Political	Disagreement	or	Partisan	Badmouthing? The	Role	of	Expressive	Discourse	in	Politics Michael	Hannon University	of	Nottingham Abstract A striking feature of political discourse is how prone we are to disagree. Political opponents will even give different answers to factual questions, which suggests that opposing parties cannot agree on facts any more than they can on values. This impression is	widespread	and	supported	by	survey	data. I	will	argue,	however,	that	the extent and depth of political disagreement is largely overstated. Many political disagreements are merely illusory. This claim has several important upshots. I will explore	the	implications	of	this	idea	for	theories	about	voter	misinformation,	motivated reasoning, public reason liberalism, deliberative democracy, and a number of other issues. Don't	boo.	Vote. –	Barack	Obama 1.	Introduction Is	Barack	Obama	the	founder	of	ISIS?	Was	he	born	in	the	United	States?	Does	the	United	Kingdom send	£350	million	to	the	European	Union	each	week?	Would	the	world	be	safer	if	everyone	owned a	gun?	Is	global	warming	going	to	be	catastrophic	if	we	don't	take	immediate	action? These	questions	provoke	strong	disagreement.	So	do	plenty	of	others.	Political	opponents	cannot agree	on	matters	concerning	the	economy,	foreign	affairs,	education,	energy,	health	care,	the environment,	privatization,	and	immigration.	In	the	United	States,	nearly	half	of	all	Republicans	and Democrats	say	they	"almost	never"	agree	with	the	other	party's	positions	(Doherty	et	al.	2016). When	it	comes	to	politics,	there	seems	to	be	no	end	to	the	number	of	issues	over	which	people disagree. Political	disagreement	is	often	a	good	thing	for	a	healthy	democracy.	We	expect	values	and preferences	to	differ	in	a	pluralistic	society,	and	reasonable	citizens	understand	that	people	of	good will	can	disagree	about	moral	and	political	issues	(Rawls	1993).	For	this	reason,	theorizing	about liberal	democracy	has	focused	largely	on	moral	and	political	disagreements,	while	taking	for 2 granted	that	citizens	tend	to	agree	on	the	facts.	But	this	assumption	no	longer	seems	valid.	Today, partisan	disagreements	often	go	beyond	political	values	and	even	include	disputes	about	obvious matters	of	fact.1	In	the	United	States,	for	example,	Democrats	and	Republicans	disagree	about whether	the	GDP	has	gone	up	or	down,	whether	unemployment	rates	are	better	or	worse,	how many	immigrants	entered	the	United	States	illegally,	and	many	other	issues.	Consider	the	issue	of climate	change.	The	extent	and	causes	of	climate	change	are	scientific	issues	that	should	be	settled independently	of	one's	political	beliefs.	Yet	politics	seems	to	drive	our	beliefs	about	the	facts instead	of	the	facts	driving	policy. This	is	a	big	problem	for	democratic	politics.	If	partisanship	is	shaping	our	perceptions	of	reality, then	democratic	decision-making	becomes	incredibly	difficult.	Without	agreement	on	the	facts, voters	will	be	unable	to	hold	representatives	accountable,	to	productively	deliberate	with	others, and	to	find	political	compromise. But	is	political	disagreement	as	extensive	and	deep	as	many	have	claimed?	I	want	to	argue	that many	apparent	political	disagreements	are	not	genuine	disagreements.	I	will	draw	on	three	sources of	evidence	to	justify	this	claim. First,	I	will	argue	that	voters	are	increasingly	polarized	in	terms	of	their	attitudes	towards	each other,	even	though	there	has	been	comparatively	little	polarization	on	the	issues.	As	Lilliana	Mason (2018)	puts	it,	politics	is	increasingly	characterized	by	"uncivil	agreement".	Voters	have	grown	more partisan,	angry,	and	biased	against	their	political	opponents,	but	these	reactions	have	almost nothing	to	do	with	one's	opinions	about	the	issues.	We	are	simply	behaving	as	if	we	disagree. Second,	I	will	argue	that	survey	data	tends	to	exaggerate	the	level	of	disagreement	in	politics.	When surveyed	about	political	issues,	people	often	deliberately	misreport	their	beliefs	as	a	way	to	express their	attitudes.	This	is	called	"expressive	responding".	People	engage	in	this	behaviour	for	at	least two	reasons:	either	partisans	know	the	truth	but	prefer	to	"cheerlead"	when	there	is	nothing	to gain	from	accuracy,	or	they	are	ignorant	on	the	issue	and	they	offer	a	congenial	answer	as	their	best guess.	Either	way,	survey	responses	are	not	entirely	sincere.	Thus,	we	should	not	interpret	these responses	as	evidence	that	partisans	are	unable	to	agree. 1	Sinnott-Armstrong	(2018)	and	Bartels	(2002). 3 Third,	I	will	argue	that	voters	often	claim	to	have	policy	convictions	when,	in	fact,	they	do	not	have stables	political	beliefs	at	all.	Here	I	follow	the	democratic	'realists'	who	argue	that	people	vote largely	on	the	basis	of	partisan	loyalties,	not	sincere	policy	preferences	(Achen	and	Bartels	2016). Although	many	citizens	will	describe	themselves	as	"liberal"	or	"conservative",	they	actually	lack stable	beliefs	fitting	these	ideological	self-descriptions.	What	seems	like	deep	political	disagreement is	actually	superficial	and	inauthentic. All	this	suggests	that	political	disagreement	is	neither	as	deep	nor	as	extensive	as	we	may	have thought.	What	follows	from	this	fact? There	are	several	important	upshots,	which	I	will	explore	in	the	second	half	of	this	paper.	For example,	I	will	argue	that	insincere	disagreement	explains	why	debates	often	go	so	poorly,	why people	seem	to	hold	blatantly	contradictory	beliefs,	and	why	it	is	often	so	difficult	to	correct	false beliefs.	I	will	also	discuss	some	positive	and	negative	implications	of	the	idea	that	political disagreement	is	often	illusory.	On	the	positive	side,	I	will	argue	that	political	surveys	tend	to overstate	the	level	of	political	misinformation,	that	motivated	reasoning	is	not	distorting	our perceptions	of	reality	as	often	as	many	scholars	claim,	and	that	there	is	less	disagreement	over	the facts	than	survey	data	suggest.	This	is	good	news.	On	the	negative	side,	however,	it	seems	that voters	are	not	supporting	policies	based	on	their	actual	content,	that	we	cannot	decrease polarization	by	reasoned	debate,	and	that	people	are	not	genuinely	interested	in	engaging	with	the other	side. 2.	Division	Without	Disagreement According	to	a	common	view	of	politics,	voters	tend	to	choose	the	political	party	that	best	matches their	own	interests	and	issue	positions.	This	is	the	"folk	theory	of	democracy"	(Achen	and	Bartels 2016).	Imagine	a	voter	who	thinks	that	corporate	and	individual	tax	cuts	will	help	create	a	booming economy,	and	that	there	is	a	critical	need	for	an	immigration	policy	that	secures	the	border	and limits	migration.	Such	a	person	is	likely	to	vote	Republican,	according	to	the	folk	theory,	because the	Republican	Party	will	better	represent	this	voter's	interests	and	values.	The	folk	theory	predicts that	party	affiliation	is	strongly	linked	to	issue	positions,	since	voters	will	choose	to	support whichever	party	best	fits	their	political	preferences. 4 The	folk	theory	of	democracy	is	intuitive,	rational,	and	widely	accepted.	It	is	also	mistaken. In	Uncivil	Agreement,	Lilliana	Mason	argues	that	citizens	do	not	base	their	voting	decisions	primarily on	the	proximity	of	the	policy	positions	of	parties	to	the	voters'	own	positions.	Rather,	their decisions	are	based	on	social	identity.	A	'social	identity'	involves a	subjective	sense	of	belonging	to	a	group	that	is	internalized	to	varying	degrees, resulting	in	individual	differences	in	identity	strength,	a	desire	to	positively	distinguish	the group	from	others,	and	the	development	of	ingroup	bias.	(Mason	et	al.	2015:	3) Social	identity	theory	is	a	powerful	foundation	to	study	partisanship	and	political	behavior.	On	this model,	the	strength	of	a	person's	partisanship	can	derive	from	a	number	of	influences	that	have nothing	to	do	with	political	issues;	in	particular,	partisan	strength	seems	to	be	rooted	in	social group	memberships,	social	networks,	and	cultural	identity.2	These	influences	may	increase	the strength	of	partisanship	without	any	corresponding	increase	in	the	extremity	of	issue	positions (Mason	2018	and	Iyengar	et	al.	2012).3 This	captures	the	current	state	of	American	politics.	On	the	one	hand,	Democrats	and	Republicans are	increasingly	polarized	in	the	sense	that	they	dislike	each	other	more	than	ever,	ascribe	negative traits	to	members	of	the	other	side,	and	even	claim	that	they	would	be	upset	if	their	children married	someone	from	the	other	party	(Iyengar	et	al.	2012).	On	the	other	hand,	there	has	been almost	no	increase	in	the	extremity	of	issue	positions	in	the	mass	public	(Iyengar	et	al.	2012; Iyengar	et	al.	2019;	and	Fiorina	and	Abrams	2008).4	To	borrow	some	terminology	from	Iyengar	and his	colleagues	(2012),	there	has	been	an	increase	in	"affective	polarization"	without	a corresponding	increase	in	"issue-based	polarization".	Affective	polarization	is	characterized	by increased	partisan	strength,	partisan	bias,	political	activism,	and	anger,	while	issue-based polarization	occurs	when	citizens	move	from	moderate	issue	positions	to	more	extreme	ones. Although	there	has	been	increased	issue-based	polarization	at	the	level	of	political	elites	(e.g., 2	See	Campbell	et	al.	(1960)	and	Mutz	(2002)	for	a	discussion. 3	'Extremity'	refers	to	a	person's	movement	from	moderate	positions	on	issues	to	more	extreme	positions,	i.e.,	stating	that	they are	more	strongly	committed	to	their	chosen	positions	and	allowing	for	less	uncertainty	in	their	responses	(Mason	2013:	142). 