This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 1% Moral&Realism,&Moral&Disagreement,&and&Moral&Psychology& % Simon*Fitzpatrick* & Abstract:&This% paper% considers% John% Doris,% Stephen% Stich,% Alexandra% Plakias,% and% colleagues'%recent%attempts%to%utilize%empirical%studies%of%crossNcultural%variation%in% moral% judgment% to% support% a% version% of% the% argument% from% disagreement% against% moral%realism.%Crucially,%Doris%et%al.%claim%that%the%moral%disagreements%highlighted% by%these%studies%are%not%susceptible%to%the%standard%'diffusing'%explanations%realists% have% developed% in% response% to% earlier% versions% of% the% argument.% I% argue% that% plausible% hypotheses% about% the% cognitive% processes% underlying% ordinary% moral% judgment% and% the% acquisition% of% moral% norms,% when% combined% with% a% popular% philosophical% account% of% moral% inquiry-the% method% of% reflective% equilibrium- undercut%the%antiNrealist%force%of%the%moral%disagreements%that%Doris%et%al.%describe.% I% also% show% that% Stich's% recent% attempt% to% provide% further% theoretical% support% for% Doris%et%al.'s%case%is%unsuccessful.& & 1.& Introduction& To%a%first%approximation,%moral%realism%is%the%view%that%there%are%objective%answers% to% moral% questions,% that% the% objectivity% of% morality% is% underwritten% by% a% set% of% stanceNindependent% moral% facts,1% and% that% these% moral% facts% are% discoverable% through%careful%moral%inquiry.% Thus% understood,% moral% realism% has% been% thought% to% face% significant% difficulties% when% it% comes% to% explaining% the% extent% and% persistence% of% moral* disagreement% in% the% world.% This% paper% will% consider% John% Doris,% Stephen% Stich,% Alexandra%Plakias,%and%colleagues'%recent%attempts%to%use%empirical%studies%of%crossN %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 1%Moral%facts%are%stanceNindependent%if%they%obtain%independently%of%the%evaluative%attitudes%of%any% actual% or% hypothetical% individual% or% group% (ShaferNLandau,% 2003).% Moral% realism% is% thus% to% be% contrasted% with% various% constructivist% metaNethical% views,% which% hold% that% the% moral% facts% obtain% relative% to% a% particular% evaluative% stance,% and% with% moral% error% theory,% which% holds% that% moral% statements% are% systematically% false% because% there% no% moral% facts% to% make% them% true,% and% nonN cognitivism,%which%denies%that%moral%statements%are%capable%of%being%true%or%false.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 2% cultural%variation%in%moral%judgment%to%support%such%an%antiNrealist%argument%from% disagreement% (Doris% and% Stich,% 2005;% Machery,% et% al.,% 2005;% Doris% and% Plakias,% 2008a;% Stich,% 2009).% Crucially,% Doris% et% al.% claim% that% the% moral% disagreements% highlighted% by% these% studies% are% not% susceptible% to% the% standard% 'diffusing'% explanations%realists%have%developed%in%response%to%earlier%versions%of%the%argument% from%disagreement.% I% will% argue% that% current% views% in% moral% psychology% about% the% cognitive% processes% that% underlie% ordinary% moral% judgment% and% the% acquisition% of% moral% norms,%when%combined%with%a%popular%philosophical%account%of%moral%inquiry-the% method%of%reflective%equilibrium-suggest%a%plausible%diffusing%explanation%for%the% moral%disagreements% that%Doris% et% al.% highlight.%While% this%does%not% show% that% the% crossNcultural%data%poses%no%challenge%to%moral%realism,%it%does%show%that%Doris%et%al.% have%more%work% to%do% to%make% their%case.%Finally,% I%will% show%that%Stephen%Stich's% (2009)%recent%attempt%to%provide%further%theoretical%support%for%Doris%et%al.'s%case%is% unsuccessful.% & 2.& Moral&Realism&and&Moral&Disagreement& What% has% become% known% as% the% 'argument% from% disagreement'% against% moral% realism%has%been%formulated%in%many%different%ways%(see%Enoch,%2009),%but%here%is%a% standard% formulation:2%moral% realists%hold%not%only% that% there%are%objective%moral% facts,% but% also% that% these% moral% facts% are% epistemically% accessible% to% us-i.e.% that% moral% inquiry%provides%a%reliable%means%of%discovering%them.%However,% this%would% seem%to% imply%a%gradual%convergence% in%moral%views%over%time,%as% individuals%and% communities%engage%in%such%inquiry.%Yet,%what%we%actually%see%are%persistent%failures* of% convergence.% Disagreement% over%moral% issues% is% not% only%widespread,% but% also% seems% remarkably% resistant% to% resolution.% Importantly,% so% it% is% argued,% this%makes% morality% look% unlike% areas% of% inquiry% that% plausibly% admit% a% realist% interpretation,% such% as% natural% science.% While% disagreements% over% scientific% claims% are% certainly% common,% empirical% scientific% methods% generally% seem% able% to% filter% out% such% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 2% This% formulation%derives% from%Mackie% (1977)% and% subsequent%discussion% (e.g.%Brink,% 1989;% Loeb,% 1998).%% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 3% disagreements%over%time.%The%methods%of%moral%inquiry,%on%the%other%hand,%appear% unable% to% do% this;%moral% disagreements% often% appear% to% be% permanent.% This,% antiN realists%claim,%suggests%either%that%there%are%no%stanceNindependent%moral%facts%for% us%to%discover,%or,%if%such%facts%do%exist,%the%methods%of%moral%inquiry%fail%to%provide% reliable%means%to%discover%them.%Either%way,%persistent%moral%disagreement%is%bad% news%for%realism.% In%response%to%this%argument,%realists%have%suggested%a%number%of%what%Doris% et% al.% call% 'diffusing'% explanations% for% the% persistence% of% moral% disagreement% (e.g.% Boyd,%1988;%Brink,%1989;%Smith,%1994).%To%begin%with,%it%can%be%argued%that%some%of% the%apparent%moral%diversity%in%the%world-crossNcultural%and%historical%differences% in% attitudes% towards% infanticide,% for% instance-is% not% really% genuine% moral% disagreement,%but%the%result%of%the%same%moral%principles%being%applied%to%different% circumstances-for% instance,% applying% the% principle,% 'killing% is% only% permitted% in% extreme%circumstances'%under%different%material%conditions.%Also,%as%in%other%areas% of% inquiry,% the% truth%may%be%epistemically%accessible% to%us,%and%yet%convergence%of% opinion%fail%to%obtain,%if%people%do%not%always%form%and%revise%their%moral%beliefs%in% rational%ways.%Some%may%be%irrationally%wedded%to%their%beliefs,%or%fail%to%take%all%the% relevant%issues%in%account.%In%addition,%people%may%maintain%divergent%moral%views% as% a% result% of% insufficient% or% faulty% information% about% the%moral% situation% at% hand% (whether%X% intended% to%do%A,%was% aware%of% the% consequences%of% doing%A,% etc.),% or% unresolved%disagreements%over%relevant%nonNmoral% issues% (what%cosmological%and% religious% views% are% correct,% whether% a% foetus% is% a% 'person',% etc.).% Since%more% than% truth%is%normally%at%stake%in%moral%debates,%partiality%and%vested%interest%may%also% play%a%role% in%explaining%why%people%persistently% fail% to%reach%agreement%on%moral% issues.%Moreover,%realists%need%not%hold%that%moral%inquiry%is%guaranteed%to%get%us%to% the% truth-there% is,% after% all,% no% such% guarantee% for% scientific% inquiry-only% that% it% provides%a%generally% reliable%means% for%acquiring%and% improving%knowledge%of% the% moral%truths.%They%can%also%accept%that%there%are%some%moral%questions%that%are%too% difficult%for%us%to%answer%(presumably%some%scientific%questions%may%also%escape%our% epistemic%reach),%or%do%not%admit%determinate%answers%(for%instance,%because%some% of% the% relevant% properties,% such% as% the% property% of% being% a% 'person',% have% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 4% indeterminate% borders).% Hence,% realism% need% not% entail% complete% convergence% of% opinion,%even%amongst%fully%informed,%rational,%and%impartial%inquirers.% As% Doris% et% al.% see% it,% such% responses% to% the% argument% from% disagreement% commit%the%realist%to%the%claim%that%most%moral%disagreements%are%superficial%rather% than% fundamental.% The% suggestion% seems% to% be% that% it% is% only% widespread,% truly% fundamental% moral% disagreement-genuine% disagreement% that% would% remain% unsettled%once%all%epistemic%disadvantages%on% the%part%of%disputants% (irrationality,% partiality,% lack%of% relevant%nonNmoral% information,% etc.)