IS ,o « IS « " 3 01 ts 3 O m n iH u A a a o o o u V V 9) 4J O i 6 Q) j:' a V 9) 4J £ to V l 01 U 9 O o a B vH »-i 01 V) u <d B vH »-i 'ft £ u u> a o H 1 rH u a V a o u> a o H T> '> 4J e u j: u 00 O « o o b 0 u A V ' > (0 ;c O « o o 3 <4 > \a a u »! cv o . « u m <H 9) e " 0 a H V3 01 H > H 9 O . o J3 4 -- o w M JJ « U 3 w «n 01 ts u V tu (J r,rJ JJ i« O « U M u a ^ iH .J r s " & 00 « 7 . 5 5 ,5 Id 2i « tn <D u a *§ s o M K S .9 3 o -I r-l 0) tu V £ «J <u o T3 O A W n « u 60 H H to 01 J3 U U V 00 s . n 3 J3 t- fe. sf B rj « _  v4 0) A r o S u "H Z i « ^ -J ?» 2 , n u A fl) {>^ a ro n N \ u 0 « a a. (« « u M « u / td j: 9 m 9 4J JS a 0 U (ti m .a o. o .§ 5 o2 u s o s T* 3 « O (9 to * a js u d rt tft « m U4 0 o 0 J= U 9 3 u d j: o >% o. 9 XI a u o n o u %o 0) lu a a o H   TJ > o iJ V rt a n u 00 o rl tfl y £ fH n P< 4) ki > o o W 01 00 4i 10 « d B M <r4 « 0) . ? 14 J A<i the? are abouc "not-being ai±xed-up about the word being as they (243c). Thus before rhay l:ry to solve the probU.s o£ "oot-belng .hay »111 try to figure out "being." To do this, they consider those before them.who have talked about being. Apparently, these «ere people who tried to answer the question -What is there," -ith so.ethlns -ore than unlimited lists of every Eeeiing. sight, sound, noise, tsste. and seent. ,s « there is so»e world or all (rS .Iv, which stands behind .h.sa appearances. So.e of these people thought that behind the Sights t see, the sounds I hear, and all the other feelings I have stands Just Hot and Cold; that these tTM -stand-behinds" or .thers agreed that there are two substances or beings, but thought these were Wet and .ry or (according to others) so„e other two beings. Then there were yet others who thought that .here were .ore than two beings, and still others who thought that there was just one being- ,„t, Whether they try to say that being is two or only one. the Stranger argues that they will n.n into countless perplexities. Briefly, the perplexity for those who believe that there are exactly two beings Csay. Hot and Cold) see.s to be that, as soon as they say "Hot and Cold are." they (on certain unstated assu.ptions shared by the Stranger and 15 Theaetetus) oust Ismiedlately allov that there Is also, besides Hot and Cold, a third substance, Being. On the other hand, the perplexity for those who believe that there is only one being Is that Cagaln because of certain unstated, shared assuaptions) in saying "Being is one" they oust use two nases; besides this, they oust allov that Being and its name together are two, not one. In any case, they are dri-iii to a denial of their attempted nonlsa. The Stranger concludes: .Countless other probleffls, each one Involving Inflclte difficulties, will confront him who says that Being Is, whether it be two or only one (245d-e). There are others who speak of Being~tho8e who say that that alone exists which can be touched and handled, who say Being and natter are the same thing (246a-'b), and against these there are yet others who take Being to be ioaaterlal forms perceptible to the olod (246b-c). But the Stranger finds reasons to deny both of these, which leads him to say that Being, that Is, the whole uniTerse, is both forms and natter. But by saying the universe is these two they are brought back to the same perplexity they ran into earlier when they said Being

&A ic 13 possible not Co have the bit of ledse this thing [l-e. «rhAr bit of knowledge bird nZ-l. but some other bit instead, when la huatlog for so.e b .„o„l.dsa. as t.. ,arlo.. Uads fl.  . , -istake and catches one Insteao he makes a miscaK-e .o.e. so . one .a„..  „el,e was eleven, because he caugh -U-. »hlch »as »lchln him. Instead o£ the bird n2-. caught a ringdove, as were. iBStead o£ a pigeon. lep.v iv.' Uc^s. Wv 6.a,«o.ev.v xve et P k'cpav Suap^Sv XS?3, xox. .p.r ra ev6«<i etcpav J Kxowiv 6a,6eica clvai., ^ ^ , c * ivxX 6Sl6«<x xTlv .V cau.u ^axzav a"-c\ sepicrcepas. 199b. ..e oatch-up «hlch really .aloags togetbe.. of the birds Here the oacch up „atch-up «e end -U-. IS cxe.nr distinguished ::: a result oe our hunt, .us both distinctions «e.de, . >1.0 allesed weak spots, the blrd-cagc model does not a 45 It Is wrong, then, to see Socrates as coopletelj rejecting Che bird-cage model but still seeing part, at least, of the vax-block model as unrefuted In some way. And after all, when Socrates does reject Che bird-cage model, he plalalj does wish to say that the wax-»block model is just as absurd: he says chat ^ refuter (eXeytiicos) will deride both the Mrd cages and the wax blocks (nepiOTSpeuves ... ktipxvoi nXâa-ta) as ridiculous (YCXovoi, 200a-c). The weak-spots-ln-the-blrd-cage-model hypothesis, In concradiccloa with this passage, should predict that when Socrates rejects the bird-cage model he will not equally scorn the wax-block model, for that model, according to those who put forward this hypothesis, does achieve a measure of success and Is not the total failure which the bird-cage model Is. A general theory of 188-200. On the other hand, the Interpretatloa I am arguing for-that Plato rejects the Hatch-up Postulate throughout 188-200-can account for the complete failures of both models, while still allowing for the fact that the wax-block model Is initially dismissed for a more superficial reason (its lack of generality). As I have said, the pattern of initially dismissing a theory for one reason while later disoisslng Ic for a deeper reason occurs elsewhere in Che Theaetetus. Indeed, if we suppose that Plato rejects the Hatch-up Postulate throughout 188-200, we caa explain why he

TheaeCetue, and a sense la which I do not knov the same man, for ve can have a blc of tcnowledge about sooethlog without knowing everything about ic. Apparent consequences of the universal complaint. I need to look Into this giant hole. It seems to me that, strictly speaking, even with Che partial knowledge theories, ve still oust allow that It Is Impossible both to know and not know the same thing. For to say we have partial knowledge o£ Theaetetus, for Instance-according to any theory that I have 8een^^-~ls In fact to say that the real object of out knowledge-what we really know-Is not Theaetetus but bits about Theaetetus, his name. Job, age, and the like, or (depending on the theory) true Save one. Terry Penner maintains the exceptional theory ^ that (a) Theaetetus himself, not bits of some sort about hlo. Is the real object of knowledge, yet (b) the claln that we either know something completely or else not at all Is a faulty dichotomy. Thus for Penner we can really somehow have knowledge ' of Theaetetus without having complete knowledge of him. Penner, describes this somehow real, yet Incomplete, knowledge of These' tetus which makes Socrates' dlchotomjr faulty as an Imperfect or partial grasp' of Theaetetus. This Incomplete koowledge Is "somehow real' in that Lt really succeeds In being aboû Theaetetus himself: In a private (Continued next page*) 51 sentences about hlo, or facts about hln. These partial knowledee ea can only understand the words "I partially know Theaetetus" or "r . Theaetetus- to sav "r Ar. i, y I do know some thlnea X ® (facts, sentences, or whatever) about Theaetetus h.if t ^ vv-uauiQued from previous page.) rur ,7 r*- -    ....... r. iCTZ" that we can make mistakes h ^ Incomplete* m rhetorically for this posalblUtr -=ur«e. ' rr ' '"'==<' "yone you" Lrla "IS'.C 70U aot .h. or thin. ,3 I" theory „ "oth^/rrtthl'l' " Socrates' rejection .u unelaborated denial of ia, an unelaborated f^alse belief (an affipmat.