HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY Volume 30, Number 4, October 2013 311 "THE COW IS TO BE TIED UP": SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE Malcolm Keating INTRODUCTION In this paper, I undertake textual exegesis and rational reconstruc-tion of Mukula Bha৬৬a's AbhidhƗ-v܀tta-mƗt܀ka, or "The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function." The treatise was written to refute Ɩnandavardhana's claim, made in the DhvanyƗloka, that there is a third "power" of words, vyañjanƗ (suggestion), beyond the two already accepted by traditional Indian philosophy: abhidhƗ (denotation) and lak܈a۬Ɨ (indication).1 I argue that the explanation of lak܈a۬Ɨ as presented in his text contains internal tensions, although it may still be a compelling response to Ɩnandavardhana. Mukula argues that the postulated power of vyañjanƗ can be identified as lak܈a۬Ɨ, one of the two well-established powers. I claim that Mukula's theory presents two logically distinct notions of lak܈a۬Ɨ and that he does not carefully distinguish between them. I show this by analysis of a few of the many examples surveyed in the text.2 I utilize two concepts from modern analytic philosophy in my reconstruction of Mukula's arguments: metonymic sort-shifting and Gricean pragmatic implication. While Mukula's argument that vyañjanƗ is equivalent to lak܈a۬Ɨ may be successful, I conclude that his claim must be made more precise: vyañjanƗ is equivalent to only a subvariety of lak܈a۬Ɨ, which I call "pragmatic indication." MUKULA BHA৫৫A ON MUKHYA AND LAK܇A۫Ɩ Broadly speaking, the Indian philosophical tradition distinguishes between two functions (vyƗpƗra) or powers (Ğakti) of words: denotation (mukhya or abhidhƗ) and indication (lak܈a۬Ɨ).3 Toward the beginning of his treatise, Mukula Bha৬৬a defines mukhya and lak܈a۬Ɨ in this way: HPQ 30_4 text.indd 311 1/21/14 10:55 AM 312 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY It is said that: Denoted meaning is what is comprehended from the word's function, Indicated meaning is understood additionally from that meaning.4 According to Mukula, when the power of words is "expended" by denoting their referent (which can be a universal, a quality, an action, or a named thing), the power of indication (lak܈a۬Ɨ) comes into operation if there is still work to be done.5 In other words, powers are demarcated based on their effects. Denotation's effect is the cognition of a referent by a hearer. Indication's effect is some further cognition. As well, denotation and indication are distinguished based on their domains. In the verse above, mukhya and lak܈a۬Ɨ are different not only because they perform different functions but because they operate on different entities. Denotation is Ğabda-vyƗpara, or the function of a word; indication functions on the meaning resulting from this first function.6 MUKHYA OR WORD DENOTATION Mukula then describes the function of denotation (mukhya): It is due to the function of words that we have an understanding of the denotative meaning, and this understanding is avyƗdhƗna, or without an interruption or an interval.7 Literal meaning is obtained simply by considering the word. Mukula uses the term mukhya because of a similarity between literal meaning and the face (mukha means "face" in Sanskrit). On this analogy, the face is seen first, before the limbs and extremities of a person. Likewise, denoted meaning (mukhya-artha) is understood before any other meanings.8 This is, prima facie, a claim about the phenomenology of an individual hearer's cognition. If taken this way, it is easily falsifiable. We are not always consciously aware of the literal meaning of a figuratively intended utterance first. And while the phenomenology of interpretation does often play a role in Indian theorizing about language, Mukula is not taking such an obviously wrong position. Later in the very same text, he argues that the meanings of many metaphors (which are instances of lak܈a۬Ɨ) are understood without any awareness of their underlying literal meanings.9 However, the literal meaning is recoverable through reflection because the figurative meaning is dependent on it.10 The charitable reading is that this analogy is making a logical claim: literal meaning or mukhya is required for the existence of indicated meaning, since indicated meaning is dependent on the literal. Mukula claims that words denote, by mukhya, universals, qualities, actions, or objects of proper names. The referent of words was a subject of much debate among, and within, the various Indian philosophical HPQ 30_4 text.indd 312 1/21/14 10:55 AM schools. The MƯmƗূsƗ, with whom Mukula is aligned in many ways, were divided on the question.11 The BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ, following KumƗrila Bha৬৬a (660 CE), argue that words refer to universals. They present several arguments for this view, among them that understanding of a universal is necessary before an interpreter could understand a particular. The PrƗbhƗkara MƯmƗূsƗ, following PrabhƗkara (700 CE), argue that words cannot refer to anything except in connection with other words in a sentence token.12 They point out that, even if there is some cognition of a universal when someone utters a sentence, if we are to take an action based on the sentence, we must understand a particular thing to be meant. Thus words will not always refer to universals, but sometimes to a particular.13 Mukula himself takes up a third position, consonant with the tradition of the Grammarians. In citing Patañjali (ca. 200 CE), author of the MahƗbhƗ܈ya, he explicitly argues against the BhƗ৬৬a view, claiming that four lexical categories (universal-denoting words, quality-denoting words, action-denoting words, and proper names) correspond to four different ontological categories (upƗdhi) that determine the word's denotation. Even though Mukula spends most of his treatise analyzing lak܈a۬Ɨ, the discussion of the categorical divisions of mukhya is not trivial. His proposal for indication must be consistent with his analysis of denotation. SUGGESTION AND DHVANI While cognitions of words and their literally denoted meanings constitute much of a given speech act's effect on hearers, we frequently-in both poetic and nonpoetic contexts-also uptake tinges of emotional inflections, unstated implications of facts, or metaphors that are implied at the level of an entire text. Ɩnandavardhana (820–890 CE), author of the DhvanyƗloka, thinks that vyañjanƗ, or "suggestion," can explain these things. Further, when we are in a poetic context, unlike many conventional situations, these implicit meanings are the predominant aim of the writer or orator. In conversation, our word choice may sometimes convey certain emotions, but in poetry, the goal is always beautiful aesthetic experience (rasa). Ɩnandavardhana argues that denoted meaning and indicated meaning alone are insufficient as a characterization of the full range of poetic meaning: If [suggested] meaning were denotative, one would get to it by a knowledge of