German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger Daniel Ferrer at Matrin Heidegger's Todtnauberg haunt (Die Hütte, Rütte, Todtnauberg, Black Forest, Schwarzwald, Germany) By Daniel Fidel Ferrer 2 2011 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written permission. No part of this book may be stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means including electronic, electrostatic, magnetic tape, mechanical, photocopying, recording, digital, optical or by any information storage and retrieval system now known or hereafter invented; or otherwise without the prior permission in writing and signed by the author, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Photo of Daniel Fidel Ferrer at Heidegger's Todtnauberg haunt copyright ©Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Photo taken by Dr. Harald van Veghel with my 35 MM camera. Location: front page, title page. Die Hütte, Rütte, Todtnauberg, Black Forest, Schwarzwald, Germany, Deutschland. Some brief cataloging. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel (1952- ) German Philosophers: Kant, Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, and Heidegger Includes bibliographical references. Index. 1. Ontology. 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4.Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. 7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. 8. Philosphy, Asian. 9. Philosophy, Indic. 10. Philosophy, Modern -20th century. 11. Philosophy, Modern -19th century. 12. Practice (Philosophy). 13. Philosophy and civilization. 14. Postmodernism. 15. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 16. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. -17. g r una nd cent. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. Dedication and Acknowledgements Family members. Families: Ferrer, Reavis, Kuhn, Lindstrom, Schmidt, and Yeager. Ernesto B. Ferrer, Louise (Reavis) Ferrer, Joseph and Helen (born Longrich) Ferrer, Alice Amanda Ferrer, Dolores Juanita Ferrer, Shobha or Surbha (born Sundar) Ferrer, Vandana Kiran Lata (born Dayal) Young, Scott Young; Kaiden Curtis Young, Maliha Kiran Young. Ashmita Rita (Marguerita) Ferrer, Marguerita Ruth Ferrer, Ernesto Jo Ferrer, Laurie and Daniel Large. Rafael Steward Ferrer, Loren Fidel Ferrer, and Cory Glen Ferrer. Dr. Jan-Peter Wülbern and Peer Kuhn. Friends on the path. To Dr. Gupta, friends in India. To The Natubhai Patel family (Chicgao, IL). To Richard Pulaski for the question mark. To Harvey Williams for many of our conversation gone by. To Dr. Alfred Denker. To Dr. Holger Zaborowski. To Central Michigan University Libraries and staff. To Daniel Mazur my ultimate planetary guide. To Dr. Richard Polt for many thoughts. 3 Table of Contents Preface (page 4). 1). Heidegger and the Purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (p. 5 to p. 29). ). Martin Heidegger's Encounter Methodology: Kant (p. 31 to p. 44). 3). Metahistories of philosophy: Kant and Nietzsche (p. 45 to p. 63). 4). Martin Heidegger and Hegel's Science of Logic (p. 64 to p. 79). 5). Heidegger and Purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 80 to p. 102). 6). Analysis of the "Preface" to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (p. 103 to p. 110). 7). Hegel's Dialogue with Lesser Known Philosophers (p. 111 to p. 121). 8). Heidegger's Encounter with F.W.J. Schelling: The Questions of Evil and Freedom, and the end of Metaphysics (p. 123 to p. 135). 9). Martin Heidegger contra Nietzsche on the Greeks (p. 136 to p. 148). 10). Martin Heidegger and Nietzsche on Amor Fati (p. 149 to p. 156). (11). Martin Heidegger's ontotheological problems and g r una solutions: Heidegger's Presuppositions and Entanglements in Metaphysics (p. 157 to p. 165). Index (p. 166 to p. 235). Note: Number 4 above has been translated into German and published as "Martin Heidegger und die Logik der Philosophiegeschichte am Beispiel seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel." In Alfred Denker & Holger Zaborowski (Eds.). Heidegger und die Logik (pp. 89-97). Amsterdam, New York: Rodopli, 2006. 4 Preface Prologue Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) the most written about 20 th century philosopher has been my philosophical guide up the mountains of German philosophers as reflected in these writings. I owe him a profound debt – absolutely. G.W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) was general negative about the concept of putting a "preface" in a book. Hegel in his own "Preface" to Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, 1820) made an interesting point with regard to the general idea of what is a 'preface'. Hegel's published remarks at end of his 'preface' are: "But it is time to close this preface. As a preface it is its place to speak only externally and subjectively of the standpoint of the work which it introduces. A philosophical account of the essential content needs a scientific and objective treatment. So, too, criticisms, other than those which proceed from such a treatment, must be viewed by the author as unreflective convictions. Such subjective criticisms must be for him a matter of indifference." Dated: Berlin, June 25th, 1820. G.W.F. Hegel wrote in his History of Philosophy (1805-1806), that "Schelling completed his philosophical education in public. The list of his philosophical writings is simultaneously the history of his philosophical education." Although I am surely not in F.W.J. Schelling's (17751854) league, I grant it that this group of writing is also a process of my own self-education in the fine art of philosophizing. I assume there are mistakes and mis-steps. This is inherently part of our philosophical process. Indeed there is some duplication as well – please disregard any of these unessential issues. There has been considerable time and effort involved in years of writing these essays. Hegel in the preface to the Science of Logic, makes note that. "Anyone who in our times labors at erecting anew an independent edifice of philosophical sciences may be reminded, thinking of how Plato expounded his, of the story that he reworked his Republic seven times over. The reminder of this, any comparison, such as may seem implied in it, should only serve to incite ever stronger the wish that for a work which, as belonging to the modern world, is confronted by a profounder principle, a more difficult subject matter and a material of greater compass, the unfettered leisure had been afforded of reworking it seven and seventy times over". (Science of Logic, preface, 21:20, p 21. Dated: Berlin, November 7, 1831). These essays were reworked and rethought at the time of writing them; but have not been rewritten in toto when brought together in October, 2011. Many of these writings have appeared on different web sites over time and have not been redone for the present collection. Dated: October 14, 2011. Mount Pleasant, Michigan, U.S.A. 5 Heidegger and the Purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 'The most beautiful part of it is that I am beginning actually to love Kant. I am grateful that fate has kept me from spoiling Kant and Hegel with any one of those pairs of glasses available on the market today. I think I can sense the world spirit in the presence of both.' Heidegger's letter to Karl Jaspers December 1925. (Genesis of Being and Time. T. Kisiel, p. 409). 'Kantbook, an attempt to question what had not been said, instead of writing in a fixed way about what Kant said. What has been said is insufficient, what has not been said is filled with riches.' (Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, p.175). 'Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is among those philosophical works which, as long as there is philosophy on this earth at all, daily become inexhaustible anew. It is one of those works that have already pronounced judgment over every future attempt to "overcome" them by only passing them by.' (What is a thing, p. 61, 1935-36). Abstract What is Kant up to with the Critique of Pure Reason? Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1781) is one of the primary works in all of philosophy; however, it is complex and difficult to understand. Martin Heidegger, through his reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason comes to an understanding of five misinterpretations of the purpose of the Critique: 1) Metaphysical misunderstanding (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel); 2) Epistemological misunderstanding, Marburg Neo-Kantianism; 3) Psychological misunderstanding (L. Nelson, J. Fries), Gottingen Neo-Kantianism; 4) Combination metaphysical , epistemological, and psychological; and 5) Philology misunderstanding (H. Vaihinger). This is also part of Heidegger's general attack on the Neo-Kantians and E. Husserl's Phenomenology. Heidegger, through his own unique way of reading other philosophers, has a radical view of the Critique of Pure Reason as ontology. Kant says in a letter that the Critique is a "metaphysics of metaphysics." Heidegger sees this as laying the foundations of metaphysics as ontology. He sees Kant as a precursor to Heidegger's own fundamental ontology of Dasein as was carried out in his work -Being and Time (1927). Is the purpose of the infamous Critique ontology? Is Heidegger's interpretation of Kant too violent and extreme? What does Kant really say is the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason? 6 Introduction Numerous publications show Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) as the most published philosopher and thinker of the twentieth century. Heidegger's writing has sparked many people to write about him (for and against). He is the most written about twentieth-century philosopher. This has been called the Heidegger industry. Now at the end of our millennium, it is time to review what has happened in the twentieth century in thinking. Heidegger's first major publication was Being and Time in 1927, and it is his most famous work. His collected writings (Gesamtausgabe) has grown to ninety volumes and is still growing. Most of these are lectures he gave to specific groups or are extensive lecture notes that were first read to students at the Universities of Freiburg and/or Marburg. Clearly Heidegger is an ontologist. This is an important point to understand what Heidegger is doing. The question of the meaning of Being is his fundamental question in Being and Time and remained his primary matter for thought. In his work on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (GA3 lecture 1930) Heidegger says " . . . the inner necessities of the first and last problem of philosophy the question of Being" and he continues, "I have been concerned with renewing the question of ontology the most central problem of Western Philosophy the question of Being . . ." (p.13) Additional Heidegger says, "We assert now that Being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy" (Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA24, 1927 lecture), p11). "Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of Being, of Being's structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological." (Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA24, lecture 1927), p.11). Let us be clear; Heidegger is not going to read Kant's Critique to understand Kant's ethics or logic -Heidegger is going to be looking at only ontological issues; the basic matter for thought is Being and ontology. So here I will look at Heidegger's methodology, then his attack on Neo-Kantians, and finally his interpretation of the purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. After this analysis I will offer my own Kant interpretation based a friendly reading of Kant's works. Heidegger pushes us to do what he has done read Kant or whoever, and then engage them and think with them their thoughts. So, instead of following Heidegger on all the details of 7 his works on Kant, I have given up on the details and launch into Kant's works to find Kant's vision and purpose of Critique of Pure Reason. I ask you as well, you can read my selections of Kant and try to determine what you think Kant is up to, or, you can read Kant's works your self. Remember what Wittgenstein said, "I should not like my writing to spare other people the trouble of thinking. But, if possible, to stimulate someone to thoughts of his own." Both Heidegger and I agree with Wittgenstein, perhaps after reading this article you will decide to engage and think with Kant yourself. Heidegger's encounter Methodology What is Heidegger's methodology? What is the methodology of a dialogue between thinkers? Heidegger has a fresh way of reading and thinking 'with' other philosophers and poets. He is not interested in just what they said, but what they wanted to say but could not say, where they got stuck, and how Heidegger then tries to get them unstuck. This is where Heidegger wants to have a dialogue. Heidegger is alive to the hermeneutics of the text. Part of the methodology he used in Being and Time was hermeneutics, and he is responsible for rekindling this methodology in the twentieth century. In the methodological section of Being and Time he says, "Phenomenology of human existence (Da-sein) is hermeneutics in the original signification of that word . . ." Hermeneutics of Kant's texts is a part of his methodology. We will see if it is true to Kant's texts or Heidegger's interjections. Heidegger approvingly quotes F.W. J. Schelling (1775-1854): "If you want to honor a philosopher, you must catch him where he had not yet gone forth to the consequences, in his fundamental thought; (in the thought) from which he takes his point in departure" (Of Human Freedom. 1809. E.T. p.9). Heidegger says, "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says." In another article Heidegger says, "We show respect for a thinker only when we think. T his demands that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought." (The Word of Nietzsche, p. 99). Heidegger wants to think everything that Kant thought, but in his own way and in his own time in history. Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) says: 'One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil. Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you. Verily, my brothers, with a different eyes shall I then seek my lost ones; with a different love shall I then love you'. (Thus Spoke Zarathustra. 1883-5). In reading Kant, Heidegger found himself. To be exact, Heidegger's reading of Kant is a radical interpretation. This reading has more to do with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of 8 metaphysics than with understanding Kant's own project. Heidegger says, "Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to Kant philology" (Kant and the problem of metaphysics, ET p.175). Heidegger says in his work on Hegel the following about his own Kant interpretation: "Kant people refuse to see the problem and speak rather of my arbitrarily reading my own views into Kant" (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, ET p147). Has Heidegger really found Kant or only his own views in Kant? Did Heidegger only look into the mirror and find himself? Where do we see only ourselves? How can we translate between Kant Heidegger's dialogue, and ourselves with Kant? Perhaps what we can read in Kant and Heidegger is only what we already know shades of Nietzsche. In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger says, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx) And then Heidegger goes on to talk about "thoughtful dialogue between thinkers" and "In a dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics, p. xx). So he sees this problem himself. But I think that is part of the difference between Heidegger's encounters with other thinkers in a dialogue and the presentation of philosophical positions, which tries to be philosophy. Heidegger is not making claims and counterclaims. He is not looking for proofs. Aristotle says in Book IV of the Metaphysics (1006a), "For it is uneducated not to have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof, and when this is not necessary." Heidegger is reading into Kant what he wants to hear from Kant. What is the best possible reading of Kant that Heidegger would like to see in Kant? Kant is a great thinker and he is doing the same thing as Heidegger, but Heidegger's thinking is clearer than Kant. Kant had the right questions (about Being) and had some of the answers, but was not as clear as Heidegger. Therefore, for Heidegger, Kant is an important precursor to Heidegger's position. Note: this is said of Heidegger only in the 1920s. Although Heidegger learned a lot from Kant and in Being and Time he is full of praise for Kant, nevertheless, in the later Heidegger Heidegger must place Kant back into traditional metaphysics. At a later stage in Heidegger thinking, his Metahistorical approach takes over and Kant rejoins history as a metaphysician. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics was for Heidegger the first book length analysis of a philosopher like Kant and one who was very close to his thinking at the time. So, he is still working out his destructuring methodology. Heidegger at this time is working through the destruction of metaphysics, and he has the task of reducing and overcoming metaphysics. Although in 1929 he was not very clear about how his destruction project would work out and what the entire outline would look like when it was finished, this became clear for Heidegger in 1930s. 9 This was an important part of Being and Time that did not get published in 1927, and in fact most of Heidegger later works deals with the history of ontology. But it all started in Being and Time. For example, Heidegger wrote in the section on the Task of a Destructuring of the History of Ontology. (Introduction II, E.T. p. 17). "The destructuring of the history of ontology essentially belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely within such a formulation." (E.T. p. 20). One of his lectures during this time (1927) Heidegger has a concise statement about the importance of the destruction and has remarks about his phenomenological method as well. "These three basic components of phenomenological method reduction, construction, destruction belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. And this not a negation of the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it signifies precisely a positive appropriation of tradition." (Basic Problems in Phenomenology, E.T. p.23). This notes the methodology and intentions but not the content or the results of the process. The later Heidegger had the results of the appropriation of the philosophical tradition. This became his history of Being as metaphysics. We need to return back to Heidegger's method. A philosophical study of Heidegger and Kant makes a striking claim on Heidegger's methodology. Charles Sherover states: "It is thus irrelevant to object that Kant is being approached from a new context, subjected to possibly strange criteria or that novel implications are seen in what he had worked out. The task of a retrieve is not to chronicle the past but to wrest out of it a deeper comprehension of our present situation and the possibilities for development it yet offers. The real question is whether significant philosophic insights emerge, or new directions for philosophic development are brought forth, from such an encounter between two thinkers." (Heidegger, Kant and Time, pp. 12-13.) In other words, who cares what Kant wrote and thought just try everything. So, at least for Heidegger he will go where Kant takes the philosopher Heidegger. In other words, Heidegger is not considering what others think and how close or true he is to the real Kant. This is a no-holdsbarred free-for-all in the domain of thinking, to wrest out new understandings, to push new possibilities. Finally let us look back to what Kant himself thought: 10 Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), paragraph A314. "I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention." Kant said this. Therefore, to give Kant the last word on the Heideggerian methodology of a dialogue between thinkers -Heidegger can try to understand Kant better than he understood himself and still be Kantian. Kant has understood the problem of how to dialogue with other thinkers. For more of Kant, than please read Heidegger's Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. However, if you want more Heidegger read Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Nevertheless, Kant is still usurped by the Heideggerian questioning; it is Heidegger's matter for thought first, and Kant is somewhere in the background. Our question remains does this help illuminate Kant's problematic? The Five Misinterpretations of the Purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason Heidegger attacks the opposition. Although he makes critical attacks against the Neo-Kantians in several of his works on Kant, the clearest is in Phenomenological Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason (based on his lecture course at the University of Marburg in 1927-28, E.T. P. 5051 (GA25). He outlines five misinterpretations: 1) Metaphysical misunderstanding (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) This is the absolutizing of reason, the absolute I. 2) Epistemological misunderstanding Marburg Neo-Kantianism This started in the 1860s. The Critique is giving a theory of knowledge of mathematical nature science. 3) Psychological misunderstanding Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) and Jakob Fries (1773-1843) 11 Gottingen Neo-Kantianism Since this is a theory of knowledge and knowledge is a psychic process, then the Critique is doing some kind of psychology. 4) Combination metaphysical, epistemological, and psychological In addition, we can add this number 5. 5) Philology Hans Vaihinger's (1862-1933) commentary on the first 70 pages of the Critique itself is 1066 pages. This of course looks like T. K. Oesterreich's (1880-1949) first survey of Neo-Kantianism. His seven positions or approaches to Neo-Kantianism are: 1) physiological (H. Helmholtz, F. Lange) 2) metaphysical (Otto Liebmann, J. Volkelt) 3) realist (A. Riehl) 4) logicalist (H. Cohen, P. Natorp, E. Cassirer Marburg School) 5) value-theoretical criticalism, axiological (W. Windelband, H. Rickert, H. Munsterberg, Baden School) Perhaps Max Scheler and B. Bauch. 6) relativist remodeling of criticalism (G. Simmel) 7) psychological remodeling deriving from J. Fries (neo-Friesian school, L. Nelson) The history of Neo-Kantianism is long and complex. Most of their works are available only in German. Studies have examined Neo-Kantianism in the context of historical and sociological events of the time. According to Thomas Willey, "The Neo-Kantian movement was the work of middle-class professors, a few of whom took an active interest in politics and social reform. NeoKantianism emerged in the late 1850s and early 1860s, achieved academic supremacy in the 1890s, and rapidly lost its academic preeminence (but not its entire following) after 1914." The philosophical context is that Neo-Kantianism is basically a rejection and an overcoming of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and his followers. Karl Marx (1818-1883), Soren Kierkegaard (181312 1855), and Neo-Kantians have this point in common. The movement against Hegel shaped most of the philosophical thinking in 1800s. A Hegelian, Rudolf Lotze (1817-1881) and his Kantian critique of Hegel is sometimes credited with the being the forerunner of the Neo-Kantian movement. The following section is an overview of the Neo-Kantian movement in the context of the rise of epistemology at center stage of the Kantian philosophy. E. Zeller in 1862 accepted the chair of philosophy at Heidelberg and was the first to issue the cry of "Back to Kant" in his inaugural address, Uber Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie (1887, p.433). But it was Otto Liebmann in Kant und die Epigonen (1865) who ended every chapter of his book with the chant "Thus Back to Kant, in German "Zurück nach Kant!". The important point for the discussion here is the rise of the Neo-Kantianism of 'Erkenntnistheorie' or theory of knowledge, or, in general, epistemology (the question of Dingan-sich (thing-in-itself) is a controversial area of the Neo-Kantians, but not for our focus). The Neo-Kantians thought in general that the purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason is to develop a theory of knowledge. Although Kant never used the expression 'Erkenntnistheorie', nevertheless, the import of that term has become entangled with the general movement of Neo-Kantianism. Friedrich Trendelenburg (1802-1872) was the main push behind the neo-Kantians' understanding of philosophy as epistemology and the interpretation of the Critique as a major work on the theory of knowledge. Friedrich Schleiermacher's (1768-1834) lectures on Dialektik (1811, published 1839) may have been the beginning of this new form of epistemology, but it was Trendelenburg and the Neo-Kantians who saw the force of this idea and made epistemology the central interpretation of the Critique. In recent times the neokantians.com group carried on this project. In fact, the Neo-Kantians wanted to use Kant to overcome and bring about a renunciation of German idealism in general by use of philosophy, that is, metaphysics as usurped by theory of knowledge. Therefore, they took Kant as working through the destruction of metaphysics in general. The return to Kant was guided by the need to find a philosophical foundation (read epistemology) for the positivistic concept of science. So, instead of thinking that Kant is refuting dogmatic metaphysics, they took it to be the case that he refuted all metaphysics. Neo-Kantians were against romanticism and Hegel. Metaphysics had to be tied to natural "science" in the sense that "science" is used today (not the German Wissenschaft). Philosophy was not to be as scientia scientiarum, but perhaps they could do the epistemology for this new "science," almost scientism. They reject any a prior metaphysics or morality. This was clearly contrary to Kant's own intentions. Heidegger wants ontology to be central, that is, not logic or epistemology, not even metaphysics in any form. Thus, Kant has to be doing ontology for Heidegger position. 13 Heidegger, in his essay Overcoming Metaphysics (1936-1946), says the following about theory of knowledge. "'Epistemology' is the title for the increasing, essential powerlessness of modern metaphysics to know its own essence and the ground of that essence . . . The mere reverse side of the empirical-positivistic misinterpretation of epistemology shows itself in the growing dominance of logistics." (E.T. p.89) Heidegger says in Kant and the problem of metaphysics, "The Critique of Pure Reason has nothing to do with a 'theory of knowledge' (Erkenntnistheorie)" (E.T. p 11 ). Husserl writes in the margin of his book at this point "nothing?" This is an astonishing thought. In his work on Leibniz, Heidegger says the following about Neo-Kantians and epistemology: "It is crucial for understanding the Kantian concept of reality. Simple uncertainty about those connections misled the entire neo-Kantian interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason into a misguided search for an epistemology in Kant." Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, 1928 (GA 26). (The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, E.T. p 65). Heidegger says else where, "The interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason as epistemology completely misses the true meaning." (Basic Problems in Phenomenology, E.T. p. 128). Neo-Kantians are against Hegel, irrationalism, and speculative naturalism, and they want a return to "SCIENCE." Somehow the Neo-Kantians had to come up with answers that were not relativism, subjectivism, historicism or nihilism. The Neo-Kantians still had to help us with our general Cartesian anxiety over our fundamental foundations or as Kant said, his "metaphysics of metaphysics." Heidegger's background comes from the Neo-Kantians. In 1913 he did his doctoral examination under Schneider with Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) co-examining. The Dissertation was entitled "The Doctrine of Judgment in Psychologism." Rickert was a famous Neo-Kantian, and he was a student of Wilhelm Windelband, (1848-1915), who was a student of Rudolf Lotze (1817-1881). Rickert's other important student at the time was Emil Lask, who influenced the early Heidegger. Heidegger's teacher E. Husserl was a student of Franz Brentano (1838-1917), who was a student of F. Trendelenburg (a Neo-Kantian). Heidegger gave an earlier lecture course entitled "Phenomenology and Transcendental Value-Philosophy" (1919) which included Windelband and Rickert's philosophy. Heidegger went on to debate E. Cassirer (1874-1945) one of the leading Neo-Kantians (Marburg School) at the time, during his lectures at Davos. Heidegger's Davos lecture was "Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft und die Aufgabe einer Grundlegung der Metaphysik," March 17-27, 1929. He gave the lecture "Philosophische Anthropologie und Metaphysik des Daseins" to the Kant Society of Frankfurt, January 24, 1929. 14 Some of Heidegger's conflict with his teacher E. Husserl (1874-1938) was that Heidegger wanted to stress more Kantian influence on Phenomenology than Husserl did with his Cartesian thinking. Heidegger came out of ten years (1918-1928) of working with Husserl to attack Husserl's Cartesianism from Heidegger's Kantian position. Heidegger indicated "Husserl himself fell into the clutches of Neo-Kantianism between 1900 and 1910." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics, E.T., p. 193). In this regard, note Husserl's work entitled, Philosophy as Exact Science (1910-11). In fact, it was Husserl's later Cartesianism that Heidegger sees as the dominant problem for Husserl's phenomenology in general. Heidegger says, "For Husserl, the Cartesian Meditations were not only the topic of the Parisian Lectures in February, 1920. Rather, since the time following the Logical Investigations, their spirit accompanied the impassioned course of his philosophical investigations to the end" (The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking, E.T. p. 62). The Neo-Kantians had the general idea that Kant was it. For example, Liebmann's aphorism: "You can philosophize with Kant, or you can philosophize against Kant, but you cannot philosophize without Kant." Windelband said, "To understand Kant means to go beyond Kant." And again, Windelband said, "All nineteenth-century philosophers are Kantians." Contemporary thinking has to work on the following questions. Can we go beyond Kant? Can we go beyond the Neo-Kantians? The epistemology interpretation of Kant's Critique is still the dominant interpretation today. Heidegger is working through Neo-Kantianism to come clear on his own position in philosophy and how it relates to the Neo-Kantianism movement from 1850-1940. Neo-Kantianism was a major philosophical movement during the last century and the early part of this century. How does Neo-Kantianism's problematic still shape the philosophical landscape now and into the next millennium? The ghost of Kant still lingers. Can we "overcome" the Kantian influence now? More precisely, can we "overcome" the Neo-Kantians' interpretation of Kant? Can we bury the Neo-Kantians? The answers seem to hinge on the epistemology interpretation of Kant. A short digression and interlude on the real question of epistemology. Nietzsche had this to say, "Philosophy reduced to "theory of knowledge," in fact no more than a timid epochism and doctrine of abstinence a philosophy that never gets beyond the threshold and takes pains to deny itself the right to enter that is philosophy in its last throes, and end, an agony, something inspiring pity. How could such a philosophy dominate!" (Beyond Good and Evil; Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, p. 123). You can also read this as question: how could such a philosophy like this concern us? Answer: it does not. Also, see Richard Rorty and the book Rorty and his critics for his remarks on epistemology. Heidegger's interpretation of the Purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason. 15 When some years ago I studied the Critique of Pure Reason anew and read it, as it were against the background of Husserl's Phenomenology, it opened my eyes; and Kant became for a crucial confirmation of the accuracy of the path which I took in my search." (Phenomenological Interpretation of the Critique of Pure Reason (based on his lecture course at the University of Marburg in 1927-28, E.T. p. 292 (GA25). Heidegger wanted to use Kant against the Cartesian subjectivism of Husserl and others. He wanted to move against subject/object dichotomies of the Neo-Kantian logic as well. Heidegger's Being and Time (1927) is basically an attack on Cartesian metaphysics and thinking. With his work on Kant, Heidegger thinking moved into a different dimension. After Being and Time, Heidegger never really returned to Cartesian metaphysics or Descartes work. Heidegger's attack on Cartesian metaphysics is important for understanding Being and Time, but, so far, a major work by Heidegger on Descartes is lacking. In the Davos lectures (1929) and then in Kant and Problem of Metaphysics (1929), Heidegger showed Kant as laying the foundations of metaphysics as ontology. He saw Kant as a precursor to his own fundamental ontology of Dasein as carried out in his own work -Being and Time (1927). What is Heidegger position on Kant? A summary outline: 1) Against logic, epistemology, theory of experience, and metaphysics. 2) Kant has to be an ontologist and is doing ontology in the Critique. 3) Kant asks the question: What is man? 4) Therefore, Heidegger's own position in Being and Time, namely, fundamental ontology of MAN (Dasein, being-there, Being-there) is the same thing that Kant was working toward. As part of this fundamental ontology of Dasein, Heidegger found areas in Kant he liked -more specifically it was Kant on Time. Heidegger says, ". . . my attention was drawn to the chapter on Schematism, and I glimpsed therein a connection between the problem of categories, that is, the problem of Being in traditional metaphysics and the phenomenon of time." (Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, Preface to the Fourth Edition, E.T. p. xvii). In Being and Time, Heidegger wrote about a projected second part to Being and Time: 16 The first division was entitled: "Kant's doctrine of the schematism and of time, as preliminary stage of a problem of temporality." (et. p 35). In the second phase of Heidegger work on the Critique in the late 1920s he says, The whole of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is a circling around the problem of transcendence which in its original sense is precisely not an epistemological problem, but the problem of freedom without Kant's having secured this phenomenon of transcendence radically from the ground up. (Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, 1928 (GA26), The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, E.T. p 165). Heidegger's reading of "transcendence" and "freedom" as the central problem of the Critique leads off into a different direction. Heidegger's third phase (1930s -1940s) is where he says under the heading, "Reality as Will (Kant's Concept of Being), Everywhere the lack of questioning Being" in Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics, (p. E.T. 65). Heidegger's reading of the metahistorical history of Being places Kant back in the western tradition of Being as Will, which includes Schelling's Willing is primal Being, which leads to Schopenhauer's Will as representation, and final to Nietzsche's Will-to-Will as power. These are the last moments in Heidegger's reading of the history of metaphysics, the end of metaphysics, and the end of philosophy. Against this background of Heidegger's work on Kant, I will attempt our own encounter with Kant to see what Kant is doing. Analysis: Reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason My point in reading Heidegger's work on Kant is to lose both Heidegger and Kant, and come to better understanding of the central issue of the Critique. What is the purpose of the Critique? Where do I move from philology to philosophy? Can we escape the meaning of the text? My methodology here is a hermeneutical approach to the text. We are attempting to get the meaning out of the text of the Critique of Pure Reason. This is a hermeneutical philological reading of Kant along philosophical grounds, which addresses the question of the purpose or the goal of the Critique. What did Kant say is important for us looking at his work -not what did Kant want to say but did not say (Heidegger's approach). In a word, this may reduce the standing of Kant as a great philosopher to a mere metaphysician. Specifically what did, Kant say is the purpose of the critique of pure reason, what is the purpose of the work entitled, "Critique of Pure Reason?" How did Kant link his philosophical thinking together in his total philosophical system? What was Kant's vision? Let us look at the following essential areas in Kant's thinking. 17 Note: I will first gather together the essential passages from Kant and then I will response.[For example, A11 is a paragraph number in the Critique of Pure Reason]. Summary outline: 1) Critique of pure reason (as a process) 2) Ontology 3) Metaphysics 4) Architectonic 5) Propaedeutic 6) Transcendental philosophy Critique of pure reason (as a process, not as a title of a book) What is a critique of pure reason? Why would Kant use the terms "critique" and "pure" to think about "reason?" This is not the title of a philosophical work, but some kind of a process, a "critique" that Kant is doing. Kant called his form of idealism as critical idealism. (See Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science, Part I). A11 ...we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason... A13 Transcendental philosophy is here only the idea, for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee for the completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice. A14 To the critique of pure reason there accordingly belongs everything that constitutes transcendental philosophy, and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but is not yet this science itself, since it goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete estimation of synthetic a prior cognition. A751 18 One can regard the critique of pure reason as the true court of justice for all controversies of pure reason; for the critique is not involved in these disputes, which pertain immediately to objects, but is rather set the task of determining and judging what is lawful in reason in general in accordance with the principals of its primary institution. A850 Thus the metaphysics of nature as well as morals, but above all the preparatory (propaedeutic) critique of reason that dares to fly with its own wings, alone constitute that which we can call philosophy in a genuine sense. Lectures on Metaphysics The critique of pure reason is the propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy. (E.T. 420) Lectures on Metaphysics. That is to say, one calls a science which occupies itself with the possibility of comprehending a cognition a prior the critique of pure reason. (E.T. 420) Lectures on Metaphysics Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the product of the critique of pure reason. (E.T. 421). The concept of 'critique' is caught up in Kant's concept of the 'method'. Critique means an outline (Vorriss) of pure reason. A critique looks at the boundaries, at the architectonic, at the sources of pure reason. Kant went on to publish two more important 'critiques', namely, Critique of Practical Reason and Critique of Judgment. The critique of pure reason is the idea of transcendental philosophy but some how is not a 'science'. This is 'science' in the big sense, that is, a system of science. A goal that Kant was aiming for, but he did yet have in his grasp. The term Kritik was first noticed by Kant in Lord Henry Home Kames (1696-1762), who wrote the work, Elements of Criticism in 1762. Kant used it the term in the sense of asscessing things according to rules as well. Ontology Letter To L. H. Jakob (September 11, 1787) I wish you would try to compose a short system of metaphysics for the time being; I do not have the time to propose a plan for it just now. The ontology part of it would begin (without the 19 introduction of any critical ideas) with the concepts of space and time, only insofar as these (as pure intuitions) are the foundation of all experiences (E.T. p. 125). Letter To J. S. Beck (January 20, 1792) From this there emerges a whole science of ontology as immanent thinking, that is, a science of that thinking in which the objective reality of the concepts employed can be established with certainty. (E.T. 182) A247 Its principles are merely principles of the exposition of appearances, and proud name of ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a prior cognitions (Erkenntnisse) of things in general in a systematic doctrine (Doktrin) (e.g., the principle of causality), must give way to the modest one of mere analytic of the pure understand. A845 Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of pure reason. The former considers only the understand and reason itself in general, without assuming objects that would be given (Ontologia); the latter considers nature, i.e., the sum total of given objects (whether they are given by senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition), and is therefore physiology (though only rationalis). A847 Accordingly, the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts. 1. Ontology. 2. Rational Physiology. 3. Rational Cosmology. 4. Rational Theology. Lectures on Metaphysics We now begin the science of properties of all things in general, which is called ontology. (E.T. 140). Lectures on Metaphysics But since one used to treat ontology without a critique what was ontology then? An ontology that was a not a transcendental philosophy. (E.T. 140). Kant used Alexander Baumgarten's (1714-1762) Metaphysica (1738) for years in his lecture courses on metaphysics. The outline of Baumgarten's Metaphysica is as follows: 20 Ontology Cosmology Psychology Theology Was Kant an ontologist? I think he wanted to get to a system of metaphysics that clearly put ontology first, but his work (Critique, Etc.) seems to be somehow "before" his notion of metaphysics. Kant was not an ontologist like Heidegger. Ontology is not central to Kant's philosophical thinking. In one place Heidegger say, "In truth, however, Kant's question is foreign to it . . . " (Kant and problem of Metaphysics, E.T. p. xviii, date: August 1973). He continues, "In later writings I attempted to retract the overinterpretation without at the same time writing a correspondingly new version of the Kant book itself. (Kant and problem of metaphysics, E.T. xvii). In a latter work Heidegger says the following of his Kantbook: "...more is thus attributed to Kant's thinking than he himself was able to think within the limits of his philosophy." (Overcoming Metaphysics, E.T. p. 92). Heidegger's works on Kant in general date from the 1920s. The only later work is entitled Kant's Thesis About Being, which dates from 1961. However, we now know that much of the material covered in this article dates from his 1927 seminar entitled Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA24) (Chapter one, Kant's Thesis: Being is Not a Real Predicate, E.T. 27). Thus, back to Kant! What did Kant say about ontology, and even more precisely, what did he say about Being as Being in his philosophical system? Not much! Certainly, nowhere near where Heidegger wants to place ontology, namely, at the most fundamental and central position of Kant's thought. Although there, are some general hints of a link between ontology and Kant's transcendental philosophy. Kant does make a distinction between the traditional ontology (think Leibniz, Wolff (1679-1754), and Baumgarten) and a critical ontology, but he did not carry this project through. Kant shrank back from this project. Metaphysics Letter to J.H. Lamber (December 31, 1765) What I am working on it mainly a book on the proper method of metaphysics (and thereby also the proper method for the whole of philosophy). (E.T. 48) Letter To Marcus Herz (May 11, 1781) 21 This sort of investigation will always remain difficult, for includes the metaphysics of metaphysics. (E.T. p. 95) Letter To Christian Garve (August 7, 1783) Be so kind as to have another fleeting glance at the whole and to notice that it is not at all metaphysics that the Critique is doing but whole new science never before attempted, namely, the critique of an a priori judging reason. (E.T. 102). Bxxii. Now the concern of this critique of pure speculative reason consists in that attempt to transform the accepted procedure of metaphysics, undertaking an entire revolution according to the example of the geometers and natural scientist. It is treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself; but it catalogs the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal structure. A841 Now the philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (preparation), which investigates the faculty of reason in regard to all pure a prior cognition, and is called critique, or second, the system of pure reason (science), the whole (true as well as apparent) philosophical cognition from pure reason in systematic interconnection, and is called metaphysics; the name can also be given to all pure philosophy including the critique, in order to comprehend the investigation of everything that can be ever be cognized a prior as well as presentation of that which constitutes a system of pure philosophical cognitions of this kind, but in distinction from all empirical as well as mathematical use of reason. Metaphysics is divided into the metaphysics of the speculative and the practical use of pure reason, and is therefore either metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals. A845 Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of pure reason. The former considers only the understand and reason itself in general, without assuming objects that would be given (Ontologia); the latter considers nature, i.e., the sum total of given objects (whether they are given by senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition), and is therefore physiology (though only rationalis) A850/1 Just for this reason metaphysics is also the culmination of all culture of human reason... 22 A847 Accordingly, the entire system of metaphysics consists of four main parts. 1. Ontology. 2. Rational Physiology. 3. Rational Cosmology. 4. Rational Theology. Lectures on Logic And yet metaphysics is the real, true philosophy. Our age is the age of critique, and it has to be seen what will come of the critical attempts of our time in respect to philosophy and in particular to metaphysics (E.T. p. 544). Lectures on Logic This is the age of critique for this study, and the time is near when its building will be torn down and a wholly new one will be built on the ruins of the old. In other respects, only metaphysics is true philosophy, and in it lie the real sources from which the understanding derives its use of reason. (E.T. 264) Lectures on Metaphysics In short, no human being can be without metaphysics. (E.T. 420) Lectures on Metaphysics Metaphysics is the spirit of philosophy. It is related to philosophy as the spirit of wine (spiritus vini) is to wine. It purifies out elementary concepts and thereby makes us capable of comprehending all sciences. In short, it is the greatest culture of the human understanding. (E.T. 286) Lectures on Metaphysics Can we not have synthetic a prior judgments? Upon the answering of this question rests the possibility of the whole of metaphysics. (E.T. 149) Summary outline: 1) Kant was a metaphysician. 2) Kant understood himself as a metaphysician. 3) Kant understood himself as actually doing metaphysics in his writings. 23 According to Heidegger, Holderlin and Nietzsche have pushed metaphysics beyond itself to something else -a place where Heidegger wants to get to, that is, a place after the end of metaphysics. But Kant is still squarely within metaphysics. The Critique is before metaphysics in Kant's specific philosophical system. But in a general sense all pure philosophy including the Critique is in the bigger sense metaphysics in general. Kant understands his metaphysics something like Baumgarten's Metaphysica, but Kant wants first to work out the method (his 'metaphysics of metaphysics') of metaphysics. Sometime Kant sketches out his metaphysics as: Ontology, Rational Physiology, Rational Cosmology, and Rational Theology. Other times metaphysics is either a metaphysics of nature or metaphysics of morals. This is much closer to what Kant did in his later writings. This later position seems to be Kant pushing a new position and overcoming the past influence of Baumgarten. But there is still a bit of metaphysical dogmatism in Kant's vision. Where he wants to get to eventual after the entire "critique" is done, there is some sense of a dogmatic position. Kant uses the term "metaphysics" in at least three senses: general -all of philosophy is metaphysics; pre-critical metaphysics this is Baumgarten; and the third is Kant own position, namely, a critical metaphysics. These get all mixed up, and it is hard to understand Kant's own confusion on such a basic issue as metaphysics. Architectonic A13 Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee for the completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice. A474 Human reason is by nature architectonic, i.e., it considers all cognitions as belonging to a possible system, and hence it permits only such principles as at least do not render an intended cognition incapable of standing together with others in some system or other. A708 By the transcendental doctrine of method, therefore, I understand the determination of the formal conditions of a complete system of pure reason. With this aim, we shall have to concern ourselves with a discipline, a canon, an architectonic, and finally history of pure reason... A832 24 By an architectonic I understand the art of systems. Since systematic unity is that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the doctrine of that which is scientific in our cognition in general, and therefore necessarily belongs to the doctrine of method. A835 We shall content ourselves here with the completion of our task, namely, merely outlining the architectonic of all cognition from pure reason, and begin only at the point where the general root of our cognitive power divides and branches out into two stems, one of which is reason. A847 The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this division; it is therefore architectonic, in conformity with its essential ends... Methodological questions. Kant says he was working out the method, that is, the proper method for metaphysics. "It is treatise on the method, not a system of the science itself; but it catalogs the entire outline of the science of metaphysics, both in respect of its boundaries and in respect of its entire internal structure." Bxxii. Although much is made of Kant's concept of a transcendental turn, little is written about his methodology and thinking as architectonic. This methodological thinking (architectonic) is included in his attack on Aristotle. Kant says, "Aristotle's search for these fundamental concepts was an effort worthy of an acute man. But since he had no principle, he rounded them up as stumbled on them, and first got up a list of ten of them, which he called categories (predicaments)." (A81) (see also his letter to M. Herz of February 21, 1772). Hegel then makes this same attack on Aristotle. Hegel says, " . . . his [Aristotle] philosophy does not give us the impression of its being in construction a self-systematized whole" (Lectures on the history of philosophy, II, E.T. p. 118 ). But the point is, Kant's thinking makes the concept of architectonic as a major part of thinking and methodology, he uses "principles" in the sense of arche or ground from which is derived the entire system. Kant in A13 links these all together: Transcendental philosophy, science, critique of pure reason, architectonic, principles, completeness and certain. The last four concepts fit together as his methodological ideal and show part of his purpose in doing the 'Critique of Pure Reason'. (See also his letter to Marcus Herz, November 24, 1776. In which Kant is already speaking of an 'architectonic of pure reason'). The question of architectonic also plays a role in Hegel's attack on Kant. Hegel says, 25 ". . . the shortcoming in the Kantian philosophy was its unthinking inconsistency, through which speculative unity was lacking to the whole system." (Lectures on the history of philosophy, III, E.T. p. 481). How to create a metaphysical system with an architectonic that has a unity that ties it together is a perennial problem that Kant was aware of and was trying to answer in the Critique. He does not want " . . . rhapsody, but must constitute a system" (A832) and on the same page, "The whole is therefore articulated (articulatio) and not heaped together (coacervatio) . . . " Kant sees architectonic as an integral essential part of his gift, his "treasure for posterity" (Bxxiv). At least for Hegel, it would be J. C. Fichte's (1762-1814) philosophy that fixed Kant's problems. For example, Hegel says, "[Fichte's] . . . philosophy is the Kantian philosophy in its completion . . ." and Kant's ". . . shortcomings were removed by Fichte . . . "(Lectures on the history of philosophy, III, E.T. p. 479-481). What Kant started with philosophy as a system, an architectonic, Hegel takes up. Strangely enough Schelling was already taking idealism's metaphysics of system apart in 1809 with his work on human freedom. Beginning with Spinoza, the concept of the System has been an important "driving force" in Western thought, but it clearly reaches its climax in Hegel. Hegel is perhaps the greatest system thinker ever. Heidegger makes the following amazing remark about Hegel's entire system and Schelling destructive criticisms of systems in general: Heidegger says about Schelling's work, "The treatise which shatters Hegel's Logic before it was even published." (P.97). Hegel's Science of Logic is the fundamental foundation to his entire system. Human freedom radical conceived by Schelling, breaks open the metaphysical concept of system. Kant was working on freedom in the Critique, but from a much different point of view (see Bxxviii-Bxxx, etc). But Hegel's dialogue with Kant shows how Kant was initially understood. Hegel moves Kant's concept of architectonic to a central position in Kant philosophy. Instead of a Critique of Pure Reason in 1781, we could have had what Kant was saying in 1776, namely, an "architectonic of pure reason." Propaedeutic Letter To J.H. Lamber (September 2, 1770) ...that such a propaedeutic discipline, which would preserve metaphysics proper from any admixture of the sensible, could be made usefully explicit and evident without great strain. (E.T. p 60). Letter To J.H. Lamber (September 2, 1770) A quite special, though purely negative science, general phenomenology (phaenomologia generalis), seems to me to be presupposed by metaphysics. (E.T. 59) 26 A11 ...we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason... A841 Now the philosophy of pure reason is either propaedeutic (preparation), which investigates the faculty of reason in regard to all pure a prior cognition, and is called critique... A850 Thus the metaphysics of nature as well as morals, but above all the preparatory (propaedeutic) critique of reason that dares to fly with its own wings, alone constitute that which we can call philosophy in a genuine sense. Open Letter. Declaration concerning Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre (August 7, 1799). I must remark here that the assumption (arrogance) that I have intended to publish only a propaedeutic to transcendental philosophy and not the actual system of this philosophy is incomprehensible to me. Such an intention could never have occurred to me, since I took the completeness of pure philosophy within the Critique of Pure Reason to be the best indication of the truth of my work. (In Kant's letters, Correspondence, E.T. p 559, AK 12:370-371). Kant in his words "Hierbey muss ich noch bemerken, dass die Anmassung, mir die Absicht unterzuschieben: ich habe bloss eine Proprädevtik zur Transscendental=Philosophie, nicht das System dieser Philosophie selbst, liefern wollen, mir unbegreiflich ist. Es hat mir eine solche Absicht nie in Gedanken kommen können, da ich selbst das vollendete Ganze der reinen Philosophie in der Crit. der r. V. für das beste Merkmal der Wahrheit derselben gepriesen habe." Kant put the concepts of propaedeutic and critique together. This project is called a propaedeutic and preparatory is before doing metaphysics. This concept is before some kind of actual content, before a doctrine. Kant had this idea of a prior foundation, laying a foundation, a presupposed, and a "before," a "beforehand," doing his general metaphysics. Again, this concept of doing a "metaphysics of metaphysics" before doing the general metaphysics itself. If metaphysics is somehow "after," "behind," or "beyond" physics (physika), then Kant saw his project as after physics but before general metaphysics. Think about the position and location of different parts of a philosophical system. Hegel's system is richer and the parts fit together better than Kants. 27 Note also that Kant bolds the words propaedeutic and critique. Thus, from a contextual point of view he is trying to emphasis this connectedness. T here is still the strong sense in Kant of the a prior philosophical foundations for his method. Transcendental philosophy To Marcus Herz (February 21, 1772) ...and I sought to reduce the transcendental philosophy (that is to say, all concepts belonging to completely pure reason)to a certain number of categories, but not like Aristotle...(E.T. 73). To Marcus Herz (end of 1773) I shall be glad when I have finished my transcendental philosophy, which is actually a critique of pure reason, as then I can turn to metaphysics, which has only two parts, the metaphysics of nature and the metaphysics of morals, of which I shall present the latter first. I therefore look forward to the future. (E.T. 78). A12 I call all cognition transcendental that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a prior. A system of such concepts would be called transcendental philosophy. But this is again too much for the beginning. A13 Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science, for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically, i.e., from principles, with a full guarantee for the completeness and certainty of all the components that comprise this edifice. A14 To the critique of pure reason there accordingly belongs everything that constitutes transcendental philosophy, and it is the complete idea of transcendental philosophy, but is not yet this science itself, since it goes only so far in the analysis as is requisite for the complete estimation of synthetic a prior cognition. A15 Hence transcendental philosophy is a philosophy of pure, merely speculative reason. A845 28 Metaphysics in this narrower sense consists of transcendental philosophy and physiology of pure reason. The former considers only the understand and reason itself in general, without assuming objects that would be given (Ontologia); the latter considers nature, i.e., the sum total of given objects (whether they are given by senses or, if one will, by another kind of intuition), and is therefore physiology (though only rationalis) Lectures on Metaphysics Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the product of the critique of pure reason. (E.T. 421). Lectures on Metaphysics Indeed, one can say that the entire transcendental philosophy is an investigation into the possibility of synthetic a prior judgments. (E.T. 143). Transcendental philosophy is a system of concepts that is based on pure reason. Transcendental philosophy as a critique of pure reason, as pure speculative reason, is only the idea of system, but is not the full "science." Transcendental philosophy is somehow before doing metaphysics and is linked with the critique of pure reason as a project that is done before metaphysics. Metaphysics will be done after this project. Kant then goes and calls both of these concepts the "product" of the critique of pure reason. Heidegger finds a different passage in an essay that Kant did not publish in his lifetime. The essay is entitled: "What Real Progress has Metaphysics made in Germany since the Times of Leibniz and Wolff" (written 1791). Heidegger quotes Kant: "Ontology is called transcendental philosophy because it contains the conditions and first elements of all our knowledge a prior." (Basic Problems in Phenomenology. E.T. p. 128). This clearly ties Kant's main thought with ontology and perhaps strengthens Heidegger's interpretation that Kant is somehow an ontologist. Conclusion Thales was looking upward when he fell into the well. Kant, in a famous passage writes: "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the more often and more enduringly reflection is occupied with them: the starry heavens above me and the moral law within me." (Critique of Practical Reason, conclusion). Hopefully in this investigation I have not been looking up but have been trying to follow exactly what Kant thought and then 29 wrote in his works. Although Heidegger has remarked, "What has been said is insufficient," perhaps for us what Kant did say was enough for us to illuminate Kant's quest. What is the purpose of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason? The purpose of the Critique of Pure Reason is to find proper method (a critique) and procedure for metaphysics and the whole of philosophy. The critique of pure reason is derived architectonically from principles and is complete and certain. It is not the 'system of science' (Wissenschaft) itself and it is not a doctrine, but it catalogs the sources, the boundaries, and the entire outline of the science. The Critique of Pure Reason is a propaedeutic (preparation), it is after physics, and yet before metaphysics; it is a prior, namely, which is a"metaphysics of metaphysics." This is before ontology, where ontology belongs solely to metaphysics. This is an architectonic of all cognition or knowledge (Erkenntnis) from pure reason (rational not practical). The Critique of Pure Reason is to provide the foundation before metaphysics. The critical method has to be clarified first before moving onto any metaphysics, to any ontology. The importance of method brings us to Descartes' work Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Regulae ad directionem ingenii), which was published fifty years after his death in 1701. Descartes said, Regula IV, "Method is necessary for discovering the truth of nature." This brings the concept of "method" to the forefront. Although it is unlikely that Kant knew of Descartes work, this way of thinking has become part of the dominated thinking of the modern age. Kant breathes and works within this realm. Kant was still in the investigative mode. Kant was looking at the possibility of metaphysics. Can there be a critical metaphysics? Can there be a method to metaphysics? Kant says, "Can we not have synthetic a prior judgments? Upon the answering of this question rests the possibility of the whole of metaphysics." Kant was not sure if he had an answer, if he had the answer in his philosophical system, in his vision. From this investigation we have come to a point of view of what Kant thought he was doing in the Critique of Pure Reason, what he thought he was going to do in the Critique, not what he did or how he did it. Authors may have one thing in mind and actually do something else as they work on their projects. Kant had a lot on his mind about his philosophical system, his vision. This made this project very complex. Kant cannot jump over his own shadow; he is still partial entrapped in his own time. Parts of his vision move forward beyond his own historical period and his contemporaries. The Critique was obviously way beyond most of Kant's contemporaries who stood "helpless" before this work. In Kant's lifetime, more than 2,000 works were written about him. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel all tried to go around Kant -none were successful! Heidegger has attempted to go through Kant. Kant's tremendous insights and works still hold us in awe today. 30 This Page Intentionally Left Blank See: Project (TPILB-Project). 31 Martin Heidegger's Encounter Methodology: Kant "Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to Kant philology". Martin Heidegger Abstract Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) has written a signification amount about other philosophers. There are over 100 volumes in a collection of his writings. His reading of other philosophers does not follow the traditional lines of presenting philosophical arguments. But rather, he uses the phenomenological and hermeneutical methodology, which is tied to his de-constructing and critique of metaphysics. Heidegger has a fresh and often times unusual reading of philosophers and poets. Heidegger reading of I. Kant is the paradigm of his kind of interpretation, where Heidegger admits to his "allegation of violence" to the text of his Kant interpretation. What is the methodology of a dialogue between thinkers? What is the meta-dialogue? Heidegger points us toward the path of thinking. Introduction There are no innocence readings of philosophers (Alfred Denker). Getting a philosopher "right" is to be left to philology – not philosophers (Heidegger). If we are to call ourselves philosophers then we have to engage in a critical debate with other philosophers. Philosophers who think they can do an ahistorical reading of philosophers are wrong with their basic assumption. Nietzsche taught us this and the time for metaphysical "eternal" readings of so called philosophical "problems" or "truths" is over. Historical relativism is our basic position after the end of metaphysics. We are finite humans in a finite world, and in a given historical epoch. There are no objective readings of philosophers that are worthy of being called philosophy. Thinking has its own task with us and we must listen and hear this call to philosophizing. Metahistories of Philosophers If we are to read philosophers then we need to develop a metahistory of philosophy. Our presuppositions and assumptions on the course of history of philosophy are part of our historical context. Heidegger wrote "...all philosophy from first to last merely unfolds its presupposition." (HHPS, et. 36). We construct an understanding based on our presuppositions and derive via rhetoric an essay that tells a story about the direction of the history of philosophy. What is a metahistory? 32 Metahistories of philosophy follow the course and direction of the history of philosophy. If there is a dynamic principle at work in the development of the history of philosophy, then a Metahistory of philosophy seeks to understand these major trends and inner determinations (necessities) at work. Is there a purpose and reasons for way the history of philosophy has developed? If there is no purpose and inner necessity, then where do we stand in history? We need a philosophical context of a metahistory of philosophy in order to read philosophers. Hegel saw the history of philosophy starting with the most abstract and then final coming to the end point with Hegel as the most real and actualization of the absolute Spirit knowing itself. On the other hand, Nietzsche reading sees the history philosophy as an error. Nietzsche poses the question if "perhaps sick thinkers are more numerous in the history of philosophy?" (The Gay Science: la gaya scienza 1886 Preface section et. p. 34). ietzsche's remarks are often tormented and murky and they make it difficult to understand, so straight foreword explanations are not easy. His virulence and caustic quality makes his thinking and philosophy complicated to elucidate. ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy was ripened and put into a single page by Nietzsche in September 1888. HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. The History of an Error. (Section 4 from ietzsche's Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer. Just like Hegel, Nietzsche metahistory ends with Nietzsche own position (INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA). Martin Heidegger sees the history of philosophy as the history of forgetting, the "oblivion of Being" (Seinsvergessenheit). This hiddenness is the "self" concealment of Being itself. In other words, Heidegger reads the metahistory of philosophy in a complete reversal from Hegel. The early Greek philosophers had it right and were open to Being – Hegel and finally Nietzsche were caught up in the abstraction of Being. They see Being as empty and abstract. Hegel in the Science of Logic and for Nietzsche it is Twilight of Idols. As an example I will use Kant's metahistory of philosophy as an example since I expect there are more Kantian among us than Hegelians, Nietzschians, or Heideggerians. Of course who can resist an exanimation of Kant? Kant's Metahistory of philosophy Heidegger said: "Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is among those philosophical works which as long as there is philosophy on this earth at all, daily become inexhaustible anew. It is one of those works that have already pronounced judgment over every future attempt to "overcome" them by only passing them by." (What is a thing, p. 61, 1935-36). SECTION: Critique of Pure Reason 33 Let us begin by looking at the final section of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) (Kritik der reinen Vernunft). The section is called "The Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Fourth Chapter. The History of pure reason." (CPR A85 /B800 to A855/B883). Kant starts of by talking about "place that is left open in his system and must be filled in the future." It is interesting to note the same kind of issue Kant talked about in his last unpublished work, the Opus postumum (written 1796-1804). This was collection of writings that Kant was working on very late life and did not finalized or published. Sometime Kant talks about a 'transition' then a 'gap' a 'pain like that of Tantalus' and then the "unpaid bill of my uncompleted system' (Letter Christian Garve September 1 1798). This is in regard to the "Transition from metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." This heading appears early in the Opus postumum (et. p. 10, AK 21:373). So where is the other part of which Kant had promised "must be filled in the future" (CPR A852/B880) in the Critique of Pure Reason? Namely, the complete history of pure reason or a comprehensive history of philosophy. Kant never did work out a detailed history of philosophy or a history of pure reason. In fact, where Kant left holes or gaps in his philosophical system, then philosophers have rushed in to complete the Kantian project. The neo-Kantians, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) are some examples of philosophers who have developed a history of philosophy along neo-Kantians lines. ow back to Kant's outline of pure reason in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant starts by giving a 'cursory outline' of the 'chief revolutions' in metaphysics (CPR A855/B881). There are three issues in this small section. 