THREE ACCOUNTS OF COGMTMST iNTERNALISM UNDERMINED by Anthony Skelton Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master of Arts Dalhousie University Halifax, Nova Scotia August, 1997 O Copyright by Anthony Skelton, 1997 I of Canada du ~anaaa Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bbliographic Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K I A O N 4 ûttawaON KIA ON4 Canada canada The author has granted a nonexclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distnbute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, paper or electronic formats. L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distriiuer ou vendre des copies de cette thèse sous la forme de microfiche/slm, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. 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Table of Contents Chapter One Two Intuitions and Hume's Dictum: The Moral Problem Introduction 1 1.1 Two Intuitions 2 1.2 Hume's Dicnim 6 1.3 The Moral Problem 9 1.4 Putative Solutions to the Moral Problem 14 1.5 Conclusion 18 Chapter Two David McNaughton: Internalist Moral Reaüsm Introduction 19 2.1 Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives 19 2.2 A Cognitive Account of Motivation 29 23 A Cognitive Account of Motivation Undermined 33 2.4 The Case of the Masochist 37 2.5 Conclusion 42 Chapter Three Jonathan Dancy: The Pure Theo y Introduction 3.1 The Pure Theory 3.2 Amordism, Wickedness and Lucifer Himself 33 Weakness of Will and the Person Suffering fiom Accidie 3.4 Particularism Undennined 3.5 The Argument from Directions of Fit 3.6 Further Problems for the Pure Theory 3.7 Conclusion Chapter Four Michael Smith: CognitMsm, Intemalisrn and Humeanism At Once Introduction 4.1 The Practicality Requirement 4.2 Rationalism 4.3 Smith's Account of Nonnative Reasons 4.4 Smith's Account of Normative Reasons Undermined 4.5 Conclusion Abstract Consider the following intuitively plausible, though mutually inconsistent propositions: 1. Mord judgements, e.g., "It is right to @", express only an agent's beliefs about an objective matter of fact, and not her desires. 2. If an agent judges that it is right to 4 then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to a. 3. An agent is motivated to act just if she has a desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are distinct existences. The inconsistency arises because 1 States that a moral judgement expresses a belief, which, according to 2, motivates an agent to act, which must be a desire according to 3. Thus, 1,2 and 3 together entaii that there is a necessary connection between having a belief and having a desire. But 3 denies that there is such a comection, given that beliefs and desires are distinct existences. This is the mord problem. In the fust chapter, I explain the nature of this problem. In the remainder of the essay, 1 cmvass and reject three recent solutions to the moral problem. In chapters two and three I discuss David McNaughton's and Jonathan Dancy's attempts to solve this problem by rejecting 3.1 argue that they fail to adequateiy defend their own positive views and fail to rebut 3. In the final chapter of the essay, 1 discuss Michael Smith's solution to the moral problem. Smith attempts to solve the problem by reconciling the statements. 1 argue that he fails to defend 2 and that he cannot make 2 and 3 consistent. Acknowledgements An immense amount of gratitude goes to Duncan Machtosh, my supervisor, for his helpful comments and criticisms. Thanks to Richmond Campbell and Nathan Brett for reading this essay. 1 would also like to thank the entire faculty for making this year one of the most intellectuaily challenging and rewarding years of my life. 1 own a great inteliectual debt to Margaret Cameron who has read, cntiqued and cornmented on everything 1 have written this past year. Thanks to my parents, Marie and Peter Skelton, for their moral and hancial support. vii C r n R ONE Two tntuitions and Hume's Dictum: The Moral Problem ' Tis not contrary to r e m n to prefer the destruction of the iuhole world to the scratching of rny figer. - ~ a v i d ~ u m e ' Moral philosophy is a cake with three layers. The fit layer is practical or 'appiied' ethics, which deals with substantive moral problems such as whether it is wrong to have an abortion, or whether the unbridled pursuit of economic gain is a permisnile business practice, or whether the govemment's taxation proposal is unjust. The second layer comprises ethical theory, which concems itselfwith constniction of a general theory of what &es an action ri@ or wrong, or a person good or bad. These theories are employed (or 'appiied') when answering specinc practical moral questions. Finaily, there is metaethics. Metaethics deals with a broad range of issues concerning the nature of moral judgements. Accordmg to Stephen DarweU, AUan Gibbard and Peter bilton', gmetaethics studies . . . the justification and justifiability of ethical claims as well as their rneming, and also the metaphysics and epistemology of morals, and like matters." Rather than dealing with answers to questions like "Should I lie?", metaethics deals with questions about these types of questions. For example, does a moral judgement nich as "Steahg is wrong," state a fact? Can moral judgements be tme? Can we juw our moral judgements? 1s there one tme morai theory? What does the 'should' in "Should 1 lie?" mean? Does the fact that I recognize that 1 have a morai Hume 1978,116. Darwell, Gibbard and Railton 1992, 125-26. obligation necessdy motivate me to act in accordance with what the obligation enjoins?' The questions with which I will deal in this essay are metaethical questions. 1.1 Two Lntuitions According to Michael smith4, metaethicai debate engenders radical disagreement. Smith suggests that this disagreement can be traced to two distinct features of moral@, namely, its putative objectivity and its practicality (or its action-guiding nature). It is important to notice here that these feahires are not merely figments of a philosophically over-inventive mhd. Nor are they merely theoretical. Rather, they are embedded in cornmon-sense moral thinking, and, hence, should best be thought of as found in intuitions about morality itself. What is paradoxical about these intuitions is that they "pull against each other, so threatening to make the very idea of moraliv incoherent."' This problem, which besets contemporary metaethics, Smith dubs the 'Moral Problem'. In the remainder of this chapter, I will describe the morai problem as it is presented by smith6, and then 1 will recount several attempts by others to avoid it. The mord problem, then, starts with two intuitions or features of morality. According to Smith, the Est is this: when we engage in moralizing with the goal of answering certain morai questions, e.g., 'Should I lie to spare my fiend's feelings?', we are concemed to come, not to the answer which best suits our own needs, but to the 'correct' or 'right' aaswer. And, this presupposes that there c m be 'correct' or 'right' 3 Although 1 have divided moral philosophy up iato three layers, there are several alternative ways of carving up this territory For example, David Brink argues that the metaethical issues are second-order ethical issues, and that both practicai ethics and ethical theory are f i m a d e r levels of inquiry in ethics. See Brink 1989, 1-2. For similar terminology see Mackit t 977, 16. 4 Smith 1994,4.. 5 6 Smith 1994,s. See also Smith 199 1,399. Smith 1994, 1-15. answers to moral questions. In a sllnilar vein, David Brink argues that when we engage in a moral argument or discussion, "we try and hope to arrive at the correct answer, that is, the answer that is correct prior to, and independentiy of, o u corning upon b"' This presupposes that there exists a rnind-independent moral redity, one which contains moral facts which determine the rightness of moral judgements and about which we can form beliefs; and which, in virtue of their mind-independent statu, we can be wrong about. Smith contends that the intuition that there are such facts explains why we care about and engage in moral arguments at d l , and why we agonize over moral questions. We do these things because we wonder if the answer we give to a moral question is the right one. If we didn't thuik there was a right answer, then why wouid we argue about it or wonder if the view we hold is the right one? Brink concurs that our everyday moralizing presupposes that there are correct answers to moral questions. According to Brink, "when we are uncertain about moral issues, we often deliberate a s if there were a right answer to the issue before us."' The fact that we htuitively feel that there nght answers to moral questions seems to explain why we engage in moralizing at dl. Furthemore, Smith argues, we intuitively feei that the oniy thing wtiich determines the 'rightness' of an action (or the moral fact of the matter about the situation) is the circum~fance in which it takes place, not things like one's own feelings. In other words, the non-moral facts which comprise the circumstance in which the action takes place 'k' or 'fashion' the mord properties of the action, so thai if any two people carry out the same action in the very same circumstances (i.e., if al1 the non-moral fzts about ' B M ~ l989.3l. ' Brink 1989.29. them and their actions are the same), then their actions have the very same mord property , e.g., rightness or wrongness. Smith says that we seem to think (or intuit) that the best way to access or discover what the moral facts in a situation are is to formdate theories and marshal reasons in support of or against any answer to a moral question, dilemma or issue. Moreover, if we are willing to listen to each other and take each other's positions and view-points seriously, then, we seem to hold, the result of the marshaling of reasons pro aud con will be "a convergence on moral opinion, a convergence on the tnith.'" This first feahire or intuition about ethics can be summed up as follows: We seem to think that moral questions have correct answers; that the correct answers are made correct by objective moral facts; that moral facts are whoily detenniaed by circumstances; and that, by engaging in mord conversation and argument, we can discover what these objective facts determined by the circumstances are.'' Smith calls the first feature of morality the "objectivity of moral judgement."ll Moral judgements, then, purport to be objective: they are made correct or incorrect by the existence of moral facts which are detemiined by the circrunstances in which the judgements occur; and they are discovered through eamest moralking. According to Smith, the second feature of morality concerns the "practicality of moral judgement."12 The best way to illustrate this featw of morality is by way of an example of Smith's: suppose that after a long conversation debating the pros and cons of 9 Smith 1994,6. 10 Smith 1994,6. " Smith 1994.6. 