Editorial Manager(tm) for Behavioral and Brain Sciences Manuscript :raft Manuscript ;umber= Title= Could embodied simulation be a byAproduct of emotion perceptionB Commentary on ;iedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer D Eess BBS target article, "The Simulation of Smiles (SIMS) Model= Embodied Simulation and the Meaning of Hacial Expression." Short Title= Could embodied simulation be a byAproduct of emotion perceptionB Article Type= Commentary Article Corresponding Author= :r. Lulian :aniel Miverstein, Nh.: Corresponding AuthorOs Institution= Pniversity of Edinburgh Hirst Author= Lulian :aniel Miverstein, Nh.: Qrder of Authors= Lulian :aniel Miverstein, Nh.:R Edoardo Samuner, Nh: Abstract= The SIMS model claims that it is by means of an embodied simulation that we determine the meaning of an observed smile. This suggests that crucial interpretative worU is done in the mapping that taUes us from a perceived smile to the activation of oneOs own facial musculature. Eow is this mapping achievedB Might it depend upon a prior interpretation arrived at on the basis of perceptual and contextual informationB !"#$%& (#&)*+%, -)%.%/&0"+1 2%#3)++4.1 2"#)/$%# 5 6%77 889 &"#$%& "#&)*+%1 :!0% !"#$%&'"() (+ !#"%,- .!/0!1 0(2,%3 4#5(2",2 !"#$%&'"() &)2 '6, 0,&)")7 (+ ;"*)"+ <=>#%77)4/?@ 8(92 :($)'- ;5-'9&:'3 !" $ords 0&") <,='3 )*" $ords >,+,9,):,-3 *) $ords 4)'"9, <,='3 11)* $ords <"'%,3 Could embodied simulation be a by7product of emotion perception; <ulian =iverstein ?niversity of Edinburgh Cchool of Dhilosophy, Dsychology and Fanguage Cciences Gugald Cte$art Huilding 3 Charles Ctreet Edinburgh, Ccotland, EJK !D? Telephone: N44 (")131 *R1 *333 E7mail: S.UiversteinVed.ac.uU Edoardo Wamuner FaTrobe ?niversity Gepartment of Dhilosophy Xictoria 3"K* Yustralia Telephone: N*1 3 )4!) 24R3 E7mail: e.[amunerVlatrobe.edu.au Commentary Article Click here to download Commentary Article: niedenthal et al 2010 BBS commentary.doc Ybstract The C\MC model claims that it is by means of an embodied simulation that $e determine the meaning of an observed smile. This suggests that crucial interpretative $orU is done in the mapping that taUes us from a perceived smile to the activation of one*s own facial musculature. Jo$ is this mapping achieved; Might it depend upon a prior interpretation arrived at on the basis of perceptual and contextual information; Main Text Cmiles can be used to communicate a range of different psychological phenomena including positive emotions, comple2 social intentions, and even a person*s social status. 7iven this diversity of possible meanings, ho$ do $e succeed on a given occasion in $orUing $hat a particular smile means; To do so $e must single out $hich of these many nuanced psychological phenomena the smile expresses. _iedenthal and colleagues say $e solve this problem in part by "simulating= the nuanced states that $e observe in others. `e agree that embodied simulation may maUe an important contribution to the type of understanding $e have of a smile. Jo$ever the exact nature of this contribution seems to us to remain an open auestion. \n the spirit of friendly critics it is this auestion $e $ill taUe up in our commentary. The C\Ms model claims that $e $orU out $hat a smile means in three interrelated stages. biven the $orU that motor mimicry and its effects is being asUed to do in the determination of a smile*s meaning, something important is clearly happening in the transition from perception at stage 1 to motor mimicry or action at stage 2. There are a number of possible affective states the smile you are producing might be expressing, but $hen \ copy your facial expression this results in me expressing the very same affective state. Thus the process that allo$s me to map the perception of your behaviour onto the activation of my o$n facial musculature must someho$ be singling out the meaning of the smile \ am seeing. >e don*t wish to deny that this might be possible, but the ?IM? model, so far as we can tell, doesn*t tell us how this mapping is supposed to be effected. The authors appeal to eye contact to explain ho$ an embodied simulation gets triggered. Jence they clearly thinU that at least sometimes the embodied simulation is sufficient for us to arrive at an interpretation of a smile. Cupposing this is so, this maUes