being	a presentation. 3	See	Brentano	1874	II	Chapters	6-8,	including:	'my	three	classes	are	not	the	same	as	those	which	are usually	proposed.	In	the	absence	of	more	appropriate	expressions	we	designate	the	first	by	the	term "presentation,"	the	second	by	the	term	"judgment,"	and	the	third	by	the	terms	"emotion,"	"interest," or	"love".'	(Brentano	1874:	198)	A	clearer	presentation	of	the	view	is	this:	'It	is	clear	that	all	modes	of relation	to	an	object	fall	into	three	classes:	presentation,	judgment,	and	emotion	[interest].	The second	and	third	modes	always	presuppose	the	first,	and	in	both	we	find	a	contrast,	in	that	a judgment	is	either	a	belief	or	a	denial,	and	am	emotion	is	either	a	form	of	love	or	hate.'	(Brentano 1928:	42) 4	Although	Brentano	considers	presentation	the	most	basic	of	the	three,	since	the	other	two	are grounded	in	it,	my	exposition	will	proceed	in	a	different	order.	Moreover,	my	exposition	will	be	a 'dogmatic'	one,	in	that	I	will	not	present	Brentano's	argument	for	the	classification,	only	the classification	itself.	For	reconstruction	and	discussion	of	his	argument	for	it,	see	Kriegel	forthcoming. 5	I	say	'in	the	first	instance'	because	as	we	will	see	later,	ultimately	Brentano's	view	is	that	a	judgment present	what	it	does	as	existent	or	nonexistent	rather	than	as	true	or	false. 6	Brentano's	'Vorstellung'	is	variously	translated	as	presentation,	representation,	apprehension,	idea, thought,	and	contemplation.	Here	I	go	mostly	with	'presentation.' 7	When	one	supposes	that	p,	one	is	not	thereby	committed	to	the	truth	of	p.	There	is	a	sense	in	which in	supposing	that	p,	one	presents	p	to	oneself	under	the	guise	of	truth,	but	for	Brentano,	the	lack	of commitment	to	truth	lands	supposition	in	the	category	of	presentation.	His	student	Meinong	argued that	in	fact	suppositions,	or	assumptions	(Annahmen),	share	one	essential	characteristic	with presentations	and	another	with	judgments,	and	so	constituted	a	sui	generis	category	(Meinong 1902).	Brentano	argues	against	this	in	several	places,	for	example	Brentano	1911:	284-6. 8	This	is,	at	least,	Brentano's	treatment	of	Aristotle's	four	types	of	statements	for	most	of	his	career.	In the	final	decade	of	his	life,	he	seems	to	have	complicated	the	account	considerably,	adopting	his	socalled	double-judgment	theory	(see	especially	Appendix	IX	of	the	Psychology,	as	well	as	Brentano 1956	§30).	Here	I	will	ignore	this	later	complication,	well	motivated	though	it	may	be. 9	Brentano	writes:	'The	proposition,	"If	a	man	behaves	badly,	he	harms	himself,"	is	a	hypothetical proposition.	As	far	as	its	meaning	is	concerned,	it	is	the	same	as	the	categorical	proposition,	"All	men who	behave	badly	harm	themselves."	And	this,	in	turn,	has	no	other	meaning	than	that	of	the existential	proposition,	"A	man	who	behaves	badly	and	does	not	harm	himself	does	not	exist,"	or	to use	a	more	felicitous	expression,	"There	is	no	such	thing	as	a	man	who	behaves	badly	and	does	not harm	himself".'	(Brentano	1874:	218) 10	Brentano	nowhere	states	the	attitudinal	account	of	existence-commitment	as	explicitly	as	one might	wish.	But	he	comes	close	at	various	points.	For	example:	'The	most	natural	expression	is	"A	is," not	"A	is	existent,"	where	"existent"	appears	as	a	predicate....	[But	such	an	existential	statement] means	rather	"If	anyone	should	think	of	A	in	a	positive	way,	his	thought	is	fitting	(entsprechend)".' (Brentano	1930:	69)	The	commitment	to	A's	existence	is	an	aspect	of	the	way	(or	mode)	in	which	the thinking	is	done. 11	There	is	a	question	of	how	to	handle	the	truthmaking	of	negative	existentials.	This	is	something Brentano	had	nothing	to	say	about.	Perhaps	this	is	because	for	him	the	issue	is	not	really	one	of truthmaking,	but	of	the	ontological	commitment	that	positive	existentials	involve.	