* first explanation of -c.„es- .i/rj LTet:;"'''?'""  next page.) 8 t at first model). (Continued u £ 60 p . I U o . Bl £ V 69 C CI et n V a X H V i A O U) o s 60 c :d c « CV J3 o B U o a (4 U -C 60 B u u 3 4 £ U 4J d 3 O n J} H A D . 60 O 10 «!-( 3 d H H J: u d " J: u V I 01 u w n 60 < « 9 <0 V ta > M H d V «H m e u 01 J= V u JS u \ m iJ O R CO a 3 V a H M J: <9 u 1 a o u d o H s n s u u d o X u d o to a o M d rt u tt P . M s U eu « g iH 1 M v l O D tJ s CS tJ s s . 4) <0 f r4 4J 60 n  u v l a £ 0) U u U u a n e n o "H £ B <w 4) o a \ o u tN n d o Id n  n "H  w B 3 a JS ^ M o ® «d V I 3   S J? -B «0 a o 3 .o e* ^1 » «l s a >u 60 a 0) tM e a H n e H JS 4) » s 4J M u a u d u V i-> a n O 1 te 0 v4 4J X o v4 60 3 a <d d c9 41 d 3 eo a H u 41 tt e - « j: c a 41 e - « « j o JS b o e u s o t» <9 o Q u u M v l <d «M 01 X a «M W 4 iJ 4) 4) d u of 4) «) 60 o « n t> Q « u s u 0 M u -d h-t "3 o 4) j; 1 tM b 3 4) 41 J2 V a >> H M V a I-J H H V a w 41 tt oT u o cx Q . a w H .o « a V « »-< B> CO rl Cfl n p-i e <0 B , «w o 4l « u o W « a o V s 9 41 n s ri H 4) » a d O O o -vl « d o rl *> Id c <9 a s Q) W l ^ C O s 60 e 3 . ri O s *3 o 5 >> £ » 0 TJ u o e o> 60 O W 01 60 o 0) ij <0 o. » d o H U n d « 0* 41 d f-> :  60 O H U JO M u 5 u g § 60 td 4) « M X a o H § 5 «a "H «) T> 0 B 0) 60 « U 1 o .B 52 d u V ts 9 * -u d H e a) O v4 o O iJ v4 U 10 v t S o 9 X rl u *4 a g v( X 3 >. M O « £ t) V a 60 60 60 u 5 H 3 % rt M 0) a w DO «} 00 o M 9 § « » W 1 . I  _ o O ft SI g a p ' s K 9 O >, 0 01 A « m u 9 O t» <« a I £ u 01 0) o. a i C bO a 3 e tK Ji H B H 4J B v( (9 bD a M § to a u c H Q B M Jt H CI n .  » *ri u u «« d e a. *o u u o. a >  § > o , £ ti £ o ts <H fH tJ iH (9 rt B H « *J U a rt K n V 41 a » 60 c u H M J= S} 4J U 4» n 41 M je u 41 u t> <« 41 S  vl m H M 4> e J3 rt a u u « to H c U v4 O rt « 60 £ rt U 5 0) £ ts « J3 O 5 |k_| "rt S 3 « .c u o % « 60 B O H 0) ja o H 3 0 O 4J O. (9 B «] C1-X u 5 1 o u u M -rt a *4 «9 M o< s ji w ti 60 B 3 6 O v> § 41 B O u «8 V (0 9 (9 U 01 .O O 4) f-4 1 P* 8 Xi 9 a 4) e 41 £ a A rH a s w o i a o u u JS 60 « T ' 41 o< £ O (U o * 0 fM O e rt ^ « rt « a . u o \o t* -2 > tt u 'r". v4 u iO ti jj . q) tx. W  ' > o Q. ~ U * O iS 3- lo *b »* u A > \0 u H <- » \B >w «) a o o a 4) P * O «M H 0) 41 p n t) |C 4) t) |C 0 p 0 B U o .o n <4 5 M I « s U X 01 4) n .O ' rt u X cu U a 9 e 4) e JS AJ > o * a u w n v» v> .i,U 9 O o to V <4J O M 4) u J2 a O oa o V u i 4» U o u j: 4) a 9 <e u 41 x> o « £ " s Q Q> ^ 'i U 0 J= U u a rfS w u o u 0) C M 5 ri £ « 5 A *> o ti X " u  I '5 ' \tJ 9 o a u  t» 9  60 B vf g a> u B O o U ai iJ B a  C w « "H Oi 7 « 4) H a 60 5 B 0 1 H M O bl 9 o Cl B 5 6 rt O P o tt O vl t Ss -I CI 4)   9 a Jl o o 41 H v» o 4> 4> S «J 9 4> S 4) £ « rt 4) I U rt 4) U) O 00 3 SI > 01 "V 0 e 01 w n o t o u s i Zi = g " 3 a « ?. a 4) JS u 01 I V p o & q tH Xi a 3 Jr y u £ 3 TS » » U * " c) o vl «J cd p (d a g O 0) -S I to s 3 4) U4 u H a S "H O g D j: ® u a « O 4J 4) 4> V tx 41 U U> u v( 41, ta J- 41 a f o- 9 o V U 0 H u p e rt  fO t3 i 4) £ >u LI D > o S o H U 3. JJ to b u 10 u 0 01 j: o. «n u fli \U t! 41 Itf ? Q > o w u a S. J3 u  J '3 > ti a 0 K 41 tf v< >> K 41 "0 Cd m H P. > 'F c i U P o ts CI 1  Qi r* u A N (4 Id 01 AU c vH B <« tM «d > lH H «a a <J K a 4) «g CJ 3 j: 4 j \ ta 01 C u > q JS u V r u > cd to  m a> / 01 u O. u u n a pj ta b a. u u o u o 01 IM v ) o a > is 01 /O U  01 Q. o j 01 01 U > w 01 ti « a. 4) 41  x a 41 u u n 60 a ta u e o 9 o a H o C9 q > 0 u d b ' c h « rl  <n 9 r4 60 > 4! 1 iS 01 V § £ u 60 a W Ai a 41  o n o j: Id i rH u a s u H « n r-l H a U 4J U to Id 0 & CM ! 4) O f H i i i « ts ea 9 § a 0) tj 0) H 01 60 T> u 01 eo Id y I d Sr Jl 4) U O « 9 o 0) Jl 01 eo "0 u u «« s 0) j: A eo 9 Is 01 £ 4). 60 a o i ja a s a " ill ^ o t d o t vl U u 4) a H U Vt U Id tn 01 41 a 4> j: a u u m o « u 0) a U a 41 u Xi 41 U <0 4) a fl o 4) vl x: U H 4) U m b >. O Q tu b-V U m & 3 d M 60 «P O B -TSe* a <a o  o > /U 3. 4 3 u c > O s & 5 t) i u > \U V! e o « p > s «u 0) a 4) JO a i 5 C a I u e e 9 O to. ts % s to 4) 60 "S n) H iJ « Di 41 fl 4) 60 O 4) r-i <e H u M <9 S OI r* o cx 4) eo 41 a x: 41 u H » o u a « -4 <9  vl a U H U (9 « a P. 4l tt > 4) d rl £ M O d 4) fi j: u «j d i9 a b » oi O a d jd 41 U 41 0) 9 d 4> U 0) X u 60 a d r4 H j: Cd 4J H U 4) n s td H a H 0 d 0 4> Ji *J t 5 60 a o 5 g 60 e b ."0 c (d : 5 5 s o a Jd s H £ » 2 u. * 4> eo H -o « 5 «rl w a u o a i

60 s d o H O J M "H tt to u o .M V Ji 4) M tf 6 « 0 j: « u v4 ul 0 ol J. ol o 0] o «>l a u u >r4 0 o B) 0 iJ rt 0 «J iH 9 9 t-l u o tt 0) o D< & O « u > ti 4J o 0 X o 4J 60 o O H 60 0 p n vl 0 iH rl vl B 0 « «u <r| 0 vl U P4 V o 4> U n 9 tH X P< 60 0 T t o u o u 8 1 « * 60 e o U u « u tt 9 o the 0 rl u t 1 ii B O 4> o M X 0 O M o Q> u e 0 . s 0 0 > n 0 Jl 4) JZ 0 4J 3 4i o w a 0 j: 9 0 0 M e « 4) w o u o .4> « 5 4) U « i s «0 1 0 fi O. 1 u u £ .o I .<0 to o vl Jl u >1 ? 2 k  P H o. o 4) o. u r-l vl an 1«* s r 0 O 0 .>4 H ei> b « k 0 b m «j 0 V o »-i u p< a o o 0 4 X> M U I O 5 s <4 O O f-l J> ll " s 0 s 4) > 0 = 41 S I (9 b s 41 60 «) J3 3 I 0 M 41 60 4) b Ui a V* u « 5 -s 9 64 one of these bits for another. In this »ay we will be driven to say that not even these second-order bits are what we have la our cage, but there are third, fourth, aod ever higher orders of bits. Yec ^ order can be said to be In our cage, without the saoe probleo as ever: If we do have Lt in our csge, chat Is, know It, how will we be able to mistake It for any other bit? We are forced to run without end up through higher and higher orders, without ever getting anywhere (koi outu 5ti avoYKceoflfioeirte eis xauTo- "v icepitpexcxv [lupioicts oofiev itXeov noiouvTSs, 200c). A sufltmary of Socrates' rejection of the Match-up Postulate in 188-'20Q. In each attempted explanation of false belief, the Hatch-up Postulate was assumed. Against each mismatching explanation, Socrates argtied that, although It inevitably required that we mistake one thing for another, there is no explanation of how this slstake is made. This Is laid out in the table. False Belief Objects Irratiooal (transparently Mismatched Mistake described) 1. Theaetetus is Socrates* Theaetetus and Socrates Theaetetus for Socrates 65 2. Theaetetus is Socrates. mental descrlp- Clons of Theae- tetus and of Socrates mental descrip- tion of Theae- tetus for one of Socrates 3. Theaetetus Is Socrates. wax Imprint of Theaetetus and perception of Socrates wax Imprint of Theaetetus for wax imprint of Socrates 4. Twelve is eleven. bird "T+S" and bird "11' bird "11' for bird "12' Kotice that even the wax~block model. In postulating the mismatch of a Theaetetus-laprlnt to a Socrates-perception, requires that we mistake our Theaetetua-ioprint for a Soc- rates-ioprlnt. There Is just as much a mistake here as a mismatching, Jusc as, when I go and look in my tool box for a nut to fit a certain bolt and falsely think that I have found one, this mismatching of nut to bolt required that t nlscake the wrong nut for one of the right size. The mistake seetfts to be just as much a mistake, and not merely a mismatching, whether or not there is a right-sized nut in the box at all. 66 5. Twelve ta eleven. 