literal, denotative meanings, and the words that convey them. But this meaning is beyond the range of those who have taken pains only on the definitions of words and who have paid no attention to the study of poetic meaning.14 SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 313 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 313 1/21/14 10:55 AM 314 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY Below are Ɩnandavardhana's central arguments for the distinctiveness of suggestion from indications: Argument from Primariness [S]econdary usage is a nonprimary (amukhya) operation of a word, whereas suggestiveness is a primary (mukhya) operation, for not the slightest hint of a non-primary nature can be observed in our apprehension of any of the three types of suggested sense. Argument from Kind of Operation [S]econdary usage may be called a denotative operation applied in a non-primary way, whereas suggestiveness is entirely different from denotation. Argument from Transformation [I]n secondary usage a meaning that indicates a secondary meaning becomes transformed into that indicated meaning, as in ga۬gƗyƗۨ gho܈aۊ("a village on the Ganges"); whereas in the process of suggestion the meaning that suggests a second meaning is apprehended to reveal that second meaning only by revealing itself at the same time.15 The "Argument from Primariness" is that indication functions by operating on the results of the operation of denotation and that suggestion operates on the word itself. Thus, they have different domains. For example, according to Ɩnandavardhana, if I say "A village is on the Ganges" (an example that we will investigate in more detail later), denotation functions on the words "village" and "Ganges." This means the village is directly on the river. By indication operating on the resultant meanings, I come to know that the river is on the bank of the Ganges and not directly upon the river. The suggested meaning is that the village is cool and pure because the Ganges river, the literal denotation of "Ganges," actually has these properties. The "Argument from Kind of Operation" is that the coolness and purity of the village is suggested and not denoted. One could say that the indicated statement is true only if the village is on the bank of the river. Thus, indication is like a kind of denotation. In contrast, the suggested meaning in this statement aims at a particular aesthetic experience, not communication of a fact. There are suggested facts (termed vastu-dhvani) and suggested figures (alaۨkƗra-dhvani), but Ɩnandavardhana is primarily concerned with the kind of suggestion that, when predominant in a poem, forms the basis for an experience of beauty. (When suggested meaning or vyañjanƗ is predominant in a statement or discourse, it is called dhvani.) Finally, Ɩnandavardhana argues in the "Argument from Transformation" that, in the process of indication, the literal meaning is HPQ 30_4 text.indd 314 1/21/14 10:55 AM replaced with the indicated meaning, whereas suggestion allows for the cognition of both a suggested meaning and a literal (or indicated) meaning at the same time. There can be the suggestion of beauty at the same time as the understanding of the truth-conditional content of a statement. Mukula's goal is to show that purported instances of suggestion can be reduced to lak܈a۬Ɨ, or indication.16 Thus, he must be precise about the domain of each power, to argue successfully that vyañjanƗ is simply another term for lak܈a۬Ɨ. In response to Ɩnandavardhana's Argument from Primariness, Mukula must show that suggestion shares the same domain as indication. To counteract the Argument from Kind of Operation, he must show that the kind of suggestion whose function is the generation of aesthetic experience can be explained by indication. Finally, Mukula must show that indication does not always replace the literal meaning, as in the Argument from Transformation. The table below illustrates how Mukula conceives his model as supplanting Ɩnandavardhana's. In this paper, I focus on Mukula's replies to the Argument from Primariness and the Argument from Transformation. I think that his responses to these first two arguments are stronger than to the last (Argument from Kind of Operation), in large part because I think it is a misstep for Mukula to grant Ɩnandavardhana's assumption that aesthetic experience should be considered "meaning" in the same way as the other two subvarieties of indication. The problem of whether aesthetic experience can be counted as "meaning" in the same way as indicated and denoted meanings is too complex to investigate in this short space. INDICATION OR SECONDARY MEANING To explain the function of lak܈a۬Ɨ, Mukula distinguishes between a speaker (vakt܀), a sentence meaning (vƗkya), and the utterance meaning (vƗcya). A speaker is simply someone who speaks a sentence (vƗkya) in SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 315 Table 1. Mukula and Ɩnanda's conceptions of linguistic powers Mukula Bha৬৬a Ɩnandavardhana mukhya mukhya Denotation Denotation lak܈a۬Ɨ  Indication vyañjanƗ Suggestion lak܈a۬Ɨ Indication HPQ 30_4 text.indd 315 1/21/14 10:55 AM 316 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY order for hearer to understand something. The term vƗkya refers to a syntactically unified expression constituting a meaning (eka-arthaۊ). In contrast, the gerundive vƗcya, literally, "that which is to be said," refers to what is conveyed by either mukya or lak܈a۬Ɨ by means of what the words denote.17 Mukula also distinguishes between contextual factors: place (deĞa), time (kƗla), and circumstance (avasthƗ). With these distinctions in hand, Mukula argues that lak܈a۬Ɨ is a matter of relating the utterance meaning to the sentence meaning, by making use of these contextual factors. In terms contemporary philosophers would recognize, utterance meaning is determined by the context, which consists of a speaker, place, time, and world (what Mukula calls "circumstance"). While he is not working with any explicitly modal framework like David Lewis's possible worlds, Mukula's notion of circumstance evidently goes beyond simply the place at which an utterance is taking place, since it is mentioned as being separate.18 It might refer to facts about the way the world is when a speaker utters a sentence (the term means something like "condition," "state," or "situation" and is used in Sanskrit dramaturgy to describe stages of development in a plot), but he says nothing more about this contextual factor. The general way in which indication is employed is a form of inference called arthƗpatti or presumption. MƯmƗূsƗ philosopher ĝabara (ca. 100 BCE) defines presumption as "the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already seen or heard of cannot be explained without that presumption."19 The traditional example is that, if we are given the facts that (1) Devadatta is alive and (2) Devadatta is not in his house, we must presume that Devadatta is alive outside of his house. We can generalize about the form of presumption as follows: Presumption q is presumed from p and m if: 1. p and m are two already-established facts and 2. The presumption of q is required to make p consistent with m. What lak܈a۬Ɨ does, by means of arthƗpatti, is to remove the apparent inconsistency between, for example, the sentence meaning and facts about the speaker or the sentence meaning and facts about the circumstance. A similar strategy is employed a little over a thousand years later by H. P. Grice, in "Logic and Conversation." He proposes a principle that he takes to guide the rationality of contributions to a conversation, at least when that conversation can be understood as being a cooperative effort: HPQ 30_4 text.indd 316 1/21/14 10:55 AM Cooperative Principle. Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.20 This principle is then divided into Grice's familiar four categories of maxims (some of which are divisible into submaxims) including the Maxim of Quantity, the Maxim of Quality, the Maxim of Relation, and the Maxim of Manner. With these maxims, Grice formulates the idea of conversational implicature, which he uses to explain how it is that we can utter a sentence like "He is in the grip of a vice" and mean by it that someone is caught in a bad character trait, not that someone is physically trapped by an instrument. Conversational Implicature S conversationally implicates that q in saying that p if S implicates q when: 1. S is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or the Cooperative Principle). 2. The supposition that S thinks that q is required to make saying "that p" consistent with this presumption. 3. S thinks, and expects H to think that S thinks, the hearer can work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that q is required. The structure of Gricean conversational implicature and MƯmƗূsaka arthƗpatti are closely analogous. In a case of lak܈a۬Ɨ, we are presented with a sentence meaning p and we must presume that S is implicating q by saying "that p." The inconsistency arises between the sentence meaning p and some facts about the speaker, place, time, or circumstance, which I above represented with m. On this reconstruction, m stands in for the conversational maxim(s) that have to do with these contextual facts. Thus, lak܈a۬Ɨ is essentially a form of implicature that functions by reconciling the sentence meaning with contextual factors. If this were indeed the case, we could neatly distinguish between mukhya as being the literal meaning of the constituent words in a sentence (meanings such as universals, qualities, actions, and objects of proper names) and lak܈a۬Ɨ as being what is implicated by the utterance of such a sentence in a given context. Unfortunately, things are not so simple. In what follows, I survey several examples of lak܈a۬Ɨ given by Mukula. I will demonstrate that this distinction cannot be maintained, at a detriment to Mukula's claim that he has given a consistent account of the proper domains of mukhya and lak܈a۬Ɨ. However, I argue that he has still given a cogent reply to Ɩnandavardhana's argument that a new linguistic power must be assumed. SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 317 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 317 1/21/14 10:55 AM 318 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY MUKULA'S INTRODUCTION TO LAK܇A۫Ɩ The first example of lak܈a۬Ɨ that Mukula analyzes is (1) gaur anubandhyaۊ(The cow is to be tied up) Based on what Mukula has said earlier about the referents of words, this sentence, which in Sanskrit consists of a noun and a gerundive, contains a universal-denoting term and an action-denoting term. Its denoted meaning, as understood from the powers of the words in composition, is that cowhood is the object of the action of tying. However, Mukula points out that it would not make sense to instruct someone to fasten the universal of cowhood to a stake in order to make a sacrifice, the context for this sentence. And further, he adds that the referential function of "gaur" has been exhausted by denoting cowhood because the denotative task of a word is simply to give its referent. This means that we have what is essentially a list: cowhood, to be brought. On the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ view, in order for "gaur" to have a syntactic relationship with "anubandhyaۊ," we must understand it as indicating a particular (though perhaps not a definite) cow, by lak܈a۬Ɨ. KumƗrila makes a similar observation about the sentence: (2) gam Ɨnaya (Bring a cow) Regarding this sentence, he says that "bring" simply gives us the general act of bringing, not the tense or injunctive mood. He reiterates Mukula's analysis of "cow" as referring to a universal. In this context, it is evident that a single cow is required, though maybe not Bessie as opposed to another cow, and so "a cow." He concludes that indication is responsible for the words having meanings (like particulars or temporally defined actions) that can be related to the other words in the sentence.21 Mukula only asserts that there is indication of the particular cow, not the particular action. The text is characteristically terse in its analysis, so it is unclear if this is due to Mukula's Grammarian notion of word reference or if he thinks that the process of lak܈a۬Ɨ is clear enough that he need not deal with the gerundive. One thing is clear: where a BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsaka would appeal to lak܈a۬Ɨ to explain a universal-denoting word being used as a quality, Mukula would not need to make such a move. In either case, lak܈a۬Ɨ here follows the typical structure of a presumptive inference. The inference is based on conflict between the known fact that "gaur" refers to cowhood (this is taken to as given by Mukula) and the fact that the referent of "gaur" must be the object of being tied up. Below, I reconstruct the presumption explicitly: Presumption of a Particular Cow. A particular cow is presumed from the fact that "cow" refers to cowhood and the fact that the referent of "cow" must be the object of being tied up if HPQ 30_4 text.indd 318 1/21/14 10:55 AM 1. The fact that "cow" refers to cowhood and the fact that the referent of "cow" must be the object of being tied up are two already established facts. 