Forthcoming	in	Philosophical	Topics,	special	issue. On	the	Connection	between	Semantic	Content	and	the	Objects	of	Assertion Una	Stojnić Department	of	Philosophy &	Center	for	Cognitive	Science Rutgers	University Abstract: The	Rigidity	Thesis	states that	no	rigid	term	can	have	the	same	semantic	content	as	a non-rigid one. Drawing on Dummett (1973, 1991), Evans (1979, 1982), and Lewis (1980),	Stanley	(1997a,	1997b,	2002)	rejects	the	thesis	since	it	relies	on	an	illicit	identification	of	compositional	semantic	content	and	the	content	of	assertion	(henceforth,	assertoric	content). I	argue	that	Stanley's	critique	of	the	Rigidity	Thesis	fails	since	it	places	constraints	on	assertoric	content	that	cannot	be	satisfied	by	any	plausible	notion	of content	appropriately	related	to	compositional	semantic	content.	For	similar	reasons,	I also challenge a recent two-dimensionalist defense of Stanley by Ninan (2012). The moral	is	far-reaching:	any	theory	that	invokes	a	distinction	between	semantic	and	assertoric	contents is	unsatisfactory	unless it	can	plausibly	explain	the	connection	between them. Keywords: semantic content; assertoric content; compositionality; intensional operators;	rigidity;	two-dimensionalism. 2 0. Introduction The	Rigidity	Thesis	(RT)	is	the	claim	that	no	rigid	term	has	the	same	content	as	a	nonrigid	one.1	RT	requires	that	if	the	two	sentences	differ	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	rigid	term	where	the	other	contains	a	corresponding	non-rigid	one,	they	differ	in	content. Prima	facie,	the	thesis	is	corroborated	by	intuitions	about	the	modal	profiles	of	sentences	containing	rigid	terms,	and	corresponding	non-rigid	ones.	Intuitively,	while	(1)	is	informative,	and	contingent	(false	in	some	circumstances),	(2)	is	trivially	true	and	necessary. 1. Aristotle	is	the	last	great	philosopher	of	the	antiquity. 2. Aristotle	is	Aristotle. But	(1)	and	(2)	only	differ	insofar	as	one	contains	the	non-rigid	term	'the	last	great	philosopher	of	the	antiquity',	and	the	other	the	co-referring	rigid	one, 'Aristotle'.	By	RT,	it follows	they	have	different	contents,	which,	in	turn,	explains	why	they	intuitively	differ in	modal	profiles.2 However,	other	examples	support	counter-intuitions. Relative	to	a	context,	(3)	and	(4)	seem	to	communicate	the	same	content: 3. The	actual	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott. 4. The	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott. What	you	would	learn	in	a	normal	conversation	from	(3)	–	the	recoverable	information –	seems	exactly	what	you	would	learn	from	(4).	The	occurrence	of	'actual'	seems	redundant. But	(3)	contains	a	rigid,	while	(4)	a	corresponding	non-rigid, term. By	RT,	they differ	in	content,	and	so,	that	they	seem	to	communicate	the	same	content	is	puzzling. 1	RT	goes	back	to	Kripke's	(1980)	arguments	against	the	descriptivist	theory	of	names,	and	was one	of	the	central	underlying	assumptions	in	the	anti-descriptivist	tradition. 2	See	Kripke	(1980). 3	Similar	considerations	are	in	Davis	&	Humberstone	(1980). 2	See	Kripke	(1980). 3 Following	Dummett (1973,	1991)	and	Evans	(1979,	1982),	Stanley	(1997a,	1997b, 2002)	argues	that	this	puzzle	rests	on	an	implicit	assumption	of	what	I	shall	call	Identification:3 (Identification): The compositional semantic content (henceforth, semantic content)	of	a	sentence	S	of	a language	L in	a	context	c	= the	proposition that	a normal	assertive	utterance	of	S	expresses	in	C	(its	assertoric	content,	for	short). With	Dummett	and	Evans,	Stanley	rejects	Identification.4	He	is	drawing	on	an	argument from	Kaplan	(1989)	and	Lewis	(1980),	both	of	whom,	starting	with	the	widely	held	assumption	that	the	objects	of	propositional	attitudes	are	propositions,5	argue	that	propo- 3	Similar	considerations	are	in	Davis	&	Humberstone	(1980). 4	Ninan	(2010),	Rabern	(2012a,	2012b),	and	Yalcin	(2007,	2012,	2015)	have	all	recently	rejected Identification,	albeit	not	only	for	reasons	about	rigidity	(though	Ninan	(2012)	defends	Stanley's argument	against	RT from	criticism	by	King	(2003,	2007)).	Others, such	as	Bach	(2003),	Borg (2004),	Cappelen	and	Lepore	(2005),	as	well	as	some	Relevance	Theorists	(Sperber	and	Wilson, 1986)	have	also	argued	for	a	separation	of	compositional	semantic	content	from	assertoric	content, though for	different reasons.	These critics are	guided	by the	belief that context	has	only minimal	effects	on	compositional	semantic	content.	Although	my	focus	is	not	on	this	type	of	rejection	of	Identification,	considerations	I	raise	provide	a	challenge	for	these	authors	as	well. 5	This assumption is contested by contemporary relativists (e.g. Egan (2010) and	MacFarlane (2005)),	who nevertheless endorse Identification, by virtue of	making the objects of the attitudes	non-propositional. It	has	also	been	contested	by	expressivists	(Yalcin,	2007,	2012),	who deny	Identification.	Since	my	interests	here	will	be	only	with	a	(dis)analogy	between	Stanley's and	Lewis'	arguments,	and	its	bearing	on	the	Dummet-Evans-Stanley	rejection	of	Identification, and	since	both	Stanley	and	Lewis	accept	the	assumption,	I	can	grant	it	for	the	sake	of	argument. 4 sitions	cannot	be the	compositional semantic	values	of sentences	on	occasions	of	use, for	any	such	identification	would	violate	compositionality.6 In what follows, Section 1 presents an argument from Lewis (1980) and Kaplan (1989) intended to establish that certain sentential operators, in particular, temporal and locational ones, require attributing semantic contents to sentences (in a context) that are ill-suited as objects of propositional attitudes. Lewis (1980) concluded that these	operators	must	operate	on semantic,	but	not	assertoric, contents. (A similar	argument	is	in	Kaplan	(1989).7) Section	3	presents	Stanley's	argument	that	modal	operators	are	likewise	of	this	sort,	thereby	concluding	that	semantic,	but	not	assertoric,	content	exemplifies	modal	properties.	