To	Remake	Man	and	the	World...comme	si? Camus's	"Ethics"	contra	Nihilism Norman	K.	Swazo1 ABSTRACT Whether	Albert	Camus's	"existentialist"	thought	expresses	an	"ethics"	is	a	subject of	disagreement	among	commentators. Yet,	there	can	be	no	reading	of	Camus's philosophical	and	literary	works	without	recognizing	that	he	was	engaged	in	the post-WW2	period	with	two	basic	questions:	How	must	we	think?	What	must	we do? If	his	thought	presents	us	with	an	ethics,	even	if	not	systematic,	it	seems	to be	present	in	his	ideas	of	"remaking"	both	man	and	world	that	are	central	to	his The Myth of Sisyphus and The Rebel. Curiously, however, this apparent recommendation	is	ambiguous	for	the	fact	that	while	Camus	proposes	as	much he	does so "comme	si," i.e., form	a	perspective of "as if." A clarification	of this qualification is presented here in the light of the fact that Camus rejects any nihilist project that countenances either suicide or	murder. Thereby one	may argue	that	Camus	indeed	has	an	ethics	that	remains	pertinent	to	today. Keywords:	Camus;	philosophical	suicide;	nihilism;	ethics Camus's	Two	Basic	Questions Nietzsche's late	19th	century	anti-metaphysics informs	the	philosophy	of	Albert Camus, especially because Camus's philosophical impetus was to counter nihilism and its perceived onset politically in the fascism	of twentieth century Europe. For	Camus,	appeals	to	the	authority	of	transcendent	values-i.e.,	belief in the God of Abrahamic religion, belief in the classical ideas of the Good, the True,	and	the	Beautiful-have	lost	what	was	believed	to	be	an	"indubitable"	and "unshakeable"	foundation.	We	are	suspended	(as	it	were)	over	an	abyss,	having lost our false innocence, and this without "lamentation" or "glorification."2 Accepting these assumptions, then,	Camus takes center stage in a 21st century interrogation	having	two	questions:	How	must	we	think?	What	must	we	do? These questions translate to Camus's philosophically fundamental question of suicide. Whether we live or die, those questions presuppose a practical rationality. If "what is called a reason for living is also an excellent reason	for	dying,"	and	vice	versa,	then	one	may	ask	whether	Camus	presents	us with	an	"ethics"	that	issues	from	his	encounter	with	the	absurd.	Of	course,	Camus expresses	his	perception	of	his	time,	believing	as	he	did	after	the	Second	World War that "we have to hasten to create in the interval between [the "frenzied 1	Professor	of	Philosophy,	Department	of	History	and	Philosophy,	North	South	University,	Dhaka Bangladesh;	norman.swazo@northsouth.edu 2	Albert	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	ed.	P.	Thody,	trans.	E.C.	Kennedy	(New	York:	Vintage Books,	1970),	p.	245. Camus,	writing in	February	1947,	uses these	words in	reference to Jules Roy's	La	Vallée	Heureuse. 2 embraces" of] war and revolution," 3 i.e., after a war that promised total destruction. Critics	have	written	little	on	this	aspect	of	Camus's	thought Lana	Starkey	comments	that	Camus	is	neglected	as	a	moral	philosopher.4 Herbert Hochberg, however, remains notably severe in his assessment. 5 Hochberg argued that Camus sought, but failed, to derive an ethics from the absurdity of the human condition. Situating Camus among empiricists in epistemological	outlook,	Hochberg interprets	Camus	as	accepting the factuality of	his	existence	and	of	the	world	as	disclosed	in	ordinary	experience. Our	task	is to	live	in	the	world	as	we	find	it. Camus	thus	counters	the	nihilist	"who	does	not believe	in	what	exists."	For	Camus,	however,	Hochberg	comments,	"man	cannot grasp rationally an explanation of his and the world's existence," hence the absurdity	of	the	human	condition.	This	condition	is	expressed	in	the	"polarity"	of the human desire to know and the	world's silence about the foundations and promises	of	human	existence. In	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus	and in	The	Rebel,	Camus refuses	the	nihilist	option:	"The	final	conclusion	of	absurdist	reasoning	is,	in	fact, the repudiation of suicide and the acceptance of the desperate encounter between	human	inquiry	and	the	silence	of	the	universe."6 Hochberg	complains, Camus	has	leaped	from	the	factual	premise	that	the	juxtaposition	of	man and the universe is absurd, to the evaluative conclusion that this state ought to be preserved...For this transition we have no justification. Without such justification, Camus has not, in the least way, made his point. To produce such a justification would obviously involve the construction	of	an	ethic. But	it	is	precisely	on	this	point	that	Camus	builds his	ethical	view. Hence	all	that	follows	leans	on	a	hollow	argument.7 Hochberg	requires	a logic	of "justification."	But, there is	ample	reason	to	argue that	Hochberg	misses	Camus's	point. Does Camus's refusal render his "ethics" hollow and inadequate? I propose Camus's questions remain central to a postmodern ethics such as he anticipated would have to be thought differently from the philosophy of Nietzsche, Marx, and Kierkegaard and differently from existentialists such as Jaspers and Sartre. If, upon confronting the absurd, the act of suicide is not a legitimate	choice	while	not	believing	in	God	or	in	the	authority	of	transcendent 3Ibid.,	243. 4	Those	writing	on	Camus's	ethics	are	few. See,	e.g.,	Michael	Mohrt	and	Warren	Ramsey,	"Ethic and Poetry in the	Work of Camus,"	Yale	French	Studies 1 (1948): 113-118; Serge	Doubrovsky, "The Ethics of Albert Camus," in Camus: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Germaine Brée, (Englewood	Cliffs,	NJ:	Prentice-Hall,	1962),	71-84;	Harold	A.	Durfee,	"Albert	Camus	and	the	Ethics of Rebellion," Foundational Reflections: American University Publications in Philosophy, 29, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), 147-177; Lana Starkey, "Albert Camus and the Ethics of Moderation," Parrhesia 21 (2014): 144-160. Starkey's use of 'virtue ethics' is not to say that Camus	seeks	to	warrant	an	Aristotelian	eudaimonistic	ethics,	since,	as	Starkey	(p.	7)	opines,	for Camus "virtues are unintelligible in	modernity." She does, however,	want to identify Camus's notion of la mesure as equivalent in meaning to the Aristotelian virtue of temperance or moderation	(sophrosuné). 5	Herbert	Hochberg,	"Albert	Camus	and	the	Ethic	of	Absurdity,"	Ethics	75(2),	(1965):	87-102. 6	Albert	Camus,	The	Rebel,	trans.	Anthony	Brower	(New	York:	Vintage	Books,	1956),	6. 7	Hochberg,	92. 3 values, then	we	have	some	thinking to	do.	We	have to	perform	our	deeds	with reference to a thinking that finds "the means to proceed beyond nihilism."8 Camus	discloses to	us "reasons for living	and for creating"	beyond the "mortal problems"	he	has	engaged	by	way	of	illustration	(deliberately	not	to	say	here,	by way	of	justification). Camus	does	not	propose	we	live	haphazardly	or	in	aimless wandering	about,	but	(echoing	Nietzsche)	instead	to	live	as	creators. Camus	desires that	we	proceed beyond	nihilism, appropriating Pindar's counsel-to	aspire	not to immortal life	but, rather, to	exhaust the limits	of the possible.9 Acknowledging human mortality, we require a sense of what is possible. Despite the absurdity of the human condition, our	mortal life is still worth	living.	