UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for 1 a Genuine Causal Role for Consciousness? 2 Paavo Pylkkänen 3 It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts 4 of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do 5 because of them, and that this is the way in which the mind acts, and not 6 from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I 7 wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which 8 the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and 9 misnaming. (Plato, The Phaedo) 10 1 Introduction 11 Does consciousness have causal powers? Does it make a difference to the 12 effects of information processing whether or not the system is conscious of 13 a given item of information? Are our actions at least sometimes determined 14 P. Pylkkänen () Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies, Academy of Finland Center of Excellence in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (TINT), University of Helsinki, Unioninkatu 40 A, P.O. Box 24, 00014 Helsinki, Finland Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy, School of Biosciences, University of Skövde, P.O. Box 408, 54128 Skövde, Sweden e-mail: paavo.pylkkanen@helsinki.fi; paavo.pylkkanen@his.se © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 E. Haven, A. Khrennikov (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Quantum Models in Social Science, DOI 10.1057/978-1-137-49276-0_14 293 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 294 P. Pylkkänen by our conscious free will? Since Libet's (1985) work on the neuroscience of 15 free will, the notion that the conscious will is not the original determinant 16 of action has won increasing support. For example, Velmans's (1991) work 17 suggests that consciousness "is neither necessary for any type of mental ability 18 nor does it occur early enough to act as a cause of the acts or processes typically 19 thought to be its effects" (Van Gulick 2014, p. 36). The radical upshot of 20 this line of thinking is the claim that "the sorts of mental abilities that are 21 typically thought to require consciousness can all be realized unconsciously 22 in the absence of the supposedly required self-awareness" (ibid.). In Libet's 23 famous studies, conscious self-awareness is present, but Van Gulick notes that 24 many claim that it occurs too late to be the cause of the relevant actions: "self25 awareness or meta-mental consciousness according to these arguments turns 26 out to be a psychological after-effect rather than an initiating cause, more like 27 a post facto printout" (ibid.). Van Gulick adds, however, that the arguments 28 are controversial and that many theorists regard the empirical data as no real 29 threat to the causal status of consciousness (for a recent discussion of the issue 30 from various viewpoints, see e.g. Pockett et al. 2006). 31 But how are we to understand the causal status of consciousness? In 32 philosophy of mind there has been a long debate about the problem of mental 33 causation. Many philosophers assume that consciousness is in some sense 34 a nonphysical property. But this immediately gives rise to the problem of 35 understanding how something nonphysical could possibly influence some36 thing physical. A key idea to be explored in this chapter is that the ontological 37 interpretation of quantum theory might throw new light upon this perennial 38 issue. This interpretation suggests that a new type of active information is 39 playing a key causal role in physical processes at the quantum level. Now, 40 when one examines the various suggestions about the putative causal powers 41 of consciousness, many of them refer to the role of information, in one way 42 or another. This then suggests a strategy for the present chapter. We will first 43 consider how the various suggestions about the causal status of consciousness 44 involve information before asking whether such information in mental and 45 conscious states could be connected to information at the quantum level. In 46 this way we could begin to understand mental causation, and the causal role of 47 conscious experiences in particular, in a new way. Of course, this is a big and 48 difficult issue and we can only sketch the solution in a single chapter. However, 49 even this sketch will hopefully illustrate the great potential of quantum 50 theory when trying to meet some of the grand challenges facing the social 51 sciences. 52 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 295 2 Van Gulick and Revonsuo on the Causal 53 Efficacy of Consciousness 54 In his useful review of the suggestions about the causal role of consciousness 55 Van Gulick (2014, pp. 34–42) says that consciousness is thought to provide 56 the organism with (a) more flexible control; (b) better social coordination; 57 (c) more integrated representation; (d) more global informational access; (e) 58 increased freedom of will; and (f ) intrinsic motivation. In this section I will 59 briefly explicate these (as well as some of Revonsuo's 2006 related ideas) 60 and then, in the next section, discuss how they connect with the notion of 61 information. Note that the aim in this chapter is not to evaluate critically 62 these suggestions. The aim is rather to indicate, for the sake of the discussions 63 that follows, that there is at least a reasonable possibility that consciousness 64 has a genuine causal role, and that this connects strongly with the notion of 65 information. For a more detailed discussion the reader is advised to consult 66 the references given below, as well as in Van Gulick (2014, pp. 35–42) and 67 Revonsuo (2006). Let us now consider a number of suggestions about the 68 causal role of consciousness. 69 It is common to claim that conscious mental processes provide a flexible 70 and adaptive type of control, as opposed to unconscious automatic processes 71 (Anderson 1983). Even if these latter can be quick, they are also relatively fixed 72 and predetermined, and thus not particularly effective in unexpected situations 73 (Penfield 1975). Also, when the challenge is to learn new skills, conscious 74 attention is typically assumed to be important at the early stages of learning 75 (Shiffrin and Schneider 1977). 76 It has been suggested that organisms that are conscious of their own and 77 others' mental states have a better ability to interact, cooperate, and communi78 cate. The idea is that such meta-mental or "higher-order" consciousness would 79 enable a better capacity for social coordination, which in turn can be thought 80 to provide adaptive advantage (Humphreys 1982; Van Gulick 2014, p. 38). 81 It has further been suggested that conscious experiences enable a more 82 unified and integrated representation of reality, which allows for amore flexible 83 response in various situations (Campbell 1994; Van Gulick 2014, pp. 38–39; 84 Tononi and Koch 2015). 85 It is a well-known suggestion that information in conscious mental states is 86 globally available to a number of different mental subsystems or "modules", 87 and can thus be made use of in many different ways in behavior (Baars 1988). 88 In contrast, it is argued that non-conscious information is usually available 89 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 296 P. Pylkkänen only to special mental modules and has a more limited effect upon behavior 90 and action (Fodor 1983). (However, Rosenthal 2009 thinks it is unclear that a 91 state's potential to have global effects coincides with its being conscious.) 