Philosophy	East	&	West	Volume	64,	Number	2	April	2014	404–424 ©	2014	by	University	of	Hawai'i	Press MEANING, UNDERSTANDING, AND KNOWING-WHAT: AN INDIAN GRAMMARIAN NOTION OF INTUITION (PRATIBHĀ) Chien-hsing Ho Graduate	Institute	of	Religious	Studies,	Nanhua	University chho@mail.nhu.edu.tw Prologue For	Bhartṛhari,	a	fifth-century	philosopher	of	the	Indian	Grammarian	(Vaiyākaraṇika) school,	all	conscious	beings	-	beasts,	birds	and	humans	-	are	capable	of	what	he called	pratibhā,	a	flash	of	indescribable	intuitive	understanding	such	that	one	knows what	the	present	object	"means"	and	what	to	do	with	it.	Contemporary	scholars	writing	on	pratibhā	generally	translate	the	Sanskrit	term	as	"intuition,"	not	in	the	sense understood	by	many	analytical	philosophers as an	a	priori judgment appealed to in	thought	experiments	to	test	philosophical	hypotheses,	but	in	the	sense	of	a	spontaneously	arising	awareness	that	is	immediate,	reliable,	indescribable,	and	pregnant with	meaning.	Significantly,	our	instantaneous	understanding	of	a	sentence	or	complete	utterance	already	counts	as	an	instance	of	pratibhā.	Given	that	to	understand	a sentence is to	know its	meaning, such	an	understanding, if	correct,	amounts to	a mode	of	knowing	that	may	best	be	termed	knowing-what,	to	distinguish	it	from	both knowing-that	and	knowing-how. This	essay	attempts	to	expound	Bhartṛhari's	conception	of	pratibhā	in	relation	to the	notions	of	meaning,	understanding,	and	knowing	laid	out	in	his	magnum	opus, the	Vākyapadīya	(henceforth	VP ).1	The	conception	is	philosophically	intriguing	and contemporarily	relevant.	Yet,	it	has	not	hitherto	been	subjected	to	a	systematic	analytical	philosophical	treatment.2	Here,	I	hope	to	fill	this	lacuna. Now, to offer a broadly coherent and focused philosophical analysis, I shall neglect the metaphysical and presumably exotic aspects of the conception. My overall purpose is to provide a rational reconstruction of Bhartṛhari's empirical thought on pratibhā to suggest its relevance for contemporary studies of related topics. I	identify	three	different	yet	interrelated	notions	of	pratibhā:	intuitive	meaning, intuitive	understanding,	and	knowing-what.	The	remainder	of the	essay	deals	with each in turn. In	"Intuitive	Meaning," I touch	briefly	on	Bhartṛhari's	views	of	consciousness	and	language,	and	examine	at	some	length	his	indescribability	thesis	concerning	the	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence.	In	"Intuitive	Understanding,"	I	delineate the	general	features	of	pratibhā	as	intuitive	understanding	and	discuss	its	probable range	in	relation	to	expert	intuition	and	sense	perception.	Thereafter,	in	"Knowingwhat," I relate pratibhā to the notion of knowing-what and show why these two notions are to be differentiated from knowing-that and knowing-how. I conclude Chien-hsing	Ho 405 with some remarks on the contemporary relevance of Bhartṛhari's conception of pratibhā. Intuitive Meaning Bhartṛhari's	philosophy	affirms	the	omnipresent	and	world-constituting	character	of language	while	revealing	holistic	and	monistic	tones.	He	is	well	known	for	claiming that	all	awareness	appears	as	if	permeated	by	words.	It	is	by	dint	of	words	that	consciousness	is	capable	of	illuminating	its	object,	that	one	is	able	to	grasp	distinctions among	things.	Meanwhile,	Bhartṛhari	has	a	holistic	preference	for	that	which	is	conceptually	undifferentiated;	for	him,	a	whole	is	typically	more	real	than	its	parts.	He goes	on,	it	seems,	to	posit	an	undivided	and	linguistic	reality	as	the	ultimate	source of	myriad things in the	world.3	However, I shall	not	discuss	such	metaphysical	or quasi-metaphysical	aspects	of	his	philosophy,	but	will	confine	my	discussion	to	the generally	empirical	dimension. Equally	unmistakable is the fact that for	Bhartṛhari the	nature	and functioning of	language	is	closely	interlinked	with	that	of	consciousness.	A	perceptual	awareness or	an	episode	of	perceptual	consciousness	consists	of	the	act	of	perception	and	the immanently	known	form	of	its	external	object.	Let	us	call	such	a	form	a	percept.	For example,	when	I	see	a	gray	treepie	bird,	there	would	appear	in	my	consciousness	a gray-treepie	percept,	which	results	from	it	having	being	illuminated	and	assimilated by the	consciousness.4 In	Bhartṛhari's	view, further,	consciousness is	self-aware in that	both	the	act	and	the	percept	are	instantaneously	and	immanently	known	to	consciousness	itself.	In	perception,	one	is	aware	of	both	the	perceptual	act	and	the	intentional	percept.5	Similarly,	in	understanding	a	word,	one	is	aware	of	both	the	signifying word	and	its	signified	meaning.6	Here,	Bhartṛhari	takes	the	meaning	(artha)	of	a	word like "treepie" to	be	an immanent intentional	object (buddhiviṣaya) - basically the form	or	image	appearing	in	the	awareness	of	understanding	the	word	-	which	has	as its	ground	an	external	object	and	is	externally	imposed.7	For	him,	the	understanding can	occur	even	if	no	concerned	external	object	is	present. For	Bhartṛhari,	the	primary	meaningful	unit	of	language	is	the	sentence,	not	the word.	Only	a	sentence	or	complete	utterance	conveys	a	clear	and	complete	meaning and	prompts	the	hearer	to	action.	Words,	by	contrast,	express	their	meanings	only	in the	context	of	a	sentence. In fact,	Bhartṛhari	would tend to	view	the	meanings	of words	in	isolation	as	imaginary	constructs.	Consequently,	he	normally	uses	the	term pratibhā	to	represent	the	instantaneous	understanding	of	a	sentence	and	the	correlative	sentence	meaning,	but	not	word	understanding	and	word	meaning.	Significantly, the	sentence	meaning	is	also	mental,	or,	we	may	say,	intentionally	immanent	in	character.8	Additionally,	the	percept	and	the	sentence	meaning	are	alike	in	that	they	both figure	as	gestalt-like	wholes	that	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	mere	aggregation	of	their constituents.	Let	us	now	focus	on	the	notion	of	sentence	meaning	as	an	instance	of pratibhā. With	Bhartṛhari's	emphasis	on	linguistic	practice	and	consciousness,	the	notion of	sentence	meaning	discussed	here	is	not	the	conventional	or	semantic	meaning	of 406 Philosophy	East	&	West a	sentence,	but	what	the	hearer	intentionally	apprehends	at	the	precise	moment	she understands	a	complete	utterance.	In	the	process	of	comprehending	a	sentence,	we typically	apprehend	its	constituent	words	and	their	indefinite	meanings	individually and	sequentially.	Toward	the	end	of	the	process,	according	to	Bhartṛhari,	a	distinct sentence	meaning	as	pratibhā	may	appear	in	a	flash,	brought	forth	by	the	word	meanings.	Let	us	term	such	a	meaning	intuitive meaning,	using	the	adjective	"intuitive"	to capture	the	immediate,	holistic,	and	somehow	indescribable	character	of	the	meaning.	Here	is	how	Bhartṛhari	characterizes	it	in	the	VP	:	9 It [i.e., the intuitive	meaning]	cannot	be	explained to	others	as "it is this."	Though its existence	is	borne	out	by	one's	own	experiential	activity,	even	the	agent	herself	cannot render	a	description	of	it.	(2.144)	While	being	beyond	analytical	reflection,	it	seems	to complete	the	combination	of	the	word	meanings	and	assume,	as	it	were,	the	whole	form [covering	all	the	meanings].	It	figures	as	an	object.	