Original	Paper	UDC	[165.242.1:17.02]:616.89 Received	October	5th,	2009 Luca Malatesti University	of	Rijeka,	Faculty	of	Arts	and	Sciences,	Department	of	Philosophy,	Omladinska	14,	HR–51000	Rijeka lmalatesti@ffri.hr Moral Understanding in the Psychopath* Abstract A pressing and difficult practical problem concerns the general issue of the right social response to offenders classified as having antisocial personality disorder. This paper approaches this general problem by focusing, from a philosophical perspective, on the still relevant but more approachable question whether psychopathic offenders are morally responsible. In particular, I investigate whether psychopaths possess moral understanding. A plausible way to approach the last question requires a satisfactory philosophical interpretation of the empirical evidence that appears to show that psychopaths fail to draw the distinction between conventional and moral norms. Specifically, I will consider a recent philosophical debate polarized between supporters of rationalist and sentimentalist accounts of moral understanding. These opponents have discussed whether the case of psychopathy offers empirical support for their account and undermine the rival view. I will argue that the available empirical data leave the outcome of this discussion indeterminate. However, this implies that both these principal theories of moral understanding, if independently motivated, would imply that psychopaths have certain deficits that might affect their moral understanding and, consequently, their moral responsibility. Key words psychopathy,	moral	responsibility,	moral	understanding,	rationalism,	sentimentalism,	psychology	of	moral	understanding,	conventional/moral	norms 1. Introduction A	pressing	and	difficult	practical	problem	concerns	the	general	issue	of	the right	response	to	offenders	classified	as	having	antisocial	personality	disorders.	In	UK,	for	instance,	the	government	proposed	the	preventive	civil	commitment	of	people	with	this	type	of	disorder	(The	Home	Office	1999).	This proposal	has	generated	a	wide	debate,	faced	many	criticisms	and,	finally,	has been	rejected	(Cordess	2002;	Moran	2002).	In	this	discussion,	it	has	emerged the	persuasive	suggestion	that	deciding	how	to	respond	to	this	class	of	offenders	should	require,	amongst	other	types	of	legal	and	practical	considerations, an	evaluation	of	their	moral	responsibility	(McMillan	2003). * I	would	like	to	thank	John	McMillan,	Suzanne	Uniacke,	Heidi	Maibom,	and	Tony	Ward for their	helpful comments	on	previous	versions	of this paper.	Moreover, parts and antecedents	of	this	paper	were	presented	at	the 18th	Annual	Meeting	of	the	AAPP	(Toronto), at	the	Institute	of	Psychiatry	at	King's	College (London) and at philosophy departments in	Siena,	Hull,	Rijeka,	Zagreb,	and	Firenze.	I am	grateful	to	the	audiences	for	very	helpful discussions.	This	work	was	supported	by	the Wellcome	Trust	[grant	number	075966/Z/04/ Z], that financed	my Postdoctoral Research Fellowship	at	the	Institute	of	Applied	Ethics of	the	University	of	Hull. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath338 This	paper	addresses	the	question	whether	psychopathic offenders	are	morally responsible	for	their	crimes	by	considering	whether	they	possess	moral understanding.	This	appears	to	be	a	relevant	and	approachable	issue	within the general practical debate mentioned above.1 Several philosophers have approached	the	problem	of	the	moral	responsibility	of	psychopaths	by	considering	whether they possess	moral understanding.2	Moreover, due to the work	of	the	psychologist	Robert	Hare,	focusing	on	psychopathy	appears	to	be more	promising	than	considering	the	general	notion	of	antisocial	personality disorder.3	In	the	last	three	decades,	Hare	has	offered	and	investigated	an	operational	refinement	of	Harvey	Cleckley's	classical	clinical	characterization of	psychopathy	(Hare	1991,	Cleckley	1976).	Hare's	notion	of	psychopathy demarcates	a	relevant	subgroup	amongst	the	individuals	that	are	classified	as having	antisocial	personality	disorder	(ASPD)	by	the	Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorder (DSM IV)	(American	Psychiatric	Association 1994). Hare's	diagnosis	of	psychopathy	appears	to	be	a	unifying	construct	in	a growing	number	of	psychometric,	neuropsychological	and	neurological	studies	that	appear	to	support	its	plausibility	and	fruitfulness	(Patrick	2006,	Blair, Mitchell,	and	Blair	2005). The	main	thesis	of	this	paper	is	that	certain	philosophical	attempts	to	argue for	the	conclusion	that	psychopaths	lack	moral	understanding	are	unsatisfactory.	