U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 1 2 3 4 5On Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification 6in Political Liberalism 7Thomas M. Besch1,2 8Received: 18 September 2019 /Accepted: 10 March 2020 9# Springer Nature B.V. 2020 10 11Abstract 12Public justification in political liberalism is often conceptualized in light of 13Rawls's view of its role in a hypothetical well-ordered society as an ideal or 14idealizing form of justification that applies a putatively reasonable conception of 15political justice to political matters. But Rawls implicates a different idea of public 16justification in his doctrine of general reflective equilibrium. The paper engages 17this second, more fundamental idea. Public justification in this second sense is 18actualist and fundamental (rather than ideal or idealizing and conception-apply19ing). It is actualist in that it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is 20fundamental in that political liberalism qualifies conceptions of political justice as 21reasonable to begin with only if they can be accepted coherently by actual 22reasonable citizens. Together, these features invite the long-standing concern that 23actualist political liberalism is objectionably exclusionary. I argue that the exclu24sion objection, while plausible, is more problematic in own right than it seems if 25actualist and fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and discursive 26respect is compatible with substantive discursive inequality. This leaves propo27nents and critics of political liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of 28permissible discursive inequality in public justification. 29Keywords JohnRawls . Charles Larmore . Political liberalism . Public justification . 30Reflective equilibrium . Discursive respect . Discursive equality 31 Philosophia https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-020-00203-8 * Thomas M. Besch thomas.besch@whu.edu.cn; thomas.besch@sydney.edu.au; https://whu–cn.academia.edu 1 School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072 Hubei, China 2 Honorary Research Associate, Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 321 Introduction 33Recent discussions of public justification in political liberalism often adopt a perspec34tive that John Rawls foregrounds in his account of a well-ordered society at the second 35stage of his theory, Justice as Fairness (or JF):1 they discuss public justification with a 36focus on the stability of an idealized social order, while conceptualizing public justi37fication in ideal terms and as applying a putatively reasonable conception of justice to 38political matters (I elaborate on this below). But a different idea of public justification is 39in play in Rawls's doctrine of general reflective equilibrium. This discussion explores 40this second, arguably more fundamental idea of public justification. I focus exclusively 41on first-generation, Rawls-type political liberalism (as advanced by Rawls and political 42liberals like Stephen Macedo or Charles Larmore),2 interpret its idea of public justifi43cation in light of the doctrine of general reflective equilibrium, and address limits of the 44idea so understood. On the reading suggested here, public justification, in one role, is 45actualist and fundamental (rather than ideal and conception-applying). It is actualist 46insofar as it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. It is fundamental in that 47political liberalism counts conceptions of political justice, including JF, as reasonable in 48the first place only if they can equally be accepted coherently by actual reasonable 49citizens. Together, these features invite a familiar concern: since political liberalism 50from the ground up prioritizes the standpoint of citizens that it regards as reasonable, it 51seems objectionably exclusionary. I argue that this long-standing objection–call it the 52exclusion objection–is more problematic in its own right than it seems if actualist and 53fundamental public justification hypotheticalizes and the kind of equal respect that 54public justification allocates to people allows for substantive discursive inequality–in a 55sense to be detailed later. This leaves proponents and critics of Rawls-type political 56liberalism with deeper questions about the nature of permissible discursive inequality in 57actualist public justification.3 58My discussion proceeds as follows. To elaborate further on my topic and aims, 59sections 2 and 3 provide needed background. I distinguish two ideas of public 60justification and two ideas of equal respect in Rawls-type political liberalism (as I 61address only this kind of view, I often drop the qualifier "Rawls-type"). This discussion 62focuses on actualist (rather than ideal) public justification that reflects a conception63constraining (rather than conception-dependent) form of respect, namely, discursive 64respect (Besch 2014). Sections 4 and 5 read Rawls's doctrine of general reflective 65equilibrium as suggesting a requirement of actualist and fundamental public justifiabil66ity. Section 6 relates this to JF's Original Position (OP) and the aim of reasonable 67overlapping consensus. Section 7 contrasts the proposed reading with Jonathan 68Quong's reading of public justification in Rawls: both readings see public justification 1 See Rawls and Kelly, 2001 and 2005; Weithman 2011, 2015 and 2017; Gaus 2011; see also the discussion of various stability-centric claims about the role of public reason in Lister 2017. 2 Rawls and Kelly, 2001, 2005; Macedo 1991; Larmore 2015 and 2008, part II, and 1996, chapters 6 and 7. 3 Actualist readings of public justification in Rawls-type political liberalism are around for a long time, but they rarely take it to be fundamental or focus on the political role of reflective equilibrium: see Hampton 1989 and 1993; Campos 1994; Q1Forst 1994; Wenar 1995; Estlund 1998; Besch 1998; Gaus 1999; Mulhall and Swift 1999; see also the notes to sections 4 and 5, below. The view suggested here develops further the "deep view" of public justification: see [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review]. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 69as fundamental in political liberalism, but they disagree about the nature of political 70liberalism's commitment to extend equal respect to reasonable people. 71Section 8 turns to the exclusion objection. In political liberalism, political legitimacy 72is a function of what is publicly justifiable to "reasonable" people, yet its idea of 73reasonableness seems parochial. Contrary to one line of criticism, this coheres with 74salient "public reason intuitions" (Enoch 2015, p. 114ff); but it still is objectionably 75exclusionary. Sections 9 and 10 then consider whether hypotheticalization can accom76modate the exclusion objection. To this end, I ask whether Larmore-type 77hypotheticalized actualist public justification (or LAJ) can model equal discursive 78respect. Two things emerge. First, LAJ can allocate discursive standing that is equal 79formally, but not substantively, or in terms of its discursive purchase (for now, think of 80discursive purchase as the measure of influence that an agent's discursive standing 81accords her in justification). Yet, second, LAJ nevertheless can model equal discursive 82respect if it allocates discursive standing that does not impermissibly differ in discursive 83purchase. LAJ's ability to model equal discursive respect hence turns on its ability to 84avoid impermissible substantive discursive inequality. As section 11 concludes, this 85marks a matter of concern not only for political liberalism, but for the wider family of 86conceptions of acceptability-based justification. 872 Public Justification and Equal Respect 88To say that a salient political thing, φ (e.g., exercises of political power, a political 89principle, or a conception of political justice), is publicly justifiable is to say, roughly, 90thatφ is authoritatively acceptable by relevant people; alternatively, it is to say thatφ is 91justifiable on the basis of public reasons, i.e., reasons that are so acceptable. In political 92liberalism, I assume, this standard refers to φ's equal acceptability by reasonable 93citizens, while the view that political things must be so acceptable reflects a view of 94what it takes to extend a form of equal respect to reasonable citizens in relation to such 95things. Yet political liberalism employs this standard in two roles–or, say, it adopts two 96ideas of public justification–and it puts to work two different ideas of equal respect. I 97address both things in turn. 98One role of the standard just mentioned is internal to Rawls's model of a well99ordered society. Within this model, public justification, or public reason giving that 100"aims for" public justification (Rawls 2005, p. 465), is carried out by the reasonable 101citizens of a society that is well-ordered by JF; these citizens accept JF as reason102able and they employ it as a shared basis of justification in matters of basic justice. 103If we understand things in such terms, to say that φ is publicly justifiable is to say 104something like: 1056IJ For a society that is well-ordered by a conception of political justice,ψ, and 107for reasonable citizens of this society, who accept ψ as reasonable: φ is 108equally acceptable by all reasonable citizens on the basis ofψ, orψ's values. 