Since	rigidity is	a	modal	property, it is	exemplified only	by	semantic	content;8	two	sentences	differing	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	rigid 6	One cannot straightforwardly characterize Kaplan as rejecting Identification, since he often speaks	of	semantic	content	as 'what is	said'	not	only	in	a	technical,	but	also	in	a	pre-theoretic, sense.	This	is	especially	pressing	since	he	motivates	his	account	by	drawing	on	intuitions	about the	(pre-theoretic)	notion	of	what	is	said.	(See	Kaplan	1989,	pp.	489)	However,	Kaplan	also	recognizes the tension	provoked	by	a	commitment to Identification,	and	his	main	argumentation for	distinguishing	propositions	from	semantic	contents	is	present	in	Kaplan	(1989,	pp.	503-4). Thus,	I	group	him	with	Lewis	for	simplicity,	but	add	a	caveat	that	there	is	tension	in	Kaplan	regarding	Identification. 7	Although, as noted earlier, the question of whether Kaplan actually denies Identification, is more	complex.	Cf.	fn.	6. 8	Thus,	insofar	as	one	agrees	that	we	have	direct	intuitions	about	rigidity	even	in	the	absence	of an	explicit	modal	operator,	as	in	examples	such	as	(1)	and	(2),	these	intuitions	would	naturally be	understood	as	tracking	semantic,	not	assertoric,	content.	Stanley	(1997a),	in	fact,	argues	that these	intuitions	are	not	intuitions	about	assertoric	content. 5 term	and	the	other	a	corresponding	non-rigid	one	can	share	assertoric	content,	establishing	that	RT	is	false. The failure	of Identification is remarkable	because	most theorists	assume it to	explain	how	communication	is	possible. We	can	communicate	with	the	use	of	a	sentence in	a	given	context	because	what	is	expressed	by	that	use	just	is	the	semantic	content	of that	sentence	in	that	context.9 Thus,	a	failure	of	Identification	leaves	us	in	a	quandary	– if semantic	content is	distinct from	assertoric	content, then	how	is the	assertoric	content	of	an	utterance	determined	given its	semantic	content?	Section	2	presents	Leiws' account	of	how	to	derive	assertoric	content	from	semantic	content,	but	Section	4,	on	the contrary,	argues	Stanley	has	no	way to reestablish the	connection	via	Lewis' strategy, and	surprisingly,	neither	can	the	recent	two-dimensionalist	reconstruction	of	Stanley's account	proposed	by	Ninan (2012) establish the connection.10 Indeed, there is sufficient reason to believe that there is no plausible and sufficiently constrained	way to reestablish the connection	between the two levels of content for a Stanley-type view. That	is	because,	as	I	will	argue,	there	is	no	plausible	notion	of	content	that	can	play	the role	of	Stanley's	assertoric contents, given	a	presumed	connection	between	assertoric and	compositional	semantic	content. 9	This	is,	of	course,	compatible	with	the	expressed	content	–	what	is	said	–	being	an	input	to	further	pragmatic	reasoning. 10	That Stanley's view can be interpreted as two-dimensionalist is suggested by King (2003, 2007)	as	well.	Stanley	(2002)	considers	this	interpretation,	but	does	not	explicitly	endorse	it. 6 1. The	Operator	Argument 1.1. The	Operators	and	Compositional	Semantic	Content Since	natural languages	in	general,	and	English	in	particular,	are	riddled	with	contextsensitivity,	sentences	express	semantic	content	only	relative	to	a	context,	where	a	context	is	usually	understood	as	a	location	(time,	world,	and	spatial	location)	of	the	utterance,	and	as	such,	it	comprises	parameters	and	features	that	help	determine	the	semantic	content	of	a	given	utterance. According	to	the	picture	Lewis is	challenging, the	semantic	content	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	is	a	proposition.	A	sentence	is	true	in	a	context c iff at c it expresses a true proposition. Since propositions are true/false relative to worlds,	a	sentence	is	true	at	c	iff	the	proposition	it	expresses	in	c	is	true	relative	to	the world	determined	by c (a.k.a. 'the	world	of utterance').	However, relativizing truth to just	a	context,	Lewis	argues,	is	insufficient,11	since	the	truth	of	some	sentences	at	a	context	depends	on	the	truth	of	the	proposition	expressed	by	another	sentence	in	that	context,	relative	to	a	world	other	than	the	world	of	utterance.	For	example,	the	truth	of,	'It	is possible that there	are five	coins in	my	pocket,'	uttered in	c,	depends	on	whether	at	a world	w′	accessible	from	the	world	of	utterance	wc,	the	proposition	expressed	by	'There are	five	coins	in	my	pocket'	in	c	is	true.12 The	point	is	that	sentential	operators	such	as	'it	is	possible	that'	shift	the	world	parameter	of	the	context. A	sentence	containing	a	'shifty'	operator	is	true	in	a	context	and a	world of utterance iff the proposition expressed by the embedded sentence in that context	is	true	relative	to	a	world(s)	other	than	the	world	of	utterance.	To	capture	that the	truth	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	can	depend	on	the	truth	of	a	proposition	expressed 11	This	idea	is,	of	course,	not	new	with	Lewis.	See	Kamp	(1971)	and	Kaplan	(1989). 12	As	usual,	'accessible'	worlds	are	determined	by	a	contextually	supplied	accessibility	relation. 7 by	another sentence in that context relative to a	world	other	than the	world	of	utterance,	truth	has	to	be	relativized	not	merely	to	contexts,	but	also	to	worlds.13 Following	Lewis,	call	an	n-tuple	of	parameters	of	a	context	that	can	be	shifted	in	this manner	an	index.14	The	truth	of	sentences	(of	a	language	in	a	context)	can	then	be	relativized to indices. So far, an index	need	only contain	a single	parameter	–	a	world.	A sentence	S	of	L	is	true	relative	to	a	context	c	and	an	index	i	iff	the	proposition	expressed by	S	in	L	at	c	is	true	relative	to	i. We	define	the	truth	of	S	at	c	as:	S	is	true	at	c	iff	S	is	true relative	to	c	and	the	index	determined	by	the	context	ic,	i.e.,	iff	the	proposition	expressed by	S	at	c	maps	ic	to	true.15 To	see	Lewis'	argument	that,	given	certain	natural	language	operators,	the	semantic content of a sentence cannot be a proposition (in the traditional sense), consider the pair	(5)-(6): 5. Mary	is	drowsy. 6. From	time	to	time,	Mary	is	drowsy. 