6. The bird "T+S' oacches up vlth Che bird "11'. knovledge'*blrd "7+5' and tgnor- ance-blrd "ll' bird of the bird "7+5' and bird of Che bird "U' Ignoraace-blrd "II' for know- ledge-bird "L2' bird of Che bird "Ll' for bird of Che bird "12' 7. Some bird of the bird "*7+5' matches up with some bird of the bird "ll'. bird of some bird of Che bird "7+5' and ecc. The evident conclusion is chat no oaccer what we take Co be Che proper objects of knowledge Cpeople, descriptions, bits), an explanation of a false belief concerning those objects which depends on Che Match-up Postulate will fall to explain whac It presupposes-Chat we can oistake one of chose objects for another. This completes the first step of 07 argument that Placo in Che Theaetetus rejects the Match-up Poaculate. This first step was made by showing that the failure of the bird-cage model of false belief requires a rejection of Che Kacch-up Postulate; I 67 have further argued that at 188-200 Socrates argues against che Match-up Postulate from Che very first to the last argument in terms of lowing and not knowing. His argiioenC was suauoarlzed in Che table above. STEP TWO: WHY THE REJECTIOK IS CANONICAL The second scep of my argument Chat Plato in the rejects the Match-up Posculate Is to argue chat Socrates' rejection of the Match-up Postulate in 188-200 is "canonical'. That iS) X will try to show that Socrates himself rejects the Match-up Posculate; that he is not at 188-200 coming Co a conclusion which he himself does not hold. I7ov there are only two ways eo claim chat 188'-200 Is non-caaonical: One might claim elcher chat only I88»200 Is non-canonical,^^ or that more Chan 188-200 la non-canonical. The claim Chat only 188-200 Is non-canonical undercut. The point of claiming Chat 188-'200 is noa-eanonlcal is to avoid attaching to PlaCo Che farfetched view that he rejects che Pine (1979) seems to do chls, pp.77-8.

C3 g U a H b a s .a W o H > I 3 a y u u a yU w 3 O e « 1-1 s 3 s bo a 3 a d <4 V a q a £ 60 3 O 01 ta n o 0 u M U H fl) s a <d 01 M rt u o  H tfl 9 p O M a 0 o o a o S) n u « u <w u o o CO d £ 1 u H n V h u V o 0 a 0> eo tK d (4 5 to 3 u V >-1 r  i u o t«l u a H b 1i 3 t-i- M l d o O i-l 41 W § « to M U I tJ 5 V. d -c IL U 2 "5 .o £ 1 fiO 0 3 a a I u ts B fH o 0 M o tu u 0» 9 a J3 O u a (0 iH u JS u 4i a d d r« n H iJ a M d « D> to \ u r f-1 t H 13 « M JJ .O ii V e d j: a u <9 u « > « a rf: u u o o tu c tu c s d o a i » o (M u u t « 6 0 j: e O u H £ v4 to V O 9 0) o B 01 JS O j: to ts 4J A u B t» a n H 0) M M > e . v l U O 3 if 01 Q . a 01 3 ij But u o <u , CD s u J- ^ u Q ) CD s u 1 u V i 1 - < t O a 0) S t u f- o « 0) S t u f- u u & o IM lu 0 «> j: XJ W IJ a B U <H <H 0 £ M U 4 U a B t V H M « M § «H B O 4» M W 5 2 « 5 a 4> Gl U IM 0 to C3 1 s" 3 CL4  » o a o u n M eg t n u V x> JJ 9 O H J3 H a « 0) 60 U a 4J 2 O a e <H e A a 4J u 0) M .c a * « <v j: > u 0) > u a " 60 a II n u n a «) u e «u o Q> M 01 V 0) <U 0 H V 01 £ u «J o H s - ( d U u w M d O «9 0 g « o £ « H rt «H £ 4J q 0 3 n ts to s o tJ t) tt u a> a *2 b U 0) u > d 4.3 o> u I0> 01 »u IM 3 <H "0 O « e 4J »-( 0) u tt 3 a u n 01 u u is « js «0 a H n w V OS u « « IM o SI A n 60 v4 B TJ H J3 a 4J JS u 4> B « O 0) £ b W 3 u O a n <9 a u n o a <0 u 0> «9 u 01 d a a 01 « e «i » ii o s a o A a 9 a a B) te e «u M o £ U 01 o b a « u AJ M e U JS V u £ o L) 72 It should bj aov be clear that Socrates" Cheoc/ of thlaklng rules out aay alleged case of olsiaatchlng, since, as 188-200 eho«s, an7 alleged case of Dlsmatchlng depends on a mistake of one thing for another. In thof thinking Is way hof thinking Is theory of thinking is Incoopatlble tflth the Katch-up ?o8tulate. Thus this theory, froa outside of 188-200, undercuts the clala that Socrates does not in his own person reject the Katch-up Postulate at 188-200. Indeed, this theory of thinking gives us a better idea hov Socrates himself rejects the Match-up Pos- tulate at 188-200. Sow Socrates rejects the Hatch-up Postulate; his alternative* When Socrates brings up perplexities lii explaining false belief at 188-200, he Is not trying to oate a nev theory One reply to Socrates' theory of thinking Ukely to be made today is that the tvo loprlnts are distinct, even if we cannot see that they are, on the ground that they have different causes: the one imprint has been caused by Theaetetus, the other by Theodorus. I guess Socrates tfould claim that, speaking precisely, the imprlne vas caused by various qualities or things about Theaetetus, but that, evidently (since the imprint Is confuaable), these qualities are all also held by others. So even the cause of this indistinct print is theaetetuo no more than It is those others having those same qualities. 73 of false belief together with a standard theory of what a thought l3 and vhat a true belief is. toaglne what such a cross-bred monster would be; On the one hand, following Frege, we would see ourselves rationally "enterCiilnlng propositions about various things (I.e. in fact thinking or musing about Theaetetus, Socrates, etc.). When we stop entertaining the thoughts and come to a judgment, say, a true judgment, we are still thinking about the thing in question. But when we stop entertaining thoughts about things and make a false judgment, following Socrates we must say that rationality stops-there Is suddenly no belief at all In our heads, but only a vain sUent analogy to the noise of hammering on potts and pans, like the false speech described by Cratylus. Such a cross-bred theory of course Is ridiculous. The theory Socrates Is proposing is not limited only to a revision of what a false belief Is; it Is a wholly different theory of knowledge, too different eo Judge ridiculous as easily as It was to judge the cross-breed. According to this theory we are not thinking at all unless we are thinking about something, and we cannot think about anything unless we know all about it. Including how Its snub nose is different froa aH other cases of snub noses. On this view we have not any of us got real thoughts at all (until we get complete knowledge), but only phony thoughts,phonies which are no more like a real thought 3 60 a v4 0 > o « A n «a X 60 c u H 60 £ o Ql 01 »H O .a » a r-\ ji tQ B >o 4) V 1-4 P w P Cb H u 'W t o p t r Q  1 « Q b X e 41 JJ E o e b b bi o g o OJ u o a <a ti u u » 4) 4> X U tH u <s H s H b £ *0 JJ 0 « o s a 9 «u «a O k o « g O 60 b <» C o v4 lu 4 j1 a U 41 b X t U vl « V 60 60 n <Pt o A 4) O -i -1 U > « u O U a g rl x b b «u o 9 O <b x> I- " « .o vl u 3 n -I a e ?  n 2 " *3 o 41 CO 41 pH » o 5 a s i b H g- :3 2 If (d S 3 0 13 a 5 e) 60 s O td a  9 £ V U *< fH A U « 4» X 60 o Q 0) >i4 9 « lu o s «b O <b d O o rt U tt 0 4> B 0 n 41 H o> iO K o w Ci 2 »M o a 5 " *1 M «u 5 v4  60 e :d 0 o & i o 'i 60 6 "3 to c B a >> u o « £