(2.145) Upon	hearing	a	sentence	that	is	understood,	an	intuitive	meaning	spontaneously	occurs	as	the	intentional	correlate	of	the	act	of	sentence	understanding	and	is	immanently	and	distinctively	known	or	experienced	by	the	hearer.	This	fact	shows	itself	in the	hearer's	knowing	what	to	do	in	response	to	the	sentence. For	Bhartṛhari,	one	can	directly	and	instantly	experience	the	intuitive	meaning	of a	sentence,	which,	we	may	say,	approximates	what it is like to	understand	what	the sentence	means.10	While	probably	many	would	concede	that	upon	understanding	a sentence	a	somewhat	unitary	meaning	or	sense	appears	and	is	experienced	in	consciousness,	what	is	remarkable	here	is	Bhartṛhari's	view	that	the	intuitive	meaning cannot	be	properly	verbalized.	He	sees	a	limit	of	language	right	in	linguistic	understanding!	We	may	ascribe	to	him	the	following	Indescribability	Thesis:	that	the	intuitive	meaning that is	directly	experienced in linguistic	understanding	cannot	be adequately	expressed	as	it	truly	is	by	words.	Significantly,	the	indescribability	does not	arise	because	the	meaning	is	unique	and	private	to	every	individual.	The	meaning is	as	ineffable	to	oneself	as	it	is	incommunicable	to	others.	Bhartṛhari	does	not	posit any	kind	of	private	language	to	address	the	problem. If	someone	does	not	know	what	it	is	like	to	see	lavender,	we	can	hardly	describe to	him	what	seeing	the	color	is	like.	We	may	just	show	it	by	inducing	in	him	a	visual experience	of	the	color.	Similarly,	if	one	is	ignorant	of	what	it	is	like	to	understand what	is	meant	by	the	sentence	"Lavender	is	extensively	used	in	aromatherapy,"	we may	make	sure	he	understands	the	meaning	of	the	words	concerned	and	then	induce in	him	the	relevant	experience	of	sentence	understanding.	It	is	not	easy	to	put	adequately	into	words	the	experienced	(intuitive)	meaning.11	Bhartṛhari	could	be	hinting at	this	when,	in	VP	2.421–422,	he	explains	the	difference	between	the	particularized experience	of	sentence	meaning	and	the	indefinite	apprehension	of	word	meaning by	referring	to	that	between	the	actual	experience	of	being	burnt	and	the	mere	apprehension	of	the	meaning	of	the	word	"burn."	In	any	case,	I	detect	in	the	VP	three interrelated	reasons	for	the	indescribability	thesis,	to	which	we	shall	now	attend. To	state	the	first	reason:	for	Bhartṛhari,	intuitive	meaning	is	of	the	nature	of	interrelation	between	word	meanings,	while	a	relation	in	itself	cannot	be	described.	A Chien-hsing	Ho 407 relation is not determinately cognizable; it lacks an independent form on which words	can	alight,	because	it	depends	entirely	on	the	items	that	are	related	by	it.12	In addition,	given	the	entity-like	nature	of	nouns,	any	noun	used	to	signify	the	relation inevitably turns it into an entity that possesses a relation, but not the relation as such.13	We	then	reformulate	the	reason	as	the	following	argument: A1.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence	is	of	the	nature	of	a	relation,	because	it knits	together	the	meanings	of	the	words	that	constitute	the	sentence. A2.	A	relation	is	indescribable,	for	it	is	indeterminate	and	cannot	be	expressed without	being	turned	into	a	relatum. A3.	Hence,	the	intuitive	meaning	is	indescribable	in	words. In	an	essay	that	touches	upon	the	issue	of	ineffability,	it	is	advisable	here	to	explain	the	sense	in	which	words	can	be	said	to	directly	and	properly	express,	that	is, to	describe,	their	objects.	Broadly	following	Bhartṛhari,	we	may	take	the	semantic object	of	a	word,	that	is,	that	which	is	directly	and	properly	expressed	by	a	word,	to be	what	the	word	is	invariably	and	referentially	connected	to	in	each	of	its	literal	uses in	a	sentence	and	when	it	is	used	with	the	same	meaning.	The	semantic	correlate	of words	that	form	a	sentence	can	be	understood	mutatis mutandis.	Now,	words	that form	a	sentence	directly	and	properly	express	a	thing	if	and	only	if	their	semantic correlate	conforms	to	the	thing.	If	the	correlate	does	not	conform	to	the	thing,	then the	words	fail	to	describe	it.	A	Christian	theologian,	for	example,	may	consider	God ineffable	on	the	ground	that	the	subject-predicate	form	of	the	language	that	we	use connotes	a	semantic	correlate	that	represents	a	division	between	a	substance	and	its attributes,	yet	God	is	altogether	one	and	simple	in	Himself.	The	semantic	correlate	of language	is	structured,	with	distinctions	due	to	word	meanings,	yet	the	Deity	is	taken to	be	void	of	division	and	structure. Language	operates	in	the	realms	of	generality	or	semblance,	and	the	sentential form	of	language,	together	with	the	distinctions	due	to	word	meanings,	indicates	that the	semantic	correlate	of	a	sentence is	structured	and	does	not	conform	to things that	are	devoid	of	division	and	structure.	Thus,	Bhartṛhari	is	of	the	view	that	an	item that	is	devoid	of	division	and	structure,	and	so	lacks	a	distinct	basis	for	the	application	of	words,	is	indescribable	in	itself.14	With	regard	to	our	case,	the	sentence	"The sky	is	clear"	may	express	a	semantic	correlate	composed	of	distinct	relata,	whereas the	intuitive	meaning	known	from	the	sentence	is	an	interrelation	of	the	form,	say,	of "the-sky-is-clear."	The	correlate	does	not	conform	to	the	meaning.	Hence,	the	indescribability	thesis	follows.15 One	may,	of	course,	have	doubts	about	premise	A1.	However,	Bhartṛhari	also contends that an intuitive meaning is divisionless and sequenceless, which may count as the second reason for the thesis. Even though the meaning results from the combination of word meanings, it is actually a unitary, structureless whole that is beyond analytical reflection.16 It cannot be put into words, for the mere combination	of	word	meanings	entails	a	structure	that	fails	to	conform	to	it.	Here	is the	argument: 408 Philosophy	East	&	West B1.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence	is	a	unitary,	structureless	whole	that	cannot	be	analyzed	and	reduced	to	the	mere	combination	of	word	meanings. B2.	Any	sentence	used	to	express	the	meaning	invariably	connotes	a	semantic structure	that	fails	to	conform	to	it. B3.	Hence,	the	intuitive	meaning	is	indescribable	in	words. Again,	one	may	question	the	tenability	of	premise	B1.	How	can	a	sentence	meaning that	arises	out	of	distinct	word	meanings	be	without	division?	Let	us	then	consider	the third	reason	for	holding	the	indescribability	thesis,	which	concerns	the	irreducibility of	an	effect	to	its	causes.	For	Bhartṛhari,	an	effect	arises	spontaneously	and	distinctly from	a	set	of	causal	factors	and	is	not	related	to	them	in	a	definite	manner.	The	effect as	a	unitary,	previously	non-existent	item	is	said	to	come	into	existence	by	a	wonderful	process	-	one	may	think	of	the	intoxicating	power	of	wine	in	relation	to	its	causal materials.	As	a	result,	its	nature	cannot	be	described	and	properly	revealed	by	reference	to	its	causal	factors. In	understanding	a	sentence,	we	sequentially	apprehend	its	constituent	words and	their	meanings,	and	the	meanings	may	leave	in	our	subliminal	consciousness their residual traces, which finally help to bring forth the intuitive meaning.	The meaning,	which	figures	as	an	undifferentiated	gestalt,	even	though	it	depends	causally	on	the	vaguely	known	word	meanings,	is	far	more	than	their	mere	conglomeration.	