volume	20,	no.	19 june	2020 Cartesian Clarity Elliot Samuel Paul Queen's University © 2020 Elliot	Samuel	Paul This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/020019/> C lear	and	distinct	perception	is	the centerpiece	of	Descartes's	philosophy.	It	is	uniquely	indubitable	and	uniquely	infalli-ble.	It	is	the	one	and	only	source	of	certain	knowledge.	It	is normatively	required	for	assent	in	a	priori	disciplines	like	metaphysics, mathematics, and logic: you're not supposed to assent to a proposition	unless	you	perceive	it	clearly	and	distinctly.	Descartes	designed an	early	work, the Rules, to	help readers "acquire the	habit	of intuiting	the	truth	distinctly	and	clearly"	(AT	10:400–1).1	Likewise,	the	chief purpose	of	his	masterpiece,	the	Meditations,	is	to	teach	readers	how	to perceive	things	clearly	and	distinctly.	As	he	writes	to	Mersenne:	"We have	to	form	distinct	ideas	of	the	things	we	want	to	judge	about,	and this is what most people fail to do and what I have mainly tried to teach	by	my	Meditations"	(AT	3:272). Most	interpreters	recognize	that	clear	and	distinct	perception	plays the psychological and epistemic roles listed above. There is broad agreement,	in	other	words,	about	what	clear	and	distinct	perception does.	Much	more	vexed	is	the	question	of	what	it	is.	What	does	Descartes	mean	by	the	terms	'clear'	and	'distinct'	(and	by	their	antonyms 'obscure'	and	'confused')? It	is	often	suggested	that	Descartes	offers	no	real	guidance	on	this question	and	that	it	remains	a	kind	of	interpretive	enigma.	More	than one	commentator	has	quipped	that	Descartes's	"concept	of	clear	and distinct	perception	is	the	least	clear	and	distinct	concept	in	his	philosophy"	(Markie	1992:	161),	that	"the	notion	of	a	clear	and	distinct	idea	is, unfortunately,	one	of	Descartes'	least	clear	and	distinct	notions"	(Della Rocca	2002:	74),	or	that	"it	does	not	seem	he	ever	bothers	to	get	clear on	clarity	and	distinctness"	(Shapiro	2008:	28).	A	recent	reference	entry	on	the	topic	ends	by	calling	for	a	new	account.2 1. For Descartes's works, I refer (by volume and page number) to the Adam and	Tannery	(AT)	edition	of	the	original.	I	generally	quote	from	the	standard translation	(CSM[K]).	I	use	(*)	to	indicate	when	I	have	altered	the	translation or	provided	my	own.	I	use	(†)	to	indicate	when	I	have	added	italics	or	boldface. 2. "[A]	more	general	account	of	clarity	and	distinctness	is	still	required" (Schmaltz 2015:	76). elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) quality,	and	then	in	§4	I	offer	five	textual	arguments	to	show	that	this is	in	fact	Descartes's	view.	In	§5,	I	explain	how	Descartes	defines	obscurity,	confusion,	and	distinctness	in	terms	of	clarity.	I	conclude	in	§6. Altogether,	Descartes	views	clarity	as	a	primitive	phenomenal	quality	which	is	definitionally	prior	to	the	other	perceptual	qualities.	In	a slogan:	Clarity	First. 1. Preliminaries 1.1 Relational Properties of Clear and Distinct Perception Let's	begin	by	registering	some	well-known	points	about	what	a	perception	is,	for	Descartes,	and	what	roles	a	perception	plays	when	it	is clear	and	distinct. What	Descartes	calls	a	'perception'	or	'idea'	is	a	mental	state	with intentional	content;	it	is	of or	about things	(AT	7:37,	44).	Perceptions	are not	limited	to	the	senses:	they	can	be	sensory,	imaginative,	or	purely intellectual	(due	to	pure	reason,	the	intellect,	or	understanding).	The term 'perception' refers to the act	of	perceiving.	The term 'idea' can also	refer	to	the	act	of	perceiving,	but	it	more	often	refers	to	the	object of	perception,	the	thing	perceived,	and	so	that	is	how	I	use	it	here.3 A	perception is	not	by itself	a	belief	or judgement; it	merely	provides the content for a possible judgement (AT 7:37, 56; AT 8A:17). The	will	responds	to	(the	content	of)	a	perception	either	by	assenting to	it	as	true	(forming	a	judgement)	or	by	withholding	assent	(suspending	judgement	in	a	state	of	doubt)	(AT	7:37). 3. "I	have	frequently	pointed	out	that	I	use	the	term	'idea'	to	apply	to	what	is	established	by	reasoning	as	well	as	anything	else	that	is	perceived	in	any	manner	whatsoever"	(AT	7:185).	"I	make	it	quite	clear	in	several	places	throughout the	book,	and	in	this	passage	in	particular, that I	am	taking	the	word 'idea' to	refer	to	whatever	is	immediately	perceived	by	the	mind	[quod immediate a mente percipitur]" (AT	7:181).	One	way	of	understanding	the	relation	between perceptions and ideas is offered by Descartes's disciple Antoine Arnauld, who	writes,	"I	take	perception	and	idea	to	be	one	and	the	same.	Nonetheless ...	this	thing,	although	single,	stands	in	two	relations:	one	to	the	soul	which	it modifies,	the	other	to	the	thing	perceived	...	and	the	word	'perception'	more directly	indicates	the	first	relation;	the	word 'idea', the	latter	relation"	(2011 [1775]:	198).	For	more	on	Arnauld's	take,	see	Pearce	(2016). Other interpreters venture to explicate the nature of clarity and distinctness.	They	generally	recognize	that	Descartes	defines	distinctness in terms of clarity: a distinct perception "contains within itself only what is clear"	(Pr. i.45†).	Where	scholars	disagree	-	the	crux	of	the debate	-	is	about	what	it	means	for	a	perception	to	be	clear. According	to	the	prevailing	approach,	what	it	means	for	a	perception	to	be	clear	is	that	its	content	has	a	certain	objective	property,	like truth. I	argue	instead	that	clarity	is	a	subjective,	phenomenal	quality whereby	a	content	is	presented as true	to	the	perceiving	subject.	Senseperception	and	imagination	can	be	clear	to	varying	degrees	which	are fallible:	what	is	presented	as	true	might	be	false.	But	in	the	special	case of	completely	clear	intellectual	perception,	what	is	presented	as	true must	be true. Like phenomenal qualities in general, clarity is (epistemically) primitive	in	the	sense	that	we	cannot	come	to	understand	what	clarity is	by	analyzing	it	or	defining	it	in	terms	of	other	properties.	Instead,	we come	to	understand	what	clarity	is	by	reflecting	on	examples,	within our	own	experience,	of	clarity	itself. In	addition	to	my	main	claim	about	the	primitive,	phenomenal	nature	of	clarity, I	develop	a	secondary	claim	about the	natures	of the other	perceptual	qualities	Descartes	identifies:	obscurity,	distinctness, and	confusion.	All	three	of	these	qualities,	I	argue,	are	defined	in	terms of	clarity.	Obscurity	is	the	absence	of	clarity	in	a	perception.	Confusion is the condition whereby one perception is fused with another in a way	that	makes	it	less clear.	Distinctness, the	opposite	of	confusion,	is the	condition	whereby	a	clear	perception	is	"sharply	separated"	from anything	obscure	so	that	it's	completely clear.	That	last	point	is	worth emphasizing:	distinctness	is	not	a	further	feature	to	be	added	to	clarity. A distinct perception is just a completely clear perception. Here	is	the	plan:	In	§1,	I	lay	out	some	basic	points	about	Descartes's appeal	to	clear	and	distinct	perception.	In	§2,	I	expose	problems	for	the dominant interpretation, which attempts to analyze clarity (and distinctness)	in	terms	of	an	objective	property	of	intentional	content,	like truth.	In	§3,	I	explain	the	alternative	view	that	clarity	is	a	phenomenal elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) object	or	content	of	a	clear	and	distinct	perception	unless	it	is	real	or true.	Commentators	refer	to	this	claim	as	"the	Truth	Rule". Third,	clear	and	distinct	perception	is	necessary	for	apprehending truths	with	certainty:	"A	perception	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a certain	and	indubitable	judgement	needs	to	be	not	merely	clear	but also	distinct"	(Pr.	i.44,	AT	8A:21–2;	cf.	AT	7:145,	146). Fourth,	clear	and	distinct	perception	is	not	only	necessary	but	also sufficient	for	certain	apprehension	of	truths.	The	authors	of	the	Second Set of Objections to the Meditations	read	Descartes	as	holding	that	one must	apprehend	God	in	order	to	apprehend	anything	else.	But	this	is a	misreading,	as	Descartes	explains	in	reply: The	fact	that	an	atheist	can	"clearly	apprehend	[clare cognoscere]	that	the	three	angles	of	a	triangle	are	equal	to	two right	angles"	is	something	I	do	not	dispute	...	(2O/R, AT 7:141*) If	you're	an	atheist,	you	can	still	perceive	truths	clearly	and	distinctly, you	cannot	help	but	assent	to	them	when	you	do,	and	the	judgement you thereby form constitutes what Descartes calls cognitio of those truths.	As it	was	used in	ordinary	Latin, cognitio could	be translated as 'knowledge', but Descartes often prefaces it with adjectives like 'clear', 'evident', and 'certain' to remind us that he is speaking of an epistemic	achievement,	characterized	by	certainty,	which	is	more	demanding	than	what	we	might	ordinarily	call	'knowledge'.	To	forestall the	hasty	assumption	that	cognitio is	ordinary	knowledge,	I	render	as 'apprehension'.7 that	the	will	assents	"without	fail"	(i.e.	inevitably)	to	clear	perception.	He	says that	"the	will	of	a	thinking	thing	is	drawn	infallibly	[infallibiliter],	to	a	clearly known	good"	(2O/R, AT	7:166*),	and	that	"seeing	very	clearly	what	one	must do,	one	does	it	infallibly	[infailliblement]"	(To	Mesland,	2	May	1644,	AT	4:117*). Thus,	Descartes's	use	of	'infallible'	is	closer	to	my	use	of	'indubitable'	above.	I thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	pressing	me	to	clarify	this. 7. Descartes goes on to explain that clear and distinct perception is not sufficient for the	highest	grade	of	knowledge,	namely	scientia,	which requires cognitio of	God.	On	Descartes's	distinction	between	cognitio and	scientia, see Carriero	(2008,	2009),	Christofidou	(2012:	182–6),	Cottingham	(1986),	Della The	content	of	a	perception	can	be	designated	with	a noun-phrase (e.g.	I	have	a	perception	or	idea	of the sun)	or	a	sentential	complement expressing	a	proposition	(e.g.	I	perceive	that the sun is round).	For	Descartes,	this	is	merely	a	verbal	difference:	we	may	choose	to	speak	either	way,	depending	our	purposes.4	As	we'll	see,	rival	interpretations are	often	formulated	only	with	noun-phrase	constructions,	as	accounts of	what	it	means	to	have	a	clear	and	distinct	perception	or	idea	of x. But as	Descartes	recognizes,	we	need	propositional	formulations	in	order to	specify	exactly	what	it	is	about	x -	which	proposition(s)	-	are	being perceived	clearly	and	distinctly	in	a	given	instance.	For	example,	when the meditator first comes to have a clear and distinct perception of herself	through	the	cogito argument	in	Meditation	Two,	she	perceives clearly and distinctly that she exists, without perceiving clearly and distinctly that she is 'really distinct' from her body. Descartes is emphatic	that	the	latter	claim	isn't	established	until	Meditation	Six	(AT 7:	8,	27,	129–32,	175,	355–6).	So	we	need	to	use	propositional	formulations,	as	Descartes	himself	does,	to	be	suitably	specific. When	a	perception	is	clear	and	distinct,	it	plays	key	epistemic	roles. First, clear and distinct perception is indubitable: "The nature of my mind	is	such	that	I	cannot but assent	to	these	things,	at	least	so	long	as I	clearly	perceive	them"	(AT	7:65).5	So	long	as	you	perceive	p clearly (and	distinctly),	you	cannot	doubt	p,	cannot	help	but judge	that	p is true. Second,	clear	and	distinct	perception is infallible: "whatever I	perceive	clearly	and	distinctly	is	true"	(AT	7:35).6	Something	cannot	be	the 4. When	Mersenne	asks	Descartes	about	whether	the	contents	of	ideas	should be	expressed "as terms	or	propositions",	Descartes replies: "I	do	not	understand	your	question	whether	our	ideas	are	expressed	by	a	single	term.	Words are	human	inventions,	so	one	can	always	use	one	or	several	to	express	the same	thing.	But	I	explained	in	my	Reply	to	the	First	Objections	how	a	triangle inscribed	in	a	square	can	be	taken	as	a	single	idea	or	as	several"	(AT	3:	417–8; cf.	AT	3:395).	This	point	has	been	noted	by	others:	e.g.	Gewirth	(1943:	n.	5), Nelson	(1997:	n.	23),	and	Simmons	(2012:	n.	17). 5. Cf.	AT	7:39,	58;	AT	3:64,	147. 6. Cf.	AT	7:62,	65,	70.	I	am	using 'infallible' in	our	contemporary	sense	of	the term.	Descartes	himself	uses	the	term	(in	its	adverbial	form:	'infallibly')	to	say elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) as	lively	and	vivid	[vives & expresses]	as	in	waking	life,	or	more	so"	(AT 6:40*).	So	sense-perception	and	imagination	can	be	very	clear	(lively, vivid).11 Some	commentators	maintain	that	although	sense-perception	can be	clear,	it	cannot	be	distinct.	But	again,	Descartes	says	otherwise.	Toward	the	end	of	the	Meditations,	Descartes	has	the	meditator	recall	that, when	she	began,	"the	ideas	perceived	by	the	senses	were	much	more lively	and	vivid	[vividae & expressae]	and	even,	in	their	own	way,	more distinct [suo modo distinctae]"	(M6, AT	7:75*)	than	the	intellectual	ideas that	she	only	dimly	glimpsed	through	her	fledgling	efforts	in	meditation.	