JS u V V a " a «> M u 3 3 § " S CD (v « bO u c c vl W >  « (3 q> 0) a tn U n u D. e w u u a o 41 M o a Ck B a o a o u 0) o 60 a 0) s 9 O o Ai o tw a* u «l V) li B O u <F<  0) u V ffi H 4P a V a o* o tj u n U ot M e> «-N U j: 0 u O u l« a c c n j: Tl 60 o u e e o >  o a u vl j: <0 o 9 u u <0 ti « a e> ( S e 60 B o a t-i n H a 01 m 1) to K u ;i H (4 ft (u a t) <u d B t» » V* o V C o u » V* 3 () o <f f I) (1 f a V .c » n u I) (1 M M s 1 11 <M s_/ ji 6(1 4J ,s{ >4 O ;> n 9 u V u G vl O 9 a v4 1 <1 u o CI V o( 1 U f-H 4) s: u o .Q H U f-H *4 H O e J: u U 4 JZ js k > o tu B t 4J 60 a t) n U B d <>4 H V I H H »i CI u D v( V U 41 J: «j o *1 «) W e o U-O iJ U 41 J: «j o »s u u H .o >  g 0) lu 0) li 9 > o Cu O « fi o Cu H p « <4 > c 0) .C o 41 n .c o tu .O vl u I « 60 a M g >> C M A U >> a (9 60 a a 01 p> « 2 » w " £  £ » iJ a *5 H » & c« p 9 U U » «u o u Jl« to te S 5 « «o a »! i i î 60 « fO 3 S-8 60 D s 0) ii 5 66 41 B 13 M vl £ > JJ O o u e Q. u 0 «u to i a o (u 41 J3 u of « e o tff 4) g iJ (4 vl 60 G k vl 9 «e u <0 iJ U vl tn Q B 9 o bi « u «> 41 JS «9 V Si fi m P vl 1 O 5 « u 01 a 0) a 4) R A e 4J Cu 41 tM o J3 u 4) 41 c o t u o tM 9 O e 43 tl a U 01 vl u £ a a B «u M O 0) e V e P n c n Ji U 3 o 0> «j u 41 «i a u « dC a « dC « H AJ B U3 4) U » vl s 41 a J: u n 1 M o e bi o 60 9 a O vl vl ii U ii 19 vl > to X :1 (9 9 ta 9 H H M s V U 01 (0 « e b o at n a t 9  ed «9 9 A: U «) M iJ 0) 4) ii (9 4> V i5 o n u o (U 0 n E » o (u 4 « M JS « ii U Qi JS < ii U » n 4) « a t» vl td V O g X 0) V ii 4) a W vl 60 ii B B H V ti i iJ 9 v4 60 (/> h « e E M O o o «o fu (M 1 41 » 41 -t in J3 ii Cb t 80 Now If "Theaetetus clies" is false, then of course Theae~ cetus will be other than flying. We may write: The fonas for Theaetetus Interweave with Othe'r, or, for Che sake of accuracy. The Forms for TheaeteSus Interweave with Other with respect Co (itpos) Flying. Thus we may provide Che biconditioaals for false sentences: The sentence 'TheaeCetus flies'* is false iff the Forms for Theaecetus interweave with the Foru Other C^ch respect to Flying). Why the Interweaving Postulate alone does not give ^ suit- able definition of false speech. This method of completing bicondltlonals using the Intervearlng Postulate and nenclonlng the Font Other cannot by itself serve the Stranger as a definition of false speech. If the Stranger only had the Inter- weaving Postulate, he would be unable Co find any suitable definition; for the Stranger requites that every sentence "'point out sooethlng' (e.g. it oust point out about Theaetetus that he is sitting). 81 Two of the Stranger"s- requirenents for speech. Before Che Stranger lays out Che 'pointing out' requirement, he describes two other cequlreoents by taking two examples of non-speech. Some words, he says, are upon (cnv) things that are done! a state something night be in or an action something might perform. He calls these things "doings" (epôevs) and the words that are upon doings "doing-words" (p^para, 262a). Other words, he says, are upon things that do: the thing which is in a state oe which performs an action. He calls these things in general "doers" (ta xp«TovT(x) and the words which are upon doers "doer-words" (ovontrta, 262a). Sow a word string, no matter how long, which is only upon doings, e.g. "walks runs sleeps," cannot be speech; nor can a word string which is only upon doers, e.g. "lion stag horse." But as soon as someone puts together dolog-words with doer-words a sentence (Xoyos) comes Into being (262b-c). In the same way a sentence needs co be upon a doing; otherwise "lion stag horse" would be a sentence. The Stranger's "pointing out' requirement. But these are not the only requirements. A string of doer-words fulfills the flcat requlrementj it is upon at least one doer. And a string of doing-words fulfills the second requlreaent: it is upon at least one doing. But in neither case, says the Stranger, do the sounds uttered (ta <a)vii0cvT(z) point out (StiXoi) a doing; Chey do not point out a doing; in fact, he says, not even a non-doing,^ 82 In face, aot eveo the belcg of any being or even of a non-belng^ (oii6ep\av y®P "^"ce mtos ou-^ e<etvwfl icpâiv ov^ aupâxav ou6e ouaicv ^vTos ou5e ixq ^v-cob, 262c). Thus this requirement Is a third besides the first two: a seateace needs to point out a doing. As strongly as possible, the Stranger emphasizes that pointing out a doing Is not achieved merely by being upon a doing: no amount of being upon doings-^ot even if someone uttered every dolog^ord there Is in a rov (262b)~tflll ever point out a doing, a oon-dolag, or even the mere being of any being or noa-belag. This polntlng-out requlreaent seeos co presuppose that words fit together only In certain ways, so that he who points omr has managed to fit together (^ppoacv, 262c) the words right; the Stranger says this person makes a connection (t\ itepaivcv, 262d). ^ Apparently, in view of the Stranger's rejection of talk about what does not exist (237-9) and his break-down of "not" into "other" in the greatest krinds section (cf. chapter 1, pp.16-17), a non-doing Is something other than any of the doings the doer in question is doing* Likewise, a nen'>belng here is apparently something which is doing something other than the doing in question. 83 Why the Interweaving Postulate alone cannot fulfill the polntlng-out requirement. Any attempt to break down the false sentence "Theaetetus flies" into a mere case of interweaving, even if we make oentloa of the Form Other, will Call to meet this requirement that sentences make connections or poin- out. Such attempts must fail because the Interweaving Postulate alone will not let us explain what a false sentence points out. For Instance, suppose we tried to say that "Theaetetus flies" points out the interweaving of the Forms for Theaetetus with the Form Other (with respect to Flying). lo this case, the (false) "Theaetetus flies" will point out the very sane thing as the (true) "Theaetetus is other than flying" or "Theaetetus is not flying," which is ridiculous. Also, of course, we cannot say that the false "Theaetetus files" points out the interweaving of the Forms for Theaetetus and the Fcrs Flying, for there is ao such interweaving^ (If such an interweaving existed, the sentence would be true, not false, cf.256b). Thus something more than the Interweaving Postulate and the Form Other will be 3 Professor Penner has emphasized the truth of this Parmenldean prohibition. 