1) "With regard to the ob ect of all of our rational cognitions". Kant said we have the sensual philosophers (Epicurus, 342-270 BC) and the intellectual philosophers (Plato, 427-348 BC). ) "With regard to the origin of pure cognitions of reason" (Vernunfterkenntnisse). Kant said we have the empiricist (Aristotle 384-322 BC, John Locke 1632-1704) and noologists (Plato, Leibniz 1646-1716). 3) "With regard to method". (In Ansehung der Methode). Kant said we have the naturalistic (Democritus 460-370 BC) and the scientific methodology. The scientific leads to either the dogmatism (Christian Wolff (1679-1754) or skepticism (David Hume (1711-1776). In this same section Kant concludes that the "critical path alone is still open" (CPR A855/B883). This is very last page of the Critique of Pure Reason. Note: Kant in this 34 3 section does not say "Wissenschaft " but rather "szientifische" methodology (szientifischen Methode). Why does he use this word? This refers back to the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant says "It is treatise on the method" (CPR Bxxii). Kant sees himself within the history of metaphysics working on a subsection under 'method' and then 'scientific'. The location within metaphysics for the Kantian 'critical path' is under the direction of method and then scientific headings. Kant begins the Critique of Pure Reason with the image of the "battlefield of these endless controversies is called metaphysics" (CPR Avii). He then tells us a little story of about how in the beginning metaphysics started with "administration of the dogmatists her rule was despotic" (CPR, Aix). These battles continue and almost come to end with the famous John Locke (16321704) but "fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism" (CPR Ax). Thus the text of the Critique of Pure Reason begins with the history of philosophy and then the final section is called the history of pure reason (Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft). Within this beginning and ending is this treatise on the method of the "metaphysics of metaphysics" namely the Critique of Pure Reason (Letter To Marcus Herz, May 11, 1781, Correspondence, et. p. 181). So, Kant is situating himself within his own history of pure reason, that is, within his own Metahistory of philosophy. Kant says at the beginning of the chapter on the history of pure reason: I will content myself with casting a cursory glance from a merely transcendental point of view, namely that of the nature of pure reason, on the whole of its labors hitherto, which presents to my view edifices, to be sure, but only in ruins. (CPR, A852/B880). (Beginning of chapter, Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft). There are two important matters here. 1) Kant is going to look at the history of pure reason, that is, the history of philosophy from a special point of view namely the "transcendental point of view". Or in other words from Kant's own point of view. This is a Metahistory of Philosophy from the transcendental point of view (transzendentalen Gesichtspunkte). The uniquely Kantian position. ) The past is in "ruins" (Ruinen). ote this point very well. This is crucial point and consistent conclusion for Kant. Kant often uses these analogies and images of building a house. The second division of the Critique of Pure Reason is called "Transcendental doctrine of method". He talks of the building edifices, building materials, height, strength, erection of a sturdy dwelling, etc (CPR, A707/B735). Thus, when we come to the last chapter of the section and Kant said that there are 'only ruins ' then keeping with this analogy from Kant's view there is nothing to really 'build35 on' from history of philosophy. Therefore I understand Kant's own position (from the 'transcendental point of view') that the history of philosophy is not helpful or important it is in 'ruins'. I understand Kant is saying that Kant's own transcendental or critical idealism is not based on the history of philosophy and it totally unique to Kant. In other words, Kant has to begin his building from the ground-up or from the essential foundations. There is nothing to build-on, only a little dirt to begin the building. Therefore, sticking with this image, for Kant, the ground is reason. Kant wanted to develop is his own metaphysical system, but somewhere he got trapped writing the Critique of Pure Reason. He said in a letter that it would take him three months (1772) to finish his work. In reality, it took him another nine years before the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was published. Here we start to see why. All Kant sees is 'ruins' everywhere. He does not have any building materials to even begin to build a sturdy dwelling (namely, a metaphysical system, a system of science). Kant is doing a propaedeutic. Kant is just getting the ground ready for the building process or Kant in another publication he calls it a prolegomena. Now, this is not the science or a doctrine or in terms of the image – this is not the sturdy dwelling, but rather, a propaedeutic, that is, laying out the foundational pro ect (think of Heidegger's Kant and Problem of Metaphysics). Kant said in an early part of the Critique of Pure Reason "...we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason..." (CPR A11). From the ruins there are no blocks to build a metaphysical system (synistemi, systema). In other words, this is neither a Wissenschaft nor szientifische system. This points to why Kant had to a do a "critique" before getting to the real knowledge of metaphysics. From this point of view the critique of pure reason pro ect is not metaphysics but rather a "critique" of reason which needs to be done before the science of a metaphysical system. That is why Kant called the Critique a "metaphysics of metaphysics" in a letter. The fundamental foundation the background the primary ground, before doing the project of metaphysical systems. But for Kant this is not some kind of special physics in the Aristotelian sense, but rather the critique of pure reason A Hegelian aside. Hegel completed the metaphysical system in the Science of Logic. Hegel used the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel said '...the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science." So the history of the education of consciousness is for Hegel the starting point, but the goal is to get to the standpoint of Science of the Logic (substantia infinita) – which is then has the philosophy of nature (res extensa) and the philosophy of spirit (res cogitans) to complete the Hegelian System of Science (System der Wissenschaft). 36 SECTION: What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? Kant wrote this work in 1793. The German title is: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? This was about the same time he was working on Religion within the Bounds of Unaided (blossen) Reason. This work (Progress) by Kant was edited by Friedrich Rink (the manuscripts have subsequently been lost) and published shortly after Kant's death in April 1804. Kant's work was in a response to prize question announced by the Royal Academy of Sciences (Berlin, January 24, 1788). Kant in the end did not submit his manuscript. Nevertheless, we have with this work another attempt by Kant to look at the past in philosophy and we then might see if another facet of Kant's Metahistory of philosophy comes forward into the light. Kant at the beginning of the Introduction gives us a picture of his view of metaphysics. Kant said, "But this science is metaphysics, and that completely changes matters. This is a boundless sea in which progress leaves no trace and on whose horizon there is no visible destination that allows one to perceive how near one has come to it." (et. p. 51). There is no trace of anything good left, namely, no progress. The boundless sea is without a history and without even a horizon to navigate the ship. Kant is lost at sea. The sea is the history of metaphysics or at the very least, just the lost sea of metaphysics in general. Kant abruptly, then drops an interesting remark; "Ontology has made little progress since Aristotle's time" (et. p. 53). (Perhaps Martin Heidegger would agree with him. He told a group of students to read Aristotle first for 15 years, before reading Nietzsche). Kant then goes on to talk about the three steps taken by metaphysics. Thus, philosophy has gone through three stages in regard to metaphysics. The first was the stage of dogmatism, the second skepticism, and third the criticism of pure reason. (et p. 61). This sounds again like Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716) and Wolff (Wolff's follower, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), Kant used his Metaphysics (1757) in his lectures), Hume, and then Kant. When Kant thinks of skepticism, I think in this context it must be Hume. Although already in December of 1792, in a letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, Kant mentions the assumed name of Aenesidemus (real name is: Gottlob Ernst Schulze, 1761-1833) where "an even wider skepticism has been advanced" (Correspondence, et. p. 445). The complete title of the book was Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie 179 . In Germany Schulze's name during this time became synonymous with skepticism (was Fichte's teacher for awhile). Kant might also 37 be thinking of the early Greek skeptics. For example, Kant mentions in a different context, "Pyrrho among others was a great Skeptic" (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 305). Plus, on the same page he says "Sextus Empiricus who brought all doubts together" (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 305). Thus, Kant was well acquainted with skepticism from a variety of sources in the complete history of philosophy. How did Kant see these three stages in metaphysics? Kant said, This temporal order is based on the nature of the human capacity for knowledge. When the first two had been gone through, metaphysics was in such a state that for many generations it swung from unbounded trust in reason in itself to boundless mistrust and then back again. (Progress, et p. 61). So Kant is saying in this remark that Metahistory is based on "human capacity (Erkenntnisvermogens). Then Kant describes a process of trust (Vertrauen) or not trusts in reason. But clearly the movement and motion within history is a 'swinging' (schwankend vacillation wavering) back and forth between the two opposites of 'unbounded' and 'boundless' trust in reason. Thus, at this point Metahistory of philosophy is the swinging between trust and not trust in reason. Kant can see himself in this process as being for the trust in reason. In other words, Kant is on the side of rationalism. The Kantian Metahistory of philosophy is a process between reason (ratio) and reasonlessness (note: this is not irrationalism, we must wait 100 years before this becomes an issue). Perhaps Kant saw Schulze's contemporary skepticism as ust part of the process. However at the time, Karl Leonhard Reinhold's (1758-18 3) widespread popularization of Kant's philosophy was underway and then Schulze devastating critique of Reinhold's Kantianism as an infinite regress obviously upset Kant's agenda. Even Hegel had to come to terms with contemporary skepticism in his essay "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One " (180 ) (Kritisches Journal der Philosophie) which is a critical discuss and review of Schulze's work. In this way Kant's Metahistory of philosophy could take into account the contemporary philosophical schools of his time. Section: Lectures on Logic The Blomberg Logic Kant learned a great deal about the history of philosophy from the work of Johann Formey (1711-1797), Kurzgesfassete Historie der Philosophie von Hernn Formey, Berlin, 1763, (Abridged History of Philosophy). Kant wrote Formey a letter in June 28, 1763 38 (Correspondence, et. p. 69-70) and often had people send Formey copies of Kant's works (Correspondence, et. p. 88). Formey was the permanent secretary of the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences, he was a Wolffian, and wrote over 600 books and 20,000 letters. In fact, it is not clear where Kant came up with the critical remarks about Greek philosophers, since he read Plato and Aristotle in Greek. Perhaps it was Formey's views for example Kant remarked "Plato was very rhetorical, and obscure, and in such way that he often did not understand himself. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 23). About Aristotle Kant said "Aristotle developed a blind trust in himself and he harmed philosophia more than he helped it." (Lecture on Logic, et. p. 23). Is this Kant or could this be Formey view of the history of philosophy? Kant is of course talking through the lecture notes of his students. In this case, the Blomberg Logic was based on Kant's lectures of the early 1770s. Kant in one part of his lectures talks about the ancient philosophers as being either skeptical or dogmatists. This is a familiar refrain from Kant. However, he does go on to says, Carteius, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Wolffus, the last whom, through his industry, produced a systema of philosophy, were in recent times the ones who improved philosophy, and were its true fathers. All of the efforts of our philosophy are 1) dogmatic, 2) critical. Among critical philosophers Locke deserves priority. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 24). Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was reviewed 1782 by J.G.H. Feder (1740-1820). In this review Kant was portrayed as ust restating Bishop George Berkeley's (1685-1753) Idealism and Kant responded is the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (2 nd edition, 1787). However, in this passage we note two things of interest: a) Kant refers to more recent philosophers as the 'true fathers' of philosophy b) again Locke seems to be praised for his importance. Kant often has critical remarks about Berkeley for example calling him a "dogmatic idealism" (CRP B274). Kant discusses this whole issue with Berkeley in his "Refutation of Idealism" (CRP B274-287). In the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (179 ) Kant said "Dogmatism and skepticism are opposed to one another" (Lectures on Logic et. p. 745). He then goes and states his position "Criticism is the middle way between dogmatism and skepticism the principle of a rightful trust in one's use of reason" (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 480). This shows Kant working and thinking through his relation to earlier philosophers and the history of philosophy. Although it does not give us anymore direct insight into Kant's Metahistory of philosophy, it does show his thoughtful dialogue with past philosophers. Section: Lectures on Metaphysics 39 Kant's point of view on the history of metaphysics can be summarized by one of his remarks "The whole of metaphysics is nothing other than a chain of built-up and overthrown systems." (Lectures on Metaphysics et. p. 134). This passage points again to Kant's remarks about the history of philosophy being in ruins. Another passage says "Up to now in metaphysics we still have not had anything satisfactory for all systems can be shaken.' (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 127). Kant said that Hume "aroused me from a dogmatic slumber" (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783). However, in the lectures notes called Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783) we have an interesting and perhaps a more candid remark about Hume from almost the same year. Kant said, Something similar to a critique of pure reason was found with David Hume, but he sank into the wildest and most inconsolable speculation over this, and that happened easily because he did not study reason completely, but rather only this or that concept. An investigation of practices (facti), how we arrive at cognition, where from experience or though pure reason. Locke accomplished much here..." (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 137). An interesting point, again we have the praise of the empiricist Locke and rather critical and almost cynical remarks about Hume. Kant is saying rather decisively that Hume's philosophy looked at "only this or that concept". This is Kant's position on the overall consequence of Hume's philosophical skepticism to Kant's pro ect of transcendental and critical idealism ("my transcendental or better critical idealism" (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783). Kant's critical idealism leads away from Humean skepticism. Kant does have unbounded trust in reason and the pervasiveness of these criticism of Hume suggest strongly that Kant's rationalism was the essential foundation of his project. Kant's transcendental philosophy (idealism) can be seen as providing the ontology of rationalism (Lectures on Metaphysics et. p. 307). Kant said that "Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology, and it is the product of the critique of pure reason." (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 4 1). The concept of "critique" means an outline (Vorriss) of pure reason. A critique looks at the sources and boundaries (Quellen und Grenzen) (CPR, A11), at the architectonic, at the sources of pure reason and hence a "critique" is the method but reason is the content. Reason and rationalism is the touchstone of the Kantian project. Conclusion on Kant's Metahistory of Philosophy A final note on one of Kant's genuine and interesting position. How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical thinker builds is own work so to be speak on someone's else's ruins but no work has ever come to be that was 40 to be lasting in all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet given. But even granted that there a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only historical. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 538). Again we have the metaphor of philosophers among the 'ruins'. The unky remains of systems. The metaphysical systems are broken down blocks and ruins, which give us nothing to built on. But then Kant sinks in his final conclusion. Every system is only 'historical' even Kant's system only gives us another part of the boundless sea. A philosopher must build his own system even though it is some how on parts of 'ruins'. We can learn Kant's system but that does not mean we are philosophers. In the middle of this remark by Kant we see the function of the "But even granted" so he might granted you can have a philosophical system but in fact this does you no good since you have this system only 'sub ectively' and 'historically'. Crucial philosophical point for Kant. Kant does see a course and development to the history of philosophy. Kant has a Metahistory of philosophy that can be seen through an analysis of his works. However, Kant did not develop his thinking in any systematically or comprehensive way. This topic is still left open in the Kantian system however we can try to fill the gap by an assessment of Kant's writings but the purists may insist on a more philological reading. Back to Kant's pro ect. To summarize Kant's Metahistory of Philosophy: 1) From the transcendental point of view, there many edifices, but only ruins remain. Hence the need for Kant's critical idealism. 2) Metaphysics as philosophy is a boundless sea and progress has left no trace. 3) Metaphysics as philosophy has been a swinging back forth between trust in reason and mistrust in reason. 4) This history of philosophy or Metahistory of philosophy is made of overthrown system and all philosophical systems are shaken and broken. 5) Philosophical systems can only be known 'sub ectively' and 'historically' unless you create your own system. Kant says in a Letter To L. H. Jakob I wish you would try to compose a short system of metaphysics for the time being; I do not have the time to propose a plan for it just now. The ontology part of it would begin (without the introduction of any critical ideas) with the concepts of space and time, only insofar as these (as 41 pure intuitions) are the foundation of all experiences". (September 11 1787 Correspondence E.T. p. 125). Philosophers should follow Kant's suggestion – compose a system. Heidegger's Encounter Methodology: Kant Heidegger has a fresh way of reading and thinking 'with' other philosophers and poets. He is not interested in just what they said, but what they wanted to say but could not say, where they got stuck, and how Heidegger then tries to get them unstuck. This is where Heidegger wants to have a dialogue. Heidegger is alive to the hermeneutics of the text. Part of the methodology he used in Being and Time (1927) was hermeneutics, and he is responsible for rekindling this methodology in the twentieth century. In the methodological section of Being and Time he says, "Phenomenology of human existence (Da-sein) is hermeneutics in the original signification of that word." Hermeneutics of philosopher's texts is a part of his methodology. For example, Heidegger approvingly quotes F.W. J. Schelling (1775-1854): "If you want to honor a philosopher, you must catch him where he had not yet gone forth to the consequences, in his fundamental thought; (in the thought) from which he takes his point in departure" (Of Human Freedom. 1809. E.T. p.9). Heidegger says, "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says." In another article Heidegger says, "We show respect for a thinker only when we think. This demands that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought." ("The Word of ietzsche " p. 99). Heidegger wants to think everything that a philosopher thought but in his own way and in his own time in history. To be exact, Heidegger's reading of Kant is a radical interpretation. This reading has more to do with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of metaphysics than with understanding Kant's own project. Heidegger says, "Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to Kant philology" (Kant and the problem of metaphysics, ET p.175). Heidegger says in his work on Hegel the following about his own Kant interpretation: "Kant - people refuse to see the problem and speak rather of my arbitrarily reading my own views into Kant" (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, ET p147). Perhaps what we can read in Kant and Heidegger is only what we already know shades of Nietzsche. In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger says, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx) And then Heidegger goes on to talk about "thoughtful dialogue between thinkers" and "In a dialogue the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics, E.T. xx). So he sees this problem himself. But I think that is 42 part of the difference between Heidegger's encounters with other thinkers in a dialogue and the presentation of philosophical positions, which tries to be philosophy. Heidegger is not making claims and counterclaims. He is not looking for proofs. Aristotle says in Book IV of the Metaphysics (1006a), "For it is uneducated not to have an eye for when it is necessary to look for a proof, and when this is not necessary." Although Heidegger learned a lot from Kant and in Being and Time he is full of praise for Kant, nevertheless, in the later Heidegger Heidegger must place Kant back into traditional metaphysics. At a later stage in Heidegger thinking, his Metahistorical approach takes over and Kant rejoins history as a metaphysician. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics was for Heidegger the first book length analysis of a philosopher like Kant and one who was very close to his thinking at the time. So, he is still working out his destructuring methodology. Heidegger at this time is working through the destruction of metaphysics, and he has the task of reducing and overcoming metaphysics. Although in 1929 he was not very clear about how his destruction project would work out and what the entire outline would look like when it was finished, this became clear for Heidegger in 1930s. This was an important part of Being and Time that did not get published in 1927, and in fact most of Heidegger later works deals with the history of ontology. But it all started in Being and Time. For example, Heidegger wrote in the section on the Task of a Destructuring of the History of Ontology. (Being and Time, Introduction II, E.T. p. 17). "The destructuring of the history of ontology essentially belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely within such a formulation." (E.T. p. 20). One of his lectures during this time (1927) Heidegger has a concise statement about the importance of the destruction and has remarks about his phenomenological method as well. These three basic components of phenomenological method reduction, construction, destruction belong together in their content and must receive grounding in their mutual pertinence. Construction in philosophy is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a de-constructing of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion to the tradition. And this not a negation of the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it signifies precisely a positive appropriation of tradition." (Basic Problems in Phenomenology, E.T. p.23). This notes the methodology and intentions but not the content or the results of the process. The later Heidegger had the results of the appropriation of the philosophical tradition. This became his history of Being as metaphysics. Charles Sherover states: 43 "It is thus irrelevant to object that Kant is being approached from a new context, subjected to possibly strange criteria or that novel implications are seen in what he had worked out. The task of a retrieve is not to chronicle the past but to wrest out of it a deeper comprehension of our present situation and the possibilities for development it yet offers. The real question is whether significant philosophic insights emerge, or new directions for philosophic development are brought forth, from such an encounter between two thinkers." (Heidegger, Kant and Time, pp. 12-13.) So, at least for Heidegger he will go where Kant takes the philosopher Heidegger. In other words, Heidegger is not considering what others think and how close or true he is to the real Kant. This is a no-holdsbarred free-for-all in the domain of thinking, to wrest out new understandings, to push new possibilities. Finally let us look back to what Kant himself thought: Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), paragraph A314. "I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention." "Ich merke nur an dass es gar nichts Ungewöhnliches sei sowohl im gemeinen Gespräche als in Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser über seinen Gegenstand äussert, ihn sogar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht genugsam bestimmte, und dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht ntgegen redete, oder auch dachte." Therefore, to give Kant the last word on the Heideggerian methodology of a dialogue between thinkers -Heidegger can try to understand Kant better than he understood himself and still be Kantian. Kant has understood the problem of how to dialogue with other thinkers. Nevertheless, Kant is still usurped by the Heideggerian questioning; it is Heidegger's matter for thought first, and Kant is somewhere in the background. Conclusion Heidegger said: 44 "Kantbook an attempt to question what had not been said instead of writing in a fixed way about what Kant said. What has been said is insufficient, what has not been said is filled with riches." (Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, E.T. p.175). Kant opens up philosophical questions. Heidegger wants to follow in similar way. Not by following Hegel's lead by doing a metaphysical system (telling a story of the world), but rather, by a critical debate about the foundations. Kant and Heidegger must question even this. Heidegger wants us to follow Kant as a kindred spirit and be engaged with Kant about the matter for thinking. We are not getting Kant "right" but rather we are getting the task for thinking "right". Heidegger encounter methodology is to "the things themselves" (Hegel 1807) or "to the thing itself" (Husserl 1911). On one hand Heidegger is doing the "reduction construction destruction" pro ect with the history of philosophy (ontology metaphysics); but then on the other hand, Heidegger wants to go directly to the primary matters/issues themselves. Here you can think of the analytic of humans (Da-sein), his analysis of moods, etc. This all follows out of his main project outlined in Being and Time (1927). Partial Bibliography Critique of pure reason / Immanuel Kant; translated and edited by Paul Guyer, Allen W. Wood. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Correspondence / Immanuel Kant; translated and edited by Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge, U.K.; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science / translated and edited, with selections from the Critique of pure reason, by Gary Hatfield. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. Lectures on logic / Immanuel Kant; translated and edited by J. Michael Young. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Lectures on metaphysics /Immanuel Kant; translated and edited by Karl Ameriks and Steve Narago. Cambridge [England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997. What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? / by Immanuel Kant. Translation and introduction by Ted Humphrey. New York: Abaris Books, 1983. 45 Metahistories of philosophy: Kant and Nietzsche Abstract The purpose of this paper is to use Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche as springboard to a general investigation of the nature of Metahistories of philosophy. Kant and Nietzsche are two very dissimilar philosophers and they have approached the history of philosophy in radically different ways. By comparing and contrasting their approaches, then a sharp and clear idea of a Metahistory of philosophy should appear. Metahistories of philosophy follow the course and direction of the history of philosophy. If there is a dynamic principle at work in the development of the history of philosophy, then a Metahistory of philosophy seeks to understand these major trends and inner determinations (necessities) at work. Is there a purpose and reasons for way the history of philosophy has developed? Do we need the phenomenological or hermeneutical destruction of history of philosophy? Has philosophy reached its completion or goal? Is there a continuing history to philosophy? Introduction Both Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) had a relationship to past philosophers and this reverberates throughout their writings. The purpose of this paper is the assessment of Kant's and ietzsche's relationship to early philosophies and to investigation their overall Metahistories of philosophy. In general, Kant had less interest in the early philosophers, whereas ietzsche's work is covered with name-dropping of philosophers, writers, politician, and artists of every kind. Nietzsche has a myriad of remarks about various philosophical and religious positions or –isms. Nietzsche's critique and dialogue with whole history of philosophy comes partial from his background in philology and his study of the Greeks, but a major part of his philosophy is directed at the value structure of philosophies and religion (Christian in particular). Nietzsche situated himself within history and has a highly developed Metahistory of philosophy. Although extreme opposites in their general approach to philosophy, both G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and Nietzsche are in fact completely historical thinkers and know their own historical context. Part of ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy comes from a meaningful and penetrating dialogue with G.W.F. Hegel. This can be seen by the view of Hegel that Nietzsche had in his early essay "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life " 1874. This is the second of ietzsche's Untimely Meditations (18731876). Unzeitgemässe Betrachtungen. Zweites Stück: Vom Nutzen und Nachtheil der Historie für das Leben. ietzsche said this about Hegel's influence: 46 "I believe that there has been no dangerous variation or change in German culture in this century, which has not become more dangerous through the monstrous influence of the philosophy of Hegel, an influence which continues to flow right up to the present." Nietzsche then goes on to say "Thus for Hegel the summit and end point of the world process coincided with his own individual existence in Berlin." ietzsche view of Hegel was undoubted influence negatively by Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), but the Hegelian view of the world spirit progressing in history up to the point of the 1820s in Berlin is a view that Nietzsche surely wants to reject. To justify the present with the past (if Hegel did indeed do this, certainly many people have interpreted Hegel this way), yes, Nietzsche would not stand for this kind of thinking. ( ietzsche had more says about Hegel's philosophy of history see his notes of 1873 for example VI 336). Hegel did say "The owl of Minerva takes its flight only when the shades of night are gathering." (Philosophy of Right, Preface dated, Berlin, June 25th, 1820). This means philosophers do not appear until after the historical moment or epoch. Philosophers for Hegel only look and deduce history after it has happen. For Hegel world history had an aim, a plan, and there was reason in history. Nietzsche rejected this view of history. Following his critique of Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach (1804-1872), Karl Marx (1818-1883) said, "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it." Theses On Feuerbach, written spring of 1845. One of Feuerbach main works was entitled: Principles of Philosophy of the Future (1843), Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft. Nietzsche was reading this book in 1882 (Thomas H. Brob er " ietzsche's Reading and Private Library, 1885-1889"). I think ietzsche got some of his inspiration from Feuerbach's pointing toward the future. One of ietzsche's important works is entitled "Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future (1886). So, in a sense there is more than just the question of changing the world with philosophy, but the direction of philosophical thinking as pointing toward the future. ietzsche's dialogue with Hegel is over the direction of philosophy and how one reads this history of philosophy and of course how one understands history as such. For Hegel history always is a progression. The issues with any Metahistories of philosophy most always include a dialogue with Hegel. Although not explicitly part of this paper nevertheless, Hegel is still part of this investigation. No philosopher before him had such a metaphysical sweep of the history of philosophy and with it philosophy of history as Hegel had. In addition Hegel's equates his own philosophy with the progress of the history of philosophy. Hegel was the first great philosopher to undoubtedly 47 develop a systematic and comprehensive Metahistory of philosophy. Hegel understood and implicitly knew the course of the history of philosophy as a philosophical problem. However, in this paper I will assess and investigate the Metahistories of philosophy that were developed by Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Nietzsche. Hopefully by comparing and contrasting we will gain a deeper understanding of doing a Metahistory of philosophy. As a contemporary and insightful philosopher, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) said "The greater a revolution is to be the more profoundly must it plunge into its history." ("Nietzsche's Overturning of Platonism " 1936). A paradigm shift or a revolution within philosophy can only come about by a plunge into the history of philosophy and for that we need a well-developed idea and concept of a Metahistory of philosophy. The counterexample seems to be Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who had no understanding of the history of philosophy. Scholars are finding more and more of Schopenhauer's influence in Wittgenstein writings. Wittgenstein did not read widely in the history of philosophy. The purpose of this paper is an attempt to work out the concept of a Metahistory of philosophy through an investigation of two dissimilar philosophers, namely, Kant and Nietzsche. Kant's Metahistory of philosophy SECTION: Critique of Pure Reason Let us begin by looking at the final section of the Critique of Pure Reason (CPR) (Kritik der reinen Vernunft). The section is called "The Transcendental Doctrine of Method. Fourth Chapter. The History of pure reason." (CPR A85 /B800 to A855/B883). Kant starts of by talking about "place that is left open in his system and must be filled in the future." It is interesting to note the same kind of issue Kant talked about in his last unpublished work, the Opus postumum (written 1796-1804). This was collection of writings that Kant was working on very late life and did not finalized or published. Sometime Kant talks about a 'transition' then a 'gap' a 'pain like that of Tantalus' and then the "unpaid bill of my uncompleted system' (Letter Christian Garve, September 21, 1798). This is in regard yo the "Transition from metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." This heading appears early in the Opus postumum (et. p. 10, AK 21:373). So where is the other part of which Kant had promised "must be filled in the future" (CPR, A852/B880) in the Critique of Pure Reason? Namely, the complete history of pure reason or a comprehensive history of philosophy. Kant never did work out a detailed history of philosophy or a history of pure reason. In fact, where Kant left holes or gaps in his philosophical system, then philosophers have rushed in to complete the Kantian project. The neo-Kantians, Friedrich 48 Adolf Trendelenburg (1802-1872) and Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) are some examples of philosophers who have developed in the history of philosophy. ow back to Kant's outline of pure reason in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant starts by giving a 'cursory outline' of the 'chief revolutions' in metaphysics (CPR A855/B881). There are three points in this small section. 1) "With regard to the ob ect of all of our rational cognitions". Kant said we have the sensual philosophers (Epicurus, 342-270 BC) and the intellectual philosophers (Plato, 427-348 BC). ) "With regard to the origin of pure cognitions of reason" (Vernunfterkenntnisse). Kant said we have the empiricist (Aristotle 384-322 BC, John Locke 1632-1704) and noologists (Plato, Leibniz 1646-1716). 3). "With regard to method". (In Ansehung der Methode). Kant said we have the naturalistic (Democritus 460-370 BC) and the scientific methodology. The scientific leads to either the dogmatism (Christian Wolff (1679-1754) or skepticism (David Hume (1711-1776). In this same section Kant concludes that the "critical path alone is still open" (CPR A855/B883). This is very last page of the Critique of Pure Reason. Note: Kant in this section does not say "Wissenschaft " but rather "szientifische" methodology (szientifischen Methode). Why does he use this word? This points back to the Preface of the Critique of Pure Reason, where Kant says "It is treatise on the method" (CPR Bxxii). Kant sees himself within the history of metaphysics working on a subsection under 'method' and then 'scientific'. The location within metaphysics for the Kantian 'critical path' is under the direction of method, and then scientific headings. Kant begins the Critique of Pure Reason with the image of the "battlefield of these endless controversies is called metaphysics" (CPR Avii). He then tells us a little story of about how in the beginning metaphysics started with "administration of the dogmatists her rule was despotic" (CPR, Aix). These battles continue and almost come to end with the famous John Locke (16321704) but "fell back into the same old worm-eaten dogmatism" (CPR Ax). Thus the text of the Critique of Pure Reason begins with the history of philosophy and then the final section is called the history of pure reason (Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft). Within this beginning and ending is this treatise on the method of the "metaphysics of metaphysics" namely the Critique of Pure Reason (Letter To Marcus Herz, May 11, 1781, Correspondence, et. p. 181). So, Kant is situating himself within his own history of pure reason, that is, within his own Metahistory of philosophy. 49 Kant says at the beginning of the chapter on the history of pure reason: I will content myself with casting a cursory glance from a merely transcendental point of view, namely that of the nature of pure reason, on the whole of its labors hitherto, which presents to my view edifices, to be sure, but only in ruins. (CPR, A852/B880). (Beginning of chapter, Die Geschichte der reinen Vernunft). There are two important points here. 1) Kant is going to look at the history of pure reason, that is, the history of philosophy from a special point of view namely the "transcendental point of view". Or in other words from Kant's own point of view. This is a Metahistory of Philosophy from the transcendental point of view (transzendentalen Gesichtspunkte). The uniquely Kantian position. 2) The past is in "ruins" (Ruinen). ote this point very well. This is crucial point and conclusion for Kant. Kant often uses these analogies and images of building a house. The second division of the Critique of Pure Reason is called "Transcendental doctrine of method". On the incredibly first page we hear Kant's images. He talks of the building edifices building materials height strength, erection of a sturdy dwelling, etc (CPR, A707/B735). Thus, when we come to the last chapter of the section and we hear from Kant that there are 'only ruins ' then keeping with this analogy from Kant's view there is nothing to really 'build-on' from history of philosophy. Therefore I understand Kant's own position (from the 'transcendental point of view') that the history of philosophy is not helpful or important it is in 'ruins'. I understand Kant is saying that Kant's own transcendental or critical idealism is not based on the history of philosophy and it totally unique to Kant. In other words, Kant has to begin his building from the ground-up or from the essential foundations. There is nothing to build-on, only a little dirt to begin the building. Therefore, sticking with this image, for Kant, the ground is reason. Kant wanted to develop is his own metaphysical system, but somewhere he got trapped writing the Critique of Pure Reason. He said in a letter that it would take him three months (1772) to finish his work. In reality, it took him another nine years before the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was published. Here we start to see why. All Kant sees is 'ruins' everywhere. He does not have any building materials to even begin to build a sturdy dwelling (namely, a metaphysical system, a system of science). Kant is doing a propaedeutic. That is just getting the ground ready for the building process or Kant in another publication he calls it a prolegomena. Now, this is not the science or a doctrine or in terms of the image – this is not the sturdy dwelling, but rather, a propaedeutic, that is, 50 laying out the foundational pro ect (think of Heidegger's Kant and Problem of Metaphysics). Kant said in an early part of the Critique of Pure Reason "...we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason, of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason. Such a thing would not be a doctrine, but must be called only a critique of pure reason..." (CPR A11). From the ruins there are no blocks to build a metaphysical system or a system built on science. In other words, this is neither a Wissenschaft nor szientifische system. This points to why Kant had to a do a "critique" before getting to the real knowledge of metaphysics. From this point of view the critique of pure reason project is not metaphysics, but rather a "critique" of reason which needs to be done before the science of a metaphysical system. That is why Kant called the Critique a "metaphysics of metaphysics". The fundamental foundation, the ground, before doing the project of metaphysics. But for Kant this is not some kind of special physics in the Aristotelian sense, but rather the critique of pure reason. Aristotle would not understand the project, which is why Kant is so unique. SECTION: What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? Kant wrote this work in 1793. The German title is: Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat? This was about the same time he was working on Religion within the Bounds of Unaided (blossen) Reason. This work (Progress) by Kant was edited by Friedrich Rink (the manuscripts have subsequently been lost) and published shortly after Kant's death in April 1804. Kant's work was in a response to prize question announced by the Royal Academy of Sciences (Berlin, January 24, 1788). Kant in the end did not submit his manuscript. Nevertheless, we have with this work another attempt by Kant to look at the past in philosophy and we might see if another facet of Kant's Metahistory of philosophy comes forward into the light. Kant right in the beginning of the Introduction gives us a picture of his view of metaphysics. Kant said, "But this science is metaphysics, and that completely changes matters. This is a boundless sea in which progress leaves no trace and on whose horizon there is no visible destination that allows one to perceive how near one has come to it." (et. p. 51). There is no trace of anything good left, namely, no progress. The boundless sea is without a history and without even a horizon to navigate the ship. Kant is lost at sea. The sea is the history of metaphysics or at the very least, just the lost sea of metaphysics in general. Kant abruptly, then drops an interesting remark; "Ontology has made little progress since Aristotle's time" (et. p. 53). (Perhaps Martin Heidegger would agree with him. He told a group of students to read Aristotle first for 15 years, before reading Nietzsche). 51 Kant then goes on to talk about the three steps taken by metaphysics. Thus, philosophy has gone through three stages in regard to metaphysics. The first was the stage of dogmatism, the second skepticism, and third the criticism of pure reason. (et p. 61). This sounds again like Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716) and Wolff (Wolff's follower, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-1762), Kant used his Metaphysics (1757) in his lectures), Hume, and then Kant. When Kant thinks of skepticism, I think in this context it must be Hume. Although already in December of 1792, in a letter to Jacob Sigismund Beck, Kant mentions the assumed name of Aenesidemus (real name is: Gottlob Ernst Schulze, 1761-1833) where "an even wider skepticism has been advanced" (Correspondence, et. p. 445). The complete title of the book was Aenesidemus oder über die Fundamente der von Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie 179 . In Germany Schulze's name during this time became synonymous with skepticism. Kant might also be thinking of the early Greek skeptics. For example Kant mentions in a different context "Pyrrho among others was a great Skeptic" (Lectures on Metaphysics et. p. 305). Plus on the same page he says "Sextus Empiricus who brought all doubts together" (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 305). Thus, Kant was well acquainted with skepticism from a variety of sources in the complete history of philosophy. How did Kant see these three stages in metaphysics? Kant said, This temporal order is based on the nature of the human capacity for knowledge. When the first two had been gone through, metaphysics was in such a state that for many generations it swung from unbounded trust in reason in itself to boundless mistrust and then back again. (Progress, et p. 61). So, Kant is saying in this remark that Metahistory is based on "human capacity (Erkenntnisvermogens). Then Kant describes a process of trust (Vertrauen) or not trusts in reason. But clearly the movement and motion within history is a 'swinging' (schwankend, vacillation wavering) back and forth between the two opposites of 'unbounded' and 'boundless' trust in reason. Thus, at this point Metahistory of philosophy is the swinging between trust and not trust in reason. Kant can see himself in this process as being for the trust in reason. In other words, Kant is on the side of rationalism. The Kantian Metahistory of philosophy is a process between reason (ratio) and reasonlessness (note: this is not irrationalism, we must wait 100 years before this becomes an issue). Perhaps Kant saw Schulze's contemporary skepticism as ust part of the process. However at the time Karl Leonhard Reinhold's (1758-18 3) widespread popularization of Kant's 52 philosophy was underway and then Schulze devastating critique of Reinhold's Kantianism as an infinite regress obviously upset Kant's agenda. Even Hegel had to come to terms with contemporary skepticism in his essay "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One " (180 ) (Kritisches Journal der Philosophie) which is a critical discuss and review of Schulze's work. In this way Kant's Metahistory of philosophy could take into account the contemporary philosophical schools of his time. Section : Lectures on Logic The Blomberg Logic Kant learned a great deal about the history of philosophy from the work of Johann Formey (1711-1797), Kurzgesfassete Historie der Philosophie von Hernn Formey, Berlin 1763 (Abridged History of Philosophy). Kant wrote Formey a letter in June 28, 1763 (Correspondence, et. p. 69-70) and often had people send Formey copies of Kant's works (Correspondence, et. p. 88). Formey was the permanent secretary of the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences, he was a Wolffian, and wrote over 600 books and 20,000 letters. It is not clear where Kant came up with the critical remarks about Greek philosophers, since he read Plato and Aristotle in Greek. Perhaps it was Formey's views for example Kant remarked "Plato was very rhetorical, and obscure, and in such way that he often did not understand himself. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 23). About Aristotle Kant said "Aristotle developed a blind trust in himself and he harmed philosophia more than he helped it." (Lecture on Logic, et. p. 23). Is this Kant or could this be Formey view of the history of philosophy? Kant is of course talking through the lecture notes of his students. In this case, the Blomberg Logic was based on Kant's lectures of the early 1770s. Kant in one part of his lectures talks about the ancient philosophers as being either skeptical or dogmatists. This is a familiar refrain from Kant. However, he does go on to says, Carteius, Malebranche, Leibniz, and Wolffus, the last whom, through his industry, produced a systema of philosophy, were in recent times the ones who improved philosophy, and were its true fathers. All of the efforts of our philosophy are 1) dogmatic, 2) critical. Among critical philosophers Locke deserves priority. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 24). Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was reviewed 1782 by J.G.H. Feder (1740-1820). In this review Kant was portrayed as ust restating Bishop George Berkeley's (1685-1753) Idealism and Kant responded is the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (2 nd edition, 1787). However, in this passage we note two things of interest: a) Kant points to more recent philosophers as the 'true fathers' of philosophy b) again Locke seems to be praised for his importance. Kant often has critical remarks about Berkeley for example calling him a "dogmatic idealism" (CRP 53 B 74). Kant discusses this whole issue with Berkeley in his "Refutation of Idealism" (CRP B274-287). In the Dohna-Wundlacken Logic (179 ) Kant said "Dogmatism and skepticism are opposed to one another" (Lectures on Logic et. p. 745). He then goes and states his position "Criticism is the middle way between dogmatism and skepticism the principle of a rightful trust in one's use of reason" (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 480). This shows Kant working and thinking through his relation to earlier philosophers and the history of philosophy. Although it does not give us anymore-direct insight into Kant's Metahistory of philosophy, it does show his thoughtful dialogue with past philosophers. Section: Lectures on Metaphysics Kant's point of view on the history of metaphysics can be summarized by one of his remarks "The whole of metaphysics is nothing other than a chain of built-up and overthrown systems." (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 134). This passage points again to Kant's remarks about the history of philosophy being in ruins. Another passage says "Up to now in metaphysics we still have not had anything satisfactory for all systems can be shaken.' (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 127). Kant said that Hume "aroused me from a dogmatic slumber" (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783). However, in the lectures notes called Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783) we have an interesting and perhaps a more candid remark about Hume from almost the same year. Kant said, Something similar to a critique of pure reason was found with David Hume, but he sank into the wildest and most inconsolable speculation over this, and that happened easily because he did not study reason completely, but rather only this or that concept. An investigation of practices (facti), how we arrive at cognition, where from experience or though pure reason. Locke accomplished much here..." (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 137). An interesting point, again we have the praise of the empiricist Locke and rather critical and almost sarcastic remarks about Hume. Kant is saying rather decisively that Hume's philosophy looked at "only this or that concept". This is Kant's position on the overall consequence of Hume's philosophical skepticism to Kant's pro ect of transcendental and critical idealism ("my transcendental or better critical idealism" (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783). Kant's critical idealism points away from Humean skepticism. Kant does have unbounded trust in reason and the pervasiveness of these criticism of Hume suggest strongly that Kant's rationalism was the foundation of his project. 54 Kant's transcendental philosophy (idealism) can be seen as providing the ontology of rationalism (Lectures on Metaphysics et. p. 307). Kant said that "Transcendental philosophy is also called ontology and it is the product of the critique of pure reason." (Lectures on Metaphysics, et. p. 421). The concept of "critique" means an outline (Vorriss) of pure reason. A critique looks at the sources and boundaries (Quellen und Grenzen) (CPR,A11), at the architectonic, at the sources of pure reason and hence a "critique" is the method but reason is the content. Reason and rationalism is the touchstone of the Kantian project. Conclusion on Kant's Metahistory of Philosophy A final note on one of Kant's genuine and interesting position. How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical thinker builds is own work, so to be speak on someone's else's ruins but no work has ever come to be that was to be lasting in all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet given. But even granted that there a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only historical. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 538). Again we have the metaphor of being among the 'ruins'. The metaphysical systems are broken down blocks and ruins, which give us nothing to built on. But then Kant sinks in his final conclusion. Every system is only 'historical' even Kant's system only gives us another part of the boundless sea. A philosopher must build his own system even though it is some how on parts of 'ruins'. We can learn Kant's system but that does not mean we are philosophers. In the middle of this remark by Kant we see the function of the "But even granted" so he might granted you can have a philosophical system, but in fact, this does you no good, since you have this system only 'sub ectively' and 'historically'. Crucial philosophical point for Kant. Kant does see a course and development to the history of philosophy. Kant has a Metahistory of philosophy that can be seen through an analysis of his works. However, Kant did not develop his thinking in any systematically or comprehensive way. This topic is still left open in the Kantian system, however, we can try to fill the gap by an assessment of Kant's writings but the purists may insist on a more philological reading. Back to Kant's pro ect. To summarize Kant's Metahistory of Philosophy: 1) From the transcendental point of view, there many edifices, but only ruins remain. 2) Metaphysics as philosophy is a boundless sea and progress has left no trace. 3) Metaphysics as philosophy has been a swinging back forth between trust in reason and mistrust in reason. 55 4) This history of philosophy or Metahistory of philosophy is made of overthrown system and all philosophical systems are shaken and broken. 5) Philosophical systems can only be known 'sub ectively' and 'historically'. Does Kant really mean this? What are the implications? Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy Nietzsche has a very rich and complex relationship with the history of philosophy and history in general. One of his good friends was the famous Swiss philosopher of history, Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) who developed a whole new theory of cultural history. Nietzsche not only attend his lectures, but in addition he had student lecture notes of different lectures that Burckhardt did over a period of many years. Burckhardt influenced Nietzsche relationship to history and his profound effect can be seen in many of ietzsche's writings. Nietzsche says in his autobiographical work Ecce Homo (written 1888) "I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus" (Preface Section et. P. 17). The Greek philosophers are important for Nietzsche as a source and origin of his thinking. For example, in the Will To Power (#419, 1885) notes, he says, A few centuries hence, perhaps, one will judge that all German philosophy derives its real dignity from being a gradual reclamation of the soil of antiquity, and that all claims to "originality" must sound petty and ludicrous in relation to that higher claim of the Germans to have oined anew the bond that seemed to be broken the bond with the Greeks... Nietzsche sense of the Greek world and the modern world does not allow him to think of historical progress or development like Hegel or Kant. He said "But the nineteenth century does not represent progress over the sixteenth; and the German spirit of 1888 represents a regress from the German spirit of 1788. "Mankind" does not advance it does not even exist." (Will to Power, #90, Jan-Feb 1888). There are of course many other places where Nietzsche says the same thing. He does not seem to quite get to the point of Heidegger of saying that the ancient Greeks were more original thinkers than the rest of the philosophers. Nietzsche has a high regard for many things from ancient Greek. But he does pose the question if "perhaps sick thinkers are more numerous in the history of philosophy?" (The Gay Science: la gaya scienza, 1886, Preface, section 2, et. p. 34). ietzsche's remarks are often tormented and murky and they make for difficult understanding and straight foreword explanations are not easy. His virulence and caustic quality makes his thinking and philosophy complicated to elucidated. Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy was ripened and put into a single page by ietzsche in September 1888. The year 1888 saw Nietzsche write his last four books. Although Twilight of 56 the Idols (Die Götzen-Dämmerung) was written in 1888 it was not published until January 24, 1889. This page is its own section (the fourth) and it contains a complete vision of the course of the history of philosophy namely ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy. Heidegger's remarks captures the importance of this section "in a magnificent moment of vision, the entire realm of ietzsche's thought is permeated by a new and singular brilliance" (Nietzsche Vo1, et. p. 202). A Kantian note on the word, Übersinnlichen (the supersensuous). Translation note: Übersinnlichen could be translated as oversensuous or oversense or oversensorial. Kant in the unpublished essay, What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff? of 1793 defines metaphysics as "the science of advancing by reason from knowledge of the sensible (Sinnliche) to the knowledge of the supersensuous. (Progress, et. p. 53). The object of the Kantian problem is the transition from the sensible (sensory) to supersensuous. There are three objects or components to the supersensuous, namely, God, freedom, and immortality (Progress, et. p. 294-295). But what can we know of these objects? In the second preface to the Critique of Pure Reason Kant said " ow after speculative reason has been denied all advance in this field of the supersensuous..." (CPR, Bxxi). Kant was not happy about this and went on to say in the same paragraph that "cognitions a prior that are possible, but only from a practical intention." (praktischer Absicht) (CPR Bxxi). This is the background on ietzsche's thought of the "true world". Translation note: the German is "wahre Welt" this can also be translated as the "real world" but I think it makes more sense to translated as the "true world". This is the realm of Plato's idea (eidos, ideos). The world of the forms. Or, to cross the line and have only knowledge at level of opinion (doxa). Nietzsche wrote in the Will to Power, #568 (March-June 1888) "Critique of the concept "true and apparent world". Of these the first is mere fiction constructed of fictitious entities." Thus there is nothing to the true world (Will to Power, #567). These are concept-mummies (BegriffsMumien). So, from this analysis Nietzsche has a decisive and lucid vision of the central and inner logic of metaphysics. For Nietzsche, this is the fundamental constitution of metaphysics and hence he uses this distinction to lay out his Metahistory of philosophy. Does Nietzsche himself get caught within metaphysics? Short answer: yes, but he pushes the limits of metaphysics. His finger is pointing onward. ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy is partially ietzsche looking back into history but ietzsche's vision for philosophy points toward the future. At this point, let us read Nietzsche words and then grapple and grasp his historical/philosophical vision. This next page (following 6 points) is the complete text of Section 4 from ietzsche's Twilight of Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer (written August and September, 1888). HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. The History of an Error 57 1. The true world--attainable for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man; he lives in it, he is it. (The oldest form of the idea, relatively sensible, simple, and persuasive. A circumlocution for the sentence, "I, Plato, am the truth.") 2. The true world--unattainable for now, but promised for the sage, the pious, the virtuous man ("for the sinner who repents"). (Progress of the idea: it becomes more subtle, insidious, incomprehensible--it becomes female, it becomes Christian. ) 3. The true world--unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable; but the very thought of it--a consolation, an obligation, an imperative. (At bottom, the old sun, but seen through mist and skepticism. The idea has become elusive, pale, Nordic, Königsbergian.) 4. The true world--unattainable? At any rate, unattained. And being unattained, also unknown. Consequently, not consoling, redeeming, or obligating: how could something unknown obligate us? (Gray morning. The first yawn of reason. The cockcrow of positivism.) 5. The "true" world--an idea which is no longer good for anything, not even obligating--an idea which has become useless and superfluous-consequently (therefore), a refuted idea: let us abolish it! (Bright day; breakfast; return of bon sens (good sense) and cheerfulness; Plato's embarrassed blush; pandemonium of all free spirits.) 6. The true world--we have abolished. What world has remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the true world we have also abolished the apparent one. (Noon; moment of the briefest shadow; end of the longest error; high point of (pinnacle) humanity; INCIPIT ZARATHUSTRA.). [end of section]. Remarks on ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy as fable and an error (Irrthums). For Nietzsche the course of the history of philosophy has just been a fable (Fabel), that is, a fictitious story of the "true world" and man's relationship to the "true world". The history of philosophy has been a fabrication, not even a legend or a parable, but rather, just a myth. Philosophers have been confused about the supersensuous world. This is just a simple error in thinking. But of course, at what cost? How has this lead the Western World into a dangerous straight? The essence of Nihilism is heard here. This fable obviously leads to Nietzsche's 58 critique of the religious realm, which is full of the supersensuous world (the eternal God). ietzsche's Ockham razor cuts off the world of the supersensuous. Nietzsche uses a the image of the different parts of the day. In point 4, we start with the "morning" in point 5 it is the "bright day or broad daylight" and then in point 6 we have "noon" (in German: Morgen Heller Tag Mittag). We now have the "shortest shadow" at noon. This is the high point, the summit, the peak, the tip, the top of the rock, the apex, the top of the wave, the very pinnacle of mankind (humanity, Menschheit). Afterwards humanity can perished or incipit tragoedia (The Gay Science: la gaya scienza, 1886 #342). What are the periods of Metahistory does Nietzsche show us? The six periods are: 1) Plato. 2) Platonism and Christian. 3) Kantian. 4) Auguste Comte (1788 – 1857) (positivism). 5) Early Nietzsche (but still caught between the two worlds). 6) Midday sun – ietzsche's own final philosophy in the name of Zarathustra. In The Gay Science: la gaya scienza 1886 ietzsche says "incipit tragoedia" (#342, the tragedy begins) and in this points to Zarathustra, whereas in the this section of the Twilight of the Idols ietzsche says "I CIPIT ZARATHUSTRA" in capital letters in both the English version and the German edition. Nietzsche asks the question in Ecce Homo in the section about the Gay Science where he asks the question "What is here called "highest hope" – who could have any doubt about that when he sees the diamond beauty of the first words of Zarathustra flashing at the end of the fourth book?" ietzsche's endings are often the beginnings. The going under (untergehen), the setting of the sun, the twilight of the setting sun. The twilight of the old idols, the old truths (Ecce Homo "the old truth is approaching its end"). But out of the process of going under ietzsche says "I am he that brings these glad tidings. – Thus I am also a destiny." (Ecce Homo). So from this fable and history of error, Nietzsche does brings us something, a gift. What is that gift? The beginning of Zarathustra "I CIPIT ZARATHUSTRA" means the starting of the time of Zarathustra here on earth. Who is Zarathustra? 59 Zarathustra the teacher of the overman/superman (Übermensch, frenzy and lightening) and of the eternal return of the same (ewigen Wiederkunft des Gleichen). Nietzsche says in Ecce Homo at the beginning of the section on Thus Spoke Zarathustra " ow I shall relate the history of Zarathustra. The fundamental conception of this work, the idea of eternal recurrence, this highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable...". What does this mean for ietzsche Metahistory of Philosophy? For Nietzsche, the supreme point (point 6, midday) comes to be Nietzsche's final philosophy. Do you hear shades of Hegel and some of Kant? ietzsche's last philosophy is at the final ultimate end point of his Metahistory of philosophy, namely, Nietzsche, the thinker as he was during September 1888 in Sils-Maria (Upper Engadine, Switzerland). What is the end point or goal for ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy? Answer: ietzsche and his Zarathustra. For Nietzsche, Zarathustra is a code name for: (negative) end of the ideals and idols, the old truths, the end of the eternal supersensuous world, death of God, (positive) free spirits, immoralist, Dionysus, overman, innocent of becoming, will-to-power, and the highest affirmation – the eternal return of the same. To summarize ietzsche's Metahistory of Philosophy: 1) Nietzsche Metahistory of philosophy is a fable and the history of an error, which is the fundamental logic of metaphysics, namely, the two worlds, the eternal supersensuous world and the apparent world. 2) ear the end of ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy we have the two worlds abolished but still the distinction is there. ietzsche's early thought moves with this distinction. 3) The end and goal of ietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy is ietzsche's own final and ultimate philosophy, code name: Zarathustra. Nietzsche is caught within his own shadow. Else where Nietzsche has pointed toward the future. Conclusion By comparing and contrasting the philosophies of Kant and Nietzsche, we wanted to get a sense if there is a dynamic principle at work in the development of the history of philosophy. One thing has become clear in Hegel, some parts of Kant, and Nietzsche they all see themselves as the end point in their Metahistories of philosophy. Hegel's position is well known. But from this analysis we can see some of Kant and Nietzsche coming to this point. In contrast to Heidegger, who sees himself building a bridge forward, ambit of a narrow path. 60 But on the other hand, it looks like Kant has the most interesting and far-reaching position. How should it be possible to learn philosophy anyway? Every philosophical thinker builds is own work so to be speak on someone's else's ruins but no work has ever come to be that was to be lasting in all its parts. Hence, one cannot learn philosophy, then, just because it is not yet given. But even granted that there a philosophy actually at hand, no one who learned it would be able to say he was a philosopher, for subjectively his cognitions of it would always be only historical. (Lectures on Logic, et. p. 538). What is Kant's position? Kant's position here is similar to Heidegger when he wants people to think about the matters for thinking and not to worry about becoming Heideggerians or getting Heidegger right; but rather, thinking through the matters or issues themselves. Remember the principle, following both Hegel and Edmund Husserl the remarkable phenomenological methodology motto that is "to the things themselves" (die Sachen selbst). Heidegger pushed his student away from him and tried to point them to on their own paths. Although they (and us) traveled along with Heidegger, we still need our own expereicnes (Erfahrung). Heidegger at one point said there is no Heideggerian philosophy. Nietzsche uses the expression Versuch, an experiment, and an attempt. In the Gay Science: la gaya scienza 1886 he says "We ourselves wish to be our experiments..." (#319). Individuals must develop and attempt their own singular unique historical thinking. Fly and be your own eagle, do not be sheep. Nietzsche stated clearly with the expression "I want no "believers" (Ecce Homo, Why I am a Destiny, section #1). How many philosophers in the history of philosophy would have said they want no "believers" in their metaphysical systems? Nietzsche said in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: One repays a teacher badly if one always remains nothing but a pupil. Now I bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I return to you. Verily, my brothers, with a different eyes shall I then seek my lost ones; with a different love shall I then love you. ietzsche does not want "pupils" or "believers". This is not a question of faith or the use of reason to find foundations of metaphysics or some new values in philosophy. But rather, an admonishment to the eagles to fly on your own. He said in the Wanderer and His Shadow (# 67) "There are no educators. As thinker one should speak only of self-education". 