it all the more urgent to Uno$ ho$ the problem of determining $hat a smile means is solved by producing an embodied simulation. \n order for me to mimic a smile that is affiliative mustn*t I have already some how worBed out that the smile is affiliativeC If so, howC Consider no$ cases in $hich facial mimicry is blocUed or socially inhibited (ms, p.3K7 DE). The absence of motor mimicry has the conseHuence that "activation of motor systems and emotion systems will be absent=. Jence if recognition is achieved it must be some other means than embodied simulation. _iedenthal and colleagues suggest this could be achieved by matching visual input to a stored perceptual representation. \f $e sometimes have recourse to this strategy, why don*t we always use this strategyC _iedenthal et al go on to allo$ that embodied simulation could still occur in this scenario, but it $ould have to be triggered by the use of conceptual Uno$ledge since it does not arise from eye contact. Jo$ever if an interpretation of a smile has already someho$ been achieved by matching visual input to a perceptual representation, $hat $orU is left for the embodied simulation to do; curthermore ho$ is the perceptual representation selected that is used to give meaning to the visual input; _iedenthal et al have endorsed an embodied or grounded account of perceptual processing. Thus $hen they talU about conceptual Uno$ledge triggering an embodied simulation, they must mean some reactivated multi7modal representation is $hat triggers an embodied simulation. Iowever they don*t e2plain how visual input leads to the reactivation of the specific multi7modal representations that provide us $ith the interpretation of a smile. dnce again an appeal is made to a mapping from visual input but this time to a multimodal representation, and it is by means of this mapping that $e come to assign a meaning to a smile. Jo$ever there is no account given of the mechanisms that might bring about such a mapping. Could it be that the problem of interpreting the smile is already settled at stage 1 in perception, and this perceptual interpretation is $hat subseauently causes motor mimicry and its associated effects; Consider a parallel problem of determining the goal of an instrumental action. Csibra (2""!) has argued that prior to an embodied simulation of an instrumental action is a stage of processing in $hich a visual analysis is formed of an action and the context in $hich the action is taUing place. Je hypothesises that it is on the basis of this visual analysis that the goal of the action is determined. Derhaps a comparable visual analysis taUes place in the case of smiles in $hich contextual information is combined $ith information gathered from comple2 visual cues to arrive at an interpretation of a smile*s meaning. This is not to say that embodied simulation maUes no contribution to our understanding of expressive behaviour. \t might maUe it possible for us to respond to a smile $armly and share in the emotion the smile expresses. \n the absence of an embodied simulation our response to and understanding of an emotion is by comparison "pale, colourless and destitute= to paraphrase >illiam James. The Jennenlotter et al 2"") study (cited by the authors in e3.22.) $ould seem to provide some support for this suggestion. CubSects prevented from mimicUing expressions of sadness and anger by means of a HdTdf inSection exhibited less limbic system activation than controls. Thus mimicry certainly plays a causal role in generating emotion and that may, in turn, affect the character of a person*s affective understanding. `hat remains unclear ho$ever is $hether $e understand smiles by sharing another*s feelings, or whether we can share in another*s feeling only because $e have already understood the meaning behind their smile. >,+,9,):,Csibra , b. (2""!). Yction mirroring and action interpretation: Yn alternative account. D. Jaggard, g. hossetti, i M. =a$ato (Eds) The Censorimotor coundations of Jigher Cognition. Yttention and Derformance ff\\. dxford: dxford ?niversity Dress Jennenlotter, Y., Cchroeder, ?., Erhard, D., Catrop, c., Jaslinger, H., CtoecUer, G., Fange, =.`., i Ceballos7Haumann, Y. d. (2""R). Y common neural basis for receptive and expressive communication of pleasant facial affect. _euroimage, 2*, RK