Original	Paper	UDC	165.62:165.242.2Husserl,	E.,	Stein,	E. Received	October	3rd,	2013 James Jardine Center	for	Subjectivity	Research,	Njalsgade	140–142,	Building	25,	Floor	5,	DK–2300	Copenhagen pdr992@hum.ku.dk Husserl and Stein on the Phenomenology of Empathy: Perception and Explication* Abstract Within the phenomenological tradition, one frequently finds the bold claim that interpersonal understanding is rooted in a sui	generis form of intentional experience, most commonly labeled empathy (Einfühlung). The following paper explores this claim, emphasizing its distinctive character, and examining the phenomenological considerations offered in its defense by two of its main proponents, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein. After offering in section 2 some preliminary indications of how empathy should be understood, I then turn to some characterizations of its distinctive structure, considering, in section 3, the Husserlian claim that certain forms of empathy are perceptual in nature, and in section 4, Stein's insistence that empathetic experience frequently involves explicating the other's own intentional experiences. Section 5 will conclude by assessing the extent to which their analyses lead support to a conception of empathy as an intuitive experience of other minds. Keywords empathy,	perception,	interpersonal	understanding,	Edmund	Husserl,	Edith	Stein Introduction Treatments	of	interpersonality	and	intersubjectivity	in	the	phenomenological tradition	have	unanimously	rejected	the	notion	that	understanding	and	relating	to	other	minds	and	persons	is	most	fundamentally	a	matter	of	inference, inner simulation, or projection. More positively, phenomenologists have classically	attempted	to	identify	and	describe	a	form	of	experience,	empathy (Einfühlung),	in	which	other	embodied	minds	are	grasped	as	such,	and	which more	complex	and	cognitive	forms	of	intersubjectivity	take	as	their	point	of departure.1	Such	an	approach	may	have	significant	implications	for	contemporary	discussions	of	social	cognition	and	interpersonal	understanding,	since if	correct	it	challenges	certain	assumptions	held	by	the	two	dominant	camps of	theory-theory	and	simulation-theory.	In	this	paper	I	will	show	how	certain * I am grateful to David Carr,	Adam Farley, Axel Honneth, Zhida Luo, John Michael, Alessandro Salice, Joona Taipale, and Dan Zahavi,	each	of	whom	read	an	earlier	draft	of this	paper	and	provided	invaluable	comments and	thought-provoking	discussion,	as	well	as two	anonymous	reviewers. 1 This	line	of	thought	need	not	be	committed	to the	idea	that	the	concrete	encounter	with	the other	could	not	be	preceded	by	more	fundamental forms of intersubjectivity, but rather that	empathy	precedes	all	other	forms	of interpersonal understanding. For two	Husserlian	accounts	of	pre-empathic	intersubjectivity,	see	Zahavi	(2001)	and	Steinbock	(1995). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy274 analyses from	Husserl's Ideen II and	Stein's	Zum Problem der Einfühlung mark	out	the	contours	of	an	account	of	empathy	which	distinguishes	it	sharply from	both imaginative	simulation	and	analogizing inference.	After	offering in	section	2	some	preliminary	indications	of	how	empathy	should	be	understood,	I	will	turn	to	some	characterizations	of	its	phenomenological	structure, considering, in	section	3, the	Husserlian	claim	that	within the	personalistic attitude	empathy	can	be	understood	as	a	perception,	and	in	section	4,	Stein's insistence	that	empathy	accomplishes	an	explication	of	the	other's	own	intentional	experiences.	Section	5	will	conclude	by	assessing	the	extent	to	which their analyses lead support to a conception of empathy as experience, and more	specifically	as	an	intuitive	givenness	of	foreign	subjectivity. 1. Empathy as a mode of experience Towards	the	end	of	Satyajit	Ray's	film	Pather Panchali,	a	poor	man	arrives home	after	several	months	away,	unaware	that	in	his	absence	his	young	daughter	has	died.	On	his	arrival,	the	man	encounters	and	cheerfully	greets	his	wife, who	at	first	seems	to	avoid	his	gaze,	until	he	shows	her	a	sari	which	he	intends	to	give	as	a	gift	to	his	daughter.	His	wife	clutches	the	gift	to	her	chest and	begins	to	uncontrollably	cry.	Realizing	his	wife's	grief,	the	man	tries,	in vain,	to	comfort	her.	But,	just	in	this	immersed	awareness	of	his	wife's	sadness,	in	feeling	her	trembling	movements,	hearing	her	desperate	screams,	and seeing	her	hand	clenched	around the	sari, the tragic	event invoked	by	his wife's	misery	becomes	apparent	to	the	man.	Indeed,	that	he	now	realises	his daughter's	death	is	clear	to	his	wife	and	to	their	nearby	son,	in	that	he	himself descends	into	cries	of	grief. Husserl	and	Stein	would	call the	man's	awareness	of	his	wife's	sadness	an empathic	awareness.	Characteristic	of	such	awareness	is	a	certain	form	of	directedness	towards	another	subject.	Empathic	awareness	is	thus	to	be	considered	as	an	intentional	awareness,	and	broadly	speaking	it	has	as	its	intentional object	either	the	other	herself,	or	something	belonging	to	her	experiential	life. But	which	particular	acts	are	we	then	to	pick	out,	from	such	concretely	intersubjective	encounters	as	lived	through	by	us,	and	identify	as	acts	of	empathy? In	this	paper,	I	will	work	with	the	contention	that	empathy,	at	least	in	its	most pregnant	and	precise	sense,	does	not	refer	to	the	man's	attempts	to	comfort his	wife,	nor	to	his	own	feeling	of	grief	upon	learning	of	his	daughter's	death, and,	likewise,	neither	to	whatever	sense	of	unity	he	may	experience	with	his wife	when	he	himself	becomes	overwhelmed	by	sadness. Rather,	here	I	will	follow	Husserl	and	Stein	and	suggest	that	these	more	complex	occurrences	may	only	be	clarified	once	we	attend	to	something	which they	each in	some	sense	presuppose.	More	specifically,	what	counts in the strict	sense	as	empathy	are	those	experiential	acts	in	which	a	foreign	subject is	not	merely	hypothesized	or	inferred,	but	rather	given	and	experienced	herself.	To	return	to	our	example,	it	is	simply	not	the	case	that	the	man	first	sees a	merely	physical	body	which	he	then	takes	as	indicative	of	his	wife,	rather he	has	an	irreducible	experience	of	the	woman	herself,	an	experience	which moreover	makes	all	else	which	occurs	in	the	encounter	possible. A question arises here concerning, in	Husserlian terms,	whether empathic experience is intuitive in character. I cannot here fully spell out the complex	notion	of	intuitive	experience,	but	one	should	note,	first,	that	only	those intentional	acts	which	present	their	object,	as	opposed	to	re-presenting	it	in some	manner,	are	intuitive	experiences,	and	in	this	sense	intuitive	experience SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy275 involves	a	certain	form	of	direct	or	presentational	consciousness	of	its	object. According	to	Husserl,	for	each	basic	class	of	intentional	object	(e.g.,	physical thing	or	mathematical	equation),	there	corresponds	a	type	of	intentional	act (e.g.,	perceptual	or	categorical)	in	which	such	an	object	is	given	intuitively. And	such	intuitive	givenness	is	accomplished	when	the	thing	actually	presents itself	to	us	as	bodily	present	(leibhaftig),	as	opposed	to	its	being	intended	in	a more	indirect	fashion	via	images,	signs	or	representations	(Husserl	1976:	11, 14–15	[2014:	9,	13]). Noteworthy	also	is	the	epistemic	role	played	by	intuitive	experience,	or	its	evidential	character.	