Trust	me:	News,	Credibility	Deficits,	and	Balance Carrie	Figdor (Forthcoming	in	Fox	and	Saunders,	eds.,	Media	Ethics,	Free Speech,	and	the	Requirements	of	Democracy	(Routledge)) Please	contact	the	author	for	use	or	citation	of	material	in	this draft. Abstract.	When	a	society	is	characterized	by	a	climate of	distrust,	how	does this impact the	professional	practices	of	news	journalism?	I	focus	on	the	practice	of	balance,	or	fair	presentation	of	both	sides	in	a	story.	I	articulate a two-step model of how trust modulates the acceptance	of	testimony	and	draw	out	its	implications	for justifying	the	practice	of	balance. Introduction. When	a	democratic	society	is	characterized	by	a	climate	of distrust,	how	does	this	impact	the	practice	of	journalism?	This	paper	considers	a	special	case	of	the	question:	the	society	in	question is	the	contemporary	United	States,	the	type	of	journalism	is	objective	news	journalism,	and	the	impact	considered	is	with	regard	to the	practice	of	balance. Balance	is	a	norm	as	well	as	a	practice	of	objective	news:	it is	the	professional	method	in	which	a	reporter	presents	both	sides in	a	news	story,	and	its	use	is	prescribed	by	a	professional	norm	of fair	treatment	or	neutrality	(Kovach	and	Rosensteil	2001;	Mindich 1988).i	Balance	is	also	presumed	to	provide	an	epistemic	contribution	towards	the	social	goal	of	democratically	legitimate	public	policy in the	public interest: it	supports	each citizen's reason	to informed	conclusions	based	on	all	the	relevant	evidence.	This	epistemic	role	and	its	social	end	are	neatly	expressed	by	synthesizing two	of	the	Fox	News	Network's	slogans,	"Fair	&	Balanced"	and	"We Report.	You	Decide.":	we	report	in	a	fair	and	balanced	manner,	and you	make informed	decisions.	Of	course,	coming from	a	partisan 2 news	outlet	such	as	Fox,	the	recently	retired	"Fair	&	Balanced"	slogan	was	widely	considered	a	cynical	nod	(at	best)	to	the	norm	of balance.	Nevertheless,	it	reflected	the	traditional	adherence	to	the norm	in	the	U.S.	mainstream	media.	The	synthesized	slogan	could well	be	adopted	by	The	New	York	Times	and	other	leading	media to	encapsulate	their	approach	to	news. Notably, Fox retired "Fair & Balanced" in favor of "Most Watched,	Most	Trusted"	as	extreme	sociopolitical	polarization	was becoming the dominant mode of U.S. public discourse. ii "Most watched"	is	a	statistical	issue.	But	"Most	Trusted"?	How	does	trust figure	into	the	epistemic	relationship	between	news	reporting	and public	decision-making?	And	within	this	relationship,	how	do	balance	and	trust	interact?	My	first	aim	in	this	paper	is	to	clarify	the role	of trust in this	relationship. In	more familiar terms, I	aim	to clarify	the	role	of	trust	in	the	acceptance	of	testimony.	My	second aim	is	use	this	account	to	clarify the	epistemic	role	of	balance in objective	news. In	Part	1,	I	present	research	showing	that	a	common-sense view	of	the	justification	of	balance	cannot	be	correct.	The	core	inference from "We report" to "You decide"	has "You believe" as a middle premise, but problems	with balance in science reporting show	how	the	inference	from	"We	report"	to	"You	Believe"	is	anything	but	straightforward.iii	I	call	the	issue	of	explaining	this	inference the	problem	of acceptance	of testimony,	contrasting it	with the more traditional problem that centers on justifying the acceptance	of	testimony.	In	Part	2,	I	articulate	a	two-step	account	of acceptance	in	which	trust	modulates	both	steps	via	its	impact	on various	cognitive	mechanisms.	In	Part	3,	I	reconsider	the	justification	of	balance	in	the	light	of	this	account.	I	argue	that	balance	is	of direct	epistemic	benefit	only	to	those	individuals	who	are	already able to accept testimony in an epistemically virtuous way. It is through	such	individuals	that	balance	can	indirectly	contribute	to better	decision-making	at	the	social	level. Part	1.	Problems	with	Balance	and	Belief	in	U.S.	News	Journalism 3 The	practice	of	balance	"aims	for	neutrality	(and)	requires that	reporters	present	the	views	of	legitimate	spokespersons	of	the conflicting	sides	in	any	significant	dispute	...	with	roughly	equal	attention" (Dixon	and	Clarke	2013,	p.	360).iv	Balance	was	also	U.S. public	policy	since	1949	in	the	form	of	the	Fairness	Doctrine,	under which media with U.S. government licenses to use publicallyowned airwaves were required to cover controversial issues of public	importance	and	to	present	both	sides	of	a	story	(Matthew 2011).	This	doctrine	(along	with	an	equal	time	rule)	was	dropped in	1987	following	challenges	to	its	constitutionality	as	a	restriction on	broadcasters'	free	speech.	Some	trace	the	current	sociopolitical polarization	in	part	to	the	demise	of	the	Fairness	Doctrine;	in	any case,	right-wing	talk	radio	took	off	shortly	afterwards. Epistemic	problems	traced	to	balance	first	began	to	emerge strikingly	in	science	reporting.	Balance	began	in	political	reporting and	migrated	to	science	reporting	along	with	other	elements	of	the objectivity	norm.	The	practice	served	to	compensate for journalists'	inability	to	check	whether	scientists'	claims	were	true	or	false (Dunwoody	2014.	p.	33).	The	aim	was	provide	neutral	but	accurate testimony	of	scientists'	claims.	In	the	1990's	major	U.S.	news	outlets	began	presenting	nonconsensus	views	on	the	issue	of	climate change	as	a	matter	of	balanced	reporting.	However,	despite	accumulating	scientific	evidence	of	and	consensus	regarding	its	existence	and	human	causes,	the	public	responded	with	increased	uncertainty	about	its	reality	and	causes	and	with	the	perception	that the	scientific	evidence	is	mixed	(Boykoff	and	Boykoff	2004).	