These	proposals	share	the	methodological	assumption	that	this	conclusion should derive from the adoption	of either sentimentalist or rationalist accounts	of	moral	understanding.	Against	this	strategy,	I	will	argue	that	the functional	impairments	of	psychopaths	are	consistent	with	both	these	views on	moral	psychology. 2. Psychopathy The	term	'psychopath'	has	an	imprecise	current	usage.	Moreover,	it	has	been employed	in	the	history	of	psychiatry	in	connection	with	different	diagnostic practices.	Here	'psychopathy'	will	be	used	to	refer	to	the	notion	formulated	by Robert	Hare.	In	the	Seventies	he	began	refining	the	concept	of	psychopathy elaborated	in	the	seminal	work	of	Harvey	Cleckley.	Hare's	research	culminated in the formulation	of the	Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R), a qualitative	diagnostic	tool	that	aims	to	establish	how	a	subject	scores	along different	dimensions	encompassing	behavioural	criteria	and	personality	traits (Hare	1991). The	PCL-R	is	used	to	evaluate	a	subject	along	20	items:	(1)	Glib/superficial charm,	(2)	Grandiose	sense	of	self-worth,	(3)	Need	for	stimulation/proneness to boredom, (4)	Pathological lying, (5)	Conning/manipulative, (6)	Lack	of remorse	or	guilt,	(7)	Shallow	affect,	(8)	Callous/lack	of	empathy,	(9)	Parasitic lifestyle,	(10)	Poor	behavioural	controls,	(11)	Promiscuous	sexual	behaviour, (12)	Early	behavioural	problems,	(13)	Lack	of	realist,	long-terms	goals,	(14) Impulsivity,	(15)	Irresponsibility,	(16)	Failure	to	accept	responsibility	for	own actions,	(17)	Many	short-term	marital	affairs,	(18)	Juvenile	delinquency,	(19) Revocation	of	conditional	release,	and	(20)	Criminal	versatility. The	PCL-R	is	applied	via	semi-structured	interviews	and	intensive	study	of the	files	concerning	the	history	of	the	subject.	For	each	element	in	the	list, there	is	a	score	varying	between	0	to	2	points.	The	maximum	total	score	is thus	40	points;	when	a	subject	obtains	a	value	of	30	or	more	points	he/she	is considered	psychopathic.4	Factorial	analysis	studies	show	that	the	values	of variables	in	PCL-R	can	be	located	on	three	dimensions:	items	concerning	the SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath339 social	interaction	characterized	by	mendacity	and	arrogance,	items	concerning	the	factor	of	deficient	affective	experience,	and,	finally	a	dimension	concerning	impulsivity	and	irresponsibility	(Cooke	and	Michie	2001).	However, the	exact factorisation	of	psychopathy is	an	open issue	amongst	specialists (see	Hare	and	Neumann	2006). The	PCL-R	has	played	a	central role in	different types	of fruitful research and	there	are	good	reasons	for	considering	it	a	plausible	unifying	diagnostic tool.	Statistical studies appear to show that it	might be a	useful predictive tool	for	recidivism	(Douglas,	Vincent,	and	Edens	2006).	Moreover,	the	existence	of functional	deficits that are specific to	psychopathy is corroborated empirically (Blair,	Mitchell, and	Blair 2005). Finally, recent brain activity visualization	studies	(positron	emission	tomography,	computer	assisted	magnetic	resonance)	suggest	that	there	might	be	specific	anatomic	and	functional neurological	anomalies	underlying	this	disorder	(Raine	and	Yang	2006). 3. Measuring Moral Understanding in the Psychopath Several	philosophical	accounts	of	moral	responsibility	hold	that	moral	understanding	is	a	requirement	for	deeming	an	agent	morally	responsible.5	Without offering a complete characterization	of	moral understanding, here it is enough to	point to a	minimal	necessary requirement for ascribing such an understanding.	The	upholders	of	the	majority	of	views	on	the	nature	of	moral concepts	and	judgment,	and	of	the	associated	faculties,	should	agree	that	an agent	possesses	moral	understanding	when,	minimally,	he	or	she	has	the	capacity	to	recognize	that,	when	acting,	he	or	she	and	other	individuals	should consider the interests	of	others.	Moreover, it	seems	safe	assuming that this recognition,	whatever	the	subservient	underlying	faculties,	can	be	reflected	in the	agents'	ways	of	explicit	reasoning	about	the	permissibility	of	performing certain	types	of	action	in	certain	contexts. Psychologists	have	devised	experimental	paradigms	to	establish	the	presence and	nature of this type of reasoning in agents.	