Hence,	our	specifically	human	task	is	to	work	to	exhaust	the	limits of	the	possible	through	creative	acts. The	question,	then,	is: How	far	shall	we	go in exhausting the limits of the possible? This question is entirely salient in postmodern context. Camus reminded that Nazism was a movement born of rebellion,	but	it	had	an	impetus	toward	irrationality. Nazis	were	free	to	act	with irrational terror, and thus	with impunity. Theirs	was a	movement of "nihilist revolution," establishing "a mystique beyond the bounds of any ethical considerations," its consequences of suicide and murder thereby "neither efficacious	nor	exemplary."10 Camus writes, "Those who rush blindly to history in the name of the irrational,	proclaiming	that	it	is	meaningless,	encounter	servitude	and	terror	and finally	emerge	into	the	universe	of	concentration	camps."11 Mussolini's	fascism, Hitler's Nazism, Russian Communism betrayed the origin of the revolution, politically	cynical	in	their	drawing	from	"moral	nihilism." They	offered	"private and public techniques of annihilation," suicide and murder: "If men kill one another, it is because they reject	mortality and	desire immortality for all	men. Therefore,	in	one	sense,	they	commit	suicide."12 These	revolutionaries	went	too far in their turn to history. Camus would have us be rebels "at grips with history," but moving beyond moral nihilism: "instead of killing and dying in order	to	produce	the	being	that	we	are	not,	we	have	to	live	and	let	live	in	order	to create	what	we are.'13 Contrary to	moral nihilism's refrain that "everything is permitted,"	Camus	prefers	Van	Gogh's	"admirable	complaint"-"I	can	very	well, in life and in	painting, too, do	without	God. But I cannot, suffering as I do, do without something that is greater than I am, that is my life-the power to create."14 In	The	Myth	of Sisyphus,	Camus opined, "There is but one useful action, that	of	remaking	man	and	the	earth."15 We	can	take	the	statement	as	comprised of	two	interdependent	assertions:	(1)	It	is	useful	to	remake	humankind;	(2)	It	is 8	Albert	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus	and	Other	Essays, trans. Justin	O'Brien	(New	York:	Vintage Books,	1955),	"Preface." 9	Camus	cites	Pindar,	Pythian,	iii. 10	Camus,	The	Rebel,	184. 11	Ibid.,	246. 12	Ibid.,	247. 13	Ibid.,	252. 14	Ibid.,	257. 15	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	64. 4 useful to remake the earth. For Camus, then, there is some	utility to remaking humankind and the earth. 'Remaking' is to be understood with reference to destiny:	"It	is	not	sufficient	to	live,	there	must	be	a	destiny	that	does	not	have	to wait	for	death,"	he	says. "It	is	therefore	justifiable	to	say	that	man	has	an	idea	of a	better	world	than	this."16 The	task	is	to	make	one's life	a	work	of	art,	thus	to complete	what	reality lacks,	as lucidity informs	us that, "suffering	has	no	more meaning	than	happiness."17 With	this	observation,	Camus	offers	a	tragic	sense	of life: life "can be	magnificent and overwhelming-that is the whole tragedy."18 But this recognition of the tragedy of human life elicits the essential comportment: "The realization that life is absurd cannot	be an end, but only a beginning."19 When Camus says 'earth' we are to interpret him to mean 'world', the latter	understood	to	be	the	locus	of	meaning	and	understanding	in	relation	to	our disclosure	of	meaning (what, as	Heidegger	put it, is 'world' in the sense	of "the referential context of signification," Bedeutsamkeit20). Yet, in the moment of stating	as	much,	Camus	also	demurs-"I	shall	never	remake	man. But	one	must do 'as if.'" '...as if...', he says.21 The statement is enigmatic. In the French, one says	'...comme	si...'. It	seems	this	statement	speaks	to	two	actions	Camus	will	not himself	undertake. We	must	clarify the interpretive	problem	presented in this assertion. There	are	multiple	implicatures	present	in	the	statement: • Implicature	1:	'I	shall	never	remake	man.'	(reference	to	self) • Implicature 2: 'I shall never remake man.' (reference to an imperative) • Implicature	3:	'I	shall	never	remake	man.'	(reference	to	time	frame) • Implicature	4:	'I	shall	never	remake	man.'	(reference	to	action) • Implicature 5: 'I shall never remake	man.' (reference to object of action) The	questions	following	from	these	implicatures	are	obvious.	Are	we	to	accent	'I', to say 'Camus means he himself will not do so', but that he leaves it open to others,	to	us,	to	do	so? Or,	are	we	to	accent	'shall',	Camus	meaning	that	he	gives	to himself an imperative not to do so, even though he might have an inclination (whether	of	emotion	or	appetite)	to	remake	humankind	and	the	world? Etc.,	etc., the questions follow each implicature. Howsoever we interpret Camus's 16	Camus,	The	Rebel,	262. 17	Ibid.,	261. 18	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	201. 19	Ibid.,	201. 20 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 19??) Heidegger (BT, III. "The	Worldliness of the	World," 59), clarified 'world' to be understood in several	ways,	including	"the	totality	of	being	which	can	be	objectively	present	within	the	world," also	"as that	'in	which'	a	factical	Dasein	'lives'." Later,	in	section	17	"Reference	and	Signs"	(71	ff.) he	writes,	"reference	and	the	referential	totality	were	in	some	sense	constitutive	of	worldliness itself." Thus	Heidegger	says	(80-81):	"As	that	for	which	one	lets	beings	be	encountered	in	the	kind of	being	of	relevance,	the	wherein	of	self-referential	understanding	is	the	phenomenon	of	world." 21	Camus,	Le	mythe	de	Sisyphe (Editions Gallimard, 1942),	writes: "Les conquérants savent	que l'action	est	en	elle-même	inutile.	Il	n'y	a	qu'une	action	utile,	celle	qui	referait	l'homme	et	la	terre.	Je ne	referai	jamais	les	hommes.	Mais	il	faut	faire	'comme	si'." 5 meaning, we cannot ignore the subsequent statement complicating the interpretation. Despite	saying	he	shall	never	remake	humankind,	Camus	utters	a general imperative	that	seemingly	excludes	him	but	not	us:	"One"	must	do	this, he	says;	"one"	must	remake	both	humankind	and	the	world,	but	...	as	if...,	comme si. Who	is	this	"one"	who	must	do	so?	What	does	Camus	mean	here? What does	it	mean	to	say,	'as	if',	'comme	si'?	Is	this	the	logic	of	the	subjunctive-to	say, 'as	it	were',	thus	to	say,	'One	must	remake	humankind	and	the	world...as	it	were'? Or,	is	it	the	word	of	the	epistemological	and	moral	skeptic-'as	if'	alike	to	saying, 'well,	not	quite'; 'well,	not	really'; 'No,	I	don't	really	mean	that'; 'No,	I	don't	really believe	that';	'I	mean,	as	if	that	were	true...but	not	really';	and	so	on? Does	Camus mean that one	must act to remake	humankind and the	world	as if it	were	true that	one	could	remake	humankind,	even	as	if	it	were	true	that	one	should	remake humankind and the world, thus to take up the imperative as if it were an imperative,	even	if,	were	we	pressed,	we	would	answer	'Really,	truly	speaking,	it is not an imperative'? Camus uses 'one' to denote what is impersonal and anonymous. But,	this	'one'	he	expects	to	be	made	personal	when	a	given	person "enters in	with	his	revolt	and	his lucidity." Indeed,	relative to	morality,	Camus tells	us,	"Man	can	allow	himself	to	denounce	the	total	injustice	of	the	world	and then	demand	a	total	justice	that	he	alone	will	create."22 But one must clarify Camus's 'comme si' here. Consider examples of common	usage:23 Usage	1	means:	"in	such	a	way	that	something	seems	to	be	true,"	e.g., a) 'It	looks	as	if	it's	going	to	rain.' b) 'Jack	smiled	as	though	[as	if]	he	was	[were]	enjoying	a	private joke.' Usage 2	means: "used when you are describing something and you imagine	an	explanation	for	it	that	you	know	is	not	the	real	one,"	e.g., a) 'The house	was in such a	mess-it looked as though [as if] a bomb	had	dropped	on	it.' Usage	3	means: "spoken used for emphasizing that something is not true	or	is	not	important,"	e.g., a) 'Don't get lost or anything, will you?' [One answers:] 'As if I would	[get	lost]-I'm	not	stupid.' b) 'Why	was	he	worrying	about	the	interview?-As	if	it	mattered anyway!' c) 'As if'. . . 'comme	si. . .' Does Camus utter an imperative such that he really, truly, does mean that you and I must remake humankind and remake the world, our freedom countering nihilism? Camus, informing us of his epistemological comportment, admits he does not know	"whether	this	world	has	a	meaning	that	transcends	it."24	He	also	asserts	it 22	Camus,	The	Rebel,	258. 