109Call public justification in this sense ideal justification: it is ideal in that it is 110situated in a hypothetical, ideal or idealized society and includes in its justificatory 111constituency on fully enfranchised footing only the hypothetical reasonable citizens Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 112of that society–citizens, moreover, who already accept a (putatively) reasonable 113conception of political justice and use it as a shared basis of justification. Where 114public justification is construed in such terms, it tends to be construed as concep115tion-applying, i.e., as applying a (putatively) reasonable conception of political 116justice to salient political matters. 117Needless to add, it can be a relevant result that a given political thing is IJ-justifiable, 118or that, for a given ψ, practices of IJ-justification could contribute to the stability of a 119well-ordered society, e.g., in relation to relevant assurance problems.4 But it is equally 120plain that there is more to the theme of public justification in political liberalism. 121Political liberals often refer to public justification as requiring equal acceptability by 122actual reasonable people in the actual world. So construed, the claim thatφ is publicly 123justifiable becomes a claim like: 1245AJ For the actual citizens of an actual Western democratic society: φ is 126equally acceptable by all reasonable citizens (or, perhaps, all citizens 127insofar as they are reasonable), or is justifiable by reasons that are. 128Public justification in this sense is actualist justification: the standard of public 129justification here applies to actual discursive practice, and public justification includes 130in its constituency on fully enfranchised footing actual reasonable people. (I address the 131role of AJ-justification in political liberalism in sections 3 and 4, and turn to Larmore's 132hypotheticalizing variant of AJ-justification in sections 9 and 10.) 133Two comments are called for. First, public justification in political liberalism 134enfranchises reasonable people, but there is little consensus in the field about the 135content of this idea of the reasonable. But we need not go into much detail: only two 136things matter now. First, reasonable citizens do not reject political liberalism's most 137important liberal political values (whatever exactly these are), although they might not 138also accept JF, as a token member of the family of political liberalism.5 Second, as 139proponents and critics of political liberalism alike observed, reasonableness is a 140complex virtue such that intelligent and conscientious citizens in good moral standing 141might not qualify as reasonable. This invites concerns about the inclusiveness of public 142justification, or lack thereof–I return to this below. 143Second, the distinction between IJ-justification and AJ-justification marks ideal 144types that are suggested by two roles of public justification in political liberalism. 145Beyond ideal types, it is not always straightforward whether a given conception of 146public justification instantiates, or leans toward, ideal or actualist justification. This 147is so not least because all acceptability-based justification hypotheticalizes, how148ever minimally, and hence idealizes in one sense of the word (Enoch 2015; Besch 1492019). For it must qualify the discursive input that it counts as authoritative, or as 150contributing to justification. E.g., to be authoritative, discursive input must be 151respectable, thoughtful, coherent, and so on. Correspondingly, there can be high152idealization actualist justification. E.g., we might take φ to be publicly justifiable to 4 E.g., it is one concern of Quong's internal conception to show that JF itself would equally acceptable by the hypothetical reasonable citizens of JF's well-ordered society: see Quong 2011 and 2012. Gaus and Weithman foreground assurance problems: Gaus 2011, p. 315ff; Weithman 2011, chapter II. 5 For one account of reasonableness in Rawls-type public justification: see [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review]. See also Enoch 2015. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 153actual people here and now only if they could still accept φ if they were fully 154reasonable citizens of a well-ordered society. For now, though, I may simplify. 155Thus, I shall assume that public justification is construed as ideal if it is construed as 156situated in a hypothetical well-ordered society and as fully enfranchising only the 157hypothetical reasonable citizens of that society who accept a (putatively) reasonable 158conception of political justice. It is construed as actualist if it is construed as 159situated in an actual society and as fully enfranchising actual reasonable citizens 160who (qua reasonable) accept political liberalism's most important political values. 161A commitment to actualist justification is evident in the works of Macedo and 162Larmore. For Macedo, public justification aims to justify things on the basis of good 163reasons and it aims to respect reasonable citizens as free and equal–and Macedo takes 164the latter to call for justifications on grounds that are equally acceptable by actual 165reasonable people "such as they are" (Macedo 1990, p. 281; Hadfield and Macedo 1662012, p. 10). However, political liberalism construes the first aim from the perspective 167of the second: it defines the goodness of good, publicly justifying reasons as "entirely a 168function of their capacity to gain widespread agreement among reasonable people" 169(Macedo 1990, p. 282). This applies to actual reasonable people and all public reasons, 170including public reasons that establish principles of political justice as reasonable or 171exercises of political power as legitimate. 172Similarly, Larmore sees equal respect as the "moral basis of the liberal principle that 173the fundamental rules of political association are legitimate only if they can be the 174object of reasonable agreement" (Larmore 2015, p. 79). But for political liberalism, 175reasonable people are properly respected as equals only if the political principles that 176apply to them are as justifiable "to them from their perspective as they presumably are 177to us" (ibid, p. 78). This refers to reasonable people, including actual people, "to which 178such principles are to apply" (Larmore 1996, p. 137), and it specifies a condition that all 179political principles must meet. 180Next, these two authors evidently do not take public justification to serve in a merely 181conception-applying role: rather than requiring equal acceptability only of 182(hypothetical) practices of reason giving that apply a given, putatively reasonable 183conception of political justice to salient political matters, they take it that such concep184tions must be suitably acceptable by reasonable citizens, or be justifiable by reasons 185that are, to be reasonable in the first place. 186Rawls, too, understands public justification along such lines. For Rawls, no 187conception of political justice is reasonable unless it is equally acceptable coher188ently by actual reasonable citizens, or so I claim. This in effect employs a require189ment of public justifiability as a requirement of theory-selection in the domain of 190the political, and so applies it at a level of thought, argument, or decision-making 191that is fundamental in political liberalism's order of justification. To read political 192liberalism in such terms is to read it as a political constructivism that puts center 193stage an idea of actualist public justification. 194I now turn to equal respect, or two ideas of equal respect and two views of its 195relationship to public justification. One view comes with (but is not tied to) Rawls's 196model of a well-ordered society. The reasonable citizens of JF's well-ordered society 197respect each other as equals, but they look to JF, or its values of justice and public 198reason, to define what this calls for; and as JF prescribes that they comply with a duty 199of civility to engage in public reason giving in political matters, equal respect commits Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 200them to do so (Rawls and Kelly 2001 Q2, p. 116f). This employs equal respect as a 201conception-dependent constraint–a constraint the content of which is defined by, or 202depends on, a (putatively) reasonable conception of political justice. To respect others 203accordingly is to respect them as recipients of justice, as defined accordingly; so 204construed, equal respect calls for public reason giving if a reasonable conception of 205political justice prescribes it.6 206On another, more republican or constructivist view, equal respect, rather than 207depending on a reasonable conception of justice, constrains what conceptions of justice 208count as reasonable to begin with. This employs equal respect in a conception209constraining role. On this view, or one version of it, political things accord with equal 210respect for relevant people only if they are equally justifiable to, or acceptable by, these 211people. This is the kind of equal respect in which Macedo and Larmore anchor public 212justification. Equal respect in this sense requires respecting others not merely as 213recipients, but as equal authorities or co-authors of political justice and justification 214(Forst 2017a Q3, p. 134). Thus, it involves according others a justificatory say, or discur215sive influence, in practices of reason giving in relation to what counts as just, justified, 216or reasonable to begin with. In different terms, equal respect in the conception217constraining sense involves according others constitutive discursive standing and hence 218takes the form of discursive respect (Besch 2014 and 2019). 