A	few	pages	later:	"I	distinctly	see	where	things	come	from	and where	and	when	they	come	to	me"	(M6, AT	7:90).	And	in	the	First	Replies:	"If	we	fix	our	gaze	on	some	part	of	the	sea	at	close	quarters,	then our	view	can	be	clear	and distinct,	just	as	our	picture	of	a	chiliagon	can be,	if	it	is	confined	to	one	or	two	of	the	sides"	(AT	7:113;	cf.	AT	10:400– 1). In the Second Replies he says that "someone with jaundice sees snow	as	yellow	...	just as clearly and distinctly	as	we	see	it	as	white"	(AT 7:145†).	Compare	his	remarks	on	imagination:	"We	can	distinctly	imagine	a	lion's	head	on	a	goat's	body"	(Discourse	iv,	AT	6:40†).	He	says	that "quantity	...	is	something	I	distinctly imagine"	(AT	7:63†),	and	speaks of	"the	distinct	idea	of	corporeal	nature	which	I	find	in	my	imagination" (AT	7:73†).	So,	Descartes	holds	that	sense-perception	and	imagination can	be	not	only	clear	but	also	distinct. This	may	be	surprising.	Isn't	Descartes	famously	a	Rationalist	who holds	that	clear	and	distinct	perception,	as	the	source	of	certainty,	is limited to pure reason (intellect, understanding)? The key to understanding	what	is	going	on	here	is	that	clarity	and	distinctness	are	both scalar;	they	come	in	degrees.	Each	act	of	perceiving	(whether	sensory, imaginative,	or	intellectual)	falls	somewhere	on	the	continuum	from the	clearest	to	the	most	obscure.	Sense-perception	can	be	"very	clear" and "in its own way distinct". The same is true of imagination. But noting	various	things	he	seems	to	see	and	feel,	he	proclaims,	"All	this	would not	happen	with such distinctness	to	someone	asleep!"	(AT	7:19†). 11. Cf.	AT	7:83,	145;	AT	8A:33. What we've enumerated so far are relational properties of clear and	distinct	perception.	Infallibility	is	a	relation	that	clear	and	distinct perception	bears	to	reality: it	always	represents	reality	accurately.	Indubitability	is	a	relation	that	clear	and	distinct	perception	bears	to	the will: it	always	impels	the	will's	assent.	And	the	assent	thus	impelled always	constitutes	apprehension.	While	these	points	tell	us	what	clear and	distinct	perception	does,	it	remains	to	be	seen	what	clear	and	distinct	perception is.	We	get	clues for	answering this	question	by	noting	which	kinds	of	perceptions	can	be	clear	and	distinct,	and	to	what degree. 1.2 Clear and Distinct Sense-Perception, Imagination, and Intellection Commentators	sometimes	assume	that,	in	Descartes's	view,	only	intellection can be clear and distinct; sense-perception and imagination cannot.8 But Descartes says otherwise.9 He explicitly invokes clear visual perception when he defines clarity, in Principles i.45: "we see something	clearly	when	-	being	present	to	the	eye's	gaze	-	it	strikes	it with	a	sufficient	degree	of	force	and	openness".	Elsewhere,	he	says,	for instance,	that	"we	see	the	sun	very clearly [tres clairement]"	(Discourse	iv, AT	6:40†).	He	uses	the	terms	'lively'	and	'vivid'	for	sensory	clarity,	and says	that	bodies	"produce	in	us	a	certain	very	clear	and	vivid	sensation which	we	call	the	sensation	of	colour"	(Pr. i.70,	AT	8A:34).	When	he entertains	the	dreaming	argument	in	the	Discourse,	he	asks,	"How	do we	know	that	the	thoughts	which	come	to	us	in	dreams	are	any	more false	than	the	others,	seeing	that	they	are	often	no	less	lively	and	vivid [vives & expresses]?"	(AT	6:38*).10	Sometimes	"imaginings	in	sleep	are Rocca	(2005),	DeRose	(1992),	Newman	and	Nelson	(1999),	Parvizian	(forthcoming),	Pasnau	(2013;	2017:	ch.	1),	Sosa	(1997),	and	Van	Cleve	(2002). 8. This	assumption	is	often	implicit	in	the	literature,	but	is	sometimes	explicit. Broughton, for example, asserts that "Descartes plainly uses 'natural light' [the	faculty	of	intellectual	perception]	to	mean	'faculty	of	distinct	perception'" (1984:	607	n.	16). 9. Rickless	(2005:	313–8)	forcefully	makes	this	point. 10. Compare the corresponding passage in the First Meditation, where, after elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) A perception is distinct when it is clear and contains "only what is clear"	-	when	it	is,	in	other	words,	completely clear.13 The	controversial issue	is	what	it	means	for	a	perception	to	be	clear.	The	prevailing	approach	in	the	literature	is	what	I	will	call	the intentional reading,	which proposes	to	analyze	the	clarity	of	a	perception	in	terms	of	an	objective property	of	its	intentional	content.	On	the	simplest	version	of	the	intentional	reading	the	relevant	property	is	truth.	We'll	turn	to	this	interpretation	in	a	moment. But	first	I	want	to	address	the	most	common	version	of	the	intentional	reading,	according	to	which	the	relevant	property	is	truth specifically regarding the nature or essence of the perceived object. In	her	defense	of this	reading,	Sarah	Patterson	explains	that	the	gist	of	it	is	that	"having a	clear	and	distinct idea	of	x involves	understanding	what	does	and does	not	belong	to	the	nature	of	x"	(2008:	219).	The	content	of	such an	idea	or	perception	is	true	or	accurate	with	respect	to	the	nature	or essence	of	its	object.	I	therefore	refer	to	this	as	the	"True-to-Essence Reading"	of	clarity	and	distinctness,	or	"TE"	for	short.	Proponents	of TE	formulate	it	in	different	ways,	but	we	can	work	with	the	following: The True-to-Essence Reading (TE) •	A	perception	of	x	is	clear	to	the	extent	that	it	ascribes	to	x features	which	are	consistent	with	the	essence	of	x. • A perception of x is distinct to the extent that it is clear and (in Descartes's words) "contains only what is clear"	-	i.e. it doesn't ascribe to x features which are inconsistent	with	the	essence	of	x.14 13. More	on	this	in	§5,	where	I	will	explain	that	the	terms	'clear'	and	'distinct'	are interchangeable	when	they	are	used	in	their	strict	senses. 14. Patterson	writes:	"The	best-known	account	of	Cartesian	clarity	and	distinctness	is	probably	that	provided	by	Gewirth	(1943).	The	core	of	Gewirth's	interpretation is the	notion that	an idea	of x is	minimally clear if it contains the	property	which	constitutes the	nature	and	essence	of	x,	and	minimally distinct	if	it	contains	nothing	contradictory	to	the	essence	of	x.	A	minimally clear	and	distinct	idea	of	x becomes	clearer	if	more	attributes	necessarily	connected	with	the	nature	of	x are	included	in	it.	The	idea	thereby	also	becomes Descartes	is	indeed	a	Rationalist,	since	he	maintains	that	only	intellection	can	be	clear	and	distinct	in	the	strict	sense	needed	for	certainty: It	is	clear	that	we	do	not	have	this	kind	of	certainty	in	cases where	our	perception	is	even	the	slightest	bit	obscure	or confused;	for	such	obscurity,	whatever	its	degree,	is	quite sufficient	to	make	us	have	doubts	in	such	cases.	Again,	we do not have the required kind of certainty with regard to matters which we perceive solely by means of the senses, however clear such perception may be.	...	Accordingly,	if	there	is	any certainty	to	be	had,	the	only	remaining	alternative	is	that it	occurs	in	the	clear perceptions of the intellect and nowhere else.	(2O/R, AT	7:145†) As	Descartes	explains	in	the	Sixth	Meditation,	sense-perception	is	designed	to	be	"clear	and	distinct	enough	[satis clarae & distinctae]" for practical	purposes	(AT	7:83)	-	just	not	enough	for	certainty.12 One	form	of	intellection	is	rational	insight	into	modal	truths	about what is necessary or merely possible, including truths about the essences	or	natures	of	things.	Another	form	of	intellection	is	introspection or what Descartes calls "reflection", which targets contingent truths	about	one's	own	thoughts.	As	I	will	explain,	both	forms	of	intellection	can	be	completely	clear	-	clear	and	distinct	in	the	strict	sense -	and	it	is	only	then	that	they	provide	certainty. 2. Intentional Readings Commentators	generally	recognize	that	Descartes	defines	distinctness in	terms	of	clarity: I	call	a	perception	"distinct"	when,	as	well	as	being	clear,	it is	so	sharply	separated	from	all	other	perceptions	that	it contains	within	itself	only what is clear.	(Pr.	i.45,	AT	8A:22†) 12. See	Simmons	(2008;	2014). elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) perception	is	true	regarding	the	essence	of	its	object	but	is	nevertheless	false.	Such	cases	remain	out	of	view	so	long	as	we	focus,	as	Patterson	tends	to	focus,	on	the	abstract	idea	or	perception	of	"the	mind", meaning	the	mind-in-general,	without	referring	to	any	particular	mind. Truths	about the	mind-in-general	are	exhausted	by truths	about the essence	of the	mind.	Such truths	are	not	contingent truths	but rather	modal	truths,	as	they	identify	properties	that	are	either	necessary or	possible	for	a	mind:	a	mind	must be	thinking;	a	mind	can be judging,	doubting,	willing, imagining, sensing, feeling	various	emotions, or engaging in any other mode of thinking. But when we set aside the	mind-in-general to	consider	some	actual	particular	mind,	we	encounter	a	further	realm	of	truths	-	contingent truths	about	the	specific properties	that	a	particular	mind	does have	at	a	given	moment.	Take	a case	where	you	are	trying	to	figure	out	what's	going	on	in	your	friend's mind. Suppose that by misreading her body language you come to misperceive	your	friend	as	feeling	anxious	when	she's	not	anxious	at all.	Anxiety	is	consistent	with	the	essence	of	the	mind,	for	Descartes: it's	a	mode	of	thought	-	a	property	that	a	mind	can have.	So,	your	perception	satisfies	TE's	requirement	for	being	strictly	clear	and	distinct. But	anxiety	is	a	property	that	your	friend's	mind	presently	doesn't have, so	your	perception	is	false,	and	so,	given	the	Truth	Rule,	it	cannot	be strictly	clear	and	distinct. This	kind	of	counterexample to	TE is	not limited to third-person perceptions	of	other	minds.	Analogous	cases	arise	even	when	we	perceive	our	own	minds	through	introspection	or	reflection.	Such	cases will	be	off	the	table	for	those	who	assume	that	Descartes	is	committed to	"the	epistemological transparency	of	mind	or thought"	(or	"Transparency"	for	short),	according	to	which	introspection	always	delivers indubitable,	infallible,	certain	knowledge	of	one's	own	thoughts.	But as I've argued elsewhere, Descartes rejects any such Transparency (Paul 2018). In fact, he documents various ways in which introspection	is	fallible.	For	example,	introspection	can	misrepresent	a	purely In	Patterson's	illustration	of	choice,	x is	the	mind.15	Given	Descartes's mind-body dualism, properties that are consistent with the essence of the mind include the principle attribute of the mind	-	i.e. thought	-	which	"constitutes	the	nature	and	essence	of"	the	mind,	as well	as	specific	modes	of	thinking	such	as	judging,	doubting,	willing, imagining,	sensing,	and	feeling	emotions,	all	of	which	are	"necessarily connected	to	the	nature	of"	the	mind	(Patterson	2008:	219).	Properties that are inconsistent with the essence of the mind include the principal attribute of bodies	-	i.e. extension	-	as well as specific modes of	extension,	i.e.	specific	sizes,	shapes,	locations,	and	motions.	So,	on Patterson's reading, the	more	a	perception	of the	mind	ascribes	specific modes of thought to the mind, the clearer it is. And the less it ascribes	properties	that	actually	belong	to	bodies	rather	than	minds, the	more	distinct	it	is.	TE	allows	that,	as	Descartes	says,	"a	perception may	be	clear	without	being	distinct"	(Pr. i.46).16	If	a	perception	of	the mind	contains	thinking	or	modes	of	thought,	then	it	is	clear,	but	if	it also	contains	bodily	properties,	then	it	is	not	distinct	-	it	is	clear	but confused. TE	has	something	going	for	it.	Descartes's	Truth	Rule	asserts	that if	a	perception	is	strictly	clear	and	distinct,	then	it	must	be	true	-	and so,	a fortiori,	it	must	be	true	regarding	the	essence	of	its	object.	Thus, TE	identifies	a	condition	that	is	necessary	for	strictly	clear	and	distinct perception:	truth regarding essences. However,	truth	regarding	essences	is	not	sufficient	for	strictly	clear and distinct perception. One way to see this is with cases where a more	distinct,	since	'the	richer	its	content,	the	more	is	it	distinguished	from what	is	other	than	it'	(Gewirth	1943:	90)"	(Patterson	2008:	219).	In	addition to	Gewirth,	Patterson	also	cites	Curley	(1986:	169–70),	and	Smith	(2001:	294), to	show	that,	despite	variations in	details, the	core idea	of	TE	is	shared	by others	(Patterson	2008:	219–20).	See	also	Smith	(2010;	2015a;	2015b:	56–64; Smith	2017:	§5). 15. I	will	follow	Patterson's	emphasis	on	perceptions	of	the	mind,	though	all	of the	points	I	will	make	-	both	to	illustrate	her	view	and	to	challenge	it	-	could be	made	mutatis mutandis	for	perceptions	of	the	body. 16. We'll	dive	into	this	passage	in	§5	below. elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) But	additional	problems	apply	both	to	this	simpler	version	of	the intentional	view	and	to	TE	as	well.	One	such	problem	arises	when	we turn	to	the	lesser	degrees	of	clarity	and	distinctness,	available	to	the senses	and imagination, for	which truth isn't necessary.	