23	Macmillan	Dictionary,	"as	if",	https://www.macmillandictionary.com/dictionary/british/as-if, accessed	18	July	2019. 6 is	impossible	for	him "just	now	to	know	it,"	thus	possibly	later	knowing	so. His sense of the human condition, such as he experienced it in post-WW2	Europe after	the	Holocaust, the	atomic	bombing	of	Hiroshima	and	Nagasaki, the	failure of communist revolution, etc., did not provide him the knowledge he desired. For	him,	action	integrates	human	and	world	and	works	to	alter	it	without	moral nihilism. Where there is no absolute negation there is yet reason to live: "I proclaim that I believe in nothing and that everything is absurd, but I cannot doubt the validity of my proclamation and I must at least believe in my protest."25 Cautious	of	excess,	of	transgressing	the	limit,	Camus	hopes	"for	a	new creation." One	must answer	what one	means by 'world'. It is not	merely the lifeworld	(Lebenswelt)	conceptualized	by	Husserl	and	Heidegger	or the	environing physical	world	that	is	"the	planet	Earth."	There	is	a	temporal	element	involved	in living. One	can	(a)	merely	await	the	future,	passively	present,	surrendered	to	the dominion	of	the	past	as	it	governs	the	present;	or	(b)	one	can	engage	the	future in anticipatory resolve, attentive to individual and collective potentiality-forbeing,	the	future	governing	the	present	through	that	resolve. Camus	seems	not to appreciate this distinction, however. He says: "Real generosity toward the future lies in giving all to the present."26 Does this mean, therefore, that-in view	of	contemporary	concerns-there	can	be	no	reasonable	appeal	to	a	broad principle	of	morality	such	as	asserts	"duties	to	future	generations,"	or	a	principle of "responsibility to protect" the present, including persons, the environment, etc.? The answers are unclear in Camus's texts. He allows "for those who, without concluding, continue questioning."27	We must continue questioning- such is his imperative countering the unjust act of suicide. Camus does not appeal	to	"an	eternal	idea	of	justice." On	the	contrary,	"If	injustice	is	bad	for	the rebel"-for	Camus,	it	is-"it	is	[bad]...because	it...kills	the	small	part	of	existence that	can	be	realized	on	this	earth	through	the	mutual	understanding	of	men. In the same way, since the man who lies shuts himself off from the other man, falsehood is therefore proscribed and, on a slightly lower level, murder and violence,	which	impose	definitive	silence."28	Camus	sides	with	Plato	and	dialectic to	clarify	moral	rectitude:	"Plato	is	right	and	not	Moses	and	Nietzsche. Dialogue on the level of	mankind is less costly than the gospel preached by totalitarian regimes	in	the	form	of	a	monologue	dictated	from	the	top	of	a	lonely	mountain." To	refuse	Moses	is	to	refuse	the	transcendent	as	source	of	an	a	priori	morality;	to refuse Nietzsche is to refuse moral nihilism and master-slave morality. Thus, "The	logic	of	the	rebel	is	to	want	to	serve	justice	so	as	not	to	add	to	the	injustice of the human condition...and to wager, in spite of human misery, for happiness."29 24	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	38. 25	Camus,	The	Rebel,	10. 26	Ibid.,	304. 27	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	7. 28	Camus,	The	Rebel,	283. 29	Ibid.,	285. 7 Through dialectic one attains	mutual understanding, keeping the future remains open and disclosing meaningful possibilities. Camus gives all to the present, intentionally being generous, giving all, to the future. One does not, therefore,	ignore	the	demands	of	the	future. One	accounts	for	them	by	giving	all to	the	present.30 The	problem	of	suicide	is	faced	directly,	as	foil	to	the	threat	of nihilism.31 Early in	The	Myth	of Sisyphus, Camus remarks that there are those who say 'no' to suicide but	who "act as if they thought 'yes'." Here the 'as if' relates thought and deed: One thinks the answer to the problem of suicide is 'yes', suicide thus	permitted, if not	obligatory;	but, one says 'no', in	which case one does not commit suicide. Perhaps one says 'no' impulsively; for, Camus reminds,	"We	get	into	the	habit	of	living	before	acquiring	the	habit	of	thinking." The earlier habit of living, countervailing the latter, is potent,. To continue questioning	is	to	assure	oneself	of	a	tomorrow. One	anticipates	the	eventuality of an answer while doubting reason's potency. We recognize our longing for tomorrow	as	a	sign	of	"the	revolt	of	the	flesh"	against	the	absurd. The	fact	of	revolt	is	itself	a	sign	of	deference	to	the	claim	the	future	makes on	us	when	one	feels	the	world	in	all	its	estrangement,	where	the	True,	the	Good, and	the	Beautiful	seem	to	be	without	meaning.	Rejecting	a	formal	ethics,	Camus opines:	"No	code	of	ethics	and	no	effort	are	justifiable	a	priori	in	the	face	of	the cruel	mathematics that command our condition."32 Thus Camus rejects	moral justification a priori, leaving room for an a posteriori warrant in ordinary experience. If	we	are	to	remake	humankind	and	the	world,	then	we	must	attend to	consequences. To	attend	to	the	consequences	of	our	deeds	is	to	attend	to	the claim	of the future	upon the	present. That is	why	Camus	would give all to the present. One gives all to the present in view of consequences, accounting for what	tomorrow	can	bring	beyond	the	"successive	regrets	and	impotences"	that the	history	of	human	thought	has	delivered	us. The world is not reasonable relative to Camus's interrogation of the conditions of life experienced in the first half of the twentieth century. But, reason persists, insisting on its "adventure." Even if reason lacks apodictic efficacy it	nonetheless	possesses	and	manifests	an intensity	of	hopes.	With	this hope	we	may	see	the	way	forward	to	"revolt	against	the	irremediable,"33	finding small consolation against the absurd, even if with a limited efficacy. Camus counsels:	"But	he	who	dedicates	himself	to	the	duration	of	his	life,	to	the	house he builds, to the dignity of	mankind, dedicates himself to the earth and reaps from	it	the	harvest	that	sows	its	seed	and	sustains	the	world	again	and	again."34 Camus,	in	a	quintessentially	Nietzschean	move,	may	ask	too	much	of	humankind 30	Despite his rejection of the Christian gospel, it is as if Camus appropriates the adage that counsels	taking	care	of	today	so	that	thereby	tomorrow	will	take	care	of	itself. 31	Ingrid	L.	Anderson,	"Absurd	Dignity:	The	Rebel	and	His	Cause	in	Améry	and	Camus,"	Journal	of French and Francophone Philosophy-Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 24(3),	(2016):	74-94,	at	77,	observes:	"Camus	argues	convincingly	that	the	revolutionary	desire for	a	perfected, inevitable future,	when	coupled	with	ethical	and	philosophical	bankruptcy,	not only	rationalizes	the	suspension	of	morality,	but	also	ultimately	necessitates	it. The	rejection	of what	is	eventually	requires	the	elaboration	of	what	ought	to	be..." 32	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	16. 33	Ibid.,	25. 34	Camus,	The	Rebel,	302. 8 and	the	world;	for,	he	desires	"everything	to	be	explained"	to	him	or,	failing	that, then	"nothing." In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche asks a set of questions about God: "Why	atheism	today? . . . 