Since	negative existentials	involve	no	ontological	commitment,	the	same	issue	does	not	arise	for	them. 30 12	There	are	uses	of	'belief	in'	that	may	denote	non-cognitive	attitude,	as	in	'believe	in	yourself!'	or 'we	believe	in	the	future'	(which	seem	to	denote	emotional	attitudes	such	as	confidence	and	hope). But	there	is	also	the	cognitive	usage	highlighted	in	the	main	text. 13	To	endorse	this	formulation,	one	has	to	accept	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	occurrent	believing-in. If	one	takes	believing-in	to	be	always	dispositional,	then	Brentano's	view	would	have	to	be formulated	more	cumbersomely:	all	judgments	are	occurrent	manifestations	of	believings-in.	For	the sake	of	smooth	exposition	more	than	anything	else,	I	am	here	treating	belief-in	as	a	state	that	can	be occurrent. 14	Two	exceptions	are	Szabó	(2003)	and	Textor	(2007),	who	reject	the	analysis	of	'S	believes	in	x'	in terms	of	'S	believes	that	x	exists,'	though	on	grounds	other	from	Brentano's. 15	The	name	is	suboptimal,	insofar	as	belief-in	captures	only	one	half	of	the	span	of	judgments	– disbelief-in	captures	the	other	half.	But	BIT	has	the	advantage	of	being	cute,	and	I	trust	the	reader	to keep	in	mind	the	relevance	of	disbelief-in. 16	It	might	be	objected,	to	my	interpretation	of	Brentano's	Anerkennung	as	belief-in,	that	Brentano was	adamant	that	there	are	no	degrees	of	acceptance,	whereas	one	belief-in	may	very	well	vary	in confidence	(constituting	a	kind	of	objectual	credence).	However,	it	is	possible	to	account	for	the degree	of	confidence	associated	with	a	belief-in	not	as	an	aspect	of	the	belief-in	itself,	but	as	a	kind	of second-order	state	directed	at	the	likely	truth	of	the	first-order	belief-in.	In	itself,	then,	the	belief-in would	be	absolute	in	its	existence-commitment. 17	One	place	where	Brentano	sounds	non-Leibnizian	is	in	his	discussion	of	mereological	relations among	colored	spots	in	Brentano	1982	Chap.	2.	One	place	in	which	he	mentions	the	Leibnizian paraphrase	in	a	sympathetic	tone	of	voice	is	in	his	discussion	of	Kant's	classification	of	utterances	in Brentano	1956	§28. 18	What	happens	if	there	is	more	than	one	individual	with	those	properties?	Several	avenues	are open	to	descriptivists	–	divided	reference,	reference	failure,	and	more	–	but	the	issues	surrounding this	possibility	have	nothing	specifically	to	do	with	Brentano's	project,	so	I	will	set	them	aside	here. 19	In	Kripke's	(1972)	causal	theory	of	reference,	for	example,	there	is	a	relation	of	nondeviant	causal chain	between	a	current	use	of	the	name	and	a	baptismal	event	in	which	the	name	is	introduced	in the	presence	of	the	named. 20	One	option,	of	course,	is	to	deny	the	direct	reference	theory	of	names.	For	example,	it	is	possible	to hold	that	the	insights	associated	with	causal	theory	of	reference	can	be	recovered	through	a	kind	of causal	descriptivism	(Kroon	1987),	according	to	which	a	name	refers	to	whatever	objects	satisfies the	token-reflexive	description	'the	object	suitably	causally	linked	to	this	very	use	of	the	name.'	On this	view,	'Beyoncé	is	famous'	means	the	same	as	'The	object	suitably	causally	linked	to	this	very	use of	"Beyoncé"	is	famous.'	This	would	allows	for	the	standard	Brentanian	paraphrase. 21	The	short	answer	is	that	for	Brentano	Beyoncé	and	Famous-Beyoncé	are	two	numerically	distinct but	spatiotemporally	coinciding	objects. 22	Later	in	his	career	Brentano	adopts	the	more	complicated	double-judgment	theory	to	handle	such cases	(see	esp.	Brentano	1956	§30).	There	are	good	reasons	for	this,	but	as	noted	here	I	am	going	to ignore	the	double-judgment	theory	here.	(Addressing	it	in	brief	is	not	really	possible.) 23	A	similar	strategy	can	be	extended	to	material	conditionals,	since	p	è q	is	equivalent	to	~p	V	q, hence	to	~(p	&	~q).	