61 Final remarks Kant is saying that even if we pick up his philosophy, still we are not philosophers. We can show respect by following a philosophers thoughts, but in the end, we must find our own path otherwise we are following philosophers only in a subjective and historical way. No one can climb the mountain for you. A guide like Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger for example, may help you by pointing out the way they have gone. The mountain in its stillness – awaits the climber, awaits the thinker. Appendix: Hegel's Metahistory of philosophy For Hegel philosophy itself is identical with the history of philosophy as spirit and reason come to know pure absolute Spirit. Hegel said "History we have before us here is the history of thought finding itself (p. 67-68). Starting with the Greeks as the most abstract and come to the final conclusion in Hegel's own absolute idealism system. The big Hegel system comes in three parts: logic, nature, and spirit or to use Descartes, substantia infinita, res extensa, and res cogitans (Logic, Nature, spirit). Hegel divides the history of philosophy in three periods, the Greek Middle Ages and the modern (starting with 'ego cogito sum') namely Descartes starting point of 'self-reflecting thought'. Hegel says: "In philosophy as such most currently and recently, is contained what the work from a thousand years has produced; it is the result of all that has preceded it." The modern period is the where the subjective and objective is united in the absolute. That means: Hegel. History did not stop with Hegel according to Hegel. It was Alexandre Kojève that put that in Hegel. Hegel was constantly updating his lectures etc. Hegel work a great deal on the history of philosophy; starting on the history of philosophy in Jena (1805) and lectured up until at least winter of 1829-1830. In 1833-36 in volumes 13-15 in the first edition of Hegel's Werke were collected and edited by Karl Ludwig Michelet. Hegel wrote " o philosophy therefore can make its appearance sooner than it does. It is true of course, that in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries ancient philosophies were resurrected – this was necessary to the progress of Christian culture. Nevertheless, when past philosophies return again they are like mummies of earlier thoughts. The World-Spirit has progressed, and a past philosophy is not its proper garment the form in which it finds expressed what it in fact is." (1825-1826, in Introduction). Martin Heidegger Metahistory of philosophy. 62 For Heidegger history of philosophy is the history of metaphysics, which begins with Platonism, hits its high point with Hegel, and then reaches its completion with Nietzsche and the reversal of Platonism. Heidegger sees himself as starting a new beginning. Heidegger wrote "The history of Being begins with the forgetting of Being". Metahistory of philosophy as the Metahistory of metaphysics as the History of Being. From one of his writing is Sketches for a History of Being as Metaphysics (1941, et. p. 65-66). Being Aletheia (apeiron, logos, hen-arche) Revealing as the order as the start Hen One Logos Idea Physis Ousia Energeia Hypokeimenon Hyparchein Substance, substantia Actuality, actualitas Perception, perception Subiectum Monad Position Objectivity Will of reason (Kant) Will of love (Schelling) Will as absolute knowledge (Hegel) Absolute concept (Hegel) Spirit Will Power Will to Power in the eternal recurrence of the same Will to will (Spengler) Production Transcendental Ego Machination (Enframing (Gestell) 63 Heidegger in a short essay on the Recollection in Metaphysics says "The history of Being is neither the history of man and of humanity, nor the history of the human relation to beings and to Being. The history of Being is Being itself and only this." (Recollection in Metaphysics, et. p. 8 ). ("Die Seinsgeschichte ist weder die Geschichte des Menschen und eines Menschentums noch die Geschichte des menschlichen Bezugs zum Seienden und zum Sein. Die Seinsgeschichte ist das Sein selbst und nur dieses." ('Die Die Erinnerung in der Metaphysik' Nietzsche II, p. 489). Martin Heidegger in section 85 of his second magnum opus says "the thrust into the crossing and thereby the knowing awareness that any kind of metaphysics has and must come to an end if philosophy is to attain its other beginning (Anfang)." (GA 65 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) p.171-173, et. p 121). 64 Martin Heidegger and Hegel's Science of Logic Je grosser eine Umwälzung sein muss, um so tiefer wird sie in ihrer Geschichte ansetzen. 1 Abstract Martin Heidegger has a unique and never an innocent reading of philosophers (A. Denker). My paper will be examining Heidegger's reading of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). Hegel was the leading philosopher of German Idealism. In Hegel's mature metaphysical system the Wissenschaft der Logik 2 is the central cornerstone of the system. Heidegger is interested in raising the question of meaning of Being (ontology) in the context of the destruction of metaphysics. Heidegger plunges deep into the history of German Idealism to create a revolution within ontology, metaphysics, philosophy, and the history of Being. In order to do a deconstruction of metaphysics Heidegger has to go through Hegel. Heidegger's reading of Hegel has progressed through an early critical stage to a more open appraisal of Hegel's position in western philosophy. Finally I will take a detailed look at Heidegger's reading of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. Introduction In the winter 1910-1911 at the University of Freiburg in Breisgau, at age of 21 Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) took a course from the Reverend Carl Braig (1853-19 3) entitled: 'Einleitung in die katholische Dogmatik; Gotteslehre'. Some fifty years later in 1963 Heidegger remembers it was during the few walks with Braig that he heard about the Hegel's significance for speculative theology. During years 1914/15 Heidegger is taking courses that include Hegel from Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) 'Philosophisches Seminar Übungen zur philosophischen Systematik im Anschluss an Hegel' and in 1915/16 a course on 'Die deutsche Philosophie von Kant bis ietzsche', which mostly likely covered Hegel. At end of his Habilitationsschrift on Die Kategorien und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus 3 (1915) surprisingly Heidegger ends this work with a reference for the need of philosophy to aufgehoben Hegel. This is part of the beginning context of Heidegger's struggle with Hegel. Heidegger then begins a dialogue with Hegel that will last until at least 1968 with a seminar on Hegel: Differenzschrift (Le Thor). At that time Heidegger said "In unserem Fall handelt es sich um Hegel: wir müssen also Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel beginnen damit Hegel zu uns spricht." 4 65 How are we to characterize Heidegger's dialogue with Hegel? Certainly the influence of Aristotle, I. Kant, F. Nietzsche, and E. Husserl on Heidegger is greater. Early his dialogue, Heidegger often gives sharp critical remarks about Hegel. During Heidegger's life time there was not a large work published about Hegel. For example, Heidegger did publish his famous interpretations of Kant and Nietzsche during his lifetime. But Hegel was left in the background. Even in the current plans of the Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe shows the absent of any lengthy interpretation of Hegel. Part of the purpose of this paper is to see how Heidegger's confrontion critical debate and struggle with Hegel defined his understand of the Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. Back to the story, ten years later, by December 10th, 1925 Heidegger writies to Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) that "Mir machen die Hegel und Kant Übungen ungewöhnlich viel Freude, und ich bin froh, dass ich jetzt erst an diese Sachen komme, wo relativ mindestens die Möglichkeit da ist, etwas zu verstehen." 5 In another letter to Jaspers Heidegger says „Ich bin dankbar dafür, dass mich das Schicksal davor bewahrte, mir Kant und Hegel durch irgend eine der jetzt käuflichen Brillen zu verderben. Ich glaube, den Weltgeist in der Näge dieser beiden zu spüren." 6 (Marburg 16. Dez. 1925). The Hegel course at Marburg that Heidegger is talkings about is "Phänomenologische Übungen für Fortgeschrittene (Hegel, Logik I. Buch)". We have the lecture notes from one Heidegger's students, Helene Weiss, who keep detailed notes on this seminar but there is no known manuscript of Heidegger's. There is a manuscript for the next course Heidegger taught on Hegel the course was entitled "Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik" (19 7). Heidegger taught seventeen courses and seminars on Hegel between 1925 and 1968. Did the students ask for courses on Hegel or was there something more to it than just an acdemic interested. Hegel stands at the center and he is intricately rich in complexity. Hegel begins the Vollendung of metaphysics, but it is with Nietzsche that philosophy as metaphysics reaches its final culmination and is the consummation of Platonism. Heidegger wants to escape being merely part of the countermovement to Hegel. In order to do that, Heidegger needed to enter into confrontation and a critical debate with Hegel. What is Heidegger methodology in his dialogue with Hegel? Heidegger's encounter Methodology What is the methodology of a dialogue between thinkers? There are no objective readings of philosophers that are worthy of being called philosophy. Thinking has its task with us. Heidegger said "Philosophie ist Philosophieren." 7 We need to engage in philosophizing with Heidegger. What is Heidegger's encounter methodology? 66 For instance, Heidegger sympathetically quotes F.W. J. Schelling (1775-1854): "Will man einen Philosophen ehren, so muss man ihn da auffassen, wo er noch nicht zu den Folgen fortgegangen ist in seinem Grundgedanken; [in dem Gedanken] von dem er ausgeht." 8 Heidegger says, "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says." 9 In another place Heidegger says "Einen Denker achten wir nur, indem wir denken. Dies verlangt, alles Wesentliche zu denken was in seinem Gedanken gedacht ist." 10 Heidegger said "Damit wir selbst durch die Auseinandersetzung für die höchste Anstrengung des Denkens frei werden." 11 The task of the Auseinandersetzung is so that we become thinkers – not that we become scholars or experts on Hegel or ietzsche this is not Heidegger's pro ect and vision. Scholarship provides some of the timber, but not the bricks for the bridge. Heidegger wants to think everything that a philosopher thought, but in his own way and in his own time in history. There are no ahistorical interpretations or reading of philosophers. No eternal texts outside of history. Heidegger's dialogue with Kant shows us Heidegger's encounter methodology in its fullest form. Heidegger says „Den "Kant an sich" zu entdecken bleibe der Kantphiologie überlassen." 12 Heidegger says in his work on Hegel the following about his own Kant interpretation: "bei Kant nämlich, dass man heir nicht sehn will, sondern umgekehrt von einem willkürlichen Hineininterpretieren meinerseits spricht." 13 Can we see the problem? Can we find "Heidegger in himself"? Among the Heideggerians of the center-right or the orthodox position are they trying to get Heidegger right? When Heidegger is reading Hegel does he want to find "Hegel in himself"? Is Heidegger trying to get Hegel right? No. Heidegger dialogue with Hegel is a Kampf over the issues themselves. In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger says "Unablässig stösst man sich an der Gewaltsamkeit meiner Auslegungen. Der Vorwurf des Gewaltsamen kann an dieser Schrift gut belegt werden." 14 And then Heidegger goes on to talk about "ein denkendes Gespräch zwischen Denken-den" and "Das Verfehlende ist in der Zwiesprache drohender, das Fehlende häufiger." 15 This is a dialogue – not a re-presenting of Kant's or Hegel's philosophical position. Heidegger is not making claims and counterclaims. He is not looking for logical proofs. Heidegger approvingly quotes Aristotle from Book IV of the Metaphysics (1006a sqq.), "Es ist nämlich Unerzogenheit, keinen Blick zu haben dafür, mit Bezug worauf es nötig ist einen Beweis zu suchen in bezug worauf dies nicht nötig ist." 16 Heidegger is engaged in a dialogue, a decisive and thoughtful debate with Hegel. But that means more than ust an analysis of Hegel. Heidegger said "Das Gespräch mit einem Denker kann nur von der Sache des Denkens handeln." 17 This is more than just getting the words right. Kant said in the Kritik der reinen Vernunft 1781 (KrV), paragraph A314. 67 "Ich merke nur an dass es gar nichts Ungewöhnliches sei sowohl im gemeinen Gespräche als in Schriften, durch die Vergleichung der Gedanken, welche ein Verfasser über seinen Gegenstand äussert, ihn sogar besser zu verstehen, als er sich selbst verstand, indem er seinen Begriff nicht genügsam bestimmte, und dadurch bisweilen seiner eigenen Absicht entgegen redete, oder auch dachte." There is in Kant a lot more than the Neo-Kantians would have us believe. Heidegger said "Wir sind für Kant gegen den Kantianismus und sind für Kant nur, um ihm die Möglichkeit zu geben, erneut in lebendiger Auseinandersetzung mit uns zu leben." 18 One of Heidegger's early formulations of his methodology with his dialogue with the history of philosophy is from a lecture course of 1927, Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. During this time he must have been thinking a lot about the uncompleted second part of Being and Time which was to be about Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle. Heidegger has given us a concise statement about his phenomenological method from this period. "Diese drei Grundstücke der phänomenologischen Methode: Reduktion Konstruktion Destruktion, gehören inhaltlich zusammen und müssen in ihrer Zusammengehörigkeit begründet werden. Konstruktion der Philosophie ist notwendig Destruktion, d.h. ein im historischen Rückgang auf die Tradition vollzogener Abbau des Überlieferten, was keine Negation und Verurteilung der Tradition zur Nichtigkeit, sondern umgekehrt gerade positive Aneignung ihrer bedutet." 19 In a missing third part of this lecture dealing with the method of ontology, there is a third chapter, which is outlined as being on the phenomenological method: reduction, construction, and destruction. Did Heidegger run out of time in this lecture series or were the issues unresolved? For Hegelians Heidegger's approach is starting to sound a little like aufgehoben the tradition. Heidegger uses the terms "positive Aneignung". The Hegelian image of the bud becoming the blossom and then the fruit in the Preface to the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Or, in the Wissenschaft der Logik where Hegel is explaining how the system of B. Spinoza (1632-1677) is contained within the higher true system. There is no higher standpoint for Heidegger; rather Heidegger characterized his conversation with the history of thinking as a Schritt zurück. 20 Both Heidegger and Hegel want to come to terms with history of philosophy. But their metahistories of philosophy go in opposite directions. Although it is apparent that Hegel sees himself squarely within his own metahistory of philosophy, I think it is less obvious where Heidegger see his own awakening and questioning in the Geschichte des Seyns, or for that matter in the Seinsvergessenheit. 68 Martin Heidegger's Kindred Reading of Hegel Heidegger and Hegel have a highly developed and structured metahistories of philosophy. Both of them have written extensively on the history of philosophy and on individual philosophers. Undoubtedly, a historical encounter is important for both of these philosophers. This is the crux of their radical transformation of philosophy historical thinking. Hegel has thought through the entire course of the history of philosophy up to his time. Heidegger has written more about the history of philosophy than any other philosopher. Plus, he has reflected on the methodology of a dialogue between philosophers. In Heidegger's encounter with Hegel he says "Wenn wir zu einer Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel kommen vollen dann geht an uns die Forderung mit ihm "verwandt" zu sein." 21 Heidegger meant that his reading of Hegel was among the family. There are only philosophers here. Heidegger following Hegel said "...Denn in der Philosophie "gibt es weder Vorgänger noch achgänger" das heisst nicht dass edem Philosophen eder andere gleichgültig sei sondern es besagt umgekehrt...." 22 Heidegger is not the successor to Hegel, nor is Hegel the predecessor to Heidegger. Each thinker is unique, exclusively, and his thought is radically his own. Heidegger approvingly quoted Hegel on his "verwandt" methodology. In The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy Hegel wrote "Der lebendige Geist der in einer Philosophie wohnt, verlangt, um sich zu enthüllen, durch einen verwandten Geist geborn zu werden." 23 Through out most of the Heidegger's works on Hegel he used one word to designate his encounter and dialogue with Hegel. That word is Auseinandersetzung, a critcial debate. Heidegger says "Aus-einander-setzung – Scheidung" 24 He says that this is a not a controverse nor a polemic, but rather a Kampf. This is not just a minor debate over some philosophical problem, but rather, this is a struggle over the ground question of philosophy. This is the place for the encounter and dialogue with the primary matters for thought. Indeed, this is the clearing that is open for genuine, authentic philosophical thinking. Background on Martin Heidegger's Hegel project Why did Heidegger not publish more of his works on Hegel? Why did he not fully develop his Hegel lectures? Heidegger mentioned in a Letter to Elisabeth Blochmann. "In die Vorlesung habe ich nur eine kleine Zahl aufgenommen, aber auch für diese was das meist zu schwer." 25 These were difficult lectures for Heidegger students and perhaps for Heidegger as well. Heidegger's book length work on Hegel is entitled: Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes comes from an earlier course in 1930/1931. 26 This was left by Heidegger to be published posthumous. Why was Hegel left in the background? David Krell reports in a conversation with Heidegger, 69 that Heidegger thought it was important no to let Hegel stand in isolation (May 16, 1975). 27 This was specifically in regards to the lecture Hegel und die Griechen (1958), but I think we generalize this remark – Heidegger has myriad of tribulations with Hegel and his general tendency would be to leave him isolated but Heidegger worked and struggled on Hegel's thinking – he may not have been happy with the process and some of the results. Although it is apparent that he learn more from other philosophers. From 1925 to at least 1968 (43 years) Heidegger was working and writing on Hegel, yet, he did not publish a large number of his writing on Hegel. For example, in the Martin Heidegger/Eugen Fink: Heraklit seminar of 1966/67, Hegel is the modern philosopher who is mentioned most frequently. So even in an unrelated work, it still seems like Heidegger is in some kind of dialogue with Hegel. Dr. Alfred Guzzoni's Protokoll zu einem Seminar über den Vortrag "Zeit und Sein" written in 1962 has long passages discussing the Heidegger/Hegel relationship. From the seminar notes: "Obgleich Hegel der Sache nach dem Anliegen Heideggers in gewisser Weise entfernter ist als ede andere metaphysische Position." 28 Heidegger reviewed this Protokoll and had it published in his works to help us understand his essay. There are three important quotes from Heidegger, which give some indication of how he approached Hegel's philosophy: Heidegger said in 1915, "Die Philosophie des lebendigen Geistes der tatvollen Liebe der verehrenden Gottinnigkeit deren allgemeinste Richtpunkte nur angedeutet werden konnten, insonderheit eine von ihren Grundtendenzen geleitete Kategorienlehre steht vor der grossen Aufgabe einer prinzipiellen Auseinandersetzung mit dem an Fulle wie Tiefe, Erlebnisreichtum und Begriffsbildung gewaltigsten System einer historischen Weltanschauung, als welches es alle vorausgegangenen fundamentalen philosophischen Problemmotive in sich aufgehoben hat mit Hegel." 29 Heidegger said in 1919, "Dann stehn wir mit der Front gegen Hegel d.h. vor einer der schwierigsten Auseinandersetzungen." 30 Heidegger said in 1946, "Trotz des flachen Geredes vom Zusammenbruch der Hegelschen Philosophie bleibt dies Eine bestehen, dass im 19. Jahrhundert nur diese Philosophie die Wirklichkeit bestimmte, ob-zwar nicht der äusserlichen Form einer befolgten Lehre, sondern als Metaphysik, als Herrschaft der Seiendheit im Sinne der Gewissheit. Die Gegenbewegungen gegen diese Metaphysik gehören zu 70 ihr. Seit Hegels Tod (1831) ist alles nur Gegenbewegung, nicht nur in Deutschland sondern in Europa." 31 One may add nich nur in Europa sondern die Welt. Heidegger saw Hegel's philosophy as a huge system and as a task to overcome as part of metaphysics but Heidegger's own philosophical thinking was not close to Hegel. Question: how close is Heidegger to Hegel? – The simple answer is that they are not especially close at all. In some ways Hegel's philosophical system is a closed system within itself so it did not give much room for Heidegger to try to find the unthought or the unresolved or an opening for a reinterpretation. Some of Heidegger's task of the destruction of the history of Ontology is at work with Hegel in the section on "Hegel's Concept of Time" in Sein und Zeit (Section 82), but there is less evidence of this in Heidegger's other works on Hegel. Heidegger did included Hegel in his general remarks on German Idealism, but most of these remarks are not insightful their relationship and serve only to distance Heidegger from idealism and metaphysics as such. Heidegger seems to be closer to F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) than to Hegel, when he remarks, "denn Schelling ist der eigentlich schöpferische und am weitesten ausgreifende Denker diese Ganzen Zeitalters der deutsche Philosophie." 32 Heidegger made the following interesting statement about Schelling's Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809) when he remarks that it is "Die Abhandlung die Hegels "Logik" schon vor ihrem Erscheinen erschüttert!" 33 Thus, it was Schelling that Heidegger saw as the boldest thinker of this epoch, not Hegel. For us this means Hegel still needs to be encountered, and thus his metaphysical systems need to be confronted. Hegel at this point is more villain than hero. Following what Alfred Denker said about Heidegger's Hegel interpretation "for Heidegger – Hegel is both villain and hero". 34 Martin Heidegger's Dialogue and Critical Debate with Hegel "...geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel." 35 Heidegger's approach to Hegel is shown by this remark „Hegels Systematik in den beherrschenden Blick bringen und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken." 36 This may sound like that Heidegger's project is to develop a contra position to Hegel. Yes and no. Heidegger is not part of the Gegenbewegung to Hegel like L. Feurbach, K. Marx, S. Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche (yes, Nietzsche has plenty to say contra Hegel and Hegelianism). Heidegger is developing a bridge and a transition after metaphysics and Hegel is epitome of metaphysics. So, it is not a contra position per se. Nietzsche and Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) are part of the transition. Heidegger is pointing the way for us toward this transition and new Anfang. 71 What are the main philosophical Sachen between Heidegger and Hegel? In fact, following both Hegel and Husserl we are subscribing to the grand methodology motto that is "die Sachen selbst". I want to stress Heidegger's contra thinking to Hegel: 1) Heidegger is contra systems in general. See Schelling Book. (GA 42). Also, in the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) he said "Die Zeit der "Systeme" ist vorbei." 37 2) Heidegger notes Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik as sub ectivity "rein im Elemente des Denkens." 38 Heidegger contra subjectivity. The absolute idea. 3) Heidegger is contra Hegel's Unendlichkeit and Ewigkeit. (GA 80). 4) Heidegger is contra Hegel's Die ontotheologische Verfassung der Metaphysik . (GA 11). Ontology, theology, and logic. 5) Heidegger is contra Hegelian dialectics. (GA 1, GA 56/57, GA 63). 6) Heidegger is contra Hegel's concept of time from the philosophy of nature (See Sein und Zeit, section 82) (GA 2). 7) Heidegger contra Hegel's idea of time in the Phänomenologie des Geistes als der reine Begriff tilgt die Zeit. 8) Heidegger sees the Phänomenologie des Geistes as the major work as contra the Wissenschaft der Logik. There is some connection between Being and Time (the existenziale Analytik des Da-sein) and the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Whereas there appears to be no connection between Analytik of Da-sein and the Wissenschaft der Logik. (GA 32). 9) Heidegger's Being and Time the main thesis is the essence of Being is time, this the exact opposite of Hegel's philosophy (GA 32). 10) Heidegger is contra the way Hegel thinks the history of philosophy (abstract developing to the highest standpoint – Hegel). Metahistory. 11) Heidegger is contra Hegel on speculative philosophy. Hegel's Letter "Philosophical content has in its method and soul three forms: it is 1 abstract dialectical and 3 speculative." Hegel to Niethammer Nuremberg, October 23, 1812. [Werke III, 301-16]. 12) Heidegger is contra Hegel correspondence theory of truth. 13) Heidegger is contra Hegel on Philosophie as Wissenschaft. 72 14) Heidegger is contra Hegel on Wissenschaft as a circle.39. 15) Heidegger is contra Hegel on the absolute. 16) Heidegger is contra Hegel dissolving ontology into logic.40 17) Heidegger's anfänglich denken contra Hegel on begreifende Denken. Hegel said, "immanente Entwicklung des Begriffes ist die absolute Methode" 41 Or Heidegger's remark on besinnliches Denken (letter to M. Boss, Sept 12, 1965). 18) Heidegger is contra Hegel's absolute metaphysics.42 19) Heidegger is contra Hegel's Logik im Sinne der Theo-Logik.43. 20) Heidegger is contra Hegel's Gott als absoluter Geist. 44 1) Heidegger is contra Hegel's Sein als "Das Sein ist das unbestimmte Unmittelbare." 45 ) Open Issue: Heidegger's Die egativität (1938-1939). 46 3) Open Issue: Hegel's Aesthetics. See Staiger-Heidegger Briefwechsel. 24) Open Issue: Heidegger places Hegel in history of Being as will to absolute knowledge (Wissen). 25) Open Issue: According to O. Pöggeler, Heidegger borrowed for many years the original edition of the Hegel's Die Lehre vom Wesen from the Hegel-Archiv. Heidegger gave a seminar on this topic in the Wintersemester 1955/56. There is a known Heidegger manuscript from this seminar. This work may turn out to be the most detailed interpretation of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik by Heidegger. There are manuscripts from Heidegger's seminars on other topics than either the Phänomenologie des Geistes or the Wissenschaft der Logik. For example: 1) Hegels Jenenser Realphilosophie, 2) Hegels Metaphysik der Geschichte, 3) Hegel Über den Staat, and 4) Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik. We await these publications in perhaps GA 86. 26) Open Issue: Heidegger is against Weltanschauung – Hegel wants to create some kind of a Weltanschauung. 7) Open Issue: "Hegel umped over his Schatten...and into Sonne." 47 The elimination of Endlichkeit des menschen. 28) Open Issue: Heidegger says for Hegel freedom is will and will is freedom. What is Heidegger's position on freedom and will? Martin Heidegger on Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik 73 Heidegger said in 1923, « Alle Dialektik lebt immer eigentlich in dem, was sie bringt, vom Tish der anderen. Das leuchtende Beispiel: Hegels Logik. Nicht nur, dass es bei flüchtiger Betrachtun schon in die Augen springt, dass die eine traditionelle Logik lediglich verarbeitet ist." 48 This comes from the period at the end of Heidegger's work with E. Husserl so from a phenomenologist point of view Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik is just the re-working of the tradition. This is before Heidegger real starts to reflecton Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. Heidegger first course on the Wissenschaft der Logik is a few years later in 1925. Evidently, Heidegger does not see the importance of Hegel's Logik at this time. Through many of Heidegger's early writing we see the sharp and critical remarks about Hegel. At this point, Hegel is ust simply the vilain for Heidegger. Heidegger's remarks show Hegel at his lowest point for Heidegger. Heidegger's natural tendency as a phenomenologist is to perhaps see something substantial in Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes, but the whole project of the Logik is suspect from the beginning. In a sense this is a dividing line for Heidegger, by this early rejection of the Wissenschaft der Logik this puts Heidegger on a different path and a different direction in his dialogue with Hegel. Heidegger said "Der letzte und zugleich gewaltigsten Versuch dieses Durchdenkens der Kategorien, d.h. der Hinsichten, nach denn die Vernunft das Seiende als solches denkt, ist die Dialektik Hegels, die er in einem Werk gestaltet hat, das den echten und gemässen Namen "Wissenschaft der Logik" trägt. Dies besagt: das Sichwissen des Wesens der Vernunft als das Denken des "Seins" in wilchem Denken sich die Einheit und die Zusammengehörigkeit der Bestimmungen des Seins zum "absoluten Begriff" entfalten und sich darin begründen." 49 By this time (1939) Heidegger is starting to see Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik in a larger context. He calls this an "gewaltigsten Versuch" so now Hegel's pro ect is understood through a philosophers eyes, not just a phenomenologist. This shows how far Heidegger as come, not that he has discarded his earlier thinking, but he is putting philosophical issues in a much more grounded historical totality. Heidegger makes the convincing connections between der Kategorien, die Dialektik, und absoluten Begriff. This summary statement assumes a great amount of work by Heidegger and gives us further evidence of Heidegger's continuing and detailed analysis of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik. By 1946, Heidegger has now further developed his thinking and the place of Hegel in the history of philosophy. ow he says "Die Gegenbewegungen gegen diese Metaphysik gehören zu ihr. Seit Hegels Tod (1831) ist alles nur Gegenbewegung, nicht nur in Deutschland sondern in Europa." 50 So now it is not ust the importance of Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, but rather, the whole of Hegel's metaphysics is central to western philosophy. However not as a system followed, rather, as the counterpunch or the Gegenbewegungen to Hegel thinking. The broad 74 and historical context is emphasized so Hegel is the key modern philosopher. Every since Hegel's death philosophy is only a series of footnotes that are contra to the Hegelian influence. Heidegger gives Hegel the honor of being the central opponent. Heidegger said in 196 "Diese Vorstellung vom Sein als des schlechthin Abstrakten wird im Prinzip auch noch nicht aufegeben, sondern nur bestätigt, wenn das Sein als das schelechthin Abstrakte in das schlechthin Konkrete der Wirklichkeit des absoluten Geistes aufgehoben wird, was im gewaltigsten Denken der neueren Zeit, in Hegels spekulativer Dialektik sich vollzogen hat und in seiner "Wissenschaft der Logik" dargestellt wird." 51 This is now (1962) the highest point in Heidegger's reconsideration of Hegel's metaphysics. Hegel is now the "gewaltigsten Denken der neueren Zeit". Hegel is Heidegger's Gegenspieler. Heidegger's geschichtliche Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel is because Hegel is the Gegenspieler. Hegel is a good Bösewicht for Heidegger. Being is abstract. This is how Hegel starts the beginning of the Wissenschaft der Logik. Hegel said "Das Sein ist das unbestimmte Unmittelbare." 52 Being gets transformed into the absoluten Geistes (Gott), but also as the absoluten Begriff and als die absolute Methode. Heidegger puts his finger on the whole project of the Wissenschaft der Logik, and of course rejects the fundamental position, but he shows the Hegel central place in Geschichte des Seyns, and in the Seinsvergessenheit. Hegel's grand and imposing metaphysical system is the most important key Gegenspieler for Heidegger, which is why he must Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel. Conclusion Heidegger said in 1927, „Das Problem kommt solange nicht von der Stelle als die Logik selbst nicht wieder in die Ontologie zurückgenommen wird, d.h. solange nicht Hegel, der umgekehrt die Ontologie in Logik aufloste, begriffen ist, und das besagt immer, durch die Radikalisierung der Fragestellung überwunden und zugleich angeeignet wird. Diese Überwindung Hegels ist der innerlich notwendige Schritt in der Entwicklung der abendländischen Philosophie, der gemacht werden muss wenn sie überhaupt noch am Leben bleiben soll." 53 If we can not get through Hegel and reverse his influence, then western philosophy no longer lives, it dies. Thus, we must take the necessary step of Überwindung Hegel. Heidegger points us in two directions here: 1) Logic needs to be taken back into ontology. 2) The Radikalisierung of the question and positive Aneignung of Hegel. Heidegger plunges deep into Logik and Ontologie to create eine Umwälzung. Heidegger's reading of Hegel has progressed through a critical stage to a more open assessment of Hegel's position in western philosophy. Hegel's position is the central opponent for Heidegger. Hegel is the most powerful thinking in modern times and the later Heidegger seems to place more 75 emphasis on the Wissenschaft der Logik than the Phänomenologie des Geistes. Evidently, Heidegger's position on Hegel philosophy and Hegel's position in the history of philosophy has changed. Heidegger has positively Aneignung Hegel and has not left him out. This positive Aneignung has overwhelmingly been by developing by Heidegger as a Gegendurchschlag to Hegel. Heidegger does this not by a critical refutation of Hegel's arguments or a re ection of Hegel's philosophical problems but by developing a transition and a new Anfang out of metaphysics. The transition is to das anfängliche Denken. In the years 1936/38 Heidegger worked on a second major work after Sein und Zeit, entitled Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). This is not a lecture series or a work about other philosophers, but rather, Heidegger attempts to recast in his own philosophy. In the Beiträge, Heidegger tells us about his general approach to Hegel „Hegels Systematik in den beherrschenden Blick bringen und doch ganz entgegengesetzt denken." 54 Endnotes: 1. Nietzsche Erster Band, p.235. 2. Wissenschaft der Logik by G.W.F. Hegel first published vol 1. 1812, vol 2. 1813, vol 3. 1816, reworked vol 1. 1832. 3. GA 1. 4. GA 15, p.24, August 30, 1968. 5. Martin Heidegger / Karl Jaspers. Briefwechsel 1920-1963. Herausgegeben von Walter Biemel und Hans Saner. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1990, p.57. 6. Martin Heidegger / Karl Jaspers. Briefwechsel 1920-1963. Herausgegeben von Walter Biemel und Hans Saner. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann 1990, p.59. Marburg 16. Dez. 1925. 7. GA 29/30, p.5-6. 8. GA 42, p.14. 9. GA 9, p.203. 10. Nietzsches Wort "Gott ist tot". GA 5, p.254. 11. Nietzsche I, p.13. 12. GA 3, p.249. 76 13. GA 32, p.212. 14. GA 3, p.xvii. 15. GA 3, p.xvii. 16. Zur Sache des Denkens, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1969, page 80. 17. Die Onto-Theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik. In: Identity and Difference: New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p.107. 18. GA 25, p.279. 19. GA 24, p.31. 20. See GA 11. 21. GA 32, p.44. 22. GA 32, p.45. 23. GA 32, p.44. 24. GA 36/37, p.277. 25. Martin Heidegger / Elisabeth Blochmann. Briefwechsel 1918-1969. Herausgegeben von Joachim W. Storck. Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schiller-gesellschaft, 1989, p.40. 26. GA 32. 7. David Farrell Krell. "Hegel Heidegger Heraclitus" In: Heidegger, German idealism & neoKantianism edited by Tom Rockmore, Amherst, N.Y: Humanity Books, 2000, p.151. 28. Zur Sache des Denkens, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1969, p.28. 29. GA 1, p.410-411. 30. GA56/57, p.97. 31. Vorträge und Aufsätze Pfullingen eske 1967 "Überwindung der Metaphysik" p.68. 32. GA 42, p.6. 33. GA 42, p.168. 77 34. Alfred Denker. Historical Dictionary of Heidegger's Philosophy. Lanham, Md.: Scarecrow, 2000. p.105. 35. GA36/37, p.14. 36. GA 65, p.176. 37. GA 65, 1936-1938, p.5. 38. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften section 14. p.67. 39. G.W.G. Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik I. In Werke: Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970, p. 84 85. See also Kant's KrV A797/B8 5 'Kreises'. 40. GA 24, p.254. 41. G.W.G. Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik I. In Werke: Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970, p.8. 42. Schelling Abhandlung uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Published by Max Niemeyer Verlag Tubingen, 1971. p.235. 43. GA 36/37, p.76. 44. G.W.G. Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik II. In Werke: Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970, p. 67. Where Hegel says "nicht aber Gott als absoluter Geist, als welcher allein die wahrhafte atur Gottes ist." 45. G.W.G. Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik I. In Werke: Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970, p.101. 46. GA 68, p.3-61. 47. GA 41, p.153. 48. GA 63, p.45-46. 49. Nietzsche Vol I, p.529-530. 50. Vorträge und Aufsätze Pfullingen eske 1967. "Überwindung der Metaphysik" p.68. 51. Zur Sache des Denkens, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1969, p.6. 52. G.W.G. Hegel Wissenschaft der Logik I. In Werke: Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1970, p.101. 78 53. GA 24, p.254. 54. GA 65, p.176. Bibliography Martin Heidegger's Hegel Courses (Alfred Denker's): Wintersemester 1925/26 Phänomenologische Übungen für Fortgeschrittene (Hegel, Logik I. Buch) [Seminar] Sommersemester 1927 Fortgeschrittene: Die Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik [Seminar] Sommersemester 1929 Übungen für Anfänger: Idealismus und Realismus [Seminar] Note from William J. Richardson Anfänger: Über Idealismus und Realismus im Anschluss an die Hauptvorlesungen (Hegels "Vorrede" zur Phänomenologie des Geistes). See Heidegger's student lecture notes: Herbert Marcuse and Helene Weiss. 1929 Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart (GA28), Wintersemester 1930/31 Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes [Vorlesung] (zweistündig) [note: GA32] Sommersemester 1934 Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Fortgeschrittene über Hegel, Jenenser Realphilosophie 1805/6 [Seminar] 79 Wintersemester 1934/35 Übungen für Anfänger: Hegel, Über den Staat [Seminar]. Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes [Seminar] Sommersemester 1935 Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes (Fortsetzung) [Seminar] Wintersemester 1939/40 Mittelund Oberstufe: Hegels Metaphysik der Geschichte. Sommersemester 1942 Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, Die Phänomenologie des Geistes [Seminar] Wintersemester 1942/43 Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, Phänomenologie Aristoteles, Metaphysica Q 10 E4 [Seminar] Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung (GA 5) this article is from this seminar). See also Heidegger's "Erläuterung der "Einleitung" zu Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes" (1942), in GA 68. Sommersemester 1943 Übungen für Fortgeschrittene: Hegel, Philosophie des Geistes [Seminar] Wintersemester 1955/56 Zu Hegels. Logik, Die Logik des Wesens [Seminar] Wintersemester 1956/57 Zu Hegels Logik (Über den Anfang der Wissenschaft) [Seminar] ["Die Onto-Theo-logische Verfassung der Metaphysik" lecture in Todtnauberg 4 Februar 1957. 1968 Hegel: Differenzschrift [Seminar Le Thor] 80 A conference was held in Prague Czech Republic in ovember 00 that was entitled "Issues Confronting the Post-European World" and that was dedicated to Jan Patočka (1907-1977). The Organization of Phenomenological Organizations was founded on that occasion. The following essay is published in celebration of that event. Essay 39: Heidegger and the Purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit Abstract What is the main purpose of G.W.F. Hegel's seminal work the Phenomenology of Spirit? It has spawned two great traditions, namely Marxism and Existentialism. Hegel wrote the Phenomenology of Spirit in 1806, in a rush during the battle of Jena. It went out of print, and Hegel did not use it in his lectures. How did Hegel see the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit? Martin Heidegger gave a lecture in the 1930s on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, in which he identified and discussed four misinterpretations of the intention or purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Those four are (1) it is not Husserlian phenomenology, (2) it is not a typology of philosophical standpoints (K. Jaspers, W. Dilthey), (3) it is not some kind of introduction to philosophy, and (4) it is not some form of rationalism. After an analysis and critique of Heidegger's hermeneutical interpretation I offer my own analysis and insight into the purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation follows Hegel more closely and shows connections to Hegel's Science of Logic and his metaphysical system. "Ever since Hegel's Death everything is merely a countermovement ..." (Martin Heidegger Overcoming Metaphysics) Introduction What is the main purpose of G.W.F. Hegel's (1770-1831) celebrated work the Phenomenology of Spirit? It has contributed two great traditions, namely, Marxism and Jean-Paul Sartre's (19051980) Existentialism. Both of these schools would have been offensive to Hegel and surely is not what Hegel intending to do in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Marxism is simply a counterpunch to Hegel. The Existentialism tradition has the same common interest of facticity and human existence. A third important philosopher and theologian is Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) whose anti-Hegelianism is still deeply rooted in Hegelianism. Another influence of Hegel during the mid to late 1800s, was the straight Hegelianism of the British James Stirling (1820-1909) and the American St. Louis Hegelians, namely, William Harris (1835-1909) and Henry Brokmeyer (1828-1906). 81 In the twentieth century, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) saw his own work as closer to Immanuel Kant's (17 4-1804) than to Hegel's and yet he has offered many still unpublished seminars on Hegel. Heidegger said that to link the Phenomenology of Spirit with his own work Being and Time (1927) was nonsense, but he still wanted to engage and encounter Hegel. Heidegger was famous for his interpretation of Kant and his confrontation with Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) at Davos was an important event in his attack on the Neo-Kantians. Heidegger's Hegel interpretation is not as well known as his attack and radical interpretation of Kant and the NeoKantians. Part I: Heidegger's Kindred Reading of Hegel Heidegger and Hegel both had a highly developed and structured metahistories of philosophy. Both of them have written extensively on the history of philosophy and on individual philosophers. Clearly, a historical encounter is important for both of these philosophers. This is the crux of their radical transformation of philosophy. Hegel has thought through the entire course of the history of philosophy up to his time. Heidegger has written more about the history of philosophy than any other philosopher. Plus, he reflected on the methodology of a dialogue between philosophers. This is true in particular in his interpretation of Kant. Heidegger made scattered remarks over thirty years about his detractors concerning his radical Kant interpretation. One of his remarks was very refreshing. In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger said, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx). However Heidegger's Kant interpretation seems to be much more radical than his engagement with Hegel. There is a lot more at issue with Kant and the Neo-Kantians (which includes Heidegger's teacher Edmund Husserl, as well) than with Hegel and the Hegelians. In Heidegger's encounter with Hegel he says "If we wish to confront Hegel then we are required to be 'kindred' with him." (E.T. p 31). Heidegger meant that his reading of Hegel was among the family. There were only philosophers here. Hegel made the following remark in one of his earliest publications "...with respect to the inner essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors." (The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, e.t. p.87). This means that the inner essence of philosophy is the same matter for all of us. Heidegger is not the successor to Hegel, or Hegel the predecessor to Heidegger. Each thinker is unique and his thought is radically his own. Again we are all kindred. We are all philosophers here following the "inner essence of philosophy." In other places Heidegger spoke of getting at the unthought in a philosopher's thinking. Heidegger stood firmly within the hermeneutical tradition and was keenly aware of the nature of textual interpretation. 82 Kant said something insightful about the nature of the interpretation of other philosophers, in the Critique of Pure Reason: I note only that when we compare the thoughts that an author expresses about a subject, in ordinary speech as well as in writings, it is not at all unusual to find that we understand him even better than he understood himself, since he may not have determined his concept sufficiently and hence sometimes spoke, or even thought, contrary to his own intention. (Critique of Pure Reason, A314.). Perhaps following Kant we can say that we know Hegel better than he understood himself. This is a large and difficult undertaking, what Hegel did with his writing; we can try to see the single driving force. It is important to see how the underlying assumptions and presuppositions of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the whole ontotheological/metaphysical system come together. The best interpretation needs to include both a general understanding of his entire system and an understanding of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Heidegger only hinted at this combination. For this interpretation, however, this important point will be the guiding method. Heidegger approvingly quoted Hegel on his "kindred" methodology. In The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, Hegel wrote "If the living Spirit which dwells in a philosophy is to be revealed it needs to born through a kindred spirit." (HHPS, p.31). This is the place for the encounter and dialogue with the primary matters for thought. Indeed, this is the clearing that is open for us for genuine, authentic philosophical thinking. The task for our thinking is open. Part II: Background on Heidegger's Hegel project Many of Heidegger's writings and works on Hegel are not currently planned as part of the collected writings Gesamtausgabe (GA). Why is the Hegel material left out of Heidegger's works? Why did Heidegger not publish more of his works on Hegel? In 1929 Heidegger taught a course on Idealism and Realism in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit. The materials for this course have not been published, and currently plans omit them from the collected works (Gesamtausgabe). He also taught several other unpublished courses on Hegel: Science of Logic (book one) 1925/1926; ontology of Aristotle and Hegel 1927; Jenenser Realphilosophies 1934; Phenomenology of Spirit 1934 1935 1936; Hegel's Metaphysics of History 1939/1940; Phenomenology of Spirit 1943; Logic: Logic of Essence 1955/1956; Logic: About the beginning of Science 1956/1957. None of these materials from these courses has been published and none is slated for inclusion in the collected works. Heidegger's book length published work called Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (HHPS) comes from an earlier course in 1930/1931 (GA 32). 83 From 1925 to at least 1968 (43 years) Heidegger was working and writing on Hegel, yet he did not want to publish a large number of his writing on Hegel. For example in Heidegger's Heraclitus Seminar (of 1966/67) with Eugen Fink (1905-1975), Hegel is the modern philosopher who is mentioned most frequently. So even in an unrelated work, it still seems like Heidegger is in some kind of dialogue with Hegel. There are three important quotes from Heidegger, which give some indication of how he approached Hegel's philosophy. 1) Heidegger said in 1915. "Philosophy...now faces the huge task of fundamentally confronting the system of a historical worldview which is the most powerful with regard to its fullness, its depth, its conceptually, and the richness of its experiences, and which as such has resumed and surpassed all proceeding fundamental philosophical problems; that is it has to confront Hegel" (translation by Karin de Boer, GA 1:410-411). ) Heidegger said in 1946 "In spite of the superficial talk about the breakdown of Hegelian philosophy, one thing remains true: only this philosophy determined reality in the nineteenth century, although not in the external form of a doctrine followed, but rather as metaphysics, as the dominance of beingness in the sense of certainty. The counter movements to this metaphysics belong to it. Ever since Hegel's death (1831) everything is merely a countermovement not only in Germany but also in Europe. (GA 3 :57 "Overcoming Metaphysics " E.T. p. 89). 3) Heidegger said in 1958 "Accordingly philosophy as the self-development of spirit into absolute knowledge and the history of philosophy are identical. No philosophy prior to Hegel's had acquired such a fundamental grounding of philosophy, enabling and requiring philosophizing itself to simultaneously move within its history and be in this movement philosophy itself. ("Hegel and the Greeks " Conference of the Academy of Sciences at Heidelberg. 1958). Heidegger saw Hegel's philosophy as a huge system and as a task to overcome as part of metaphysics, but Heidegger's philosophical thinking was not close to Hegel. Question: how close is Heidegger to Hegel? – The simple answer is that they are not very close at all. Perhaps the great anti-system thinker Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) is the farthest from Hegel. But this is a digression. In some ways Hegel's philosophical system is a closed system within itself so it did not leave much room for Heidegger to try to find the unthought or the unresolved or an opening for a reinterpretation. Some of Heidegger's task of the destructuring of the history of ontology is at work with Hegel in the on "Hegel's Concept of Time" in Being and Time. (E.T., p. 428), but there is less evidence of this in Heidegger's other works on Hegel. Heidegger did included Hegel 84 in his general remarks on German Idealism, but most of these remarks are not insightful about Hegel and serve only to distance Heidegger from metaphysics as such. Heidegger seems to be closer to F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) than to Hegel, when he remarks, "...for Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy. He is that to such an extent that he drives German Idealism from within right past its own fundamental position." (Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom, E.T., p. 4). Heidegger made the following interesting statement about Schelling's Treatise on Human Freedom when he remarks that it is "The treatise which shatters Hegel's Logic before it was even published." (Schelling's treatise on the essence of human freedom Treatise, E.T., p. 97). Thus, it was Schelling that Heidegger saw as the boldest thinker of this epoch, not Hegel. For us this means Hegel still needs to be encountered, and thus his metaphysical systems need to be confronted. Heidegger is still part of that countermovement to movement to Hegel, and if he needs Schelling's help to push the foundations well so be it. Part III: Heidegger Points To Four Misinterpretations of the Phenomenology of Spirit (HHPS) 1) Phenomenology of Spirit is not Husserlian phenomenology. 2) Phenomenology of Spirit is not a typology of philosophical standpoints. 3) Phenomenology of Spirit is not some kind of introduction to philosophy. Heidegger states that this is not a "...transition from so called natural consciousness of sensibility to a genuine speculative philosophical knowledge." (HHPS p. 9). 4) Phenomenology of Spirit is not some form of rationalism or, for that matter irrationalism. A. Remarks on Heidegger's First Misinterpretation Heidegger's First Thesis: Phenomenology of Spirit is not Husserlian phenomenology. Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) did not do Hegelian phenomenology. This is obvious to everyone with any training or background in philosophy. Certainly Hegel is not some kind of forerunner of Husserl, either. It is doubtful that Heidegger could find anyone holding this position, other than perhaps some misdirected popular magazine; of course he could not link this misinterpretation to any philosopher. But he wanted to be sure to link the then current usage of phenomenology only to Husserl – no one else including Heidegger was doing "phenomenology." This is ust another way that Heidegger used to distance himself from Husserl and all the present-day schools or "ism." Heidegger has always wanted to stand by himself as unique philosopher. Heidegger did not want to be known simply as a student of Husserl's or as only an assistant to Husserl. 85 B. Remarks on Heidegger's Second Misinterpretation Heidegger's Second Thesis: Phenomenology of Spirit is not a typology of philosophical standpoints. Heidegger argued against the position that the Phenomenology of Spirit was a typology of philosophical standpoints. Hegel's shapes of consciousness could be misconstrued by Hegelians as worldviews and types of philosophical standpoint. Is the Phenomenology only a question of the typologies of philosophical standpoints? On the hand, Hegel discussed skepticism and stoicism in the earlier part of the Phenomenology of Spirit; however, these are not philosophical types, but rather various shapes of self-consciousness. At the end of the Introduction, Hegel says that these are "patterns of consciousness" (Gestalten des Bewusstseins). Kant first used this term in term "Weltanschauungen" in the Critique of Judgment (1790). Heidegger used this term in the title of his first lecture in 1919. The title of the lecture is "Die Idee der Philosophies und Weltanschauungsproblem." Heidegger's own position was more complex on the use of term. In general, following Husserl, Heidegger is against and opposed the position of worldviews as some kind of philosophical standpoint. Perhaps one philosopher who can be mentioned in this context (who was for philosophy as worldviews) is Karl Jaspers (1883-1969). Karl Jaspers' work on the Psychology of WorldView (Psychologie der Weltanschauungen, 1919) is perhaps what Heidegger was thinking of when he wrote these remarks. Heidegger did a review of Jaspers' work in 19 1 but he does not discuss Jasper's remarks on Hegel. Another possible candidate for the position as one who saw philosophy and Hegel as doing philosophy as worldviews, would be Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), whose work entitled The Essence of Philosophy discusses some of the same points on concept of worldviews (Weltanschauungen). In this work, Dilthey made a passing comment on Hegel and worldviews (E.T., p. 60-61). In addition Dilthey published an article entitled "Weltanschaguung Philosophies und Religion" in 1910. Heidegger was right in calling this position of the Phenomenology as stages of worldviews a misinterpretation and misdirection in thinking about Hegel. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is not worldviews just put together in an arbitrary arrangement. Again, Hegel showed that there is a necessity at work in this process of patterns of consciousness, of the history of the education of consciousness and of the absolute Spirit unfolding. The "We" of self-consciousness is on the way toward the great ending – absolute Knowing. There is a progression upward to higher stages on the path. The philosophical point here is not some collection of worldviews as a topology of 86 philosophical standpoints. The Phenomenology is the progress of consciousness moving and striving to the absolute Spirit. C. Remarks on Heidegger's Third Misinterpretation Heidegger's Third Thesis: Phenomenology of Spirit is not some kind of introduction to philosophy. Heidegger states that it is not a "...transition from so called natural consciousness of sensibility to a genuine speculative philosophical knowledge." (p. 29). Heidegger did not elaborate on this misinterpretation. This interpretation ("transition...") is straightforward, and there are lots of reasons to actually support this so-called misinterpretation. This interpretation ("transition...") of Hegel is one of the many intentions that Hegel was thinking of when he wrote the Phenomenology of Spirit. So, why did Heidegger not see this at least as part of the purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit? Let us attempt to look at the other side (from Heidegger) and see if we can clarify the purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. There are a number of places where Hegel looked at this issue. If Heidegger's remark of "genuine speculative philosophical knowledge" is taken to mean what it was for Hegel namely Science then the "We" are on the way to standpoint of Science. For example in the Introduction Hegel says "The series of configurations which consciousness goes through along this road is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science" (Wissenschaft). (Phenomenology of Spirit, E.T., p. 50). (Bewusstseins selbst zur Wissenschaft. Jener Vorsatz stellt die Bildung in der einfachen Weise des Vorsatzes als unmittelbar abgetan und geschehen vor; dieser Weg aber ist gegen diese Unwahrheit die wirkliche Ausführung.) Hegel in the Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik, E.T., p. 48) wrote the following about the Phenomenology of Spirit "The path of this movement goes through every form of the relation of consciousness to the object and had the Notion (Begriff) of Science (Wissenschaft) for its result." This single interpretation may not be the one all-encompassing interpretation of the purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: it is evident that Notion or the standpoint of Science is at least one of the results, or goals, or the final purpose and intention of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The second part of Heidegger's remark was that the Phenomenology of Spirit does not start with "natural consciousness of sensibility." This may in fact be true but only in a very limited sense. Hegel started with consciousness. Perhaps the first ob ect is not "sensibility." The first ob ect 87 according to Hegel is called "sense certainty"; there is a case that the first ob ect is also "knowing." The idea of "sensibility" is a general supposition as to where Hegel starts. In his work entitled "Hegel's Concept of Experience " Heidegger makes this general point about how the Phenomenology of Spirit is not a description of a journey. He said "...this error [in interpretation] is not accidental. It follows in the train of the book's essence overtakes and thus conceals it." ('Hegel's Concept of Experience', 1942, E.T., p. 51). In addition, Hegel started with the absolute Spirit as well – hidden in the background or underneath the beginning. All beginnings and presuppositions are arduous in philosophy and metaphysics. For Hegel, this whole issue took on a much more decisive role as First Philosophy or First Science. Hegel may have been thinking of Aristotle's metaphysics and the idea of First Philosophy. Aristotle is a very important thinker for Hegel. So part of the purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is the "detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science" or in other words it is the movement to something like "genuine speculative philosophical knowledge " namely to the Hegelian philosophical Science (Wissenschaft). D. Remarks on Heidegger's Fourth Misinterpretation Heidegger's Fourth Thesis: Phenomenology of Spirit is not some form of rationalism, or for that matter, irrationalism. Heidegger echoing Schelling said "Both rationalism and irrationalism represent an external labeling of the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy, which does not succeed in unfolding this philosophy in terms of the fundamental issue in question." (E.T. p.30). Calling Hegel's system some kind of -ism does not really help engage and encounter Hegel's thought. The thinking related to Ismology may be interesting as the history of ideas, but it is definitely not true philosophical thinking. Many philosophers agree with this, but it is difficult to ascertain the nature of true philosophical thinking. Real philosophy is more than a little proof for some idea. Philosophy moves in a realm that is not provable by single statements. To try to refute Hegel because of his arguments does not engage his thinking or his metaphysical system. For Hegel, the whole system is the truth. Truth is not in parts of Hegel's system. The system is the inner self-unfolding of Spirit or the absolute Spirit or just the absolute unfolding itself in time. This is not just an analysis or the text of a book. In a fundamental way, this is reality that is in this process. Back to Heidegger and Hegel. What does Hegel mean by rationalism? Hegel's Philosophy of Right shows that for Hegelianism rationalism is important. Hegel in 18 0 wrote "What is 88 rational is actual and what is actual is rational." (et p. 10). This is the famous passage. But in another few later paragraphies Hegel stated his position even stronger where he says "To comprehend what is this is the task of philosophy because what is is reason." (E.T. p. 11). Hegel's thinking is in the camp of reason. There are of course the typically rationalist's positions, such as Descartes (1596-1650), Leibniz (1646-1716), and even Spinoza (1632-1677). Spinoza's system was in the air of the times and was talked about in intellectual circles and Hegel's friend Schelling is often linked to Spinoza. Schelling often mimicked Spinoza's method of geometry, for example, laying down axioms and trying to prove those propositions. Spinoza's rationalism led to pantheism. This raises the specter of the pantheism controversy ("All-is-one-ists") debated by F.H. Jacobi (1743-1819) and Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786); started by a report about G.E. Lessing (1729-1781). Lessing said he was a Spinozist shortly before his death, according to a report from Jacobi. The pantheism controversy drew Kant (17241804) into the dialogue as well. Hegel certainly would have understood his own theological position vis-a-via this debate. Hegel made a number of remarks about the shortcomings of Spinoza in the Science of Logic (E.T., p. 536). In the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Hegel said "Spinoza's system is absolute pantheism and monotheism elevated into thought." Hegel sees himself within rationalism. But Hegel's is a different kind of rationalism than Spinoza, for example. Although Hegel may have thought about matters outside of reason, these were not matters that were philosophical or in Hegelian terms – not contained within Science. These were outside of the scope of philosophy. The philosophical world is for Hegel rational. For Hegel, only the rational fell within the philosophical world. Hegel wrote in the remarks to paragraph 16 of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline "The philosophical encyclopaedia excludes first of all mere aggregates of information such as philology at first appears to be. Secondly, it also (just as decisively) excludes learning that is based on mere arbitrariness such as heraldry for instance." (E.T. p. 40). So according to Hegel there are areas of knowledge and even some kinds of sciences that are outside of his philosophical system. Thus, Heidegger maybe wrong that this is not some form of rationalism. Heidegger points to "reason and ratio" in his own interpretation of Hegel. But Heidegger was correct in that calling Hegel's system "rationalism" (or any other -ism) does not deepen our understanding of Hegel's thinking. For example calling Heidegger's book Being and Time a finite Critique of Pure Reason may be helpful for understanding some of the issues in Being and Time, but it does not really enjoin us to Heidegger's thinking in Being and Time. Hegel had a place for Reason in his system, but simply calling him a rationalist does not engage his thinking. There might be a place 89 for the irrational in the Phenomenology of Spirit, but this is off the main point of Hegel's thinking. E. What is Heidegger's Own Interpretation? Heidegger's own specific philosophical position vis-a-via Hegel was "If reading the problematic of Being and Time into some other text is ever nonsensical, then this is the case with Hegel. For the thesis that the essence of Being is time is the exact opposite of what Hegel tried to demonstrate in his entire philosophy." (HHPS p. 145). Therefore Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit is not some kind of early Being and Time. Only Kant has a glimmer of the problematic of Being and Time, according to Heidegger in his 1930 lecture. That glimmer was that the meaning of Being (Sinn von Sein) is temporality. What does Heidegger think is the main purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit? Heidegger summarized by writing that the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit was "...the absolute self-presentation of reason (ratio-logos), whose essence and actuality Hegel finds in absolute Spirit." (HHPS p. 30). Where did Heidegger find a special place for reason (Vernunft) in the Phenomenology of Spirit? Indeed, according to Hegel, reason is just one of the main stages or shapes of consciousness that Spirit passes through on the way to absolute Knowing. This is not the same idea of reason that Kant was thinking of in the Critique of Pure Reason. Although Heidegger was trying to read Kant into Hegel, he was unsuccessful in attempting to do so. Hegel owes a lot to Kant for clearing the way of dogmatic metaphysics and for simulating his thinking, but Hegel's own system is not at all Kantian. Part IV: Ferrer's Reading of the Purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit A. How should we Interpret Hegel's Thinking? We will start with a few exordiums. Ferrer's interpretation of Heidegger's reading of Hegel does not stand in the earlier classical period of Heiedggerian scholarship. Nor does it fall in any way in the formulaic schools of Heiedggerian interpretations: ultra-orthodox, rejectionist wing, orthodox wing, or liberalassimilationists. The interpretation does not follow in the new Beiträge paradigm shift, either (see Thomas Sheehan's article on "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Studies"). Rather, I use Heidegger in much the same way that Heidegger used Kant or Hegel, namely, to clarify my own thinking. I am, in fact, using Heidegger to open a door -to have my own dialogue with thinkers and in this case it is with Hegel's work on the pro ect of the Science of Experience of Consciousness, which is later known as the Phenomenology of Spirit. 90 In fact, following both Hegel and Husserl, I am subscribing to the grand methodology motto, that is "to the things themselves" (die Sachen selbst). This means for me to view Hegel's pro ect as the Science of Experience of Consciousness, which has become transformed into the infamous Phenomenology of Spirit. Although Hegel's work is a "text " it is beyond a "book" and a "text" on some philosophical positions. Can this new interpretation be just one more interpretation among many, standing side-by-side, or am I saying that this interpretation is the only one that is consist with Hegel's intentions? Is there only one correct meta-interpretation of Hegel's purpose for the Phenomenology of Spirit? We will start with a series of questions before getting to the central purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. How did the word "Phenomenology" develop in Hegel's works? To begin with Hegel's earlier title for the Phenomenology of Spirit was: System of Wissenschaft: Part One, Wissenschaft of the Experience of Consciousness. When the work was final published in 1807 the title was System of Science Part One, The Phenomenology of Spirit. Some of the books we have today have two title pages with a different title on each page. This published work of Hegel's then in a few years went out of print and Hegel never did use it for his lectures for students. Hegel was working on a new edition when he died in 1831. However, in 1832 a new edition of his Collected Works (Werke, Berlin, 1832-1845) came out. The second volume simply had the title of "Phenomenology of Spirit." This is the title as we know it today. The German title is Phanomenologie des Geistes. This is called the Jena Phenomenology of Spirit for the city of Jena where Hegel wrote this work. Hegel's story is that he finished this work on the eve of Napoleon's October 12, 1806 victory at Jena. As a historical note, Hegel was reading the proofs (January 16, 1807) when he wrote: Soon, but not quite yet, I will be able to say bon voyage to the child. But while reading through the manuscript for printing errors this one last time I truly often wished I could clear the ship here and there of ballast and make it swifter. With a second edition to follow soon-if it pleases the gods! (si diis placet?!) -everything shall come out better. (Hegel: The Letters, p. 119). The second part of the Hegelian system came to be the Wissenschaft der Logik (1812-1816) that is the Science of Logic, also called the greater logic as compared to the lesser or smaller logic, which is the logic as it appears in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline or the Encyclopedia der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1817). Back to the use of the term "Phenomenology " it was used by J.H. Lambert (17 8-1777) in 1764 the Neues Organon and was used by Kant in a number of places. The expression "Phenomenology" was also used by J.G. Fichte (176 -1814) in his Berlin lectures of 1804. 