'the father' in	God	has	been	thoroughly	refuted;	ditto, 'the	judge',	'the	rewarder'. Also	his	'free	will':	he	does	not	hear-and	if	he	heard he	still	would	not	know	how	to	help. Worst	of	all:	he	seems incapable	of	clear communication; is he unclear?"35	Not surprising then that Camus asserts, "The world itself, whose single meaning [he does] not understand, is but a vast irrational." He asserts his belief: "The absurd is born of this confrontation between the human need and the unreasonable silence of the world."36 This belief qua fact must not be forgotten, hence his imperative: If one must not forget, then one	must continue the adventure of thought. That adventure calls forth the deeds that would, if they could, if they should-comme si-remake humankind	and	the	world. The	three	strands	of	the	subjunctive,	the	indicative, and	the	imperative	are	engaged,	directing	both	deliberation	and	choice. What	are	the	conclusions	of	philosophy	such	as	Camus	articulates	them	in his interrogation	of the	absurd? To	say 'x	is	absurd' is to	say that	one faces	an apparent material impossibility, or a contradiction of belief concerning some presumed	fact	of	experience. What	happens,	then,	if	one	says,	e.g.,	'It	is	absurd	to think	one	must	remake	humankind	and	the	world,'	and	then	to	say	further	'it	is, therefore, absurd in the extreme to attempt to remake both humankind and world'? Or,	returning	to	our	initial	question:	If	one	cannot	remove	the	absurdity at	all,	are	we	then	to	give	place	to	reason's	intensity	of	hope,	in	particular	when one	says	the	foregoing	but	adds,	perhaps	reluctantly,	'as	if',	'comme	si'? Must	one not	consider	one's	aim	and	one's	strength,	thus	to	dispose	an	act	proportionate	to the aim in view? Camus sets up a logical reality, i.e., a logical possibility. He would	have	us think	of	a	material reality,	not to leave the	aim	"impotent."	The transition	between logical and	material reality is itself a creative act, an act of remaking,	if	one	could,	if	one	thinks	one	should. For	Camus the absurd is present in the conjunction	of the	human	mind and	the	world. Any	attempt	to	solve	a	problem	works	with	experience	of	both. Hence,	Camus	the	man	understands	himself	to	have	deep	feelings	concerning	the absurd. This	depth	of	feeling	means	he	cannot	fully	fathom	what	he	is	conscious of	saying. Hence,	when	he	speaks	his	seeming	imperative	to	remake	humankind and the world, one may argue, on his own position Camus is not entirely conscious	of	what remaking	humankind	and the	world	entails. He	hesitates in the very	moment he utters the imperative, hence the 'comme	si'. He does not know-we	do	not	know-whether	to	take	the	imperative	seriously	and	grant	it practical	veracity. For	Camus, 'world'	references	both	a	metaphysic	(for	Europe	since	Plato, that	means	all	Nietzsche sought to	overturn	and transvalue)	and	an	attitude	of mind-since	Plato	and	Aristotle, an	ontological commitment that is essentialist 35	Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1966),	66. 36	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	28. 9 and archeological-teleological, and since the Church Fathers all that is eschatological. But,	there	is	more	here. Camus	asserts,	"a	man	defines	himself	by his	make-believe as	well as by his sincere impulses."37 To utter a proposition and	add	'as	if',	'comme	si',	as	Camus	does,	is	to	introduce	a	move	in	thought	from the	sincere to the	make-believe-to,	what	offers itself	as logical	possibility,	but perhaps also as material possibility. Camus claims that methods disclose unconsciously present conclusions, though one claims not to know them yet. Camus's quasi-existentialist method of analysis, his sense of the moral in the linkage of the sincere and the make-believe, moves him unconsciously to entertain	the	make-believe-not	in	some	pejorative	sense	of	installing	oneself	in fantasy, but in the positive sense of intuiting a logical reality that has some promise	of	material	possibility,	hence	of	"remaking"	the	present	of	humanity	and the	world. If his	method "acknowledges the feeling that all true knowledge is impossible,"	then	we	are	left	with	the	task	of	navigating	appearances, including the totality of the manifest irrationality of human existence and the world. Camus	counsels "an	active	consent to the	relative"	as	one's lucid fidelity to the human condition. 38 One's aims are always approximate, never realized completely. The	first	rule	of	conduct,	then,	Camus	articulates	thus:	"To	conquer existence,	we	must	start	from	the	small	amount	of	existence	we	find	in	ourselves and	not	deny	it	from	the	very	beginning."39 This	rule	insists	on	the	consequent imperative of absolute self-expression; in the dialectic one speaks against the overbearing	silence	of	the	world. To acknowledge the absurd is a positive moment in human existence; one's	consciousness	awakened	to	irrationality	in	human	experience. When	that happens it "provokes what follows." An awakened consciousness of the absurdity of human existence is a provocation that dismisses the option of suicide and raises to the individual his or her conscience: One must remake humankind	and	the	world,	even	if	one	utters	the	seemingly	necessary	refrain-'as if',	'comme	si'. This	imperative	is	the	requisite	response	to	the	fact	of	the	absurd. This	is	not	to	say	that	one	identifies	objects	that	incite	our	fear. Instead,	Camus means	here	what	Heidegger calls	dread (Angst), understood	ontologically, thus without	specific	object. In the	acknowledgement	of	dread, "one"	must	move	to remake	humankind	and	the	world,	even	if	we	are	to	conclude	that	Camus	himself cannot,	or	shall	not,	do	so.40 Why should	we defer to this seeming imperative to remake humankind and world? That is a question of justification of an ethics, such as Hochberg demanded	of	Camus. Camus	provides	a	pertinent	insight,	telling	us	that	nature negates us, that "At the heart of all beauty lies something inhuman...[but that indeed the] primitive hostility of the world rises up to face us across millennia"41-and	it	is	an	irrational	hostility,	despite	the	"images	and	designs"	by which	we	have	sought	to	make	sense	of	it. These	images	and	designs	are	signs	of 37	Ibid.,	11. 38	Camus,	The	Rebel,	290. 39	Ibid.,	291. 40	Camus's	own	involvement	in	the	resistance	movement	and	later	journalistic	activity	attests	to his	inclination	to	act	to	remake	the	world	as	he	encountered	it	during	his	day. 41	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	14. 10 human artifice, of how we have worked to make sense of, and otherwise construct, the	world in	which	we	have	our	being. However, in the	provocation that	is	the	consciousness	of	the	absurd,	such	artifice	becomes	useless. In	that	moment	Camus	would	say	that	it	is	"useful"	to	us	to	remake	both humankind	and	the	world. This	is	the	moment	for	the	onset	of	a	new	artifice,	the artifice	that	works	with	consciousness	of	the	absurd	that	was	felt	before	but	was not	admitted	as	such	into	daily	discourse.	Camus	will	not	stand	passively	before Nietzsche's "nay-saying," or Kierkegaard's sickness unto death, or Sartre's nausea	and	mauvaise	foi,	not	even	Heidegger's	enigmatic	Angst. He	is	prepared to ask: "how far is one to go to elude nothing?" 42 With this question, consciousness of the absurd invokes the conscience that	would, if it could, if it should,	respond	to	the	call	to	remake	both	humankind	and	the	world.	One	does not remake	with caprice. Rather, "When the throne of God is overturned, the rebel realizes that it is now	his own responsibility to create the justice, order, and unity that he sought in vain	within his own condition, and in this	way to justify the fall of God."43 Here, perhaps, Camus appropriates the insight of Parain,	realizing	that	"Our	language	is	neither	true	nor	false. It	is	simultaneously useful	and	dangerous,	necessary	and	pointless."44 Camus appreciates that the utterance issuing from conscience is not a matter	of	distinguishing	the	true	and	the	false. Hence,	such	utterance	does	not place	us	before	a	possible	contradiction, that	effort	at logic "in	which the	mind that	studies	itself	gets	lost	in	a	giddy	whirling."45 The	intensity	of	hope	that	one may feel is not grounded in apodictic knowledge; hence, no justification qua demonstration	of	certitude	can	be	given. All	creative	acts	produce	constructions, images	and	designs	of the	human	mind. The	present task that is	conscientious, while being conscious of the absurd, is to recognize that these images and designs, while not certain have their utility. To remake humankind and the world is a task to	be	undertaken	without the illusion	of certainty, and	without the	pretense	to	knowledge. But,	the	question	remains:	How	far	shall	we	go? The	"Ethics"	of	the	Absurd For	Camus there	must	be	a logic	of	which	human	existence is	capable, i.e., that conduces to	human	existence,	not to suicide.	