Rezensionen Besprechungen Comptes rendus Objekttyp: Group Zeitschrift: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie = Revue philosophique et théologique de Fribourg = Rivista filosofica e teologica di Friburgo = Review of philosophy and theology of Fribourg Band (Jahr): 55 (2008) Heft 1 PDF erstellt am: 10.07.2018 Nutzungsbedingungen Die ETH-Bibliothek ist Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Inhalten der Zeitschriften. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern. Die auf der Plattform e-periodica veröffentlichten Dokumente stehen für nicht-kommerzielle Zwecke in Lehre und Forschung sowie für die private Nutzung frei zur Verfügung. Einzelne Dateien oder Ausdrucke aus diesem Angebot können zusammen mit diesen Nutzungsbedingungen und den korrekten Herkunftsbezeichnungen weitergegeben werden. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Printund Online-Publikationen ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. Die systematische Speicherung von Teilen des elektronischen Angebots auf anderen Servern bedarf ebenfalls des schriftlichen Einverständnisses der Rechteinhaber. Haftungsausschluss Alle Angaben erfolgen ohne Gewähr für Vollständigkeit oder Richtigkeit. Es wird keine Haftung übernommen für Schäden durch die Verwendung von Informationen aus diesem Online-Angebot oder durch das Fehlen von Informationen. Dies gilt auch für Inhalte Dritter, die über dieses Angebot zugänglich sind. Ein Dienst der ETH-Bibliothek ETH Zürich, Rämistrasse 101, 8092 Zürich, Schweiz, www.library.ethz.ch http://www.e-periodica.ch Rezensionen Besprechungen Comptes rendus 263 (182). Daraus darf man vermutlich schliessen, dass er sich für heutige Modelle der friedlichen Streitschlichtung eine ähnliche praktische Wirksamkeit erhofft. Diesen Optimismus scheint die abschliessende Feststellung, wonach der friedensethische Ansatz der katholischen Kirche und der rechtsethische Ansatz Höffes in erheb¬ lichem Mass konvergieren (270), noch zusätzlich zu bestätigen. Ich wage allerdings zu bezweifeln, dass sich Vertreter des politischen Realismus heute ohne gewichtige Zusatzargumente eher überzeugen lassen als die Zeitgenossen des Abbé de SaintPierre, die dessen „Projet de paix perpétuelle" als realitätsferne Chimäre kriti¬ sierten. Wie gerade das Beispiel Kants lehrt, müssen die Einwände von Seiten des politischen Realismus zwar erst genommen werden, sollten jedoch nicht daran hindern, weiter über ein zeitgemässes Modell internationaler Schiedsgerichtsbar¬ keit und die Bedingungen seiner Realisierbarkeit nachzudenken. Dazu bietet Justenhovens Studie eine ausgezeichnete Anleitung. Simone Zurbuchen SPINELLI, Emidio: Questioni Scettiche: Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico. Roma: Lithos 2005, pp. 211. ISBN 88-89604-07-7. Emidio Spinelli is a specialist in Pyrrhonism, known particularly for his Italian translations of and commentaries on Sextus Empiricus' Against the Ethicists and Against the Astrologers. The present book brings together six of his essays pub¬ lished between 1999 and 2005 in journals and collections not easily available. Ex¬ cept for the first, the essays deal exclusively with the Pyrrhonian variety of an¬ cient skepticism as expounded in Sextus' extant works in particular, in his Pyrröneioi Hypotypöseis (PfP). Although they do not originally belong together, the essays in combination succeed in painting a coherent picture of Pyrrhonism. In the first essay, entitled "Gli scetticismi antichi: uno schizzo introduttivo", Spinelli offers an overview of both Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism: he ex¬ amines the positions of the representatives of the two currents of skepticism as well as the historical connection and the differences between them. In so doing, he takes into account the various views about the history, the sense, and the scope of ancient skepticism that have been put forward in the vast specialist literature. In "I dieci tropi scettici", Spinelli analyzes the so-called Ten Modes of Aenesidemus the originator of the later Pyrrhonian movement in the first century BC as they are expounded by Sextus in PH I, although he also refers to the less detailed expositions by Diogenes Laertius and Philo. The Ten Modes are argu¬ ments designed to induce suspension of judgment (epoche) by means of the opposi¬ tion of both perceptual and intellectual appearances. Spinelli's purpose in analyz¬ ing these arguments is to show that the hypothesis according to which they corre¬ spond to the ten Aristotelian categories is unfounded. The essay "Induzione e definizione: contro la logica dogmatica" is devoted to examining the skeptical assault on induction and definition at PH II 204-212. 