It	might	be	objected	that	disbelief	in	sums	of	correct	judgments	is	too	weak	to capture	the	content	of	disjunctive	and	conditional	judgments.	The	claim	is	not	just	that	nobody	has	in 31 fact	made	the	relevant	correct	judgments.	It	is	rather	that	if	anyone	did	make	those	judgments,	they could	not	do	so	correctly.	This	latter	claim	has	a	modal	depth	to	it	entirely	missing	from	the	simple rejection	of	two	correct	judgments	co-occurring.	This	objection	smells	right	to	me,	but	it	just	invites discussion	of	Brentano's	treatment	of	modality,	on	which	Brentano	had	some	very	interesting	thing to	say,	but	which	would	take	us	too	far	afield. 24	There	might	be	something	odd	about	talk	of	truthmakers	for	beliefs	in.	Perhaps	it	might	be	thought ungrammatical	to	say	that	the	belief	in	ducks	is	true;	it	is	certainly	more	natural	to	say	that	such	a belief	is	correct.	In	that	case,	we	should	speak	rather	of	the	worldly	correctnessmakers	of	beliefs-in.	I am	sympathetic	to	all	this,	but	will	stick	with	the	word	'truthmaker'	for	simplicity.	On	this,	see	Textor 2007:	78-9. 25	In	the	present	context,	by	'state-of-affairs	ontology'	I	mean	any	ontology	that	admits	such	entities as	states	of	affairs.	Any	such	ontology	faces	Bradley's	regress	(Bradley	1893).	The	problem	is	how	to understand	the	'metaphysical	glue'	that	joins	an	individual	and	a	property	when	together	they compose	a	state	of	affairs.	The	fact	(obtaining	state	of	affairs)	that	Alec	the	electron	is	negatively charged	is	more	than	just	the	sum	of	the	two	facts	that	(i)	Alec	exists	and	(ii)	being	negativelycharged	is	instantiated.	It	involves	also	some	kind	of	'metaphysical	glue'	that	'brings	together'	Alec and	being	negatively-charged.	If	we	try	to	understand	this	'glue'	in	terms	of	a	relation	between	Alec and	being	negatively-charged	–	'exemplification'	or	'instantiation,'	say	–	then	we	would	require something	to	glue	Alec,	being	negatively-charged,	and	that	relation.	Appealing	to	a	second-order metaphysical	glue	would	only	launch	us	on	a	regress	–	Bradley's	regress. 26	More	specifically,	it	is	implicit	in	Brentano's	discussion	of	the	difference	between	judgment	and presentation	in	Chapter	7	of	Psychology	II. 27	I	write	'likely'	because	other	candidate	explanations	of	the	difference	between	contemplating	and judging	have	to	be	ruled	out	(other	than	the	content	candidate)	before	we	can	more	confidently assert	that	the	difference	is	attitudinal.	Much	of	the	issue	overlaps	with	the	question	of	the irreducibility	of	presentation	to	judgment,	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter. 28	In	general,	Brentano	takes	the	structure	of	language	to	be	a	poor	guide	to	the	structure	of	our mental	life.	This	is	stated	unequivocally	in	a	short	1905	fragment	titled	'Language'	(Brentano	1930: 71)	and	can	be	found	in	various	places	in	the	aforementioned	logic	courses	(e.g.,	Brentano	1956	§12). 29	Thanks	to	Marie	Guillot	for	pressing	on	me	this	objection. 30	This	work	was	supported	by	the	French	National	Research	Agency's	ANR-11-0001-02	PSL*	and ANR-10-LABX-0087.	For	comments	on	a	previous	draft,	I	am	grateful	to	Géraldine	Carranante,	Anna Giustina,	Alex	Gzrankowski,	Franz	Knappik,	Michelle	Montague,	and	Kevin	Mulligan.	I	also	benefited from	presenting	related	materials	at	the	Australian	National	University,	Columbia	University,	École Normale	Supérieure,	the	University	of	Girona,	and	at	IHPST	and	IJN	in	Paris;	I	am	grateful	to	the audiences	there,	in	particular	Damiano	Costa,	Imogen	Dickie,	Nemira	Gasiunas,	Thibaut	Giraud,	Anna Giustina,	Vincent	Grandjean,	Erick	Llamas,	Myrto	Milopoulos,	Michael	Murez,	Ben	Phillips,	David Pineda,	Maria	van	der	Schaar,	Benjamin	Schnieder,	Moritz	Schultz,	Robert	Stalnaker,	Daniel	Stoljar, Eric	Tremault,	Agustín	Vicente,	and	especially	Marie	Guillot.