Reply	to	Ori	Beck The	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is	that	both	perceptual	experiences	and the	processes	by	which	they	arise	can	be	rational	or	irrational.	A	prime	example	of	a process	that	can	modulate	the	rational	status	of	the	mental	states	they	produce	is inference.	If	perceptual	experiences	can	arise	from	inference	of	this	kind,	then	the Rationality	of	Perception	is	true. Beck	takes	for	granted	that	a	subject's	perceptual	experience	could	result from	an	inference	only	if	the	subject	herself	did	not	perform	the	inference.	("I plausibly	cannot	draw	these	experience-producing	inferences.	Only	my	subpersonal	subsystems	can	(perhaps)	draw	them.")	His	assumption	is	the	negation	of a	thesis	that	entails	the	Rationality	of	Perception.	None	of	Beck's	observations	speak to	whether	his	assumption	is	correct. Many	different	phenomena	are	labeled	by	the	term	of	'inference',	and	only some	of	them	redound	well	or	badly	on	the	rational	standing	of	subjects	who perform	the	inferences.	Why	think	that	perceptual	experiences	could	in	principle	be conclusions	of	inferences	that	redound	on	the	subjects'	rational	standing?	At	a minimum,	what's	needed	to	answer	this	question	is	an	account	of	why	nothing	in the	nature	of	either	inference	or	experience	precludes	the	possibility	that experiences	can	be	conclusions	of	inferences. My	paper	makes	the	case	that	nothing	in	the	nature	of	experience	precludes this	possibility.	To	show	that	nothing	in	the	nature	of	inference	precludes	it,	either, it's	useful	to	focus	on	inferences	to	belief	that	do	not	include	conscious	deliberation. In	taking	for	granted	that	experiences	couldn't	possibly	result	from	inferences, perhaps	Beck	is	assuming	that	inference	always	arises	from	conscious	deliberation, and	fixating	on	the	fact	that	we	can't	explicitly	deliberate	our	way	to	perceptual experience.	I	agree	that	we	can't,	but	not	every	inference	takes	that	form.	In	fact,	few inferences	do. If	Vivek	forms	the	belief	that	the	clerk	at	the	Post	Office	is	kind,	just	from observing	her	brief	interactions	with	the	person	ahead	of	him	in	line	(and	without his	visual	experience	presenting	him	with	the	property	kindness),	he	need	not	be able	to	specify	the	reasons	why	he	concludes	that	the	clerk	as	kind.	He	may	never have	been	able	to	specify	any	such	reasons.	It	is	enough	for	inference	simply	to respond	to	information	(or	misinformation)	one	has	in	the	distinctively	inferential way. Vivek	ends	up	with	the	belief	that	the	clerk	is	kind	and	that	his	audience	likes him	via	processes	that	feel	passive	to	him	(or	that	don't	feel	like	anything	at	all),	but are	in	fact	inferences	that	he	performed.	From	the	case	of	memory	color,	we	know that	perceptual	experiences	can	in	principle	(and	perhaps	in	fact)	result	from	stored generalizations,	such	as	that	banana-shaped-and-textured	things	are	yellow,	that combine	with	incoming	information	about	a	scene.	Nothing	in	the	nature	of inference	precludes	analyzing	such	processes	in	terms	of	inference	that	redound 2 well	or	badly	on	the	subject.	And	analyzing	them	that	way	can	explain	why	the epistemic	power	of	experiences	is	sometimes	reduced	by	their	relationship	with	the psychological	precursors	that	influence	them. 3 Reply	to	Raja	Rosenhagen Rosenhagen	asks	whether	there	could	be	a	world	Z	in	which	"hijacking	is	a ubiquitous	phenomenon".	Since	experiences	are	hijacked	in	having	a	specific content,	a	first	way	for	hijacking	to	be	ubiquitous	is	for	every	experience	to	be hijacked	with	respect	to	some	of	its	contents.	A	second	way	for	it	to	be	ubiquitous	is for	there	to	be	a	class	of	experiences,	such	as	color	experiences,	such	that	all experiences	in	that	class	are	hijacked.	I'll	interpret	Rosenhagen's	scenario	in	this second	way.	Here	is	an	illustration. In	the	Z-world,	things	are	colored	in	much	the	same	ways	they're	colored	here.	The sky	is	blue,	strawberries	are	red,	and	so	on.	