219On the reading suggested here, political liberalism adopts an idea of actualist public 220justification that expresses, or models, a commitment to extend equal discursive respect 221to actual reasonable citizens. Macedo and Larmore are more forthcoming about this 222commitment than Rawls, but he, too, adopts it. True, his model of a well-ordered 223society construes equal respect as conception-dependent and public justification as 224ideal and, many assume, conception-applying. But this model is part of JF, and JF 225depends for its reasonableness on its equal acceptability by actual reasonable citizens. 226And, I submit, it is this deeper requirement–one that applies to JF as a whole–that 227expresses, or models, the commitment to equal discursive respect. 2283 Three Levels of Argument 229It is useful here to distinguish three levels of argument in Rawls's mature view of 230domestic justice. Thus, let me consider in broad terms the discursive structure of that 231view. 232This structure, I submit, is roughly as follows. Rawls addresses reasonable citizens 233of a Western liberal democracy, and submits to their consideration answers to questions 234such as: 235Q1 What must a conception of political justice be like to be able to provide a 236basis for political legitimacy within a Western liberal democracy? 6 On this picture, also public reason giving is conception-dependent: reasonable people are to reason publicly if political justice, as specified by a reasonable conception of justice, requires it. Some authors who see public justification as IJ-justification think of matters in such terms: e.g., see Quong 2014, p. 273. This sits well with non-constructivist views of public justification: it suggests that the public justifiability of political things is required only if a reasonable conception of justice prescribes that they must be so justifiable–where the reasonableness of the latter hence cannot depend on its public justifiability: see Enoch 2015, Wall 2016. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 237Q2 If such a conception must take the form of a political liberalism, what 238view of that kind should be adopted? 239To answer Q1, Rawls argues that φ can provide a basis for political legitimacy in a 240society of the relevant kind only if φ is equally acceptable by the reasonable 241citizens of that society, and that φ must hence be political in scope and form of 242justification and liberal in content–i.e., roughly, φ must only regulate that society's 243domain of the political and construe equal acceptability by its reasonable citizens as 244politically justifying, while only containing liberal political values. To make this 245case, Rawls argues that a conception of justice cannot be equally acceptable by 246reasonable citizens unless it can attain an overlapping consensus between their 247reasonable comprehensive doctrines, while only a political and liberal conception 248can accomplish this. Call this Rawls's level-1-arguments. 249Rawls's answer to Q2 takes the form of JF–which itself has two stages, S1 and S2. 250S1 includes JF's argument from the Original Position (or OP) to JF's principles of 251justice (Rawls and Kelly, 2001, p. 14–18, 42–52). OP proposes a model of rational 252choice under reasonable constraints. Rawls claims that reasonable people, if they were 253to choose principles of basic justice, would do so as modelled by OP. And he argues 254that they would adopt JF's principles. Call this Rawls's level-2-arguments. 255S2 engages the theme of stability, amongst other things. Rawls defines an ideal 256of the good citizen–i.e., a reasonable and rational citizen who endorses JF–and 257argues that a society of such citizens that is well-ordered by JF would be stable 258(Rawls 2005, p. 11f, 16f, 22–28, 66–82, 94, 97f; Rawls and Kelly, 2001, p. 8f, p. 25926–29, 116f). This is because, in this society, JF would serve these citizens as a 260shared basis of public justification that they can draw on to secure stable agreement 261in matters of basic justice, while JF would order this society so as to encourage 262"cooperative virtues of political life" (Rawls and Kelly, 2001, p.116f)–e.g., reason263ableness, fairness, or the disposition to comply with a duty of civility to exercise 264public reason in salient matters–that "underwrite" a willingness to cooperate with 265others "on a footing of equality and mutual respect." (Ibid.) Rawls here employs an 266idea of public justification as ideal and, many assume, conception-applying. Call 267the arguments at JF's second stage Rawls's level-3-arguments.7 268What matters here are Rawls's level-1-arguments. They are more fundamental in 269political liberalism's order of justification than his level-2-arguments or his level-3270arguments. This is so since Rawls's answer to Q2 supposes that Q1 can be answered in 271a way that supports the project of a political liberalism: the answer to Q1 sets a frame 272that a JF aims to fill out. And, we shall now see, Rawls's level-1-arguments put centre 273stage an idea of actualist public justification. 7 Some authors suggest that JF's stability-centric considerations are part of the argument from OP: Gaus and Schoelandt 2017, p. 149; Weithman 2017. On this view, it is from the perspective of the parties of OP that stability-centric considerations bear on the selection of principles of justice. I foreground a different perspective. For Rawls, JF is reasonable only if JF as a whole is acceptable from the perspective of actual reasonable citizens (see below). It is from this perspective that the role of the argument from OP and JF's stability-centric considerations vis-à-vis each other and the task of principle selection must be acceptable. But it is possible that, from this perspective, reasons can arise to revise OP or its role on the basis of stability-centric considerations. Hence, it is best to see Rawls's level-3-arguments and his level-2-arguments as distinct stages of his overall view. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 2744 Toward Actualist and Fundamental Public Justification 275With this I turn to the political role of Rawls's criterion of reflective equilibrium 276(CRE).8 To assist my reading, I make an assumption that is implicit in the above 277already. In the present context, views to the effect that political things depend for a 278salient political merit (e.g., reasonableness, or legitimacy), on being equally ac279ceptable by reasonable people reflect a commitment to the public justifiability of 280these things, or of claims to the effect that they have that merit. With this in mind, 281consider CRE. 282For Rawls, any conception of political justice, "to be acceptable, must accord 283with our considered convictions, at all levels of generality, on due reflection, or in 284what I have called elsewhere "reflective equilibrium"." (Rawls 2005, p. 8) φ is in 285reflective equilibrium with a set of views, S, only if φ coheres with S, each member 286of S is well-considered, and S is internally coherent (ibid).9 Thus, any conception of 287political justice, including JF, must cohere with the considered judgments of 288relevant people. 289Much depends on the standpoint from which reflective equilibrium is to be sought. 290Rawls highlights three standpoints, including "that of the parties in the original 291position, that of citizens in a well-ordered society, and finally, that of ourselves–of 292you and me who are elaborating justice as fairness and examining it as a political 293conception of justice" (ibid, p. 28). For CRE's purposes, the third standpoint is 294essential. As Rawls highlights, the other two standpoints are not actually adopted by 295anyone, but belong to JF's conceptual inventory–where JF is but one theory of justice 296that must be assessed from the standpoint of "you and me." Thus, the test of reflective 297equilibrium tests how well a conception of justice 2989as a whole articulates our more firm considered convictions of political justice, at 300all levels of generality, after due examination, once all adjustments and revisions 301that seem compelling have been made. A conception of justice that meets this 302criterion is the conception of justice that, so far as we can now ascertain, is the 303most reasonable for us. (Ibid; all emphases are added.) 304Accordingly, JF aims to articulate "ourmore firm considered convictions," while "[w]e 305decide whether the whole conception is acceptable by seeing whether we can endorse it 306upon due reflection" (Ibid, p. 94; all emphases added). 307Who is referred to here as "you and me"?10 Evidently, actual people.11 But not 308just anyone: some constrains are imposed on the standpoint from which reflective 309equilibrium is to be sought. Why? We may take it that Rawls presents JF as a 8 The below adds to my discussion in [omitted for blind review]. That CRE has a political role has been observed before: see Lister 2008; Nielsen 1994; Besch 1998. 9 On reflective equilibrium: see Rawls 2005, p. 28, 45; Rawls and Kelly, 2001, p. 30ff; Rawls 1971, p. 20f, 48–51; see also Daniels 1979 and 1980; Raz Q41882; Scanlon 2002; Knight 2006; Kelly and McGrath 2010; Laden 2014; Baderin 2017. 10 For Onora O'Neill, this marks important differences between Rawls's view of public reason and her Kantian view: O'Neill 2015 and 1996, chapter 2. 11 This is worth noting: Rawls also discusses CRE in relation to the hypothetical citizens of JF's well-ordered society: Rawls and Kelly, 2001, p. 9 f. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 310political liberalism in part because he believes that JF, if it takes this form, can 311meet CRE. But CRE from the outset disqualifies JF if the group of people for 312whom JF must meet CRE included on equal footing people who cannot coherently 313accept political liberalism's most important liberal political values. Thus: the 314reflective equilibria of actual citizens count, but only those citizens count who 315can coherently accept these values, namely, citizens who are reasonable in polit316ical liberalism's sense. 317But if the reflective equilibria of actual reasonable citizens count, they count 318equally. This much springs from political liberalism's commitment to extend equal 319discursive respect to reasonable citizens. Thus: conceptions of political justice must 320attain interpersonal reflective equilibrium–or general reflective equilibrium, as 321Rawls calls this (Rawls 2005, p. 388, and 2001, p. 31). Thus, CRE specifies in 322what way φ must be acceptable for each reasonable person for this to count toward 323φ's equal acceptability by–or, with the above assumption, φ's public justifiability 324to–all reasonable people. Textual evidence confirms this: Rawls writes that JF, 325when it attains public justification, is affirmed in reflective equilibrium (Rawls 326and Kelly, 2001, p. 29, and 2005, p. 388). 327This suggests we attribute to Rawls Actualist Public Justification (for conceptions of 328political justice, φ): 32930APJ φ is reasonable if and only if φ is equally acceptable coherently by, or 331publicly justifiable to, actual reasonable citizens, 332where φ is "equally acceptable coherently" by α and β only if each can accept φ 333coherently in CRE's sense, and citizens are "reasonable" only if they do not reject political 334liberalism's most important liberal political values. Some comments are called for. 3355 Some Comments 336First, Rawls distinguishes narrow and wide reflective equilibrium–which differ 337primarily in relation to the scope and depth of the reflection through which 338equilibrium is reached. Rawls prefers wide over narrow equilibrium (Rawls 3391974, p. 8f; Rawls and Kelly, 2001, p. 29–32, and 2005, p. 387f). As wide 340equilibrium can be less conservative than narrow equilibrium, it is worth noting 341that Rawls's preference for wide equilibrium can cohere with his view that only a 342political liberalism, if anything, is equally acceptable by reasonable citizens. As 343we have seen, citizens here count as reasonable only if they can coherently accept 344political liberalism's most important liberal political values. And one way to 345square this with the dynamics of wide reflective equilibrium is to distinguish, on 346the lines of what we saw earlier, between the perspective from which an agent 347pursues reflective equilibrium and, say, her actual deliberative field, or the set of 348views, widely conceived, that she actually accesses, considers or tries to balance 349in the process. I take it that reflective equilibrium can be wide even if it is 350perspectival or not standpoint-neutral–i.e., even if some views or commitments 351remained fixed points throughout an agent's effort to attain wide equilibrium in her 352deliberative field. Thus, political liberalism's most important liberal political Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 353values, or a commitment not to reject them, here mark the perspective from which 354reasonable citizens pursue wide reflective equilibrium, rather than being mere 355items in their deliberative field.12 356Second, APJ-justification is robustly public (Postema 1995). Rawls does not claim 357merely that a reasonable conception of political justice will also be acceptable by 358reasonable people. He makes the stronger, constructivist claim that the reasonableness 359of such a conception depends on, or is (partly) constituted by, its acceptability by 360reasonable citizens. In the terms used earlier, APJ accords reasonable people a justifi361catory say on what conception of political justice qualifies as reasonable, or extends 362them discursive respect in such matters. Thus, if actual reasonable citizens cannot 363actually accept φ coherently, APJ counts this as (defeasible) evidence in own right that 364φ is not reasonable; and if they cannot actually reject φ coherently, APJ counts this as 365(defeasible) evidence in its own right that φ is reasonable. 366Third, APJ is fundamental in political liberalism's order of justification. Conceptions 367of political justice provide a basis for conditionally reasoned justifications, but these 368justifications can have only a provisional, pro tanto authority (Rawls 2005, p. 386). 369After all, they depend for their authority on the reasonableness of the conceptions they 370draw on. Accordingly, APJ relates to such conceptions and conception-dependent 371justifications like standards of theory-acceptance relate to the theories they apply to: 372the latter depend for their authority on meeting the former. 373Fourth, I may leave open here whether APJ can be applied to political principles, 374value judgements, or other political things, directly in a manner that would leave no 375meaningful justificatory role for conceptions of political justice. If it can be so applied, 376Rawls's political liberalism is structurally closer to the views of first-generation polit377ical liberals like Macedo and Larmore than it would otherwise seem. I also leave open 378whether reasonableness in APJ's sense is a family trait of conceptions of justice. If it is– 379which is an option Rawls seems to favor–then APJ by itself underdetermines the public 380choice of a token conception of political justice. 381Fifth, APJ helps to explain why "political liberalism applies the principle of 382toleration to philosophy itself" (ibid, p. 10). For Rawls, to apply this principle to 383philosophy is or involves requiring conceptions of political justice to avoid reasonable 384disagreements between reasonable citizens–or to be neutral in a justificatory sense. 385However, Rawls takes it that if φ is reasonably rejected by some reasonable citizens 386and reasonably accepted by others, then φ is the subject of reasonable disagreement.13 387But ifφ is the subject of such disagreement, then there is evidence thatφ is not equally 388acceptable by reasonable citizens. Thus: if conceptions of political justice must meet 389APJ, then there is reason for them to avoid reasonable disagreement. 390Sixth, a disclaimer: it is beyond what I can do here to show how APJ sits with many 391of Rawls's key claims, including especially his claim that only a political liberalism can 392provide a basis for political legitimacy (but I address this in [omitted for blind review] 393and [omitted for blind review]). For now, I only relate APJ to JF's Original Position, 12 Thus, Rawls's wide equilibrium can be more conservative than a method of "balance and refinement" (DePaul 1993, p. 25–43). Nor is it a "free" equilibrium (Gaus 2011, p. 311ff). Rawls might not expressly restrict the deliberative field within which equilibrium is sought, but considers its pursuit only from reasonable perspectives. 13 This draws on the account of reasonable disagreement in Rawls suggested in [omitted for blind review]. See also Larmore 2015, p. 68–74. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 394reasonable overlapping consensus (see below), and Rawls's idea of political legitimacy 395(section 8). Yet, plainly, APJ leans toward political liberalism: the search for a 396conception of political justice from the ground up privileges the perspective of reason397able people–i.e., people who do not reject political liberalism's most important liberal 398political values. 3996 The Original Position and Overlapping Consensus 400JF's Original Position (OP) and the aim of reasonable overlapping consensus are often 401taken to play important justificatory roles in Rawls's view. It is hence instructive to 402relate them to APJ. I start with OP. 403OP is often regarded as expressing an idea of practical reason such that if any actual 404citizen cannot coherently accept OP's results, such as JF's principles, then this must be 405owed to that person's unreasonableness or irrationality.14 But this cannot be right. If 406conceptions of political justice depend for their reasonableness on their equal accept407ability by reasonable citizens, the reasonableness of these citizens cannot depend on 408their acceptance of OP's results. In this light, consider: 40910[OP] models what we regard–you and I, here and now–as fair and reasonable 411conditions for the parties, who are rational representatives of free and equal, 412reasonable and rational citizens (...). [OP] also models what we regard as 413appropriate restrictions on reasons for adopting a political conception of 414justice for [the basic structure of society] ... [W]e conjecture that the 415conception of political justice the parties would select is the conception that 416you and I, here and now, would regard as reasonable and rational and 417supported by the best reasons. Whether the conjecture is borne out will 418depend on whether you and I, here and now, can, on due reflection, endorse 419the principles adopted. (Rawls and Kelly, 2001, p. 30.) 420OP models what "you and I" see as reasonable and rational deliberation, or as proper 421constraints on reasons to adopt a conception of political justice. Rawls stresses that 422OP's success as such a model turns on whether OP's results match what "you and I" on 423reflection regard as reasonable and rational, or as supported by the best reasons. 