It	results	from	the	interrelating	of	the	word	meanings	in	such	a	way	that	it	does not reside in	any	of the	meanings taken singly	or	collectively,	and	cannot	be	described	by	reference	to	them.17	Given	the	foregoing,	we	may	formulate	the	following argument: C1.	An	effect	that	arises	from	a	set	of	causal	factors	is	irreducible	to	a	mere	conglomeration	of	the	factors	and	cannot	be	described	by	reference	to	them. C2.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	a	sentence	is	an	effect	that	arises	from	the	meanings of	its	constituent	words. C3.	Hence,	the	intuitive	meaning	cannot	be	described	in	reference	to	the	word meanings. In	daily	linguistic	practice,	we	may	analyze	a	sentence	meaning	based	on	the	word meanings.	Yet,	this	is	only	an	expedient	measure	for	better	understanding	the	sentence.	The	intuitive	meaning	of	the	sentence	"The	sky	is	clear,"	being	a	distinct	effect, cannot	be	revealed	as	it	truly	is	by	a	mere	juxtaposition	of	the	words	"the,"	"sky," "is,"	and	"clear."	Appeal	to	other	words	surely	cannot	do	any	better. We	seem	to	be	facing	a	paradox:	the	intuitive	meaning	that	is	known	by	understanding	a	sentence	cannot	be	described	by	the	sentence	itself.	However,	this	only indicates	that	the	experientially	known	meaning	of	a	sentence	differs	distinctly	from the	abstractly	considered	semantic	meaning	of	the	same	sentence,	the	latter	being the	semantic	correlate	of	the	sentence.	Put	conceptually,	but	not	linguistically,	the correlate	would	be	replaced	by	a	propositional,	structured	thought	that	consists	of Chien-hsing	Ho 409 compositionally	combined	concepts.	Still,	such	a	thought	is	no	match	for	the	intuitive	meaning. Nevertheless,	Bhartṛhari	must	have	overemphasized	the	distinct,	undifferentiated character	of	the	intuitive	meaning.	VP	2.145,	quoted	above,	implies	that	the	intuitive	meaning	seemingly	comprises	within	itself	all	the	word	meanings.	Indeed,	the word	meanings	as	cooperating	factors	for	the	intuitive	meaning	occur	both	before and	simultaneously	with	the	meaning.	After	the	sequentially	and	indefinitely	apprehended	word	meanings	give	rise	to	the	intuitive	meaning,	the	latter,	while	making	the meanings	less	indefinite,	is	intertwined	with,	and	somewhat	differentiated	by	them. If	so,	the	meaning	is	not	as	divisionless	as	Bhartṛhari	would	like	to	take	it	to	be,	and may instead be endowed with a texture of interrelated word meanings such that the	indescribability	thesis	should	only	be	taken	with	a	pinch	of	salt.	Still,	this	observation	does	not	necessarily	invalidate	the	thesis,	which	should	remain	worthy	of	our consideration. It	is	worthwhile	at	this	point	to	turn	to	Michael	Polanyi's	theory	of	tacit	knowing for	further	elucidation.	For	Polanyi,	every	object-directed	awareness	has	a	tacit,	inarticulate	root.	In	wielding	a	hammer	to	drive	a	nail,	for	example,	one	watches	the	effects	of	the	strokes	on	the	nail	and	is	also	aware	of	the	feelings	in	the	hand	that	is holding	the	hammer,	which	guide	one's	handling	of	it	effectively.	Yet	the	feelings	are not	attended	to	in	the	way	that	one	attends	to	the	effects.	Here,	one	knows	the	feelings	only	by	relying	on	them	for	attending	to	the	hammer	hitting	the	nail,	and	so	one has	only	what	Polanyi	calls	subsidiary	awareness	of	the	feelings,	which,	we	may	say, is	merged	into	one's	focal	awareness	of	driving	the	nail.18	Likewise,	in	many	other conscious	activities,	one	focally	attends	to	a	coherent	item	that	emerges	from	one's integrating	various	assisting	factors,	which	are	called	subsidiaries,	of	which,	as	a	result	of	such	integration,	one	becomes	only	tacitly	and	subsidiarily	aware.	Often,	one first	needs to	attend to the	subsidiaries focally. If	one is skillful	or	knowledgeable enough	to	perform	the	integration,	one	then	integrates	the	subsidiaries	to	attend	to the	emerging	focus,	which,	interestingly,	is	said	to	be	their	meaning	or	joint	significance.	Meanwhile,	if	one	turns	one's	attention	back	to	(some	of	)	the	subsidiaries,	the latter	become the foci	while	being	deprived	of their	meaning just	as the	previous focus	is	relinquished. Polanyi	applies	his theory to	various fields, including linguistic	practice.	"The most pregnant carriers of meaning," says he, "are of course the words of a language."19	We	may	say	that	when	one	hears	a	series	of	audible	words	that	constitute an	utterance,	one	integrates	the	words	and	their	meanings	in	order	to	attend	focally to	the	meaning	of	the	utterance.	At	the	end	of	this	process,	one	is	only	tacitly	aware of	the	word	meanings.	Similarly,	for	Bhartṛhari,	in	understanding	a	word	in	a sentence, one	first	attends	to	its	sound	and	apprehends	its	true	form	as	a	signifier;	then	the	word becomes	a	remainder,	secondary	to	the	now-attended	meaning.	Likewise,	in	understanding the sentence, the word meanings, after being known sequentially and vaguely,	fuse	together	with	the	result	that	the	meaning	of	the	sentence	distinctly	appears	in	a	flash.	Bhartṛhari	agrees	that	when	the	sentence	meaning	is	obscure,	one 410 Philosophy	East	&	West may	re-attend	to	some	of	the	constituent	words	in	order	to	have	a	re-fusion	of	the word	meanings	that	results	in	the	appearing	of	a	clear	sentence	meaning. By	"tacit	knowing,"	Polanyi	mainly	means	the	act	of	knowing	involved	in	one's tacitly	integrating	the	subsidiaries	into	the	coherent	focal	entity	as	their	joint	meaning.	One	point	of	his	theory	of	tacit	knowing	is	that	the	product	of	a	tacit	integration	cannot	be	reduced	to	a	mere	summation	of	its	detectable	subsidiaries.	This	is also	what	Bhartṛhari is driving at	when	he speaks of intuitive	meaning	being	beyond analytical reflection. However, while Bhartṛhari stresses the indescribability of the	meaning,	Polanyi	highlights the	unspecifiability	of the subsidiaries and the ineffability	of	their	tacit	knowledge.20	Still,	given	that	in	many	cases	the	focal	entity is	formed	jointly	by	the	subsidiaries,	the	latter's	unspecifiability	and	the	ineffability	of the	relation	between	them	make	it	hard	to	describe	the	entity	adequately.21	In	any case, Polanyi's notion	of tacit integration and	his claim that	we know more than we can say may	help in	elucidating	and	strengthening	Bhartṛhari's ideas	on intuitive	meaning	and	understanding.	We	also	note	his	view	to	the	effect	that	all	kinds of rational knowing involve the	knower's existential	participation	and	are shaped and	sustained	by	certain	inarticulate	mental	faculties	that	we	share	with	nonhuman animals. Intuitive Understanding It	is	no	coincidence	that,	for	Bhartṛhari,	the	term	pratibhā	stands	for	sentence	understanding	as	well	as	sentence	meaning.	The	intuitive	meaning	qua	sentence	meaning, being	the	inner	intentional	object	of	an	understanding	act,	is	immanent	in	the	awareness of sentence understanding, whereas the awareness, comprising within itself both	the	act	and	the	meaning,	is	said	to	be	a	unitary,	indivisible	whole.	It	is	through conceptual	analysis	that	we	hold	the	act	and	the	meaning	apart.22	Here,	a	sentence understanding	is	a	spontaneously	arising,	unitary	awareness	that	comprises	both	the act	and	the	meaning,	and	the	previously	mentioned	indescribability	of	the	meaning can	readily	be	extended	to	that	of	the	understanding. Significantly,	sentence	understanding	is	only	a	paradigmatic	case	for	Bhartṛhari's notion	of	pratibhā as	a flash	of indescribable	understanding such that	one	knows what	the	present	object	means	and	what	to	do	with	it.	