While	an	act	with	only	propositional	or	imaginary	content is	intentional,	in	the	sense	of	being	directed	towards	and	picking	out	an	object or	state	of	affairs,	whether	it	counts	as	a	form	of	knowledge	with	respect	to	the latter	is	not	an	intrinsic	feature	of	the	act.	Rather,	to	achieve	epistemic	contact with the	world, judgements	must stand in certain justificatory relations to other	acts.	According	to	Husserl,	one	way	in	which	a	judgement	can	gain	a prima facie justificatory	basis	is	for	the	object	or	state	of	affairs	that	it	picks out	to	be	directly	given	in	intuitive	experience	(Husserl	1976:	51	[2014:	44]). In	this	regard,	the	exemplary	case	of	intuitive	experience	is	perception.	While I	can	merely	entertain	the	thought	of	say,	my	bicycle	being	stolen,	and	while I	can	imagine	it	being	taken	from	the	spot	outside	where	I	left	it	this	morning, my	("empty")	intention	towards	this	state	of	affairs	gains	a	rather	strong	epistemic	basis	(becomes	"fulfilled")	if	I	look	out	the	window	and	actually	see	a stranger	cycling	off	with	it.2 Now,	for	Husserl,	the	term	'empathy'	denotes	a	specific	class	of	basic	intentional	experiences:	"The	intentionality in	one's	own	ego	that leads into the foreign	ego	is	the	so-called	empathy"	(Husserl	1962:	321).	Similarly,	as	Stein puts	it	in	Zum Problem der Einfühlung,	as	an	irreducible	intentional	awareness of	other	subjects'	lived	experiences	(Erlebnisse),	empathy	is	"a	kind	of	experiential	act	sui generis",	which	she	describes	as	the	experience	(Erfahrung)	of foreign	consciousness	in	general	(Stein	2008:	20	[1989:	11]).3	In	our	pre-theoretical	lives,	that	is,	other	people	appear	to	us	as	existing	realities	which,	in	a quite	peculiar	way,	differ in	their	givenness	from	oneself	and	from	the	merely physical.	And,	as	Stein	observes,	the	basic	form	of	awareness	one	has	of	other people	is	not	a	matter	of	recollection,	anticipation,	or	imagination,	and	neither	does	it	involve	mental	images,	inferences	or	communication	(Stein	2008: 20	[1989:	11]).	Indeed,	our	thoughts	about	and	images	of	the	other's	mental life	gain	whatever	validity	they	have	from	the	(admittedly	often	complex	and mediated)	ways	in	which	they	are	rooted	in	acts	of	empathy,	in	which	foreign experiencing	is	actually	encountered	(Stein	2008:	31	[1989:	19]). Thus	empathy	seems	to	bear	many	of	the	hallmarks	of	intuitive	experience. And	yet	a	puzzle	presents	itself	here.	For	empathy,	considered	as	an	aware2 For	a recent	Husserlian	account	of the	epistemological	import	of	perception,	one	which engages in detail with contemporary philosophical discussions of this issue, see Hopp (2011). 3 When	referring	to	Stein,	I	have	used	the	critical	Gesamtausgabe edition	of	Zum Problem der Einfühlung.	Where possible I have provided	references	to	the	translation	by	Waltraut Stein in square brackets, although I have at times	departed	from	her terminologically. In particular,	I	have	rendered	'Erlebnis'	as	'lived experience', 'Erfahrung' as 'experience', 'Originär'	as 'originary',	and	'Vergegenwärtigung' as 'presentification'.	When referring to	Husserl	on the	other	hand, I	have simply referred	to	the	pagination	of	the	critical	Husserliana	series,	since	the	English	translations of these texts (where	available)	also	contain marginal	references	to	the	latter,	with	the	exception	of	the	translation	of	Ideen I. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy276 ness	of	subjective	experience,	clearly lacks the intimacy	of	self-awareness. After	all,	one's	lived	experiences	are,	irrespective	of	whether	they	are	given	to another	subject	in	empathy,	manifest	to	oneself	in	a	distinctive	and	immediate way.4	And	if	this	immediacy	were	characteristic	of	empathy	then	it	would	not be	an	experience	of	the	other	since,	as	Husserl	remarks,	the	other	himself	and I	myself	would	then	be	the	same	(Husserl	1950:	139).	Or	in	Stein's	formulation,	while	an	empathetic	experience	is	self-given	in	an	originary	(i.e.	direct and immediate) fashion, the	other's	experiences	as the	content	of	empathy are not given in such an originary fashion (Stein 2008: 19 [1989: 10]; cf. Husserl	1976:	11	[2014:	10]).	But	this	insight	can	be	reformulated	in	more positive	terms.	Consider	the	father	returning	home	in	Pather Panchali:	prior to	his	own	experience	of	misery	upon	comprehending the situation	he	has uncovered,	and	indeed	presumably	continuing	to	exist,	although	undoubtedly as	transformed,	during	his	misery,	is	a	numerically	and	qualitatively	distinct awareness	of	his	wife's	misery.	One's	own	misery	is	brought	to	givenness	in a	radically	different	manner	to	the	other's	misery	–	but	essentially	so,	since this	difference	is	what	permits	my	own	misery	to	present	itself	as	genuinely mine,	and	the	other's	misery	as	genuinely	other	(Stein	2008:	54	[1989:	38]). It	follows	that	empathy	is	both	an	irreducible,	direct	and	intuitive	experience of	other	subjects,	yet	one	essentially	characterized	by	its	distinction	from	the basic	intimacy	of	the	self	to	itself. I	will	try	to	show	in	the	following	that	such	formulations	lose	much	of	their paradoxical	taste	when	one	considers	more	closely	Husserl	and	Stein's	positive account of empathy. But first, it should be emphasized that this conception	of	empathy	differs	significantly	from	that	offered	by	contemporary "simulationist"	theorists.5	Consider	de	Vignemont	and	Jacob,	who	appear	to resonate	with	the	account	presented	above	when	they	describe	empathy	as	an "other-directed"	experience	of	another	subject's	affective	state	(de	Vignemont and	Jacob	2012:	304).	But	in	describing	empathy	as	an	experience	they	mean that	it	requires	the	empathizing	subject	to	imaginatively	enact	and	first-personally	"feel"	an	affective	state,	so	as	to	understand	the	mind	of	the	other	(de Vignemont	and	Jacob	2012:	297;	de	Vignemont	2010:	290).	And	when	they emphasize	the	other-directedness	of	empathy	they	mean	that	the	empathizer recognizes	that	her	first-personal	affective	state	is	both	caused	by	and	similar to	an	affective	state	first-personally	experienced	by	the	"target"	subject	(de Vignemont	and	Jacob	2012:	305).	For	Husserl	and	Stein,	on	the	other	hand, empathy	should	precisely	be	understood	as	an	intentional	act	which	immediately	grasps the	other	embodied	mind, irrespective	of	whether the	comprehended	experiences	are	currently	first-personally	lived	through	by	the	empathizing	subject,	imaginatively	or	otherwise.	And	in	this	sense	they	endorse	a notion	of	empathic	experience	as	not	only	mediately	or	projectively	other-directed.	Unlike	those	theorists	who	assume	that	the	minds	of	other	people	are ultimately	unexperienceable	domains	that	can	be	posited	only	through	imagination	or	inference,	the	account	offered	by	Stein	and	Husserl	has	the	strength of being attentive to the subtle and	unique	manner in	which	our everyday familiarity	with	others	arises	and	is	grounded	in	experiential	life. 2. Empathic perception and expressivity In	illuminating	certain	salient	aspects	of	this	account,	I	will	begin	by	focussing on a claim	which	one finds fairly frequently in	Husserl's	work, and	occasionally	in	Stein's,	namely	that	in	at	least	a	certain	mode	of	accomplishment empathy	must	be	understood	as	perceptual.6	Perception	should	here	be	underSYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy277 stood	as	an	intuitive	experience	of	a	transcendent	object	in	one's	surrounding	world	that	is	experientially	grasped	as	such,	although	as	we	shall	see	a peculiarity	in	the	case	of	empathy	is	that	the	other's	body	is	perceived	as	an expressive	foreign	subject,	and	thus	as	not	simply	an	entity	"in"	the	world. Before	considering	this	line	of	thought	more	closely,	it	should	be	noted	that on	the	Husserlian	account,	perception	involves	two	interrelated	forms	of	presence,	which	must	both	necessarily	be	operative,	and	he	names	these	primal presence	(Urpräsenz)	and	appresence	(Appräsenz).	