Recall, for	example,	Descartes's	assertion	that	a	person	with	jaundice	may	visually perceive	that	snow is yellow "just	as	clearly	and	distinctly"	as	most	of	us visually	perceive	that	snow is white (AT	7:145).	At	least	one	of	these	contents	is	false.	In	fact,	Descartes	maintains	that,	strictly	speaking,	both	of them	are	false.	He	grants	that	there	is	a	sense	in	which	one	of	them	is true:	snow	is	indeed	white,	if	"white"	is	taken	to	refer	a	certain	physical property,	a	configuration	of	microscopic	particles	that	reflects	light	in such	a	way	as	to	cause	perceptions	of	whiteness	in	typical	perceivers. But	ordinary	vision	doesn't	reveal	any	such	microscopic	configuration. What	vision	depicts instead	are	what	commentators	call sensible	or sensuous	colours,	which	do	not	belong	to	bodies	at	all,	in	Descartes's view,	but	are	rather	just	projections	of	the	mind.20	It	is	useful	for	us	to see	bodies	as	sensuously	coloured,	because it	helps	us	navigate	our surroundings,	but	it	is	a	useful	illusion.	Insofar	as	we	are	talking	about sensuous	colours	-	colours	as	they	appear	visually	-	snow	is	neither white	nor	yellow.	It	doesn't	have	any	sensuous	colour	at	all.	No	physical	object	does.	So, in	depicting	snow	as	yellow	and	snow	as	white, respectively,	the	perceptions	in	question	aren't	true	regarding	the	essence	of	snow	(nor	of	any	physical	object)	and	indeed	they	aren't	true at	all.	And	yet,	Descartes	says,	both	of	them	are	(to	a	degree	available to	the	senses)	clear	and	distinct. Let's return to the case of strictly clear and distinct (intellectual) perception,	for	which	truth	is	necessary.	Even	so,	truth	isn't	sufficient. A	perception	may	be	true	even	though	it	is	obscure	or	confused.	Descartes	makes this	plain	when	he insists that it's	always improper, in the	context	of	the	Meditations,	to	assent	to	perception	that	isn't	strictly	clear	and	distinct	-	even	if, in	doing	so,	"by	chance	I	arrive	at	the truth".	In	the	Meditations,	where	the	standards	for	assent	are	maximally 20.	See	Chamberlain	(2019b),	Nolan	(2011),	Rozemond	(1996),	Simmons	(2008). intellectual	act	of conceiving	as	an	act	of imagining;17 a	weak	belief as	a	strong	belief;18	and	an	obscure	perception	as	a	clear	perception.19 In	all	of	these	cases,	introspection	represents	one's	mind	in	ways	that are	consistent	with	the	essence	of	the	mind	(as	having	features	it	can have),	so	it	satisfies	TE's	condition;	and	yet	it	misrepresents	one's	mind (as	having features it	doesn't have), so it cannot	be	strictly	clear	and distinct. Perhaps	TE's	requirement	is	just	too	narrow.	Perhaps	what	makes	a perception	clear	and	distinct	is	not	that	its	content	is	true	just	regarding essences,	but	more	broadly	that	its	content	is	true.	This	is	the	simpler version	of	the	intentional	view	that	I	mentioned	earlier.	Defending	it, Thomas	Lennon	asserts,	"Perceiving	the	truth	clearly	and	distinctly	is not	some	mysterious	additional	episode.	It	is	just	perceiving	the	truth" (Lennon	2008:	172).	As	with	TE,	this	alternative	can	be	formulated	in different	ways.	But	the	basic	idea	is	this:	A	perception	is	clear	to	the extent	that its	content	is	true,	and	distinct	to	the	extent	that	(in	Descartes's words) it "contains only what is clear"	-	so, on this reading, only what is true.	The	content	of	such	a	perception	is	completely	true. When	a	content	is	completely	true,	that	does	not	mean	that	it	represents	all	truths,	or	even	all	truths	concerning	the	perceived	object.	It just	means	that	everything	it	does	represent	is	true,	which	is	compatible	with	it	making	no	claim	whatsoever	about	any	number	of	other truths	(AT	7:220–1).	Such	a	perception	contains	the	truth	and	only	the truth.	It	needn't	contain	the	whole	truth. This	version	of	the	intentional	view	is	more	promising	than	TE.	It avoids	the	counterexamples	to	TE	that	we've	considered	so	far.	And since the Truth Rule provides that strictly clear and distinct perceptions	must	be	completely	true	(not	just	true	regarding	essences),	this view	does	a	better	job	than	TE	does	of	specifying	a	condition	that	is necessary	for	strictly	clear	and	distinct	perception:	truth. 17. AT	3:798–9;	see	Curley	(1978:	177–8). 18. AT	3:395;	see	Radner	(1988)	and	Rozemond	(2006). 19. AT	6:33;	AT	7:35;	AT	8A:21;	AT	8B:352;	see	M.	Wilson	(1978:	155). elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) make	bold	to	assert	that	he	will	not	on	that	account	be	a true	believer,	but	will	instead	be	committing	a	sin	by	not using	his	reason	properly.	(AT	7:148*;	cf.	AT	7:208) To	drive	home	the	distinction	between	perceiving	a	truth	and	perceiving	it	clearly,	consider	that	you	can	perceive	a	truth	in	any	number of	different	ways.	For	example,	if	you	merely	consider	the	proposition God exists as the infinitely perfect immaterial being, perhaps to wonder whether	it's	true,	then	the	content	of	your	thought	happens	to	be	true (by	Descartes's	lights)	-	and	it's	true	regarding	the	essence	of	God,	so it	satisfies	the	TE	condition	-	but	you	wouldn't	thereby	have	a	clear and	distinct	perception.	Descartes	holds	that	clear	and	distinct	perceptions compel assent. But, as this example illustrates, merely considering	a	proposition	that	happens	to	be	true	does	not	compel	assent. So,	a	perception's	being	true	cannot	be	sufficient	for	strict	clarity	and distinctness.21 This	problem	generalizes	in	two	ways.	We	get	the	same	problem if	we	substitute	mere	considering	with	any	number	of	other	attitudes that	are	not	strictly	clear	or	distinct,	even	when	their	contents	happen (according	to	Descartes)	to	be	true.	If,	for	example,	you	assume,	pretend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	that	God exists,	you	do	not	thereby	clearly perceive that God exists. And we get the same problem yet again if we substitute the proposition about God with any other proposition.	Regardless	of	what	p is	-	even	if	p happens	to	be	true	regarding 21. I	think	Smith	has	a	real	insight	when	he	says	that	a	clear	idea	of	x	exhibits the	element	or	elements	that	constitute	the	nature	of	x,	along	with	the	relation	that	unifies	them,	if	x is	complex	(Smith	2001:	294).	I	see	this	as	a	precisification	of	the	truth	requirement	for	strict	clarity	-	but	again,	it	would	be necessary	but	not	sufficient.	What	is	missing,	I	will	argue,	is	the	phenomenal quality	that	is	clarity.	Smith's	use	of	the	term	"exhibit"	might	point	in	the	right direction,	since,	as	Barth	(2016)	has	shown,	Descartes	uses	exhibere	to	say	an object	or	idea	is	exhibited	or	displayed	to	the	subject	in	consciousness,	and thus	with	phenomenality.	Even	so,	there	is	still	the	further	question	of	how well	-	how	clearly	-	an	idea	is	exhibited,	since	many	ideas	are	exhibited	obscurely.	In	any	case,	Smith	doesn't	go	in	this	direction.	On	his	reading,	what makes	a	perception	clear	and	distinct	is	just	that	it	has	the	right	kind	of	content,	and	so	he	makes	no	mention	of	phenomenality,	subjectivity,	consciousness,	or	anything	of	that	sort. high,	Descartes	says	you	are	"in	error"	and	using	your	will	"improperly [non recte]" whenever you assent to a perception that is in any way obscure	-	even	if	"by	chance	[you]	arrive	at	the	truth".	Sometimes	an obscure	perception	"happens	to	be	true".	In	such	cases,	what	you	perceive	is	true,	even	while	you	"do	not	perceive	the	truth	with	sufficient clarity	and	distinctness"	(AT	7:59–60).	Truth	is	not	enough. In	the	Second	Replies,	Descartes	indicates	further	that,	contrary	to the	purely	intentional	reading,	the	clarity	of	a	perception	is	not	merely a	matter	of	its	content: We must distinguish between the subject-matter [materiam],	or	the	thing	itself	which	we	assent	to,	and	the	formal	reason	[ratio formalis]	which	moves	the	will	to	give	its assent:	it	is	only	in	respect	of	the	reason	that	transparent clarity is required [sola ratione perspicuitatem requirimus]. (AT	7:147–8) Descartes uses the phrase 'formal reason' to contrast the content or "subject-matter"	of	a	perception	with	the	particular	form of	perception, namely	clear	perception,	that	provides	a	reason	for	assent.	You	make a judgement	when	you	assent to the	content	of	a	perception.	But if you have a reason for assenting, what gives you a reason is not the content	itself	but	rather	the	particular	way	in	which	you	perceive	the content	-	i.e.	clearly.	Indeed,	Descartes	adds,	"this	formal	reason	consists	in	a	certain	inner	light	[haec ratio formalis consistit in lumine quodam interno]"	(Ibid.);	and	this	"'light	in	the	intellect'	means	transparent	clarity of cognition" (3O/R, AT 7:192). Mental illumination	-	clarity	-	is something	over	and	above	the	content	it	shines	upon,	even	when	the content	is	true.	A	content	may	true	but	unclear	to	you	-	in	which	case, you	shouldn't	assent	to	it.	As	an	example,	Descartes	gives	"the	case	of the	infidel"	who	believes	Christian	doctrines	which	are	obscure	to	the infidel	but	nonetheless	true	(in	Descartes's	view): If,	despite	the	fact	that	these	doctrines	are	obscure	to	him, he	is	induced	to	embrace	them	by	fallacious	arguments,	I elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) conceive	of	a	chiliagon	(as	a	thousand-sided	figure),	and	this	differs from what it's like to imagine a chiliagon (AT 7:72).24 Moreover, intellectual	thoughts	differ	from	each	other	in	their	phenomenality.	For example,	what	it's	like	to	intellectually	conceive	of	a	chiliagon	differs from	what	it's	like	to	do	long	division	in	your	mind,	and	so	on.	Despite such	variations, I	argue,	Descartes	recognizes	a	phenomenal	quality that	is	shared,	to	varying	degrees,	by	some	sensory	thoughts	and	some intellectual	thoughts,	namely	clarity. The	phenomenal	reading	of	clarity	has	not	been	given	a	fair	hearing.25	Before	confirming	that	Descartes	views	clarity	as	a	phenomenal quality,	we	need	to	explain	carefully	what	that	view	amounts	to.	Following	Descartes's	dictum that the	nature	of clarity is to	be learned through	examples	(AT	7:164),	I	will	begin	with	examples	both	of	sensory	clarity	(§3.1)	and	intellectual	clarity	(§3.2).	I	will	then	explain	that clarity	is	adverbial	in	the	sense	that	it	is	a	way	of	perceiving	a	content, whereby	the	content	strikes	the	perceiver	as	true	(§3.3). 3.1 Sensory Examples For	sensory	examples,	let's	focus,	as	Descartes	does,	on	cases	of	vision. Start	with	the	visual	experience	you're	having	right	now.	This	page	is visually	clear	to	you	-	or	'vivid	and	lively'	to	you,	as	Descartes	also	puts it,	using	terms	that	plainly	denote	a	phenomenal	quality.	While	he	reserves	that	pair	of	terms	for	imagistic	forms	of	clarity	in	the	senses	and imagination,	he	uses	the	term	'present'	for	what	is	clear	through	any form	of	perception,	including	intellection.	Clarity	is	presentational.26 of our thoughts (AT 7:160; AT 8A:7), and (ii) consciousness imbues our thoughts	with	phenomenality.	See	Simmons	(2012). 24. See	Simmons	(2012:	4). 25. None	of	the	proponents	of	the	dominant,	intentional	approach	(cited	above in	n.	14)	cite	any	defense	of	the	phenomenal	reading.	Patterson	is	the	only one	who	even	mentions	the	phenomenal	alternative,	as	an	after-thought	in the	conclusion	of	her	essay	(2008:	232).	Gaukroger	(1992)	offers	something like	the	phenomenal	reading,	but	his	take	is	uncharitable,	as	I	will	explain	in §3.2. 26.	Presentational phenomenology is of vital interest to some contemporary essences, or even completely true	-	if you merely consider, assume, pretend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	p,	you	do	not	thereby	perceive	p clearly or	distinctly. In	sum,	what	makes	a	perception	clear is	not	merely	that its	content	has	a	certain	objective	property,	such	as	truth	or	truth	regarding essences or natures. Truth isn't necessary for the lesser degrees of clarity	available	to	the	senses	and	imagination.	And	although	truth	is necessary	for	the	highest	degree	of	clarity	-	completely	clear	intellection	-	truth	isn't	sufficient.	Clarity	is	not	a	matter	of	the	content	itself but	of	the	way in	which	it	is	perceived.	To	perceive	something	clearly	is to	perceive	it	in	a	certain	way	-	a	way	that	is	characterized,	I	will	argue, by	its	phenomenality. 3. Explaining the Phenomenal View The phenomenality, or phenomenal character, of a thought is the subjectively	felt	or	experienced	quality	of	"what	it's	like"	to	have	that thought.22 Remember that Descartes uses the term 'thought' (cogitatio/ pensée) very broadly to include judging, doubting, conceiving, sensing, imagining,	and	occurrent	emotions	-	any	conscious	mental event. The	phenomenality	of	Cartesian	thought	is	exemplified	by	the "first	and	simple	thoughts	of	infants",	including	"the	pain	they	feel	from some	wind	that	distends	their	intestines,	or	the	pleasure	they	feel	from being	nourished	by	sweet	blood"	(AT	5:221†;	cf.	AT	3:424,	AT	8A:35). Other paradigmatic examples of phenomenal events include other forms	of	sensing,	as	well	as	imagining	and	occurrent	emotions.	