He	allows that the absurd	has its own "commandments" calling forth our action, without escapism into the transcendent. There are two commands in dilemma: (1) Live (aware of the absurd); (2) Die (lucid of one's mortality). While doubting the authority of apodictic	reason	Camus	nonetheless	concedes:	"It	is	useless	to	negate	the	reason absolutely. It	has	its	order	in	which	it	is	efficacious."46 To	that	degree,	one	need not,	e.g.,	yield	to	the	absurd	in	the	Kierkegaardian	sense	that,	Camus	says,	follows Ignatius	of	Loyola	in	sacrificing	the	intellect in	favor	of	divine	superintendence. Camus sets	his standard: "I	want to	know	whether I can live	with	what	I	know 42	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	16. 43	Camus,	The	Rebel,	25. 44	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	237. 45	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	17. 46	Ibid.,	36. 11 and	with that alone."47 Not willing to sacrifice the intellect, Camus concedes: "But if I recognize the limits of the reason, I do not therefore negate it, recognizing its relative powers."48 Rather than seek the rationalist aim of apodictic	truth,	Camus	seeks	what	is	desirable	within	the	limits	of	relative	truths. "Ethics"	would	have	to	be	articulated	within	those	parameters. One who despairs of life yields to the nihilist temptation and commits suicide. Camus,	however,	recognizing	the	limit	of	human	reason,	presses	against that limit, asking how far one will go. Life is lived all the better if it has no meaning,	i.e.,	no	meaning	such	as	provided	by	the	metaphysics	appealing	to	the transcendent.	He	clarifies	his	aim:	"In	fact,	our	aim	is	to	shed	light	upon	the	step taken by the mind when, starting from a philosophy of the world's lack of meaning,	it	ends	up	by	finding	a	meaning	and	depth	in	it."49 That	meaning	is	not the leap to faith that installs religious meaning. Neither is it found in the phenomenologist's intentionality that enumerates and describes phenomena without	explaining	them. So,	Camus	is	left	to	his	own	rational	devices,	allowing what	he	knows	and that alone. This is a function	of	belief that admits	of very limited	evidence. Thus,	Camus	says:	"What	I	believe	to	be	true	I	must	therefore preserve."50 This	is	sign	of	his	"conscious	revolt." Insisting	on	an	ethics	of	revolt rather	than	renounce	life	in	the	face	of	the	absurd,	he	will	not	suffer	to	have	his and	our	freedom	of	rebellion	abolished. At this point one aware of the absurd takes up the charge of conscious revolt,	acting	according	to	an	'as	if'...	'comme	si.' For,	Camus	asserts	that	it	is	then that	one	"thinks	that	something	in	his	life	can	be	directed. In	truth,	he	acts	as	if he	were	free,	even	if	all	the	facts	make	a	point	of	contradicting	that	liberty."51 We have here, then, a specific understanding of Camus's sense of the 'as if' that concerned	us	at the	outset. If	one is to	remake	humankind	and	the	world,	one does so not knowing that one is free (in the metaphysical sense). Notwithstanding,	one	can	engage	the	present	with	a	view	to	the	future,	acting	as if	one	is	free	to	do	so,	giving	all	to	the	present	thereby	in	generosity	to	the	future. Camus	will	say	here 'as if'	because,	as	he	again	concedes:	"But	at the	moment	I am	well	aware	that	the	higher	liberty,	that	freedom	to	be,	which	alone	can	serve as	basis for	a truth,	does	not	exist."52 That	awareness	does	not	preclude	one's action	in	which	one	believes	and	pronounces:	'I	do	so	as	if	I	were	free...' Problematic	in	our	effort	to	glean	an	ethos	from	Camus	that	accounts	for the	future,	however,	is	his	declaration:	"The	absurd	enlightens	me	on	this	point: there	is	no	future."53 What	is	the	implication	here? Is	one	to	say: 'If there	is	no future,	then	there	is	only	the	present,' in	which	case	one	commits	one's	actions entirely	to	the	present? If	that	is	what	Camus	intends-such	that	one	can,	hence, have	an	attitude	of	indifference	to	the	future-then	(a)	there	is	no	obvious	duty	to 47	Ibid.,	40;	italics	added. 48	Ibid.,	40. 49	Ibid.,	42. 50	Ibid.,	52. 51	Ibid.,	57;	emphasis	added. 52	Ibid.,	57. 53	Ibid.,	58;	emphasis	added. 12 future	generations	of	humanity	and	(b) there is	no	responsibility to	protect the present	in	view	of	ostensible	duty. There	seems	to	be	no	imperative	to	remake humankind or the	world; for, that is "non-sensical" in the face of a claim that there is no future. But, one must be cautious here, since, in Camus's sense, 'future' has onto-theo-logical connotations that include teleology and eschatology, both of which Camus rejected as part of Nietzsche's antimetaphysical	position. Where does this put us in our effort to articulate a coherent ethics? Camus opines: "I see, then, that the individual character of a common code of ethics lies	not so	much in the ideal importance	of its	basic	principles as in the norm of an experience that it is possible to measure."54 Entirely salient and informing	his	ethics,	Camus	contraposes	ideal	principles	and	norms	of	experience. Experience	provides	the	norm,	not	the	a	priori,	not	the	prima	facie,	not	abstract principles. Further,	one	must	mean	here	an	experience	one	can	measure. Hence, if one asserts a responsibility to the present, then this	must be	warranted by lived experience. A measure must be given. It seems, therefore, (a) if the condition	sine	qua	non is experience (consistent	with	empiricist	epistemology), and	logically	(b)	one	has	no	experience	of	the	future	(one	can	have	only	hopes), clearly	the	future	does	not	dispose	itself	in	the	present	to	claim	us	by	way	of	an	a priori	moral	imperative. Hence,	one	cannot	find	it	meaningful	to	assert	such	an imperative to remake humankind and to remake the world thereby. The imperative	cannot	be	"truly,	really,	so";	it	can	be	an	imperative	only 'as	if'	true... 'comme	si	c'était	vrai.' But we get ahead of ourselves. We must ask: Which "man" is to be remade? Is	it	"man"	who	appeals	to	the	transcendent,	"ideal	man"	who	has	hope of eternity and victory over individual death that is otherwise absurd? Is it "absurd	man"	in	the	flesh,	lucid	enough	to	be	aware	of	his	absurd	existence,	who therefore takes on (because he gives to himself) the task of conscious revolt? Following	Nietzsche,	Camus	would	have	us	remake	the	former	as	"type." But,	to speak	of	the	latter	type	is	also	to	allow	for	a	remaking-because,	the	absurd	man, Camus claims, is "[a]ssured of his temporally limited freedom, of his revolt devoid	of	future,	and	of	his	mortal	consciousness;"	in	that	case	"he	lives	out	his adventure	within	the	span	of	his	lifetime." This	seems	problematic,	however,	if one	is	to	speak	of	an	ethics	in	the	classical	sense	of	concern	for	alterity. Camus thinks	a	man	in	revolt	shields	his	action	"from	any	judgment	but	his	own"-the rebel	is	indifferent	to	any	claim	from	alterity,	even	seemingly	indifferent	to	any claim	from	posterity. Camus	asserts	starkly: There	can	be	no	holding	forth	on	ethics. I	have	seen	people	behave	badly with great	morality and I note every day that integrity has no need of rules. There	is	but	one	moral	code	that	the	absurd	man	can	accept,	the	one that	is	not	separated	from	God:	the	one	that	is	dictated. But	it	so	happens that he lives outside that God. As for the others (I mean also 54	Ibid.,	61. 