Let	us	use	the	term	"intuitive understanding" or simply "intuition" for this notion.23	The notion can be applied across	a	wide	range,	although	it	is	difficult	to	ascertain	precisely	what	that	range	is. For	our	purposes,	and	on	the	basis	of	my	reading	of	the	passages	in	the	VP	that	concern the notion, let us first delineate the general features of pratibhā as intuitive understanding: (1) it	cannot	be	adequately	described,	given	mainly the indescribability	of	its	intentional	content;24	(2)	it	arises	spontaneously	in	a	flash,	following	a tacit	integration	that	involves	the	presence	of	words	or	linguistic	traces	(śabdabhāvanā) and	depends	on	repeated	practice	or	nature/instinct,	such	that	it	cannot	be	reduced to	a	mere	summation	of	its	causal	factors	and	constituents; (3) it is	an	immediate, noninferential	awareness	of	an	object	for	what	it	"means"	as	well	as	of	what	to	do with	it,	and	is	generally	considered	reliable	concerning	what	it	reveals;	and	(4)	its Chien-hsing	Ho 411 content	cannot	be transmitted to	others	-	everyone	has to	acquire it through their own	practices	and	experiences.	The last three features	will	become	clearer	as	we proceed	to	discuss	the	probable	range	of	intuitive	understanding. Why	is	sentence	understanding	a	paradigm	case for	pratibhā?	Bhartṛhari,	as	a grammarian-philosopher,	recognizes	the	centrality	of	language	in	all	our	theoretical and	practical	activities.	In	his	view,	our	experiences	of	daily	life	are	invariably	impregnated with words. However, he also has a notion of linguistic traces and of inarticulate	words (anākhyeyaśabda).	Bhartṛhari	was	a	Hindu	who	believed in the doctrine	of	rebirth,	and,	for	him,	we	have	all	used	language	a	great	number	of	times in	this	and	previous	lives.	Such	linguistic	activities	have	left	in	the	subliminal	consciousness	numerous	linguistic	traces	waiting	to	be	awakened.25	When	certain	traces are	awakened,	they	give	rise	to	articulate	and	inarticulate	words	on	the	surface	of consciousness.26	It	is	hard	to	tell	what	precisely	Bhartṛhari	takes	inarticulate	words	to be.	Yet,	we	know	that	such	words	are	present	in	the	consciousness	of	an	infant	without	language;	they	also	occur	in	an	adult's	perceptual	awareness	when	the	object	is not	yet	attentively	and	determinately	cognized.	He	can	indeed	claim	that	all	awareness	appears	as	if	permeated	by	words. Thus,	our	comprehension	of	things	in	the	world	can	sometimes	be	broadly	similar	to	sentence	understanding.	We	may	understand	in	a	flash	a	facial	expression,	a perceived	state	of	affairs,	an	abrupt	situation,	or	the	quality	of	a	jewel,	by	virtue	of experiencing	a	coherent	meaning therein,	while	knowing	what to	do	with it.	The understanding	spontaneously	arises	through	our	tacitly	integrating	the	experienced aspects	of	the	object	as	well	as	the	articulate/inarticulate	words	and	their	meanings. That	would	be	an	intuitive	understanding	if	it	bears	the	aforementioned	features. The following	verses in the	VP indicate the functioning, significance,	and farreaching	presence	of	an	intuitive	understanding: Concerning	what	is	to	be	done,	no	one	can	transgress	that	[intuitive	understanding]	which arises	either	directly	from	words	or	through	the	working	of	linguistic	traces.	(2.146)	The whole	world	considers	it	to	be	a	reliable	means	of	knowledge	(pramāṇa).	Even	the	activities	of	animals	proceed	by	dint	of	it.	(2.147)	Just	as	the	power	to	intoxicate	and	the like	appear	spontaneously	in	certain	substances	by	mere	maturity,	likewise	are	intuitive understandings	[that	emerge	in	the	consciousness]	of	those	who	have	them.	(2.148) The	intuitive	understanding	that	arises	directly from	words	is	presumably	intuition as	sentence	understanding,	which	results	from	the	comprehension	of	audible	words in	an	utterance,	whereas	other	types	of	intuitive	understanding	(whatever	they	are) occur through the	working	of linguistic traces,	which	bring forth inner	words that induce the intuition concerned. Either way, the emerging intuitive understanding typically	gives	one	the	best	guidance	regarding	what	the	appropriate	action	is	to	take here	and	now. Who	causes	infants	to	move	their	speech	organs	to	utter	meaningful	sounds	for the	first time?	Who	teaches	pigeons	to	build	nests for	breeding?	Who	drives	a	rat, trained	to	run	a	maze,	to	succeed	in	finding	its	way	out	even	when	blindfolded?	Neither	human	infants	nor	nonhuman	animals	have	an	articulate	language.	Yet	given	the 412 Philosophy	East	&	West doctrine	of	rebirth,	they	are,	for	Bhartṛhari,	endowed	with	linguistic	traces	that	help to	induce	in	their	mind	an	intuitive	understanding	that	guides	them	in	their	purposive	activities.	This	might	explain	why	little	children	who	are	learning	a	language	may utter	completely	new	sentences	in	a	way	that	surprises their	elders.	However, this idea is unpersuasive to those	of us	who	have	no	belief in rebirth, and	Bhartṛhari would	be	left	nearly	only	with	nature	or	instinct	to	appeal	to	for	explaining	animals' spontaneous,	appropriate	activities.27 Meanwhile, Bhartṛhari highlights repeated practice as an important factor for the	arising	of	intuitive	understanding.	Our	ability	to	understand	sentences	of	our	native	language	already	hinges	on	long-term	linguistic	practice	in	early	childhood	and thereafter.	Here,	Bhartṛhari	appears	to	take	expert	intuition	to	be	a	form	of	intuitive understanding.28	In	VP	1.35,	he	refers	to	an	expert's	truthful	awareness	of	precious stones,	which,	he	says,	is	born	of	practice	but	not	of	inference,	and	cannot	be	communicated	to	others.	To	become	a	connoisseur	of	jewelry,	for	example,	one	needs	to receive	instruction	and	training	from	jewelry	experts,	together	with	years	of	practice in	discerning	different	types	of	jewel.	A	connoisseur's	intuition	of	a	jewel	for	what	it is	arises	from	a	tacit	integration	of	her	verbal	knowledge	of	jewelry,	various	visual cues,	and	so	forth;	the	learned	concepts	in	the	knowledge	become	only	subsidiaries to	what	she	intuitively	knows,	and	she	may	have	difficulty	in	describing	the	latter. Tacit	integration,	as	Polanyi	tells	us,	differs	from	deductive	inference	in	that	inference connects two focal items, the	premises	and	consequents,	while integration	makes subsidiaries	bear	on	one	focus.	In	addition,	the	Commentary	on	VP	1.35	states	that the	causal	or	constituent	factors (pada, hetu) for	an	expert's	intuition	are	subtle	or fine-grained	and	cannot	be	explained	to	others.29	In	any	case,	we	can	well	ascribe	to Bhartṛhari	the	view	that	an	intuitive	understanding	does	not	arise	from	any	conscious use	of	reason. Of course, an expert's intuition generally gives rise to an intuitive judgment about	the	object	in	question,	and	she	may	manage	to	say	something	about	the	probable reasons for the judgment.	Yet, were the intentional content and immediate causal	factors	of	the	intuition	adequately	describable,	the	content	would	be	transmittable.	If	the	content	could	be	transmitted	to	others,	a	novice	would	have	the	intuition merely	by	hearing	the	expert's	words,	which	is	absurd.	