ANTHONY SKELl'ON UTILITARIAN PRACTICi\L ETHICS:

SlDGWICK .AND SINGER

Henry Sidgwick and Peter Singer are 1:\vo of the most important utilitarian moralists. Unsurprisingly, they have much in common, including a commitment to a sophisticated form of utilitarianism and to a broadly foundationalist view of epistemic justification in ethics. Their commonalities extend to their attitudes toward practical ethics, which will hereafter be my focus. Both share a keen sense of the importance of moral philosophy to practkal ethics. In his Pmctical Ethics, Sidt,l'wick argues that "the effort to construct a Theory of Right is not a matter of mere speculative interest, but of the deepest practical import".l In the preface to the first edition of Tile i\1ethodr of Ethz't:I' he explains that although his main aim is to concentrate the reader's attention, from first to last, not on the practical results to which our methods lead, but on the methods themselves ... I am occupied from Erst to last in considering how conclusions arc to be rationally reached in the familiar matter of our common daily life and actual practice.2 In his most recent intellectual autobiography, Singer remarks that it is important that philosophy, and especially ethics, should reach out beyond the academy and show the public as a whole that it has some- thing significant to sa),3 1 Sec Henry Sidgwick, "The Aims and l'vlethods of an Ethical Society", in Prattical Ethics, edited by Sissela Bok, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 15-30, at p. 24. 2 Sec H. Sidgwick, TheMethoris of EtiJic.r, 1st cd., London, Macmillan and Co., 1874; 7th cd ., 1907, reprint Indianapolis / Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, 1981, p. viii; see also p. 215. 3 Sec Peter Singer, "An Intellectual Autobiography", in Peter Singer Under Fire: The Moral Iconoclast Fam His Gitics, edited by,Teffrey Schab, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois, Open Court, 2009, p. 56. 592 Utilitanan Practical rithic.r: .1'id,L,'1l'ick and Sin/!,er In addition, both are exponents of the idea that moral philoso- phers possess a certain sort of expertise. Sidgwick contends that philosophers have an important role to play in practical ethical theorizing because they are "experts ... persons 'who have gone through a thorough training in psychology, sociology, and logic".4 In his pithy "Moral Experts", Singer argues that moral philoso- phers are "experts in matters of morals" because their training makes them "more than ordinarily competent in argument and in the detection of invalid inferences", and because of their "un- derstanding of moral concepts and of the logic of moral arbl'll- ment".5 Most important of ail, both are authors of a work entitled Practical Ethics, in which they deal with (some of) tlle most pressing moral issues of their time. At this point, one might argue, the similarities end. Sidgwick's utilitarian programme has been described as "Benthamism grO\vn tame and sleek".6 Tn his formidable article "The Point of View of the Universe", Bernard Williams aCCllses Sidgwick of making "fairly uncritical use" of aspects of common-sense morality, and of relying on utilitarianism to "justify the status quo".' This is not an unreasonable accusation, since Sidgwick himself seems to suggest that one aim of the moral philoso- pher is to "establish and concatenate at least the main part of the commonly accepted moral rules".8 Singer, on the other hand, has been described as "The Dangerous Philosopher" and 4 See H. Sidgwick, "The Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society", in Practical Ethics, pp. 19-20. 5 See P. Singer, "Moral Experts", in Analpz:r 32, 1972, pp. 115-7, at p. 117. 6 See David G. Ritchie, "Review of H. Sidgwick, The Elements of Politid', in InternationalJournal ql Ethics 2, 1892, pp. 254-7, at p. 255. 7 See Bernard Williams, "The Point of View of the Universe: Sid~vick and the Ambitions of Ethics", in }.tIaking JetiJe q/ hl/manity and otherphilosophical paper.r, 1982-1993, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 153-71, at pp. 159 and 154. 8 See H. Sidb>wick, The /vlethods of Ethics, p. 373. In the same place he says that the "truth of a philosopher's premises will always be tested by the ac- ceptability of his conclusions". See also p. 102. 594 Utilitarian PmcticaIFitbic.r: Sid;;U7Ck Clnd SinJ!,er as a "moral iconoclast".9 He holds that it is not the business of the moral philosopher to capture and explain our common- sense moral convictions. No conclusions about what we ought to do can validly be drawn from a description of what most people in our society think we ought to do. If we have a soundly based moral theory we ought to be prepared to accept its implications even if they force us to change our moral views on major isslles. Once this point is forgotten, moral philosophy loses its capacity to generate radical criticism of prevailing moral stan- dards, and serves only to preserve the status guo. to Singer hopes to "make philosophy radical by linking it more closely to practice" .1 1 He makes conscious efforts to popularize his own views. 12 Sidgwick made no such efforts. Instead, he claimed that "1 would not if I could, and I could not if I would, say anything which would make philosophy my philosophy - popular".u The foregoing seems to imply that while both are ex- ponents of a utilitarian account of morality they use it to very different effect. Sidgwick is a conservative about moral matters, <) For these monikers, see Michael Specter, "The Dangerous Philosopher", in Tbe NeJJ) Yorkel; September 1999 and the subtitle of Peter Sil{l!,er Under Fire. 10 See P. Singer, "Philosophers are back on the Job", in Un.rallcti.fyil{l!, Human Life, edited by Helga Kuhse, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 53-65, at p. 62. 11 See P. Singer, "An Intellectual Autobiography", in Peter Singer Under Fire: The lyloral Icol/oclast Faces HIS Cntits, p. 24. 