4	Abramowitz	and	Saunders	(2008)	contest	this	claim.	See	Fiorina	et	al.	(2008)	for	a	reply. 5 members	of	Congress),	there	is	little	evidence	that	ordinary	citizens	increasingly	disagree	on	the issues.5	Rather,	they	simple	dislike,	even	loathe,	each	other	more. All	this	suggests	that	partisans	have	grown	increasingly	distant	and	hostile	toward	each	other	even though	their	policy	disagreements	are	not	profound.	In	fact,	Democrats	and	Republicans	do	not differ	that	much	on	matters	of	public	policy.	Rather,	they	continue	to	hold	relatively	inconsistent policy	attitudes,	and	have	done	so	for	decades.6	For	example,	Mason	measured	Americans' preferences	on	six	major	issues	–	immigration,	the	Affordable	Care	Act,	abortion,	same-sex marriage,	gun	control,	and	the	relative	importance	of	reducing	the	deficit	or	unemployment	–	and found	that	identifying	as	a	"liberal"	or	"conservative"	only	explained	a	small	part	of	their	issue positions.	It	seems	that	people	are	polarized	by	labels	such	as	"liberal"	and	"conservative"	(and what	they	imagine	their	opponents	to	be	like)	more	than	they	are	by	actual	disagreements	over issues	like	taxes,	abortion,	and	immigration.	As	a	result,	Americans	have	become	angrier	at	their political	opponents	while	not	disagreeing	with	them	on	many	issues. Why,	then,	do	liberals	and	conservatives	hate	each	other	so	much?	If	these	feeling	are	not	rooted	in policy	disagreements,	what	are	they	based	on? A	variety	of	complicated	factors	might	explain	why	partisans	are	increasingly	affectively	polarized. For	example,	the	proliferation	of	partisan	news	outlets	and	high-choice	media	environment	is frequently	blamed	for	the	current	polarized	environment	(Lelkes	et	al.	2017).	But	this	explanation might	get	things	backwards:	those	who	are	most	polarized	are	also	more	motivated	to	watch partisan	news;	thus,	partisan	news	may	not	be	the	cause	of	affective	polarization.7	It	is	also common	to	blame	the	Internet	and	social	media	for	echo	chambers,	filter	bubbles,	and	polarization; but	the	relationship	between	Internet	access	and	affective	polarization	has	also	been	contested 5	According	to	data	from	the	Pew	Research	Center	(2014),	the	partisan	gap	has	increased	on	some	issues	over	the	past	few decades.	For	example,	when	asked	whether	"government	regulation	of	business	usually	does	more	harm	than	good",	the partisan	gap	has	more	than	doubled	from	1994	to	2004.	Similarly,	when	asked	whether	"stricter	environmental	laws	and regulations	cost	too	many	jobs	and	hurt	the	economy",	the	partisan	gap	has	more	than	tripled	during	the	same	twenty-year period.	I	will	not	deny	that	there	is	some	evidence	of	a	partisan	gap	on	the	issues.	However,	I	doubt	that	these	differences reflect	changes	in	genuine	beliefs	(as	I'll	argue	in	section	3).	Rather,	these	changes	reflect	changes	in	the	social	returns	of cheerleading.	This	fits	nicely	with	the	recent	empirical	work	showing	there	has	been	a	large	increase	in	affective	polarization.	As the	strength	of	partisanship	increases,	people	become	more	motivated	to	engage	in	cheerleading	behavior.	This	also	explains why	the	partisan	"gap"	is	most	pronounced	during	campaign	seasons,	since	elections	may	make	more	salient	the	need	to support	one's	party	(Iyengar	et	al.	2012). 6	Converse	(1964);	Achen	and	Bartels	(2016);	Kinder	and	Kalmoe	(2017);	Mason	(2018). 7	See	Arceneaux	and	Johnson	(2013)	and	Prior	(2013).	In	contrast,	Levendusky	(2013)	finds	that	exposure	to	partisan	news makes	those	with	extreme	attitudes	even	more	extreme. 6 (Boxell	et	al.	2017).	Levi	Boxell	and	colleagues	(2017)	found	that	affective	polarization	has	increased the	most	among	those	who	use	the	Internet	and	social	media	the	least. According	to	Mason,	the	primary	driver	of	increased	political	animosity	is	"partisan-ideological sorting".	Over	the	past	few	decades,	political	parties	have	grown	more	socially	homogeneous	and cultural	identities	have	demographically	coalesced.	For	example,	White	evangelicals	are overwhelmingly	Republican	today,	and	African	Americans	overwhelmingly	identify	as	democrats.	In general,	political	identities	are	now	increasingly	aligned	with	other	social	divisions	in	American,	such as	race	and	religion	(Abramowitz	2013).	As	a	result,	social	identities	are	no	longer	cutting	across partisan	identities;	the	odds	of	encountering	people	from	the	other	party	have	therefore	decreased. According	to	Mason,	this	is	at	the	root	of	affective	polarization.	She	has	shown	that	people	are increasingly	viewing	members	of	the	other	party	as	an	"other,"	relying	on	stereotypes,	and	are more	prone	to	prejudice.	As	political	parties	grow	more	socially	homogenous,	their	members	are quicker	to	anger	and	tend	toward	intolerance	(Mason	2018;	Iyengar	et	al.	2019;	Ahler	and	Sood 2018). Whatever	the	exact	causes	of	polarization	might	be,	it	is	widely	acknowledged	that	the strengthening	of	partisan	identities	has	little	to	do	with	the	issues	and	almost	everything	to	do	with group	loyalty	and	group	identity.	Once	we	identify	with	a	particular	party,	we	highly	motivated	to protect	and	advance	our	group's	status.	This	is	identity	politics	at	its	worst.	"Liberals"	and "conservatives"	tend	to	hate	each	other	but	this	hatred	has	almost	nothing	to	do	with	their opinions	on	the	issues.8	They	dislike	the	other	team	simply	because	they	are	the	other	team.9	As	a consequence,	we	have	an	electorate	that	is	increasingly	divided	and	raring	to	fight,	yet	there	is	a lack	of	any	substantive	policy	reasons	to	do	so.	Although	Democrats	and	Republicans	conceive	of themselves	as	disagreeing	over	substantive	issues	like	tax	policy,	health	care,	and	government regulation,	the	political	conflict	in	America	is	not	really	about	these	things.	It	is	rather	about	team identification	and	winning	for	its	own	sake. 8	As	Mason	(2018:	ch.5)	points	out,	Democrats	who	also	label	themselves	as	liberals	are	more	likely	to	dislike	Republicans,	even when	those	same	Democrats	express	relatively	moderate	or	even	conservative	issue	positions. 9	This	is	reminiscent	of	the	conflict	between	the	Rattlers	and	the	Eagles	in	Henri	Tajfel's	(1981)	landmark	study	of	group identity.	These	boys	desperately	wanted	to	defeat	each	other	for	no	reason	other	than	that	they	were	in	different	groups. 7 3.	Political	Expressivism As	the	previous	section	illustrates,	people	often	behave	as	though	they	disagree	even	when	there isn't	much	disagreement.	This	is	because	partisanship	can	affect	our	attitudes	towards	others without	necessarily	affecting	our	beliefs	about	the	relevant	issues. Partisanship	can	also	lead	people	to	say	things	that	create	the	appearance	of	disagreement.	In particular,	people	may	deliberately	misreport	their	political	beliefs	as	a	way	to	express	their attitudes.	This	is	called	"expressive	responding".	It	has	also	been	described	as	"cheerleading" (Bullock	et	al.	2015). Sometimes	it	is	obvious	that	partisans	are	just	cheerleading.	Consider	what	Trump	supporters	say when	asked	to	compare	photos	of	his	2017	inauguration	crowd	and	Obama's	in	2009.	In	a	survey	of almost	700	American	adults,	participants	were	shown	a	crowd	picture	from	each	inauguration	and asked	a	very	simple	question:	"Which	photo	has	more	people?"	Although	only	one	answer	is	clearly correct,	Trump	supporters	were	six	times	more	likely	(compared	to	Clinton	voters	and	nonvoters)	to say	that	the	half-empty	photo	of	Trump's	inauguration	had	more	people.	Trump	supporters	with college	degrees	were	the	most	likely	to	answer	incorrectly:	26%	of	them	gave	the	clearly	wrong answer.10 Do	these	people	really	believe	there	are	more	people	in	the	obviously	half-empty	photo?	It	would be	mistaken	to	interpret	their	responses	in	this	way.	Instead,	some	Trump	supporters	clearly decided	to	express	their	support	for	Trump	rather	than	to	answer	the	question	factually.	As Elizabeth	Anderson	(2019)	puts	it,	"it	is	a	way	of	showing	those	smug	liberal	academics	[who	were conducting	the	survey]	that	Trump	voters	will	stand	their	ground	in	repudiating	insults	toward	their group."	They	were	not	making	a	factual	claim;	their	answer	was	expressive. 10	On	average,	15%	of	Trump	supporters	selected	the	half-empty	inauguration	photo	(compared	to	2%	of	Clinton	voters	and	3% of	nonvoters).	But	this	number	almost	doubles	when	we	look	just	at	Trump	supporters	with	college	degrees,	which	is	a common	proxy	for	political	engagement.	The	explanation	for	this	increase	is	that	"Trump	supporters	with	more	engagement	in politics	were	more	likely	to	have	understood	the	controversy	about	the	inauguration	crowds,	[so]	they	were	more	likely	to choose	the	wrong	photo	as	a	way	of	supporting	Trump	in	the	debate"	(Schaffner	and	Luks	2018:	140). 8 Expressive	responding	may	also	explain	why	approximately	one	in	seven	Americans	says	that Obama	is	"the	antichrist".11	Do	these	people	really	believe	this?	Maybe	they	do.	But	a	far	more likely	scenario	is	that	such	reports	reflect	partisan	cheerleading	rather	than	genuine	belief. How	often	do	people	misreport	their	beliefs? Probably	a	lot.	A	seminal	finding	of	new	research	in	political	behaviour	is	that	what	seems	like factual	disagreement	is	often	just	partisan	cheerleading.	For	example,	John	Bullock	and	colleagues (2015)	find	that	partisans	tend	to	give	more	accurate	(and	less	partisan)	responses	to	politically charged	questions	when	offered	monetary	incentives	to	do	so.	