84 aeeded to fulfill the pointing-cue requlreaent. This addltioaal aecessit/, I claim, must be some kind of match-up postulate. How the Match-up Postulate fulfills the polntlng-out requirement. According to the pointing^out requlreaent, a sentence needs to point out a doing, apparently by "fitting together" that doing with a doer, by "making a connection" between a doing and doer. If we are to have false as well as true speech, the sentence must be able to "point cue" a doing about a doer whether or cot the doing and doer really belung together or interweave. But this is precisely what the Katch-up Postulate provides for: if sentences are laatchmakers and pointing out is matching up, then by the Kateh--up Postulate the sentence will be able to point out one thing . about another whether or not there is any interweaving of those two things. Thus I say that if the Stranger is to give a definition of false speech, he must accept the Match-up Postulate.** Problems with committing the Stranger to the Match^mp ** Oetel, p.100, first pointed out that the Match-up Postulate-he calls it the 'Bestlombarkeltspostulat'-is needed for the Stranger's definition of false speech* In everyone else's Interpretation, as well as modem theories of false speech in general, the Hatch-up Postulate is tacit. 85 Postulate. If we take the Stranger to have given a definition of false speech, we must take him to be cooimltted to Che Match-up Postulate, whether he knows it or not. Three serious problems, to my olnd, follow from any such interpretation. 1. The problem of silence. If the Stranger accepts Che ^xdtch-up Postulate, he has either done so without arguing for It or after giving arguments for it* It will be fairly easy to show that the Stranger gives no arguments for the Match-up Postulate* Thus, as interpreters, we must try to claim that the Stranger silently,, without argument, accepted it* But this, I will argue, is a problem* The Stranger's lack o£ argunents for the Match-up Postulate. Ue could interpret the Stranger to be giving at 261-3 the following sort of proof "by necessity' of the Match-up Postulate: (i) there are false sentences; (11) If there are false sentences, then we must accept the Match-up Postulate; therefore (ill) we must by necessity accept the Match-up Postulate*^ But such an interpretation tears the heart out'of the body of the dialogue. Throughout the body of Che Sophist, the Stranger and Theaetetus are trying to track down the Sophist ^ Gilbert Ryle, e*g*, seems to give this sort of argument.

We cannot even concede that such a person (the- one saying "nothing") speaks-even if we insist that he says nothing. Rather, ve must assert that he who tries to utter "not- jg Pot even speaklfiB. (ap' oOv ow5e TOUTO CTurxupn-ceov, TO TOV Toiou-cov \eTcxv Iiev, Xeyeiv jievtoi iiTi6ev. iw' oifie <rceov, 08 y' av eitxxenpj ^ "ov ^Qlrxzâaxi 237e,) It Is impossible tightly to utter or to speak or to have in olnd "not-being' all by Itself; It is unthinkable, inexpreaalble, unutterable, unspeakable. (ouvvoeTs o5v ua oute 0eY5(io9(ri Suvaxov "5pei« out^ eiKciv oW eiavoTieilvai to ^ '3v aixo aSto. cottv ieidvoitcov TG «zl apptitov Kai âfieiricTov Kx\ aXoyov; 238c.) The first argument, that one who saya not-being is not even speaking. 237e-d. looks like Socrates- argument of the Theaetetua Cia9a-b) that one who thinks not-being is not even thinking. It is no surprise that parallel arguments are aade, since Plato holds chat thinking is nothing but speaking (to oneself sUently). I Une both up below. The "Chinking "nothing" is not thinking' argument: 113 (Tl) Be who chinks chinka ac leaat one thing, (o 6o5aCuv ev ye TV fioCoCei, cf. Theaetetus 189a). (T2) He who thinks what is not thinks oo one thing, (o apa |iTi'ov 6o§aCwv ouficv 6o5aCei.) (T3) But he who chinka no one thing does not think at all; it is Impossible to think what is not, either about what is or all by Itself. iWa jiriv S ye MSev SôaCuv to napairav ou5e 6o5aCcv. ... ouc spa olov ts to firi "ov 6o§aC£iv, outs icepi tuv ovTuv ouxc dvTO âTO, a-b). And Che "speaking "nothing" is not speaking' argianent: (51) He who says something says at least one thing, (o Tt Xeyuv cv yc Tt Xeyexv, cf. Sophist 237d.) (52) He who says "nothing" says not one thing at all. (o \in Tt Xeyuv TcovTaiMctjt H7j6ev Xeyctv.) (53) ffe should not even concede that he who speaks nothing is speaking. That is, we should never say "It is true that he is speaking, however, he is saying nothing." Instead, whenever anyone tries to utter "what is not," ve should insist that he is not ^even speaking. (ip' o6v oufic tooto <iuyxupTiTeov, to tqv TotouTov Xcyeiv (lev, Xeyetv jievtoi (iTi6cv, hXX* ou6e Xeyciv ateov, os y' av ^tctxctpj ht\ 'ov ecyycoeat; 237e.) To be sure, there are some differences between the two arguments. Foe instance, the sub-argument for (Tl) is different Chan the one for (SI). DO NOT/ rOANY CORh lmm€ Pfe :OPY SELEC 40 COPYING -IBRARY USE ^0 RENEWAL -RAGILE/HAN 50X SHIP/NO (EEP FROM RETURN BYTR AMOUNT INDIC 'S are not / 114 (for Tl) Thinking Is parallel to aeeing, hearing, and Couching (Theaetetus 188e-9a). (for SI) It Is Impossible Co say Che expression "something" all by Itself, stripped and disconnected from everything (Sophist 237d.) Likewise the sub-arguments for (T2) and (S2) ate different. (for T2) To see, hear, or touch what is not is Co see, hear, or Couch no one thing. (for S2) "Sooechlng" or "some" is the sign for either one, Cwo, or many. But It Is clear that (T3) and (S3) are equivalent. Given the equivalence of speaking and thinking, both Socrates and the Stranger would say chat the event coooonly described as "saying (or thinking) what Is not' Is not speaking (or chinking) at all. In other words, what pre-analytically Is called "saying (or chinking) what is not," after analysis Is not called speaking (or thinking) at all. The second argument given by the Stranger comes to the same result. (1) When a thing exists, something else that exists may be attached (upooYiYvcjyQai) to it (238a). U5 (2) But it Is not possible for anything chat exists to be attached to what is not. (3) But numbers exist. (4) So we cannot attach any number to what is not. (5) But (suppose for a olnute that we c^ say or chink what Is not) to say either "a chlog which Is not" or "things which are not" or any other way of Calking or thinking about what is not requires attaching some number to what is not (238b-c). (6) But (4) rules out the requirement of (5) chat numbers be attached to what is not- (7) Therefore what we supposed in (5) is impossible; we cannot say or think what is not all by itself ^without any strings attached'; it is unthinkable, inexpressible, un- utterable, unspeakable. After hearing these two arguments, Theaetetus might seem to be able to answer the question "To whaC is the expression "what is not" to be applied?" He seems Co have a hold on the one-sen- tence answer:

ts ta 1 o e V 01 £ 0 a a 4J o o 4J 14 iH t V Q JJ O 6 0 £ .C a <W tu u O M o 14 >> o be / .o u «) s o rt to ja u H a o m Q h V (J 1 M o JJ n rt t4 3 A s o 60 9 01 4J T J  JS (9 c u J1 U m V V B O u d ts o >u e a V p< o V H v l J: 0 u ij o b "H V CO B u o q B . E 41 iH M a <u u W ( > , g C ) 9 a H U o CI .B W O P U 3 n u (S 4J f-1 Q P U 3 n f, M d 0] a o q JS 0 u (A el ft « u 9 u H 0 9 09 H 0) » P> 9 u o B « c O «) V <4 O o . m ss u 9 4) JS rJ 4J -t to a u 0) j: 9 9 ( 1 01 u « -I o. n ft JS c JJ m H JS o. o t/} qj M JJ jJ 9 Q. O U « H JJ « H JS a o CO u JS u 1 u «l in (0 ft v( JS 60 o. u 3 0 tn 01 01 £ £ u JJ „ B o u «M 'a \p 60 a v a \_ / 60 B n H u H U o B n H u H U  " o u JJ «9 H 01 x: JS u o. o SJ V3 £ « 5 o <H tu fH o u u ii «>) JS JJ 0) JJ j: u u 01 « H « u TS cd iH s 9 o «w o S 5 to a *1 M) O > H W o 60 Q) B s H JS a o 0) "d 4> O u JS «a 01 o u X «b li 01 o u <a JS JS u ts ti e vl tj 4> U g u JJ r4 1 « o 0> iH fH o (4 U U u 01 tt « o V4 60 m -I u H S vl Q w ku 0 c c n (« « £ t4 (4 01 B « £ u ta o 60 60 4J e ti Q» w O g o H s a M u *J a M M u JJ « £ JJ X JJ to ti o JJ « £ JJ u 9 0) 4) v( u 9 0) JS U (4 u U o tt) 4J U U (4 u U tJ u <4 n 41 to tl vl £ , e- ti vl u 01 O ts 0) o JS O u U u w u n o m H u 41 is u a £ iJ M O- JJ a 2 ti O «9 QT n JJ v4 n bi (0 M bi « U O 9 o 0 O 0 £ U U u ti « <w O 41 u o vt 60 u a JJ B 01 p- <9 v4 V M X « 0 u d Of V) e. o s 2 o> e v4 e. o «9 2  S S tl jB a o 01 60 nj JJ a (d > -a rt 01 e J: iJ y « & o- M fA U ^ s  .« ts JJ (4 w tt H JS O 0 . u o v> ts « « a u <4 0) a Ji a « vl JJ tu M o JJ u o S ti w vl a< CA 0? 43 > 3 U b m V H JJ 01 8 <E 01 u u H i4 <u ti C ti" <4 vl U O «> o 60 a V) Q 4) M U JJ ti CO u JJ V ti £ 01 JJ n 01 0) tl n 4) H JS 4 9 <u u CO a vo J : fM u 60 O § « a o £ a> A 1 2 M l ^ 60 a a Q 01 60 tJ 01 o 5 01 a c a w B vl O a ^1 b a «s jc p. o w «) JS X u V Qi o. 1 u £ to D o  " i5 ? B ? u .c « " ^ S - if JS SI  S 5 6) a vl s 8 % 1! «t M W I 2 i 5 » S  e E m ^ a n d o vl o y < ri \ D a O tt 9 J vl f-4 O JS y V M 3 0 1 V u s to H <Q to w <B a o «o H > « T> Vl w t) > n ts W vt s o «-s , u 4> « vl « r-l r4 s vl 4J d «l w to v» U u « J pare. « vl o \ V a > >o " a m m U <0 d M JS It u & u 9 V *} w o d u u d o s a u rt V a B O v l o U w v l a a CU g . 8) <s n y 3 H « u  V J 3 M 3 U & n tl v 4 W £ > C k 9 o 9 tt Q <9 IM e u 0) 9 V I art m O' o ° u H rj f9 3 SI W & o u w 9 U4 VM O H M W a A S O u ti w J} 4) n <H I xs a o u a S J" » O » £ o> o < ^ IH & 5 « TJ U o *3 M  <w t» » o « t» o M « « *d 0 ee d s h o 3 d 9 o. M o u v> & u u v> v« V s or g. « >%  d u 0 d » f* u 1-4 to u o N to d *J d B o tl u m £ ti U d H *M Vl *» B H *M Vl >M > H *M Vl O ?! JW > r V s M O W m «? d > H M J M « > d M «u o w >» V d o. tt > iJ s d ** d 3 o *J I) JS u V o «M d o 3 V u *o ft u « o u e u > « g t u a o a o* B v« u £ « *» « o< L> to *! :d o n « 4i t A 124 aex itavTos icepx xo npoypa auto tioXXov 6xa \oyttiv 'rj Touvôa iiovov mivonoX-OYTicooSai xwp^s Xoycu, 218c. Hov is one supposed to arguev about the thing Itself? The Stranger gives two such arguiasnts, each oae reducing to absurdity the claim chat the thing Itself, sophistry, is an art, unless it is an art of deception. The first argument Is that if sophistry is oae art» It i9 at least six arts (221d'231e). uhich aeeffls absurd. The second arguaent is that If the Sophist's art is in any field. It ts in every field (232b-d), vhich also seems absurd* The only possible escape from these perplexities is to claim that if Che Sophist has an art, It must be the art of mafe-fng deceptive appearances (233d~23Sa)« But the Stranger shotfs Chat this escape depends on there being false speech C240b-24lb). Thus the Stranger will be able to complete his reduction to absurdity of there being a Sophist's art by arguing that false speech is Impossible and hence that there can be oo art of deception. Before going on to this second step, I will take a closer look, at the twin argments of the first step. The *1 ^ ^ argument. On the assximptloa that the Sophist has some one sort of are (221d), the Stranger shows that Che Sophist appears to be so many things that Theaetetus says he is quite perplexed (mopu 5e ^6ri to «oXAa nêavdoeXi 231b«> c). The Sophist appears to be: 125 1. a paid hunter of Che young and wealthy, 231d, 2. a wholesaler (e;itcopo8) of bits of learning for the soul, 3« a retailer (<aimX.os) of the same, 4. a seller of his own productions C(xutowX.Ti8) of bits of learning, 5. an athelete In contests of words, 6. a purger of the soul, 231e. The Stranger says that the result-when someone appears to have knowledge In oiany areas, but is called by the name of a single art (esMrniiitiJv tis noJiXuv ^aiviitaXi lixas 6e texvris ovopsTX upocoYOpeuTlTai)-that this appearance is not sound (to tavtaopa toyto us ooie 232a}. He claims thae anyone who gets this impression (o icaox^v auto) is unable to see chat one thing of the art at which all the results aim (ou 6uvatai eatVSciv ciccxvo autris cxs *o pa ata ta jiaSfiiiata tauta pXêtcx). Plainly this multiple account of what is supposed to be one art is unacceptable for the Stranger: (irj totvuv ^itexs ye aûo    aaoxuiiev. Thus they need to try again. ^5 a o H »! ,S " U p< o "9 O u o B 01 M a S fH H n 0) M U 9 .a > w* u H a 3 to 9. p- O »« oU u n w  U u V > - o n w V > e- to CL. 0 V a. 60 ts 1 « u 4) S a SI « w "S o 3 «Q Ij o> o A o » " " I M It O H > u «tf a o H U o> « u 41 O 5 «o u .s§ bO R ? B J 1 9 I H > M « .. Q «) S. M Oi « u « o 5 J3 O. O u A to t> u \r* O (V^ 1 a. g > 4 A w rr g a o e- m u t 3 u o « a » V & «3 o 9 e/> « u V j: u u h «e u «1 » W B «J S u t» to £ 4> « » K (4 d tn « x; 9 d fi u u « 5 J3 4J « B a o u *4 a U o o> M 0) CO u 9 V n 0 M <M 4) o to a « M ii to d « « IS a v l «o > 4 '5 fF < P «o P u e' U 9 *» > «& ---.-'if w i! a :a Di O Vt 4) £ n <d ja « JS «o "S p u tt o e u > >- M >- f > W X M 9 <0 m > \o u »§ a Oi n >H O m H Xi p. o 'S w X tu t* >- o ,< r' »» ? -o «0 5 M « o rt >> ii n 3 a o 'b » © '5 u > 01 £ «) «u S M /-» u Q. d U CO ti « /P «o N > u 9. ft ' 3 n ts o o u y o r'   o 41 «: <J fX 9 t* D> > « M O > 4 ' o td w O 41 ts H r' i9 o-t» « i 9 O 41 o »* I I s a to a 1 3 Q iJ ^-t I 90 a u s i? £ «i u ^ :a ' I « <t to <H C u 3 'd tJ o R : > <1 «i a «i eo o « S o .8 o S o -I x: to H  I T O S 5 -8 > 4 " U »« pj u »> .1 128 over aad over Co aceach being Co what la not, which chey have Just agreed .(236d-~239c, of. pp.111^ above) la Che aoac Impossible Chlog la Che world: tu' yap iirj ov-ct to *ov itpooOTtciv ^(UEB noXXaicxs avocYicaCEOdai* 5loXoyriaâevos vuv 6^ icou touto eivai itavtbiv a&uvatutatov. Thus, if Che Scranger does la what follows in face argue chac false sescencea are impossible (as our new roslclon muse claim, contrary Co the appearance of 261'3), be will have succeeded In showing chat there is no art of sophistry. By denying that there is an arc of sopliiscry, the Stranger will have succeeded In separating the Sophist from the Philosopher and Statesman, on the assumption that each of these has an art. And he will have found the Sophist's ^place': outside the arts along with, presumably, "rules of thumb', "old wives' tales', and other Irrational "knacks'. Our first oaln problem of interpretation, then, can be solved, if we caa show that the Stranger denies the existence of false speech throughout Che Sophist. This will depend oa finding such aa Incerprecatioa of 261-3, where false speech is ostensibly defined. THE StCOHD PROBLEM: THE DZFtNITIOIT OF FALSE SPEECH The S traager will seem to find a way to define false