In	fact, Descartes	holds	that	all	thoughts	have	phenomenality,	including	intellectual	ones.23	For	example,	there's	something	it's	like	to	intellectually 22. This	use	of the	phrase "what it's like"	was	made famous	by	Nagel (1974). I use 'phenomenality' for the relevant quality, and 'phenomenology' for the study	or	description	of	that	quality.	Scholars	have	documented	a	variety	of ways	in	which	Descartes	attends	to	the	phenomenal	dimension	of	our	mental lives.	See,	for	example,	Barth	(2016),	Chamberlain	(2016;	2019a),	Greenberg (2007), Lähteenmäki (2007), Nadler (2011: 134), Shapiro (2012), Simmons (2008;	2012;	2017). 23. This follows from two Cartesian commitments: (i) we are conscious of all elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) "vivid images" in the mind which are "forceful" or "compelling". But then he complains that Descartes makes "a laughing-stock" of this quality	by	trying	to	transport	it	to	the	pure	intellect	(Gaukroger	1992: 585,	602).27	I	disagree.	While	clarity	might	be	more	familiar	in	its	imagistic	form,	pure	intellection	can	definitely	be	clear.	The	way	to	appreciate	this	is	again	through	examples. The	only	propositions	that	can	be	completely	clear	to	the	pure	intellect	are	truths,	according	to	Descartes,	and	the	relevant	truths	range across	the	a	priori	matters	of	mathematics,	logic,	and	metaphysics.	The basic	form	of	completely	clear	intellection	is	an	intuition.	When	a	completely	clear	intellection	involves	inference,	it's	a	deduction.28	The	contents	of	intuitions	are	axioms	or	first	principles.	Here	are	a	few	of	the many	examples	Descartes	gives	from	math: A.	2+3=5 B. A	square	has	four	sides C. A	sphere	has	a	single	surface29 These axioms are so simple that a typical mature human can intuit them directly, just by attentively considering them. Contrast this theorem: D. If	π(x)	is	the	number	of	primes	less	than	or	equal	to	x, then	x−1π(x)	ln	x →	1	as	x → ∞.30 27. Gaukroger	contends that this is	a	shift from	Descartes's	early	work, the	Regulae,	to	his	later	work.	In	my	view,	Descartes	consistently	holds	throughout his	career	that	perceptions	of	all	kinds	can	be	clear	to	some	degree	but	only intellection can be completely clear. Despite my disagreement with Gaukroger,	he	makes	a	valuable	contribution	in	tracing	Cartesian	clarity	to	the	Roman	rhetorical	tradition,	including	Quintilian.	Building	on	Gaukroger,	Jones (2006:	ch.	2)	enriches	this	part	of	the	story.	Still,	I	think	a	more	important	line of	influence	stems	from	Stoic	epistemology	(see	n.	37	below). 28. I expound Descartes's notions of intuition and deduction, as two forms of completely	clear	intellection,	in	Paul	(forthcoming:	ch.	8). 29.	See	AT	7:36	and	AT	10:368. 30.	This	the	Prime	Number	Theorem,	proven	(independently)	by	Hadamard	and de	la	Vallée	Poussin	in	1896. When	you	perceive	p	clearly,	your	perception	doesn't	merely	have	p	as its	content;	it	presents p	to	you	as	true.	When	p	is	clear	or	present	to	you, we	might	say,	in	other	words,	that	p strikes	you	as	true,	or that	p feels, seems,	or	appears	to	you	to	be	true. Contrast	your	clear	vision	of	this	page	with	the	experience	you'd have	if,	without	seeing	any	page,	you	were	merely	to	you	assume,	pretend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	that	there's	a	page	here.	All	of	these	mental attitudes	have	the	same	content:	there's	a	page	here.	And	yet	only	vision	presents the	page	to	you	as	being	right	there	in	front	of	you.	Only vision	presents	it	to	you	as	true	that	there's	a	page	here. Once	we	interpret	clarity	as	this	presentational	phenomenal	quality, it	makes	perfect	sense	when	Descartes	says	that	one	person	may	see snow	as	yellow	just	as	clearly	as	someone	else	sees	snow	as	white	(AT 7:145).	He	is	not	saying	that	these	contradictory	contents	are	equally true,	as	the	intentional	reading	would	entail.	Rather,	he's	saying	that that	these	two	contents	are	equally	presented	as	true	-	they	equally feel,	seem,	or	appear	to	be	true	-	to	their	respective perceivers. We	mention	truth	to	elucidate	clarity,	but	not	in	the	way	assumed by	the	intentional	reading.	What	it	means	for	a	perception	to	be	clear is	not	that	its	content	is	true	as	a	matter	of	objective	fact,	but	rather that	its	content	is	presented	as	true	to	the	conscious	perceiver,	which is	a	matter	of	its	subjective,	phenomenal	character.	When	it	comes	to the	senses,	at	least,	clarity	isn't	truth.	It's	a	feeling	of	truth. 3.2 Intellectual Examples The	phenomenal	reading	of	clarity	has	been	hampered	by	the	assumption	that	phenomenality is limited	to	sensing, imagining,	and	occurrent	emotions.	As	far	as	I'm	aware,	the	commentator	who	comes	the closest	to	the	reading	I	propose	is	Stephen	Gaukroger,	who	seems	to indicate	the	phenomenal	quality	we	noted	above	when	he	says	that clarity is readily recognizable in "vivid pictorial representations" or epistemologists	-	see,	e.g.,	the	excellent	work	of	Bengson	(2015a;	2015b)	and Chudnoff	(2013)	-	though	I	cannot	here	get	into	how	Descartes's	views	relate to	theirs. elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) This	example	follows	the	same	pattern	as	the	one	Descartes	uses	to introduce	his	notion	of	deduction	in	Rule	3	of	the	Rules (AT	10:368).33 As	he	explains	there,	a	deduction	is	a	chain	of	intuitions:	you	clearly intuit	each	premise;	you	clearly	intuit	the	fact	that	the	premises	entail the	conclusion;	and	you	thereby	clearly	deduce	the	conclusion. Some truths are readily made clear through diagrams or illustrations.34 F should become clear to you when you reflect on this illustration: G should	become	clear	to	you	thanks	to	this	illustration: H	should	become	clear	to	you	with	this	illustration: Each	proposition	-	E, F, G, H	-	was	true	from	the	beginning	when you	perceived	it	obscurely.	Each	would	be	true	if	you	were	to	assume, pretend,	guess,	hope,	or	doubt	that	it's	true	-	which	are	all	ways	of	perceiving	obscurely.	So	again, contrary to the intentional reading,	perceiving	something	clearly is	not	simply	a	matter	of	perceiving	something	true.	Notice	what	it's	like	as	each	proposition	becomes	clear	to you. It's like the truth	gets illuminated. In	each	case, the	proposition 33. His	example	is:	2+2	=	4;	1+3	=	4;	therefore,	2+2	=	3+1. 34. In	such	cases,	Descartes	insists	that	it	is	still	through	your	intellect	that	you see truths	clearly,	even though	your intellect is "helped"	by	your	senses	or imagination.	See	Rules	12–18	of	the	Regulae	(AT	10:411–69).	For	commentary, see	Sepper	(1989,	1996). Whereas	A, B,	and	C	were	clear	to	you	as	soon	as	you	considered	them, D	is	presumably	obscure	to	you.	All	of	these	propositions	are	true,	so the difference isn't a matter of truth. It's a matter of phenomenality. What's	it's like	to	perceive	the	first	three	truths	(clearly)	differs	from what	it's	like	to	perceive	this	last	one	(obscurely).	Only	the	first	three are	presented	to	you,	or	strike	you,	as	true. It's	especially	useful	to	consider	cases	where	a	truth	becomes clear to	you	after	being	obscure	to	you	at	first.	D	could	become	clear	to	you, but	you	would	have	to	work	through	arduous	demonstrations	to	get there.	Instead,	let's	take	some	cases	that	are	a	little	more	complex	than the	first	three	above,	but	not	as	complex	as	D: E. The sum of the numbers 1, 2, and 3 is equal to their product.31 F. Whenever	two	lines	intersect,	they	produce	two	pairs of	equal	angles. G. Every	concave	figure	can	be	rounded	out	to	a	convex figure	that	bounds	a	greater	area	in	a	smaller	perimeter.32 H. Two	differently	sized	circles	can	have	at	most	two	common	points. Each	of	these	may	be	obscure	to	you	at	first.	But	E	will	become	clear	to you	through	this	simple	deduction: 1+2+3	=	6 1x2x3	=	6 Therefore,	1+2+3	=	1x2x3 If	E was	already clear	to	you	as	soon	as	you	considered	it,	I	suspect	it's because you automatically performed a deduction like this yourself. 31. Thanks	to	William	Egri	for	suggesting	examples	E	and	F. 32. I	borrow	examples	G and H	from	Chudnoff	(2013).	He	uses	them	to	illustrate the	contemporary	notion	of	intuition,	however,	and	it	should	be	noted	that some	of	the	mental	states	Chudnoff	classifies	as	intuitions	are	dubitable	and/ or	fallible,	and	so	wouldn't	count	as	intuitions	(intuitus)	in	Descartes's	sense. elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) introspectively	-	it	may	not	strike	you	-	that	what	you	have	is	pain,	as opposed	to,	say,	an	itch	or	a	tickle.	If	you	have	an	intense,	searing	pain, by	contrast, then it	will	be	very	clear to	you introspectively	-	it	will strike	you	forcefully	-	that	what	you	have	is	pain. But	even	when	introspection	is	very	clear,	Descartes	holds	that,	ordinarily,	it	won't	be	completely	clear.	This	is	because,	ordinarily,	introspection	is	confused	with	obscure	perceptions	of	your	body	in	a	way that	lessens	its	clarity.	I	will	explain	this	in	§5	below.	For	now,	though, we	need	to	get	precise	about	the	kind	of	phenomenal	quality	that	clarity	is. 3.3 Clarity Is Adverbial One obstacle to seeing the viability of the phenomenal reading is an outmoded conception of phenomenality. When analytic philosophers	began	to	take	special interest in	phenomenal	mental	states	as such,	in	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century,	they	tended	to	contrast	them with	intentional	states,	and	often	assumed	that	the	two	are	mutually exclusive.35 The paradigm examples of phenomenal states were socalled	"raw	feels"	or	"brute	sensations"	-	pain	being	their	favorite	example	-	which	they	thought	had	phenomenality	but	no	intentionality. They	contrasted	these	with	beliefs,	desires,	and	other	attitudes,	which they thought had intentionality but no phenomenality. Sarah Patterson	seems	to	adopt	this	dichotomy	when	she	opposes	her	"intentional view"	of	clarity to the	"phenomenal	view",	and	suggests that,	on	the phenomenal	view,	clear	(and	distinct)	perception	is	merely	"a	kind	of feeling	that	compels	the	will	to	assent",	a	feeling	which	exerts	a	"brute compulsion"	and	which	one	might	"compare	to	pain"	(Patterson	2008: 232).	But	this	is	a	caricature.	On	a	charitable	version	of	the	phenomenal	view,	clarity	is	not	a	brute	feeling	devoid	of	content.	In	fact,	there is	no	such	thing	as	clarity	without	content.	Just	as	you	cannot	have	a perception	without	some	content	that	you	perceive,	you	cannot	have a	clear	perception	without	some	content	that	you	perceive	clearly.	To 35. Barth	(2016:	17)	helpfully	makes	this	observation. goes	from	being	one	that	you're	merely	considering	to	one	that	is	presented	to	you,	or	strikes	you,	as	true.	In	this	respect,	intellectual	clarity is	akin	to	sensory	clarity:	it,	too,	is	a	feeling	of	truth. There are differences, however. One difference we should stress right away is that only intellection can be completely clear, in Descartes's	view,	and	when	it	is,	it's	infallible.	What	completely	clear	intellection	presents	as	true	is	always	some	truth,	some	bit	of	reality.	In	such a	case,	it	would	be	an	understatement	to	say,	as	we	do	with	sensory clarity,	that	something	'seems'	or	'appears'	to	be	true,	for	in	this	case, "if	something	is	clearly	perceived,	then	...	it	is	true,	and	does	not	merely	seems	or	appear to	be true" (AT 7:511†).	Thus,	Descartes	employs success-entailing	terms	to	say	that	what	you	perceive	in	such	cases	is 'evident', 'manifest',	or 'transparently	clear'	to	you	(evidens, manifestus, perspicuus)	-	terms	that	don't	apply	to	fallible	perceptions.	By	contrast, sensory	clarity	is	fallible:	what	it	presents	as	true	may	in	fact	be	false. While	the	examples	canvassed	so	far	are	from	math,	Descartes	also invokes	completely	clear	intellection	in	metaphysics,	which	includes all	truths	about	the	existence	of	things	and	the	natures	of	things	that exist:	minds,	bodies,	and	properties	thereof.	Many	of	these	are	necessary	truths	or	'eternal	truths',	but	some	of	them	are	contingent.	Indeed, "the	first	principle"	of	Descartes's	metaphysics	is	his	famous	cogito	argument	-	"I	am	thinking,	therefore	I	am"	-	in	which	the	premise	and conclusion are both contingent truths. Descartes often replaces the generic	premise	I am thinking	with	claims	about	the	specific	thought one	is	having	at	a	given	moment:	I am doubting; I think I am walking; I seem to see such-as-such, and	so	on. If	you	were	to	apprehend	any	such truth,	then	you	would	do	so	through	introspection,	a	higher-order	act of	perceiving	your	own	current	thoughts.	Introspection	itself	is	always intellectual,	even	when	the	lower-order	thought	to	which	it	is	directed is	sensory	or	imaginative	(AT	5:221;	AT	7:358).	As	a	form	of	intellection, introspection can be completely clear, but that doesn't mean it always	is. For starters, like any form of perception, introspection admits of variations	in	clarity.	If	you	have	a	mild	pain,	it	may	not	be	clear	to	you elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) say	that	the	robin	is	clear	to	you,	all	this	means	is	that	you	perceive the	robin	clearly.	