Similar	divergence	between	scientific	and	public	opinion	was	found	in other	science	news	domains	(Dixon	and	Clarke	op.cit.,	Stocking	and Holstein	2009),	but	climate	science	beliefs	remain	a	primary	focus of	research. The	media's	role	in	this	divergence	was	labeled	balance	as informational	bias (Boykoff and	Boykoff	op.cit.)	or false	balance, "when	a	perspective	supported	by	an	overwhelming	amount	of	evidence	is	presented	alongside	others	with	less/no	support	and	context	–	where	the	strength	of	evidence	lies	–	is	excluded"	(Dixon	and Clarke 2012, p. 359). Correspondingly, a prima facie reasonable 4 journalistic	response	to	the	problem	is	to	do	balance	better:	present the	sides	along	with information	about	where	the	weight	of scientific	evidence	and	scientific	consensus	opinion	lie	(Dixon	and Clarke	op.cit.).	This	response	correctly	rejects	an	overly	simple,	if common,	way	of	implementing	balance	in	science	news.	Unfortunately,	it	does	not	overcome	the	problem	of	the	divergence	of	scientific	and	public	opinion	about	climate	change.	While	providing scientific	consensus information	can	help	promote	acceptance	of science	claims	(Lewandowsky	et	al.	2012),	social	scientific	and	psychological research into climate change beliefs has revealed just how	complicated	the	passage	from	"We	report"	to	"You	believe"	is.v The mechanisms involved are often grouped together as forms	of	motivated	reasoning,	in	which	information	that	challenges one's	prior	beliefs	is	discounted	or	ignored	while	information	that is	consonant	tends	to	be	uncritically	accepted.vi	Basic	subtypes	of motivated	reasoning include	confirmation	bias	(seeking	out	confirming	or	avoiding	disconfirming	information)	and	evaluation	bias or	biased	assimilation	(being	selectively	sceptical	in	evaluating	evidence). The "motivated" part	of "motivated reasoning" refers to the non-epistemic (that is, non-truthor knowledge-oriented) goals	of	reasoning,	such	as	protecting	one's	social	relationships	or maintaining	one's	self-image.	As	a	result,	it	is	incorrect	to	say	that "the	whole	point	of	appealing	to	the	testimony	of	others	is	that	they know	things	we	do	not"	(Hardwig	1991,	p.	698).	That	is	certainly one	point	of	appealing	to	testimony.	But	another	point,	which	may dominate,	is	to	further	our	social	goals,	which	we	also	value.vii When	the	goal	of	reasoning	is	not	(or	is	not	strongly	determined	by)	our	interest	in	truth,	motivated	reasoning	serves	what	is called	cultural	cognition,	when	people	fit	their	risk	perceptions	to their	cultural	worldviews	(Kahan	2010;	Kahan	et	al.	2011,	2012). Acceptance	of	climate	change	testimony	has	become	dominated	by reasoning	that	aims	at	non-epistemic	goals.	For	example,	when	presented	with	the	same	information	about	scientific	consensus	opinion regarding global warming, participants' perceptions of the trustworthiness	of	various	scientists	modulated	their	processing	of this	information	so	that	it	conformed	with	their	prior	social	views 5 (Kahan	et	al.	2011).	Among	participants	with	more	individualistic and	hierarchical	worldviews,	56%	judged	that	most	scientists	were divided	on	whether	global	warming	is	occurring	and	55%	judged that	most	scientists	are	divided	about	whether	humans	are	causing global	warming.	Among	those	with	more	egalitarian	and	communitarian	views,	78%	judged	that	most	scientists	were	in	agreement about	whether	global	warming	is	occurring,	and	68%	that	most	scientists agree that humans are causing global warming. Lewandowsky	et	al.	(2018)	provide	textual	evidence	of	contradictory	assertions in the climate change denial literature, suggesting that prominent	climate	change	deniers	selectively	downgrade	the	credibility assigned to various bits of scientific evidence in order to maintain	their	political	views.	In	other	words,	scepticism	is	a	tool that	can	be	wielded	for	non-epistemic	and	epistemic	ends	alike.	An increase	in	scepticism	about	science	might	stem	from	epistemically justified	assessment,	or	from	fear	of	what	acceptance	might	entail for	one's	political	beliefs. Moreover,	higher	levels	of	education	do	not	mitigate	motivated	reasoning,	at	least	not	with	regard	to	polarized	issues.	To	the contrary,	they	can	exacerbate	the	gap	between	what	the	scientific evidence counsels and	what	people	accept.	For	example, greater understanding about climate change science among Democrats was	correlated	with	greater	belief	that	it	is	a	threat	in	one's	lifetime, while	Republicans	with	similar	levels	of	understanding	were	less likely	to	believe	it	is	a	threat	(Hamilton	2010).	Greater	science	literacy	and	numeracy	has	also	been	correlated	with	greater	polarization	in	climate	change	beliefs	in	line	with	different	cultural	views (Kahan	et	al.	2012;	Hart	and	Nisbet	2011;	Drummond	and	Fischhoff	2017).	These	results	make	sense:	education	as	such	does	not alter	the	non-epistemic	goals	that	prompt	the	motivated	reasoning. Adding	weight-of-evidence facts to balance	will fail to overcome motivated	reasoning	for	the	same	reason. Communication scholars have long recognized this complexity in	acceptance	of testimony.	For	example,	when	an	official makes a statement in a timely and voluntary fashion, it is	more likely to be accepted at face value. If not, she	may say the same 6 thing,	but	the	message	received	is	that	the	official	is	hiding	something, and may even amount to the negation of what she says: "What	is	said	is	not	necessarily	what	is	heard,	and	what	is	'correct' is	not	necessarily	what	is	believed"	(Fessenden-Raden	et	al.	(1987, p.	101).	The	epistemological	moral,	in	short,	is	that	hearers	of	testimony	are	neither	passive	nor	featureless	recipients	of	messages. An	adequate	model	of	acceptance	of testimony	should	reveal	the	factors	that	modulate	the	active	process	of	acceptance.viii Such	a	model	will	aid	in	figuring	out	what	makes	it	more	likely	that acceptance	will	be	driven	by	epistemic	goals	rather	than	non-epistemic	ones.	Even	if	we	were	to	grant	that	"culture	is	prior	to	facts" (Kahan	and	Braman	(2003,	p.	570)	or	that	"solidarity	precedes	accuracy"	(Earle	2010,	p.	570),	we	can	try	to	identify	the	contexts	or conditions	enable	our	interest	in	truth	to	strongly	constrain	(if	not wholly	determine)	acceptance.	