12 Smith 1994,6. donating to famine relief 1 have been convinced, by my interiocutor, that 1 have this obligation. That is, 1 believe that 1 have an obligation to donate to famine relief. It seems plausible to assume of me that, given that 1 believe that 1 have an obligation that I should give to famine relief, 1 will give to famine relief when 1 have the oppominity to do so. However, suppose that, despite the fact that 1 believe that I should give to famine relief, I daim, when presented with the next opportunity to act in accord with my obligation, that though 1 have been convinced that 1 should give to famine relief, 1 have not been convinced that 1 have a reason to give to famine relief. My reaction, Smith tells us, would give rise to puzzlement. This follows fiom the fact that if 1 am convinced (i.e., I believe) that 1 should give to famine relief, then it also seems to be the case that 1 am convinced that I do have remon to give to famine relief, That is, the conversation 1 had with my interlocutor about whether or not 1 should give to famine relief seems "equivalent to a conversation about whether or not 1 have reasan to give to famine relief."13 To say that 1 should give to famine relief just is to say that 1 have reason to give to famine relief. Furthemore, reasons motivate people to act: we take it for granted that when an agent acts intentionaily, she has reasons for doing what she does. Now, if 1 accept that 1 have reason to give to famine relief, then I have a motive for giving to famine relief. And, in the absence of contrary motives, if I have a motive, I will be induced to act. Smith concludes from this that, if 1 am convinced that 1 have reason to give to famine relief, and reasons fûmish me with a motive, and motives produce action, 13 Smith 1994,6; emphasis added. then, absent weakness of will or other psychological failings, it would seem quite odd that I wodd not be moved to act by the reasons 1 have. The second feature of morality cm be summarized as follows: Moral judgements seem to be, or imply, opinions about the reasons we have for behaving in certain ways, and, other things being equal, having such opinions is a matter of finding ourselves with a corresponding motivation to a d 4 1.2 Hume's Dictum To make sense of this second feature of morality, we must (following Smith) digress somewhat to discuss more broadly the nature of human psychology and action explanation. The received, though not ~ n d i s ~ u t e d , ~ ~ theory of human psychology is given to us by David ~ u m e . ' ~ According to Hume, there are two distinct types of mental states: beliefs and desires. Beliefs attempt to represent the world as it is. As such, they can be assessed as either true or fdse according to whether they accurately or inaccurately represent the world. Desires, on the other hand, are not representational, they do not attempt to represent the world as it is. Consequently, they cannot be assessed for truth or falsity. Desires are not states which rnerely represent the world, they the active states of an individual which move her to change the world. Thus, according to Hume, beliefs and desires are wholly different. There is a M e r way in which beliefs and desires are different. Whereas beliefs, since they are representational, can be rationally criticized, desires, since they are not 14 Smith 1994,7. 15 Nagel 1970 and Platts 1979. l6 Hume 1978,413-418.455-459. representational, cannot be rationally criticized; that we have desires is merely a fact about ourselves. Consequently, changing or altering our beliefs about the world in the face of newly acquired evidence does nothing to aKect, at least rationally, the desires we hold, even though it may change our beliefs about the world. I7 Another way of making the merence between beliefs and desires clear is presented to us by Mark ~1atts.l' According to Platts, what marks the distinction between beliefs and desires is that they have different and opposing 'directions of fit'. Beliefs hack the truth: if they are true, then they fit the world; if they are false, they do not fit the world, and hence, should be jettisoned. "False beliefs should be changed to fit the world and not vice On the other han& desires a h at their own satisfaction: when the target conditions of a desire obtain, the world fits it. However, if the target conditions of a desire do not obtain, it need not, unlike a belief, be jettisoned. As ~laG explains: 'me world . . . should be changed to fit with our desires, not vice versa'30 Thus, the idea that beliefs and desires have differing and opposing directions of fit points to the fact that they me radically different kinds of states. Before going fornard with our discussion of the second feature of morality, it is important to head off one misconception regarding Humean desires. Suppose that 1 hold a desire which is based on a fdse beiief, e.g., 1 desire never to be out past rnidnight because 17 It is important to point out here a salient difference between the contemporary view regarding desùes and Hume's account of desins. According to the contemporary account, desins are representational, just not ui the same way that beüefs an. Desires represent the way the world is to be once their target conditions obtain. This, however, does not change the Eact that desks are immune to rational cnticism. since they do not purport to represent the world as it is. 18 Platts 1979,256-7. l9 Platts 1979,256. 20 Platts 1979,257. I believe that if 1 stay out past midnight, 1 wil1 turn into a pumpb. In this case, I have an 'kationai' desire. Now, my present desire, the desire not to go out past midnight, is founded on a M e r desire and a beIieE my desire not to tum into a pumpkin and my belief that if I stay out past midnighî, then 1 will nirn into a pumpkin. It follows fiom Hume's theory above that 1 can be rationaily criticized for holding the belief 1 do by virtue of the fact that it is false. Since my belief is false, and, since my desires are based on that fdse belief, 1 can be rationaily criticized for holding the desire not to be out past rnidnight. Thus, desires can be rationally criticized if they exist by v h e of the holding of a false, hence rationally criticizable, belief. However, desires not so generated, i.e., not produced by false beliefs, are not rationally cnticizable. Smith contends that Hume's theory of human psychology is relevant to the second feature of morality because it provides us with a fhmework within which we can explain intentional human action. Beliefs represent how the world is, and hence, how the world can be appropriately altered to the end of making it the way the target conditions of our desires tell us it should be. As Smith puts it, "an action is thus the product of these two distinct existences: a desire representing the way the world is to be and a belief telling us how the world is to be changed so as to make it that way."" That desires and beliefs have distinct existences and that an agent is motivated just ifshe possesses a desire and an appropriate means-ends belief is what 1 will cal1 Hume's dictum. 21 Smith 1994,9. 1.3 The Moral Problem Retuming now to the fim feature of morality, the objectivity of moraiity, we c m see that by virtue of holding the intuitions in the first feature one is naturally led to ce& philosophical positions. The f a of these is moral realism. Accordhg to David Brink, morai realism, roughly speakuig, is the metaphysical view that "there are moral facts and true moral clairns whose existence and nature are independent of our beliefs about what is right and wrong.'" Those who aairm the intuitions cornprising the fint feahire of morality hold that there are correct m e r s to moral questions and that these answers are made correct by virtue of objective morai facts, i.e., facts that determine the nghtness and wrongness of actions, or the goodness or baàness of persons. Hence, they are naturaily led, it seems, to embrace moral realism. Now, it is also true about the first feature of morality that it supposes that we can have beliefs about what is right and wrong, i.e., about morai facts, that moral knowledge is possible and that morai judgements express beliefs. To think that we c m form beliefs about these moral facts, and, hence, that moral judgements express beliefs about the way things are rnorally, is to embrace cognitivism. This view is caiied cognitivism because it says that we c m fonn beliefs, representationai . cognitive States, about what morally is the case, i.e., we c m have representations of the way the world is, morally speaking. There is a M e r view about moral motivation which, given the Humean theory of action explanation outlined above, is the naturai concomitant of those who espouse moral realism, cognitivism and Hume's dictum, namely, the view that the mere holding of a mord belief will not by itself motivate a person to act in accordance with what she believes is nght. This view is cdled e x t e d s m because it maintains that believing that one has a moral obligation is insufficieut to motivate one to act; sornething extemal to the moral judgement must be the source of motivation. Brink explains that externalism is the view '?bat whether moral considerations motivate or provide reason for action depends on factors extemal to the concept of morality, such as the content of morality, a substantive theory of reasons for action, and facts about the world, such as the agent's interests or desires.'" One may desire, or be disposed to desire, to do what one believes moraliv enjoins; or one may not; it is merely a contingent fact about moral obligations that they motivate. If one does not desire, or is not disposed to desire, to do what morality enjoins, and one's desire does not rest on a false moral belief, then one cannot be rationally cnticized, since desires which do not rest on false beliefs are immune fiom rational criticism. Thus, the fact that 1 rnorally should do 0 does not provide me with reason to do cD. Holding the intuition espoused by the h t feature of morality naturally leads to jettisoning the intuitions which arise in a discussion of the second feature of morality. Those who are moral reaiists, and who at the same time accept Hume's dichim, must espouse externalism, and so they mut deny that a belief that one may have that one has a mord obligation will motivate one to act in accord with that obligation. Thus, given realism and Hume's dictum, it is not necessarily the case that if 1 judge it right to give to famine relief, 1 will be motivated to give to famine relief. * Brink 1989,8. ' The second feature of moraiïty, that to have a moral opinion is, ceteris puribus. to find oneself with a correspondhg reason or motivation to act, Ieads to a series of philosophical positions. If Hume is right that only desires conjoined with appropriate beliefs (and not beliefs themselves) motivate one to act, and if, as the second feature of morality States, when one has a moral opinion, one has a reason (or is motivated) to act, then moral opinions or judgements must express desires. Smith explains that the psychological implication of this feature of morality is this: "since making a moral judgement requires our having a certain desire, and no recognition of a fact about the world could rationally compel us to have one desire rather than another, our judgement must really simply be an expression of that desire, or perhaps a complicated disposition to have that d e ~ i r e . " ~ ~ The view that mord judgements are simply and solely expressions of a desire is cailed non-cognitivism. Smith argues that the second feature of morality also has a metaphysical implication, namely, healism. healism, or anti-realism, is the view that when we judge that something, @, is wrong, we are merely expressing our desire that cease; we are not, contra cognitivism, expressing a belief. That is, when we make a moral judgement we are not stating a fact about the way things are morally; in fact, we are not mentioning facts at all. Thus, irrealism about ethics denies that there are such things as moral facts. Smith suggests that if we embrace this form of inedisrn we can explain quite easily how it is that our moral judgements comect up neatly with our motivation to act in accordance with our moral obligations. Those who espouse irrealism or non-cognitivism 24 Smith 1994, 10. typically embrace intemalism. According to Brink, intemaiism is the view that "there is an interna1 or conceptual comection between moral considerations and action or the sources of ãt ion."~ When 1 make a mord judgement 1 am expressing a desire, and since desires, when conjoined with appropriate means-ends beliefs, will motivate me to act, 1 will be inclined to act in accordance with rny moral judgement, i.e., my desire. Thus, the mere recognition that I have a moral obligation will motivate me to act in accord with that obligation. Furthemore, Smith argues, when 1 judge that it is nght to give to famine relie& in addition to expressing a desire, "1 commit myself to saying that it is nght for anyone in circumstances like mine to give to famine relief as we11."