% have%been% corrected-that% poses%a%problem%for%realism.%Hence,%the%realist% is%committed%to%the%conjecture%that% genuine% moral% disagreement% will% not% be% widespread% under% ideal% epistemic% conditions:%when%people%are%fully%rational,%reflective,%impartial,%and%informed%of%all% relevant%nonNmoral%facts.3%This%appears%to%shift%the%focus%of%the%debate%from%actual% moral%disagreements,%which%likely%do%not%occur%under%anything%like%ideal%epistemic% conditions,% to% the% question% of% whether% there% could% exist% certain% hypothetical* disagreements,% leading% some% to% despair% that% the% metaNethical% debate% over% moral% disagreement% has% reached% its% own% intractable% impasse,% reducing% to% loosely% grounded% speculation% about% what% would% or% would% not% happen% under% remote% hypothetical%conditions.4% In%contrast%to%this%pessimistic%view%of%the%debate,%Doris%et%al.%emphasize%the% relevance% of% empirical% data% on% the% nature% of% actual% moral% disagreements.% In% particular,% they% claim% that% if% we% can% find% a% significant% number% of% cases% of% actual% moral% disagreement% that% cannot% easily% be% explained% away% in% terms% of% the% above% sorts% of% diffusing% explanations% (irrationality,% partiality,% nonNmoral% disagreements,% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 3%As%Doris%and%Plakias%(2008a,%p306N310)%note,%not%all%realists%accept%this%commitment%(e.g.%ShaferN Landau,%2003).%Such% 'divergentist'% realists%hold% that%disagreement% in% science%and%other% realismNapt% domains% is% more% widespread% and% persistent% than% moral% antiNrealists% acknowledge,% and% that% this% poses%no%challenge%to%realism.%Thus,%such%disagreement%shouldn't%impugn%moral%realism%either.%Since% Doris%et%al.%direct%their%empirical%case%against%realists%happy%to%accept%commitments%to%convergence,%I% will%not%discuss%divergentist%positions%here,%but% it% is%worth%considering%the%extent%to%which%realism% does%actually%require%such%commitments.% 4% Realists% clearly% face% difficulties% in% characterizing% these% ideal% conditions.% It% would% be% counterN productive%to%make%them%so%demanding%as%to%escape%real%human%beings%(e.g.%requiring%some%form%of% omniscience),% yet% the% weaker% the% conditions% the% more% obvious% it% will% be% that% widespread% disagreement%could%persist%when% they%obtain.%Following%Doris%et%al.,% I%will%assume%that%realists%can% characterize% them%without%undermining%their%position,% though%I%will% return%to% the% issue%of%whether% the%epistemic%standards%set%by%realists%are%too%onerous%for%human%beings%in%Section%7.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 5% and%so% forth),% then% that%would%cast% significant%doubt%on% the%realist% conjecture% that% most%moral%disagreements%will%be%settled%under% ideal%epistemic%conditions.%Hence,% even%though%the%debate%may%turn%on%hypothetical%rather%than%actual%disagreements,% both%realists%and%their%antiNrealist%opponents%have%a%clear%empirical% imperative:% to% investigate% the% extent% of% actual% moral% diversity% in% the% world% and% why% it% is% so% persistent.% Doris% et% al.'s% project% is% to% show% that% the% convergence% conjecture% is% rendered%implausible%by%the%empirical%evidence.% & 3.& Empirical&Evidence&Against&The&Convergence&Conjecture?% One% of% Doris% et% al.'s% key% examples% is% the%work% of% Richard%Nisbett% and%Dov% Cohen% (1996)% on% differences% in% attitudes% between%White% nonNHispanic% Northerners% and% Southerners%in%the%USA%towards%the%use%of%violence.%According%to%Nisbett%and%Cohen,% many%areas%of%the%American%South%exhibit%features%of%a%culture*of*honor,%typified%by% emphasis%on%male%reputation% for%strength%and%an% imperative% for%males% to%respond% with% violence% to% slights% upon% their% honor.5% In% support% of% this% claim,% Nisbett% and% Cohen% conducted% surveys% of% Southern% and% Northern% attitudes% towards% violence.% They% found% that% White% Southerners% were% significantly% more% likely% than% White% Northerners% to% regard%violent% retaliation%by%males% to% insults%and%other%affronts%as% 'extremely%justified',%and%more%likely%to%express%disapproval%of%males%who%failed%to% so%respond%with%violence.%A% field%survey%also% found%that%Southern%employers%were% more%likely%to%take%a%sympathetic%attitude%towards%a%(fictitious)%male%job%applicant% who%had%been%convicted%of%accidentally%killing%a%man%in%a%brawl,%after%the%man%had% boasted%about%sleeping%with%the%applicant's%fiancé,%than%a%male%applicant%convicted% of% stealing% a% car% when% his% family% was% in% desperate% need% of% money.% In% contrast,% Northern% employers% showed% no% difference% in% attitude% towards% the% manslaughter% and%theft%applicants.% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 5% Nisbett% and% Cohen% argue% that% such% cultures% tend% to% emerge% in% areas% where% law% enforcement% agencies%are%absent%or%ineffective%at%deterring%theft%of%valuable%resources.%Individuals%therefore%have% to% develop% their% own% deterrents,% such% as% acquiring% a% reputation% for% extreme% retaliation% for% the% slightest%affront.%Once%established,%honor%cultures%may%persist% long%after%socioNeconomic%conditions% have% altered,% as% in% areas% of% the% American% South% settled% by% herders% who% had% to% protect% valuable% livestock.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 6% Doris% et% al.% regard% this% apparent% disagreement% between%White% Southerners% and%White%Northerners%about% the%permissibility%of%violence%as% important%evidence% for% the%claim%that%a%significant%amount%of%moral%disagreement%would% likely%persist% under%ideal%epistemic%conditions.%They%claim%that%it%is%implausible%that%either%group% is% simply% irrational,% or% that% their% judgments% are% driven% by% partiality-it% seems% doubtful,% for% instance,% that% 'Southerners'% economic% interests% are% served% by% being% quick% on% the% draw...'% (Doris% and% Plakias,% 2008a,% p320).% They% also% claim% that% the% differences% cannot% plausibly% be% explained% away% by% disagreement% over% nonNmoral% issues.%White% Northerners% and%White% Southerners% don't% appear% to% disagree% about% what% counts% as% an% insult% or% provocation,% nor% do% there% seem% to% be% relevant% differences% in% background% religious% or% cosmological% views.% Doris% et% al.% conclude:% 'Nisbett% and% colleagues'% work% represents% one% potent% counterexample% to% the% convergence%conjecture...'%(Doris%and%Plakias,%2008a,%p321).% In%addition%to%the%Nisbett%and%Cohen%data,%Doris%et%al.%also%report%data%of%their% own% (Peng% et% al.,% unpublished% data)% highlighting% crossNcultural% differences% in% responses% to% the% famous% magistrate* and* the* mob% thought% experiment.% Chinese% undergraduates%and%American%undergraduates%of%European%descent%were%presented% with%a%vignette%in%which%a%murder%has%taken%place%in%a%town%with%a%history%of%ethnic% violence.% Participants%were% told% that% if% the% town's% authorities% do% not% immediately% punish% someone% for% the% crime% the% townspeople%will% riot% and%many%people%will% be% killed.%The%authorities%do%not%know%the%identity%of%the%murderer.%However,%they%can% frame%an%innocent%man%for%the%crime,%thus%preventing%the%rioting.%Participants%were% then%told%that%the%authorities%decided%to%frame%the%innocent%man,%and%asked%whether% this%was%the%right%thing%to%do.%The%American%undergraduates%tended%to%say%that%the% authorities%did%not%do%the%right%thing.%However,%the%Chinese%undergraduates%tended% to%respond%that%framing%the%man%was%the%right%thing%to%do,%and%that%it%was%actually% the%townspeople%who%were%responsible%for%his%being%punished.% This% disagreement% between% American% and% Chinese% undergraduates% is% claimed% as% another% case% that% casts% doubt% on% the% convergence% conjecture.% Importantly,%participants%were%also%asked%various%factual%questions%about%the%case,% including%whether%the% innocent%man%would%suffer%as%result%of%being%punished,%and% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 7% whether%the%riots%would%have%caused%pain%and%suffering.%No%significant%differences% were%found%in%the%answers%given%by%the%two%groups.