As	a	result,	the	gap	between Democrats	and	Republicans	in	response	to	factual	questions	sharply	decreases.	More	specifically, small	payments	for	correct	answers	reduced	partisan	divergence	by	at	least	60%.	They	reduce	by 80-100%	when	participants	are	paid	both	for	correct	responses	and	a	smaller	amount	for	admitting they	do	not	know	the	correct	response.12 The	dramatic	effects	of	a	small	incentive	for	accuracy-or	a	smaller	incentive	to	admit	that	one doesn't	know	the	answer-suggests	that	survey	responses	often	reflect	"the	expressive	value	of making	statements	that	portray	one's	party	in	a	favourable	light"	(Bullock	et	al.	2015:	521).	As	Gary Langer,	former	chief	pollster	for	ABC	News,	aptly	remarks:	"some	people	who	strongly	oppose	a person	or	proposition	will	take	virtually	any	opportunity	to	express	that	antipathy...not	to	express their	'belief,'	in	its	conventional	meaning,	but	rather	to	throw	verbal	stones." This	finding	is	supported	by	multiple	independent	studies.13	Markus	Prior	and	colleagues	(2015) asked	members	of	the	public	about	objective	economic	conditions,	such	as	whether	the	level	of employment	has	gotten	better	or	worse.	They	found	that	supporters	of	the	current	president's party	tended	to	report	more	positive	economic	conditions	than	its	opponents,	but	this	tendency 11	https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/02/americans-obama-anti-christ-conspiracy-theories. 12	The	size	of	the	reduction	depends	on	the	size	of	the	incentives.	When	incentives	were	at	their	largest-$1	for	each	correct answer	and	$0.33	for	each	"don't	know"	response-partisan	differences	vanished	almost	entirely	(Bullock	et	al.	2015:	550-55). When	a	partisan	gap	remains,	there	are	at	least	two	explanations.	The	people	responsible	for	this	gap	may	sincerely	disagree about	which	response	is	correct.	Alternatively,	they	may	agree	about	the	correct	answer	but	nevertheless	value	partisan cheerleading	more	than	receiving	a	small	reward	for	answering	accurately. 13	See	also	the	studies	by	Huber	and	Yair	(2018)	and	Khanna	and	Sood	(2018). 9 was	significantly	reduced	when	survey-takers	were	financially	motivated	to	answer	factual questions	accurately.14 In	another	experiment,	participants	were	provided	with	statistical	data-from	a	hypothetical	study on	gun	control-about	concealed	carry	laws	(Khanna	and	Sood	2018).	The	data	supported	either the	view	that	banning	guns	will	decrease	crime	or	that	it	would	increase	crime.	Participants	were then	asked	whether	cities	with	a	ban	were	more	likely	to	experience	an	increase	or	decrease	in crime	than	cities	without	a	ban.	To	measure	expressive	responding,	a	random	set	of	participants was	offered	a	small	financial	nudge	of	$0.10	for	the	correct	answer.	To	ensure	that	incentives	did not	affect	how	people	processed	the	information	about	concealed	carry	laws,	participants	were	not told	about	the	incentive	until	after	they	had	seen	the	statistical	data	(and	could	not	return	to	it). The	results	showed	partisan	cheerleading.	Without	incentives,	respondents	tended	to	give	incorrect but	congenial	answers	even	when	they	had	correct	but	uncongenial	information.	When	provided incentives,	however,	participants	were	far	less	willing	to	report	inaccurate	but	ideologically congenial	interpretations	of	data.15	This	further	indicates	that	survey	responses	are	not	always sincere.	Partisans	will	knowingly	give	incorrect	answers	to	support	their	"team"	simply	because	they lack	the	incentive	to	answer	truthfully.16 If	these	survey	responses	reflected	actual	beliefs,	then	paying	partisans	to	answer	correctly	should not	affect	their	responses.	Yet	it	does.	The	observed	gaps	between	Democrats	and	Republicans	are substantially	reduced	with	relatively	small	payments.	This	suggests	that	partisans	"do	not	hold starkly	different	beliefs	about	many	important	facts"	(Bullock	et	al.	2015:	522).	Further,	it	indicates that	partisans	have	the	capacity	to	acknowledge	inconvenient	truths	and	are	willing	to	report	them when	motivated	to	do	so.	Without	adequate	incentives,	however,	the	motivation	to	give	an	answer that	supports	one's	political	party	may	outweigh	the	motivation	to	give	an	accurate	response.	This 14	An	alternative	explanation,	suggested	to	me	by	Neil	Levy	and	Robert	Ross,	is	that	respondents	are	simply	pretending	to	hold certain	beliefs	in	order	to	get	the	reward.	On	this	interpretation,	these	studies	show	that	people	are	aware	of	the	mainstream view	and	will	claim	to	believe	it	when	incentivized	to	do	so.	While	I	agree	this	is	an	important	distinction,	I	doubt	this	concern applies	to	the	studies	I	am	discussing.	In	the	cases	of	Prior	et	al.	(2015)	and	Bullock	et	al.	(2015),	participants	were	provided with	a	mix	of	questions	that	favoured	both	Republicans	and	Democrats,	and	where	there	is	no	obvious	"mainstream	view" regarding	the	answers	(e.g.,	"Is	the	economy	doing	better	or	worse?",	"Has	unemployment	increased	or	decreased?",	etc.). 15	Interestingly,	Khanna	and	Sood	(2018)	also	found	that	incentivizing	people	to	answer	accurately	tended	to	increase	their	bias against	the	credibility	of	the	source	of	new	(but	uncongenial)	information. 16	In	another	study,	Huber	&	Yair	(2018)	hypothesize	that	cheerleading	may	arise	from	the	desire	to	send	a	partisan	message. Thus,	when	partisans	are	given	the	opportunity	to	send	that	message	before	answering	factual	questions,	they	may	be	less likely	to	cheerlead.	They	find	exactly	this	pattern:	reduced	partisan	differences.	This	further	suggests	that	cheerleading	lies behind	some	partisan	differences. 10 can	be	for	one	of	two	reasons:	either	survey-takers	have	accurate	but	uncongenial	information	and they	prefer	to	give	congenial	but	inaccurate	answers,	or	they	are	ignorant	on	the	issue	and	they offer	a	congenial	answer	as	their	best	guess.17	Either	way,	survey	responses	are	not	revealing misinformation	or	political	disagreement. This	finding	is	incredibly	significant.	Public	opinion	polls	are	consistently	showing	that	partisans	are unable	to	agree	on	the	facts.	For	example,	Republicans	are	more	likely	than	Democrats	to	say	that the	deficit	rose	during	the	Clinton	administration;	Democrats	are	more	likely	than	Republicans	to say	that	inflation	rose	under	Reagan	(Bartels	2002).	Similar	patterns	exist	when	they	are	asked factual	questions	about	healthcare	(Nyhan	and	Reifler	2010),	foreign	policy	(Jacobson	2010),	and social	services	(Jerit	and	Barabas	2012),	among	other	issues.	In	general,	when	people	are	surveyed about	factual	issues,	they	are	more	likely	to	report	having	beliefs	that	are	favourable	to	their existing	beliefs	and	attachments	than	beliefs	that	are	unfavourable.	These	patterns	are	ordinarily taken	as	evidence	that	partisanship	affects	factual	beliefs	about	politics.18	Democrats	and Republicans	are	allegedly	seeing	"separate	realities"	(Kull	et	al.	2004). An	alternative	explanation	is	that	such	patterns	merely	reflect	a	desire	to	praise	one	party	or criticize	another.19	Instead	of	assuming	that	the	public	is	misinformed,	we	should	assume	that	the public	is	misinforming	us.	In	doing	so,	they	mask	shared,	bipartisan	beliefs	about	factual	matters. This	is	likely	not	just	an	American	phenomenon.	Nearly	half	of	the	British	public	still	claim	to	believe that	the	U.K.	sends	£350m	to	the	E.U.	each	week,	despite	persistent	attempts	to	debunk	this myth.20	A	new	study	by	the	Policy	Institute	at	King's	College	London	found	that	42%	of	people	who had	heard	the	claim	still	believe	it	is	true,	whilst	only	36%	thought	it	was	false	and	22%	were unsure.	According	to	this	study,	conservative	voters	and	Brexit	voters	are	particularly	susceptible	to the	misinformation,	with	54%	and	61%	of	each	buying	the	claim.	If	we	take	these	figures	at	face 17	See	Bullock	et	al.	(2015)	and	Prior	et	al.	(2015)	for	evidence	of	the	first	explanation,	and	Luskin	et	al.	(2013)	for	evidence	of the	second	explanation.	These	are	not	the	only	reasons	to	misreport	one's	belief.	Partisans	may	also	misreport	just	to	be consistent	within	the	survey,	ensuring	that	latter	answers	do	not	contradict	earlier	ones	(Khanna	and	Sood	2018).	They	may also	provide	false	answer	for	strategic	reasons	such	as	influencing	public	opinion	(Prior	et	al.	2015). 18	Those	who	take	survey	responses	at	face	value	include:	Campbell	et	al.	(1960),	Kull	et	al.	(2004),	Jerit	and	Barabas	(2012), Shapiro	and	Bloch-Elkon	(2008),	and	Jacobson	(2010). 19	Krupenkin	et	al.	(2019)	propose	a	theory	of	"reverse	cheerleading".	This	occurs	when	partisans	misreport	or	exaggerate	their beliefs	or	attitudes	to	signal	disapproval	of	the	opposing	party	(rather	than	approval	of	their	own	party).	For	example,	many Democrats	reported	significant	increases	in	stress,	depression,	and	anxiety	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2016	U.S.	election;	but	these reports	were	unsubstantiated	by	changes	in	mental-health-related	Internet	searches.	This	suggests	that	for	many	Democrats, expressing	mental	distress	after	the	election	was	a	form	of	reverse	partisan	cheerleading. 20	https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/research-analysis/the-publics-brexit-misperceptions. 11 value,	we	are	led	to	conclude	that	nearly	half	of	the	British	public	continues	to	be	misinformed about	the	issue	because	they	continue	to	believe	that	this	claim	is	true.	