92 When it comes to free will, it seems that conscious experience not only 93 presents us with the options to choose from (at least sometimes), it also seems 94 to be a prerequisite for such freedom. Mustn't one be conscious to be able 95 to make a free choice at all (Van Gulick 2014, p. 41)? One should note that 96 researchers such as Velmans have suggested that there can be unconscious free 97 will; but it is not obvious that a decisionmade unconsciously can be considered 98 truly free. 99 Finally, it has been suggested that certain conscious states, such as pleasure 100 and pain, have an intrinsic motivating force (e.g., attraction) as an indivisible 101 part of the experience itself. The idea is that such a force cannot be reduced to 102 nonconscious properties (for a brief account of the various viewpoints on this 103 issue, see Van Gulick 2014, pp. 41–2). 104 Revonsuo (2006) has considered the causal powers of consciousness (or 105 the "phenomenal level" as he calls it) in the light of various studies on 106 blindsight, implicit perception, nonconscious visually guided actions, and 107 similar phenomena. He acknowledges that there are complex information 108 processing mechanisms in the brain that in themselves are nonconscious 109 or, in his terms, "realize no phenomenal level of organization." However, 110 he emphasizes that such nonconscious "zombie systems" seem to have only 111 limited causal powers in guiding organism–environment interaction, whereas 112 the contribution of consciousness (or the "phenomenal level") seems to be 113 decisive for meaningful interactions with our environment. 114 He further considers disorders, such as epileptic automatisms and sleep115 walking, which seem to turn the whole person into a nonconscious zombie, 116 and notes that a careful examination of such zombies reveals that nonconscious 117 organism–environment interaction, while complex, is typically pointless. He 118 concludes (2006, pp. xxiii–xxiv): 119 other types of disorders show that the simulated phenomenal world in the 120 brain has unique causal powers in determining the behavioral trajectories of our 121 physical bodies. In the light of the evidence from these disorders, consciousness 122 surfaces as a causally potent biological system with unique causal powers. 123 Therefore, we need not worry about epiphenomenalism any longer. 124 We note here that Revonsuo's reference to the way in which the simulated 125 phenomenal world in the brain determines behavioral trajectories of bodies 126 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 297 is interestingly analogous to Bohm's notion that active information encoded 127 in the quantum field determines the trajectories of particles at the quantum 128 level (we will discuss this latter idea below). We also note that to avoid truly 129 epiphenomenalism or reductionism, Revonsuo needs to show how conscious 130 experiences qua conscious could possibly play a genuine causal role in guiding 131 the physical organism without violating the laws of physics (or the causal 132 closure of the physical domain). This is of course connected to the problem of 133 mental causation, a solution to which we are trying to sketch in this chapter. 134 3 How the Causal Efficacy of Consciousness 135 Connects with Information 136 Let us now see how the above suggestions make a link between consciousness 137 and information. We can understand "more flexible control" as flexibility in 138 the way that information can be used to guide the organism. It seems that 139 consciousness makes possible such flexibility. Unconscious information just 140 "acts" when it is activated, according to an automatic routine. If there are 141 items of unconscious information that imply mutually exclusive actions, then 142 presumably the "stronger" information wins, and this may take place without 143 conscious experience ("stronger" here may be assumed to correspond to e.g. a 144 higher level of neural activity). However, it seems possible that when a person 145 is conscious of an item of information, at least some (automatic) activity of 146 that information can be suspended. Also, it seems obvious that at least in 147 some situations a person can review a number of different options, and choose 148 the one that seems best in the given situation. (In this way consciousness, 149 flexible control, and free will seem related.) Of course, which option is in 150 the end chosen may not be the result of a completely "free" choice, but is 151 instead determined by some further information which arises when reviewing 152 the options, with a content like "it is reasonable to do X" (cf. Bohm 1990). 153 We also noted that it has been suggested that organisms that are conscious of 154 their own and others' mental states have a better ability to interact, cooperate, 155 and communicate. "Conscious of" can here be understood to include "having 156 meta-level information about." This connects with higher order theories of 157 consciousness which assume that what makes a given mental state conscious 158 is that there exists a higher level of (typically) unconscious mental state, which 159 has the content that one is in the first-order mental state or activity (Rosenthal 160 1997). Thus, consciousness is not assumed to be a neural or computational 161 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 298 P. Pylkkänen property, but rather something that arises when initially nonconscious mental 162 states are related in a suitable way. It seems quite natural to think about 163 such meta-mentality in terms of information. We could say that meta164 mentality involves higher-order "information about information" rather than 165 just first-order "information about the environment." In these terms, higher166 order theories of consciousness suggest that consciousness essentially involves 167 information about information. A simple possibility would be to postulate that 168 what makes a given informational state conscious is that there exists a higher 169 level of (typically) unconscious information, which has the content that one 170 is in the first-order informational state. When it comes to the causal efficacy 171 of consciousness, the question is whether having meta-level information (and 172 consciousness) in this sense implies a better ability to interact, cooperate, and 173 communicate. Below I will briefly note how in the Bohmian scheme active 174 information at a given level can organize the behavior of elements at a lower 175 level. The challenge here, too, is to find out whether being conscious of active 176 information gives the organism some special advantages when it comes to 177 interaction, cooperation, and communication. 178 We further mentioned the suggestion that conscious experiences enable a 179 more unified and integrated representation of reality, which allows for a more 180 flexible response in various situations. To understand this feature better, we 181 can usefully quote van Gulick (2014, pp. 38–9): 182 Conscious experience presents us with a world of objects independently existing 183 in space and time. Those objects are typically present to us in a multi-modal fash184 ion that involves the integration of information from various sensory channels as 185 well as from background knowledge andmemory. Conscious experience presents 186 us not with isolated properties or features but with objects and events situated in 187 an ongoing independent world, and it does so by embodying in its experiential 188 organization and dynamics the dense network of relations and interconnections 189 that collectively constitute the meaningful structure of a world of objects. 