%According%to%Doris%and%Plakias% (2008a,% p324),% 'the% differences% are% not% readily% to% be% attributed% to% differences% in% conceptions%of% the%non;moral* facts.'%Nor,% they%claim,% is% it%plausible%to%regard%either% group% of% participants% as% irrational,% or% motivated% by% partiality;% the% hypothetical% nature% of% the% scenario% suggests% that% both% groups% can% be% regarded% as% impartial% observers.% Doris%et%al.%do%not%claim%to%have%ruled%out%all%possible%'diffusing'%explanations% for% these% apparent% moral% disagreements.% However,% their% contention% is% that% these% studies,%along%with%a%number%of%other%studies%of%crossNcultural%evaluative%diversity,% 'motivate% confident% speculation% to% the% effect% that% the% [convergence]% conjecture% is% unlikely%to%be%satisfied'%(Doris%and%Plakias,%2008a,%p327).6% Doris% et% al.'s% claims% have% prompted% various% critical% responses% (e.g.% Bloomfield,% 2008;% Leiter,% 2008;% Sneddon,% 2009;% Fraser% and% Hauser,% 2010).% In% particular,% Leiter% (2008)% and% Fraser% and%Hauser% (2010)% question%whether%Nisbett% and% Cohen's% work% provides% clear% evidence% of% disagreement% between% White% Northerners%and%White%Southerners%about%the%permissibility%of%violence,%rather%than% just%a%difference% in% their%willingness% to% forgive% violent%acts,%or% the%degree% to%which% they%regard%violence%as%permissible%in%a%given%situation.7%Moreover,%while%Doris%et%al.% emphasize%the%need%for%philosophers%to%obtain%more%accurate%understanding%of%the% extent% of% moral% diversity,% they% only% discuss% research% on% disagreement.% Research% seemingly%pointing% in% the%other%direction%also%has% to%be% considered-for% instance,% Mikhail's%(2011)%work%documenting%striking%crossNcultural%similarities%in%judgments% and% norms% concerning% battery.% Indeed,% to% some% extent,% the% Peng% et% al.% data% demonstrates% core% agreement% between% Chinese% and% Americans% that% individual% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 6%Increasing%globalization%might%reduce%such%diversity%via%the%hegemony%of%one%culture%over%others,% but% this% is%not% the%kind%of% 'convergence'%Doris% et% al.% have% in%mind,% and% clearly% couldn't%be% taken% to% indicate%convergence%to%the%truth.% 7%Leiter%and%Fraser%and%Hauser%are%nonetheless%supporters%of%Doris%et%al.'s%cause.%Leiter%argues%that% the% history% of%moral% disagreement% in% philosophy% provides% the% clearest% challenge% to% realism,% since% professional% philosophers% come% closest% to% approximating% ideal% epistemic% conditions.% Fraser% and% Hauser%regard%some%of%their%own%crossNcultural%work%as%providing%firmer%evidence%for%Doris%et%al.'s% conclusions.% My% response% to% Doris% et% al.% applies% equally% to% Fraser% and% Hauser.% Doris% and% Plakias% (2008b)%respond%to%Leiter%on%the%relevance%of%disagreement%in%philosophy.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 8% liberty%and%community%harmony%are%moral%goods,%even%if%they%disagree%about%how% they%ought% to%be% traded%off-reNcall% that% the%Chinese%participants% tended% to%blame% the% townspeople% for%punishing% the% innocent%man,% suggesting%moral% concern%about% the% infringement% of% his% liberty% (see% also%Wong,% 2006% on% Chinese% versus%Western% moral%traditions).%Hence,%we%need%a%broader%evaluation%of%the%true%extent%of%moral% diversity,% being% careful% to% distinguish% genuine% disagreement% on% core% moral% principles%and%values%from%different%views%on%how%the%same%principles/values%ought% to% be% applied% in% particular% cases-persistent% disagreement% on% the% latter% arguably% being%less%troubling%for%realism.% Rather% than% pursue% these% sorts% of% issues,% I% will% argue% that,% in% any% case,% plausible%hypotheses%about%the%psychological%processes%underlying%moral%judgment% and% the% acquisition% of% moral% norms,% when% combined% with% an% account% of% moral% inquiry% endorsed% by%many% contemporary% realists,% suggest% that% the% disagreements% cited%by%Doris% et% al.% need%not% challenge% the% convergence% conjecture.% In% so%doing,% I% will% highlight% some% important% considerations% that% need% to% be% taken% into% account% when%evaluating%how%actual%agreements%or%disagreements%bear%on%the%plausibility%of% moral%realism.% % 4.& A&DualGProcess&Model&of&Moral&Judgment&and&Norm&Acquisition% The%model% of% human%moral% psychology% that% I%want% to% appeal% to% is,% ironically,% one% that%has%been%developed%by% Stich,% along%with%Chandra% Sripada% (Sripada% and%Stich,% 2006).8% The% Sripada% and% Stich% (S&S)%model% synthesizes% a% large% body% of% empirical% research%that%has%been%conducted%over%the%last%few%decades%into%the%nature%of%moral% judgment%and%normative%cognition%more%generally.%In%particular,%it%is%consistent%with% the%increasingly%popular%view%that%most%of%our%moral%judgments%are%not%the%product% of,% or% much% influenced% by,% deliberative% and% consciously% guided% moral% reflection.% Rather,% they% are,% in% the% psychological% sense,%moral% intuitions:% fast,% automatic,% and% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 8%Stich%(2009)%argues%that%this%model%can%be%used%to%provide%further%theoretical%support%for%Doris%et% al.'s%case.%I%will%discuss%these%claims%in%Section%6.%In%Section%5,%I%will%argue%that%it%actually%highlights%a% plausible%diffusing%explanation%for%moral%disagreements.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 9% (often)% emotionNladen% responses% that% are% the% product% of% entirely% unconscious% cognitive%processes.% One% important% piece% of% evidence% for% this% view% comes% from% work% on% the% phenomenon%of%moral*dumbfounding%(Haidt,%2001),%which%shows%that%people%often% react%with%immediate,%visceral%moral%disapproval%to%certain%actions%(e.g.%consensual% sibling% incest),% while% being% completely% unable% to% articulate% moral% principles% or% beliefs% that%can%explain%why% they% judge% the%action% to%be%wrong.% In%addition,%brainN imaging%studies%have%shown%activity%in%emotional%and%affective%areas%of%the%brain%to% be%more%commonly% implicated% in%moral% judgment%than%activity% in%areas%associated% with%controlled%reasoning%(Paxton%and%Greene,%2010).%Affect%manipulations,%such%as% engendering%heightened%disgust,%have%also%been%shown%to%influence%moral%judgment% (Wheatley%and%Haidt,%2005).% Such% results% provide% support% for% the% view% that% most% moral% judgments% are% automatic,% intuitive% responses% to% situations,% closely% linked% with% emotional% and% affective% responses,% rather% than% the% product% of% controlled% moral% reasoning% and% reflection% on% the% part% of% the% agent.9% They% do% not,% however,% show% that% controlled% reasoning% never% plays% a% role% in% moral% cognition.% The% history% of% ethical% thought% suggests% that% people% are% able% to% explicitly% formulate% and% reason% from% a% set% of% consciously% accessible% moral% beliefs.% This% is% confirmed% by% brainNimaging% studies,% showing% activation% in% brain% areas% associated% with% controlled% reasoning% in% some% instances% of% moral% judgment,% and% behavioral% studies% showing% that% people% can% consciously%alter%their% initial%moral% judgments%to%bring%them%in% line%with%explicitly% held%moral%principles,%and%that%reflective%thought%can%be%increased%by%experimental% manipulations% (Pizzaro% et% al.,% 2003;% Paxton% and% Greene,% 2010).% Nonetheless,% the% current% empirical% literature% does% suggest% that% such% consciously% guided,% reflective% thinking%is%a%comparatively%rare%component%of%our%moral%lives.% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 9% This%psychological% sense%of% 'intuition'% does%not% involve% the% claim,% associated%with% the% intuitionist% tradition%in%moral%philosophy,%that%moral%intuitions%are%direct%apprehensions%of%moral%truths,%or%that% they%have%privileged%epistemic%status.%Nor%does%it% imply%that%no%process%of%reasoning%whatsoever%is% involved%in%their%generation.%Complex%computational%processes%may%still%be%operating%below%the%level% of%consciousness%(Mikhail,%2011).% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 10% This%has%motivated%numerous% researchers% to%postulate%dual;process%models% of%moral%cognition%(e.g.%Saunders,%2009;%Cushman%et%al.,%2010;%Kahane,%2012).%DualN process%models% of% cognition% (e.g.