13	Lewis	(1980)	denies	we	can	avoid	relativization	of	truth	to	worlds	by	making	the	truth-value of	the	sentence	embedded	under	a	modal	operator	dependent	on	a	context	just	like	the	context of	utterance	except	that	the	world	of	utterance	has	possibly	been	shifted.	He	argues	that	what results	from	switching	just	one	parameter	of	a	context,	while	holding	other	parameters	fixed,	is not	a	context.	Contexts	require	their	agent	to	be	located	at	a	world	of	utterance	at	a	time	of	utterance;	but	this	requirement	is	not	preserved	once	we	shift	a	world	of	a	context.	('Necessarily,	I am	here	now'	is	false.) 14Lewis'	index	is	Kaplan's	(1989)	circumstance	of	evaluation. 15	Since	(so far) indices	only	contain	a	world,	we	can	still treat	propositions	as functions from worlds	to	truth-values. 8 Suppose	that,	syntactically,	'from	time	to	time'	is	a	sentential	operator.16	Assuming,	(5) and	(6)	are	uttered	in	the	same	context,	'Mary	is	drowsy'	should	make	the	same	semantic	contribution	in	both. Lewis'	initial	assumption,	per	reductio,	is	that	the	semantic	content	a	sentence	expresses,	relative	to	a	context	of	utterance, is	a	proposition.	Then	(6) intuitively	depends	for	its	truth	at	a	context	c	and	a	world	w,	on	the	truth	of	the	proposition	expressed	by	'Mary	is	drowsy'	in	c,	at	times	other	than	the	time	of	c.	However,	since, on	the	standard	picture, the	truth-value	of	a	proposition	depends	only	on	worlds,	and not	on	times,	'Mary	is	drowsy,'	if	true	(in	a	context	and	a	world),	is	true	at	all	times.	But, then,	the	semantic	contribution	of	'from	time	to	time'	is	vacuous.	That	is,	(5)	should	express	whatever	(6)	does,	and	(6)	should	be	true	(in	a	context,	at	a	world)	iff	(5)	is. But since 'from	time	to time' is	not semantically	vacuous, the	semantic	content	of 'Mary is drowsy'	must	be,	or	determine,	a	function	from	worlds	and	times	to	truth-values.	Since, propositions,	traditionally	construed,	are	not	functions	of	this	type,	they	cannot	be	the semantic	content	(5)	contributes	to	(6).	But,	then,	to	hold	that	the	semantic	content	of	a sentence	not	embedded under	a temporal	operator is still a	proposition	would	violate compositionality,	since	then	the	semantic	content	of,	e.g.,	(6)	would	not	be	derived	as	a function	of	the	semantic	contents	of	its	parts.	This	completes	Lewis'	argument.17 16	Though	this	assumption is	controversial	(see	King	(2003)),	we	grant it for the	sake	of	argument. 17With	parallel arguments, Lewis argues (compositional) semantic contents should be (or determine)	not	only	functions	from	worlds	and	times	to	truth-values,	but	(at	least)	functions	from worlds,	times,	locations	and	standards	of	precision	to	truth-values. 9 1.2. Operators	and	Assertoric	Content The	kind	of	objects	suitable to	enter	semantic	composition	(assuming	with	Lewis that these	determine	functions	from	richer	indices	to	truth-values)	is	not	suitable	to	play	the role of objects of assertion and propositional attitudes. Lewis' thought is that, since propositions	are	what	we	believe	and	assert,	and	since	propositions	do	not	enter into semantic composition, semantic content cannot be assertoric content. And so, Lewis concludes,	'[I]t	would	be	a	convenience,	nothing	more,	if	we	could	take	the	propositional	content	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	as	its	semantic	value.	But	we	cannot.	The	propositional	contents	of	sentences	do	not	obey	the	compositional	principle,	therefore	they	are not	semantic	values.'	(Lewis,	1980;	pp.	39,	reprint)18 In	summary,	a	Lewis-style	argument	takes	the	following	general	form:	for	a	sentential operator O to have a non-vacuous semantic contribution, the semantic content it 18	As	noted	above,	a	version	of	the	Operator	Argument	is	present	already	in	Kaplan	(1989),	who also takes the semantic content of a sentence in a context to be (or to determine) a function from	richer indices to truth-values.	Kaplan is likewise sensitive to the fact that such	semantic values	might	not	be	suitable	as	the	objects	of	propositional	attitudes.	He	writes:	'Technically,	we must	note that intensional	operators	must, if they	are	not to	be	vacuous,	operate	on	contents which	are	neutral	with	respect	to features	of	circumstance	the	operator is interested in.	Thus, for	example,	if	we	take	the	content	of	S	to	be	(i)	[the	proposition	that	David	Kaplan	is	writing	at 10	a.m.	on	26	March	1977],	the	application	of	a	temporal	operator	to	such	a	content	would	have no	effect;	the	operator	would	be	vacuous'	(pp.	503–4,	n.	28).	And,	'[t]his	functional	notion	of	the content	of	a	sentence	in	a	context	may	not,	because	of	the	neutrality	of	content	with	respect	to time	and	place,	say,	exactly	correspond	to	the	classical	conception	of	a	proposition'	(p.	504).	As noted	above,	it	is	less	clear	whether	these	considerations	ultimately	lead	Kaplan	to	reject	Identification.	(Cf.	fn.	6.) 10 operates	on	cannot	be	specific	along	the	O	dimension,	on	pain	of	loss	of	compositionality. Since	O's contribution is not vacuous, semantic content is not specific along the	O dimension.	However,	the	contents	of	beliefs	and	assertions	are	specific	along	the	O	dimension.	Hence,	the	compositional	semantic	contents	are	not	the	contents	of	beliefs.19 Lewis	does	not	offer	an independent	argument for thinking	only	propositions,	and not	semantic	contents	of	the	kind	he	advocates,	are	suitable	objects	of	propositional	attitudes.20	He	takes	this	for	granted.	However,	there	are	familiar	arguments	for	this	view. 19	Of	course,	one	could	deny	that	English, in	particular,	and	natural languages, in	general,	contain	temporal,	locational	and	other	types	of	intensional	operators	(except	perhaps	modal	ones). In	fact,	a	growing	number	of	linguists	have	grown	dissatisfied	with	the	intensional	treatment	of alleged temporal and locational operators. (See	King (2003) for arguments against the intensional treatment of tense and location.) An alternative treatment	might involve treating temporal	and	locational	expressions	as	quantifiers	over	times	and	locations	in	the	object-language, rather than in the	meta-language. Going into the details of such extensional treatment	would unnecessarily complicate our dialectic, since the distinction between semantic and assertoric contents that	exactly	parallels the	distinction	made	by	Lewis	could	be	made in	an	extensional framework	(Cf.	