190 This reminds us about the fact that the information we meet in conscious191 ness is highly integrated and structured and also meaningful in various ways. 192 Van Gulick acknowledges that non-experiental sensory information can also 193 have an adaptive effect on behavior (e.g., as seen in reflexes). However, he 194 draws attention to the work of Lorenz (1977) and Gallistel (1990), which 195 suggest that conscious experience provides a more integrated representation 196 of reality, which in turn enables more flexible responses. If we consider this 197 feature in informational terms, it seems that a certain kind of information only 198 becomes available and, especially, flexibly usable to the organism in conscious 199 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 299 experience. This connects with the previously mentioned issues of flexible 200 control and free will, in the sense that consciousness, flexible control, free will, 201 and unified and integrated representations are all interconnected. Unified and 202 integrated representations, especially when consciously experienced, provide 203 the "free will" rich information about the available options which enables 204 flexibility in the control of the organism. 205 There are a number of other researchers who emphasize that consciousness 206 involves an integrated representation in the form of a "virtual reality" or 207 "world-simulation." Revonsuo, for example, characterizes conscious expe208 rience in dreams as a complex, organized, temporally progressing world209 simulation. During waking we also experience subjectively an internal, phe210 nomenal, simulated world, which we take to be the "real" world, when 211 consciousness happens to be online with the external physical world (Revonsuo 212 2015, p. 65). 213 And as we have already seen, for Revonsuo the simulated phenomenal 214 world in the brain is causally efficacious in that it determines the behavioral 215 trajectories of our physical bodies. Here we can ask what the nature of a world216 simulation is. It seems natural to think of it as some kind of structure of 217 information that is meaningful and has phenomenal properties. And given 218 that this world-simulation guides the organism, it is natural to think of it as a 219 kind of active information in the Bohmian sense that will be explained later. 220 Let us then move on to consider the suggestion that information in 221 conscious mental states is globally available to a number of different mental 222 subsystems or "modules" and can thus be made use of in many different ways 223 in behavior. This feature, together with the issues discussed previously, helps to 224 explain the flexible control that consciousness seems to enable. We saw above 225 that information in conscious experience is typically very rich in its content-it 226 is unified and integrated. If consciousness further means that such information 227 becomes globally available to many different subsystems, it clearly becomes 228 easier to understand why consciousness enables more flexible control. To put 229 it briefly, the idea is that consciousness both enables the sort of information 230 that flexible control requires, and it also makes it possible for such information 231 to reach the subsystems that are required in the execution of the control. 232 In recent years much attention has been given to Tononi's integrated 233 information theory of consciousness (Tononi and Koch 2015; Oizumi et al. 234 2014). There are various reasons why Tononi thinks the concept of infor235 mation is needed in a theory of consciousness. To account for the fact that 236 consciousness is differentiated (i.e., that each experience has a specific set 237 of phenomenological distinctions), a system of mechanisms must specify a 238 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 300 P. Pylkkänen differentiated conceptual structure via a process of in-forming (we will see 239 later that Bohm's notion of active information likewise refers to a process 240 of in-forming, though in a somewhat different sense). Tononi further says 241 that to account for the irreducible unity of consciousness (i.e., that each 242 experience is irreducible to non-interdependent components), there has to be 243 integrated information, in the sense that the conceptual structure specified by 244 the system is irreducible to that specified by non-interdependent subsystems. 245 More technically, the presence of integration (characterized by big phi or ) 246 means that a partitioning of a system of mechanisms would destroy several 247 cause–effect repertoires and change others. 248 Tononi's theory tries to explain what consciousness is in terms of the 249 notion of information. But the theory also suggests that consciousness as 250 integrated information makes a difference to the behavior of the organism. 251 Tononi and Koch (2015, p. 11) write: "a brain having a high capacity for 252 information integration will better match an environment with a complex 253 causal structure varying across multiple time scales, than a network made 254 of many modules that are informationally encapsulated." And given the 255 hypothesis that consciousness is integrated information, this implies that it 256 enables a better match with the environment and consequently more adaptive 257 behavior. 258 Wehave already briefly considered the relation of free will and consciousness 259 above, and will return to this issue below. Van Gulick's review also drew 260 attention to the suggestion that certain conscious states, such as pleasure and 261 pain, have an intrinsic motivating force (e.g., attraction) as an indivisible part 262 of the experience itself. The idea is that such force cannot be reduced to 263 nonconscious properties. This suggests that consciousness not only enables 264 information to be integrated and globally available, but that it also involves 265 (perhaps gives rise to) "forces," such as attraction. Again, we will return below 266 to consider this interesting suggestion when discussing the notion of active 267 information. 268 Van Gulick's review (as well as Revonsuo's and Tononi's theories) make 269 a reasonably strong case for the idea that consciousness has genuine causal 270 powers. Now, presumably each particular argument for such causal efficacy 271 is subject to potentially serious criticisms, but I think that it is fair to say 272 that together they imply that the question is at least an open one. It at least 273 seems to make a difference to the behavior of an organism whether or not it 274 is conscious. I have also drawn attention to the way many of the suggestions 275 about the causal efficacy of consciousness involve a link between consciousness 276 and information. In the rest of the chapter I will try to understand this link 277 better by discussing it in the context of a new notion of active information that 278 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 301 is extended all the way into physics. However, before doing that I want to meet 279 briefly another challenge. For as was already hinted at above, contemporary 280 philosophers of mind often suggest that consciousness cannot have genuinely 281 causal powers if we stay within the physicalist scientific world picture.We need 282 to address this issue briefly before proceeding. 283 4 Philosophy of Mind: Does Consciousness 284 Have No Causal Power? 285 Much of contemporary Anglo-American analytical philosophy is committed 286 to physicalism, which means that philosophers assume that everything is 287 physical, or everything is in an appropriate way dependent (or "supervenient") 288 upon the physical. However, many philosophers find it difficult to simply 289 reduce the mental to the physical, and they thus defend a doctrine known 290 as "nonreductive physicalism." This typically holds that mental properties are 291 nonphysical properties that, however, depend or supervene upon the physical. 292 Note that "mental" here is not taken to be synonymous with "conscious," but 293 includes even such possibly nonconscious properties as intentionality (in the 294 sense of the "directedness" or "aboutness" of mental states). 295 The trouble with nonreductive physicalism is that it seems to leave the men296 tal as causally inefficacious or epiphenomenal. If the mental is nonphysical, it 297 seems impossible to understand how it could be the cause of physical effects. 