264 Rezensionen Besprechungen Comptes rendus Spinelli analyzes the structure of the arguments against these notions and he at¬ tempts to identify the sources of the doctrines under attack by comparing Sextus' text with other ancient sources. As regards the notion of induction targeted at PH I 204, Spinelli argues that the ultimate source is Aristotle's Topics through the probable mediation of Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on this work. As for the notion of definition, Spinelli maintains that the doctrines attacked at PH II 205-212 are Peripatetic, Stoic, and Middle Platonic. The following paper, "Non scire per causas...", deals with (i) Aenesidemus' Eight Modes against causal explanations as expounded by Sextus at PHI 180-186, (ii) the more radical attack against the concept of cause found in both PH III and in Adversus Dogmaticos {AD) III (although Spinelli focuses on the arguments of PH III), and (iii) the attack against astrology in Adversus Mathematicos (AM) V. In ex¬ plaining the sense, structure, and scope of the Pyrrhonian arguments, Spinelli also identifies, by analyzing other ancient texts, the specific philosophical and medical doctrines which are being discussed and attacked. In addition, he compares the outlook adopted by Sextus in AM V with the epistemology of the early Carl Hempel. In "Comprensione filosofica e prassi comunicativa", Spinelli examines the skeptical responses to the objections according to which the Pyrrhonist is com¬ pelled, by the very adoption of his skepticism, to recognize both the impossibility of comprehending the doctrines he is investigating and the impossibility of articu¬ lating a discourse capable of expressing coherently his outlook. Spinelli's own po¬ sition is sympathetic to the Pyrrhonist's outlook, since he thinks it is possible to comprehend and investigate the theories and arguments of others and to commu¬ nicate one's own affections (pathe) even though one suspends judgment about any doctrine that purports to account for what things are like in their real nature. The final essay "Fatti voi foste a viver come scettici..." offers an analysis of Sextus' responses to the so-called inactivity and inconsistency arguments, which are put forward against the Pyrrhonist by ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophers alike. According to the first argument, Pyrrhonism is so radical a position that renders practical decisions and action impossible. The second argu¬ ment is related to the first, since it claims that, if the Pyrrhonist does make deci¬ sions and act, then he is inconsistent with his radical skepticism. In this essay, too, Spinelli is sympathetic to the Pyrrhonian stance, since he thinks that Sextus suc¬ cessfully shows how the Pyrrhonist can perform actions in a way that is consis¬ tent with his thoroughgoing skepticism. The essays combine philological, historical, and philosophical considerations about the issues they deal with. Spinelli's erudition is impressive, as shown not only by his deep knowledge of the ancient sources and languages, but also by his taking into account most (if not all) of the works about the issues he is writing about. The essays are copiously annotated. The notes, which are primarily in¬ tended to provide the reader with full references to ancient texts and especially to secondary literature bearing upon the topics under examination, also discuss issues that are tangential or terminological. Rezensionen Besprechungen Comptes rendus 265 Following the papers, Spinelli provides a list of references to the places in which they were originally published which shows that none of the original ti¬ tles are retained in the present versions. The volume ends with an up-to-date, twenty-five page bibliography and several indexes. I would now like to make a few of critical remarks about Spinelli's interpreta¬ tion of certain passages of Sextus' work and of the character of his Pyrrhonism. The first remark concerns Spinelli's claim that the first of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus makes use of some of the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa (see PHI 164177), although he mentions only the mode of circularity (ch. II, p. 34-35) or, as Sextus calls it, the reciprocal mode {ho diallëlos tropos). When one analyzes the passage of the First Mode in question {PHI 59-61), one may perhaps find an im¬ plicit reference to the mode of hypothesis which is that based on the arbitrary acceptance of a claim without trying to backing it up when Sextus mentions the possibility of preferring our appearances to those of the irrational animals without providing a proof for such a preference. As for the reciprocal mode, there is no hint of it in the First Mode: at PH I 59 Sextus uses the argument which may be called the "impartial judge" argument namely, one cannot impartially decide a dispute when one is a part to it and at PHI 61 he employs the sophism known as petitio principii, which he elsewhere considers as different from the reciprocal mode (see PH II 36). Spinelli also maintains that in the Second Mode (PH I 90) Sextus makes use of the mode of circularity (p. 36), but here the argument in ques¬ tion is instead that of