Perceivers	native	to	the	Z-world	(Zperceivers)	have	perceptual	experiences	that	attribute	colors	to	things.	And	their color	experiences	often	correspond	to	the	true	colors	of	things. Despite	often	being	accurate,	Z-perceivers'	color	experiences	are	hijacked	because they	are	primarily	explained	by	background	beliefs,	and	not	by	the	impact	on	the perceivers's	minds	by	the	colors	of	things.	Z-perceivers	believe	that	the	colors	things have	reflect	God's	outlook	on	those	things.	This	theory	began	as	willful	deception	by people	who	wanted	to	rule	the	Z-world	in	its	early	days,	and	thought	the	populace would	be	more	governable	if	they	believed	in	such	an	omnipresent	God.	The	theory was	culturally	transmitted	in	a	way	that	preserved	its	ill-foundedness.1 Z-perceivers	are	highly	opinionated	about	what	God's	outlook	is.	According	to	Zperceivers,	tables	are	brown	when	and	because	God	feels	neutrally	about	them, strawberries	are	red	because	God	thinks	they	should	be	noticed,	the	sky	is	blue because	God	thinks	it	should	recede,	bananas	are	yellow	because	God	thinks	they will	illuminate	things,	and	so	on.	Z-perceivers	have	beliefs	like	these:	"God	thinks strawberries	are	meant	to	be	noticed"	and	"God	thinks	the	daytime	sky	is	meant	to recede".	These	beliefs,	in	turn,	have	come	to	play	a	role	in	generating	their	color experiences.	They	believe	that	God	thinks	strawberries	are	meant	to	be	noticed,	and things	meant	to	be	noticed	tend	to	be	red.	Due	to	these	beliefs,	when	they	see strawberries,	they	end	up	with	color	experiences	that	present	those	strawberries	as red.	The	pale	green	parts	of	unripe	strawberries	look	redder	to	the	Z-perceivers than	the	pale	parts	of	unripe	blueberries,	even	when	those	parts	are	the	same	shade of	pale	green. Rosenhagen's	three	questions	about	"ubiquitous	hijacking"	can	be	applied	to	the	Zworld.	His	first	two	questions	are,	first,	whether	ubiquitous	hijacking	is	coherent, and	second,	whether	the	ability	of	experiences	to	provide	justification	depends	on the	scope	of	perceptual	hijacking.	Granting	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	a	single color	experience	E	would	be	epistemically	weakened	by	being	hijacked	by 1	On	the	difference	between	well-founded	and	ill-founded	cultural	transmission,	see The	Rationality	of	Perception,	chapter	10. 4 someone's	beliefs	about	God,	would	the	fact	that	such	influences	on	color experiences	in	general	are	pervasive	make	any	difference	to	the	E's	epistemic powers? On	the	face	of	it,	there	is	no	reason	why	the	epistemic	downgrade	of	E	would disappear,	just	because	other	color	experiences	are	perceptually	hijacked	in	the same	way.	Once	it's	granted	that	the	experience	is	downgraded	by	virtue	of	its relationship	to	the	beliefs	about	God	and	color,	the	facts	about	whether	other	color experiences	stand	in	similar	relations	to	similar	beliefs	seem	irrelevant. If	color	experiences	in	the	Z-world	in	general	are	downgraded	by	their	relationship to	the	beliefs	that	subjects	of	those	experiences	have	about	God	and	color,	then	the Z-world	is	a	skeptical	scenario	in	which	color	experiences	do	not	provide justification	for	the	corresponding	beliefs	about	the	colors	of	things. Unlike skeptical	scenarios	in	which	experiences	are	influenced	by	a	force	outside	the subject's	mind,	such	as	an	evil	demon,	in	the	Z-world,	the	crucial	influences	come from	inside	the	subject's	mind. Since	the	factor	responsible	for	the	epistemic	downgrade	comes	from	the perceiver's	own	outlook,	it	could	in	principle	be	removed	by	adjusting	that	outlook. For	instance	in	the	Z-world,	if	the	perceivers	gave	up	their	ill-founded	beliefs,	then the	crucial	factor	leading	to	perceptual	hijacking	would	be	gone. Rosenhagen's	third	question,	when	applied	to	the	Z-world,	concerns	the	epistemic role	of	hijacked	experiences	in	revising	these	beliefs.	Perhaps	Rosenhagen	has	in mind	a	scenario	like	this:	the	offending	beliefs	about	color	could	be	rationally revised,	only	by	relying	on	color	experience.	