Moreover, these paradigms have	been	applied	to	psychopaths.	Thus,	the	investigation	of	the	moral	understanding	of	psychopaths	can	consider	this	type	of	experimental	evidence.	An important	psychological	paradigm	for	the	investigation	of	moral	understanding	was	developed	by	Elliot	Turiel	(Turiel	1983).	This	paradigm	is	based	on 1 For	a	more	articulated	defence	of	this	formulation	of the	problem	see	Malatesti	and	McMillan	forthcoming. 2 See	Duff	1977,	Fields	1996,	Glannon	1997, Haji	1998,	and	Levy	2008. 3 It is important to	stress	here that,	given that the	diagnostic	criteria	are	significantly	different, investigating	the	moral	responsibility	of psychopaths	might	not	shed	light	on	anti-social	personality	disorder	in	general.	However, while	the	majority	of	individuals	with	ASPD are	not	psychopathic,	those	that	fall	under	the psychopathic diagnosis meet the diagnostic criteria	for	ASPD,	see	Ogloff,	2007. 4 This	cut-off	value	is	usually	adopted	in	North America; in Europe a value of 25 is often used. 5 See, for instance, Fisher and	Ravizza 1998, pp. 69–73 and	Watson 1993, pp. 126–128. Moreover, see note 1 above for discussions that use this assumption to investigate the moral responsibility of psychopaths. However,	some	authors	have	denied	the	relevance of	moral	understanding	(or	moral	knowledge) for	moral	responsibility;	see	Arpaly	2006	and Scanlon 1998. Particularly,	Greenspan 2003 offers	an	application	of	this	insight	to	the	case of psychopaths. Convincing replies to these deflations	of	moral	understanding	are	offered in	Levy	2008,	pp.	132–135. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath340 the	moral/conventional	distinction	task.	The	participant	is	presented	with	vignettes	involving	moral	and	conventional	transgressions.	An	action	is	a	moral transgression	when it	has	consequences for the rights	and	welfare	of	other individuals	such	as	hurting	another	individual	or	damaging	his/her	property. Conventional transgressions are defined by their consequences for the social	order;	these	are	actions	such	as	talking	in	class,	dressing	in	opposite-sex clothes.	The	participant	has to	make judgments	about the transgressions. It has	emerged	that	children	of	4	years	find	acceptable	transgressing	in	certain circumstances	to	conventional	rule	imposed	by	authorities	(teachers,	parents). However,	they	think	that	moral	transgressions	are	always	impermissible.	For instance, they	would judge	these transgressions	unacceptable	even	in	cases where	the	authorities	imposing	moral	rules	are	not	present. Recent empirical results suggest that adult psychopathic offenders, when compared	to	non	psychopathic	offenders,	manifest	insensitivity	to	the	distinction	between	moral	and	conventional	transgression	(Blair	1995;	Blair,	Jones, Clark,	and	Smith	1995).	Now	it	seems	that	an	ordinary	conception	of	moral understanding	will	require,	at	least, that	an	individual	should	be	capable	of distinguishing	between	conventional	and	moral	transgressions.	Therefore,	the application	of	Turiel's	paradigm	to	psychopaths	appears	to	offer	evidence	for the	conclusion	that	they	fail	to	draw	a	distinction	that	is	importantly	related	to moral	understanding. These	empirical	results,	however,	do	not	show	that	psychopaths	are	incapable of	drawing	the	moral/conventional	distinction	and	thus	are	incapable	of	moral	understanding.	This	behaviour	needs	to	be	caused	by	certain	impairments in order to be the expression	of incapacity.	Therefore,	we should consider the available explanations for their failure to draw the	moral/conventional distinction.	Some	philosophers	have	assumed that the	performance	of	psychopaths	in	the	conventional/moral	task	can	be	explained	by	deficits	in	the psychological	faculties	required	for	moral	judgment. 4. The Moral Faculties Stalemate The	recent	philosophical	discussion	on	the	moral	understanding	of	psychopaths is characterized	by	polarized	positions.	This	polarization	occurs	particularly	around	key	notions	such	as	moral	judgment	and	its	relationship	to emotive	and	rational	faculties.	To	illustrate	this	debate,	I	will	consider	first	a rationalist	approach	offered	by	John	Deigh	(Deigh	1995). Deigh	has investigated the	moral responsibility of psychopaths by	using a rationalist	model	of	moral	judgment	inspired	by	Kant.	