424Accordingly, he writes that OP is "a means of public reflection and self-clarification" 425that aims to help "us" attain "deeper self-understanding" and "greater coherence among 426all our judgements," with the help of which "we can attain wider agreement among one 427another" (Rawls 2005, p. 26). And one assumption here is that "we" can tell from the 428standpoint of "our" considered judgments whether OP advances that end. 429What people does Rawls refer to? These, I submit, are the people from the 430perspective of whom JF must be acceptable for it to be reasonable, namely, actual 431reasonable citizens. One way to interpret OP's role hence is this. OP is a reconstructive 432tool to draw out or clarify implications of the self-understanding of actual reasonable 433citizens. OP's success as such a tool depends on whether OP's results cohere with the 434considered judgments of these citizens–which is something they assess from the 14 Some Kantian readings of Rawls make this assumption: see Doppelt 1988 and 1989. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 435standpoint of their considered judgments. If they conclude that OP fits their self436understanding, OP succeeds in its role–in which case OP advances JF's public justifi437cation. But if OP does not succeed in its role, it does not advance JF's public 438justification–in which case these citizens must decide from their perspective whether 439to revise or reject JF. Either way, their considered judgments have the last word.15 440On this reading, then, it is not the case that if actual citizens cannot coherently accept 441OP's results, this must speak to their unreasonableness or irrationality. In relation to 442actual reasonable citizens, the dependency is reversed: if they cannot on reflection 443coherently accept OP's results, this calls into question the reasonableness of OP's 444results (or JF) if this conclusion is favored by their considered judgments. 445Next, consider reasonable overlapping consensus. Rawls writes: 4467Public justification happens when all the reasonable members of political society 448carry out a justification of the shared political conception by embedding it in their 449several reasonable comprehensive views. In this case, reasonable citizens take 450one another into account as having reasonable comprehensive doctrines that 451endorse that political conception ... Only when there is a reasonable overlapping 452consensus can political society's political conception of justice be publicly– 453though never finally–justified. Granting that we should give weight to the 454considered convictions of other reasonable citizens, this is because general and 455wide reflective equilibrium with respect to a public justification gives the best 456justification of the political conception that we can have at any given time. There 457is... no public justification for political society without a reasonable overlapping 458consensus... (Rawls 2005, p. 387f.) 459This, I submit, states a view of public justification under conditions of "reasonable 460pluralism" (see below) that applies to ideal and actualist public justification. Rawls 461draws on the link between public justification and reflective equilibrium and suggests 462that, under these conditions, a conception of justice, φ, can be publicly justifiable to 463actual reasonable citizens only if φ can attain an overlapping consensus between the 464reasonable comprehensive doctrines that these citizens endorse. Specifically, the idea 465seems to be: 466(i). φ is APJ-justifiable only if φ is acceptable by each actual reasonable citizen in 467reflective equilibrium. 468(ii). In conditions of reasonable pluralism, reasonable citizens accept reasonable but 469incompatible comprehensive doctrines. 470(iii). Hence: φ is suitably acceptable only if φ coheres with, or can "in some way" 471(ibid, p. 386) be embedded in, the reasonable comprehensive doctrines of 472reasonable citizens. 473However, if φ can be embedded in these doctrines, φ attains a reasonable overlap474ping consensus. Thus: actualist and fundamental public justification does not 15 This is on the trajectory of Scanlon's reading of the relationship between CRE and OP: see Scanlon 2002, p. 153–157. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 475compete with the aim of reasonable overlapping consensus, but requires that this 476aim can be attained.16 477Observe that this coheres with the notion of reasonable pluralism, or one of the two 478notions that Rawls uses. On one notion, a plurality of comprehensive doctrines 479instantiates reasonable pluralism only if each doctrine is perfectly reasonable (ibid, p. 48024 n. 27). Call this ideal reasonable pluralism: it obtains in JF's well-ordered society. 481Another notion surfaces here: 4823[The fact of reasonable pluralism] is the fact that free institutions tend to generate 484not simply a variety of doctrines and views... Rather, it is the fact that among the 485views that develop are a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. These 486are the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that political liberalism must 487address. (Ibid, p. 36; all emphases are added.) 488This entails that reasonable pluralism can obtain even if many unreasonable doc489trines are present. Call this non-ideal reasonable pluralism: it can obtain in actual 490societies. When it obtains, political liberalism addresses only a subset of doctrines, 491namely, the subset that only includes reasonable doctrines of reasonable citizens. In 492short, given APJ, political liberalism aims at a reasonable overlapping consensus 493also in the real world–although in the real world, such a consensus might not be 494very inclusive in scope. 4957 Quong's Reading 496To conclude the reconstructive part of this discussion, I contrast the above reading with 497Quong's reading of public justification in Rawls's political liberalism. Since both 498readings take it that political liberalism requires conceptions of political justice to be 499publicly justifiable to reasonable citizens, it is instructive to see where they differ. 500On Quong's reading, Rawls's political liberalism aims to show "how liberal rights 501and institutions can be publicly justified to the constituency of an ideal democratic 502society" (Quong 2011, p. 6; my emphasis). Accordingly, 5034the overlapping consensus represents the first stage in the justificatory process. 505We begin by identifying the common ground that reasonable citizens would share 506in an ideal, well-ordered liberal society ... [T]he core ideas of freedom, equality, 507fairness, and reasonable pluralism are assumed to ground a commitment to public 508reason and a liberal conception of justice, but the core ideas are not themselves 509subject to any test of public justification, nor do we check to see if these values 510can be the subject of an overlapping consensus amongst real citizens here and 511now. (Quong 2012, p. 51f; all emphases are mine.) 512This suggests: political liberalism requires conceptions of political justice to be 513publicly justifiable not to "real citizens here and now," but only to "the constituency 16 A related matter is the potential redundancy of the aim of reasonable overlapping consensus: see [omitted for blind review]. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 514of an ideal democratic society," namely, the (non-existent) reasonable citizens of a 515(non-existent) well-ordered society. Accordingly, it seeks an overlapping consensus 516only between the reasonable doctrines of these (non-existent) reasonable citizens– 517where citizens and their doctrines are reasonable only if they do not reject political 518liberalism's most important liberal political values. Thus, public justification here is 519a form of ideal justification. 520Quong aims to improve on what he calls the "common view" of the role of 521overlapping consensus in Rawls (Quong 2011, p. 163ff). According to the common 522view, two things hold. First, only JF's principles of justice, rather than JF as a whole, 523must attain a reasonable overlapping consensus. And second, OP addresses "an 524independently defined constituency of persons" (ibid, p. 166), rather than only reason525able citizens, i.e., citizens who are reasonable in political liberalism's sense. Quong 526disagrees with the common view on both counts. 527Quong is right to disagree with this view on these counts. Since his political turn, 528Rawls elevates the role of public justification and hence of overlapping consensus: JF 529as a whole must be publicly justifiable to reasonable citizens–where the reasonable do 530not reject political liberalism's most important liberal political values (the above 531quotation samples Quong's view of what these are). This changes the architecture of 532Rawls's overall view: public justification is now part of a first, fundamental stage of 533argument in political liberalism. 534But how should we interpret this change? This is where the reading suggested here 535and Quong's reading part ways. Quong seems to infer from the fact that political 536liberalism construes public justification as part of a first, fundamental stage of justifi537cation, and the fact that it aims to publicly justify salient things only to citizens who are 538reasonable in political liberalism's sense, that public justification is always ideal 539justification (Quong 2011, p. 6f, 138f, 166ff, 180ff). But consider where this leaves 540political liberalism. According to Quong, public justification would not enfranchise 541actual citizens–i.e., it would not check whether salient values are acceptable by "real 542citizens here and now" (see above)–although this 5434should not be misunderstood to mean that political liberalism is not also ad545dressed to real citizens ... Each of us ought to recognize [political liberalism's 546political values] as very great values, ones which should regulate the way in 547which we treat our fellow citizens. The normative conclusions of political 548liberalism thus provide us with powerful reasons to behave in certain ways, and 549not others, in our current world. (Quong 2011, p. 159.) 