The	subsequent	journalistic	question is to understand how balance figures into efforts to bring about	or	maintain	those	contexts	in	the	interest	of	effective	public policy. In	the	next	section,	I	address	the	general	epistemic	question in	part	by	arguing	that	trust	is	a	key	factor	modulating	the	goals	of reasoning,	which in consequence	determines the	mechanisms	of acceptance.	I	offer	a	model	of	acceptance	that	conceptualizes	trust as	the	outcome	of	risk	assessment.	This	risk-based	model	naturally builds source and hearer features and differences in reasoning goals	into	our	understanding	of	acceptance.	I	consider	the	journalistic	question	in	Part	3. Part	2.	Trust,	Risk,	and	the	Social	Modulation	of	Acceptance Trust	in	a	source	is	a	known	factor	in	acceptance	of	information	(Kahan	et	al.	2006,	p.	2072;	Fessenden-Raden	et	al.	op.cit.; Pornpitakpan	2014).	This	includes	trust	in	the	scientific	enterprise (Drummond and Fischhoff 2017; Siegrist 2000). ix Empirical research	on	climate	change	beliefs	in	particular	shows	relationships between	trust	and	acceptance	of	scientific	evidence.x	Malka	et	al. (2009)	found	that	increased	knowledge	was	correlated	with	more concern among participants who trusted scientists to provide 7 reliable	global	warming	information,	and	less	concern	among	those who did not trust them. Lewandowsky et al. (2013) found that strong	believers in free	markets lowered	trust	in	scientists	when consensus	information	was	presented	–	after	all,	consensus	can	be evidence	of	collusion.	Belief	polarization	(or	contrary	updating)	is when	two	people	respond	to	the	same	evidence	by	updating	their beliefs	in	opposite	directions	(Jern	et	al.	2014).	In	a	basic	Bayesian model,	this	would	make	one	of	the	two	people	irrational.	However, by including	variables for trust in	scientists and	worldview	(e.g., more	or	less	individualistic,	more	or	less	hierarchical)	in	a	Bayesian model	of	belief	updating,	Cook	and	Lewandowsky	(2016)	showed how	contrary	updating	can	be	rational	within	the	Bayesian	framework. Of	course,	trust	has	long	been	recognized	in	philosophy	as an	important	factor	in	testimony,	prompting	inquiry	into	why	trust is needed when we obtain justification via testimony (Hardwig 1991)	and	when	we	are	justified	in	trusting	(e.g.,	Faulkner	2007). In	addition,	the	traditional	problem	of	acceptance	of	testimony	is that	of	justifying	acceptance	–	that	is,	determining	when	it	is	reasonable	to	accept	testimony	given	that	we	always	risk	acquiring	a false	belief	via	testimony	(Faulkner	2007,	p.	875;	Faulkner	2011). These theoretical	starting	points	also	direct inquiry into trust in testimony.	If	our	starting	point	is	why	we	ever	accept	testimony	and when	we	are	justified	in	doing	so,	and	if	trust	plays	a	role	in	testimony, it	makes	sense	to	go	on	to	ask	why	we	ever	trust	and	and when	we	are	justified	in	doing	so. But	the	justification	questions	for	acceptance	and	trust	presuppose the possibilities of acceptance and trust,	which in turn presuppose	understanding	how	and	when	we	accept	and	trust,	and how	trusting	figures	in	accepting.	The	problems	regarding	public beliefs	about	climate	change	reveal	that	accepting	is	relative	to	various	goals	of	reasoning,	including	but	not	limited	to	truth.	The	possibility	of	acquiring	a	false	belief	via	testimony	entails	the	prior	independent	possibilities	of	hearing	it	and	then	processing	it	in	such a	way	that	it	is	accepted	in	the	way	intended	by	the	source.	These prior possibilities are actual in	what I think of as epistemically 8 optimistic	conditions:	their	actualization	presupposes	that	the	goal of reasoning is truth (or knowledge). That the goal	may not be reached	is	a	later	concern.	But	to	understand	acceptance	of	testimony in the	general case,	we	need	a	model that is epistemically neutral	in	that	it	does	not	take	for	granted	that	the	goal	of	reasoning is	truth	(or	knowledge). Such	a	model	can	be	based	on	work	in	risk	assessment.	The field	of	risk	perception	is	concerned	with	understanding	how	the public	forms	beliefs	about	various	hazards	and	policies.	From	the perspective	of	risk	analysis,	a	hearer's	contribution	to	a	testimonial exchange	goes	well	beyond	passive	reception	of	what	a	source	says, with	its	concomitant	risk	of	exposure	to	and	acceptance	of	a	lie.	She actively	assesses	the	risks	to	her	epistemic	and	non-epistemic	goals of	any	information	from	a	source,	and	modulates	first	whether	she listens	and	second,	if	she	does,	her	processing	of	what	the	source says. Testimony	is	information,	and	information	is	risky	in	a	lot	of ways. It	might conflict	with prior beliefs, values, or goals one is loathe to give up.	We accept testimony in the light	of these perceived	risks.	Information	filters	(bubbles)	and	echo	chambers	are external	means	of	reducing	informational	risk:	what	isn't	heard	or what	is	guaranteed	to	be	confirmatory	is	not	risky,	at	least	not	in the	short	term	(which	can	be	long	enough).	Research	into	climate change	beliefs	reveals	internal	means	by	which,	even	if	information is	not	straightforwardly	blocked	or	ignored,	it	is	processed	in	ways that eliminate or significantly reduce risk. For good reason, our common	reaction	of	generating	reasons for	discounting	the	relevance	of,	or	ignoring,	threatening	information	is	considered	"akin to	a	flight	response"	(Lupia	2013,	p.	14050).	The	suite	of	methods in motivated reasoning reduce informational risk and thereby modulate	acceptance.	From	this	perspective,	the	risk	of	acquiring	a false	belief	is	not	nearly	as	great	as	the	risk	of	maintaining	a	belief that	is	not	(or	no	longer)	evidentially	justified	or	true. The simplest way to assimilate goal-relative risk assessment	into	a	general	model	of	acceptance	of	testimony	is	to	use	the social	scientific	consensus	definition	of	trust,	which	is	linked	to	risk 9 perception:	a	psychological	state	comprising	an	intention	to	accept vulnerability	based	on	positive	expectations	of	the	intentions	or	behaviour	of	another	(Earle	2010,	p.	542;	Rousseau	et	al.	1998;	Baier 1986,	p.	238	fn.	5).xi	That	is,	in	trusting	someone,	one	accepts	risk in	exchange	for	an	uncertain	future	benefit,	such	as	cooperation	– or useful information. Social relationships generally are risky in various	ways	in	relation	to	various	goals.	