This	is	precisely	how Professor	Bobby	Duffy,	director	of	the	policy	institute	that	carried	out	this	research,	interprets these	results.	In	an	interview	with	The	Independent,	he	said	"These	misperceptions	raise	important questions	about	the	basis	of	our	decision-making...	the	fact	that	different	groups	see	the	same realities	so	differently	shows	how	divided	we	are." Are	these	people	seeing	the	same	reality	differently?	As	I've	suggested,	we	should	be	wary	of	taking answers	to	factual	questions	with	partisan	implications	at	face	value,	since	they	are	often contaminated	by	the	motivation	to	root	for	one's	team.	People	believe	one	answer,	but	they	give	a different	answer	to	support	their	party.	It	represents	nothing	more	than	partisan	bad-mouthing	and the	joy	of	cheerleading.21 4.	Voters	Without	Beliefs So	far	I	have	discussed	two	reasons	why	the	extent	and	depth	of	political	disagreement	is	largely illusory.	First,	increasing	levels	of	polarization	tend	to	reflect	our	attitudes	towards	our	political opponents,	but	not	our	policy	preferences	or	issue	positions.	Second,	the	partisan	gap	revealed	by survey	data	largely	reflects	team	cheerleading	and	cheap	talk,	not	genuinely	held	political	beliefs. I	now	want	to	consider	a	third-and	perhaps	more	radical-reason	to	think	that	political disagreement	is	often	illusory.	The	idea,	briefly	put,	is	that	the	typical	voter	does	not	have	many stable	political	beliefs.	Indeed,	many	of	their	political	"beliefs"	may	not	be	beliefs	at	all.	Politics	is 21	The	observation	that	individuals	routinely	lie	about	their	preferences	is	not	new.	In	his	1997	book	Private	Truths,	Public	Lies, Timur	Kuran	puts	forward	the	idea	of	"preference	falsification".	This	is	the	act	of	communicating	a	preference	that	differs	from one's	true	preference.	Preference	falsification	is	closely	related	to	expressive	responding,	but	they	are	not	the	same	thing.	First, preference	falsification	typically	occurs	because	perceived	social	pressures	cause	one	to	convey	a	preference	that	is	more socially	acceptable	than	one's	actual	preference.	This	is	not	the	case	when	people	engage	in	expressive	responding.	Second, preference	falsification	tends	to	exaggerate	the	level	of	agreement	in	politics,	whereas	expressive	responding	tends	to exaggerate	the	level	of	political	disagreement.	Third,	preference	falsification	tends	to	have	negative	psychological	effects because	it	goes	against	the	basic	human	need	to	be	honest	about	oneself.	As	Kuran	puts	it,	"one	distinguishing	characteristic	of preference	falsification	is	that	it	brings	discomfort	to	the	falsifier"	(1997:	5).	Expressive	responding,	in	contrast,	does	not	stifle one's	ability	to	be	honest	about	oneself	and	it	can	have	positive	psychological	effects. 12 largely	identity	politics:	citizens	vote	primarily	on	the	basis	of	partisan	loyalties	that	are	grounded	in social	identity,	not	sincere	policy	preferences.22 Christopher	Achen	and	Larry	Bartels	defend	this	view,	which	they	call	'political	realism'.	They describe	the	view	as	follows: voters	choose	political	parties,	first	and	foremost,	in	order	to	align	themselves	with	the appropriate	coalition	of	social	groups.	Most	citizens	support	a	party	not	because	they have	carefully	calculated	that	its	policy	positions	are	closest	to	their	own,	but	rather because	'their	kind'	of	person	belongs	to	that	party.	(Achen	and	Bartels	2016:	307) The	true	psychological	basis	for	voting	behavior,	they	claim,	is	not	individual	preferences	but	group identity.	People	do	not	first	identify	the	issues	they	care	about	and	then	align	themselves	with	the political	party	that	best	reflects	these	preferences.	Rather,	people	first	identify	themselves	with	a group	and	then	vote	according	to	this	group	allegiance.23 For	realists,	politics	resembles	sports	and	voters	are	like	sports	fans.	Consider	the	Toronto	Raptors (a	basketball	team)	and	their	fans.	People	from	Toronto,	like	myself,	become	Raptors	fans	because we	are	from	Toronto.	We	do	not	first	form	strong	opinions	about	basketball,	then	examine	the teams	on	offer,	and	finally	select	a	team	based	on	how	well	that	team	realizes	our	pre-existing preferences	or	values.24	Rather,	we	cheer	for	the	Raptors	because	that	team	is	connected	to	our demographic	identity.	On	the	realist	view,	political	affiliation	is	psychologically	equivalent	to	sports team	loyalty	(at	least	for	most	citizens).	Just	as	one's	loyalty	to	a	particular	basketball	team	is	not	a reflection	of	one's	pre-existing	ideological	commitments	about	basketball,	one's	political	affiliation 22	This	claim	differs	from	the	explanations	offered	in	the	previous	two	sections.	In	section	2,	I	argued	that	people	largely	agree on	the	issues	even	though	they	dislike	each	other.	In	section	3,	I	argued	that	partisan	cheerleading	masks	shared	beliefs.	Now,	I am	exploring	the	idea	that	partisans	often	lack	stable	beliefs	about	political	issues;	they	are	what	Mason	(2018)	calls "ideologues	without	issues".	As	a	result,	there	is	some	tension	between	the	claims	defended	in	the	previous	two	sections	and the	claim	I	am	now	exploring.	In	particular,	sections	2	and	3	imply	that	political	opponents	do	have	shared	beliefs	about	many issues,	whereas	I	am	now	suggesting	that	partisans	may	not	have	beliefs	on	many	political	issues.	Let	me	provide	two	quick replies	to	this	worry.	First,	we	needn't	view	these	explanations	as	all	or	nothing.	People	like	Mason	may	be	right	that	when citizens	do	have	beliefs	about	political	issues,	these	beliefs	often	overlap	with	the	views	of	their	opponents;	further,	it	may	also be	true	that	many	apparent	political	beliefs	are	not	genuine	beliefs.	It	simply	depends	on	which	beliefs	we're	investigating. Second,	these	explanations	needn't	be	compatible	for	my	argument	to	go	through.	I	may	be	interpreted	as	offering	a	variety	of plausible	explanations	for	the	illusion	of	political	disagreement,	but	it	is	not	necessary	for	my	conclusion	that	these explanations	are	compatible	with	each	other. 23	See	also	Lenz	(2012:	3),	who	writes:	"I	find	surprisingly	little	evidence	that	voters	judge	politicians	on	their	policy	stances. They	rarely	shift	their	votes	to	politicians	who	agree	with	them-even	when	a	policy	issue	has	just	become	highly	prominent, even	when	politicians	take	clear	and	distinct	stances	on	the	issue,	and	even	when	voters	know	these	stances.	Instead,	I	usually find	the	reverse:	voters	first	decide	they	like	a	politician	for	other	reasons,	then	adopt	his	or	her	policy	views." 24	I	borrow	this	type	of	example	from	Brennan	(2019).	Somin	(2013:	78-9)	also	likens	voting	behavior	to	that	of	sports	fans. 13 is	also	not	a	reflection	of	one's	political,	moral,	or	otherwise	ideological	commitments.	Rather,	the typical	voter	becomes	attached	to	a	political	"team"	largely	due	to	accidental	historical circumstances.25	They	are	simply	born	into	it,	just	as	children	typically	inherit	the	religious affiliations	of	their	parents.26 This	point	calls	for	two	important	qualifications.	First,	many	voters	may	initially	get	their	political attitudes	by	enculturation,	but	this	doesn't	preclude	them	from	genuinely	coming	to	believe	some (or	a	lot)	of	the	things	their	political	party	stands	for.	This	may	occur	through	a	process	of	reflection on	the	attitudes	they	inherited	from	their	community.	Second,	political	realism	is	implausible	as	an account	of	political	elites	and	people	who	devote	their	careers	to	politics.	These	people	surely	have genuine	beliefs	about	the	issues.	My	point,	however,	is	that	many	people	are	not	like	this.	The typical	voter	resembles	the	sports	fan.27 Admittedly,	many	citizens	will	describe	themselves	as	"conservative"	or	"liberal".	But	most	people actually	lack	stable	beliefs	fitting	these	ideological	self-descriptions.28	They	are	not	deeply committed	to	their	proclaimed	ideologies.	As	Jason	Brennan	(2019)	puts	it, Their	beliefs,	if	we	can	even	call	them	that,	do	not	reflect	real	commitments	about	the good	or	just,	or	about	how	the	world	works.	Instead,	expressing	political	"beliefs"	is largely	equivalent	to	wearing	sports	team	colors;	they	are	a	form	of	conspicuous	display intended	to	show	membership	in	what	are,	for	that	voter,	socially	advantageous	groups. For	them,	advocating	a	policy	is	like	wearing	the	Patriots'	blue	and	silver	or	waiving	the Steelers'	terrible	towel	...	Their	commitment	is	no	deeper	than	Patriots	fans' commitments	to	blue,	red,	and	silver;	if	the	parties	were	to	change	policy	platforms,	most 25	Brennan	(2017;	2019),	Achen	and	Bartels	(2016:	213-266),	and	Campbell	et	al.	(1960)	all	defend	this	claim. 26	This	is	substantiated	by	a	vast	amount	of	empirical	work	(see	Greenstein	1965;	Jennings	and	Niemi	1981;	and	Sears	1983). 27	The	analogy	with	sports	fans	may	be	problematic	in	the	following	way:	there	seem	to	be	important	meta-cognitive differences	between	sports	fans	and	politically	partisan	individuals.	In	particular,	sports	fans	are	likely	aware	of	the	fact	that many	of	their	beliefs	reports	are	just	instances	of	expressive	responding	(e.g.	"Manchester	is	the	best	team	ever!")	and	that they	pick	what	teams	they	support	on	the	basis	of	fairly	arbitrary	factors	(e.g.	upbringing).	Put	differently,	sports	fans	are	likely aware	that	their	attitudes	aren't	full	beliefs.	