91 According to Heidgger Husserl heard or read it about the word "phenomenology" in lecture about metaphysics by Franz Brentano (1836-1917). In a letter to J.H. Lambert Kant stated "A quite special though purely negative Science general phenomenology (phaenomologia generalis) seems to me to be presupposed by metaphysics." (1770). Kant discusses the position of phenomenology in his system in a 1772 letter to Marcus Herz: "The first part would have two sections (1) general phenomenology and ( ) metaphysics but this only with regard to its nature and method." Kant actually published the Critique of Pure Reason eleven years later in 1781. Kant's work could have been called the Phenomenology of Pure Reason. Both Hegel and Kant viewed their works as something that precedes metaphysics. These are philosophical issues that need to be worked out before actually engaging in creating the metaphysical system. This is not "physics" in the sense of Aristotle. Rather these works are the presuppositions to metaphysics. Heidegger wrote "...all philosophy from first to last merely unfolds its presupposition." (HHPS E.T. p. 36). The Critique of Pure Reason is after physics, and yet before metaphysics; it is a prior namely Kant's expression of the "metaphysics of metaphysics." Hegel at one point wrote in a similar vein of "thinking of thinking." Kant spoke of phenomenology in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786). The Fourth Chapter is entitled: "Metaphysical Foundations of Phenomenology " but his use of the term is different from Hegel's. At that point for Kant phenomenology meant something like doctrine of appearance or Erscheinugslehre. Walter Kaufmann reported that Novalis (1772-1801) used the term "phenomenology" at this point in time as well. So, the term, phenomenology was being used in the philosophical discourses at the time Hegel used. How did Hegel come to the change the name of the Phenomenology of Spirit? There was shift from the original design of the book when "Wissenschaft" was in the title. Hegel uses the term "phenomenology" later in Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Perhaps Hegel thought a book with title of the Science of Experience of Consciousness would not sell very well. Heidegger thought this title put too much emphasis on "experience." Another title could have been: The Science of the Phenomenology of Experience or, Phenomenology of the Experience of Consciousness? or, the Experience of Spirit? For Hegel, it is clear that Spirit was central in his thinking. The Preface was written several months after the book was essentially finished. The Preface mainly related to Hegel's entire philosophical system. It was not ust a Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Introduction functioned more as a Preface than did the real 92 Preface. The Introduction spoke only of the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness" Hegel did not use the term "phenomenology" in the Introduction. Many scholars think that the Introduction was one of the first parts of the book that was written. Hegel first used the term "phenomenology" in the last section in the Phenomenology of Spirit, that is in the section on "Absolute Knowing " and then later he started using the expression in Preface, since it was written later. The term is used only once in the later part of the book. For a book on the process called the phenomenology of Spirit, it is surprising how little the term is actually used in the book. As far as I can determine, Hegel did not use the term in his much earlier expressions of his system that are extant today. So the first use of term "phenomenology" was in the last chapter where Hegel wrote "Whereas the phenomenology of Spirit each moment is the difference of knowledge and Truth, and is the movement in which that difference is cancelled, Science on the other hand does not contain this difference and the canceling of it." (Phenomenology of Spirit Paragraph 805). ("Wenn in der Phänomenologie des Geistes edes Moment der Unterschied des Wissens und der Wahrheit und die Bewegung ist, in welcher er sich aufhebt, so enthält dagegen die Wissenschaft diesen Unterschied und dessen Aufheben nicht..."). It is important to note that Hegel did not italicize the phrase "phenomenology of Spirit." This means that Hegel in the first use of the term did not think of it as the title of the book; it was rather a process. The phenomenology of Spirit can be considered as the appearance of Spirit self-unfolding and coming to itself. B. The Central Issues of the Purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit: Ferrer's Fundamental Interpretation 1. The Phenomenology of Spirit and Plato's Allegory of the Cave Plato's allegory of the cave starts at the beginning of the seventh book of the dialogue within Plato's Republic (514 a2 to 517 a7). The people are chained in the cave and see only the shadows. They do not know that they are seeing only shadows of real things. Plato tells the story of their escape from the cave and how they go outside into the sunlight. The allegory is similar to Hegel's "story" of the Science of the experience of consciousness namely that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the journey from inside the cave outside into the sunlight. Heidegger used this allegory for his analysis of "Plato's doctrine of Truth" (1931/3 pub 1940). Although Heidegger did not make the connection, it is obvious by analogy that this is what Hegel was doing in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Science of Logic is then the true form, namely, the ideal form (ideos/edios) outside of the cave in the sunlight. Hegel gave us a very important clue for the analogy and for the book in general, in the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit where Hegel said '...the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science (Wissenschaft) (Phenomenology of Spirit paragraph 78). (...ausführliche Geschichte der Bildung des Bewusstseins selbst zur 93 Wissenschaft). The German word "Bildung" is used by German translators to translate the Greek word "paideia" into German. The term is used at the beginning of the allegory of the cave. In the cave the people remove the chains and leave the cave; this is their education in the same way that Hegel thinks of the "education of consciousness." The people head toward the sunlight; the image of the sun is the idea (idea) of the good (agathon). In one of the last sections of the Science of Logic, there is the section entitled "The Idea of the Good" (et P. 818-823). This shows a connection between Plato and Hegel and gives a deeper look at Hegel's work. There are linkages between the content of the Phenomenology of Spirit and the Science of Logic. Hegel went on to include history or historical consciousness in a way that no other philosopher had included in his thinking. For Hegel, this was not pure consciousness stripped of its historicalness. Self-consciousness and "We" were and are all included in the stuff of history. Therefore, Hegel led self-consciousness to the last chapter, on the Absolute Knowing. The idea of the good is the absolute Spirit and truth that Hegel has thought of right at the end of the book. Self-consciousness and "We" are on the way to absolute Knowing (Das absolute Wissen). The Phenomenology of Spirit is the path through the stages, the moments, the shapes of consciousness and their relation to the objects (including history, education of consciousness) on the way to Science. There is a religious dimension to the system. Hegel included a section in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion entitled "The metaphysical otion or Conception of the Idea of God." Hegel declared "The metaphysical otion of God here means that we have to speak only of the pure Notion which is real through its own self. Spirit or the Absolute Idea is what appears simply as the unity of the otion and reality in such a way that the otion in itself represents totality..." (E.T., p. 348). Hegel thought something similar in the Science of Logic "God as absolute Spirit which alone is the true nature of God." (E.T. p. 5 7). The absolute Idea is more connected with the Science of Logic, but we still have absolute Knowing in the Phenomenology of Spirit. This is tied to Hegel's ontotheological metaphysics so this means that the absolute Spirit is the true nature of God. Thus this is the path to Hegel's metaphysical God. Philosophically speaking we are on shake grounds, when we base an analogy on top of an allegory, but I think he gives us a clear understanding of the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit and Science of Logic within the Hegelian metaphysical/theological system. 2. Where to Begin a Metaphysical System? Hegel in the early unpublished text "Logic and Metaphysics" of 1801-180 wrote "I believe that only Logic can serve as an introduction to philosophy..." (Translation in Forster p. 589). This important and central issue is how to start philosophy or, more specifically, how to start a metaphysical system. This is one of the main issues about which Hegel seemed to change his 94 philosophical viewpoint overtime. After Hegel wrote the Preface and Introduction to the Science of Logic, the next section in the Science of Logic is not the infamous Being, Nothing, Becoming – nor is it the "General Division of Being"; the very first part of the main text starts with a deep metaphysical and speculative question namely "With What Must the Science Begin?" After Hegel wrote this section in Science of Logic, his system of first philosophy changed. His entire philosophical system changed. Hegel started this famous section with the words; "It is only in recent times that thinkers have become aware of the difficulty of finding a beginning in philosophy..." (Science of Logic, et p. 67). With this Hegel set the stage for his beginning with Logic and the real results of the task, which he called the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel hits the nail on the head with this point. Not only the beginning, but also the whole thought of creating a "system " then come to fore front and become a burning issue for Hegel. Hegel wrote "...the phenomenology of Spirit is the Science of consciousness the exposition of it, and that consciousness has for result the Notion of Science, i.e., pure Knowing." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 68). At this point, it should be noted this is the last chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit called "Absolute Knowing" (Das absolute Wissen). This point for Hegel is now pure Knowing. As Hegel noted "...pure Knowing is the ultimate absolute truth of consciousness." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 68). At this point for Hegel Logic is called pure Science. Instead of using the term "absolute" Hegel used the expression "pure." The Phenomenology of Spirit starts with "empirical and sensuous consciousness " with immediate knowledge not with mediated and pure Knowing. Hegel notes in this section "Logic presupposes the Science of manifested Spirit." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 68). The Science of manifested Spirit means the description and process of the phenomenology of Spirit as it unfolds. In other words using Plato's allegory should philosophical systems start with shadows in the cave or with world in the sunlight? The Phenomenology of Spirit starts with the shadows and shows "us" the direction up to the sunlight. We can then consider the Logic in this allegory as our world in the sunlight. Where do philosophical or metaphysical system (systema) start? Hegel wrote at the end of this section in a parenthetical remark "(and God has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with him)." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 78). In addition, Hegel in speaking of the Logic as the system of reason, in the realm of pure thought; he noted "...this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite Spirit. (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 50). This is a very powerful image of the place of God within the context of Hegel's theological metaphysics. God's true nature is as the absolute Spirit. The Phenomenology of Spirit leads to the absolute Spirit, but the Science of Logic is exposition of God before creation. 95 These parts in the Logic are the categories in mind of God before creation. In another part of the Logic, namely, the Introduction Hegel indicated that the chapters and explanations are "...to facilitate a preliminary survey and strictly are only of historical value." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 54). So, the Phenomenology of Spirit is dealing with history, plus, the Science of Logic content is of "only historical value." Hegel is making the point at some level that this is not "absolute" and "pure" anything. Hegel's philosophical system is in history in some fundamental way. The "We" (from Hegel's point of view or standpoint) are in history. Even the "reader" or the "writer" of the Science of Logic is engaged in a process that is "in" history. The purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit was to lead to the absolute Spirit, to the absolute pure Knowing, which is Science or the actual standpoint of Science. The Science of Logic is pure Science and presupposes the Phenomenology of Spirit. Hegel noted "The otion of pure Science its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 49). Hegel is leading us up the ladder to the Science of Logic to the absolute beginning. At this point, the Phenomenology of Spirit is driving us to the beginning of Science of Logic, that is, in a general sense to Science and Philosophy. But, this is not Philosophy in the normal sense, but rather, Philosophy as Hegel thought of his speculative metaphysical system. Science of Logic is the pure Science. Philosophy does not start as the Phenomenology of Spirit does with Sense Certainty (Die sinnliche Gewissheit). Philosophy for Hegel started with logic thought of as a metaphysical system. The Phenomenology of Spirit takes us (the "We" of historical consciousness) up to the door, or, in our other analogy, it takes us out of the cave into the light. Philosophy has an absolute beginning, and that beginning is God or the absolute Spirit for Hegel. The absolute metaphysical system must have a beginning, and that beginning is not the Phenomenology of Spirit; rather it is the Science of Logic, or the beginning just simply starts with the Hegelian logic as such. The Phenomenology of Spirit is only the ladder to the absolute beginning. 3. The Final Goal for Hegel's is the Absolute Notion – Methodology and Movement of the System Part of our general misunderstanding of Hegel's system is that we some how think of it as a static system. Hegel's system actually is essential in motion. Hegel wrote in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy "Here we see land; there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my Logic" (E.T. Vol 1 p. 79). Heraclitus was the first philosopher who started his system with change; 'all-is-flux' is his motto. Hegel's system is always a "process" system. There is nothing static about Hegel's system so the key is to bring that "processing" ('all-is-in-motion) into our interpretation of Hegel. Hegel is not 96 defending the status quo as a static end. The dialectic is the engine of motion and movement within his system. Hegel's system is describing the world (not a static world) as in motion. Hegel pointed out in the Science of Logic, that his method alone is true. The rest the material within his book is of ''only historical value." Hegel wrote in the last chapter on the "Absolute Idea " that the "method is only the movement of the otion itself." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 8 6). This method is the motor that keeps the system in motion. But the method is "in" the world as well so it is not ust a "sub ective" aspect added on to the world; rather it is in the world itself. Hegel wrote: By virtue of the nature of the method just indicated, the Science (Wissenschaft) exhibits itself as a circle returning upon itself, the end being wound back into the beginning, the simple ground by mediation; this circle is moreover a circle of circles, for each individual member as ensouled by the method is reflected into itself, so that in returning into the beginning it is at the same time the beginning of the new member. (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 842). At this point we begin to see Hegel's true philosophy his fundamental thinking about how his system is put together. The Phenomenology of Spirit in general does not consider methodology issues, whereas, the Science of Logic has a number of detailed sections which discuss methodology. The most important is the last section on the "Absolute Idea." This is part of the infamous dialectical method that Hegel put forth as his methodology (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 831). The circle of circles has an interesting connection to Kant, when he said in the later part of the Critique of Pure Reason "Reason is driven by a propensity of its nature to go beyond its use in experience...and to find peace only in the completion of its circle in a self-subsisting systematic whole." (CPR A798/B8 6). (In German Die Vernunft wird durch einen Hang ihrer atur getrieben, über den Erfahrungsgebrauch hinauszugehen, und nur allererst in der Vollendung ihres Kreises in einem für sich .... bestehenden systematischen Ganzen, Ruhe zu finden). Reason finds its peace in the circle, which is in the systematic whole of a complete and absolute metaphysical system. Kant wanted and knew that reason would lead to the science of a metaphysical system, but he did not make it up the mountain. Hegel said in the Preface, "Through this movement the pure thoughts become otions (Begriffe) and come to be what they are in truth: self-movements circles that which is their substance spiritual entities." (Kaufmann's translation E.T., p. 52). ( In German, Durch diese Bewegung werden die reinen Gedanken Begriffe, und sind erst, was sie in Wahrheit sind, Selbstbewegungen, Kreise, das, was ihre Substanz ist, geistige Wesenheiten). Hegel did not speak of dialectic in the Preface, but Nietzsche had some interesting things to say about the general nature of dialectics. 97 Nietzsche wrote: One chooses dialectic only when one has no other means. One knows that one arouses mistrust with it, that it is not very persuasive. Nothing is easier to erase than a dialectical effect: the experience of every meeting at which there are speeches proves this. It can only be self-defense for those who no longer have other weapons. (Twilight of the Idols, 1888). Heidegger does not have much sympathy for dialectics either. ietzsche concluded "The most valuable insights are arrived at last; but the most valuable insights are methods." (Will to Power, 469 1888 E.T. p. 61). Hegel's method was unmistakably one of the most important parts of his philosophical thinking. For Hegel, philosophy required a very specific methodology to become Science (Philosophy). Hegel indicated in the Preface, where in a more personal way he used the word "I:" The true shape in which truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science to the goal where it can lay aside the title 'love of knowing' and be actual knowing – that is what I have set myself to do. (Phenomenology of Spirt, E.T., p. 3) As to the main purpose of Phenomenology of Spirit here he said "...goal is the revelation of the depth of Spirit and this is the absolute otion." (Phenomenology of Spirit paragraph 808). (... Ziel ist die Offenbarung der Tiefe, und diese ist der absolute Begriff). In the Phenomenology of the Spirit, the goal is first the absolute Notion and then, secondarily, the goal is absolute Knowing. The absolute Notion and absolute Knowing are both the goals at the end of the journey (remember the cave). The purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit, is to raise consciousness to self-consciousness and onward to the path where ("We") consciousness in general finds the absolute otion. Hegel said this about his method and that means the otion as well. He notes "The method itself by means of this moment expands itself into a system." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 838). Hegel rarely wrote about his system, so this important idea is a distinctive link among the Notion, the method, and the system. Hegel clearly said that the "...the absolute method, which has the Notion for its soul and content... (Science of Logic E.T. p. 839). Think about the nature of "the absolute method." Who today would claim to have "the absolute method"? To continue he also used the expression the " otion as otion" (p. 817). Therefore, philosophers can see (pure, absolute, eternal) Notions as the ideas in the sunlight of Plato's cave and yet the otion is methodology and the process of the dialectics. Spirit finds its pure element of existence in the Notion. The Notion is the entelecheia that is the internal movement of spiritual reality unfolding itself. Hegel late in the Science of Logic said "In point of fact, as the principle of philosophy is the infinite free Notion, and all of its content rests on that 98 alone." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 817). In another important passage, he tied the Notion with Philosophy saying "Philosophy has the same content and the same end as art and religion; but it is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea, because its mode is the highest mode, the otion." (Science of Logic, E.T., p. 824). Thus, the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit is to get us to the standpoint of the circle of circles, namely, the pure, absolute, eternal, spiritual, ensouled reflected into itself – Notion. Hegel used the expression in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit "the seriousness of the otion" (der Ernst des Begriffs). (A. Miller's translation of this as "serious speculative effort" seems off the point). Right at the end of the Preface Hegel commented in a personal way "I find the distinctive mark of Science in the self-movement of the otion..." (Indem ich das wodurch die Wissenschaft existiert, in die Selbstbewegung des Begriffes setze). This plainly points to the importance that the otion has for Hegel's system. The final goal for Hegel's is the absolute Notion; this is his methodology, movement, and the content of his metaphysical system. Conclusion To summarize to this point, the purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit is by analogy like Plato's allegory of the cave in the Republic. It is the movement from the shadows out of the cave into the sunlight. The purpose of the Phenomenology of Spirit is to bring us to an absolute beginning. The Phenomenology of Spirit is the ladder to the absolute beginning as the Science of Logic. The third point is the Phenomenology brings the system to the point of the absolute otion which are both the methodology and the movement of Hegel's metaphysical system. Hegel, in the public announcement about the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) said the following: "It considers the preparation for Science from a standpoint which makes it a new interesting Science and the first Science in philosophy." (Forster p. 61 ). This is the exactly the point about which Hegel changed his mind as he worked on his system after publishing the Phenomenology of Spirit, namely, where his First Science is philosophy. Clearly, Hegel stepped back from the Phenomenology of Spirit after he wrote it. This is evident from what he wrote in his letters and the fact that he never used the Phenomenology of Spirit in his lectures. Hegel changed his mind. The Jena (1807) Phenomenology of Spirit was too subjective. The Phenomenology of Spirit's starting point was not philosophy or Science. Hegel concluded that Philosophy is the highest mode of apprehending the absolute Idea through the Notion. Why would Hegel have started with sense certainty as he did in the Phenomenology of Spirit? How are the patterns of consciousness, self-consciousness, Reason, Spirit, in their self-unfolding a concern of Philosophy? The education of consciousness through history to Philosophy is important, but it is not Philosophy in the Hegelian sense. 99 The later Hegel saw in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline a special place for the location of phenomenology "phenomenology of Spirit and consciousness " is between "Anthropology and the Soul" as the first section of the Spirit and then the section that follows the phenomenology is called "Psychology and the Spirit." In other words the Hegelian order is anthropology, phenomenology, and then psychology. From this point of view, some philosophers have suggested that the phenomenology is just a kind of bad historical sociology that fits between anthropology and psychology. There is a much bigger general issue here, namely, philosophical anthropology. Heidegger says, "Having become philosophical anthropology philosophy itself perishes of metaphysics." ('Overcoming Metaphysics', 1946, E.T., p. 99). Husserl and Heidegger attacked and counterattacked each other over the issue of their philosophies as philosophical anthropology only. Most modern philosophers were general attacked by Heidegger as being merely philosophical anthropologists. Of course, Heidegger connected this position to the metaphysical tendencies of contemporary philosophy. Husserl, in his attack on philosophical anthropology mentioned Dilthey and Max Scheler (18741928), but Heidegger was the one who irks him the most. In his famous essay, Husserl started out saying "As is well known over the last decade some of the younger generation of German philosophers has been gravitating with ever increasing speed toward philosophical anthropology." ("Phenomenology and Anthropology", Husserl. June 1931. E.T., p. 485). Part of his attack was the stinging remarks Husserl made about Heidegger that Being and Time was only philosophical anthropology. To return to the problem of Hegel Hegel's main thinking was not the transcendental move by Kant or later by Husserl. Hegel was not in the dogmatic tradition of Christian Wolff (16791754), nor was he following in the skeptical tradition of Gottlob Schulze (1761-1833). Hegel's own unique thinking was his formulation of the Notion as absolute Spirit unfolding itself. Hegel pulled back from the Phenomenology of Spirit because of the same philosophical anthropology issues that came between Husserl and Heidegger. Heidegger is part of the Hegelian countermovement. Kant said "The critical path alone is still open." (CPR, A855/B883). Hegel would have said that the actual knowledge of Science was unfolded in his metaphysical system. Kant said, "Metaphysics must be Science not only as a whole but in all its parts otherwise it is nothing." (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, 1783). Hegel would have agreed with Kant and said that he had produced such a Science of actual knowing (see above), namely, the metaphysics of the absolute Spirit, which started with the Phenomenology of Spirit, then moved onward to the Science of Logic, and finally, to the two concrete Sciences – namely, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit. This would then "complete the System of Philosophy" (Science of 100 Logic E.T. p. 9). This means Hegel's "System of Philosophy " as a whole is the complete absolute metaphysical system. A. Final Thoughts ow it is clear what Hegel's intention were for the Phenomenology of Spirit. This interpretation shows how the Phenomenology of Spirit fits in the entire system and how it is part of Hegel's more mature thinking in his complete system, namely, in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline. Hegel foresaw the problem of philosophical anthropology and came up with a new basis for a metaphysical system. Heidegger wanted to overcome and leave all metaphysical systems behind. In Heidegger's second magnum opus entitled Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning) he said "The time of 'systems' is over." (E.T. p. 4). Hegel's is the epitome and the most complete metaphysical system. Heidegger did not understand the purpose of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit nor did he confront and shatter Hegel's absolute complete metaphysical system (absolute idealism). Heidegger attempted to go around Hegel; he could not go through Hegel. Hegel's philosophy still determines our philosophical reality! B. Research Questions Where does Hegel's specific use of the term otion/Concept (der Begriff) come from? Historical usage? The last chapter in the Phenomenology of Spirit is "absolute Knowing" and the last chapter in the Science of Logic is the "absolute Idea" then why did he not use expression "the otion" as part of the chapter heading? What is left out of Hegel's system and why? Where is Hegel on the irrationalism issue? Is there any room for faith in Hegel's metaphysical system? His ontology seems to be theology and his theology is in his ontology, so where is faith in the system? There does not seem to be any need for faith. ietzsche said "The will to system is lack of integrity." (Der Wille zum System ist ein Mangel an Rechtschaffenheit). What kind of dialogue could Hegel have with a philosopher like Nietzsche? Heidegger in his work on ietzsche said this about Hegel "And in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) Hegel grasps the essence of Being as knowing, but grasps knowing as essentially identical to willing." (Nietzsche Volume I E.T. p. 35). What does Heidegger mean that Hegel's understanding of Being is (Sein) "Being as will" in the Phenomenology of Spirit? Is there some text within the Phenomenology of Spirit that supports Heidegger's point here? Alfred Denker makes an interesting point about the use of expression "the Absolute" in German Idealism. He said "Das Unbedingte and das Absolute are interchangeable." Das Unbedingte is the unconditioned. How should we understand the meaning of the expression "absolute or 101 Absolute" in German Idealism? (See his article "Three Men Standing over a Dead Dog" in Schelling: Between Fichte and Hegel). Bibliography Martin Heidegger's works referenced: Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes. 1930/1931. By Martin Heidegger. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1980. Gesamtausgabe (GA32). Translated as Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1988. Holzwege. 1935-46. Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1950. Hegel's concept of experience: with a section from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit in the Kenley Royce Dove translation / by Martin Heidegger. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1970. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (GA3). Translated by Richard Taft, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1997. Heraclitus Seminar. With Eugene Fink. Translated by Charles H. Seibert, Evanston, Illinois, and Northwestern University Press, 1993. Given 1966/1967. Contributions to Philosophy: (From Enowning). (GA65). Translated by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999. Written 1936/1938. Nietzsche I: The Will to Power as Art. Edited and Translated by David F. Krell, New York, Harper & Row, 1979. Contains: "The Will to Power as Art" (GA43). The End of Philosophy. Translated and introduction by Joan Stambaugh, New York, Harper and Row, 1973. Includes, "Overcoming Metaphysics" (GA7). Written 1936/1946. Being and Time (GA2). Translated by Joan Stambaugh, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1996. Written 1926 published 1927. Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom. (GA42). Translated by Joan Stambaugh, Athens, Ohio University Press, 1984. Written in 1936 with notes added from 1941. Hegel and the Greeks. Hegel und die Griechen Lecture at the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences, July 26, 1958. (GA9). Written 1958. Hegels ursprungliche, fruheste Stellung zur Religion und Kosequenzen. (GA60). Written 1918. 102 Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart. (GA28). Written 1929. Hegel und das Problem der Metaphysik (GA80). Written 1930. Hegel. Die Negativität. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Hegel aus dem Ansatz in der Negativität (1938/9, 1941). 2 Erläuterung der "Einleitung" zu Hegels "Phänomenologie des Geistes" (1942). (GA 68). Hegel: Differenzschrift (seminar Le Thor). (GA 15). Given in 1968. Hegel: Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems. English translation by William Lovitt. "A Heidegger Seminar on Hegel's Differenzschrift." The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, XI, (3) 1980, pages 9-45. Heidegger's Hegel Courses: Fortgeschrittene: Pheneomenologische Ubunge, Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik I. Buch. 1925/1926. Ontologie des Aristoteles und Hegels Logik 1927 Anfanger: Uber Idealismus und Realismus im Anschluss an dei Hauptvorlesungen (Hegels 'Vorrede' zur Phänomenologie des Geistes). 19 9. Hegels, Phänomenologie des Geistes 1930/1931 (GA32) Hegels Jenenser Realphilosophie 1934 Hegel, Über den Staat 1934/1935 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes 1934/1935 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes 1935/1936 Hegels Metaphysik der Geschichte 1939/1940 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes und Aristotles Metaphysik, IX, X, und VI. 1942 (GA 68) Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung 1942/1943 (GA5). Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes 1943. Zu Hegels Logik, Die Logik des Wesens 1955/1956 Zu Hegels Logik, Uber den Anfang der Wissenschaft 1956/1957 103 Analysis of the "Preface" to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit This is an analysis of the "Preface" to Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. The first part of this paper will clarify the issue with regard to the changes in the title of this book that Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) wrote in 1806. I count four different titles. First title: System of Science: First Part, Science of the Experience of Consciousness (18061807). Note: Title appears on some the published books. Some books have both the first and second title pages in different places. The manuscript was essential completed October 1806. This first title can be considered the working title of the book until Hegel got closer to the publication. Second Title: System of Science: First Part, Science of the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807). Third Title: System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit. Note: This is the final title in 1807. Note: Most the books published in 1807 have this on the title page and only this title page. Fourth Title: Phenomenology of Spirit (1832). Note: title as it appears in the Collected Works.Publication begins right after Hegel's death in 1931.(Werke, Berlin, 1832-1845). Note Hegel or should we say someone has the "the" dropped. German title: Phänomenologie des Geistes or the early one Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins The book was mostly written in the city Jena during 1806. October 13, 1806 is the Napoleon entered the town of Jena. "Preface" was finished in the end of January 1807. ote: Hegel's illegitimate son Ludwig born February 5, 1807. Hegel moved to the city of Bamberg in the middle of March 1807. The System of Science: First Part: The Phenomenology of Spirit was published in April of 1807. Hegel was out of work for some of this period. He went to Bamberg to edit the newspaper; it was published seven days a week. Hegel was pro-French and proNapoleon in general in his reporting. Including many reports about Paris. In many ways the "Preface" (7 total paragraphs) can be considered the "Preface" to Hegel's whole metaphysical system but ust the "Preface" to the Phenomenology of Spirit. The Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit was unlabeled and was 16 paragraphs at the front of the book, so in fact, the Introduction functions in some way as the real preface to the 104 Phenomenology of Spirit. The Introduction was added later through the 'table of contents'. Although it is clear right from the first part of the "Preface" that Hegel does not like the idea of a 'Preface' to philosophy. Why does Hegel think a 'Preface' to Philosophy is a little bit of strange undertaking? Hegel said in his "Preface" to the Philosophy of Right (Philosophie des Rechts) "As a preface it is its place to speak only externally and subjectively of the standpoint of the work which it introduces. A philosophical account of the essential content needs a scientific and objective treatment." (This is in contrast with Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) who was always writing 'prefaces' to his books for attempts at greater clarity). The Phenomenology of Spirit as a book functions as a length 'introduction' to philosophy. One way of viewing Hegel is to see the Science of Logic (Wissenschaft der Logik) as being philosophy in realm of pure thought, from this viewpoint, then the Phenomenology of Spirit is the raising up of natural consciousness to the standpoint of philosophy or Science. For example in the Introduction Hegel says "The series of configurations which consciousness goes through along this road is, in reality, the detailed history of the education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science" (Wissenschaft). (Phenomenology of Spirit, et. p. 50). We can see this from point of view of the Science of Logic (et p. 48) where Hegel, wrote the following about the Phenomenology of Spirit "The path of this movement goes through every form of the relation of consciousness to the object and had the Concept (Begriff) of Science) for its result." The "Preface" was written several months after the book was essentially finished. The Introduction spoke only of the "Science of the Experience of Consciousness". Please note and think about this implications: Hegel did not use the term "phenomenology" in the Introduction. Many scholars think that the Introduction was one of the first parts of the book that was written and the "Preface" was written last. Remember: Science (Wissenschaft) is really for Hegel what we call metaphysics or philosophy; this is not natural science like we use the term today. "Metaphysics must be Science, not only as a whole but in all its parts otherwise it is nothing." (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, I. Kant, 1783, in German, Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können). Hegel took this dictium as his guidle principal: philosiophy is a Science and in German the word used at that time was Wissenschaft. In a few places, Kant used the expression in German: "szientifische" for science. What is the nature and essence of philosophy for Hegel? What is philosophy as a Science? 105 What is philosophy as full-blown metaphysical system? What is a System of Science for Hegel? Why must philosophy, Science, and metaphysics be a system? Aristotle's words: epistêmê entelecheia alêtheia eidos, energeia, dialektikê. How does Hegel take Aristotle thought and re-work to become German Idealism? Hegel's "system" issues: unity differences movement of stages process content as Spirit wants to include everything in the world, God, methodology, transitions from each part to the next part, etc. The following 19 questions are formulated from an outline of Hegel's own table of contents for the "Preface"(1807): 1) What is scientific knowledge? An aggregate of information is not scientific knowledge. You also need to know the whole system through its history and its progression and development. The course of the history of philosophical systems or the metahistory of philosophy leads through a progression. The bud to the blossom example. This is Hegel's thinking on the negativity that drives the motion and inner development and progression through history, consciousness, philosophical systems, etc. A motion and a flux those are always moving. Process with a big 'P'. Process in general or change as such. Scientific knowledge, philosophical knowledge (system, metaphysics) is the seriousness of the Concept/Notion/Begriff. 2) How is the element of truth is in the Concept and its true form the scientific system? Hegel speaks of the goal of the project, which is absolute knowing and hence, truth is only as the Concept and we need a scientific system of Concepts. For Hegel sees the goal as where metaphysics can "lay aside the title 'love of knowing' and be actual knowing – that is what I have set myself to do." Hegel is going to give us a full-blown metaphysics system, that is, not a Kantian Propaedeutic or Prolegomena to metaphysics. The content will be fully worked out and given. The absolute Concept is truth when it is in the form of a complete scientific system. This is not a question of religion or divine love or felt or feeling or intuition; but rather, a question of truth in its true form. Who is Hegel in dialogue with in this section? (Eschenmayer, Gorres, Herder, Jacobi, F. Schlegel, Schleiermacher, Schelling, J. Wagner). Clearly, in dialogue with Kant and Fichte on the meaning of Science as a metaphysical system. On the Greek side, Aristotle on the issue of episteme, that is, as a group of certain truths about the essences of all things. 106 3) What is the present position of the Spirit? We have started a new age or a new period in world history. The spirit is never at "rest but always engaged in ever progressing motion". For Hegel this was the birth of new modern world. The French Revolution of 1789 was a tremendous impact on the young Hegel. He was a part of the pro-French element inside German areas. This was the time of dukes and the Prussian King. Hegel wanted a new birth of freedom. 4) How the principal is not the completion and why against formalism? In the section, Hegel is making a rather general point. Philosophers can have lots of details and "drag a lot of material" into their analysis but this is simply 'formal' material. We need "absolute actuality" not ust some kind of empty formalism. These points are generally thought to be aimed at Schelling philosophy of nature. 5) What is the meaning of expression the absolute is subject? There are three philosophers being mentioned in this short section. Substance (Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), the opposite view (Gottfried Wilhelm Freiherr Von Leibniz (1646-1716), the intuited unity of thought and Being (Schelling's Identity philosophy). Schelling has a strong contra movement to Spinoza. Hegel wanted to include him in his uplift of earlier philosophical systems. For Hegel his position is the absolute is subject as well as substance. I think this points to Hegel's philosophical position of absolute idealism where the absolute Spirit is also the unity/identity of subject and substance. They are in Hegel's speculative thinking the "Same". This sameness needs to be thought within Hegel's metaphysical unity of sub ect/ob ect. In his early essay, The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy (1801) (Die Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie). Hegel tries to over overcome the objective subject-object and subjective subject-object dichotomies of Fichte and Schelling. For example Hegel says in that essay "Identity has been constituted in Fichte's system only as subjective subject-object. This requires an objective subject-object for its completion, so that the Absolute presents itself in each of the two and turns out to be complete only in both together." (et. p. 7 ). The goal for Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit is absolute knowing, and in the Science of Logic the goal is the absolute Idea, and in the last section (objective Spirit) of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse) the goal is absolute Spirit. Remember Hegel said in the Science of Logic "God as absolute Spirit which alone is the true nature of God." (et. p. 5 7) 6) What does it mean – what this is? 107 There are a couple of important points in this section. The famous remark "The true is the whole". This means only the whole thing is true not ust some parts. You need the whole in its development. Again, the idea of change and motion being contained in the system. The true is as a system, which is substance essentially as subject. This speaks of the absolute as Spirit. This leads to the last part of this section where "spirit knows itself as spirit is Science". Just before this he makes some more speculative statements about the self-generation of the pure Concept as being "existence for itself an ob ect reflected into itself". This is Hegel way of trying to work through the problem of the term "Concept" sounding like a something "sub ective" inside our mind. This is OT true for Hegel. The Concept is "ob ective" and inside things as their inner nature. To use Aristotle here to speak of the entelecheia. This is the complete reality or perfection of objects and things in their objectness, but not as some-thing static – rather, in motion towards its inner end. The absolute Spirit and the absolute idealism is when our subjective Concept comes in to some kind of unity or sameness with the objective Concept or entelecheia, which is objectively in objects and things. These are not just physical objects like trees, but rather, objects like the family, ethics, the state, art, religion, and philosophy. 7) What is the element of knowledge? Philosophy must give us a ladder to the standpoint of Science. This is one of main purposes or tasks of the Hegelian project called the Phenomenology of Sprit, namely, is to give us the knowledge whereby we can obtain the standpoint of Science. Hegel wrote in a letter to his friend Karl Windischmann "It is science which had led you into the labyrinth of the soul and science alone is capable of leading you out again and healing you" (1810 quoted by T. Pinkard). The Hegelian science can heal you. 8) What is the ascent into this is the Phenomenology of Spirit? This project is a voyage of discovery for Hegel and through him for consciousness. This is consciousness in its early stages. This is the education of consciousness through history up to the standpoint of Science. We cannot just simply jump to the absolute Spirit. The progress is development and progression of consciousness. This is a special kind of education of consciousness that has been done through history and the work of the world spirit through history. There are stages or shapes of consciousness on that voyage toward the absolute (unconditioned) knowing. One can think of this project as trip through the cave out into the light of day. The mature or later Hegel will refer to the Phenomenology of Spirit as his own voyage of discovery. 9) How the transmutation of the Notion/Concept/Begriff and familiar into the thought? 108 This is a bit of confused section, but two thoughts are at work in this section. One thought is that absolute power it shown by the Understanding (note capital 'U'). The second point of Hegel is that Spirit somehow has to go through the circle of moment, stages, shapes that is the "absolute dismemberment". The second thought is important for his own system and is linked to the remarks about the 'absolute being shot of a pistol". The system has a unity but it also must have parts. The big Hegel system comes in three parts: logic, nature, and spirit or to use Descartes, substantia infinita, res extensa, and res cogitans. There is negativity underneath which helps bring the system apart and push it forward through the stages or moments. 10) What does it mean – and this into the Concept/Notion/Begriff? Hegel says in this section "Through this movement the pure thoughts become Concepts and come to be what they are in truth: self-movements, circles, that which is their substance, spiritual entities." This movement furthermore is "the nature of the scientific method in general". These ideas point to more than the Phenomenology of Spirit this rather leads to the Science of Logic as the pure thoughts as Concepts moving in circles. It is also in the Science of Logic that Hegel thinks through the dialectics and the methodology for logic and his metaphysical system. The circles within pure thought (Concepts) move dialectically with the negativity pushing the moments or stages of system as it expands itself. (See also paragraph 17 in the Preface). With this section the Phenomenology of Spirit is concluded. Spirit prepared itself in the element of absolute knowing (goal) but its time to move on to the "true in the form of the true" namely true infinite free Concepts (i.e. Logic). 11) In what way is the Phenomenology of Spirit is negative or contains what is false? The Phenomenology of Spirit has as its contents the voyage of the historical shapes of selfconsciousness (education of self-consciousness) to absolute knowing. The earlier moments or stages or shapes of self-consciousness are not false. They are just points on the journey. In this same way, the Phenomenology of Spirit as the entire journey is not false, since it helps natural consciousness to rise up to the point of Science or "true in the form of the true" or the Science of Logic. Hegel in the early unpublished text "Logic and Metaphysics" of 1801-180 wrote "I believe that only Logic can serve as an introduction to philosophy..." (Translation in Forster p. 589). Whereas here we see Hegel is arguing that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the introduction to philosophy. The "introduction" or "preface" for Hegel is not Science itself but these points on the journey are not false. Like the bud is not false after we have the full blossom of the flower. 12) What is the relationship to historical and mathematical truth? These truths are not philosophical truths. Hegel late in the Science of Logic said "In point of fact, as the principle of philosophy is the infinite free Concept, and all of its content rests on 109 that alone." (Science of Logic, et p. 817). These truths are not the infinite free Concept. They have an "indifferent external lifeless content". Schelling at a high opinion of math. This was also connected to Schelling attempted use of the Spinoza's geometric method. Kepler and ewton was also on Hegel's mind as applied mathematics. 13) What is the nature of philosophical truth and its method? Truth is the Concept in the process of the whole movement of the system. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) said, Regula IV, "Method is necessary for discovering the truth of nature." Hegel points to method and the method is in the Logic. The method is also the way of describing the metaphysical system. He is not doing philosophy as arguing one points versus another point, rather, this is a metaphysical system unfolding the world in history as a process. 14) Why be against formalism? Hegel's Science is not formalism or idealism or dogmatism but rather the Concept as absolute Idealism. Hegel is in dialogue here with Friedrich Joseph Schelling (17751854) and of course Kant. Fichte has a version of what Hegel called formal idealism. Hegel's view was much more organic and living. 15) What are the demands of the study of philosophy? The famous remark "study of science is taking upon oneself the exertion or hard labor of the Concept". This means that we have to think in the Hegelian Conceptual thinking. It is not easy. 16)In what way is argumentative thinking in its negative attitude? Determined negativity becomes part of the positive process of the system. 17) In what way in its positive attitude or its subject? Hegel said "the element of dialectical movement is the pure Concept". Here Hegel does explain a few parts of his dialectical method. At the end of this section Hegel makes the strong point about the content of philosophy. Hegel's metaphysical system will later fill in all of the details for a complete full-blown metaphysical system in all of its parts. This is contrast to Kant who wanted to develop a full-blown metaphysical system, but instead got stuck on foundational issues. ote even the terms of Kant's works for example the three 'critiques' are foundational. In addition, note the titles of some of Kant are other work: The Goundwork (Foundation) for the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics (1783), Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science (1786). In German, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten; Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können; Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft. 110 18) What does it mean natural philosophizing as health common sense and as genius? Again Hegel says "True thoughts and scientific insights are won only through the work or labor of the Concept". Or you can take the vulgar road in your night cloths or in the high priest's robes; however, you will not be in the Hegelian system. 20) What is the author's (i.e. Hegel) relation to the public? Right at the end of the "Preface" Hegel commented in a personal way "I find the distinctive mark of Science in the self-movement of the Concept..." The final goal for Hegel's is the Concept; this is his methodology, movement, and the content of his metaphysical system. This says it all! How did Hegel apply this to a system? Hegel's Major Writings: Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (1801) Glauben und Wissen (1802) Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) Wissenschaft der Logik (1812/1813, 1816, 1832) Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830) Philosophie des Rechts (1820) Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Kunst (1823) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion 111 Hegel's Dialogue with Lesser Known Philosophers "Metaphysics must be Science, not only as a whole, but in all its parts otherwise it is nothing". (Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, I. Kant, 1783). When we read a thinker like G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) one way of interpreting his writings is to think about who Hegel is in dialogue with. Who is he thinking about when he was writing? For example, is he arguing against Kant's position or some one else? When he is writing about Being is he thinking about Parmenides? Who is Hegel in dialogue with? Hegel often makes references to well known philosophers like Kant, Leibniz, Spinoza, Plato, and Aristotle. But let us look at one of Hegel's major writing. In one the first footnotes in Hegel's Science of Logic (Introduction), there are footnotes to the System of Logic (System der Logik: ein Handbuch für Lehrer und zum Selbstgebrauch, published in 1811) by Jacob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) (et p.52). Another philosopher that is mentioned early in Hegel's book, in the section on Being, is a reference to Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), his Treatise on the Undertaking of the Critical Philosophy to Bring Reason to Understanding. Jacobi gets a number of quotes and footnotes in this section (et p.95-7). Do you know who Fries and Jacobi were in the history of philosophy? Who are these lesser known philosophers? Are they important for understanding Hegel? Most of the lesser known philosophers are philosophers who lived and wrote as the same time as Hegel, but who did not become well known. Although at the time, they may have been read by many and well known. In a sense most of them are only footnotes in history books now. One example is F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) who was well known at the time. However, in the twentieth century we have philosophers like Bertrand Russell's; in his book on the history of philosophy (A history of Western Philosophy) he makes the following remark, "His (Fichte) immediate successor Schelling as more amiable, but not less subjective. He was closely associated with the German romantics; philosophically, though famous in his day, he is not important." (p.718). So, for some philosophers Schelling lands in the dustbins of history. On the other hand, Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) said this about Schelling, "Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy". (Schelling's treatise on the essence of human freedom, p. 4). Heidegger ranks Schelling above Hegel and Fichte. 112 Some of these philosophers published just before Hegel time and were connected with the flowering of Kant's philosophy. A primary example during Hegel's time is Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), who was well known during this period. Hamann was one of Kant's closes friends and yet, Kant argued against him in a number of publications. Hamann has an irrationalistic theory of faith and in general was against Englightment. It is historically interesting that Hegel toward end of his life in 1828 is writing about "Hamann's Writings" in the Jahrbücher für wissenschaftliche Kritik, which is some forty years after Hamann death. But obviously Hamann is not as well known some two hundred years later. Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788), one person who wrote about him said, " 'magus of the north', a Protestant mystic who disliked the analytical rationalism of the Enlightenment and saw more creative power in feeling, language, and especially poetry, the 'mother-tongue of the human race'" Schelling is more well known today than Hamann, but nether of them are as famous as Kant or Hegel. There are also a group of philosophers that people think Hegel is making reference to with certain expressions. For example, there is a recent article by George Di-Giovanni where he argues the phrase that Hegel uses in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, " producing the Absolute at once, as if from a pistol', is intended for Jakob Fries; rather than, as normally assumed, for Schelling. However, first we need to a short review of the: Pantheism Controversy In July of 1780 Gotthold Lessing supposedly told Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) that he was some kind of a Spinozist. After Lessing died, then Jacobi starting exchanging letters with Mendelssohn about Lessing confession about being a follower of Spinoza. Spinozism is also linked with the position of Pantheism. Mendelssohn was getting ready to publish a book called Morning Hours about Pantheism, so Jacobi heard about Mendelssohn book and he rushed to publication a book of their letters called On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mr. Mendelssohn (1785). Jacobi basic position was that Spinoza's Substance led to rationalism and rationalism leads to Pantheism, and Pantheism leads to atheism. On the other side, Jacobi position leads to faith. So, Jacobi wanted philosophers to decide on which side they were on with regards to the two horns of the dilemma. Either you are with reason or faith. In a sense it was either rationalism/atheism or theology. Which do you choose? 113 As Alfred Denker explains in his article "Three Men Standing over a Dead Dog. The Absolute as Fundamental Problem of German Idealism" with rationalism you can explain the world but you have the burden of determinism and fatalism. Kant was drawn into the debate and published a short article called "What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking" (October 1786). Kant took Mendelssohn side in the debate, but developed his position through rational faith on moral and some might say religious grounds. He tried to include faith. Remember the famous remark of Kant's in the Critique of Pure Reason, "Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith..." (CPR, Bxxx). Following Alfred Denker again, Jacobi's critical analysis leads German Idealism to the thorny woods of the Absolute (the unconditioned) and Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel all had to come up with a respond to Jacobi's charge of Pantheism. So, the stage was set and the philosophers had to respond. Hegel wrote essays or reviews about a number of philosophers who were his contemporaries. Some are more famous than others and some were to become famous after Hegel's death. This is a brief review of many of Hegel's contemporaries and philosophers that Hegel is in dialogue with regard to the history of philosophy and philosophy itself. Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) Fichte developed his own system of transcendental idealism, the Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 1796). Hegel says, "He wrote a treatise on Religion, termed a "Critique of all Revelation," where the Kantian phraseology is employed throughout so much so that it was thought to be the work of Kant." (History of Philosophy). Hegel then summaries his attack on Fichte with the following argument against Fichte, Hegel said, "The Fichtian standpoint of subjectivity has thus retained its character of being unphilosophically worked out, and arrived at its completion in forms pertaining to sensation which in part remained within the Fichtian principle, while they were in part the effort futile though it was to go beyond the subjectivity of the ego." (History of Philosophy) In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "Philosophy as Science (or in German Wissenschaft)" This is following Kant and Fichte. In addition, in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "nothing less than a sun-clear report" (Kaufmann's translation et p. 78). This is a clear reference to Fichte's A Sun Clear Report to the General Public Concerning the Actual Essence of the Newest Philosophy: An Attempt to Force the Reader to Understand (1801). Fichte was charged with Atheism (1798) leaves Jena for Berlin 114 (1799). Fichte's Addresses to the German Nation (1808). In 1811 he was made Rector of the University of Berlin. During the War of Liberation in 1813 Fichte canceled his lectures and went into the militia. Johanna Fichte, his wife was a nurse in a military hospital she got sick but lived. However, Johann Gottlieb Fichte got sick and died at the height of fame serving in the German militia of the time. Jakob Friedrich Fries (1773-1843) One of people that Hegel really disliked was Fries. Fries taught as University of Jena at the same time as Hegel. He wrote a book entitled, Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling (1803) where he was very critical of all of the post-Kantians. One could say that the reason Hegel published the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) was to try to get university positions before Fries got them. Fries did get a position at the University of Heidelberg in 1805 and Hegel was stunned. Fries published a book with the title of Knowledge, Faith and Intimation (1805). Fries thinks that these feelings that we have are independent of reason and understanding "Ahndung," or "intimation." Feelings (inkling, divination, presentiment) are intimations of the transcendent. Fries was a follower of Kant, but not with the Idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Rather he wanted the post-Kantians to go toward an empiricist and moralistic way. Karl Friedrich Goeschel (1784-1861) Karl Friedrich Goeschel wanted a reconciliation of Christianity with modern culture. Lived in Berlin at the same time as Hegel. In 1830, Hegel wrote of a review of Goeschel's book entitled Aphorisms on Ignorance and Absolute Knowing. Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749-1832) Goethe was one of the most famous writers of this period in German literature. Wrote Foust (1808) and Sorrows of Young Werther (1774). Very good friend of Friedrich Schiller. Strong personal connections to Hegel, dinners, letters, etc. Johann Georg Hamann (1730-1788) Hamann was one of Kant's closes friends and yet, Kant argued against him in a number of publications. Hamann has an irrationalistic theory of faith and in general was against Englightment. Was like by S. Kierkegaard. Christian Gottlieb Heinrich (1748-1810) 115 Professor of History at Jena was against the appointment of Schiller in history. Schiller later moved to philosophy. Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs (1794-1861) Professor of philosophy at University of Breslau, 1822; Professor at University Halle, 1824. In 1825 wrote on Aesthetics and Goethe's great work Faust. The title is: Aesthetische Vorlesgungen über Goethe's Faust, als Beitrag zur Anerkennung wissenschaftlicher Kunstbeurtheilung. Also wrote on tragedy. The title is: Das wesen der antiken tragödie, in ästhetischen vorlesungen durchgeführt an den beiden Oedipus des Sophokles im allgemeinen und an der Antigone insbesondere. Was a great follower of Hegel. Hegel's student from Heidelberg. Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) Herder was against the synthesis of faith and reason. His collected works are long, 33 volumes. He was one of Kant's well-known students. Attacked Enlightenment. On of the leading lights of the "Sturm und Drang" (storm and stress) movement. Friend of Hamann. In 1785, Kant published a review of Herder's work, Ideen (Ideas). Wilhelm Freiherr Von Humboldt (1767-1835) Change the school system of the times to a more humanistic way and liberal. Developed a theory of language. Was attacked by Hegel in his 1827 review, "On the episode of the Mahabharata known as the Bhagavad-Gita by Wilhelm von Humboldt". Von Humboldt vision of a university as a union of "teaching and research" remains with us today. He was always surprised that Hegel system became famous. Founder of the University of Berlin, but was not involved in its development. Wilhelm von Humboldt Gesellschaft e.V. zur Wahrung und Förderung der Bildung, der Kultur und der deutschen Sprache Did early studies of lingustics. His brother Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) was the traveler (central and south America, 1799-1804) and did natural science. Also traveled to Siberia, Ural Mountains, and Caspian Sea in 1829. I would like to thank Dr. Tze-wan Kwan, Professor and Chair, Philosophy Department, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shatin, NT, Hong Kong, People's Republic of China for pointing out the relationship between the two brothers. Back to Hegel. There is a recent translation of Hegel's work. Entitled: On The Episode of the Mahabharata Known by the Name Bhgavad-Gita by Wilhelm Von Humboldt translated by Herbert Herring, New Delhi : Indian Council of Philosophical Research : Distributed by Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1995. This is an English translation of Hegel's work, Über die unter dem namen Bhagavad-Gita bekannte episode des Mahabharata von Wilhelm von Humboldt. In some ways it is classic Hegel, since he puts this Indian work in his large context of world history. 116 Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819) He thought that our knowledge of mundane and divine matters rests, not on argument, but on feeling and faith. The one word should come to mind on Jacobi position is FAITH. In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "the unmethod of intimation' (Kaufmann's translation, et p. 74). Mostly likely he was thinking of Jacobi. He was clearly against the French revolution. Considered Goethe to be on the side of fatalism. Jacobi attack Lessing and Moses Mendelssohn. Started the Pantheism Controversy. Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842) Wilhelm Traugott Krug (1770-1842) wrote "Groundwork of Philosophy," setting forth a "Transcendental Synthesis". Wrote some awful reviews of Hegel's works. Krug followed Kant to the chair of Philosophy at University of Konigsberg (1804). Hegel wrote an early work entitled "How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (as displayed in the works of Mr. Krug)" in 1802. Krug was a common sense philosopher dressed up as a Kantian. Krug also attacked Reinhold and Fichte. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) Hegel read one of Lessing plays in his youth and made notes about in his diary and later quoted from it in Hegel's writings. The play is called Nathan der Weise (1779). Early work, On the education of the Human Race, 1778. Lessing has been considered a deist, a theist, a Spinozistpantheist, a panentheist and most likely some kind of atheist. Lessing remarks about Spinzoa that started the great Pathenism Controversy in the late 1700s. Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786) popular philosopher rationalism. Defended orthodox theology based on reason. Wrote letters to Kant. He was model for Lessing play, Nathan der Weise (1779). Work on fine art and aesthetics. Loved poetry, wrote Hebrew poems at the age of 10. Novalis (1772-1801) 117 Novalis. His real name was Friedrich Leopold Friedrich Baron von Hardenberg Romantic Movement in Jena 1799. Wrote a novel entitled, Hymns to the Night. (Hymnen An Die Nacht). This was written after the untimely death of fiancée at the age of 14. He defines Philosophy as homesickness, as the need to be at home in all places. Hegel said this about Novalis, Subjectivity signifies the lack of a firm and steady basis, but likewise the desire for such, and thus it evermore remains a yearning. These yearnings of a lofty soul are set forth in the writings of Novalis. This subjectivity does not reach substantiality, it dies away within itself, and the standpoint it adopts is one of inward workings... (History of Philosophy). Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758-1823) Made Kant famous person. Reinhold taught Kantian philosophy at the University of Jena (1787). In 1788 was teaching to classes with over 400 students. Leading interpreter of Kantian philosophy until Fichte published his Critique of All Revelation anonymously. Every one thought this book was the work I. Kant. This launched Fichte's career and made him more famous than Reinhold's Elementarphilosophie ("The Philosophy of Elements"). Reinhold also attacked Schelling. Hegel is out to defend Schelling in his early writings against the attacks of Reinhold. Reinhold's publication, The Fundamental Concepts and Principles of Ethics (1798), uses the expression "common sense". In general, he worked on Kant's philosophy and came up with a theory of consciousness. Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775-1854) F.W.J. Schelling was a roommate with G.W.F. Hegel and the famous classical poet, Fredrick Holderlin (1770-1843) at the Tubingen Stift. His first major publication Ideen zur Philosophie der Natur (1797) was published at the age of twenty-two. He was appointed to a chair of Philosophy at Jena University, 1798 (age of twenty-three). In 1803 he moved to a chair at Wurzburg University until 1806. During this time he wrote his treatise on human freedom in 1809 (age of thirty-six). This was to be his last major work published during his lifetime even though he wrote volumes more. These were not to be published in his lifetime. In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "or to pass off one's absolute as the night in which, as one says, all cows are black that is the naiveté of the emptiness of knowledge." (Kaufmann's translation, et p. 26). Hegel tried to calm Schelling down in letters even before Schelling saw this reference, but Hegel and Schelling were no longer friends after this time. 118 Much later Hegel said, It was Schelling, finally, who made the most important, or, from a philosophic point of view, the only important advance upon the philosophy of Fichte; his philosophy rose higher than that of Fichte, though undoubtedly it stood in close connection with it; indeed, he himself professes to be a Fichtian. Now the philosophy of Schelling from the first admitted the possibility of a knowledge of God, although it likewise started from the philosophy of Kant, which denies such knowledge. At the same time Schelling makes Jacobi's principle of the unity of thought and Being fundamental, although he begins to determine it more closely. (History of Philosophy). Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller (1759-1805) German philosopher and poet who wrote a series of popular "Sturm und Drang" (storm and stress) plays, including Die Räber and Wilhelm Tell. Although he criticized Kant's ethical theory in Über Anmuth und Würde (On Grace and Dignity) (1793), Schiller applied Kantian notions to the sensuous appreciation of aesthetic experience in (Briefe über die äesthetische Erziehung des Menschen) Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (1795). Hegel was greatly influence by the Schiller language and incorporated a lot terminology from Schiller into the Phenomenology of Spirit. August Wilhelm von Schlegel (1767-1845) Brother of Friedrich Von Schlegel (1772-1829). Did the standard translation of Shakespeare into German. Also did work on Sanskrit and was involved in the publishing of Indian religious text. Schlegel was general known with his brother for his involvement the early German Romantic movement. Friedrich Von Schlegel (1772-1829) Friedrich Von Schlegel. Romantic movement. Hegel said, "This first form, Irony, has Friedrich von Schlegel as its leading exponent. The subject here knows itself to be within itself the Absolute, and all else to it is vain; all the conclusions which it draws for itself respecting the right and good, it likewise knows how to destroy again. " (Philosophy of History). Studied Sanskrit. Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) 119 German philosopher and theologian. In Über die Religion. Reden an Gebildeten unter ihren Verächtern (On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers) (1799); Schleiermacher proposed that religious experience be based on human emotions (especially the feeling of dependency) rather than on reason. Also, he was the author of Der Christliche Glaube (The Christian Faith) (1822). Translated the dialogues of Plato into German, and invented the modern study of hermeneutics. There is one interesting remark about their relationship: "Hegel admired his On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799), but later came to hate him, avowedly because he rejected his view that religion rests on a feeling of 'absolute dependence'." But later Hegel polemics against Schleiermacher became so bad that the students in the lecture hall would stomp their feet in displeasure. Taught at the University of Berlin at the same time as Hegel. Schleiermacher was a great and a very polished lecturer. Hegel was the opposite. He was a great thinker, but not a very good lecturer. For Schleiermacher religion and theology is primarily neither morality (contra Kant) nor belief or knowledge (contra Hegel), but rather, an immediate self-consciousness or feeling of absolute reliance on God. He was very close friend of Friedrich Schlegel. Schleiermacher was against Napoleon as a foreign conqueror and dictator (contra Hegel and Goethe). Consider by many to be the founder of modern Protestant theology Gottlob Ernst Schulze (1761-1833) He was a skeptic and professor at Helmstadt. Became famous by attacking Reinhold and Kant's critical philosophy. Had read some of Hume. Reinhold and Fichte attacked him. Hegel also wrote a review of Schulze work in an article called "The Relation of Skepticism to Philosophy" in 1802. Taught the great Arthur Schopenhauer. In general, Schulze attack the whole idea of Kant's thing-in-itself. Schulze also published a book very close to Hegel's Encyclopedia; he called it Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, for use with Lectures (1814). Hegel wrote a very long article on 1802 entitled "On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One". The latest form is indeed Schulze. This article is basically a review of Schulze book, Critique of Theoretical Philosophy (1801). Hegel was upset with Schulze commonsensical skepticism and tried to defend ancient skepticism like Sextus Empiricus against Schulze. Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) In the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit Hegel spoke of "Comprehending God as the one substance outraged the age in which this definition was proclaimed. " (Kaufmann's translation, et p. 28). This is a reference to Spinoza. 120 Bibliography Alfred Denker "Three Men Standing over a Dead Dog. The Absolute as Fundamental Problem of German Idealism" in Schelling: Zwischen Fichte und Hegel Schelling: Between Fichte and Hegel. Grüner/Benjamins (Bochumer Studien zur Philosophie; 32), Amsterdam 2000. Dr. George Di-Giovanni article is entitled: "Wie aus der Pistole: Fries and Hegel on Faith and Knowledge" in Hegel and the Tradition: Essays in Honour of H.S. Harris, Baur, Michael (ed) The English translation is Schelling's treatise on the essence of human freedom, by Martin Heidegger. Translation by Joan Stambaugh, published by Ohio University Press, 1985. This is a translation from the German entitled: Schelling Abhandlung uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Published by Max Niemeyer Verlag Tubingen, 1971. In 1936 Heidegger gave a summer lecture series on Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). Volume 42 of the Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe is entitled: Schelling: Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen; AKA Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). 1936. Hegel's lesser known works: Although there are more 'lesser known' works of Hegel's, I thought this would show some of his publications that are directly related to this article's on lesser known philosophers. The Positivity of Christian Religion, Essay (1795) (Discuss Kant). On the Nature of Philosophical Criticism in general and its Relation to the Present Conditions of Philosophy in Particular. (1802). (Discuss Kant and Fichte, Philosophy as Science). The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's Systems of Philosophy, 1801. (Has a third section discussing Reinhold). On the Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy, Exposition of its Different Modifications and Comparison of the Latest Form with the Ancient One. (Discuss and reviews Schulze's work). How the Ordinary Human Understanding Takes Philosophy (as displayed in the works of Mr. Krug) (1802). Review of Freidrich Heinrich Jacobis Werke. Dritter Band. (1817) 121 Faith and Knowledge or the Reflective Philosophy of Subjectivity in the Complete Range of Its Forms as Kantian, Jacobian, and Fichtean Philosophy. (1802). Preface to Heinrichs Religion and its inner relationship to Science. (1822). Heinrich full title of the book is "Die Religion im inneren Verhältnisse zur Wissenschaft; nebst Darstellung und Beurtheilung der von Jacobi, Kant, Fichte und Schelling gemachten Versuche, dieselbe wissenschaftlich zu erfassen, und nach ihrem Hauptinhalte zu entwickeln." By Hermann Friedrich Wilhelm Hinrichs (1794-1861). On the episode of the Mahabharata known as the Bhagavad-Gita by Wilhelm von Humboldt. (1827). Review of Hamann's Writings (1828). Review of Goeschel's book entitled 'Aphorisms on Ignorance and Absolute Knowing'. (1830). On Lessing's letters to his wife. (Unknown, place and date of publication). Hegel's Major Writings: Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der Philosophie (1801) Glauben und Wissen (1802) Phänomenologie des Geistes (1807) [Earlier title: Wissenschaft der Erfahrung des Bewusstseins] Wissenschaft der Logik (1812/1813, 1816, 1832) Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830) Philosophie des Rechts (1820) Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte Vorlesung über die Philosophie der Kunst (1823) Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion Some notes: Hegel loved both Medoc and Pontac wines, which really cost more than he could afford. Hegel himself did not end up as a footnote in history as can be seen by the view of Hegel that Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in his early essay "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life," 1873, said this about Hegel influence: "I believe that there has been no dangerous variation or change in German culture in this century, which has not become more dangerous through the monstrous influence of the philosophy of Hegel, an influence which continues to flow right up to the present." 122 This Page Intentionally Left Blank See: Project (TPILB-Project). 123 Heidegger's Encounter with F.W.J. Schelling: The Questions of Evil and Freedom End of Metaphysics "There is no other principle of explanation for the world than divine freedom." F.W.J. Schelling. "All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare." Spinoza (Ethics, v 42). "The alpha and omega of all philosophy is freedom." From a Letter from Schelling to Hegel, February 4, 1795. Abstract Martin Heidegger through his reading of F.W.J. Schelling's treatise on human freedom comes to a critique of metaphysics. Heidegger starts with an analysis of systems in general, then pantheism, fatalism, human freedom, a metaphysics of evil, metaphysics in general, and finally the metahistorical ontological position of Being as Will. Basically Schelling's radical thinking on human freedom and evil annihilates the metaphysical foundation of Idealism and hopefully metaphysics in general. It is only after the end of metaphysics, according to Heidegger can we began a dialogue with Being and God or the gods. This work on Schelling is perhaps the most sustain discussion of traditional theological issues in Heidegger's writing. Introduction The speculative thinking of German Idealism seems far removed from our time. This paper looks at Heidegger's reading of one of the deeper thinkers of German Idealism, namely, F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854). Schelling was a young bright star of Idealism, he was highly published, but his friend G.W.F.Hegel (1770-1831) soon replaced him in the sun light. Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) publications show him as the most published philosopher and thinker of the twentieth century. Heidegger's thinking has sparked many people to write about him. He is the most written about twentieth century philosopher. This has been called the Heidegger industry. Heidegger's early theological connections are extensive. He entered as a novitiate of the Society of Jesus at Titis near Feldkirch in Austria in 1909, at the age of 19. He began studying for the priesthood at the Albert-Ludwig University in Freiburg. In 1911 abandons the theological 124 seminary changes to mathematics and philosophy. Heidegger in 1913 says "the undersigned intends to dedicate himself to the study of Christian philosophy" and the next year 1914 he says "career in the service of researching and teaching Christian-Scholastic philosophy" (The Young Heidegger p. 54). He also speaks of doing a study of the "problem of a theoretical-scientific treatment of Catholic theology" (ibid. p. 55). Now at the end of the millennium, it is time to review what has happen in the twentieth century in thinking and theology. Heidegger's first ma or publication was Being and Time in 1927 and it is his most famous work. His collected work (Gesamtausgabe) has grown to ninety volumes and is still growing. Most of these are lectures he gave to specific groups or are extensive lecture notes that were first-read to students at the University of Freiburg or Marburg. Heidegger's most documented lecture course on Schelling dates from 1936 with some notes from the summer semester 1941 at the University of Freiburg. This paper is based on the English translation of the book entitled: Schelling's treatise on the essence of human freedom, by Martin Heidegger. Clearly Heidegger's is an ontologist. The question of the meaning of Being is his fundamental question in Being and Time and remained his primary matter for thought. Through his work on ontology, philosophy, and metaphysics, he has especially influenced the theology of his friend Rudolf Bultmann among others. Who was Schelling? F.W.J. Schelling (1775-1854) was a roommate with G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) and the famous classical poet, F. Holderlin (1770-1843) at the Tubingen Stift. His first major publication Ideen zur Philosophie der Natur (1797) was published at the age of twenty-two. He was appointed to a chair of Philosophy at Jena University, 1798 (age of twenty-three). In 1803 he moved to a chair at Wurzburg University until 1806. During this time he wrote his treatise on human freedom in 1809 (age of thirty-six). This was to be his last major work published during his life time even though he wrote volumes. These were not to be published. Back to1806, he meets the theologian Franz von Baader (1765-1841) and was reading Jakob Bohme (1575-1624). Other influences on Schelling at this time were Christoph Oetinger, Paracelsus, Emanuel Swedenborg, Johann Bengel, Saint Martin, Johannes Tauler, Meister Eckhart, and Nicolaus of Cusanus. In 1841 he was called to Berlin University to try to overturn Hegel's influence after Hegel's death in 1831. In Schelling's Berlin lectures was a group of students who perhaps became more famous than Schelling himself, namely, S. Kierkegaard, J. Burckhardt, F. Engels, L. Feuerbach, and M. Bakunin. Schelling has become more famous in the twentieth century through his influence on Paul Tillich (1886-1965) and his theology. Tillich two most famous books on Schelling are: 1) The construction of the history of religion in Schelling's positive philosophy: its presuppositions and principles (originally, his thesis from 1910) and, (2) Mysticism and guilt-consciousness in Schelling's philosophical development (originally, his thesis from 1912). 125 At this moment we need to mention Bertrand Russell's A history of Western Philosophy. In the section on I. Kant (1724-1804), after discussing Fichte, (1762-1814) he ends with the following remark "His immediate successor Schelling (1775-1854) as more amiable, but not less subjective. He was closely associated with the German romantics; philosophically, though famous in his day he is not important." (p.718). B. Russell is known for writing a great many works during his life time. Perhaps he needed to do a little more reading, research, and thinking before writing. Also, A history of Western Philosophy was written under contract, so perhaps he was more interested in money than philosophy. Who said that the Sophist had a bad name in Greece? Heidegger's encounter with Schelling Heidegger has a fresh way of reading, thinking, and philosophizing with other philosophers and poets. He is not just interested in what they said, but what they wanted to say but could not say, where they get stuck, and Heidegger tries to get them unstuck. This is where Heidegger wants to have a dialogue. Heidegger is very much alive to the hermeneutical text. Part of the methodology he used in Being and Time was hermeneutics and he is responsible for rekindling this methodology in the twentieth century. In the methodological section of Being and Time, he says, "Phenomenology of human existence (Da-sein) is hermeneutics in the original signification of that word . . . " Heidegger's reading of Schelling is not as controversial as his interpretation of Kant. For the motto of this interpretation of Schelling, Heidegger approvingly quotes Schelling himself "If you want to honor a philosopher you must catch him where he had not yet gone forth to the consequences, in his fundamental thought; (in the thought) from which he takes his point in departure" (Treatise p.9). Although this is Schelling's thought Heidegger's later works mention this same motif repeatedly, as he does his own unique interpretation of the Western thought. In another work Heidegger says "The 'doctrine' of a thinker is that which is left unsaid in what he says." In a later article Heidegger says "We show respect for a thinker only when we think. This demands that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought." (The Word of Nietzsche, p. 99). To be exact Heidegger's reading of Schelling is a radical interpretation. This reading has more to do with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of metaphysics, than that of understanding Schelling's own pro ect. If you want to understand Schelling then read Schelling. On the other hand, if you want to understand Heidegger's interpretation of the history of ontology then read Heidegger. Heidegger starts his analysis with saying that "Schelling's treatise on freedom is one of those very rare works . . . " (Treatise p.4). From a different point of view, G.W.F. Hegel remarked 126 about this work "Schelling had made known a single treatise on Freedom. It is of a deep speculative nature but it stands alone. In philosophy a single piece cannot be developed" (Hegel's History of Philosophy, p.13). This tells us more about Hegel's position than his understanding of what Schelling is trying to do with his work on freedom. (A short historical digression. By this time, the two great friends, Schelling and Hegel had already had a falling out and only had a chance meeting later in life at a bath spa, Karlsbad, September 1829. After Hegel died, his son Immanuel heard Schelling lecturing in Munich and was invited to his house and seemed impressed with Schelling's and his daughters as well.) Now to return to Heidegger's work. According to Heidegger Schelling is very important for our understanding of this period. For example, he says A . . . for Schelling is the truly creative and boldest thinker of this whole age of German philosophy. He is that to such an extent that he drives German Idealism from within right past its own fundamental position (Treatise p. 4)." Our task is to see if Schelling can really get us by Idealism and metaphysics. Has metaphysics finally come to end after Idealism? It should be noted that Heidegger does not come to a generalized notion of freedom or evil. These notions are rather used in the service of his bigger project, that is, of the deconstruction of metaphysics. This is part of our problem in the understanding and the interpretation of Heidegger's work on Schelling. Heidegger takes only a glancing blow at both freedom and evil. His main sights are aimed at the foundations of ontology, theology, and metaphysics. This process has been called genealogical deconstruction or archeologies of western metaphysics. Heidegger says in Being and Time "The destructuring of the history of ontology essentially belongs to the formulation of the question of Being and is possible solely within such a formulation." (E.T. p. 0). So the purpose of this project is the same as Being and Time, namely, what is the meaning of Being. Thus, Heidegger looks at Schelling in terms of the history of ontology and metaphysics. What is Schelling's place in the history of metaphysics? Attack on the concept of Systems Beginning with Spinoza and certainly with Kant the concept of the System has been an important "driving force" in Western thought. Kant says for example in Critique of Pure Reason A13 "Transcendental philosophy is here the idea of a science for which the critique of pure reason is to outline the entire plan architectonically . . . " and in A847 "The original idea of a philosophy of pure reason itself prescribes this division; it is therefore architectonic, in conformity with its essential ends . . . " Kant's concept of system is clearly architectonic. Kant was a great system thinker, but the concept and implementation of the system clearly reach its climax in Hegel. Hegel is perhaps the greatest system thinker ever. Hegel says in his Science of Logic (181 ) "Accordingly logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure thought. It can therefore be said that this content is the 127 exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the creation of nature and a finite mind." (p. 50). In a sense GOD is the SYSTEM or GOD equals the SYSTEM. Note the whole pantheism discussion. In Hegel's thinking there is A. . . first part of the System of Science which contains the Phenomenology should be followed by a second part containing logic and two concrete sciences, Philosophy of ature and Philosophy of Spirit which complete the System of Philosophy" (p. 9). Later on Hegel's system pro ect was completed as lecture notes under the title Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences. Hegel's entire system is obviously linked to his theology. In the first part of the Science of Logic, Hegel has a section entitled "With What Must the Science Begin?". At this end of this section Hegel states: "...(and God has the absolutely undisputed right that the beginning be made with him) . . . " (p.78). This points clearly to the theological foundations of Hegel's system. Heidegger would have said this points to the onto-theological foundation of not ust Hegel's system but the metaphysics of Idealism in general. Heidegger says "God is the leading idea of system in general (Treatise p. 50)." It is hard to image German Idealism without a theology an atheist Idealism seems out of the question for these philosophers. Heidegger makes the following amazing remark about Hegel's entire system and Schelling destructive criticisms of systems in general. Heidegger says "The treatise which shatters Hegel's Logic before it was even published."(Treatise p.97). Hegel's Science of Logic is the fundamental foundation to his entire system. Once Hegel wrote his Logic the rest of his life was just working on the fine details of his system. In a sense, Hegel was finished thinking and philosophizing. All of Hegel's questions had been answered. In Heidegger's analysis of Schelling he says "Schelling shows first of all how the system is split open by the reality of evil" (Treatise p.98). Freedom leads the way for possibility of evil. Human freedom radical conceived by Schelling breaks open the system. How is freedom possible within a system? Freedom What does Heidegger's analysis of Schelling show us about freedom? Heidegger says A . . . freedom is freedom for good and evil. The 'and' the possibility of this ambiguity and everything hidden in it is what is decisive. That means that the whole concept of freedom must change." (Treatise p. 97). So, it is not good or evil. Instead, Heidegger is doing ontology and his analysis has more to do with the possibility of evil, that is, not what evil means, but that evil exists and has an ontological status. Is there really evil in the world? Does evil exist for us? 128 According to Schelling "Until the discovery of Idealism the genuine concept of freedom was lacking in all recent systems in Leibniz's ust as in Spinoza's." Schelling thinking in relation to Spinoza (1632-16770 has always been close, but he also makes reference to Leibniz (1646-1716) concept of freedom. Schelling often quotes G. W. Leibniz's Theodicy (1710), which has two ma or sections: section I "Preliminary Dissertation on the Conformity of Faith with Reason." Section two in three parts entitled "Essays on the Justice of God and the Freedom of Man in the Origin of Evil." (p.31 E.T. 1-417 paragraphs). Note the concepts of freedom of man and evil are similarly in name to Schelling's treatise; however, they are used in a much different way in Leibniz. Toward the end of his analysis Heidegger asks the question "But then why is the treatise on the system a treatise on freedom? Because evil truly existent in human freedom and as human freedom. The most extreme discord in beings is truly existent in the freedom of man (Treatise p.177)." This leads to the next section on evil. Evil I. Kant in October 1794 received a strongly worded letter from his King. This was right after Kant published his last major work entitled: Religion within the limits of reason alone (1793). The King was not happy with Kant and said: "If you continue to resist you may certainly expect unpleasant consequences to yourself" (p.xxxiv). Although he got into hot water over the publication, the major theme of the work is evil and human nature. For example, there are four books and the first is entitled: Book One. Concerning the indwelling of the evil principal with good, or, on the radical evil in human nature. Although these topics seem somewhat the same as Schelling, Kant has a much different direction. Heidegger does not make any connection with Kant in his analysis of Schelling. Although Schelling grew up reading Kant and Fichte, he seems to pay more attention to Leibniz in this work. What does evil mean for Heidegger? In his analysis of Schelling he says "Evil that is the key word for the main treatise. The question of the nature of human freedom becomes the question of the possibility and reality of evil." And AEvil itself determines the new beginning in metaphysics. The question of the possibility and reality of evil brings about a transformation of the question of Being." (Treatise p. 97). How is that possible? What is the speculative relationship between the question of Being (Sein) and evil? During Heidegger's analysis of Schelling he makes a sweeping statement "Previous systems especially Idealism, are incapable of founding a true system acknowledging the reality of evil. The next time the reflection is affirmative: the determining of the ground of the system, the essence of Being in general, must be more primordially conceived in order for evil to be comprehensible in its own being and thus introduced into the system, thus making a system of freedom possible (Treatise p.98)." This amazing statement by Heidegger does not seem to lead 129 anywhere. So far Heidegger's other writing does not follow up on this statement. Heidegger has certainly made attempts to more primordially conceive the essence, meaning, truth of Being, but the introduction of evil into the system and making a Heideggerian system of freedom has not happened. What is Heidegger's concept of freedom? So far in published writings this is not a major concept for Heidegger, but his use here is more generally to attack Idealism and metaphysics. Ontology In part of Heidegger's analysis of Being he also quotes Schelling here is the whole passage Heidegger says "Being is understood as egoity as freedom. Freedom is will. Thus, Being is originally willing. "The Will is primal being." (Treatise p. 99)." The famous quote from Schelling is "The Will is primal being." This plays into Heidegger's interpretation of Schelling's ontology. For Heidegger, Schelling is at the beginning of the 19 th century shapes Being's Metahistory with Being as Will, which begun with Kant. Freedom is Will, Being is Will, this then leads us in the late 19 th century to Schopenhauer's central work The World as Will and Representation and Nietzsche's ma or pro ect (starting in 1877) which he called the "Will to Power " and he restarted again and again. For Heidegger these are last moments in his Metahistory of Being. Being is Being as Will. This is a Metahistory which Heidegger is hoping will end. This provides him a foundation to escape the entire onto-theological metaphysics of western thought. (See "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking"). Heidegger says in his work on ietzsche the following about metaphysics "But then what does it mean Athe end of metaphysics"? It means the historical moment in which the essential possibilities of metaphysics are exhausted" (Nietzsche Vol IV, p.148). Heidegger points this out directly in a later work, he says, ABut Hegel also, as little as Husserl, as little as all metaphysics does not ask about Being as Being . . . " (p.389). Again Heidegger wants to step beyond his own shadow, to ask about Being (Sein) and God outside of traditional metaphysics and ontologies. He is ontologist and he wants to radically ask the question of the meaning of Being. Theology According to Heidegger theology, philosophy, metaphysics, and ontology are closely linked. This position is not in line with what passes as Philosophy on most university campus today. Heidegger says "Philosophy's questioning is always and in itself both onto-logical and theological in the very broad sense. Philosophy is Ontotheology. The more originally it is both in 130 one the more truly it is philosophy. And Schelling's treatise is thus one of the most profound works of philosophy because it is in a unique sense ontological and theological at the same time (Treatise p. 51)." At a more particular level Heidegger's remarks on Christian theologies (circa 1936) appear in general to be negative. For example, Heidegger says, "The assertion often heard of late that modern philosophy is simply a secularization of Christian Theology is only true very conditionally and also true only in being restricted to adopting the realms of Being. Rather, the reverse is true that Christian theology is the Christianization of an extra-Christian philosophy and that only for this reason could this Christian theology also be made secular again (p51)." Finally In Heidegger's analysis of Schelling he says "God lets the oppositional will of the ground operate in order that might be which love unifies and subordinates itself to for the glorification of the Absolute. The will of love stands about the will of the ground and this predominance, this eternal decidedness, the love for itself as the essence of Being in general, this decidedness is the innermost core of absolute freedom (Treatise p.160)." (In German: "Gott lasst den gegenstrebigen Willen des Grundes wirken damit enes sei was die Liebe einige und sich zur Verherrlichung des Absoluten unterordne. Der Wille der Liebe steht uber dem Willen des Grundes, und dieses Uberwiegen, die ewige Entschiedenheit dazu, also die Liebe zu sich selbst als Wesen des Seyns uberhaupt; diese Entschiedenheit ist der innerste Kern absoluten Freiheit."(in Schelling: Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen; AKA Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). 1936., p. 277). In this quotation, Heidegger links God=Love=Absolute Freedom=Eternal Decidedness=Absolute in a very direct way, they are the Self-Same. How this becomes an identity is part of the deep speculative thinking that has directed this kind of inquiry. End of Metaphysics Metaphysics has exhausted its possibilities, it has ended. The question for Heidegger is what path there is for thinking after metaphysics. He wants to open the question of the truth of Being and, make room for God or the gods. Heidegger did an interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel in September 1966. This was only to be published after his death. Heidegger died in 1976 and the interview was published a few weeks later. The interview seems to get at a much more personal tone of the later Heidegger's think on a great number of topics. You also get a sense that Heidegger is humble about his influence and what can be done. However, this is the concept of theo-logy with no connections to metaphysics or the Onto-theo-logy nature of metaphysics. This is a step out. The 131 followed passages give us a sense of Heidegger's thinking on the future of a postmetaphysical theo-logy "Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare a sort of readiness through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of the god or for the absence of the god in the time of foundering; for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder (Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger p 77)." Heidegger's last remark in this interview was "For us contemporaries the greatness of what is to be thought is too great. Perhaps we might bring ourselves to build a narrow and not far-reaching footpath as a passageway." (Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger, p284). So, we need a 'footpath' or some kind of path onward. Heidegger uses the image of the path a great deal in his writings. A Heidegger poem dating from 1971 says, Paths, Paths of thought, going by themselves, vanishing. When they turn again, what do they show us? Paths, going by themselves, formerly open, suddenly closed, later on. Once pointing out the way, never attained, destined to renunciation - slackening the pace from out of the harmony of trustworthy fate. And again the need for a lingering darkness within the waiting light. (Philosophy Today, vol. 21, 1976, p287) 132 Heidegger feels himself in the lingering darkness and he is waiting for the light. The lingering darkness is the absent of God and God is the light. And where is the trustworthy fate? Select Bibliography Books: Buren, van John. The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994. Hegel, G.W.F. Hegel's Science of Logic. Translated by A.V. Miller. Humanities Press, New York, 1969. Hegel, G.W.F. Hegel: The Letters. Translated by Clark Butler and Christiane Seiler. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1984. P. 32. Footnote: Only a god can save us: Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger, Philosophy Today, Winter 1976. Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger, p. 277. In 1936 Heidegger gave a summer lecture series on Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). Volume 4 of the Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe is entitled: Schelling: Ueber das Wesen der menschlichen; AKA Schelling: Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit (1809). 1936. This does not include Appendix which appears in the English translation below. The English translation is Schelling's treatise on the essence of human freedom, by Martin Heidegger. Translation by Joan Stambaugh, published by Ohio University Press, 1985. This is a translation from the German entitled: Schelling Abhandlung uber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit. Published by Max Niemeyer Verlag Tubingen, 1971. Schelling's work first came out under the title: Philosophical Inquiries into the Nature of Human Freedom and Matters Connected Therewith as part of F.W. Schelling's Philosophical Writings, Volume 1, in 1809. F.W.J. Schelling was thirty-four years old at this time. See. Ott H. "Heidegger Martin Catholic Origins." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly V. 69, N. 2, 1995, p 137. Bibliography Schelling and Freedom 133 Schelling's philosophy of freedom By Laughland, John. A thesis, 1999. Choosing evil : Schelling, Kierkegaard and the legacy of Kant's conception of freedom By Kosch, Michelle. A thesis, 1999. Spinoza's thinking of freedom and its reception in subsequent European philosophy. By Bernstein, Jeffrey Alan. A thesis, 1998. The conspiracy of being : F. W. J. Von Schelling and conscientiousness before philosophy's freedom By Wirth, Jason Martin. A thesis, 1994. The abyss of freedom By Zizek, Slavoj. ; Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von,; 1775-1854. ; Weltalter.; English. 1997. The physics of freedom : the beginnings of Schelling's philosophy of nature By Koeller, David Wayne. A thesis, 1989. Heidegger and Schelling Additional Notes. Heidegger does not mention Schelling in Being and Time (1927). However, in the little essay by Heidegger entitled "My way to Phenomenology " he mentions on his walks with his Professor Dr. Carl Braig (circa 1911) A . . . I first heard of Schelling's and Hegel's significance for speculative theology as distinguished from the dogmatic system of Scholasticism" (p. 73). In a very early work of Heidegger's entitled "Review of Ernst Cassirer's Mythical Thought" (19 8) he compares Cassirer's position to the later Schelling's work on mythology. In the last paragraph Heidegger writes "The critical questions here brought forward cannot detract from the merit of Cassirer's work insofar as it is the first attempt since Schelling to place myth as a systematic problem within the range of philosophy (p. 45)." Heidegger earlier lectures from 19 9 are concerned with only the early Schelling's work not the Treatise on freedom. See Heidegger's volume GA 8 Der Deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Hegel, Schelling) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart. 1929. In 1968, Heidegger gave the first of series of seminars First Le Thor seminar (Hegel: Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems), in Provence, August 30 to September 8. The topic of this seminar is Hegel's work entitled: The difference between the Fichtean and Schellingian systems of philosophy. Also, there are notes from volume GA 49, Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus. Zur erneuten auslegung von Schelling: Philosophische untersuchungen ueber das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhaengenden Gegenstaende (1809). 1941. In Heidegger's work entitled "Who is ietzsche's Zarathustra?" he says the following about Schelling's treatise: 134 "The essential coinage of Being comes to language in classic form in several sentences formulated by Schelling in his Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and the Objects Pertaining Thereto (1809). The three sentences read: 'In the final and highest instance there is no other Being than willing. Willing is primal Being, and to it willing alone all of the predicates of the same primal Being apply: absence of conditions; eternity; independence from time; self-affirmation. All philosophy strives solely in order to find this supreme expression.' Schelling assets that the predicates which metaphysical thought since antiquity has attributed to Being find their ultimate, supreme, and thus consummate configuration in willing. However, the will of the willing meant here is not a faculty of the human soul. Here the word willing names the Being of beings as whole. Such Being is will". (E.T. p. ). 135 This Page Intentionally Left Blank See: Project (TPILB-Project). 136 Martin Heidegger contra Nietzsche on the Greeks Introduction Martin Heidegger has developed his own thinking in opposition to ietzsche's philosophy and to metaphysics in general. Heidegger sees Nietzsche as trapped within metaphysics as the same time as being the last metaphysician of Western thought. Nietzsche according to Heidegger has brought metaphysics to an end. In Heidegger's metahistory of Being ietzsche is under the epoch of will as will to power. So, Nietzsche stands at the end of metaphysics and yet Heidegger has given us a clue that Nietzsche is part of the transition beyond metaphysics. This is the transition to a new, other beginning of philosophy that Heidegger is leading us toward. First, the general context of reading Heidegger needs to be elucidated. This will be done by looking at Heidegger's confrontational methodology and his way of reading philosophers and also hermeneutical text issues with Heidegger's writings and publications. The ensuing second part enumerates four areas that bring out Heidegger's contra "position" with ietzsche on the issue of thinking with the Greeks. Why are the Greek so important for Nietzsche and Heidegger? Nietzsche is taken with opposing Plato, whereas Heidegger seems closer to Aristotle and PrePlatonic Philosophers. Heidegger's Confrontational Methodology Although Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche was important for his development, it seems that Heidegger's reading and encounter with Kant in the 19 0s was the interpretive reading that Heidegger received the most acrimonious grief from others. His Kant interpretation methodology is one that drove Heidegger to clarify his thinking on encounter methodology with other philosophers and poets. So, I will use some examples from what Heidegger said over a number of years about his Kant interpretation as first developed in 1929 with the publication of Kant and problem of Metaphysics. It should be noted that historical this publication is one which have with Edmund Husserl's marginalia and clearly shows the early break between and Husserl and Heidegger. One of the central issues is Heidegger's remark about interpretive violence and the fact that Husserl's misconstrued this idea. Heidegger wrote "Certainly in order to wring from what the words say, what it is they want to say, every interpretation must necessarily use violence." (section 35 01-203, et. 141). Why must we use force and violence? Specifically, Heidegger's reading of Kant is a radical interpretation of Kant. This reading has more to do with Heidegger becoming clear on his Metahistory of metaphysics than with understanding Kant's own project. Heidegger said, "Discovering 'Kant in himself' is to be left to Kant philology" (Kant and the problem of metaphysics ET p.175 Heidegger's personal notes were added later) Heidegger said in his work on Hegel the following about his own Kant interpretation: "Kant - people refuse to see the problem and speak rather of my arbitrarily reading my own views into Kant" (Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, ET p147, 1930-31). Even 137 in a lecture series not devoted to Kant Heidegger's still feels a need to response to his critics. During this lecture series on Hegel was the time that the first reviews by Ernst Cassirer and Rudolf Odebrecht were being published about Heidegger's Kant book. In the Preface to the Second Edition (June 1950) to Kant and problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger said, "Readers have taken constant offense at the violence of my interpretations. Their allegation of violence can indeed be supported by this text." (Kant and problem of Metaphysics. E.T. xx). I think Heidegger wants to be clear and tell his readers that he knows about the criticisms of the book and he is not denying anything about this interpretation. A careful reading will understand the force and violence that Heidegger brings to his dialogue with Kant. The rekindled spirit of Kant will speak again. It is easy to make some pe orative remarks about Kant's old system and then not to come to grips with Kant's thinking for today. Bernd Magnus gives us some remarks Heidegger made to an unnamed friend about his Kant book. Heidegger reportedly said "It may not be good Kant but it is awfully good Heidegger." ('Forward to English Translation' to Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same by Karl Löwith, page xvii). This personal remark makes the point that Heidegger is not trying to be a punctilious Kant scholar or a pedantic historian of philosophy. Heidegger is not simply a Kant adherent. Again, Heidegger defines philosophy as philosophizing and being in a live dialogue with other philosophers even if this means not getting them "right" since that is not the point. Why must philosophy open a new horizon with Kant's thinking? Heidegger was adamant when he wrote "Kantbook an attempt to question what had not been said, instead of writing in a fixed way about what Kant said. What has been said is insufficient, what has not been said is filled with riches." (Kant and the problem of Metaphysics, E.T. p.175, marginalia). So, it is not a matter about what Kant said, but rather what he thought and also what he did not think. Heidegger some time speaks about what is unsaid in a thinker. In the author's forward to the multi-volume Nietzsche Band I-II (1961) Heidegger wrote "The matter the point in question is in itself a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung)" (et. p. xxxviii). Heidegger goes on to say in next few pages "Confrontation is genuine criticism. It is the supreme way, the only way, to a true estimation of a thinker. In confrontation we undertake to reflect on his thinking and to trace it in its effective force, not in its weakness. To what purpose? In order that through the confrontation we ourselves become free for the supreme exertion of thinking." (Nietzsche Volume 1, et. p. 4-5). What is the purpose of reading a philosopher? Again, this is not to get Heidegger or Nietzsche or even their readings of the Greeks right. The pivotal task is not scholarship or philology or witty repartee, but rather philosophical thinking and to galvanize a genuine dialogue with philosophers. 138 In a summary essay on Nietzsche Heidegger wrote that "We attend to a thinker only by thinking. This requires that we think everything essential that is thought in his thought." (" ietzsche's word "God is Dead" p. 190 in Off the Beaten Track). Heidegger is showing us in his historical lecture what is means to engage in a critical encounter, struggle, or a confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) with other philosophers. In Being and Time, Heidegger brought up the "Task of a Destructuring of the History of Ontology" (section II #6). Needless to say the single word "destruction" gave Heidegger enough grief. Later on in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger said something even more intriguing, "What unfolds as "destruction" in Being and Time does not mean dismantling (Abbau) as demolishing (Zerstörung) but rather as purifying (Reinigung) in the direction of freeing metaphysical positions." (GA 65 et. p. 154). Therefore, Heidegger has given us a methodology not just to understand how he reads and encounters philosophers, but an adroit methodology for our own dialogue with Heidegger. A standard way of engaging Heidegger's thought. The methodology shows us to move along Heidegger's pathways as an attempt with being historical thinking (seynsgeschichtliche Denken). The journey and the seeking is putting us on a path. Heidegger says "Seeking itself is the goal." (Das Suchen selbst ist das Ziel). (GA 65, p. 18, et. p.13). We can take Heidegger at his word and try to think through what that means for philosophizing. Since this is not about revealing "eternal truths" nor giving a metaphysical description of our world nor creating a grand "system" nor creating a "worldview" (Weltanschauung) nor creating a value system. But rather seeking and asking questions, simply philosophizing. The journey is the process. Textual Issues with Heidegger's Publications Heidegger writings and letters are extensive and proliferating, but there is an interesting issue of how and what Heidegger actually published and how he has directed his son and others on how to publish his writings after death (posthumous writings). For example, we know that Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) was to be published only after most of the historical lectures series were published. The volumes of Überlegungen (GA 94-96) (Considerations or perhaps Reflections) are to be published after the vast majority of the volumes of the Gesamtausgabe are published and according to Dr. Hermann Heidegger are closed for publication until at least 2005 (now 2011 – what happen?) How did Heidegger understand his publications as his own development? During Heidegger's life time there is some evidence that only two books were published as a book, namely, Kant and the problem of Metaphysics and Being and Time. Being and Time which was rushed to be published as an incomplete project so that Heidegger could get a permanent job at the University of Freiburg. Heidegger has always stressed the preeminent part of Being and Time as questioning investigation not as philosophical book or work. In the Appendix to his Schelling book which he published Heidegger wrote "Thus we can distinguish the necessity 139 designated by the name Being and Time from the "book" with this title." (et. p 189). Heidegger in a more radically way said "All specific "contents" and "opinions" and "pathways" of the first attempt in Being and Time are incidental and can disappear." (GA65 section 1 5 et. 171). In fact, he said in his second major project Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) is not a "work". For example, at about this same time, but after Beiträge was completed Heidegger wrote, "Diese "Beiträge zur Philosophie" sollen in einem neuen Anlauf die Weite der Seinsfrage sichtbar machen; hier gilt nicht die Ausfaltung im Einzelnen, weil diese allzu leicht den eigentlichen Gesichtskreis verengt und den Grundzug des Fragens verlieren lässt. Noch aber ist auch hier nicht die Form erreicht, die ich für eine Veröffentlichung als "Werk" gerade hier fordere; denn hier muss sich der neue Stil des Denkens kundgeben die Verhaltenheit in der Wahrheit des Seyns; das Sagen des Erschweigens das Reifmachen für die Wesentlichkeit des Einfachen." (Besinnung (1938/39) GA 66, page 427). Of course right at the beginning of Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger said, "must avoid all false claims to be a "work". (GA 65 et. 3). This means we are not presumably dealing with some final philosophical "work" or finished pro ect. The matter does not allow for the "work" to be published. Thinking has a different way of proceeding. So far, Heidegger has not published aphorisms, but he has published a few books, addresses, lectures, dialogues (GA77), poems, sketches (Entwürfe), elucidations, and letters. Heidegger does not claim to have published a philosophical work. Being and Time was partial based on a lecture series in the Summer Semester 19 5 entitled: "Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Prolegomena zur Phänomenologie von Geschichte und atur" (now Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs GA20). So, Heidegger's book Kant and the problem of Metaphysics is a singular project. Heidegger mentions in the Preface to the Fourth Edition (end of August 1973) that "The Kant book written immediately after the conclusion of the second Hochschule course (March 17 – April 6 19 9) was based on the preparatory work." (et. p. xviii). Heidegger wrote the Kant book very quickly after he returned to Freiburg from Davos. The general implication is that Heidegger was impetuous with his Kant reading. Heidegger could not do his radical interpretation of Kant with impunity. The litany of complaints again Heidegger about the Kant book forced Heidegger to explain himself in the later published Forwards that came out with various editions that were published during his life time. Heidegger has given some interesting titles to his publications during his life time. Many of these convey the impression that those writings are not a final philosophical statement or Heidegger's ultimate philosophical position; for example Holzwege (1935-1946), Wegmarken (1919-1961), Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-1959). In Holzwege, Heidegger puts a note in front of the texts of what is a Holzwege, a pathway that has no direct goal. The new English translation of this book is entitled "Off the Beaten Track". One can say barking up the wrong 140 tree or going down the wrong path. However, these are writings are not just simply digressions or peregrinations. Late in his life Heidegger added a crucial motto to his collected writings (Gesamtausgabe) "Pathways not works" (Wege nicht Werke). This means these are collected writings not his collected works. However, there are some publications that Heidegger himself published during his life time that will not be appearing in the Gesamtausgabe as planned so far, hence the word 'collected' is not entirely true. The main point is that Heidegger sees himself on the way. Even a chronological approach does not work very well, for example, Pathways (Wegmarken) covers forty years of Heidegger's writings. All of these rhetorical devices make a strong point that Heidegger is underway. This comes out of his basic philosophical 'position' (if that is the right term) of being postmetaphysical. That means he is not describing the world and he is not making speculative metaphysical statements about the Übersinnlichen (the supersensuous) world. Consider the direction of Kant on this issue in an important unpublished essay, What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany Since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?, written in 1793 where Kant defines metaphysics as "the science of advancing by reason from knowledge of the sensible (Sinnliche) to the knowledge of the supersensuous. (Progress et. p. 53). Heidegger's quest for meaning or truth of Being is not about the metaphysical eternal supersensuous world. These are all Nietzschian concept-mummies (Begriffs-Mumien). Heidegger is pertaining to pathways and not philosophical works or grand systems. Heidegger said in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) "Questioning is here beginning and end." (et. 4 ). Remember Heidegger said "Seeking itself is the goal." (GA65 p 18 et. 13). We can take Heidegger at his word and try to think through what that means for philosophizing. Since the pro ect is not to reveal "eternal truth" nor giving a metaphysical description of our world nor creating a grand "system" nor creating some kind of liberal "worldview" nor creating a value system so empirical facts do not need "proofs" or "logic" or to develop a philosophical "position". The journey and seeking is a path toward philosophizing. Philosophy is philosophizing nothing more or less. Heidegger said "The grandeur of man is measured according to what he seeks and according to the urgency by which he remains a seeker." (GA45 p 5, et p.7). The lack of seeking is pointing toward the distress (Notlosigkeit) of the current epoch. Since many of Heidegger's published writings have started as historical lectures to students it seems that Heidegger's voice in these writings is to his students. The voice here is Heidegger as a teacher. Heidegger gave lectures or addresses to a variety of audience; some times his lectures were to philosophers, but more often a general academic audience. Some of these were published during life time, but many have not been published yet (see especial a large collection of his lectures GA 80 Vorträge (1915-1967)). Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) has been heralded as Heidegger second magnum opus (Otto Pöggeler) and it stands a singular project at this time. We still await some other major writings that were done shortly after Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1939), for example, Über den Anfang (1941), Das Ereignis (1941/42), Die Stege des Anfangs (1944)) and 141 of course the Überlegungen volumes (Considerations) sometimes called the "Schwarzen Hefte", which are often referenced inside of the Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis). Can we take what Heidegger wrote in Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) with more authority than in his historical lectures or other writings? At this time, it seems that the Beiträge has a special place in Heidegger's writings; but there are many more publications from this period that may place the Beiträge in a different context. Certainly, the Beiträge was not in any way a series of lectures or address and was not widely known among Heidegger's students. It was fairly concealed by Heidegger, so it seems to be closer to Heidegger essential thought. Heidegger worked on this publication for a number of years and it is oddly autobiographical. He references many of his own works, many of which are not yet published sixty-four years later. So, Heidegger on Heidegger is part of the intimate dialogue of his thinking and writing in the Beiträge. Heidegger's writings are his pathways so it is important to remain within the hermeneutical context and not to over draw our conclusions. Heidegger is acting as a guide and is pushing and directing us up the mountain, but the right analogy is that we still have to do the climbing and follow this path with our own thinking. Nietzsche is lucid on this point when he said in the Wanderer and His Shadow (#267), "There are no educators. As thinker, one should speak only of self-education". In the Gay Science: la gaya scienza, 1886, he says, "We ourselves wish to be our experiments..." (#319). Nietzsche said in his extraordinary autobiographical work Ecce Homo (written 1888), "I am a disciple of the philosopher Dionysus" (Preface, Section 2, et. P. 217). This is pointing in nonontological direction and more toward a life philosophy, namely, a whole world view that includes the cloak of the power of ancient Greek. Of course, we can ask what happen to German philosophers like Wolf, Leibniz, Hamann, Kant, Herder, Jacobi, Hegel, Fichte, Schleiermacher, Lange, Zeller, Lotze, Schelling, or even Schopenhauer The topic of Heidegger's contra ietzsche on the Greeks can be seen in at least four specific areas that can be distinguished. 1) Nietzsche caught by Platonism Heidegger writes in his essay "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" (1940) that ietzsche is the "most unrestrained Platonist in the history of Western metaphysics" (et. p. 174). ietzsche is entirely caught by metaphysics (GA65 et 127). Heidegger points toward one of his basic attacked against Nietzsche are the claims that Nietzsche early on recognized his basic philosophical position was the task of overturning Platonism. The two basic points for Heidegger in Western metaphysics is the first beginning marked by Plato and the second who marks the end is Nietzsche. This distinction is the relationship between the supersensuous (Übersinnlichen) and sensuous. Plato's ideas are in the domain of the supersensuous and ietzsche's Ockam's razor cuts away the supersensuous (true world, see Section 4 from Nietzsche's Twilight of Idols or How to 142 Philosophize with a Hammer, HOW THE "TRUE WORLD" FINALLY BECAME A FABLE. The History of an Error) and leaves us with the sensuous or apparent world. Of course at some points Nietzsche wants to do a way with this distinction and hence this leads us out of Platonism. Certainly, Plato and Nietzsche were antipodes on the world of ideas. For Nietzsche there are no eternal ideas. Heidegger's point is that ietzsche wanted to invert Platonism and still in general got stuck in the Platonist distinction of the supersensuous and sensuous worlds. Nietzsche was on the verge of seeing through his inversion of Platonism, but taking his overall considerate is still within the web of Platonism. Western philosophy is just a series of footnotes to Plato according to a famous saying by Alfred North Whitehead. However, with Heidegger he sees this as the metahistory of metaphysics and forgottenness of Being as being caught in the limitation of Platonism or the inadequacy of western metaphysics. After Heidegger sees these limitations, this is the way that Heidegger wants to break out in to a new, other beginning for philosophy. Heidegger's break out is done through a confrontation with Platonism and its entanglement in ietzsche's inversion of Platonism. Western metaphysics has happen all within the limitation and realm of Platonism. Nietzsche sees Christianity as Platonism for the people. For Heidegger, Nietzsche is simply the extreme opposition (the antagonist opponent) to eternal truth and ideas of Platonism. Although Nietzsche was reading many of the early Greek philosophers, the task for Nietzsche is still within the dominion of the fundamental trends of his engagement with Platonism. It should be noted that there is nothing of Kant or Hegel or the German philosophers in ietzsche's on-going development and thinking. The crux to Nietzsche for Heidegger is ietzsche's opposition to Platonism. For Heidegger ietzsche is trapped within the limited horizon of Platonism. Heidegger said " ietzsche remains caught in metaphysics: from beings to Being; and he exhaust all possibilities of this basic position..." (GA 65 18 et. p. 127). Hence, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche task is simply the overturning (Umkehrung) of Platonism Heidegger on the other hand is completely contra to this reading of Western metaphysics. Through the philosophical comprehension of the early Greeks and a deeper understanding of Aristotle, Heidegger gains a sweeping perception of the Greeks that leads to recovery and retrieval of the question about the meaning or the truth of Being of beings without those essential elements of Platonism. Heidegger's udgment of ietzsche as the "most unrestrained Platonist" shows unmistakably Heidegger's contra interpretation of the Greeks. Heidegger wrote " ietzsche was stuck in this interpretation because he did not recognize the guiding-question as such and did not enact the crossing to the grounding-question." (GA65 section 110 et. 153). Nietzsche does have his own way out of Platonism, which he summed up with the expression, "My recreation my preference my cure from all Platonism has always been Thucydides." (Twilight of the Idols "What I Owe to the Ancients" section 3). 143 2) Young Nietzsche --superficial In Heidegger's essay from 1946 Anaximander's Saying, Heidegger said, "The young ietzsche does indeed in his own way establish a lively relationship to the personality of the pre-Platonic philosophers, but his interpretation of the texts are thoroughly commonplace (herkömmlich) even quite superficial (oberflächlich) throughout." (et. P. 243, Off the Beaten Track). Der Spruch des Anaximander. German p. 297. GA 5). Heidegger is talking about the Pre-Platonic Philosophers which is the text of a lecture series delivered by the young Friedrich Nietzsche (then a philologist) at the University of Basel in 1870s. Heidegger is clearly belittling Nietzsche reading of the pre-Platonic philosophers and his interpretation is banal. He does speak to Nietzsche actual relationship to the early Greek philosophers which is more than ust a slight influence on ietzsche's own thinking. In this passage Heidegger makes three more important remarks. The first notion is that he contrast Nietzsche's translation with Hermann Diels translation and finds them both to lacking. Nietzsche calls them Pre-Platonic and Diels calls them Pre-Socratics. After Heidegger's remarks about Nietzsche, he follows that with a very strong statement about Hegel. Heidegger wrote, "Hegel is the only Western thinker who has thoughtfully experienced the history of thought..." (et. p.14). In his lecture on "Hegel and the Greeks" (circa 1958) Heidegger gives more praises for Hegel and says similar things. Although Kant and Nietzsche did develop a Metahistory of philosophy it is clear that Hegel's Metahistory of philosophy is distinctly connected to his whole philosophy of history. The absolute spirit as moving from the abstract to the concrete, Hegel was able to give a pattern to the entire development of history. Of course the same was said about Nietzsche only book on the Greeks, The Birth of Tragedy Out of the Spirit of Music (Die Geburt der Tragödie aus dem Geiste der Musik (1873)) with the later title of The Birth of Tragedy Or: Hellenism And Pessimism (1886), which started a fight between Nietzsche and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff over the very nature of philology. Hugh Lloyd-Jones said "with all its appalling blemishes it is a work of genius and begun a new era in the understanding of Greek thought." (Quoted in translator's introduction to ietzsche's PrePlatonic Philosophers p. xlii). Although ietzsche's writing maybe marked with little regard to pedantic and scholarship notions, it is clear that what is important is ietzsche's ability to push a new paradigm of how to view the Greeks. Heidegger does understand that there is a question of the bigger picture and for that Nietzsche is important even though it is not the same vision that Heidegger has of the Greeks thinkers. 3) Untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus Heidegger wrote a very clear and sharp critical remark about ietzsche's true understanding of the Greeks Heidegger statement is a book he published. Heidegger said "To be sure, Nietzsche fell prey to the commonplace and untrue opposition of Parmenides to Heraclitus. This is one of the essential reasons why his metaphysics never found its way to the decisive question, although 144 Nietzsche did re-conceive the great age of the inception of Greek Dasein in its entirety in a way that is surpassed only by Hölderlin." (et page 133). Introduction to metaphysics. (GA 40). Translation by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. The supposed commonplace opposition is that for Parmenides, Being is the one and never changes and for Heraclitus, Being is becoming and always in flux. According to historians Heraclitus and Parmenides were supposedly antipodes. Heidegger said that this was not true and he calls this a commonplace and untrue opposition. Nietzsche in a exceptionally telling passage in his autobiography, Ecce Homo outlines his philosophy in relationship to Heraclitus. Nietzsche said, "I retained some doubt in the case of Heraclitus, in whose proximity I feel altogether warmer and better than anywhere else. The affirmation of passing away and destroying, which is the decisive feature of a Dionysian philosophy; saying Yes to opposition and war; becoming, along with a radical repudiation of the very concept of Being (Sein) –all of this is clearly more closely related to me than anything else thought to date. The doctrine of the "eternal recurrence " that is of the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all things – this doctrine of Zarathustra might in the end have been taught already by Heraclitus. (Ecce Homo, on his own book entitle: "The Birth of Tragedy section 3). In this passage Nietzsche links up his closeness to Heraclitus, Dionysus, his connections to Zarathustra and the doctrine of the eternal return of the same; but most important for Heidegger is thought that for ietzsche Heraclitus is involved in the "radical repudiation of the very concept of Being (Sein)" (radikaler Ablehnung refusal). This is clearly where there is a split between Heidegger and Nietzsche on the issue of the rejection or refusal of Being, since for Heidegger Being is full and not empty or a fiction. But how much did ietzsche know and scrutinize about Heraclitus' thinking? In a sense Nietzsche was never disciplined enough to collected all of the saying of these Greek philosophers in one collection. That was accomplished by Hermann Diels with the publication of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, griechisch und deutsch, which was first published in 1903. As Heidegger points out that this work is dedicated to Wilhelm Dilthey, although not because that Dilthey was a great Greek scholar. Nietzsche also did work on an Index to the prestigious philology journal Rheinisches Museum für Philologie. This indexing and review of contemporary philology gave Nietzsche a better understand of the current philology research at that time. So in fact, Nietzsche did work on Greek philology before his submersion into Greek philosophy. But it was his insight into Platonism that drove ietzsche's philosophical response. Of course, this is part of his tangled relationship with Socrates. Although Nietzsche had metaphysical problems and concerns it seems more his driving force is with more with morality than with metaphysics or ontology. Again, Heidegger is not concerned with getting Nietzsche right accord to some interpretation which reads the weight of ietzsche's statements in Ecce 145 Homo about his life and philosophy. But rather, what is provocative in Nietzsche for Heidegger's thinking. What is the decisive question that Nietzsche never found? Certainly as a pristine metaphysician ietzsche could have to come to the question of "What is the nature of beingness (Seiendheit)?" Or he could have asked the question "Why is there something rather not nothing?" ietzsche's own critique of metaphysics predetermined that Nietzsche would not follow down this path. This is where Nietzsche stands in league with Heidegger and their basic position of being antimetaphysics. Heidegger wants to take the next step by not being caught in the web of being "anti-" metaphysics. He wants to leave it behind and stand completely outside of metaphysics. Our question is does Heidegger actually stand in a new beginning. Can we still have a relationship to metaphysics by freeing and purifying metaphysics? Heidegger's historical lectures are the way that Heidegger has attempted to engage philosophers from the past, that is, to bring them to life in the present. Even though these philosophers are as Hegel said "...with respect to the inner essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successors." (The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy, e.t. p.87). Philosophers stand side by side all thinking one thought but each in their own way. Heidegger understands the relationship between Parmenides and Heraclitus is contra to ietzsche's understands of that relationship as a simple opposition. Note carefully that Heidegger does in the end position Nietzsche very high in the rebirth of Greek philosophy, which is just surpassed only by Friedrich Hölderlin (1770-1843) 4) Ontology and the new, other Beginning In an important remark Heidegger said "with Nietzsche the critical encounter (Auseinandersetzung) as the one is nearest (Nächsten) but to recognize that he is farthest removed from the question of Being (Seinsfrage)". (GA65 et 1 4 g 176). ietzsche is the closest one in the project of overcoming metaphysics, of overcoming Platonism, of understanding the finitude of Da-sein, of coming the closest to a new spirit of the Greeks. Nietzsche sees "Being is an empty fiction" (das Sein eine leere Fiktion). (Twilight of the Idols, "Reason" in Philosophy" section ). Heidegger rightly understands ietzsche's position as being farthest removed from his single question about the Being of beings. In the Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger said this about ietzsche's remarks about ontology. "What ietzsche says here about Being is no casual remark, jotted down during the frenzy of labor in preparation for his authentic and never completed work. Instead, it is his guiding conception of Being since the earliest days of philosophical labor. It supports and determines his philosophy from the ground up." (et. p.38). Heidegger's position on the importance of ontology is clear Heidegger said this in a number of places but it makes it clear when he states "The question of the "meaning of Being" is the question of all questions." (GA 65 et 8 g 11). In his work on Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (GA3 lecture 1930) Heidegger said " . . . the inner necessities of the 146 first and last problem of philosophy the question of Being" and he continues, "I have been concerned with renewing the question of ontology the most central problem of Western Philosophy the question of Being . . ." (E.T. p.13) Additional Heidegger said, "We assert now that Being is the proper and sole theme of philosophy" (Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA24, 1927 lecture), p11) and he adds the following remark "Philosophy is the theoretical conceptual interpretation of Being, of Being's structure and its possibilities. Philosophy is ontological." (Basic Problems of Phenomenology (GA24, lecture 1927), p.11). Although Heidegger does not quote Nietzsche, there is an important passage by Nietzsche in the Pre-Platonic Philosophers lecture series from 1870s at the University of Basel. In the section on Heraclitus (most likely dating from 187 ) ietzsche wrote a real propitious remark "Well this is the intuitive perception of Heraclitus; there is no thing of which we many say "it is". He rejects Being. He knows only Becoming the flowing." ietzsche then continues in a few sentences later "Heraclitus thus sees only the One but in the sense opposite to Parmenides." (et. p. 62-63). Although Nietzsche here realizes the ontological issues, he does not make it a central issue or even a question. Ontology is not just one discipline among other philosophical discipline like ethics, epistemology, and logic; but rather, philosophy is only as ontology. Certainly, Heidegger and Nietzsche were antipodes on ontology. Heidegger is contra ietzsche as ontology is primary. Heidegger's position is exactly contra to ietzsche thesis about the Being of beings as "empty fiction". It is through Heidegger's analysis of the Greeks (specifically, Anaximander, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Plato, and also Aristotle) that Heidegger draws out his resplendent ontological thinking. On the other hand, Nietzsche does not find ontology as central in the Greeks. What does Nietzsche find? Nietzsche wrote a short note in 1885 that not only summarized his closeness to the Greeks but may have foreseen Heidegger's bond to the Greeks. ietzsche wrote "... with discovery of antiquity the digging up ancient philosophy, above all of the pre-Socratics – the most deeply buried of all Greek temples! A few centuries hence, perhaps, one will judge that all German philosophy derives its real dignity from being a gradual reclamation of the soil of antiquity, and that all claims to "originality" must sound petty and ludicrous in relation to that higher claim of the Germans to have joined anew the bond that seemed to be broken, the bond with the Greeks, the hitherto highest type of man." In another note Nietzsche said in March-June 1888 (Will to Power #437) "The real philosophers of Greece are those before Socrates". ietzsche goes on to say "Today we are again getting close to all those fundamental forms of world interpretation devised by the Greek spirit through Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and Anaxagoras – we are growing more Greek by the day..." Will to Power (419) (1885). From these remarks it is clear that Nietzsche realizes the immense impact the Greeks had on German philosophers and will have in the future. The image of the Greeks had a profound effect on ietzsche's philosophy and thinking even without having ietzsche 147 pedantically following every translation of the Greek to the final degree. This is not a question of ietzsche's Greek philological scholarship but rather the tremendous impact and influence of the Greek image. What did Heidegger find in the Greeks that the incorrigible Nietzsche did not see? It is becoming apparent and incipient that one of Heidegger's pro ects is in his discussion of the other beginning in philosophy. For example in the Beiträge he says, "the thrust into the crossing and thereby the knowing awareness that any kind of metaphysics has and must come to an end, if philosophy is to attain its other beginning" (GA 65 Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) p.171-173, et. p 121). There are sections with the titles: „Die ursprüngliche Zueignung des ersten Anfangs bedeutet das Fussfassen im anderen Anfang"(section 85) or „Die Auseinandersetzung des ersten und anderen Anfangs"(section 9 ). So, Heidegger is trying to guide us so that Philosophy itself can "attain its other beginning". Heidegger sees the links to the Greeks as when they started the first beginning to philosophy and where he is pointing to another, new, other beginning to philosophy. In the future there will be additional major publications of Heidegger's that again are pointing to this other beginning in philosophy. For example in the forthcoming publications: Über den Anfang (1941), Das Ereignis (1941/42), and Die Stege des Anfangs (1944) subsections are tied up with the idea of beginnings (Anfang). In a different light remember Hegel's question in the beginning of the Science of Logic "With What Must the Science Begin?" ("Womit muss der Anfang der Wissenschaft gemacht werden?"). Heidegger sees this original thrust of the first Greek beginning of philosophy as an inspiration for the new, other beginning in philosophy. The crux is that Heidegger is guiding us toward this new, other beginning in philosophy by raising the question of the meaning and truth of Being (Seyn, Ereignis). Heidegger was first starting to raise these issues and questions in a lecture course started in Winter Trimester 1937/38, the title of the course was "Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik' [Vorlesung]" which was published in English as the Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic (GA 45). There is a section entitled "Our situation at the end of the beginning and the demand for a reflection on the first beginning as a preparation for another beginning." (GA 45 p. 1 4 et. p 108). ("Unser Stand im Ende des Anfangs und die Forderung einer Besinnung auf den ersten Anfang als Vorbereitung des anderen Anfangs"). In a section at the end of this work Heidegger writes, "That is we are standing before the decision between the end (and its running out, which may still take centuries) and another beginning..." (GA 45 g 1 4 et. p. 108). ("Und dies sagt: Wir stehen vor der Entscheidung zwischen dem Ende und seinem vielleicht noch Jahrhunderte füllenden Auslauf – und dem anderen Anfang."). Heidegger stands at the decision point between the final end of the first beginning in philosophy and the new, other beginning in philosophy that is just starting. Nietzsche also understands his position in history. He said at the beginning of "Why I am a Destiny" in Ecce Homo "I know my fate. One day my name will be associated with memory of something tremendous – a crisis without equal on earth." I do not think that 148 Heidegger would say this is the same way that Nietzsche did, but I think the results will be the same. Heidegger is confronting and endowing us with a decision toward the new, other beginning which will force a breaking point or a rift in philosophy. Heidegger's question is: will it be the final epitaph? 