Ninan	2012;	Rabern	2012a,	2012b.),	and	the	disanalogy	I	want	to	draw	between the Stanley-type argument and Lewis' argument could be drawn in a purely extensionalist framework. 20	In	fact,	in	'Attitudes	De	Dicto	and	De	Se',	published	a	year	before	'Index,	Context	and	Content,' Lewis	endorses	a	view	according	to	which	compositional	semantic	contents	(of	the	kind	he	endorses)	are	suitable	as	objects	of	the	attitudes.	This	view	rejects	not	the	claim	that	propositions violate	compositionality,	but	rather	the	claim	that	propositions	are	the	objects	of	the	attitudes. What's	asserted	and	believed	on	this	type	of	account	is	(or	determines)	a	function	from	richer indices (that contain	more than just a	world coordinate) to truth-values. Such	an	approach is embraced	by	modern	relativists	(see,	e.g.,	Egan	(2010),	McFarlane	(2005)).	The	jury	is	still	out 11 One	might	think	that	while	compositional	semantic	contents	(of	the	Lewis	variety)	vary in truth-value (at least)	with times	and locations in	addition to	worlds,	beliefs	do	not share	this	feature.	The	contents	of	our	beliefs	(and	assertions)	are	not	timeor	locationneutral;	our	beliefs	don't	seem	to	change	truth-value	with	times	and	locations. To	illustrate	the	type	of	argument	those	attracted	to	this	view	advance,	suppose	that	on	April 15th,	2015, it is	raining,	and	I	believe	and	say	that it is	raining. The	argument	goes, it would	seem	false	to	say	on	April	16th,	2015,	that	what	I	believed	and	said	yesterday	is false.	You	cannot	challenge	me	on	April	16th,	2015,	by	saying:	'Yesterday	you	said	something	false'. And	parallel	arguments	can	be	constructed	against	the	idea	that	assertoric contents	vary	in	truth	with	location.	Sitting	in	my	office,	I	believe,	and	I	say	to	you,	that the	North	Pole	is	3428.72mi	away.	Once	at	the	North	Pole,	it	would	be	odd	for	me	to	say what	I	believed	in	my	office	is	false.	And	it	would	be	odd	for	you	to	challenge	me	by	saying:	'Back	in	your	office,	you	said	something	false'.21 Of	course,	other	examples	in	the	literature	pull	intuition	in	the	opposite	direction.	I do	not	here	wish	to	assess	the	success	of	such	arguments,	or	take	a	stand	on	the	nature of	the	objects	of	propositional	attitudes.	That	is	a	topic	for	another	day. My	present	interest	is	the	analogy	between	Lewis-type	and	Stanley-type	arguments. Thus,	my	strategy	will	be	to	grant,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	semantic	content	is	as	Lewis	takes	it	to be,	and	that	assertoric	content	is	also	as	he	takes	it	to	be.	I	will	show	that,	while	there	is still,	as	Lewis	argues,	a	clear	connection	between	the	two	levels	of	content	in	the	Lewis- on	whether	this	kind	of	object	is	suitable	to	play	the	role	of	an	object	of	assertion	and	propositional	attitudes.	I	will	not	pursue	this issue	here,	since	the	only	thing	that	matters	for	my	purposes	is	the	analogy	between	the	Lewis-type	and	the	Stanley-type	arguments. 21	For	arguments	along	these	lines,	see	Richard	(1981)	and	Salmon	(2003). 12 type case, the connection	does	not carry over to	what	would	have to be Stanley-type contents. 2. The	Connection A semantic theory without any connection between assertoric and semantic content would	leave	unexplained	how	by	making	an	assertion,	a	speaker	manages	to	convey	information	to	others	or	to	modify	their	beliefs	in	a	more	or	less	systematic	way.	Without an	account	of	how	semantic content	can	play	a role in fixing	assertoric content, it	becomes	an idle	wheel in a theory	of communication, and	how	assertoric content is expressed	becomes	completely	mysterious.	Moreover,	a	chief	reason for	a	compositional semantics is to explain how language users can understand and produce indefinitely many	novel	sentences.	Yet,	since	compositionality	only	governs	semantic	content,	without	a	clear	connection	between	semantic	and	assertoric	content,	these	capacities	would be	mysterious,	and	left	unexplained	by	appeals	to	compositionality	of	semantic	content. Luckily,	recovering	assertoric	from	semantic	content	is	easy	for	Lewis	(and	Kaplan). To	see	how,	represent	the	semantic	content	of	an	utterance	of	a	(unembedded)	sentence φ	in	a	context	c	as	follows: SC-L: λw. λt. λl. φ !, !,!,! where	c is	the	context,	and w, t, l an	index	(where	w, t and	l	are	world,	time	and	location	parameters, respectively).22	According to	SC-L, the semantic content	of	φ	in c is a function from	possible	worlds, times and locations to extensions – here, truth-values. The	assertoric	content	is	then	easily	recovered	by	letting	the	context	'fix',	i.e.,	supply	the location	and	time	parameter.	Thus	the	assertoric	content	for	Lewis	is	AC-L: 22	I	take	' '	to	denote	an	interpretation	function	of	the	model	that	takes	an	expression,	a	context,	an index	and	an	assignment function to	extensions.	For	simplicity, I suppress the	assign- 13 AC-L: λw. φ !, !,!!,!! where	t! , l! are	the	time	and	location	parameters	fixed	by	context	c.	The	function	in	ACL	takes	a	possible	world	and	returns	a	truth-value. That	is,	it	is	a	good	old	proposition. Lewis' lesson	is	that,	although	semantic	and	assertoric	contents	do	not	coincide	on his story, semantic content nevertheless determines assertoric content, since, given a semantic	content,	we	can	recover	the	assertoric	content	by	letting	the	context	saturate the time, location and	possibly other parameters of the index. Thus, a Lewis-type account	does	not leave	mysterious	how	we	get	such	content	across. We	turn	directly	to Stanley's	analogy. 3. Assertoric	Content,	Semantic	Content	and	Rigidity As	noted	above,	Stanley	(following	Evans	and	Dummett)	differentiates	assertoric from semantic	content	for	reasons	distinct	from	those	in	Lewis	and	Kaplan.	His	goal	is	to	challenge	RT.	His	main	argument	can	be	sketched	as	follows:	pairs	of	sentences	like	(3)–(4), (repeated	below	as	(7)	and	(8))	differ	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	non-rigid	term,	and the	other	a	corresponding	rigid	one,	yet	both	typically	seem	to	communicate	the	same content	relative	to	the	same	context. 