In	contrast,	in	the	context	of	politics,	even	if	people	are	engaging	in	expressive responding	there	might	be	many	cases	in	which	they	are	not	meta-cognitively	aware	of	the	fact	that	they	are	responding expressively.	Unlike	sports	fans,	many	voters	might	not	believe	they	support	political	issues	on	the	basis	of	arbitrary	factors	like upbringing.	Thanks	to	Robert	Ross	and	Neil	Levy	for	making	this	point,	which	deserves	to	be	explored	in	more	detail	(elsewhere, alas). 28	This	raises	an	interesting	question	about	what	it	even	means	to	be	a	Republican,	a	Democrat,	or	any	kind	of	partisan. Campbell	et	al.	(1960)	defined	partisanship	as	both	a	set	of	beliefs	and	feelings	that	culminate	in	a	sense	of	"psychological attachment"	to	a	political	party. 14 of	their	"ideological"	voters	would	claim	they	agree	with	the	changes,	and	some	would claim	they	believed	such	views	all	along. To	illustrate,	Brennan	asks	us	to	consider	how	many	Republicans	switched	their	"views"	on numerous	economic	issues	when	Trump	was	elected.29	For	example,	they	went	from	pro-free	trade to	protectionist	almost	overnight,	without	batting	an	eye.	Even	apparently	key	issues	like	free	trade are,	at	bottom,	just	proclamations	intended	to	demonstrate	group	membership.30	Similarly,	when Democrats	say	"I'm	pro-regulation",	they	are	often	not	expressing	a	belief	about	appropriate responses	to	market	failure;	they	are	just	expressing	a	commitment	to	seeing	the	Democrats	win. The	implicature	is	"Hurray,	Democrats!"	(Brennan	2019). Indeed,	people	will	support	whatever	policy	or	platform	they	think	is	backed	by	their	party. Geoffrey	Cohen's	(2013)	work	provides	a	striking	example	of	this.	He	ran	a	study	in	which participants	were	told	about	two	welfare	programs:	a	harsh	(extremely	stingy)	welfare	program	and a	lavish	(extremely	generous)	one.	When	Democrats	were	told	that	their	ingroup	party	supported the	harsh	policy,	they	approved	of	it.	When	Democrats	were	told	that	their	party	supported	the lavish	policy,	they	approved	of	that	instead.	The	same	thing	happened	with	Republican	participants. All	that	mattered	was	which	party	was	said	to	support	the	program;	it	made	little	difference	what the	actual	content	of	the	policy	was.31	Moreover,	the	participants	were	unaware	of	this	bias.	When asked	to	justify	their	decision,	the	participants	felt	they	were	responding	to	the	program's	objective merits	and	insisted	that	party	considerations	were	irrelevant.	Relatedly,	studies	have	found	that people	are	unable	to	justify	political	positions	they	claim	to	feel	strongly	about.	For	example,	people 29	https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/11/17/16585982/psychology-memory-polls-trump 30	This	doesn't	mean	that	the	average	citizen	has	no	firm	beliefs	about	basic	moral	issues.	Most	people	probably	have	a	wide range	of	genuine	ethical	commitments	relevant	to	their	day-to-day	lives,	such	as	the	morality	of	keeping	promises	or	stealing (Haidt	2012).	The	point,	as	Brennan	(2019)	says,	is	that	these	basic	moral	principles	"radically	underdetermine	politics",	and that	getting	to	any	political	policy	from	these	basic	moral	principles	will	always	require	additional	empirical	claims	and	opinions about	social	scientific	issues	and	matters	of	basic	political	knowledge. 31	One	might	suggest	that	this	is	the	result	of	the	following	heuristic:	voters	know	that	a	particular	party	shares	their	general ideological	outlook,	so	they	use	this	as	a	way	to	determine	what	they	would	think	about	other	issues.	However,	Gabriel	Lenz (2012)	tested	this	hypothesis	and	found	little	support	for	it.	He	writes:	"...a	considerable	share	of	the	public	exhibits	a	rather crude	form	of	following.	They	did	not	just	follow	politicians	on	policy.	They	also	appeared	to	follow	politicians	on	basic predispositions	such	as	ideology.	Furthermore,	they	followed	the	views	of	politicians	even	when	they	were	ignorant	of	those politicians'	broader	policy	outlooks,	they	followed	even	when	they	did	not	know	much	about	politics	in	general,	and	they followed	candidates	as	well	as	parties."	(2012:	211)	The	finding	that	people	tend	to	follow	even	on	basic	ideology	is	particularly striking.	Lenz	writes:	"When	citizens	who	supported	a	Republican	president	but	whose	own	ideologies	were	to	the	left	learned that	the	Republican	Party	was	on	the	ideological	right,	they	didn't	shift	against	the	Republican	president-they	shifted	their own	reported	ideology	to	the	right."	(2012:	18) 15 who	claim	to	believe	deeply	in	cap	and	trade	often	have	little	idea	about	what	these	policies actually	entail.32 What	does	all	this	mean	for	political	disagreement? It	means	that	when	a	typical	Democrat	or	Republican	expresses	their	"beliefs"	about	some	political issue,	we	shouldn't	regard	this	as	evidence	that	they	genuinely	disagree	with	each	other.	Rather,	we should	regard	this	behavior	as	symbolic,	expressing	loyalty	to	their	political	team	and	a	desire	to	see that	team	win,	without	any	deeper	commitment	to	what	that	team	stands	for.33	Thus,	many	people cannot	quite	be	said	to	"believe"	in	their	party's	ideology	or	platform;	they	only	express commitment	to	it.	Consequently,	their	political	"disagreements"	are	superficial	and	inauthentic. What	looks	like	the	expression	of	a	genuine	belief	(and	thus	what	seems	like	evidence	of	political disagreement)	is	instead	just	a	proclamation	intended	to	display	partisan	affiliation. You	might	insist	that	these	states	of	mind	still	qualify	as	beliefs.	Perhaps	there	is	a	meaningful	sense in	which	we	can	call	these	mental	states	"beliefs",	but	it	would	require	a	pretty	thin	notion	of	belief. Further,	it	is	unlikely	that	these	"beliefs"	would	be	sufficiently	complete	or	robust	to	serve	as	a satisfactory	basis	for	democratic	theory.	A	much	thicker	notion	of	belief	lies	at	the	heart	of	liberal democratic	theory.	This	is	evident	from	the	first	page	of	Robert	Dahl's	classic	book,	Polyarchy.	He writes,	"a	key	characteristic	of	a	democracy	is	the	continued	responsiveness	of	the	government	to the	preferences	of	its	citizens";	but	the	aim	of	a	liberal	democracy	is	surely	not	to	aggregate	just	any wishy-washy	individual	preferences	into	collective	choice.	It	is	for	precisely	this	reason	that	many political	theorists	worry	about	framing	effects	on	political	preferences	(Kelly	2012).	Liberal democratic	theorists	have	assumed	that	people	have	definite	preferences	and	that	a	democratic government	must	respond	appropriately	to	those	preferences.	The	instability	of	thin	"beliefs"	(if	we choose	to	call	them	that)	would	still	create	significant	problems	for	attempts	to	discern	public preferences	on	issues	of	policy.	Thus,	the	distinction	between	my	thicker	sense	of	belief	and	the thin	notion	of	belief	is	not	merely	a	theoretical	nicety.	It	is	presumably	for	this	reason	that	Philip 32	See	Brennan	(2019)	and	Fernbach	et	al.	(2013).	A	sizeable	minority	of	citizens	do	express	stable	political	beliefs.	However,	the political	realist	will	claim	that	for	most	of	these	seemingly	ideological	citizens,	this	amounts	to	a	post-hoc,	superficial endorsement	of	their	parties'	platform.	Achen	and	Bartels	describe	this	mental	process	as	one	that	"feels	like	thinking". 33	Brennan	(2016:	32)	notes	that:	"In	the	2000	U.S.	presidential	election,	significantly	less	than	half	of	all	Americans	knew	that Gore	was	more	supportive	of	abortion	rights,	more	supportive	of	welfare	programs,	favored	a	higher	degree	of	aid	for	blacks, or	was	more	supportive	of	environmental	regulation	than	Bush."	Similarly,	Lenz	(2012:	226)	reports	that,	"across	[more	than 15]	different	policy	issues	examined...	I	typically	find	that	only	about	50%	of	voters	could	correctly	place	the	major	candidates or	parties	to	the	right	of	left	of	each	other." 16 Converse,	in	his	foundational	work	on	the	nature	of	belief	systems	in	mass	publics,	said	that	citizens "do	not	have	meaningful	beliefs"	on	these	important	political	issues	(1964:	245).	Finally, contemporary	philosophers	of	mind	generally	use	the	term	"belief"	to	refer	to	the	attitude	we	have when	we	regard	something	as	true.	But	as	revealed	by	the	literature	on	expressive	responding, citizens	who	make	factual	claims	do	not	actually	regard	the	content	of	these	assertions	as	true. Thus,	expressive	responses	would	not	qualify	as	"beliefs"	even	according	to	the	standard	definition in	contemporary	Anglophone	philosophy. To	be	clear,	I	am	not	saying	that	people	never	choose	political	parties	on	the	basis	of	their	beliefs	or policy	preferences.	My	claim	is	only	that	in	a	vast	range	of	cases,	the	folk	theory	of	democracy	does not	fit	the	general	picture	of	political	reasoning	that	emerges	from	decades	of	empirical	research across	multiple	disciplines.	This	literature	suggests	that	an	adequate	account	of	partisan	identity must	give	a	central	role	to	social	identity,	tribal	allegiances,	and	expressive	discourse. 5.	Implications What	are	the	implications	of	my	argument?	Suppose	I	am	right	that	there	is	less	disagreement	in politics	than	we	have	been	led	to	believe.	What	follows? This	account	helps	to	explain	why	people	seem	to	disagree	about	well-established	facts,	even	when the	evidence	for	them	is	unequivocal	and	easy	to	access.	While	this	behavior	might	seem	illogical, people	are	simply	making	claims	about	factual	issues	to	signal	their	allegiance	to	a	particular ideological	community. This	also	helps	us	understand	why	debates	often	go	so	poorly.	