Clarity	is	not	what	you	perceive	when	you	are	close to	the	robin.	Rather,	clarity	qualifies	the	way	you	perceive	the	robin when	you	are	close	to	it.	And	this	way	of	perceiving	is	characterized by its	distinctive	phenomenality:	what it's like to	perceive the	robin clearly	differs	from	what	it's	like	to	perceive	it	obscurely.36 Surface	grammar	can	be	misleading.	When	we	say that	your	perception	represents	something	as	red,	this	just	means	that	red is	a	predicate within the content of your perception. When I say that a clear perception	of	p	presents	p	as	true	to	you,	one	might	think	that,	likewise, this	just	means	that	true	is	a	predicate	within	the	content	of	your	perception.	But	that	would	be	a	misunderstanding.	To	see	why,	let	p	be the	proposition,	for	example,	that	there	are	Martians.	If	you	suppose for	the	sake	of	argument	that	it's true that there are Martians,	then	true is a	predicate	within	the	content	of	your	supposition,	but	this	does	not by	any	means	make	it	clear	to	you	-	it	doesn't	thereby	strike	you	-	that there	are	Martians.	In	§2	we	saw	that	perceiving	a	content	which	happens	to	be	true	is	not	sufficient	for	perceiving	it	clearly.	Here	we	see further that	predicating truth	of	a	proposition	within the	content	of your	perception	is	not	sufficient	for	perceiving	it	clearly. Descartes	uses	the	following	forms	of	locution	interchangeably: p is	clear	to	S. S	has	a	clear	perception	that	p. S	clearly	perceives	that	p. All	three	of	these	locutions	mean	the	same	thing,	but	the	last	one	-	using	the	adverb	'clearly'	-	is	the	most	apt	because	it	indicates	that	clarity	is	an	adverbial	quality,	modifying	the	way	in	which	a	subject	perceives	something.37 36. I	don't	deny	that	clarity	can	be	an	object	of	perception.	When	you	have	a	clear perception, the clarity of that perception may become the object of an additional,	higher-order	act	of	introspection;	you	may	introspectively	perceive the	clarity	of	your	lower-order	perception.	The	point	remains	that	the	clarity of	the	lower-order	perception	is	not	an	object	of	that	very	perception. 37. Lennon	gets	on the right track	momentarily	when	he	observes that clarity perceive	a	content	clearly	is	to	perceive	it	in	a	phenomenally	distinctive	way. Insofar	as	clarity	is	a	way	of	perceiving	content,	it	needn't	be	part	of the	content	itself.	Let's	distinguish	between	two	kinds	of	phenomenal qualities.	On	one	hand,	some	phenomenal	qualities	figure	in	the	content	of	perception;	they	are	qualities	that	seem	to	belong	to	the	objects we perceive. For example, sensuous qualities like colour, heat, and taste	appear to	be	properties	of things	we	perceive: the	apple looks red,	the	stove	feels	hot,	the	mango	tastes	sweet.	Such	qualities	are	part of	what we	perceive. On the other hand, some phenomenal qualities are adverbial: within	a	given	perception,	they	are	not	part	of	what	we	perceive,	but characterize	the	way	we	are	perceiving.	Adverbial	phenomenal	qualities	include	the	ones	that	vary	between	perceptual	modalities,	which are,	literally,	different	ways	of	perceiving.	Compare	vision	and	touch. What	it's	like	to	see	with	your	eyes	that	a	ball	is	round	is	different	from what	it's	like	to	feel	with	your	hands	that	the	ball	is	round.	The	phenomenal	qualities	of	seeing	and	touching	are	not	perceived	as	properties	of	the	ball,	like	roundness	is;	instead,	they	characterize	different ways	of	perceiving	the	roundness	of	the	ball.	Qualities	of	this	sort	can be	referred	to	with	adverbs	-	what	it's	like	to	perceive	roundness	visually	differs	from	what	it's	like	to	perceive	roundness	haptically	-	which indicate	ways	of	perceiving	rather	than	objects	perceived. Clarity is likewise an adverbial phenomenal quality. When your perception	is	clear,	its	clarity	is	not	an	object	of	that	very	perception, but characterizes the way you are perceiving. Suppose you're looking	at	a robin in the	woods.	When it's far	away	and	you	perceive it obscurely,	you	perceive	it	as	having	a	certain	shape	and	colour. When you	get closer	and	you	perceive it clearly,	you	perceive it as	having several	additional	properties	-	eyes,	a	beak,	a	certain	texture	of	feathers,	etc.	-	but	clarity	is	not	among	them.	We	can	of	course	say	that	the robin	is	now	clear	-	or	more	precisely	that	it's	now	clear	to you	-	but that should not mislead us into reifying a referent for 'clear' as if it were	some	thing	or	property	that	you've	now	come	to	see.	When	we elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) is	an	attempt	to	explain	or	convey	what	x is,	let	us	distinguish	between logical definitions and	ostensive definitions.	To	start	with	the	former: A logical definition of	x is	an	attempt	to	convey	what	x is by	analyzing	x into	more	basic	conditions	that	are	each logically necessary and together logically sufficient to make	something	x. We can logically define octagon, for example: a closed plane figure with	eight	straight	sides.	These	are	all	more	basic	concepts	that	you can	understand	without	knowing	what	an	octagon	is.	So,	you	can	use this	definition	to	learn	what	an	octagon	is,	without	experiencing	one first-hand. We cannot, however, give a logical definition of anything phenomenal.	This	goes	not	just	for	phenomenality	in	general	but	also	for the distinctive phenomenality of specific types of thoughts. We cannot	logically	define	sensuous	redness, for	example.	The	only	way	to convey	what	sensuous	redness	is	like	is	to	point	one's	attention	to	instances	of	that	quality	in	one's	own	experience,	which	is	to	define	it ostensively.	More	generally: An ostensive definition of x is an attempt to convey to someone	what	x is by	pointing	their	attention	to	(instances of)	x. We	can	now	be	precise	about	the	sense	in	which	phenomenal	qualities are	primitive	and	indefinable: x is	(epistemically)	primitive	just	in	case	x cannot	be	defined	logically,	but	only	ostensively. Descartes	is	in	line	with	the	consensus	that	phenomenal	qualities are	primitive in	this	sense.	Consider	this	passage	from	his	Search After Truth, where	he	discusses	the	paradigmatically	phenomenal	quality that	is	(sensuous)	colour,	using	white	as	an	example: There	are,	in	my	view,	some	things	which	are	made	more 4. Attributing the Phenomenal View to Descartes In	the	course	of	explaining	the	view	that	clarity	is	phenomenal,	we've already	seen	that	that	it	fits	with	various	things	Descartes	says.	We'll now	see	that	his	adherence	to	the	phenomenal	view	is	confirmed	by five	new	lines	of	argument:	Like	phenomenal	qualities	in	general,	he treats	clarity	as	primitive	or	indefinable	(§4.1);	he	refers	to	clarity	with phenomenological terms (§4.2); he describes clarity with phenomenological	metaphors	(§4.3);	he	insists	that	clarity	requires	attention (§4.4);	and	he	identifies	perceptions	as	clear	while	it	remains	an	open question	whether	they	are	true	(§4.5). 4.1 Clarity Is Primitive We're	about	to	see	that	Descartes	regards	clarity	as	primitive,	in	a	certain sense. While the intentional reading does not account for this point,	the	phenomenal	reading	does. Philosophers commonly observe that phenomenality "cannot be defined	in	more	basic	terms.	Like	many	other	concepts,	it	is	primitive and indefinable.	Our	only	option	is	to	define	the	concept	ostensively	..." (Smithies	2019:	4†).	What	does	this	mean?	Given	that	a	definition	of	x (and	distinctness)	are	"adverbials	notions"	which	qualify	the	act	rather	than the	object	or	content	of	perception.	But	I'm	not	sure	his	reading	respects	this observation.	He	writes:	"Clarity	and	distinctness	are	used	by	Descartes	as	adverbs	to	emphasize	the	success	of	certain	perceptions	in	arriving	at	the	truth" (Lennon 2008: 171). On this reading, a perception of p is successful	-	and thus	clear	and	distinct	-	precisely	insofar	as	p is	true.	But	truth	is	not	adverbial. "S clearly	and	distinctly	perceives p" cannot	be replaced	with "S truly perceives	p".	And	truth	is	a	property	of	the	content	of	a	perception,	not	the	act. We	can	say	that	an	act	of	perceiving	is	accurate	or	true,	but	only	in	virtue	of the	fact	that	its	content	is	true.	This	is	why,	in	§2,	I	cast	Lennon	as	advancing a	version	of	the	intentional	reading,	perhaps	malgré-lui. Responding	to	Lennon,	Smith	denies	that	clarity	itself	is	an	adverbial	quality,	though	he	grants	that	we	can	use	adverbs	to	describe	it	(Smith	2010:	75; Smith	2015a:	90).	Smith	could	agree	with	me	that	the	three	locutions	above mean	the	same	thing,	but	I	think	he	would	say	that	the	first	one	is	the	most apt,	insofar	as	it	might	seem	friendlier	to	his	view	that	clarity	is	a	property	of the	content	rather	than	the	act	of	perceiving.	I	would	reply	that,	even	in	the first	locution,	what	'clear'	qualifies	is	not	the	content	p	by	itself,	but	the	way	p is	to the	perceiving	subject:	"p is	clear	to S". elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) Things	which	"we	cannot	know	about	unless	we	see	them"	(as	he	says in the	Search)	-	or things	which	do	not	admit	of "logical	definitions" (as	he	says	here	in	the	Principles)	-	are	primitive	in	the	sense	I	identified	above. Descartes gives at least four indications that clarity is primitive. First, when we consider Descartes's list of primitives	-	including thought, doubt, and	certainty -	it	seems	like	clarity belongs	in	the	same category. Someone who insists that we can understand what doubt, thought,	and	certainty	are	only	by	"seeing"	or	reflecting	on	our	own states	of	doubt,	thought,	and	certainty	should	probably	also	hold	that we	can	understand	what	clarity	is	only	by	reflecting	on	our	own	states of	clarity. Second,	one	could	argue	that,	for	Descartes,	certainty	in	particular is not just in the same category as clarity: it is clarity. Descartes often	uses	terms	for	'certain'	(certus) and	'clear'	(clarus, perspicuus) interchangeably.	In	a	prominent	strand	of	Latin	usage	going	back	to	Cicero, those terms are not only interchangeable but synonymous.38 If Descartes	follows	this	usage,	then,	when	he	says	that	certainty	is	primitive, he	is	saying,	in	other	words,	that	clarity	is	primitive.	While	this	point	is suggestive,	we	needn't	put	weight	on	it	here. For	in	another	passage	-	and	this	is	our	third	and	most	direct	bit	of evidence	-	Descartes	does	refer	to	clarity	by	name	as	he	indicates	that it	is	primitive: I	ask	my	readers	to	ponder	all	the	examples	that	I	went through in my Meditations, both of clear and distinct 38.	Before	Cicero,	Western	philosophy	as	we	know	it	was	conducted	exclusively in	Greek,	and	so	it	was	Cicero,	more	than	any	other	individual,	who	standardized	Latin	usage	for	philosophical	discourse.	In	his	Academica, Cicero	renders dêlos	as	clarus ('clear'	as	'clear')	and	adêlon as	incertum ('unclear'	as	'uncertain'). In	this	rendering,	'clear'	and	'uncertain'	are	antonyms,	so	'clear'	and	'certain' are	synonyms.	In	other	work	(Paul	forthcoming:	ch.	2),	I	argue	that	Descartes it	at	least	partly	through	Cicero	that	Descartes	encountered	the	epistemology of	the	ancient	Stoics,	who	coined	the	notion	of	clear	and	distinct	perception. My	phenomenological	reading	of	Cartesian	clarity	dovetails	with	'internalist' readings	both	of	Stoic	clarity	(Nawar	2014,	Perin	2005)	and	of	late	medieval evidentia (Choi	2018). obscure by	our	attempts to	define them: since they	are very	simple	and	clear,	they	are	perceived	and	known	just on	their	own,	and	there	is	no	better	way	of	knowing	and perceiving	them.	Perhaps	some	of	the	most	serious	errors in	the	sciences	are	those	committed	by	those	who	try	to define	what	should	only	be	conceived	....	The	only	way we	can	learn	such	things	is	by	ourselves:	what	convinces us	of	them	is	simply	our own experience or awareness	-	that awareness or internal testimony which everyone experiences within himself when he ponders such matters. Thus	it	would	be	pointless	trying	to	define,	for	someone totally	blind,	what	it	is	to	be	white:	in order to know what white is, all that is needed is to have one's eyes open and to see white.	(AT	10:524*†) Though	he	does	not	use	the	term	'primitive'	here,	he	does	say, in	effect,	that	white	is	primitive.	We	cannot	understand	"what	white	is"	by defining	it	in	other	terms;	indeed,	attempting	to	define	it	would	only "[make	it]	more	obscure".	We	can	understand	"what	white	is"	only	"on [its]	own",	by	being	acquainted	with	white itself	as it	occurs in "our own	experience"	when	we	"see	white",	which	is	why	"someone	totally blind"	has	no	way	of	learning	"what	white	is". In the same passage of the Search, Descartes says that doubt and thought	are	also	primitive:	"[T]here	are	things	we	cannot	know	about unless	we	see	them.	In	order,	then,	to	know	what	doubt	and	thought are,	all	we	need	do	is	to	doubt	and	to	think"	(AT	10:525).	