12 For example, Ibid., pp. 65-6. Ll See II. Sidgwick,Joumal, December 1884, in Artl1l1r and Eleanor j\1ildred Sidgwick, HeJJ~y SidgJlJick A 1\1emoir, London, Macmillan aml Co., 1906, reprint Bristol, Thoemmes Press, 1996, p. 396. For more on this isslle, see Stefan Collini, "rvfy Roles and their Duties: Sici!:,,,vick as Philosopher, Professor, and Public Moralist", in Hem)! Sidl;Wick. P/Y}(eediIWof tbe Britisb ,/JmdcIIJ}', edited by R.Harrison, Oxford, Oxt()rd University Press, 2001, pp. 9-49. 596 Uttiitarian Practical Lithic.r: Sidj.,'1rick and Sin,l!,er while Singer is a radical. I think this way of viewing the two is mistaken or, at the very least, overstated. Sidgwick is less conser- vative than has been suggested and Singer is less radical than he initially seems. To illustrate my point, I will rely on what each has to say about the moral demands of suffering and destitution. 1. Sidgwick begins The jvlethods q/ Etbics "vith the hope of solving the problem that he argues afflicts the ordinary person in her reasoning about what to do or be. The difficulty is that in such reasoning, most of us appeal to a "loose combination or confu- sion of methods".14 UnfortLmately, this delivers plural and con- flicting reasons for action, leaving us wondering what we ought, all things considered, to do. To remedy this situation, the moral philosopher "seeks unity of principle, and consistency of method".15 This involves developing a method of ethics, that is, "any rational procedure by which we determine what individual human beings 'ought' or what it is 'right' for them to do, or to seek to realise by voluntary accion".I(' One such method is utilitarianism: the view that an agent acts rightly insofar as her act produces at least as much net aggregate happiness as any other act she could have performed in her situ- ation. Sidgwick devotes a considerable portion of The Methods of Ethics to a defense of this framework. Aspects of the argument are obscure and the source of some philosophical and interpretive controversy" but the basic features are c1ear.17 The argLlment begins 14 See H. Sidgwick, The Metbods 0/ Etbics, p. 102. 15 Ibid., p. 6. 16 Ibid., p. 1. 17 For a more detailed analysis of the argument, see J. B. Schnec\vind, Sidg- }J)irk} Etbil:r and Victorian Moml Pbilo.ropby, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977; and Anthony Skelton, "Sidgwick's Philosophical Intuitions", in Ftlm & Po/dim / Etbics &Politic.r, 10, 2008, pp. 185-209. 598 Utziitarian Practical .Ethic.r: Sid,f,'n7ck and Sin,ger with a detailed analysis and evaluation of dogmatic intuitionism, the view that "certain kinds of actions are right and reasonable in themselves, apart from their consequences; or rather with a merely partial consideration of consequences, from which other consequences admitted to be possibly good or bad are definitely excluded".18 This view combines epistemic intuitionism the view that there are non-derivatively justified propositions - \-vith the po- sition that the rules that specify the kinds of actions that are right are those that form the core of common-sense morality, and in- clude requirements of justice, veracity, and benevolence, among others. The problem with this view is that none of the rules of common-sense morality actually satisfy the four conditions, "the complete fulfilment of which would establish a signiticant propo- sition, apparently self-evident, in tl1e highest degree of certainty attainable: and which must be approximately realised by the prem- ises of our reasoning in any inquiry, if that reasoning is to lead us cogently to trustworthy conclusions".19 These conditions require that for a proposition to be self-evident it must be "clear and pre- cise", "ascertained by careful reflection", consistent with other propositions considered self-evident, and that disagreement re- garding its trutl1 be absent or rationally explained away.2U The prob- lem is iliat the rules of common-sense morality are either agreeable but unclear, or clear but disputed, or in conflict with each oilier. As Sidgwick puts it, "so long as they are left in the state of somewhat vague generalities ... we are disposed to yield them unquestioning assent. .. But as soon as we attempt to give them the definiteness which science requires, we find that we cannot do this without abandoning the universality of acceptance"? At best, ilie rules and 18 Sec H. Sidgwick, TheAfethodr qf EthicJ, p. 200. 19 Ibid., p. 338. C.O Ibid., pp. 338-42. 21 Ibid., p. 342. 600 U!ilitarian Practical Lithic.r: Siti),11Jick (Jnti .\'in,g£!r principles of common-sense moralit:y provide adequate guidance to typical people in typical circumstances.22 Out of his rejection of dogmatic intuitionism emerges Sidg- wick's positive view that the only acceptable form of intuitionism is philosophical intuitionism, the view that there are "one or more principles ... absolutely and undeniably true and evident".23 On one (disputed) reckoning there are six philosophical intuitions, the most important of which seem to support utilitarianism, namely, that "as a rational being I am bound to aim at good gen- erally... not merely at a particular part of it"24 and that "Happi- ness (when explained to mean a sum of pleasures) ... [is] the sole ultimate end".25 These principles are abstract, making it difficult to infer from them what we ought to do in particular cases. Nev- ertheless, Sidgwick holds that "Utilitarianism is ... the final form into which Intuitionism tends to pass, when the demand for really self-evident first principles is rigorously pressed".26 Once he has arrived at utilitarianism, Sidgwick is keen to disa- buse us of the idea that utilitarianism requires us to be impartial in practice. He thinks that though in theory the vie\v requires strict impartiality in practice it permits patterns of moral concern that are decidedly partialY He adopts this stance as part of an indirect utilitarianism.28 He thinks that deviating from the strict require- ment of impartiality in the sort of cases that he discusses is justi- fied on the grounds that doing so will maximize net aggregate happiness over the long run. This version of utilitarianism permits giving greater weight to oneself, one's family and one's friends and others with whom one has special relations.29 22 Ibid., p. 361.