According	to	an	optimistic	view, political	disagreement	is	a	good	thing	because	it	allows	citizens	to	encounter	diverse	perspectives, consider	the	value	of	alternative	points	of	view,	and	evaluate	their	opinions	in	light	of counterarguments.	For	these	reasons,	theorists	from	Aristotle	to	Mill,	Dewey,	and	Arendt	extolled the	benefits	of	deliberation	and	disagreement	in	politics.34	Why,	then,	do	real	life	political disagreements	swiftly	devolve	into	heated	partisan	rancor	and	absolute	denouncement?	It	is 34	As	J.	S.	Mill	writes,	deliberating	in	public	about	political	issues	is	good	for	a	democracy	because	it	affords	citizens	"the opportunity	of	exchanging	error	for	truth"	and	the	chance	of	acquiring	a	"livelier	impression	of	truth"	(1859:	21).	For	Mill, deliberation	is	a	vital	mechanism	through	which	individuals	improve	and	develop	their	political	ideas,	without	which	their "mental	development	is	cramped"	(ibid:	39). 17 because	these	disputes	are	not	generally	treated	as	opportunities	to	exchange	reasons	or	make arguments.	Rather,	they	are	opportunities	for	cheering	and	booing.	Recall	the	analogy	with	sports. When	fans	cheer	for	their	team,	this	is	not	an	exercise	in	rational	deliberation.	They	are	just expressing	loyalty	to	their	team.	If	political	disagreement	is	similarly	tribal,	then	we	should	view partisan	claims	about	global	warming,	health	care,	and	the	like	in	a	similar	light.	They	are	not conclusions	articulated	on	the	basis	of	reasons,	but	rather	proclamations	akin	to	"Yay,	team!"	and "Boo,	the	other	guys!"	As	such,	political	disputes	are	not	aimed	at	rational	resolutions.	And	when partisans	do	give	reasons	or	arguments	for	their	views,	these	are	most	likely	the	product	of	posthoc	reasoning	(Haidt	2012). As	the	empirical	evidence	shows,	political	attitudes	and	beliefs	are	often	not	the	products	of	careful reasoning.	It	might	also	be	true	that	they're	not	supposed	to	be.35	When	people	cheer	for	the	L.A. Lakers	or	Toronto	Raptors,	this	is	not	supposed	to	be	an	exercise	in	rational	deliberation.	Thus,	it would	be	misguided	to	complain	that	a	Raptor's	fan's	enthusiasm	for	his	team	does	not	reflect	a sober	appraisal	of	the	team's	recent	performance.	That	would	miss	the	point.	If	politics	is	also	about expressing	team	loyalty,	then	complaining	that	someone's	views	on	global	warming	are	not grounded	in	the	facts	may	also	be	off	the	mark.	Their	views	on	these	issues	are	not	articulated conclusions	but	expressive	proclamations. In	reply,	one	might	argue	that	even	if	politics	isn't	typically	an	exercise	in	rational	deliberation,	it ought	to	be.	We	should	treat	political	disagreements	as	an	opportunity	to	exchange	reasons, consider	the	value	of	alternative	perspectives,	and	evaluate	our	opinions	in	light	of counterarguments.	So	even	if	politics	does	resemble	sports,	it	shouldn't.	We	can	therefore	criticize individual	citizens	for	failing	to	meet	this	standard-or	so	the	objection	goes. However,	political	views	may	share	another	common	property	with	views	about	sports	teams-they don't	really	matter.	As	Paul	Bloom	(2016:	237)	observes, If	I	have	the	wrong	theory	of	how	to	make	scrambled	eggs,	they	will	come	out	too	dry;	if	I have	the	wrong	everyday	morality,	I	will	hurt	those	I	love.	But	suppose	I	think	that	the leader	of	the	opposing	party	has	sex	with	pigs,	or	has	thoroughly	botched	the	arms	deal with	Iran.	Unless	I'm	a	member	of	a	tiny	powerful	community,	my	beliefs	have	no	effect	on 35	Bloom	(2016:	236)	makes	this	argument. 18 the	world.	This	is	certainly	true	as	well	for	my	views	about	the	flat	tax,	global	warming,	and evolution. While	this	view	is	not	uncontroversial,	it	has	many	defenders.	The	idea	is	that	voters	are	'rationally ignorant'	(Somin	2013;	Bloom	2016;	Brennan	2019).	Their	failure	to	gather	evidence,	attend	to	data, and	consider	counterarguments	in	the	political	domain	does	not	reflect	stupidity,	laziness,	or irrationality.	It	reflects	how	many	of	us	make	sense	of	politics:	we	care	more	about	team	loyalty than	the	truth	because,	for	us,	politics	is	not	really	about	truth	(Bloom	2016:	237).	This	would explain	why	people	are	unaware	of	even	the	most	basic	facts	about	the	issues,	policies,	and politicians	that	they	express	opinions	about. It	would	also	explain	why	it	is	often	so	difficult	to	correct	false	beliefs	(or	"beliefs").	If	our	political claims	are	expressions	of	cheerleading,	then	providing	partisans	with	correct	information	may	do little	to	change	their	minds	(Bullock	and	Lenz	2019).	When	our	views	are	not	based	on	the	facts	or aiming	at	truth,	we	should	not	expect	them	to	be	rationally	revisable	in	light	of	the	evidence	or reasoned	argumentation.36	This	would	also	explain	why	disagreements	often	seem	irresolvable:	we cannot	resolve	issues	when	there	is	no	genuine	disagreement.37 The	tendency	to	signal	allegiance	by	making	claims	about	factual	issues	would	also	explain	why people	often	seem	to	hold	blatantly	contradictory	beliefs.	David	Dunning	and	Peter	Enns	surveyed roughly	500	Americans	and	found	that	over	25%	of	liberals	(but	only	6%	of	conservatives)	endorsed both	the	statement	"President	Obama's	policies	have	already	created	a	strong	revival	in	the economy"	and	"Statutes	and	regulations	enacted	by	the	previous	Republican	presidential administration	have	made	a	strong	economic	recovery	impossible."38	Both	statements	are	pleasing to	the	liberal	eye	and	thus	may	induce	cheerleading	behavior,	even	though	it	is	impossible	for Obama	to	have	already	created	a	strong	recovery	that	Republican	policies	have	rendered impossible.	Among	conservatives,	27%	(compared	to	just	10%	of	liberals)	agreed	both	that "President	Obama's	rhetorical	skills	are	elegant	but	are	insufficient	to	influence	major	international 36	I	am	not	saying	that	arguments	and	evidence	never	resolve	political	disagreements;	only	that	they	are	typically	ineffective. 37	It	may	be	useful	to	draw	a	distinction	between	two	people	"disagreeing"	and	two	people	"disputing".	When	they	disagree, each	possesses	beliefs	with	incompatible	contents.	When	they	dispute,	they	engage	in	a	communicative	exchange	of	some form	wherein	they	express	disagreement	(genuine	or	not).	An	apparent	disagreement	might	be	irresolvable	because	there	is	no real	disagreement,	but	this	would	not	explain	why	disputes	are	irresolvable	(if	they	are).	Thanks	to	Adam	Gibbons	for	this	point. 38	https://psmag.com/social-justice/confident-idiots-92793 19 issues"	and	that	"President	Obama	has	not	done	enough	to	use	his	rhetorical	skills	to	effect	regime change	in	Iraq."	This	seems	contradictory:	if	Obama's	rhetorical	skills	are	insufficient,	why	should	he be	criticized	for	not	using	them	to	influence	the	Iraqi	government?	Dunning	and	Enns	explain	these results	by	appealing	to	psychological	bias.	Alternatively,	we	may	regard	these	contradictory	claims as	expressions	of	attitude	rather	than	empirical	assertions. Elizabeth	Anderson	(2019)	defends	a	similar	view.	In	"Epistemic	Bubbles	and	Authoritarian	Politics", she	points	out	that	the	political	right-wing	tend	to	make	the	following	claims	about	Obama:	that	he was	not	born	in	the	U.S.,	that	he	is	a	Muslim	founder	of	ISIS,	and	a	former	crack-addicted	gay prostitute,	and	a	follower	of	America-hating	Christian	preacher	Jeremiah	Wright,	and	a	Communist, and	yet	also	hated	for	bailing	out	the	Wall	Street	banks.	There	is	no	attempt	to	reconcile	these contradictory	claims,	either	with	each	other	or	with	the	evidence.	This	is	because	these	claims	are not	to	be	interpreted	as	empirical	assertions.	According	to	Anderson,	they	function	as	shibboleths. These	phrases	are	a	way	to	express	that	Obama	is	not	"one	of	us"	or	a	"real"	American. Anderson	suggests	that	we	model	these	factual	claims	with	partisan	implications	in	terms	of	insults and	cheering.	When	one	person	utters	"Yo	Momma..."	to	another,	nobody	thinks	the	speaker	is attempting	to	cast	the	other's	mother	in	disrepute	by	way	of	an	empirical	claim	about	her.	It	is	just an	attempt	to	put	down	one's	interlocutor.	A	variety	of	political	claims	likely	function	similarly.	For example,	a	lot	of	populist	rhetoric	should	be	regarded	as	forms	of	symbolic	positioning	rather	than empirical	or	factual	claims.	Anderson	writes: "Build	the	wall"	is	not	to	be	understood	as	a	practical	way	to	stop	illegal	immigration	(the coasts	cannot	be	walled;	people	are	smuggled	in	trucks;	walls	do	not	stop	the	millions	of undocumented	immigrants	who	entered	the	U.S.	legally	and	overstayed	their	visas).	It	is	an affirmation	of	who	the	(real)	people	are	and	recognition	of	who	they	must	be	protected from.	"Lock	her	up!"	is	not	based	on	a	legal	argument,	but	a	delegitimizing	move.	"Voter fraud"	is	not	an	empirically	determined	problem,	but	a	grievance	against	fellow	citizens whom	populists	think	do	not	deserve	to	vote. These	claims	are	a	vehicle	of	symbolic	expression	in	the	context	of	a	rivalry	between	competing identity	groups.	We	use	them	to	express	which	side	we	are	on,	who	is	the	enemy,	and	who	is superior	to	whom. 20 As	you	can	see,	the	idea	that	political	disagreements	are	often	superficial	has	a	lot	of	explanatory power.	Once	we	realize	that	political	disagreement	is	often	illusory	and	merely	the	reflection	of identity-expressive	discourse,	we	can	make	a	lot	more	sense	of	our	currently	political	context. Our	tendency	to	engage	in	identity-expressive	discourse	would	also	explain	why	people	do	not often	read	the	news	posts	they	share.	