~~ But, Smith argues, it is not the case that 1 think that other people or moral agents therefore have reason to give to famine relief. A fortiori, 1 do not think that my daim that others who are in the same ckcumstances as mine should give to famine relief is in any way0m objective tnith. This follows from the fact that since a mord judgement in an expression of a desire, and a desire is not rationally criticizable unless it t eN on a false belief, a moral judgement, if it does not rest on a false belief, is immune to rational criticism. The fact that odiers might disagree with my moral judgement is not a sign of their irrationality; it shpiy points to the fact that they have desires different fiom mine. This, Smith explains, brings us to the moral problem. The first feature of morality 0 can quite easily explain moral argumentation because it says that there is a fact of the matter about what is wrong, and thai this fact can be discovered through genuine moralizing. These fxts are determined by objective moral facts which, in turn, are Brink l989,38. Smith 1994, 10. detemiined by the circumstances in which the judgement takes place. Furthermore, the k s t feature of morality aileges that moral judgements express beiiefs. However, the k t feature or rnorality cannot, given Hume's theory of action explmation, explain how the having of a morai opinion can motivate one to act It cannot explain why it is that we expect people who make certain morai judgements to act in accord with their mord judgements. On the other hand, the second feature of morality says that moral judgernents express desires, and so can easily explain the comectioa between the having of a moral opinion and being motivated to act in accordance with it. Yet, it cannot explain what we are arguing about when we engage in moral argument. The moral problem aises, then, because a mord judgement cannot be everything that we intuitively take it to be. It cannot be simultaneously objectively correct or incorrect in the way of a belief and practical or action-guiding in the way of a desire. Nothing c m both be a fact or a belief about a fact and, at the same t h e , given Hume's dictum, be action-guiding. According to Smith, the moral problem explains the source of disagreement in the domain of metaethics; in fact, he alleges, '?he moral problem is the centrai and organizing problem in contemporary rnetaethic~."~' These three inconsistent statements capture the essence of the moral problem: 1. Moral judgements of the form 'It is right that I a' express [only] a subject's beliefs about ên objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do." 27 Smith 1994, 1 1. 1 add the world "only" to Smith's reconstruction of 1, because without this addition it is not e n h l y clear that the three statements are inconsistent On Smith's reconstruction, 1 does not nile out the possibiiity that a moral judgement could contain both an agent's belief3 and desires. If this were the case, then we couid hold al1 three of the statements consistently, since 1 and 2 no longer seem in conflict with 3: an agent is motivated by a moral judgement, which expresses a desire in addition to a belief. 2. If someone judges that it is right that she 0 s then, ceteris paribus, she iç motivated to 0. 3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where beiief and desire are, in Hume's t e m , distinct existences.2g These statements are mutuaily inconsistent in the following way. 1 states that moral judgements express beiiefs about the way things are morally speaking, while 2 states that there is an interna1 or conceptual comectioa between an agent's m a h g a moral judgement (Le., having a moral belief) and acting in accordance with what it enjoins. But, given Hume's dictum, 3, there is no such connection between believing that one has a moral obligation and acting in accordance with it, because facts, or beliefs about them, do not motivate one to act: Beliefs are motivationally inert, and ody desires in conjunction with the appropnate means-end belief can motivate. Thus, the moral problem is that moral judgements cannot sirnultaneously be objective and practical. 1.4 Putative Solutions to the Moral Probiem Thus far 1 have sketched some of the views which arise out of the two features of morality and that comprise the main cluster of views in contemporary metaethics. As will become clear in this section, some of these very positions, namely, non-cognitivism, externalism and anti-Humeanism, purport to provide solutions to the moral problem. My goal in this section is to give a brief sketch of the various solutions to the moral problem. 1 have not argued against the possibility that a moral judgement rnight express both a belief and a desire. For the purposes of this essay 1 will not do so. Moreover, the t h theorists which 1 examine in this essay contend that a moral judgement expresses only a belief; hence, this reconstruction better illustrates the problem which confiants them. 1 would Iike to thank Richmond Campbell for bringing this problem to my attention, 29 Smith 1994,12. For a different, though related formulation of this problem, see McNaughton 1988,23, 1 will use this as a segue into the solution which 1 will spend the rest of this essay andyzing and criticizing. As explained above, the view which states that there are no moral tmths and that moral judgements do not express beliefs is calIed non-~ognitivism.~~ According to Brink, non-cognitivisrn is the view that "moral claims do not reaiiy make assertions of fact but, rather, express the moral agent's or appraiser's attitudes. Consequently, moral claims can be neither true nor false, there can be no moral facts or tnie moral claims, and moral knowledge it not possible.'J' Non-cognitivism, then, denies the proposition expressed by 1. So, what function is served by moral judgements? Under the rubric of noncognitivism there are a number of different theories regarding the function of morai language and moral judgementd2 But these theories share some basic similarities. One of the tenets of non-cognitivism is that when we are employing moral language we are not imputing moral properties to agents or acts. Ayer makes the point this way: "The presence of an ethical symbol in a proposition adds nothing to its factual content. Thus if 1 Say to someone, 'You acted wrongly in stealing that money,' 1 am not stating anything more than if 1 had simply said, 'You stole that money.' In adding that this action is wrong 1 am not making any M e r statement about it.'J3 Non-cognitivism of this type holds that to make a moral judgement is just to react e m o t i o d y to what one witnesses. A morai condemnation of, say, racist behaviour is to be thought of as aa affective response to what 30 Ayer 1936, Hare 198 1 and Stevenson 1937. 31 Bruik 1989,3. '* For difiering versions of the ultimate huiction of ethical utterances see the works cited in note 29 above. 33 Ayer 1936, 107.one believes to be the non-moral facts of the situation. If one takes it that what one has just witnessed is wrong, then one has a negative emotional reaction to it, and one's moral utterance - ''That is wrong!" is an expression of one's emotion. For this version of non-cognitivism, then, mord experience has two distinct facets: fïrst, we have a set of beliefs about the non-moral facts of the circumstance in which the m o d judgement takes place. To be m e , these beliefs must fit the world. If they do not, then they are false; and tbis may undennine the moral judgement we make on the basis of the non-moral facts. Second, we react either negatively or positively to the non-moral facts. The moral judgement is not a further belief about the circumstance, but the result of our emotions; it says something about the appraiser and not about the world. Non-cognitivists in general are united in their rejection of the proposition expressed in 1. That is, they deny that mord judgments express beliefs and that there is any moral tnith. The main virtue of non-cognitivisrn is that it can explain quite easily the connection between the having of a moral judgement and being motivated to act in accord with it. According to the non-cognitivists, since the uttering of mord judgement is the expression of an emotion or desire, and since the makuig of a moral judgement is the having of a desire to act in some way, a, the maker of the moral judgement, desires to do a. And since desires are what motivate the moral appraiser to act, then the appraiser will be motivated to do 0. T~us, non-cognitivists embrace the practicality of moral j udgement, Le., internalism, and Hume's dicturn. Another way to avoid the moral problem is to deny the proposition expressed by 2 and embrace what has corne to be cdled e x t e d s m . The position in 2 is known as intemalism, the view that there is an intemal or conceptual connection between havhg a moral judgement and being motivated to act in accord with it. Extemalisrn denies this. Embracing externalism, and so denying intemaiism, is the solution adopted by David ~rink. '~ According to Brink, externaiism is the denial of intemalism; "extemalism daims that the motivationai force and rationdity of moral considerations depends on factors external to the moral considerations therñelves."~~ Believing that one has a moral obligation will not be sufficient to motivate one to act; one must also desire to do what morality tells one to do before one will be motivated to do what morality enjoins. It is in this sense that motivation is external to moral considerations themselves. Since externalists like Brink deny intemalism, they deny 2. Thus, they cm embrace moral realism, as Brink does, and also the Humean theory of action explanation. A third and final way in which to attempt to solve the mord priblem is to go after the beliefdesire theory of moral motivation, i.e., 3. Proponents of this view are called cognitivist intemalists. Cognitivist intemalism is the view which accepts the propositions expressed in 1 and 2 while denying 3. This approach, rather than the solutions sketched above, is the solution to the moral problem which 1 will take up in the remahder of this essay. Those who reject Hume's dictum, at least in part, hold in one fom or another that moral judgements are objective and practical. The versions of this position which 1 consider in this essay are those of David ~ c ~ a u ~ h t o n ~ ~ , J nathan ~ a n c ~ ~ ' and Michel ~mith.)' McNaughton argues, contrary to Hume's dicnim, that the mere recognition of a Y Brink 1989,37-80. '' Brink 1989,42. 36 See note 28 above. 37 Dancy 1993. 3' Smith 1994. moral obligation can motivate one to act; and so a beiief can motivate. Dancy argues that, though botb a desire and a belief m u t be present in order that one be motivated to act in accordance with a moral obligation, a desire is not the cause of the motivation. Finally, Smith puts forward an anti-Humean account of rationality; according to this account, some desires are in fact rationdy criticizable. Smith's solution to the moral problem turm on his reinterpretation of 2. I will take up these positions in the next three chapters, arguing that each position is flawed in seved respects. Hence, 1 will establish aprima facie contention in favou. of the view that moral judgements cannot be simuitaneously objective and practical. 1.5 Conclusion Thus far 1 have sketched perhaps the most pressing problem which faces metaethicists today: the moral problem. In the rest of this essay 1 will assume, for the sake of argument, that moral realism is true: that there are correct answers to mord questions, that they are made correct by the existence of moral facts and that these facts c m be discovered through earnest moralizing. Of course, this view is not without its c~itics.'~ However, it is not my intention to examine this view. Rather, I wish to take up the problem which besets the internalist moral realist: How c m mord judgements be simultaneously objective and practical? 1 shall pay particdar attention to the way in which the three philosophen 1 examine deal with Hume's dictum. 1 now turn to this task. 39 See Mackie 1977 and ïiaxman 1977. CHAPTERWO David RI cNaughton: Cnternalist Moral ~ e a l i s r n ~ ~ In this chapter, 1 will recount David McNaughton's arguments in support of a coguihka intemalkt thesis. 1 hope by the end of this discussion to have provided reasons for rejecting nearly every aspect of this &es McNaughton ' s challenge. 