550However, public liberalism would address actual citizens only in the weak sense of 551treating them as recipients of public justification. Political liberalism would expect their 552compliance with its conclusions. But it would not make these conclusions depend for 553their reasonableness or justification on their equal acceptability by any actual citizen 554here and now. No actual citizen here and now would have a justificatory say in relation 555to the content of political justice or its justification.17 17 That Quong-type public justification can address actual citizens in one sense is sometimes overlooked: e.g., see Schoelandt 2015, p. 1039. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 556But this cannot capture the nature of political liberalism's commitment to equal 557respect, or so I claim. Political liberalism respects actual reasonable citizens not 558merely as recipients, but as authorities or co-authors of public justification: it 559accords them a justificatory say, or discursive respect. Yes, it expects actual 560citizens to abide by the normative conclusions of political liberalism. But it does 561this insofar as these conclusions can be supported by a reasonable conception of 562political justice, where the reasonableness of such conceptions depends on their 563acceptability by actual reasonable citizens. Thus: public justification is part of a 564fundamental stage of justification and aims to publicly justify salient political 565things only to citizens that it regards as reasonable. But this reflects a commitment 566to actualist justification: Rawls's political liberalism is fundamentally a form of 567actualist, rather than ideal, political liberalism. 5688 Political Legitimacy and the Exclusion Objection 569With this I turn to the exclusion objection. Political liberalism construes the 570legitimacy of exercises of political power as a function of their justifiability to 571citizens who do not reject political liberalism's most important liberal political 572values. It has often been argued that this renders the view objectionably exclu573sionary.18 What I will do in the remainder of this discussion is to consider whether 574Larmore's hypotheticalizing variant of actualist public justification can accommo575date this objection. This will bring to the fore deeper questions about the nature of 576discursive (in)equality in actualist public justification. 577How does APJ relate to Rawls's liberal principle of legitimacy (LPL)? According to 578LPL, political power must be exercised "in accordance with a constitution the essentials 579of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles 580and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational" (Rawls 2005, p. 217). This 581refers to principles and ideals that are justifiable as reasonable and rational by a 582reasonable conception of political justice. But to be reasonable, such conceptions must 583be equally acceptable by actual reasonable citizens–where, as suggested above p.5, this 584expresses, or models, an idea of equal discursive respect. Thus, Rawls adopts a respect585based actualist form of justificatory liberalism: to properly respect actual reasonable 586citizens, exercises of political power must be justifiable on grounds that are equally 587acceptable by them.19 588Central here is the idea that citizens are owed a measure of discursive influence at a 589fundamental level of political justification–or a share of "discursive power" (Forst, 5902017b Q5, p. 10f), or discursive standing of relevant discursive purchase (see below). This 591places weight on the participation value of public justification ([omitted for blind 592review]). That is, the point is not simply that political power must be based on grounds 593that relevant people can accept (say, at some level of idealization); the point is, rather, 594that their actual ability or inability to accept a conception of justice is to have traction 595on its eligibility for the role. This is part of the non-domination or emancipatory upshot 18 This objection has been made since the early days of Rawls's political turn: e.g., see Hampton 1989 and 1993; Campos 1994; Besch (1998); Friedman (2000). 19 I discuss political legitimacy in Rawls in more detail in [omitted for blind review]. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 596of Rawls's view of political legitimacy.20 Of course, a flip-side here is that only 597reasonable citizens get to have such influence. Unreasonable citizens are not, or not 598in the same way, respected as co-authors of public justification. 599Does this cohere with political liberalism's "public reason intuitions," as Enoch calls 600them (Enoch 2015, p. 114ff)? The phrase refers to the two-fold view that political 601power can be reconciled with the freedom and equality of citizens only if it is justifiable 602to them, and equally so. For Rawls, this reconciliation requires such power to be 603justifiable on grounds that are equally acceptable by reasonable citizens. Note that it is 604not clear whose freedom and equality political liberalism aims to reconcile with 605political power. Some critics, notably Enoch, assume that Rawls's political liberalism 606initially aims to reconcile the freedom and equality of all citizens with political power, 607or at least not only reasonable people (ibid, p. 122–126). This makes political liberalism 608an easy target for an internal version of the exclusion objection. For if political 609liberalism pursues inclusive aims, it does not achieve them: the equal justifiability of 610political power to citizens who are reasonable in political liberalism's sense might 611reconcile their freedom and equality with political power, but it does little to reconcile 612the freedom and equality of other citizens with political power (ibid). 613But there is another, perhaps more charitable reading that clarifies the terms of the 614problem that political liberalism aims to solve in light of the solution it offers. Macedo 615tells us how: political liberalism, he notes, respects as "free and equal (...) all those who 616pass certain threshold tests of reasonableness: we respect those whose disagreement 617with us does not impugn their reasonableness" (Macedo 1991, p. 47, 71). Thus, what 618political liberalism aims to reconcile with political power is the freedom and equality 619not of all citizens, but of all citizens that it respects as free and equal, namely, 620reasonable citizens. As far as the public reason intuitions are concerned, therefore, 621the exclusion objection misfires as a stretch of internal criticism: in political liberalism, 622the equal justifiability of exercises of political power to reasonable citizens is all that is 623called for to begin with. 624Still, the exclusion objection has much appeal. If the legitimacy of political power is 625a function of its justifiability, and if justification must model equal discursive respect, 626then such power must be equally justifiable to everyone to whom such respect is owed. 627But why should it be owed only to citizens who do not reject political liberalism's most 628important political values? Why is it a non-rejection of these things on which an 629entitlement to exercise (a full measure of) discursive influence at a fundamental level 630of political justification hinges? Again, I set aside what values are built into APJ's idea 631of the reasonable. Yet, arguably, many citizens might not qualify as reasonable in 632political liberalism's sense. Thus, the exclusion objection articulates the concern that it 633is in one form or another impermissible–or unjust, arbitrary, dogmatic, and so on–to 634extend equal discursive respect only to citizens who are reasonable in that sense. 635It remains open how Rawls-type political liberalism can plausibly respond to the 636exclusion objection without at the same time undermining itself. Consider just two of 637the more self-suggesting responses. First, public justification might fully enfranchise 20 But we should not overstate the import of the influence that APJ accords the reasonable: there may not be emancipatory trickle-down effects such that an agent's discursive influence at the level of assessments of the reasonableness of conceptions of justice translates into influence in lower-order assessments of the legitimacy of exercises of political power–and it will often only be the latter kind of influence that demonstrates in the eyes of agents that their perspectives matter politically. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 638(some) people who are not reasonable in political liberalism's sense–people, that is who 639cannot accept (all of) its most important liberal political values. But it must then be 640doubtful that a political and liberal conception of justice can be claimed to be 641reasonable in APJ's then-inclusive sense. Second, political liberalism might justify 642the values it builds into APJ's idea of the reasonable to unreasonable people. But then 643APJ-justification cannot be fundamental; and so one question will be how this could 644square with the commitment to accord reasonable citizens discursive respect at a 645fundamental level of political justification. Either way, political liberalism seems 646pushed to sacrifice something essential to the project. 6479 Hypotheticalizing Actualist Public Justification? 