As	a	subspecies	of	communication,	testimony	simply	inherits	the	role	of	goal-relative	risk assessment	in	acceptance	from	the	general	case.xii This general definition of trust admits of two basic subtypes,	depending	on	whether	the	expectations	are	based	on	intentions	or	behaviour.	Relational	trust	is	based	on	a	close	relationship between	the	trusting	person	and	the	other,	and	the	role	of	intentions	is	paramount.	One	relationally	trusts	the	other	to	have	good intentions	towards	one,	with	the	expectation	that	these	intentions will	be	borne	out	in	future	behaviour.	This	type	of	trust	is	resilient or	hard	to	undermine;	it	is	more	likely	to	be	maintained	in	the	face of	behaviour that	may seem to	violate	expectations	about intentions.	Calculative	trust	(also	called	confidence)	is	based	on	actual past	behaviour	of the	other	or	constraints	on	their future	behaviour,	such	as	by	legal	contract.	This	type	of	trust	is	fragile	or	more easily undermined. Both types operate in relation to individuals (including groups) and properties (see also	Kruglanski 2010, p. 945	on	general	and	specific	epistemic	authorities).	One	can	trust an	individual	directly,	or	a	role	that	may	be	filled	by	different	individuals.	Finally,	the	familiar	idea	of	an	asymmetry	between	the	establishment	and	maintenance	of	trust	–	i.e.	that	trust	is	hard	to	establish	and	easy	to	destroy	–	is	more	characteristic	of	calculative trust.	However,	the	asymmetry	between	trust	and	distrust	–	i.e.	that distrust	is	harder	to	dislodge	than	trust	–	appears	to	hold	for	both types	of	trust.xiii With the possible exception of Hardin's (1993) encapsulated interest account –	which at best captures only calculative trust,	as	it	is	based	on	iterated	prisoner's	dilemmas	–	risk	assessment	is	not	explicit	in	many	philosophical	definitions	of	trust.	Nevertheless	it	is	a	consistent	background	feature	by	way	of	references 10 to	vulnerability	(Pettit	1995),	reliance	on	freely	cooperative	behaviour	despite	the	unreliability	of	others	(Simpson	2012),	accepted vulnerability	despite	the	possibility	of	harm	(Baier	1986),	or	other themes of dependence and expectation of future benefit despite unreliability	(Nickel	2017).	Philosophers	also	distinguish	kinds	of trust that track	the	relational/calculative	distinction	(e.g.,	Baier's non-contract-based/contract-based distinction, Faulkner's affective/ predictive distinction). The above definition captures this common	core	of	many	philosophical	definitions	and	is	also	apt	for an	epistemically	goal-neutral	model	of	acceptance. Note	that	risk	here	is	a	subjective	assessment	(i.e.	perceived risk),	but	it	can	include	objective	components:	for	example,	when risk is defined as a combination of uncertainty (the objective chance	of	an	outcome),	and	exposure	(the	extent	to	which	the	outcome	matters)	(Holton	2004).xiv	To	illustrate,	the	risk	of	whether you	should	accept the	testimony	of	a friend	who	says	her	homebaked	cookies	don't	contain	peanuts	depends	in	part	on	whether your	child	has	a	severe	peanut	allergy	(an	objective	matter)	and how	much	the	possible	outcomes	of	acceptance	matters	(a	subjective	matter	–	in	this	case,	a	lot).	Of	course,	probability	itself	has	objective	and	subjective	definitions;	the	point	is	that	perceived	risk	is itself	complex	and	does	not	rule	out	an	objective	component.	This is	epistemically	important	in	that	a	perceived-risk-based	model	of acceptance	must	have	room	for	acceptance	to	be	determined	(or strongly	constrained)	by	the	goal	of	truth. Besides	relegating	truth	to	the	position	of	being	just	one	of various,	possibly	competing,	goals	of	acceptance,	the	risk-based	account	makes	source	features	and	source-hearer	relations,	both	of which	are involved in	assessing risk, an	essential element in the hearer's	active	engagement	in	the	testimonial	relationship.	For	example, in calculative trust we may assess risk by investigating someone's	track	record	or	seeking	evidence	of	her	expertise.	In	relational	trust	we	often	use	cognitive	shortcuts,	such	as	a	similarity heuristic	(A	is	like	B	in	respect	R,	where	R	may	be	a	group	identity, shared	value,	facial	similarity,	or	other	cue)	or	an	affective	response (positive or negative feelings). Perceived risk is relative to the 11 variable levels	of vulnerability	one	has in relation to	others, and these	levels	depend	on	varying	features	of	individuals.xv	For	example,	white	males	tend	to	see	the	world	as	much	less	risky	than	people with other gender/race combinations (Slovic 1999, p. 694). Such	individual	differences	are	intrinsic	to	the	risk-based	model	of acceptance; I	will argue	below that they	are	essential for	understanding	the	epistemic	role	of	balance in	news	reporting.	Finally, we	also	make	risk	assessments	in	context.	For	example,	in	conditions of high need for cognitive closure (that is, judgment-formation),	judgments	tend	to	be	driven	more	by	prejudices	and	stereotypes	than	individualizing	information	(Kruglanski	1990).xvi To	flesh	out	the	proposed	model	of	acceptance	and	the	role of	trust	in	it,	consider	Hardwig's	(1991)	discussion	of	the	role	of trust	in	testimony.	In	his	discussion,	trust	is	required	for	"modern knowers"	in	research	teams	given	their	epistemic	reliance	on	other knowledge	workers.	In	his	analysis,	A's	having	good	reasons	to	believe	a	proposition	said	by	B	depends	on	A's	trusting	B,	since	A	does not	have	B's	evidence	(by	assumption).	For	trust,	A	can	know	B	personally or rely	on someone else	who	does, setting up a chain	of trust.	