To	take	an	example,	I	may only	perceive	a	house	as	something	there	before	me	in	its	bodily	presence	if a	certain limited	set	of the	house's	spatial	aspects	are	currently	sensuously present	to	me,	say	the	side	of	it	which	faces	the	street	and	the	interior	of	certain	rooms	whose	outer	windows	I	peer	through.	The	object	present,	however, is	only	a	transcendent	object	in	as	much	as	its	sensuously	appearing	aspects are	accompanied	by	profiles	which	are	not	currently	sensuously	present,	but which	are	rather	presentified	or	appresented	(Husserl	1950:	150–151;	1952, §44).7	That	is,	what	is	genuinely	given	sensuously	as	currently	oriented	towards	my	body	only	appears	perceptually,	is	only	experienced	as	the	exterior of	a	house	I	am	walking	past,	in	virtue	of	a	co-given	horizon	of	other	aspects which	do	not currently appear sensuously, but	which are taken in the	perceptual	act	itself	as possible	sensuous	presences	for	someone.	These	aspects, which	are	sensuously	absent	but	nevertheless	co-intended	as	aspects	of the object	bodily	present,	do	not	only	enable	the	transcendence	of	the	perceived object,	but	also	play	an	essential	role	in	determining	what	the	perceived	object is	experienced	as:	"from	the	very	beginning,	what this experience presents must belong to the unity of the very object appresented."	(Husserl	1950:	151) Thus	for	Husserl,	both	primal	or	sensuous	presence	and	appresence	are	fundamental	components	of	all	perception,	and	the	same	structure	applies	in	the case	of	empathy. 4 For	detailed	elucidations	of	this	self-manifestation or pre-reflective self-awareness, and arguments	to	the	effect	that	it	should	inform philosophical discussions of selfhood and consciousness,	see	Zahavi	(1999,	2014b). 5 Zahavi	(2014b)	has	recently	argued	in	detail for	the	contemporary	significance	of	the	positive	accounts	of	empathy	offered	by	phenomenologists	such	as	Husserl,	Stein,	Scheler,	and Schutz,	offering	a	detailed	critical	analysis	of the discussion between theory-theorists and simulationists.	There	has	been something	of an	upsurge	of	work	on	the	phenomenology	of empathy	in	recent	years,	much	of	it	engaging with	the	social	cognition	debate.	Along	with the	articles	referred	to	elsewhere	here,	see	e.g. Thompson	(2001),	De	Preester	(2008),	Smith (2010),	Zahavi	(2010),	Zahavi	and	Overgaard (2012), Overgaard (2012), Ratcliffe (2012), Gallagher (2012), Ingerslev (2014), Walsh (2014),	and	Taipale	(Forthcoming). 6 See	e.g.	Husserl	1973c:	514,	641;	1973b:	352; 1950: 150–151; and Stein 2008: 15, 19–20, 31,	75,	78	[1989:	58,	61]. 7 Presentification (Vergegenwärtigung) should not	be	taken	as	strictly	identical	to	appresentation.	Husserl	uses	the	former	term	to	denote	a distinct	act	which	intuitively	gives	something not	perceptually	present	–	thus	memory	presentifies	the	past,	imagination	the	imaginary, etc	–	and	as	such	is	to	be	distinguished	from the co-givenness of the absent profiles of an	object,	which is	non-intuitive and	occurs only	as	a	partial	intention	within	a	presentative	act (Husserl	1966:	4,	68–69).	However, when	describing	empathy	Husserl	also	characterizes	appresentation	as	"a	presentification combined	by	association	with	presentation	... in	the	particular	function	of	'co-perception'". (Husserl 1950: 150)	This	may be due a peculiar	feature	of	empathic	perception,	namely that	here	the	presentification	of	the	other's	experiences	functions	in	an	appresentative	way, since	it	is	constantly	intertwined	with	the	sensory	givenness	of	his	or	her	body, in	such	a manner	that	both	are	given	as	actually	present aspects	of	a	perceived	unity. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy278 A	phenomenological	elucidation	of	the	notion	of	empathy	as	a	form	of	perception	can	be	found	in	Husserl's	analyses	of	the	personalistic	attitude	in	the second	book	of	Ideen,	and	it	will	first	be	necessary	to	briefly	spell	out	what this	attitude	amounts	to.	As	Husserl	argues	in	Sections	1	and	2	of	Ideen II,	the naturalistic	attitude,	which is the	orientation towards the	world	adopted	by the	natural	scientist	in	his	or	her	research	activities,	is	guided	by	the	underlying	motive	of	determining	the	'objective',	substantial	properties	of	physical or	psychophysical	entities,	those	which	are	manifest	in	the	altering	states	of physical	things	and	creatures	in	their	relation	to	causal	circumstances.8	But this	motive	can	be	realized	only	after	a	certain	abstraction	is	accomplished, in	which	the	axiological,	practical,	and	aesthetic	predicates	which	are,	in	ordinary	life,	immediately	experienced	as	belonging	to	worldly	objects	are	disregarded,	or	as	Husserl	also	puts	it,	in	which	certain	intentionalities	belonging	to	the	personal	sphere	are	temporarily	"neutralized"	and	the	relativity	of perceptual	objects	to	the	bodily	peculiarities	of	their	perceiver	overcome,	so that	the	'Objectively	real'	can	be	come	into	view	as	something	to	be	studied through	mathematical natural science (Husserl 1952: 8–10, 27, 76, 84–90, 186–8).	The	personalistic	attitude,	on	the	other	hand,	is	just	the	prior	attitude of everyday life, in	which subjects do	not adopt an abstractive orientation towards the objects of their surrounding	world (Umwelt), but rather experience them in their life-worldly concreteness, a concreteness	which refers in	its	sense	to	one's	own	and	others'	personal	evaluations,	motivations,	and past	experiences	(Husserl	1952:	§§50–51).	Husserl	thus	maintains	that	"the naturalistic	attitude	is	subordinated	to	the	personalistic",	and	that	the	natural scientist	may	only	take	his	or	her	theoretical	activity	to	bear	an	exhaustive, absolute	and	unconditioned	cognitive relation to the	world	by	means	of	"a kind	of self-forgetfulness	of the	personal	Ego",	only if the	abstraction just described	has become a	matter of habit (Husserl 1952: 183–184).	He also insists	that	it	is	for	subjects	of	the	personalistic	as	opposed	to	the	naturalistic attitude	that	sociality	operates,	and	in	which	culture	and	society	can	blossom, since	it	is	in	this	attitude	that	others	are	encountered	as	persons	and	engaged with	communicatively	(Husserl	1952:	§51). The	manner	of	givenness	of	other people	for	subjects	in	the	personalistic	attitude,	then,	provides	an	appropriate	basis	from	which	a	phenomenology	of empathy	may	at least	gain	an initial footing.	And	for	Husserl, the	personal subject "sees" in its surrounding world other personal subjects, "persons who	are	engaged	in	their	own	surrounding	world"	(Husserl	1952:	190).	More precisely,	other	persons	are	not	comprehended	through	the	seeing	of	things, rather	what	is	first	and	foremost	seen	of	the	other	person	is	the	person	herself, as "intrinsically one" (Husserl 1952: 320).	