298 Even the notion of mental-physical dependence or supervenience doesn't 299 seem to help here. Some philosophers (e.g., Stephen Yablo, David Lewis, 300 and Jaegwon Kim) have developed some ingenious ways to make the idea of 301 genuine mental causation plausible (see Ritchie 2008). However, it seems that 302 even these fail to tell us how mental properties (conceived as nonphysical) 303 could possibly influence the physical course of events. There thus seems to 304 be no genuine causal role for mental properties in contemporary nonreductive 305 physicalism. This is a very unsatisfactory situation. However, to go back to, say, 306 interactive substance dualism seems equally unsatisfactory. Nagel (2005) has 307 succinctly summarized the situation: "neither dualism nor materialism seems 308 likely to be true, but it is not clear what the alternatives are." 309 Note that this apparent epiphenomenalism of the mental is particularly 310 troublesome for our above discussion about the causal role of conscious 311 experience. It is not at all obvious that conscious experiences are physical or 312 material in any traditional sense (remember e.g. Chalmers's 1996 discussion 313 of the "hard problem" of consciousness). Thus contemporary nonreductive 314 physicalism seems forced to declare consciousness to be an epiphenomenon. 315 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 302 P. Pylkkänen Reductive physicalism resolves the issue trivially by assuming that conscious 316 experiences are physical states. But for those who do not understand how 317 conscious experience could possibly be a physical state, this "resolution" is not 318 of much value. 319 We have noted that nonreductive physicalism implies that consciousness 320 is epiphenomenal, but how seriously should we take the nonreductive phys321 icalists' arguments? For if one examines the views of many of the leading 322 physicalists (whether reductive or nonreductive), one is struck by the fact that 323 hardly any attention is given to what seems to be the most fundamental of the 324 natural sciences, namely (fundamental) physics. This seems to be in violation 325 of the very principles the physicalists have usually set themselves, namely that 326 they ought to base their metaphysics upon the best theories in the natural 327 sciences. A particularly sharp criticism of such tendencies in philosophy has 328 recently been made by Ladyman and Ross (2007, p. vii). They write, for 329 example, that "standard analytic metaphysics (or 'neo-scholastic' metaphysics 330 as we call it) contributes nothing to human knowledge and, where it has any 331 impact at all, systematically misrepresents the relative significance of what 332 we do know on the basis of science." Such "neo-scholastic" metaphysics also 333 includes analytic philosophy of mind, in so for as this gives little attention to 334 the results of modern science, including fundamental physics. Ladyman and 335 Ross's view is extreme, but I think they are correct in drawing attention to 336 certain weak points in contemporary philosophy of mind. If we want to claim 337 that the physical world leaves no room for the causal powers of consciousness, 338 we should justify our view on the basis of the best theories in physics. And as we 339 will see in the next section, it is not clear that, say, quantum theory excludes 340 in principle the causal powers of consciousness. On the contrary, a natural 341 extension of quantum theory might well make room for mental properties 342 and even conscious experience in our scientific world picture. 343 5 Information in the Ontological 344 Interpretation of Quantum Theory 345 Can quantum theory throw any new light upon the nature of information, 346 whichmight also help us to understand the relationship between consciousness 347 and information, and the causal powers of consciousness? I suggest that the 348 best place to start exploring this issue is David Bohm's interpretation of 349 quantum theory, in its later form developed in cooperation with Basil Hiley 350 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 303 (Bohm and Hiley 1987, 1993; see also Pylkkänen et al. 2016; for Bohm's early 351 work on quantum theory and the mind, see Pylkkänen 2014). 352 To understand the significance of Bohm's work for the mind–matter 353 problem it is necessary to understand the development of physics in the 354 twentieth century.When quantum theory was emerging, physicists were trying 355 to make sense of puzzling features such as wave–particle duality and, a little 356 later, entanglement. In particular they were attempting to develop ontological 357 models of quantum systems such as electrons. In the 1920s Louis de Broglie 358 came up with the idea of an electron being a particle guided by a pilot 359 wave, while Schrödinger was trying to describe the electron as some kind 360 of a physical field. These models had some difficulties, though in retrospect 361 we can see that at least de Broglie's ideas could have been developed further 362 (Bacciagaluppi and Valentini 2009). What happened however was that the 363 so-called "Copenhagen interpretation" won the day in the 1920s. There are 364 actually many different versions of this interpretation, but it is typical of them 365 that they emphasize epistemology-in the sense of our ability to predict the 366 statistical results of measurement-rather than ontology-in the sense of a 367 model of what quantum reality may be like, including when we are not making 368 measurements. As a result, physicists were not able to offer a new notion of 369 objective physical reality, which philosophers could then use when discussing 370 ontological issues, such as the mind–matter relationship. 371 It is here that Bohm comes in. In the early 1950s, after discussions with 372 Einstein in Princeton, he independently rediscovered de Broglie's theory and 373 formulated it in a more coherent way, providing a first consistent realistic 374 model of quantum systems (Bohm 1952). Bohm's interpretation was initially 375 resisted, but is today more and more widely acknowledged as one of the 376 key possible interpretations of quantum theory. Later on further ontological 377 models were proposed, for example Everett's (1957) "many worlds" interpre378 tation and Ghirardi et al.'s (1986) objective collapse theory, and currently 379 the nature of quantum reality is intensively debated within the philosophy 380 of physics community (see e.g. the anthology The Wave Function: Essays on 381 the Metaphysics of QuantumMechanics, edited by Alyssa Ney and David Albert 382 (2013)). We do not know which ontological interpretation (if any) is correct, 383 but each may reveal something significant about the nature of physical reality 384 at a very fundamental level. One should note that there are by now also 385 different versions of the Bohm theory. Much attention has in recent years 386 been given to a minimalist version known as "Bohmian mechanics" (see e.g. 387 Goldstein 2013; for a balanced discussion of the relation between de Broglie's 388 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 304 P. Pylkkänen and Bohm's approaches, see Holland (2011)). Bohm himself developed from 389 the mid-1970s, with Basil Hiley, a philosophically more radical version they 390 called the "ontological interpretation," culminating in their 1993 book The 391 Undivided Universe. 