648Maybe actualist public justification can be more inclusive and prioritize reasonableness 649if it includes unreasonable citizens in its constituency, but recognizes discursive input 650as counting toward public justification only insofar as it is reasonable. Can 651hypotheticalization help? 652In passing, I note two things. First, hypotheticalization here is not ad hoc, as Enoch 653objects (Enoch 2015, p. 118–120, 126–130). After all, political liberalism is from the 654outset committed to prioritize the reasonable. Second, hypotheticalization does not turn 655actualist public justification into Quong-type ideal public justification. Yes, 656hypotheticalized actualist public justification "idealizes" (in one sense) around its 657fringes, but it fully enfranchises actual reasonable citizens. 658Larmore expressly hypotheticalizes actualist public justification, or what he calls 659"rational dialogue" (Larmore 2015, p. 74–87, and 1996, p. 134ff). He concedes that 660political liberalism excludes some people in some way, such as unreasonable citizens or 661people who do not "prize most highly the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect" 662(Larmore 1996, p. 142, and 2015, p. 83). Still, he insists, exercises of political power 663must be justifiable to citizens more generally on the (perhaps counterfactual) assump664tion that they are reasonable.21 Thus, in relation to the unreasonable, what counts 665toward public justification is what they would accept if they were reasonable. This 666coheres with the idea of equal respect: 6678[T]he moral idea of respect for persons lying at the heart of political liberalism 669should be formulated more precisely as follows: the fundamental principles of 670political society, being coercive in nature, ought to be such that all who are to be 671subject to them must be able from their perspective to see reason to endorse them 672on the [perhaps counterfactual] assumption that they are committed to basing 673political association on principles that can meet the reasonable agreement of 674citizens. (Larmore 2015, p. 82f.) 675The point: Larmore-type hypotheticalized actualist public justification (or LAJ) does 676not restrict its constituency to the reasonable, but adds a reasonableness constraint on 677the kind of discursive input that is counts as authoritative. Thus, LAJ accords a 21 Larmore 2015, p. 83. He reads Rawls's view of political legitimacy in such terms: ibid., p. 75f, and 1999, p. 609 f. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 678justificatory say not only to reasonable people, but counts exercises of this say as 679authoritative only insofar as they are reasonable.22 680Can LAJ accommodate the exclusion objection? One way to pick up the stick is to 681ask whether LAJ can model equal discursive respect. Upfront, this is doubtful: LAJ, 682too, prioritizes the reasonable. Yet on reflection, a more nuanced assessment is needed, 683or so we shall find. 684To start with, recall that all acceptability-based justification must qualify the 685discursive input it counts as authoritative, and so will hypotheticalize. E.g., to 686justify, acceptability must be respectable, thoughtful, coherent, or some such. This 687means that discursive equality must be seen in light of relevant authoritativeness 688constraints–or, in the present case, a reasonableness threshold. With this in mind, 689consider now discursive equality.23 690Actualist public justification expresses, or models, an idea of equal discursive 691respect in that it accords people an equal justificatory say, or equal constitutive 692discursive standing. Now, one especially salient respect in which discursive standing 693can be equal or unequal is its discursive purchase. What is this? Roughly, discursive 694purchase is a function of the discursive influence that an agent's discursive standing 695accords her in justification, or on its outcomes, given her actual deliberative resources 696(widely conceived so as to include the entire range of views, volitions, commitments, 697capacities, and so on, that she draws on in her practical thought). When we consider 698discursive purchase, we consider the participation value of justification: we consider 699how standards of justification relate to the agents they apply to, or range over, and what 700level of discursive influence in justification these standards allocate these agents 701([omitted for blind review]). 702This influence comes in degrees. Consider two justification practices, JP1 and JP2, 703that accord average Betty a justificatory say, but apply to her different authoritativeness 704constraints. JP1 counts her rejection ofφ as authoritative if it is locally coherent in light 705of her actual deliberative resources. JP2 counts her rejection of φ as authoritative only 706if she would still rejectφ if she was fully or ideally rational. It is plain that JP1 can give 707Betty's actual perspective traction in justification in a way in which JP2 does not. As 708JP1 sets its bar for authoritativeness at a readily accessible level, her justificatory say 709can be meaningful: if she cannot actually accept φ coherently, this in its own right can 710count as (defeasible) evidence that φ is not justified. Hence, her discursive standing is 711high in purchase. Not so in JP2, for better or worse. If her actual say is not aligned with 712an ideally rational say, Betty's coherent rejections do not count as evidence thatφ is not 713justified. Thus, her standing is low in purchase, or lower than in JP1. 714Discursive standing can vary in purchase also in a single justification practice. One 715factor that determines purchase is how readily available it is for people to meet salient 716authoritativeness constraints. Other things being equal, the more readily available this is 22 This simplifies. Hypotheticalization must add constraints that suffice for authoritativeness. Yet Larmore construes reasonableness in thin epistemic terms that make it only necessary for authoritativeness. Thus, discursive input must arguably also cohere with other things, such as the commitment to "prize most highly the norms of rational dialogue and equal respect" (Larmore 1996, p. 142). For now, I put things in terms of reasonableness and take the latter to suffice for authoritativeness. On reasonableness in Larmore: see Macedo 1991, p. 260f, and [omitted for blind review]. 23 The following applies to the present case the account of discursive equality proposed in [omitted for blind review], [omitted for blind review]. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 717for an agent, the more will her standing resemble Betty's standing in JP1. And the less 718available this is, the more will it resemble Betty's standing in JP2. At the limit, 719discursive practice can put it out of the actual reach of people to exercise any relevant 720level of discursive influence: thus, while people might notionally have a justificatory 721say, their standing might have little discursive purchase. 722A final matter worth highlighting now concerns justification practices that adopt 723non-trivial authoritativeness constraints–constraints, that is, that not every relevant 724agent readily meets anyway. Where agents relevantly differ in their deliberative 725resources, such constraints often are not equally available to them. As a result, their 726discursive standing will differ in purchase. E.g., if authoritative input must at least be 727thoughtful and coherent, always-thoughtful-and-coherent Betty's voice always qualifies 728as authoritative (thus, her standing is like Betty's in JP1), while rarely-thoughtful-and729coherent Paul's voice rarely does (and so his standing is like Betty's in JP2). Now, 730actualist public justification includes in its constituency real people and instantiates in 731contexts of actual interpersonal difference. Hence, it is expectable, if not unavoidable, 732that a practice of actualist public justification, when it applies the same non-trivial 733authoritativeness constraint across a diverse constituency, allocates discursive standing 734that differs in purchase. 735This suggests we distinguish between two ways in which discursive standing can be 736equal. A justification practice, JP, accords α and β discursive standing that is equal 737formally if and only if it accords α and β discursive standing of the same kind (e.g., 738constitutive discursive standing) and applies to α and β the same authoritativeness 739constraints (e.g., a reasonableness threshold). But JP accords α and β discursive 740standing that is equal substantively only if it accords them standing that is equal in 741discursive purchase. The intuitive point: while formal discursive equality is a matter of 742the consistent application of salient standards to relevant agents, substantive discursive 743equality is a matter of the measure of discursive influence in justification, or on its 744outcomes, that an application of these standards leaves relevant agents with.24 74510 Equal Discursive Respect? 746LAJ can meet formal discursive equality: it accords reasonable and unreasonable 747citizens constitutive discursive standing and applies to all the same reasonableness 748threshold. But LAJ does not meet substantive discursive equality: it allocates discursive 749standing that is unequal in discursive purchase. To the reasonable, it allocates high750purchase standing like Betty's standing in JP1. To other people, it allocates low751purchase standing more like Betty's standing in JP2. 