According	to	this	account,	the	capacity	for	moral	judgment	presupposes	that	certain	formal	principles	regulate	practical	reason.	This	requirement	implies	a	number	of	conditions.	Firstly,	and	more importantly,	subjects	should	be	able to recognize their actions as a	manifestation of their intentions.	Moreover, they should be	able	to	universalize	these	intentions.	Notoriously,	opinions	differ	on	how the	criterion	of	universalisation	should	work	to	deliver	moral	understanding; however	its	theoretical	aim	is	quite	clear.	This	criterion	is	required	to	impose consistency	in	moral	judgment	and	thought.	In	accordance	with	this	principle, an	individual	possesses	moral	understanding	when	she	recognizes	as	reasons for	action	rules	that	she	wants	to	regulate	the	behaviour	of	those	who	are	in	a situation	similar	to	hers. According	to	Deigh,	to	know	whether	an	intention	could	apply	to	all	persons, a	subject	has	to	recognize	that	other	individuals	have	interests	and	goals	that SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath341 they	regard	as	good.	However,	he	suggests	that	a	form	of	understanding	richer that	this	recognition	is	required	for	the	right	kind	of	universalisation.	A	subject might	recognize	that	others	have	interests	that	they	regard	as	important,	but	he might	still	assume	that	only	his	interests	matter.	Therefore,	although	he	might see	the	interests	of	others	from	their	point	of	view,	he	might	universalize	his intentions	without	being	lead	to	recognize	any	inconsistency.	Moreover,	the capacity	for	moral	understanding	requires	a	form	of	empathy	that	renders	the agent	capable	of	imagining	other	people's	feelings	of	frustration	that	might result	from	his	actions	and	to	understand	that	their	interests	constitute	reasons for	action,	even	if	such	reasons	are	different	from	his	own. Deigh	suggests	that	this	notion	of	empathy	has	to	be	quite	"rich".	For	example, empathy here cannot be taken as	mere emotional identification.	Children, for	example,	can	empathize in this	sense.	Moreover,	sadists	arguably need	at	least	this	form	of	empathy	to	take	pleasure	from	others'	pain.	Thus, Deigh	argues	that	possessing	moral	understanding	requires	having	some	sort of	mechanism for the	comparison	of	values	and	goals	of	others	with	ours. Therefore	moral	understanding	requires,	firstly,	appreciation	of	the	fact	that one's	interests	might	conflict	with	those	of	others.	Secondly,	this	understanding	requires	sensitivity	to	a	criterion	for	the	solution	of	these	conflicts.	It	is in	virtue	of	this	"mature	empathy"	that	rational	constraints	and	principles	of consistency	enter	as	requirements	for	moral	understanding. Deigh's	rather	elaborate	set	of	psychological	requirements	for	moral	understanding	produces	two	main	hypotheses	about	the	shortcomings	of	the	psychopath	that	need	to	be	empirically	investigated	(Deigh	1995,	p.	763).	Firstly, the	psychopath	might	be	incapable,	given	a	certain	"stunted	development", of	reaching	a	proper	understanding	of	others'	interests	and	reasons	for	action. Secondly,	it	could	be	the	case	that	they	revert	to	an	egocentric	perspective, because	they	cannot	handle	conflicting	different	perspectives,	given	that	they do not appreciate the need for their harmonization.	However, some	might maintain	that	there	are	philosophical	reasons	for	not	investigating	these	hypotheses.	This	because	Deigh fails to	provide	a satisfactory	account	of the faculties	required	for	moral	understanding. Shaun	Nichols,	for	instance,	has	argued	that	psychopaths	undermine	rationalist	accounts	of	moral	judgment	and	understanding	(Nichols	2002).	According	to	him,	psychopaths,	being	rational	individuals	that	fail	to	be	motivated by	moral reasons, offer a counterexample to those that assume that	moral rationalism	is	a	conceptual	or	empirical	truth.	Moreover,	moral	rationalism, understood	as	an	empirical	account	of	moral	psychology,	fails	to	explain	the psychology	of	psychopaths.	We	can	leave	aside	the	important	problem	of	the relevance	of	psychopaths	for	the	meta-ethical	issue	of	the	nature	of	the	capacities	required	for	moral	judgement.	What	is	relevant	here	is	that	Nichols suggests	an	explanation	of	their	failure	to	draw	the	distinction	between	conventional	and	moral	norms	that	might	shed	light	on	the	issue	whether	they	are not	capable	to	draw	this	distinction. Nichols	focuses	on	well-documented	emotional	impairments	that	affect	psychopaths'	empathic	responding.	