13 immoralism),	the	absurd	man	sees	nothing	in	them	but	justifications	and he	has	nothing	to	justify.55 Camus	identifies	here	a	contradiction.	Those	who	posit	ethical	codes	but	whose practice is contrary are hence without truth or efficacy. But, his experience informs him of individuals having moral integrity without ground in obvious maxims	of	conduct	(whether	subjectively	or	objectively	valid). Further,	Camus	is aware	of those	who insist	on 'immoralism', asserting 'Everything is	permitted'. Camus is quick to clarify: What matters is to understand this assertion as "a bitter	acknowledgment	of	a	fact,"	viz.,	a	person	possesses	"the	ability	to	behave badly	with	impunity,"	such	evil	conduct	part	of	ordinary	experience. Camus,	however,	does	not	accept this	vulgar	sense	that,	e.g.,	Dostoevsky seems to express through Ivan in The Brothers Karamazov. Camus is quite definitive: "The absurd does not liberate; it binds. It does not authorize all actions."56 This	is	so	because	of	the	consequences	of	actions,	not	in	any	a	priori or	prima	facie justification	such	given	in	Western	moral	philosophy.	Camus	is	a consequentialist	(not	to	say	utilitarian) in	his	moral	demeanor; for,	he	assesses that, "All systems of morality are based on the idea that an action has consequences that legitimize it or cancel it." 57 He does not subscribe to eudaemonist, utilitarian, or deontological systems of morality, since, "if all experiences	are	indifferent,	that	of	duty	is	as	legitimate	as	any	other. One	can	be virtuous through a	whim."58 That opinion	will not satisfy an Aristotelian or a Kantian,	obviously,	since	it	asserts	that	one	can	be	indifferent	to	moral	virtue	or duty but perform according to duty as a	matter of inclination or self-interest. This,	of	course,	is	not	the	"strict	motive"	of	respect	for	universal	law	or	appeal	to the	"second	nature"	of	habitual	praxis. Camus recognizes a practical link between past, present, and future relative to	moral consequence,	without	privileging the authority of the	past or the	claim	of	the	future:	"At	very	most,	such	a	mind	[that	of	a	responsible	person] will consent to use past experience as a basis for its future actions."59 That consent is merely a matter of fact in a situation of judgment. One may be indifferent, but one has the freedom to consent or dissent. No apodictically warranted imperative of action is presupposed; for, Camus asks (and not rhetorically): "What rule, then, could emanate from that unreasonable order? The	only	truth	that	might	seem	instructive	to	him	is	not	formal:	it	comes	to	life and	unfolds	in	men. The	absurd	mind	cannot	so	much	expect	ethical	rules	at	the end	of	its	reasoning..."60	It	can	expect	only	"illustrations,"	"images,"	"constructs," from lived experience, where, because no one is "guilty"-e.g., in reference to some objectively valid maxim that warrants moral judgment-there are no singular	exemplars	per	se. 55	Ibid.,	66-67,	italics	added. 56	Ibid.,	67.	italics	added. 57	Ibid.,	67. 58	Ibid.,	67. 59	Ibid.,	67-68. 60	Ibid.,	68. 14 It	seems	Camus	insists,	then,	that	one's	lived	experience	is	sufficient	to	the deed	that	unfolds. All that	matters is its	efficacy in	relation	to the	aim	and	the strength invested. One may choose to be someone or something, even as, conscious	of	one's	mortality,	one	trembles. One	can	be,	as	Camus	presents	these two images, an	unrepentant	Don Juan	or a rebellious lady	of the stage such	as Adrienne	Lecouvreur,	who	had	no	problem	presenting	herself	as	"an	unblushing face to the	world"-Voltaire, in	poetic verse,	writing at her	death: "Should she then,	breathless,	criminal	be	thought,	And	is	it	then	to	charm	the	world	a	fault?"61 In	choosing	thus,	each	plays	a	game;	and,	he	and	she	consent	to	the	rules	of	the particular	game. One	may,	of	course,	decline	to	play,	choose	a	different	game,	or choose	no	game	at	all	(which	is,	in	effect,	the	choice	of	suicide). It	is	thus	that	one chooses	a	moral	code,	an	ethics	in	which	one	is	ever	conscious	of	one's	mortality. One subscribes to a maxim (the rule of the game) but only 'as if', 'comme si', taking	it	as	if	true	in	the	moment	of	living	one's	experience,	knowing	it	may	not	be true. This	is	a	"logical"	comportment"	Camus	argues. Hence, not committing to an inductive logic of probable consequence, Camus is nonetheless consequentialist in the lucidity of his comportment. He appropriates	the	moment	as	lived	experience,	committing	to	living	what	unfolds without	pretense	of	telos	or	eschaton. That	is	why	he	speaks	of	Don	Juan	as	one who	"achieves	a	knowledge	without	illusions	which	negates	everything	[men	of God] profess," even if such	men call down punishment upon his head for the excesses of his interminable devotion to the flesh, his unbridled carnality and debauchery. Similarly, Camus commends Adrienne who, he reminds, "on her deathbed	was	willing to confess	and receive communion"-thus	as	a	good	and convicted Catholic Christian is expected to do-but who, Camus observes, "refused to abjure her profession."62 Is one to judge her guilty thereby, as Voltaire asked, thus to condemn her for her choice, such as the Church did in refusing	her	a	Christian	burial? Camus	says	otherwise: She thereby lost the benefit of the confession. Did this not amount, in effect,	to	choosing	her	absorbing	passion	in	preference	to	God? And	that woman	in	the	death	throes	refusing	in	tears	to	repudiate	what	she	called her	art	gave	evidence	of	a	greatness that	she	never	achieved	behind	the footlights. This	was	her	finest	role	and	the	hardest	one	to	play. Choosing between	heaven	and	a	ridiculous	fidelity,	preferring	oneself	to	eternity	or losing	oneself in	God is the	age-old tragedy in	which	each	must	play	his part.63 Is	her	choice	absurd? Nay;	not for	Camus. It	would	have	been	absurd	had	she repudiated	her	art	upon	confession	and	communion. That	maxim	she	declined	to accept,	even	as	Don	Juan	declined	to	say	he	had	loved	"at	last"	and	said,	instead, that always he loved "once	more." As actor in his game and as actress in her 61	Voltaire (Francois Marie Arouet), "On the Death of Adrienne LeCouvreur, A Celebrated Actress," https://www.poetry-archive.com/v/on_the_death_of_adrienne_lecouvreur.html, accessed	25	July	2019). 62	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	83. 63	Ibid.,	83. 15 game, both	Don Juan and	Adrienne remade themselves-comme	si-at least in the	persona	they	presented	to	others.64 The	"Ethics"	of	Conquest? We return to the question that engages the conquerer's claim that one must remake	humankind and the	world as the only	meaningfully useful action. This conquerer	who	would act so no longer conquers territories, not a conquest of "the	earth". Camus speaks	of conquest that "lies in	protest and the	blind-alley sacrifice."65 The modern conquerer seeks victory in rebellion as l'homme révolté-"revolution...accomplished	against the	gods"	as	with	Prometheus, "the first of	modern conquerers." One can choose to be a	modern conquerer: "The conquerers are merely those among men who are conscious enough of their strength	to	be	sure	of	living	constantly	on	those	heights	and	fully	aware	of	that grandeur."66 Yet, they admit of death: "In the rebel's universe, death exalts injustice. It is the supreme abuse."67 But, the rebel chooses so rather than choose	the	eternal	that	is	mere	illusion-for	him,	one	must	conquer	illusion	and appropriate	one's	lucidity,	even	at	the	point	of	death. Camus presented us with the images of Don Juan, Adrienne, and the conquerer,	clear	that,	"these	images	do	not	propose	moral	codes	and	involve	no judgments:	they	are	sketches. They	merely	represent	a	style	of life. The lover, the	actor,	or	the	adventurer	plays	the	absurd. But	equally	well,	if	he	wishes,	the chaste	man,	the	civil	