According to	Husserl,	we	may only	take	other	persons	as	mere	things	through	a	naturalistic	apprehension,	in which	their	lived	body	(Leib)	is	abstracted	from	this	unity	and	regarded	as	a material	thing	like	any	other,	a	step	which	forces	naturalistic	psychology	to posit	a	further	natural	strata	in	the	form	of	a	psyche	(Seele)	bound	to	and	dependent	upon	the	material	body	–	a	double	movement	which,	while	legitimate for	certain	theoretical	purposes,	certainly	does	not	lead	to	the	person	as	such (Husserl	1952:	139–140,	190–191).	On	the	other	hand,	Husserl	characterizes the	other	person	as	given	in	the	personalistic	attitude	as	a	unity	in	which	a lived	body	is	given	as	immediately	expressive	of	mental	(geistig)	–	that	is, personal-subjective	–	attributes	or	experiences,	and	he	maintains	that	this	peculiar,	yet	"thoroughly	intuitive"	unity	is	experienced	most	fully	and	thematically	in	acts	of	empathy	(Husserl	1952:	236,	244). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy279 Husserl	more	precisely	characterizes	the	phenomenological	structure	of	such experience	in	the	following	passage: "In	a	certain	way,	I	also	experience	(and there is	a	self-givenness	here) the	other's lived	experiences	;	to	the	extent	that	empathy	(comprehensio)	accomplished	as	one	with	the	originary experience	of	the	lived	body	is	indeed	a	kind	of	presentification	[Vergegenwärtigung],	one	that nevertheless	serves	to	ground	the	character	of	co-existence	in	the	flesh.	To	that	extent,	what	we have	here	is	thus	experience,	perception.	But	this	co-existence	("appresence"	...)	does	not,	in principle,	allow	itself to	be transformed	into immediate	originary	existence	(primal	presence [Urpräsenz])."	(Husserl	1952:	198) Husserl	indicates	here	that	the	experience	of	the	other	person	simultaneously involves	a two-fold	appresence.	Given in	appresence	here	are	both	aspects of	what	is	physical	(namely	the	absent	"sides"	of	the	other's	body)	and	nonphysical aspects (namely the other's lived experiences). It is only through being co-intended	with both such sorts of appresented aspects that the aspect	of	the	other	which	is	sensuously	given,	appears	as	aspect	of	the	other. Noteworthy	here	is	that	while	the	other's	appresented	physical	aspects	may come	to	primal	or	sensuous	presence	through	a	movement	on	behalf	of	either the	empathizing	or	the	empathized	subject,	the	experiential	life	of	the	other necessarily	remains	in	appresence.	On	Husserl's	view,	the	lived	experiences of	the	other	may	only	be	empathically	experienced	in	such	a	way	that	they remain	–	in	a	certain	sense	–	continually	absent,	as	this	is	what	grounds	the other's	phenomenological	character	as	co-existing,	as	a	subject	with	his	or	her own	lived	experiences. It	is	this	double	appresence	of	empathy	which	makes	it	an	experience	of	an expressive	whole,	and to	grasp the	character	of	empathic	perception it	will be	important	to	dwell	on	this	notion	of	the	object	of	empathy	as	something expressive.	Husserl	means	by	this,	first,	that	the	other's	spatiotemporal	being is	only	experienced	as	such	insofar	as	it	immediately	manifests	the	existence of	foreign	lived	experience,	and	likewise	that	the	other's	subjectivity	is	only directly	experienced	in	its	embodiment.	While	it	is	the	other's	bodily	presence which	affords	the	possibility	of	his	or	her	being	concretely	experienced,	this bodily	presence	is	always	already	an	embodied-subjective	one,	or	as	Husserl expresses the	point, the	other	human	being	which I see	before	me,	"in	his movements,	in	his	action,	in	his	speaking	and	writing,	etc.,	is	not	a	mere	connection	or	linking	up	of	one	thing,	called	a	soul,	with	another	thing,	a	lived body.	The	lived	body	is,	as	lived	body,	filled	with	soul	through	and	through." (Husserl	1952:	240) Moreover,	in	empathy	one	does	not	intend	an	aggregate	of	lived	experiences, nor	a	unified	physical	body,	but	rather	the	object	is	precisely	a	person:	"In	empathy	we	apprehend	persons"	(Husserl	1952,	320).	And	this	person	appears	as a	unity	which	"has	corporeality	[Leiblichkeit],	it	has	a	body	which	is	a	physical	thing	with	such	and	such	qualities,	and	it	has	lived	experiences	and	lived dispositions"	(Husserl	1952:	240).	Husserl's	point,	then,	is	not	merely	that	the other	of	empathy	is	a	special	sort	of	expressive	object	with	both	mental	and 8 See	e.g.	Husserl	(1952:	§11,	§15–17,	§32).	Incidentally,	Stein	herself	played	a	significance role in the	formation	of	what	we	now	know as Ideen II, since she elaborated and edited the	manuscripts	which	ultimately	found	their way	into	this	posthumously	published	work, and it is undoubtedly the case that some of the	passages	in	this	text	are	just	as	much	her own	work	as	they	are	Husserl's.	The	true	extent	of	this	will	become	much	clearer	with	the publication of the original manuscripts that Husserl	intended	for	use	in	Ideen II and	III	in a	Husserliana	volume,	edited	by	Dirk	Fonfara and	Dieter	Lohmar,	that	is	expected	to	appear in	2015. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy280 material	strata,	but	rather	that	those	aspects,	as	they	are	given	to	the	subject empathizing,	manifest	the	unity	and	transcendence	of	another	personal	life. The	other	experiential	life	which	exists	for	the	empathizing	subject	as,	and "in",	this	expressive	unity,	also	exists	in	and	for	itself	in	a	manner	which	differs	from	its	existence-for-me,	and	Husserl	thus	writes	that	other's	own	selfpresence	is	referred	to,	but	not	originally accomplished,	in	the	act	of	empathy (Husserl 1952: 198).	But empathy is nevertheless a "thoroughly intuitive" experience	of	another	person,	one	which	frequently	incorporates	not	only	a recognition	of	the	bare	presence	of	another	experiential	life,	but	also	an	immediate	grasp	of	the	type	of	experiential	episode	the	other	is	undergoing,	and in	this	respect	something	of	the	other's	personality	may	even	announce	itself (Husserl	1952:	235,	273–274). Finally,	that	the	other	of	empathy	is	given	as	expressive	means	that	an	expressive relation	pertains	between	the	other's	body	and	the	personal	life	experienced	"therein".	But	one	should	avoid	the	temptation	to	understand	this	as	the idea	that,	while the	other's	body	is	a	perceived	physical	reality,	her	mental life	is	something	merely	intended	signitively,	as	if	her	body	were	a	sign	for a	distinct	and	absent	object	–	rather,	Husserl	insists	that	what	is	experienced in	empathy	is the	"unity	of the	'expression'	and	the	'expressed'", the	other person	herself (Husserl	1952:	236).	While	Husserl in Ideen II does indeed speak	of	the	other's	mind	(Geist)	as	the	sense	of	the	lived-body,	and	claims that	empathy	is	the	apprehension	of	the	lived	body	which	grasps	this	sense,	he means	by	this	that	empathy	is	an	apprehension	which	discloses	that	body	as what	it	concretely	is	(i.e.,	as	the	embodiment	of	a	person),	and	he	stresses	that this	occurs	in	a	single	stroke,	and	does	not	permit	of	temporal	differentiation (Husserl	1952:	240–241,	244).	The	other's	facial	expressions,	for	example, "are	seen	facial	expressions,	and	they	are immediately	bearers	of	sense	for the	other's	consciousness,	e.g.,	his	will,	which,	in	empathy,	is	characterized as	the	actual	will	of	this	person	and	as	a	will	which	addresses	me	in	communication"	(Husserl	1952:	235).	In	this	vein,	Husserl	notes	that	the	empathy	in which	such	immediate	expressivity is laid	bare	involves	the	other's	merely bodily	appearances	being	articulated in such	a	manner that they	constitute "a	certain	corporeality	[Leibliches]	with	a	certain	mentality	[Geistigen]	–	a certain	one,	which,	as	horizon	of	experience,	is	to	be	determined	further	by experience."	