i Appearance and Explanation: A Defense of Phenomenal Explanationism Kevin McCain and Luca Moretti Contents Acknowledgements ix Part I: Phenomenal Conservatism: Promising but Incomplete 1 Phenomenal Conservatism and Its Promises I. Phenomenal Conservatism: The Basics II. Supporting PC III. Benefits of PC IV. Challenges for PC? V. The Plan 2 Defeat, Inference, and Reflective Awareness I. Defeat II. Inference III. Reflective Awareness IV. Conclusion Part II: Phenomenal Explanationism 3 The Nature of Appearances I. What Seemings Are Not II. The Basics of the Experience View III. The (Dis)Unity of Experience IV. The Justificatory Power of Appearance V. Conclusion 4 Phenomenal Explanationism I. The Proper Framework II. Explanationism III. Phenomenal Explanationism IV. PC Problems, PE Solutions V. Objections to PE VI. Conclusion 5 Phenomenal Explanationism versus Epistemic Entitlement I. Conservatism, Liberalism, and PE II. Wright's Cornerstone Epistemology and ET ii III. Conclusion Part III: In Defense of Phenomenal Explanationism 6 Global Ambitions I. General Features of Smithies' Attack on PC II. The First Front: Evidence III. The Second Front: Evidential Support IV. Conclusion 7 The Look of Things I. Explaining Defeat II. The Straightforward Argument III. Beliefs About Looks IV. Conclusion 8 The Skeptical Challenge I. Skepticism and Reflective Awareness II. PE and Skepticism III. Concluding Thoughts References Index