2.1 Categorical and Eypothetical theory and for maintaining that Hume's dictum Imperatives McNaughron maintains that moral judgements can be tme, that moral knowledge is possible and that moral opinions are beliefs about the way the world is, moraIty speaking. Furthemore. he holds that the mere recognition that one is under a moral obligation to act provides one with motivation or reasons to act, Le., he holds to mternalism4' McNaughton thus holds a cognitivist account of motivation. By virtue of the fact that he holds that beliefs cognitive States can motivate, McNaughton rejects the notion that an agent is motivated only in the presence of both a belief and a desire. For McNaughton, %e belief [of an agent] that he is mordy required to act is d i c i e n t to move the agent to act, without assistance fkom a different kind of state, a de~ire. '"~ McNaughton argues that this anti-Humean contention has its basis in commonsense moral thinking: we typically hold that ' b o r d requirements have a daim to our cornpliance which is independent of what we happai to d e ~ i r e . ' ~ ~ Moraijudgements ''O For the purposes of this essay, 1 wiii understand cognitivist intemalism and reaiist internalisrn to be asserting roughiy the same clairns. The reader c m see these phrases as inter-changeable and symnymous. '' McNaughton, 1988,3965. 42 McNaughton, 1988,49. 43 Mcbiaughton, 1988, 14-15; see ais0 48 & I 14. 19 seem to constrain our behaviour. hdeed, sometimes the demands of morality conflict with what we otherwise might desire or prefer to do. Of course, this way of viewing moral judgements is denied by the externalists." This follows from the fact that they embrace a Humean account of motivation. On this theory, a mord judgement, though it may express a belief. will not be sficient to motivate an agent to act. A moral judgernent motivates an agent to act just if that agent desires to do what morality enjoins; absent the relevant desire, the agent will rem& unmoved by moral considerations Thus, the debate between the extemalkt and the realist internalist is over what counts as a reason for action: is it a belief alone or the combination of a belief and a desire? Altematively, the debate between McNaughton and the Humean can be broady conceived as one over what type of imperative provides an agent with a reason to perfonn an action. Imperatives typically take one of the following two forms: 'If you want x, do y' or 'You ought to do y'. Correspondingly, Kant argues that there are two distinct types of imperatives: hypothetical imperatives and categorical i~ñera t ives .~~ An imperative is hypotheticai if it is based on the putative fact that y is, in the present circumstances, the best means available to bring about the target conditions of the desire for x. The reason for doing y rests on the fact that the doing of y would cause the target conditions of the desire for x to obtain; the oughtness of the imperative is contingent upon the desire. The agent can resist doing the action prescribed by the imperative simply by saying: '1 do not care about x.' However, 'You ought to do y' wiiI be a categorical imperative if you ought - - - * S a Brink 1989,37-80, and also Foot 1972. " Kant. 1959 to do y whether or not you have a desire that the doing of y satisfies; that you ought to do y is thus not contingent upon your having any desires. Thus, the agent's reasons for doing y are not extinguished when the agent says: '1 do not care about y.' An example will help to capture Kant's distinction. Imagine that I have promised to take my sick mother to the pharmacist so that she can collect her much needed prescription, but that when the t h e comes to act on my promise 1 do not feel like doing so. At that t h e , suppose that my sister says to me: 'You ought to fulfill your promise.' Whether the imperative uttered by my sister is hypothetical or categoricd depends on the implied reason for keeping the promise. If the reason I am supposed to keep the promise involves an unstated conditional, as in 'You ought to keep your promise, if you want mother to trust you again,' then the imperative is hypothetical; if not, then it is categoncal. In sum, categorical imperatives give reasons for action which are unconditional in the sense of not being contingent upon any present desire of the agent. Categorical imperatives are binding on agents unconditionally, that is, whether or not the agent has a desire to act on the imperative. Hypotheticd imperatives, by contrast, are requirements or reasons which are binding on agents only conditionally on the agents having certain desires. Kant held that moral judgements express categoricai imperatives, and that categorical imperatives provide an agent with reasons for action. As suggested above, McNaughton agrees that categorical imperatives provide reasons for action. For he thinks that morai judgements "appear" to provide an agent with reasons for action independently of an agent's desires? What this commits McNaughton to is the claim that it "appears" that an agent's beliefs about what she is momlly required to do are sufncient to motivate her to act, despite what she desires. McNaughton suggests that what justifies this claim is that it coheres weii with our moral phenomenology. But this claim appears to beg the question against the Humean! The Humean denies that moral judgements, if they express beliefs about what we ought mordly to do, are sufficient to motivate an agent to act. Thus, McNaughton's expostulation begs the question against Hume because it implies that the very concept of a cognitive moral judgement is that it provides an agent with motivation to act. Moreover, since our debate over what counts as a reason for action just is a debate over whether a moral belief aione can provide one with a motive to act, to assert that cognitive mord judgements provide an agent with a motive is to dogmatically assume the very claim over &hich Hume and McNaughton disagree. But this charge would be too quick since McNaughton holds that it only "appears" that this is so. He can, and, in fact does, attempt to demonstrate that cognitive moral judgements4' provide reason for action by way of refuting Hume's dictum. I detail this argument in the next section. There is one difficulty with McNaughton's contention that categoncal imperatives provide a reason for acting, namely, that if one is motivated by a belief that one has a moral obligation and a desire does not figure into the reason for acting upon one's moral obligation then we might plausibly conclude that the person acts according to the 46 McNaughton 1988,48. 47 HeteaAer, I drop the term cognitive h m the phrase 'cognitive moral judgements'. When I use the pbrase moral judgements, I mean cognitive moral judgements. dictates of moraiity, but does not desire to do so.18 McNaughton sees this consecpence of his position as "excessively austere and surely i~ñlaus ib le . '~~ In response, he argues that the person who acts morally the vktuous person can be seen as doing what moraiity enjoins, not as a soldier who begmdgingly does what he is told because he is told to do it, but as a person who takes joy and pleasure in doing what rnorality enjoins.50 Moreover, the vimious person can even be said to have desired to do what he did. McNaughton suggests that '?O ascribe such a desire to the agent, after he . acted, is merely to acknowledge that his moral belief was here &cient to motivate him.w5 1 It seems, then, that McNaughton has made a concession to the Humean, since he proposes that for an agent to be suitably motivated, both a beiief and a desire must be present. Does this not concede too much to Hume, and so undennine the contention that moral judgernents express categorical imperatives, and that categorical imperatives are sufficient to motivate an agent to act? McNaughton argues not. Though we ascnbe a desire to an agent when she acts htentionally, it does not follow that motivating reasons for action are constituted by beliefs and desires. McNaughton agrees with Hume that al1 intentional actions take place in the presence of a belief and a desire, but he denies that a desire is always a Humean desire. The account of desire that McNaughton espouses does not see a desire as a distinct existence in the way Hume thought, nor as a source of McNaughton 1988,SO & 106. " McNaughton 1988,50. 50 McNaughton 1988,50 & 106. 51 McNaughton 1988,50. motivation, but merely as something that is ascribed to an agent when she has acted intenti~nall~?~ This concession to the Humean is paradoxical, though. McNaughton contends that mord judgements give agents reasons for acting quite independently of what they desire or prefer. At the same t h e , however, McNaughton, suggests that a person who acts morally the vimious person in fact h m a desire to act morally. And, there is a tension here: on the one hand, moral judgements give agents reasons for acting independently of what they desire; on the other hanci, given McNaughton's account of desire, agents act on their moral judgements because they desire to do so. What, then, is McNaughton up to? 1 do not think that this tension is reaily a problern for McNaughton since he does not assume that if one desires to act in accord with a categorical imperative, it is no longer a categorical imperative. To put it another way, categorical imperatives give an agent reasons for action independent of what they may othenvise desire or prefer to do, but an agent may also desire to do what the categorical imperative enjoins, and it does not follow from the fact that because an agent desired to act in the way prescribed by a categorical imperative that the imperative is no longer categorical. However, two things follow from holding that a moral judgement is a categoncal imperative and that a categorical imperative provides reason for action. First, a desue need not figure into the reasons that an agent acted on a categorical hperative, even if the desire to do what a categorical imperative enjoins is present in the agent. Second, and perhaps this follows fiom the last statement, an agent should act in accord with a categorical imperative even " McNaughton 1988,SO & 106. if she does not desire to do so and even if she desires to act in a way contrary to the imperative. But here is where McNaughton's account of desire becomes problematic. If he holds that categorical Unperatives provide reasons for acting independent of an agent's desires, then he will have to hold that an agent should act in the way enjoined even if he desires ohenvise. To illustrate how this is a problem for McNaughton, 1 will employ an example. Imagine that 1 have promised to visit my sick Gmdrnother in the hospital. Since 1 am morally obliged to M l 1 that promise, 1 am under a categorical imperative. Yet, suppose that when it cornes time act on the promise, 1 no longer desire to do so. Rather, 1 want to attend the football game to which I have tickets, and I have had a burning desire to do so for a long time now. Now, 1 see myself with a moral obligation, and my moral obligation, since it expresses a categorical imperative, provides me with reasons for acting despite what my desires may be. In this case, 1 desire not to act in the way prescribed by the categorical imperative. 1 am tom; 1 do not know what to do. However, after much deliberation, I decide that 1 will act in accord with my obligation despite the fact that 1 have no desire to act in accord with it. Now, on McNaughton's account of desire, since I acted in accord with what my moral judgement enjoined, 1 desired to do what I did, because for McNaughton "to ascribe a desire to an agenS after he acted [in accord with a categorical imperative], is rnerely to acknowledge that his moral belief was here sufficient to motivate him."s3 Yet, in this case, my moral beiief did in fact motivate me to act, but 1 did not desire to do what my moral belief enjoined. But, 53 McNaughton 1988,SO. since McNaughton says that if a mord belief was sufticient to motivate me to act, then 1 desired to do what 1 did, 1 desired to act the way 1 did. Thus, on McNaughton's account, 1 desired to act mordy. But according to the story 1 just told 1 did not desire to act morally; 1 desired to go to the football game. McNaughton's account of desire amibes a desire to an agent when no such desire is present in the agent when he acted in accord with a categorical imperative. If this is a consequence of McNaughton's theory, then it must be flawed. And, if it is flawed in this way, then it rnust be false; if it is fdse, then it must be jettisoned. Of course, the Humean might quanel with the example 1 have constructed above because it seems psychologicdy unusual, given that on Hume's theory every action issues fiom a motivating reason which is constituted by both beliefs and desires. 