Utilitanclil PractiCtii Iithic.r: SidJ!,II ick and Sin.xer However, the view does not completely eliminate the impar- tiality of utjlitarianism. He contends that we ought to treat as equal to our own the pain and suffering and poverty of those "vho find themselves, through no fault of their own, in dire cir- cumstances. If I am made aware that, owing to a sudden calamity that could not have been foreseen, another's resources are manifestly inadequate to protect him from pain or serious discomfort, the case is altered; my theoretical obligation to consider his happiness as much as my own becomes at once practical; and I am bound to make as much eff()rt to relieve him as will not entail a greater loss of happiness to myself or others.-1!! This is a radical commitment. It seems to imply the sort of in- junctions that Singer claims are true of the scenarios that he dis- cusses in which one is called upon to sacrifice some resources and/or effort to produce a greater benefit for another. The view entails that if you alone happen upon a small child about to perish by drowning in a pond, then you ought to save her even at the cost of ruining your fancy new outfit.]l It also appears to entail that we ought to do much more to relieve the pain, the serious discomfort and the poverty of those living in distant foreit,J11 coun- tries, especially where the calamities are not foreseen. This sug- gests that at least in this case Sidgwick's utilitarianism is very far from being "tame and sleek" or "uncritical" of common-sense morality.32 30 Ibid., p. 436. 31 This case and others similar ones are outlined in, among other places, P Singer, JlJe ufo You Can Save: Acting Noll' to End WorM Poverty, New York, Random IIousc, 2009, pp. 3, 13-5; and P Singcr, "Faminc, Affluence, and Morality", in PhilosoP0' and PublicAjj{tirJ, 1, 1972, pp. 229-43, at p. 231; P Singcr, "The Singer Solution", in TlJe Nc}}; 101k Times MagtJ'{jne, Scptember 1999. 32 For evidence that his radical views failed to translate into radical actions, see S. Collini, "1"f)' Roles and their Duties: Sidt,)"wick as Philosopher, Professor, and Public Moralist", in Henry Sidgwick. ProrcedilWof the Blitl~rh A Ctldem}. 604 Utilitarian Practical Eithic.r: Sidgllick and Jin,ger Indeed, his endorsement of this view is a notable instance in which he seems to correct common-sense morality. He says at one point that he is not sure that the utilitarian view is "not the principle of general Benevolence, as recognised by the common sense of mankind".33 However, in his final evaluation of com- mon-sense morality, he notes that it admits that we have a general duty of rendering services to our fellow-men and especially to those who are in special need, and that \ve are bound to make sacritlces for them, when the benefit that we thereby confer very decidedly outweighs the loss to ourselves; but when we ask how t~lr we are bound to give up our own happiness in order to promote that of our fellows, while it can hardly be said that Common Sense distinctly accepts the Utilitarian principle, it yet does not definitely af- tlrm any other.34 The practical principle that Sidgwick endorses is both much stronger and much more definite than what common sense ac- cepts. Therefore, it is not implausible to conclude that his utili- tarian programme is more radical than some critics suggest, at least when it comes to the reduction of (unforeseen) poverty. It requires not only that we help others in speciaJ need when the benefit to them "very decidedly" outweighs the cost to us, but when the benefit to them is greater than the cost to us. Sidgwick repeatedly refers to himself as a utilitm-ia11 in his Practical Ethics.35 He relies on the V1C\,V in his The Elements of Politics and The Pril1dplesrf PoliticaIErononry.3C> These treatises outline the utilitarian viC\,v 3.1 See H. Sidf.,rwick, "{be lvlethodr of I:thics, p. 252; italics in original.