He	discusses primitives	again	in	the	corresponding	passage	of	the	Principles: I	have	often	noticed	that	philosophers	make	the	mistake of	employing	logical	definitions	in	an	attempt	to	explain what	was	already	very	simple	and	self-evident;	the	result is	that	they	only	make	matters	more	obscure.	(Pr. i.10,	AT 8A:8) elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) (iii)	metaphors for	(complete)	clarity	-	i.e.	illumination; feeling	and	handling. (iv)	an enabling condition	for	clarity	-	i.e.	attention. (v) a cause of (sensory) clarity	-	i.e. forceful impact on sensory	organs. (vi)	an effect	of	(complete)	clarity	-	i.e.	compelled	assent. In his Meditations, Descartes leans most heavily on the first and primary	way	of	pointing	to	clarity,	which	is	to	get	you	to	have a	clear	and distinct	perception,	with	the	paradigm	example	of	the	cogito (AT	7:25), and	then	to	reflect	on	this	perception	so	as	to	notice its	evidential	quality:	"In	this	first	item	of	knowledge	there	is	simply	a	clear	and	distinct perception	of	what	I	am	asserting"	(AT	7:35).39 Descartes	employs	the	other	ways	of	pointing	to	clarity	throughout the Meditations and in other works as well. Indeed, that is precisely what he is doing in the notoriously puzzling text where he defines clarity	in	Principles i.45: I	call something 'clear'	when it is	present	and	open	<Fr. manifest>	to	the	attentive	mind	-	just	as	we	say	that	we see something clearly when, being present to the eye's gaze,	it	strikes	it	with	enough	force	and	openness	[Claram voco illam, quae menti attendenti praesens & aperta <Fr. manifeste> est: sicut ea clarè à nobis videri dicimus, quae, oculo intuenti praesentia, satis fortiter & apertè illum movent]. (AT 8A:22*) 39.	The	Meditations	is	specially	written	to	help	you	gain	clarity	for	yourself.	The way	it	does	so,	I	would	argue,	is	partly	thanks	to	its	unique	style,	which	appropriates	literary	strategies	from	the	traditional	genre	of	spiritual	meditations. On	the	style	of	the	Meditations see	Cunning	(2010),	Garber	(1986:	91–7,	113 n	36),	Gilson	(1975:	186),	Kosman	(1986), Janowski	(2000:	109	ff.),	Marlies (1978),	Mercer	(2014;	2016);	Nolan	(2000)	and	Rorty	(1986).	On	Descartes's debt to the meditational tradition, see Hatfield (1985; 1986; 2003), Mercer (2014;	2016),	Secada	(2013),	and	Vendler	(1989). perception, and of obscure and confused perception, and thereby accustom themselves to distinguishing what is clearly apprehended from what is obscure. This is something	that	it	is	easier	to	learn	by	examples	than	by	rules, and	I	think	that	in	the	Meditations	I	explained,	or	at	least touched	on,	all	the	relevant	examples.	(2O/R,	Geometrical	Appendix,	AT	7:164†*) The	difference	between	what	is	"clear"	(or	"clearly	apprehended")	and what	is	"obscure"	is	to	be	learned	"by	examples"	rather	than	"by	rules". There is	a	close	connection	between	rules	and logical	definitions. If there is a logical definition of x, then it can be used to formulate a rule	for	determining	whether	or	not	something	is	x. The	logical	definition	of	octagon,	for	example,	yields	an	obvious	rule	for	determining whether or not something is an octagon: Check whether or not it's a	closed	plane	figure	with	eight	straight	sides.	If	there	were	a	logical definition of clarity, there would be a corresponding rule for determining	whether	something	is	clear	as	opposed	to	being	obscure.	But Descartes	says	the	difference	between	clarity	and	obscurity	is	not	to be learned by rules, and so not by logical definitions, but rather by examples	-	which	is	just	what	it	means	for	something	to	be	primitive. Fourth,	even	if	Descartes	had	never	said	that	clarity	is	primitive,	he treats clarity	as	primitive,	in	that	he	never	gives	it	a	logical	definition. He	only	points	to	it.	Throughout	his	writings,	he	points	to	clarity	in	six different	ways,	by	identifying: (i)	objects or contents	that	can	be	perceived	clearly	-	i.e. the cogito, various other axioms or first principles that can	be	intuited,	as	well	as	various	theorems	that	can	be deduced. (ii) synonyms for 'clear'	-	i.e. (phenomenally) 'present',	'open	[to	view]',	'manifest',	'evident',	'perspicuous'	or 'transparent';	and,	for	sensory	clarity,	'lively	and	vivid'. elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) define	clarity	logically	in	terms	of	another	property	(viz. truth,	or	truth regarding essences or natures). In contrast, the primitive nature of clarity	fits	very	well	with	the	phenomenal	reading,	because	Descartes treats	phenomenal	qualities	as	primitive.	He	cannot	give	a	logical	definition	of	clarity	any	more	than	he	can	for	a	sensuous	colour.	All	he	can do	is	point	your	attention	to	it	as	you	experience	it	for	yourself.	And when	you	do	look	where	he	points,	what	you'll	find,	he	trusts,	is	the phenomenal	quality	of	something	striking	you	as	true. 4.2 Phenomenological Terms for Clarity Recall	the	first	clause	in	the	definition	of	clarity:	"I	call	something	'clear' when	it	is	present	and	open	<Fr.	manifest>	to	the	attentive	mind"	(Pr. i.45*).	Three	of	these	terms	-	'present',	'open',	and	'manifest'	(praesens, aperta, manifeste)	-	are	used	as	synonyms	for	'clear'	(clarus). As	we	noted	in	§3.1,	'present'	evokes	the	phenomenal	quality	you experience	when	an	object	or	content is	presented	to	you	as	real	or true. When something is present to you in this way, it is, in other words,	'manifest'	to	you	or	'open'	to	you	(in	the	sense	of	being	open	to your	view	as	opposed	to	being	'hidden'	or	obscured	from	your	view). Elsewhere	he	describes	the	same	quality	by	speaking	of	what	is 'evident'	or	'transparent'	(evidens, perspicuus)	to	you.42	While	he	reserves these terms for completely clear intellection, we've seen that in the case	of	sensory	clarity	he	speaks	of	what	is	'lively	and	vivid'	(vividae & expressae)	to	you. At	least	some	of	Descartes's	synonyms	for	'clear'	have	unmistakable overtones	of	phenomenality.	Insofar	as	these	terms	refer	to	qualities of	perceptions,	it	is	hard	to	know	what	'vivid'	or	'lively'	could	mean	if they	don't	describe	a	phenomenal	quality,	and,	taken	in	context,	the same	is	true	for	terms	like	'manifest'	and	'evident'.	It	should	be	emphasized	too	that	'clear'	itself	has	a	definite	phenomenal	resonance.	This 42. For	example,	he	says	that	none	God's	purposes	are	"open"	to	us;	"all	are	equally	hidden"	(AT	7:375).	There	is	an	abundance	of	texts	where	clarus is	substituted	with	manifestus (e.g.	AT	7:16,	40,	120),	evidens	(e.g.	AT	7:47,	58–9,	147–8), or	perspicuus (e.g.	AT	7:62,	147–8),	or	vividae & expressae	(recall	§1.2). This	isn't	good	for	the	intentional	reading.	If	Descartes	defines	clarity in	terms	of	truth	(or	essences	or	natures),	why	doesn't	he	say	so	when he defines clarity? Proponents of the intentional reading downplay this	passage.40	But	it	appears	in	a	major	work	that	he	published	twice, and	it	is	the	only	sentence	in	the	entire	corpus	where	he	explicitly	says what	he	means	by	'clear'.	If	there	is	one	sentence	to	which	an	interpretation	of	Cartesian	clarity	must	answer,	this	is	it. So	let's	dig	into	it.	It	has	two	clauses,	separated	by	the	dash.	In	the first	clause,	Descartes	glosses	clarity	in	general,	and	then	he	turns	to the	familiar	case	of	visual	clarity. The	adjective	"clear"	applies	to	a	content	or	object	here,	but	notice the	dative	construction:	menti attendenti, "to	the	attentive	mind." Clarity isn't	just	a	matter	of	the	object	itself	but	of	how	that	object	is	presented to the subject. Reinforcing this	point is the fact that	Descartes	moves freely	here,	as	he	often	does,	between	the	adjective	"clear"	as	it	qualifies	the	perceived	object	and	the	adverb	"clearly"	as	it	qualifies	the	act of	perceiving.	So	the	object	is	not	clear	full-stop;	it's	clear	to	the	subject who	perceives	it	clearly. While this sentence is conventionally referred to as Descartes's definition	of	clarity,	we	should	be	careful	how	we	define 'definition'. It	is	not	a	logical	definition;	it	doesn't	provide	a	rule	or	independent criteria	for	identifying	clarity.	Those	who	expect	that	kind	of	thing	are naturally	disappointed.41	Instead	of	analyzing	clarity	in	terms	of	other properties, this sentence defines clarity by pointing to it. It does so in	three	of	the	six	ways	mentioned	above:	by	identifying	an	enabling condition	for	any	clear	perception	(i.e.,	attention);	synonyms	for	'clear' (i.e.	'present',	'open',	'manifest');	and	a typical cause of	visual	clarity	in particular	(i.e.,	forceful	stimulation	of	the	eye). The	fact	that	Descartes	denies	that	clarity	can	be	defined	logically	in terms	of	another	property	is	a	problem	for	intentional	readings,	which 40.	See,	for	example,	Lennon	(2008:	168),	who	dismisses	it	without	quoting	it. 41. Recall	the	remarks	of	Markie,	Della	Rocca,	and	Shapiro,	quoted	in	the	introduction. I agree with LoLordo that the definition "would not help anyone understand	clarity	and	distinctness	from	the	outside"	(2005:	59	n.	15). elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) More	evidence	that	clarity	is	phenomenal	comes	from	Descartes's correspondence	with	Silhon,	in	which	he	elaborates	on	his	very	paradigm	of clarity	-	the intuition	of the cogito -	in	a	way that	explicitly highlights its phenomenality. In a letter to Descartes, Silhon contends that, because we are embodied, we are so prone to obscurity and confusion that we cannot have intuitive knowledge during our earthly	lives	and	must	await	the	beatific	vision	of	God	in	the	afterlife. In	reply,	Descartes	grants	that	whatever	clarity	we	enjoy	in	this	life	is fleeting	and	surely	pales in	comparison to the "pure,	constant,	clear, certain,	effortless,	and	ever-present light"	of the	"beatific	vision"	(To [Silhon],	March	or	April 1648,	AT	5:136–7).	But	he insists that,	even here	and	now	in	our	Earthly	lives,	we	are	nevertheless	capable	of	intuiting	truths	clearly	enough	to	apprehend	them.	He	tries	to	get	Silhon to	recognize	that	Silhon	himself	has	such	clear	intuitions,	and	the	way he does so, notably, is by pointing to what it feels like to experience such	clarity.	He	points	to	this	quality	with	two	sensory	metaphors:	one visual,	the	other	tactile.	The	visual	metaphor	is,	again,	that	of	illumination:	clear	intuition,	he	writes,	"is	an	illumination	of	the	mind"	(Ibid.). He	then	introduces	the	tactile	metaphor	to	describe	his	prime	example of	clear	perception: I	agree	that	such	illumination	is	somewhat	obscured	by the	soul's	mingling	with the	body;	but	still it	gives	us	a primary, unearned and certain apprehension which we touch [touchons] with our mind with more confidence than	we	give	to	the	testimony	of	our	eyes.	You	will	surely admit	that	you	are	less	certain	of	the	presence	of	the	objects you see than of the truth of the proposition 'I am thinking,	therefore	I	exist.'	Now	this	apprehension	is	not the	work	of	your	reasoning	or	information	passed	on	to you	by	teachers;	it	is	something	that	your	mind	sees,	feels and handles [la voit, la sent & la manie]; and although your imagination insistently mixes itself up with your thoughts	and	lessens	their	clarity	by	trying	to	clothe	them is even more obvious in the original Latin and French, where both clarus	and	clair	connote	bright,	vivid,	vibrant,	or	loud,	and	obscurus and obscur connote	dark,	dim, faint,	or	quiet.	The	authors	of the	Second Objections find it	natural to	speak	of truths that	are "as	clear	as the sunlight"	-	a phrase that Descartes repeats with approval in his response	(AT	7:126,	146).	In	French,	when	a	truth	is	evident	or	manifest to	us,	we	can	say,	"C'est clair comme le jour" - "It's	as	bright	as	day." 4.3 Phenomenological Metaphors for Clarity Phenomenality	lends	itself	to	metaphors	and	similes.	In	trying	to	convey	what	it's	like	to	have	a	given	kind	of	thought,	we	naturally	resort to	saying,	well	...	what	it's	like. As we've	already	seen,	Descartes	uses a	famous	metaphor	to	convey	what	it's	like	to	experience	intellectual clarity	at	its	best.	He	likens	it	to	the	experience	of	light,	a	kind	of	mental	illumination - a	metaphor	that	is	all	the	more	apt	given	the	connotation	of	brightness	in	clarus and	clair. It's	no	coincidence	that	another term	for	clear	is	'lucid',	from	lucere	('shine')	and	lux	('light').	When	you employ	your	intellect	well,	Descartes	says,	truth	is	revealed	to	you	"by a	certain	inner	light"	which	he	calls	"the	natural	light"	or	the	"light	of reason",	explaining	that	this	"light in	the	intellect	means	transparent clarity	of	cognition"	(3O/R, AT	7:192).	If	phenomenality	is,	as	we	say, the	"lights-on"	subjective	quality	of	what	it's	like	to	have	a	certain	kind of	thought,	then	having	clear	intellection	of	a	truth	is	like	blasting	it with	your	mental	floodlights.43 43. We	can	unpack	the	light	metaphor	in	terms	of	the	structure	of	perception.	A perception	is	a	relation	between	subject	and	object,	between	perceiver	and thing	perceived. Descartes	holds	that	by	its	very	nature,	every	perception	is endowed	with	intentionality	in	relation	to	its	object,	as	well	as	consciousness whereby	it	displays	that	object	to	the	perceiving	subject.	