392 How, then, might Bohm's theory be relevant to the mind–matter rela393 tionship and to the causal status of consciousness in particular? The theory 394 postulates that an electron is a particle, always accompanied by a new type of 395 field, which guides its behavior-thus the name "pilot wave theory" which 396 is sometimes used. Jack Sarfatti has characterized the Bohmian electron 397 imaginatively by saying that it consists of a "thought-like" pilot wave, guiding a 398 "rock-like" particle. This metaphor suggests that matter at the quantum level is 399 fundamentally different from the sort of mechanical matter of classical physics 400 that is presupposed in philosophy of mind by typical materialists. If even the 401 basic elements that constitute us have "thought-like" and "rock-like" aspects, 402 then it is perhaps not so surprising that a very complex aggregate of such 403 elements (such as a human being) has a body, accompanied by a mind that 404 guides it. 405 But, one might think, this is merely a vague metaphor. Now, Bohm himself 406 realized in the early 1980s that the pilot wave might be more literally "thought407 like" in a very interesting sense. He considered the mathematical expression of 408 the so-called quantum potential, which describes the way the pilot wave affects 409 the particle. He realized that the quantum potential, and thus the effect of the 410 wave upon the particle, only depends on the form or shape of the wave, not 411 on the size or amplitude of the wave (mathematically, the quantum potential 412 depends only on the second spatial derivative of the amplitude of the wave). 413 He went on to suggest that the quantum wave is literally putting form into, or 414 in-forming, the motion of the particle along its trajectory, rather than pushing 415 and pulling it mechanically. 416 Note that we are here talking about information for the electron, not 417 information for us-we are thus thinking about information as an objective 418 commodity that exists out there in the world, independently of us, guiding 419 and organizing physical processes. The form of the quantum wave reflects the 420 form of the environment of the particle-for example the presence of slits in 421 the famous two-slit experiment. In this experiment, electrons arrive one by one 422 at the detecting screen at localized points, suggesting that they are particles. Yet 423 as we keep on watching, the individual spots build up an interference pattern, 424 suggesting that each individual electron also has wave properties. Remember 425 that in the Bohm theory the electron is seen as a particle and a wave. In the 426 two-slit experiment the particle goes through one of the slits. The wave goes 427 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 305 through both slits, interferes and guides or in-forms the particle in such a way 428 that an interference pattern is formed as many electrons pass through the slit 429 system. It thus seems that with the help of the notion of active information 430 we can have a realist interpretation of the quantum theory, without the usual 431 puzzles, such as Schrödinger's cats, many worlds, or the consciousness of the 432 observer producing physical reality (for details see Bohm and Hiley 1987, 433 1993). 434 What happens with the electron is somewhat analogous to a ship on 435 autopilot, guided by radar waves that carry information about the environment 436 of the ship. The radar waves are not pushing and pulling the ship, but rather 437 in-forming the much greater energy of the ship. Bohm generalized this into 438 a notion of "active information"-which applies in situations where a form 439 with smaller energy enters and informs a larger energy. We see this not only 440 with various artificial devices, but also in the way the form of the DNA 441 molecule informs biological processes, and even in the way forms act in human 442 subjective experience (for example, seeing the form of a shadow in a dark night 443 and interpreting it as "danger" may give rise to a powerful psychosomatic 444 reaction). Indeed, Bohm (1990) sketched out how the active information 445 approach could be developed into a theory of mind and matter. 446 While the radar-wave analogy helps us to understand the Bohmian electron, 447 it is important to realize that the quantum potential has some radically holistic 448 properties that go beyond what is implied by such mechanical analogies. 449 In particular, in the many-body system there can be a nonlocal connection 450 between particles that depends on the quantum state of the whole, in a way 451 that cannot be expressed in terms of the relationships of the particles alone. 452 Bearing in mind that this quantum state involves active information, we can 453 note an interesting connection to Tononi's idea of integrated information. It 454 is likely that the many-body quantum state involves the most radically holistic 455 (integrated) information that science has thus far detected, thus making it 456 interesting to consider its role when trying to understand consciousness as 457 integrated information. 458 6 Bohm's Sketch for a Theory of the Relation 459 of Mind and Matter 460 Bohm proposed that we understand mental states as involving a hierarchy of 461 levels of active information. We typically not merely think about objects in the 462 external world, but we can also become aware of our thinking. He suggested 463 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 306 P. Pylkkänen that suchmeta-level awareness typically involves a higher level of thought. This 464 higher level gathers information about the lower level. But because its essential 465 nature is active information, it not merely makes a passive representation of 466 the lower level. Rather, the higher level also acts to organize the lower level, 467 somewhat analogously to the way the active information in the pilot wave acts 468 to organize the movement of the particle. (In particular, the higher level of 469 thought can organize the content in the lower level into a coherent whole. This 470 could be seen as a kind of "integrated information" and suggests yet another 471 connection with Tononi's integrated information theory of consciousness.) 472 And of course, we can become aware of this higher level of thought from a yet 473 higher level, and so on. 474 How then does mind, understood as a hierarchy of levels of active informa475 tion, connect with matter in the Bohmian scheme? First of all, he suggested 476 that it is natural to extend the quantum ontology. So just as there is a pilot 477 wave that guides the particle, there can be a super-pilot wave that guides 478 the first-order pilot wave, and so on. (He claimed that such an extension is 479 "natural" from the mathematical point of view.) Now it seems that we have 480 two hierarchies, one for mind and another for matter. His next step was to 481 postulate that these are the same hierarchy, so that there is only one hierarchy. 482 This then allows, at least in principle, for a new way of understanding how 483 mind can affect the body. Information at a given level of active information 484 in the mind can act downwards, all the way to the active information in the 485 pilot waves of particles in, say, the synapses or neural microtubules, and this 486 influence can then be amplified to signals in the motor cortex, leading to a 487 physical movement of the body. 488 Bohm's proposal differs strongly from the usual theories in cognitive neu489 roscience. Most neuroscientists ignore quantum considerations and seek the 490 "neural correlates of consciousness" in some macroscopic neural phenomena, 491 which can presumably be understood in terms of classical physics. Yet Bohm is 492 proposing that mind, understood as a hierarchy of levels of active information, 493 is implemented in (or perhaps even identical with) a hierarchy of super494 quantum fields. However, these fields are not separate from the macroscopic 495 neural processes. On the contrary, the role of the fields is in the end to gather 496 information about the manifest neural processes and, on the basis of what this 497 information means, to organize and guide them. 498 One should acknowledge that it is a tremendous challenge to work out an 499 empirically testable theory along the Bohmian lines. The ideas described above 500 provide a scheme for such an endeavor, rather than a fully developed theory. 