In	this	way	justification	for	a	research	result	may	be	distributed	among	members	of	a	collaboration	via	chains	or	a	network	of trust	connections. But	notice:	source	credibility,	and	hence	risk	assessment	of a	potential	source	of	information,	is	built	into	Hardwig's	case:	a	scientific research collaboration. This hides from view, and from deeper	understanding,	the	role	that	goal-directed	risk	assessment has already played in	making acceptance of collaborators' testimony	possible.	The	academic	credentialing	system	diminishes	the risk	of	each	collaborator	qua	potential	source,	as	faked	credentials make vivid; in Becker's (1967) terms, the scientists are roughly equal	in	the	collaboration's	hierarchy	of	credibility,	although	finegrained	junior	and	senior	academic	statuses	can	matter.	Each	scientist	also	has	roughly	the	same	degree	of	vulnerability	relative	to the others. Finally, all collaborators share the goal of obtaining truth; cases	of research	misconduct	makes	vivid the	presence	of non-epistemic	goals	even	if	in	this	case	the	risk	is	presumed	to	be 12 low.	In	sum,	the	problem	of	acceptance	of	interest	of	interest	here has	already	been	resolved.	The	role	of	trust	in	acceptance	has	been to	allow	a	collaborator's testimony	to	be	heard in	the first	place, and	then	to	enable	the	hearer	to	process	what is	heard in	a	way determined	(or	strongly	constrained)	by	the	goal	of	truth.	What's left	is	just	the	traditional	problem	the	justification	of	knowledge	by accepted testimony given that one lacks one's own justification. Collaborators	trust	that	the	source	has	justification	–	a	separate	issue	from	the	role	of	trust	in	acceptance. Conversely,	consider	Fricker's	(2008,	2009)	notion	of	testimonial	injustice,	when	a	speaker	is	given	less	credibility	than	she deserves – she suffers from a credibility deficit – because of an identity	prejudice	held	by	the	hearer.	An	identity	prejudice	is	a	prejudice	based	on	an identifiable	social	group	to	which	the	speaker belongs,	such	as	race,	religion,	or	occupation.	As	a	result	of	this	injustice,	"the	flow	of	knowledge	is	blocked,	truths	fail	to	flow	from knower	to	inquirer".xvii	As	I	might	put	it,	passage	from	"We	report" to	"You	believe"	is	blocked	by	the	inquirer's	identity	prejudice	towards	the	knower. Cases	of	testimonial	injustice	display	the	risk-based	model of acceptance	at	work.	Fricker's cases show	what	happens	when trust	is	difficult	and	non-epistemic	goals	of	reasoning	dominate	acceptance.	In	testimonial	injustice,	the	knower	is	deemed	not	credible	by	the	inquirer	because	the	knower	belongs	to	a	social	outgroup relative	to	the	inquirer	–	she	represents	a	perceived	social	risk	and hence	an	information	risk.	Motivated	reasoning	is	primed	by	this risk	assessment,	although	the	exact	mechanisms	by	which	testimonial	injustice	may	result	can	differ.	The	inquirer	may	seek	to	reinforce	her	in-group	relationships	by	blocking	information	from	the knower that might threaten those relationships if taken at face value.	For	example,	the	personal	experience	of	perceiving	a	mayor drink	a	glass	of	water	with	gusto	and	declaring "there's	nothing wrong	with	this	water"	will	highly influence	reasoning	about the safety	of	a	town's	water	supply	(Fessenden-Raden	op.cit.).	Citizens have	more	relational	trust	in	their	mayor	than	in	outside	experts who	test	the	water,	and	this	trust	modulates	acceptance	–	they	hear 13 the	mayor	and	ignore	the	expert,	or	they	also	hear	the	expert	but heavily	discount	the	credibility	of	her	testimony	in	subsequent	processing.xviii	In	other	cases,	an	inquirer	may	simply	raise	the	bar	for the	establishment	of	calculative	trust	via	a	biased	assessment	of	the knower's	track	record.	The	number	of	actions	needed	to	reach	calculative	trust	may	be	raised,	and	actions	that	might	count	towards it	are	downgraded	in	assessed	competence.	Alternatively,	in	cases where	calculative	trust	might	otherwise	have	led	to	relational	trust over time, the amount of time needed	may never quite be long enough. Fricker's	notion	of	an	identity	prejudice	can	also	easily	be expanded	to	include	many	(perhaps	any)	social	categories	not	usually	considered	prejudices.	A	trust	deficit	due	to	any	group	membership	–	"is	a	government	official",	"works	for	Monsanto",	"is	liberal"	–	can	suffice	for	acceptance	to	be	blocked	or	subject	to	some form	of	bias in	processing.	Fricker considers	news	outlets "indirect"	testimony	–	presumably	on	the	assumption	that	direct	testimony is	an	individual-to-individual	affair	–	but this	metaphysical position	is	not	essential	to	testimonial	injustice.	One	can	distrust groups	or	institutions	directly	–	whether	these	are	scientists	or	private	industries	(Siegrist	2000)	or,	in	the	cases	of	interest	here,	The New York Times, Fox News Network, or the	mainstream	media ("MSM").	Trust	in	media	is	itself	complex,	since	it	involves	trust	in various features	of	news:	selectivity	of topics,	selectivity	of facts, accuracy	of	depictions,	and	journalistic	assessment	(Kohring	and Matthes	2007).	For	example,	"the	more	an	issue	does	not	relate	to personal	experience,	the	greater	the	role	that	trust	plays	in	the	relationship	between	journalists	and	recipients"	(Kohring	and	Matthes	op.cit.,	p.	248).	Acceptance	of testimony	thus	varies	by	content:	it	matters	what	that	p	expresses. This	model	of	acceptance	–	in	the	sense	of	'model'	used	in science	(Weisberg	2013)	–	does	not	take	a	particular	kind	of	trust or trust-based testimonial relationship as standard. Instead, acceptance	can	be	thought	of	in	terms	of	the	outcome	of	a	reasoning process	characterized in	terms	of the	goals	of	reasoning	and	features	of	sources	and	recipients	and	their	relations	that	affect the 14 latter's risk assessment. Different cases (and predictions) of acceptance	are	generated	by	setting	the	relevant	variables	to	various values.	