7. The	actual	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott. 8. The	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott. ment function argument throughout. Note that one could argue against Identification on the grounds	that	the	standard	semantics	for	quantification	and	variable	binding	would	require	semantic	contents	to	vary	in	truth-value	with	assignment	functions	(that	quantifiers	operate	on), whereas assertoric contents are typically not taken to be variable in this way (see Rabern (2012a,	2012b)).	Even	if	this	is	right, importantly	note	that	one	can	establish	a	connection	between the two types of content in a Lewisean	way	by saturating the assignment function	parameter	with	a	contextually	supplied	value. 14 Indeed,	in	any	context,	(7)	is	true	just	in	case	(8)	is.	But,	nevertheless,	they	manifest	distinct	behavior	when	embedded	under	modal	operators,	e.g.,	(9)	is	true	and	(10)	is	false: 9. Necessarily,	the	actual	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott. 10. Necessarily,	the	author	of	Waverly,	if	there	is	(a	unique)	one,	is	Scott. The	actual	author	of	Waverly	(i.e.	Scott)	could	not	have	failed	to	be	Scott,	but	Scott	might not have authored	Waverly. Similar considerations, Stanley argues, hold for so-called descriptive	proper	names. Suppose 'Julius'	has	been introduced into the language	via	a reference	fixing	description	(S): (S)	'Julius'	refers	to	whoever	invented	the	zip. Suppose further with Stanley that linguistic competence with 'Julius' presupposes knowledge	of	(S).23	Then	consider	(11)–(12): 11. Julius	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did. 12. The	inventor	of	the	zip	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did. As	with (7)–(8), uttered in the same context, assuming competence	with 'Julius', (11) and	(12)	communicate	the	same	thing.	Further,	assuming,	as	Stanley	does,	that	competence	with	'Julius'	requires	knowledge	of	(S),	in	every	context	in	which	interlocutors	are competent	with	'Julius',	(11)	is	true	just	in	case	(12)	is. However,	just	as	(7)	and	(8)	exhibit	different	modal	profiles,	so	too	do	(11)	and	(12), as	evidenced	in	(13)-(14): 13. Necessarily,	Julius	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did. 14. Necessarily,	the	inventor	of	the	zip	invented	the	zip,	if	anyone	uniquely	did. (13)	is	false	and	(14)	true.24 23	This	is	not	a	completely	innocuous	assumption,	but	I	grant	it	for	the	sake	of	argument. 15 Again,	(11)	and	(12)	differ	only	insofar	as	one	contains	a	rigid,	and	the	other	a	corresponding non-rigid, expression. So, RT predicts they cannot have the same semantic content.	And, indeed,	the	difference	in	modal	profiles	of	(7)–(8)	and	(11)–(12)	has	led many	(indeed,	most)	authors	to	conclude	that	neither	(7)–(8)	nor	(11)–(12)	share	content. Stanley, however, resists this conclusion, arguing that it rests	on the	unwarranted assumption	of	Identification.	Following	Lewis	that	temporal	and	locational	operators	do not	operate	on	assertoric	content,	but	on	semantic	contents,	Stanley	argues	that	modal operators	likewise	do	not	operate	on	assetoric	contents,	but	on	semantic	contents.25 He thereby	recommends	the	following	explanation	of	the	data	in	(7)–(8):	(7)	and	(8)	share assertoric	content,	but	differ	in	compositional	semantic	content.	Because	modal	operators operate on compositional semantic values, (7) and (8) exhibit different behavior when	embedded	under	modal	operators. That	(7)–(8)	share	assertoric	content	explains why	they	seem	to	express	the	same	content	with	respect	to	the	same	contexts;	that	they differ	on	semantic	content	explains	why	they	behave	differently	when	embedded	under modal	operators.26	Mutatis	mutandis for (11)–(12).	Thus,	by	drawing	a	distinction	between	assertoric	and	compositional	semantic	contents,	Stanley	seems	to	get	the	best	of both	worlds. However, once Stanley draws a distinction between these two levels of content,	he	needs	to	tell	us	how	to	connect	assertoric	content	to	semantic	content. 24	Similar	examples	are	used	to	motivate	the	distinction	between	semantic	and	assertoric	content	in	Dummett	(1973,	1991),	Davis	and	Humberstone	(1980)	and	Evans	(1979,	1982). 25	This	line	of	thought	is	challenged	by	King	(2003,	2007).	He	argues	the	analogy	is	unwarranted,	since	intensional	treatments	of	temporal	and	location	expressions	are	mistaken.	Prima	facie, if	King	is	right,	that	would	seem	to	undermine	Lewis'	argument.	However,	Rabern	(2012b)	re- 16 4. (Dis)connection According	to	Lewis,	we	need	to	distinguish	between	two	types	of	content	because	contents that only vary in truth-value with worlds, but not times and locations, violate compositionality.	Since	assertoric	contents,	that	is,	for	Lewis,	propositions,	only	vary	in truth-value	with	worlds,	it	follows	that	they	cannot	be	compositional	semantic	contents. Stanley,	we	saw, inspired	by	Lewis, concludes that	modals	also	are intensional	operators	operating	on	semantic,	but	not	assertoric, contents.	But	how	does	he	account for the	connection	between	them? cently	argued	that	even	if	we	assume	an	extensional	framework,	propositions	(traditionally	understood)	would	still	not	be	able	to	play	the	role	of	compositional	semantic	values.	Thus,	if	Rabern	is	right,	even	if	Lewis	is	wrong	about	the	nature	of	temporal	and	locational	expressions,	we might	still	be	forced	to	draw	the	distinction	between	the	two	types	of	content	for	purely	formal reasons	(though,	granted,	not	for	reasons	Stanley	cites).	One	could	then	reconstruct	the	dialectic in	an	extensional	framework. 26	As	Stanley	points	out,	it's	easy	to	find	pairs	of	sentences	that	seem	to	convey	the	same	content relative	to	the	same	context,	yet	behave	differently	when	embedded	under	temporal	and	locational	operators.	