149 Martin Heidegger and Nietzsche on Amor Fati Amor fati -love of fate. Perhaps this is one way that Nietzsche wants to summarize his whole philosophy into two words. What did Heidegger hear with these two words – amor fati? In 1937 summer semester Martin Heidegger taught a course entitled: ietzsche's Fundamental Metaphysical Position in Western Thought. In the publication of this lecture series in the Nietzsche volumes in 1961, Heidegger has changed the title to: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same. At the end of this lecture Heidegger in section 6 entitled: ietzsche's Fundamental Metaphysical Position; the whole section ends with his only brief published remarks about Nietzsche and amor fati. As Heidegger sees it ietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position is amor fati. Heidegger does use this expression amor fati in one of the supplement remarks (1939) in Die Geschichte des Seyns. More importantly, in a recently published lecture from the same period entitled "Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und Schein)" we find twenty or more passages on amor fati from Heidegger. Heidegger wrote a letter to Hans-Hermann Groothoff (26 Nov 1939), he mentions Ernst Jünger and amor fati. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger want to go back to the Greeks. Amor fati helps Nietzsche to a non-Christian affirmation of the meaning of the earth. For Heidegger, it is crucial to understand that he is contra ietzsche's postion on the Greeks and it is rather Friedrich Hölderlin (17701843) and Heidegger that have a deeper grasp of the early Greeks. Heidegger reaches back to the early Greeks for a new other beginning (Anfang) in philosophy. This is a radical antimetaphysical stance or a leaving behind of all metaphysics. Heidegger's unpacking of ietzsche's amor fati show us that Nietzsche is still tied and trapped in metaphysics. Heidegger locates ietzsche's position as the last metaphysican of the West. What does amor fati mean in ietzsche's thought and what does it mean for Heidegger's critical encounter with ietzsche? Nietzsche on Amor Fati Why Nietzsche would use an expression in Latin like amor fati and only a few times to express his inner most nature? ietzsche's thinking about amor fati spans from 1881-1889, through four published sources, six unpublished notes and a letter written in 1882. All of these passages will analysed chronological in this article. Amor fati – love of fate. Nietzsche may have been contrasting amor fati to Spinoza's amor dei intellectualis. ietzsche's own use of amor fati lines up (1881) when Nietzsche was reading Kuno Fischer's book Geschichte der neuern Philosophie (1865), which includes a section on Spinoza. There is a copy of this book currently in ietzsche's library. There is also a letter to Overbeck in July 30 1881 where ietzsche links his thinking with his 'precursor" namely Spinoza. But in fact, Spinoza and Nietzsche are oppostite in many ways, they are indeed antipodes philosophically. Therefore, amor fati is the love of fate, love of the necessity of 150 human life on the earth, not the love of God. You should live your life as if you love your fate, do not worry, you will live your life as your fate – you have no choice. For Nietzsche, the Dionysian and the eternal return of the same are wrapped up in a Heraclitean innocent of becoming; and these 'concepts' are all linked to the requirement of your love of your earthly fate, namely, amor fati. If there is no Hinterwelten, then what is left on earth? Answer: your own inimitable fate. Analysis of Nietzsche's thought on amor fati in chronological order The first use of amor fati dates from autumn of 1881. itezshce wrote "Copy by R. W. Emerson autumn 1881. First the necessary, the needful (Noethige) and this so beautifully and perfectly as you can! "love what is necessary (nothwendig)" amor fati this would be my moral, it all property on and lifts it up over its terrible origin to you." (kgw=v.2541 ksa=9.643. V.15 [20]). Emerson does write about fate, but Nietzsche transfoms this, if indeed there is any real connection to Emerson. Here amor fati is moral in the ethical realm, but even at this point there is an attachment to the concept of necessity. This is the first known use of amor fati in all of itzsche's writings. ietzsche wrote "Yes! I want to only love still what is necessary (nothwendig)! Yes! Amor fati is my last love!" (Dezember 1881 – Janurar 1882 kgw=V-2.562 ksa=9.664, V.16 [22]). Love the necessity of life. What is necessary? Answer: love of fate. In many passages, Nietzsche is linking amor fati to the notion of "necessity". What is necessity? Answer: inevitability. What will be, will be and you should love what will be – even if you think you have a choice you should love your fate. Nietzsche wrote, "Also I am in a mood of fatalistic "surrender to God" (Gottergebenheit) I call it amor fati so much so that I would have rush into a lion's aw not to mention -- (Naumburg, ca. June 5, 1882: Letter to Franz Overbeck. Selected letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, 1969, page 184)." What makes ietzsche speak about the surrender or devotion to God? Why a mood and not a metaphysical statement? If you surrender to God's will then there is no issue of your fate that is inner directed. There is a still a strong recurring theme of fatalism in Nietzsche. Fatalism affirms the inevitable. Nietzsche wrote in "The Gay Science ("la gaya scienza") Book IV 76. (First edition 188 ). "I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things:-then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. Amor fati: let that be my love from henceforth! I do not want to wage war (Krieg) against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse, I do not even want to accuse those who accuse. Looking away shall be my only negation! And all in all and on the whole: some day I wish to be only a Yes-sayer!" This passage is the first published use of the amor fati. We must attempt to see all of the necessity in things in general. Nietzsche is highly critical of so many philosophers, –isms in philosophy, people, and cultures, so it is rare when Nietzsche wants to be a yes-sayer and move to the affirmation. What is necessary in things, sounds like will-to151 power and the necessity of that will in the world. Plus, he wants to make things beautiful. This is Nietzsche wanting to become the artest. Twice Nietzsche brings up amor fati in the context of Richard Wagner (1813-1883), who for a while was Nietzsche's ideal of an artist. ietzsche is on the edge here with an aesthetic fatalism. Does it mean that ietzsche's yes-saying is a metaphysical statement about the world? Nietzsche wrote a title of a book he wanted to write, "Wisdom and love for the wisdom Prolegomena for a philosophy of the future. By Friedrich ietzsche." "Die Fragmente von Frühjahr 1884 bis Herbst 1885 [Frühjahr 1884. VII.25 [500], kgw= VII- .141 ksa=11.145". Under the draft title of this book is simply two words: amor fati. This is one of the many, many drafts of books projects that Nietzsche seemed to be writing down endlessly. Nietzsche has read Ludwig Feurbach's Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft (copy in his library) and was influence by him; and hence it shows in the fragment of a book title and would later resurface in ietzsche's book of 1886 as Jenseits von Gut und Böse: Vorspiel einer Philosophie der Zukunft. Thus, Nietzsche would have the content of a book on wisdom and the love of wisdom; described in just two simple words: amor fati. ietzsche wrote "I do not want nothing differently also backwards I was not allowed to want anything differently... Amor fati... "Fragmente Dezember 1888-Anfang Januar 1889 kgw=VIII3.445 ksa=13.641 VIII. 5 [7]. " The thought here is just like the eternal return of the same – the eternal return of necessity is amor fati. The necessity leads directly to amor fati. It does, however, point to the issues of necessity and if you have a choice to want your fate to be different. While it is in some sense undeniable that choice and fate are directly opposite each other, but Nietzsche is pointing out that I do not want anything to be different. Do we accept it or are we resigned to our own fate? Are we active or pastive or acquiescence to our fate without a choice? In any case, Nietzsche was not allowed anything different. Nietzsche wrote in his unique and self-absorbed autobiography "My formula for greatness in man is amor fati: that man does not want to have anything differently, either in the future, the past, or for all eternity. Not only must he endure necessity, and on no account conceal it-all idealism is falsehood in the face of necessity-but love it . . ." Ecce Homo (Why I Am So Clever, #10) (1888, autumn). This is Nietzsche's polished prose (laid on the gold scales) and ripened like a good late wine. Now, it become the greatness in man (note so postively affirming). Again as Nietzsche explans it further, it sounds like the eternal return of the same and not only the thought of necessity but we should "love it". Certainly fatalism but note the usage of the word "want"; that means not the stronger fatalism of "you will anyway" as if you had an actual choice. Nietzsche wrote, I myself have never suffered from all this; what is necessary does not hurt me; amor fati is my inmost nature." Ecce Homo (The Case of Wagner, #4) (1888, Autumn). So, ietzsche is telling us that "necessity" does not hurt because I already have amor fati as my intermost nature. What is necessary sounds like there is no freedom and no free will, Nietzsche 152 has already wrung out freedom and free will. Furthermore, we should love it, namely, love fate. Do not think you can choose something different. Side note: Eastern philosophy, amor fati is like the Indian or Hindu concept of dharma. Dharma has the strong notion of fatalism in it. In Ecce Homo ietzsche talks about his own version of extreme fatalism he calls it "Russian fatalism" where a Russian solider ust lies down in the snow and dies. The final choice. In a simarly way ietzsche wrote "As my inmost nature teaches me whatever is necessary as seen from the heights and in the sense of a great economy-is also the useful par excellence: one should not only bear it, one should love it. Amor fati: that is my inmost nature." Nietzsche Contra Wagner Epilogue 1 (1888, December). Embrace the whole idea and thought of our stance in the world as the love of fati. The necessity is useful because it realizes that there is no love of God, since there is no God; then yes, it is better to have only our love of our earthly fate. For Nietzsche, this is an extremely Greek way of looking at the world (un-Christian) and our place in the world – love our fate. This is the last passage that Nietzsche wrote about amor fati here he says "...to a Dionysian affirmation of world as it is, without subtraction, exception, or selection – it wants the eternal circulation: – the same things, the logic and illogicalness of entanglements (Knoten). The highest condition a philosopher can reach: Dionysian to existence (Dasein) stand – my formula for it is amor fati." Will to Power 1041 (1888) spring-summer, 1888-1889. VIII.16 [32] kgw=VIII3.288, ksa=13.492, CM, W II, 7a [32]. This note from the unpublished writings (Nachlass), really adds many more things to ietzsche's thought of amor fati. The eternal return of the same means the Dionysian affirmation and furthermore, it wants the world as it is without anything changed. Fatalism embraced and with the additional meaning of loving your fate. As Nietzsche has lived his experimental philosophy even if this means the "most fundamental nihilism" and no-saying, he switches in the middle of this note (#1041) to his most yes-saying. There are three points of linkage: Dionysian, eternal return of the same, and amor fati. Again, Nietzsche is trying to sum up his total "yes-saying" in two words – amor fati. Heidegger on Nietzsche's Amor Fati Heidegger revised and edited his lectures (1936-1941) on Nietzsche in to two volumes and published them in 1961. Heidegger deleted and made changes for this publication. But this was not in the section on amor fati. So this is Heidegger's revised publication of his lectures after his review 20 years later. At this point in his life it is not clear that he knew that all of his writings and lectures would be published later, so why he published only these writings on amor fati remains unknown. There is some foreshadowing in the early part of the volume two. Heidegger wrote "We know that since antiquity in the Western intellectual tradition necessity designates a particular trait of beings; and that necessity (Notwendigkeit), as a fundamental trait of beings, has received the most variegated interpretations: Moria, fatum, destiny, predestination, and dialectical process." (Nietzsche volume II, et p. 96). The love of fate points toward the 153 inescapable destiny of man or the predestiny. Heidegger uses fate and fatum as the basic trait of necessity. Heidegger's essential published remarks on amor fati are in his Nietzsche volume, where he says, " ietzsche himself once chose a phrase to designate what we are calling his fundamental metaphysical position, a phrase that is often cited and is readily taken as a way to characterize his philosophy: amor fati love of necessity. (Epilogue to "Nietzsche contra Wagner"; VIII 06). Yet the phrase expresses ietzsche's fundamental metaphysical position only when we understand the two words amor and fatum – and, above all, their conjunction – in terms of Nietzsche own most thinking, only when we avoid mixing our fortuitous and familiar notions into it." Heidegger goes on in the passage to state "Amor – love – is to be understood as will..." and finally, "Fatum – necessity – is to be understood, not as a fatality that is inscrutable, implacable, and overwhelming, but as that turning of need which unveils itself in the awestruck (emergency "der ot") moment as an eternity eternity abundance (Werdensfülle) with the becoming of being (Seienden) as a whole: circulus vitiosus deus." (Nietzsche volume II, et p. 206). Amor is the will and fatum is the becoming of beings as whole. For Heidegger, he understands amor as love, and as the will. In other words, amor (as the will) is understood on the subjective side. We should note: whereas fatum or necessity as fatum is more on the objective side of nature as having the necessity in the world. So, the expression amor fati is where the two come together: subjective and objective. More importantly this shows that amor fati is still using metaphysical statements and that means that Nietzsche is doing metaphysics. The Latin expression "circulus vitiosus deus" there are some different English translations: circle vicious God, a vicious circle made God, God is a vicious circle, or the circle is a vicious God, divine vicious circle. Nietzsche used the expression in Beyond Good and Evil (section §56). Is Nietzsche doing theology? For Heidegger metaphysics at its base is always ontotheological and ietzsche's metaphysic has a theological element even when he is anti-theology. Heidegger's interpretation of metaphysics as ontotheology thinks that the question of God (metaphysica specialis) and the question of Being (metaphysica generalis) have been tangled in all metaphysics; and most importantly, this includes Nietzsche as well. Nietzsche does not escape metaphysics; although he is pushing the limits and attempting the reversal (not the overcoming) of Platonism. Heidegger often blurs the distinction between Nietzsche's published writing and his unpublished writings of the achlass. The same issue is of course true of Heidegger's own writings and some of his supplemental remarks (Beilagen). Heidegger was against the use of the aphorism as way of doing philosophy and his pity remarks are often difficult to decipher, but they were not constucted as aphorisms. These remarks often stand by themselves and so the context is often difficult to understand. 154 Heidegger says in a "Reversal as overcoming of the Nihilismus circulus vitiosus deus amor fati. (GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, " ietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und Schein), p. 153, #162). The reversal of Platonism and nihilism is still caught in the fundamental postion of metaphysics and even the anti-metaphysical is still stuck to the metaphysical thinking. Heidegger sketches even shorter remarks "Amor will as love... Amor fati – moment of eternity. (GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, " ietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und Schein), p.170, #181). Under the heading of "The essence of Amor Fati" we find the following remark "Amor the decision the will; fatum the necessity. Will as release to the necessity, this is the highest freedom." (GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, " ietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und Schein), p.169, #179). Another heading Heidegger asks the question, "177. Amor fati the formula for the basic position?" GA 87 Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944, " ietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung (Sein und Schein), p.168, #177). These hand written notes of Heidegger show him actively engaged in his Auseinandersetzung with Nietzsche. The essential point is clear ietzsche's fundamental postion is amor fati, and that is still metaphysics. Conclusion Heidegger's remarks about amor fati hits Nietzsche with his own hammer. Nietzsche attempted a reversal of Platonism (forms of Christianity) and yet got completely stuck in metaphysics. The crux of ietzsche's philosophy is amor fati and Heidegger's analysis shows that amor fati is metaphysics. Maybe Nietzsche can be seen as not just the last metaphysician, but as giving us hints on the way out metaphysics. His criticism of the other worldly supersensuous, Christianity as Platonism for the people, abolishment of the true world and the apparent world, and the requirement to overcome Platonism -all these attempts by Nietzsche has helped Heidegger in working his own way through metaphysics to a new other beginning (Anfang) of philosophy and thinking. Nietzsche has attacked the problem of metaphysics but only Heidegger has a way out of metaphysics. References Nietzsche writings: 155 Kritische Gesamtausgabe Werke, KGW. Kritische Studienausgabe, KSA. Nietzsche does use the expression amor dei in three published text and several notes in 1884 (one example was a poem of An Spinoza (ksa=11 Herbst 1884. 8 [49]). Also he says "Dass so etwas wie Spinozas amor dei wieder erlebt werden konnte, ist sein grosses Ereigniss. Gegen Teichmüller's Hohn darüber dass es schon da war! Welch Glück, dass die kostbarsten Dinge zum zweiten Male da sind! - Alle Philosophen! Es sind Menschen, die etwas Ausserordentliches erlebt haben." Sommer-Herbst 1884. 26 [416] The gay science ("la gaya scienza"); with a prelude in rhymes and an appendix of songs. Translated, with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann. New York, Random House, 1974. The will to power. A new translation by Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. Edited, with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann. New York, Random House, 1967. Ecce Homo / by Friedrich Nietzsche; translated by Walter Kaufmann; edited, with commentary, by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1967. The Portable Nietzsche, translated by Walter Kaufmann New York: Viking Press, 1968. Selected letters of Friedrich Nietzsche, Edited and translated by Christopher Middleton, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1969. Martin Heidegger's writings: Nietzsche I (1936-1939) (GA 6.1) Herausgegeben von Brigitte Schillbach, 1996. Nietzsche II (1939-1946) (GA 6.2) Herausgegeben von Brigitte Schillbach, 1997. Nietzsche Seminare 1937 und 1944 (GA 87) Herausgegeben von Peter von Ruckteschell, 2004. Die Geschichte des Seyns (GA 69) Herausgegeben von Peter Trawny, 1998. Included in this volume is a single remark about amor fati. Heidegger wrote "Beilagen Zu: Die Geschichte des Seyns (1938/40). Zu V. To Koivov. Amor fati – Stehen vor dem Seienden – es übernehmend – weil es und wie es ist." Zu Ernst Jünger (GA 90) Herausgegeben von Peter Trawny, 2004. 156 Heidegger's letter to Hans-Hermann Groothoff 26 Nov 1939, p. 273. "Jünger wermag keine Entscheidung zu enfalten und durch sie erst den ihr gemassen Gründungsraum zu eröffnen. Er bleibt beim amor fati – wobei das factum ist die neuzeitliche Wirklichkeit, die schon ein Vergangenes darstellt." Nietzsche / Martin Heidegger; translated from the German with notes and an analysis by David Farrell Krell. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979. 157 Martin Heidegger's ontotheological problems and Nāgārjuna solutions: Heidegger's Presuppositions and Entanglements in Metaphysics In the Hegel book Martin Heidegger wrote "...all philosophy from first to last merely unfolds its presupposition (Voraussetzung)." (1) What are Heidegger's own presuppositions? Where did Heidegger get stuck attempting his own philosophy? The purpose of this paper is to examine Heidegger's internal problems his metaphysical shadows, his presuppositions, and his bounds and limits. The second part of the paper will see if a 2-3 nd century Buddhist Philosopher, the Acharya g r una (perhaps the greatest Indian philosopher) can help Heidegger with some ways out of his own predicament. In June 1950, Heidegger wrote about his Kant Book, "Philosophicohistorical research is always correctly subject to this charge (violence of my interpretations) whenever it is directed against attempts to set in motion a thoughtful dialogue between thinkers." ( ) We are attempt a creative and critical encounter (Auseinandersetzung) and thoughtful dialogue between Heidegger and g r una over their philosophical presuppositions. Heidegger's critique of history of metaphysic as being ontotheology; namely metaphysics is ontology as Being as first and most universal ground common to all beings; second, metaphysics is theology as highest ground (causa sui); and metaphysic as logos (as logic). Therefore, the basic nature of metaphysics combines all three essential and is ontotheological (termed used by Kant and redefined by Heidegger). Heidegger was critical of the traditional philosophy. Heidegger's own entanglements with metaphysics maybe linked to his own Christian background his 'subterranean quakes'(GA66 p 368) and his overcoming of Christianity without destroying it. There are many linkages between Heidegger and the eastern thought of Japan and China (his work on the attempted translation of the Tao Te-Ching in 1946 with Paul Shih-yi Hsiao), which includes his own Asian students; however, his connections with the Indian philosophical traditions are more problematic and have been more with the connected to the Vedânta tradition (J.L. Mehta for example) than with the Buddhist traditions. Heidegger said "The greatest difficulty in this enterprise always lies, as far as I can see, in the fact that with few exceptions there is no command of the Eastern languages either in Europe or in the United States." (in his Letter 1969 to Hawaii conference). But it should be noted that Sanskrit and Greek have a common origin in proto-Indo-European; and Sanskrit is much closer to the German language than all other Asian languages. For example Boss writes: "These days when Heidegger comes to stay with me, he shows more and more interest in Indian thought. He regrets in particular that he has no knowledge of Sanskrit. He now has asked me to inquire what would be the Sanskrit of some fundamental terms and concepts. Above all, he wishes to know whether the Sanskrit language can distinguish between ''Sein'' and ''Seiendes.'' (Hoch 1991 p. 51-292) Hoch, Erna 158 M. 1991. Sources and Resources: A Western Psychiatrist's Search for Meaning in the Ancient Indian Scriptures. Verlag Ruegger. ISBN 3 7253 0412-2. Also, this interest is mentioned in the Zollikon Seminars (p. 254). Letter March 7 1960. "If you could – but only at your leisure – find out and share with the me the Indian words for "ontological difference" that is for "Being" and "beings" for "unconcealedness" and "forgetfulness" I would be very grateful." This led to an exchange of letters and interviews between Medard Boss, Erna M. Hoch, Kanti Chandra Pandey a professor of Sanskrit at Lucknow University (during the year 1960) and Martin Heidegger (Hoch 1991, p. 251-292) concerning the details of Sanskrit words for some of Heidegger's request. Heidegger had difficulties with his dialogue on Nietzsche. In his letter to Boss dated August 16, 1960 he says "I am still stuck in the "abyss" of ietzsche." (3). He must have been working on his two volume set on Nietzsche which was published in 1961. About Nietzsche according to Otto Pöggeler Heidegger said "Er hat mich kaputt gemacht"; namely " ietzsche kaput me". This is because a number of Heidegger's own presuppositions were questioned during his encounters with Nietzsche. These are essential left over from his attack on the ontotheological nature of metaphysics. With the lost the supersensuous (Übersinnliche) world there is no guarantees or ultimate support, so therefore, there are no goals, no values, no worldview, no view, and no standpoint for philosophy. Ultimately we have a single task to wrestle the very nature of philosophy out of earlier philosophers. What is nature of philosophy? What the nature of philosophical thinking? Great philosophers altered our understanding of what it means to do philosophy. What is living and what is dead in Heidegger's and agar una's philosophy? Heidegger has some intrinsic counterdictions (inconsistencies) and problems within his philosophical thinking – some of which he sees himself at various times in his development. In agar una's work on "Averting the arguments" (Vigrahavyavartani) he states his opponents twenty verses and replies. The main attack is that Nagarjuna (he lived in the 2-3 AD in southern India, he was a Buddhist) has to assume self-existence in order to attack the self-existence, in other words it is an attack against agar una's self-consistence in his philosophical thinking. To show that a philosopher's philosophical thinking is self-counterdiction is one of the first ways to attack a philosopher. Nagarjuna deployed the so called Catuskoti (fourfold) logic, known as tetralemma logic. Example would be: "Everything is real and is not real. Both real and not real. either real nor not real. This is Lord Buddha's teaching." (MMK XVIII:8). agar una often uses his methodology against himself since he has no position. Heidegger's critical remarks (Auseinandersetzung) about his major treatise Sein und Zeit (1927) will be published in GA 82 Zu eigenen Veröffentlichungen. Hegel is noted for his thought that speculative thinking, does indeed involve showing the counterdictions in the world as an inherent structure of the world. This is part of Hegel's rethinking of dialectical thinking and with Karl Marx developing this much further than Hegel. For 159 example, "Hegel" Bertrand Russell observed is "the hardest to understand of the great philosophers' because with Hegel there is a different way of thinking all together – counterdictions." What is philosophy? Almost no one agrees on what it is we are doing since philosophy's unusually nature is inherently problematic and belongs to the essential first problems of philosophy. We do not agree on the basic presupposition as to what is philosophy. Philosophy is a seeking and a questioning, it does not have the power to be any more. There is also the question of "section 18. The Powerlessness of Thinking" (p. 33) in the Contributions. Metaphysics is at an end; but Heidegger has his own entanglements with the shadows of metaphysics (the Buddha's shadow was shown for centuries according to Nietzsche, Gay Science, 3 rd book #108). Heidegger's metaphysical shadows still play on the walls of the Die Hütte. Christianity in the past has set the foundations for the setting goals (eschatology), Christian values of the highest good (evil at the bottom of ranks), and a Christian worldview (standpoint). Heidegger's presuppositions that I wanted to outline are: 1) Setting goals (progress). Nihilism. Ideals, idols. Purpose. Aim. Or, no goals? Goalessness (Ziellosigkeit). GA 65, section 260. 2) Hierarchies of Values (highest good, bad, evil). Or, no values? Valuelessness (wertlosigkeit). 3) Worldview. Philosophy as constructing a worldview? Weltanschauung. 4) Viewlessness (Ansichtslosigkeit, a special word for Heidegger). 5) Standpointlessness (standpunktlosigkeit) Remarks and Analysis 1). Goalessness in Heidegger. Goalessness is sometime translated from German as aimlessness. For Nietzsche Goalessness (Ziellosigkeit) is a form and basic belief of Nihilist (Will to Power, #25). Heidegger wrote in the Contributions " ihilism in ietzsche's sense means that all goals are gone.(GA 65, section 72, et p. 96 german p. 138). Later in this paragraph he talks of 'admit the goal-lessness' and then believing again in goals, for example: the volk (people), movies, seaside resort vacations (et. P. 97). On the other hand, he also talks about seeking, in the Contributions, Heidegger remarks about the goal is ust "seeking" (p. 13). Contributions "In this way the inceptual mindfulness of thinking becomes necessarily genuine thinking, i.e., a thinking that sets goals. What gets set is not just any goal, and not the goal in general, but the one and only and thus singular goal of our 160 history. This goal is the seeking itself the seeking of Seyn." (p. 13). About the same time, in the Wintersemester 1937/38, Heidegger wrote: "The grandeur of man is measured according to what he seeks and according to the urgency by which he remains a seeker (Suchende)." (Grundfragen der Philosophie. Ausgewählte 'Probleme' der 'Logik', GA 45 g. p. 5, et. p.7). Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic". In an interesting remark Richard Polt says "...the Contributions are a transitional text in which Heidegger has not quite weaned himself away from metaphysical, goal-directed thinking." (p. 225). Richard Polt goes on to mention that Heidegger sees this problem himself in an unpublished writing entitled: Überlegungen X (section 52). By the next major writing, after GA65, in Besinnung (1938/39) at least in writing is no longer talking about goals but he say in the poetic Introduction "We do not know goals and are only a pathway"(GA 66 section 6a p. 9). Indeed, the whole notion of goals requires the will to a goal or even just a will; so as we are moving the will to power or the will to will out of metaphysics, then this means that process of setting goals also has to be left behind. In terms of culture, this is seen in the goals setting of such ideas as: Plato's Republic Karl Marx's communist utopia or during in 1930s the so called "Thousand-Year Empire". ietzsche was critical of the improvers of mankind in Twilight of Idols and other idols or ideals. Can we will non-willing as such? I no longer will a goal. A few days before Heidegger death in 1976, he came up with the motto for his collected writings (Gesamtausgabe) he wrote "Wege – nicht Werke". The translation into English would be, "Ways not works". Heidegger used the word "Wege" for many of publications for example, Holzwege (1935-1946), Wegmarken (1919-1961), Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-1959), Feldweg-Gespräche (1944/45). Heidegger would often say that his thinking was underway or a pathway. This shows that Heidegger wanted to be known as ust "going" in other words no goals just a pathway. "Future thinking is a thinking that is underway..." (Contributions, et p 3). His way out of the bottle as a fly sounds like the Chinese philosophy's Tao. 2) Valuelessness in Heidegger. In the distance background is the Value-Philosophy of the NeoKantians like Heidegger's teacher Heinrich Rickert (Neo-Kantian Southwest School included Wilhelm Windelband). Values are thought of terms of will. For Nietzsche, Nihilism is when the highest values have devalued themselves. Remember ietzsche's pro ect of the revaluation of all values under the guise of will to power and Nihilism. Beings are values in this late stage of metaphysics. Nietzsche wrote in fragment "The entire idealism of mankind hitherto is on the point of changing suddenly into nihilism--into the belief in absolute valuelessness (Wertlosigkeit), i.e., meaninglessness (Sinnlosigkeit). (Will to Power, #617). Heidegger says "Every metaphysics is a "system value-estimations." (Nietzsche by Heidegger, Vol 3 p. 0 ). During Heidegger's encounter with Nietzsche he came to greater understanding of the place of values in the late stages of the history of metaphysics. Heidegger says that 161 "Value is 'essentially the viewpoint' (Gesichtspunktes) of power-reckoning of will to power (Will to Power, #715). In the Letter on Humanism he says, is it wrong to talk against values? Values are of course part of the subjective part of all modern thinking. Heidegger in the Letter on Humanism goes on to says "To think against values therefore does not mean to beat the drum for valueslnessness and nullity of beings." (et. p.265 Pathmarks). 3) Worldview in Heidegger. Philosophy and worldview are incompatible according to Husserl and Heidegger, although Husserl would replace philosophy as worldview with philosophy as rigorous science (Philosophy as Strict Science, 1911). Heidegger wrote a letter to Rudolf Bultmann in 1927 requesting information about his development where he says "My work has no ambitions toward a worldview or a theology, but it may well contain approaches and intentions in the direction of an ontological founding of Christian theology as a science. This should suffice to give you an idea of what I am after." (Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, by Theodore J. Kisiel, University of California Press, 1993, p. 452). Heidegger's attack on worldview-ism was in his work on the nature of ground questions in phenomenology (developed in his work with Edmond Husserl) given in a series of lectures at the University of Marburg in 1927, after the writing of his most famous major work, entitled: Being and Time. In the very earlier lectures Heidegger discusses the difference between scientific philosophy and worldview philosophy. The title of the lectures in English, Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1954) Published by Indiana University Press, 1975. GA24 Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie. 19 7. Overview of Heidegger's remarks. The word worldview (Weltanschauung) was first used by Kant in the Critique of Judgment (his third critique) and there is no Latin or Greek equivalent it was coined in German first and was used later in English. The word and its meanings involved over time, Heidegger quotes and investigates the usage of the word in Goethe, Alexander von Humboldt, Schelling, Hegel, Gorres, Ranke, Schleiermacher, Bismarck, and final Karl Jasper (his book on the Psychology of Worldviews was published in 1925); but the one philosopher of note that he leaves out was Wilhelm Dilthey. In the next section that Heidegger asserts the main point of his philosophy (alpha and omega of philosophy) that Being is the "proper and sole theme of philosophy" (et 11 G 14-15). He goes on to say that "Philosophy is ontology. In contrast a worldview is positing of knowledge of beings and a positing attitude towards beings; it is not ontological but ontic." (et 11 G 14-15). After a few remarks he shuts the door with the statement "a worldview philosophy is simple inconceivable" (et 1 G 15-17). Philosophy is not involved in creating worldviews. What does this do for ethics and morality or political philosophy? Although at various points in Heidegger's writing he most certainly gives a worldview and has an agenda. 162 4) Viewlessness in Heidegger Heidegger in unpublished lecture from 1932 says, "There is no point of viewlessness," Heidegger states " there is only choice of point of view strength of point of view and courage of point of view." GA 36/37 Sein und Wahrheit (lectures 1932). Sommersemester 1932. Der Anfang der abendländischen Philosophie (Anaximander und Parmenides) [Vorlesung]. ("A ote on the Philosophy of Heidegger" by Mar orie Glicksman The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Feb. 17, 1938), pp. 98. Supposedly, Heidegger came up with the word "Ansichtslosigkeit". 5). Standpointlessness in Heidegger. 6). Positionslosigkeit Heidegger said "Yet we must heed one thing: this standpoint of freedom-from-standpoints is of the opinion (Meinung) that it has overcome the one-sidedness and bias of prior philosophy, which always was, and is, defined by its standpoints. However, the standpoint of Standpointlessness (Standpunktslosigkeit) represents no overcoming (Uberwindung). In truth it is the extreme consequence, affirmation, and final stage of that opinion concerning philosophy which locates all philosophy extrinsically in standpoints that are ultimately right in front of us, standpoints whose one-sidedness we can try to bring into equilibrium." (Nietzsche Vol II, et 118, German, Vol I, p 379). There are no standpoints --only Standpointlessness. One of Heidegger's in the middle of his writing on the Essence of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus (1931-3 ) we find a interesting passage where he says "The desire to philosophize from the standpoint of standpointlessness, as a purportedly genuine and superior ob ectivity is either childish or as it usually the case disingenuous...[a couple of sentences] Not freedom from any standpoint (something fantastic), but the right choice of standpoint, the courage to a standpoint, the setting in action of a standpoint and holding out within it, is the task: a task, admittedly, which can only be enacted in philosophical work..." (The Essence Of Truth: On Plato's Cave Allegory and Theaetetus , Continuum, 2005. et. p. 57, translation Ted Sadler). [empiricist-positivist side of the Cartesian legacy, namely, Rorty and Taylor. Their story, however, is in many ways typical of numerous others. Each, I claim, retains more of the standpointless or ahistorical ideal than he realizes. I begin with a brief review of Descartes' own struggle to reach this ideal, in order to stress its ahistorical character and to identify the strong "Cartesianism" that still characterizes much later English-speaking philosophy] However by 1955; Heidegger which is "I write all of this in the form of questions; for, as far as I can see, thinking can today do more than to continually ponder what evoked in the said questions." ("On The Question of Being" Letter to Ernst Jünger "Zur Seinsfrage (1955) / Über die Linie" in GA 9 Pathmarks et. p.306). Madhyamika ("Middle Way") school of Mahayana Buddhism is best represented by Nagarjuna was a second century Buddhist philosopher – is the preeminent single philosopher that India ever produced. Nagarjuna attacked most of the 163 traditional Indian metaphysical schools and the Buddhist schools as well. The language Sanskrit is close to the original mother language of all Indo-European languages, for example, Greek, Latin, Russian, Persian, Hebrew, German, French, and English. The Sanskrit University library in Varanasi has over 100,000 texts in Sanskrit and there is a very rich and old tradition of Sanskrit in India. Sanskirt was used like Latin was used in Europe for years as the universal language in writing for philosophy, literature, and sciences. The Buddhists had their own way of using Sanskrit. The Sanskrit word "drsti" means a view or sometime more loosely translated as a dogma. agar una's favorite dialogue of the Buddha's was the "Discourse to Katyayana" (Kaccayanaqotta-sutta) where there is a length discussion of the right-view and the wrong-view. Remember there is the Buddhist teaching of the Aryan (noble) EightFold Path: Right Viewpoint. (samyag-dṛṣṭi samm -diṭṭhi) or right seeing. Indian philosophy in Sanskrit is called: Darshanas, Visions of life. (note: Darsan, seeing). Mahayana philosophical schools, Svatantrika-Madhyamika and Prasangika Madhyamika Nagarjuna has taught not only emptiness but also the emptiness of emptiness (sunyatasunyata). Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (Devanagari: ), or Fundamental Verses on the Middle Way final chapter, and final words. Many different translations. Chapter: 27. Dṛṣṭiparīkṣ : Analysis of views. Verse: 30. "I bow down to Gautama whose kindness holds one close who revealed the sublime dharma in order to let go of all views." (Tibetan translation). Verse: 30. "I reverently bow to Gautama (the Buddha) who out of compassion has the truth of being (saddharma) in order to destroy all views." (Sanskrit translation). Verse: 30: "I reverently bow to Gautama [the Buddha] who, out of compassion, has taught the true doctrine in order to relinquish all views." Verse: 30: "I prostrate to Gautama Who through compassion Taught the true doctrine which leads to the relinquishing of all views." Nagarjuna view was viewlessness. The Buddha was seeking nirvana and enlightenment; and not another view of the world. The second century Indian Buddhist (Madhyamika) philosopher, Nagarjuna was critical of all philosophical worldviews (Dṛṣṭiparīkṣ ) and may have suggested solutions to a number of Heidegger's own entanglements with the ontotheological nature of metaphysics and the Christian aspects of Heidegger's thinking. It seems fitting that the very last verse of Nagarjuna's challenging work, Mulamadhyamakakarika (Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way), would present the readerw ith what seems to be a riddle:" I prostrated o Gautama, who through compassion, taught the true 164 doctrine, which leads to the relinquishing of all views" (27:30). This should be read with an earlier verse (13:8): "The victorious ones have said that emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. For whomever emptiness is a view, that one will accomplish nothing."1 drsti (view) We should not forget that Nagarjuna declared that "sunyata is the relinquishing of all views." 13:8 (sunyata is sarvadrstinam prokta nihsaranama "the relinquishing of all views") Footnotes: (HHPS et. 36) ( "... dass alle Philosophie im Ersten und Letzten nur ihre Voraussetzung entfaltet." (German p. 53). GA-32. Preface to the Second Edition. Kant and Problem of Metaphysics. p.xx. June 1950. Translated by Richard Taft. Indiana University Press, 5 th enlarged edition, 1997. p. xx. Zollikon Seminars. P. 255. Zollikon Seminars. P. 290. 6) Anti-Christ, section 15. "Introduction to the Symposium and Reading of a Letter from Martin Heidegger' by Winfield E. Nagley. Philosophy East and West, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1970), pp. 221 "Wege – nicht Werke" is der Leitspruch den Heidegger wenige Tage vor seinem Tod fur seine GA letzter Hand zusammen mit dem Titelblatt handschriftlich aufsetzte. "ways not works" is the guidance saying, which handwritten Heidegger put on few days before its death fur its GA of last hand as well as the title page. Ihr instandiger Beistand auf dem langen Weg Wegfeld (way field). T. R. V. Murti, The Central Philosophy of Buddhism (2d ed. 1960, repr. 1970); The Victorious ones have said That Emptiness is the relinquishing of all views. For whoever emptiness becomes a view That one will accomplish nothing (MMK XIII:8). I prostrate to Gautama Who, through compassion Taught the true doctrine Which leads to the relinquishing of all views. (MMK XXVII:30) 165 Heidegger said in 1971 "I would like to dissuade you from the literature on Heidegger" (4). Exactly unless we have a 'matter for thought" (Zur Sache des Denkens); that is Heidegger's own internal struggle (shadows) with metaphysics. ietzsche wrote that "Buddhism is the only positivistic religion in history; even in its epistemology (a strict phenomenalism)... (6)". How much the later Heidegger (after 1939) is still engage in some form of descriptive phenomenology of the world like the Buddhist is still open to thinking? From an Appendix from 1964 for Phenomenology and Theology Heidegger says "One should avoid the impression that dogmatic theses are being stated in terms of a Heideggerian philosophy when there is no such thing." (et p. 55). So, by 1964 there is nothing like a Heideggerian philosophy The director of the conference, Professor Albert Borgmann, has translated the letter he received from Martin Heidegger regarding the Conference as follows: "It is a great honor to have your letter of June 3. I want to thank you and the other gentlemen for your interest in my work. That you together with colleagues from Japan are planning a conference in honor of my eightieth birthday, deserves special thanks on my part. Again and again it has seemed urgent to me that a dialogue take place with the thinkers of what is to us the Eastern world. The greatest difficulty in this enterprise always lies, as far as I can see, in the fact that with few exceptions there is no command of the Eastern languages either in Europe or in the United States. A translation of Eastern thought into English, on the other hand, remains-as does every translationan expedient. May your conference prove fruitful in spite of this unfortunate circumstance. It is extremely kind of you to offer me all the conveniences necessary for participation at this meeting in Hawaii. But-as you rightly supposed-I cannot undertake this trip at my age ... Please express to your colleagues my gratitude and give them my best wishes for a fruitful dialogue. With most cordial regards to you and the other gentlemen. signed by Martin Heidegger." THE END or PERHAPS just some space for you – the reader and thinker who are selfattempters. Index A abandons, 123 Abaris, 44 Abbau, 67, 138 abendländischen, 74, 162 aber, 68, 77, 86, 139 abgetan, 86 Abhandlung, 70, 77, 120, 132 ability, 143 able, 17, 20, 40, 44, 54, 60, 90, 143 Ablehnung, 144 abolish, 57 abolished, 57, 59 abolishment, 154 About, 20, 38, 52, 82, 158, 160 about, 4-6, 8-10, 12-13, 15, 17, 20, 24-26, 29, 31, 33-34, 36-39, 41-48, 50-53, 56-58, 60, 64-68, 70, 73, 75, 81-88, 91, 93, 95-100, 103-105, 107-109, 111-113, 116-117, 119, 121, 123, 126-130, 133, 136-140, 142-146, 149-152, 154-155, 157-161 Above, 157 above, 3, 18, 26, 28, 99, 111, 146, 153 Abridged, 37, 52 abruptly, 36, 50 absence, 131, 134 absent, 65, 131-132 Absicht, 26, 43, 56, 67 Absolute, 62, 92-96, 100-101, 106, 112-114, 118, 120-121, 130 absolute, 10, 32, 61-62, 71-72, 74, 83, 85-89, 93-100, 105-109, 117, 119, 130, 143, 160 absolutely, 4, 94, 127 Absoluten, 130 absoluten, 73-74, 130 absoluter, 72, 77 absolutizing, 10 absorbed, 151 abstinence, 14 Abstract, 5, 31, 45, 64, 80, 123 abstract, 32, 61, 71, 74, 143 abstraction, 32 Abstrakte, 74 Abstrakten, 74 abundance, 153 Abuse, 45, 121 ABut, 129 abyss, 133, 158 academic, 11, 140 Academy, 36, 38, 50, 52, 83, 101 accept, 151 accepted, 12, 21 accidental, 87 accompanied, 14 accomplish, 164 accomplished, 39, 53, 144 accord, 144 accordance, 18 According, 11, 23, 72, 91, 126, 128-129, 144 according, 18, 21, 61, 87-89, 123, 136, 138, 140, 142, 158-161 Accordingly, 19, 22, 83, 126 accordingly, 17, 27 account, 4, 37, 52, 104, 151 accuracy, 15 accuse, 150 Index acdemic, 65 Acharya, 157 achgänger, 68 achieved, 11 achlass, 153 achten, 66 Acknowledgements, 2 acknowledging, 128 acquainted, 37, 51 acquiescence, 151 acquired, 83 acrimonious, 136 acting, 141 action, 162 active, 11, 151 actively, 154 Actual, 113 actual, 26, 88, 95, 97, 99, 105, 143, 151 actualitas, 62 Actuality, 62 actuality, 89, 106 actualization, 32 actually, 5, 22, 27, 29, 40, 54, 60, 86, 91-92, 95, 138, 145 acute, 24 AD, 158 ad, 29 adamant, 137 add, 11, 70 added, 96, 101, 104, 136, 140 addition, 11, 46, 55, 85, 87, 94, 109, 113 Additional, 6, 133, 146 additional, 147, 152 address, 12, 141 Addresses, 114 addresses, 16, 139-140 adds, 146, 152 adherent, 137 administration, 34, 48 admiration, 28 admired, 119 admit, 159 admits, 31 admitted, 118 admittedly, 162 admixture, 25 admonishment, 60 Adolf, 33, 48 adopted, 95 adopting, 130 adopts, 117 adroit, 138 advance, 55-56, 118 advanced, 36, 51 advancing, 56, 140 Aenesidemus, 36, 51 Aesthetic, 118 aesthetic, 118, 151 Aesthetics, 72, 115 aesthetics, 116 Aesthetische, 115 AEvil, 128 affirmation, 59, 134, 144, 149-150, 152, 162 affirmative, 128 affirming, 151 affirms, 150 afford, 121 afforded, 4 After, 6, 15, 80, 94, 112, 126, 142-143, 161 after, 7, 11, 23, 26, 28-29, 31, 36, 46, 50, 56, 70, 75, 91, 98, 103-104, 108, 112-113, 117, 123-126, 128, 130, 138-140, 152, 160-161, 165 Afterwards, 58 Again, 26, 40, 54, 81, 85, 107, 110, 129, 137, 144, 151-152, 165 again, 14, 27, 36-39, 51-53, 61, 107, 113, 118, 129-131, 137, 139, 146-147, 159, 165 Against, 15-16 against, 6, 10, 12-15, 72, 85, 106, 109, 111-117, 119, 141, 150, 153, 157-158, 161 agar, 158, 163 agathon, 93 age, 22, 29, 64, 84, 106, 111, 116-117, 119, 123-124, 126, 144, 165 agenda, 37, 52, 161 Ages, 61 aggregate, 24, 105 aggregates, 88 ago, 15 agony, 14 agree, 7, 36, 50, 87, 159 agreed, 99 agrees, 159 ahistorical, 31, 66, 162 Ahndung, 114 Aim, 159 aim, 23, 46 aimed, 106, 126 aiming, 18 aimlessness, 159 air, 88 Aix, 34, 48 AK, 26, 33, 47 AKA, 120, 130, 132 Alan, 133 Albany, 101 Albert, 123, 165 Index Aletheia, 62 Alexander, 19, 36, 51, 115, 161 Alexandre, 61 Alfred, 2-3, 31, 69-70, 77-78, 100, 113, 120, 142 Alice, 2 alive, 7, 41, 125 All, 2, 14, 35, 38, 49, 52, 87-88, 117, 123, 127, 134, 139-140, 149 all, 5-7, 9-10, 12, 17-19, 21-24, 26-29, 31-33, 37, 39-44, 48, 51, 53-57, 59-61, 70, 81-84, 86, 88-89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99-100, 104-105, 108-111, 113-114, 117-118, 123, 127-129, 134, 139-140, 142-146, 149-154, 157, 159-165 Alle, 73, 155 alle, 69, 164 allegation, 8, 31, 41, 81, 137 Allegory, 92, 162 allegory, 92-94, 98 allein, 77 Allen, 44 allererst, 96 alles, 66, 70, 73 allgemeinen, 115 allgemeinste, 69 allow, 55, 139 allowed, 151 allows, 36, 50 allzu, 139 Almost, 159 almost, 12, 34, 39, 48, 53 alone, 18, 26, 33, 48, 93, 96, 98-99, 106-107, 109, 126, 128, 134 along, 16, 33, 60, 86, 104, 138, 144 alpha, 123, 161 already, 5, 8, 24-25, 32, 36, 41, 51, 126, 144, 151-152 als, 43, 67, 69, 71-74, 77, 86, 104, 109, 115, 130, 139, 147 Also, 14, 71, 115, 118-119, 125, 133, 150, 155, 158 also, 4-5, 14, 18, 20-21, 24, 27-28, 36, 39, 51, 54, 56-58, 64, 74, 77, 79, 82-83, 87-88, 90, 94, 97, 105-106, 108-109, 112, 116-117, 119, 124, 128-130, 136-137, 144, 146-147, 149, 151-152, 159-160, 163 altered, 158 Although, 4, 8, 10, 12, 20, 24, 29, 36, 38, 42, 45-46, 51, 53, 55, 60, 67, 69, 88-90, 92, 104, 111, 118, 120, 125, 128, 136, 142-144, 146, 161 although, 83, 118, 143-144, 153, 161 altogether, 144 always, 7, 21, 40, 46, 54, 60, 84, 95, 104-106, 115, 128-129, 138, 142, 144, 153, 157, 162, 165 alêtheia, 105 Am, 151 am, 3-5, 20, 55, 57-58, 60, 70, 74-77, 89-90, 101, 141, 147, 150, 158, 161 Amanda, 2 amazing, 25, 127-128 ambiguity, 127 ambit, 59 ambitions, 161 America, 115 American, 80, 132 Ameriks, 44 Amherst, 76 amiable, 111, 125 Among, 38, 52, 66 among, 5, 32, 37, 40, 51, 54, 68, 81, 90, 97, 124, 141, 146 Amor, 3, 149-155 amor, 149-156 amount, 31, 73 Amsterdam, 3, 120 An, 19, 39, 53, 105, 113, 117, 155 an, 4-6, 8-16, 18, 20-21, 23-26, 28-29, 31-32, 35-37, 39-40, 42-44, 46-47, 50-54, 56-57, 59-60, 63-70, 73, 78, 80-85, 87, 93, 95-96, 98, 100, 102-103, 105-109, 112, 114-116, 119, 121, 123-124, 126-127, 130, 136-138, 140, 142, 144-147, 149-153, 155-156, 158-161, 164-165 analogies, 34, 49 analogy, 34, 49, 92-93, 95, 98, 141 analysed, 149 Analysis, 3, 16, 103, 150, 159, 163 analysis, 6, 8, 17, 27, 40, 42, 44, 54, 56, 59, 66, 73, 80, 87, 92, 103, 106, 113, 123, 125, 127-130, 146, 154, 156 analytic, 19, 44 analytical, 112 Analytik, 71 Anaxagoras, 146 Anaximander, 143, 146, 162 Ancient, 37, 52, 119-120, 158 ancient, 38, 52, 55, 61, 119, 141, 146 Ancients, 142 And, 8-9, 14, 22, 41-42, 57, 66, 100, 128, 130-132, 143, 150 and, 1-29, 31-76, 78, 80-101, 103-121, 123-134, 136-165 andere, 68-69 anderen, 73, 147 Andreas, 46 Aneignung, 67, 74-75 Anerkennung, 115 anew, 4-5, 15, 32, 55, 146 Anfang, 63, 70, 75, 79, 102, 140, 147, 149, 151, 154, 162 Anfanger, 102 Anfangs, 140, 147 Index Anfangsgründe, 13, 16, 109 Anfänger, 78-79 anfänglich, 72 anfängliche, 75 angedeutet, 69 angeeignet, 74 Anlauf, 139 Anliegen, 69 Anmassung, 26 Anmuth, 118 annihilates, 123 announced, 36, 50 announcement, 98 anonymously, 117 Another, 39, 53, 80, 85, 91, 111, 154 another, 7, 19, 21, 28, 35-36, 38, 40-41, 49-50, 53-54, 65-66, 84, 88, 95, 98, 109, 125, 146-147, 163 Ansatz, 102 Anschluss, 102 Anschluss, 64, 78 Ansehung, 33, 48 ansetzen, 64 Ansichtslosigkeit, 159, 162 Anstrengung, 66 Answer, 14, 59, 150 answer, 25, 29, 56, 70, 83 answered, 127 answering, 22, 29 answers, 8, 13-14 antagonist, 142 Anthropologie, 13 anthropologists, 99 Anthropology, 99 anthropology, 99-100 Anti, 164 anti, 80, 83, 145, 153-154 Antigone, 115 antiken, 115 antimetaphysical, 149 antimetaphysics, 145 antipodes, 142, 144, 146, 149 antiquity, 55, 134, 146, 152 anxiety, 13 Any, 39, 53, 99, 104, 109, 111 any, 2, 4-5, 12, 17, 19, 25, 29, 35, 40, 44, 46, 49, 54, 57-58, 63, 65, 68, 81, 84, 88-89, 100, 128, 141, 147, 150-151, 159, 162 anymore, 38, 53 Anyone, 4 anyone, 84 anything, 36, 39, 50, 53, 57, 95, 137, 144, 151-152 anyway, 39, 54, 60, 151 anywhere, 129, 144 apart, 25, 108 apeiron, 62 apex, 58 aphorism, 14, 153 Aphorisms, 114, 121 aphorisms, 139, 153 appalling, 143 apparent, 21, 56-57, 59, 67, 69, 142, 147, 154 appear, 45-46, 130 appearance, 61, 91-92, 131 appearances, 19 appeared, 4 appearing, 140 appears, 33, 47, 71, 88, 90, 93, 103, 132 Appendix, 61, 132, 138, 165 appendix, 155 applied, 109, 118 apply, 110, 134 appointed, 117, 124 appointment, 115 appraisal, 64 appreciation, 118 apprehending, 98 approach, 8, 16, 42, 45, 67, 70, 75, 140 approached, 9, 43, 45, 69, 83 approaches, 11, 45, 161 approaching, 58 appropriation, 9, 42 approvingly, 7, 41, 66, 68, 82, 125 April, 36, 50, 103, 139 Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 78 arbitrarily, 8, 41, 136 arbitrariness, 88 arbitrary, 85 arche, 24, 62 archeologies, 126 Architectonic, 17, 23 architectonic, 18, 23-25, 29, 39, 54, 126 architectonically, 17, 23, 27, 29, 126 Archiv, 72 arduous, 87 Are, 111, 151 are, 4, 6, 8-9, 11, 13-14, 16, 19-21, 28, 31-35, 38, 40-41, 43-50, 52-56, 58, 60-61, 65-66, 68-72, 74, 80-88, 91-93, 95-98, 100, 105-115, 117, 120, 123-124, 126, 128-130, 133, 136, 138-143, 145-147, 149-153, 157-162, 165 area, 12 areas, 15-16, 88, 106, 136, 141 argued, 85, 112, 114 argues, 112 arguing, 108-109, 111 argument, 113, 116 Index argumentative, 109 arguments, 31, 75, 87, 158 Aristoteles, 65, 72, 78-79, 102 Aristotelian, 35, 50 Aristotle, 8, 24, 27, 33, 36, 38, 42, 48, 50, 52, 65-67, 82, 87, 91, 105, 107, 111, 136, 142, 146 Aristotles, 102 Arnulf, 44 around, 16, 29, 100 aroused, 39, 53 arouses, 97 arrangement, 85 arrive, 39, 53 arrived, 97, 113 arrogance, 26 Art, 101 art, 4, 24, 98, 107, 116 artest, 151 Arthur, 46, 119 article, 7, 20, 41, 79, 85, 89, 101, 112-113, 119-120, 125, 149 articulated, 25 articulatio, 25 artist, 151 artists, 45 Aryan, 163 As, 4, 15, 32, 47, 60, 90, 92, 94, 97, 99, 104, 113, 141, 144, 149, 152 as, 3-10, 12-29, 32, 35, 37-40, 42-47, 50-52, 54-57, 59, 61-62, 65, 67-68, 70-75, 81-101, 103-121, 123, 125-134, 136-138, 140-143, 145-147, 149-154, 157-165 ascent, 107 ascertain, 87 Ashmita, 2 Asian, 2, 157 aside, 35, 97, 105 ask, 7, 65, 129, 141 asked, 145, 157 asking, 138 asks, 15, 58, 128, 154 aspect, 96 aspects, 163 asscessing, 18 assert, 6, 146 assertion, 130 asserts, 161 assess, 47 assessment, 40, 45, 54, 74 assets, 134 assistant, 84 associated, 111, 125, 147 assume, 4, 158 assumed, 36, 51, 112 assumes, 73 assuming, 19, 21, 28 assumption, 26, 31 assumptions, 31, 82 astonishing, 13 astray, 8, 41 At, 8, 25, 42, 56-57, 64, 73, 85, 91, 94-96, 109, 118, 125, 127, 130, 141, 149, 152 at, 1-2, 4-6, 8-10, 12-13, 15-16, 18, 20-21, 23-24, 29, 32-34, 36-37, 39-43, 45, 47, 49-51, 53-54, 56-61, 64-65, 69-70, 73, 81-83, 85-86, 88-98, 101, 103-104, 106, 108-117, 119, 123-124, 126, 129-130, 132, 136-144, 146-147, 150, 152-153, 158-161, 165 Athe, 129 Atheism, 113 atheism, 112 atheist, 116, 127 Athens, 101 attachment, 150 Attack, 126 attack, 5-6, 14-15, 24, 81, 99, 113, 116, 119, 129, 158, 161 Attacked, 115 attacked, 99, 115-117, 119, 141, 154, 162 attacking, 119 attacks, 10, 117 attain, 63, 147 attainable, 57, 59 attained, 131 Attempt, 113 attempt, 5, 16, 21, 32, 36, 44, 47, 50, 60, 86, 133, 137-139, 150, 157 attempted, 20-21, 29, 100, 109, 145, 154, 157 attempting, 16, 89, 153, 157 attempts, 22, 75, 104, 129, 154, 157 attend, 55, 138 attention, 15, 128 attitude, 109, 161 attributed, 20, 134 atur, 77, 96, 139 ature, 127 auch, 43, 67-68, 74, 139 audience, 140 auf, 67, 147, 164 aufegeben, 74 auffassen, 66 Aufgabe, 12-13, 69 aufgehoben, 64, 67, 69, 74 aufgenommen, 68 Aufheben, 92 aufhebt, 92 aufloste, 74 Index aufsetzte, 164 Aufsätze, 76-77 auftreten, 104, 109 Augen, 73 August, 20-21, 26, 56, 75, 118, 133, 139, 158 Auguste, 58 Aus, 68 aus, 102, 120, 143 Auseinandersetzung, 3, 64, 66-70, 74, 102, 137-138, 145, 147, 154, 157-158 Auseinandersetzungen, 69 Ausfaltung, 139 ausführliche, 92 Ausführung, 86 Ausgang, 13, 16 ausgeht, 66 Ausgewählte, 147, 160 ausgreifende, 70 Auslauf, 147 auslegung, 133 Auslegungen, 66 Austria, 123 authentic, 68, 82, 145 author, 2, 4, 10, 43, 82, 110, 119, 137 authority, 141 Authors, 29 autobiographical, 55, 141 autobiography, 144, 151 Autumn, 151 autumn, 150-151 Ausserordentliches, 155 available, 5, 11 Averting, 158 Avii, 34, 48 avoid, 139, 153, 165 avowedly, 119 aw, 150 await, 72, 140 awaits, 61 awakening, 67 aware, 25, 81, 94 awareness, 63, 147 away, 39, 53, 60, 117, 141, 144, 150, 160 awe, 28-29 awestruck, 153 awful, 116 awfully, 137 awhile, 36 Ax, 34, 48 axiological, 11 axioms, 88 B Baader, 124 Back, 12, 40, 54, 65, 87, 90, 115, 124 back, 8-9, 16, 20, 33-34, 37, 40, 42-43, 48, 51, 54, 56, 74, 96, 98-99, 149 Background, 68, 82 background, 10, 13, 15-16, 35, 43, 45, 56, 65, 68, 84, 87, 157, 160 backwards, 151 bad, 99, 119, 125, 159 Baden, 11 badly, 7, 60 Bakunin, 124 ballast, 90 Bamberg, 103 banal, 143 Band, 75, 120, 137 barking, 139 Baron, 117 barred, 9, 43 Baruch, 106, 119 base, 93, 153 based, 6, 10, 15, 28, 31, 35, 37-38, 49, 51-52, 88, 116, 119, 124, 139 Basel, 143, 146 Basic, 6, 9, 13, 20, 28, 42, 146-147, 160-161 basic, 6, 9, 23, 31, 42, 112, 140-142, 145, 153-154, 157, 159 Basically, 123 basically, 11, 15, 119 basis, 100, 117 bath, 126 battle, 80 battlefield, 34, 48 battles, 34, 48 Bauch, 11 Baumgarten, 19-20, 23, 36, 51 Baur, 120 BC, 33, 48 Be, 21 be, 2, 4, 6-8, 10, 12, 15, 17, 19-23, 25-29, 31, 33-45, 47, 49-56, 59-60, 64, 67-72, 74, 81-88, 90-92, 94, 96-97, 99-100, 103-106, 108-111, 113, 116-119, 121, 124-128, 130-131, 136-143, 146-148, 150-154, 157-160, 162-164 bear, 152 beat, 161 Beaten, 138-139, 143 beautiful, 5, 150-151 Index beautifully, 150 beauty, 58 BECAME, 32, 56, 142 Became, 119 became, 8-9, 15, 36, 42, 51, 115, 119, 124 Because, 128 because, 28, 39-40, 53-54, 60, 74, 87-88, 98-99, 119, 130, 142, 144, 151-152, 158-159 Beck, 19, 36, 51 become, 5, 12, 29, 32, 46, 57, 59, 66, 90, 94, 96-97, 99, 105, 108, 111, 113, 121, 124, 137, 151 becomes, 37, 51, 57, 109, 128, 130, 159, 164 Becoming, 94, 146 becoming, 7, 41, 59-60, 67, 125, 136, 144, 147, 150, 153 bedeutet, 147 Bedeutung, 12 Bedeutungslehre, 64 bedutet, 67 been, 3-6, 12, 25, 28-29, 36-37, 40, 44, 46, 50-51, 54, 56-57, 67, 69, 75, 80, 82, 87, 91, 99, 106-107, 111, 116, 121, 123, 126-128, 137, 140, 142, 144, 146, 149, 153, 157-158 befolgten, 69 before, 20-21, 23, 25-26, 28-29, 35-37, 46, 49-51, 61, 73, 84, 88, 90-91, 94-95, 107, 112, 114, 117, 125, 127, 133, 144, 146-147, 160, 164 beforehand, 26 began, 123 Begin, 93-94, 127, 147 begin, 18-19, 24, 33, 35, 40, 47, 49, 90, 96, 162 beginnen, 64 Beginning, 25, 34, 49, 126, 145 beginning, 5, 12, 27, 34, 36, 48-50, 58-59, 62-64, 73-74, 82, 87, 92-96, 98, 127-129, 136, 139-142, 145, 147-149, 154 beginnings, 58, 87, 133, 147 begins, 34, 48, 58, 62, 64-65, 103, 118 begreifende, 72 Begriff, 43, 67, 71, 73-74, 79, 86, 97, 100-102, 104-105, 107-108 Begriffe, 96 begriffen, 74 Begriffes, 72, 98 Begriffs, 98, 140 Begriffsbildung, 69 BegriffsMumien, 56 begründen, 73 begründet, 67 begun, 129, 143 beherrschenden, 70, 75 behind, 12, 26, 100, 145, 149, 160 bei, 66, 73 beiden, 65, 115 Beilagen, 153, 155 beim, 156 Being, 5-9, 15-16, 20, 32, 41-42, 44, 62-64, 67, 71-72, 74, 81, 83, 88-89, 94, 99-101, 106, 111, 118, 123-126, 128-130, 133-134, 136, 138-140, 142, 144-147, 153, 157-158, 161-162 being, 9, 12, 15, 18, 22, 24, 31, 37-40, 43, 51-55, 57, 65, 67, 74, 91, 96, 99, 104, 106-108, 112-113, 128-130, 133, 136-138, 140, 142, 145-146, 153, 157, 163, 165 beingness, 83, 145 Beings, 160 beings, 63, 128, 134, 142, 145-146, 152-153, 157-158, 161 Beispiel, 3, 73 Beistand, 164 Beitrag, 115 Beiträge, 63, 71, 75, 89, 138-141, 147 bekannte, 115 belegt, 66 belief, 119, 159-160 believe, 46, 67, 93, 108, 121 believers, 60 believing, 159 belittling, 143 belong, 9, 42, 83 belonging, 4, 23, 27 belongs, 9, 17, 24, 27, 29, 42, 126, 159 below, 132 bemerken, 26 Bengel, 124 Benjamins, 120 Berkeley, 38, 52-53 Berlin, 4, 36-38, 46, 50, 52, 90, 103, 113-115, 119, 124 Bernd, 137 Bernstein, 133 Bertrand, 111, 125, 159 besagt, 68, 73-74 besinnliches, 72 Besinnung, 139, 147, 160 besser, 43, 67 best, 8, 26, 82, 162, 165 beste, 26 bestehen, 69 bestehenden, 96 bestimmte, 43, 67, 69 Bestimmungen, 73 bestätigt, 74 Betrachtun, 73 Betrachtungen, 45 better, 10, 16, 26, 39, 43, 53, 82, 90, 144, 152 Between, 101, 120 Index between, 7-10, 14-15, 20, 31, 37-38, 40-43, 51, 53-54, 58, 65, 68, 71, 73, 81-82, 93, 99, 106, 115, 128, 133, 136, 141, 143-145, 147, 153, 157-158, 161 Beurtheilung, 121 bewahrte, 65 Bewegung, 92, 96 Beweis, 66 Bewusstseins, 85-86, 92, 103, 121 Beyond, 14, 46, 153 beyond, 14, 23, 26, 29, 90, 96, 113, 129, 136 Bezug, 66 bezug, 66 Bezugs, 63 Bhagavad, 115, 121 Bhgavad, 115 bias, 162 bibliographical, 2 Bibliography, 44, 78, 101, 120, 132 bid, 7, 60 Biemel, 75 big, 18, 61, 105, 108 bigger, 23, 99, 126, 143 Bildung, 86, 92-93, 115 bill, 33, 47 bin, 65 Birth, 143-144 birth, 106 birthday, 165 bis, 64, 151 Bishop, 38, 52 Bismarck, 161 bisweilen, 43, 67 bit, 23, 104, 108 Black, 1-2 black, 117 Blank, 30, 122, 135 bleibe, 66 bleiben, 74 bleibt, 69, 156 blemishes, 143 Blick, 66, 70, 75 blind, 38, 52 Blochmann, 68, 76 blocks, 35, 40, 50, 54 Blomberg, 37-38, 52 Bloomington, 101, 132 blossen, 36, 50 blossom, 67, 105, 108 blow, 126 blown, 105, 109 bloss, 26 blurs, 153 blush, 57 Bochumer, 120 Boer, 83 Bohme, 124 boldest, 70, 84, 111, 126 bolds, 27 bon, 57, 90 bond, 55, 146 Book, 8, 42, 66, 71, 128, 150, 157 book, 2, 4, 8, 12-14, 17, 20, 36, 42, 46, 51, 58, 68, 82, 87-88, 90-93, 96, 103-104, 111-112, 114, 117, 119, 121, 124, 137-139, 143-144, 149, 151, 157, 159, 161 Books, 44, 76, 132, 155 books, 38, 52, 55, 90, 103-104, 111, 124, 128, 138-139, 151 Borgmann, 165 born, 2, 82, 103 borrowed, 72 Boss, 72, 157-158 Both, 7, 45, 67-68, 80-81, 87, 91, 149, 158 both, 5, 16, 21, 24, 28, 45, 58, 60, 68, 70-71, 81-82, 90, 97-98, 103, 106, 121, 126, 129, 143 bottle, 160 bottom, 57, 159 boundaries, 17-18, 21, 24, 26, 29, 35, 39, 50, 54 boundless, 36-37, 40, 50-51, 54 Bounds, 36, 50 bounds, 157 bow, 163 Braig, 64, 133 branches, 24 break, 136, 142 breakdown, 83 breakfast, 57 breaking, 148 breaks, 25, 127 breathes, 29 Breisgau, 64 Brentano, 13, 91 Breslau, 115 bricks, 66 bridge, 59, 66, 70 brief, 2, 113, 149, 162 Briefe, 118 briefest, 57 Briefwechsel, 72, 75-76 Bright, 57 bright, 58, 123 Brigitte, 155 Brillen, 65 brilliance, 56 Bring, 111 bring, 12, 95, 97-98, 108, 131, 136, 145, 162 bringen, 70, 75 Index brings, 29, 58, 98, 128, 137, 151 bringt, 73 British, 80 broad, 58, 73, 129 Brob, 46 broken, 40, 54-55, 146 Brokmeyer, 80 Brother, 118 brother, 115, 118 brothers, 7, 60, 115 brought, 4, 9, 37, 43, 51, 133, 136, 138 Buch, 65, 78, 102 bud, 67, 105, 108 Buddha, 158-159, 163 Buddhism, 162, 164-165 Buddhist, 157-158, 162-163, 165 Buddhists, 163 build, 34-35, 40, 49-50, 54, 131 building, 22, 34-35, 49, 59 builds, 39, 54, 60 built, 22, 39-40, 50, 53-54 Bultmann, 124, 161 Burckhardt, 55, 124 burden, 113 Buren, 132 buried, 146 burning, 94 bury, 14 But, 4, 7-9, 12, 19, 23-25, 27, 31, 35-37, 40-42, 50-51, 54-60, 65-67, 83-84, 88, 90, 95-96, 111-112, 119, 128-129, 138, 144-145, 149, 152, 157, 165 but, 4, 7-9, 11-12, 14-18, 20-21, 23-29, 34-35, 39-46, 48-50, 53-61, 65-66, 68-70, 73-75, 81, 83-91, 93-100, 103-109, 111-117, 119, 123, 125-129, 137-148, 150-151, 153-154, 158-163 Butler, 132 Bxxi, 56 Bxxii, 21, 24, 34, 48 Bxxiv, 25 Bxxviii, 25 Bxxx, 25, 113 By, 1, 23-24, 45, 59, 73, 96, 101, 121, 126, 133, 151, 160 by, 2, 4-5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 18-19, 21, 23, 25, 28, 32-33, 36, 38-41, 43-48, 50-56, 61, 65, 68, 70, 72-73, 75-77, 81, 83-85, 87-93, 96-99, 101-102, 107-108, 111-112, 114-115, 118-121, 124, 126-128, 131-134, 136-147, 150-151, 153-157, 160-162, 164-165 Böse, 151 Bösewicht, 74 C ca, 150 California, 161 call, 18, 26-27, 31, 104, 150 called, 6, 17-19, 21, 24, 26-28, 31, 33-35, 39, 47-50, 53-54, 58, 65, 82, 84, 86-87, 90-92, 94, 99, 107, 109, 112-113, 116, 119, 123-124, 126, 129, 141, 158, 160, 163 Calling, 87 calling, 38, 52, 85, 88, 153 calls, 18, 28, 35, 49, 73, 143-144, 152 calm, 117 Cambridge, 44 came, 14, 38, 52, 90, 99-100, 117, 119, 132, 139, 160, 162 camera, 2 camp, 88 campus, 129 Can, 14, 16, 22, 29, 66, 90, 141, 145, 160 can, 5, 7-8, 10-11, 14, 17-19, 21-22, 26-28, 31-32, 35, 37, 39-41, 43-45, 47, 50-51, 53-56, 58-59, 61, 74, 81-82, 85-86, 92-94, 97, 103-108, 110, 113, 121, 123, 126, 130-132, 137-141, 147, 150, 152, 154, 157, 162, 165 canceled, 114 canceling, 92 cancelled, 92 candid, 39, 53 candidate, 85 cannot, 14, 29, 40, 54, 60, 107, 126, 133 canon, 23 capable, 22, 107 capacity, 37, 51 capital, 58, 108 captures, 56 career, 117, 124 careful, 137 carefully, 145 cares, 9 Carl, 64, 133 carried, 5, 9, 12, 15, 42 carry, 20 Carteius, 38, 52 Cartesian, 13-15, 162 Cartesianism, 14, 162 Case, 151 case, 12, 38, 52, 87, 89, 144, 151, 162 Caspian, 115 Cassirer, 11, 13, 81, 133, 137 Index casting, 34, 49 casual, 145 cataloging, 2 catalogs, 21, 24, 29 catch, 7, 41, 125 categories, 15, 24, 27, 95 Catholic, 124, 132 Catuskoti, 158 caught, 18, 32, 56, 58-59, 141-142, 145, 154 causa, 157 causality, 19 caustic, 32, 55 Cave, 92, 162 cave, 92-95, 97-98, 107 celebrated, 80 celebration, 80 cent, 2 center, 12, 65-66 Central, 2, 92, 164 central, 6, 12, 16, 20, 25, 56, 64, 73-74, 90-91, 93, 115, 129, 136, 146 centuries, 55, 61, 146-147, 159 century, 2, 4, 6-7, 14, 41, 46, 55, 81, 83, 111, 121, 123-125, 129, 157, 162-163 certain, 24, 27, 29, 105, 112 Certainly, 20, 65, 84, 136, 141-142, 145-146, 151 certainly, 46, 88, 126, 128-129, 161 Certainty, 95 certainty, 17, 19, 23, 27, 83, 87, 98 chain, 39, 53 chained, 92 chains, 93 Chair, 115 chair, 12, 116-117, 124 challenging, 163 chance, 126 Chandra, 158 Change, 115 change, 46, 91, 93, 95, 105, 107, 121, 127 changed, 75, 94, 98, 149, 152 changes, 36, 50, 103, 124, 144, 152 changing, 46, 160 chant, 12 Chapter, 20, 33, 47, 91, 163 chapter, 12, 15, 34, 49, 67, 92-94, 96, 100, 163 chapters, 95 character, 113, 162 characterize, 65, 153 characterized, 67 characterizes, 162 charge, 113, 157 charged, 113 Charles, 9, 42, 101 cheerfulness, 57 Chicago, 155 Chicgao, 2 chief, 33, 48 child, 90 childish, 162 China, 115, 157 Chinese, 115, 160 Ching, 157 choice, 150-152, 162 choose, 112, 152 chooses, 97 Choosing, 133 chose, 153 Christ, 164 Christian, 21, 33, 45, 47-48, 57-58, 61, 99, 114, 119-120, 124, 