For	example,	in	Hardwig's	case	of	a	scientific	collaboration, the	goal	variable is	set to truth,	and	variables for the features	of sources and recipients (e.g., elite academic credentials, equal standing	in	the	collaboration,	white	men)	yield	a	low-risk	context in which acceptance of the source's intended	message is highly probable.	The	risk	of	acquiring	a	false	belief	arises,	but	acquiring one	in	a	context	defined	by	these	settings	is	improbable.	In	comparison,	in	Fricker's	cases	of	testimonial	injustice,	the	goal	variable may be set to	maintain social ties, and variables for source and hearer	features	and	relations	yield	a	context	in	which	acceptance	is improbable.	In	this	case,	the	risk	of	acquiring	a	false	belief	doesn't even	arise. It	follows	from	this	view	that	it	is	not	quite	right	to	say	that we	trust	speakers	to	be	truthful	(when	we	do	trust	them).	That	way of	putting	the	matter	connects	the	role	of	trust	in	testimony	directly to the	goal	of truth.	What	we	should	say instead is that	we	trust someone	as	a	result	of	a	process	of	risk	assessment,	and	what	that person	says	is	(or	will	be)	perceived	as	truthful	because	we	trust them.	As	Faulkner	(2007)	argues,	the	audience's	trust	in	the	source of testimony	can	be reason	enough for	accepting that testimony. But	trust	is	at	work	before	the	speaker	opens	her	mouth	(the	first stage	in	acceptance),	and	what	is	accepted	is	a	weighted	version	of what	comes	out	when	she	does	(the	second	stage).	In	terms	of	the journalistic	concern	of	this	paper,	"You	trust"	precedes	and	modulates	both	"We	report"	(who is	able to listen?)	and	"You	believe" (what	do	they	accept?).	Trust	makes	passage	from	"We	report	in	a balanced	and	fair	manner"	to	"You	decide"	possible. Thus, when Fox News Network declared itself as "Most Trusted",	it	trumpeted	this	role	of	trust	in	its	testimony	precisely when	it	is	worth	doing	so:	in	a	social	context	characterized	by	distrust.	In	epistemological	terms,	a	climate	of	distrust	is	a	defeaterenvironment.	Given	the	above	analysis	of	acceptance,	it	is	a	communication context in which the thresholds for establishing or maintaining	relational	and	calculative	trust	between	members	of 15 different	social	subgroups	are	high.	Testimonial	failures	across	subgroup	boundaries	are	likely.	In	orthodox	Bayesian	terms,	the	only way	that	a	hearer	can	resist	new	evidence	for	a	conclusion	p	is	if the	hearer	already	firmly	believes	p	is	false.	But	given	the	role	of trust	in	acceptance,	the	hearer	can	resist	the	new	evidence	for	p, even	without being committed to not-p, just because the hearer distrusts	the	source.xix	In	general,	anything	that	primes	non-epistemic	goals	of	reasoning	has	potentially	epistemically	suboptimal consequences, since the more reasoning aims at non-epistemic goals	the	less	it	aims	at	forming	true	beliefs.	A	lack	of	trust	is	one such	prime. Part	3.	The	Practice	and	Justification	of	Balance This leaves the question of the epistemic role of balance, given the trust-modulated	passage from	"We	report" to	"You	believe."	The science communication research	shows that	balanced science	news,	even	with	weight-of-evidence	information	included, does	not	entail	public	belief	that	matches	scientific	consensus,	at least	not in	a	climate	of	distrust. In	such	a	climate,	acceptance is blocked	or	diverted	away	from	truth	(or	justified	belief,	such	as	scientific	consensus	opinion)	even	when	reports	are	balanced	and	information about scientific consensus information is provided. In short,	presenting	both	sides,	in	itself,	is	epistemically	neutral	as	a means	of	leading	to	evidentially	justified	beliefs.	So	what	good	is	it? It	is	a	separate	issue	that	different	political	and	social	values	will yield	different	policy	recommendations	even	when	opposing	sides believe	the	same	facts.	Does	balance	do	nothing	to	contribute	to	the acceptance	of	those	facts? From the fact that balance is not a cure for epistemically suboptimal	reasoning,	it	does	not	follow	that	it	plays	no	essential epistemic	role.	In	any	form,	balance	offers	news	consumers	distinct perspectives,	whether	or	not	they	weigh	these	perspectives	in	justified	ways	and	end	up	with	justified	beliefs.	The	epistemic	value	of balance	derives	from	the	fact	that	risk	assessment	differs	between individuals.	Balance	provides	those	who	are	able	to	accept	more	informational risk with distinct perspectives. They can reason to 16 justified	beliefs	and	use	those	beliefs	in	the	light	of	their	values	to arrive at policy suggestions. Such people can act as multipliers within their respective subgroups, thus spreading the epistemic value	of	balance	to	those	who	are	not	able	to	accept	the	same	information	directly	from	the	original	source	of	the	testimony. As	Hardin	(1993,	p.	525)	notes,	we	have	different	capacities for trust,	depending	on	a	number	of factors,	such	as	a	stable	upbringing, keen assessment of other peoples'	motives, or being a member	of	a	dominant	social	group.	The	risk-based	model	of	acceptance	of testimony	entails that there	will	be individual	differences	in	acceptance.	Less	vulnerable	individuals	will	have	less	need to engage in self-protective reasoning. For example, Kruglanski (2010,	p.	941)	notes	that	political	conservativism	is	positively	related	to	need	for	cognitive	closure,	but	it	does	not	follow	that	each political	conservative	is	equally	in	need	of	closure.	Many	conservatives respond to scientific consensus information about climate change	with	contrary	updating,	but	not	all	do. Some	can	even	flip.	A	famous	recent	case	is	former	Cato	Institute	climate	change	denier	Jerry	Taylor,	who	was	able	to	critically assess	the	positions	of	scientists	arguing	against	taking	action	and begin	to	argue	for	policies	to	mitigate	the	effects	of	climate	change (Inquiring	Minds	podcast	2017).	Taylor is	a	white	man	of	stable, high	socioeconomic	status.	These	features	alone	do	not	determine why	the	possibility	of	acceptance	for	him	of	climate	science	results conflicting	with	his	political	views	was	greater	than	that	of	other conservative	white	men	in	similar	circumstances.	