See H. Sidgwick, "Public Morality", in Practical Ethics, pp. 30c 6; see also

H. Sidgwick, "The Ethics of Religious Conformity", in Practical Ethic'S, p. 73. 36 For a detailed and helpful analysis of these works, see Bart Schultz, Henry Sidguick: .qye of the Universe. An IlItelleetNal Biograp~y, Cambridge, Cam- bridge University Press, 2004. 606 [JttJitan'cJlt Prad:icaIEthic.r: Sid,gwick and Sin.r,er of the matters with which they deaL But should we accept the utilitarian view for the purpose of reasoning about practical moral issues? Should we accept Sidgwick's claims about the moral demands of pain and serious discomfort? There seems to be a good reason why \ve should not. The practical ethical pronounce- ments of a utilitarian are only as good as the argument for utili- tarianism itself Sidgwick claims that the problem for the dogmatic intuitionist is that her intuitions fail to satisfy the tests for self- evidence. His acceptance of the claim that utilitarianism is justi- fied implies that he thinks that the philosophical intuitions that he argues provide utilitarianism with a foundation do satisfy the tests. This is contestable. Recall that Sidgwick says of the dogmatic innlitionist's intu- itions that "so long as they are left in the state of somewhat vague generalities .. , we are disposed to yield them uncluestioning as- sent.. , But as soon as we attempt to g1ve them the definiteness which science requires, we find that we cannot do this without abandoning the universality of acceptance".37 This is a charge that can be made against his philosophical intuitions. Consider the innlition pertaining to the main element of utilitarianism, that "as a rational being I am bound to aim at good generally, so far as it is attainable by my efforts, not merely at a particular part of it",38 So long as it is left in this vab'ue state, it seems to garner agreement, It is agreed to by the ideal utilitarians G E. Moore and Hastings Rashdall and by deontologists like W D. Ross who argue that we have obligations of beneficence, But once the in- nlition is made more precise so that it really does reveal the util- itarian idea that one ought, as a rational being, to aim onjy at general good, and never at a particular part of it, then it no longer garners universality of acceptance, since Ross will deny it. 37 See H. Sidgwick, TheAlethods of Ethics, p, 342, 38 Ibid" p, 382, 608 Utilitancl!t Practiml Iithics: Sid!.,lll'ick and Sin/!,er In addition, once the notion of good is made clearer and more precise, agreement with the ideal utilitarians will disappear. Sidg- wick thinks the more precise principle enjoins rational agents to aim at aggregate happiness or pleasure, and though the ideal util- itarians Moore and Rashdall agree that we ought to aim at good generally, they reject the idea that happiness or pleasure is the only good. For example, Rashdall thinks that we ought to aim at virtue, intellectual activity, various kind of affection, and pleasure generally.39 A jotti01i even if Sidt"wick does manage to get agree- ment on the claim that we ought to aim at happiness generally, agreement breaks down when happiness is understood to consist in pleasure and the absence of pain, since the notion of pleasure is often defined differently by different philosophers. Sidgwick himself seems to give various different definitions of pleasure.4o Therefore, we have no reason to accept Sidgwick's utilitarianism for the purpose of reasoning about practical moral matters. Sidgwick appears prepared for tl1ese objections. In PradicalEthilJ, his view is that resolving practical moral issues seems po.rJibie only if we "give up altogether the idea of getting to the bottom of things, arriving at agreement on the first principles of duty or tl1e Summum Bonum".41 In particular, we need to refrain from appealing to po- sitions tl1at remain mired in "fundan1ent'll disagreements".42 He ad- vocates beginning with what those "vho disagree on fundamentals can agree on, namely, "the particulars of morality".43 The point of departure is the "broad agreement in tl1e details of morality which 39 See Hastings Rashdall, The Theor), 0/ Good and EI)il, 2 volumes, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1907. 40 See H. Sidgwick, The Aiethods olEJhics, pp. 127, 131, 402. 41 See H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Ijmits of the Work of an Ethical Soci- ety", in Practica!Ethics, p. 5. 42 See H. Sidgwick, "The Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society", in Practical Ethics, pp. 24 and 25; see also H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of the Work of an Ethical Society", in Frac/ita! Ethti'S, p. 10. 43 Ibid., p. 7; see also H. SidW,vick, "The Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society", in Pmcticill Ethics, pp. 25-6. 