1 agree that this is so, but despite the fact that it seems psychologically unusual, McNaughton is still commined to the fact that such an example is at Least a possibility: he thinks that a moral belief by itself c m motivate without the help of a desire and that one ought to be motivated by a moral judgement whatever one desires. Notice that McNaughton cannot simply jettison his account of desire because, if he does, then he f d s prey to the objection that provided the impetus for his account of desire in the f k t place. That objection, remember, was that if one holds that a categoncal imperative provides an agent with a reason for action, then one is committed to the view that 'the virtuous person has no desire to act in the way he does, when he acts in virtue of his belief that a certain course of action is morally requiredW" Thus, if McNaughton - - - - 54 McNaughton t 988,SO. rejects his account of desire, then he is dl susceptible to this objection to his account of mord judgements and, hence, is teft with an account of morality that is, in his words, "excessively austere and surely implausible."s McNaughton might suggest in response to my objection that since 1 did act in accord with my promise in the above example, 1 must have desired to do so. By saying this, he couid argue that the example I gave is impossible: no one is capable of acting in a way that is contrary to their desires. There are two rebuttals to this objection. First, if he concedes that one caanot act contrary to one's desires, then he cannot hold that moral beliefs by themselves give us reasons for action? That is, McNaughton cannot hold that categoncal imperatives give an agent reasons for acting independent of her desires. Furthemore, if he concedes that action always requires a desire, then he is conceding that a desire has some sort of motivational "oomph" or comprises part of the reasons for why agents act. And, if he concedes this, then he must concede that it is not the moral belief by itself that is motivating agents to act. But he wants to hold that the moral belief is what motivates, so he cannot use this as a response to my objection. Therefore, McNaughton's account of desire must be false and should be rejected. It seems that my example forces McNaughton into a dilemma. Either he m u t admit that it is possible for one to act on moral judgements since they give reasons for action despite the fact that one does not desire to do so, or desires to do something else. Or, he must concede that one acts on a moral belief only if one desires to do as the belief 55 McNaughton 1 988,5O. " What about a case where an agent has no desires on the matter either way? If this is the case, then the agent c m o t act, since she has reasons for acting both ways, or no way at dl . But if this is the case, then she will not act either way, because she has no deteminate reason for doing so. Hence, it still follows that a categorical imperative alone will not be sufficient to motivate an agent to am tells one. If McNaughton takes the fkst hom, then he is saddled with an account of moral judgements which is "excessively austere and surely implausible."s7 If he takes the second horn, then he is committed to saying that moral beliefs are not sufkient to motivate an agent to act, and that moral judgements do not provide an agent with reasons to act despite the agent's desires. Either way, it seems that he is left with the prospect of abandoning something central to his account of morality . But perhaps McNaughton rnight have a reply to the second horn of the dilemma He might argue that 1 am motivated to and, hence, desire to because I believe that Oing is my moral obligation. My motivation to @ does not exist in virtue of the fact that I have an antecedent desire to a; my desire to 0 is caused by what my moral obligation enjoins. My desire to 4 thus explains my belief that 1 ought to O. However, there are two objections to this response. First, it is not at dl clear how it is that a belief can cause a desire since beliefs and desires are independent existences. Moreover, McNaughton would have to admit that if a belief causes an agent to have a desire, then whenever an agent has that belief, then he has that desire. But this seems implausibly strong: there are cases in which an agent can hold a beiief without having the concomitant desire, e-g., when an agent is weak-willed. McNaughton wouid need to explain how it is that on some occasions a belief causes a desire, while on other occasions it does not. It seems that no explanation is forthcorning. Second, even if we were to concede that a belief is capable of causing a desire, this contention undermines McNaughtonYs contention that a mord belief alone provides an agent with reasons for action and, hence, the c l a h that a categorical 57 McNaughton L988,SO. imperative provides an agent with reason for action. This follows fiom the fact that if a belief causes a desire and a desire is what moves an agent to act, it is not the moral belief, but the desire, which moves the agent to a d 8 Thus, McNaughton's account of desire seems defective. 2.2 A Cognitive Aecount of Motivation McNaughton thinks that he c m offer us a cognitive account of motivation. He thereby denies that a cognitive state, i.e., a beiief, cannot motivate one to act. On this view, a desire does not need to be added to the explanation of why an agent acted the way she did; nor is a desire required in order that an agent be motivated to ac t Thus, McNaughton rejects the Humean account of action explanation and motivation which states that an agent is motivated just ifshe has both a desire and a means-end belief. However, McNaughton must meet one objection before he can vindicate his cognitive account of motivation. In the last chapter (1.2), 1 explained, following Mark Platts, that beliefs and desires are radically different kinds of states, since they have different and opposing directions of f i t According to this explanation, beliefs are responsible for represenring the world t d y or fdsely, while desires have no such responsibility. Desires, rather, are directed at changing the world. They do not represent the world ûuiy or fdsely, though they might be said to represent the world as it would be if the target conditions of that desire obtained. Beliefs aim at the truth, while desires aim at their own satisfaction. If a belief fits the world, then it is true; if the target conditions of su For more on this argument see section 2.3. a desire obtain, then the desire is satisfied. Beliefs, thm, must fit the world to be tme while the worid must be changed to fit a desire, if a desire is to be satisfied. McNaughton argues that this account of the distinction between beliefs and desires poses a problem for the cognitivist account of motivation. We have characterized beliefs and desires in such a way that we can only explain an agent's action if we ascribe to her some end or goal. And, this can be done only insofar as we c m ascribe a state to her whose satisfaction would con& in the world being altered to fit it. Desires are states 6th this direction of fit. Thus, if we want to explain why an agent acted, we m u t hold that she desired to do the action, or desires an outcome of doing it. However, McNaughton's copnitivist account of motivation purports to explain an agent's action by ascribing to her a belief about what she is morally required to do. But a belief has a certain direction of fit that the state mut fit the world. And this is the wrong direction of fit to explain an agent's action. In order to explain why an agent acted, we must ascribe to her a state with the direction of fit of a desire, namely, a state which is such that the world must fit it. Ascnbing to the agent a belief, therefore, fails to explain why the agent acted to bring about a change in the world; only the ascription of a desire can do this since only it has the correct direction of fit. In reply to this objection, McNaughton argues that "some cognitive states cm be seen as having. . directions of fit ninning both ways.'J9 This sort of state would be such that the world mut fit with it, insofar as it is desire-like, and such that it m u t fit the world insofar as it is belief-like. McNaughton maintains that if an agent is aware 59 McNaughton 1 988,109. (believes) that he is under a mord obligation to act in a certain way, then he sees the situation as demanding a response; if he is disposed to act, then he m u t be in a state with the direction of fit of a desire, namely, one to which the world must fit. This state wiil only be satisfied if the agent acts to alter the world to fit the state. However, McNaughton also wants to claim that the agent's conception of the situation is "purely cognitive."60 This foliows from the fact that the agent has a belief that he is morally obliged to act and so his state must fit the world. The belief that he is under a moral obligation will be tnie just if it represents accuraiely the way the world is, moraily speaking. McNaughton thus comrnits himself to the claim that "awareness of a moral requirement is a state which must be thought of as having directions of fit facing both ways. The agent's conception of the situation reveals to him both that the world is a certain way and that he must change it.w6 1 One technical term for a state with two directions of fit is a "be~ire.' '~~ However, against prevaihg philosophical orthodoxy, McNaughton does not c d such a state a 'besire', but a belief. But on what grounds is he entitled to do this? McNaughton suggests that though it is a sufficient condition of a state's being a belief that it has the direction of fit that the state must fit the world, "it does not lose the status of a belief if it happens to have another direction of fit as well."" But c m we not Say the same of a desire? A sufficient condition of a state's being a desire is that it has the dilection of fit that the world must fit it. But we might also say that though it is a sufficient condition of a state's -- -- " McNaughton 1988. 109. 61 McNaughton 1988, 109. 62 The tenn "besw" cornes h m James Altham. See Altham 1986. Michael Smith cdls a state with two directions of fit a "quasi-belief'. See Smith 1987: 56. 63 McNaughton 1988, 1 IO. being a desire that it has the direction of fit that the world must fit it, it does not Lose the status of a desire if it happens to have another direction of fit as well. Hence, following McNaughton's own reasoning, surely a state can be called a desire despite the fact that it has both directions fit. Perhaps McNaughton could embrace such a conclusion, but it would severely cost him, for he wants to hold that a state with two directions of fit is in fact a belief. He wants to hold this because he wants to hold that a moral belief is sufficient to motivate or give reasons for an agent to act. Therefore, McNaughton cannot make this move:But then he does not have an independent argument as to why such a state shouid be called a belief rather than a desire or a besire. Without an independent argument for calling such a state a belief rather than a desire such a state simply cannot rightly be called a mere belief. But perhaps McNaughton can c l a b that the state with two dir&tions of fit can be called a belief since he argues that an agent's conception of the situation is "purely cognitive." As McNaughton puts it: "beliefs ... are cognitive states they are representations of the way we take the world to be."