servant,	or	the	president	of	the	Republic."68 Each	remakes him/herself	involving	neither	the	absolute	negation	of	suicide	nor	the	surrender to the illusion that	appeals to	eternal	values. Above	all	one	must	choose to	be lucid, whichever game one chooses to make life possible and meaningful for oneself. There	is, for	Camus,	no	formal	ethics	of judgment,	of	good	and	bad,	no "right	side"	or	"wrong	side"	(l'enverse	et	l'endroit). There	is	only	the	logic	of	the absurd	that	modern	conquerers	know:	"They	are	not	striving	to	be	better; they are	attempting	to	be	consistent. If	the	term	'wise	man'	can	be	applied	to	the	man who	lives	on	what	he	has	without	speculating	on	what	he	has	not,	then	they	are wise	men."69 Hence,	one	hesitates	to	speak	of	ethics,	of	morality,	in	the	classical or	modern sense. One	does	not speak	of virtue	or	duty, except as	whim. One does not speak of the True, the Good, and the Beautiful and thus assert a correspondence between one's lived experience and postulated transcendent realities. One	has	only	one's	absurd logic,	one's	adventure,	being	consistent in the game one chooses to play, including the game one plays with oneself to remake	oneself	and	to	"be"	what	one	will,	but	"as	if,"	"comme	si." One	can	ask	no more	of	the	man	or	woman	who	has	found	his	or	her	lucidity,	thereby	conscious of	the	human	condition. 64	Camus	says	that	although	he	shall	have	seen	an	actor	a	hundred	times	he	shall	not	for	that	have known	the	man. If	all	of	us	present	ourselves in images, then	there is	never	any	certainty that one	has	a	basis	for	judging	any	person	as	if	one	knows	(certainly)	with	an	indisputable	truth	or even	a	truth	beyond	a	reasonable	doubt. 65	Ibid.,	81-82. 66	Ibid.,	88. 67	Ibid.,	90. 68	Ibid.,	90. 69	Ibid.,	91,	italics	added. 16 The ethics of conquest in Camus's sense thus alters	what it is "to be" a Don Juan	or an	Adrienne:	One	must	be conqueror "in the realm	of the	mind, a Don	Juan	but	of	knowledge,	an	actor	but	of	the	intelligence..."70	One	must	be	even more	than	conqueror	of	the	mind. This	Camus	identifies	with	s/he	who	creates beyond the absurd	present as a	matter of "metaphysical honor," despite being lucid	about	the	fact	that	s/he	is	defeated	in	advance	by	the	inevitable	enemy	that is	death. From	Ethics	to	Aesthetics If Camus acknowledges a rank of virtues the highest is that of metaphysical honor, revolt the means to its accomplishment. The rebel's directive in action, however, is aesthetic-not	moral in the classical sense but nonetheless	finding	morality	in	the	aesthetic. The	problem	of	life	is	aesthetic,	as he	says:	"The	problem	for	the	absurd	artist is	to	acquire	this	savoir-vivre	which transcends savoir-faire."71 With this comportment the absurd artist renounces whatever "prestige" thought has commanded hitherto. S/he is resigned to the fact	that	"the intelligence...works	up	appearances	and	covers	with images	what has no reason." Asserting savoir-vivre one lives without apodictic reason as ground of one's choice of action, hence living comme si. Camus realizes the appropriation of savoir-vivre must be viewed relative to "fictional creation," which	he characterizes as "a	work in	which the temptation to explain remains greatest, in which illusion offers itself automatically, in which conclusion is almost	inevitable."72 Art, as in the creation of a novel, Camus asserts, "has its logic, its reasonings, its intuition, and its postulates," its "intellectualization." In this context Camus expresses his principal concern: "I want to know whether, accepting a life	without	appeal, one can also agree to	work and create	without appeal and	what is the	way leading to these liberties."73 This situates	Camus's imperatives	of	the	absurd	he	confronts:	"If	the	commandments	of	the	absurd	are not	respected,	if	the	work	does	not	illustrate	divorce	and	revolt,	if	it	sacrifices	to illusions	and	arouses	hope,	it	ceases	to	be	gratuitous."74 If	the	work	of	art	is	no longer	gratuitous,	then,	Camus	decries	the	consequence:	"I	can	no	longer	detach myself	from	it. My	life	may	find	a	meaning	in	it,	but	that	is	trifling. It	ceases	to	be that	exercise	in	detachment	and	passion	which	crowns	the	splendor	and	futility of	a	man's	life."75	This	tendency	to	attachment	is,	for	Camus,	entirely	problematic if the commandment of the absurd is rebellion, for it leads to resentment and consequentially	permits	both	suicide	and	murder. Hence,	Camus	asks:	"In	the	fictional	world	in	which	awareness	of	the	real world is keenest, can I remain faithful to the absurd	without sacrificing to the 70	Ibid.,	91. 71	Ibid.,	98. 72	Ibid.,	99. 73	Ibid.,	102. 74	Ibid.,	102. 75	Ibid.,	102. 17 desire	to	judge?"76 Camus	would	have	us	be	careful	of	the	"final	illusion"	that	we are	capable	of	judging	the	True,	the	Good,	and	the	Beautiful	through	such	works of	art. The	prospect	of final illusion	has its	source in "stubborn	hope." Rather than	commit	himself to	moral	"judgment"	or	theoretical	"justification"-thus	to avoid appeal to the authority of apodictic reason-Camus engages such	works not	morally	but	aesthetically, all	by	way	of "illustration." He is	quick to	assert this	does	not	lead	to	absolute	negation. Adhering	to	the	commandments	of	the absurd,	Camus	commits	himself	to	denying	the	moral	validity	of	both	suicide	(as articulated in The	Myth of Sisyphus) and	murder (as articulated in The	Rebel). Despite	the	absurdity	of	human	existence,	relative	truths	such	as	we	experience suffice to	prohibit	both suicide	and	murder-in the former case, in "the	age	of negation," so as to affirm human liberty; in the latter case, in "the age of ideologies,"	to	affirm	human	solidarity	against	tyranny	and	servitude,	against	any master-slave	morality,	and	even	against	nationalism.77 Camus	rejects	the	appeal to	absolute	freedom,	which	"is	achieved	by	the	suppression	of	all	contradiction: therefore it destroys freedom." 78 There can be no dialectic without contradiction,	whether	in	the	assertion	that	becomes	an	elenchus	or	that	delivers a	provisional	truth. For	Camus	there	is	no	novelist	more	apropós	to	his	point	about	stubborn hope than Dostoevsky, whose works of art represent heroes of "modern sensibility," who "question themselves as to the meaning of life." 79 In Dostoevsky's	art	Camus	finds	the	problem	of	logical	suicide	engaged,	therein	the existential	problem	of	the	ground	of	modernity's	ethics.	If	indeed	man	has	killed "God" (humanity's "metaphysical crime"), then Camus asks (with reference to Kirilov	in	Dostoevsky's	The	Possessed):	"But	if	this	metaphysical	crime	is	enough for	man's fulfillment,	why add suicide? Why kill oneself and leave this	world after	having	won	freedom? That	is	contradictory."80 There,	squarely,	is	Camus's problem	of	philosophical suicide,	his facing	squarely	the logic	of	suicide. In	the transition from the classical to the	modern sensibility, Camus	understands the problematic comportment: "As in the time	of	Prometheus, they	entertain	blind hopes."81 The	modern sensibility, if it is to	be lucid	of absurdity,	must	dismiss such	illusion. It	must	dismiss	the	final	illusion	that	may	be	promised	in	works	of art, such as the novel. It is precisely there that one can discern the essential commandment of the absurd, such as Camus clarifies with the foregoing question:	Why	kill	oneself	and	leave	this	world	after	having	won	freedom? One cannot answer this question without admitting to the absence of "justification"	such	as	a	universal	rationality	prefers.	One	dismisses	the	right	of "judgment,"	there	being	no	ground	for	practical	rationality. From	the	outset	and in the	end	of	his	philosophical	elucidation,	Camus	champions relative freedom, 76	Ibid.,	102. 77	Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays, 190. Camus opines: "Nationalisms always make their appearance	in	history	as	signs	of	decadence." 