(Husserl	1952:	242)	Husserl	indicates	here	that	there	is	a	single apprehension	which, in	grasping its sense as an embodied	mind,	gives the body	both	its	particular	sense	as	this	lived-body	and	as this	personal	subject, and	moreover,	that	this	"horizonal"	givenness	of	the	other	person	is	open	to further	determination,	is	continually	modifying	and	enriching	itself.	In	short, in personalistic empathy the 'merely physical' is at no stage given, rather what	presents	itself	is	a	whole,	the	person,	with	two	intertwined	dimensions, the	lived	body	as	essentially	personally	significant,	and	the	personal	subject as	essentially	manifesting itself in the lived	body.	Expressivity then	means that	the	person	is	a	unity	of	two	dimensions	–	bodily	"expression"	of	mind, mind	"expressed"	bodily	–	each	of	which	gain	their	particular	sense	in	relation	to	the	other	(Husserl	1952:	325).9 To	summarize,	Husserl's	analysis	of the	personalistic	attitude	suggests that one can speak	of at least a certain type	of empathy as	perceptual, so long as	one	respects	several	crucial	nuances.	First,	what	is	perceived	in	empathy is	not	a spatiotemporal thing,	but rather	another	person.	Second,	while the phenomenological structures	of empathy	and the	perception	of things	both involve	a	highly	structured	interplay	of	spatiotemporal	aspects	dynamically coming	to	presence	and	appresence,	empathic	intentionality	also	involves	the SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy281 appresence	of	the	other's	mental	life.	Or	rather,	in	empathy	the	other's	body is	given	as	immediately	expressive,	that	is,	as	constituting	a	mentally	infused bodily	dimension,	this	dimension	being	intertwined,	in	personal	unity,	with a	subjective life	manifesting	itself	bodily.	Third,	and	in light	of this	bodily 'articulated'	subjective	dimension	of	the	other	person,	the	object	of	empathy has	a	more	profound	transcendence	than	does	the	perceived	spatiotemporal object,	since	the	other's	experiential	life	is	grasped	in	the	act	of	empathy	as given	to	itself	in	a	way	which	differs	radically	from	its	empathic	givenness. 3. Empathic explication and foreign intentionality There	is,	however,	a	certain	danger	in	understanding	empathy	in	terms	of	perception,	since	one	may	then	end	up	overlooking	a	crucial	aspect	of	empathy. In	the	scene	from	Pather Panchali	introduced	earlier,	the	man	is	aware	of	his wife	as	a	world-directed	subject	of	intentional	acts.	Only	if	it	includes	this	latter	awareness	does	empathy	play	a	role	in	the	man's	realization	that	his	wife is,	in	her	sadness,	aware	of	the	all	too	worldly	event	of	their	daughter's	death. It	is	unclear,	perhaps,	just	how	this	realization	is	reached	–	perhaps	a	process of deliberation or imagination, or through a comprehension of the significance	which	the	sari	he	gives	to	his	wife	has	for	her,	play	an	important	role. But	in	any	case	the	realization	has	as	its	basis	an	experience	the	man	has	of	his wife	in	which	her	own	experiential	world-directedness	is	explicated,	and	in	a manner	continuous	with	his	perception	of	her.	His	empathic	grasp,	then,	does not	solely	consist	in	a	comprehension	of	something	"about	the	other",	but	crucially	involves	a	comprehension	of	the	other's	self-transcending	experiences. Empathy	is	then	able	to	achieve	a	grasp	of	the	other's	experiential	life	which uncovers	aspects	of	the	content,	structure,	and	objects	of	that	life.	If	it	were not	the	case	that	these	aspects	could	be	empathically	comprehended,	that	is, if	the	other's	intentional	experiences	could	not	be	manifested	in	their	specificity,	then	the	other	would	at	best	be	indeterminately	taken	as	a	subject,	and	at worst,	as	a	reified	psychophysical	"thing"	of	the	natural	or	cultural	world. In	her	attempt	to	clarify	this	aspect	of	empathy,	Stein	helpfully	distinguishes between	empathy	as	perceptual	experience	of	the	other	person,	in	which	the other is the intentional	object, and	what she takes to	different level	of empathic	accomplishment (Vollzugsstufe).10	As	Stein	notes,	while in the initial apprehension	of	the	other's	sadness	"in"	her	face,	that	sadness	faces	me	as	an object, 9 Michael	Theunissen	has	argued that,	despite occasionally	stressing	the	immediacy	of	personalistic	alien	experience, the	mode	of	empathy which Husserl takes to underlie such experience is	mediate and reifying, and that his account is therefore ultimately unable to do justice to the direct character of lifeworldly alien encounters (Theunissen 1965: §§21–22). It seems to me, however, that Theunissen's presentation of Ausdrucksverstehen fails to	do justice to	Husserl's insistence that personalistic empathy is first and foremost	an	intuitive	experience	of	the	other as unitary embodied Geist, and that the expressive relation is located	within this	originary	unity.	The	passages	referred	to	above	appear	to	adduce	greater	textual	support	to	this reading	than	Theunissen's	own,	of	which	the following	formulation	is	typical:	"Der	fremde Leibkörper	ist	ja	sozusagen	das	vorgegebene Material,	das	ich	auf	seine	geistige	Bedeutung hin interpretiere." (Theunissen 1965: 120) On the issue of expressivity in	Husserl, see Heinämaa	(2011). 10 Stein's	descriptions	of	this	level	or	modality of empathy are highly suggestive but could probably	benefit	with	more	precision.	Unsurprisingly,	one	finds	a	variety	of	interpretations in	the	secondary	literature.	Cf.	Zahavi	(2014: 137–138);	Shum	(2012:	185–195);	Dullstein, (2013:	343–346). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy282 "when	I	inquire	into	its	implied	tendencies	(try	to	bring	another's	mood	to	clear	givenness	to myself),	the	content,	having	pulled	me	into	it,	is	no	longer	really	an	object.	I	am	now	no	longer turned	to	the	content	but	to	the	object	of	it,	am	at	the	subject	of	the	content	in	the	original	subject's	place.	And	only	after	successively	executed	clarification,	does	the	content	again	face	me as	an	object."	(Stein	2008:	19	[1989:	10]) In Stein's example, the perception of the other as undergoing a particular mood	already	contains	tendencies	towards	a	fulfilling	explication,	by	means of	which the	(other's)	experiential	context in	which that	mood	is lived	can be	made	thematic	and	explicated,	in	such	a	manner	that	the	contents	of	the other's	experiences	are incorporated	within	the	content	of the	act	of	empathy	(Stein	2008:	20	[1989,	11]).	Stein	claims	that	such	empathic	explication constitutes	a	clarification	and	fulfilment	of	the	perceptual	phase,	and	this	implies	that	in	optimal	cases	empathy	has	a	certain	teleological	structure,	that it	unfolds	towards	an	ideal	state	of	comprehension	in	which,	as	Stein	writes, the	empathized	joy	is	the	same	as	the	other's	originally	lived	joy	"in	every respect",	having	"the	same	content	and	only	a	different	mode	of	givenness." (Stein 2008: 25 [1989: 15])	But	what precisely does empathic explication amount to, if it is	neither	exactly	empathic	perception	and	yet	does	not involve	the	experience	being	given	as	if	it	were	one's	own? Stein	describes	explication	as	"the	non-original	parallel	to	the	having	of	the experience", by	which she	means that	while the empathic act is, like any experience, one originally had, the empathized content,	while being given as	the	content	of	an	original	experience,	is	not	given	in	the	manner	in	which one one's own experiences are	manifest as one lives through them, but is rather	given	as	the	content	of	an	experience	one	is	not	originally	accomplishing.	