the "impartial judge". Spinelli maintains that the Pyrrhonist's "ricerca si proclama infinita" (ch. V, p. 117) and speaks of the "vita 'zetetica', quella della ricerca senza fine" (ch. VI, p. 150). Such claims are highly problematic, since if the Pyrrhonist affirmed that his investigation {zëtêsis) of the truth is endless, then he would be adopting a dog¬ matic view, namely that the disagreements or disputes about how things really are will never be resolved, so that he will have to keep investigating forever. In addi¬ tion, such a view would be awkward, since what would be the sense of continuing to search for the truth if one is convinced that one will never discover it? The Pyrrhonist's outlook is rather that he will keep investigating because, although he has so far been unable to resolve the disagreements he has found, he cannot rule out the possibility that such disagreements will eventually be resolved and hence that his zëtêsis will come to an end. With respect to the matters discussed at AD V 162-166, at AD V 167 Sextus says that he has "spoken more accurately about these matters in the lectures on the skeptical end {telos)". Spinelli maintains that "il rimando interno è sicuramente o quanto meno anche a quei paragrafi dei Lineamenti pirroniani da cui ha preso le mosse la nostra breve digressione: per l'esattezza PHI 21-30" (ch. VI, p. 145). And in a note he affirms that "resta sempre valida, pero, l'ipotesi che Sesto alluda anche ai libri perduti di M [i.e., AM]" (p. 156). Now, the issues discussed at AD V 162-166 correspond, not to those dealt with in the chapter on the end of skepti¬ cism {PHI 25-30), but to those addressed in the chapter on the criterion of skepti¬ cism {PHI 21-24). This mismatch is most probably the reason Spinelli says that, 266 Rezensionen Besprechungen Comptes rendus at AD V 167, Sextus is referring also to some paragraphs of PH and that one can¬ not rule out the possibility that he is alluding also to the lost books of AD Spinelli speaks of the lost books of AM because, although AD and the AM are two distinct works, scholars conventionally refer to AD I-V as AM VII-XI. Spinelli's view is, in my opinion, unclear, since either one assumes that, at AD V 167, Sextus is referring to an exposition of the telos of skepticism contained in the now lost part of AD or one must suppose a slip on his part and say that there he is actually referring to "the lectures on the skeptical criterion" found at PH I 21-24. Given that the part of AD which is no longer extant provided a general account of Pyr¬ rhonism similar to that found in the first book of PH, it is reasonable to assume that, at AD V 167, Sextus is referring back to that lost part rather than to the chapter of PH devoted to explaining the Pyrrhonist's criterion. Note, finally, that it is useless to attempt resolve the problem posed by the back-reference at AD V 167 by saying that Sextus is referring back to the whole PHI 21-30. As the subtitle of the book indicates, the essays are above all intended as an in¬ troduction to Pyrrhonism. In this respect, they offer both a clear presentation of the subjects they deal with and a useful survey of the vast specialist literature of particularly the past thirty years. Hence, they are no doubt an excellent starting point for the study of the Pyrrhonian philosophy. Diego Machuca CHENEVAL, Francis: La Cité des peuples. Mémoires de cosmopolitismes. Paris: Edi¬ tions du Cerf collection « Humanités ») 2005, 303 p. ISBN 978-2204075992. Le livre de Francis Cheneval se propose de combler une lacune dans l'historio¬ graphie de la philosophie politique moderne en retraçant la genèse, l'évolution conceptuelle du cosmopolitisme moderne dans son sens juridico-politique, c'est-àdire « la possibilité ou [...] la nécessité (normative et empirique) d'une structure positive et globale de droit, fondée à partir des droits de l'homme » (17). « Mémoires de cosmopolitismes » ne se limite pas néanmoins à une analyse histo¬ rique contextuelle et critique des penseurs de la philosophie politique moderne qui ont conçu, systématisé, critiqué et contribué à l'idée cosmopolitique, tels Gott¬ fried Wilhelm Leibniz, Christian Wolff, Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, John Locke, l'abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant et les philo¬ sophes contemporains qui ont actualisé l'héritage kantien tels par exemple John Rawls et ses disciples Charles Beitz et Thomas Pogge, et Jürgen Habermas. F. Cheneval défend la thèse selon laquelle l'idée cosmopolitique constitue le coeur, ou plutôt l'horizon de la pensée politique moderne, et non pas un simple appen¬ dice dont celle-ci pourrait faire l'économie. La nécessité, voire l'urgence d'intégrer l'héritage kantien dans la réflexion politique contemporaine va de pair avec une réflexion critique sur la nécessité de « transgresser » le concept d'Etat-nation, eu égard notamment au contexte actuel de globalisation et de mondialisation.