130, 149, 152, 157, 159, 161, 163 Christiane, 132 Christianity, 114, 142, 154, 157, 159 Christianization, 130 Christliche, 119 Christoph, 118, 124 Christopher, 155 chronicle, 9, 43 chronological, 140, 149-150 CIPIT, 58 circa, 130, 133, 143 circle, 72, 96, 98, 108, 153 circles, 88, 96, 98, 108 circling, 16 circular, 144 circulation, 152 circulus, 153-154 circumlocution, 57 circumstance, 165 cited, 153 city, 90, 103 civilization, 2 claim, 9, 55, 97, 139, 146, 162 claims, 8, 42, 55, 66, 139, 141, 146 clarified, 29 clarify, 86, 89, 103, 136 clarity, 104 Clark, 132 class, 11 classes, 117 classic, 115, 134 classical, 89, 117, 124 Clear, 113 clear, 6-8, 14, 38, 41-42, 45, 52, 59, 90-91, 93, 100, 104, 113, 125, 136-137, 143, 145-146, 152, 154 clearer, 8 clearest, 10 Index clearing, 68, 82, 89 Clearly, 6, 81, 98, 105, 124 clearly, 12, 20, 25, 28, 37, 51, 60, 97, 116, 126-127, 136, 143-144 Clever, 151 climax, 25, 126 climb, 61 climber, 61 climbing, 141 cloak, 141 close, 4, 8-9, 42-43, 70, 83, 118-119, 128, 146, 163 closed, 70, 83, 131, 138 closely, 80, 111, 118, 125, 129, 144 closeness, 144, 146 closer, 23, 70, 81, 84, 97, 103, 136, 141, 157 closes, 112, 114 closest, 145 cloths, 110 clue, 92, 136 clutches, 14 CM, 152 co, 13 coacervatio, 25 cockcrow, 57 code, 59 cogitans, 35, 61, 108 cogito, 61 cognition, 17-18, 21, 23-24, 26-27, 29, 39, 53 cognitions, 19, 21, 23, 33, 40, 48, 54, 56, 60 cognitive, 24 cognized, 21 Cohen, 11 coinage, 134 coincided, 46 coined, 161 colleagues, 165 Collected, 90, 103 collected, 6, 61, 82, 115, 124, 140, 144, 160 collection, 4, 31, 33, 47, 85, 140, 144 com, 12 Combination, 5, 11 combination, 82 combines, 157 come, 13-14, 16-17, 22, 29, 34, 36-37, 39, 44, 47-50, 52, 54, 60-61, 63, 67, 73, 82, 90-91, 94, 96, 100, 108, 113, 116, 126, 137, 145, 147, 153 comes, 5, 13, 36, 45, 50, 59, 61, 68, 73, 82, 107-108, 123, 134, 140, 157 coming, 32, 59, 92, 145 command, 157, 165 comment, 85 commentary, 11, 155 commented, 98, 110 common, 12, 80, 110, 116-117, 157 commonplace, 143-144 commonsensical, 119 communist, 160 compare, 10, 43, 82 compared, 90 compares, 133 comparing, 45, 47, 59 Comparison, 37, 52, 119-120 comparison, 4 compass, 4 compassion, 163-164 complaints, 139 Complete, 121 complete, 17, 23, 27, 29, 32-33, 35-37, 47, 51, 56, 96, 99-100, 105-107, 109, 127 completed, 4, 35, 103, 127, 139, 145 completely, 13, 27, 36, 39, 45, 50, 53, 142, 145, 154 completeness, 17, 23-24, 26-27 completion, 24-25, 45, 62, 96, 106, 113 complex, 5, 11, 29, 55, 85 complexity, 65 complicated, 32, 55 components, 9, 17, 23, 27, 42, 56 compose, 18, 40-41 comprehend, 21, 88 Comprehending, 119 comprehending, 18, 22 comprehensible, 128 comprehension, 9, 43, 142 comprehensive, 33, 40, 47, 54 comprise, 17, 23, 27 Comte, 58 conceal, 151 concealed, 141 concealment, 32 conceals, 87 conceive, 129, 144 conceived, 25, 127-128 Concept, 16, 70, 83, 87, 100, 104-105, 107-110 concept, 4, 10, 12-13, 18, 24-26, 29, 39, 43, 47, 53-54, 56, 62, 71, 82, 85, 101, 126-130, 140, 144, 150, 152 Conception, 93 conception, 59, 133, 145 Concepts, 105, 108, 117 concepts, 9, 19, 22, 24, 26-28, 40, 42, 128, 150, 157 Conceptual, 109 conceptual, 6, 146 conceptually, 83 concern, 14, 21, 23, 98 concerned, 6, 133, 144, 146 Concerning, 113, 128 concerning, 26, 81, 158, 162 Index concerns, 144 concise, 9, 42, 67 concluded, 97-98, 108 concludes, 33, 48 Conclusion, 28, 39, 43, 54, 59, 74, 98, 154 conclusion, 28, 34, 40, 49, 54, 61, 139 conclusions, 118, 141 concrete, 99, 127, 143 condemnation, 9, 42 condition, 152 conditionally, 130 Conditions, 120 conditions, 23, 28, 134 Conference, 83, 165 conference, 80, 157, 165 confession, 112 configuration, 134 configurations, 86, 104 confirmation, 15 conflict, 14 Conformity, 128 conformity, 24, 126 confront, 81, 83, 100 Confrontation, 137 confrontation, 65, 81, 137-138, 142 Confrontational, 136 confrontational, 136 confronted, 4, 70, 84 Confronting, 80 confronting, 83, 148 confrontion, 65 confused, 57, 108 confusion, 23 conjunction, 153 Connected, 132 connected, 93, 99, 109, 112, 143, 157 connectedness, 27 connection, 15, 71, 92-93, 96, 118, 128, 150 connections, 13, 73, 80, 114, 123, 130, 144, 157 conqueror, 119 conscientiousness, 133 Consciousness, 89-92, 103-104 consciousness, 35, 84-87, 89, 92-95, 97-99, 104-105, 107-108, 117, 119, 124 consequence, 39, 53, 162 consequences, 7, 41, 125, 128 Consequently, 57 consequently, 57 Consider, 119, 140 consider, 94, 96 considerable, 4 considerate, 142 Considerations, 138, 141 Considered, 116 considered, 92, 103, 116 considering, 9, 43 considers, 19, 21, 23, 28, 98 consist, 90 consistence, 158 consistent, 34 consists, 19, 21-22, 28 consolation, 57 consoling, 57 conspiracy, 133 constant, 8, 41, 81, 137 constantly, 61 constitute, 18, 25-26 constituted, 106 constitutes, 17, 21, 27 constitution, 56 construct, 31 constructed, 56 constructing, 9, 31, 42, 159 Construction, 9, 42 construction, 9, 24, 42, 44, 67, 124 constucted, 153 consummate, 134 consummation, 65 contain, 92, 161 contained, 61, 67, 88, 107 containing, 127 Contains, 101 contains, 28, 56, 108, 127 contemporaries, 29, 113, 131 Contemporary, 14 contemporary, 37, 47, 51-52, 99, 144 content, 4, 9, 24, 26, 34, 39, 42, 49, 54, 71, 93-95, 97-98, 104-105, 108-110, 126, 151 Contents, 3 contents, 104-105, 108, 139 context, 9, 11-12, 31-32, 36-37, 43, 45, 51, 64, 73-74, 85, 94, 115, 136, 141, 151, 153 contextual, 27 continually, 162 continue, 34, 48, 97, 128 continues, 6, 20, 46, 121, 146 continuing, 45, 73 Continuum, 162 Contra, 152 contra, 3, 70-72, 74, 106, 119, 136, 141-142, 145-146, 149, 153 contract, 125 contrary, 10, 12, 43, 82 contrast, 59, 104, 109, 143, 161 contrasting, 45, 47, 59, 149 contributed, 80 Index Contributions, 100-101, 159-160 controverse, 68 controversial, 12, 125 controversies, 18, 34, 48 Controversy, 112, 116 controversy, 88 conveniences, 165 conversation, 2, 67-68 convey, 139 convictions, 4 convincing, 73 copies, 38, 52 Copy, 150 copy, 149, 151 copyright, 2 cordial, 165 core, 130 cornerstone, 64 correct, 88, 90 correctly, 157 Correspondence, 26, 34, 36, 38, 41, 44, 48, 51-52 correspondence, 71 correspondingly, 20 Cory, 2 Cosmology, 19-20, 22-23 cost, 57, 121 could, 7, 12, 14, 25-26, 37-38, 41, 52, 56-58, 84-85, 90-91, 100, 114, 121, 125, 130, 138-139, 145, 158 Council, 115 count, 103 counter, 83 counterattacked, 99 counterclaims, 8, 42, 66 counterdiction, 158 counterdictions, 158-159 counterexample, 47 countermovement, 65, 80, 83-84, 99 counterpunch, 73, 80 couple, 107, 162 courage, 162 course, 10-11, 13-15, 31-32, 38, 40, 45-47, 52, 54-57, 61, 64-65, 67-68, 73-74, 81-82, 84, 88, 99, 105, 109, 124, 139, 141-144, 147, 149, 153, 161 Courses, 78, 102 courses, 19, 64-65, 82 court, 18 covered, 20, 45, 64 covers, 140 cows, 117 CPR, 10, 33-35, 39, 43, 47-50, 54, 56, 96, 99, 113 create, 25, 40, 64, 72, 74 creating, 91, 94, 138, 140, 161 creation, 94-95, 127 creative, 84, 111-112, 126, 157 credited, 12 crisis, 147 Crit, 26 critcial, 68 criteria, 9, 43 Critical, 70, 111 critical, 10, 17, 19-20, 22-23, 29, 31, 33-35, 37-40, 44, 48-49, 52-53, 64-65, 73-75, 99, 113-114, 119, 133, 138, 143, 145, 149-150, 157-158, 160, 163 criticalism, 11 Criticism, 18, 38, 53, 120 criticism, 36, 39, 51, 53, 137, 154 criticisms, 4, 25, 127, 137 criticized, 118 critics, 14, 137 Critique, 3, 5-7, 10-18, 20-21, 23-26, 28-29, 32-35, 38, 43-44, 47-50, 52, 56, 82, 85, 88-89, 91, 96, 113, 117, 119, 126, 161 critique, 12, 16-19, 21-24, 26-29, 31, 35, 37, 39, 45-46, 50, 52-54, 58, 80, 123, 126, 145, 157, 161 critiques, 18, 109 cross, 56 crossing, 63, 142, 147 CRP, 38, 52-53 Crucial, 40, 54 crucial, 13, 15, 34, 49, 140, 149 crux, 68, 81, 142, 147, 154 cry, 12 culmination, 21, 65 cultural, 55 culture, 21-22, 46, 61, 114, 121, 160 Cultured, 119 cultures, 150 cure, 142 current, 65, 84, 140, 144 currently, 61, 82, 149 cursory, 33-34, 48-49 Curtis, 2 Cusanus, 124 cuts, 58, 141 cynical, 39 Czech, 80 D Da, 7, 41, 44, 71, 125, 145 da, 26, 65-66, 155 Index dachte, 43, 67 dadurch, 43, 67 dafür, 65-66 dagegen, 92 daily, 5, 32 Damit, 66 damit, 64, 130, 133 dangerous, 46, 57, 121 Daniel, 1-2, 118 dankbar, 65 Dann, 69 dann, 68 dares, 18, 26 dargestellt, 74 darin, 73 darkness, 131-132 Darsan, 163 Darshanas, 163 darstellt, 156 Darstellung, 121 darüber, 155 Das, 66, 72-74, 93-94, 100, 115, 138, 140, 147 das, 26, 45, 63, 65-66, 68, 72-75, 77, 96, 98, 100, 102, 120, 130, 132-133, 138-139, 145, 147, 156 Dasein, 5, 15, 144, 152 Daseins, 13 dass, 69, 164 date, 20, 121, 144 Dated, 4 dated, 46, 158 dates, 20, 124, 150 dating, 131, 146 daughters, 126 David, 33, 39, 48, 53, 68, 76, 101, 133, 156 davor, 65 Davos, 13, 15, 81, 139 day, 57-58, 84, 107, 111, 125, 146-147, 150 Dayal, 2 daylight, 58 days, 103, 145, 157, 160, 164 dazu, 130 Dass, 155 dass, 26, 43, 65-68, 73, 155 de, 9, 31, 42, 83 Dead, 101, 113, 120, 138 dead, 158 deal, 37, 52, 61, 131 dealing, 67, 95, 139 deals, 9, 42 Death, 80 death, 29, 36, 50, 59, 74, 83, 88, 103, 112-113, 117, 124, 130, 138, 160, 164 Debate, 70 debate, 13, 31, 44, 65-66, 68, 88, 113 debated, 88 debt, 4 decade, 99 December, 5, 20, 36, 51, 65, 152 decide, 7, 112 Decidedness, 130 decidedness, 130 decipher, 153 decision, 147-148, 154 decisive, 56, 66, 87, 127, 143-145 decisively, 39, 53, 88 Declaration, 26 declared, 93, 164 deconstruction, 64, 126 dedicate, 124 dedicated, 80, 144 Dedication, 2 deduce, 46 deduction, 95 deep, 64, 74, 94, 126, 130 deepen, 88 deeper, 9, 43, 47, 93, 123, 142, 149 deeply, 80, 146 defend, 117, 119 Defended, 116 defending, 96 defense, 97 defined, 65, 162 defines, 56, 117, 137, 140 definitely, 87 definition, 119 degree, 147 dei, 102, 149, 155 deist, 116 deleted, 152 Delhi, 115 delivered, 143 dem, 66, 69, 73, 102, 115, 130, 143, 147, 155, 164 demand, 147 demands, 7, 41, 109, 125 Democritus, 33, 48, 146 demolishing, 138 demonstrate, 89 Den, 66 den, 65-67, 69-70, 72-73, 75, 79, 96, 102, 115, 130, 139-140, 147, 156, 164 denied, 7, 56, 60 denies, 118 Denken, 66, 72-75, 138 denken, 66, 70, 72, 75 denkendes, 66 Denkens, 66, 71, 76-77, 139, 165 Index Denker, 2-3, 31, 64, 66, 70, 77-78, 100, 113, 120 denkt, 73 Denn, 68 denn, 70, 73, 139 deny, 14, 113 denying, 137 Department, 115 departure, 7, 41, 125 dependence, 119 dependency, 119 deployed, 158 depth, 83, 97 Der, 66, 68, 73, 78, 100, 102, 119, 130-133, 143, 162 der, 3-4, 12-13, 16, 26, 33-37, 43, 45-49, 51-52, 63-79, 85-86, 90, 92, 96-98, 100-104, 106, 109-111, 115-117, 120-121, 124, 130, 132-133, 139, 143-144, 147, 149, 151, 153, 160-162, 164 deren, 69 derive, 31 derived, 24, 29 derives, 22, 55, 146 deriving, 11 derselben, 26 des, 4, 13, 59, 63-69, 71-79, 85-86, 90, 92, 98, 101-104, 106, 110, 115, 118, 121, 130, 133, 139-140, 143, 147, 149, 155, 165 Descartes, 15, 29, 61, 67, 88, 108-109, 162 described, 151 describes, 37, 51 describing, 96, 109, 140 description, 87, 94, 138, 140 descriptive, 165 deserves, 38, 52, 165 design, 91 designate, 68, 153 designated, 139 designates, 152 desire, 117, 162 Despisers, 119 despotic, 34, 48 dessen, 92 destination, 36, 50 destined, 131 Destiny, 60, 147 destiny, 58, 152-153 destroy, 118, 163 destroying, 144, 157 destruction, 8-9, 12, 42, 44-45, 64, 67, 70, 138 destructive, 25, 127 Destructuring, 9, 42, 138 destructuring, 8-9, 42, 83, 126 Destruktion, 67 detailed, 33, 35, 47, 64-65, 72-73, 86-87, 92, 96, 104 details, 6-7, 106, 109, 127, 158 determination, 23 determinations, 32, 45 determine, 7, 92, 118 Determined, 109 determined, 10, 43, 82-83 determines, 100, 128, 145 determining, 18, 128 determinism, 113 detract, 133 detractors, 81 deus, 153-154 deutsch, 144 Deutsche, 76, 78, 102, 133 deutsche, 64, 70 deutschen, 115, 133 Deutschland, 2, 36, 50, 70, 73 devalued, 160 Devanagari, 163 devastating, 37, 52 develop, 12, 31, 35, 40, 47, 49, 54, 60, 68, 70, 90, 109, 140, 143 Developed, 115 developed, 32-33, 38, 45, 47-48, 52, 55, 68, 73, 81, 113, 126, 136, 161 developing, 70-71, 75, 158 development, 9, 32, 40, 43, 45, 54-55, 59, 83, 105, 107, 115, 124, 136, 138, 142-143, 158, 161 devices, 140 devised, 146 devoted, 137 devotion, 150 Dez, 65, 75 Dezember, 150-151 Dharma, 152 dharma, 152, 163 Di, 112, 120 dialectic, 96-97 dialectical, 71, 96-97, 109, 152, 158 dialectically, 108 dialectics, 71, 96-97, 108 Dialektik, 12, 73-74 dialektikê, 105 Dialogue, 3, 70, 111 dialogue, 7-8, 10, 25, 31, 38, 41-43, 45-46, 53, 64-69, 73, 81-83, 88-89, 92, 100, 105, 109, 111, 113, 123, 125, 137-138, 141, 157-158, 163, 165 dialogues, 119, 139 diamond, 58 diary, 116 dichotomies, 15, 106 dictator, 119 Dictionary, 77 Index dictium, 104 Did, 8, 65, 67, 115, 118 did, 9, 13-14, 16, 18, 20, 23, 28-29, 33, 36-40, 42, 46-47, 50-55, 61, 65, 68-70, 80, 82-86, 89-92, 96, 98, 100, 104, 110-111, 114-115, 118, 121, 130, 137-138, 142-144, 147-149, 157 Die, 1-2, 34, 48-49, 56, 63-64, 67, 69-73, 76, 78-79, 85, 95-96, 102, 106, 117-118, 121, 133, 140, 143-144, 147, 149, 151, 155, 159, 161 die, 3, 12-13, 26, 36, 43, 50-51, 60, 63-74, 77-78, 86, 90, 92, 96-98, 101-102, 104, 109-110, 115, 118-119, 121, 130, 133, 139, 147, 155-156, 162 died, 90, 112, 114, 126, 130 Diels, 143-144 Dies, 66, 73 dies, 66, 69, 74, 117, 147, 152 Diese, 67, 74, 139 diese, 65, 68-70, 73, 86, 96-97, 130, 139 dieselbe, 121 diesen, 92 dieser, 26, 65-66, 86 dieses, 63, 73, 130 Difference, 68, 76, 81-82, 106, 120, 145 difference, 8, 42, 92, 133, 158, 161 differences, 105 Different, 37, 52, 119-120 different, 4, 7, 15-16, 25-26, 28, 37, 45, 51, 55, 58, 60, 73, 88, 90-91, 103, 125, 128, 139, 141, 147, 151-153, 159, 163 differently, 151 Differenz, 102, 106, 110, 121, 133 Differenzschrift, 64, 79, 102 difficult, 4-5, 21, 32, 55, 68, 82, 87, 123, 153 difficulties, 158 difficulty, 94, 157, 165 digging, 146 digital, 2 Dignity, 118 dignity, 55, 146 digression, 14, 83, 126 digressions, 140 diis, 90 dilemma, 112 Dilthey, 80, 85, 99, 144, 161 dimension, 15, 93 Dingan, 12 Dinge, 155 dinners, 114 Dionysian, 144, 150, 152 Dionysus, 55, 59, 141, 144 direct, 38, 53, 130, 139 directed, 45, 130, 138, 150, 157, 160 directing, 141 Direction, 29 direction, 16, 31-32, 34, 45-46, 48, 73, 94, 128, 138, 140-141, 161 directionem, 29 directions, 9, 43, 67, 74 directly, 44, 120, 129, 151 director, 165 dirt, 35, 49 disappear, 139 discarded, 73 disciple, 55, 141 discipline, 23, 25, 146 disciplined, 144 discord, 128 Discourse, 163 discourses, 91 Discovering, 8, 31, 41, 136 discovering, 29, 109 discovery, 107, 128, 146 Discuss, 120 discuss, 37, 52, 85, 96 discussed, 80, 85 discusses, 38, 53, 85, 91, 161 discussing, 69, 120, 125 discussion, 12, 123, 127, 147, 163 disingenuous, 162 disliked, 112, 114 dismantling, 138 dismemberment, 108 displayed, 116, 120 displeasure, 119 disputes, 18 disregard, 4 Dissertation, 13, 128 dissimilar, 45, 47 dissolving, 72 dissuade, 165 distance, 70, 84, 160 distinction, 20-21, 56, 59, 141-142, 153 distinctive, 97-98, 110 distinctly, 143 distinguish, 138, 157 distinguished, 133, 141 distress, 140 Distributed, 115 divided, 21 divides, 24, 61 dividing, 73 divination, 114 divine, 105, 116, 123, 153 Division, 94 division, 16, 24, 34, 49, 126 þÿ d imm h i ,  163 Index Do, 45, 59, 111, 151-152 do, 6-8, 12-13, 16, 18, 23, 29, 31-32, 35, 40-41, 46, 50, 60, 64-65, 80, 84, 89, 92, 94, 97, 105, 112, 125-127, 131, 136, 139-142, 147, 150-151, 158-162 doch, 70, 75 doctoral, 13 Doctrine, 13, 33, 47, 112, 141 doctrine, 7, 14, 16-17, 19, 23-24, 26, 29, 34-35, 41, 49-50, 66, 83, 91-92, 125, 144, 163-164 documented, 124 Does, 55-56, 127, 151 does, 5, 10, 14, 20, 24-25, 31, 34-35, 38-40, 48-49, 52-55, 58-61, 66, 73, 75, 85-89, 92, 95-97, 100, 104-106, 108-110, 113, 117, 125-129, 132-133, 138-140, 142-143, 145-146, 149-151, 153, 155, 158-159, 161, 165 Dog, 101, 113, 120 dogma, 163 dogmatic, 12, 23, 38-39, 52-53, 89, 99, 133, 165 Dogmatik, 64 Dogmatism, 38, 53 dogmatism, 23, 33-34, 36, 38, 48, 51, 53, 109 dogmatists, 34, 38, 48, 52 Dohna, 38, 53 doing, 6, 8, 11-12, 15-17, 21-22, 24, 26, 28-29, 35, 44, 47, 49-50, 84-85, 92, 109, 124, 127, 153, 159 Doktrin, 19 Dolores, 2 domain, 9, 43, 141 dominance, 13, 83 dominant, 14 dominate, 14 dominated, 29 dominion, 142 done, 6, 23, 28, 35, 50, 107, 130, 136, 140, 142 door, 89, 95, 161 doubt, 58, 144 doubtful, 84 doubts, 37, 51 Dove, 101 down, 22, 40, 54, 88, 117, 140, 145, 151-152, 163 doxa, 56 Dr, 2, 69, 115, 120, 133, 138 draft, 151 drafts, 151 drag, 106 Drang, 115, 118 draw, 141 drawn, 15, 113 draws, 118, 146 drei, 67 dressed, 116 drew, 88 Dritter, 120 driven, 96 drives, 84, 105, 126 driving, 25, 82, 95, 126, 144 drohender, 66 dropped, 103 dropping, 45 drops, 36, 50 drove, 136, 144 drsti, 163-164 drum, 161 dukes, 106 Duns, 64 duplication, 4 Durch, 96 durch, 43, 65-68, 74, 96, 156 Durchdenkens, 73 durchgeführt, 115 During, 64-65, 67, 114, 117, 124, 128, 137-138, 160 during, 9, 13-14, 36, 42, 51, 59, 64-65, 80, 103, 112, 117, 124-125, 139-140, 145, 158, 160 dustbins, 111 dwelling, 34-35, 49 dwells, 82 dynamic, 32, 45, 59 Dämmerung, 56 þÿ d[cm i ,  163 þÿ D[cm i p a r+ kc ,  163 E Each, 68, 81, 162 each, 90, 92, 96, 99, 105-106, 145, 151 eagle, 60 eagles, 60 ear, 59 Earlier, 121 earlier, 13, 38, 53, 61, 68, 73, 82, 85, 89-90, 92, 106, 108, 133, 158, 161, 164 earliest, 81, 145 Early, 58, 65, 116 early, 11, 13-14, 32-33, 35, 37-38, 45, 47, 50-52, 59, 64, 67, 73, 89, 93, 103, 106-108, 111, 115-118, 121, 123, 133, 136, 141-143, 149, 152 earth, 5, 32, 58, 147, 149-150 earthly, 150, 152 easier, 97 easily, 39, 53 Index East, 164 Eastern, 152, 157, 165 eastern, 157 easy, 32, 55, 109, 137 eaten, 34, 48 Ecce, 55, 58-60, 141, 144, 147, 151-152, 155 echoing, 87 echten, 73 Eckhart, 124 economy, 152 ect, 33, 35, 39-40, 44, 48, 50, 53-54, 66, 73, 86-87, 89-90, 106-107, 125, 127, 129, 139-140, 160 ection, 75 ective, 96, 107 ectively, 40, 54-55 ectivity, 71, 162 ects, 147 ed, 120, 164 ede, 69 edem, 68 eder, 68 edes, 92 edge, 151 edifice, 4, 17, 23, 27 edifices, 34, 40, 49, 54 edios, 92 edit, 103 Edited, 101, 155 edited, 36, 44, 50, 61, 76, 152, 155 Edition, 8, 15, 41, 66, 81, 137, 139, 164 edition, 38, 52, 58, 61, 72, 90, 150, 164 editions, 139 Edmond, 161 Edmund, 60, 81, 84, 136 Eds, 3 Education, 118 education, 4, 35, 60, 85-87, 92-93, 98, 104, 107-108, 116, 141 educators, 60, 141 effect, 55, 97, 146 effective, 137 effort, 4, 24, 98, 113 efforts, 38, 52 egativität, 72 Ego, 62 ego, 61, 113 egoity, 129 ehren, 66 eidos, 56, 105 eigenen, 43, 67, 158 eigentlich, 70, 73 eigentlichen, 139 EightFold, 163 eightieth, 165 ein, 43, 66-67, 100, 111, 156 einander, 68 Eine, 69, 102 eine, 26, 64-65, 68-69, 73-74, 139, 145 einem, 66, 69, 73, 96, 139 Einen, 66 einen, 66, 68, 96 einer, 13, 68-69, 104, 109, 147, 151 eines, 63 Einfachen, 139 einfachen, 86 Einheit, 73 einige, 130 Einleitung, 64, 79, 102 Einzelnen, 139 Either, 112 either, 21, 23, 26, 33, 38, 48, 52, 72, 84, 89, 97, 112, 151, 157-158, 162, 165 elaborate, 86 electronic, 2 electrostatic, 2 element, 97, 105-109, 153 Elementar, 36, 51 Elementarphilosophie, 117 elementary, 22 Elemente, 71 Elements, 4, 18, 117 elements, 28, 142 elevated, 88 eleven, 91 elimination, 72 Elisabeth, 68, 76 Else, 59 else, 13, 23, 29, 39, 54, 60, 84, 111, 118, 144 elucidate, 32 elucidated, 55, 136 elucidations, 139 elusive, 57 Emad, 101 Emanuel, 124 embarrassed, 57 Embrace, 152 embraced, 152 emerge, 9, 43 emerged, 11 emergency, 153 emerges, 19 Emerson, 150 Emil, 13 emotions, 119 Empedocles, 146 emphasis, 27, 75, 91 Index emphasized, 74 Empire, 160 empirical, 13, 21, 94, 140 empiricist, 33, 39, 48, 53, 114, 162 Empiricus, 37, 51, 119 employed, 19, 113 Emptiness, 164 emptiness, 117, 163-164 empty, 32, 106, 144-146 enabling, 83 enact, 142 enacted, 162 encompassing, 86 Encounter, 3, 31, 41, 123 encounter, 7, 9, 16, 43-44, 65-66, 68, 81-82, 87, 125, 136, 138, 145, 149, 157, 160 encountered, 70, 84 encounters, 8, 42, 138, 158 Encyclopaedia, 91, 127 encyclopaedia, 88 Encyclopedia, 88, 90, 99-100, 106, 119 END, 165 End, 14, 101, 123, 129-130 end, 3-4, 6, 14, 16, 23, 27, 31-32, 34, 36, 46, 48, 50, 57-59, 61, 63-64, 73, 85, 93-94, 96-98, 103, 107, 109-110, 112, 121, 123-124, 126-129, 136, 139-141, 144-145, 147, 149, 159 Ende, 147 ended, 12, 130 ending, 34, 48, 85 endings, 58 endless, 34, 48 endlessly, 151 Endlichkeit, 72 Endnotes, 75 endowing, 148 ends, 24, 32, 64, 125-126, 149 endure, 151 enduringly, 28 Energeia, 62 energeia, 105 enes, 130 enfalten, 156 Enframing, 62 Engadine, 59 engage, 6-7, 31, 65, 81, 87-88, 138, 145, 165 engaged, 44, 66, 95, 106, 154 engagement, 81, 142 engaging, 91, 138 Engels, 124 engine, 96 England, 44 Englightment, 112, 114 English, 58, 102, 115, 120, 124, 132-133, 137, 139, 147, 153, 160-163, 165 enjoin, 88 enlarged, 164 Enlightenment, 112, 115 enlightenment, 163 enough, 25, 29, 138, 144 Enowning, 100-101 ensouled, 96, 98 ensuing, 136 entangled, 12 entanglement, 142 Entanglements, 3, 157 entanglements, 152, 157, 159, 163 entdecken, 66 entelecheia, 97, 105, 107 enter, 14, 65 entered, 103, 123 enterprise, 157, 165 entfalten, 73 entfaltet, 164 entfernter, 69 entgegen, 67 entgegengesetzt, 70, 75 enthält, 92 enthüllen, 68 entire, 8, 11, 13, 17, 19, 21-25, 27-29, 42, 56, 68, 81-82, 89, 91, 94, 100, 108, 126-127, 129, 143, 160 entirely, 140-141 entirety, 144 entities, 56, 96, 108 entitle, 144 Entitled, 115 entitled, 13-14, 16, 20, 28, 46, 64-65, 68, 75, 80, 85, 87, 91, 93, 100, 114, 116-117, 119-121, 124, 127-128, 132-133, 139, 147, 149, 160-161 entrapped, 29 Entscheidung, 147, 156 Entschiedenheit, 130 entwickeln, 121 Entwicklung, 72, 74 Entwürfe, 139 enumerates, 136 Enzyklopädie, 77, 106, 110, 121 Ephraim, 116 Epicurus, 33, 48 Epigonen, 12 Epilogue, 152-153 Episode, 115 episode, 115, 121 episteme, 105 Epistemological, 5, 10 epistemological, 5, 11, 16 Index Epistemology, 13 epistemology, 12-15, 146, 165 epistêmê, 105 epitaph, 148 epitome, 70, 100 epoch, 31, 46, 70, 84, 136, 140 epochism, 14 equal, 147 equals, 127 equates, 46 equilibrium, 162 equivalent, 161 Er, 156, 158 er, 43, 46, 66-67, 73, 92 era, 143 erase, 97 erecting, 4 erection, 34, 49 Ereignis, 63, 71, 75, 138-141, 147 Ereigniss, 155 Erfahrung, 60, 79, 101-103, 121 Erfahrungsgebrauch, 96 erfassen, 121 Erinnerung, 63 Erkenntnis, 29 Erkenntnisse, 19 Erkenntnistheorie, 12-13 Erkenntnisvermogens, 37, 51 Erlebnisreichtum, 69 erlebt, 155 Erläuterung, 79, 102 Erna, 157-158 Ernesto, 2 erneut, 67 erneuten, 133 Ernst, 36, 51, 81, 98, 118-119, 133, 137, 149, 155, 162 erreicht, 139 Error, 32, 56, 142 error, 32, 57-59, 87 errors, 90 Erscheinen, 70 Erscheinugslehre, 91 Erschweigens, 139 erschüttert, 70 erst, 65, 96, 156 Ersten, 164 ersten, 147 Erster, 75 Erziehung, 118 eröffnen, 156 Es, 26, 66, 155 es, 43, 64, 66-69, 73, 155 escape, 16, 65, 92, 129, 153 eschatology, 159 Eschenmayer, 105 eske, 76-77 especial, 140 especially, 70, 112, 119, 124, 128 Essay, 80, 120 essay, 13, 28, 31, 37, 45, 52, 56, 63, 69, 80, 99, 106, 121, 133, 138, 140-141, 143 Essays, 120, 128 essays, 4, 113 Essence, 82, 84-85, 101, 113, 134, 162 essence, 13, 57, 71, 81, 84, 87, 89, 94, 100, 104, 111, 120, 124, 127-130, 132, 145, 154 essences, 105 essential, 4, 7, 13, 16-17, 24-25, 35, 39, 41, 49, 95, 103-104, 125-126, 129, 134, 138, 141-143, 153-154, 157-159 essentially, 9, 42, 91, 100, 104, 107, 126, 161 establish, 143 established, 19 estimation, 17, 26-27, 35, 50, 137 estimations, 160 ET, 8, 41, 136 et, 16, 31-34, 36-40, 47-48, 50-56, 60, 62-63, 88, 93-94, 104, 106, 109, 111, 113, 116-117, 119, 136-147, 152-153, 159-162, 164-165 Etc, 20 etc, 25, 34, 44, 49, 61, 105, 114 Eternal, 130, 137, 149 eternal, 31, 58-59, 62, 66, 94, 97-98, 127, 130, 138, 140, 142, 144, 150-152 eternity, 134, 151, 153-154 ethical, 118, 150 Ethics, 117, 123 ethics, 6, 107, 146, 161 etwas, 65, 155 Eugen, 69, 83 Eugene, 101 Europa, 70, 73 Europe, 83, 157, 163, 165 European, 80, 133, 157, 163 Evanston, 101 eve, 90 Even, 37, 52, 65, 95, 136, 140, 145 even, 10, 12, 20, 25, 35-36, 40, 43-44, 49-51, 54-55, 57, 60-61, 69, 82-84, 88, 109, 117, 124, 127, 137-138, 141, 143, 146, 150, 152-154, 160, 165 event, 80-81 events, 11 eventual, 23 Ever, 80, 83 ever, 4, 21, 25, 28, 39, 54, 60, 89, 99, 106, 126, 162 evermore, 117 Index Every, 39-40, 54, 60, 74, 117, 160 every, 5, 12, 32, 45, 86, 97, 104, 136, 147, 165 everyone, 84 Everything, 158 everything, 7, 9, 17, 21, 27, 41, 66, 80, 83, 90, 105, 125, 127, 138 Everywhere, 16 everywhere, 35, 49 evidence, 70, 73, 83, 138 evident, 25, 86, 98 Evidently, 73, 75 Evil, 3, 14, 46, 123, 128, 153 evil, 123, 126-129, 133, 159 evoked, 162 ewige, 130 ewigen, 59 Ewigkeit, 71 ewton, 109 Exact, 14 exact, 7, 41, 71, 89, 125 Exactly, 165 exactly, 28, 98, 146 examination, 13 examine, 157 examined, 11 examining, 13, 64 Example, 158 example, 9, 14, 17, 21, 25, 32, 37-38, 41-42, 46, 51-52, 55, 61, 65, 69, 72, 83, 86, 88, 104-106, 109, 111-112, 126, 128, 130, 138-140, 147, 155, 157, 159-160, 163 examples, 33, 48, 136 exanimation, 32 excellence, 152 excellent, 123 exception, 152 exceptionally, 144 exceptions, 157, 165 exchange, 158 exchanging, 112 excludes, 88 exclusively, 68 exertion, 109, 137 exhaust, 142 exhausted, 129-130 exhibits, 96 exist, 55, 127 existence, 7, 41, 46, 80, 97, 107, 125, 152, 158 existent, 128 Existentialism, 80 existenziale, 71 existiert, 98 exists, 97, 127 exordiums, 89 expands, 97, 108 expect, 32, 128 expedient, 165 expereicnes, 60 Experience, 87, 89-92, 103-104 experience, 15, 39, 53, 91-92, 96-97, 101, 118-119 experienced, 143 experiences, 19, 41, 83 experiment, 60 experimental, 152 experiments, 60, 141 experts, 66 explain, 109, 113, 139 explaining, 67 explains, 113 explanation, 123 explanations, 32, 55, 95 explans, 151 explicit, 25 explicitly, 46 exponent, 118 Exposition, 37, 52, 119-120 exposition, 19, 94, 127 expounded, 4 express, 149, 165 expressed, 61 expresses, 10, 43, 82, 153 expression, 12, 60, 90-92, 94, 97-98, 100, 104, 106, 117, 134, 142, 149, 153, 155 expressions, 92, 112 extant, 92 extensa, 35, 61, 108 extensive, 6, 123-124, 138 extensively, 68, 81 extent, 84, 126 external, 83, 87, 109 externally, 4, 104 extra, 130 extraordinary, 141 extreme, 5, 45, 128, 142, 152, 162 extremely, 152, 165 extrinsically, 162 eye, 8, 42 eyes, 7, 15, 60, 73 F Fabel, 57 Index FABLE, 32, 56, 142 fable, 57-59 fabrication, 57 face, 131, 151 faces, 83 facet, 36, 50 facilitate, 95 fact, 9, 12, 14, 33, 38, 40, 42, 45, 47, 54, 61, 71, 86, 89-90, 97-98, 103, 108, 136, 139, 144, 149, 157, 165 facti, 39, 53 facticity, 80 facts, 140 factum, 156 faculty, 21, 26, 134 fairly, 141 FAITH, 116 Faith, 114, 119-121, 128 faith, 60, 100, 112-116 Fall, 64 fall, 89 falling, 126 false, 108, 139 falsehood, 151 fame, 114 familiar, 38, 52, 107, 153 Families, 2 Family, 2 family, 2, 68, 81, 107 famous, 6, 13, 28, 34, 48, 55, 65, 81, 88, 94, 99, 107, 109, 111-115, 117, 119, 124-125, 129, 142, 161 fantastic, 162 far, 15, 17, 27, 60, 73, 92, 95, 123, 129, 131, 139-140, 157, 162, 165 Farrell, 76, 156 farthest, 83, 145 Fatalism, 150, 152 fatalism, 113, 116, 123, 150-152 fatalistic, 150 fatality, 153 fate, 5, 131-132, 147, 149-153 fathers, 38, 52 Fati, 3, 149, 152, 154 fati, 149-156 Fatum, 153 fatum, 152-154 Faust, 115 favorite, 163 feature, 144 Feb, 55, 162 Februar, 79 February, 14, 24, 27, 103, 123 Feder, 38, 52 feel, 144 feeling, 105, 112, 116, 119 Feelings, 114 feelings, 114 feels, 132, 137 feet, 119 Fehlende, 66 Feldkirch, 123 Feldweg, 160 fell, 14, 28, 34, 48, 88, 143 felt, 105 female, 57 Ferrer, 1-2, 89, 92 Feuerbach, 46, 124 Feurbach, 70, 151 few, 11, 55, 64, 73, 88-90, 104, 109, 130, 137, 139, 146, 149, 157, 160-161, 164-165 fiancée, 117 Fichte, 5, 10, 25-26, 29, 36, 68, 78, 81-82, 90, 101-102, 104-106, 109, 111, 113-114, 116-121, 125, 128, 133, 141, 145 Fichtean, 121, 133 Fichteschen, 102, 106, 110, 121, 133 Fichtian, 113, 118 fiction, 56, 144-146 fictitious, 56-57 Fidel, 1-2 field, 56, 164 fifteenth, 61 fifty, 29, 64 fight, 143 Fiktion, 145 fill, 28, 40, 54, 109 filled, 5, 33, 44, 47, 137 Final, 61, 95, 100 final, 16, 32-34, 39-40, 47-48, 54, 58-59, 61, 65, 86, 90, 98, 103, 110, 134, 139, 147-148, 152, 161-163 finalized, 33, 47 FINALLY, 32, 56, 142 Finally, 9, 43, 64, 130 finally, 6, 23, 32, 99, 118, 123, 126, 153 find, 7-8, 10, 12, 29, 43, 60-61, 66, 70, 82-84, 89, 96, 98, 110, 134, 146-147, 149, 154, 158, 162 finden, 96 finding, 47, 61, 94 finds, 28, 61, 89, 96-97, 143 fine, 4, 116, 127 finger, 56, 74 finish, 35, 49 finished, 8, 27, 42, 90-91, 103-104, 127, 139 finite, 31, 88, 94, 127 finitude, 145 Fink, 69, 83, 101 firm, 117 Index firmly, 81 First, 84, 87, 98, 103, 133, 136, 150 first, 6, 8, 10-12, 16-18, 20, 23-24, 27-29, 31, 36-37, 42-43, 46, 49-51, 56-58, 61, 73, 75, 85-88, 91-92, 94-95, 97-99, 103-104, 111-112, 117-118, 124, 127-128, 132-133, 136-137, 139, 141, 143-144, 146-147, 150, 157-159, 161 Fischer, 149 fit, 24, 26 fits, 99-100 fitting, 163 Five, 10 five, 5, 10 fixed, 5, 25, 44, 137 flachen, 69 flashing, 58 fleeting, 21 flight, 46 flow, 46, 121 flower, 108 flowering, 112 flowing, 146 flux, 95, 105, 144 Fly, 60 fly, 18, 26, 60, 160 flüchtiger, 73 focus, 12 Folgen, 66 follow, 28, 31-32, 41, 44-45, 89-90, 129, 141, 145 followed, 73, 83, 116, 127, 131 follower, 36, 51, 112, 114-115 followers, 11 Following, 46, 70, 113 following, 6, 8, 11-14, 16, 20, 25, 41, 44, 56, 60-61, 66, 68, 70-71, 80-82, 84-86, 90, 98-99, 104-105, 111, 113, 125, 127, 129, 133, 136, 146-147, 154 follows, 19, 44, 80, 87, 99, 143, 165 Footnote, 132 footnote, 121 Footnotes, 164 footnotes, 74, 111, 142 footpath, 131 For, 8-10, 14, 17, 25, 37, 41-42, 46, 51, 55-57, 59, 61-62, 65-67, 69-70, 72, 82-84, 86-89, 91-93, 97, 104-106, 111-112, 119, 125-126, 128-131, 138-139, 142, 147, 149-150, 152-153, 157-160, 164 for, 2, 4, 6-10, 12-25, 27, 29, 31-32, 34-57, 59-62, 64-68, 70, 72-74, 81-92, 94-100, 103-113, 115-119, 121, 123-133, 136-145, 147, 149, 151-152, 154, 157-163, 165 Force, 113 force, 12, 25, 82, 126, 136-137, 144, 148 forced, 139 fordere, 139 Forderung, 68, 147 fore, 94 forefront, 29 foreign, 20, 119 forerunner, 12, 84 foresaw, 100 foreseen, 146 foreshadowing, 152 Forest, 1-2 foreword, 32, 55 forget, 164 forgetfulness, 158 forgetting, 32, 62 forgottenness, 142 Form, 37, 52, 69, 119-120, 139 form, 2, 12, 17, 57, 61, 66, 80, 83-84, 86-88, 92, 97, 104-105, 108, 118-119, 134, 159, 162, 165 formal, 23, 106, 109 formalism, 106, 109 former, 19, 21, 28 formerly, 131 Formey, 37-38, 52 Forms, 121 forms, 56, 71, 113, 146, 154 formula, 59, 151-152, 154 formulaic, 89 formulated, 105, 134 formulation, 9, 42, 99, 126 formulations, 67 Forster, 93, 98, 108 fortgegangen, 66 Fortgeschrittene, 65, 78-79, 102 forth, 7, 9, 37, 40-41, 43, 51, 54, 96, 116-117, 125 forthcoming, 147 Fortschritte, 36, 50 Fortsetzung, 79 fortuitous, 153 forty, 112, 140 Forward, 137 forward, 17, 27, 29, 36, 44, 50, 59, 108, 133, 137 Forwards, 139 found, 7-8, 15, 39, 53, 143, 145 Foundation, 109 foundation, 12, 19, 25-26, 29, 35, 39, 41, 50, 53, 123, 127, 129 foundational, 35, 50, 109 Foundations, 13, 16, 91, 109 foundations, 5, 13, 15, 27, 33, 35, 44, 47, 49, 60, 84, 126-127, 159 founded, 80 Founder, 115 founder, 119, 131 Index foundering, 131 founding, 128, 161 Four, 84 four, 19, 22, 24, 55, 80, 103, 128, 132, 136, 141, 149 fourfold, 158 Fourth, 15, 33, 47, 87, 91, 103, 139 fourth, 56, 58 Foust, 114 Fragens, 139 Fragestellung, 74 fragment, 151, 160 Fragmente, 144, 151 Francisco, 101, 156 Frankfurt, 13, 75, 77, 101 Franz, 13, 91, 124, 150 Fredrick, 117 free, 9, 43, 57, 59, 97, 108-109, 137, 151-152 Freedom, 3, 7, 41, 84, 101, 123, 126-130, 132, 134 freedom, 16, 25, 56, 72, 84, 106, 111, 117, 120, 123-130, 132-133, 151-152, 154, 162 freeing, 138, 145 frei, 66 Freiburg, 6, 64, 123-124, 138-139 Freidrich, 120 Freiheit, 70, 77, 120, 130, 132-133 Freiherr, 36, 51, 106, 115 French, 103, 106, 116, 163 frenzy, 59, 145 frequent, 8, 41 frequently, 69, 83 fresh, 7, 31, 41, 125 Freude, 65 Fried, 144 Friedrich, 2, 7, 12, 33, 36, 45, 47, 50, 70, 83, 103, 109, 111-112, 114-119, 121, 133, 143, 145, 149-151, 155 Friend, 115 friend, 88, 107, 114, 119, 123-124, 137 friendly, 6 Friends, 2 friends, 2, 55, 112, 114, 117, 126 Fries, 5, 10-11, 111-112, 114, 120 Friesian, 11 froh, 65 From, 19, 29, 35, 40, 50, 54, 62, 69, 83, 99-101, 123, 125, 146, 165 from, 4-5, 7-9, 11, 13-14, 16-17, 20-25, 27, 29, 31-35, 37-39, 41-47, 49, 51-53, 55-56, 58-61, 64-73, 78-79, 82-84, 86, 88, 91-92, 95, 98-101, 104-105, 112, 115-116, 118, 120, 123-126, 128-129, 131-134, 136, 139-143, 145-146, 149-152, 156-160, 162, 164-165 Front, 69 front, 2, 94, 103, 139, 162 fruheste, 101 fruit, 67 fruitful, 165 Frühjahr, 151 full, 8, 17, 23, 27-28, 42, 58, 105, 108-109, 121, 144 Fulle, 69 fullest, 66 fullness, 83 fully, 68, 105 function, 40, 54 functioned, 91 functions, 103-104 Fundamental, 92, 113, 117, 120, 149, 163 fundamental, 5-7, 13, 15, 20, 24-25, 35, 41, 50, 56, 59, 74, 83-84, 87, 95-96, 118, 124-127, 142, 146, 149, 152-154, 157 fundamentalen, 69 fundamentally, 83 Fundamente, 36, 51 fur, 164 further, 73, 151, 158 Furthermore, 152 furthermore, 108, 152 futile, 113 Future, 14, 39, 46, 53, 99, 104, 109, 111, 160 future, 5, 17, 27, 32-33, 44, 46-47, 56, 59, 131, 146-147, 151 Fussfassen, 147 Förderung, 115 füllenden, 147 für, 26, 45, 65-68, 78-79, 96, 111-112, 139, 144 G GA, 6, 10, 13, 15-16, 20, 63, 71-72, 75-79, 82-83, 101-102, 133, 138-147, 154-155, 157-162, 164 gain, 47 gains, 142 galvanize, 137 ganz, 70, 75 Ganze, 26 Ganzen, 70, 96 gap, 33, 40, 47, 54 gaps, 33, 47 gar, 43, 67 garment, 61 Garve, 21, 33, 47 Gary, 44 gather, 17 Index gathering, 46 Gautama, 163-164 gave, 6, 13, 72, 80, 92, 120, 124, 132-133, 138, 140, 144 Gay, 32, 55, 58, 60, 141, 150, 159 gay, 155 gaya, 32, 55, 58, 60, 141, 150, 155 geben, 67 Gebildeten, 119 geborn, 68 Geburt, 143 gedacht, 66 Gedanken, 26, 43, 66-67, 96 Gegen, 155 gegen, 67, 69, 73, 86 Gegenbewegung, 70, 73 Gegenbewegungen, 69, 73 Gegendurchschlag, 75 Gegenspieler, 74 Gegenstaende, 133 Gegenstand, 43, 67 gegenstrebigen, 130 Gegenwart, 78, 102, 133 geht, 68 gehören, 67, 69, 73 Geist, 68, 72, 77 Geiste, 143 Geistes, 67-69, 71-75, 78-79, 90, 92, 101-103, 110, 121 geistige, 96 geleitete, 69 gelieferten, 36, 51 gemacht, 36, 50, 74, 147, 158 gemachten, 121 gemassen, 156 gemeinen, 43, 67 gemässen, 73 genealogical, 126 General, 94, 113 general, 4-5, 12-14, 18-21, 23-26, 28, 36, 45, 50, 55, 69-71, 75, 82, 84-85, 87, 91-92, 95-97, 99, 103, 105-106, 108, 112, 114, 117-120, 123, 127-128, 130, 136, 139-140, 142, 150, 159 generalis, 25, 91, 153 generalize, 69 generalized, 126 generally, 106, 129 generation, 99, 107 generations, 37, 51 Genesis, 5, 161 genius, 110, 143 gentlemen, 165 genugsam, 43 genuine, 18, 26, 39, 54, 68, 82, 84, 86-87, 128, 137, 159, 162 genügsam, 67 geometers, 21 geometric, 109 geometry, 88 Georg, 2, 103, 112, 114 George, 38, 52, 112, 120 gepriesen, 26 gerade, 67, 139 Geredes, 69 German, 1-4, 11-12, 36, 46, 50, 55-56, 58, 64, 70, 76, 84, 90, 93, 96, 99-101, 103-106, 109, 111, 113-114, 118-121, 123, 125-127, 130, 132, 141-143, 146, 156-157, 159, 161-164 german, 159 Germans, 55, 146 Germany, 1-2, 28, 36, 44, 50-51, 56, 83, 140 Gesamtausgabe, 6, 65, 82, 101, 120, 124, 132, 138, 140, 155, 160 geschehen, 86 Geschichte, 34, 48-49, 63-64, 67, 72, 74, 79, 92, 102, 110, 121, 139, 149, 155 geschichtliche, 70, 74 Gesellschaft, 115 gesellschaft, 76 Gesichtskreis, 139 Gesichtspunkte, 34, 49 Gesichtspunktes, 161 Gespräch, 66 Gespräche, 43, 67, 160 Gestalten, 85 gestaltet, 73 Gestell, 62 get, 7, 9, 16, 20, 23, 35, 41-42, 55-56, 59, 66, 74, 98, 114, 125-126, 130, 137-138, 157 getrieben, 96 gets, 14, 74, 111, 159 Getting, 31 getting, 35, 44, 49-50, 60, 66, 81, 90, 112, 137, 144, 146 gewaltigsten, 69, 73-74 Gewaltsamen, 66 Gewaltsamkeit, 66 gewisser, 69 Gewissheit, 69, 95 ghost, 14 gibt, 68 gift, 25, 58 gilt, 139 Giovanni, 112, 120 Gita, 115, 121 give, 10, 19, 24, 38, 40, 43, 53-54, 69-70, 83, 105, 107, 131, 143, 161, 165 Given, 101-102 given, 7, 19, 21, 28, 31, 40, 54, 60, 67, 105, 136, 138-139, 161 Index gives, 36, 40, 50, 54, 65, 73-74, 93, 137, 143, 161 giving, 10, 33, 48, 138, 140, 154 glad, 27, 58 glance, 21, 34, 49 glancing, 126 glasses, 5 Glaube, 119 glaube, 65 Glauben, 110, 121 Gleichen, 59 gleichgültig, 68 Glen, 2 Glicksman, 162 glimmer, 89 glimpsed, 15 glorification, 130 Glück, 155 go, 9, 14, 29, 38, 43-44, 52, 64, 67, 92, 96, 100, 108, 113-114, 149, 163 Goal, 95 goal, 16, 18, 35, 45, 59, 97-98, 105-106, 108, 110, 138-140, 159-160 Goalessness, 159 goals, 86, 97, 158-160 GOD, 127 God, 56, 58-59, 93-95, 105-106, 118-119, 123, 127-130, 132, 138, 150, 152-153 god, 131-132 gods, 90, 123, 130 goes, 8, 17, 27-28, 36, 38, 41, 46, 51, 53, 66, 86, 104, 137, 146, 153, 160-161 Goeschel, 114, 121 Goethe, 114-116, 119, 161 going, 6, 8, 29, 34, 41, 49, 58, 105, 131, 140, 142, 160 gold, 151 gone, 2, 7, 36-37, 41, 51, 61, 125, 159 Good, 14, 46, 93, 153 good, 36, 40, 50, 54-55, 57, 74, 93, 114, 118-119, 127-128, 137, 151, 159 Gorres, 105, 161 got, 7, 24, 35, 41, 46, 49, 103, 109, 114, 128, 142, 154 Gott, 72, 74-75, 77, 130 Gottergebenheit, 150 Gottes, 77 Gotteslehre, 64 Gottfried, 36, 51, 106, 115 Gotthold, 112, 116 Gottingen, 5, 11 Gottinnigkeit, 69 Gottlieb, 36, 51, 104, 113-114 Gottlob, 36, 51, 99, 119 Goundwork, 109 Grace, 118 gradual, 55, 146 grand, 71, 74, 90, 138, 140 grandeur, 140, 160 grant, 4 granted, 40, 54, 60 grapple, 56 grasp, 18, 56, 149 grasps, 100 grateful, 5, 158 gratitude, 165 gravitating, 99 Gray, 57 Great, 158 great, 8, 16, 25, 37, 46, 51-52, 61, 73, 80, 83, 85, 115-116, 119, 125-126, 130-131, 144, 152, 159, 165 greater, 4, 47, 65, 90, 104, 160 greatest, 22, 25, 126, 157, 165 greatly, 118 greatness, 131, 151 Greece, 125, 146 Greek, 32, 37-38, 51-52, 55, 61, 93, 105, 136, 141-147, 152, 157, 161, 163 Greeks, 3, 45, 55, 61, 83, 101, 136-137, 141-143, 145-147, 149 Gregory, 144 Grenzen, 39, 54 grew, 128 Griechen, 69, 101 griechisch, 144 grief, 136, 138 grips, 137 Groothoff, 149, 156 grossen, 69 ground, 13, 16, 24, 35, 49-50, 68, 96, 128, 130, 145, 157, 161 grounded, 73 grounding, 9, 42, 83, 142 grounds, 16, 93, 113 Groundwork, 116 group, 4, 12, 36, 50, 105, 112, 124 groups, 6, 124 growing, 6, 13, 124, 146 grown, 6, 124 grosser, 64 grosses, 155 Grundes, 130 Grundfragen, 147, 160 Grundgedanken, 66 Grundlegung, 13, 109 Grundlinien, 4 Grundprobleme, 67, 161 Grundrisse, 90, 106 Grundstellung, 149, 154 Index Grundstücke, 67 Grundsätze, 46, 151 Grundtendenzen, 69 Grundzug, 139 Gründungsraum, 156 Grüner, 120 guarantee, 17, 23, 27 guarantees, 158 guidance, 164 guide, 2, 4, 61, 141, 147 guided, 12 guiding, 82, 142, 145, 147 guidle, 104 guilt, 124 guise, 160 Gupta, 2 Gut, 151 gut, 66 Guyer, 44 Guzzoni, 69 Götzen, 56 H habe, 26, 68 haben, 66, 155 Habilitationsschrift, 64 Had, 119 had, 4-5, 7-9, 12-14, 24-26, 29, 32-33, 35, 37-39, 41-47, 50-53, 55, 69, 81, 83, 86, 88, 90, 93, 96, 99, 104, 107, 113, 125-127, 137, 144, 146, 151, 158, 163 hall, 119 Halle, 115 Hamann, 112, 114-115, 121, 141 Hammer, 32, 56, 142 hammer, 154 Hand, 164 hand, 32, 40, 44, 54, 60, 85, 92, 111, 125, 142, 146, 154, 159, 164-165 Handbuch, 111 handeln, 66 handelt, 64 handschriftlich, 164 handwritten, 164 Hang, 96 Hans, 11, 75, 149, 156 happen, 46, 124, 138, 141-142 happened, 6, 39, 53, 129 happy, 56, 69, 128 Harald, 2 hard, 23, 109, 127 Hardenberg, 117 hardest, 159 harmed, 38, 52 harmony, 131 Harper, 76, 101, 156 Harris, 80, 120 Harvey, 2 Has, 8, 45, 120, 126 has, 3-10, 12-15, 22, 25, 27-29, 31-32, 35-36, 38-46, 49-52, 54-57, 59-61, 63-65, 67-71, 73-75, 80-84, 89-90, 93-99, 103, 106-109, 112-114, 116, 118, 121, 123-130, 134, 136-143, 145, 147, 149, 151-154, 157-163, 165 hat, 26, 36, 50, 69, 73-74, 158 hate, 119 Hatfield, 44 haunt, 1-2 Hauptinhalte, 121 Hauptvorlesungen, 78, 102 have, 4-8, 10-12, 18, 21-23, 25-29, 31-33, 35-36, 39-43, 45-50, 53-61, 65, 67-69, 80-82, 87-91, 93-95, 97-100, 103, 105-106, 108-109, 111, 113-114, 125, 127, 136-137, 139-142, 144-146, 149-153, 157-160, 163-165 Haven, 144 Having, 99 having, 16, 146, 153 Hawaii, 157, 165 He, 5-8, 10, 13, 15, 20, 25, 34-36, 38, 41-42, 48-50, 53, 55, 60, 66, 68, 73, 82, 84, 87, 97, 100, 103, 106, 109, 111, 113-117, 119, 123-126, 129-130, 141, 143, 145-147, 157-158, 161 he, 4, 6-10, 12-13, 15-16, 18, 20, 23-24, 27-29, 31, 34-43, 48-60, 64-71, 73-74, 80-86, 88-90, 92-94, 96-100, 107, 111-112, 114-119, 121, 123-130, 132-133, 137-147, 149, 151-153, 155, 157-162, 165 head, 93-94 heading, 16, 33, 47, 100, 154 headings, 34, 48 heal, 107 healing, 107 health, 110 heaped, 25 hear, 8, 31, 49, 59, 149 heard, 57, 64, 91, 112, 126, 130, 133 heavens, 28 Hebrew, 116, 163 heed, 162 Hefte, 141 Index Hegel, 1-6, 8, 10-13, 24-26, 29, 32, 35, 37, 41, 44-47, 52, 55, 59-62, 64-121, 123-127, 129, 132-133, 136-137, 141-143, 145, 147, 157-159, 161 Hegelian, 12, 35, 46, 67, 71, 74, 83-84, 87-88, 90, 93, 95, 98-99, 107, 109-110 Hegelianism, 70, 80, 87 Hegelians, 32, 67, 80-81, 85 Hegels, 65, 68, 70, 72-75, 78-79, 101-102 Hegelschen, 69 Heidegger, 1-10, 12-16, 20, 23, 25, 28-29, 31-32, 35-36, 41-44, 47, 50, 55-56, 59-89, 91-92, 97, 99-102, 111, 120, 123-133, 136-149, 152-165 Heideggerian, 10, 43, 60, 129, 165 Heideggerians, 32, 60, 66 Heideggers, 69 Heidelberg, 12, 83, 101, 114-115 Heidgger, 91 Heiedggerian, 89 height, 34, 49, 114 heights, 152 Heinrich, 13, 64, 111-112, 114, 116, 120-121, 160 Heinrichs, 121 heir, 66 heisst, 68 held, 80 Helen, 2 Helene, 65, 78 Hellenism, 143 Heller, 58 Helmholtz, 11 Helmstadt, 119 help, 10, 13, 61, 69, 84, 87, 97, 157 helped, 38, 52, 154 helpful, 35, 49, 88 helpless, 29 helps, 108, 149 Hen, 62 hen, 62 Hence, 27, 40, 54, 60, 142 hence, 10, 23, 39, 43, 54-56, 82, 105, 140, 142, 146, 151 henceforth, 150 Henry, 18, 80 her, 34, 48 Heraclitean, 150 Heraclitus, 76, 83, 95, 101, 143-146 Heraklit, 69 heralded, 140 heraldry, 88 Herausgegeben, 75-76, 155 Herbert, 78, 115 Herbst, 151, 155 Herder, 105, 115, 141 Here, 35, 44, 49, 95, 109, 134, 150 here, 6, 12, 16-17, 23-24, 26-27, 34, 39, 49, 53, 57-58, 60-61, 68, 74, 81, 85, 90, 93, 97, 99-100, 107-109, 118, 126, 129, 133-134, 140, 145-146, 151-152 hereafter, 2 herkömmlich, 143 Hermann, 115, 121, 138, 143-144, 149, 156 hermeneutical, 16, 31, 45, 80-81, 125, 136, 141 Hermeneutics, 7, 41 hermeneutics, 7, 41, 119, 125 Hernn, 37, 52 hero, 70 Herring, 115 Herrn, 36, 51 Herrschaft, 69 Herz, 20, 24, 27, 34, 48, 91 HHPS, 31, 82, 84, 89, 91, 164 Hidden, 132 hidden, 87, 127 hiddenness, 32 hier, 139 Hierarchies, 159 Hierbey, 26 high, 55, 57-58, 62, 109-110, 145 higher, 55, 67, 85, 118, 146 highest, 58-59, 71, 74, 98, 134, 146, 152, 154, 157, 159-160 highly, 45, 68, 81, 123, 150 him, 4, 6-7, 10, 29, 35-36, 38, 41, 43, 46, 49-50, 52, 55, 60, 69, 75, 81-82, 88, 94, 99, 106-107, 112, 114, 117, 119, 123, 125, 127, 129, 151, 154 himself, 7-10, 14, 20, 22, 31, 34, 37-38, 41, 43, 45, 48, 51-52, 56, 59, 62, 66-67, 82, 84, 88, 118, 121, 124-125, 132, 136, 139-140, 153, 158, 160 hinauszugehen, 96 Hindu, 152 Hineininterpretieren, 66 hinge, 14 Hinrichs, 115, 121 Hinsichten, 73 hinted, 82 Hinterwelten, 150 hints, 20, 154 His, 6, 11, 31-32, 55-56, 60, 94, 100, 111, 115, 117, 124-126, 136, 141, 154, 160 his, 4-20, 22-29, 31-56, 59-70, 72-75, 80-85, 87-101, 103-104, 106-121, 123-131, 133-134, 136-147, 149, 151-154, 157-162 historian, 137 historians, 144 Historical, 31, 77, 100 historical, 9, 11, 29, 31, 40, 42, 45-46, 54-56, 60-61, 68, 73-74, 81, 83, 90, 93, 95-96, 99, 108, 126, 129, 136, 138, 140-141, 145 Index historically, 40, 54-55, 112 historicalness, 93 historicism, 13 Historie, 37, 45, 52 historischen, 67, 69 History, 4, 9, 16, 32-33, 37, 42, 45, 47, 52, 56, 61-62, 82, 88, 95, 113, 115, 117-118, 121, 126, 138, 142 history, 4, 7-9, 11, 16, 23-25, 31-42, 44-64, 66-68, 70-73, 75, 81, 83, 85-87, 92-93, 95, 98, 104-107, 109, 111, 113, 115, 121, 124-126, 141, 143, 147, 157, 160, 165 hitherto, 34, 49, 146, 160 hits, 62, 94, 154 Hoch, 157-158 Hochschule, 139 Hohn, 155 hold, 29 Holderlin, 23, 117, 124 holding, 84, 162 holds, 9, 43, 163 holes, 33, 47 Holger, 2-3 Hollingdale, 155 Holzwege, 101, 139, 160 Home, 18 home, 117 homesickness, 117 Homo, 55, 58-60, 141, 144-145, 147, 151-152, 155 Hong, 115 honor, 7, 41, 74, 125, 165 Honour, 120 hope, 58 Hopefully, 28, 47 hopefully, 123 hoping, 129 horizon, 36, 50, 137, 142 horns, 112 hospital, 114 hot, 128 Hours, 112 House, 155 house, 34, 49, 126 HOW, 32, 56, 142 How, 8, 14, 16, 25, 32, 37, 39, 51, 54, 56-57, 60, 65, 80, 89-91, 98, 100, 105-107, 110, 116, 120, 127-128, 130, 138, 141, 165 how, 4, 7-10, 14, 18, 25, 29, 34, 36, 39-43, 46, 48, 50, 53-54, 57, 65, 67, 69-70, 73-74, 82-83, 87, 92-93, 95-96, 100, 118, 127, 138, 143-144 However, 10, 20, 37-40, 47, 51-54, 73, 81, 90, 111-112, 114, 130, 133-134, 140, 142, 162 however, 5, 20, 40, 54, 82, 85, 110, 128, 151, 157, 162 Hsiao, 157 huge, 70, 83 Hugh, 143 Human, 7, 23, 25, 41, 84, 101, 116, 120, 127, 132, 134 human, 7, 21-22, 25, 37, 41, 51, 63, 80, 84, 111-112, 117, 119-120, 123-125, 128, 132, 134, 150 Humanism, 161 humanistic, 115 Humanities, 132 Humanity, 76 humanity, 57-58, 63 humans, 31, 44 humble, 130 Humboldt, 115, 121, 161 Hume, 33, 36, 39, 48, 51, 53, 119 Humean, 39, 53 Humphrey, 44 hundred, 112 hurt, 151 Husserl, 5, 13-15, 44, 60, 65, 71, 73, 81, 84-85, 90-91, 99, 129, 136, 161 Husserlian, 80, 84 Hymnen, 117 Hymns, 117 Hyparchein, 62 Hypokeimenon, 62 häufiger, 66 höchste, 66 Hölderlin, 70, 144-145, 149 Hütte, 1-2, 159 I ibid, 124 Ich, 43, 65, 67 ich, 26, 65, 68, 98, 139 Idea, 62, 93, 96, 98, 100, 106 idea, 4, 12, 14, 17-18, 23-24, 26-28, 45, 47, 56-57, 59, 71, 87, 89, 93, 97, 104, 107, 119, 126-127, 136, 147, 152, 161 ideal, 24, 92, 151, 162 Idealism, 38, 52-53, 64, 70, 82, 84, 100-101, 105, 109, 113-114, 120, 123, 126-129 idealism, 12, 17, 25, 35, 38-40, 49, 52-54, 61, 70, 76, 100, 106-107, 109, 113, 151, 160 Idealismus, 78, 102, 133 Ideals, 159 ideals, 59, 160 Ideas, 115 Index ideas, 19, 40, 87, 97, 108, 141-142, 160 Idee, 85 Ideen, 115, 117, 124 identical, 61, 83, 100 identified, 80 identify, 162 Identity, 76, 106 identity, 106, 130 ideos, 56, 92 Idols, 32, 56, 58, 97, 141-142, 145, 160 idols, 58-59, 159-160 ietzsche, 32, 41, 45-46, 55-60, 64, 66, 97, 100, 129, 133, 136, 138, 141-147, 149-154, 158-160, 165 ietzsches, 154 If, 7, 26, 31-32, 41, 45, 74, 81-82, 86, 89, 125, 128, 150, 158 if, 7, 10, 19, 21, 28-29, 32, 36, 46, 50, 55, 59-61, 63, 84, 86, 90, 112, 125-126, 137, 140, 147, 150-152, 157 Ignorance, 114, 121 ihilism, 159 ihm, 67-68 ihn, 43, 66-67 Ihr, 164 ihr, 70, 73, 156 ihre, 96, 164 ihrem, 70, 121 ihren, 69, 119 ihrer, 64, 67, 96 ihres, 96 II, 9, 24, 42, 63, 77, 82, 137-138, 152-153, 155, 162 III, 25, 71, 84 IL, 2 illegitimate, 103 Illinois, 101 illogicalness, 152 illuminate, 10, 29 im, 13, 16, 43, 64, 67, 69, 71-72, 74, 78, 90, 102, 106, 115, 121, 139, 147, 164 image, 34-35, 48-49, 58, 67, 93-94, 127, 131, 146-147 images, 34, 49 immanent, 19 immanente, 72 Immanuel, 2, 5, 44-45, 47, 81, 126 immediate, 94, 111, 119, 125 immediately, 18, 139 immense, 146 immer, 73-74 immoralist, 59 immortality, 56 impact, 106, 146-147 impassioned, 14 imperative, 57 impetuous, 139 implacable, 153 implementation, 126 implication, 139 implications, 9, 43, 55, 104 implicitly, 47 implied, 4 import, 12 importance, 9, 29, 38, 42, 52, 56, 73, 98, 145 important, 6, 8-9, 12-13, 15-16, 18, 25, 34-35, 42, 46, 49, 55, 68-69, 74, 80-83, 87, 92-93, 96-98, 107-108, 111, 118, 125-126, 136, 140-141, 143-146 importantly, 149, 153 imposing, 74 impressed, 126 impression, 24, 139, 165 improved, 38, 52 improvers, 160 impunity, 139 In, 3, 6-9, 11-16, 20, 22, 24, 26, 29, 32-33, 35-38, 40-41, 43, 45-54, 56, 58-61, 64-68, 70-71, 73, 75-77, 81-83, 85, 87-88, 90-91, 93-100, 103-104, 106, 108-109, 111-117, 119-120, 123-130, 132-134, 136-139, 141, 143-147, 149-153, 157-162 in, 2-29, 31-75, 79-121, 123-134, 136-155, 157-163, 165 inadequacy, 142 inaugural, 12 incapable, 23, 128 inception, 144 inceptual, 159 incidental, 139 incipient, 147 INCIPIT, 32, 57 incipit, 58 incite, 4 include, 46, 64, 82, 93, 105-106, 113, 132 Included, 155 included, 13, 24, 70, 83, 93, 160 Includes, 2, 101 includes, 16, 21, 81, 141, 149, 153, 157 Including, 103 including, 2, 21, 23, 84, 93, 118 inclusion, 82 incompatible, 161 incomplete, 138 incomprehensible, 26, 57 inconceivable, 161 inconsistencies, 158 inconsistency, 25 inconsolable, 39, 53 incorporated, 118 incorrigible, 147 increasing, 13, 28, 99 incredibly, 49 Index Indeed, 4, 28, 68, 82, 89, 160 indeed, 8, 41, 46, 81, 118-119, 137, 143, 149-150, 158 Indem, 98 indem, 43, 66-67 indemonstrable, 57 independence, 134 independent, 4, 114 Index, 2-3, 144 indexing, 144 India, 2, 158, 162-163 Indian, 115, 118, 152, 157-158, 163 Indiana, 101, 132, 161, 164 Indic, 2 indicated, 14, 95-97 indication, 26, 69, 83 indifference, 4 indifferent, 109 individual, 46, 68, 81, 96 Individuals, 60 Indo, 157, 163 industry, 6, 38, 52, 123 indwelling, 128 inescapable, 153 inevitability, 150 inevitable, 150 inexhaustible, 5, 32 infamous, 5, 90, 94, 96 infinita, 35, 61, 108 infinite, 37, 52, 97, 108-109 infinitely, 144 influence, 14, 23, 45-47, 65, 74, 80, 118, 121, 124, 130, 143, 147, 151 influenced, 13, 55, 124 influences, 124 information, 2, 88, 105, 161 ingenii, 29 inhaltlich, 67 inherent, 158 inherently, 4, 159 inimitable, 150 initially, 25 inkling, 114 inmost, 151-152 inner, 6, 32, 45, 56, 81, 87, 105, 107, 121, 145, 149-150 inneren, 121 innerlich, 74 innermost, 130 innerste, 130 innocence, 31 innocent, 59, 64, 150 inquire, 157 Inquiries, 132 inquiry, 130 insbesondere, 115 inscrutable, 153 inside, 92, 106-107, 141 insidious, 57 insight, 38, 53, 80, 144 insightful, 47, 70, 82, 84 insights, 9, 29, 43, 97, 110 insist, 40, 54 insofar, 19, 27, 40, 133 insonderheit, 69 inspiration, 46, 147 inspiring, 14 instance, 66, 88, 134 instandiger, 164 Instead, 25, 94, 127, 145 instead, 5-6, 12, 44, 109, 137 institution, 18 insufficient, 5, 29, 44, 137 integral, 25 integrity, 100 intellectual, 33, 48, 88, 152 intellectualis, 149 intended, 23, 26, 112 intending, 80 intends, 124 intention, 10, 26, 43, 56, 80, 82, 86, 100 Intentionally, 30, 122, 135 intentions, 9, 12, 42, 86, 90, 161 interchangeable, 100 interconnection, 21 interest, 11, 38, 45, 52, 80, 157-158, 165 interested, 7, 41, 64-65, 125 interesting, 4, 33, 36, 39, 47, 50, 53-54, 60, 70, 84, 87, 96, 98, 100, 112, 119, 138-139, 160, 162 interjections, 7 interlude, 14 intermost, 151 internal, 21, 24, 97, 157, 165 Interpret, 89 Interpretation, 10, 15, 89, 92 interpretation, 5-8, 12-14, 28, 31, 41, 65-66, 70, 72, 80-82, 86-90, 95, 100, 125-126, 129, 136-137, 139, 142-144, 146, 153 interpretations, 8, 41, 65-66, 81, 89, 137, 152, 157 interpreted, 46 interpreter, 117 interpreting, 111 interpretive, 136 Interview, 131-132 interview, 130-131 interviews, 158 intimate, 141 Intimation, 114 Index intimation, 114, 116 intimations, 114 into, 3, 7-8, 13-16, 21, 24, 28, 32, 34, 36-39, 41-42, 47-48, 50, 52-53, 55-57, 63-65, 72, 74, 80, 83, 88-90, 92-93, 95-98, 106-108, 113-114, 118-119, 128-129, 132, 134, 136, 144, 147, 149-150, 153, 160, 162, 165 intricately, 65 intriguing, 138 intrinsic, 158 introduced, 128 introduces, 4, 104 Introduction, 6, 9, 31, 36, 42, 45, 50, 61, 64, 80, 85-86, 91-92, 94-95, 103-104, 111, 123, 136, 144-145, 160, 164 introduction, 19, 40, 44, 80, 84, 86, 93, 101, 104, 108, 129, 143 intuited, 106 intuition, 19, 21, 28, 105 intuitions, 19, 41 intuitive, 146 invented, 2, 119 inversion, 142 invert, 142 investigate, 47 investigates, 21, 26, 161 investigation, 21, 28-29, 39, 45-47, 53, 138 Investigations, 14, 134 investigations, 14 investigative, 29 invited, 126 involve, 158 involved, 4, 18, 115, 118, 144, 161 involvement, 118 inward, 117 irgend, 65 irks, 99 Irony, 118 irrational, 89 irrationalism, 13, 37, 51, 84, 87, 100 irrationalistic, 112, 114 irrelevant, 9, 43 Irrthums, 57 Is, 5, 32, 38, 45, 52, 66, 85, 90, 100, 127, 153 is, 4-29, 31-75, 79-100, 103-113, 115-121, 123-134, 136-155, 157-165 ISBN, 158 ism, 84, 87-88, 161 Ismology, 87 isms, 45, 150 isolated, 69 isolation, 69 Issue, 72 issue, 12, 16, 23, 33, 37-38, 47, 51, 53, 81, 86-87, 93-94, 99-100, 103, 105, 136, 138, 140, 144, 146, 150, 153 Issues, 80, 92, 138 issues, 4, 6, 33, 44, 46, 60, 66-67, 73, 88, 91, 93, 96, 99, 105, 109, 123, 136, 146-147, 151 ist, 26, 63, 65-67, 69-75, 77, 86, 92, 96-97, 100, 130, 138-139, 155-156 ists, 88 It, 5, 9, 13, 21-22, 24, 29, 32-34, 43, 47-48, 52, 61, 80, 82, 84, 87, 91-92, 94, 97-98, 107-109, 112, 118, 123, 126-127, 129, 136-137, 141-142, 145-147, 151, 163, 165 it, 4-10, 12, 14-15, 17-18, 20-25, 27-29, 32, 35-40, 42-43, 46-47, 49-58, 60-61, 64-65, 67, 69-71, 73-74, 80, 82-84, 86-92, 94-100, 103-106, 108, 110-113, 115-119, 124, 126-127, 129-130, 133-134, 136-137, 140-141, 143-146, 148-153, 157-159, 161-162, 165 italicize, 92 itezshce, 150 ith, 163 Its, 19, 121 its, 4, 6, 11, 13-14, 16-18, 21-22, 24-26, 31, 34-35, 37-38, 40, 45-47, 49-50, 52, 54-56, 58, 60-63, 65-66, 71, 83-84, 86, 91, 93, 95-99, 104-109, 111, 113, 115, 118-121, 124, 126, 128, 130, 133, 137, 142-144, 146-147, 150, 153, 157, 161-162, 164-165 itself, 11-14, 17-21, 23-24, 26-29, 32, 35, 37, 44, 51, 61, 63, 70, 83, 86-87, 92-93, 96-99, 104, 106-108, 113, 117-119, 126, 128-130, 137-138, 140, 147, 153, 160 itzsche, 150 IV, 8, 29, 42, 66, 89, 109, 129, 150 IX, 102 J Jacob, 36, 51, 55, 111 Jacobi, 88, 105, 111-113, 116, 118, 121, 141 Jacobian, 121 Jacobis, 120 Jahrbücher, 112 Jahrhundert, 69 Jahrhunderte, 147 Jakob, 10, 18, 40, 112, 114, 124 James, 80 Jan, 2, 55, 80 Januar, 151 January, 13, 19, 36, 50, 56, 90, 103 Janurar, 150 Index Japan, 157, 165 Jason, 133 Jasper, 85, 161 Jaspers, 5, 65, 75, 80, 85 Je, 64 Jean, 80 jeden, 104, 109 Jeffrey, 133 Jena, 36, 51, 61, 80, 90, 98, 103, 113-115, 117, 124 Jenenser, 72, 78, 82, 102 Jener, 86 Jenseits, 151 Jesus, 123 jetzt, 65 Jo, 2 Joachim, 76 Joan, 101, 120, 132 job, 138 Johann, 37, 52, 104, 112-115, 118, 124 Johanna, 114 Johannes, 124 John, 33-34, 48, 132-133 joined, 146 Jones, 143 Joseph, 2, 109, 133 jotted, 145 Journal, 37, 52, 102, 162 journal, 144 journey, 87, 92, 97, 108, 138, 140 Juanita, 2 judge, 55, 146 judging, 18, 21 Judgment, 13, 18, 85, 161 judgment, 5, 32 judgments, 22, 28-29 Jul, 164 July, 101, 112, 149 jump, 29, 107 June, 4, 8, 37, 41, 46, 52, 56, 66, 81, 99, 137, 146, 150, 157, 164-165 Just, 21, 32, 107 just, 7, 9, 18, 35-36, 40-41, 46, 49-50, 54, 57, 60, 65-66, 68, 73, 85, 87-90, 95-96, 99, 107-108, 112, 125, 127, 138, 140, 142, 145-147, 151, 154, 159-160, 165 Justice, 128 justice, 18 justify, 46 Jünger, 149, 155-156, 162 K Kaccayanaqotta, 163 Kaiden, 2 Kames, 18 Kampf, 66, 68 kann, 66 Kant, 1-3, 5-10, 12-20, 22-29, 31-45, 47-56, 59-62, 64-67, 77, 81-82, 85, 88-91, 96, 99, 101, 104-105, 109, 111-121, 125-126, 128-129, 133, 136-143, 157, 161, 164 Kantbook, 5, 20, 44, 137 Kanti, 158 Kantian, 10-15, 25, 32-34, 37, 39-40, 43, 47-49, 51, 54, 56, 58, 89, 105, 113, 116-118, 121, 160 Kantianism, 5, 10-12, 14, 37, 52 Kantianismus, 67 Kantians, 5-6, 10, 12-14, 33, 47, 67, 81, 114 Kantphiologie, 66 Kants, 13, 26 kaput, 158 kaputt, 158 Karin, 83 Karl, 5, 11, 37, 44, 46, 51, 61, 65, 75, 85, 107, 114, 117, 137, 158, 160-161 Karlsbad, 126 Kategorien, 64, 73 Kategorienlehre, 69 katholische, 64 Katyayana, 163 Kaufmann, 91, 96, 113, 116-117, 119, 155 keenly, 81 keep, 65 keeping, 34, 49 keeps, 96 keine, 67, 156 keinen, 66 Kenley, 101 Kenneth, 101 Kepler, 109 kept, 5 Kern, 130 key, 74, 95, 128 KGW, 155 kgw, 150-152 Kierkegaard, 11, 70, 80, 114, 124, 133 kind, 11, 17, 19, 21, 26, 28, 31, 33, 35, 45-47, 50, 63, 69, 72, 80, 83-89, 99-100, 106-107, 112, 116, 130-131, 140, 147, 165 kindness, 163 Index Kindred, 68, 81 kindred, 44, 81-82 kinds, 88 King, 106, 128, 132 Kiran, 2 Kisiel, 5, 161 kleine, 68 Klostermann, 75, 101 knew, 29, 47, 96, 152 Knoten, 152 know, 8, 13, 20, 41, 45, 56, 61, 82, 90, 92, 105, 111, 138, 144, 147, 152, 157, 160 Knowing, 85, 89, 92-95, 97, 100, 114, 121 knowing, 32, 63, 87, 97, 99-100, 105-108, 147 Knowledge, 114, 120-121 knowledge, 10-14, 28-29, 35, 37, 50-51, 56, 62, 72, 83-84, 86-88, 92, 94, 99, 105, 107, 113, 116-119, 140, 157, 161 Known, 3, 111, 115 known, 2, 40, 55, 59, 65, 72, 81, 84, 89, 99, 111-112, 115, 118, 120-121, 125-126, 141, 150, 158, 160 knows, 97, 107, 118, 137, 146 Koeller, 133 Koivov, 155 Kojève, 61 komme, 65 kommen, 26, 68 kommt, 74 Kong, 115 Konigsberg, 116 Konkrete, 74 konnte, 155 konnten, 69 Konstruktion, 67 Kosch, 133 Kosequenzen, 101 kostbarsten, 155 Kreise, 96 Kreises, 77, 96 Krell, 68, 76, 101, 156 Krieg, 150 Kritik, 13, 18, 33, 47, 66, 112 Kritische, 155 Kritisches, 37, 52 Krug, 116, 120 KrV, 66, 77 KSA, 155 ksa, 150-152, 155 Kuhn, 2 Kultur, 115 kundgeben, 139 Kuno, 149 Kunst, 110, 121 Kunstbeurtheilung, 115 Kurzgesfassete, 37, 52 Kwan, 115 käuflichen, 65 Königsbergian, 57 können, 26, 104, 109 künftigen, 104, 109 L la, 32, 55, 58, 60, 141, 150, 155 labeling, 87 labor, 109-110, 145 labors, 4, 34, 49 labyrinth, 107 lack, 16, 100, 117, 140 lacking, 15, 25, 128, 143 ladder, 95, 98, 107 laid, 151 Lamber, 20, 25 Lambert, 90-91 land, 95 lands, 111 landscape, 14 Lange, 11, 141 langen, 164 language, 112, 115, 118, 134, 157, 163 languages, 157, 163, 165 Lanham, 77 Large, 2 large, 65, 69, 82-83, 115, 140 larger, 73 Lask, 13 lasst, 130 last, 6, 10, 14, 16, 24, 31, 33-34, 38, 43, 47-49, 52, 55, 59, 64, 90-94, 96-97, 99-100, 104, 106-107, 117, 124, 128-129, 131, 133, 136, 146, 149-150, 152, 154, 157, 163-164 lasting, 40, 54, 60 Lata, 2 Late, 140 late, 11, 16, 33, 47, 80, 97, 108, 116, 129-130, 151, 160 Later, 127, 138, 159 later, 8-9, 14, 20, 23, 42, 64-65, 73-74, 88-89, 91-92, 96, 99, 104, 107, 109, 112, 115-116, 118-119, 125-126, 129-131, 133, 136, 139, 141, 143, 146, 151-152, 161-162, 165 Latest, 37, 52, 119-120 Index latest, 119 Latin, 149, 153, 161, 163 latter, 19-21, 27-28 Laughland, 133 launch, 7 launched, 117 Laurie, 2 law, 28 lawful, 18 lay, 56, 97, 105 laying, 5, 15, 26, 35, 50, 88 Le, 64, 79, 102, 133 lead, 44, 57, 95-96, 128 Leading, 117 leading, 13, 64, 95, 107, 115, 118, 127, 136 leads, 16, 33, 39, 48, 57, 94, 105, 107-108, 112-113, 127-129, 142, 151, 163-164 league, 4, 145 learn, 39-40, 54, 60, 69, 150 learned, 8, 37, 40, 42, 52, 54, 60 learning, 88 least, 9, 23, 25, 36, 43, 50, 61, 64, 69, 83, 86, 138, 141, 160 leave, 69, 83, 93, 100, 145 leaves, 36, 50, 113, 142, 161 leaving, 149 Leben, 45, 74 leben, 67 lebendige, 68 lebendigen, 69 lebendiger, 67 lebt, 73 Lecture, 38, 52, 101 lecture, 6, 10, 13, 15, 19, 38, 52, 55, 65, 67, 69, 75, 78-80, 85, 89, 91, 119-120, 124, 127, 132, 137-139, 143, 145-147, 149, 162 lectured, 61 lecturer, 119 Lectures, 14, 18-19, 22, 24-25, 28, 37-40, 44, 51-54, 60, 88, 93, 95, 119 lectures, 6, 9, 12-13, 15, 36, 38-39, 42, 51-53, 55, 61, 68, 80, 90, 98, 114, 124, 133, 138-141, 145, 152, 161-162 lecturing, 126 led, 88, 93, 107, 112, 158 lediglich, 73 leere, 145 Left, 30, 122, 135 left, 7-8, 31, 33, 36, 40-41, 47, 50, 54, 65-66, 68, 75, 82, 100, 125, 131, 136, 150, 158, 160 legacy, 133, 162 legend, 57 Lehre, 69, 72 Lehrer, 111 Leibniz, 13, 16, 20, 28, 33, 36, 38, 44, 48, 50-52, 56, 88, 106, 111, 128, 140-141 Leibnizens, 36, 50 leicht, 139 leisure, 4, 158 Leitspruch, 164 length, 8, 42, 68, 82, 104, 163 lengthy, 65 Leonard, 10 Leonhard, 37, 51, 117 Leopold, 117 less, 45, 67, 70, 83, 111, 113, 125, 140 Lesser, 3, 111 lesser, 90, 111, 120 Lessing, 88, 112, 116, 121 lessness, 159 Let, 6, 16, 33, 47, 86 let, 9, 43, 56-57, 69, 111, 150, 163 lets, 130 Letter, 18-21, 25-26, 33-34, 40, 47-48, 68, 71, 123, 150, 157-158, 161-162, 164 letter, 5, 24, 35-37, 49, 51-52, 65, 72, 91, 107, 128, 149, 156, 158, 161, 165 Letters, 90, 112, 118, 132 letters, 26, 38, 52, 58, 98, 112, 114, 116-117, 121, 138-139, 150, 155, 158 letzte, 73 Letzten, 164 letzter, 164 leuchtende, 73 level, 56, 95, 130 liberal, 115, 140 liberalassimilationists, 89 Liberation, 114 Libraries, 2 Library, 46 library, 149, 151, 163 lie, 22 Liebe, 69, 130 Liebmann, 11-12, 14 liefern, 26 lies, 152, 157, 165 Life, 45, 121 life, 33, 47, 65, 112, 124-127, 138-141, 145, 150, 152, 163 lifeless, 109 lifetime, 28-29, 65, 117 lifts, 150 light, 36, 50, 95, 107, 123, 131-132, 147 lightening, 59 lights, 115 Like, 108 Index like, 7-8, 11, 14, 20, 23, 27, 32-33, 36, 42, 47, 51, 55, 60-61, 67, 69-70, 83, 87, 91, 98, 100, 104, 107, 111, 114-115, 119, 141, 146, 149-152, 160, 163, 165 liked, 15 likely, 64, 116, 146 likewise, 117-118 limitation, 142 limitations, 142 limited, 86, 142 limits, 20, 56, 128, 153, 157 Lindstrom, 2 line, 56, 73, 129 lines, 31, 33, 149 lingering, 131-132 lingers, 14 lingustics, 115 Linie, 162 link, 16, 20, 81, 84, 97 linkage, 152 linkages, 93, 157 linked, 28, 88, 108, 112, 127, 129, 150, 157 linking, 150 links, 24, 130, 144, 147, 149 lion, 150 list, 4, 24 listen, 31 litany, 139 literature, 114, 163, 165 little, 24, 34-36, 48-50, 67, 87, 92, 104, 125, 129, 133, 143 live, 137, 150 Lived, 114 lived, 111, 114, 152, 158 lively, 143 lives, 57, 74 living, 82, 109, 158 Lloyd, 143 locates, 149, 162 Location, 2 location, 26, 34, 48, 99 Locke, 33-34, 38-39, 48, 52-53 lofty, 117 Logic, 3-4, 13, 16, 22, 25, 32, 35, 37-38, 40, 52-54, 60-61, 64, 74, 80, 82, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92-100, 104, 106, 108-109, 111, 126-127, 132, 147, 160 logic, 6, 12, 15, 44, 56, 59, 61, 71-72, 90, 95, 108, 126-127, 140, 146, 152, 157-158 Logical, 14 logical, 66, 129 logicalist, 11 Logik, 3, 13, 16, 64-65, 67, 70-75, 77-79, 86, 90, 102, 104, 110-111, 121, 147, 160 logische, 76, 79 logistics, 13 Logos, 62 logos, 62, 89, 157 logy, 130-131 long, 5, 11, 32, 69, 115, 119 longer, 57, 74, 97, 117, 160 longest, 57 Longrich, 2 look, 6, 8-9, 16, 27, 34, 36, 42-43, 46, 49-50, 64, 86, 93, 111 looked, 39, 53, 86 Looking, 150 looking, 6, 8, 16, 28-29, 33, 42, 47, 56, 66, 136, 152 looks, 11, 18, 39, 54, 60, 123, 126 loosely, 163 Lord, 18, 158 Loren, 2 lose, 7, 16, 60 lost, 7, 11, 36, 50, 60, 158 lot, 8, 29, 42, 67, 81, 89, 106, 118 lots, 86, 106 Lotze, 12-13, 141 Louis, 80 Louise, 2 Love, 130, 150 love, 5, 7, 60, 62, 97, 105, 130, 149-154 Loved, 116 loved, 121 loving, 152 Lovitt, 102 lowest, 73 lucid, 56, 141 Lucknow, 158 ludicrous, 55, 146 Ludwig, 46-47, 61, 103, 123, 151 lässt, 139 Löwith, 137 M ma, 124, 128-129 machen, 65, 139 Machination, 62 Made, 36, 44, 50, 56, 117, 140 made, 4, 12, 24-25, 28-29, 36, 40, 50, 55, 70, 81, 84-85, 88, 94, 99, 114, 116-118, 126-127, 129-130, 137, 152-153 Madhyamika, 162-163 Index magazine, 84, 130 magnetic, 2 magnificent, 56 magnum, 63, 100, 140 Magnus, 137 magus, 112 Mahabharata, 115, 121 Mahayana, 162-163 Main, 75, 77, 101 main, 12, 19, 22, 28, 44, 46, 71, 80, 89, 93-94, 97, 99, 107, 126, 128, 140, 158, 161 mainly, 20, 91 Major, 110, 121 major, 6, 12, 14-15, 24, 32, 45, 71, 75, 111, 117, 124, 128-129, 139-140, 147, 158, 160-161 majority, 138 make, 20, 32, 55, 61, 90, 92, 96, 113, 128, 130, 137, 140, 146, 150-151 makes, 4, 9-10, 22, 24-25, 32, 55-56, 73, 87, 98, 100, 107, 109, 111, 118, 127-128, 137, 143, 145, 150 making, 8, 42, 66, 95, 106, 112, 128-129, 140 Male, 155 Malebranche, 38, 52 Maliha, 2 Maly, 101 MAN, 15 Man, 118, 128 man, 15, 24, 57, 63, 66, 128, 140, 146, 151, 153, 160 Mangel, 100 manifested, 94 Mankind, 55 mankind, 58, 160 manner, 2 Manoharlal, 115 manuscript, 36, 50, 65, 72, 90, 103 manuscripts, 36, 50, 72 Many, 4, 82, 87, 92, 104, 139, 163 many, 2, 6, 37, 40, 46, 51, 54-55, 60, 72-73, 81, 86, 90, 103, 111, 113, 119, 123, 125, 140-142, 146, 149-152, 157, 160, 162 Mar, 162 Marbach, 76 Marburg, 5-6, 10-11, 13, 15, 65, 75, 124, 161 March, 13, 56, 103, 139, 146, 158 Marcus, 20, 24, 27, 34, 48, 91 Marcuse, 78 margin, 13 marginalia, 136-137 Marguerita, 2 Maria, 59 mark, 2, 98, 110 marked, 141, 143 market, 5 marks, 141 Martin, 2-6, 31-32, 36, 47, 50, 61, 63-64, 68-70, 72, 75-76, 78, 80-81, 101, 111, 120, 123-124, 131-133, 136, 149, 155-158, 164-165 Marx, 11, 46, 70, 158, 160 Marxism, 80 material, 4, 20, 82, 96, 106 materials, 34-35, 49, 82 math, 109 mathematical, 10, 21, 108 mathematics, 109, 124 Matrin, 1 matter, 4, 6, 10, 43-44, 67, 81, 84, 87, 124, 137, 139, 165 Matters, 132 matters, 34, 36, 44, 50, 60, 68, 82, 88, 116 mature, 64, 100, 107 Max, 11, 76-77, 99, 120, 132 May, 20, 34, 48, 69, 165 may, 2, 4, 10, 12, 16, 29, 40, 43, 54, 61, 69-70, 72, 82, 86-88, 111, 128, 137, 141, 146-147, 149, 161, 163 Maybe, 154 maybe, 88, 143, 157 Mazur, 2 Md, 77 me, 5, 7, 25-26, 28, 39, 53, 60, 90-91, 144, 151-152, 157-158, 165 mean, 40, 54-55, 59, 86-87, 100, 106, 108, 110, 113, 128-129, 138, 149, 151, 161 Meaning, 158 meaning, 6, 13, 16, 64, 89, 100, 105-106, 124, 126, 129, 140, 142, 145, 147, 149, 152 meaningful, 45 meaninglessness, 160 meanings, 161 means, 2, 14, 18, 39, 46, 54, 58, 61, 66, 70, 81, 84, 90, 92-94, 97, 100, 107, 109, 127, 129, 137-140, 151-153, 158-160, 163 meant, 68, 81, 91, 134 measured, 140, 160 mechanical, 2 Medard, 158 mediated, 94 mediation, 96 Meditations, 14, 45 Medoc, 121 meeting, 97, 126, 165 meets, 124 Mehta, 157 meiner, 66 meinerseits, 66 Meinung, 162 meist, 68 Meister, 124 Index member, 96 members, 2 memory, 147 Men, 101, 113, 120 Mendelssohn, 88, 112-113, 116 Menschen, 63, 118, 155 menschen, 72 Menschentums, 63 Menschheit, 58 menschlichen, 63, 70, 77, 120, 130, 132-133 mention, 125, 133, 150, 160 mentioned, 68-69, 83, 85, 99, 106, 111, 158 mentions, 36-37, 51, 133, 139, 149 mere, 13, 16-17, 19, 24, 26, 35, 50, 56, 88 merely, 19, 24, 27, 31, 34, 49, 65, 80, 83, 91, 99, 157 merit, 133 merke, 43, 67 Merkmal, 26 meta, 31, 90 Metahistorical, 8, 42 metahistorical, 16, 123 Metahistories, 3, 31-32, 45-47, 59 metahistories, 67-68, 81 Metahistory, 7, 32, 34, 36-41, 45, 47-59, 61-62, 71, 125, 129, 136, 143 metahistory, 31-32, 67, 105, 136, 142 metaphor, 40, 54 metaphysic, 153, 157 Metaphysica, 19, 23, 79 metaphysica, 153 Metaphysical, 5, 10, 13, 16, 91, 93, 109, 149 metaphysical, 5, 11, 23, 25, 31, 33, 35, 40, 44, 46-47, 49-50, 54, 60, 64, 70, 74, 80, 82, 84, 87, 91, 93-96, 98-100, 103, 105-106, 108-110, 123, 134, 138, 140, 144, 149-151, 153-154, 157, 159-160, 163 metaphysican, 149 metaphysician, 8, 16, 22, 42, 136, 145, 154 Metaphysics, 2-3, 5, 8, 10, 12-22, 28, 35-42, 44, 50-51, 53-54, 56, 62-63, 66, 80-83, 93, 99, 101, 104, 108-109, 111, 123, 130, 136-140, 145, 157, 159, 164 metaphysics, 5, 8-9, 12-13, 15-29, 31, 33-37, 39-42, 44, 48, 50-51, 53, 56, 59-60, 62-65, 70, 72-75, 83-84, 87, 89, 91, 93-94, 99, 104-105, 123-130, 136, 140-145, 147, 149, 153-154, 157-160, 163, 165 Metaphysik, 13, 36, 39, 50, 53, 63, 69, 71-73, 76-77, 79, 102, 104, 109, 133 Metaphysische, 13, 16, 109 metaphysische, 69, 149, 154 Method, 29, 33, 47, 109 method, 9, 18, 20-21, 23-24, 27, 29, 33-34, 39, 42, 48-49, 54, 67, 71, 82, 88, 91, 96-97, 108-109 Methode, 33-34, 48, 67, 72, 74 Methodological, 24 methodological, 7, 24, 41, 125 Methodology, 3, 7, 31, 41, 65, 95, 136 methodology, 6-10, 16, 24, 31, 33-34, 41-44, 48, 60, 65-68, 71, 81-82, 90, 96-98, 105, 108, 110, 125, 136, 138, 158 methods, 97 mich, 65, 158 Michael, 44, 120 Michelet, 61 Michelle, 133 Michigan, 2, 4 mid, 80 Midday, 58 midday, 59 Middle, 61, 162-163 middle, 11, 38, 40, 53-54, 103, 152, 162 Middleton, 155 might, 36, 40, 50-51, 54, 88, 113, 130-131, 144 military, 114 militia, 114 millennium, 6, 14, 124 Miller, 98, 132 mimicked, 88 Mind, 29 mind, 28-29, 95, 98, 107, 109, 116, 127 mindestens, 65 mindfulness, 159 Minerva, 46 minor, 68 Mir, 65 mir, 26, 65 mirror, 8 mis, 4 misconstrued, 85, 136 misdirected, 84 misdirection, 85 misguided, 13 Misinterpretation, 84-87 misinterpretation, 13, 84-86 Misinterpretations, 10, 84 misinterpretations, 5, 10, 80 misled, 13 misses, 13 missing, 67 mist, 57 mistakes, 4 mistrust, 37, 40, 51, 54, 97 misunderstanding, 5, 10, 95 mit, 3, 64, 66-70, 74, 102, 164 Mittag, 58 Mittel, 79 mixed, 23 mixing, 153 Index MM, 2 MMK, 158, 164 mode, 27, 29, 98 model, 116 Modern, 2 modern, 4, 13, 29, 55, 61, 69, 74, 83, 99, 106, 114, 119, 130, 161 modest, 19 Modifications, 37, 52, 119-120 Moellendorff, 143 Moment, 92 moment, 46, 56-57, 92, 97, 108, 125, 129, 153-154 moments, 16, 93, 108, 129 Monad, 62 money, 125 monotheism, 88 monstrous, 46, 121 months, 35, 49, 91, 104 mood, 150 moods, 44 moral, 28, 113, 150 moralistic, 114 morality, 12, 119, 144, 161 Morals, 109 morals, 18, 21, 23, 26-27 More, 14, 149, 153 more, 4, 7-8, 10, 14-15, 18, 20, 28-29, 32, 38-41, 46-47, 52-57, 64-70, 73-74, 80-82, 85, 87, 90-91, 93, 97, 100, 107-109, 111-113, 115, 117-118, 120-121, 124-130, 136, 138-141, 143-144, 146, 149-150, 152-153, 157, 159, 162-163 moreover, 96 Morgen, 58 Moria, 152 Morning, 112 morning, 57-58 Moses, 88, 116 Most, 6, 11, 99, 103, 111, 124 most, 4-6, 9, 12, 20, 29, 32, 39, 42, 46, 53, 60-61, 68-70, 72, 74, 83-84, 96-97, 99-100, 111, 114, 116, 118, 123-124, 128-130, 136, 138, 141-142, 144, 146, 149, 152-153, 157, 161-162, 165 Mostly, 116 mostly, 64, 103 mother, 112, 163 motif, 125 motion, 37, 51, 95-96, 105-107, 157 motor, 96 motto, 60, 71, 90, 95, 125, 140, 160 Mount, 4 mountain, 61, 96, 141 Mountains, 115 mountains, 4 move, 15-16, 29, 83, 99, 108, 138, 150 moved, 15, 99, 103, 115, 117, 124 Movement, 95, 117 movement, 11-12, 14, 37, 51, 83-84, 86-87, 92, 96-98, 104-106, 108-110, 115, 118 movements, 83, 96, 108 moves, 25, 59, 87 movies, 159 moving, 29, 86, 105, 108, 143, 160 Mr, 112, 116, 120 Mrongovius, 39, 53 Much, 118 much, 20, 23-25, 27, 39, 53, 70, 73, 81, 83, 87, 89, 91-92, 97, 99, 109, 113, 125, 128, 130, 144, 150, 157-158, 162, 165 Mulamadhyamakakarika, 163 multi, 137 Mumien, 140 mummies, 56, 61, 140 mundane, 116 Munich, 126 Munshiram, 115 Munsterberg, 11 murky, 32, 55 Murti, 164 Museum, 144 Music, 143 Musik, 143 muss, 66, 74 Must, 94, 127, 147 must, 4, 7-9, 17, 19, 25-26, 31, 33, 35-37, 40-42, 44, 47, 50-51, 54-55, 60-61, 63, 67, 74, 95, 99, 104-105, 107-108, 111, 125, 127-128, 136-137, 139, 146-147, 150-151, 158, 162 mutual, 9, 42 muss, 26, 64, 139, 147 My, 16, 64, 133, 142, 151, 161 my, 2, 4, 6-8, 15, 26-27, 33-34, 39, 41, 47, 49, 53, 60, 80-81, 89, 95, 136-137, 142, 147, 150-152, 157, 165 myriad, 45, 69 myself, 34, 49, 97, 105, 151 mystic, 112 Mysticism, 124 myth, 57, 133 Mythical, 133 mythology, 133 Möglichkeit, 65, 67 müssen, 64, 67 þÿ Mk l a m a d h y a m a k a k r i k ,  163 Index N nach, 12, 69, 73, 121 Nachlass, 152 Nacht, 117 Nachtheil, 45 Nagarjuna, 158, 162-164 Nagley, 164 nail, 94 naiveté, 117 Name, 115 name, 19, 21, 36, 45, 51, 58-59, 91, 117, 125, 128, 139, 147 Namely, 33, 47 namely, 15, 18, 20-21, 23-25, 29, 34-36, 47-50, 56, 59, 61, 80, 86-87, 89, 91-92, 94-95, 98-100, 107-108, 123-124, 126, 138, 141, 149-150, 152, 157-158, 162 Namen, 73 namen, 115 names, 134 Napoleon, 90, 103, 119 Narago, 44 narrow, 59, 131 narrower, 19, 21, 28 Nathan, 116 Nation, 114 Natorp, 11 Natubhai, 2 Natur, 117, 124 Natural, 91, 109 natural, 12, 21, 33, 47, 73, 84, 86, 104, 108, 110, 115 naturalism, 13 naturalistic, 33, 48 Nature, 61, 99, 120, 132 nature, 10, 18-19, 21, 23, 26-29, 34-35, 37, 45, 49, 51, 61, 71, 81-82, 87, 91, 93-94, 96-97, 104, 106-109, 126-128, 130, 133, 143, 145, 149, 151-153, 157-159, 161, 163 Naturwissenschaft, 109 Naumburg, 150 navigate, 36, 50 nd, 2, 38, 52, 157 near, 20, 22, 36, 50, 123 nearest, 145 nebst, 121 necessarily, 9, 24, 42, 136, 159 necessary, 8, 29, 42, 61, 74, 109, 150-152, 165 necessities, 6, 32, 45, 145 necessity, 32, 85, 138, 149-154 Neckar, 76 need, 9, 12, 31-32, 40, 45, 47, 60, 64-65, 70, 84, 91, 100, 105-107, 112, 117, 125, 131, 137, 140, 153 needed, 65, 125 needful, 150 Needless, 138 needs, 4, 35, 50, 70, 74, 82, 84, 104, 106, 136 Negation, 67 negation, 9, 42, 150 negative, 4, 25, 59, 91, 108-109, 130 negatively, 46 negativity, 105, 108-109 Negativität, 102 neither, 35, 50, 63, 81, 119, 145 Nelson, 5, 10-11 Neo, 5-6, 10-15, 67, 81, 160 neo, 11-13, 33, 47 NeoKantianism, 11 neoKantianism, 76 NeoKantians, 81, 160 neokantians, 12 nether, 112 neue, 139 neuen, 139 neueren, 74 neuern, 149 Neues, 90 neuzeitliche, 156 never, 12, 14-15, 21, 26, 33, 47, 64, 90, 98, 106, 131, 143-145, 151 Nevertheless, 10, 36, 43, 50, 61 nevertheless, 8, 12, 42, 46 New, 3, 44, 76, 101, 115, 132, 144, 155 new, 9, 12, 20-23, 28, 43, 55-56, 60, 62, 70, 75, 89-90, 96, 98, 100, 106, 128, 136-137, 139, 142-143, 145, 147-149, 154-155 Newest, 113 newspaper, 103 next, 14, 56, 65, 94, 105, 124, 128, 137, 145, 160-161 nich, 70 Nicht, 73 nicht, 26, 43, 66-70, 73-74, 77, 92, 139-140, 160, 164 Nichtigkeit, 67 nichts, 43, 67 Nicolaus, 124 nie, 26 Niemeyer, 76-77, 120, 132 Niethammer, 71 Nietzsche, 1-3, 7-8, 14, 16, 23, 31-32, 36, 41, 45-47, 50, 55-63, 65, 70, 75, 77, 83, 96-97, 100-101, 121, 125, 129, 136-138, 141-156, 158-160, 162 Nietzsches, 75, 149 Nietzschian, 140 Nietzschians, 32 Index Night, 117 night, 46, 110, 117 Nihilism, 57, 159-160 nihilism, 13, 152, 154, 160 Nihilismus, 154 Nihilist, 159 nihsaranama, 164 nine, 35, 49 nineteenth, 14, 55, 83 ninety, 6, 124 nirvana, 163 No, 2, 46, 61, 66, 83, 162, 164 no, 9, 14, 22, 24, 31-32, 35-36, 39-40, 43, 46-47, 50, 54, 57, 60, 65-67, 69-71, 74, 84, 93, 95, 97, 117, 121, 123, 130, 134, 139, 141-142, 145-146, 150-152, 157-162, 165 noble, 163 Noch, 139 noch, 26, 63, 66, 68, 74, 147 Noethige, 150 non, 149, 160 None, 82 none, 29, 82 nonontological, 141 nonsense, 81 nonsensical, 89 noologists, 33, 48 Noon, 57 noon, 58 Nor, 89 nor, 