They	do	explain why	his	perceived	risk	of flipping	was	lower	than it	might	be for many	other	conservatives.	Another	critical	factor	was	his	ability	to give	sufficient	weight	to	the	goal	of	truth	over	other	goals,	such	as his personal interest in being a regular and	well-paid pundit	on conservative	television.	For	hearers	who	have	this	constellation	of features,	balance	can	contribute	to	good	decision-making	more	or less	in	the	way	traditionally	assumed	-even	in	a	general	climate	of distrust	and	polarization.	But	this	is	a	special	case,	and	the	model of	acceptance	given	above	shows	why. 17 Such individual differences can then	make a social difference	via	amplification	of	the	voices	of	such	individuals	within	their epistemic	communities.	Taylor	now	works	for	a	think-tank	in	which he	develops	libertarian-consonant	policy	positions	in	response	to anthropogenic	climate	change.	The	facts	are	not	in	dispute;	the	responses depend on values, as	was always the case. His position magnifies	his	individual	reasoning	so	that	the	epistemic	benefits	of balance at the individual level can be made available to those within	the	community	for	whom	taking	the	same	information	risk is not possible and so for whom acceptance is not possible. Whether	such	individuals	choose	to	play	this	amplifying	role	is	not up	to	the	media,	but	the	media	can	provide	the	raw	material. There is of course nothing new in noting that testimony from	individuals	within	a	social	group	is	more	likely	to	be	accepted (heard	and	processed	in	an	epistemically	virtuous	way)	by	others in	the	group.	Katherine	Hayhoe,	a	climate	change	scientist	who	is also	an	evangelical	Christian,	is	a	prominent	case	of	this	type.	Ingroup relations	are likely to	be characterized	by relational trust, which	de-incentivizes	defensive reasoning	and thereby increases acceptance.	It	follows,	however,	that	there	will	be	fewer	such	individuals	in	a	climate	of	distrust,	blunting	the	epistemic	contribution of	balance	to	democratic	decision-making. This	is	why	journalistic	measures	to	address	distrust	must also	play	a role.	A frequent suggestion	along these lines is	more careful attention to framing. Frames are "interpretive storylines that	set	a	specific	train	of	thought	in	motion,	communicating	why an	issue	might	be	a	problem,	who	or	what	might	be	responsible	for it,	and	what	should	be	done	about	it"	(Nisbet	2009,	p.	15).	How	issues	are framed in	a	news	story	"can	have	an	effect	on	how	it is understood	by	audiences"	(Scheufele	and	Tewksbury	2007,	p.	11). The	elements	of	framing	involve	identifying	a	problem,	the	cause,	a moral	interpretation,	and	a	proposed	remedy	(Huttunen	and	Hilden	(2014).	Each	of	these	elements	are	not	necessarily	said	(or	expressible	easily	in	propositional	form)	but	they	are	critical	to	what is communicated. Various frames for climate change are those which involve social progress, economic development and 18 competitiveness,	morality	and	ethics,	and	scientific	and	technical uncertainty	(see	also	Nisbet	2009,	p.	18	Table	2).	For	example,	a moral	frame	communicates	the	message	"Our	way	of	life	is	unethical",	while	other frames	deny this	message	even if they	accept	a need	for	a	policy	response.	The	suggestion	is	that	journalists	or	ingroup	communicators	can	try	to	neutralize	the	effects	of	worldview and	distrust	of	scientists	by	framing	stories	in	"world-consonant" terms	(Cook	and	Lewandowsky	2016;	see	also	Kahan	and	Braman op.cit.). Conclusion. I've argued for a more adequate understanding of acceptance	of	testimony	–	the	route	from	"We	report"	to	"You	believe" –	as	a	way	of	clarifying	the	epistemic	value	of	balance	in	new	journalism.	The	goal-relative,	risk-based	model	of	acceptance	reveals	a role	for	truth	at	the	start	of	this	route	and	in	the	middle.	Trust	determines	or	constrains	the	possibility	of	taking	the	initial	informational	risk	of	consuming	a	news	report	and	in	how	what	is	reported is	processed	to	result	in	what	is	believed	or	accepted.	It	follows	that "We	report in	a fair	and	balanced	manner"	will	depend	on	trust, and	that	balance	cannot	compensate	for	a	climate	of	distrust. Nevertheless,	different	individuals	have	different	capacities for	trust	or	different	tolerances	for	informational	risk.	A	climate	of distrust	will	decrease	the	proportion	of	such	individuals	within	a society.	But	because	balance	presents these individuals	with	opposing	viewpoints,	they	can	accept	and	process	balanced	news	in the	way that	was assumed to be the norm across consumers of news.	The	account	of	acceptance	provided	here	shows	in	what	way they	are	exceptions.	As	in-group	members,	their	acceptance	can	be leveraged to amplify acceptance at the social level of public discourse	and	public	decision-making.	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The cases of interest here involve gaps between scientific consensus and public opinion and the role of balance in creating or mitigating these gaps. ii The old slogan was reportedly dropped to separate the channel to some extent from right-wing political operative Roger Ailes, its founding chairman. Ailes, who adopted the slogan, died in May 2017. Even if true, this reason does not explain why "Most Watched, Most Trusted" was the chosen replacement. 26 iii While some in the philosophical literature distinguish acceptance	from	belief,	I	will	use	them	as	synonyms.	It's	unlikely	the folk	systematically	distinguish	between	these	states,	and	the	empirical	studies	discussed	below	don't	either.	