Here's	one	example: (a) The	Olympic	champion	in	show	jumping	is	Steve	Guerdat. (b) The	current	Olympic	champion	in	show	jumping	is	Steve	Guerdat. (c) It will always be the case that the Olympic champion in show jumping is Steve Guerdat. (d) It	will	always	be	the	case	that	the	current	Olympic	champion	in	show	jumping	is	Steve	Guerdat. Stanley takes these	data to further	support	extending	Lewis' treatment	of locational	and temporal	operators,	to	modal	operators. 17 He	can	take	semantic	content	to	be	Lewis'	SC-L,	i.e.	a	function	from	times,	locations and	worlds	to	truth-values,	reflecting	that	temporal,	locational	and	modal	operators	can shift	the	relevant	parameters	of	the	context.27	Or,	ignoring	the	time	and	location	parameters,	for	simplicity,	he	can	take	it	to	be	SC-S:	a	function	from	worlds	to	truth-values. SC-S: λw. φ !, ! But, on either route, a crucial disanalogy between Stanley and Lewis emerges. Given Stanley's	data,	assertoric	content	must	be	world	specific,	because 'the	actual	author	of Waverly'	and	'the	author	of	Waverly',	relative	to	different	worlds,	have	different	extensions	(the	former	is	rigid,	the	latter	is	not).	The	truth-value	of	Stanley's	assertoric	content,	then,	cannot	vary	with	worlds. So,	given	his	data,	Stanley	needs	to	retrieve	the	assertoric	content	that	does	not	vary in	truth-value	with	worlds,	from	the	world	natural	semantic	content	in	SC-S;	following Lewis' strategy he	would let the	world parameter of the index be determined by the context,	as	in	AC-S: AC-S: φ !, !! But	AC-S	cannot	play	the	role	of	assertoric	content.	Since	SC-S	is	a	function	from	worlds to truth-values, once	we saturate the	world argument of the function SC-S, we get a truth-value.	AC-S	is	just	a	truth-value.	The	objects	of	assertion	and	belief	are	supposed to	be	the	bearers	of	truth-values,	not	the	truth-values	themselves. Distinctions	between different beliefs and assertions are too fine-grained to be captured by truth-values.28 27	Bear	in	mind,	Stanley	grants	that	the	time-neutral	and	location-neutral	contents	cannot	figure as	assertoric	contents. 28Of	course,	the	same	point	holds	if	we	saturate	all	three	of	the	parameters	in	SC-L-a	world,	a time	and	a	location-with	a	contextually	supplied	value:	we	just	get	a	truth-value.	In	that	sense, 18 Indeed	according	to	this	account	of	assertoric	content	there	can	be	at	most	two	beliefs: the	True	and	the	False.	So,	Lewis'	way	of	accounting	for	the	connection	between	the	two types	of	content	automatically	fails. The	failure	of	extending	Lewis'	strategy	to	Stanley's	account	is	instructive.	It	shows that	Lewis' assertoric contents cannot	be	Stanley's, for the former	vary in truth-value with	worlds	in	a	way	that	Stanley's	cannot.	So,	assertoric	content	cannot	be	AS-C.29	Alternatively,	Stanley	might try to treat	assertoric	contents	as	structured	propositions- complex structured entities-rather than as functions from worlds to truth-values.30 But fine-grained structured contents are not retrievable by SC-S. SC-S is too coursegrained to deliver the relevant structured content; so, if this view is to get off the it	makes	no	difference	whether	we	are	working	with	SC-L,	or	the	simplified	SC-S.	For	the	record, it	wouldn't	help	to	try	to	recover	the	assertoric	content	from	SC-L	by	letting	the	context	saturate only	the	world	parameter	of	the	index,	but	not	the	time,	and	location	parameters.	Such	objects would	fail	to	properly	capture	the	truth-conditions	of	a	sentence,	which	is	something	objects	of assertion	and	belief	are	required	to	do. 29	Note,	it	wouldn't	help	to	argue	that	assertoric	content	is	recoverable	from	the	semantic	content	by	some	kind	of	pragmatic	enrichment,	where	semantic	content is	understood	as	SC-S	or SC-L.	A	standard	variety	of	pragmatic	enrichment	takes	the	form	of	saturation	of	the	functions that	are	semantic	values	–	and	it	looks	like,	for	the	reasons	given	above,	what	results	from	such an	enrichment	of	SC-S	is	a	truth-value,	rather	than	an	entity	suitable	to	be	an	object	of	assertion or	belief.	Thus, insofar as enrichment	has to	deliver a	world-specific semantic value, it	would run	into	the	same	problem	as	Lewis'	strategy.	Moreover,	SC-S	is	neither	"gappy"	nor	in	need	of expansion,	so	it	isn't	clear	what	would	trigger	enrichment. 30	See, e.g., King (1995, 1996, 2007), Salmon (1986, 1989) and Soames (1986, 2010) for structured	accounts	of	semantic	content. 19 ground, we	would also have to replace SC-S, a function from indices to truth-values, with	structured	contents-complex	entities	comprised	of	semantic	contributions	(in	a given context) of parts of sentences expressing them (in that context).31	That is, we could	take	both	the	assertoric	and	semantic	contents	of	sentences	(relative	to	contexts) to	be	structured	propositions. But, this move, unfortunately, will not improve Stanley's position. The problem with	employing	structured	propositions	to	try	to	forge	a	connection	between	semantic and	assertoric	contents	is	that	structured	semantic	values	are	not	compositional	in	Lewis'	sense,	since	they	do	not	compose	in	a	function-argument	way	with	operators,	and	so, no	significant	semantic	composition	occurs	with	them.	The	result	of	appending	an	operator	to	a	structured	content	is	another	structured	content.	In	a	framework	that	employs structured	contents	as semantic	values, compositionality	enters in	only	at the level	of the	truth-definition	for	structured	contents,	not	at	the	level	of	semantic	contents	themselves.32	Structured	fine-grained	semantic	values	are	not	compositional	semantic	values in	the	sense	meant	by	Lewis.	Thus,	this	route	is	a	dead	end	for	proponents	of	the	distinction	between	assertoric	and	semantic	content.33 31	There	is	a	further	question	of	what	gives	structured	propositions	their	structure.	See	e.g.	King (2007)	for	a	positive	proposal	and	a	further	discussion. 32	For	a	helpful	discussion	see	King	(2007,	pp.	113	and	onwards). 33Note	that	even	if	it	weren't	for	this	problem,	the	view	would	still	face	problems. The	view	still needs	to	deliver	world-specific	assertoric	contents	and	world-neutral	semantic	contents.	