Empathic	living-in	is	not	an	original	self-presentation,	but	rather	a	sort of	"presentification	of	lived	experiences",	that	is,	a	bringing	to	givenness	of what is	originally	present in	experiences	which the	subject is	not	currently undergoing.	That	is,	this	stage	of	empathy	is	more	closely	analogous	to	imagination	or	memory	than	perception,	in	that	the	empathizing	subject	becomes momentarily	aware	of	an	experiential	context in its lived	concreteness,	but one that differs in certain essential	ways from her own current perceptual sphere.	However,	Stein emphasizes that	here too	empathy remains	distinct from	imagination	and	memory, targeting	a	different	domain	of	experiences (namely, those	of the	other,	not	a	past	or imagined	self),	and	having	a	different type	of	epistemic import	and	motivation (Stein	2008:	19–20, [1989: 10–11]).	Empathic	explication	thus	gives	its	content	as	the	content	of	original experiences	being	had	by	another	subject	"here	and	now",	but	not	by	the	empathizing	subject.	And	the	content	brought	to	givenness	in	this	way	is	none other	than	that	emptily	intended	in	empathic	perception,	just	as	the	subject	for whom	this	content	is	originally	"had"	is	the	other	personal	subject	empathically	perceived. Monika	Dullstein	(2013)	has	recently	argued	that,	in	light	of	her	characterization	of	this	explicatory	stage	as	involving	a	non-original	bringing	to	givenness of	the	other's	experiences,	Stein's	analysis	gives	support	to	what	de	Vignemont	and	Jacob	(2012)	call	in	their	own	account	the	isomorphism	condition of	empathy.	This	condition	states	that,	at	least	in	the	most	enhanced	and	ideal form	of	empathy,	both	the	empathizing	and	the	empathized	subject	must	share a	mental	state,	in	the	sense	of	the	empathizing	subject	having	a	representation of the	mental	state	empathized,	a representation	which	moreover is	similar in its content and intentional object to the actual mental state represented (Dullstein 2013: 346–348). Dullstein correctly acknowledges that Stein's description	of	empathic	explication	as	a	Vergegenwärtigung	–	a	term	which SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy283 Dullstein,	perhaps	misleadingly	in	this	context,	translates	as	'representation' –	does	not	commit	her	to	the	idea	that	the	empathizing	subject	must	imaginatively	simulate	the	other's	experience,	so	as	to	experience	it	in	a	first-personal or	primordial	manner,	a	position	which	de	Vignemont	and	Jacob	defend in their	own	account	(Dullstein	2013:	348).	But	if	correctly	understood,	it	seems to	me	that	this	insight	of	Stein's	renders	inappropriate	any	talk	of	empathy	as involving	isomorphism,	and	indeed	'representation'	in	Dullstein's	sense.	For if	it	is	only	the	other's	experience	that	is	presentified,	and	not	my	own,	then in	successful	cases	of	empathic	explication	the	experience	presentified	is	not merely	similar	to	the	other's	actual	experience,	but	it	is	that	experience	itself, given	in	the	mode	of	empathy	as	opposed	to	that	of	self-awareness.	Indeed	for Stein	the	moment	one	presentifies	an	experience	which	one	posits	as	something	similar	to,	as	opposed	to	sharing	an	identity	with,	the	other's	experience, we	now	no	longer	have	a	case	of	empathy.	Rather	such	a	case	would	involve an	act	of	imagination	whose	content	is	presumed	to	correspond	to	the	reality	of	the	other's	experience,	a	correspondence	which	could	only	be	directly confirmed	on	the	basis	of	a	genuine	act	of	empathy.11 For	Stein,	that	is,	the	only	one	who	actually	has	the	experience	which	I	empathically	explicate	is	the	other	who	I	see	before	me.	Thus	in	such	explication the	content	I	grasp	is	original	content	for	the	other,	content	which	I	do	not	originally	live	through	myself,	or	put	differently,	while	in	empathic	perception	one apprehends	a	foreign	subject	as	embodied,	empathic	explication	thematises this	very	same	subject	in	the	nexus	of	her	world-directed	intentional	acts.	To be	more	precise,	the	other's	intentionality	is	emptily	meant	in	empathic	perception,	but	it	may	only	be	determinately	and	fulfillingly	uncovered	through a	positional	shift	on	behalf	of	the	empathizing	ego	in	which	the	'I'	ceases	to intend	the	other	as	object	and	rather	allows	the	content	and	objects	of	the	other's	own	intending	to	become	manifest.	As	Stein	notes,	the	peculiarity	of	this mode	of	empathy,	that	it	is	neither	intuitive	nor	representational,	should	not compel	the	phenomenologist	to	declare	it	unintelligible,	but	testifies	only	that "it	refuses	to	be	classified	in	one	of	the	pigeonholes	of	psychology"	(Stein 2008:	33	[1989:	20]).	Moreover,	while	being	a	non-objectifying	experience,	it nevertheless	makes	possible	a	subsequent	positional	shift	in	which	the	experience	is	again	intended	as	object,	but	now	with	a	richer	(and,	we	might	add, potentially	transformed)	sense	(Stein	2008:	19–20	[1989:	10–11]). Husserl,	on the	other	hand,	does	not	appear to	conceive	of the	relation	between	empathic	perception	and	empathic	explication	in	terms	of	a	temporal progression	from	the	former	to	the	latter.	Rather,	in	a	passage	already	quoted, Husserl	maintains	that	empathy	as	a	presentification	of	the	other's	lived	experience	is unified	with	the	originary	presentation	of	the	lived	body,	and	he 11 Stein maintains that, despite differing from thing-perception in its	making present	what may	not	be	strictly	bodily	given	(but	only	cogiven),	it	is	precisely	the	non-representational character and evidential import of empathy that makes it comparable to the outer perception of	material objects (Stein 2008: 31, 37–38 [1989: 19, 24]).	Given this, it seems to	me that	when	Dullstein stipulates that, in occasionally	characterizing	empathy	as	a	perception	Stein	merely	"tried	to	take	her	supervisor's views into account and to	point to a possible	way	of	combining	her	and	Husserl's ideas"	(Dullstein	2013:	343),	she	underplays the structural similarities which Stein often stresses between thing-perception and empathy.	Moreover,	it	is	also	worthwhile	noting that	when	Stein	distinguishes empathy from perception, she always	distinguishes it from the perception of material objects. Consequently,	I	see	no	basis	for	supposing	that	Stein would reject the	Husserlian analysis of section	3,	and its	conclusion that	empathy	may be	regarded	as	perceptual-intuitive	experience of	the	other	person,	understood	as	irreducible to	the	perception	of	material	objects. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy284 describes	the	experience	which	involves	both	apprehensions	as	a	perception (Husserl 1952: 198).	And	he	writes that in the "comprehensive experience of the existence of the other"	he	or	she	is	understood,	"without	further	ado, as	a	personal	subject	and	thereby	as	related	to	Objectivities"	(Husserl	1952: 191).	