501 Bohm and Pylkkänen (1992) were discussing ways to develop the scheme in 502 the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a later development, Hiley and Pylkkänen 503 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 307 (2005) discussed the prospects of applying the Bohm scheme to Beck and 504 Eccles's quantum model of synaptic exocytosis (for a review of Beck and 505 Eccles's model, as well as other quantum approaches to consciousness, see 506 Atmanspacher 2011).While this may be a small step forward, problems remain. 507 For example, Henry Stapp (2005) has pointed out that the sort of interference 508 of the mind upon the laws of quantum mechanics that the Bohmian scheme 509 involves can lead to serious problems with special relativity. This is a challenge 510 that future research along Bohmian lines needs to face. A possible way for 511 meeting this challenge is opened up by a recent study on the nature of nonlocal 512 quantum information transfer by Walleczek and Grössing (2016). 513 While the possibility of non-negligible quantum effects in the brain is often 514 dismissed as implausible, there are interesting recent advances in quantum 515 biology. And it is already part of mainstream neuroscience that the retina acts 516 to amplify the effects of individual photons. Also, researchers such as Roger 517 Penrose and Stuart Hameroff have discussed in great detail how quantum 518 effects might play a role in neural processes via quantum coherence and 519 collapse in neural microtubules. Connecting the Hameroff–Penrose work 520 with the Bohm scheme is one potentially fruitful line for future research. 521 Indeed I have begun to explore these connections together with Hameroff 522 and the philosopher Rocco Gennaro, who is a specialist on higher-order 523 (HO) theories of consciousness (which seem to fit together with Bohm's 524 idea of the mind as a hierarchy of levels of information). (For an early result 525 of this cooperation, focusing on combining HO theories with Penrose and 526 Hameroff's orchestrated objective reduction (ORCH-OR) hypothesis, leading 527 to "deeper order thought" (DOT), see Hameroff et al. 2014.) 528 Note that Bohm introduced a new category, namely information, to the 529 debate. Is information physical or mental? He suggested that it is simultane530 ously both physical andmental, or has these two as its aspects. This sort of view 531 is called a double-aspect theory in philosophy of mind. The traditional worry 532 with double-aspect views is that the underlying thing, which has the aspects, 533 is left as a mystery. The hypothesis that information is the fundamental, 534 underlying feature of reality can be seen as a way to alleviate this worry. 535 7 Understanding Consciousness in the Active 536 Information Scheme 537 A common criticism of contemporary theories in the philosophy of mind- 538 such as identity theory and functionalism-is that they leave out conscious 539 experience, instead of explaining it (Searle 1992). How might conscious 540 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 308 P. Pylkkänen experience fit into the active information scheme? In particular, is it possible 541 to understand the causal status of consciousness in this scheme? While Bohm 542 saw nature as a dynamic process where information and meaning play a key 543 dynamic role, he assumed that "99.99 per cent" of our meanings are not 544 conscious (Bohm in discussion with Renée Weber 1987, p. 439). Thus, for 545 example, he thought it obvious that the particles of physics are not conscious. 546 But how can one then address the problem of consciousness in this scheme? 547 In other words, why is there sometimes conscious experience associated with 548 the activity of information (as seems obvious at least with humans and higher 549 animals)? Why doesn't all the activity of information in humans proceed "in 550 the dark," as it seems to do in physical and biological processes in general? And 551 does the presence of consciousness make a causal difference? Bohm himself did 552 not say much about the hard problem of consciousness (he died a little before 553 the hard problem was made the center of attention by David Chalmers in the 554 1994 Tucson consciousness conference). However, I have suggested that the 555 most natural context to explore this issue is some version of an HO theory of 556 consciousness (Pylkkänen 2007, p. 247). Let us here expand somewhat on this 557 idea. 558 As we saw above, the basic idea of higher-order theories of consciousness, 559 when expressed in terms of the notion of information, is to postulate that 560 what makes a given mental state (or level of information or mental activity) 561 conscious is that there exists a higher level of (typically) unconscious infor562 mation, which has the content that one is in the first-order mental state or 563 activity. 564 Note also that David Chalmers famously suggested that we tackle the hard 565 problem of consciousness with a double-aspect theory of information. The 566 idea is that information is a fundamental feature of the world, which always 567 has both a phenomenal and a physical aspect. Now, we could take this idea to 568 the Bohm scheme and postulate that active information, too, has phenomenal 569 properties. This then raises the question about what we should think about 570 the active information in the pilot wave of an electron. Does it, too, have 571 phenomenal properties in some sense? Bohmwent as far as to say that electrons 572 have a "primitive mind-like quality," but by "mind" he was here referring to 573 the "activity of form," rather than conscious phenomenal experience in any 574 full sense. 575 I think that it is reasonable to combine Chalmers's hypothesis to active 576 information, but we need to restrict the hypothesis. For example, we could 577 say that a certain kind of active information (e.g., a holistic active information 578 that is analogous to quantum active information) has the potentiality for 579 phenomenal properties, but a potentiality that is actualized only in suitable 580 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 309 circumstances (e.g., when a given level of active information is the intentional 581 target of a higher level of active information; or if we want to follow an 582 approach similar to that of Tononi, we could say that suitably integrated active 583 information is conscious). Of course, this also opens up the possibility for 584 genuine artificial consciousness. If we could implement quantum-like holistic 585 active information in an artificial system and set up a suitable higher-order 586 relationship of levels in the system, phenomenal properties should actualize 587 themselves, according to this hypothesis. (Or, in a Tononian approach, if 588 active information is suitably integrated in an artificial context, it would be 589 conscious.) 590 We should acknowledge that Bohm andHiley's proposal about active infor591 mation at the quantum level is radical and somewhat controversial, for they are 592 in effect suggesting that this type of information ought to be acknowledged as 593 a fundamental-perhaps the fundamental-category of physics. Indeed, they 594 wrote in 1984: "the notion of a particle responding actively to information in 595 the [quantum] field is : : : far more subtle and dynamic than any others that 596 have hitherto been supposed to be fundamental in physics." This proposal is 597 still mostly ignored within the physics community. There are some technical 598 issues with the proposal, but in my view a major reason for its being ignored 599 is that it goes so much against the prevalent mechanistic way of thinking 600 in physics. However, some leading thinkers do take it seriously, for example 601 Smith (2003). Also, an interesting adaptation of the active information scheme 602 to neuroscience has been proposed by Filk (2012). In the field of the social 603 sciences, Khrennikov (2004) has made imaginative use of the proposal and 604 the Bohm theory has also been applied to financial processes by Choustova 605 (2007) and Haven (2005). Of course, the notion of "quantum information" 606 has been widely discussed in recent years (see e.g. Bouwmeester et al. 2000). 