seateaces and beliefs. Thua the new position claiming chAt the Theaetetus and Sophist are written la Plato's peculiar dialogue 129 style and claiming chat the Stranger denies the possibilicy of false speech must somehow devalue the apparent reversal later in this dialogue, Just as Che apparent reversals at the end of the Laches, Meno, and Sophist 236d~239e are devalued by a satisfactory grasp of the teacher's whole positloa. In fact, the Stranger gives quice a few hints that his owa understanding will devalue the later reversal. He says chat the later reversal appears to attack Ce*it\Qeo0ci) the theory of his ovn father, Pemenldea (tov tou itatpos IIdp(ievi6ou Xoyov, cf.241d, 242a). But the Stranger has a pressing request for Theaetetus: that he will not think that the Stranger is turning into a sort of parricide (lirj ^le oiov iratpoXotov uiroXSpgs yiYvecflat two, 2&ld). Also, the Stranger says that he has always been too fainthearted (oneipriteM) Co refute this theory and still is Qov, 242a* He Is afraid thae he will seem to be mad (liaviicos), reversing his own position (irapa iio6a (letâaXuv 1 V ^ êKZUtov avu ksi leatu). And he Is undertaking the refutation for Theaetetus' sake (orjv y'P 5*1 cXcyxciv Xoyov actdTiac{ieda, 242ãb), so it would seem that he is not undertaking it oa his owa behalf. Our new positloa caa unravel all these hints. The Stranger declares Chat he oight seem to Theaetetus to be doing something crazy (cf 2I6d: tote 6' eattv ots lupaoxô^'^o icavtaitaffw 'exovtea ^aviKus). Bvte in fact he is ade about to refute

(2T or F) Whether or aot a string of vords will point out aa laterveavlng la the world, sotae vords will, some will oot, fit together. [Call this "fitting together^ p»"l Hext the Stranger sets out the dlstlnetloo Theaetetus had la olad for detetolalng whether or not vords fit together^ p. (fe will see that this distinction will establish (2t) before It establishes C2T or F). Fitting together^ j. Is distinguished by marking off different kinds of vords. That Is, Theaetetus will agree that (claim 1) A stateoent never consists of doer->vord8 spoken together, nor of dolng-vords apart feon doer-words, spoken together. oueouv ovoiiaTuv (lev ^lovuv ouvexus Xcyojicvuv ouic eaxx so-ce \oyo8, oy6' au pTîoTuv ovopoTuv Xex^cvtuv, (2620^. For example, (a) "walks ruas sleeps'* Is not a sentence, and no other string of doiog-*word8, no matter how long, will make up a sentence (262b), And (,b) neither Is "lion stag horse," or any string of only doer~vords, a seatence (262b'e). But the StrangerV without saying that ehls Is what he will do, la fact uadercuts this argumeat for fitting together^ j by carrying it one step further* He points out to Theaetetus the deeper 133 claim, the reason vhy "lion stag horse" or "walks runs sleeps" are not sentences* The Stranger says that la neither of these examples do the souods uttered (ts ^vtiOcvts) poiat out (StiXoi) aay doing or non-dolQg or being of anything that is or Is not (262c). On' Theaetetus' level, this final reason for (2T or F) may seem to close Che case In favor of (IT or F)* But, on the Stranger's level, chls final reason undercuts (21 or F), supporting Instead (2T). t caa redo the Stranger's argumeat with chls drawlog. a b F G Take ^ and ^ to be doers, £ and £ to be doings. In the picture I show that a doer x does some doing ^ by drawing a line between X and 2," Suppose chat the Stranger holds that (2T) Only a string of words that vlll point out an inter* weaving In the vorld will fit together, which In this picture amounts to the dais chat only "Fa," "Fb,"

la the text, the Stranger concludes this part of the arguoenc by saying that "according to how things do or do not fit together, words do or do not £le together." ouT(i> 6Ti icaSanep -cc vparfiuxtfL ta (lev ocXXriXovs ^ilPHO-ccE, xa 6" ov, Kcii nept to ttis wvtis au on^xs TS (lev oux appo-CTeit xa oe apiio-cTovra ouTuv xSyov OTexpYseraTO, 262d-e. Looking at oy sodel, the Stranger talghe put it this way. In the model, the things £ and & fit together, so the words and "a" fit together; they form a sentence, "fa." But the things and ^ do act fit together, so the words "G" and do not fit V together; "Gb" Is not a seaeeoce. The pieces of language fie together when and only when the corresponding pieces of the world fit"together. If we offer a distinction of types of words alone, whether It is between doer- sod doing-words or names and live verbs, or anything else, and try to define being a sentence with that distinction alone, then the Stranger will claim that the only evidence we can bring out for out word-based distinction is in fact evidence for C2T), not (2T or F). Theaetecus views this first part of the arguoene from a different level, of course. He sooehow still cakes the fitting together of words to be fitting together^ p, seizing the 137 examples of sentences and non-sentences (ZSIb-c) without grasping the reason for their being or not being sentences. Part two; 262e-263c. The second part of the Stranger's argument,262e-263c, begins with the Stranger laying down the "aboutness" requirement; a sentence-If It is to be a sentence- must be about something. For a sentence not to be about - > " c. ^ ? something is impossible (Xoyov avonficaxov, o-covnep 5, twos e\va\ XSyov, n?! 6e txvos «6uvat0v, 262e, cf. ThvV.ef.esua 189a, I89d-e). Vaguely, he also says that every sentence must "have aoae quality' (itoxov ^xvu). Again we see two different levels of understanding here. On one level, Theaetetus takes this to say that every sentence must have the quality of being either true or false- On another level, the Stranger takes this to be the quality of being true. The Stranger will now go'on to use the « aboutness requirement to reduce Theaetetus's position to absurdity, although he will neglect to say the final one sen- tence of the reduetlo, namely, the sentence "Therefore, false sentences are Impossible." In the text, the Stranger deals with an example of a true sentence first, "Theaetetus sits.* This sentence is about something-Theaetetus himself (263a). Likewise, in oy drawing, the Stranger would say that the true sentence "Gb" Is about something, too, 138 Kexc, Itt Che text, the Stranger aaka Theaetetus what th^ is about: -Theaetetus flies." Theaetetus claims that no one could deny that this Is about nothing butt himself, toutov ou6^ sxs (xXXxiis cxnoi iiX,t|v c^ov ce KKV itcpt euou, 263a), that is, everyone would agree that this Is about Theaetetus- Looking at oy drawing, Theaetetus would likewise claim that "Ga" could only be about a. The Stranger makes this reply: But we agree that every sentence oust have soma quality. - .  