% Evans% and%Over,% 1996)% distinguish% between% two% types%of%cognitive%process%that%may%play%role%in%a%given%cognitive%domain:%System%1% processes,%which%are%automatic,% fast,%and%not%consciously%accessible,%and%System%2% processes,%which% are% effortful,% slow,% and% consciously% accessible.% The% suggestion% is% that% a% suite% of% System% 1% processes,% closely% linked% with% emotion% and% affect,% drive% much%of%our%moral%cognition,%and%these%are%responsible%for%our%moral%intuitions.%We% also% have% a% System% 2% capacity% for% controlled% and% consciously% accessible% moral% reasoning,% which% underlies% our% ability% to% explicitly% formulate,% and% make% moral% evaluations%based%upon,% a% set%of%moral% convictions.%This%may%allow%us% to%override% our%System%1%intuitions% in%some%cases,%but%plays%a%minimal%role% in%everyday%moral% judgment,%compared%to%System%1%processes.10% % 4.1* The*S&S*Model* Sripada%and%Stich's%'A%framework%for%the%psychology%of%norms'%(2006)%is%an%attempt% to%explicate%what%such%a%dualNprocess%model%of%moral%cognition%might%look%like.%The% model% is%represented%diagrammatically% in%Figure%1.%One% important%question%raised% by% the% dualNprocess% picture% concerns%where% our% System%1%moral% judgments% come% from,% if% not% from% some% process% of% controlled% reasoning% and% reflection.% Merely% highlighting% the% link%with%emotional%and%affective%responses%does%not%explain%how% such%responses%are%triggered%by%often%quite%complex%moral%stimuli%(Mikhail,%2011).% Sripada%and%Stich%ask%a%similar%question%about%normative%judgments%more%generally.% They%describe%empirical%work%showing%that%though%there%are%significant%differences% in%their%content,%every%human%social%group%has%norms%governing%aspects%of%life%such% as% appropriate% behavior,% dress,% and% diet.% Violations% of% these% norms% typically% elicit% strong%emotional%reactions,%such%as%anger%and%disgust,%and%these%provide%individuals% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 10%Greene%and%colleagues%(e.g.%Paxton%and%Greene,%2010)%argue%that%the%difference%between%intuitive% and% reflective% processes% is% associated% with% a% difference% in% the% content% of% the% resultant% moral% judgments:%the%former%reflecting%implicit%deontological%commitments,%the%latter%reflecting%utilitarian% reasoning.% Kahane% (2012)% critiques% these% claims,% arguing% for% a% contentNindependent% dualNprocess% model%similar%to%that%described%here.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 11% with% strong% intrinsic% (rather% than% instrumental)% desires% for% norm% compliance% and% for% the% punishment% of% norm% violators,% even% at% significant% cost% to% themselves.% Yet,% many% of% these% norms% are% not% explicitly% articulated% or% taught.% Rather,% they% are% implicit%in%the%behavior%and%normative%judgments%of%other%group%members.%How%is% it,%then,%that%children%come%to%internalize%the%norms%of%their%group?% % [Insert&Figure&1&here]& % To% address% this% question,% Sripada% and% Stich% posit% two% key% psychological% mechanisms,%both%of%which%are%culturally%universal,% innate,%automatic,%and%entirely% unconscious-hence,% they% can%both%be% regarded%as% System%1%processes.%These%are% the%acquisition*mechanism%and%the%execution*mechanism.%The%acquisition%mechanism% is% a% dedicated% learning% mechanism% that% enables% individuals% to% unconsciously% identify% and% internalize% the% prevailing%moral% and%nonNmoral% norms%of% their% group% from%proximal%cues%in%the%environment.%As%Sripada%and%Stich%note,%there%is%a%range% of% possible% hypotheses% about% how% exactly% the% norm% acquisition% mechanism% does% this.% According% to%what% they% call% the% 'PacNMan'% thesis,% although% the%mechanism% is% specifically% tuned% to% identifying% normNimplicating% behavior% in% the% environment,% it% internalizes% all% and% only% those% norms% present% in% the% environment.% Another% possibility% is% that% that% the%mechanism%is%guided%by%an% innate%normative% 'grammar'% that%constrains%the%types%of%norms%it%can%acquire.% In% any% case,% once% the% content% of% a% prevailing% norm% is% identified% by% the% acquisition%mechanism,%a%mental%representation%of%the%norm%gets%stored%in%the%norm* database.% This% is% a% central% part% of% the% execution% mechanism,% which% underlies% everyday% capacity% for% normative% evaluation.% This% mechanism% applies% the% internalized% norms% in% the% database% to% particular% situations% to% determine% what% compliance%with%these%norms%would%involve,%and%whether%a%particular%action%on%the% part%of%the%individual,%or%a%third%party,%would%conform%to,%or%violate,%an%internalized% norm.%The%model%links%the%norm%database%with%motivational%and%desire%generating% processes% that% lead% to% the% individual% being% intrinsically%motivated% to% comply%with% the% norms% in% the% norm%database,% desire% that% others% comply%with% them,% and% being% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 12% motivated%to%behave%punitively%towards%those%who%violate%these%norms.%The%model% also% has% the% execution% mechanism% output% evaluative% judgments% about% particular% situations%into%the%judgment%box%via%the%emotion*system,%giving%normative%judgments% their%characteristic%emotional%valence.% However,%when%an%individual%observes,%or%thinks%about,%a%norm%violation,%all% she%has% conscious% access% to% is% the%normative% judgment% and% the% emotional% valence% attached%to%it.%Though%the%execution%mechanism%may%have%to%perform%some%complex% processing% in% order% to% apply% the% relevant% norm% to% particular% situations,% the% individual% is% not% consciously% aware% of% going% through% any% process% of% reasoning% to% reach% the% judgment.% Rather,% such% judgments% are% fast,% automatic% responses% to% the% relevant% stimuli,% the% content% of%which% are% determined% by% the% norms% stored% in% the% norm% database,% which% are% in% turn% the% product% of% the% acquisition% mechanism% internalizing% the% norms% present% in% the% individual's% cultural% environment.% The% individual%has%no%conscious%control%over%which%norms%are%internalized,%nor%does%she% have%conscious%access%to%these%norms.%Hence,%she%will%not%be%able%to%articulate%the% norms%that%give%rise%to%her%judgments;%rather,%she%will%only%be%able%to%provide%a%post% hoc% reconstruction% of% them% by% studying% her% intuitions.% This% accounts% for% the% phenomenon%of%moral%dumbfounding.% In% contrast% to% the% acquisition% and% execution% mechanisms,% the% belief,% judgment,%and%explicit*reasoning%boxes%can%be%regarded%as%System%2%processes.%It%is% via% the% operation% of% these% latter% processes% that% reflective% moral% reasoning% takes% place.% An% individual's% explicitly% held% moral% principles% and% convictions% may% be% acquired%via%explicit%reasoning,%testimony,%or%explicit% learning.%Once%acquired,%they% are% stored,% not% in% the% norm% database,% but% in% the% belief% box.% Application% of% such% principles% and% convictions% to% concrete% situations% will% take% place% not% via% the% execution%mechanism,%but%via%the%operation%of%explicit%reasoning.% % 4.2* The*S&S*Model*and*Reflective*Equilibrium* Many% important%architectural%questions%are% left%open%by% the%S&S%model.%However,% this% dualNprocess% framework% for% understanding% our% normative% psychology% is%well% supported%by%the%current%empirical%evidence.& This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 13% One% interesting% implication% of% the% S&S% model% that% has% been% explored% by% Leland% Saunders% (2009)% is% that% potential% interactions% between% the% System% 1% and% System%2%processes%may%provide%a%psychological%basis% for%a%popular%philosophical% account% of% moral% inquiry% and% justification:% the% method% of% reflective* equilibrium,% suggested% by% John% Rawls% in% A* Theory* of* Justice,% but% perhaps% most% influentially% articulated% by% Norman% Daniels% (1979).% On% this% account,% moral% inquiry% should% be% conceived% as% a% dynamic,% ongoing% process% of% mutual% adjustment% between% one's% considered% moral% judgments,% moral% theories,% and% nonNmoral% beliefs,% the% ideal% endpoint%being%a%fully%coherent%network%of%belief-a%reflective%equilibrium.% The%method% is% supposed% to%work% like% this:% as% a%moral% theorist,% one% has% no% choice% but% to% start% with% one's% initial% moral% beliefs-for% example,% the% intuitive% judgments%that%one%has%about%the%rightness%or%wrongness%of%particular%actions.