610 Utilitarian PradicaII'itbicJ: Sid,gllick and JinJ"er we actually find both among thoughtful persons who profoundly disagree on first principles, and among plain men who do not seri- ously trouble themselves about first principles",44 The object of the broad agreement is referred to as the "region of middle axioms".45 The so-called axioms are, roughly speaking, the rules of common- sense morality surveyed in Book III of The Methodr if Ethics, in- cluding rules regarding benevolence, veracity, good faith and just treatrnent, among others.4(, In part, Sidgvvick's move away from ap- peal to controversial or disputed elements of moral theories or out- looks is driven by the recoE,>nition that astute, well-meaning, impartial inquirers can be led to fimdamentaUy different conclusions about the ultimate requirements of reason.47 These constitute "funda- mental controversies"48 or "fundan1ental disagreements".49 His very own attempt to "ii'ame a perfect ideal of rational con- duct" he concluded "vas "foredoomed to inevitable failure".50 The failure results from the fact that he finds both rational egoism and utilitarianism to be equally plausible (but ultimately conflicting) claims about the ultimate demand of reason. He thinks it is "rea- sonable" to hold either View. 51 His remarks in PradicaiEthics make it 44 See H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Lirnits of the Work of an Ethical So- ciety", in Pmctical Ethics, p. 6; see also H. Sidgv\~ck, "The Aims and J\'fethods of an Ethical Society", in Practical Etbics, p. 26. 45 Sec H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of the Work of an Ethical Soci- ety", in PradicalEthicJ, p. 7. 46 Sec H. Sidgwick, "Public Morality", in Practical EthicJ, pp. 33, 42-3. 47 See H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of the \\/'ork of an Ethical So- ciety", in Practiced Ethics, p. 6; see also H. Siclgvvick, "Tile Aims and NTethods of an Ethical Society", in Practiml EthicJ, p. 25. 48 See H. Sid&,>wick, "The Scope and Limits of tile Work of an Ethical So- ciety", in PmctimIIitbic.r, p. 10. 49 See H. Sidgwick, "The Aims and Metbods of an Ethical Society", in Practical Ethii'S, p. 24. 50 See H. Sidgwick, The ivIethods of Ethics, l"t ed., p. 473; see also H. Sidg- wick, Jhe Methorls of Ethii'S, 7th ed., pp. 496-509. 51 Sec II. Sidgwick, "Some Fundamental Ethical Controversies", in Alittrl, 14,1889, pp. 473-87, at p. 486. 612 ----Utilitarian PmctiCCl/I.'ithic.r: Sidj,'1l7ck Clnd Si'l'!,er plausible to hold that he thought something like this of other views as well. Note that Sidgwick is not it seems advocating that we abandon moral theories or fundamentals altogether. He seems to advocate that we refrain from appealing only to the elements upon which people do not converge. So, for example, if appeal to utilitarian considerations is agreed upon, the appeal is uncon- troversial. Now, no specific solution follows from the recognition of fun- damental and seemingly intractable disagreements. One option, of course, is to engage in a war of attrition. But this is not Sidt,Y\vick's strategy. He notes that to employ a moral theory or outlook in light of disagreement about it would be to invite "the grave drawbacks of sectarian rivalries and conflicts".52 To remain fixed in one's favoured moral theory means impeding progress in solving im- portant practical moral questions and refusing to cooperate. 53 Instead, he maintains that appeal to controversial fundament1.ls is a problematic way to approach practical ethics, since it is expres- sive of "onesidedness".54 The mark of a "thoughtfLll" or "moral" person or a person embodying the "spirit of justice"55 is a will- ingness to t1.ke an impartial stance to cooperate and forge lasting practical policies, "to compromise... even when the adjustment [policy] thus attained can only be rough, and far removed from what either party regards as ideally equitable".5(, The spirit requires "reciprocal aclmissions",57 making any practical ethic that unfairly benefits some at the expense of others objectionable. He holds 52 See H. Sidf:,lWick, "Tbe Aims and Methods of an Ethical Society", in PracticalEtbic.r, p. 25. 53 Ibid., p. 24; see also H. Sidgwick, "The Scope and Limits of the \\?ork of an Ethical Society", in Pradica/EthicJ, p. 6; and also H. Sidgv.rick, "The Morality of Strife", in Practical Ethics, p. 59. 54 Ibid., p. 53. Altbough Sidgwick's main concern in the essay is to deal with the issue of war, he says that the principles for dealing with war are applicable to "milder conflicts". Ibid., p. 49. My suggestion is that included among these milder conflicts are disagreements about which practical policies to adopt. 55 Ibid., pp. 58, 59. 56 Ibid., p. 61. 57 Ibid., p. 60.