2. The presumption of "cow" as including the referent a particular cow is required to make the two consistent. While the solution-"cow" indicates a particular cow-initially seems to give up cowhood as the referent of "cow," Mukula explains that this is a kind of lak܈a۬Ɨ known as upƗdana, or "inclusion." That is to say, the particular cow that is indicated does not replace the universal cowhood, but the initial, literal referent is now included within the meaning of the indicated referent. We have indicated a particular cow, but all cows possess in the universal of cowhood, so the universal is still included in the referent of "cow."22 However, because here, lak܈a۬Ɨ functions in order to obtain the appropriate syntactic relations between words, it is not pragmatic. In fact, on KumƗrila's view, sentence meaning is invariably attained in this manner, or else we are left with a string of disconnected words, referring to universals but not doing much else.23 There is no sentence meaning or vƗkya for us to use as a basis for our presumption. The speaker has not said that p because, until we construe the words by lak܈a۬Ɨ as being in relationship, there is no p. I suggest that a better model for this kind of lak܈a۬Ɨ is found in the theory of sort-shifting. TYPEAND SORT-SHIFTING In the Western tradition of linguistics and philosophy of language, models of sortand type-shifting are used to represent the relationship between the semantics of expressions and assumptions about the world's ontology. "Type" refers to a coarse-grained distinction between such categories as entities, truth-values, and relationships. "Sort" is a further, fine-grained distinction between such categories as universals, particulars, groups, collections, masses, persons, and things. Type-shifting is an approach intended to explain the flexibility of semantic expressions. Expressions change their meanings as contexts change, but the proposal that there is a large number of lexical entries for every single word is implausible: How would speakers learn all these definitions? How would they know what to do with a novel instance? Further, contexts seem to underdetermine the meaning for many ambiguous expressions. We need an explanation of how hearers "narrow down" the range of possibilities. Rather than postulate multiple lexical entries, type-shifting suggests a mechanism that can take contextual values, ontological commitments, and principles of compositional semantics to generate the appropriate SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 319 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 319 1/21/14 10:55 AM 320 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY type for an expression in the given context. Sort-shifting operates with the same principles, but at more fine-grained level. Type-shifting might function to resolve the conflict between the types in the conjunct below: John and every woman arrived.24 In this sentence, "John" is an individual entity. The idea is that, when someone utters the sentence (3), there is no inferential process that a speaker must go through to resolve the ambiguity between John as an entity or John as a quantifier (intuitively, most speakers are not even aware that such ambiguity exists). Type-shifting functions automatically to resolve the ambiguity for the speaker. The benefit of the theory is its flexibility-the same expression can refer to various types without sacrificing compositional semantics. Being an entity is a primitive in type-shifting terms and is represented by "e." "Every woman" is a quantifier expression that ranges over entities that are women. One way of representing "every woman" is by using brackets, < >, to indicate its status as function. The quantifier expression is a function of type < <e,t>,t> where "t" represents the primitive notion of a truth-value. Thus, "every woman" is a function that takes as input a function from entities to truth-values, <e,t>, and returns a truth-value, t. We are unable to conjoin two nonlike types, but this is necessitated by the verb, so we shift "John" to the type < <e,t>,t>. 25 These types are taken from Richard Montague's generative semantics, which allows for individuals in the discourse, possible worlds, and moments of time.26 A noun such as "cow" might be understood as type <e, t> or a function from an individual (the cow) to a truth-value (which is true when the individual is a cow). Such a function might itself be the input for another function, such as an adjective, of type < <e,t>,<e,t> >. For example, "white" would take "cow" (a function from an individual to a truth-value) and yield a function from an individual to a truth-value. The function would map to "true" where there is a white cow and "false" where there is not. The motivation for this model aligns closely with the MƯmƗূsƗ claim that words have an eternal, unchanging, and single referent, which is a universal. Instead of multiple lexical entries for a verb that can take multiple kinds of complements, there is a single entry that shifts under contextual constraints. Importantly, the shift is coerced by the presence or absence of various compositional factors. However attractive such a sparse ontology of types may be for set-theoretic modeling, some recent approaches have been in favor of expanding the kind and number of inhabitants in the discourse model. Sorts, as described above, are included and axiomatic relations are HPQ 30_4 text.indd 320 1/21/14 10:55 AM drawn between the entities in the discourse. (It is possible that the commitments upon which speakers rely for meaning construction admit entities that we would not want in our final ontology.) Shifting models are employed to explain phenomena such as metonymy, ambiguity in genitive constructions, and so forth. The aim of sortand type-shifting models is to represent the various interpretive possibilities available to a hearer for a given expression in a context. These possibilities are understood as models that are consistent with the context and syntax. Below, I develop an example of sort-shifting before returning to Mukula. One area in which a sort-shifting model has been applied is genitive modifier phrases. Genitive modifier phrases have a head noun (N) in the nominative case and a noun phrase (NP) in the genitive case. Take, for example, stakan moloka (glass of milk) The N is "glass" (stakan), in the nominative case, and the NP is "of milk" (moloka), in the genitive case. The problem with a genitive construction is how to construe the "of" relationship between the N and NP. The glass is not constituted by milk as its material but is filled by the milk. Borschev and Partee (2001) understand the genitive case in Russian as being a type that seeks out a relationship with the head N. Which relationship is appropriate is given through the sortal information in the lexical entry of the head N. When this fails, that same lexical information, plus ontological commitments and context, allows us to shift sorts.27 The relationship between x and y depends on the semantic sort of the head noun, N. The meaning of "leg" as "part of the table" is made straightforwardly available by the context, where the reference to a piece of furniture makes the part-whole relationship salient. The problem is explaining for cases like stakan moloka how we move from one meaning for stakan-a physical entity that is a container-to another meaning for stakan-a quantity of something contained by such a container. These are two different types: the first is <e,t> and the second <e,<e,t> >, where the entity underlined, <e>, is what Borschev and Partee (2001) call a "relational entity." Since noun phrases in genitive constructions are always "looking for" a noun to relate with, their referent is an entity having some