%The% first%stage%of%the%method%is%to%sort%among%these%to%find%those%considered%judgments% that% one%has% some% initial% confidence% in-for% instance,% those% that% are% stable% rather% than%fleeting,%are%not%the%product%of%distress,%anger,%or%vested%interest.%The%second% stage% is% to% formulate% moral% principles% that% can% systematize% and% explain% these% judgments.% Such% systematization% is% regarded% as% mutually% reinforcing,% providing% justification% for% both% the% considered% judgments% and% the% systematizing% principles.% Achieving% a% coherent% system% of% moral% beliefs% will% not% be% easy,% however.% Any% candidate%set%of%moral%principles%will%typically%come%into%conflict%with%some%of%one's% considered% judgments.% One%will% then% have% to% revise% either% or% both% the% discrepant% judgments%and%the%moral%principles,%depending%on%which%one%has%least%commitment% to,% and% on% what% kind% of% revision% would% bring% about% the% most% coherent% system.% Neither%is%to%be%held%immune%from%potential%revision%in%the%search%for%equilibrium.% However,% one% should% not% just% settle% for% a% narrow% reflective% equilibrium-an% internally%coherent%moral%system.%One%should%also%strive%towards%a%wide% reflective% equilibrium,%which% involves%bringing%one's%moral%beliefs% into%a% state%of% systematic% coherence%with%one's%other%beliefs,%including,%for%instance,%background%scientific%and% philosophical%beliefs.%This%should%also% involve%comparing%candidate%moral%systems% with%potential%alternatives,%considering%possible%arguments%for%and%against%each%of% them,%so%as%to%assess%which%would%fit%most%coherently%into%one's%overall%network%of% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 14% beliefs.% Though% one% may% never% actually% reach% the% ideal% endpoint% of% a% full% wide% equilibrium,% the%degree%of%overall% coherence%attained%constitutes%a%measure%of% the% rational%justification%for%one's%beliefs.11% According% to% Saunders'% psychologized% account% of% reflective% equilibrium,% System%1%processes%can%supply%the% individual%with%a%set%of%starting% intuitive%moral% judgments.%System%2%reasoning%processes%may%then%use%these%System%1%judgments%to% get%the%process%of%moral%inquiry%off%the%ground,%attempting%to%develop%systematizing% principles,% which% would% get% stored% in% the% belief% box.% Saunders% then% envisions% discrepant%System%1%judgments%potentially%being%overridden%by%System%2%judgments% derived% from% the% individual's% consciously% held%moral% and%nonNmoral% beliefs.%More% speculatively,%Saunders%suggests%that%an%individual's%reflectively%held%moral%beliefs% could%become%embedded% in% the%norm%database.%For% instance,% the%norm%acquisition% mechanism% might% take% an% individual's% verbal% expression% of% her% moral% beliefs% as% inputs,% causing% them% to% be% internalized% into% the% norm% database.% Hence,% explicit% moral% reasoning% might% lead% to% an% individual% acquiring% new%moral% intuitions% that% conform%to%her%explicitly%held%moral%convictions.% These%possibilities%are%important%for%moral%realism,%since%many%realists%have% endorsed% a% reflective% equilibrium% account% of% how% it% is% that% we% are% to% acquire% knowledge% of% the% moral% facts% (e.g.% Boyd,% 1988;% Brink,% 1989;% Smith,% 1994).12% The% method% is% attractive% to% realists% since% it% allows% them% to% avoid% having% to% posit% a% mysterious%faculty%of%rational%intuition%that%provides%us%with%direct%nonNinferential% access% to% the%moral% facts.% They% can% concede% that%moral% truths% cannot% be% directly% inferred% from%empirical%observation%without%having% to%embrace% the% idea% that% they% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 11% Thus% understood,% reflective% equilibrium% is% normally% taken% to% assume% a% coherentist% account% of% epistemic% justification,%according%to%which%a%belief% is% justified% in%proportion%to%the%coherence%of% the% network%of%beliefs%of%which%it%is%a%part,%and%thus%implies%a%rejection%of%foundationalism,%according%to% which%justification%must%ultimately%trace%back%to%set%of%nonNinferentially%justified%foundational%beliefs.% However,%the%search%for%coherence%as%method%of%inquiry%can,%in%principle,%be%separated%from%the%idea% that% justification% is% reducible% to% coherence,% and% not% all% advocates% of% reflective% equilibrium% reject% foundationalism.% 12%Rawls%famously%shied%away%from%a%realist%interpretation%of%reflective%equilibrium,%preferring%to%see% it%as%a%kind%of%psychology,%helping%to%reveal%our%fundamental%'moral%sensibility'.%In%this%respect,%there% are% important% differences% between% Rawls% and% Daniels'% treatments% of% reflective% equilibrium% (see% Mikhail,%2010).%The%description%of%the%method%given%here%follows%Daniels'%treatment,%which%has%been% most%influential%in%realist%circles.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 15% are% somehow% selfNevident,% or% that% our% moral% intuitions% have% some% privileged% epistemic%status.13%Similarly,%it%suggests%that%our%preNreflective%moral%beliefs%can%still% play% a% role% in% moral% inquiry,% even% if% it% is% recognized% that% cultural% and% biological% forces%have%shaped%their%content.%These%merely%provide%the%starting%point%for%moral% inquiry.%The%pursuit%of%wide%reflective%equilibrium%may%lead%to%significant%revisions% of% these% beliefs,% or% to% their% systematization.% Crucially,% that% our%moral% beliefs%may% have% nonNrational% origins% need% not% undermine% their% potential% justification% on% a% coherence%account%of%moral%justification.%Reflective%equilibrium%therefore%provides%a% response%to%the%notion%that%cultural%or%biological%explanations%for%the%content%of%our% moral% beliefs% are% necessarily% debunking.% Indeed,% according% to% Richard% Boyd,% reflective%equilibrium%undermines% the%notion% that%moral% and% scientific% inquiry%are% all% that% distinct,% since% 'the% dialectical% interplay% between% observations,% theory% and% methodology%which,%according%to%the%realist,%constitutes%the%discovery%procedure%for% scientific% inquiry% just* is% the%method%of%reflective%equilibrium...'%(Boyd,%1988,%p199N 200).% With%this%conception%of%moral%inquiry%in%mind,%I%want%to%argue%that%the%S&S% model%highlights%a%plausible%diffusing%explanation%for%the%moral%disagreements%that% Doris%et%al.%cite.% & 5.& A&Diffusing&Explanation& To% set% the% stage% for% this% response,% it% should% be% emphasized% that% realists% are% only% committed% to% claims% about% convergence% given% the% assumption% that% some% appropriate% method% of% moral% inquiry% provides% a% generally% reliable% procedure% for% acquiring%and%improving%knowledge%of%the%moral%truths.%As%Doris%and%Plakias%put%it,% the%standard%way%of%framing%the%problem%of%disagreement%is%'that%application%of%the% same% method% may,% for% different% individuals% and% cultures,% yield% divergent% moral% judgments%that%are%equally%acceptable%by%the%lights%of%the%method,%even%in%reflective% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 13%This% is%not% to% say% that% all% realists%have%abandoned% such%notions% (e.g.% ShaferNLandau,%2003;%Audi,% 2004).%Though%some%modern% intuitionists%may%be%able% to%utilize% the%kind%of%diffusing%explanation% I% will% soon% articulate,% intuitionism% is,% I% think,% threatened%both%by% the% sort% of% crossNcultural% data% that% Doris%et%al.%cite%and%the%psychological%account%of%our%moral%intuitions%just%described%(on%the%latter,%see% SinnottNArmstrong,%2006).%Thus,%I%will%restrict%my%focus%to%nonNintuitionist%realisms.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 16% conditions% that% the% method% countenances% as% ideal'% (2008a,% p326).% Crucially,% this% means% that% in% assessing% whether% actual% moral% disagreements% ground% 'confident% speculation'% that% the% convergence% conjecture% is% unlikely% to% be% satisfied,% it%matters% how%exactly%realists%think%this%method%is%supposed%to%work,%what%the%relevant%'ideal'% reflective%conditions%are,%and%what%sorts%of%cognitive%processes%are%actually%involved% in% sustaining% the% disagreements.