Husserl's	position	would	then	seem	to	be	that	empathic	perception	does not	merely	emptily	and	indeterminately	grasp	the	content	of	the	other's	lived experiences,	so	as	to	require	a	fulfilling	explication,	but	rather	that	it	already has	those	lived	experiences	as	co-given	in	a	non-objectifying	manner,	that	it already	presentifies	them	in	their	own	directedness,	and	with	their	own	intentional	contents	and	objects,	and	that	this	informs	the	sense	of	the	other	person as	perceived.12 Husserl	occasionally	goes	so	far	as	to	claim	that	empathy	is	a	non-experiential	form	of	awareness,	a	claim	which	could	be	understood	as	the	suggestion that sensory	givenness is in fact inessential for empathy.	As	he	writes, the empathic	apprehension	of	the	other	as	personal	ego "which	here	can	no	longer	be	considered	an	'experiential	consciousness'	or	an	'apperception,' still	does	not	involve	my	making	the	natural	reality	of	the	other	my	thematic	Object,	i.e.,	taking a	human	being	as	a	member	of	nature.	Rather	I	am,	in	empathy,	directed	to	the	other	Ego	and Ego-life	and	not	to	psychophysical	reality,	which	is	a	double	reality	with	physical	reality	at	the founding	level.	The	other's	body	is	for	me	a	passageway	(in	'expression,'	in	indication,	etc.,) towards	the	understanding	of	the	Ego	there,	the	'he:'	he	moves	his	hand,	he	reaches	for	this	or that,	he	strikes,	he	considers,	he	is	motivated	by	this	or	that.	He	is	the	centre	of	a	surrounding world	appearing	to	him,	present	to	him	in	memory,	thought	about,	etc.,	and	included	in	it	is	a corporeal	surrounding	world,	which	to	a	great	extent	he	has	in	common	with	me	and	with	others."	(Husserl	1952:	347) Husserl	seems	in	this	passage	to	identify	empathy	with	the	comprehension	of the	other's	subjectivity	in	its	own	concrete	intentional	directedness,	to	such an	extent	that	such	empathic	comprehension	is	distinguished	from,	and	even gains	a	certain	priority	over,	the	sensory	experience	of	the	other's	body.	However,	I	take	it	that	Husserl	should	not	be	understood	here	as	denying	that	empathy	is	an	experiential	awareness	of	foreign	subjectivity.	Rather,	his	claim	is that	empathic	experience	has	as	an	essential	component	a	comprehension	of what	cannot	be	given	merely	sensuously,	namely,	the	other's	subjective	life and	its	own	intentional	correlates.	Furthermore,	this	comprehension	is	so	fundamental	that	in	empathy	the	sensuously	given	is	immediately	encountered as	that which expresses	this	subjective	life.	Expressivity,	then,	is	for	Husserl essentially	connected	with	intentionality,	and	the	perception	of	the	personal subject	always involves	an	element	of	comprehension	of the	other's intentional	directedness. It seems to	me that	on this	point	Husserl's	and	Stein's respective	accounts are	not in fact	mutually	exclusive.	With	Stein,	one	can	maintain that there are	many	cases	in	which	one's	immediate	apprehension	of	the	other	involves a certain emptiness of content, which then becomes determinate and full through the	other's intentional experiences	being explicated.	This	may	occur, for example,	when	one sees the	miserable face of a homeless person, which	(perhaps	due	to	the	intolerable	normality	of	such	encounters)	one	first apprehends	as	"the	face	of	a	beggar",	and	then	only	subsequently	grasps	as embodying	a	presentified	desperation.	On	the	other	hand,	one	can	maintain with	Husserl	that	empathy	does	not	simply	take	the	other	as	intentional	object, that	from	the	beginning	the	empathizing	subject	faces	the	presence	of	foreign intentional experiencing, and	does so	with some	degree	of insight into the structure	and	contents	of	the	latter.13 SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy285 Conclusion In	Section	2	I	described	empathy	in	terms	of	an	intuitive	givenness	of	foreign subjectivity,	and	it	may	now	be	considered	how	such	a	characterisation	bears upon	the	two	distinct	moments	of	empathy,	namely	perception	and	explication,	brought	to	light	in	Husserl's	and	Stein's	analyses. Let	me first consider	whether	empathy	can	be	understood	as	awareness	of foreign	subjectivity.	It	was	suggested	in	Section	3	that,	for	Husserl,	empathic perception	is	an	awareness	of	another	person.	Characteristic	of	this	other	person	is	that	he	or	she	is	a	unified	whole,	one	that	is	nevertheless	an	expressive whole,	that	is,	that	bears	two	intertwined	dimensions,	a	bodily	"expression" of	subject	and	a	subject	"expressed"	bodily.	Furthermore,	I	suggested	in	Part 4	that	the	subject	"expressed"	in	the	personal	whole	perceived	comes,	or	may come	through	an	explicatory	shift,	to	thematic	focus	in	such	a	manner	that	his or	her	lived	experiences	may	be	thematically	grasped	in	their	own	contents and	their	own	specific	character	as	intentional	conscious	acts.	But	in	none	of these	accomplishments	does the	empathizing	subject	coincide	with the	one empathized.	As	Husserl	underlines,	all	that	I	empathize	in	the	other	refers	to an	'I'	which	is	manifest	to	itself	in	essentially	the	same	manner	which	I	am to	myself.	But	this	self-manifestation,	however,	is	utterly	transcendent	of	my own,	and	that	this	transcendent	self-manifestation	is	intended	in	empathy,	and in	a	manner	which	fundamentally	determines	its	character	as	an	act,	underlines	both	the	alterity	and	the	subjectivity	of	the	other	of	empathy. But	to	what	extent	do	Husserl's	and	Stein's	analyses	permit	talk	of	empathy	as a	mode	of	intuitive experience?	If	the	perceived	material	object	is,	in	a	sense, relatively	unproblematic	as	an	example	of	the	intuitively	given,	in	virtue	of the	sensuously	apparent	being	part	of	a	the	thing	itself,	and	the	latter	being a	totality	which	could	in	principle	show	itself	fully	by	means	of	futural	perspectival	appearances,	the	other	personal-subjective	life	is	intuitively	present only	in	a	somewhat	enigmatic	sense.	Empathy	is	intuitive	insofar	as	it	is	that mode	of	experience	by	which	the	subject	achieves,	through	the	two	moments of	perception	and	explication,	a	sui generis	grasp	of	a	transcendent	personalsubjective	life,	in	its	transcendence	and	yet	also,	to	a	certain	extent,	its	determinate	comportment.	Yet	what	this	intuitive	givenness	of	the	other	essentially requires is a persistently non-original	moment.	While the other is directly grasped	as	a	self-manifesting	intentional	life	–	in	the	sense	that	this	grasping is	an	essential	aspect	of	the	intuitive	experience	of	the	other	person	–	the	other's	experiential	life	may	never	be	lived	through	in	the	most	basic	and	originary	sense.	But	this	is	a	necessary	absence	since,	as	we	saw	in	Section	2,	if it	were	so	lived	through	the	other	would	cease	to	be	other	and	would	become 12 Cf.	Carr	1987:	270. 13 In fact, both Husserl and Stein distinguish between different levels of empathy, with the most basic experiential achievement being	a	passively	occurring	apperception	of	the other's	body	as	a living	body	which senses, and they	maintain that on this primitive experiential	level	there	is	not	yet	the	expression of Geist, that the other is not here encountered	as	a	subject	of	intentional	activity	(Stein 2008: 74–79 [1989: 56–61],	Husserl 1973a: 455–457).	But	the	recognition	of	such	levels need not	motivate the denial of the claim I have been attributing to them here, namely that in personalistic empathy the other is experienced as an embodied and intentional mind	"without	further	ado",	since	this	thesis is entirely compatible	with a	more nuanced understanding of the various intentions and motivational relationships inherent within personalistic empathy. Indeed a complete account of the phenomenology of empathy would	certainly	need to incorporate such	an understanding.	For	further	discussion	of this issue,	see	Zahavi	(2014a). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy286 one	with	me.	Thus	for	the	other's	self-presence	to	be	grasped	as	the other's	it cannot	be	given	but	only	comprehended	or	recognized,	yet	this	recognition	is already	achieved	in	the	experience	of	the	other	person's	expressivity.14	It	thus seems	that	empathy	achieves	a	coincidence	between	experiential	insight	and the	recognition	of	transcendence,	or	between	direct	intuition	and	alterity,	and that	Husserl	is	on	firm	ground	when	he	writes	as	follows: "Just	as	what	is	past	can	be	originally	given	as	past	only	through	memory,	and	what	is	to	come in	the	future	can	as	such	only	be	originally	given	through	expectation,	the	foreign	can	only	be originally	given	as foreign through	empathy.	Original	givenness in this sense is the	same	as experience."	(Husserl	1959:	176) References Carr,	D.	(1987).	Interpreting Husserl.	Dordrecht:	Martinus	Nijhoff. De	Preester,	H.	(2008).	From	Ego	to	Alter Ego:	Husserl,	Merleau-Ponty	and	a	Layered	Approach	to	Intersubjectivity.	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The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1960).	Cartesian Meditations.	Trans.	D.	Cairns.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1962).	Phänomenologische Psychologie.	Husserliana	9.	The	Hague:	Martinus Nijhoff. Husserl,	E. (1966).	Analysen zur passiven Synthesis: aus Vorlesungsund Forschungsmanuskripten.	Husserliana	11.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E. (1973a).	Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität II.	Husserliana	14.	The Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1973b).	Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität III.	Husserliana	15.	The Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1976).	Ideen zu einer reiner Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch. Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie. Husserliana III/1.	The	Hague:	Martinus	Nijhoff. Husserl,	E.	(1989).	Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution.	Trans.	R.	Rojcewicz	&	A.	Schuwer.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer	Academic. Husserl,	E.	(2001).	Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis.	Lectures on Transcendental Logic.	Trans.	A.	J.	Steinbock.	Dordrecht:	Kluwer	Academic	Press. Husserl,	E.	(2014).	Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.	Trans.	D.	O.	Dahlstrom.	Indianapolis:	Hackett	Publishing	Company. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy287 Ingerslev,	L.	R.	(2014).	Why	the	Capacity	to	Pretend	Matters	for	Empathy.	Topoi,	33(1), 201–203. Jardine,	J.	(Forthcoming).	Stein	and	Honneth	on	empathy	and	emotional	recognition.	Human Studies,	(Special	Issue	on	'The	Social	Philosophy	of	Edith	Stein'). Overgaard,	S.	(2012).	Other	People.	In:	D.	Zahavi	(ed.),	The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Phenomenology.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Ratcliffe,	M.	(2012).	Phenomenology	as	a	Form	of	Empathy.	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From Bench to Bedside	(3–20).	Cambridge:	MIT	Press. Zahavi,	D.	(2014a).	Empathy	and	Other-Directed	Intentionality.	Topoi,	33(1),	129–142. Zahavi,	D.	(2014b).	Self and Other. Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame.	Oxford: Oxford	University	Press. 14 For	a	closer	look	at	the	relationship	between empathy	and	recognition,	see	Jardine	(Forthcoming). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(273–288) J.	Jardine,	Husserl	and	Stein	on	the	Phenomenology	of	Empathy288 James Jardine Husserl i Stein o fenomenologiji empatije: percepcija i eksplikacija Sažetak U fenomenološkoj tradiciji često se nalaze hrabre tvrdnje da je interpersonalno razumijevanje ukorijenjeno u sui	generis obliku intencionalnog iskustva, koji se najčešće naziva empatijom (Einfühlung). Ovaj rad istražuje te tvrdnje, naglašujući njihov specifičan karakter, te ispituje fenomenološka razmatranja u obrani tih tvrdnji koje su ponudili dva istaknuta zagovaratelja, Edmund Husserl i Edith Stein. U drugome dijelu, nakon iznošenja nekih uvodnih indikacija kako bi se empatija uopće trebala razumijevati, pažnju pridajem nekim karakterizacijama specifične strukture empatije, uzimajući u obzir u trećemu poglavlju huserlovsku tvrdnju da su neki oblici empatije opažajne naravi, te u četvrtome poglavlju inzistiranje Edith Stein da empatičko iskustvo često uključuje ekspliciranje intencionalnih iskustava drugih. Peto poglavlje zaključujem s procjenom razine do koje njihove analize podupiru shvaćanje empatije kao intuitivnog iskustva drugih umova. Ključne	riječi empatija,	percepcija,	interpersonalno	razumijevanje,	Edmund	Husserl,	Edith	Stein James Jardine Husserl und Stein zur Phänomenologie der Empathie: Perzeption und Explikation Zusammenfassung Innerhalb der phänomenologischen Tradition findet man häufig die gewagte Behauptung, das interpersonale Verständnis sei in der Sui-generis-Form der intentionalen Erfahrung verwurzelt, die meistens als Empathie (Einfühlung) bezeichnet wird. Die vorliegende Arbeit erforscht diese Behauptung, indem sie ihren distinktiven Charakter hervorhebt und phänomenologische Betrachtungen examiniert, die zu ihrer Verteidigung deren zwei Hauptbefürworter, Edmund Husserl und Edith Stein, vorgebracht haben. Nachdem ich im zweiten Teil einige vorbereitende Hinweise angebracht habe, darüber, wie man Empathie auslegen sollte, widme ich mich danach einigen Charakterisierungen ihrer distinktiven Struktur, indem ich im dritten Teil die husserlsche These betrachte, bestimmte Formen der Empathie seien in ihrer Natur perzeputell, und im vierten Teil Steins Bestehen darauf, dass die empathische Erfahrung oftmals Explikationen eigener intentionaler Erfahrungen anderer enthält. Teil fünf schliesst mit der Beurteilung ab, in welchem Umfang ihre Analysen die Auffassung der Empathie als einer intuitiven Erfahrung anderer Verstande unterstützen. Schlüsselwörter Empathie,	Perzeption,	interpersonales	Verständnis,	Edmund	Husserl,	Edith	Stein James Jardine Husserl et Stein sur la phénoménologie de l'empathie : perception et explication Résumé Dans la tradition phénoménologique, on trouve souvent qu'il est audacieux d'affirmer que la compréhension interpersonnelle soit enracinée dans une forme sui	generis de l'expérience intentionnelle, désignée généralement comme empathie (Einfühlung). L'article suivant explore cette affirmation, en soulignant son caractère distinctif et en examinant les considérations phénoménologiques que proposent en sa défense deux de ses principaux partisans, Edmund Husserl et Edith Stein. Après avoir proposé dans la partie 2 quelques indications préliminaires sur comment l'empathie devrait être comprise, je me tourne ensuite vers quelques descriptions de la structure caractéristique de celle-ci, en considérant, dans la partie 3, l'affirmation husserlienne d'après laquelle certaines formes d'empathies sont de nature perceptive, puis dans la partie 4, l'insistance d'Edith Stein sur le fait que l'expérience empathique implique souvent l'explication des expériences intentionnelles propres à l'autre. La partie 5 conclura en évaluant jusqu'où leurs analyses soutiennent une conception d'empathie comme expérience intuitive des autres esprits. Mots-clés empathie,	perception,	compréhension	interpersonnelle,	Edmund	Husserl,	Edith	Stein