Plainly,	everyone	has	to	acquire	intuition	through	repeated	practice. Both	sentence	understanding	and	expert intuition	are intellective in	character. What of skillful and practical knowing such as knowing how to swim or knead bread?30	Should	we	treat	knowing-how	as	a	kind	of	intuitive	understanding?	The	view that	the	content	of	intuitive	understanding	cannot	be	transmitted	to	others	reminds	us of	the	story	about	an	old	wheelwright	in	the	Chinese	Daoist	text	Zhuangzi.	This	old man	spoke	of	his	know-how for subtly	chiseling	a	wheel,	which	was	acquired in the hand and felt in the mind	but	could	not	be	put	into	words.	He	complained	that he	could	not	impart	his	expertise	to	his	son	and	so	he	said,	"I've	gone	along	for	seventy	years	and	at	my	age	I'm	still	chiseling	wheels."31	In	the	VP,	Bhartṛhari	does	not discuss	pratibhā in relation to	skills	and	skillful	knowing,	although	he	does	assert that	all	crafts	are	based	on	an	awareness	that	is	linguistic	in	nature,	supposedly	refer- Chien-hsing	Ho 413 ring to the	prolonged	process	of	acquiring	craft skills	wherein	an	apprentice tries to	comprehend	the	master's	instructions	and	closely	watch	and	emulate	the	latter's efforts	at	getting	the	work	done.	Now,	a	knowing-how	typically	depends	on	repeated practice	and	has	an	ineffable	content	that	cannot	be	transmitted.	Yet,	it	does	not	seem to	arise	spontaneously	in	a	flash,	nor	is	it	an	immediate	awareness	of	an	object	for the intuitive	meaning.	Given the lack	of the second	and third features	delineated above, it is advisable not to include knowing-how under the notion of intuitive understanding. Furthermore,	can	we	count	sense	perception	as	a	form	of	intuitive	understanding?	Although	Bhartṛhari	appears	to	treat	as	cases	of	intuitive	understanding	certain supersensory	perceptions	(such	as	those	that	result	from	the	discipline	of	yoga),	the VP	does	not	clearly	place	sense	perception	under	the	notion	of	pratibhā.	Indeed,	if sense	experiences	are	invariably	impregnated	with	words,	they	might	be	so	conceptual	as	to	exclude	any	indescribable	content.	As	we	have	seen,	however,	by	"words" Bhartṛhari may include inarticulate words, which we supposedly share with animals.32	Besides,	even	if	articulate	words	or	verbalizable	concepts	are	always	present in	a	human	adult's	sense	perception,	this	might	well	be	a	contingent	fact	rather	than what	is	integral	to	the	perception. VP	1.53	and	2.7	imply	that	the	percept	in	sense	experience,	like	sentence	meaning,	is	an	indivisible	whole.	According	to	a	passage	in	the	Commentary	on	VP	1.26, a	thing	of	interrelated	constituents	first	appears	to	an	awareness	as	a	whole,	but	may then	be	deliberately	divided	in	order	to	focus	on	different	constituents;	yet,	for	the arising	of	an	intuitive	understanding	that	leads	to	purposeful	activity,	one	needs	to unite	the	constituents	and	once	again	comprehend	the	thing	in	its	closely	interrelated form.33	It	is	quite	clear	that	for	Bhartṛhari	an	intuitive	understanding	may	occur	in sense	experience. Suppose,	for	example,	a	person	who	is	afraid	of	snakes	suddenly	sees	a	snake when	walking	past	a	bush.	The	person	may	at	that	very	moment	understand	the	snake in	a	flash	by	virtue	of	experiencing	a	coherent	but	indescribable	meaning therein, while	knowing	to	step	back	immediately.	This	understanding	arises	from	the	person instantly integrating the perceived aspects of the snake, the past experiences of snakes,	and	other	things.	This	would	not	be	very	different	from	the	intuition	a	hungry raccoon	may	have	on	seeing	the	snake,	even	though	the	two	intuitions	will	result	in very	different	actions. Nevertheless,	what is the intuitive	meaning that figures in such sense experiences?	The	meaning	is	perhaps	close	to	what	Michael	Dummett	has	chosen	to	call "proto-thought." For Dummett, the notion of proto-thought serves to account for the fundamental non-sensory component of sense perception that we share with animals.	A	dog	can	distinguish	between	being	attacked	by	one	hostile	dog	and	by several,	yet	we	cannot	seriously	ascribe	to	him	the	thought,	"There	is	only	one	dog there."	The	dog	has	only	proto-thoughts,	which	cannot	be	accurately	expressed	in words,	because	they	do	not	have	the	structure	of	verbally	expressed	thoughts.	Whereas	proto-thought,	unlike	full-fledged	thought,	does	not	have	language	as	its	vehicle and cannot be detached from present situations, it may enable us, on seeing an 414 Philosophy	East	&	West object, immediately	to	recognize	the	object	according	to	its type,	say,	as	a	dog,	a tree,	et	cetera,	and	may	evoke	specific	behavioral	responses	on	our	part.34 The intuitive meaning as the intentional content of intuitive understanding is presumably more holistic and less differentiated than Dummett's proto-thought. While	it	is	difficult	to	say	precisely	what	it	is	(after	all,	it	is	indescribable!),	Bhartṛhari may	agree	that	neither	does	an	intuitive sense	experience	involve	a	conceptual	judgmental	content	that	can	be	verbalized	properly,	nor	is	it	a	non-conceptual	experience that	was	believed	by some	Buddhist epistemologists to	be	alone	capable	of manifesting	the	object	as	it	truly	is.	It	seems	to	me	implausible	that,	upon	seeing	a snake,	concepts	like	"snake"	or	propositional	thoughts	like	"that	is	a	snake"	would always	in	the	first	place	figure	in	one's	visual	experience.	Instead,	one	may	first	see the	creature	meaningfully in	the	sense	of	apprehending	its	meaning	of the	unitary form,	say,	"that-is-a-snake!"	and	act	immediately	without	any	reflection	in	the	middle.	If	the	experience	involves	a	conceptual	judgment,	one	would	not	act	instantly;	if it	were	wholly	non-conceptual,	one	would	not	act	at	all.	In	any	case,	I	concur	that our	sense	perception	is	often	loaded	with	concepts.	What	is	suggested	here	is	only that	sense	experience	can	in	some	cases	bear	the	previously	mentioned	features	and therefore	count	as	a	form	of	intuitive	understanding. Finally,	while	Bhartṛhari	notes	the	occasional	unreliability	of	sense	perception, inference,	and	verbal	testimony,	which	are	regarded	by	many	traditional	Indian	philosophers,	perhaps	even	by	himself,	as	chief	means	of	knowledge,	he	claims	in	VP 2.147	that	the	whole	world	takes	intuitive	understanding	to	be	reliable.	Such	a	claim is	not	groundless.	Even if the	uttered	sentence	"The tea is tasty"	and	my	resultant judgment	that	the	tea	is	tasty	are	both	false,	my	intuitive	understanding	of	the	sentence	is	correct	insofar	as	I	correctly	apprehend	the	meaning	of	the	sentence.	The understanding	would	only	be	considered	incorrect	if	I	misunderstand	the	sentence. Again,	expert	intuitions	are	penetrative	and	typically	trustworthy.	Moreover,	several contemporary	studies	indicate	that	people	tend	to	trust	and	use	their	intuitions	when they	are	in	positive	mood	states;	also,	in	many	decision-making	situations,	intuition is	considered	more	effective	and	accurate	than	analysis.35	That	said,	Bhartṛhari	does not	assert	that	intuitive	understanding	is	infallible,	and	it	seems	advisable	to	take	it	to be	connected	with	the	possibility	of	being	mistaken. Knowing-what In	the	preceding	section,	we	discussed	the	general	features	and	probable	range	of intuitive	understanding	as	pratibhā.	