% Actual%moral% disagreements%would% only% seem% to% put% genuine%pressure%on% the% convergence% conjecture% if% they% are% sustained%by,% and% thus% persist% in% spite% of,% individuals% (or% communities% of% individuals)% diligently% forming%and% revising% their%moral%beliefs% according% to%whatever%method%of% inquiry% realists% think% provides% us%with% epistemic% access% to% the%moral% facts,% since% it% is% the% ability% of% this%method,% properly%deployed,% to% settle%moral% disagreements% that% is% at% issue.% If%a%disagreement% is%not%sustained%by% the%relevant%set%of%cognitive%processes% that%constitute%the%implementation%of%this%method,%or%is%somehow%causally%insulated% from% them,% this% will% leave% open% the% possibility% that% the% disagreement% may% be% resolved% were% the% method% to% be% deployed.% Thus,% such% disagreements% need% not% present%the%kind%of%threat%to%the%convergence%conjecture%that%Doris%et%al.%are%trying% to% pose.% Indeed,% in% principle,% this% conjecture% is% consistent% with% any% amount% of% persistent% diversity% in% moral% belief% where% those% beliefs% are% insulated% from% the% relevant%method%of%inquiry.% Let% us% assume,% then,% that% the% S&S% model% is% broadly% correct.% Let% us% also% assume% that% something% like% the%method% of% reflective% equilibrium% is% the% preferred% realist%conception%of%how%we%are%to%discover%the%moral%facts%(which%it%does%seem%to% be).% As% Saunders% has% shown,% the% S&S%model% seems% to% allow% for% the% psychological% possibility% of% pursuing% the% method% of% reflective% equilibrium.14% However,% the% empirical%work% underlying% the%model% also% suggests% that%most% ordinary% people% do% not% engage% in% this%process,% or%do% so%only% very% rarely.% Saunders% argues% that% this% is% partly% because% it% is% timeNconsuming% and% cognitively% costly.% Most% ordinary% people% probably%have% little%motivation% to% reflect%upon,% systematize,%and%potentially% revise% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 14%There%is%also%fascinating%research%by%Epley%and%colleagues%(Epley%et%al.,%2004;%Epley%and%Gilovich,% 2005)%on%how%people%adjust%their%initial%judgments%in%various%cognitive%domains,%which%shows%some% of%the%hallmarks%of%reflective%equilibrium.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 17% the%moral% judgments%that%they%have% internalized%from%their%community.% Indeed,%as% Sripada%and%Stich%note,% in%many%societies% there%are%strong%social%pressures%against% deviation%from%prevailing%normative%standards.%% Consequently,% the%S&S%model%suggests% that%most%moral% judgments%made%by% ordinary%people,%including%those%made%by%participants%in%the%studies%cited%by%Doris% et% al.,% are% brute% System% 1% intuitions:% the% product% of% the% acquisition% mechanism% automatically%and%unconsciously%internalizing%the%sociallyNgenerated%norms%present% in% the% environment.% While% such% System% 1% judgments% may% count% as% considered% judgments,%in%so%far%as%they%are%stable%rather%than%fleeting,%not%simply%the%product%of% stress,% partiality,% and% so% forth,% such% judgments% are% only% the% starting% point% for% reflective%equilibrium-the%input,%rather%than%the%output.% My%suggestion,%then,%is%that%realists%can%argue%that,%in%so%far%as%it%is%plausible% to% hold% that% the% moral% disagreements% at% issue% between% White% Northerners% and% Southerners%and%between%Chinese%and%American%college%students%exist%at% the% level% of%System%1%intuitions%that%have%not%been%subject%to%careful%reflection%and%potential% revision%via% the%operation%of%System%2%processes,% they%should%not,%without% further% argument,% be% regarded% as% having% direct% empirical% bearing% on% the% convergence% conjecture.% This% is% because% such% disagreements% are% not% sustained% by% individuals% reaching%different%moral%conclusions%via%the%method%supposed%by%realists%to%have%to% the%power%to%eliminate%moral%disagreements%under%ideal%conditions.%Rather,%they%are% sustained%by%individuals%unconsciously%internalizing%different%norms%from%different% cultural%environments.% Importantly,% the% nature% of% System% 1% moral% cognition% allows% us% to% offer% a% diffusing%explanation%for%why%these%moral%disagreements%may%persist%even%when%the% disputants%don't%appear%to%disagree% in%any%directly%relevant%way%on%the%nonNmoral% facts,%and%there%is%no%clear%evidence%of%outright%irrationality%or%partiality.%The%norms% that% give% rise% to% the%moral% judgments% of%White% Southerners% and%Northerners% and% Chinese%and%American%college%students%are%culturally%entrenched%as%a%result%of% the% fact%that%we,%as%humans,%automatically%and%unconsciously%internalize%the%prevailing% norms%of%our%social%group,%rarely,%if%ever,%reflect%on%the%judgments%these%internalized% norms% give% rise% to,% and% thus% rarely% bring% them% into% contact% with% the% rest% of% our% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 18% beliefs.% This% leaves% open% the% possibility% that% such% disagreements%may% be% resolved% were% the% parties% to% the% disagreement% to% consciously% reflect% on% their% brute% moral% intuitions,%bring% them% into%contact%with% their%nonNmoral%beliefs,%and%engage% in% the% pursuit%of%wide%reflective%equilibrium.% To% be% clear,% I% am%not% claiming% that%we% have% good% reason% to% think% that% the% moral%disagreements%at%issue%will%be%eliminated%under%ideal%conditions,%or%that%they% are% irrelevant% to% the% metaNethical% debate.% Rather,% I% am% claiming% that% the% crossN cultural% data% that% Doris% et% al.% cite% do% not,% as% presented,% and% without% further% argument,%support%an%empirical%case%against%the%realist%convergence%conjecture.%This% is%because%the%moral%judgments%at%issue%are%plausibly%not%ones%that%have%withstood% application%of%the%kind%of%method%of%moral%inquiry%that%realists%claim%will%lead%to%the% elimination% of% (most)% moral% disagreement% under% ideal% conditions.% Hence,% they% plausibly%do%not%put% the% convergence% conjecture% to% the%kind%of% empirical% test% that% Doris%et%al.%claim.% It%might%be%argued%that% this%makes%things%too%easy% for%realists.%They%cannot% arbitrarily%stipulate%a%particular%method%of%moral%inquiry,%and%then%claim%that%only% moral%disagreements%sustained%by%that%method%provide%a%challenge%to%realism,%since% they% could% then% guarantee% the% absence% of% problematic% disagreement% by% playing% around%with% the% notion% of%moral% inquiry.% For% example,% realists% could% stipulate% as% constitutive%of%moral%inquiry%a%version%of%reflective%equilibrium%that%includes%a%set%of% inviolable%moral%beliefs,%in%order%to%rule%out%any%potential%disagreement%over%these% beliefs%as%being%a%threat%to%realism.%That%would%indeed%be%an%ad%hoc%move.%However,% realists% shouldn't% be% accused% of% making% such% a% move% in% this% context.% Reflective% equilibrium% is% not% being% plucked% out% of% the% air% just% to% explain% away% moral% disagreement.% It% is%a% central% commitment%of%many%prominent% realists.% Indeed,% it% is% arguably%the%orthodox%view%of%inquiry%in%contemporary%philosophy.% In%any%case,%the%version%of%the%argument%from%disagreement%that%Doris%et%al.% advocate%only%gets%off% the%ground%given% the%assumption% that% the%disagreements% in% question% persist% in% spite% of% diligent% application% of% a% particular%method% of% forming% and% revising% moral% beliefs% that% is% supposed% by% the% realist% to% provide% us% with% epistemic% access% to% the% moral% facts.% As% noted% earlier,% Doris% and% Plakias% seem% to% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 19% acknowledge% this% when% they% state% that% their% way% of% setting% up% the% metaNethical% relevance%of% the%crossNcultural%data%assumes%that% 'moral%disagreements%proceed%in% surroundings% typified% by% substantial% methodological* agreement.% On% this% construction,% the%problem%of%disagreement% is% that%application%of% the% same%method% may,%for%different%individuals%and%cultures,%yield%divergent%moral%judgments%that%are% equally%acceptable%by%the%lights%of%the%method,%even%in%reflective%conditions%that%the% method%countenances%as%ideal'%(2008a,%p326).%However,%they%go%on%to%claim%that%not% only%is%there%significant%diversity%of%moral%belief,%there%is%also%likely%to%be%significant% disagreement%about%the%correct%method%for%forming%and%revising%these%beliefs,%and% claim% that% this% makes% the% problem% of% disagreement% worse% for% realism:% 'the% methodological% restriction% is% in%want%of% an%argument-an%argument% that%does%not% beg% substantive% methodological% questions'% (ibid.).