UttJitanan PratticaiLitbier: Sid,gwick and Sin,ger that in cases of disagreement thoughtful people should seek com- promise, not enforcement of their O\,vn principles.58 The spirit of justice requires "sympathy, and the readiness to imagine oneself in another's place and look at things from his point of view; and ... the intelligent apprehension of common interests. Tn this way we may hope to produce a disposition to compromise"?) This methodology leads him to take a different approach to tile moral demands of poverty, pain and serious discomfort. Tn his essay "Luxury;' he addresses tile issue of tile morality of luxurious expenditure. He begins with what he regards as a difficulty: many of us live in luxury, yet we want to do what is commonly regarded as right and are aware that living in luxury is commonly regarded as open to moral censure. To make sense of the extent to which living in luxury is defensible, he draws a distinction between luxu- ries and necessaries. On his view, luxuries involve consumption that "increases pleasure without materially promoting health or ef- ficiency",60 while necessaries are what one needs for one's physical and moral well-being and for efficiency in one's work or social role.6I He considers and rejects several different arguments against expenditure on luxury. He considers the utilit.'lrian complaint that "a man who lives luxuriously consumes what would have pro- duced more happiness if he had left it to be consumed by others".62 He rejects it. Instead, he adopts the view that expenditure on lux- uries is justified when it advances knowledge andlor "the appre- ciation and production of beauty",6.l He appears to hold the view 58 Ibid" pp, 59-60, ,9 Ibid" p, 61. W See H. Sidgwick, "LlL'mry", in Practim! EtbicJ, p, 106; see also p, 101 01 Ibid" pp, 99, 106, 62 Ibid" p, 109. 63 Ibid" p, 111, He appears to think that this justifies expenditure on "liter- ature regarded as a fine art, on music and the drama, on paintings and sculptures, on ornamental buildings and furniture, on t10wers and trees and landscape gar- dening of all kinds", Ibid" p, 112, 616 Utzlitariall PracticaIEtbic.r: Sid)',II'ick and SinJ!,er that it is permissible to use resources to purchase luxuries even when this fails to maximize happiness and even when this fails to help those who are living "hard lives".&! In his essay "The Pursuit of Culture", he puts his view as follows: it would seem to me in view of the multiple evils of the penury around us a clear moral duty for most persons with ample means to restrict their expenditure to the minimmTI necessary for the health, and the effi- ciency in professional or social \.vorl<, of themselves and their families. The superfluity could then be spent in any of the \vays of relieving dis- tress which the Charity Organization Society would sanction ... \'Vnat stands in the way of this moral judgment is the widespread conviction that the lavish expenditure of the rich on the clements of culture, the means of developing and gratifying the love of knowledge and the love of beauty in all their various forms, meets an important social need.G" This suggests a plausible standard regarding our obligations to poverty and pain or serious discomfort. It states that we ought to give to the alleviation of poverty what is not devoted to our own and our family'S necessaries or to what advances culture, that is, knowledge and the production and appreciation of beauty: He appears to adopt this view because he thinks that there is a marked agreement amongst thoughtful people that culture mat- ters.!>6 This proposal is firmly rooted in common-sense morality. Ttis a more precise rendition of d1e common-sense standard that Sidgwick rejects in The Method\" qf Ethil's, \vhich is, as noted, un- clear on how far we are bound to give up our own happiness in order to promote that of our fellows. This new standard tells us how far we are required to go. There may be some worries about the view that Sidf:,Y\vick puts forward. We might want him to be more specific about 64 Ibid. For further discussion, see H. Sidgwick, The ElelJletlts of Polt/its, 4th ed., London, Macmillan and Co., 1919, pp. 159-61. 65 See H. Sidgwick, "The Pursuit of Culture", in Pmctiea! Ethics, p. 115. 66 Ibid., pp. 113-6. 618 Utiiitanall Practica!.Ethic.r: Sidg1l7ck and Sin,f!,l'r the nature of knowledge and the nature of beauty that he thinks it worth promoting. Presumably he considers only some k11O\vl- edge important. But which knowledge is important and which knowledge is trivial? In addition, we may '"vorry that perhaps the standard he advocates is still too stringent and demanding to be agreed to. Furthermore, he has not really shown that his philo- sophical foes accept it. These are important worries. In reply, he might accept that the view needs to be made more precise and that we need to show more clearly that the practical view in ques- tion garners agreement without moving away from the machin- ery on which he relies in practical ethics and which pushes him away from his utilitarian beginnings. So, Sidgwick appears in theory to have fairly radical ideas about our obligations to eliminate "pain or serious discomfort" or "poverty".67 This deflects some of the criticism according to which he is a conservative. However, he appears to be held back from advocating his utilitnrian positions for the purpose of conducting practical ethics on account of the sort of practical methodology that he adopts. This makes him conservative to some extent. But his view seems like it is the right view to adopt for practical ethics. It seems the most suitable way to handle the deep disagreements that exist in ethics and with which Sidbl"wick was all too familiar.68 II. Like Sidgwick, Singer is committed to utilitarianism. He seeks to use this view in an effort to make sense of the ultimate dernands of morality. To establish the truth of utilitarianism he sometimes expresses a commitment to the sort of intuitions to which Sidgwick is wedded. In "Ethics and Intuitions", he argues that certain of our 67 See H. Sidgwick, The Methods ~l Ethics, p. 436. 