35, 50, 63, 68, 81, 94, 99-100, 119, 138, 140, 145, 158 Nordic, 57 normal, 95 normally, 112 North, 142 north, 112 Northwestern, 101 Not, 20, 44, 94, 151, 162 not, 4-14, 16-29, 31-44, 46-57, 60-61, 65-66, 68-70, 73-75, 80-100, 104-112, 114-117, 119, 121, 124-129, 131-134, 137-147, 150-154, 158-161, 163-165 Note, 3, 8, 17, 27, 33, 48, 78, 103, 127-128, 145 note, 4, 10, 14, 33, 37-39, 43, 47, 51-52, 54, 56, 78, 82, 90, 92, 104, 108-109, 139, 146, 151-153, 161, 163 noted, 94-95, 126, 136, 142, 157-158 Notes, 133 notes, 6, 9, 38-39, 42, 46, 52-53, 55, 65, 69, 71, 78, 94, 97, 101, 116, 121, 124, 127, 133, 136, 149, 154-156 Nothing, 94, 97 nothing, 7, 13, 34-35, 39-40, 49, 53-54, 56, 60, 95, 99, 104, 111, 113, 140, 142, 145, 151, 164-165 nothwendig, 150 notice, 21 noticed, 18 Notion, 86, 93-95, 97-99, 105, 107-108 notion, 20, 126, 143, 150, 152, 160 Notions, 97 notions, 118, 126, 143, 153 Notlosigkeit, 140 notwendig, 67 notwendige, 74 Notwendigkeit, 152 Nov, 149, 156 Novalis, 91, 116-117 novel, 9, 43, 117 November, 4, 24 novitiate, 123 Now, 6-7, 21, 26, 35, 49, 60, 118, 124, 126, 151 now, 2, 6, 14, 18-20, 39-40, 53, 57-58, 73-74, 83, 94, 111, 138-139, 146, 157 nowhere, 20 NT, 115 ntgegen, 43 nullity, 161 Number, 3 number, 11, 17, 27, 69, 83, 86, 88, 90, 96, 111-114, 130, 136, 141, 145, 158, 163 Numerous, 6 numerous, 32, 55, 162 nur, 43, 63, 66-70, 73-74, 96, 164 Nuremberg, 71 nurse, 114 Nutzen, 45 Nächsten, 145 Näge, 65 nämlich, 66 nötig, 66 þÿ N g r j u n a ,  157 O ob, 33, 48, 69, 86-87, 106-107, 162 oberflächlich, 143 Oberstufe, 79 Obgleich, 69 object, 9, 15, 43, 56, 86, 104, 106 objective, 4, 19, 31, 61, 65, 104, 106-107, 153 objectively, 107 Objectivity, 62 objectness, 107 Index Objects, 134 objects, 18-19, 21, 27-28, 56, 93, 107 obligate, 57 obligating, 57 obligation, 57 oblivion, 32 obscure, 38, 52 observed, 159 obtain, 107 obvious, 67, 84, 92 obviously, 29, 37, 52, 57, 112, 127 occasion, 80 occupied, 27-28 occupies, 18 occurred, 26 Ockam, 141 Ockham, 58 October, 4, 71, 90, 103, 113, 128 oddly, 141 Odebrecht, 137 oder, 36, 43, 51, 67 Oedipus, 115 Oesterreich, 11 Oetinger, 124 Of, 7, 32, 41, 56, 99, 139, 141-144, 162 of, 2-29, 31-75, 77, 80-121, 123-134, 136-147, 149-155, 157-165 Off, 138-139, 143 off, 16, 58, 89, 98, 117 Offenbarung, 97 offense, 8, 41, 81, 137 offensive, 80 offer, 6, 19, 80, 165 offered, 81 offers, 9, 43 often, 28, 31-32, 34, 38, 49, 52, 55, 58, 65, 88, 90, 111, 128, 130, 140-141, 153, 158, 160 Ohio, 101, 120, 132 oined, 55 old, 22, 34, 48, 57-59, 132, 137, 163 oldest, 57 omega, 123, 161 omit, 82 On, 32, 37, 44-46, 49, 52, 85, 105, 111-112, 115-116, 118-121, 125, 146, 159, 162 on, 2-16, 18-25, 28-29, 31-44, 46-54, 56-61, 63-75, 80-103, 105-109, 111-121, 123-133, 136-147, 149-154, 157-165 Once, 127, 131 once, 92, 112, 153 One, 7, 9, 18, 37, 42, 46, 52, 55, 59-60, 62, 67, 70, 81, 90, 97, 104, 107-108, 111, 114, 119-120, 128, 136, 139, 146-147, 162, 165 one, 5, 7-8, 13, 18-22, 24, 28-29, 32, 36, 38-40, 42, 44, 46, 50, 52-55, 57, 60-62, 65, 68, 81-86, 88-93, 97, 99, 103-104, 107, 109, 111-112, 114-117, 119, 123, 125, 130, 136, 141, 143-147, 149-152, 155, 158-159, 161-164 ones, 7, 38, 52, 60, 164 oneself, 109, 113 Only, 89, 131-132 only, 4-8, 10-11, 14, 17, 19-24, 26-28, 32, 34-35, 39-41, 43, 46-47, 49-50, 53-56, 60-61, 63, 68, 70, 74, 81-86, 88, 90-97, 99, 103-108, 110-111, 118, 123, 125-126, 130, 133, 137-138, 141, 143-146, 149-154, 158-160, 162-163, 165 ontic, 161 Onto, 76, 79, 130 onto, 29, 127, 129 Ontologia, 19, 21, 28 ontological, 6, 123, 127, 130, 146, 158, 161 Ontologie, 65, 72, 74, 78, 102 ontologies, 129 ontologist, 6, 15, 20, 28, 124, 129 Ontology, 2, 9, 17-20, 22-23, 28, 36, 42, 50, 70-71, 129, 138, 145-146 ontology, 5-6, 9, 12, 15, 18-20, 28-29, 39-40, 42, 44, 54, 64, 67, 72, 74, 82-83, 100, 124-127, 129, 144-146, 157, 161 ontotheological, 3, 82, 93, 153, 157-158, 163 ontotheologische, 71 Ontotheology, 129 ontotheology, 153, 157 onward, 56, 97, 99, 131 Open, 26, 72 open, 25, 32-33, 40, 47-48, 54, 64, 68, 74, 82, 89, 99, 127, 130-131, 137, 165 opened, 15 opening, 70, 83 opens, 44 operate, 130 opinion, 56, 109, 162 opinions, 139 opponent, 74, 142 opponents, 158 opposed, 38, 53, 85 opposing, 136 opposite, 67, 71, 89, 106, 119, 146, 151 opposites, 37, 45, 51 opposition, 10, 136, 142-145 oppositional, 130 oppostite, 149 optical, 2 Opus, 33, 47 opus, 63, 100, 140 Or, 34, 49, 56, 67, 72, 110, 143, 145, 159 Index or, 2, 6-16, 19, 21, 23-24, 26, 28-29, 31-33, 35-40, 42-61, 65-67, 70, 72-73, 75, 80-84, 86-91, 93-95, 98-100, 103-114, 117-119, 121, 123-124, 126-131, 137-142, 144, 146-153, 157-158, 160-163, 165 orative, 137 order, 21, 32, 37, 51, 62, 64-65, 99, 113, 128, 130, 134, 136-137, 150, 158, 162-163 Ordinary, 116, 120 ordinary, 10, 24, 43, 82 organic, 109 Organization, 80 Organizations, 80 Organon, 90 orie, 162 orient, 113 Origin, 128 origin, 33, 48, 55, 150, 157 original, 7, 16, 24, 41, 55, 72, 91, 125-126, 147, 163 originality, 55, 146 originally, 124, 129 Origins, 132 orthodox, 66, 89, 116 OT, 107 ot, 153 ote, 34, 49, 103, 109, 162 Other, 23, 124 other, 4-5, 7-10, 13, 22-23, 31-35, 37, 39, 41-44, 47, 49-51, 53, 55, 60, 63, 68-70, 72, 75, 81-84, 86-89, 92-95, 97, 99, 109, 111-112, 123, 125, 129, 134, 136-138, 140-142, 145-149, 151, 153-154, 157-160, 165 others, 9, 15, 23, 37, 43, 51, 113, 124, 136, 138, 162 otherwise, 2, 61, 99, 104, 111 otion, 93, 95-98, 100 otions, 96 Ott, 132 Otto, 11-12, 140, 158 Our, 10, 22, 31, 126, 145, 147 our, 2, 4, 6, 9, 12-13, 16, 22, 24, 27-28, 31, 33, 38, 43, 48, 52, 60-61, 82, 88, 94-95, 100, 107, 116, 123, 126, 138, 140-141, 151-153, 158-159 ourselves, 8, 23-24, 31, 60, 131, 137, 141 Ousia, 62 Out, 143 out, 5, 8-9, 14-16, 22-24, 33, 35, 42-44, 47, 50, 56, 58, 61, 67-68, 72, 75, 80, 82, 90-91, 95-96, 98-100, 103, 105-107, 113, 115, 117, 126-127, 129-132, 136, 139-140, 142, 144, 146-147, 151-152, 154, 157-158, 160-163 Outline, 88, 90, 99-100, 106 outline, 8, 15, 17-19, 21-24, 27, 29, 33, 39, 42, 48, 54, 105, 126, 159 outlined, 44, 67 outlines, 10, 144 outlining, 24 outraged, 119 outside, 66, 88, 92, 129, 145 ovember, 80 over, 4-5, 8, 13, 29, 31-32, 38-39, 42, 46, 52-53, 55, 66, 68, 72, 81, 99-101, 106, 113, 117, 120, 128, 136, 141, 143, 150, 157-158, 161, 163 overall, 39, 45, 53, 142 Overbeck, 149-150 overcome, 5, 12, 14, 32, 70, 83, 100, 106, 154, 162 Overcoming, 13, 20, 80, 83, 99, 101 overcoming, 8, 11, 23, 42, 145, 153-154, 157, 162 overinterpretation, 20 overman, 59 oversense, 56 oversensorial, 56 oversensuous, 56 overtakes, 87 overthrown, 39-40, 53, 55 overtime, 94 overturn, 124 Overturning, 47 overturning, 141-142 Overview, 161 overview, 12 overwhelming, 153 overwhelmingly, 75 ow, 33, 48, 56, 59, 73, 100 Owe, 142 owe, 4 owes, 89 owl, 46 Own, 89 own, 4-8, 10, 12-16, 18, 23, 26, 29, 31-32, 34-35, 39-41, 43, 45-46, 48-49, 54, 56, 58-61, 66-68, 70, 75, 80-82, 84-85, 88-89, 93, 99, 105, 107-108, 113, 125-126, 128-129, 136, 138, 141-145, 149-154, 157-159, 162-163, 165 P pace, 131 Page, 30, 122, 135 page, 2-3, 25, 32-33, 37, 48-49, 51, 55-56, 76, 90, 103, 137, 139, 144, 150, 164 pages, 11, 90, 102-103, 137 paideia, 93 Index pain, 33, 47 pains, 14 pairs, 5 pale, 57 pandemonium, 57 Pandey, 158 panentheist, 116 Pantheism, 112-113, 116 pantheism, 88, 123, 127 paper, 45-47, 64-65, 103, 123-124, 157 par, 152 parable, 57 Paracelsus, 124 Paradigm, 89 paradigm, 31, 47, 89, 143 Paragraph, 92 paragraph, 10, 17, 43, 56, 66, 88, 92, 97, 108, 133, 159 paragraphies, 88 paragraphs, 103, 128 parenthetical, 94 Paris, 103 Parisian, 14 Parmenides, 111, 143-146, 162 Part, 7, 17, 41, 45, 65, 81-82, 84, 89-91, 95, 99, 103, 125 part, 2, 4-5, 7-9, 14-15, 18, 24-25, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37-38, 40-42, 45-47, 50-52, 54, 64-65, 67, 70, 82-87, 90-92, 94-96, 99-100, 103-107, 109, 113, 126-127, 129-130, 132, 136, 138, 141, 144, 152, 157-158, 161, 165 Partial, 44 partial, 29, 45, 139 partially, 56 participation, 165 Particular, 120 particular, 22, 45, 81, 130, 152, 157 Parts, 29 parts, 19, 22, 26-27, 40, 54, 58-61, 87, 92, 95, 97, 99, 104, 107-109, 111, 128 Parvis, 101 pass, 117 passage, 28, 38-39, 52-53, 88, 98, 129, 143-144, 146, 150, 152-153, 162 passages, 17, 69, 131, 149-150 passageway, 131 passes, 89, 129 passing, 5, 32, 85, 144 past, 9, 23, 34, 36, 38, 43, 45-46, 49-50, 53, 61, 84, 126, 145, 151, 159 pastive, 151 Patel, 2 Path, 163 path, 2, 15, 31, 33-34, 48, 59, 61, 73, 85-86, 93, 97, 99, 104, 130-131, 138, 140-141, 145 Pathenism, 116 Pathmarks, 161-162 Paths, 131 paths, 60 pathway, 139, 160 Pathways, 140 pathways, 138-141 þÿ P a t o  k a ,  80 pattern, 143 patterns, 85, 98 Paul, 44, 80, 124, 157 pay, 128 pe, 137 peace, 96 peak, 58 pedantic, 137, 143 pedantically, 147 Peer, 2 penetrating, 45 People, 115 people, 6-8, 38, 41, 46, 52, 60, 92-93, 112, 114, 123, 136, 142, 150, 154, 159 per, 70 perceive, 36, 50 Perception, 62 perception, 62, 142, 146 peregrinations, 140 perennial, 25 perfection, 107 perfectly, 150 PERHAPS, 165 Perhaps, 8, 11, 36-38, 41, 50-52, 82-83, 85-86, 91, 125, 131, 149 perhaps, 7, 12, 25, 28-29, 32, 39, 53, 55, 57, 68, 72-73, 84-85, 123-126, 138, 146, 157 period, 29, 55, 61, 67, 73, 89, 103, 106, 112, 114, 126, 141, 149 periods, 58, 61 perished, 58 perishes, 99 permanent, 38, 52, 138 permeated, 56 permission, 2 permits, 23 Persian, 163 person, 112, 117 personal, 97-98, 110, 114, 130, 136-137 personality, 143 persuasive, 57, 97 pertain, 18 Pertaining, 134 pertaining, 113, 140 pertinence, 9, 42 pervasiveness, 39, 53 Index Pessimism, 143 Peter, 2, 155 petty, 55, 146 Pfullingen, 76-77 phaenomologia, 25, 91 Phanomenologie, 90 phase, 16 Pheneomenologische, 102 phenomenalism, 165 Phenomenological, 10, 15, 80 phenomenological, 9, 31, 42, 45, 60, 67 phenomenologist, 73 Phenomenology, 3, 5-9, 13-15, 20, 28, 35, 41-42, 80-82, 84-87, 89-101, 103-104, 106-108, 112-114, 116-119, 125, 127, 133, 136, 145-146, 161, 165 phenomenology, 14, 25, 80, 84, 91-92, 94, 99, 104, 161, 165 phenomenon, 15-16 philological, 16, 40, 54, 147 Philologie, 144 philologist, 143 Philology, 5, 11 philology, 8, 16, 31, 41, 45, 88, 136-137, 143-144 philosiophy, 104 Philosophen, 66, 68, 155 Philosopher, 157 philosopher, 4, 6-9, 16, 31, 40-43, 46-47, 54-55, 60, 64, 66, 68-69, 74, 80-81, 83-85, 93, 95, 100, 111, 116, 118-119, 123, 125, 137, 141, 152, 157-158, 161-163 Philosophers, 1-3, 31, 41, 46, 57, 106, 111, 136, 143, 145-146 philosophers, 4-5, 7, 14, 31-33, 38, 40-41, 45-48, 52-55, 60-61, 64-66, 68-69, 73, 75, 81-82, 87, 97, 99, 106, 111-113, 120, 125, 127, 136-138, 140-146, 150, 158-159 philosophia, 38, 52 philosophic, 9, 43, 118 Philosophical, 40, 55, 71, 88, 90-91, 99-100, 106, 115, 119-120, 127, 132, 134 philosophical, 4-5, 8-9, 11-12, 14, 16-17, 20-21, 23, 26-27, 29, 31-33, 37, 39-40, 42, 44-47, 52-56, 60, 66, 68, 70-71, 73, 75, 80, 82-91, 94-95, 97, 99-100, 104-106, 108-109, 124, 137-142, 144-146, 157-158, 162-163 Philosophically, 93 philosophically, 111, 125, 149 Philosophicohistorical, 157 Philosophie, 4, 26, 36-37, 46, 51-52, 63-65, 67-71, 74-75, 79, 104, 106, 110, 117, 120-121, 124, 138-141, 147, 149, 151, 160, 162, 164 Philosophiegeschichte, 3 Philosophieren, 65 Philosophies, 85 philosophies, 45, 59, 61, 99 Philosophische, 13, 133 philosophische, 78, 102, 133 Philosophischen, 110, 121 philosophischen, 64, 69, 77, 90, 106 Philosophisches, 64 Philosophize, 32, 56, 142 philosophize, 14, 162 philosophizing, 4, 31, 65, 83, 110, 125, 127, 137-138, 140 Philosophy, 2, 4, 6, 12-14, 34, 37, 39-40, 46, 49, 52, 54, 59, 68, 77, 81-83, 85, 87-88, 93, 95, 97-102, 104, 106-107, 111, 113, 115-121, 124-127, 129, 131-132, 137, 140, 145-147, 159-162, 164 philosophy, 3, 5-6, 8-9, 12-14, 16-29, 31-40, 42, 44-65, 67-71, 73-75, 80-89, 91, 93-94, 96-100, 104-109, 111-113, 115, 117-119, 121, 123-126, 129-130, 133-134, 136-137, 141-154, 157-163, 165 Philosphy, 2 Photo, 2 photocopying, 2 phrase, 92, 112, 153 phraseology, 113 physical, 107 physics, 26, 29, 33, 35, 47, 50, 91, 133 physika, 26 physiological, 11 Physiology, 19, 22-23 physiology, 19, 21, 28 Physis, 62 Phänomenologie, 67-68, 71-73, 75, 78-79, 92, 101-103, 110, 121, 139, 161 Phänomenologische, 65, 78 phänomenologischen, 67 pick, 61 picture, 36, 50, 143 piece, 126 Pinkard, 107 pinnacle, 57-58 pious, 57 pistol, 108, 112 Pistole, 120 pity, 14, 153 pivotal, 137 place, 4, 8, 20, 23, 33, 42, 47, 66, 68, 73-74, 82, 88-89, 94, 99, 104, 121, 126, 133, 141, 152, 160, 165 places, 16, 55, 72, 81, 86, 90, 103-104, 117, 145 placet, 90 plainly, 98 plan, 17-18, 23, 27, 40, 46, 126 planetary, 2 planned, 82, 140 planning, 165 Index plans, 65, 82 Plato, 4, 33, 38, 48, 52, 56-58, 92-94, 97-98, 111, 119, 136, 141-142, 146, 160, 162 Platonic, 143, 146 Platonism, 47, 58, 62, 65, 141-142, 144-145, 153-154 Platonist, 141-142 play, 116, 159 plays, 24, 116, 118, 129 Pleasant, 4 Please, 104, 165 please, 4, 10 pleases, 90 plenty, 70 plunge, 47 plunges, 64, 74 Plus, 37, 51, 68, 81, 151 plus, 95 poem, 131, 155 poems, 116, 139 poet, 117-118, 124 poetic, 160 poetizing, 131 poetry, 112, 116 poets, 7, 31, 41, 125, 136 point, 4, 6-7, 12-13, 16, 24-25, 27, 29, 32, 34-35, 37, 39-41, 46, 49-51, 53-62, 70, 73-74, 82, 85, 87, 89, 91, 94-100, 104, 106, 108-109, 118, 125, 137, 140-142, 147-148, 150-152, 154, 160-162 pointed, 59, 96 pointing, 46, 56, 61, 70, 115, 131, 140-141, 147, 151 Points, 84 points, 31, 35, 39, 48-50, 52-53, 56, 58, 74, 85, 88, 98, 106-109, 127, 129, 141-142, 144, 152, 161 polemic, 68 polemics, 119 polished, 119, 151 political, 161 politician, 45 politics, 11 Polt, 2, 144, 160 ponder, 162 Pontac, 121 popular, 84, 116, 118 popularization, 37, 51 Portable, 155 portrayed, 38, 52 pose, 55 poses, 32 positing, 161 Position, 62, 69, 149 position, 8, 12, 14-15, 20, 23, 25-26, 31-32, 34-35, 38-39, 49, 53-54, 59-60, 64, 66, 70, 72, 74-75, 84-85, 88-89, 91, 99, 106, 111-114, 116, 123, 126, 129, 133, 136, 139-142, 145-147, 149, 153-154, 158 positions, 8, 11, 42, 45, 88, 90, 114, 138 Positionslosigkeit, 162 positive, 9, 42, 59, 67, 74-75, 109, 124 positively, 75 positivism, 57-58 positivist, 162 positivistic, 12-13, 165 Positivity, 120 possibilities, 6, 9, 43, 129-130, 142, 146 possibility, 8, 18, 22, 28-29, 41, 118, 127-128, 131 possible, 7-9, 23, 27, 39, 42, 54, 56, 60, 85, 126-128 possibly, 9, 43 Post, 80 post, 114 posterity, 25 posthumous, 68, 138 postion, 149, 154 postively, 151 postmetaphysical, 131, 140 Postmodernism, 2 postumum, 33, 47 Power, 55-56, 62, 97, 101, 129, 146, 152, 159-161 power, 16, 24, 59, 108, 112, 136, 141, 151, 155, 159-161 powerful, 74, 83, 94 Powerlessness, 159 powerlessness, 13 pp, 3, 9, 43, 162, 164 Practical, 18, 28 practical, 21, 29, 56 Practice, 2 practices, 39, 53 Prague, 80 praise, 8, 39, 42, 53 praised, 38, 52 praises, 143 praktischer, 56 Prasangika, 163 Pre, 143, 146 pre, 23, 143, 146 preceded, 61 precedes, 91 precisely, 9, 14, 16, 20, 42 precursor, 5, 8, 15, 149 predecessor, 68, 81 predecessors, 81, 145 predestination, 152 predestiny, 153 predetermined, 145 predicament, 157 Index predicaments, 24 Predicate, 20 predicates, 134 predominance, 130 preeminence, 11 preeminent, 138, 162 Preface, 3-4, 8, 15, 32, 34, 41, 46, 48, 55, 66-67, 81-82, 91-92, 94, 96-98, 103-105, 108, 110, 112-113, 116-117, 119, 121, 137, 139, 141, 164 preface, 4, 56, 103-104, 108 prefaces, 104 preference, 142 Preliminary, 128 preliminary, 16, 95 Prelude, 14, 46 prelude, 155 preparation, 21, 26, 29, 98, 145, 147 preparatory, 18, 26, 139 prepare, 131 prepared, 108 PrePlatonic, 136, 143 prescribes, 24, 126 presence, 5 Present, 120 present, 4, 9, 27, 43, 46, 84, 95, 106, 121, 145, 163 presentation, 8, 21, 42, 89 presentiment, 114 presenting, 31, 66 presents, 34, 49, 106 preserve, 25 Press, 44, 101, 120, 132, 144, 155, 161, 164 prestigious, 144 presumably, 139 presumes, 19 presupposed, 25-26, 91, 95 presupposes, 94-95 presupposition, 31, 91, 157, 159 Presuppositions, 3, 157 presuppositions, 31, 82, 87, 91, 124, 157-159 Previous, 128 prey, 143 priest, 110 priesthood, 123 primal, 16, 129, 134 primarily, 119 primary, 5-6, 18, 35, 44, 68, 82, 112, 124, 146 primordially, 128-129 principal, 104, 106, 128 principals, 18 principle, 4, 19, 24, 32, 38, 45, 53, 59-60, 97, 108, 113, 118, 123 Principles, 46, 117 principles, 17, 19, 23-24, 27, 29, 124 print, 80, 90 printing, 90 Prinzip, 74 prinzipiellen, 69 prior, 2, 12, 17-19, 21-22, 26-29, 56, 83, 91, 162 priori, 21 priority, 38, 52 pristine, 145 Private, 46 prize, 36, 50 pro, 35, 39-40, 44, 50, 53-54, 66, 73, 89-90, 103, 106, 125, 127, 129, 139-140, 147, 160 Problem, 8, 10, 15, 35, 42, 50, 74, 101-102, 113, 120, 164 problem, 5-6, 8, 10, 13-16, 20, 25, 41, 43-44, 47, 56, 66, 68, 81, 99-100, 107, 124, 126, 133, 136-139, 146, 154, 160 problematic, 10, 14, 89, 157, 159 Probleme, 147, 160 Problemlage, 78, 102, 133 Problemmotive, 69 Problems, 6, 9, 13, 20, 28, 42, 146-147, 160-161 problems, 3, 25, 31, 75, 83, 144, 157-159 procedure, 21, 29 proceed, 4 proceeding, 83, 139 Process, 105 process, 4, 9, 11, 17, 35, 37, 42, 46, 49, 51, 58, 69, 85, 87, 92, 94-95, 97, 105, 109, 126, 138, 152, 160 processing, 95 proclaimed, 119 produced, 38, 52, 61, 99, 162 producing, 112 product, 18, 28, 39, 54 Production, 62 professes, 118 Professor, 36, 51, 115, 133, 165 professor, 119, 158 professors, 11 profound, 4, 55, 130, 146 profounder, 4 profoundly, 47 Progress, 28, 36-37, 44, 50-51, 56-57, 140 progress, 36, 40, 46, 50, 54-55, 61, 86, 107, 159 progressed, 61, 64, 74 progressing, 46, 106 progression, 46, 85, 105, 107 Project, 30, 122, 135 project, 8, 12, 20, 26, 28-29, 33, 35, 39, 41-42, 44, 47, 50, 53-54, 68, 70, 73-74, 82, 105, 107, 126, 136, 138-140, 145 projected, 15 projects, 29, 151 Index prokta, 164 Prolegomena, 17, 39, 44, 53, 99, 104-105, 109, 111, 139, 151 prolegomena, 35, 49 proliferating, 138 Prologue, 4 promised, 33, 47, 57 proNapoleon, 103 pronounced, 5, 32 proof, 8, 42, 87 proofs, 8, 42, 66, 90, 140 Propaedeutic, 17, 25, 105 propaedeutic, 17-18, 21, 25-27, 29, 35, 49-50 propensity, 96 proper, 6, 20, 24-25, 29, 61, 146, 161 properties, 19 property, 150 propitious, 146 propose, 18, 40 proposed, 119 proposition, 95 propositions, 88 Proprädevtik, 26 prose, 151 prostrate, 163-164 prostrated, 163 Protestant, 112, 119 proto, 157 Protokoll, 69 proud, 19 provable, 87 prove, 88, 165 Provence, 133 proves, 97 provide, 29 provides, 66, 129 providing, 39, 54 provocative, 145 proximity, 144 Prussian, 106 Psychiatrist, 158 psychic, 11 Psychological, 5, 10 psychological, 5, 11 Psychologie, 85 Psychologism, 13 Psychology, 20, 85, 99, 161 psychology, 11, 99 pub, 92 Public, 113 public, 4, 98, 110 Publication, 103 publication, 6, 35, 49, 103, 112, 117, 121, 124, 128, 136, 138, 141, 144, 149, 152 Publications, 138 publications, 6, 72, 81, 112, 114, 120, 123, 136, 138-141, 147, 160 publish, 18, 26, 28, 65, 68-69, 82-83, 112, 138 Published, 77, 120, 132, 161 published, 3-4, 6, 9, 12, 25, 29, 33, 35-36, 42, 47, 49-50, 56, 65, 68-69, 75, 80, 82, 84-85, 90-91, 101, 103, 111-115, 117, 119-120, 123-124, 127-130, 132, 137-141, 143-144, 147, 149-150, 152-153, 155, 158, 161 Publishers, 115 publishing, 98, 118 Pulaski, 2 pulled, 99 punctilious, 137 pupil, 7, 60 pupils, 60 Pure, 3, 5-7, 10, 12-17, 24-26, 29, 32-35, 38, 43, 47-50, 52, 56, 82, 88-89, 91, 96, 113, 126 pure, 16-19, 21, 23-29, 33-36, 39, 41, 44, 47-51, 53-54, 61, 93-98, 104, 107-109, 126 purely, 25, 91 purifies, 22 purifying, 138, 145 purists, 40, 54 purportedly, 162 Purpose, 3, 5, 10, 14, 80, 89, 92, 159 purpose, 5-7, 12, 16, 24, 29, 32, 45, 47, 65, 80, 86-87, 89-90, 93, 95, 97-98, 100, 126, 137, 157 purposes, 107 push, 9, 12, 43, 84, 108, 143 pushed, 23, 60 pushes, 6, 56 pushing, 23, 108, 141, 153 put, 20, 26, 32, 55, 61, 85, 91, 96, 164 puts, 73-74, 115, 139 putting, 4, 73, 138 Pyrrho, 37, 51 Pöggeler, 72, 140, 158 Q quakes, 157 quality, 32, 55 Quarterly, 132 Quellen, 39, 54 Index quest, 29, 140 Question, 70, 83, 162 question, 2, 5-6, 9-10, 12, 14-16, 20, 22, 24, 29, 32, 36, 42-44, 46, 50, 55, 58, 60, 64, 68, 74, 85, 87, 94, 105, 124, 126-130, 137, 142-143, 145-148, 153-154, 159 questioned, 158 Questioning, 140 questioning, 10, 16, 43, 67, 129, 138, 159 Questions, 3, 100, 123, 147, 160 questions, 8, 14, 24, 44, 90, 105, 127, 133, 138, 145, 147, 161-162 quickly, 139 quite, 9, 25, 42, 55, 90-91, 143, 160 quo, 96 quotation, 130 quote, 129, 146 Quoted, 143 quoted, 68, 82, 107, 116 quotes, 7, 28, 41, 66, 69, 83, 111, 125, 128-129, 161 R Race, 116 race, 112 radical, 5, 7, 25, 41, 68, 81, 123, 125, 127-128, 136, 139, 144, 149 radically, 16, 45, 68, 81, 129, 139 radikaler, 144 Radikalisierung, 74 Rafael, 2 raise, 97, 147 raises, 88 raising, 64, 104, 147 Random, 155 Range, 121 range, 133 Ranke, 161 ranks, 111, 159 rapidly, 11 rare, 123, 125, 150 rarely, 97 rate, 57 Rather, 14, 89, 91, 114, 130 rather, 8, 18, 27, 31, 34-35, 39, 41, 44, 48-50, 53, 57, 60, 67-68, 73, 75, 83, 85, 92, 95-96, 105-109, 112, 119, 126, 136-138, 145-147, 149 ratio, 37, 51, 88-89 Rational, 19, 22-23 rational, 29, 33, 48, 88, 113 rationalis, 19, 21, 28 rationalism, 37, 39, 51, 53-54, 80, 84, 87-88, 112-113, 116 rationalist, 88 razor, 58, 141 rd, 159 re, 66, 73, 75, 105, 144 reach, 117, 126, 152, 162 reached, 45 reaches, 25, 62, 65, 149 reaching, 60, 131 read, 6-8, 10, 12, 14-15, 31-32, 36, 38, 41, 47, 50, 52, 56, 89, 91, 111, 116, 119, 124-125, 134, 151, 164 Reader, 113 reader, 95, 165 Readers, 8, 41, 81, 137 readers, 137 readerw, 163 readily, 153 readiness, 131 Reading, 16, 46, 68, 81, 89, 164 reading, 5-8, 16, 31-32, 36, 40-41, 46, 50, 54, 64, 66, 68, 74, 81, 89-90, 123-125, 128, 136-137, 139, 142-143, 149 readings, 31, 65, 137 reads, 32, 46, 138, 144 ready, 35, 49, 112 Real, 20, 28, 36, 44, 50, 56, 87, 140 real, 9, 14, 22, 32, 35-36, 43, 50-51, 55-56, 73, 91-94, 103, 117, 146, 150, 158 Realism, 82 Realismus, 78, 102 realist, 11 Reality, 16 reality, 13, 19, 35, 49, 83, 86-87, 93, 97, 100, 104, 107, 127-128 realizes, 146, 152, 162 really, 5, 8, 15, 34, 49, 55, 87-88, 104, 114, 121, 126-127, 152 realm, 29, 56, 58, 87, 94, 104, 126, 142, 150 realms, 130 Realphilosophie, 72, 78, 102 Realphilosophies, 82 Reason, 3, 5-7, 10, 12-18, 24-26, 28-29, 32-36, 38-39, 43, 47-50, 52, 54, 56, 82, 88-89, 91, 96, 98, 111, 113, 126, 128, 145 reason, 10, 16-19, 21-29, 33-40, 44, 46-51, 53-54, 56-57, 60-62, 88-89, 94, 96, 112, 114-116, 119, 126, 128, 130, 140 reasonlessness, 37, 51 reasons, 32, 45, 86, 143 Reavis, 2 Index rebirth, 145 recast, 75 receive, 9, 42 received, 128, 136, 152, 165 recent, 12, 38, 52, 94, 112, 115, 128 recently, 61, 149 reception, 133 Rechts, 4, 104, 110, 121 Rechtschaffenheit, 100 reckoning, 161 reclamation, 55, 146 recognize, 142, 145 recognized, 141 Recollection, 63 reconciliation, 114 reconsideration, 74 recording, 2 recovery, 142 recreation, 142 Rector, 114 Recurrence, 137, 149 recurrence, 59, 62, 144 recurring, 150 recursion, 9, 42 redeeming, 57 redefined, 157 Reden, 119 redete, 43, 67 redone, 4 reduce, 16, 27 reduced, 14 reducing, 8, 42 reduction, 9, 42, 44, 67 Reduktion, 67 refer, 107 reference, 64, 111-113, 117, 119, 128 referenced, 101, 141 References, 154 references, 2, 111, 141 refers, 34, 38 reflect, 137 reflected, 4, 68, 81, 96, 98, 107 reflecting, 61 reflection, 28, 128, 147 Reflections, 138 Reflective, 121 reflecton, 73 reform, 11 refrain, 38, 52 refreshing, 81 refusal, 144 refuse, 8, 41, 136 Refutation, 38, 53 refutation, 75 refute, 87 refuted, 12, 57 refuting, 12 regard, 4, 14, 17-18, 21, 26, 33, 35-36, 47-48, 50-51, 55, 83, 91, 103, 113, 143 regarding, 165 regards, 69, 112, 165 regress, 37, 52, 55 regrets, 157 Regula, 29, 109 Regulae, 29 Reifmachen, 139 rein, 71 reine, 71 reinen, 13, 26, 33-34, 47-49, 66, 96 Reinhold, 36-37, 51-52, 114, 116-117, 119-120 Reinigung, 138 reinterpretation, 70, 83 reject, 12, 46 rejected, 46, 119 rejection, 11, 73, 144 rejectionist, 89 rejects, 74, 146 rejoins, 8, 42 rekindled, 137 rekindling, 7, 41, 125 relate, 59 related, 22, 87, 91, 120, 144 relates, 14 Relation, 119-120 relation, 38, 53, 55, 63, 86, 93, 104, 110, 128, 146 Relationship, 37, 52, 119-120 relationship, 45, 55, 57, 69-70, 108, 115, 119, 121, 128, 141, 143-145 relativ, 65 relatively, 57 relativism, 13, 31 relativist, 11 release, 154 reliance, 119 Religion, 36, 50, 85, 93, 101, 110, 113, 119-121, 128 religion, 45, 98, 105, 107, 119, 124, 165 religious, 45, 58, 93, 113, 118-119 relinquish, 163 relinquishing, 163-164 remain, 21, 40, 54, 141 remained, 6, 57, 113, 124 remains, 7, 10, 40, 60, 83, 115, 117, 140, 142, 152, 160, 165 remark, 25-26, 36-37, 39-40, 50-51, 53-54, 69-70, 72, 81, 86, 94, 107, 109, 111, 113, 119, 125, 127, 131, 136-137, 143, 145-146, 154-155, 160 Index remarkable, 60 remarked, 29, 38, 52, 125 Remarks, 57, 84-87, 159 remarks, 4, 9, 14, 32, 38-39, 42, 45, 52-53, 55-56, 61, 65, 70, 73, 81, 84-85, 88, 99, 108, 116, 130, 137, 143, 145-146, 149, 153-154, 158-159, 161 Remember, 7, 60, 104, 106, 113, 140, 160, 163 remember, 97, 147 remembers, 64 reminded, 4 reminder, 4 remodeling, 11 remove, 93 removed, 25, 123, 145 render, 23 Rene, 109 renewing, 6, 146 renunciation, 12, 131 repartee, 137 repays, 7, 60 repeated, 144 repeatedly, 125 repents, 57 replace, 161 replaced, 123 replies, 158 Report, 113 report, 88, 113 reported, 91 reportedly, 137 reporting, 103 reports, 68, 103 repr, 164 represent, 55, 87 Representation, 129 representation, 16 represented, 162 represents, 55, 93, 162 reproduced, 2 Republic, 4, 80, 92, 98, 115, 160 repudiation, 144 request, 158 requesting, 161 required, 81, 97 requirement, 150, 154 requires, 106, 138, 160 requiring, 83 requisite, 17, 27 res, 35, 61, 108 Research, 100, 115 research, 115, 125, 144, 157 researching, 124 reserved, 2 resigned, 151 resist, 32, 128 resort, 159 Resources, 158 respect, 7, 21-22, 24, 41, 61, 81, 125, 145 respecting, 118 respects, 22 resplendent, 146 respond, 113 responded, 38, 52 response, 17, 36, 50, 137, 144 responsible, 7, 41, 125 rest, 55, 96, 106, 127 restarted, 129 restating, 38, 52 restricted, 130 rests, 22, 29, 97, 108, 116, 119 result, 61, 86, 94, 104 results, 9, 42, 69, 86, 94, 148 resumed, 83 resurface, 151 resurrected, 61 retained, 113, 144 retains, 162 rethinking, 158 rethought, 4 retract, 20 retrieval, 2, 142 retrieve, 9, 43 return, 7, 9, 12-13, 57, 59-61, 99, 126, 144, 150-152 returned, 15, 139 returning, 96 revaluation, 160 reveal, 140 revealed, 82, 163 Revealing, 62 revealing, 138 Revelation, 113, 117 revelation, 97 reverberates, 45 Reverend, 64 reverently, 163 Reversal, 154 reversal, 32, 62, 153-154 reverse, 9, 13, 42, 74, 130 Review, 120-121, 133 review, 6, 37-38, 52, 85, 112-115, 119, 124, 144, 152, 162 reviewed, 38, 52, 69 reviews, 113, 116, 120, 137 revised, 152 Revolution, 106 revolution, 21, 47, 64, 116 Index revolutions, 33, 48 reworked, 4, 75 reworking, 4 rewritten, 4 rhapsody, 25 Rheinisches, 144 rhetoric, 31 rhetorical, 38, 52, 140 rhymes, 155 rich, 55, 65, 163 Richard, 2, 14, 101, 144, 151, 160, 164 Richardson, 78 richer, 26 riches, 5, 44, 137 richness, 83 Richtpunkte, 69 Rickert, 11, 13, 64, 160 riddle, 163 Riehl, 11 rift, 148 Right, 4, 46, 87, 98, 104, 110, 163 right, 8, 14, 31-32, 44, 46, 50, 60, 66, 84-85, 93-94, 103-104, 118, 121, 126-128, 137, 139-141, 144, 162-163 rightful, 38, 53 rightly, 145, 165 rights, 2 rigorous, 161 Rink, 36, 50 ripened, 32, 55, 151 rise, 12, 108 Rita, 2 road, 86, 104, 110 robes, 110 rock, 58 Rockmore, 76 Rodopli, 3 role, 24, 87 Romantic, 117-118 romanticism, 12 romantics, 111, 125 room, 70, 83, 100, 113, 130 roommate, 117, 124 root, 24 rooted, 80 Rorty, 14, 162 rose, 118 rounded, 24 Row, 76, 101, 156 Royal, 36, 38, 50, 52 Royce, 101 Ruckteschell, 155 Rudolf, 12-13, 124, 137, 161 Ruegger, 158 Ruhe, 96 Ruinen, 34, 49 ruins, 22, 34-35, 39-40, 49-50, 53-54, 60 rule, 34, 48 Rules, 29 rules, 18 Rumor, 132 run, 67 running, 147 rush, 80, 150 rushed, 33, 47, 112, 138 Russell, 111, 125, 159 Russian, 152, 163 Ruth, 2 Räber, 118 Rückgang, 67 Rütte, 1-2 S Sache, 66, 69, 76-77, 165 Sachen, 60, 65, 71, 90 saddharma, 163 Sadler, 162 sage, 57 Sagen, 139 sagt, 147 said, 5, 7-8, 10, 13-14, 29, 32-39, 41, 43-56, 60-61, 64-74, 81-83, 87-88, 92, 96-100, 104, 106, 108-109, 111-113, 117-118, 121, 125-128, 136-147, 157-158, 162, 164-165 Saint, 124 Same, 106, 130, 137, 149 same, 8, 15, 20, 24-25, 33-34, 36-37, 39, 47-48, 50-51, 53, 55-56, 59, 62, 80-81, 85, 89, 93, 96, 98-99, 108, 111, 114, 118-119, 125-126, 128, 130, 134, 136, 139, 143-144, 148-153, 160 sameness, 106-107 samm, 163 samyag, 163 San, 101, 156 Saner, 75 sank, 39, 53 Sanskirt, 163 Sanskrit, 118, 157-158, 163 sarcastic, 53 Sartre, 80 Index sarvadrstinam, 164 satisfactory, 39, 53 save, 131-132 saw, 12, 15, 26, 32, 37, 51, 55, 70, 81, 83-85, 99, 112, 117 say, 5, 7, 9, 14, 16, 18, 20, 27-29, 34, 40-42, 46, 48, 54, 56, 60, 70, 82, 90, 96, 103, 113-114, 125, 136-139, 146, 148, 160-161 sayer, 150 Saying, 143 saying, 25, 35, 37, 39, 49, 51, 53, 55, 61, 90, 98-99, 125, 142, 144, 151-152, 164 says, 5-8, 13-16, 20, 24-25, 29, 34, 37-42, 46, 48-49, 51-53, 55, 58-61, 63, 65-66, 68, 72-73, 77, 81, 85-86, 88, 99, 104, 106, 108, 110, 113, 117, 124-131, 133, 138, 141, 143, 145, 147, 152-155, 158, 160-162, 165 scales, 151 Scarecrow, 77 scattered, 81 Schatten, 72 Scheidung, 68 Schein, 149, 154 schelechthin, 74 Scheler, 11, 99 Schelling, 1-5, 7, 10, 16, 25, 29, 41, 62, 66, 68, 70-71, 77-78, 81-82, 84, 87-88, 101-102, 105-106, 109, 111-114, 117-118, 120-121, 123-130, 132-134, 138, 141, 145, 161 Schellingian, 133 Schellingschen, 102, 106, 110, 121, 133 Schematism, 15 schematism, 16 Schicksal, 65 Schillbach, 155 Schiller, 76, 114-115, 118 schlechthin, 74 Schlegel, 105, 118-119 Schleiermacher, 12, 105, 118-119, 141, 161 Schmidt, 2 Schneider, 13 scholar, 137, 144 Scholars, 47 scholars, 66, 92, 104 Scholarship, 66 scholarship, 89, 137, 143, 147 Scholastic, 124 Scholasticism, 133 schon, 70, 73, 155-156 School, 11, 13, 160 school, 11, 115, 162 schools, 37, 52, 80, 84, 89, 163 Schopenhauer, 16, 46-47, 119, 129, 141 Schrift, 66 Schriften, 43, 67 Schritt, 67, 74 Schulze, 36-37, 51-52, 99, 119-120 schwankend, 37, 51 Schwarzen, 141 Schwarzwald, 1-2 schwer, 68 schwierigsten, 69 schöpferische, 70 SCIENCE, 13 Science, 3-4, 14, 25, 32, 35, 55, 58, 60, 64, 80, 82, 86-100, 103-111, 113, 120-121, 126-127, 132, 141, 147, 150, 159, 161 science, 10, 12, 17-19, 21, 23-29, 33, 35-36, 44, 47, 49-50, 56, 96, 104, 107, 109, 115, 126, 140, 155, 161 Sciences, 36, 38, 50, 52, 83, 88, 90-91, 99-101, 106, 119, 127 sciences, 4, 22, 88, 127, 163 scientia, 12 scientiarum, 12 Scientific, 105 scientific, 4, 24, 33-34, 48, 97, 104-105, 108, 110, 124, 161 scientism, 12 scientist, 21 scienza, 32, 55, 58, 60, 141, 150, 155 scope, 88 Scott, 2 Scotus, 64 Scriptures, 158 scrutinize, 144 se, 70 Sea, 115 sea, 36, 40, 50, 54 Search, 158 search, 13, 15, 24 seaside, 159 Second, 8, 41, 66, 81, 85, 103, 137, 164 second, 15-16, 21, 34, 36, 38, 45, 49, 51-52, 56, 63, 67, 75, 86, 90, 100, 103, 108, 127, 136, 139-141, 157, 162-163 secondarily, 97 Secondly, 88 secretary, 38, 52 SECTION, 32, 36, 47, 50 Section, 32, 37-38, 52-53, 55-56, 70, 128, 141 section, 7, 9, 12, 32-34, 41-42, 47-49, 55-60, 63, 70-71, 77, 92-94, 96, 99, 101, 105-109, 111, 120, 125, 127-128, 136, 138-139, 142, 144-147, 149, 152-153, 159-161, 164 sections, 91, 93, 96, 128, 147 secular, 130 secularization, 130 Index secured, 16 See, 17, 24, 30, 71-72, 76-79, 101, 108, 122, 129, 132-133, 135 see, 7-8, 14, 16, 24-25, 32, 35-37, 40-41, 46, 49-51, 54, 59, 65-67, 73, 80, 82, 86, 89, 92, 95-97, 99, 104, 108, 126, 136, 140-141, 147, 150, 157, 162, 165 seeing, 92, 142, 163 seek, 7, 60 seeker, 140, 160 Seeking, 138, 140 seeking, 138, 140, 159-160, 163 seeks, 32, 45, 140, 160 seem, 4, 14, 55, 100, 128 seemed, 55, 93, 126, 146, 151, 165 seems, 20, 23, 25, 38, 47, 52, 69-70, 74, 81, 83-84, 91, 98, 100, 123, 127-128, 130, 136, 140-141, 144, 163 seen, 9, 22, 39-40, 43, 45, 54-55, 57, 121, 141, 152, 154, 160 sees, 5, 8, 14, 25, 32, 34-35, 41, 48-49, 58-59, 62, 67, 71, 88, 105, 136, 140, 142, 145-147, 149, 158, 160 sehn, 66 sei, 43, 67-68, 130 Seibert, 101 Seiende, 73 Seienden, 63, 153, 155 Seiendes, 157 Seiendheit, 69, 145 Seiler, 132 Sein, 63, 69-72, 74-75, 89, 100, 128-129, 144-145, 149, 154, 157-158, 162 sein, 7, 41, 44, 64, 68, 71, 125, 145, 155 seine, 164 seinem, 66, 147, 164 seinen, 43, 67 seiner, 3, 43, 67, 74 Seins, 73 Seinsfrage, 139, 145, 162 Seinsgeschichte, 63 Seinsvergessenheit, 32, 67, 74 Seit, 70, 73 seit, 36, 50 selbst, 26, 43, 60, 63, 66-67, 71, 74, 86, 90, 92, 130, 138 Selbstbewegung, 98 Selbstbewegungen, 96 Selbstgebrauch, 111 Select, 132 Selected, 147, 150, 155, 160 selection, 152 selections, 7, 44 Self, 93, 130 self, 4, 7, 24, 32, 60-61, 83, 85, 87, 89, 92-93, 96-98, 107-108, 110, 119, 134, 141, 151, 158 selfattempters, 165 selfconsciousness, 108 sell, 91 Semester, 139 semester, 124, 149 seminal, 80 Seminar, 64, 69, 78-79, 83, 101-102 seminar, 20, 64-65, 69, 72, 79, 102, 133 Seminare, 154-155 Seminars, 158, 164 seminars, 65, 72, 81, 133 seminary, 124 send, 38, 52 sens, 57 sensation, 113 Sense, 95 sense, 5, 12, 16, 18-19, 21, 23-24, 26-28, 35, 46, 50, 55-57, 59, 73, 83, 86-87, 91, 95, 98, 110-112, 116-117, 127, 129-131, 144, 146, 151-152, 159 senses, 19, 21, 23, 28 sensibility, 84, 86-87 sensible, 25, 56-57, 140 sensory, 56 sensual, 33, 48 sensuous, 94, 118, 141-142 sentence, 57 sentences, 134, 146, 162 Sept, 72 September, 18, 25, 32-33, 41, 47, 55-56, 59, 126, 130, 133 series, 67, 74-75, 86, 90, 104, 118, 120, 132-133, 137-139, 141-143, 146, 149, 161 serious, 98 seriousness, 98, 105 serve, 4, 70, 84, 93, 108 service, 124, 126 serving, 114 set, 18, 94, 97, 105, 113, 117, 157-159 sets, 159 Setting, 159 setting, 58, 116, 159-160, 162 setze, 98 setzung, 68 seven, 4, 11, 103 seventeen, 65 seventh, 92 seventy, 4 several, 10, 82, 91, 104, 134, 155 Sextus, 37, 51, 119 Seyn, 147, 160 Seyns, 67, 74, 130, 139, 149, 155 seynsgeschichtliche, 138 shades, 8, 41, 46, 59 Shadow, 60, 141 Index shadow, 29, 57-59, 129, 159 shadows, 92, 94, 98, 157, 159, 165 shake, 93 shaken, 39-40, 53, 55 Shakespeare, 118 shall, 7, 23-24, 27, 59-60, 90, 150 shape, 14, 97 shaped, 12 shapes, 85, 89, 93, 107-108, 129 share, 158 sharp, 45, 65, 73, 143 Shatin, 115 shatter, 100 shatters, 25, 84, 127 she, 114 Sheehan, 89 sheep, 60 Sherover, 9, 42 Shift, 89 shift, 47, 89, 91 Shih, 157 ship, 36, 50, 90 Shobha, 2 Short, 56 short, 14, 18, 22, 40, 63, 106, 112-113, 126, 146 shortcoming, 25 shortcomings, 8, 25, 41, 88 shorter, 154 shortest, 58 shortly, 36, 50, 88, 140 shot, 108 should, 4, 7, 39, 41, 45, 54, 60, 89, 94, 100, 103, 116, 126-127, 136, 141-142, 150-153, 157, 161, 164-165 show, 6-7, 24, 38, 41, 53, 58, 61, 73, 120, 123, 125, 127, 131, 149, 154, 158 showed, 15, 85 showing, 138, 158 shown, 70, 108, 159 shows, 13, 25, 38, 53, 65-66, 73-74, 80, 87, 93-94, 100, 127, 136, 138, 142, 151, 153-154, 157, 160 shrank, 20 shuts, 161 si, 90 Siberia, 115 sich, 12, 43, 64, 66-69, 73-74, 92, 96, 130, 139 sichtbar, 139 Sichwissen, 73 sick, 32, 55, 114 Side, 152 side, 13, 37, 51, 86, 90, 105, 112-113, 116, 145, 153, 162 sidedness, 162 sie, 64, 73-74, 96, 156 sights, 126 Sigismund, 36, 51 signed, 2, 165 significance, 64, 133 significant, 9, 43 signification, 7, 31, 41, 125 signifies, 9, 42, 117 Sils, 59 simarly, 152 similar, 39, 44, 53, 60, 91-93, 143 similarly, 128 Simmel, 11 Simple, 13 simple, 57, 70, 83, 96, 145, 151, 161 simply, 73, 80, 84, 88, 90, 93, 95, 106-107, 130, 137-138, 140, 142, 151 simulating, 89 simultaneously, 4, 83 Since, 11, 24, 36, 44, 50, 56, 138, 140 since, 10, 14, 17, 19, 24, 26-28, 32, 36, 38, 40, 43, 50, 52, 54, 74, 80, 82-83, 92, 108, 115, 133-134, 137, 144-145, 152, 158-159 sind, 36, 50, 67, 96, 155 single, 32, 55, 82, 86-87, 126, 138, 145, 155, 158, 162 singular, 56, 60, 139-140, 159 sinks, 40, 54 Sinn, 89 Sinne, 69, 72 sinner, 57 Sinnliche, 56, 140 sinnliche, 95 Sinnlosigkeit, 160 sites, 4 Sitten, 109 situated, 45 situating, 34, 48 situation, 9, 43, 147 six, 58, 117, 124, 149 sixteenth, 55, 61 sixty, 141 Skeptic, 37, 51 skeptic, 119 skeptical, 38, 52, 99 Skepticism, 37, 52, 119-120 skepticism, 33, 36-39, 48, 51-53, 57, 85, 119 skeptics, 37, 51 Sketches, 16, 62 sketches, 23, 139, 154 slackening, 131 slated, 82 Slavoj, 133 slight, 143 slumber, 39, 53 small, 33, 48 Index smaller, 90 snow, 152 So, 4, 6, 8-9, 12, 33-35, 37, 41-43, 46-48, 51, 56, 58, 69-70, 73, 83, 86-88, 91-92, 95, 111-113, 126-127, 129, 131, 136-137, 139, 141, 144, 147, 151-153, 165 so, 15, 17, 21, 27, 31-32, 39-40, 50, 54, 60, 64, 66, 70, 73-74, 83-84, 86, 89, 92-93, 95-97, 100, 103, 106, 112-113, 119, 125, 136, 138, 140-141, 147, 150-153, 155, 158, 160 social, 11 Society, 13, 123 sociological, 11 sociology, 99 Socrates, 144, 146 Socratics, 143, 146 sogar, 43, 67 soil, 55, 146 solange, 74 solche, 26 solches, 73 sole, 6, 131, 146, 161 solely, 9, 29, 42, 126, 134 solider, 152 soll, 74 sollen, 139 solutions, 3, 157, 163 Some, 2, 14, 64, 70, 83, 90, 103, 112-113, 121, 140 some, 4, 8, 11, 15, 17-18, 20, 23, 26, 33, 35, 40, 46, 48, 50, 54, 59-60, 66, 68-72, 80, 83-90, 95-96, 99-100, 103, 106-107, 109, 111-113, 115-116, 119-120, 124, 131, 136-140, 142, 144, 150-153, 157-158, 165 Somehow, 13 somehow, 20, 26, 28, 108 someone, 7, 39, 54, 60, 103 Something, 39, 53 something, 14, 23, 29, 57-58, 65, 73, 82, 87, 91, 93, 107, 138, 145, 147, 152, 162 Sometime, 23, 33, 47 sometime, 159, 163 sometimes, 10, 12, 43, 82, 141 somewhat, 128 somewhere, 10, 35, 43, 49 Sommer, 155 Sommersemester, 78-79, 162 son, 103, 126, 138 sondern, 66-70, 73-74 songs, 155 Sonne, 72 Soon, 90 soon, 90, 123 sooner, 61 Sophist, 125 Sophokles, 115 Soren, 11, 80 Sorrows, 114 sort, 21, 131 sought, 27 Soul, 99 soul, 71, 97, 107, 117, 134 sound, 55, 67, 70, 146 sounding, 107 sounds, 36, 51, 150-151, 160 source, 55 Sources, 158 sources, 17-18, 22, 26, 29, 35, 37, 39, 50-51, 54, 149 south, 115 southern, 158 Southwest, 160 Southwestern, 102 sowohl, 43, 67 spa, 126 space, 19, 40, 165 spans, 149 spare, 7 sparked, 6, 123 spawned, 80 speak, 4, 8, 39, 41, 54, 60, 93, 96, 104, 107, 136-137, 141, 143, 150 speaking, 24, 93-94, 162 speaks, 105, 107, 124, 137 special, 25, 34-35, 49-50, 89, 91, 99, 107, 141, 159, 165 specialis, 153 specific, 6, 23, 89, 97, 100, 124, 139, 141 Specifically, 16, 136 specifically, 15, 69, 93, 146 specter, 88 speculation, 39, 53 speculative, 13, 21, 25, 27-28, 56, 64, 71, 84, 86-87, 94-95, 98, 106-107, 123, 126, 128, 130, 133, 140, 158 speech, 10, 43, 82 Speeches, 119 speeches, 97 speed, 99 spekulativer, 74 Spengler, 62 Spiegel, 130-132 Spinoza, 25, 67, 88, 106, 109, 111-112, 119, 123, 126, 128, 133, 149, 155 Spinozas, 155 Spinozism, 112 Spinozist, 88, 112 Spinozistpantheist, 116 Spinzoa, 116 Spirit, 3, 6, 8, 32, 35, 41, 61-62, 80-82, 84-87, 89-101, 103-108, 112-114, 116-119, 127, 136, 143, 145 Index spirit, 5, 14, 22, 35, 44, 46, 55, 61, 82-83, 106-108, 137, 143, 145-146 spirits, 57, 59 spiritual, 96-98, 108 spiritus, 22 Spirt, 97 spite, 83, 165 split, 127, 144 spoiling, 5 Spoke, 7, 59-60 spoke, 10, 43, 81-82, 91-92, 104, 113, 116-117, 119 Sprache, 115, 139, 160 spricht, 64, 66 spring, 46, 152 springboard, 45 springt, 73 Sprit, 107 Spruch, 143 spüren, 65 sqq, 66 squarely, 23, 67 St, 80 Staat, 72, 79, 102 staff, 2 stage, 8, 12, 16, 36, 42, 51, 64, 74, 94, 113, 160, 162 stages, 36-37, 51, 85, 89, 93, 105, 107-108, 160 Staiger, 72 Stambaugh, 101, 120, 132 stance, 149, 152 Stand, 147 stand, 32, 46, 69, 84, 89, 145, 152-153 standard, 118, 138 Standing, 101, 113, 120 standing, 16, 23, 90, 147 standpoint, 4, 35, 67, 71, 85-87, 92, 95, 98, 104, 107, 113, 117, 158-159, 162 standpointless, 162 Standpointlessness, 159, 162 standpointlessness, 162 standpoints, 80, 84-86, 162 standpunktlosigkeit, 159 Standpunktslosigkeit, 162 stands, 65, 126, 130, 136, 140, 145, 147 star, 123 starry, 28 start, 35, 49, 58, 62, 86, 89-90, 93-95 Started, 116 started, 9-10, 25, 34, 42, 48, 86-88, 92, 94-95, 98-99, 106, 116, 118, 140, 143, 147 Starting, 61 starting, 32, 35, 58, 61-62, 67, 73, 98, 112, 129, 147 starts, 33, 47-48, 73-74, 87, 92, 94-95, 123, 125 State, 101 state, 37, 51, 107, 153 stated, 60, 88, 91, 165 statement, 9, 42, 67, 70, 73, 84, 128-129, 139, 143, 150-151, 161 statements, 87, 107, 140, 144, 153 States, 157, 165 states, 9, 38, 42, 53, 84, 86, 127, 145, 158, 162 static, 95-96, 107 status, 96, 127 stay, 157 steady, 117 Stege, 140, 147 Stehen, 155 stehen, 147 stehn, 69 steht, 69, 130 Stelle, 74 stellt, 86 Stellung, 101 stems, 24 step, 74, 129-130, 145 stepped, 98 steps, 4, 36, 51 Steve, 44 Steward, 2 sticking, 35, 49 Stift, 117, 124 Stil, 139 still, 6, 8, 10, 13-14, 23, 27, 29, 33, 39-40, 42-43, 46, 48, 53-54, 58-61, 69-70, 80-81, 83-84, 93, 99-100, 124, 137, 140-142, 145, 147, 149-150, 153-154, 158-159, 162, 165 stillness, 61 stimulate, 7 stinging, 99 Stirling, 80 stoicism, 85 stomp, 119 stood, 29, 81, 118 stop, 61 storage, 2 Storck, 76 stored, 2 storm, 115, 118 story, 4, 31, 34, 44, 48, 57, 65, 90, 92, 162 straight, 32, 55, 57, 80 straightforward, 86 strain, 25 strange, 9, 43, 104 Strangely, 25 strength, 34, 49, 162 strengthens, 28 stress, 14, 71, 115, 118, 162 Index stressed, 138 Strict, 161 strict, 165 strictly, 95 striking, 9 stripped, 93 strives, 134 striving, 86 Strong, 114 strong, 27, 106, 109, 140, 143, 150, 152, 162 stronger, 4, 88, 151 strongly, 39, 53, 128 structure, 6, 21, 24, 45, 146, 158 structured, 68, 81 struggle, 64-65, 68, 138, 162, 165 struggled, 69 stuck, 7, 41, 109, 125, 142, 154, 157-158 student, 13, 55, 60, 78, 84, 115 students, 6, 36, 38, 50, 52, 65, 68, 90, 115, 117, 119, 124, 140-141, 157 Studied, 118 studied, 15 Studien, 120 Studienausgabe, 155 Studies, 11, 89 studies, 115 study, 9, 22, 39, 45, 53, 109, 119, 124 studying, 123 stuff, 93 stumbled, 24 stunned, 114 sturdy, 34-35, 49 Sturm, 115, 118 stösst, 66 Stück, 45 sub, 40, 54-55, 71, 96, 106-107 Subiectum, 62 subject, 4, 10, 15, 43, 82, 106-107, 109, 118, 157 subjected, 9, 43 subjective, 4, 61, 98, 106-107, 111, 125, 153, 161 subjectively, 4, 40, 54, 60, 104 subjectivism, 13, 15 Subjectivity, 117, 121 subjectivity, 71, 113, 117 sublime, 163 submersion, 144 submit, 36, 50 subordinates, 130 subscribing, 71, 90 subsection, 34, 48 subsections, 147 subsequent, 133 subsequently, 36, 50 subsisting, 96 Substance, 62, 106, 112 substance, 96, 106-108, 119 substantia, 35, 61-62, 108 substantial, 73 substantiality, 117 Substanz, 96 subterranean, 157 subtle, 57 subtraction, 152 succeed, 87 successful, 29 successor, 68, 81, 111, 125 successors, 81, 145 Such, 4, 17, 26, 35, 50, 134 such, 4, 9, 14, 23, 25, 27, 37-38, 42-43, 46, 51-52, 61, 70, 83-84, 88, 93, 95, 97, 99, 105, 117-118, 126, 142, 160, 165 Suchen, 138 suchen, 66 Suchende, 160 suddenly, 131, 160 suffered, 151 suffice, 161 sufficiently, 10, 43, 82 suggest, 39, 53 suggested, 99, 163 suggestion, 41 Suhrkamp, 77 sui, 157 sum, 19, 21, 28, 61, 152 summaries, 113 summarize, 40, 54, 59, 98, 149 summarized, 39, 53, 89, 146 Summary, 17, 22 summary, 15, 73, 138 summed, 142 Summer, 139 summer, 120, 124, 132, 149, 152 summit, 46, 58 Sun, 113 sun, 57-58, 93, 113, 123 Sundar, 2 sunlight, 92-94, 97-98 sunyata, 164 sunyatasunyata, 163 superficial, 83, 143 superfluous, 57 superior, 162 superman, 59 supersensuous, 56-59, 140-142, 154, 158 supplement, 149 supplemental, 153 Index support, 86, 158 supported, 8, 41, 81, 137 supports, 100, 145 supposed, 144, 165 Supposedly, 162 supposedly, 112, 144 supposition, 87 supremacy, 11 supreme, 59, 134, 137 Surbha, 2 sure, 29, 34, 49, 84, 143 surely, 4, 46, 80 surpassed, 83, 144-145 surprised, 115 surprising, 92 surprisingly, 64 surrender, 150 survey, 11, 95 suspect, 73 sustain, 123 sutta, 163 Svatantrika, 163 Swedenborg, 124 sweep, 46 sweeping, 128, 142 swifter, 90 swinging, 37, 40, 51, 54 Swiss, 55 switches, 152 Switzerland, 59 swung, 37, 51 sympathetically, 66 sympathy, 97 Symposium, 164 synistemi, 35 synonymous, 36, 51 Synthesis, 116 synthesis, 115 synthetic, 17, 19, 22, 27-29 SYSTEM, 127 System, 25-26, 35, 68-69, 81-82, 90, 93, 95, 99-100, 103, 105-106, 111, 126-127, 145 system, 2, 16-29, 33, 35, 40-41, 44, 47, 49-50, 54-55, 61, 64, 67, 70, 73-74, 80, 82-83, 87-100, 103, 105-110, 113, 115, 126-129, 133, 137-138, 140, 160 systema, 35, 38, 52, 94 systematic, 19, 21, 24, 47, 96, 133 systematically, 40, 54 Systematik, 64, 70, 75 systematischen, 96 systematized, 24 Systeme, 71 Systems, 102, 106, 110, 120-121, 126, 133 systems, 24-25, 35, 39-40, 53-55, 60, 70-71, 84, 94, 100, 105-106, 123, 127-128, 133, 140 szientifische, 34-35, 48, 50, 104 szientifischen, 34, 48 T Table, 3 table, 104-105 Taft, 101, 164 Tag, 58 Tage, 164 take, 35, 37, 49, 52, 64, 74, 105, 110, 138, 140-141, 145, 147, 165 taken, 2, 8, 36, 41, 51, 74, 81, 86, 136-137, 153 Takes, 116, 120 takes, 7-9, 14, 25, 41-43, 46, 95, 125-126 taking, 25, 64, 109, 142 talk, 8, 36, 41, 51, 66, 83, 161 talked, 33, 47, 88 talking, 33, 38, 47, 52, 143, 160 talkings, 65 talks, 33-34, 38, 47, 49, 52, 152, 159 tangled, 144, 153 Tantalus, 33, 47 Tao, 157, 160 tape, 2 Task, 9, 14, 42, 129, 138 task, 8-9, 18, 24, 31, 42-44, 65-66, 70, 82-83, 88, 94, 126, 137, 141-142, 158, 162 tasks, 107 tatvollen, 69 Taught, 119, 163-164 taught, 31, 65, 82, 114, 117, 144, 149, 163 Tauler, 124 Taylor, 162 Te, 157 teacher, 7, 13-14, 36, 59-60, 81, 140, 160 teaches, 152 teaching, 115, 117, 124, 158, 163 Ted, 44, 162 Teichmüller, 155 Tell, 118 tell, 137 telling, 44, 144, 151 tells, 31, 34, 48, 75, 92, 126 temples, 146 temporal, 37, 51 Index temporality, 16, 89 ten, 14, 24, 65 tendencies, 99 tendency, 69, 73 term, 12, 18, 23, 85, 90-94, 100, 104, 107, 140 termed, 113, 157 terminology, 118 terms, 17, 35, 37, 49, 52, 67, 87-88, 109, 126, 153, 157, 160, 165 terrible, 150 tetralemma, 158 text, 7-8, 16, 31, 34, 41, 48, 56, 81, 87, 89-90, 93-94, 100, 108, 118, 125, 136-137, 143, 155, 160 texts, 7, 41, 66, 139, 143, 163 Textual, 138 textual, 81 th, 2, 4, 46, 65, 129, 164 Thales, 28 than, 4, 8, 10, 14, 20, 26, 29, 32, 38-39, 41, 43, 46, 52-53, 55, 61, 65-68, 70, 72, 75, 81-82, 84, 87-88, 91, 95, 97, 108, 112-113, 117-119, 121, 123-126, 134, 136, 141, 143-144, 157-158, 162 thank, 115, 165 thanks, 165 That, 18, 35, 49-50, 61, 68, 89, 127, 140, 144, 147, 164-165 that, 4-15, 17-21, 23-29, 31-61, 63-71, 73-74, 80-100, 103-109, 111-121, 124-128, 130-131, 134, 136-154, 157-165 THE, 32, 56, 142, 165 The, 2-7, 9-14, 16, 18-21, 23-25, 28-29, 32-37, 39-43, 45-59, 61-63, 65-68, 70-75, 80-110, 113, 115-120, 123-134, 136-147, 149-155, 157-165 the, 2-29, 31-75, 80-101, 103-121, 123-134, 136-165 Theaetetus, 162 Their, 8, 41, 81, 137, 162 their, 6, 9, 11, 14, 29, 31, 42, 45, 59-60, 67-68, 70, 81, 91-93, 96, 98-99, 106-108, 112, 119, 134, 137, 145, 153, 157, 163 theist, 116 them, 4-7, 24, 28, 32, 41, 60, 68, 81-82, 111-112, 114, 125, 137, 143, 145, 152, 165 theme, 6, 128, 146, 150, 161 themselves, 44, 59-60, 66, 90, 131, 153, 160 Then, 37, 51 then, 6-8, 11, 15, 17, 19, 24, 26-28, 31-38, 40-41, 44-54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66-67, 74, 81, 84, 86, 89-90, 92, 94, 97, 99-100, 104, 112-113, 123, 125, 128-129, 137, 143, 146, 150, 152, 159-160 Theo, 72, 76, 79 theo, 130-131 Theodicy, 128 Theodore, 161 theologian, 80, 119, 124 theological, 88, 93-94, 123, 127, 129-130, 153 theologies, 130 Theology, 19-20, 22-23, 129-130, 165 theology, 64, 71, 100, 112, 116, 119, 124, 126-127, 129-130, 133, 153, 157, 161 Theoretical, 119 theoretical, 6, 11, 124, 146 Theory, 113 theory, 10-15, 55, 71, 112, 114-115, 117-118 There, 4, 31, 33-36, 48-50, 55-56, 60, 65-69, 71-72, 81, 83, 85-86, 88, 91, 93, 95, 99-100, 106-108, 112, 115, 119, 123, 141, 147, 149-150, 152, 157, 159, 162 there, 4-5, 15, 17, 19-20, 23, 27, 29, 32, 34-36, 40, 45-46, 49-50, 54, 56, 59-60, 65, 67, 70-71, 81, 83, 85-88, 90, 93, 95, 97, 100, 111-112, 120-121, 127-128, 130, 133-134, 138, 140-147, 150-153, 157-159, 161-163, 165 thereby, 20, 22, 63, 147 Therefore, 8, 10, 12, 15, 35, 43, 49, 89, 93, 97, 138, 149, 157 therefore, 19, 21, 23-25, 27-28, 57, 61, 95, 126, 158, 161 therein, 15 Thereto, 134 Therewith, 132 These, 4, 9, 16, 23, 34, 42, 48, 56, 68, 88, 91, 95, 106-109, 117, 124, 126, 140, 153-154, 157-158 these, 4, 6, 18-19, 24, 28, 32, 34, 37, 39-40, 45, 48-49, 51, 53, 56, 58, 68, 70, 72, 80-82, 84-85, 88, 91, 108, 111-112, 114, 124, 127-129, 139-140, 142, 144-147, 149-150, 152, 154 Theses, 46 theses, 165 Thesis, 20, 84-87 thesis, 71, 89, 124, 133, 146 They, 12, 32, 92, 106, 108-109 they, 7, 12-13, 19, 21, 28-29, 31-32, 41, 45, 55, 59-61, 66, 70, 83, 92, 96, 108, 111-113, 123, 125, 128, 130-131, 136, 147, 149, 153 thing, 5, 8, 12, 15, 17, 26, 29, 32, 35, 44, 50, 55, 59, 83, 107, 119, 146, 162, 165 things, 18-19, 28, 38, 44, 52, 55, 60, 90, 92, 96, 105, 107, 123, 143-144, 150-152 Think, 26, 97 think, 5-9, 17, 20, 31, 35-36, 41, 43-44, 46, 50-51, 55-56, 60, 66-67, 69, 89, 92-93, 95, 104, 106-107, 109, 111-112, 125, 130, 137-138, 140, 147-148, 150, 152, 161 thinker, 6-8, 25, 39, 41, 54, 59-61, 66, 68, 70, 81, 83-84, 87, 111, 119, 123, 125-126, 137-138, 141, 143, 165 thinkers, 7-10, 31-32, 41-43, 45, 55, 65-66, 89, 94, 123, 143, 157, 165 Thinking, 14, 31, 65, 89, 129, 139, 159 Index thinking, 2, 4, 6-9, 12, 14-16, 19-20, 24, 29, 31-32, 37-38, 40-44, 46, 51, 53-55, 57, 60, 67-71, 73-74, 81-83, 85-89, 91, 93, 96-97, 99-100, 105-106, 109, 111, 113, 116, 123-125, 127-128, 130-131, 133, 136-138, 141-146, 149, 153-154, 158-163, 165 thinks, 36, 51, 71, 93, 108, 114, 153 Third, 86, 103 third, 16, 23, 36, 51, 67, 80, 98, 120, 161 thirty, 81, 117, 124, 132 This, 4-7, 9-13, 16-18, 21-24, 26, 28-30, 32-58, 60, 64, 66, 68-70, 72-75, 80-82, 84, 86-94, 96, 98-100, 103-110, 113, 115, 117-120, 122-130, 132, 135-141, 143-145, 147, 149-152, 158, 160-161, 164 this, 2, 4-17, 19-24, 26-29, 31-42, 44-59, 61, 63-73, 75, 79, 81-100, 103-112, 114-115, 117, 119-121, 124-134, 136-155, 157-162, 165 Thomas, 11, 46, 89 Thor, 64, 79, 102, 133 thorny, 113 thoroughly, 143 Those, 80 those, 4-5, 13, 32, 88, 97, 105, 125, 139, 142, 146, 150 though, 19, 21, 25, 28, 39-40, 53-54, 91, 111, 113, 117-118, 124-125, 143, 145 Thought, 2, 133, 149 thought, 6-7, 9-10, 12-13, 20, 25, 28-29, 41, 43, 56-57, 59, 61, 66, 68-69, 81-82, 87-88, 91, 93-95, 104-108, 113, 116-118, 120, 124-126, 129, 131, 134, 136-138, 141, 143-145, 149-152, 157-158, 160, 165 thoughtful, 8, 38, 41, 53, 66, 157 thoughtfully, 143 Thoughts, 100 thoughts, 2, 6-7, 10, 43, 61, 82, 96, 108, 110 Thousand, 160 thousand, 61 threatening, 8, 41 Three, 91, 101, 113, 120 three, 9, 23, 33, 35-37, 42, 48-49, 51, 56, 61, 69, 71, 83, 106, 108-109, 117, 124, 128, 134, 143, 152, 155, 157 threshold, 14 throes, 14 Through, 68, 73, 96, 108, 124, 142 through, 5, 8, 12, 14, 20, 25, 29, 36-38, 40, 42, 46-47, 51-54, 57, 60, 64, 68, 73-74, 81-82, 86, 89-90, 93, 98, 100, 104-105, 107-108, 110, 113, 121, 123-124, 131, 137-138, 140, 142, 146, 149, 154, 163-164 throughout, 45, 113, 143 thrust, 63, 147 Thucydides, 142 Thus, 7, 12, 18, 20, 26-27, 34, 36-37, 46, 48-49, 51, 56, 58-60, 70, 74, 84, 88, 93, 98, 113, 126, 129, 138, 151 thus, 9, 20, 43, 70, 84, 87, 113, 117, 128, 130, 134, 146, 159 Tibetan, 163 tidings, 58 tied, 12, 31, 93, 98, 147, 149 Tiefe, 69, 97 tiefer, 64 ties, 25, 28 tilgt, 71 Tillich, 124 timber, 66 Time, 5-9, 15, 36, 41-44, 50, 56, 67, 70-71, 81, 83, 88-89, 99, 101, 124-126, 133, 138-140, 161 time, 4, 6-9, 11, 13-16, 18-20, 22, 29, 31, 36-37, 40-42, 50-52, 58, 64-68, 71, 73, 81, 87, 89-91, 96, 100, 104, 106, 108, 111-112, 114, 117-119, 123-126, 128, 130-132, 134, 136-141, 144, 160-161 Times, 28 times, 4, 12, 23, 31, 38, 52, 74, 88, 94, 115, 140, 149, 158 timid, 14 tip, 58 Tish, 73 Titelblatt, 164 Titis, 123 Title, 103 title, 2, 13, 17, 36, 50-51, 85, 90-92, 97, 103, 105, 114-115, 121, 127, 132, 139, 143, 147, 149, 151, 161, 164 titles, 103, 109, 139, 147 To, 2, 7, 14, 17-21, 25, 27, 34, 40-41, 46, 48, 54-55, 59, 84, 87-88, 90, 97-99, 107, 125, 137, 143, 155, 158, 161 to, 3-29, 31-75, 80-101, 103-121, 123-131, 133-134, 136-147, 149-165 Tod, 70, 73, 164 Today, 131-132, 146 today, 5, 12, 14, 29, 90, 92, 97, 104, 112, 115, 129, 137, 162 Todtnauberg, 1-2, 79 together, 4, 9, 16-17, 23-26, 37, 42, 51, 82, 85, 96, 106, 153, 159, 165 told, 36, 50, 112 Tom, 76 tone, 130 tongue, 112 too, 4-5, 27, 91, 98, 131 took, 11-12, 15, 26, 35, 49, 64, 87, 104, 113 top, 58, 93 topic, 14, 40, 54, 72, 133, 141 topics, 72, 128, 130 topology, 85 tormented, 32, 55 torn, 22 tot, 75 Index total, 16, 19, 21, 28, 103, 152 totality, 73, 93 totally, 35, 49 toto, 4 touchstone, 39, 54 Toward, 128 toward, 15, 31, 46, 56, 59, 70, 85, 93, 99, 107, 112, 114, 136, 140-141, 147-148, 152, 161 towards, 107, 161 town, 103 TPILB, 30, 122, 135 trace, 36, 40, 50, 54, 137 Track, 138-139, 143 Tradition, 67, 120 tradition, 9, 16, 42, 67, 73, 80-81, 99, 152, 157, 163 traditional, 8-9, 15, 20, 31, 42, 123, 129, 157, 163 traditionelle, 73 traditions, 80, 157 Tragedy, 143-144 tragedy, 58, 115 tragoedia, 58 Tragödie, 143 tragödie, 115 train, 87 training, 84 trait, 152-153 transcendence, 16 transcendent, 114 Transcendental, 13, 17-18, 23-24, 27-28, 33-34, 39, 47, 49, 54, 62, 116, 126 transcendental, 17-21, 23-24, 26-28, 34-35, 39-40, 49, 53-54, 99, 113 transfoms, 150 transform, 21 transformation, 68, 81, 128 transformed, 74, 90 Transition, 33, 47 transition, 33, 47, 56, 70, 75, 84, 86, 136 transitional, 160 transitions, 105 translate, 8, 93 Translated, 101, 119, 132, 155, 164 translated, 3, 44, 56, 115, 155-156, 159, 163, 165 Translation, 44, 56, 93, 108, 120, 132, 137, 144 translation, 83, 96, 98, 101-102, 113, 115-120, 124, 132, 139, 143, 147, 155, 157, 160, 162-163, 165 translations, 153, 163 translator, 143 translators, 93 transmitted, 2 transmutation, 107 Transscendental, 26 transzendentalen, 34, 49 trapped, 35, 49, 136, 142, 149 Traugott, 116 traveled, 60, 115 traveler, 115 Trawny, 155 treasure, 25 treat, 19 Treatise, 84, 101, 111, 125-130, 133 treatise, 21, 24-25, 34, 48, 84, 111, 113, 117, 120, 123-128, 130, 132-133, 158 treatment, 4, 104, 124 tree, 140 trees, 107 tremendous, 29, 106, 147 Trendelenburg, 12-13, 33, 48 trends, 32, 45, 142 tribulations, 69 tried, 29, 60, 89, 113, 117, 119 tries, 7-8, 41-42, 106, 125 Trimester, 147 trip, 107, 165 Trotz, 69 trouble, 7 TRUE, 32, 56, 142 True, 110 true, 7, 9, 13, 18, 21-22, 38, 43, 52, 56-57, 61, 67, 81, 83, 86-87, 92-94, 96-97, 105-108, 128, 130, 137, 140-141, 143-144, 153-154, 163-164 truly, 84, 90, 111, 126, 128, 130 trust, 37-40, 51-54 trusts, 37, 51 trustworthy, 131-132 Truth, 87, 92, 109, 141, 162 truth, 20, 26, 29, 57-58, 71, 87, 93-94, 96-97, 105, 108-109, 129-130, 140, 142, 147, 162-163 truths, 31, 58-59, 105, 108-109, 138 try, 7, 9-10, 18, 40, 43, 54, 70, 82-83, 87, 114, 124, 138, 140, 162 trying, 25, 27-28, 66, 88-89, 107, 126, 137, 147, 152 trägt, 73 Tubingen, 77, 117, 120, 124, 132 turn, 24, 27, 72, 131 turning, 153 turns, 106 twentieth, 6-7, 41, 81, 111, 123-125 twenty, 117, 124, 149, 158 Twice, 151 Twilight, 32, 55-56, 58, 97, 141-142, 145, 160 twilight, 58 Two, 28 two, 9, 18, 24, 27, 34, 37-38, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51-52, 58-59, 74, 80, 90-91, 99, 106, 108, 112, 115, 117, 124, 126-128, 138, 141, 149, 151-153, 158 Index type, 146 types, 85 typical, 162 typically, 88 typologies, 85 typology, 80, 84-85 Tze, 115 Tübingen, 76-77 U Uber, 12, 102 uber, 77, 120, 130, 132 uberhaupt, 130 Uberwiegen, 130 Uberwindung, 162 Ubunge, 102 udgment, 142 Ueber, 120, 130, 132 ueber, 133 ugly, 150 Ulrich, 143 ultimate, 2, 59, 94, 134, 139, 158 Ultimately, 158 ultimately, 162 ultra, 89 um, 64, 67-68 umgekehrt, 66-68, 74 Umkehrung, 142 umped, 72 Umwälzung, 64, 74 un, 152 una, 2-3, 157-158, 163 Unablässig, 66 Unaided, 36, 50 unattainable, 57 unattained, 57 Unbedingte, 100 unbegreiflich, 26 unbestimmte, 72, 74 unbounded, 37, 39, 51, 53 uncertainty, 13 uncompleted, 33, 47, 67 unconcealedness, 158 unconditional, 144 unconditioned, 100, 107, 113 Und, 147 und, 3, 12-13, 36, 39, 43, 45, 50, 54, 63-65, 67, 69-79, 85-86, 92, 96-97, 101-102, 106, 110-111, 115, 118, 120-121, 130, 133, 139, 144, 147, 149, 151, 154-156, 158, 162, 164 undeniable, 151 Under, 151, 154 under, 13, 16, 34, 48, 58, 125, 127, 132, 136, 160 underlying, 82 underneath, 87, 108 undersigned, 124 Understand, 113 understand, 5-6, 10, 14, 19, 21, 23-24, 28, 32, 35, 38, 43, 45, 49-50, 52, 65, 69, 82, 100, 125, 137-138, 143-144, 149, 153, 159 Understanding, 108, 111, 116, 120 understanding, 5, 8, 12-13, 15-16, 22, 31, 41, 47, 55, 82, 88, 93, 100, 111, 114, 125-126, 136, 142-143, 145, 158, 160 understandings, 9, 43 understands, 23, 46, 145, 147, 153 understood, 10, 22, 25, 43, 47, 73, 82, 88, 126, 129, 153 undertake, 137, 165 Undertaking, 111 undertaking, 21, 82, 104 underway, 37, 52, 140, 160 undisputed, 94, 127 undoubted, 46 Undoubtedly, 68 undoubtedly, 46, 118 uneducated, 8, 42 Unendlichkeit, 71 Unerzogenheit, 66 unessential, 4 unfettered, 4 unfolded, 99 unfolding, 85, 87, 92, 97-99, 109 unfolds, 31, 91, 94, 138, 157 unfortunate, 165 ungewöhnlich, 65 Ungewöhnliches, 43, 67 unifies, 130 union, 115 unique, 5, 35, 49-50, 60, 64, 68, 81, 84, 99, 125, 130, 151 uniquely, 34, 49 United, 157, 165 united, 61 unity, 24-25, 93, 105-108, 118 universal, 157, 163 Universities, 6 University, 2, 10, 15, 44, 64, 101, 114-117, 119-120, 123-124, 132, 138, 143-144, 146, 155, 158, 161, 163-164 university, 114-115, 129 Index Unknown, 121 unknown, 57, 152 unky, 40 unlabeled, 103 unless, 40, 165 unlikely, 29 unmethod, 116 unmistakably, 97, 142 unmittelbar, 86 Unmittelbare, 72, 74 unnamed, 137 unpacking, 149 unpaid, 33, 47 unphilosophically, 113 unpleasant, 128 unpromisable, 57 unpublished, 33, 47, 56, 81-82, 93, 108, 140, 149, 152-153, 160, 162 unreflective, 4 unrelated, 69, 83 unresolved, 67, 70, 83 unrestrained, 141-142 uns, 64, 67-68 unsaid, 7, 41, 66, 125, 137 Unser, 147 unserem, 64 unstuck, 7, 41, 125 unsuccessful, 89 unter, 115, 119 untergehen, 58 unterordne, 130 Unterschied, 92 untersuchungen, 133 Unterwegs, 139, 160 unterzuschieben, 26 unthinking, 25 unthought, 70, 81, 83 Until, 128 until, 46, 56, 61, 64, 103, 117, 124, 138 Untimely, 45 untimely, 117 Untrue, 143 untrue, 143-144 unusual, 10, 31, 43, 82 unusually, 159 unveils, 153 Unwahrheit, 86 Unzeitgemässe, 45 Up, 39, 53 up, 4-5, 7, 13, 16, 18, 23-25, 28, 32, 35, 38-39, 44, 46, 49, 52-53, 61, 68, 81, 94-96, 100, 104, 107-108, 113, 116-117, 121, 128-129, 138-139, 141-142, 144-147, 149-152, 160, 162 updating, 61 uplift, 106 Upon, 22, 29 upon, 96, 109, 118 Upper, 59 upset, 37, 52, 119 upward, 28, 85 Ural, 115 urgency, 140, 160 urgent, 165 ursprungliche, 101 ursprüngliche, 147 us, 6, 9, 13-14, 16, 22, 24, 29, 31-34, 36, 38, 40, 43-44, 47-48, 50, 53-54, 56-58, 60-61, 65-67, 69-70, 73-75, 81-82, 84, 86, 88, 92-95, 98, 105, 107, 111, 115, 126-127, 129, 131-132, 136-138, 141-142, 147-149, 151, 154, 162, 165 usage, 84, 100, 151, 161 Use, 45, 121 use, 12, 15, 17, 21-22, 32, 34, 38, 45, 48, 53, 60-61, 80, 85, 89-92, 96, 100, 104, 107-109, 119, 129, 136, 149-150, 153, 155 used, 2, 7, 12, 18-19, 35-36, 41, 51, 68, 84-85, 89-94, 97-98, 104, 125-126, 128, 153, 157, 160-161, 163 useful, 152 usefully, 25 useless, 57 uses, 23-24, 31, 34, 49, 56, 58, 60, 67, 91, 112, 117, 131, 153, 158 using, 89, 92, 94, 153, 163 ust, 37-38, 51-52, 66, 73, 84, 91, 96, 103, 106-107, 127-128, 143, 152, 159-160 usually, 162 usurped, 10, 12, 43 utopia, 160 V vacations, 159 vacillation, 37, 51 Vaihinger, 5, 11 vain, 118 valuable, 97 Value, 13, 160-161 value, 11, 45, 95-96, 138, 140, 160 Valuelessness, 159-160 valuelessness, 160 Values, 159-161 Index values, 60, 158-161 valueslnessness, 161 van, 2, 132 Vandana, 2 vanishing, 131 Varanasi, 163 variation, 46, 121 variegated, 152 variety, 37, 51, 140 various, 45-46, 85, 139, 158, 161 vast, 138 Vedânta, 157 Veghel, 2 vein, 91 verarbeitet, 73 verderben, 65 verehrenden, 69 verengt, 139 Verfasser, 43, 67 Verfassung, 71, 76, 79 Verfehlende, 66 Vergangenes, 156 verge, 142 Vergleichung, 43, 67 Verhaltenheit, 139 Verherrlichung, 130 Verhältnisse, 121 Verily, 7, 60 Verlag, 76-77, 120, 132, 158 verlangt, 66, 68 verlieren, 139 Vernunft, 13, 33-34, 47-49, 66, 73, 89, 96 Vernunfterkenntnisse, 33, 48 Verse, 163 verse, 163-164 Verses, 163 verses, 158 version, 20, 58, 109, 152 verstand, 43, 67 verstehen, 43, 65, 67 Versuch, 60, 73 Versuche, 121 versus, 109 Vertrauen, 37, 51 Verurteilung, 67 verwandt, 68 verwandten, 68 Very, 114 very, 8, 29, 33-34, 36, 38, 42, 45, 47-50, 52, 55, 57-58, 81, 83, 86-87, 91-92, 94, 97, 114, 119, 125-126, 129-130, 133, 139-140, 143-145, 158, 161, 163 Verächtern, 119 Veröffentlichung, 139 Veröffentlichungen, 158 VI, 46, 102 via, 31, 88-89 vicious, 153 Victorious, 164 victorious, 164 victory, 90 viel, 65 vielleicht, 147 view, 5, 25, 27, 29, 34-36, 38-40, 45-46, 49-50, 52-54, 73, 90, 95, 99, 104, 106, 109, 118-119, 121, 125, 141, 143, 158, 162-164 viewed, 4, 91 viewing, 104 Viewlessness, 159, 162 viewlessness, 162-163 Viewpoint, 163 viewpoint, 94, 104, 161 views, 8, 38, 41, 52, 136, 163-164 Vigrahavyavartani, 158 VII, 151 VIII, 151-153 Viking, 155 vilain, 73 villain, 70 vini, 22 Vintage, 155 violence, 8, 31, 41, 81, 136-137, 157 violent, 5 virtue, 96 virtuous, 57 virulence, 32, 55 vis, 88-89 visible, 36, 50 vision, 7, 16, 23, 29, 56, 66, 115, 143 Visions, 163 vitiosus, 153-154 Vo, 56 voice, 140 Vol, 77, 95, 129, 160, 162, 164 vol, 75, 131 volk, 159 Volkelt, 11 vollen, 68 vollendete, 26 Vollendung, 65, 96 vollzogen, 74 vollzogener, 67 Volume, 100, 120, 132, 137 volume, 90, 133, 137, 152-153, 155, 158 volumes, 6, 31, 61, 115, 117, 124, 138, 141, 149, 152 Vom, 45, 63, 70-71, 75, 120, 130, 132, 138-141, 147 vom, 69, 72-74 Index Von, 36, 51, 106, 115, 118, 133 von, 2, 13, 16, 36-37, 51-52, 64, 66, 69, 74-76, 89, 114-115, 117-118, 121, 124, 133, 139, 143, 151, 155, 161 vor, 69-70, 86, 147, 155, 164 vorausgegangenen, 69 Voraussetzung, 157, 164 vorbei, 71 Vorbereitung, 147 Vorgänger, 68 Vorlesgungen, 115 Vorlesung, 68, 78, 110, 121, 147, 162 Vorlesungen, 110, 121 vorlesungen, 115 Vorrede, 78, 102 Vorriss, 18, 39, 54 Vorsatz, 86 Vorsatzes, 86 Vorsokratiker, 144 Vorspiel, 151 Vorstellung, 74 Vortrag, 69 Vorträge, 76-77, 140 Vorwurf, 66 voyage, 90, 107-108 vulgar, 110 W wage, 150 Wagner, 105, 151-153 wahre, 56 wahrhafte, 77 Wahrheit, 26, 92, 96, 139, 162 Wahrung, 115 wait, 37, 51 waiting, 131-132 walks, 64, 133 walls, 159 Walter, 75, 91, 155 wan, 115 Wanderer, 60, 141 want, 7, 10, 13, 16, 25, 41, 60, 66-67, 71, 83-84, 125, 136, 149-151, 165 wanted, 7, 12, 14-15, 20, 35, 41, 49, 59, 81, 84, 96, 100, 106, 109, 112, 114, 125, 142, 151, 159-160 wanting, 151 wants, 7-8, 12, 20, 23, 41, 44, 46, 60, 65-66, 72, 105, 125, 129-130, 137, 142, 145, 149-152 War, 114 war, 144, 150, 155 warmer, 144 Was, 20, 114-115 was, 4-9, 11-16, 18-20, 22, 24-25, 28-29, 32-42, 46-56, 59-61, 64-70, 73-74, 80-81, 83-86, 88-93, 95-99, 103-104, 106, 109, 111-119, 123-128, 130-132, 136-139, 141-144, 147, 149, 151-153, 155, 157-163 water, 128 wave, 58 wavering, 37, 51 Way, 162-163 way, 5, 7, 19, 29, 32, 37-38, 40-41, 44-46, 52-54, 61, 66, 70-71, 84-87, 89, 93, 95, 97-98, 103-104, 107-111, 114-115, 125, 127-128, 130-131, 133, 136-145, 148-149, 152-154, 159-160, 163-164 Wayne, 133 Ways, 160 ways, 45-46, 70, 83, 103, 115, 149, 157-158, 162, 164 We, 6-7, 9, 16, 19, 24, 31-32, 40-41, 44, 54, 58, 60-61, 65, 72, 81, 85-86, 89-90, 93-95, 97, 104, 106-107, 125, 138, 140-141, 146, 150, 152-153, 157, 159-160, 164 we, 7-8, 10-11, 14, 16-18, 20, 22-23, 25-26, 29, 31-41, 43-45, 47-54, 56-61, 65-66, 69, 71, 73-74, 81-82, 86, 89-90, 93, 95-96, 100, 103-105, 107-109, 111-112, 114, 123, 125, 131, 136-139, 141, 145-147, 149, 151-154, 158-160, 162, 165 weakness, 137 weaned, 160 weapons, 97 web, 4, 142, 145 weder, 63, 68 week, 103 weeks, 130 Weg, 86, 164 Wege, 140, 160, 164 Wegfeld, 164 Wegmarken, 139-140, 160 weight, 144 weil, 139, 155 Weise, 69, 86, 116 Weiss, 65, 78 Weite, 139 weitesten, 70 Welch, 155 welche, 43, 67 welcher, 77, 92 Welches, 36, 50 welches, 69 Well, 146 Index well, 4, 7, 9-10, 15, 18, 21, 26, 28, 34, 37, 42-43, 47, 49, 51, 59, 68, 81-82, 84, 87-88, 91, 96-97, 99, 106, 111-112, 115, 126, 140, 153, 161, 163-164 Welt, 56, 70 Weltalter, 133 Weltanschaguung, 85 Weltanschauung, 69, 72, 138, 159, 161 Weltanschauungen, 85 Weltanschauungsproblem, 85 Weltgeist, 65 Weltgeschichte, 110, 121 wenige, 164 Wenn, 68, 92 wenn, 74 went, 13, 18, 56, 80, 90, 93, 103, 114 werden, 66-69, 74, 96, 147, 155 Werdensfülle, 153 were, 4, 6, 12-15, 25, 29, 32, 38, 47, 52, 55, 61, 67-68, 81, 88, 93, 99-100, 111-113, 117, 124, 136-140, 142, 144, 146, 153, 158 Werk, 73, 139 Werke, 61, 71, 77, 90, 103, 120, 140, 155, 160, 164 wermag, 156 Werther, 114 Wertlosigkeit, 160 wertlosigkeit, 159 Wesen, 70, 72, 77, 120, 130, 132-133 wesen, 115 Wesenheiten, 96 Wesens, 73, 79, 102 Wesentliche, 66 Wesentlichkeit, 139 West, 149, 164 Western, 6, 25, 57, 111, 125-126, 136, 141-143, 146, 149, 152, 158 western, 16, 64, 73-74, 126, 129, 142 What, 5, 7-8, 15-17, 20, 25, 28-29, 31-32, 36, 44, 50, 55-60, 65, 71-72, 80, 87, 89, 94, 100, 104-110, 113, 126-129, 137-138, 140, 142, 145-147, 149-151, 157-159, 161 what, 4-9, 16, 18-20, 22-23, 25, 28-29, 41-44, 56-57, 61, 66, 70, 80, 82, 85-86, 88-89, 92-93, 96-98, 100, 104-106, 108-109, 124-127, 129-131, 136-141, 143, 145, 149-151, 153, 157-163, 165 whatever, 152 whatsoever, 2 When, 15, 36-37, 51, 66, 90, 111, 131 when, 4, 7-8, 10, 22, 27-28, 34, 41-43, 46, 49, 58, 60-61, 70, 82, 84-86, 90-91, 93, 96-97, 105, 107, 111, 125, 137, 141, 145, 147, 149-150, 153, 157, 160, 165 whenever, 157 Where, 8, 16, 23, 77, 89, 93-94, 100, 157 where, 7, 9, 13, 16, 20, 23-24, 29, 31-36, 38-39, 41, 43, 47-48, 51-53, 55, 58-59, 61, 67, 86-88, 90, 92, 97-98, 100, 104-107, 112-114, 125, 132, 140, 144-145, 147, 149, 152-153, 161-163 Whereas, 71, 92, 108 whereas, 45, 58, 96, 136, 153 whereby, 107 whether, 9, 19, 21, 28, 43, 157 Which, 112, 164 which, 4-5, 7-8, 13, 15-27, 29, 31-37, 40-42, 46-47, 49-50, 52, 54, 57-59, 61-62, 64, 66-67, 69, 74, 80-84, 86-87, 89-90, 92-99, 104-108, 112-113, 117-119, 121, 125-130, 132, 134, 136, 138, 140-149, 153, 157-158, 160, 162-164 While, 151 while, 90, 113, 151 Whitehead, 142 Who, 58, 97, 105, 111, 124-125, 133, 163-164 who, 4, 8-9, 12-13, 18, 29, 31-33, 37-38, 40, 42, 47-48, 51-52, 54-55, 57-60, 65, 69, 83, 85, 95, 97, 99, 104, 109, 111-113, 118, 124, 131, 141, 143, 150-151, 163, 165 whoever, 6, 164 whole, 16, 19-22, 24-25, 29, 34, 38-39, 45, 49, 53, 55, 73-74, 82, 84, 87, 94, 96, 99-100, 103-105, 107, 109, 111, 119, 126-127, 129, 134, 141, 143, 149-150, 152-153, 160 wholly, 22 whom, 11, 38, 52 whomever, 164 whose, 36, 50, 80, 85, 89, 144, 162-163 Why, 17, 34, 48, 60, 68, 82, 98, 104-105, 109, 136-137, 145, 147, 149-151 why, 35, 49-50, 74, 86, 100, 106, 128, 143, 152 widely, 47, 141 wider, 36, 51 widespread, 37, 51 Wie, 120 wie, 69, 155 wieder, 74, 155 Wiederkunft, 59 wife, 114, 121 Wilamowitz, 143 wilchem, 73 wildest, 39, 53 Wilhelm, 2, 13, 33, 36, 48, 51, 85, 103, 106, 115-118, 121, 133, 144, 160-161 Will, 16, 55-56, 62, 66, 97, 101, 123, 129, 146, 152, 154, 159-161 will, 6-7, 9, 16-17, 19, 21-22, 28, 32, 34, 43-44, 47, 49, 55, 59-60, 62, 64, 66, 72, 82, 89-90, 100, 103, 105, 107, 109-110, 129-130, 134, 136-137, 140, 146-155, 157-158, 160-161, 164 Index Wille, 100, 130 Willen, 130 Willey, 11 William, 78, 80, 102 Williams, 2 Willing, 16, 134 willing, 100, 129, 134, 160 willkürlichen, 66 Windelband, 11, 13-14, 33, 48, 160 Windischmann, 107 wine, 22, 151 wines, 121 Winfield, 164 wing, 89 wings, 18, 26 Winter, 132, 147 winter, 61, 64 Wintersemester, 72, 78-79, 160 Wir, 67, 147 wir, 64, 66, 68-69 wird, 64, 74, 96, 104, 109 wirken, 130 wirkliche, 86 wirklichen, 36, 50 Wirklichkeit, 69, 74, 156 Wirth, 133 Wisdom, 151 wisdom, 151 wish, 4, 18, 40, 60, 81, 141, 150 wished, 90 wishes, 157, 165 Wissen, 72, 93-94, 110, 121 Wissens, 92 Wissenschaft, 12, 29, 34-35, 48, 50, 64-65, 67, 71-75, 77, 79, 86-87, 90-93, 96, 98, 102-104, 109-110, 113, 121, 147 Wissenschaften, 77, 90, 106, 110, 121 wissenschaftlich, 121 wissenschaftliche, 112 wissenschaftlicher, 115 Wissenschaftslehre, 26, 113 With, 15, 23, 33, 48, 57, 90, 94, 101, 108, 127, 147, 158, 165 with, 2-10, 12-14, 16-19, 23-28, 31-32, 34-46, 48-53, 55-56, 58-62, 64-70, 73, 81-84, 86-87, 89-91, 93-95, 97-101, 103-105, 107-109, 111-115, 117-120, 123-133, 136-139, 141-149, 151-165 Within, 34, 48 within, 9, 20, 23, 26, 28-29, 34, 36-37, 42, 45, 47-48, 50-51, 56, 59, 64, 67, 70, 81, 83-84, 88, 92-94, 96, 100, 106, 108, 113, 117-118, 126-128, 131, 133, 136, 141-142, 158, 162 without, 2, 14, 16, 18-22, 25, 28, 36, 40, 50, 127, 142, 146-147, 151-152, 157 Wittgenstein, 7, 47 witty, 137 wo, 65-66 wobei, 156 wodurch, 98 wohnt, 68 Wolf, 141 Wolff, 20, 28, 33, 36, 44, 48, 50-51, 56, 99, 140 Wolffian, 38, 52 Wolffs, 36, 50 Wolffus, 38, 52 Wolfgang, 114 wollen, 26 Womit, 147 won, 110 Wood, 44 woods, 113 worauf, 66 Word, 7, 41, 125 word, 7, 10, 16, 34, 41, 43, 48, 56, 68, 90-91, 93, 97, 104, 116, 125, 128, 134, 138, 140, 151, 159-163 worded, 128 words, 9, 26-27, 32, 34-35, 37, 43, 49-51, 56, 58, 66, 87, 94, 99, 105, 136, 149, 151-153, 158, 160, 163 Work, 116 work, 4-6, 8, 11-18, 20, 23, 25-26, 29, 32-33, 35-37, 39, 41-42, 45, 47, 49-50, 52, 54-55, 59-61, 64-66, 68-73, 75, 80-83, 85, 87, 89-91, 93, 95, 100, 103-105, 107-110, 113, 115-120, 123-126, 128-129, 132-133, 136, 138-141, 143-145, 147, 157-158, 161-163, 165 worked, 9, 43, 69, 75, 91, 98, 105, 113, 117, 141 working, 8, 12, 14-15, 20, 24-25, 33-34, 36, 38, 42, 47-48, 50, 53, 69, 73, 83, 90, 103, 127, 154, 158 workings, 117 Works, 90, 103 works, 5-7, 9-11, 20, 29, 32, 38, 40, 42, 46, 52, 54, 68-70, 82-83, 90-91, 101, 109, 115-116, 120, 125, 130, 140-141, 160, 164 WORLD, 32, 56, 142 World, 57, 61, 80, 129 world, 4-5, 31, 44, 46, 55-59, 88, 94, 96, 105-107, 109, 113, 115, 123, 127, 138, 140-142, 146, 151-154, 158, 163, 165 worldly, 154 worlds, 58-59, 142 WorldView, 85 Worldview, 159, 161 worldview, 83, 138, 140, 158-159, 161 Worldviews, 161 worldviews, 85, 161, 163 worm, 34, 48 Index worry, 60, 150 Wort, 75 worthless, 9, 42 worthy, 24, 31, 65 would, 8, 17-19, 21, 25-28, 35-36, 40, 42, 46, 49-50, 54, 60, 67, 69, 80, 85, 88, 91, 96-99, 115, 119-120, 127, 145, 148-152, 157-158, 160-161, 163, 165 wound, 96 wrapped, 150 wrest, 9, 43 wrestle, 158 wring, 136 write, 6, 55, 123, 150-151, 162 writer, 95 writers, 45, 114 writes, 13, 28, 133, 141, 147, 157 writies, 65 writing, 2, 4-7, 20, 35, 44, 49, 62, 69, 73, 82-83, 89, 104, 111-112, 123, 125, 129, 137, 141, 143, 151, 153, 160-163 Writings, 110, 112, 121, 132 writings, 4, 6, 10, 20, 22-23, 31, 33, 40, 43, 45, 47, 54-55, 82, 111, 116-117, 129, 131, 136, 138-141, 150, 152-155, 160 Written, 101-102 written, 2, 4, 6, 24, 28-29, 31, 33, 46-47, 55-56, 68-69, 81, 91-92, 103-104, 117, 123, 125, 139-141, 149, 154 wrong, 31, 88, 139-140, 161, 163 Wrote, 114, 116-117 wrote, 4, 9, 15, 18, 29, 31, 36-38, 42, 50, 52, 56, 61-62, 68, 80, 82, 85-88, 90-98, 103-104, 107-108, 111-119, 124, 127, 136-139, 141-143, 146, 149-152, 155, 157, 159-161, 165 wrung, 152 Wundlacken, 38, 53 Wurzburg, 117, 124 Wülbern, 2 Würde, 118 X XI, 102 XIII, 164 xlii, 143 xvii, 15, 20, 76, 137 XVIII, 158 xviii, 20, 139 xx, 8, 41, 81, 137, 164 XXVII, 164 xxxiv, 128 xxxviii, 137 Y Yale, 144 yawn, 57 Yeager, 2 Year, 160 year, 39, 53, 55, 124, 158 yearning, 117 yearnings, 117 years, 4, 14-15, 19, 29, 35-37, 49-51, 55, 61, 64-65, 69, 72-73, 75, 81, 83, 90-91, 112, 132, 136, 140-141, 152, 163 Yes, 70, 144, 150 yes, 46, 56, 70, 150-152 Yet, 153, 162 yet, 7, 9, 17-18, 22, 27, 29, 40-41, 43, 54, 60, 69, 81, 83, 90-91, 97, 112, 114, 125, 136, 140-141, 154 yi, 157 yo, 47 York, 3, 44, 76, 101, 132, 155 You, 14, 105, 107, 130, 150 you, 7, 10, 14, 18, 40-41, 44, 54, 59-61, 107, 110-113, 125, 128, 150-152, 158, 161, 165 Young, 2, 44, 114, 124, 132, 143 young, 106, 123, 143 younger, 99 your, 7, 40, 60, 110, 150-152, 158, 165 yourself, 7, 128 yourselves, 7, 60 youth, 116 Z Zaborowski, 2-3 Zahl, 68 ZARATHUSTRA, 32, 57-58 Zarathustra, 7, 58-60, 133, 144 Zeit, 69-71, 74-75, 158 Zeitalters, 70 Zeitbegriffs, 139 Index Zeiten, 36, 50 Zeller, 12, 141 Zerstörung, 138 Ziel, 97, 138 Ziellosigkeit, 159 Zizek, 133 Zollikon, 158, 164 Zu, 79, 102, 155, 158 zu, 43, 64-69, 73, 79, 96, 102, 104, 109, 121, 130, 156 Zueignung, 147 zugleich, 73-74 Zukunft, 46, 151 zum, 63, 73, 100, 111, 155 Zur, 76-77, 133, 162, 165 zur, 26, 63-64, 67, 71, 75, 78, 86, 92, 101-102, 109, 115, 117, 120-121, 124, 130, 138-141, 147, 160 Zurück, 12 zurück, 67 zurückgenommen, 74 zusammen, 67, 164 Zusammenbruch, 69 Zusammengehörigkeit, 67, 73 zusammenhaengenden, 133 zwar, 69 Zweig, 44 zweistündig, 78 zweiten, 155 Zweites, 45 Zwiesprache, 66 Zwischen, 120 zwischen, 66, 147 Ä äesthetische, 118 ästhetischen, 115 äusserlichen, 69 äussert, 43, 67 Ü Über, 72, 78-79, 102, 115, 118-119, 140, 147, 162 über, 36, 43, 51, 67, 69, 78, 96, 110, 115, 118, 121 überhaupt, 74 überlassen, 66 Überlegungen, 138, 141, 160 Überlieferten, 67 Übermensch, 59 übernehmend, 155 Übersinnliche, 158 Übersinnlichen, 56, 140-141 Überwindung, 74, 76-77 überwunden, 74 Übungen, 64-65, 78-