Adults	with	psychopathy,	and	children	with presumed precursors of psychopathic traits, show reduced autonomic responses	to	and	recognition	of	fearful	and	sad	behavioural	manifestations	(facial	expression,	vocal	affect)	(Blair	1999;	Hare,	Clark,	Grann,	and	Thornton 2000).	He,	then,	argues	that	an	account	of	morality	based	on	moral	sentiments explains the case of psychopaths.	Their immoral behaviour in general and their	incapacity	to	draw	the	distinction	between	moral	and	conventional	rules SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath342 is	explained	by	their	emotional	impairments	that	in	turn	affect	their	capacity for	moral	judgment	and	understanding. However, empirical evidence concerning psychopaths suggests that their moral	shortcomings	can	be	explained	by	adopting	a	Kantian	view	which	emphasizes the role	of rationality in	moral	understanding.	Firstly, it has	been persuasively argued that highly-functioning autistic adults	with	Asperger's syndrome	manifest a similar deficit in empathic understanding as psychopaths.	However, individuals	affected	by	this	form	of	autism	can	realize,	by reasoning,	that	other	people	have	reason-giving	interests	as	their	own	(Kennett	2002). Moreover, given that without consistency in conception or consistency in willing,	there	cannot	be	universalisation,	psychopaths	manifest	impairments in their rational	capacities that	appear to	undermine their	capacity to think consistent	course	of	actions	and	will the	means for their	ends (see for this argument	Maibom	2005). In	particular, let	us	consider	a subject that	has	a reason	to	form	the	intention	to	act	in	accordance	with	a	certain	universal	rule. It seems that	she	should recognize that	having that reason	commits	her	either	to	pursue	the	means	for	that	action	or	abandon	it	(see	Millar	2004,	pp. 76–78). But it seems that psychopaths	do	not have this capacity.	First of all, there is	a	growing	literature	attesting	that	psychopaths	have	attention	deficits	that cause	problems	when	they	have	to	coordinate	their	specific	strategies	(means) required	to	carry	out	a	certain	underlying	intention	(end).	Moreover,	psychopaths	have	problems	with	response	reversal,	the	capacity	to	change	responses	that	were	previously	rewarded	and	then	punished	(Newman	and	Kosson 1996).	Clearly,	this	appears	to	be	a	limitation	in	their	capacity	to	follow	strategies	that	will	consistently	promote	their	ends. Thus,	it	can	be	concluded	that	psychopaths,	besides	emotional	impairments suffer	cognitive	limitations	that	impair,	relatively	to	non-psychopathic	individuals, their rational	capacities.	Therefore, it	appears that	both	rationalists and	sentimentalists	can	accommodate	the	case	of	psychopaths. Walter	Glannon	(Glannon	1997)	has	advanced	an	important	objection	to	this conclusion.	He claims that emotions play a central role in	motivation and rational	deliberation	on	the	basis	of	a	well	known	hypothesis	advanced	by	Antonio	Damasio.	Damasio	studied	patients	who	have	suffered	lesions	of	their frontal	lobes	and	argued	that	emotions	have	a	central	role	in	guiding	practical deliberation	(Damasio	1994).	The	central idea	here is that	emotions	play	a role	in	limiting	the	space	of	possible	options	that	a	subject	will	consider	when deliberating	on	the	action	to	pursue.	In	fact,	he	argues	that	the	representations of	possible	outcomes	are	associated,	through	experience,	to	a	certain	emotion (positive	or	negative),	that	Damasio	calls	a	"somatic	marker".	The	occurrence of	a	certain	representation	of	a	future	outcome	will	determine	the	occurrence of	an	emotive	effect,	either	positive	or	negative,	that	will	accordingly	induce a	positive	or	negative	disposition	in	the	subject	in	relation	to	the	action	that will	bring	about	the	outcome. According	to	Damasio,	certain	lesions	to	the	frontal	lobes	impair	the	formation of somatic	markers.	Thus, the patients so affected lack emotional responses	to	the	events	that	will	shape	the	space	of	alternative	possibilities	that are evaluated in their deliberation. For example, in the case of the patient known	as	Elliott,	his	prefrontal	cortex	was	rendered	dysfunctional	owing	to a	tumour.	Elliot's	behaviour	became	extremely	irrational.	Consequently,	his job	was terminated,	his	marriage	collapsed,	and	he lost	his income.	MoreSYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath343 over,	it	has	been	suggested	that	damage	to	somatic	marker	functioning	early in	development	may	impair	the	normal	acquisition	of	moral	knowledge.	For instance,	Damasio and	his collaborators studied two	patients	who suffered ventromedial frontal lobe damage early in childhood (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio,	and	Damasio	1999).	Both	patients	showed	psychopathic features such	as	irresponsible	and	criminal	behaviour,	abusive	behaviour	towards	others,	and	lack	of	empathy	and	remorse. Glannon	endorses	the	hypothesis	advanced	by	Damasio	and	others	that	impairment in somatic	marker generation	might underlie psychopathy.	However,	even	if	we	concede	that	Damasio's	account	is	satisfactory	for	patients with	damaged frontal lobes,	we cannot extend it to psychopaths. It is true that	there	is	some	preliminary	evidence,	based	on	the	use	of	the	Four-Pack Gambling	task,	that	suggests	that	psychopaths	manifest	an	abnormal	somatic marker functioning (Blair, Colledge, and Mitchell 2001). However, these results are not uncontroversial. In two other studies emerged that psychopathic	individuals	perform	similarly	to	controls	on	the	Four-Pack	Gambling task	(Blair	and	Cipolotti	2000,	Schmitt,	Brinkley,	and	Newman	1999).	Moreover,	there	are	studies	that	appear	to	show	that	those	who	score	highly	in	the PCL-R	respond	to	emotive	stimuli	that	are	not	involved	in	causing	sadness	or fear	(Flor,	Birbaumer,	Hermann,	Ziegler,	and	Patrick	2002).	These	individuals	show	autonomic	arousal	to	emotionally	arousing	stimuli	so	long	as	these stimuli are	not	expressions	of sadness	or fear.	But	according to	Damasio's model,	lesions	in	the	system	of	somatic	markers	cause	a	complete	exclusion of	whatever	the	relevant	emotional	response.	It	could	be	replied,	of	course, that	in	the	case	of	psychopaths,	we	might	hypothesize	that	they	suffer	more localized	impairments	that	undermine	their	emotive	responses.	However,	this hypothesis	is	not	only	hostage	to	empirical	data	that	we	lack	at	the	moment,	it is	also	theoretically	implausible.	In	fact,	there	are	sound	reasons	to	think	that psychopaths	manifest the	opposite impairments	of those that	would follow from	a	damaged	somatic	marker	system. Finally,	Heidi	Maibom	has	suggested	that	these	results	contrast	with	the	impairments	of	patients	with	damages	to	the	frontal	lobes	(Maibom	2005).	Some studies offer compelling reasons for concluding that psychopaths	manifest attention	deficits (Jutai,	Hare,	and	Connolly	1983).	For	example,	empirical studies	appear	to	indicate	that	psychopaths	dedicate	a	great	deal	of	their	attention	resources	to	events	of	immediate	interest,	while	they	ignore	effectively other	stimuli.	In	a	well	replicated	study,	it	has	been	found	that	psychopaths show	a reduced	physiological response to irrelevant auditory stimuli	when they	are engaged in some	other activity, although their response is	normal when	they	are	involved	in	passive	listening.	Similarly,	it	has	been	shown	that psychopaths	are	not	distracted	by	certain	stimuli	when	they	perform	certain tasks	(Hiatt,	Schmitt,	and	Newman	2004).	In	these	tests	they	should	perform certain	duals	tasks,	were	they	were	required	to	follow	the	movements	of	several	objects.	These	findings	suggest	that	the	problem	with	psychopaths	is	that they	have	an	excessive	narrowing	of	their	attention.	But	this	is	the	opposite of	what	would	be	expected	if	psychopaths	had	their	somatic	marker	system damaged. Thus,	although there	might	be	a significant relation	between	emotions	and reason,	Glannon	has	not	put forward	compelling	evidence	for the idea that the	practical	irrationality	of	the	psychopaths	depends	on	their	emotional	impairments.	It	seems	that	psychopaths	have	impairments	that	undermine	both emotional and rational capacities.	Therefore, it is far from	clear how their SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath344 deficits	contribute	to	the	understanding	of	faculties	required	for	moral	understanding. It	seems	that	both	sentimentalist	and	rationalist	accounts	of	moral	understanding	can	provide	explanations	of	the	deficits	of	the	psychopaths	that	might	undermine	their	performance	in	the	conventional/moral	distinction	task.	Deciding	which	of	these	two	explanations	is	the	correct	one	requires	an	independent investigation	to	establish	which	of	these	two	approaches	to	moral	understanding	is	correct.	