68 For a defence of Sidgwick's methodology, see A. Skelton, "Henry Sidg- wick's Practical Ethics: A Defence", in [Jtilitas, 18,2006, pp. 199-217. 620 Utilitarian Pradical.Fithic.f: Sidgnick and Sin,ger intuitions are owed to our "evolutionary and cultural history" and should therefore be put aside in favour of those perhaps like Sidg- wick's that have a "rational basis",'i9 He is keen to defend Sidg- \vick's claim that "the good of anyone individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if Tmay say so) of the Uni- verse, than the good of any other".70 He does not put forward any procedure for separating rational intuitions from those that might be mistaken for rational intuitions, and so his position is less well developed than Sidgwick's. What he adds to the defense of Sidg- wick's intuitions, namely, that intuitions that are the "outcome of our evolutionary past" are somehow less trustworthy than those that Sidb>wick put" forward, raises more controversial issues than it settles.il 1vforeover, he has no procedure for determining the truth of our intuitions. This may not trouble Singer since he appears to rely on a dif- ferent sort of argument for the main conclusions of utilitarianism. In his most famous article, "l'amine, Affluence, and Morality", he argues for the principle that if it is in our power to prevent some- thing bad from happening without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, then we ought, morally speak- ing, to do it.72 This principle explains why we ought to save a child from drowning in a pond at the expense of ruining our new shoes and our fancy new outfit. It also entails that we ought to do much more for the world's most impoverished citizens. Singer suggests that this principle implies that we ought to give to the relief of poverty until our giving makes us worse off than it makes any- one else better off.73 In other words, he seems to suggest that 69 See P. Singer, "Ethics and Intuitions", in The Journal oj litbic.f, 9, 2005, pp. 331-.52, at p. 351. 70 See H Sidl:,rwick, Tbe Methods oj I:tbicJ, p. 382; see also P. Singer, "Ethics and Intuitions", in Tbe Journal oj Etbic'S, 9,2005, p. 351. 71 Ibid., p. 350. 72 See P. Singer, "Famine, Aftluence, and Morality", in Pbilosop&V and Public Affairs, 1, 1972, p. 231. 73 Ibid., p. 241.

Utilitarian Practical Iithic.r: Sid!,'117Ck and Sin,ger he can get us to the main component of utilitarianism by appeal to our intuitions about familiar particular cases. However, it is far from clear that this argument is sufficiently robust to get us all the way to utilitarianism since there is much dispute about what counts as comparable in importance to relief of severe poverty.74 In addition, there are worries that utilitarianism is too demanding and that it delivers injunctions that are beyond the motivational capacities of the typical individual. In response, Singer has backed away from the utilitarian ren- dering of this principle. Like Sidgwick, he adopts a version of in- direct utilitarianism.iS On the basis of this view he advocates less demanding practical directives. In PmcticalEthics he claims that ad- vocating t.he utilitarian standard on the question of poverty is problematic because it may be "counterproductive"; a more mod- est standard will likely produce better results all things considered. He advocates that each rich person give about ten percent of their income to the relief of famine.76 In his essay "The Singer Solu- tion",he argues on the same basis that the rich ought to give every.. thing that they earn over US $30,000.00 for the san1e purpose. In the book One U70rkfhe defends the view that those who can afford it give at least one percent of their annual income.77 In The L.Jfi You Can Save he defends the suggestion that those who are "fi- nancially comfort.:'lble" should give five percent of tl1eir annual in- come and tl1at the "very rich" should give more.7S In the same work 74 For discussion, see, for example, Garrett Cullity, The A10ml Demandr of Affillence, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004; and see also T M. Scanlon, What U:-'eOIlJe to .F,acb Other; Cambridge,MA, Harvard University Press, 1998. 75 For Singer's endorsement of this view, see P Singer, Practical L:thics, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 91ff 76 See P Singer, Practim/ Ethics, 2nd ed., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 246. 77 See P. Singer, One World: The E thics ~l Globalization, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2002 pp. 193, 194, and 195. 70 See P Singer, The Llje Yoll eim Sal'f:: .Actir!gNoIJ' to E nd Workl PovertY, p. 152; for the details of his proposal, see Chap. 5. 624 U!ilitanan Pmctica/ .Fitliic.r: SidJ,lJl'lck and Sin,ger he claims that "I think we should advocate the level of giving that will raise the largest possible total, and so have the best conse- quences".79 This seems to explain why he adopts the various stan- dards. But he sometimes gives a different reason for more modest proposals. Tn "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", he suggests a weaker version of the principle discussed above on f.,rt"ounds that some might balk at its demands. The weaker principle says that "we should prevent bad occurrences unless, to do so, we ... [have] to sacrifice something morally significant".8o He seems to think the weaker principle is more likely to garner agreement. A similar view is expressed more robustly in more recent writings. In The uJe You Can Save he \vrites of hoping to arrive at a reasonable public stan- dard for giving aid. He suggests that we "use praise and blame to influence behavior, and the appropriate standard must be relative to what we can reasonably expect most people to dO".81He argues that this has not only to do with the typical utilitarian reasons that he and Sidg.vick provide. It has to do with the fact that the more modest/less demanding public standard is agreeable to or might reasonably be assumed to be agreeable to other non-utilitarian philosophers and to those who are not philosophers but who care about doing the right thing. He notes that in theory he rejects those philosophical v"iews which do not endorse the utilitarian implica- tions regarding our obligations to the impoverished. However, in practice he thinks that the disagreements are less important than the agreements. As he puts it: ''Against the background of 79 Ibid.; see also P Singer, One [forM: The Ethics of Globalization, p. 192. 