Although	the	understanding	is	not	infallible,	it	is considered	generally	correct.	When	correct,	the	understanding	amounts	to	a	mode of	knowing.	For	some	reasons,	such	a	knowing,	which	I	have	termed	knowing-what, should	be	distinguished	from	both	knowing-that	and	knowing-how.	The	present	section	is	meant	to	address	this	issue. Gilbert	Ryle's	cerebrated	distinction	between	knowledge-that	and	knowledgehow,	which	he	presented	in	his	1949	book	The Concept of Mind,	has	recently	been debated	among	analytical	philosophers.	Some	thinkers	dismiss	the	distinction	and Chien-hsing	Ho 415 attempt	to	show	that	knowledge-how	is	indeed	a	species	of	knowledge-that,36	while others argue against any wholesale reduction of knowledge-how to knowledgethat.37	I	cannot	here	explore	this	issue	at	length,	but	merely	make	a	few	preliminary points	pertinent	to	my	approach. (1)	A	semantic	analysis	of	"knowing	how"	sentences	can	indeed	lend	support	to the	view	that	knowledge-how	is	a	species	of	knowledge-that.	After	all,	in	many	uses of	the	linguistic	form	"know	how	to	F"	(where	F denotes	an	activity),	what	is	expressed	is	clearly	knowledge-that,	as	when	we	say	"Jim	knows	how	to	go	to	the	park" (he knows that the route is such and such). However, in our concern with types of	knowledge,	we	should	rather	attend	to	the	substantive	message	of	utterances,	not the	precise	verbal	formulations	that	are	used.	Ryle	was	originally	concerned	with	the message.	If	so,	we	may	construe	the	term	"knowledge-how"	prescriptively	to	mean practical knowledge, roughly a practical ability to do something, which involves embodied,	action-centered	and	normally	learned	skills	that	are	developed	through actual	bodily	performance.	By	contrast,	the	term	"knowledge-that"	refers	to	factual, propositional	knowledge,	roughly	a	true	(dispositional)	belief	that	is	describable	and has	an	appropriate	warrant.38 (2)	I	suggest	we	use	the	term	"knowing"	in	the	occurrent	sense,	and	"knowledge" in the	dispositional	sense.	A	knowing-that is	basically	a true,	warranted	cognition harboring	a	conceptual	thought	that	can	be	articulated	in	the	form	of	a	proposition that	tells	how	things	stand.	It	will	then	become	dispositional	as	a	knowledge-that.	A knowing-how,	meanwhile,	is	an	agent's	good	or	successful	manifestation	of	her	practical	ability	as	knowledge-how.	Here,	a	person	may	be	said	to	know	how	to	F,	yet	be unable	to	F	successfully.	Suppose	an	accident	left	a	master	pianist's	arms	severely paralyzed.	For	a	certain time	period	she	would	still	have the	knowledge-how, the ability,	to	play	the	piano,	but	would	have	no	knowing-how,	being	now	unable	to	play successfully.	In	a	way,	she	both	knows	and	knows	not	how	to	play	the	piano.	The point	is	that	she	would	not	lose	her	ability	overnight;	if,	soon	after	the	accident,	her paralysis	was	magically cured,	her	masterly ability	would	again	be	manifested in actual	musical	performance. (3)	One	may	have	consciously	accessible	beliefs	about	one's	knowledge-how, yet,	as	the	wheelwright	story	tells,	it	is	difficult	to	clearly	articulate	and	impart	the knowledge	proper.	One	may	know	how	to ride	a	bicycle	without	any	conceptual understanding	of	how	one	maintains	balance.	One	cannot	learn	to	play	bowls	just	by reading	a	book	on	the	game;	one	must	practice	it	to	get	the	knack.	There	is	an	ineffable	content	in	one's	knowledge-how.	In	addition,	knowing	how	to	swim	and	knowing that one is swimming are plainly two phenomenologically distinct episodes. Hence,	the	irreducibility	of	knowledge-how	(and	knowing-how). Now,	one	may	think	that	the	two	types	of	knowing	/knowledge	depicted	above are	jointly	exhaustive.	The	duality	between	them	corresponds	to	that	between	theory and	practice,	thinking	and	doing,	and	intellect	and	will.	As	with	many	dualities	and dichotomies	in	philosophy,	however,	to	challenge	and	bridge	it	can	be	philosophically	rewarding.	To	begin	with,	Polanyi	has	already	taken	his	tacit	knowing	to	underlie	both	knowing-that	and	knowing-how.	Besides, I	have	related	above	the	notion 416 Philosophy	East	&	West of	intuitive	meaning	to	that	of	what-it-is-likeness.	Here,	Earl	Conee	argues	that	knowing	what	an	experience is like	consists in	acquaintance	with the	experience,	and such	knowledge by acquaintance,	which	requires	only	a	maximally	direct	epistemic relation to the	experience,	"constitutes	a third	category	of	knowledge, irreducible to	factual	knowledge	or	knowing	how."39	Further,	Eva-Maria	Jung	and	Albert	Newen very recently claimed that the Rylean dichotomy between knowledge-that and knowledge-how	has	to	be	replaced	by	a	theory	that	distinguishes	three	different	formats	of	knowledge:	(1)	propositional,	(2)	practical,	and	(3)	image-like.	Propositional and	practical	knowledge,	respectively,	roughly	correspond	to	our	knowing-that	and knowing-how,	whereas	image-like	knowledge	is	similar	to	knowing-what	in	that	it	is somewhat	unstructured	such	that	its	content	is	only	partially	explicable	by	concepts and	their	combinations.40 In	this	essay,	the	type	of	knowing-what	with	which	we	are	concerned	is	a	correct intuitive	awareness	about	some	object	that	bears	the	features	delineated	in	the	previous	section.	Lacking	a	propositional	content,	an	intuitive	awareness	cannot	be	assessed	for	truth,	but	only	correctness	and	its	intentional	content	cannot	be	described adequately.	Meanwhile,	a	knowledge-what	would	be	a	dispositional trace	that	results	from	a	knowing-what	awareness.	Now,	a	correct	intuition	as	a	knowing-what	is similar	to	a	knowing-that	in	that	it	is	broadly	epistemic	as	it	is	intentionally	directed to	some	external	object	and	may	reveal	to	the	knower	certain	aspects	of	reality.	In addition,	it	readily	becomes	a	knowing-that	or	a	conceptual	judgment.	However,	it differs	from	a	knowing-that	in	that	it	involves	no	explicit	presence	of	concepts	and	is not	structured	by	their	composition.	As	a	result,	neither	it	nor	its	intentional	content can	properly	be	described;	again,	what	is	thus	known	cannot	be	transmitted	and	has to	be	acquired	by	everyone	via	their	own	experiences. Like	a	knowing-how,	a	correct	intuition	has	an	ineffable	dimension:	its	content cannot	be	matched	by	any	list	of	propositions.	It	depends	for	its	arising	on	repeated practice	or	nature/instinct.	Yet,	unlike	a	knowing-how,	it	concerns	mainly	the	mind and	senses,	not	the	body.	It	is	an	intuitive	understanding	that	comprehends	its	object meaningfully,	rather	than	a	successful	manifestation	of	a	skillful	ability	in	bodily	actions.	Consequently,	one	knows	what	swimming	is	even	if	one	does	not	know	how to	swim,	yet	it	takes	nothing	short	of	a	jewelry	connoisseur's	intuition	to	know	what it	is	to	discern	a	genuine	jewel. Not	being	endowed	with	language	and	conceptual	thought,	animals	are	unable to	grasp	propositions.	They	do	not	have	factual	or	propositional	knowledge.	Nevertheless,	rats	in	an	eight-arm	maze	know,	on	the	sight	of	a	red	sign,	which	arm	of	the maze	to	enter	for	food,	and	scrub	jays	know	where	to	recover	particular	food	items they	previously	cached.	It	is	problematic	to	place	such	types	of	knowing	under	the same	umbrella	as	one's	knowing	how	to	swim	and	chicks'	knowing	how	to	fly.	