kind of relationship to another entity.28 One solution would be to propose multiple lexical entries for stakan. The word is simply polysemous. In addition to this simply pushing the problem back another level (how do we select which lexical entry is appropriate?), this puts a cognitive load on the interpreter. Further, as Borschev and Partee (2001, 148) point out with their imaginative example "full hat of mushrooms" (meaning a hat made out of mushrooms), we need SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 321 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 321 1/21/14 10:55 AM 322 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY an explanation of novel uses. Proposing that there is a lexical entry for "hat" which has it as a container burdens our lexicon unduly. What Borschev and Partee (2001) suggest is that sorts such as container or quantity function as their own quasi-lexical entries, or what they call "theories." A theory for the sort container might be as shown below: Container (y)(x) sort: physical object x usage: x can be used to hold/keep substances of the sort y form: x has an inner part and, when it is used to keep a substance y, y is inside x volume of x: the volume of x's inner part, so the volume of substance x can contain. Given such a theory, a shift-operater, which Borschev and Partee (2001, 149) call "Quant," can be invoked to shift the meaning of words that typically are of the sort container to be of the sort quantity. In the proper context, the shift-operator will take a semantic value that is of the sort container and output the sort quantity. A sort-shifting approach to metonymic and other phenomena identifies distinctions within a given type, rather than trying to multiply types. It is ontologically sparse, since sorts are reducible to the standard types in Montague semantics. Thus we might distinguish between plural individuals and groups, institutions and things, aggregates and stuff-even though each of these pairs could together belong to the same type. The result is that, for each sort, we have a theory, like the theory of container above. There are relationships between the sorts and internal relationships within the sorts (allowing for part-whole metonymic shifting). Shifting between sorts is governed by these axioms, which give us not only the possible available moves but which are most likely for a given sort (for example, there is a close relationship between individual persons and institutions). The trigger for such a shift could be explained by the lexical value of a word itself. Certain verbs may take only specific sorts as their direct object, or certain adjectives may modify only specific sorts, and so on. When there is a mismatch, what Borschev and Partee (2001, 153) call "sortal incorrectness," the result is a presupposition failure or, where possible, a coerced meaning shift. It is important to reiterate that Mukula is not working with this kind of framework, and we should be wary of attempts to shoehorn his four categories of upƗdhi, or ontological kinds, too tightly into a typeor HPQ 30_4 text.indd 322 1/21/14 10:55 AM sort-shifting theory. It may be possible to reconstruct a formal semantics from the texts of the Grammarians (after all, PƗ৆ini developed the world's first generative grammar), but this particular text is sparing with the details that would be required. My claim is simply this: that in sentences like (1) gaur anubandhyaۊabove, the way that Mukula describes lak܈a۬Ɨ as functioning is much more like sort-shifting than Gricean pragmatic implication. To illustrate this, I suggest a folk ontological theory of what a particular is: Particular (y)(x) sort: particular object x usage: x is the locus of y's inherence, where y is a universal form: x has a spatio-temporal location There could be a sort-shifting mechanism, Particular, which, when sentence (1) is uttered in a context suitable for a particular cow, shifts a semantic value of the sort universal to the sort particular. Because Mukula postulates that at least one category of words refers to universals, many sentences we utter will involve a shift from universals to particulars. MUKULA ON METAPHORIC TRANSFER These conceptual tools in hand, I now return to Mukula's analysis of instances of lak܈a۬Ɨ. After introducing the distinction between mukhya (denoted meaning) and lak܈a۬Ɨ (indication) with (1), he goes on to introduce what is also a well-known example in Indian philosophy, analyzed in terms of suggestion by Ɩnandavardhana: (5) gangƗyƗۨ gho܈aۊ(The village is on [the bank of] the Ganges.) Mukula categorizes this case as lak܈a۬a-lak܈a۬Ɨ, or indirect indication, in contrast to (1), which he describes as upƗdana-lak܈a۬Ɨ, or inclusive indication. In upƗdana-lak܈a۬Ɨ, the universal of cowhood is included as part of the new meaning of "cow," which is a particular cow. Cases of lak܈a۬a-lak܈a۬Ɨ, however, do not have such an inclusive nature, but rather are instances of replacement. In (5), the word "gangƗyƗۨ" or "Ganges" is in the locative case. Therefore, since the sentence would literally mean that the village is directly on top of the Ganges, we must understand, by indication, that "Ganges" means "bank of the Ganges." As Mukula puts it, a particular stream cannot be the substratum (adhikara۬a) of a village. We must understand something different: "bank." In contrast to (1), where cowhood is SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 323 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 323 1/21/14 10:55 AM 324 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY included as part of the meaning of a particular cow, a riverbank is not part of the meaning of "Ganges." Therefore, this is indirect indication. On Ɩnandavardhana's view, in the Argument from Transformation, this demonstrates that indication requires replacement of meaning, and suggestion cannot be cognized. Mukula goes on to argue against this, in an illustration of what I am calling "pragmatic indication": Presumption of the Bank. The bank is presumed from the fact that the speaker must be saying something true and the word "Ganges" refers to a particular river if 1. The fact that the speaker must be saying something true and the word "Ganges" refers to a particular river are two already established facts 2. The presumption of "Ganges" as instead referring to the bank of the Ganges is required to make the two consistent. In this case, the fact that the speaker is taken to be saying something true is a case of Grice's Maxim of Quality, and it is implicitly appealed to by Mukula. Later, Mukula explicitly appeals to something like the Maxim of Manner to explain why a speaker might not simply say "on the bank of the Ganges." The reason is that the Ganges is associated with sanctity and beauty, and the speaker wants to convey that the village, by proximity, shares in these properties. The indication of bank as the referent of "Ganges" is made salient because of the bank's close proximity to the river. On Ɩnandavardhana's account, in his Argument from