Consciousness	imbues	perception	with	phenomenality;	it	is	the	light	of	the	mind	(Barth	2016; Lähteenmäki	2007;	Simmons	2012).	So	in	perceiving	this	page,	you	are	conscious	of	this	page	-	it	is	something	you	experience.	Whereas	the	intentional reading	locates	clarity	in	the	object	alone,	I	locate	clarity	in	consciousness	of the	object. Everything	we	perceive	is	in	the	light	of	consciousness	to	some degree,	but	while	the	light	shines	brightly	(clearly)	on	some	things,	it	shines only	dimly	(obscurely)	on	others. elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) God,]	if	I	concentrate	carefully,	all	this	is	quite	evident	.... But	when	I	relax	my	concentration	...	it's	not	so	easy	for me to remember how I arrived at that conclusion. (M3, AT	7:47†) It's	quite	clear to	anyone	who	attentively considers the nature	of	time	...	that	creating	something	and	conserving it	in	existence	are	exercises	of	the	same	power.	(M3, AT 7:49†;	cf.	AT	7:45)45 When Descartes prepares to introduce or reinforce a clear (and distinct)	perception,	he	stresses	the	need	to	concentrate	or	pay	attention. Furthermore,	he	says	the	degree	to	which	he	perceives	things	clearly depends	on	the	degree	to	which	he	attends	to	them	or	on	how	carefully	he	concentrates	on	them.	Note	that	the	attention	required	is	not a higher-order act. In order to perceive p clearly, what you have to concentrate	on	is	p	itself,	not	your	perception	of	p. The	fact	that	clarity	requires	attention	is	yet	another	mark	against the intentional reading,	according to	which	an idea is clear	and	distinct	just	in	virtue	of	having	the	right	kind	of	content.	In	his	defense	of that	reading,	Kurt	Smith	notes	that	innate	ideas	have	what	he	takes	to be	the	right	kind	of	content.	Thus,	he	infers	that	"Descartes's	position is that innate ideas are clear and distinct" (2001: 292). While Smith regards	this	implication	as	a	virtue	of	his	reading,	I	see	it	as	a	problem. In	Descartes's	view,	we	always	have	innate	ideas	-	of	God,	extension, number, etc.	-	even when we're not attending to them, and when we're	not	attending	to	them,	they	can't	be	clear,	much	less	clear	and distinct.	It's	not	enough	that	we're	born	with	ideas	that	have	the	right kind	of	content.	"We	have	to	form	[clear	and]	distinct	ideas"	(AT	3:272†), 45. Thanks	to	Alison	Simmons	for	suggesting	these	texts.	While	these	examples concern	intellectual	clarity,	attention	is	also	required	for	sensory	clarity.	See, e.g.,	Rule	9,	where	Descartes	"compares	mental	intuition	with	ordinary	vision" and	describes	how	focused	attention	enhances	both	(AT	10:400–1). with	shapes,	it is	nevertheless	a	proof	of	the	capacity	of our	soul	for	receiving	intuitive	apprehension	[une connoissance intuitive]	from	God.	(Ibid.*†) The	visual	language	("sees")	reminds	us	that	Descartes	elsewhere	refers	to	the	faculty	of	intellectual	intuition	as	"the	mind's	eye"	(e.g.	AT 7:25),	and	with	this	new	tactile	language	he	depicts	that	same	faculty as,	so	to	speak,	the	mind's	hand.	By	saying	that	when	you	clearly	intuit	a	truth	you	"touch"	and	"feel	and	handle"	that	truth,	Descartes	is expressly	highlighting the feeling	of intuition;	we	might	similarly	describe	it	as	the	feeling	of	"grasping"	or	"getting	hold	of"	a	truth.	He	is, in effect, rehearsing the strategy of the Meditations: using the cogito as	his	paradigm	example,	he tries to	get	Silhon	first	of	all to	have	a (completely)	clear	perception,	and	then	to	reflect	on	it	so	as	to	notice its	clarity	-	notice	how	it	feels	to	grasp	the	truth,	what	it's	like	when the	truth	is	illuminated.44 4.4 Clarity Requires Attention Something	can	be	clear	only	"to	the	attentive	mind"	-	a	requirement that	is	stated	not	only	in	Principles	i.45	but	also	(twice)	in	Descartes's characterization	of	completely	clear	intuition	in	the	Rules (AT	10:336). In the Second Replies, after recapping some important claims from the	Meditations,	Descartes	asserts that "all this is	manifest if	we	give the	matter	our	careful	attention"	(AT	7:120).	Within	the	Meditations,	he repeatedly	illustrates	the	need	to	attend	to	or	concentrate	on	things	in order	to	perceive	them	clearly: [My perception of the wax can be] imperfect and confused,	as	it	was	before,	or	clear	and	distinct,	as	it	is	now, depending	on	the	degree	to	which	I	attend [minus vel magis ... attendo]	to	what	the	wax	consists	in.	(M2, AT	7:31*†) [Upon	completing	the	first	argument	for	the	existence	of 44. On	uses	of the light	metaphor	more	broadly in	the	17th	century,	see	Jolley (1990). elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) But	it	does	make	sense	to	question	the	veracity	of	clear	and	distinct perceptions.	It	is	the	ultimate	skeptical	question,	and	Descartes	takes it	very	seriously.	At	the	beginning	of	Meditation	Three,	when	he	notes that	what	assures	him	of	the	truth	of	the	cogito is	nothing	other	than his	clear	and	distinct	perception	of	it,	he	queries	whether	he	"can	now lay	it	down	as	a	general	rule	that	whatever	I	perceive	very	clearly	and distinctly	is	true"	(AT	7:35).	In	the	next	two	paragraphs	he	concludes that	he	cannot	do	so	yet.	He	concedes	that,	for	all	he	knows	so	far,	God could	be	a	deceiver,	and	could	"bring	it	about	that	I	go	wrong	even	in those	matters	which	I	think	I	intuit	utterly	clearly"	(AT	7:35*).	In	order to dispel this	doubt,	he	must	establish the	Truth	Rule, and in	order to	do	that,	he	"must	examine	whether	there	is	a	God,	and,	if	there	is, whether	he	can	be	deceiver.	For	if	I	do	not	apprehend	this, it	seems that	I	can	never	be	fully	certain	about	anything	else"	(AT	7:35*). Pursuing	this	examination,	Descartes	goes	on	to	argue	that	indeed there	is	a	God,	and	that	God	cannot be	a	deceiver.	From	there	he	proceeds into Meditation Four	-	titled "Truth and Falsity"	-	where he marshals	the	following	argument	through	a	thicket	of	objections:	God cannot	be	a	deceiver;	God	would	be	a	deceiver	if	God	allowed	indubitable	perceptions	to	be	false;	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	indubitable;	so,	God	must	guarantee	that	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are true	(=	the	Truth	Rule).49 In	short,	Descartes's	quest	is	largely	driven by	the	skeptical	question	of	whether	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are true,	and	he	has	to	work	very	hard	to	answer	it	in	the	affirmative.	None of	this	would	makes	sense	if	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	were	true by	definition,	as	the	intentional	reading	makes	them	out	to	be. On	the	phenomenal	reading,	by	contrast,	it	does	make	sense.	The skeptical	question	amounts	to	this:	When	things	are	compellingly	presented	to	me	as	true,	are	they	really	true?	That	question	is	meaningful, and	answering	'yes'	to	it	is	no	trivial	matter. 49. We	can	remain	neutral	here	on	which	notion	of	indubitability	drives	this	argument. Some scholars say it's psychological indubitability (Gewirth 1941; Loeb	1992;	Newman	2007;	Newman	2019:	§5.3);	others	say	it's	rational	indubitability	(Della	Rocca	2006;	2011). Descartes	stresses,	and	what	that	requires,	minimally,	is	that	we	give them	due	attention.46 While	the	need	for	attention	clashes	with	the	intentional	reading,	it coheres	nicely	with	my	alternative.	For	just	like	clarity,	attention	itself admits	of	an	adverbial	treatment	and	invites	the	phenomenally-laden metaphor	of	light.	To	perceive	something	clearly,	you	have	to	perceive it	in	a	certain	way:	"attentively"	(AT	7:49).	You	have	to	bring	it	into	the spotlight	of	attention.47 4.5 The Truth Rule Is Not Trivial The intentional reading defines clarity and distinctness in terms of truth	(or	at	least	truth	with	respect	to	the	essences	or	natures	of	things). On	this	reading,	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	true	by	definition. If this were correct, the Truth Rule	-	that clear and distinct perceptions	are	always	true	-	would	be	trivial	tautology.	Lennon	embraces this	result:	"Descartes	takes	the	truth	rule	of	clarity	and	distinctness	to be	trivially	true"	(2008:	173).	On	his	interpretation,	it	would	be	utterly incoherent	to	ask	whether	clear	and	distinct	perceptions	are	true.	That would	be	like	asking	whether	circles	are	shapes,	or	whether	bachelors are	unmarried48	-	it	makes	no	sense. 46. Smith	does	note	that	attention	is	"connected	to	clarity"	(2001:	284),	but	one problem,	just	noted,	is	that	this	goes	against	his	claim	that	innate	ideas	are always	clear,	since	we	have	them	even	without	attention.	Another	problem	is that	Smith	misconstrues	the	connection	between	clarity	and	attention	when he	adopts	Nelson's	proposal	that	things	which	are	clear	are	"attention	grabbers" (Smith 2001:301, citing Nelson 1996: 24). Some things become clear to	us	when	they	grab	our	attention,	as in the	case	of intense	pain	or	other salient	stimuli.	But	other things,	especially	abstract intellectual	matters,	do not	grab	our	attention,	and	Descartes	stresses	that	we	have	to	attend	to	them voluntarily	and	sometimes	with	difficulty in	order to	perceive	them	clearly (AT	7:47;	AT	8A:37). 47. Descartes's	treatment	of	attention	is	interesting	in	its	own	right.	See	Barrier (2017),	Brown	(2007),	Dubouclez	(2017),	and	Hatfield	(2009;	2017). 48. Or to adapt Lennon's own comparisons, it would be like asking whether someone	who	has	successfully	sought	a	thimble	has	found	it,	or	whether	a doctor	who	has	successfully	treated	a	patient	has	cured	him	(2008:	173). elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 21 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) I	call	a	perception	'distinct'	when,	as	well	as	being	clear,	it is	so	sharply	separated	from	all	other	perceptions	that	it contains	within	itself	only what is clear [Distinctam autem illam, quae, cum clara sit, ab omnibus aliis ita sejuncta est et praecisa, ut nihil plane aliud, quam quod clarum est, in se contineat].	(AT	8A:22) Clarity	is	more	fundamental.	Distinctness	is	defined	in	terms	of	clarity. Moreover,	distinctness is	defined	negatively,	not	as	clarity	combined with	some	additional feature,	but	as	clarity in the absence of	-	"sharply	separated"	or	literally	"cut	off"	and	"separated"	(sejuncta et praecise) from	-	anything	unclear.	Notice	the	double-negation:	a	perception	is distinct to the extent that it's not contaminated by what is not clear. Distinctness	is	simply	the	purest	case	of	clarity,	obtaining	when	a	perception	"contains	within	itself	only what is clear"	-	when	it	is	wholly	or completely	clear.	This	bears	emphasis: (1)	A	distinct	perception	is	a	completely clear perception. Within	Principles i.45,	Descartes	also	says: (2)	A	perception	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	certain and	indubitable	judgement	needs	to	be	not merely clear but also distinct.	(AT	8A:22*) If	I	have	interpreted	distinctness	correctly,	then,	it	should	follow	that: (3)A	perception	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	certain and	indubitable	judgement	needs	to	be	completely clear. [from	1,	2] And	that	is,	indeed,	what	Descartes	says: It is clear that we do not have this kind of certainty in cases	where	our	perception	is	even the slightest bit obscure or	confused;	for	such	obscurity,	whatever its degree,	is	quite sufficient to	make	us	have	doubts in such	cases. (2O/R, AT	7:145†) 5. Obscurity, Confusion, and Distinctness It's	appropriate	that	we've	examined	clarity	extensively,	because	Descartes	defines	the	other	perceptual	qualities	-	obscurity,	distinctness, and	confusion	-	in	terms	of	clarity. Take	obscurity.	Clarity	and	obscurity	are	contraries.	More	precisely, since	they	are	scalar,	they	are	logical	complements:	more	clarity	means less obscurity, and vice versa. But there is an asymmetry between them: obscurity is the absence of clarity, not vice versa.50 Descartes is	part	of	a	long,	broadly	Augustinian	tradition	that	posits	this	kind	of asymmetry	between	certain	contraries	(AT	7:55,	374).	Within	this	tradition,	evil,	non-being, imperfection,	and	darkness, for	example,	are not	positive	features.	Evil	is	the	absence	of	goodness,	non-being	is	the absence	of	being,	imperfection	is	the	absence	of	perfection,	and	darkness	is	the	absence	of	light.	That	last	example	is	particularly	instructive.	We've	seen	that	clarity,	at	its	best,	is	a	floodlight	in	the	mind,	and so	obscurity is simply the	absence	of that illumination.	Obscurity is not	a	positive	feature;	it's	just	the	absence	of	clarity.51 Now	for	distinctness	and	its	contrary,	confusion.	Here	once	again is	how	Descartes	defines	distinctness	after	defining	clarity	in	Principles i.45: 50.	Martha Bolton makes a similar suggestion when she says that obscurity and	confusion	are	"privations"	of	clarity	and	distinctness	(Bolton	1986:	389). While	scholastic	philosophers	distinguished	between	at	least	three	different kinds of absences or negative entities	-	'lacks', 'negations', and 'privations' (see	Embry	2015)	-	I	remain	neutral	on	those	finer	classifications	here. 51. Closely	connected	with	obscurity	is	Descartes's	notion	of	"material	falsity".	