Just	as	the	primary	function	of	certain	claims	about	factual issues	is	to	signal	allegiance,	the	primary	function	of	the	communicative	act	of	news-post	sharing may	also	be	expressive	(Lynch	2019). 6.	Additional	Upshots If	my	argument	is	correct,	it	has	several	additional	upshots. First,	it	suggests	that	standard	survey	research	methods	are	flawed.39	The	bulk	of	survey	research assumes	that	respondents	provide	truthful	answers	when	asked	questions.	If	this	assumption	were correct,	then	conventional	survey	methods	would	provide	evidence	of	real	and	deeply	held differences	in	assessments	of	political	facts.	But	as	the	literature	on	expressive	responding	makes clear,	these	partisan	gaps	are	often	illusory.	The	appearance	of	factual	disagreement	in	politics	is,	to some	extent,	an	artifact	of	survey	measurement.	Admittedly,	we	do	not	know	the	precise	extent	to which	voter	"misinformation"	and	factual	"disagreement"	is	merely	a	reflection	of	expressive responding.	Nevertheless,	the	research	I	have	surveyed	strongly	indicates	that	many	alleged disagreements	are	not	real	disagreements,	and	that	what	seems	like	a	misinformed	public	is	not	in fact	so.40 Second,	the	theory	of	"motivated	reasoning",	which	is	the	most	common	explanation	for	political misinformation	and	partisan	disagreement,	is	often	incorrect.	This	theory	says	that	people	who come	across	the	same	information	will	walk	away	with	different	beliefs	about	what	the	evidence supports,	since	partisanship	leads	us	to	process	factual	information	in	biased	ways	(Taber	and 39	Bullock	et	al.	(2015)	and	Prior	et	al.	(2015)	make	this	point. 40	A	much	deeper	problem,	which	I	will	not	discuss,	is	that	voters'	preferences	may	be	unknowable.	To	learn	about	preferences, we	ask	survey	questions.	But	the	way	the	questions	are	framed	changes	the	way	people	answer	them.	Achens	and	Bartels (2016:	31)	cite	experimental	evidence	from	the	1970s	in	which	about	half	of	the	participants	would	"not	allow"	a	communist	to give	a	speech,	but	only	about	one-fourth	said	they	would	"forbid"	him	from	doing	so."	Before	the	1991	Gulf	War,	almost	twothirds	of	Americans	were	willing	to	"use	military	force,"	but	fewer	than	half	were	willing	to	"engage	in	combat,"	and	fewer	than 30%	were	willing	to	"go	to	war." 21 Lodge	2006).	This	is	by	far	the	commonest	explanation	for	why	voters	are	misinformed	and increasingly	polarized.	However,	the	theory	of	motivated	reasoning	presumes	that	the misinformation	documented	by	survey	researchers	is	an	accurate	reflection	of	what	individuals believe.	I	have	thrown	this	assumption	into	doubt.	When	Trump	voters	point	to	a	half-empty inaugural	photo	and	say	it	has	more	people	than	the	obviously	full	photo,	this	is	not	the	result	of	a cognitive	processing	error.	Motivated	reasoning	has	not	led	them	to	believe	that	which	flies	in	the face	of	unambiguous	photographic	evidence.	What	looks	like	motivated	reasoning	is	just	political cheerleading. This	also	explains	why	political	"misperceptions"	are	the	most	common	among	the	most	political engaged.	It	is	commonly	assumed	that	the	most	strongly	partisan	are	also	the	most	likely	to	be biased	and	engage	in	motivated	reasoning.	This	may	be	true,	but	this	explanation	ignores	the	fact that	the	most	strongly	partisan	are	also	the	most	likely	to	engage	in	cheerleading	and	other	forms of	expressive	responding.	Thus,	the	theory	of	motivated	reasoning	may	often	misdiagnose	partisan cheerleading	as	biased	cognitive	processing. This	leads	me	to	another	point.	It	is	commonly	said	that	many	political	disagreements	are	"deep disagreements"	(de	Ridder	2019;	Kappel	2018;	Lynch	2010).	A	deep	disagreement	occurs	when	two (or	more)	people	not	only	disagree	about	the	facts,	but	also	disagree	about	how	best	to	form	beliefs about	those	facts-viz.,	about	how	best	to	gather	and	assess	evidence	in	proper	ways.	For	example, two	people	may	disagree	about	the	causes	and	consequences	of	climate	change	because	they	have different	underlying	commitments	about	what	counts	as	good	evidence,	how	to	weigh	difference sources	of	evidence,	who	the	experts	are,	and	so	forth.	When	the	disputing	parties	have fundamentally	different	epistemic	commitments,	it	will	be	difficult	(if	not	impossible)	to	reach	a rational	resolution.41 41	Another	common	explanation	for	intractable	political	disagreement	is	that	people	have	divergent	fundamental	principles	and values.	In	other	words,	disagreements	about	the	merits	of	political	parties,	politicians,	or	policies	are	the	consequences	of deeper	disagreements	about	moral	issues	(see	Ancell	2017	for	a	detailed	discussion).	For	example,	Amy	Gutmann	and	Dennis Thompson	open	their	book	Democracy	and	Disagreement	by	announcing	that,	"Of	the	challenges	facing	American	democracy today,	none	is	more	formidable	than	the	problem	of	moral	disagreement.	Neither	the	theory	nor	the	practice	of	democratic politics	has	so	far	found	an	adequate	way	to	cope	with	conflicts	about	fundamental	values."	(1996:	1)	Similarly,	in	Democracy and	Moral	Conflict,	Robert	Talisse	writes,	"We	are	divided	over	our	most	fundamental	moral	commitments.	We	disagree	about moral	basics,	and	accordingly	disagree	about	the	precise	shape	that	our	politics	should	take."	(2001:	3)	If	my	hypothesis	is	right, this	explanation	gets	things	backwards:	people's	beliefs	about	the	deeper	moral	issues	are	consequences,	not	causes,	of	their beliefs	about	the	merits	of	politicians,	parties,	and	policies	(insofar	as	they	have	beliefs	on	these	issues	at	all). 22 According	to	Klemens	Kappel	(2018),	most	societal	disagreements	are	deep	disagreements.	This allegedly	explains	why	political	disagreements	are	so	intractable.	However,	I	have	argued	that	many cases	of	political	disagreement	are	not	genuine	disagreements;	thus,	they	cannot	be	deep disagreements.	While	I	do	not	dispute	the	claim	that	political	disagreements	may	sometimes	be "deep",	many	of	them	are	not.	Instead	of	thinking	of	these	as	deep	disagreements,	we	should instead	think	they	are	relatively	shallow.	This	would	also	explain	why	these	disputes	are	not rationally	resolvable.	As	I	argued	above,	political	disputes	are	often	not	aimed	at	rational resolutions;	they	are	just	opportunities	to	root	for	one's	team. A	final	upshot	concerns	the	theory	of	public	reason	liberalism.	According	to	public	reason	liberals, people	have	a	diverse	range	of	moral,	religious,	and	political	views.	Consequently,	citizens	deeply dispute	the	nature	of	the	good,	what	is	just	or	unjust,	and	also	which	institutions,	policies,	and practices	best	realize	their	normative	goals.	This	gives	rise	to	a	well-known	normative	problem	in political	theory:	how	can	a	government	impose	uniform	moral	and	political	rules	upon	all	citizens without	treating	them	as	unfree	and	unequal? Public	reason	liberals	claim	that	we	must	be	able	to	base	a	justification	for	coercive	moral	and political	rules	on	the	underlying	beliefs	of	reasonable	citizens.	According	to	Brennan	(2019), however,	this	central	idea	of	public	reason	liberalism	rests	on	a	mistake.	If	'political	realism'	is correct,	then	citizens	actually	have	few	real	stable	political	beliefs.	But	if	they	lack	the	right	kind	of political	beliefs,	there	is	no	sense	in	which	policies	or	rules	can	be	justified	in	light	of	them.	As Brennan	puts	it, they	[citizens]	'wear'	their	political	beliefs	the	way	they	wear	sports	colors,	but	they	are	not genuinely	committed	to	such	beliefs.	So,	there	is	nothing	there	upon	which	to	base	public justification. This	is	a	problem	for	the	public	reason	theorist.	Public	reason	liberals	say	that	we	should	not	force coercive	policies	on	citizens;	policies	must	be	publicly	justified	on	the	basis	of	reasons	that	all reasonable	citizens	could	accept.	This	assumes	that	citizens	can	themselves	recognize	and	accept moral	and	political	rules	in	light	of	their	own	beliefs.	But	if	people	do	not	actually	have	the	requisite beliefs,	values,	or	commitments,	then	we	cannot	justify	moral	or	political	norms	on	that	basis. 23 7.	Good	News	and	Bad	News These	conclusions	have	a	variety	of	positive	upshots. Here's	one:	the	extent	to	which	voters	are	misinformed	is	overstated.	Although	a	large	number	of people	will	say	that	Obama	is	the	antichrist,	that	he	founded	ISIS,	and	so	forth,	many	of	these people	do	not	genuinely	believe	these	things.	Our	worries	about	voter	incompetence	have	been driven	not	by	voter	misperceptions	but	rather	by	our	misperceptions	about	voters.	I	find	this incredibly	reassuring.	One's	willingness	to	occasionally	disregard	factual	information	is	far	less pernicious	than	being	misinformed,	since	genuinely	believing	incorrect	information	would	preclude doubt	and	obstruct	the	attainment	of	truth. I	do	not	deny	that	voters	are	often	ignorant.42	One	of	the	best-established	findings	of	decades	of research	in	political	theory	is	the	extent	to	which	ordinary	citizens	are	ignorant	of	politics.43	Indeed, the	studies	on	expressive	responding	by	Bullock	and	his	colleagues	reveal	that	people	will	often admit	their	ignorance	on	many	factual	political	questions.	But	this,	too,	is	reassuring.	