For	example,	standard social	science	surveys	present	a	proposition	and	ask	whether	participants	agree	or	disagree	on	a	7-point	scale	anchored	by	"strongly agree" and "strongly disagree". There is no clear motivation for mapping	"agree"	to	one	of	either	"accept"	or	"believe". iv False equivalence is when a behaviour (usually egregious) by one side or person is "balanced" by mention of a similar but inequivalent act by an opposing side or person on the other – a variant of the Tu Quoque fallacy. Obviously judgments of when such comparisons are falsely equivalent will vary (in ways that the text helps illuminate). v Misinformation, easily found on the Internet, also plays a role (Lewandowsky et al. 2012, Lewandowsky et al. 2013). Lewandowsky et al. 2012: 623) define rejection of science as "dismissal of well-established scientific results that are not scientifically grounded", but (as other studies show) those who understand more about science don't necessarily accept science. See also Kobayashi 2018 on the roles of beliefs about scientific consensus and social consensus in the acceptability of a scientific claim. vi Kruglanski and colleagues (Kruglanski 1990; Kruglanski et al. 2010) theorize that motivated reasoning is rooted in the need to achieve cognitive closure, or to form a judgment based on the information available. Closure is theorized to be a fundamental motivation for constructing knowledge (or belief), and is modulated by context-specific and individual variation in the need to achieve it. For example, we may seek closure in order to attain perceived non-epistemic benefits, such as esteem or material welfare for oneself or significant others, or avoid corresponding perceived losses. Individual differences in the need for closure will consequently affect individual acceptance. vii The Principle of Charity (by which one should interpret another's utterances so that they optimize agreement in terms of their meaning or at least truth conditions) rests on social relationships: President Trump's literal lies are interpreted by supporters in a broader light in which he's expressing something true, just not in propositional form. 27 See Daukas 2006 on a principle of epistemic charity extended within social groups. viii The sender's side of the relationship matters -for example, in terms of how intended messages should be framed to raise the probability of acceptance. I consider news senders in the final section, since in this context the role of the sender is the specific question of what the practice of balance in journalism contributes to acceptance. ix Lupia (2013: 14051) suggests two variables are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for source credibility: the listener's perception of common interests and perception of relative expertise (p. 14051). For example, in conditions in which external forces for preventing or punishing lying are high, the extent to which perceived common interests are required for credibility decreases (p. 14052). As this example implies, assessment of common interests will itself involve risk assessment (e.g. risk is low when breaking a contract incurs severe penalty), although it is an open question exactly how these variables are related to others in the risk-assessment literature. x The Quine-Duhem thesis already implies that the conclusion one accepts in hypothesis testing depend on auxiliary hypotheses, or prior background beliefs. The empirical results reveal that a broader range of psychological attitudes, in particular trust, also play a role. xi On this view, trust is distinct from reliance, which may involve inanimate objects. Since my focus is on testimony from people, this difference will not matter here. xii	The	status	of	testimony	as	a	form	of	communication	is	noted (e.g.	Lackey	2008:	fn.	9;	Faulkner	2000),	and	(as	Slovic	1999:	697 puts	it),	"if	trust	is	lacking,	no	form	or	process	of	communication will	be	satisfactory." xiii Relational and calculative trust no doubt interact in complicated ways and can be difficult to distinguish (and research to date is sparse: Earle op.cit., p. 571). Ascriptions of intentions and predictions of behaviour are often intertwined, and relational trust may be the long-run outcome of calculative trust (e.g., a married couple) but not necessarily (e.g., children and their parents). However, these complications don't play a role here. 28 xiv Subjective features associated with risk assessment include uncertainty, dread, controllability, and other factors (Slovic 1999). xv	Given	Dunbar's	work	on	the	number	of	personal	relationships one	can	have	that	involve	trust	(and	obligations)	–	about	150	–	it	is likely that trust	is	a	limited	resource.	Group	membership	can	expand	this	circle,	but	a	second-order	limit	may	also	appear. xvi Thus, the explanation of why we trust isn't necessarily what might count philosophically as a reason (see also Hawley 2017: 233). A trusts B just because B is a member of A's church; A distrusts C just because C makes A feel uncomfortable. The rationality of such reasons is important for the question of whether trust is justified, but not for the question of how it comes about. xvii It is not quite the case that in testimonial injustice truths do not flow from knower to inquirer. More precisely, A's intended message is not accepted because A communicates (perhaps, but not necessarily, nonpropositionally) that she belongs to a particular group, B distrusts that group, and A's intended message is assigned low credibility. xviii Consistently with this model, Marsh (2011) argues that testimonial injustice is one of a broader class of "trust injustices", or injustices in our credibility judgments whether or not these involve testimonial relationships. Information risk is one kind of risk we assess. xix Thanks to Sean Sullivan for this point. xx Acknowledgements: Thanks to Charles Fishkin, Carl Fox, Richard Fumerton, Erin Nash, Haris Shekeris, and Sean Sullivan for comments and/or pointers to relevant sources; the audience at the When Experts Disagree (WEXD) conference on Trust, Expert Opinion, and Policy at University College Dublin, Aug. 31-Sept. 2, 2017; and the Philosophy Department and other attendees at my faculty colloquium at the University of Iowa Nov. 10, 2017 on a part of this paper.