78	Camus,	The	Rebel,	288. 79	Camus, The	Myth of Sisyphus, 104. Camus clarifies: "What distinguishes modern sensibility from classical sensibility is that the latter thrives on moral problems and the former on metaphysical	problems." 80	Ibid.,	108. 81	Ibid.,	108. 18 relative	justice,	and	relative	truth,	all	on	the	basis	of	ordinary	experience	that	is, in	his	purview,	tragic. Hence,	he	asserts,	"Instead	of	saying,	with	Hegel	and	Marx, that all is necessary, [rebellion] only repeats that all is possible and that...it is worth making the supreme sacrifice for the sake of the possible."82 Camus's above question has force, challenging Kirilov's attitude of dismay and disappointment	when	he	says,	"I	am	unhappy	because	I	am	obliged	to	assert	my freedom."83 Unhappily obliged to assert his freedom? Indeed. Yet, even Nietzsche-"the most famous of God's assassins"-did not wince before that task. He did not commit to the act of suicide though he felt obliged to give himself	a	new	tablet	of	commandments	that	would inaugurate	a	transvaluation of	past	values. Suicide	is	not	the	answer	that	savoir-vivre	calls	into	the	forefront of	the	present	moment	of	lucidity. One	must	remake	both	the	individual	"man" and	the	"world"-without	asking	the	question	(that is	"the	essential impulse	of the absurd	mind"	when faced	with its survey of a given act (such as an act of suicide) or a mind that succumbs to madness), viz., "What does that prove?" Camus	does	not	consent	to	Dostoevsky's	stance	in	The	Brothers	Karamazov, i.e., to	assert	in	the	end	that	"existence	is	illusory	and	it	is	eternal."84 In	the	end,	Camus	offers	his	alternative	to	the	creative	act	undertaken	by one such as Dostoevsky. Camus's confession is not that of the philosophical artist such as Dostoevsky is philosophical in his creative work. Camus is the absurd	artist: "If	something	brings	creation	to	an	end,"	he	argues,	"it is	not	the victorious	and	illusory	cry	of	the	blinded	artist: 'I	have	said	everything,'	but	the death	of the creator	which	closes	his	experience	and the	book	of	his	genius."85 Can	one,	as	artist,	"prove"	oneself	victorious,	in	the	end	of	the	work	of	art? In	the shift	from	the	classical	metaphysical	sensibility	to	the	modern	moral	sensibility, then	from	the	latter	to	an	aesthetic	sensibility,	Camus	insists	on	strict	adherence to	the	commandments	of	the	absurd: An	absurd	artist	shall	not,	in	the	end	of	his or	her	work	of art,	be	blinded to the	absurd	and	shall	not utter	an illusory cry that	seeks	to	sustain	the	bitter	hopes	of	the	human	heart. In	the	shift	from	the	modern	moral	sensibility	to	the	aesthetic,	the	absurd artist's	metaphysical	honor	insists	on	seeing	clearly,	on	persisting	in	the	lucidity that permits no appeal to the eternal or to an absolute rationality that may govern the human condition. Most important, in being confronted with the question,	'Why	kill	oneself	and	leave	this	world	after	having	won	freedom?',	the absurd	artist	shall	not	answer	that	s/he	has	the	incontrovertible	answer	to	that question. Instead,	s/he	will insist	that	one	ought	not	kill	oneself	and	leave	this world	after	having	won	one's	liberty,	admitting	to	one's	relative	freedom. Camus utters	his	yet	salient	warning	in	his	insistence	on	the	limit	of	freedom,	on	the	law of	moderation:	"Either	this	value	of	limitation	will	be	realized,	or	contemporary excesses	will only find their principle and	peace in universal destruction."86 A sense of the tragic in human existence requires this sense of limit. After all, Camus asserts, there are those among men who arrive at "the limits of their 82	Camus,	The	Rebel,	290. 83	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	108. 84	Ibid.,	112. 85	Ibid.,	114. 86	Camus,	The	Rebel,	295. 19 selves, stumbling over an absurdity they cannot overcome," and this the consequence	of	"an	excess	of	liberty."87 Hence,	if	one	will	undertake	the	challenge	of	remaking	humanity	and	the world,	beginning	with	remaking	oneself	as	absurd	artist,	one	must	do	so	"as	if," "comme si," thereby not presuming to "demonstrate the truth you feel sure of possessing" (as happens in "thesis-novels"). The absurd novelist does what Camus	understands	himself	to	do	in	his	own	literary	work-to	prove	nothing,	but "to raise up images," his works of art "like the obvious symbols of a limited, mortal,	and	rebellious	thought."88 After	all,	Camus	remarked	once,	"Comfortable optimism	surely	seems	like	a	bad	joke	in	today's	world."89 One	who,	like	Camus, is	lucid,	asserts:	"All	that	remains	is	a	fate	whose	outcome	alone	is	fatal. Outside of that	single fatality	of	death,	everything, joy	or	happiness, is liberty. A	world remains	of	which	man is the	sole	master. What	bound	him	was the illusion	of another world."90 That is a lesson learned from Nietzsche and from his life experience. Admitting to one's mortality, living without the illusory appeal to eternity,	one	appropriates	one's	liberty	to	insist	on	one's	dignity. No	"proofs"	are available to	us to	establish	any	apodictic, formal,	moral truth. We	have	only	a savoir-vivre,	thus	a	will	to	live	creatively,	"as	if...comme	si." That	style	of	life	may turn	out	to	be	both	efficacious	and	exemplary. As	Camus	says	in	interview,	"An analysis	of	the	idea	of	revolt	could	help	us	to	discover	ideas	capable	of	restoring a relative meaning to existence, although a meaning that would always be in danger."91 Camus's literary	work, as the	work	of an absurd artist in the act of rebellion and resistance to the totalitarian impulses of the twentieth century, contributes	to	that	aim. What matters in creative rebellion, Camus declared, is "to create in history	what	Shakespeare,	Cervantes,	Moliere,	and	Tolstoy	knew	how	to	create:	a world	always ready to satisfy the	hunger for freedom	and	dignity	which	every man carries in his heart."92 Such acts of creation are at the center of Camus's ethos: Is it possible eternally to reject injustice	without ceasing to acclaim the nature	of	man	and	the	beauty	of	the	world? Our	answer	is	yes. This	ethic at	once	unsubmissive	and	loyal,	is	in	any	event	the	only	one	that	lights	the way	to	a truly	realistic	revolution. In	upholding	beauty,	we	prepare the way	for	the	day	of	regenerating	when	civilization	will	give	first	place-far ahead of the formal principles and degraded values of history-to this living virtue on which is founded the common dignity of man and the world	he	lives	in...93 87	Camus,	Lyrical	and	Critical	Essays,	204. 88	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	116. 89	Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays, 351. The statement is given in interview with Gabriel d'Aubarede	in	Les	Nouvelles	Littéraires,	10	May	1951. 90	Camus,	The	Myth	of	Sisyphus,	117. 91	Camus, Lyrical and Critical Essays, 346. The statement is given in interview with Jeanine Delpech,	in	Les	Nouvelles	littératres,	15	November	1945. 92	Camus,	The	Rebel,	276. 93	Ibid.,	276-277. 20 One	asserts thereby the	dignity	of	all	humanity in its solidarity,	hence	Camus's imperative to one and all to commit neither suicide	nor	murder.94 In the end, Camus	would, if he	could, because	he should, die	his	mortal	death. But, in that moment	that	discloses	his	finitude,	he	would	do	so	uttering	in	song	the	words	of Epicurus:	"Ah,	with	what	dignity	we	have	lived."95 94	There	remains	the	question,	if	not	a	complaint,	that	Camus	would,	if	he	must,	when	spirit	and intelligence	are	in	accord,	permit	killing	in	defense	of	justice. Such	was	his	position	expressed	in his letters to a German friend in 1943 and 1944. See here, Albert Camus, Lettres à un ami allemande, ed. Jean-Marie Tremblay (Paris: Les Editions Gallimard, 1st Edition, 1948; Revised edition	1972;	Electronic	edition,	2008). 95	Camus,	The	Rebel,	30.