So	without	these	independent	accounts,	there	is	no	hope	of	establishing	whether	psychopaths	are	unable	to	recognize	moral	norms	because of some impairment of	what classically philosophers have taken to be the moral	faculties. However,	given	the	practical	and	pressing	nature	of	the	question	of	the	social response	to	psychopaths,	this	appears	to	be	an	interesting	and	important	result. It	authorizes	us	to	discuss	this	practical	concern	in	terms	of	"middle	ground principles"	and	"parity	of	explanations"	between	competing	important	philosophical	views,	whose	final	adjudication	does	not	appear	to	be	forthcoming or	easy.	The	majority	of	sentimentalists	and	rationalists	can	agree	that	moral understating	requires	the	capacity	to	draw	the	distinction	between	moral	and conventional	norms.	Moreover,	the	empirical	evidence	so	far	considered	appears	to	support	the	conclusion	that	both	these	theories	can	explain	psychopathic	deviant	behaviour	in	terms	of	impairments	of	capacities	required	for moral	understanding.	Nevertheless,	it	is	clear	that	this	does	not	lead	to	an	uncontroversial	outcome	concerning	the	moral	responsibility	of	psychopaths. First	of	all,	sentimentalism	and	rationalism	as	sketched	here	might	not	represent	all	the	plausible	positions	on	moral	understanding.6	Moreover,	even	if we	accept	this	disjunction	as	exhaustive,	further	steps	might	be	required	to	establish	that	psychopaths	are	not	morally	responsible.	Even	if	we	can	establish that	psychopaths	are	incapable	of	moral	understanding,	because	these	faculties	are	impaired,	we	will	still	have	to	investigate	whether	these	impairment are	such	to	undermine	their	moral	responsibility. There	are	several	problems	to	be	considered,	here	I	can	only	mention	one	that derives	from	interfacing	our	practices	of	ascribing	moral	responsibility	and the	empirical	data	discussed.	The	empirical results show	certain functional impairments	of the	psychopaths	as traced	by	statistical	differences	with	individuals	diagnosed	as	not	being	psychopaths.	Thus,	without	a	deterministic explanation	of	the	impairment	that	generated	these	functional impairments, we	have to	be	prepared to	adjust	our judgment	concerning the	presence	of absence	of	a	certain	capacity	in	a	certain	class	of	individuals	in	a	statistical fashion.	In	turn,	this	will	imply	that	our	practice	to	ascribe	moral	responsibility	to	certain	classes	of	individuals,	depending	on	their	moral	understanding, has	to	be	sensitive	to	these	statistical	correlations. 5. Conclusion It	appears	that	the	empirical	evidence	we	have	about	psychopaths	is	consistent	both	with	the	idea	that	they	might	lack	certain	emotional	capacities	and certain rational capacities that are required for comprehending the distinction	between	moral	and	conventional	rules.	Thus,	it	is	clear	that	psychopaths do	not	draw	an	important	distinction	between	conventional	and	moral	rules. 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Testing	Damasio's	Somatic	Marker	Hypothesis	with	Psychopathic Individuals:	Risk	Takers	or	Risk	Averse?	Journal of Abnormal Psychology 108,	3:	538–543. The	Home	Office	Department	of	Health.	1999.	Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality Disorders: Proposals for Policy Development.	London:	The	Stationary	Office. Turiel,	E.	1983.	The Development of Social Knowledge: Morality and Convention.	Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press. Luca Malatesti Moralno razumijevanje kod psihopata Sažetak Gorući i težak praktički problem vezan je uz opće pitanje ispravnog društvenog odgovora na prijestupnike klasificirane kao osobe s antisocijalnim poremećajem ličnosti. Članak prilazi ovom općem problemu fokusirajući se, iz filozofske perspektive, na još uvijek važno ali lakše dohvatljivo pitanje jesu li psihopatski prijestupnici moralno odgovorni. Posebno se istražuje imaju li psihopati mogućnost moralnog razumijevanja. Vjerodostojni pristup posljednjem pitanju zahtijeva zadovoljavajuću filozofsku interpretaciju empirijskog dokaza koji pokazuje da psihopati ne uspijevaju naći razliku između konvencionalnih i moralnih normi. Preciznije, uzet ću u obzir nedavnu filozofsku raspravu polariziranu između pobornika racionalističkog i sentimentalističkog objašnjenja moralnog razumijevanja. Ovi su suparnici otvorili raspravu nudi li