But	if	the	color	experiences	are precluded	from	supporting	rational	revision,	then	Z-perceivers	would	face	an epistemic	start-up	problem.	They	could	not	rationally	revise	their	color	beliefs	in	a way	that	would	end	the	hijacking,	because	that	revision	would	have	to	depend	on hijacked	experience.	Perhaps	Rosenhagen	is	worried	that	revising	the	offending beliefs	would	replace	one	set	of	irrational	beliefs	with	another. Ubiquitous	hijacking	is	a	skeptical	scenario	where	the	skepticism	can	come	to	an end	if	the	perceiver's	outlook	is	appropriately	adjusted.	Rosenhagen	gives	no reasons	to	think	that	this	start-up	problem	would	necessarily	stymie	the	evolution away	from	ubiquitous	hijacking.	Z-perceivers	could	rationally	shed	the	offending beliefs	by	gaining	evidence	against	the	existence	of	the	Z-world	God,	and	this	change of	belief	wouldn't	rationally	rely	on	color	experiences.	Or	they	could	be	subject	to collective	permanent	amnesia	about	God,	and	thereby	cease	to	have	the	offending beliefs.	There	may	be	other	skeptical	scenarios	stemming	from	the	configuration	of perceivers'	own	minds	that	those	perceivers	can't	evolve	out	of.	But	if	there	are,	that predicament	would	stem	from	specific	circumstances	of	hijacking,	not	from ubiquitous	hijacking	itself. 5 Reply	to	Declan	Smithies Let	p	be	the	proposition	that	there's	mustard	in	the	fridge.	In	Smithies's	scenario, the	perceiver	has	reason	to	believe	that	he	has	reason	to	believe	p.	The	ground	for the	higher-order	reason	is	the	perceiver's	belief	that	conditions	are	normal.	This higher-order	reason	is	at	least	partly	misleading,	because	the	experience	is	hijacked, and	thereby	does	not	contribute	to	his	reason	to	believe	p,	and	so	conditions	are	not normal. Smithies's	perceiver	also	has	reason	to	believe	(2).	Claim	(2)	entails	~p,	and	I'll assume	with	Smithies	that	the	testimony	supporting	(2)	also	supports	believing	~p. Smithies	argues	that	when	combined,	the	two	pressures	he	describes	makes	it rational	to	infer	the	conjunction	of	(1)	and	(2).	He	then	argues	that	since	believing this	conjunction	could	never	be	reasonable,	the	prediction	that	it	is	reasonable	is absurd.	He	blames	the	absurd	prediction	on	the	thesis	that	experiences	can	lose epistemic	power	from	perceptual	hijacking. The	conjunction	of	(1)	and	(2)	is	a	form	of	(4):	p	but	it	is	reasonable	to	believe	~p. Smithies	argues	that	instances	of	(4)	are	always	unreasonable,	but	this	claim	seems to	have	counterexamples.	If	you	believe	p	but	acknowledge	reason	to	believe otherwise,	as	people	sometimes	do	in	philosophical	discussion,	then	an	instance	of (4)	could	be	reasonable	to	believe. Conjunctions	of	form	(4)	differ	from	standard Moorean	conjunctions,	whose	problematic	nature	arises	from	the	first-personal nature	of	belief	and	assertion. Even	granting	Smithies's	assumption	that	it's	not	rational	to	infer	conjunction	(3) from	its	conjuncts,	nothing	in	Smithies's	scenario	predicts	that	the	inference	would be	reasonable	to	draw.	Several	factors	could	make	the	inference	unreasonable, consistently	with	Smithies's	scenario. First,	supposing	that	my	belief	that	conditions	are	normal	gave	me	reason	to	believe (1),	absent	testimony	supporting	~p,	why	think	that	it	would	continue	to	do	so,	once I	received	such	testimony?	Perhaps	the	testimony	gives	me	reason	to	think	that conditions	aren't	normal	after	all. Smithies	may	be	imagining	a	case	in	which,	absent	perceptual	hijacking,	we'd	favor experience	over	testimony. If	we'd	favor	experience	over	testimony	absent hijacking,	on	this	view,	then	it	could	be	reasonable	to	do	the	same,	even	with hijacking,	purely	on	the	strength	of	the	belief	that	conditions	are	normal. The trouble	is,	as	he	sees	it,	that	the	rational	force	of	testimony	is	not	at	all	weakened, either	by	the	belief	that	conditions	are	normal,	or	by	the	higher-order	belief	in	(1) that	Smithies	says	it	supports. This	brings	us	to	the	second	factor	that	could	make	the	inference	unreasonable. Smithies	assumes	that	the	pressures	from	(1)	and	(2)	do	not	weaken	each	other.	