Primariness, we cannot derive the suggestion of holiness from the meaning of "bank of the Ganges" because it is the river, not the bank, that is holy. Mukula argues that, because there is a relationship of nearness between the bank and the river, our understanding of the bank is influenced by our cognition of the river. Note, however, that the properties of purity and beauty-which are what Ɩnandavardhana argues are given by suggestion-are a consequence of the cognition of the referent of "Ganges," not its indicated meaning "bank." Thus, there is, as Mukula presents things, not a perfect match between indication and suggestion. However, Mukula concludes that the property of holiness, shared between the bank and the river, can, contra the Argument from Kind of Operation, be understood through indication. Further, this means that, even when indication replaces the literal meaning, there can be what is putatively "suggested," contra the argument from transformation. However, there is a further complication. Before we can employ arthƗpatti to recover the indicated meaning, we need to have a sentence meaning. This, as we have seen already, must also be generated by lak܈a۬Ɨ. Even if Mukula does not think that all words refer to universals HPQ 30_4 text.indd 324 1/21/14 10:55 AM (like the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ), "village" will not refer to a particular village until there has been a metonymic or similar shift. The Ganges is the object of a proper name, but, without understanding an implicit action ("is"), there is no way for the words to have syntactic unity. One obvious approach would be to argue that lak܈a۬Ɨ does all of this: it functions to unify the words in a sentence and recover something truthevaluable, and then it functions to recover something that is not only truth-evaluable but the likeliest candidate for what the speaker meant by the sentence in that context. There has been scant discussion, either in the original MƯmƗূsƗ textual tradition or in modern commentaries, about this problem. An exception is a short series of paragraphs in a brief essay written by K. K. Raja, primarily to compare Buddhist apoha theory and MƯmƗূsƗ lak܈a۬Ɨ. Raja observes, If an operation can effect only one result, we may have to accept two lak܈a۬Ɨ-s. But nobody has spoken about two lak܈a۬Ɨ-s while explaining verbal comprehension of the sentence-meaning, and the law of parsimony (lƗghava) requires the simpler approach in solving the problem. Hence it seems preferable to assume that only one lak܈a۬Ɨ is needed to explain the two effects.29 In support of this view, Raja cites the mid-seventeenth-century MƯmƗূsaka, NƗrƗya৆a Bha৬৬a, who says that the shift from universals to particulars is required for there to be a unified sentence meaning and that the resultant syntactic relations are also the result of lak܈a۬Ɨ. However, what Raja omits is that lak܈a۬Ɨ is also appealed to in cases where we have syntactic unity, but there is some other inconsistency between the sentence and context. If the principle, which Mukula has appealed to in the case of mukhya, is that a power is exhausted when it has attained its aim, then we do have a principle pairing an operation to a single effect. While perhaps we could plausibly understand a single operation that aims at an intelligible syntactic whole as consisting in several shifts in word-meaning, the aim of intelligibility in a context is of a different sort. And, in fact, Mukula himself, in his appeal to the difference between sentence meaning (vƗkya) and speaker meaning (vƗcya) has admitted as much. FAT DEVADATTA AND ARTHƖPATTI Complicating the situation for Mukula is the example of Fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day. This sentence is a traditional illustration of arthƗpatti found in the ĝloka-vƗrttika of the MƯmƗূsƗ philosopher KumƗrila. The sentence is as follows: (6) pƯno devadatto divƗ na bhu۬kte (Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day) SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 325 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 325 1/21/14 10:55 AM 326 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY Mukula identifies this as another case of upƗdana-lak܈a۬Ɨ or inclusive indication, just like (1) above. He says that the denotion of "fat" is fatness as qualified by not eating during the day. In this context, fatness as qualified by eating at night is indicated by arthƗpatti. The fatness as an effect includes eating at night in itself as a cause. For this reason, we have a case of inclusive indication because we are not understanding a new meaning for "fat" other than fatness. Instead, we simply include within fatness the appropriate cause. Further, Mukula suggests that we understand eating at night rather than drinking during the day because the speaker has said "does not eat during the day." As with (5), Mukula has ignored the necessity of generating a syntactic unity from a list of unconnected words. He does not have the same problem as the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ, since "fat" can refer to a quality, "Devadatta" to the object of a proper name, and "eat" to an action (with the caveat that it is unclear whether the action is general or particular). However, "day" is plausibly a universal-denoting term, and lak܈a۬Ɨ may be required to quantify over a particular range of days. The larger problem here is in Mukula's analysis of the case as analogous to (1) "The cow is to be tied up." It is simply a stretch to maintain that either "does not eat during the day" or "eats at night" is part of the meaning of "fat." What he is trying to do with this category of upƗdanalak܈a۬Ɨ is show that lak܈a۬Ɨ does not always require replacing the literal meaning with a new, indicated meaning. This is his response to the Argument from Transformation in which Ɩnandavardhana claims that lak܈a۬Ɨ always replaces the literal meaning with a new one. The idea is that the vƗkya (sentence meaning) is incompatible with the facts we know about fatness, like that it is typically a result of eating food, since to not eat food would result in starvation. Mukula appeals to something like Grice's Maxim of Manner in his observation that we get "eats at night" instead of "drinks a tonic" because the speaker has mentioned the time during which Devadatta does not eat. Therefore, we presume that she is implicating that Devadatta eats at night and expects us to recognize that this is the reason for her speaking in such a way. However, as we have seen, (1) is a case of what I am calling "semantic indication," which functions to unify the words in an uttered sentence in such a way as to recover a truth-evaluable sentence meaning. It is likely, though not necessary, that, in Mukula's theory, semantic lak܈a۬Ɨ functions for all sentence types (as it does for the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ). Now, sentence (6) is a case of "pragmatic indication," which functions to remove incompatibility between a sentence meaning (vƗkya) and