A materially	false	perception	or	idea	is	one	that	provides	"subject-matter	for	error"	or	for	"formal	falsity"	(4O/R, AT	7:232).	The	"essence	of	error	[formam erroris]"	consists	in	the	"incorrect	use	of	free	will"	(M4, AT	7:60).	In	the	context of	the	Meditations,	you	use	your	will	improperly	just	in	case	you	assent	to	a perception	that	is	obscure	or	confused	-	even	if	that	perception	"happens	to be	true"	(Ibid.).	Confusion	entails	obscurity,	as	we'll	see.	Thus,	Descartes	says that	"an	idea's	material falsity	...	arises	solely	from	the	obscurity	of	the	idea" (4O/R, AT	7:234†).	So,	a	perception	is	materially	false	just	in	case	it	is	obscure. For	more	support	for	this	proposal,	see	Naaman-Zauderer	(2010). elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 22 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) an	additional	form",	provided	by	the	will's	assent	(M3,	AT	7:37).	The contents	of	the	perceptions	involved	may	be	formulated	as	follows: (c)	very	clear	perception: a pain exists. (o)	obscure	perception:	something in my foot exists. (c)	and	(o)	fused	together:	a pain in my foot exists. To	explain	this,	I	will	adapt	an	expository	device	from	an	excellent	essay	by	Alan	Nelson	(1997)	and	use	diagrams	as	follows:	each	oval	is	an act	of	perception;	what	is	printed	inside	each	oval	is	the	content	of	that perception;	and	a	white	interior	indicates	clarity	while	shades	of	grey mark degrees of obscurity. If the perception of pain were clear and distinct,	it	would	be	sharply	separated	from	the	obscure	perception	of the	foot	so	as	to	be	thoroughly	clear. But	this	is	not	how	we	ordinarily	perceive	the	pain.	We	don't	just	perceive	pain	and something	in	the	foot.	We	perceive	pain	as something in	the	foot: We	generally	regard	[pain]	not	as	being	in	the	mind	alone, or in	our	perception,	but	as being in the hand or foot or in some other part of our body.	(Pr. i.67†) Our perception of the pain and our perception of something in the foot	are	not	separated	but	are	fused	into	an	indiscriminate	whole. This is just	one instance	of	a	persistent	syndrome	of	confusion: "All our	ideas	of	what	belongs	to	the	mind	[i.e.,	thoughts]	have	up	till	now [before the	Meditations]	been	very	confused	and	mixed	up	with	our A	perception	provides	certainty	only	when	it is	completely	clear,	unmarred	by	even	the	slightest	scintilla	of	obscurity. This	point	is	crucial	because,	as	Descartes	says	in	the	very	next	article,	"a	perception	can	be	clear	without	being	distinct"	(Pr.	i.46)	-	i.e. clear	but	confused.	In	other	words,	a	perception	can	be	clear	-	more precisely, it can be relatively clear, or even very clear	-	without being completely clear.	Even	when	a	perception is	very	clear, it	may	be confused	with	an	obscure	perception,	such	that	it	is	not	distinct,	not completely	clear.	To	illustrate	this	point,	Descartes	describes	the	way people	commonly	or	ordinarily	perceive	pain: For example, when someone feels an intense pain, [c] the perception he has of this pain is indeed very clear, but is	not	always	distinct.	For	people	commonly	confuse this perception with [o] an obscure judgement they make concerning	the	nature	of	something	which	they	think	exists in	the	painful	spot	and	which	they	suppose	to	resemble the	sensation	of	pain;	but	in	fact	it	is	the	sensation	alone which they	perceive	clearly.	Hence	a	perception	can	be clear	without	being	distinct,	but	not	distinct	without	being	clear.	(Pr. i.46,	AT	8A:22†) Two	perceptions	are	"commonly"	(vulgò)	or	"ordinarily"	(ordinairement) confused	-	literally "fused together" (confusio). One of them is (c) a very clear perception of pain. Importantly, the object of this perception	-	pain	-	is	a	sensation,	which,	for	Descartes,	is	a	kind	of	thought, existing	only	in	the	mind.	Pain	and	other	sensations	are	caused	by	the body	but	they	are	not	in the	body,	so	the	perception	of	pain	is	not	a perception	of	the	body.	Rather,	it's	an	inner	perception	of	something within	one's	own	mind,	a	perception	which	Descartes	goes	on	to	identify	as "inner	consciousness	[intimè conscii]" (Pr. i.66,	AT	8A:32*). In this	example,	one's	(c)	very	clear	perception	of	one's	mind	is	not	distinct,	because	it's	fused	with	(o)	an	obscure	perception	of	one's	body. Descartes	calls	the	obscure	perception	an	"obscure	judgement"	here, but	a judgement is a	perception, in	his	view: it's a	perception "with elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 23 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) believe	it	to	be	true.	But	my	nature	is	also	such	that	I	cannot	fix	my	mental	vision	continually	on	the	same	thing, so	as	to	keep	perceiving	it	clearly.	(M5,	AT	7:69†;	cf.	2O/R, AT	7:125,	141) Given	that	clarity	does	not	entail	distinctness,	why	does	Descartes	so often	just	say	'clear(ly)'	when	he	also	means	'distinct(ly)'? If distinctness were an additional feature, this usage would be problematic.	But	since	a	distinct	perception	is	just	a	completely	clear perception,	it	makes	perfect	sense.	On	my	reading,	the	phrase 'clear and	distinct'	is	logically	similar	to	the	phrase	'one	and	only'.	Being	one person	in	the	room	does	not	entail	being	the	only	person	in	the	room, but	we	could	say	the	same	thing	by	saying	that	you	are	the	'one	person', or the 'only person', or the 'one and only person' in the room. This is because only-ness is not a property in its own right to be added to	one-ness:	it's	just	the	condition	of	being	one	thing	in	the	absence of	-	separated from	-	anything else. Likewise, being clear does not entail	being	distinct,	but	Descartes	often	means	the	same	thing	by	saying	that	a	perception	is	'clear',	or	that	it	is	'distinct',	or	that	it	is	'clear and	distinct'.	That	is	because	distinctness	is	not	a	property	in	its	own right	to	be	added	to	clarity:	it's	just	the	condition	of	being	clear	in	the absence	of	-	separated	from	-	anything	unclear. Finally, remember that	while	a	completely	clear	perception	must contain	the	truth	and	only	the	truth,	given	the	Truth	Rule,	that	does not	mean it contains the	whole truth (AT 7:220–1).	There is	always more	to	learn,	more	to	get	clear	on. 6. Conclusion In	sum,	Descartes	is	committed	to	the	following	thesis: Clarity First •	Clarity	is	a	primitive, phenomenal	quality. •	Clarity	is	definitionally	prior	to	these	other	properties: ideas	of	sensible	things	[i.e.,	bodies]"	(2O/R, AT	7:130–1*).	Our	ideas of	thoughts	are	normally	"very	confused	and	mixed	up	with"	our	ideas of	bodies. In	one	remarkable	passage,	Descartes	says this	confusion even	interferes	with	our	apprehension	of	"the	proposition	'I	am	thinking,	therefore	I	exist.'"	He	says	that	"your	imagination	insistently	mixes itself up	with	your	thoughts	and	lessens the clarity	of	this	apprehension by	trying	to	clothe	it	with	shapes"	(To	[Silhon],	March	or	April	1648, AT	5:136–7†*).	That	is	precisely	what	is	depicted	in	the	diagram	above. With	perceptions	of	the	foot	and	the	pain	"mixed	together"	in	this	way, the	obscurity	of	one	"lessens	the	clarity"	of	the	other.52 Interpreting distinctness as nothing other than complete clarity resolves	a	puzzle	in	Descartes's	usage.	Recall	his	view	that	a	"perception	which	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	a	certain	and	indubitable	judgement needs to be not merely clear but also distinct" (Pr. i.45). He also says	that	"a	perception	can	be	clear	without	being	distinct,	but	not	distinct	without	being	clear"	(Pr.	i.46).	Since	distinctness	entails	clarity,	it makes	sense	that	he	sometimes	uses	the	term	'distinct'	by	itself	when he	means 'clear	and	distinct'.	But	the	converse	doesn't	hold	-	clarity doesn't	entail	distinctness	-	and	yet	he	often	uses	the	term	'clear'	by itself	when	he	means	'clear	and	distinct': I	clearly	infer	that	God	also	exists.	...	So	clear	is	this	conclusion	that	I	am	confident	that	the	human	intellect	cannot	know	anything	that	is	more	evident	or	more	certain. (M4,	AT	7:53†;	cf.	M5,	AT	7:65) Sometimes	he	substitutes	'clearly	and	distinctly'	with	'clearly': Admittedly	my	nature is	such that	so long	as I	perceive something very clearly and distinctly I cannot but 52. In	other	work	(Paul	2018)	I	examine	these	passages	in	more	detail	to	argue the following. The clear but confused "perception of pain" at issue is not sense-perception	but	an	intellectual	act	of	introspection,	which	is	why	it	can become clear	and	distinct	in	the	way	required	for	certainty.	The	way	it	becomes clear	and	distinct	is	through	radical	doubt,	i.e.	doubt	about	the	existence	of	all bodies,	including	one's	own. elliot	samuel	paul Cartesian Clarity philosophers'	imprint – 24 – vol.	20,	no.	19	(june	2020) infallibly	true,	how	can	we	use them	to	apprehend	truths	if	we	can't	be sure	which	of	our	perceptions	are	completely	clear?54 Whether	this	is	really	a	problem	depends	on	what	is	required	for apprehending	truths.	Some	commentators	assume	that	in	order	to	apprehend	some	truth,	p,	it	wouldn't	suffice	that	you	have	a	completely clear	perception that p - you further	have to	apprehend the	secondorder	truth	that	you	have	a	completely	clear	perception	that	p.55	Given the	present	assumption,	you	further	have	to	apprehend	the	third-order truth	that you	have	a	completely	clear	perception	that you	have	a	completely	clear	perception	that	p.	And	so	on,	ad infinitum. If this	were required, it	would	be impossible for	finite	minds like	ours to	apprehend	truths. Fortunately,	Descartes	denies	that	apprehension	requires	any	such thing.	As	we	saw	in	§1,	he	holds that	having	a	completely	clear	perception	that	p is	sufficient	for	apprehending	p.	It	follows	that	nothing further is required, including any act of higher-order apprehension or thought. When you perceive p with complete clarity, there is no room for doubt or deliberation, including higher-order deliberation. The	clarity	of	your	perception	compels	your	assent,	and	the	resulting judgement	just	is an	act	of	apprehension.	I	develop	this	point	in	other work,56	but	what I	want to	observe	here, in	closing, is	how	it	underscores	the	primacy	of	clarity	itself.	Since	clarity	is	primitive,	there	are no	independent	criteria	we	can	use	to	identify	clarity.	Nor	do	we	need any. To apprehend truths, we don't need criteria for clarity. All we need	is	clarity.57 54. This	problem	was	raised	in	the	17th	century	by	Pierre	Gassendi	(see	LoLordo 2005a;	2005b;	2006:	55–9)	and	Pierre-Daniel	Huet	(see	Lenon	2008:	cf.	5). For	another	treatment,	see	Humber	(1981). 55. Larmore (1984) articulates this assumption but doesn't endorse it. Alanen (1999;	2003:	ch.	7)	does. 56. Paul	(forthcoming:	ch.	6). 57. I	am	especially	grateful	to	Colin	Chamberlain	for	his invaluable	comments on	multiple	drafts	of	this	material.	Special	thanks	also	to	Michael	Della	Rocca,	Robert	Pasnau,	Marleen	Rozemond,	Alison	Simmons,	and	Tad	Schmaltz who	offered	generous	and	helpful	feedback.	I	am	also	grateful	for	insightful • Obscurity	is	the	absence	of	clarity. • Confusion is the condition whereby one perception is fused with another in way that lessens its clarity. • Distinctness	is	the	condition	whereby	a	clear perception	is	'sharply	separated'	from	anything obscure	so	that	it's	completely clear. We began by noting that clear and distinct perception is the centerpiece	of	Descartes's	philosophy,	but	on	closer inspection it is	clarity, specifically,	which	stands	at	the	center.	Clarity	is	an	indefinable	quality in	terms	of	which	the	other	perceptual	qualities,	including	distinctness, are	defined. In other work, I elaborate on Descartes's Clarity First thesis by showing	that,	in	his	view,	clarity	is	prior	in	a	different	way	-	not	definitionally	but	explanatorily	-	to	six	other	key	properties.	When	your perception is completely clear, its clarity explains why you have (i) a	conclusive	reason	for	assent	(belief, judgement), (ii) rational indubitability,	(iii)	psychological	indubitability,	(iv)	spontaneity	(the	highest	grade	of	human	freedom),	(v)	infallibility,	and	(vi)	apprehension. These six properties are the goods that clarity provides. They flow from	the	very	nature	of	clarity,	from	the	phenomenally	distinctive	way in	which	a	clear	perception	presents	its	content	as	true	to	the	perceiving	subject.	Clarity	does	what	it	does	because	of	what	it	is.53 This	might	seem	to	make	it	all	the	more	urgent	to	ask:	How	can	we tell	whether	or	not	a	perception	is	completely	clear?	While	Descartes claims to have complete clarity on various matters, he also admits that	there	have	been	things	which	"through	habitual	belief	I thought I perceived clearly, although I did not in fact do so" (M3, AT 7:35†; cf. AT	8A:21;	AT	8B:352;	AT	6:33).	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