When partisans	are	motivated	to	give	accurate	responses,	they	display	the	capacity	to	acknowledge	their own	ignorance.44	The	problem	is	that	people	are	unwilling	to	admit	their	lack	of	knowledge	under ordinary	survey	conditions. In	addition	to	overstating	the	actual	amount	of	factual	disagreement	in	politics	(and	the	extent	to which	voters	are	misinformed),	survey	responses	also	tend	to	exaggerate	the	degree	to	which partisanship	biases	or	distorts	our	perception	of	the	facts.	As	mentioned	earlier,	the	theory	of "motivated	reasoning"	assumes	that	the	misinformation	documented	by	survey	researchers accurately	reflects	what	voters	truly	believe.	But	this	is	an	inadequate	diagnosis	in	many	cases.	It turns	out	that	citizens	have	the	capacity	to	perceive	reality	in	a	less	partisan	way	than	many	have claimed.	This	may	be	good	news	for	democracy.	If	there	were	genuine	disagreement	over	basic factual	issues,	then	the	possibility	of	democratic	deliberation	and	compromise	would	be	slim.45 42	It	is	common	to	distinguish	ignorance	(a	lack	of	information)	from	misinformation	(false	or	inaccurate	information.).	When the	public	is	misinformed,	then	tend	to	confidently	hold	false	beliefs.	As	a	result,	misinformation	is	often	a	greater	obstacle	to educating	people	with	facts. 43	For	surveys,	see	Delli	Carpini	and	Keeter	(1996)	and	Somin	(2013). 44	Interestingly,	there	may	still	be	a	failure	of	self-knowledge,	since	many	partisans	claim	that	they	"almost	never"	agree	with the	other	party's	position	(Doherty	et	al.	2016).	Thus,	we	may	often	think	that	we	disagree	even	when	we	are	not. 45	However,	it	is	not	clear	what	hope	there	is	for	deliberative	democracy	if	'political	realism'	is	true	and	people	rarely	have genuine	political	beliefs. 24 In	short,	people	are	neither	as	dumb	nor	as	biased	as	is	commonly	assumed.	What	appears	to	be stupidity	or	irrationality	is	often	just	cheerleading.46 Now	for	the	bad	news. An	unfortunate	consequence	of	identity-based	polarization	is	that	we	often	cannot	resolve	partisan conflict	by	reasoned	debate	or	educating	people	about	the	issues.	If	Mason	is	right	that	Democrats and	Republicans	are	affectively	polarized	despite	their	agreement	on	many	issues,	then	attempting to	resolve	political	disagreement	by	closing	partisan	gaps	on	policy	issues	is	misguided.	This	is	a problem	for	deliberative	democracy.	If	our	disagreements	are	not	based	on	genuine	reasons	or arguments,	then	we	cannot	engage	with	each	other's	views.	This	is	inconsistent	with	the	idea	that citizens	should	deliberate	with	each	other	via	rigorous,	careful,	and	open-minded	discussion	of	the issues. A	larger	worry	looms:	the	facts	don't	seem	to	matter.	Individuals	do	not	generally	choose	to support	a	political	party	on	the	grounds	that	it	best	represents	their	interests,	preferences,	or values.	Quite	the	opposite.	Partisans	will	edit	their	list	of	reasons	for	holding	particular	attitudes	in order	to	defend	the	position	that	is	faithful	to	their	party.47	Thus,	the	typical	voter's	political	"views" have	little	intellectual	value.	As	Somin	(2013),	Achen	and	Bartels	(2016),	Mason	(2018),	Anderson (2019),	Brennan	(2019),	and	many	others	have	argued,	our	political	identities	are	only	loosely	based on	our	own	interests	and	issue	positions.	We	are	happy	to	cheerlead	and	protect	our	group's	status as	if	we	had	the	facts,	but	the	facts	play	no	substantive	role	in	shaping	our	political	attitudes	or beliefs. It	also	follows	that	we're	not	really	interested	in	genuinely	engaging	with	the	other	side.	When policy	debates	are	just	battles	between	"us"	vs.	"them",	we	no	longer	select	policies	based	on	their actual	content	and	we	lose	all	motivation	to	reach	a	compromise.	Consider	what	happened	with	the Affordable	Care	Act.	When	constructing	the	Act,	Democrats	incorporated	Republican	ideas	in	hopes of	winning	bipartisan	support,	but	they	received	none.	For	Republicans,	it	wasn't	about	policy.	It 46	Another	benefit	of	superficial	political	disagreement	is	that	we	do	not	court	skepticism.	According	to	a	growing	number	of philosophers,	the	fact	of	widespread	disagreement	provides	us	with	good	grounds	to	skepticism.	For	example,	Sandy	Goldberg (2013)	argues	that	disagreements	in	domains	like	philosophy	(and	presumably	politics)	where	disagreement	are	systematic make	it	unreasonable	to	think	that	there	is	any	knowledge,	or	even	justified	belief. 47	As	Lilliana	Mason	(2018:	20-1)	writes,	"More	often	than	not,	citizens	do	not	choose	which	party	to	support	based	on	policy opinion;	they	alter	their	policy	opinion	according	to	which	party	they	support". 25 was	about	denying	their	opponents	a	win	and	giving	themselves	a	campaign	issue.	A	compromise would	have	been	seen	as	an	unnecessary	concession	to	"the	enemy". This	has	implications	for	policy-making.	If	the	political	divide	cannot	be	bridged	by	creative	new policies	that	incorporate	ideas	from	both	the	left	and	right,	there	is	little	possibility	for	bipartisan lawmaking.	Policy	becomes	about	one	side	getting	its	agenda	through	and	scoring	a	win.	Instead	of constructing	bipartisan	policies,	then,	it	seems	the	only	way	to	reduce	partisan	antipathy	is	by reducing	the	strength	or	alignment	of	political	identities. Partisan	cheerleading	also	corrupts	public	discourse.	When	empirical	language	is	appropriated	to make	expressive	claims,	it	generates	confusion	about	what	people	are	actually	saying.	As	Anderson (2019)	puts	it,	"populist	political	discourse	hijacks	empirical	discourse-the	grammar	of	assertion- for	expressive	purposes,	overtaking	spaces	normally	reserved	for	empirical	policy	discussion."	This harms	public	discourse	by	infecting	the	public	domain	with	misleading	information,	thereby corrupting	human	knowledge. This,	too,	has	policy	implications.	When	we	mistakenly	interpret	expressive	discourse	literally,	we tend	to	reply	with	empirical	arguments.	For	instance,	if	liberal	democrats	interpret	vehement denials	of	anthropogenic	climate	change	as	out	of	touch	with	reality,	they	will	criticize	their opponents	for	not	engaging	with	the	evidence.	This	may	further	antagonize	the	other	side	because their	opponents	will	interpret	liberals	as	calling	them	stupid. I'll	end	this	section	by	mentioning	a	rather	strange	upshot	of	my	argument.	I	have	argued	that politics	is	characterized	by	less	disagreement	than	we	thought.	On	this	basis,	one	might	conclude that	politics	has	more	agreement	than	we	thought.	But	this	does	not	follow.	Indeed,	my	argument may	explain	away	genuine	agreement	just	as	easily	as	it	explains	away	genuine	disagreement.48	For example,	two	people	who	claim	to	be	pro-regulation	may	not	actually	have	any	settled	beliefs	on the	matter;	they	may	simply	be	making	a	factual	claim	to	express	partisan	support.	In	general, whenever	two	people	seem	to	agree	on	some	political	issue,	they	may	be	expressing	similar	proattitudes	without	any	corresponding	beliefs	on	the	matter.	Thus,	my	central	claim	that	there	are fewer	political	disagreements	than	we	thought	does	not	imply	that	there	is	more	agreement	in 48	Ballantyne	(2016:	759)	makes	a	similar	point	in	the	context	of	verbal	disputes	in	philosophy. 26 politics	than	is	often	claimed.49	We	now	have	to	be	unsure	about	whether	people	who	seem	to agree	are	actually	agreeing	or	just	cheering	for	the	same	side. 8.	Concluding	Remarks I	have	no	solutions	to	these	problems.50	The	aim	of	this	paper	is	not	to	recommend	solutions	but rather	to	change	how	we	look	at	the	problem	of	political	disagreement.	In	our	polarized	climate,	it is	easy	(and	common)	to	conclude	that	politics	is	rife	with	disagreement,	including	factual disagreement.	This	is	allegedly	supported	by	a	wealth	of	survey	data.	I	have	argued,	however,	that many	political	disagreements	are	not	really	disagreements.	What	appears	to	be	disagreement	is often	cheap	talk	and	partisan	cheerleading. I	have	also	explored	the	implications	of	this	idea.	As	we've	seen,	the	very	factors	that	explain	why political	disagreement	is	superficial	also	explain	why	debates	often	go	so	poorly,	why	it	is	difficult	to correct	false	beliefs,	and	why	people	seem	to	hold	blatantly	contradictory	views.	The	expressive nature	of	political	engagement	also	creates	problems	for	standard	survey	research,	the	theory	of motivated	reasoning,	and	the	view	that	political	disagreements	are	"deep	disagreements".	The news	is	not	all	bad,	though.	As	I've	argued,	political	surveys	tend	to	overstate	the	level	of	political misinformation,	motivated	reasoning	is	not	distorting	our	perceptions	of	reality	as	often	as	scholars have	claimed,	and	there	is	less	disagreement	over	the	facts	than	we	thought.	Ultimately,	I	hope	to have	highlighted	the	importance	of	thinking	carefully	about	the	concept	of	"disagreement"	for future	research	in	politics. 49	That	said,	Mason	(2018)	says	there	is	more	issue-based	agreement	than	surveys	typically	suggest. 50	Several	solutions	have	been	proposed.	For	example,	correcting	misperceptions	about	party	supporters	tends	to	reduce animus	toward	the	other	side	(Ahler	&	Sood	2018).	Mason	(2018)	suggests	that	partisan	news	media	should	be	compelled	to present	opposing	partisans	in	more	sympathetic	ways.	We	may	also	try	to	shift	the	salience	of	partisan	identities.	Democrats and	Republicans	normally	perceive	each	other	as	members	of	a	disliked	partisan	out-group.	But	they	are	also	members	of	a common	group:	Americans.	By	shifting	the	salience	of	partisan	identities,	they	move	from	out-group	members	to	in-group	ones, and	hence	group-based	partisan	animus	might	fade	(Levendusky	2018).	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