slučaj psihopatije empirijsku potporu za njihovo objašnjenje i potkopava suparnički pogled. U radu tvrdim da dostupni empirijski podaci ostavljaju ishod ove rasprave neodlučenim. To implicira da bi obje teorije moralnog razumijevanja, ako su neovisno motivirane, uzele u obzir psihopate kao osobe koje imaju određene nedostatke koje bi mogle utjecati na njihovo moralno razumijevanje a stoga i na njihovu moralnu odgovornost. Ključne riječi psihopatija,	moralna	odgovornost,	moralno	razumijevanje,	racionalizam,	sentimentalizam,	psihologija	moralnog	razumijevanja,	konvencionalne/moralne	norme Luca Malatesti Moralisches Verständnis der Psychopathen Zusammenfassung Ein akutes und gewichtiges praktisches Problem knüpft an die generelle Frage einer angemessenen gesellschaftlichen Reaktion auf Delinquenten an, die als Personen mit antisozialer Persönlichkeitsstörung klassifiziert werden. Der Artikel nimmt dieses allgemeine Problem in Angriff, indem er – aus der philosophischen Perspektive – die noch immer bedeutende, doch leichter zu umreissende Problematik zum Fokus macht, ob die psychopathischen Zuwiderhandelnden moralische Verantwortung tragen. Es wird nachdrücklich erforscht, ob Psychopathen über Fähigkeit zum moralischen Verständnis verfügen. Ein glaubwürdiges Herangehen an die letzte Frage beansprucht eine zufriedenstellende philosophische Interpretation des empirischen Beweises, der auf das Ausserstandesein der Psychopathen hinweist, die Differenz zwischen konventionellen und moralischen Normen zu detektieren. Präziser ausgedrückt nehme ich Bezug auf eine neuliche philosophische Abhandlung, die zwischen den Verfechtern rationalistischer und sentimentalistischer Auslegung des moralischen Verständnisses polarisiert ist. Diese Rivalen entfesselten eine Debatte, ob der Psychopathiefall den einen empirischen Beistand leistet, während er die Einstellung anderer untergräbt. In meiner Arbeit stelle ich die Behauptung auf, dass verfügbare empirische Angaben den Ausgang dieser Diskussion unentschieden lassen. Dies impliziert, dass beide Theorien des moralischen Verständnisses – falls unabhängig motiviert – Psychopathen als Individuen mit bestimmten SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 48	(2/2009)	pp.	(337–348) L. Malatesti, Moral Understanding in the Psychopath348 Mängeln berücksichtigen würden, welche ihr moralisches Verständnispotenzial und folglich ihre moralische Verantwortung beeinflussen könnten. Schlüsselwörter Psychopathie,	moralische	Verantwortung,	moralisches	Verständnis,	Rationalismus,	Sentimentalismus, Psychologie	des	moralischen	Verständnisses,	konventionelle/moralische	Normen Luca Malatesti La conscience morale chez le psychopathe Résumé Un problème pratique pressant et difficile est lié à la problématique générale de la réponse sociale adéquate concernant les délinquants qualifiés comme souffrant de trouble de la personnalité antisociale. L'article se penche sur le problème en se focalisant, d'un point de vue philosophique, sur la question – tout aussi pertinente mais plus abordable – de savoir si les délinquants psychopathes sont moralement responsables. Plus particulièrement, il s'interroge si les psychopathes possèdent une conscience morale. Une approche crédible de la question pré-citée exige une interprétation philosophique satisfaisante de la preuve empirique indiquant que les psychopathes ne parviennent pas à distinguer les normes conventionnelles et morales. Plus précisément, j'examinerai un débat philosophique récent polarisé entre les partisans de l'explication rationaliste et ceux de l'explication sentimentaliste de la conscience morale. Ces opposants ont ouvert le débat sur la question de savoir si le cas de la psychopathie offre un appui empirique à leur explication et s'il mine la position de leurs opposants. Dans cette étude, j'affirme que les preuves empiriques disponibles laissent l'issue de ce débat incertain. Ceci implique que les deux théories de la conscience morale, si elles étaient motivées indépendamment, considèreraient les psychopathes comme des personnes dont certaines inaptitudes pourraient influer sur leur conscience morale et par conséquent leur responsabilité morale. Mots-clés psychopathies,	responsabilité	morale,	conscience	morale,	rationalisme,	sentimentalisme,	psychologie de	la	conscience	morale,	normes	conventionnelles/morales