@ However, in saying that a state with two directions of fit is purely cognitive like a beiief does he means that it oniy serves to represent and not to motivate? Sureiy not. But, then, he fails to provide us with an argument to the ef5ect that something can be both solely representational and simultaneously motivational, since for something to be purely representational is for it to be representational but not motivational. And, he needs an argument to this effect in order to demonstrate that a mord judgement, which expresses a belief about the way the world 64 McNaughton 1988,2 1. is rnoraily, is sunicient to motivate an agent to act. Although 1 think these objections tell against McNaughton's contention that a state can have both directions of fit, 1 think that the notion saers fiom more intractable problerns; and that the only way in which McNaughton can escape these problems is a way which undermines his claim that moral beiiefs are sufficient to motivate an agent to act. 2.3 The Cognitive Account of Motivation Undermined Michael Smith argues that the notion of a state with both directions of fit is iñoherent.~' Smith justifies this conclusion by examinhg the differences between beliefs and desires in terms of direction of fit. Smith argues that the Merence "cornes d o m to a dif5erence between the counterf'tuai dependence of a belief and a desire that p, on a perception that not-p: roughly, a belief thatp is a state that tends to go out of existence in the presence of a perception that not-p, whereas a desire that p is a state that tends to endure, disposing the subject in that state to brhg it about that p."66 With this in mind, consider the following example. imagine that 1 desire that x obtain. If 1 see that not-x obtains, then my desire that x obtain will tend to persist, and, hence, motivate me to act to bring about the target conditions of my desire, narnely, x. This foilows from the fact that the worid does not yet fit my state. However, if 1 see that x obtains, Le., if 1 see that the world fits my state, then since the target conditions of my desire already obtain, my desire wiil extinguish. How does this make the notion of a state with both directions of fit incoherent? For one to have a desire that x obtain* one must necessarily believe that not-x obtains in 65 Smith 1994, 116-125. See also Michael Smith 1987,55-57. a Smith I987,54. the world; for if it dÏd not, if instead x obtained, and, if 1 saw this, the desire should be extinguished. But if a state has both directions of fit, the target conditions of the state would have to both obtain and not obtain. The target conditions of my state would have to obtain in order for the state to fit the world, and it would have to not obtain, Le., not fit that world, for me to be motivated to bring about its target conditions. Moreover, as Smith puts it: "A state with both directions of fit would . . . have to be such that both, in the presence of such a perception, it tends to go out of existence, and, in the presence of such a perception, it tends to endure, disposing the subject that has it to bring it about that [x]."~' Thus, a state with both direction of fit requires that the same state of the world would have to obtain and not obtain and the same mental state endure and not endure, in order to motivate an agent to bring its target conditions about. But this is absurd, for something cannot both be x and no ta simultaneously. Thus, the contention that there is a state with both directions of fit is contradictory, and hence incoherent. It is important to point out here that a state with two directions of fit is incoherent for two reasonç. First, because it requires that the same state persist and not p i s t in the presence of the same relevant perception. Second, because it requires that the world be a certain way and that it . not be a certain wqP8 How might McNaughton reply to these objections? 1 think a plausible reply can be mustered by looking at a concrete example. Imagine that 1 see a young child struggling in the water. I f 1 do not throw her a life-preserver, she will surely perish. Suppose that it is also true that 1 ought to Save the drowning girl because morality requires this of me, . - -67 Smith, 1987,56. 68 Smith does not explicitly assert this second proposition, but I think that it is Unplicit in his argument. and 1 believe that 1 ought to save the drowniag girl. McNaughton argues that my conception of the situation is enough to move me to act; rny mere beiief that 1 have a moral obligation provides me with the motivation to act. ui this case, since 1 believe truiy that I ought to Save the drowning girl, my state fits the world. Of course, if this state has two directions of fit, then it will also have to be the case that my state does not fit the world so as to motivate me to act. The part of my state which motivates me to act is the part that represents it that that the girl 6e sme& this part of m y state motivates me to b ~ g it about that the world fits the state, and it does so because it does not yet fit the world. Once 1 act to bring about the target conditions of this part of the state, the world WU be such that it fits the state. Further, I am not motivated to bring it about that I r oughr to be that the girl be saved For this proposition is represented in the belief-like part of my state. The only way such a state would be contradictory would be if the state motivated me to change the world so as to make the belief-like part of my state or the mord judgment me, nameiy, 'It ought to be th& the drowning girl be saved.' But this is not what 1 am acting to b ~ g about; 1 am acting to make true the state of affain prescribed by the belief part of my state, namely, t h the drowning girl be saved. I f it was the case that 1 was acting to make the belief-like part of my state me, then both the belief-like part of my state wouid have to be tme and not true simultaneously, and the state would have to endure and not endure, if 1 was to be motivated. However, in the example given above, I am not acting to make the belief-Iike part of my state true. Rather, 1 am acting to make the state of &airs prescribed by the belief-like part of my state true. Since, the target conditions prescribed by the belief part of my state do not yet obtain when the belief-part is tme, the state still endures and so motivates me to act. Thus, a state with both directions of fit is not contradictory and so not incoherent. 1 thÿik this move gets McNaughton off the hook regarding the Uicoherence of States with both directions of fit. But it does so in a way which undermines McNaughtonYs overall contention, namely, that cognitive moral judgements are sufficient to motivate action. The reply c o d t s him to the assurnption that a moral judgernent would have two intentional objects. The mental state that it is wrong not to Save the girl has the propositional content that it is wrong not to Save the drowniag girl and a prescriptive content, namely, that the drowning girl be saved. Since the propositional content of the state and the recommendation of the state differ, and 1 am motivated to bring about the latter, the objection that a state with two directions of fit is contradictory is avoided. However, it avoids the objection at the cost that it is not the propositional content of the state alone that serves to motivate the agent to act; hence, a belief will not be the sole source of motivation. Since the propositional content of the state that it is wrong not to Save the drowning girl represents the moral judgement, that it is wrong not the save the drowning girl, the reply has the consequence that it is not just what the mord judgement is about that serves to motivate the agent to act. What motivates me to act is what the propositional content of my state recommends, and not the propositional content alone. Yet, McNaughton wants to maintain that it is the mord judgement by itself that serves to motivate the agent to act. According to McNaughton, what motivates me to save the drowning girl is that it is right to Save the drowning girl. But in order to avoid the prima facie contradictory nature of a state with two directions of fit, he mus concede that the propositional content of my state, namely, 'It ought to be that the drowning girl be saved', does not motivate. The states of affâirs prescnbed by the propositional content of the state motivated me to act, and not the propositional content it self, and so not the moral judgement. Hence, the beliefthat 1 am under a motal obligation by itseif, at least on McNaughton's account, does not serve to motivate. Moreover, if the state c m be divided up in the way that 1 have just suggested, then we cm see that one part is a belief and the other is a desire, and this is just what the Humean wants. Thus, his cognitivist account of motivation is undennined. Therefore, McNaughton's cognitivist account of motivation does not provide a threat to the Humean account of motivation. 2.4 The Case of the Masochist T'us far 1 have argued that McNaughton's cognitivist account of motiiation is fiawed. But McNaughton has one more attack on Hume's dictum, namely, that it is explanatorily i~ñotent.6~ If he can prove this, then he might be able to at l e s t show how a cognitivist account of motivation is more plausible than Hume's account at least in t e m of explainhg action. This will not, of course, shield McNaughton fiom my amck on his account of motivation. It will merely show that Hume's account of action explanation is no better off than his own. Hume, remember, argues that there are two distinct mental states: beliefs and desires. Beliefs tell us how the world is at present, and how it might be changed to make it fit with the target conditions of our desires. Hume employs this account of human 69 McNaughton 1988, 110-1 13. psychology to explain intentional human action. For Hume, an action is the product of both beliefs and desires. Desks represent the way the world is to be when their target conditions obtain, and a belief represents how the world is and how it has to be changed to make it fit with our desires. Thus if one is to be motivated to act one must have both a means-end belief and a desire. McNaughton calls this Hume's belief-desire theory of action explanation. McNaughton argues that on Hume's beliefdsire theory of action explanation, it is logically possible for an agent to desire any state of &airs. McNaughton argues that "if an agent's beliefs about a desired state of affairs or his way of conceiving of what he desires is quite independent of his desiring then he can consistently desire anything, no matter how he conceives of it. There is no limit to the combinations of beliefs and desires that are possible."70 McNaughton suggests that this contention may be suggested by empirical evidence: people do desire all kinds of strange things. Take, for instance, masochism. The masochist is a person who claims to desire to be in pain, which is something most of us try our utmost to avoid. On the Humean account of action explanation where desires are non-cognitive states, this desire seems perfectly intelligible. The fact that some people desire pain while most avoid it is no more strange than the fact that some people like steak while others abhor it. But McNaughton argues that the desires which the Humean says are intelligible in fact appear to be unintelligible; we find them bizarre. For instance, we cannot understand why a masochist desires being beaten and whipped. Yet, according to "the 'O McNaughton 1988. 1 1 1. belief-desire theory of action explanation, we are wrong to be p&ed."7' For in this theory, it is enough to explain why the masochist acted to state that he desired to be in pain. McNaughton argues that the fact that the belief-desire theory can explain this action so easily mut mean there is something wrong with this theory, for we are in fact p d e d by such desires. And, "if we cannot make sense of that desire then we c m o t make sense of an action explanation which appeais to that desire? Though the Humean account of desire can explain what the agent is aiming to bring about, it does not explain his action fully. McNaughton claims that this foliows from the fact that "we have no insight into why beùig in the desired state should bring sati~faction."