% But% that% is% to% completely% misunderstand%why%moral%disagreement%is%a%problem%for%realism.%No%realist%should% be%committed% to% the%claim% that% there%will%be%convergence%of%moral%belief%amongst% individuals% that% use% any% method% whatever% for% forming% and% revising% their% beliefs.% Commitments% to%convergence%only% follow%from%claims%about%epistemic%access,%and% no%realist%should%claim%that%any%method%whatever%provides%epistemic%access%to%the% moral%facts.15% Doris% et% al.% may% be% right% that% there% is% cultural% diversity% in% conceptions% of% correct%moral%methodology,%but% that% just%serves% to%emphasize% that% the%adoption%of% particular% methods% rather% than% others% requires% justification.% There% are% deeply% difficult%issues%to%address%here%for%any%philosophical%theory%that%endorses%particular% methods% of% inquiry.% Standard% strategies% for% justifying% methods% such% as% reflective% equilibrium%may%not%work%in%the%face%of%this%kind%of%cultural%diversity%(Stich,%1990).% For%example,%one%might%not%be%able%to%offer%it%as%an%analysis%of%the%concept%of%moral% inquiry% or%moral% justification.% But% that% doesn't% change% the% fact% that% the% epistemic% problem% of%moral% disagreement% cannot% even% be% posed% unless% particular% norms% of% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 15%Consider%the%analogous%situation%for%scientific%realism:%in%so%far%as%realists%are%committed%to%there% being%a%general%convergence%of%opinion%on%scientific%truths,%it%is%only%for%agents%who%form%and%revise% their% beliefs% according% to% what% are% regarded% as% reliable% scientific% methods.% Persistent% failures% of% convergence% between% those%who% utilize% such%methods% and% those%who% do% not% (e.g.% astrologers% and% creationists)% presents% no% problem,% since% realists% are% not% committed% to% the% epistemic% reliability% of% other%possible%methods.& This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 20% moral%inquiry%endorsed%by%realists%are%accepted%for%the%sake%of%argument.16%Hence,% given% that% it% is% the% ability% of% diligent% moral% inquiry,% as% realists% understand% it,% to% produce%moral%convergence%that%is%at%issue%in%the%argument%from%disagreement,%the% point%remains%that,%if%the%S&S%model%is%on%the%right%track,%and%reflective%equilibrium% is%the%conception%of%moral%inquiry%adopted%by%realists,%Doris%et%al.'s%data%sheds%little% empirical% light% on% this.% At% the% very% least,% Doris% et% al.% have% more% work% to% do% to% challenge%the%convergence%conjecture.% & 6.& Reflective&Equilibrium&and&The&Prospects&for&Convergence& One%might%be%skeptical%that%even%impeccable%application%of%the%method%of%reflective% equilibrium% would% likely% resolve% the% sorts% of% disagreements% that% seem% to% exist% between%White%Northerners%and%Southerners,% and%between%Chinese%and%American% college%students.%If%such%skepticism%were%legitimate,%these%disagreements%could%still% threaten% the% convergence% conjecture.% Though% he% does% not% consider% the% sort% of% response%to%Doris%et%al.'s%argument%described% in%the%previous%section,%Stich%(2009)% has% effectively% sought% to% highlight% grounds% for% such% skepticism% in% an% effort% to% provide%additional%theoretical%support%for%Doris%et%al.'s%project.% Stich% agrees% with% Saunders% that% the% S&S%model% motivates% a% psychologized% reflective% equilibrium% account% of%moral% inquiry.% He% then% argues% that% this% gives% us% good% reason% to% expect% there% to% be% widespread% fundamental% moral% disagreement,% simply% because% inquirers% born% into% different% cultures% will% tend% to% internalize% different% socially% generated% norms,% and% start% out% with% different% considered% judgments.%Stich%relies%on%a%view%of%reflective%equilibrium,%common%amongst%critics% of%the%method,%according%to%which%the%set%of%moral%beliefs%that%an%individual%is%likely% to% end%up%with,% even% in%wide% reflective%equilibrium,%will% largely%be%determined%by% those%she%started%with.%While%some%revision%of%these%preNreflective%beliefs%may%occur% in%the%initial%filtering%process,%in%the%process%of%ironing%out%inconsistencies%that%she% may%come%to%find%in%her%beliefs,%and%upon%consideration%of%alternative%moral%views,% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 16% Interestingly,% ShaferNLandau% (2003,% p224N226)% responds% to% the% argument% from%disagreement%by% accepting% methodological% pluralism:% if% there% is% no% single% correct% method% for% determining% moral% truths,%no%argument%from%disagreement%can%be%posed.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 21% the%end%state% is% largely%going%to%be%a% function%of% the%starting%state.17%Hence,%all% the% method% is% likely% to% do% is% to% polish% up% the% individual's% cultural% inheritance-the% norms%embedded%in%her%normNdatabase.%If%this%were%so,%then%it%would%seem%obvious% that% there% could% remain% significant% moral% disagreement% even% amongst% ideal% inquirers,%who% agree% on% all% the%nonNmoral% facts,% but% started% from%different% sets% of% judgments.18% Realists%may%pursue%various%responses%to%Stich.%First,%he%assumes%that%it%will% be%easy% for%people% in%different%cultures% to%construct%equally%coherent%but%radically% incompatible%networks%of%moral%and%nonNmoral%belief.%However,%much%turns%on%how% we% are% to% understand% the% relevant% notion% of% 'coherence'.% Critics% of% coherence% methods%in%ethics%typically%take%it%to%involve%merely%removing%logical%inconsistency% in% one's% beliefs.% Yet,% proponents% of% such% methods% normally% have% a% much% more% demanding% notion% in% mind,% which% also% involves% maximizing% things% like% evidential* consistency% (that% none% of% one's% beliefs% constitute% evidence% against% holding% any% of% one's%other%beliefs),%connectedness%(there%being%mutually%reinforcing%inferential%and% explanatory% connections% between% beliefs),% comprehensiveness,% and% so% on% (SayreN McCord,% 1996).% Realists% may% argue% that,% on% such% a% demanding% understanding% of% coherence,% it% will% be% no% easy% feat% to% turn% a% folk% morality% into% a% coherent% moral% system%and%blend%it%with%a%coherent%network%of%nonNmoral%belief,%without%subjecting% it% to% extensive% revision-revision% that% will% filter% out% most% of% the% starting% disagreements% that% may% or% may% not% exist% between% individuals% from% different% cultures.% Second,%Stich%also%assumes%that%our%nonNmoral%beliefs%place%weak%constraints% on%the%kinds%of%moral%views%that%can%be%in%wide%reflective%equilibrium.%Here,%realists% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 17% This% motivates% the% criticism% that% reflective% equilibrium% is% merely% intuitionism% rebranded:% any% justification%that%an%individual%can%have%for%the%beliefs%she%holds%in%reflective%equilibrium%will%have%to% derive%from%her%original%intuitions.% 18%Since%realists%needn't%hold%that%moral%inquiry%is%guaranteed%to%get%us%to%the%truth%(even%in%the%long% run),% a% realist% conception%of% reflective% equilibrium% is% consistent%with% individuals% reaching%different% moral% views%and%being% equally% justified% in%holding% their% respective%networks%of%beliefs% in% virtue%of% their% overall% coherence.% It% is% also% consistent% with% the% possibility% of% multiple% full% wide% reflective% equilibria,% even% for% ideal% agents% who% agree% on% all% the% nonNmoral% facts.% What% would% seem% to% be% problematic% for% realism% is% if% there% could% be% widespread% moral% disagreement% between% such% ideal% agents% in% full% wide% reflective% equilibrium.% Stich% seems% to% assume% that% this% is% highly% likely,% given% cultural%differences%in%starting%points.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 22% may% want% to% follow% Daniels% (1979):% striving% for% a% genuinely% wide% reflective% equilibrium%is%likely%to%reveal%complex%and%surprising%interconnections%between%our% moral% and%nonNmoral% beliefs,% and% thus%highlight%unobvious%ways% to%make% starting% moral% disagreements% more% tractable.