contextual elements, relying on conversational norms akin to Gricean HPQ 30_4 text.indd 326 1/21/14 10:55 AM maxims to do so. The result is that there is an implication that Fat Devadatta eats at night, in order to resolve what might, prima facie, be an incoherent, though syntactically unified, utterance. Part of the motivation for Mukula's strained interpretation may be his commitment to the principle of eka-vƗkyatƗ or the requirement that there must be a unified meaning for every sentence. Without inserting, so to speak, the eating at night somewhere into the vƗkya, there is a problem: the speaker seems to mean two things. Further, Mukula does not want the result that the speaker is only saying that Fat Devadatta eats at night, since the literal meaning of the sentence must be preserved. CONCLUSION As presented, Mukula's analysis of the overlap between suggestion and indication is compelling. Using the examples that I have surveyed, Mukula targets Ɩnandavardhana's arguments from Primariness, Kind of Operation, and Transformation. He has shown that the underlying mechanism of presumption can ground both a semantic and pragmatic kind of indication. I have argued that, if he is to be successful in bringing suggestion completely into the sphere of indication, he must show that suggestion shares precisely the same function and domain as indication. By Mukula's own criteria for the demarcation of linguistic "powers," he has more than one kind of lak܈a۬Ɨ: a semantic indication that functions like a sort-shifting operator and a pragmatic indication that functions like Gricean implication. In his paradigmatic examples of lak܈a۬Ɨ, he appeals to both powers, but apparently without sensitivity to these distinctions, classifying a pragmatic case of lak܈a۬Ɨ with a semantic case. In effect, the proponents of vyañjanƗ could agree with Mukula that their power is pragmatic lak܈a۬Ɨ by another name, since the reductive strategy only succeeds if Mukula can show that he is not adding a new power to the two already accepted powers. Thus, the question remains: Is pragmatic lak܈a۬Ɨ a new power, or is it identical to one of the standard powers given by earlier philosophers? The response depends on which philosophical viewpoint one takes up. Further complicating the response for Mukula is that his text incorporates as many competing philosophical viewpoints as possible and attempts to formulate a hybrid account. While the BhƗ৬৬a MƯmƗূsƗ are explicitly committed to lak܈a۬Ɨ as the power that achieves syntactic unity in a sentence, the PrƗbhƗkara MƯmƗূsƗ are not. In fact, the PrƗbhƗkara think that words have referents only in the context of a sentence token. For them, there is no such thing as the referent of a word in isolation from other words, outside of an utterance context. Mukula discusses this view in a short section devoted to the competing SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 327 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 327 1/21/14 10:55 AM 328 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY theories of sentence meaning. He points out that whether one accepts the BhƗ৬৬a or the PrƗbhƗkara view of sentence meaning will impact at what stage (logically speaking) lak܈a۬Ɨ occurs. For the PrƗbhƗkara, lak܈a۬Ɨ will only have what I have been calling a pragmatic role, because the vƗkya is always determined in a context of utterance by the power of mukhya. Thus, if one is committed to the PrƗbhƗkara analysis of sentence meaning, vyañjanƗ seems to be within the scope of lak܈a۬Ɨ, as Mukula argues. While Mukula is trying to incorporate the PrƗbhƗkara views into his theory, in his explanation of (1) "The cow is to be tied up," he has sided against the PrƗbhƗkara in rejecting semantic lak܈a۬Ɨ. As Mukula puts things, for the BhƗ৬৬a, lak܈a۬Ɨ seems only to be semantic, since he says it comes before the sentence meaning or vƗkya. On the BhƗ৬৬a view, we do need an additional power to explain pragmatic implication. But Mukula does not want to accept that mukhya, or denotation, yields the particular cow as meant by gaur, since he is committed to the referent of "cow" being a universal, so he must accept semantic lak܈a۬Ɨ. This is why Mukula argues for what he calls a "combined theory," or "samuccaya," in which lak܈a۬Ɨ would occur in both stages. Mukula does not give the details of this combined theory in his text- how it is that we understand the referent of words, how the four lexical categories earlier given relate to this theory, etc. He simply states that, on a combined view, we have lak܈a۬Ɨ in both stages. Mukula's strategy is to expand lak܈a۬Ɨ to have both a semantic and pragmatic role, thus edging out the requirement for vyañjanƗ. It may be the case that Mukula's hybrid account of lak܈a۬Ɨ is ultimately a compelling explanation of the relationship between the referents of words, the meanings of sentences, the meanings of utterances, and contextual factors. However, we are lacking the details of such an account, and the account we have contains some internal inconsistencies. Perhaps these inconsistencies might be rectified (though this is not my task here). As presented, Mukula's analysis of the overlap between suggestion and indication is compelling. He has shown that lak܈a۬Ɨ can function in a pragmatic manner, based on the inferential process of arthƗpatti. However, if he is to be successful in bringing suggestion completely into the sphere of indication, he must show that they share the same function and domain. And as I have shown, the classic example of "the village on the Ganges" proves problematic in this regard.30 University of Texas at Austin HPQ 30_4 text.indd 328 1/21/14 10:55 AM NOTES 1. Abhinavagupta, writing his commentary on the DhvanyƗloka, argues for an additional power, tƗtparya-v܀tti, which is the capacity of a speaker, through her intention, to constitute a syntactic unity from a collection of words. Adding tƗtparya to the list yields four linguistic powers. Ɩnandavardhana, in contrast, identifies only three powers. I will not take up the question of tƗtparya in relationship to lak܈a۬Ɨ. This topic has been addressed by Raja 2000 and Gerow 1984, as well as others. 2. While this paper uses Sanskrit terminology and example sentences in the Sanskrit language, they are accompanied by English translations to assist the nonspecialist. Only a few, central Sanskrit terms remain untranslated, primarily because there is no theoretically neutral English translation readily available. 3. I say "broadly speaking" because the Indian Buddhist tradition had a very different view of meaning and understood the referents of words to be conceptual constructions or vikalpa. 4. Ğabda-vyƗpƗrato yasya pratƯtis yasya mukyatƗ artha-avaseyasya punar lak܈yamƗ۬atvam ucyate. Bha৬৬a 1977, 203. 5. viĞe܈yaۨ na abhidhƗ gacchet k܈Ư۬a-Ğaktir viĞe܈a۬e iti nyƗyƗc chabdasya jƗti-mƗtra-pari-avasƗyitvƗt. Bha৬৬a 1977, 201. 