607 The advantages of the concept of active information over quantum informa608 tion, when discussing some quantum experiments, have been argued for by 609 Maroney (2002); see also Maroney and Hiley (1999). 610 To summarize: Bohm's suggestion was that a natural extension of his 611 ontological interpretation of the quantum theory can include mental processes 612 and even conscious experience into a single coherent view. From the point 613 of view of the question about the causal powers of consciousness this view 614 is particularly promising, for it makes it-at least in principle-possible to 615 understand how conscious experience, via its effects upon information, could 616 make a difference to physical processes. If we can provide an intelligible theory 617 about how conscious experience can make a difference to information, this 618 scheme provides a view of how such informational differences can then affect 619 manifest physical processes (see also Hiley and Pylkkänen 2005). We have 620 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 310 P. Pylkkänen hinted that this question can be approached within some of the already existing 621 available theories of consciousness-for example, higher order theories or 622 Tononi's integrated information theory. 623 8 Active Information and the Causal Powers 624 of Consciousness 625 The view described above sketches out how information content might affect 626 manifest physical processes (e.g., bodily behavior) in a way that is coherent 627 with the principles of physics. We have already touched on the question of 628 the causal role of consciousness in the active information scheme. Let us now 629 consider this role in more detail. First of all, how can we understand the 630 idea that consciousness enables more flexible control in the context of the 631 active information view? More flexible control means, for example, that the 632 organism is able to choose from among different options the one that best fits 633 the situation, instead of having to follow mechanically one of the options. 634 In Bohmian terms this means that consciousness enables the organism to 635 suspend the activity of information. The way this works is that one is aware of 636 information that means something like "It is reasonable to consider different 637 options before acting." And when one finally acts, this is based on information 638 that means "It is reasonable to do X." In other words, flexible control in the 639 Bohmian view seems to involve higher-order, meta-level information that we 640 are conscious of (while typically, according to higher order theories, we need 641 not be conscious of the higher-order thought itself ). 642 When it comes to better social coordination, Bohm's view involves a 643 notion he calls "common pools of information" (Bohm 1990). This notion 644 applies strikingly well at the quantum level (e.g., in the Bohmian view of 645 superconductivity) where the behavior of a system of particles can in some 646 situations be organized by information in the so called many-body wave 647 function. The particles act together in an organized way (e.g., electrons may 648 pass obstacles in a wire, which results in very low resistance). Information at the 649 level of human cognition operates presumably according to different principles 650 from information at the quantum level. However, when a group of people 651 communicate with each other (e.g., in a group discussion) they begin to build 652 up a common pool of information. This enables the group to develop common 653 intentions and carry out common actions (see e.g. Tuomela 2013). Suppose, 654 for example, that a group of eight people need to carry a very heavy grand piano 655 upstairs along a narrow staircase. They need to exchange information and 656 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 311 make sure that they each understand what they are supposed to do. Again, it 657 is hard to imagine that such joint tasks requiring collective coordination could 658 take place without some consciousness of the shared information. However, 659 it is an experimental question to ask to what extent such collective action is 660 possible without conscious awareness. Going back to our above example, it 661 does seem difficult to act without conscious awareness at least in a situation 662 where the group needs to carry the piano through a very narrow opening. 663 While the mainstream literature in the field of collective or shared inten664 tionality does not consider quantum principles, there is at the very least an 665 interesting analogy between Bohm's notion of common pools of information 666 at the quantum level and the notion of collective intentionality in social 667 ontology. Some researchers have even explored whether social phenomena 668 might involve quantum principles more literally. See, for example, Alexander 669 Wendt's (2015) recent ground-breaking study, as well as Flender et al.'s (2009) 670 radical approach to the shared intentionality of the mother-infant relationship, 671 making use of quantum principles in a phenomenological context. 672 We have also considered the suggestion that consciousness enables more 673 unified and integrated representation. The tricky question here is whether the 674 information first gets unified and integrated in preconscious processes, and is 675 then presented to consciousness; or whether consciousness plays a role in the 676 very unification and integration of the information (Van Gulick seems to favor 677 the latter alternative). I am inclined to think that much of the unification and 678 integration takes place (largely) without consciousness, but that consciousness 679 is needed for such information to be flexibly usable in the control of behavior 680 (of course, in the Tononian approach one would say that sufficiently integrated 681 information constitutes consciousness). In the Bohmian picture it is assumed 682 that typically such information tends to act, even if it is not consciously 683 attended to. Conscious attention may then make the response of information 684 stronger, or lead to the suspension of action and reflection of the different 685 options. 686 The idea that consciousness involves more global access can also be naturally 687 understood in terms of the notion of active information. If information is 688 consciously attended to, this may start what Bohm (2003) calls a "signa689 somatic" flow: the significance of the information acts somatically toward a 690 more manifest level in the brain. Global access means that the significance can 691 affect many different modules. 