In fact,	we	should	cast	doubts	on	the	joint	exhaustiveness	of	knowing-that	and	knowinghow ,	and	I	have	sketchily	shown	that	correct	intuitive	understanding	qua	knowingwhat	needs	to	be	distinguished	from	these	two	types	of	knowing.	It	is	also	palpable that	the	notion	of	knowing-what	can	help	to	bridge	between	them.41 Chien-hsing	Ho 417 Concluding Remarks I	have	attempted to	explicate	Bhartṛhari's	conception	of	pratibhā in its relation to the	notions	of	meaning,	understanding,	and	knowing.	A	pratibhā,	we	have	seen,	is	a spontaneously arising, broadly word-tinged intuitive understanding about something.	It	is	a	knowing-what	as	well	if	it	correctly	apprehends	an	unstructured	meaning of the	thing.	Further,	it	is	not	reducible	to	its	verbal	and	nonverbal	causal	factors	and cannot	be	described	adequately.	I	have	tried	to	provide	a	coherent	rational	reconstruction	of	the	conception,	although	my	reconstruction,	being	largely	constrained by	Bhartṛhari's	laconic	exposition,	remains	incomplete. Western	philosophers	used	to think	that the	human	being	is the	only	creature endowed	with	a	mind	that	thinks	in	terms	of	conceptual	ideas,	and	is	the	only	creature	that	possesses	an	articulate	language.	It is the	use	of	language,	as	well	as	the exercise	of	rational	thinking,	that	accounts	for	the	intellectual	superiority	of	humans over animals. Polanyi, however, cautions against such a view.	The human gift of speech,	he	says,	cannot	itself	be	due	to	the	use	of	language	but	must	be	due	to	some pre-linguistic	capacities.	Accordingly,	we	shall	have	to	account	for	the	acquisition	of language	in	humans	by	acknowledging	in	them	the	same	kind	of	inarticulate	powers as	we	observe	in	animals.42	In	the	meantime,	a	number	of	recent	studies	in	moral psychology	suggest	that	people's	moral	judgments	are	generally	the	result	not	of	a process	of	ratiocination	and	reflection	but	of	moral	intuitions.	In	a	review	of	these studies,	Jonathan	Haidt	writes: Rather	than	following	the	ancient	Greeks	in	worshiping	reason,	we	should	instead	look for	the	roots	of	human	intelligence,	rationality,	and	virtue	in	what	the	mind	does	best: perception,	intuition,	and	other	mental	operations	that	are	quick,	effortless,	and	generally quite	accurate.43 While	analysis	and	ratiocination	need	to	be	valued	in	our	search	for	truth	and	knowledge,	they	may	have	to	be	supplemented	by	spontaneous	holistic	intuitions.	Here, Bhartṛhari's	conception	offers	us	an	Indian	Grammarian	perspective	on	intuition	that should	be	worthy	of	our	consideration. In	contemporary	scholarship,	intuition	is	often	said	to	occur	quickly	and	effortlessly	such	that	only	the	outcome,	but	not	the	process,	is	accessible	to	consciousness.	The	process	is	regarded	as	non-conscious,	whereas	the	outcome	is	an	intuitive judgment.	We	saw	that	one	characteristic	feature	of	the	Bhartṛharian	intuition	is	that its	intentional	content	is	indescribable:	one	has	an	intuitive	sense	of	what	is	an	appropriate response to	make	here	and	now,	but	one	cannot	properly	verbalize the sense	-	not	to	say	the	reasons	for	it.	The	term	"intuitive	judgment"	would	then	be	a misnomer for	pratibhā.	Such	a	position	is indeed	unconventional.	Nevertheless, it accounts	for	the threshold	state	between	the	process	and	the	judgment	and	better captures the immediate, not yet propositionally structured character of the suddenly	arising	intuitive	experience.	(After	all,	it	takes	some	time	for	the	mind	to	form a judgment!)	The intuition, further, is related to the	notions	of knowing-what and 418 Philosophy	East	&	West of	knowing	what	an	experience	is	like.	The	notion	of	knowing-what	gives	us	a	third type	of	knowing	aside	from	knowing-that	and	knowing-how.	In	addition,	we	know what	it	is	like	to	see	or	hear,	yet	the	nature	of	the	knowing	remains	obscure.44	Overall, while more work needs to be done, I hope to have shown the relevance of Bhartṛhari's	conception	of	pratibhā	for	contemporary	philosophical	studies	of	related topics. Notes An	earlier	draft	of	this	article	was	read	as	a	paper	in	two	different	seminars	in	Taiwan in	2010	and	2011.	I	am	grateful	to	the	participants,	particularly	Professor	Norman	Y. Teng	and	Dr.	Cheng-hung	Tsai,	for	their	critical	discussion	and	helpful	suggestions. My	thanks	also	go	to	the	reviewers	of	Philosophy East and West for	their	valuable comments. 1 – For	a	critical	edition	of	the	Sanskrit	text	of	the	Vākyapadīya,	see	Rau	1977.	Verse numbers	in	the	present	article	are	given	according	to	that	edition. 2 – Bhartṛhari's	presentation	of	the	topic	is	laconic	and	requires	hermeneutic	elucidation,	for	which	one	may	refer	to	Subramania	Iyer	1982,	Tola	and	Dragonetti 1990,	and	Akamatsu	1994.	However,	the	approach	of	these	works	is	more	philological	than	philosophical.	Readers	may	also	consult	Coward	and	Raja	1990 for	discussions	of	the	relevant	issues	in	the	Grammarian	school. 3 – For	relatively	recent	discussions	on	the	related	issues,	see	Aklujkar	2001	and Bronkhorst	2001. 4 – Ogawa	1999,	pp.	276–278;	apart	from	the	verses	cited	therein,	one	may	refer to	VP	1.51	and	88	(verses	51	and	88	of	the	first	division	or	Kāṇḍa	of	the	VP ). 5 – VP	1.51	and	the	Commentary	(the	Vṛtti )	on	it	in	Subramania	Iyer	1966,	p.	109. (I	assume	that	Bhartṛhari is the	author	of the	Vṛtti.)	What	I take	to	be	the	act here	is	called	the	own form	(ātmarūpa)	in	the	verse.	Both	the	act	and	the	intentional percept (jñeyarūpa) are immanent in the awareness or consciousness (jñāna). 6 – The	signifying	word	as	the	own	form	(svarūpa)	of	a	word	is	called	sphoṭa	in	the VP,	but	I	shall	bypass	this	notion. 7 – VP	2.132.	This	verse	states	that	the	intentional	object	is	understood	to	be	the meaning	of	a	word	when	it	is	known	as	an	external	object.	In	light	of	VP	2.445 and 3.7.6, I take this to mean that the intentional object is superimposed (bāhyīkṛtya, samāropya)	on	the	external	world.	Cf.	Ogawa	1999,	pp.	271–276. The	superimposition	serves	for	Bhartṛhari	the	important	function	of	relating	the inner	image	to	the	external	world.	Incidentally,	although	Bhartṛhari	gives	other different	views	of	word	meaning,	he	seems,	at	least	at	the	conventional	level,	to generally	accept	the	present	view. Chien-hsing	Ho 419 8 – VP	2.445	speaks	of	sentence	meaning	as	of	the	nature	of	awareness	(saṃpratyaya), while	VP	2.145	takes	it	to	appear	in	the	form	of	an	object	(viṣaya).	Thus,	the meaning	is	an	object	immanent	in	the	awareness	of	sentential	understanding and	is	in	this	sense	said	to	be	intentionally immanent.	The	meanings	of	words constituting	a	sentence	are	also	intentionally	immanent,	but	they	are	said	to	be abstracted or analyzed out of the sentence meaning, while being externally imposed.	Cf.	VP	2.445–446. 9 – To save space, only my translations, not the Sanskrit originals of the verses quoted	from	the	VP,	are	given. 10 – David	Pitt	(2004)	has	argued,	I	think	quite	convincingly,	that	conscious	thoughts have	proprietary	phenomenal	properties	that	outstrip	any	accompanying	auditory or visual imagery	-	that	what it is like to think a conscious thought (or understand	a	sentence)	is	distinct	from	what	it	is	like	to	think	any	other	conscious	thought	(or	understand	any	other	sentence)	and	from	what	it	is	like	to	be in any other kind of conscious mental state.	