~~ McNaughton dleges that we requKe a more satisfactory account of explanation of action than the belief-desire theory allows us, and that the cognitive account of motivation c m provide this. On the cognitive account of action explanation, we explain the masochist's action by appreciating the masochist's view of whipping, and we do this by discovering why the masochist h d s wtiipping attractive. There are several paths to this goal. For example, we may point out that "some things that are normally experienced as mildly painfbi can be enjoyable when we are sexually excited, or that punishment can have the pleasurable eEect of relieving g ~ i l t . " ~ ~ McNaughton suggeçts that we corne to understand the desire for pain by coming to appreciate, though not sharing, the experience of the masochist whose actions we are trying to explain. The agent's conception of the situation makes the desire intelligible. Once we have grasped the " McNaughton 1988, 112. McNaughton 1988, 1 1 1. 73 McNaughton 1988,111. 74 McNaughton 1988, 112. attractiveness of the desire, we come to understand why that person was motivated to act to bring about the target conditions of his desire. McNaughton contends that we do not therefore, contra Hume, need to add anything to his conception to explain his action. We do not need to ascribe to the agent a non-cognitive state. If we were to entirely share the rnasochist's conception of the situation, then we would be motivated to act a s he does. Thus, McNaughton concludes, al1 we need to explain action is the cognitive account of action explanation. 1 think that there are two responses to this objection. F h t , it is not clear that we really need a cognitive account of action explanation to explain how it is that some desires, though they seem prima facie unintelligible, are intelligible. Hume could simply deny that the desires that McNaughton claims are iininteliigible, e.g., the desire to drink a can of paint, are reaily unintelligible. For Hume, that we have a given desire is just a fact about us. Furthemore, Hume can quite easily explain a desire and its correspondhg action by employing his belief-desire theory of action explanation. If we find that a certain agent thinks that a certain state is desirable, then it seems to be the case that we will come to realize or know that he wiil be & a m to brhg about the mget conditions of that desire; and hence, we come to understand why he came to act the way he did. He acted that way because he desùed the outcome of that action. Someone's desiring something is evidence that he will act in ways that will satisfy that desùe. However, 1 might agree with McNaughtonYs claim that if we are really to understand an agent's desires and why he acts to bring their targets about, then we might need to get inside his head, so that we can redy see the desire and the action fiom his point of view. In the case of the masochist, we might need to know what the agent befieves about being whipped to discover why he desires to be whipped. We do this by, for instance, coming to discover that the masochist believes that being whipped is pleasurable and exciting, or that it relieves some kind of guilt. For the Humean these are the agent's beliefs about the situation, and these beliefs explain why the rnasochist h d s being whipped attractive. The fact that the masochist desires being whipped exists in vVtue of the fact that he believes that it will, Say, relieve guilt or increase pleasure, and thus explains why he desires being whipped. If the Humean can do this, then he can make the desire intelligible in just the way that McNaughton requires. Now, we know that the masochist believes that being whipped will relieve his guilt or cause him pleasure, and that explains why he desires being whipped. However, just knowing how the masochist conceives of the situation will not be sufficient to explain why he acts to bring about the target conditions of his desire to be whipped: we m u t also know that the masochist desires (in the non-cognitivist sense) pleasure or the relief of guilt. Hume cm explain the seemingly unintelligible desire to be whipped which the masochist has. He explains it by citing a M e r belief which the masochist has, namely, that king whipped relieves guilt or causes pleasure. But what is salient about Hume's expianation of the agent's action is the positing of a nonderivative desùe to relieve guilt or exmence pleasure, which motivated the masochist to desire to be whipped in the first place. Without this further desire, the desire to be whipped does not make sense. The desire to relieve guiit explains the desire to be whipped, and this desire is explained by appeal to the beiief that being whipped relieves guilt or causes pleasure. But the former desire needs no explanation. So ît will not be enough to explain why the agent acted by citing his beliefs about the situation; what we need is a non-denvative desire. Thus, even on the beliefdesire theory of action explanation we cm make sense of the rnasochist's desire to be whipped, and thus explain why he acted to bring about that he be whipped. We need to know therefore, not only how an agent conceives of things, e.g., his belief that whipping relieves guilt, but also that he desires the relief of guilt. Therefore, 1 thuik that McNaughton's objection to the Humean account of action explmation fails. 2.5 Conclusion In this chapter I have argued that David McNaughton's cognitivist internalist account of motivation is flawed because it relies on the plausibility of the notion of a state with two directions of fit, which itself is flawed. Furthemore, the only reply thai he can give to avoid the flaws with a state with two directions of fit underniines his contention that a moral beiief is suffïcient to motivate an agent to act. I have also argued that his attack on the Humean account of action explanation can be defused by the Humean. Thus, we should reject McNaughton's argument for intemaikt realism and his attacks on Hume's dictum. At the end of the last chapter and the beginning of this chapter I argued that if McNaughton's internalist realism is to move beyond its mere intuitive plausibility, it must provide us with sound philosophical arguments. If what I have said about his thesis is correct, then he has failed at this task, and so we shodd reject his account of intemalist moral realism. However, it would be too hasty to say that intemalkt reaiism has gone down in an ignominious defeat. In the next chapter 1 examine Jonathan Dancy's attempt to provide us with an argument for intemalist reaiism. Dancy's position does not employ the same arguments as McNaughton, and so must be treated as an altogether new attempt to vindicate internalist reaiism. CBAPTERTHREE Jonathan Dancy: The Pure Theory In the las chapter, 1 argued that McNaughton failed to establish the tmth of cognkhkt mternalism ui this chapter, I will take up Jonathan Dancy's attempt to provide arguments in favour of this same thesis. Dancy suggests that there is a strong intuitive argument m favour of cognitive intemalism He considers this argument to be ' strong', becaw there is "a sense [m which] morality is essentialiy practical, so that t would be odd for someone to say 'This action is wrong but 1 do not see that as at all relevant to my choi~e."'~~ This intuition provides the point of departure for Dancy's defase of cognitive mtemaiîsm. Of course, Dancy does not stop here; he attempis to demonstrate that there are good philosophical reasons for embracing internalisn In this chapter, 1 present those reasons. 1 reject Dancy's intemalimi and, in the process, give at least prima fucze reasons in favour of extemalism. 3.1 The Pure Theory Dancy purports to provide us with a version of cognitive internalism. As should be familiar by now, this Mew has two features: first, the daim that moral judgements express beliefs; second, the claim that moral judgements necessarily motivate or provide reasons for action. What should also be famüiar by now is that this thesis clashes directly with Hume's dictum. Hume maintains that every completely motivating state is a combmation of a belief and a desire. Hume ais0 suggests that beliefk are motivation^ impotent, whereas desires are essentiaily motivating. Thus, beliefs and desires conjoined constitute a reason for action. Dancy agrees in part with Hume, maintainhg that a completely motivating state has two elements, labeled belief and desire. But he disagrees with Hume over the way in which beliefs and desues are to be conceived. Dancy suggests that the two be conceived in broadly cognitivist terms. On Dancy's view, what is required for an agent to be motivated to act is that there be "two distinct 'representations' in the agent."76 The first is the agent's belief(s) about the way the worid is at present; the second is the agent's belief about the way the world will be once the action is completed. An agent needs to hold the fist representation because without it she would not be aware of the circumstances within which she acts, nor whether her action will lead to any change. The second representation is needed because without it an agent would be blind to what she is trying to bring about. An example will demonstrate just what Dancy has in mind. Imagine that I believe that my girlfnend is in extreme pain, and 1 also believe that were I to give her the appropriate dose of morphine, her pain wouid be mitigated. There are two representations hem: (1) The belief that my girbiend is in extrerne pain; (2) The belief that were 1 give her the morphine, her pain would be mitigated. Dancy contends that the two representations are enough to motivate me to act. Two questions immediately arise with respect to Dancy's c l a h that the two representations motivate action: (1) What is it about them that motivates the agent to act? (2) Where does the notion of a desire figure into this account? In answer to the nrst " Dancy 1993. 13: question, Dancy argues that what motivates the agent to act is ''the gap between the two representations."" In the case above, then, what motivates me to administer the morphine to my girlfiend is the gap between the belief that she is in pain and the belief that were 1 give her the morphine, then she will be relieved of her pain. Furthemore, for the agent to be motivated there does not need to be any instance of a "recognhble version of Hume's conception of de~ire."'~ In answer to the second question, Dancy maintains that %e occurrence of the desire is the agent 3 being momtoted by the gap."7g Dancy's account of desire differs fkom Hume's in that the desire is "not part of the causai story that takes us &om beliefs to action. The desire here is to be conceived as a distinct event, that of the agent's being motivated by certain conceptions. As such it is caused by those conceptions, but though necessary for eventual action it is not a cause of that action; it does not pull its own weight in the causal s t ~ r y . ' ' ~ ~ in essence, this is Dancy's account of motivation. Dancy does not provide a detailed elaboration of his account of motivation. As Dancy explains: "1 shall never offer an explicit argument in favour of that theory [namely, his theory of motivation], nor argue against its Humean rival."81 Instead, his view must be gleaned fkom the way in which he defends his theory against Humean-type attacks. In the next four sections 1 take up Dancy's defenses, arguing that they ail fail. In the fifth section 1 attempt to demonstrate that Dancy's account of motivation is hught with problems. - - n Dancy 1993, 19. " Dancv 1993. 14. " anc ci 1993; 19. 80 Dancy I993,20. 3.2 Amorshm, Wickedness and Lucifer aimself If Dancy's contention is that moral judgements, which express beliefs, are sufficient to rnotivate one to act, then it d e s out as impossible the figures of the amoralist and the wicked penon. The amordist is one who is capable of distuiguishing between right and wrong, but is not concemed with nich considerations and., hence, is not motivated by them. The wicked person, like the amoraiist, knows the distinction between right and wrong, but sees the wrongness of an action as a reason for doing it, and the rightness of an action as a reason for leaving it undone." David Brink argues that the mere possibility of such people poses a problem for intemalism in the following way: Intemalism is the view that it is part of the concept of morality that a belief about what we are obliged to do necessarily provides an agent with a reason or motivation for action. If people such as the amoralist and t6e wicked person are possible, then intemaiism is fal~e.