He assumes	that	they	are	mutually	normatively	insulated.	If	they	are	not	so	insulated, 6 then	either	pressure	could	weaken	the	other,	and	that	would	make	it	unreasonable to	draw	the	inference	in	their	conjunction. Here's	how. According	to	some	philosophers,	even	when	it	is	misleading,	higher-order	reason that	you	have	reason	for	p	exerts	some	normative	pressure	to	believe	p.	This	view	is analogous	to	the	idea	that	evidence	of	evidence	is	evidence.	When	this	view	is applies	to	Smithies's	scenario,	the	higher-order	reason	for	(1)	is	also	(backdoor, non-perceptual)	reason	for	p. On	this	view,	the	higher-order	reason	and	the	testimony	in	Smithies's	scenario	exert conflicting	normative	pressures,	in	either	of	two	forms	(or	both).	In	the	first	form, the	testimony	pressures	the	perceiver	to	believe	~p,	so	when	combined	with	the higher-order	reason,	the	perceiver	is	simultaneously	pressured	to	believe	p	and	to believe	~p,	which	someone	could	do	only	on	pain	of	irrationality.	In	the	second form,	testimony	pressures	the	perceiver	not	to	believe	p,	so	when	combined	with the	higher-order	reason,	the	perceiver	is	simultaneously	pressured	to	believing	p and	not	believing	p,	which	is	logically	impossible. If	you	have	reason	to	believe	that	p,	but	also	have	reason	to	believe	~p,	you	don't thereby	have	grounds	to	infer	(p&~p). From	the	fact	that	absent	reason	to	believe ~p,	you	have	reason	to	believe	p,	it	doesn't	follow	that	given	reason	to	believe	~p, your	reason	to	believe	p	survives. In	Smithies's	scenario,	by	giving	the	perceiver	reason	to	believe	p,	the	higher-order reason	also	gives	him	reason	to	back	off	from	~p. He	thereby	ends	up	with	reason not	to	infer	the	conjunction.	He'd	have	reason	to	infer	the	conjunction,	only	if	the opposing	normative	pressures	were	mutually	normatively	insulated.	It's	this insulation	thesis	that's	responsible	for	predicting	that	it's	rational	to	believe	a supposedly	problematic	conjunction.	The	conjunction	won't	be	rational	to	infer	if	at least	one	of	the	opposing	normative	pressures	is	weakened	by	the	other.	The	culprit is	the	insulation	assumption,	not	the	thesis	that	perceptual	hijacking	weakens	the epistemic	power	of	experience.	That	thesis	does	not	entail	the	insulation assumption. 7 Reply	to	Mazviita	Chirimuuta In	two	ways,	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is	discontinuous	with	the inferentialist	tradition	that	Chirimuuta	identifies. First,	it	does	not	entail	the	empirical	hypothesis	that	perceptual	experiences	are actually	formed	by	inference.	It	says	they	could	be	so	formed.	By	contrast,	the inferentialist	tradition	consists	of	theories	about	the	nature	of	perceptual processing,	often	focusing	on	localized	processes,	such	as	calculating	shape	from shading,	distance	from	visual	angle,	or	edges	from	light	contrasts. Second,	my	thesis	concerns	the	kind	of	inference	that	redounds	on	the	perceiver's rational	standing,	whereas	much	of	the	inferentialist	tradition	has	no	theoretical need	to	distinguish	between	that	kind	of	inference	and	other	kinds. Given	these	differences,	my	position	is	not	a	platitude	for	the	inferentialist	tradition. Even	if	inferences	culminating	in	perception	used	the	same	cognitive	mechanisms	as those	used	in	epistemically	appraisable	inferences	between	non-perceptual	states,	it wouldn't	follow	that	the	inferences	to	perception	redound	on	the	subject's rationality.	It's	not	in	general	true	that	sameness	of	cognitive	mechanism	entails sameness	of	normative	status.2 Perceptual	hijacking	is	defined	in	terms	of	failing	to	give	perceptual	inputs	proper weight	and	giving	too	much	weight	to	prior	outlooks.	Chirimuuta	highlights	three cases	she	calls	describes	as	hijacking	that	nonetheless	redound	well	on	the perceiver,	by	the	lights	of	her	Basic	Bayesian	approach. In	her	first	case,	Vivek's	belief	that	people	like	him	is	properly	reflected	in	his perceptual	experience	because	the	faces	in	the	audience	were	poorly	lit.	