80 See P. Singer, "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", in PhilosopJ!y and Public Affairs, 1, 1972, p. 241; see also p. 231. 81 See P Singer, Tbe J.jIb You Can Sat'l!:Actil!f!,NoJ1' to End Wodd Poverl)l, p. 154. 626 Utilitarian Pradiml Eithic.r: Sidgwick and Sin,ger a world in which most affluent people give only a trivial propor- tion of their income, or none at aU, to help the poor, the agree- ment among the four of us [Singer, Richard Miller, Brad Hooker and Garrett Cullity] that we all have, at a minimum, moderately demanding obligations to help the poor is more important than the differences between US".82 He appeals to these views to help "in answering ... [the] practical question" of \vhat standard ought to be publicly advocated.8} He also notes that non-philosophers agree on the sort of standard he goes on to argue for: "Surpris- ingly, Americans earning less than $20,000 a year actually give a higher percentage of their income a substantial 4.6 percent - to charity than every other income group until we get to those earning more than $300,000 a year".84 He might also note the general agreement about the particular cases he discusses and the weaker version of his initial principle, which imply that we have relatively robust obligations to those in desperate need. Singer thinks this agreement can function as the basis of a "realistic ap- proach" to the relief of Llmine. This seems for Singer to be a new and distinct approach to jus- tifying his claims about our obligations to the most impoverished citizens of the world. It is reminiscent of Sidgwick's approach, since it calls for agreement among philosophers, moral experts, and plain people who are concerned to do their duty. Its implica- tion is that Singer advocates a less radical view than one might ex- pect, one that calls for modest amounts of money and effort aimed at achieving a set of goals to do with poverty reduction that all see to be both realistic and compelling for their own distinct reasons. But this means that Singer is therefore in some sense more conser- vative d1an is often suggested. However, as in the case of Sidgwick, 82 Ibid. , pp. 148-9.

Utilitarian PradicaIE~tbicJ: SidJ!,ll7Ck and Sin,ger the conservatism seems to be an implication of a reasonable and plausible approach to practical moral issues that is the outcome of hoping to achieve lasting agreement and meaningful results. It might appear that Singer has adopted this sort of frame- work only in the case of poverty. 1 do not think that this is true. Although 1 do not have the space to defend this claim, 1 think the view is operative elsewhere. It could plausibly explain why he ad- vocates the policy that parents have authority over whether or not to euthanize a defective or severely disabled newborn with no fu- ture of value, and why he advocates that the sum total of sustain- able carbon emissions should be divided up equally amongst the world's citizens.85 It must be admitted at this point that the evidence for attribut- ing something like Sidgwick's view to Singer is not conclusive. However: e there is a difference between appealing to utilitarian reasoning for modest practical proposals and appealing to agree- ment of the sort at issue here for the same purpose. It is indeed noteworthy that Singer gravitates toward consensus amongst moral philosophers/experts and those who are seriously con- cerned to do their duty rather than some other mechanism. The appeal to consensus seems to have a certain plausibility and au- thority in the case of practical ethical dunking: it entails that the policy can be justified to others on grounds that they accept. That Singer makes this appeal is perhaps an unconscious recof:,mition of this fact. At any rate, Singer "vould do well to heed Sidgwick's advice about how best to do practical ethics. It seems to be the only way to make progress in pratical ethics in the absence of a universally agreed upon moral framework. 85 See H. Kuhse and P. Singer, Should the Bãy Live? Theprohlem if halldirapped tiijantJ, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985; and see P. Singer, Olle [f,7orld: The Ethics if Globalizatioll, p. 43, 630 Uttlitantlli Prartical .Etliic.r: Sir/gll'ick (lnd . \'in.~er To conclude, in this paper, I have attempted to argue that Sidgwick is more radical about practical moral matters than he is often given credit for. In his defense of utilitarianism, he appears to advocate radical departures from common-sense morality on the issue of the relief of poverty. He departs from such radical pronouncements in his Practical EthicJ because of the plausible practical methodology on which he relies. This methodology aims for agreement on practical moral policies amongst those who disagree on moral fundamentals. In a series of books and articles Singer has argued for a more radical moral view on the issue of the relief of poverty However, more recently he has ad- vocated more conservative proposals. This has to do in part with the fact that he appears attracted to something like the practical methodology on which Sidgwick relies, which may provide a mechanism for gradual but compelling moral change.86 il6 I wish to thank Meena Krishnamurthy and Peter Singer for helpful com- ments on a previous draft of this paper.