752If so, does LAJ model equal discursive respect? Yes and no. Yes, insofar as LAJ 753allocates citizens discursive standing that is equal formally. But no, insofar as LAJ 754does not allocate citizens standing that is equal substantively. This shifts the issue: 755what kind of discursive equality does equal discursive respect require? Let me 24 The idea of substantive discursive equality is sympathetic with Susan Dieleman's idea of substantive inclusion (Dieleman 2015, p. 803). Substantive discursive inequality (i.e., purchase inequality), when impermissible, can instantiate an objectionable failure to include substantively in her sense. See also [omitted for blind review]. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 756assume here that equal discursive respect requires at least formally equal discursive 757standing: for LAJ to extend to α and β equal discursive respect, LAJ must at least 758allocate each constitutive discursive standing and apply to them the same reason759ableness threshold. Does this suffice? 760Intuitively, it does not. Discursive standing that is equal formally can be objection761ably unequal in purchase. Consider JP3: it accords all citizens constitutive discursive 762standing and applies to all the same authoritativeness constraint, ψ. Let JP3's constit763uency include Dominant Group and Marginal Group, and assume that Dominant Group 764has used its influence to define ψ in terms of values that its members accept and other 765people reject: in JP3, discursive input counts as authoritative only insofar as it coheres 766with Dominant Group Values. Thus, while members of Dominant Group have a 767standing like Betty in JP1, others have a standing like Betty in JP2. JP3 satisfies formal 768discursive equality. But it does not treat people as discursive equals or accord them 769(some purchase-sensitive form of) "equal opportunity for political influence" (Cohen 7702006, p. 242) or equal "opportunities to participate in the process of public delibera771tion" (Peter 2009, p. 67). Rather, JP3 entrenches the dominance of Dominant Group: it 772turns justification practice itself into a vehicle of domination, marginalization, or worse. 773And it is not a big stretch to see similarities between the standing of members of 774Marginal Group in JP3 and the standing of the unreasonable in LAJ. 775Perhaps, then, LAJ can model equal discursive respect only if it allocates standing 776that is equal formally and substantively–i.e., if it satisfies discursive equity ([omitted for 777blind review])? LAJ cannot do this. But neither will any real-life practice of public 778justification that applies non-trivial authoritativeness constraints across real-life, diverse 779constituencies that include agents who relevantly differ in their deliberative resources– 780relevantly, that is, so as to affect how available it is for them to meet these constraints. If 781real-life public justification can model equal discursive respect, then, equal discursive 782respect cannot require discursive equity. 783A third view is this: equal discursive respect allows for differences in discursive 784purchase, but not every form of purchase inequality is compatible with it. On this view, 785LAJ can extend α and β equal discursive respect even if LAJ accords α and β 786discursive standing that is unequal substantively if their standing does not impermissi787bly differ in discursive purchase. As far as this goes, this, I assume, is plausible. But it 788implies that we cannot know whether LAJ models equal discursive respect unless we 789know whether LAJ allocates permissible purchase inequality. Thus, the question shifts 790again: when is purchase inequality permissible, or just?25 791Let me bring this back to the exclusion objection. I asked whether hypotheticalizing 792actualist public justification can accommodate this objection. To explore the matter, I 793considered whether LAJ can model equal discursive respect. The above suggests a 794nuanced answer. LAJ can accord discursive standing that is equal formally. In one 795respect, then, LAJ can model discursive equality. But we have also seen that this does 796not suffice to accommodate the exclusion objection if equal discursive respect requires 797not only formal discursive equality, but also the absence of impermissible purchase 798inequality. Thus: even if hypotheticalized actualist public justification accords formally 799equal discursive standing to unreasonable citizens, it cannot model equal discursive 25 On conceptions of permissible purchase inequality: see [omitted for blind review]. Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 800respect, or accommodate the exclusion objection, unless its allocation of purchase 801inequality is permissible. 802Now, we saw that some level of purchase inequality is permissible if actualist public 803justification across a diverse constituency can model equal discursive respect. But it is 804open whether LAJ's allocation of purchase inequality is permissible. And while this 805seems doubtful from the perspective of the exclusion objection, political liberals like 806Larmore are evidently committed to the view that LAJ's level of purchase inequality is 807permissible. Thus, proponents and critics of actualist political liberalism are left with 808two questions: 809(i) Who should be accorded a justificatory say in political liberalism's practices of 810actualist public justification (or: to whom should such justification extend equal 811discursive respect)? 812(ii) What level of substantive discursive inequality is permissible within such prac813tices, or is compatible with equal discursive respect (or: when are purchase 814inequalities in such practices permissible, or just)? 815Hypotheticalizing actualist public justification can answer (i) in a manner that goes 816some way toward meeting the exclusion objection. But this puts (ii) center stage. While 817LAJ includes the unreasonable, it does so by allocating discursive standing that 818involves high levels of purchase inequality. And with this the issue now turns on an 819answer to (ii). Thus, how should we answer (ii)? What view of the permissibility of 820purchase inequality–or of purchase justice, for short ([omitted for blind review])– 821should be adopted here? On this, the jury is still out. 82211 Conclusion 823This paper suggested that Rawls-type political liberalism puts center stage a conception 824of public justification that is actualist and fundamental. I sketched aspects of this 825conception and considered in this light the exclusion objection to political liberalism. 826We saw that also a Larmore-type hypotheticalized version of actualist and fundamental 827public justification cannot overcome this objection: insofar as it remains open whether 828LAJ allocates a permissible form of purchase inequality, it remains open whether LAJ 829expresses, or models, equal discursive respect. Yet rather than proving compelling 830grounds to reject political liberalism, this consideration leads to deeper questions about 831the nature of discursive equality in public justification. 832In closing, I make a general observation. The above left open how political 833liberalism defines APJ's idea of the reasonable, although I assumed that this idea is 834rich enough in content to invite the exclusion objection. Now, as has often been noted, 835there can be many versions of political liberalism depending on what idea of the 836reasonable it builds on (Nussbaum 2011; Besch 2012; Wall 2014; Billingham 2017). 837As a rule of thumb, the thinner in contested moral or political content this idea is, the 838more inclusive, or less exclusionary, APJ is–but the more inclusive it is, the more 839doubtful it must be that a political liberalism qualifies as reasonable in APJ's then840more-inclusive sense. Accordingly, an inclusively inclined political liberalism must 841strike a balance between a more inclusive interpretation of its commitment to equal Philosophia JrnlID 11406_ArtID 203_Proof# 1 14/03/2020 U N C O R R EC TE D PR O O F 842discursive respect and its other, lower-order substantive moral or political commit843ments. But so long as it attempts to reconcile these things by premising APJ on a non844trivial reasonableness threshold–one that not every relevant person meets anyway–it 845invites the question whether APJ, in this more inclusive form, allocates only permis846sible purchase inequality. The issue of purchase inequality hence would be a matter of 847concern also for more inclusively inclined forms of actualist political liberalism. 848Of course, it does not stop here. Purchase inequality is a matter of concern for every 849conception of acceptability-based justification that aims to express, or model, equal 850discursive respect for actual people. On such conceptions, discursive practice must 851satisfy discursive equality. But once we recognize that discursive standing can be equal 852formally while being (objectionably) unequal substantively, it quickly becomes opaque 853what exactly discursive equality calls for.26 Thus, what distinguishes permissible from 854impermissible purchase inequality? Again, if this is open, it is open what it takes for 855practices of actualist public justification to model equal discursive respect. And so long 856as this is open, the ability of such practices to provide justification must be in doubt. 857 858Q6References 859Baderin, A. (2017). Reflective equilibrium: Individual or public? Social Theory and Practice., 43(1), 1–28. 860Besch, T. M. (1998). Über John Rawls' politischen Liberalismus. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang. 861Besch, T. (2012). Political liberalism, the internal conception, and the problem of public dogma. Philosophy 862and Public Issues, 2(1), 153–177. 863Besch, T. M. (2014). 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