% For% example,% Daniels% (following% Parfit)% suggests%that%part%of%the%dispute%between%utilitarian%and%Rawlsian%theories%of%justice% may% come% down% to% their% fitting% better%with% different% theories% of% the% person:% 'The% problem%between%the%utilitarian%and%the%contractarian%thus%becomes%the%(possibly)% more%manageable%problem%of%determining%the%acceptability%of%competing%theories%of% the%person,%and%only%one%of%many%constraints%on%that% task% is% the%connection%of% the% theory% of% the% person% to% the% resulting% moral% principles'% (1979,% p263).% For% many% naturalistic%realists,%who%hold%that%moral%properties%supervene%on,%or%are%reducible% to,%ordinary%natural%facts%about%what%promotes%basic%human%and%societal%needs%(e.g.% Boyd,% 1988),% the% assumption% is% also% that% the% expansion% of% background% scientific% knowledge% in% the% human% sciences% will% substantially% constrain% the% kinds% of% moral% beliefs% that% can% be% in% genuine%wide% reflective% equilibrium.% Hence,% realists%may% be% inclined%to%bet% that% the%nonNmoral%constraints%on%our%moral%beliefs%will% leave% little% scope% for% substantial% moral% disagreement% between% fully% rational,% impartial,% and% reflective%inquirers,%informed%of%all%the%relevant%nonNmoral%facts.% Finally,%some%advocates%argue%that%reflective%equilibrium%should%not%be%seen% as%a%detached%and%purely% intellectual%process.%DePaul% (1988)%argues% that% it% should% involve% a% requirement% to% seek% out% moral% experiences% apt% to% cause% one% to% change% one's%mind.%DePaul%is%concerned%with%'moral%naïveté',%where%people%maintain%moral% views%that%they%would%otherwise%reject%as%a%result%of%limited%life%experiences.%Thus,% he% emphasizes% the% importance% of% being% exposed% to% a% range% of% challenging% moral% experiences-including,% for% instance,% acquaintance% with% vivid% representations% of% morally%significant%events%in%art%and%literature,%as%well%as%personal%interaction%with% people%who%hold%different%moral%perspectives.%If%such%a%role%for%moral%experience%is% built% into% the%method,%and% it% is%recognized%that%such%experiences%can%cause%radical% shifts%in%one's%moral%thinking,%there%may%be%further%hope%for%convergence.% Given% these% potential% responses% to% Stich,% which% is% the% more% plausible% speculation:% optimism% or% pessimism% about% the% prospects% for% convergence% under% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 23% ideal%conditions?%Unfortunately,%I%don't%think%that%we%are%on%solid%enough%ground%to% arrive% at% a% principled% verdict.% This% is% partly% due% to% the% remoteness% of% the% hypothetical% situations%we% are% trying% to% imagine,% but% it% is% also%due% to% the% residual% vagueness% of% the%method% of% reflective% equilibrium% itself.% Though% there% have% been% attempts% by% proponents% of% the% method% to% articulate% norms% for% filtering% initial% judgments,% and% for% making% revisions% to% one's% beliefs% in% order% to% bring% them% into% coherence,% these% norms% tend% to% leave% important% questions% about% the% method% unanswered.%For%instance,%can%one%reject%a%nonNmoral%belief%if%doing%so%would%bring% one's%moral%beliefs%into%coherence%with%the%rest%of%one's%belief%network,%or%do%nonN moral% beliefs% always% trump%moral% ones?%How% is% one% to% choose%between% the% likely% numerous%different%possible%ways%of%bringing%any%particular%set%of%moral%and%nonN moral%beliefs%into%coherence?%The%remarks%made%in%the%previous%section%about%how% an% argument% from% disagreement% needs% to% proceed% suggest% that,% without% a% much% more%detailed%account%of%how%reflective%equilibrium%is%actually%meant% to%work,%we% cannot%reasonably%assess%whether%there%could%exist%widespread%moral%disagreement% between%ideal%epistemic%agents% in% full%wide%reflective%equilibrium,%given%particular% culturally%variable%starting%points.%This%places%the%onus%on%realists%to%be%much%more% specific% about% the% norms% that% they% think% should% govern% the% pursuit% of% reflective% equilibrium.% But% it% also% shows% that,% while% realists% should% not% rest% easy,% Stich% has% failed% to% add% any% substantive%weight% to%Doris% et% al.'s% case.% Indeed,%we% seem% to% be% back%to%the%kind%of%impasse%that%Doris%et%al.%originally%wanted%to%break.% % 7.& Concluding&Remarks& It%should%be%noted%that%the%picture%of%human%moral%psychology%I%have%been%relying% on%is%a%doubleNedged%sword%for%the%realist.%First,%it%suggests%that%apparent%instances% of%moral%agreement%may%not%be%the%output%of%a%process%of%moral%inquiry%either,%but% rather%the%product%of%joint%cultural%inheritance,%or%perhaps%the%constraints%imposed% by%an% innate%normative%grammar.%Thus,%contrary%to%realists%(e.g.%Smith,%1994)%that% have%sought% to%use%arguments% from%agreement% to%establish% the%reliability%of%moral% inquiry,%convergence%on%the%truth%may%not%provide%the%best%explanation%for%the%cases% of%moral% agreement% that%we%do% find.%As%with% arguments% from%disagreement,%what% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 24% matters% in% assessing% such% arguments% are% the% cognitive% processes% involved% in% producing%the%agreement.19& % Second,%while%the%apparent%rarity%of%reflective%moral%inquiry%can%be%seen%as%a% diffusing%explanation%for%the%persistence%of%moral%disagreement,%it%seems%that%when% we%do%engage%in%such%reflection%we%are%not%especially%good%at%it.%Haidt's%(2001)%work% on% moral% dumbfounding% suggests% that% when% people% are% forced% to% engage% in% controlled%moral%reasoning,%all%they%tend%to%do%is%search%for%supporting%evidence%for% their% preNexisting% judgments.% When% they% reach% the% point% of% being% dumbfounded,% they% simply% stop% reasoning% altogether,% but% do% not% revise% their% judgments.% Other% work%has%shown%that%moral%judgments%are%susceptible%to%a%variety%of%framing%effects% and%biases%(see%SinnottNArmstrong,%2006),%and,%more%generally,%that%people%tend%to% be% poor% at% noticing% and% correcting% inconsistency% and% incoherence% in% their% own% beliefs%and%arguments,%and%recognizing%the%merits%of%views%with%which%they%disagree% (see%Mercier% and% Sperber,% 2011).% There% is% little% reason% to% think% that% professional% philosophers% or% other% 'moral% experts'% are%much% less% susceptible% to% these% kinds% of% biases.% Though% there% is% evidence% that% people% are% able% to% overcome,% or% at% least% mitigate% the% effects% of% these% biases,% this% should% give% realists% pause% in% so% far% as% it% raises%concerns%about%the%practical%feasibility%of%reflective%equilibrium%as%a%method% for% discovering% the%moral% facts.% It% could% be% argued% that%we% suffer% from% too%many% cognitive%shortcomings%to%ever%be%in%a%legitimate%position%to%adopt%a%realist%attitude% towards%any%particular%set%of%moral%beliefs,%if%the%epistemic%standards%embodied%in% reflective% equilibrium%are% to%be%our% guide% to%whether%we%are% entitled% to%hold% that% moral%truth%has%been%achieved.% These%are%important%issues%for%realists%to%face%up%to.%Indeed,%I%suspect%that%the% latter% concern% has% the% makings% of% a% much% more% potent% epistemic% challenge% to% realism% than% the% argument% from% disagreement% that% Doris% et% al.% advocate-in% particular,% it% does% not% rely% on% speculations% about% what% would% happen% under% hypothetical%ideal%conditions.%Nonetheless,%what%I%have%shown%in%this%paper%is%that%if% something% like% the% S&S% model% of% our% moral% psychology% is% correct,% and% reflective% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 19%See%Nichols%(2004)%for%an%interesting%nonNrealist%account%of%the%convergent%evolution%of%common% harm%norms.% This%is%an%Author's%Original%Manuscript%of%an%article%whose%final%and%definitive%form,%the%Version%of% Record,%is%to%be%published%in%Philosophical*Papers,*July%2014.%http://www.tandfonline.com/% % 25% equilibrium% is% the% preferred% realist% account% of% moral% inquiry,% the% actual% moral% disagreements% cited%by%Doris%et% al.%need%not%provide%a% significant% challenge% to% the% realist% conjecture% that% most% moral% disagreement% will% be% eliminated% under% ideal% epistemic%conditions.% I%have%also%argued%that%Stich's%recent%attempt%to%use%the%S&S% model%to%provide%further%theoretical%support%for%the%argument%from%disagreement%is% unsuccessful.%Moral%realists%cannot%afford%to%be%sanguine%about%moral%disagreement,% but% in% 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