A	way to	do	this is	to	posit	that	structured	propositions	that	play	the	role	of	assertoric	contents	contain	the	world	of	utterance	as	a	part,	and	the	ones	that	play	the	role	of	semantic	content	do	not. The	most	straightforward	way	to	achieve	this	effect	is	to	posit	a	world	variable	in	the	LF	of	sentences and an obligatory	wide-scope lambda	binder that binds all free	world variables in the 20 Recently,	Ninan (2012)	has	defended	a two-dimensionalist	version	of	Stanley's	argument against RT. According to two-dimensionalist accounts, each sentence S is semantically	associated	with two	semantic	values	– the	horizontal	content	(the	proposition	S	expresses	at	a	context	c),	and	the	diagonal	content	(the	proposition	that	is	true	in a	world	w	just in case,	when	uttered in	w, S	would	express	a true	proposition in	w).34 The	idea	is	that	the	horizontal	content	tracks	the	modal	profile	of	an	utterance	and	the diagonal	content tracks	the information it	communicates	relative	to	a	context.	So	construed,	semantic	content is identified	with the former,	and	assertoric	content	with the structure (where modal operators would then be treated extensionally, as quantifiers over worlds).	Such	LFs	then	determine	the	compositional	semantic	content	of	sentences.	The	assertoric	content	would	be	generated	by	saturating	the	world	variable	in	the	LF	with	a	contextually supplied	world.	(For	this	way	of	constructing	world	neutral	vs.	world	specific	structured	propositions,	see	Schaffer	(2012).	Yet	Schaffer	does	not	suggest that	we	should	exploit	either	of the two	contents	as	semantic	or	assertoric	content.) Note	that	on	this	view,	however,	the	semantic content	of	an	unembedded	sentence	again	is	not	what	it	contributes	to	composition	with	modal operators-this	strategy is	more	akin to	what	Lewis	calls "the	schmentencite strategy"	(Lewis, 1980).	Moreover,	apart	from	this	problem,	the	view	wouldn't	be	deriving	the	structured	semantic	content	from	the	structured	assertoric	content-it	would	posit	two	structured	contents	with different	elements	derived	from	the	LF	of	the	sentence	in	question.	Note	also	that	no	structured account	that	tries	to	derive	(structured)	assertoric	content	from	(structured)	semantic	content by	some	kind	of	pragmatic free	enrichment	would	help	Stanley, since the	semantic	content	of Stanley's kind is neither 'gappy', nor in need of expansion in order to determine truthconditions. 34	Stanley	himself	suggests	that	one	way	to	understand	assertoric	content	is	as	a	diagonal	proposition	(cf.	Stanley	2002).	This	is	also	suggested	by	King	(2003). 21 latter.35 This	seems	to	capture	Stanley's	data-namely,	that	(3)–(4)	share	diagonal	content, but not horizontal content, and, assuming competence with a name like 'Julius' presupposes	knowledge	of	(S),	(7)–(8)	does,	too. Unfortunately,	as	stated,	this	proposal	also	does	not	establish	a	connection	between semantic and assertoric content. On it, semantic content doesn't	determine assertoric content.	The	account	just	assigns	two	levels	of	content	to	each	utterance.	More	seriously,	diagonal	content	is	not	suited	to	play	the	role	of	assertoric	content	in	all	the	relevant cases.	The	problem	is	familiar	(Soames	2002).	Were	diagonal	content	the	object	of	beliefs and assertions, then propositional attitudes	would relate individuals to diagonal contents.	And	propositional	attitude	reports	would	express	relations	between	individuals	and	diagonal contents.	But, then, it	would	be	natural to	hold that	ascription 'S	believes	that	p' is	true	in	c	iff	S	believes	the	diagonal	content	of 'p' in	c.	But	this	result	is problematic.	For	suppose	Mary	believes	that	Jason	is	angry.	Then,	Jason,	knowing	this, can	report:	'Mary	believes	that	I	am	angry'.	However,	according	to	the	present	proposal, 35	I	am	simplifying.	The	question	is	whether	we	want	to	side	with	Lewis	in	relativizing	truth	to other	parameters	in	addition	to	the	world	parameter	of	the	index.	In	that	case,	neither	diagonal content	nor	horizontal	content	(if	we	take	them	to	be	traditional	propositions,	rather	then	functions from richer indices) would strictly speaking be compositional. This would complicate Stanley's	story	and	make	the	disanalogy	with	Lewis	ever	more	striking	–	for	to	get	at	these	contents	we	would	first	have	to	saturate	the	additional	parameters	in	the	index.	Moreover,	though this	proposal,	unlike	the	previous	ones,	opens	the	possibility	for	Stanley	to	claim	assertoric	content is essentially propositional content, it is worth noting that on the	most developed twodimensional stories, the diagonal is not a possible worlds proposition, but a set of centered worlds	(ordered	triples	of	a	world,	an	individual	and	a	time	in	that	world).	(See	Chalmers	(2004, 2006a,	2006b).) 22 his	report	comes	out	false	–	the	diagonal	proposition	expressed	by	Jason's	utterance	of	'I am	angry'	is	not	a	proposition	about	Jason.	It	is	something	like	the	general	descriptive proposition	that the	agent	of the	context,	whoever	s/he is, is	angry.	And	this	does	not capture	the	content	of	the	belief,	which	is	a	singular	proposition	about	Jason.	This	problem has been well recognized by both proponents and opponents of twodimensionalism.	(See	Chalmers	(2006b)	and	Soames	(2002).) Note	that,	though	often	stated	this	way,	the	problem	does	not	depend	on	the	semantics	of	propositional	attitude	reports.	Here's	another	way	to	see	it.	If	Jason	utters,	'I	am in	NJ',	and	I	follow	up	with	'That's	false'	or	'What	Jason	said	is	false',	I'm	intuitively	denying	the	truth	of	a	singular	proposition	about	Jason,	not	a	general	one	about	speakers	in context,	which	would	be	so	were	the	asserted	content	the	diagonal	content.	Similarly,	if Jason	says	'I	am	here	now'	and	I	follow	up	with	'That's	necessarily	true',	or	'What	Jason said	is	necessarily	true', intuitively	what	I	said	is	false,	which	shouldn't	be	so	were	the propositional anaphor picking up the diagonal, rather then the horizontal, content.36 Thus,	identifying	compositional	semantic	contents	with	horizontal	contents,	and	asser- 36	Note	that	though	a	two-dimensionalist	can	claim	modal	operators	operate	on	horizontal,	and not	diagonal,	content,	here	we	have	a	predication	of	necessary	truth,	rather	then	a	sentnece	embedded	under	a	modal	operator.	