Thus, there is something it is uniquely	like	to	apprehend	the	meaning	of	a	sentence. 11 – See	Pitt	2004,	p.	31. 12 – It	seems	for	Bhartṛhari that	a	thing	is	directly	and	properly	expressible	if it is independent in the sense	of	being	determinately	cognizable	and is	qualified by a distinct qualifier that functions as the basis for the application of the word	concerned.	Such	a	thing	is	structured	or	at	least	endowed	with	a	qualifierqualificand division.	A	structureless	thing,	by	contrast,	can	only	be	indirectly expressed	by	conceptually	imposing	such	a	division	on	it. 13 – VP	2.425,	439,	441.	The	ineffability	of	relation	is	explained	mainly	in	the	third chapter of the third division of the VP: 3.3.3–5, 19; see Houben 1995, pp. 170–213.	Cf.	Russell	1927,	pp.	275–276,	where	Russell	recognizes	the	unsubstantiality	of	relations	and	the	difficulty	of	expressing	them	by	words.	After	highlighting	the	ineffability	of	relation,	Bhartṛhari	goes	on	in	VP	3.3.20–24	to	show why	one	can,	without	contradiction,	speak	of	something	by	saying	that	it	is	ineffable;	for	an	elaboration	of	this	issue,	refer	to	Ho	2006. 14 – Cf.	VP	2.440,	3.3.54,	3.11.7,	3.14.475.	For	Bhartṛhari,	an	indescribable	thing mostly	bears	various	properties	and	capacities,	yet	they	are	so	intimately	interwoven	that	the	thing	as	such	is	indivisible.	To	express	it,	one	needs	to	abstract from it a distinct form or impose on it an extraneous adjunct that serves to qualify	it	and	functions	as	the	basis	concerned.	This	artificially	divided	or	extraneously	qualified	thing	is	describable,	but	it	is	not	the	original	thing.	For	exposition	of	such	ideas,	see	the	Commentary	on	VP	2.440	in	Subramania	Iyer	1983, p.	313,	and	Helārāja's	commentary	(the	Prakīrṇaprakāśa)	on	VP	3.11.7	in	Subramania	Iyer	1973,	p.	98. 15 – The	Commentary	on	VP	1.132	asserts	that	when	an	object	freshly	presents	itself to	consciousness	without	any	basis	for	the	application	of	words	being	cognized 420 Philosophy	East	&	West therein,	it	appears	in	an	unspecifiable	(avyapadeśya)	way	as	"it	is	this."	There may	seem	to	be	a	tension	between	this	assertion	and	VP	2.144.	However,	the use of the word avyapadeśya (literally meaning "indefinable" or "unspeakable")	here	suggests	otherwise,	and	we	may	take	the	object	-	and	the	intuitive meaning	-	to	be	only	indirectly	expressible	by	an	expression	such	as	"it	is	this" or	by	a	demonstrative	like	"this." 16 – VP	2.145,	419,	444. 17 – VP	2.234,	425,	442,	446;	3.3.81. 18 – Polanyi	and	Prosch	1975,	p.	33. 19 – Polanyi	1958,	p.	57. 20 – Polanyi 1958, pp. 62–63, 87–93; Polanyi 1959, pp. 44–46; Polanyi 1969, pp.	123–127,	132. 21 – Cf. Polanyi 1958, pp. 87–93. Polanyi states on p. 90: "by acquiring a skill, whether	muscular	or	intellectual,	we	achieve	an	understanding	which	we	cannot	put into	words	and	which	is	continuous	with the inarticulate faculties	of animals."	On	pp.	91–92,	he	takes	one's	focal	knowledge	of	the	meaning	of	a text	to	be	inarticulate	knowledge. 22 – Cf.	VP	2.7,	25,	and	Tola	and	Dragonetti	1990,	p.	96. 23 – Modern	scholars	in	the	fields	of	psychology,	philosophy,	and	management	have offered various definitions and characterizations of intuition; see the discussions	in	Shirley	and	Langan-Fox	1996	and	Dane	and	Pratt	2009.	Of	course,	I	am concerned	mainly	with	the	characterizations	given	in	the	present	article	to	the notion	of	pratibhā. 24 – By "intentional content" I mean the ideal content that is immanent in consciousness	as	the	intentional	correlate	of	the	act	of	awareness	concerned,	which would,	in	the	case	of	intuitive	understanding,	be	said	to	be	an	intuitive	meaning (in	a	rather	stretched	sense	of	the	term	"meaning"). 25 – VP	1.129–131	and	its	Commentary. 26 – See the Commentary on VP 1.129, 131–132. Roughly, articulate words are inner,	unspoken	words	that	can	properly	be	articulated	as	audible	words,	while inarticulate	words	cannot.	For	Bhartṛhari,	thinking	amounts	to	an	inner	silent speech that	consists	of	a series	of such	articulate	words	and their	correlated meanings. 27 – Apart	from	words	and	linguistic	traces,	Bhartṛhari,	in	VP	2.152,	lists	nature	and training	/practice	among	six	kinds	of	causal	factors	that	help	to	bring	about	an intuitive	understanding (the	other four kinds are somewhat exotic).	He	does note	that	some	animals	can	be	trained	such	that	hearing	of	specific	sounds	induces	in	them	an	intuitive	understanding	about	what	to	do	in	response	to	the sounds;	see	VP	2.117–118	and	the	Commentary	on	VP	1.123. Chien-hsing	Ho 421 28 – In	the	Commentary	on	VP	2.152,	an	expert	digger's	intuition	of	where	to	dig	a well	is	considered	an	intuitive	understanding	that	results	from	practice.	In	situations	related	to	expertise,	an	expert	knows,	almost	spontaneously,	what	to	do, yet	may	not	be	able	to	explain	the	reasons	for	his	or	her	judgment. 29 – Polanyi	and	Prosch	1975,	p.	40;	Subramania	Iyer	1966,	p.	93. 30 – People	may	speak	of	expert	wine	tasters	and	chicken	sexers	as	possessing	specific skills.	One	may	be said to	possess the skills	of	understanding	a	certain language.	Such	skills	are	intellective	in	the	sense	of	being	correlated	with	discernment	and	understanding.	However,	here,	I	use	the	notion	of	skill	only	to refer	to	embodied,	action-centered,	and	non-intellective	skills that	are	developed	through	actual	bodily	performance,	but	not	to	intellective	skills,	although the	borderline	between	the	two	types	of	skills	can	be	somehow	fussy. 31 – Watson	1968,	p.	153. 32 – If the	notion	of inarticulate	words seems	unappealing,	we	may	consider	Michael	Dummett's	(1994,	p.	125)	notion	of	proto-concept.	While	a	cat	cannot have	any	concepts,	properly	so	called,	it	may	possess	proto-concepts,	which	we share	with	animals	without	language.	Proto-concepts	constitute	proto-thoughts, and	I	shall	soon	discuss	Dummett's	notion	of	proto-thought. 33 – Subramania	Iyer	1966,	p.	75.	Subramania	Iyer	(1982,	pp.	54–55)	and	Tola	and Dragonetti	(1990,	p.	110)	take	pratibhā	to	occur	in	ordinary	sense	perception, although	they	do	not	give	textual	evidence. 34 – Dummett	1994,	pp.	121–126.	Dummett	contends that to	attain	an	adequate account	of	perception,	we	adult	human	beings	must	be	regarded	as	frequently engaging	in	proto-thoughts,	voluntarily	and	involuntarily. 35 – Dane	and	Pratt	2009,	pp.	12–16.	Surely,	the	Bhartṛharian	intuition	is	only	akin to,	but	not	identical	with,	the	intuitions	discussed	in	modern	scholarship. 36 – See	Stanley	and	Williamson	2001,	Snowdon	2003,	and	Bengson	and	Moffett 2007. 37 – For	example,	Noë	2005,	Wallis	2008,	and	Jung	and	Newen	2010. 38 – No	commitment	need	be	made	here	to	a	particular	kind	of	warrant;	any	will	do for	the	present	purposes. 39 – Conee	1994,	p.	136. 40 – Jung	and	Newen	2010,	pp.	124–130.	However, their approach	centers	only on knowledge we have of our actions and is therefore not very pertinent here. 41 – If, as Subramania Iyer holds (1982, p. 54),	pratibhā takes	place	all the time in	us,	it	would	often	remain	only	implicit	and	subconscious,	and	yet	probably be integral to knowing-that and knowing-how. I shall not pursue this issue here. 422 Philosophy	East	&	West 42 – Polanyi	1958,	p.	70. 43 – Haidt	2001,	p.	822.	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