6. As Jonarden Ganeri has aptly shown in his exposition of NaiyƗyika theories of meaning, Indian philosophy of language was interested in what contemporary philosophers working in model theoretic semantics call "assignment functions." Thus, they were trying to ascertain what relationship held between the words in a language and their meanings, where meanings are entities external to the speaker/hearer (in other words, not mental concepts). See Ganeri 2011, 34ff. 7. Ğabda-vyƗpƗrƗd yasya avyƗdhƗna avagatis mukhyatvam. Bha৬৬a 1977, 203. 8. sa hi yathƗ sarvebhyo hasta-Ɨdibhyo 'vayavebhyaۊpnjrvam mukham avalokyate tadvad eva sarvebhyaۊpratƯyamƗnebhyo 'rtha-antarebhyaۊpnjrvam avagamyate. Bha৬৬a1977, 203. 9. In his discussion of aropa (superimposed) and ƗdhyavasƗna (suppressed) indication, he observes that for very conventional cases, there is no cognition of a relationship between the denotative and indicated meanings, but only the indicated meaning by itself. It is by reflection, or vicƗra۬a, that we come to know the relationship, and the denotative meaning. Bha৬৬a 1977, 208. 10. See the discussion of rƗjan in section 6.2, Bha৬৬a 1977, 226. 11. While Mukula is clearly indebted to the MƯmƗূsa, he also has views in line with the Grammarians. It is unclear with which philosophical school, if any, he aligned himself. See McCrea 2008, 264. SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 329 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 329 1/21/14 10:55 AM 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY 12. For more details on the dispute between the PrƗbhƗkara and BhƗ৬৬a on sentence meaning, see Siderits 1991 and Taber 1989. Taber's point (429n20) is well taken and ought to be kept in mind throughout my presentation: the PrƗbhƗkara do not deny that there can be a context-independent core to words, but they do deny that a word successfully picks anything out, or designates anything, outside of a particular sentence. 13. See Jha 1942, 146ff. 14. Ɩnandavardhana 1990, 122. 15. Ibid., 562–63. 16. This aim is stated explicitly only at the end of the work: "lak܈a۬ƗmƗr ga avagƗhitvaۨ tu dhvaneۊsah܀dayair nnjtanatayopavar۬itasya vidyata iti diĞam unmnjlayitum idam atra uktam." However, as McCrea (2008) has convincingly argued, the entire work is structured around this goal and ought to be understood in terms of it. 17. sa-ƗkƗ۬k܈Ɨ۬Ɨۨ padƗnƗm eka-arthaۊsamnjho vƗkyam. Ğabdena mukhyaۨ lƗk܈a۬ikam abhidhƗ-vyƗpƗram ƗĞritya yad gocarƯ-kriyate tad vƗcyam. Bha৬৬a 1977, 209. 18. See Lewis 1986. 19. Jha 1942, 157. 20. Grice 1989, 26. The following principles and maxims are taken directly from Grice's "Logic and Conversation." 21. Jha 1942, 152. See Ganeri 2011, 15–18, on KumƗrila's analysis. He concludes that the distinction between definite and indefinite uses (or when a particular cow is indicated or a universal class property is literally denoted) is a "pragmatic one." In my terminology, this kind of metonymical shift falls under "semantic" indication because it is a more or less automatic process driven by compositional principles rather than Gricean conversational maxims. 22. Mukula does not take up the metaphysics of how individuals are related to jƗti, or "universals." For a discussion of this topic, see Scharf 1996. 23. Raja 2000, 210. 24. Pustejovsky 1993, 76. 25. As with Gricean implicatures, the details are contentious. Here, I am sketching the general idea to motivate my reconstruction of Mukula. 26. See, for example, Partee 1976. 27. Borschev and Partee 2001, 144. The original accounts of sort-shifting and type-shifting can be found in Partee and Rooth 1983 and Partee and Borschev 1998. For the sake of illustration, I have adapted examples from their recent analysis of the Russian genitive, simply for the clarity with which this paper sets out the details. 28. Formalizations can be found in Borschev and Partee 2001. This relational N can be represented as: !y!x [Thing(x) & Related-to-y(x)]. My argument does HPQ 30_4 text.indd 330 1/21/14 10:55 AM not require a particular transformation into lambda calculus, so I omit these details for the sake of perspicuity. 29. Raja 1993, 199. 30. I would like to thank Josh Dever, Larry McCrea, Stephen Phillips, and the members of the UT Austin Dissertation Seminar for reading earlier drafts of this paper. REFERENCES Ɩnandavardhana. 1990. The DhvanyƗloka of Ɩnandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta. Edited and translated by Daniel H. H. Ingalls. Number 49 in Harvard Oriental Series. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Bha৬৬a, Mukula. 1977. "AbhidhƗv৚ttimƗt৚kƗ." Edited and translated by K. Venugopalan. Journal of Indian Philosophy 4: 203–64. Borschev, Vladmir, and Barbara Partee. 2001. "Genitive Modifiers, Sorts, and Metonymy." Nordic Journal of Linguistics 24: 140–60. Ganeri, Jonardon. 2011. Artha: Meaning. New York: Oxford University Press. Gerow, Edwin. 1984. "Language and Symbol in Indian Semiotics." Philosophy East and West 34, no. 3: 245–60. Grice, H. P. 1989. "Logic and Conversation." In Studies in the Way of Words, ed. H. P. Grice, 22–57. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Jha, GañganƗtha. 1942. Pnjrva MƯmƗۨsƗ in Its Sources. Benares: Benares Hindu University. Lewis, David. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. McCrea, Lawrence. 2008. "Mukulabha৬৬a and PratƯhƗrendurƗja." In The Teleology of Poetics in Medieval Kashmir, 260–310. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Partee, Barbara. 1976. Montague Grammar. New York: Academic Press. Partee, Barbara, and Vladimir Borschev. 1998. "Integrating Lexical and Formal Semantics: Genitives, Relational Nouns, and Type-shifting." In Proceedings of the Second Tbilisi Symposium on Language, Logic, and Computation, ed. Robin Cooper and Thomas Gamkrelidze, 229–41. Tbilisi: Center on Language, Logic, Speech, Tbilisi State University. Partee, Barbara, and Mats Rooth. 1983. "Generalized Conjunction and Typeambiguity." In Meaning, Use, and the Interpretation of Language, ed. Rainer Bauerle, Christoph Schwarze, and Arnim von Stechow, 361–83. Berlin: de Gruyter. SORT-SHIFTING IN CLASSICAL INDIAN LANGUAGE 331 HPQ 30_4 text.indd 331 1/21/14 10:55 AM 332 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERLY Pustejovsky, James. 1993. "Type Coercion and Lexical Selection." In Semantics and the Lexicon, 73–94. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Raja, K. K. 1993. "Buddhist and MƯmƗূsƗ Views on Lakৢa৆Ɨ." In Researches in Indian and Buddhist Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Professor Alex Wayman, ed. R. K. Sharma, 196–201. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. ---. 2000. Indian Theories of Meaning. Adyar: The Adyar Library and Research Centre. Scharf, Peter M. 1996. The Denotation of Generic Terms in Ancient Indian Philosophy: Grammar, NyƗya and MƯmƗۨsa. Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society. Siderits, Mark. 1991. Indian Philosophy of Language. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Taber, John. 1989. "The Theory of Sentence Meaning in Pnjrva MƯmƗূsƗ and Western Philosophy." Journal of Indian Philosophy 17: 407–30. HPQ 30_4 text.indd 332 1/21/14 10:55 AM