692 When it comes to free will, Bohm used to emphasize that true freedom is 693 typically limited by our lack of knowledge-both about the consequences of 694 one's actions and about our true motives. He refers to Schopenhauer when 695 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 312 P. Pylkkänen he writes: "though we may perhaps be free to choose as we will, we are not 696 free to will the content of the will : : : Is there any meaning to freedom of will 697 when the content of this will is : : : determined by false knowledge of what is 698 possible" (Bohm 1986). In a more positive vein, he writes: 699 How, then, is it possible for there to be the self-awareness that is required for 700 true freedom? : : : I propose that self-awareness requires that consciousness sink 701 into its implicate (and now mainly unconscious) order. It may then be possible 702 to be directly aware, in the present, of the actual activity of past knowledge, and 703 especially of that knowledge which is : : : false : : : Then the mind may be free 704 of its bondage to the active confusion that is enfolded in its past. (Ibid.) 705 By "the implicate order" Bohm above refers (roughly) to the more subtle 706 levels of active information which include long-term memory and from which 707 the part of the content of conscious experience unfolds. It is clear that for 708 Bohm free will requires consciousness. However, it is not enough that we are 709 conscious of the options that we typically face in a situation when we are about 710 to make a choice. We also need to be aware of-and thus free from-falsity in 711 the past knowledge that we typically unconsciously hold and on the basis of 712 which we tend to react and make our choices. 713 Let us finally consider intrinsic motivation in the light of the Bohmian view. 714 What is interesting here is that Bohm emphasizes that information is typically 715 active (while passive information is a special case). One possibility is that the 716 presence of consciousness increases the level of activity of the information. 717 Thus, for example, consciousness of information with an attractive content 718 may be needed to awaken desire or make that desire more intense. At the 719 same time conscious awareness of the negative consequences of carrying out a 720 particular desire may lead to the suspension of action. In Bohmian terms, all 721 these phases involve active information. For example, desire informs us to carry 722 out a certain action X, while information about the consequences of the action 723 may result in information with the content "It is not reasonable to do X." 724 9 Concluding Discussion 725 I have drawn on fundamental physics to support the idea that conscious 726 experiences can, at least in principle, be causally efficacious in a physical world, 727 contrary to what much of contemporary physicalism suggests. Yet we have 728 admittedly only scratched the surface of this difficult topic. Basically, I have 729 assumed that consciousness (understood as something that arises due to higher 730 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F Is there Room in Quantum Ontology for a Genuine Causal Role for... 313 order information and/or information integration) can influence lower-level 731 information, and information in turn can influence physical processes "signa732 somatically," as Bohm would put it. 733 The Bohmian view we considered suggests that nature can be under734 stood as a two-way movement between the aspects of soma (the physical) 735 and significance (information, meaning, the mental). Consciousness comes 736 in here, but only at the higher, subtler levels, where, say, suitable higher737 order relations (and/or a sufficient degree of information integration) prevail, 738 depending upon which theory of consciousness we are relying upon. Thus the 739 active information view is consistent with the idea-also supported by recent 740 experimental work-that much of our most sophisticated brain functions 741 work totally independently of consciousness. Yet the active information view 742 also makes room for the genuine causal powers of consciousness, and in this 743 way can accommodate such causal efficacy of consciousness as is suggested 744 by Van Gulick, Revonsuo, and others. Bohm himself did not address very 745 explicitly the causal powers of consciousness, but I think it is reasonable to 746 assume that his scheme makes such powers in principle possible. To explain 747 that scheme fully is, however, not possible here, and the interested reader is 748 referred to a more detailed study (Pylkkänen 2007). 749 One important potential criticism of the active information approach 750 has to do with the notion of information that is presupposed. Is it really 751 justified to use the term "information" to describe the sorts of processes 752 connected to the quantum field? One could examine this question in the 753 light of the recent developments in the philosophy of information (e.g., 754 Floridi 2015). Floridi distinguishes between environmental and semantic 755 information; and semantic information can be further distinguished into 756 factual and instructional information. The quantum active information is 757 about something (the environment, slits, etc.), it is for the particle and it helps 758 to bring about something (a certain movement of the particle). This suggests 759 that it is semantic and has both factual and instructional aspects, though this 760 issue needs to be explored more carefully in future research. Also, Maleeh 761 and Amani (2012) have usefully considered active information in relation 762 to Roederer's (2005) notion of pragmatic information, suggesting that only 763 biological systems are capable of "genuine" information processing. I think 764 one can argue that Bohmian quantum information potential involves genuine 765 information processing (indeed, the most fundamental kind of genuine infor766 mation processing science has thus far discovered), but this will also need to 767 be explored in future research. 768 I would like to end by reflecting upon the quote from Plato's Phaedo 769 (1892) provided at the start of the chapter. Plato there thinks it obvious that 770 UN CO RR EC TE D PR OO F 314 P. Pylkkänen our physical actions depend upon "the choice of the best," while a typical 771 materialist would say that insofar as physical actions are determined, they are 772 determined by the physical state in a previous moment (including "bones 773 and muscles"). Now, I think that the active information view allows for a 774 naturalistic grounding of Plato's view. In their 1984 article Bohm and Hiley 775 note that there are good reasons for expecting that quantum theory, and 776 therefore the notion of a quantum information potential, would be relevant 777 when we are studying consciousness itself, as based on the material structure 778 of the brain and nervous system: 779 it may well be that in our mental processes, the quantum information potential 780 is significant (as is, for example, suggested by the fact that information regarded 781 as correct is active in determining our behaviour, while as soon as it is regarded 782 as incorrect, it ceases to be active). The quantum theory may then play a key part 783 in understanding this domain. (1984, p. 269) 784 The above implies that our veridicality judgments play a key role in 785 determining whether or not information acts. For example, if I judge a shadow 786 in a dark night tomean "an assailant" and thus "danger," this typically gives rise 787 to a powerful psychosomatic reaction; if I a little later notice that it was merely 788 a shadow of a branch (i.e., that the earlier judgment was incorrect), I will 789 typically calm down. We could expand the idea toward Plato by assuming that 790 our ethical judgments (e.g., "the choice of the best") can typically also affect the 791 way information is activated, and consequently our behavior. The quantum 792 theoretical active information scheme enables such activity of information to 793 reach all the way to the level of fundamental physics, and in this way we can 794 begin, in a newway, tomake sense of a perennial puzzle inWestern philosophy, 795 namely the place and role of minds, meanings, and morals in the physical 796 world. 797 References 798 Anderson, J. (1983).The architecture of cognition. 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