What quality oust one say (!ach of these sentences has? (263a-b). Theaetetus, of course, says that one Is false, the other true. To reduce Theaetetus' position Co absurdity, the Stranger needs one more claim:-to be about a thing, a sentence must say or point out something about that thing. For instance, the true sentence points out G about b. In the Stranger's words, the true sentence says the things that ate, as they are, about Theaetetus" (Xcytx 5c aytwv o nev aXn8r,8 w ovta us c«'5^ uepv oou)  139 The trouble with Theaetetus' position is saying what the false "Ga" says or points out about ai. If he had the Match-up Postulate, he could say that "Ga" points out C about a, irregardless of the fact that G Is not about a. - In our model we had: a F G Here G is not about a, only F is- The false, therefore, says what ts other (that is, G) than uhat is about a (that Is, F). It says what is "not'Cthat Is, what is other than) as if it In the Stranger's words, o 6e 5n ifreuStis Hepa -cuv ovttav .   ta iiTt ^vt' w8 ovta Xeyt^* (263b). Just as Jn the first part of the argument, 261d-262c, Theaetetus seizes this much of the explanation and does not aee any trouble. But Theaetetus does not aee what this purported solution tests on. In Theaetetus' eyes, the Stranger seems to be saying that, although G is not about a, nevertheless G can be aaid about a. For G Is not contrary to being, and thus unutterable (as was shown at 236d-239c)- It ^ not Itt that It is other than something, here _a. The Stranger's theory of "not" as other than certainly does let him Bsy what is not, that is, what is-other than. In this way Theaetetus Is right. But the whole greatest kinds section does not enable him to say what is other than a about a; this Is 140 the point Theaetetus has alssed. We can say «hat Is "not" or -hat Is othec thaa, "foe ve said that about each ehlog there is ouch that Is, and nuch that Is aoc« (itoXXa ^cv yep êâev ov-ca itepi SKaoTOv cwax *oy, KoXXa 6e ouc ovTa.) Hlthout the Match-up Postulate* this reasoa shovs at nost that only true sentences can exist. According to Che Stranger's theory of "not," In oy model we are alloved to say Chat F Is, with reference to or about ^ and b, and that Is with reference to or about but Is "not' or other than with reference to cf. 257b, above pp. 18_£. This theory of "not" offers no support for the claim Theae- tetus needs, that a false sentence says (about a thing) things that are, other than what really Is about that thing (e£.263b: "ovtuv 5e ye *6xepa iccp x <Jou). To take a case froo the oodel, this theory of "not" offers no support for the claim that "Ga' says G about Really, Q Is not about And this can be said: £ot^. Really, F Is about And this can be said: Pa. This Is as far as the Stranger's theory of "not" will carry us. ^ tToc to nentlon that a Is other than with reference to and ? Is other than with reference to 0. L41 All in all, Che requirements which che Stranger puts on sentences talghe be written this way. Let £ be a word string, x a doer, and 9 a doing or a non-doing (that is, a doing chat is other than some doer's doings). (I). ^ is a sentence (that is, £ fits togetheriy) if and only If there Is an such that ^ Is about x (262e, 263c)« (II) £ Is about X if and only If there is a 4 such that ^ says 4 about x (cf. 263b). (III) ^ says 4 about x if and only If, first. ^ contains words (ts Tf^s 4<dVT]S oriiieta) for x and 4 and, second, 4x. The result, of course. Is that there are oo false sentences. Theaetetus, forgetting or never noclclng chae Che rlatsh^p Poseulaee was rejeceed, does not see where the argument has led. The Stranger, a lesson In self-restraint in teaching, does not blurt out this one-sentence answer. Instead, one last Ciffle, he reminds Theaetetus of the main premises: 1. If "Theaetetus flies'* is cot About Theaetetus, it is not about anything (ei £e cori oos, ou< aXXou ye ouSevos, 263e). 2. If "Theaetetus £lles" is not about anything, it is not a sentence ae all (^n^evos 6c wv ou6' av X-oyos ciii ro vapansv* U 4'^ ^ u u 2 i TJ b u m u > o O M '' i< & P _ 'P o » ? -< «*o o p v§ ^ ? W «a o s ^1 > u u \U V a> a Q o «u A o > u > > - > - > H >  b u > J- a 9 k' t 9 \g <D ? 3. F H e ,/a M - ^ « « 9 b « s s « eo a :d I u <o 5 > 3 9 > '3 JO a. > - ^ U <X> d. <s u :>  xP > « o u >- ti ^o M Q V a M 5 2 e I 1 J ^ I a 4 « S S ^ s " I u u a U u M Q S O V I ° § I « » C «9 S O  « «0 ° 3 & w « u o J2 M a o 0 «) a « « "3 4 H lU «u « m no « 41 A «M o a o v » v a H u s « 43 «L 4J V H M O <n « o 4J U td V H M O <n « o D J3 «> 1 a D «J 4J "D a 9 f3 o o> w n « u u H «4 « a n a o W Si d H V S « e« 9 R H S JJ 5 O to JS u CO iJ .e *< w * § S iH ji u H £ a rt 9 \  « M V P « « o v> U » e (. a D V Of <4 u u a a li 41 4P V> a «i a «i H 4i V s = 8 V 6 3 S » tj S  A «) o » « - s I H :i %> '5 5 ^ 5 «o 5 '" * »\D l-l. '5 -5 «-> o a. w w » p O o «u V u UJ« u > fp. ? 3 ? tH H a u ifU 5 " u /sU o M J3 60 4i a 'd u «fl M C 0) 3 -S co a a s to a 3 a b ? 3 U «1 a « v t» V & fi t. M M « U S tsl u H I j: ee a «j .e u 9 » . «y " S 5 u VJ to> o u u I ^ « i 1 : iJ > 4P u \o & b -S 5 t H « " to a V , H «cS u ?! ts 4" ' s- s £ £ JS I" 9 a e T> H i H « o 5 S ^ S -g " § - s o « tl H « o rj at NO « E «> 9 B e 0 M 4> 4* £ £ «> eo 9 O 4: «l « u 0 0 u « w T> u 0 V a « e> a ei 0 hi u « -5 s t % " « u V s  ® 3 <j  o « ' W tJ n d b VI « «M f . « X I - f  i-Tr' 5 e O u > 3 4 § I a o g m V to e S- o V I IS g o u 4) JS > 4J «) a c w Q a u 3 60 a I 146 ^ ^ ^ ^ ( other; ouSexa aiîotepa ye  ' t 6o5«C«v . . . 6o§5aexev ois to <» ^ > Etepov etepov ectxv, 190c. Likewise, the Stranger would aay that if two things ate other, one may not say they are the same. The worda simply would not fit together to aake up a sentence. If Che two things do not weave together, it is impossible to say that they do (cf. 2S9e: tsxetircatri hSvtwv xoytov \ct\v âsvtais to SiaXueiv skceotov otco iiavxuv* 6ia yap triv ôiiXuv tuv eiSuv ovn«X.o>cTiv o X.oyoff yeyovcv niiiv). Words fit together Co make up sentences according co the way thlnga fit together in the world (cf.262d-e; outu 6?! iccflonep -ca tcpoy^ara xa jiev aXX^Xois ^piiotre, ta 5' ou, Kci «Epi ta ttjs ^oivds at otîcxs ixev oux «piioTTei, ta 6e apuoTCovTd outcuv X,oyov CTExpyacaTc.) Speech is impossible if Foros do not blend (6xa yop tt\v ^WtiXuv tuv si6uv ^(ikXok^v o \0y0lT Y^OVEV Conclusion. Our new posielon requires that we be able to separate two levels of understanding, che level understanding the whole position and the level of ineooplete understanding, and that che whole position can plausibly be seen in the text to devalue che ostensible conclusion. This t have tried to do. It seems Co oe that (1) the Stranger.showed how the doer word/doing word <Useinceloa tests on che principle that a sentence should point out something about something, and (11) he shoved that this aboutness requirement cannot be met by false sentences -147 (Theaetetus' "understanding' of the situation notwlchscandlng). If chls is right we can at last fit together the parts of the story told to terpsion: Socrates' theory of thinking (209a-c) fits together wlch che Stranger's cheory of sentences; Socraces' vlev of falsity complements, not contradicts, the Stranger's. Ho more need we say chat in che Sophist Plato gave a quick solution to one of the problems of falsity, 'that of being and noc-belng, and forgot to explain thu problem of knowing and not knowing, left unsolved at Theaetetus 188-'200.