Of	course,	one	might insist that the	propositional	anaphor in such examples is obligatorily picking out semantic, rather than assertoric, contents, but then there	should	be	an	explanation	for	why	this	is	so.	The	problem	is	especially	pressing	since	'That is	true/false'	or	'What	x	said	is	true/false'	are	normally	taken	to	target	assertoric,	not	semantic, content. One	could	also	claim	propositional	anaphors	target	either	of	two	contents	(semantic	or assertoric),	but	then	one	would	have	to	explain	why	we	only	get	one	reading	of	'What	Jason	said is	necessarily	true'	in	the	above	example,	moreover,	one	that	is	false	rather	than	one	that	is	true. 23 toric	contents	with	diagonal	contents	doesn't	work.37 Taking	stock,	assertoric	content can	be	neither	a	diagonal	proposition,	nor	a	horizontal	one,	nor	a	structured	one,	if	semantic	content	is	to	determine	assertoric	content.	Do	any	options	remain	open? One	possible	reaction is to	build	a	structured	semantic	content	and include	all the relevant	information.	That	is,	fix	the	semantic	value	of	a	sentence	relative	to	a	context	to be	a	structured	n-tuple	that	includes	as	a	constituent	its	semantic	content,	in	the	technical	sense	discussed,	as	well	as	assertoric	content	(see	Chalmers	2011). In	short,	this proposal	'generalizes	to	the	worst	case',	by	assigning	a	very	fine-grained	semantic	value to	a	sentence	relative	to	a	context,	but	one	that	contains	enough	information	to	extract everything	one	might	need. Whatever	its	other	merits,	this	kind	of	proposal	is	irrelevant	in	the	current	theoretical	context,	and	this	is	so	for	two	reasons.	The	first	is	theoretical.	As	noted	above,	struc- 37	Alternatively,	instead	of	identifying	compositional	semantic	content	in	a	context	with	the	horizontal,	one	might	define	it	as	a	function	from	pairs	of	worlds	to	truth	values,	where	the	first	element	of	the	pair	is	the	world	of	the	utterance,	and	second	the	world	of	evaluation,	that	is	(ignoring	other	potential	features	of	context): SC-S*: λw. λw′. φ !,!! And	then	one	could	argue	that	assertoric	content	is	determined	as	follows: AC-S*: λw. φ !,! Though	this	proposal	connects	the	two	types	of	content, it	suffers	from	the	problem	discussed above. AC-S* is	not	suited	to	play	the	role	of	assertoric	content	–	it	just	is	the	diagonal	content. (Thanks	to	B.	Rabern,	p.c.) 24 tured	semantic	contents	(whether	we	call them	propositions	or	not)	are	not	compositional	semantic	contents	in	Lewis's	sense.	They	do	not	compose	in	a	function-argument sort	of	way	with	operators,	and	no	significant	semantic	composition	occurs	with	structured	contents.	Thus,	to	reiterate,	structured	fine-grained	semantic	values	are	not	compositional	semantic	values	in	the	sense	of	Dummett	and	Lewis. The second reason the proposal is irrelevant in this context is that, even setting aside the aforementioned worry, the proposal does not vindicate the distinction between	assertoric and compositional semantic contents.	According to	Dummett,	Evans, and	Stanley,	assertoric	content	plays	the	role	of	the	object	of	propositional	attitudes	and assertion, and semantic contents are compositional semantic values. The two	notions are	distinct,	and	so,	any	defense	of	the	tradition	must	exhibit	a	compositional	semantic value,	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	suitable	object	of	the	attitudes,	on	the	other.	But	the	proposal	under	consideration	does	not	do	this	–	it	promises	a	single	object	as	an	amalgamation of both, rather than two somehow related. Even if in the end this	were right, it would not count as a vindication of the	Dummett-Evans-Stanley position. In fact, this approach,	far	from	salvaging	the	Dummet-Evans-Stanley	position,	is	in	essence	another vindication	of	Identification. To	sum	up,	if	assertoric	and	semantic	contents	are	to	be	connected,	yet	distinct,	they cannot	be	Lewisean,	diagonal	or	structured	propositions,	or	Chalmers' rich	structured contents. 5. Conclusion I	argued	that	anyone	who	challenges Identification	must	still	provide	some	sort	of	account	of	how	semantic	and	assertoric	contents	are	connected,	and	in	this	regard,	I	further argued, the tradition from Dummett and Evans continued by Stanley fails: the 25 straightforward	way	of	establishing	the	connection	proposed	by	Lewis	is	unavailable	to them,	as	well	as	any	plausible	alternative.	Thus,	Stanley's	attack	on	the	Rigidity	Thesis	is unsuccessful.	This	failure,	however,	points	to	a	deeper	problem	with	Stanley's	notion	of assertoric	content.	No	plausible	notion	of	content	can	play	the	role	of	Stanley's	assertoric	content	if	it	is	to	be	related	to	compositional	semantic	content,	as	it	must	be	if	the	two contents	are	to	play	an	explanatory	role	in	a	theory	of	communication. In	particular,	the assertoric	content	cannot	be	Lewisean	assertoric	content,	a	horizontal	proposition,	or	a diagonal	proposition,	or	a	structured	proposition,	or	some	other	type	of	rich	structured content. There is	a	broader	moral	here.	Many	reasons	have	been	advanced for	positing	differences	between	the	semantic	contents	of	uttered	sentences	and	what	these	utterances communicate	–	not	just	based	on	considerations	of	operators,	but	also	based	on	those	of context-sensitivity.	But for	a semantic theory to	play	a role in	an	account	of linguistic communication,	the	semantic	contents	it	assigns	to	sentences	must	bear	some	clear	relation	to	what is	communicated	by	them.	In	the literature	on	context-sensitivity,	some theorists	hold	that	the	semantic	contents	of	uttered	sentences	are	related	to	what	they communicate	via	saturation	(Soames,	2008).	Others	hold	positions	according	to	which semantic	contents	are	propositions,	and	what	is	communicated	are	sets	of	propositions (Cappelen	and	Lepore,	2005).	Here	too	one	might	raise	worries	about	whether	a	tight enough	connection	has	been	forged	between	semantic	and	assertoric	contents	to	justify the	value	of	the	semantic	project.	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