Chirimuuta is	assuming	that	if	the	faces	are	poorly	lit,	then	it	is	reasonable	to	rely	more	heavily on	the	prior	assumptions	about	what	they	look	like.	But	given	this	assumption,	this situation	is	not	a	case	of	hijacking.	In	perceptual	hijacking,	prior	outlooks	are	given too	much	weight,	whereas	in	this	example,	by	Chirimuuta's	lights,	they're	given proper	weight. In	Chirimuuta's	second	case,	Vivek's	prior	belief	is	initially	unwarranted,	but	this status	is	insufficient	for	producing	an	irrational	perceptual	experience.	Being unwarranted	doesn't	make	a	prior	any	less	fit	to	determine	the	content	of experience,	according	to	Chirimuuta's	Basic	Bayesian	approach,	because	what matters	is	whether	the	prior	is	updated	in	response	to	new	evidence.	But	it's	natural 2	For	instance,	if	episodic	memory	of	crossing	a	finish	line	used	the	same	cognitive mechanisms	as	my	imagining	crossing	the	finish	line,	my	memory	can	justify	my belief	that	I	crossed	the	finish	line	whereas	my	merely	imagining	it	cannot. 8 to	assume	that	Vivek's	belief	got	be	unwarranted	in	the	first	place	because	he	was insensitive	to	evidence	that	supported	a	more	measured	view.	His	kind	of	belief	is not	an	arbitrary	start-up	assumption	of	a	learning	system.	It's	the	product	of responses	to	his	environment.	In	addition,	if	we	accepted	Chirimuuta's	description of	the	case,	then	as	before	it	wouldn't	be	perceptual	hijacking	(and	therefore	it wouldn't	be	rational	hijacking),	since	the	prior	belief	can	properly	determine	the content	of	experience. The	substantive	issue	Chirimuuta	raises	is	whether	the	outputs	of	inference	in	her second	case	redound	well	or	badly	on	Vivek,	when	his	prior	belief	is	unwarranted. Chirimuuta's	verdict	that	the	perceptual	output	redounds	well	on	him	is counterintuitive.	Suppose	I	consider	you	incompetent	at	something	that	matters	to us	both	because	I	haven't	got	a	close	look	at	what	you	can	do,	and	I	unjustifiedly assumed	your	were	incompetent	before	I	could	observe	your	actions.	The	fact	that	I will	update	my	belief	over	the	long	run	may	vindicate	my	practices	of	belief adjustment,	but	does	not	stop	my	belief	as	it	stands	from	being	unjustified. Chirimuuta's	Basic	Bayesian	theory	of	rationality	may	be	more	plausible	for	belief dynamics	over	the	long	run	than	it	is	for	local	transition	to	belief	or	perception. Chirimuuta's	third	case	draws	on	the	idea	that	if	Vivek's	belief's	impact	on perception	keeps	his	performance	anxiety	in	check,	then	it	is	Bayes-rational	because it	facilitates	his	goal	of	performing	by	sustaining	his	self-conception.	Assimilating this	kind	of	prudential	consideration	to	epistemic	appropriateness	blurs	the distinction	between	epistemic	and	practical	rationality,	and	that	conflation	has implausible	consequences.	If	it	will	facilitate	my	sense	of	superiority	to	you	to perceive	you	as	dangerous,	that	does	not	make	my	prior	belief	that	you	are dangerous	epistemically	rational,	even	if	believing	that	facilitates	my	goals.	Some philosophers	try	to	assimilate	epistemic	rationality	to	practical	rationality,	but	they acknowledge	that	they	have	a	lot	of	explaining	to	do	(Rinard	2017). Chirimuuta	recommends	Basic	Bayesian	as	more	nuanced	account	of	perceptual hijacking.	But	the	Basic	Bayesian	notion	is	less	nuanced	than	standard epistemologies	that	distinguish	between	epistemic	and	practical	reasons	for	belief, and	between	the	epistemic	status	of	beliefs	at	a	time	and	the	epistemic	status	of cognitive	dispositions	to	adjust	beliefs. Reply	to	Alison	Springle I	pointed	to	beliefs	that	are	unadjustable	by	deliberation	to	support	my	claim	that adjustability	by	deliberation	is	not	necessary	for	being	rationally	evaluable.	I concluded	that	the	fact	that	perceptual	experiences	are	so	unadjustable	doesn't preclude	them	from	being	rationally	evaluable. Springle	claims	that	my	route	to	this	conclusion	entails	that	"perceptual	experiences will	win	the	status	of	possessing	epistemic	charge	at	the	cost	of	being	systematically irrational".	Here	she	seems	to	reason	as	follows.	If	unadjustability	by	deliberation makes	a	belief	irrational,	then	unadjustability	by	deliberation	of	experiences	would 9 make	them	irrational.	I	reject	this	reasoning.	It	assumes	that	beliefs	and	experiences are	similar	with	respect	to	all	the	factors	that	can	explain	why	they	might	be unadjustable	by	deliberation.	Nothing	in	the	reasoning	forces	that	assumption.	And it	seems	false. Springle	objects	to	my	appeal	to	pathological	beliefs	as	examples	of	rationally evaluable	states	that	are	also	unadjustable	by	deliberation.	What	makes	those	states beliefs,	she	thinks	(assuming	that	the	delusional	states	in	question	really	are beliefs),	is	that	they	belong	to	a	class	of	states	that	are	adjustable	by	deliberation when	they're	not	pathological.	"[W]ere	[the	delusional	beliefs]	non-deviant they	would	be	so	adjustable",	she	writes.	But	how	would	this	show	that	these	beliefs aren't	both	rationally	evaluable	and	unadjustable	by	deliberation?	Springle	seems	to grant	that	delusional	beliefs	have	both	features.	And	that	is	all	that	matters,	if	we want	to	know	whether	rational	adjustability	is	necessary	for	belief. Springle	suggests	that	what	makes	beliefs	beliefs	is	that	they	are	normally adjustable	by	deliberation.	A	related	idea	is	that	what	makes	beliefs	rationally evaluable	is	that	they	are	normally	so	adjustable.	Applying	this	idea	to	delusional beliefs,	the	result	is	that	those	beliefs	are	rationally	evaluable	only	because	normal beliefs	are	deliberatively	adjustable. At	this	point	two	questions	arise.	First,	(i)	is	this	hypothesis	about	the	ground	of rational	appraisability	of	belief	correct?	Second,	(ii)	if	it	is	correct	about	belief,	must an	analogous	hypothesis	be	correct	about	perceptual	experience	as	well?	If	so,	then perceptual	experiences	would	have	to	follow	the	same	pattern:	they'd	have	to	be rationally	evaluable	only	if	normally	they	are	so	adjustable.	And	if	they	were unadjustable	by	deliberation,	that	could	only	be	because	they	are	pathological. Regarding	(i),	examples	abound	of	normal	beliefs	that	are	not	adjustable	by deliberation,	due	to	the	limited	capacities	of	the	believers,	such	as	a	young	child	who concludes	from	the	fact	that	their	coat	is	being	removed	from	the	hook	that	their babysitter	is	going	to	bring	them	to	the	playground.	Cooperation	with	a	caretaker's gentle	urgings	is	as	close	to	deliberation	as	young	reasoners	come.	This	observation is	a	reason	to	think	that	the	hypothesis	is	incorrect. In	reply,	someone	might	propose	that	what	makes	this	belief	rationally	appraisable is	that	other	normal	beliefs	are	adjustable	by	deliberation.	But	why	are	those	other beliefs	the	ones	whose	status	as	adjustability	or	unadjustable	makes	it	the	case	that any	belief	is	rationally	appraisable?	A	more	plausible	idea	is	that	the	child's	beliefs are	rationally	appraisable	because	the	child	is	rationally	appraisable.	But	that	more plausible	idea	does	not	justify	including	beliefs	among	the	rationally	appraisable states	while	excluding	perceptual	experiences. I've	argued	against	the	hypothesis	that	beliefs	are	rationally	evaluable	only	because normal	beliefs	are	adjustable	by	deliberation.	This	brings	us	to	question	(ii):	even	if the	hypothesis	were	correct,	would	an	analogous	hypothesis	about	perceptual 10 experience	have	to	be	correct	as	well?	There's	reason	to	think	not.	Rational appraisability	need	not	have	a	single	ground.	It	might	be	surprising	if	the	ground	of rational	appraisablity	for	beliefs	and	experiences	were	completely	disjoint.	But	a belief's	property	of	being	adjustable	by	deliberation	might	bring	with	it	other properties	that	are	shared	by	experience,	such	as	belonging	to	an	overall	outlook	of the	subject	and	belonging	to	a	rationally	appraisable	subject,	where	those properties	help	explain	what	makes	a	state	rationally	appraisable.