*~ The amoralist and the wicked person are possible. Therefore, internalism is fdse." BMik argues that externdism can account for the existence of such people because the extemaiist holds that '4he motivational force of moral considerations [is] a matter of contingent psychologicd fact, depending on the beliefs and desires agents happen to have.''85 Externalisrn thus takes it as at least apossibiliry that an agent can believe that he is under a moral obligation, and not thereby be motivated to act. A fortiori, that such people are possible is an argument in favour of externalism. Dancy seeks to See Dancy 1993.4-6; see also McNaughton 1988, 134-146. 83 This formulation isn't quite apposite for the case of the wicked person. The wicked person is motivated b such considenitions, but in the wrong way. 'Brink 1989,45-50. BMk 1989.49. establish against this objection that neither the genuuie arnoralist nor the wicked person, as conceived in the objection, are possible. And, since they are not possible, they do not pose a problem for the internalist. Regardmg the amoralist Dancy says this: %e may al1 admit that there is the person who sees the institution of morality from the outside, as something whose clairns on us he rejects," but this person "does not accept the moral judgements whose reievance he denies . . . he merely knows w h t judgements would be made by th ers."^^ The . amoralist, then, is not a person who believes that what he is doing is wrong; rather, he is one who simply rejects conventional morality. This person is no trouble for the intemalist . Dancy's argument amounts to no more than the dogmatic assertion that the amoralist one who accepts the dictates of rnorality but is not motivated by them is not possible. But this seems a jejune response to Brink's objection, since it begs the question. According to Brink, it is implausible to assume that a person who remains unmoved by mord considerations is merely to be seen as rejecting conventional rnorality. For as Brink puts it: "We can imagine someone who regards what we take to be the moral demands as moral demands not simply as conventional morality and yet remains unmoved."*' But perhaps Dancy's objection is more subtle. He might be suggesting that if one were really to believe that one is under a moral obligation, then one would be moved to act. In other words, the fact that one is not moved by the moral obligation that one supposedly believes one has, proves that one reaiiy does not beIieve that one has a moral obligation at -a6 Dancy 1993,s; emphasis added. " Brink 1993.48. dl. I f one did believe it, then one wouid be motivated. However, if this is Dancy's argument, then he has merely asmmed the tnith of intemalism and thereby begged the question against the extemalist. This response is question-begging, because it States that if one were under a mord obligation then one wodd thereby be motivated. But extenialisrn denies just this thesis. Extemalism claims that it is possible for one to believe that one is under a moral obligation, but not be moved by that consideration. For extemalists, sornething extemal to morality must be present for an agent to be motivated. However, perhaps it is the extemalist who is r edy making a dogrnatic assertion here to the effect that his conception of the amoralist is possible; hence, perhaps the externalist is begging the question against the intemalists' conception of the amoralist. It seems that we are at an impasse. 1s there any way out? The extemalist can simply tum the matter over to empincai evidence. There do seem to be people in society, e.g., sociopaths, killers and mad people, who believe that what they are doing is wrong, yet regard this belief as irrelevant to their actions8' Empincal evidence (Le., that there are such people) and expenence seem to confirm the externalist's conception of the amordia and, at the same tirne, tell against Dancy's daim that the amoralist as conceived by Brink's objection could not possibly exist* Dancy thus fails to corne to grips in a serious way with the possibility of the amoralist; he merely denies what we have good empirical evidence to assert However, Dancy might dissent fkom the externalist's reading of the empincal data, arguing that the person who is thought to be an amoralist is really not the type of 88 For an interesting account of a mal-life sociopath, see Watson (1 987). Watson recounts the story of Mil-killer Robert Harris who claims that he h e w that what he was dohg was wrong and that he chose to do it despite this fact. amoralist that the externalist needs to undermine intemalism. Dancy can simply argue that the way he reads the empirical data concurs with his concept of the amordist. Thus, we are again at a deadlock. Both Dancy and the externalist need to provide an independent, non-question begging argument regarding the correct account of the amordist. However, since it seems that neither Dancy nor the externalist can do this, we m a t search for another way to break the impasse between the two theories. The possibility of breaking the impasse cornes through reflection on another kind of person the wicked person who undennines internalism. 1 now tum to that argument. Dancy offers the following objection to the argument firom wickedness. Dancy maintains that although we can conceive of the notion of a "wicked person", it is impossible that such a person could actually exist. That is, there could be no person who takes the badness of his actions as a reason for carrying them out. For example, although we cm have a notion of a person, such as Lucifer, who pursues e d for its own sake, it is in fact impossible that Lucifer could exist as conceived. It is simply impossible for an agent to pume evil for its own sake.8' Dancy suggests that Lucifer does not "pursue evil . . . for its own sake (su6 specie mah") . . . but for extraneous reasons, such as the fact that it is his last remaining hope of an empire."" According to Dancy, "this renders Satan's pursuit of evii comprehensible, but at the cost of making it useless to the ex~emalist."~' It is not entïrely clear just what Dancy's objection arnounts to. There appear to be two ways to understand the objection. First, Dancy might be suggesting that an agent 89 Dancy uses the concept of Lucifer put forth by John Milton in 91) Dancy 1993,6, 91 Dancy 1993,6. * cannot pursue evil for its own sake because that which is believed evil is something which is intrinsically repulsive to agents, while that which is believed good is intrinsicaily attractive to agents. Dancy seems to suggest this reading when he says that "for us to understand the pursuit of evil, we have to tind some comprehensible relation between it and some good.'"2 Second, Dancy rnight be arguing that by reflection on the very concept of a person who pursues evil, e.g., Lucifer, we reaiize that no one, not even Lucifer, achially pumies evil directiy, but for extraneous reasons. The first way of understanding Dancy's objection breaks down into two component parts. First, the claim that the good necessarily attracts and second that evil necessarily repels. 1 do not think that Dancy can daim that the good necessarily attracts given that he claims that such psychological failings like weakness of will, accidie, depression, and so on, can preclude an individual nom pursuing what she believes to be good?3 In response to the second claim Michael Stocker argues, this view is "clearly and simply f a l ~ e . " ~ ~ As Stocker explains: 3here are clear and unproblematic [cases where we are attracted to do an act] because it is (believed) bad or in spite of its being (believed) bad, where the act or feature is not attractive because or only because it or some other relevant act or feature! is (believed) good.'"S To illustrate Stocker's point, consider the following example: Imagine that Bill is sutTering fiom A I D S and will soon die. He is angry and decides that if he has to die, then others should go with him. He begins to engage in sexual intercoune with people while neglecting to Uiforrn them that he has " Dancy 1993,6. 93 For more on this type of response see Stocker 1979,744. P1 Stocker 1979,740. 95 Stocker 1979,74 1. AIDS. In sum: he has a desire to harm others. In this case, it seems that Bill wantts to do something he clearly thinks is bad and despite the fact that it is bad. Now, it might be objected that Bill does not desire to do the hami intrinsically, but becaue it leads to something good, e.g., his own pleasure. However, as Stocker argues, 'Tust as helping others can the direct and proper object of desires and appetites, so can hanning th ers.'"^ How does Stocker justm this cl&? Stocker puts forth the following: When we feel firious, hwt, enviou, jealous, threatened, btra ted , abandoned, endangered, rejected, and so on, what we often seek is precisely the harm or destruction of someone, and not dways the ccoffending party": "If I cm' t have her no one will." "So, you are Leaving me d e r al1 1 have done for you. WelI than, take that." 'The whole &y has gone badly, I might as well complete it by nllning the little I did accomplish." '1 let him have it with the hom; he was the millionth Sunday driver who cut in fiom of me." Watch out for hirn today, he just had an awful fight with his wife."" Stocker's point seems to be that the mood 1 am in can influence my action, that is, "given such moods and circumstances [above], harming another can be the proper and direct object of attraction.'"* There does not seem to be any need to amibe to the agent any other object which he is after, e.g., pleasure. In certain moods, I c m desire what is harmfid to others and myself. "In such moods, . . . we not only do not care, we are filled t ,999 with 'uncare . Now, if we accept that out rnoods can affect the comection between what we evaluate as good and what we are motivated to do, then we must accept that sometimes % Stocker 1979,748. 97 Stocker 1979,748. 91 Stocker 1979,748. 99 Stocker 1979,749. when we are in certain moods we desire the bad. And, if we accept this, then we must reject the f is t reading of Dancy's objection to the possibility of an agent who pursues evil for its own sake. Let us consider the second reading of Dancy's objection, vu., that by reflection on the paradigm case of an evildoer, e-g., Lucifer, we see that not even he pursues evil for its own sake, However, Dancy's response is problematic, since it can be used against him, mutatis mutandis, in the case of a person who putatively pursues good for its own sake (sub specie boni). Consider the paradigrn case of a person who pursues good for its own sake: Jesus. The extemalist might weli wonder whether such an extreme degree of gooddoing is actually possible for Jesus, or any penon. For as we have seen it is sometimes the case that agents pursue evil. So perhaps the best way to understand Jesus's pursuit of good is to see Jesus as pursuhg good, not for its own sake, but for extraneou reasons, e.g. because doing good will make it such that more people will be apt to believe and foilow him, or because this is the only way to keep together his followers, or because it undemines the various activities of Lucifer. If the extemalist considers Jesus's actions in this way, then he can make sense of Jesus's pursuit of good: Jesus pursues good, not for its own sake, but instmmentally, i.e., because of what cornes fiorn i t This rnakes Jesus's pursuit of good explicable, but at the cost that it undemiines Dancy's contention that a mere belief that something is good (or that we ought to do it) will motivate an agent to act. Moreover, what follows fkom this understanding of Jesus's pursuit of good is that it is possible to conceive that there is no person who pursues good for its own sake, or does what is right just because it is right. People pursue good only for instnunental reasons. Accordtigly, internalism is undermined, since it seems that no person is motivated by a moral judgement, e.g., Tt is right to x in circumstances c', just because it is right to do x. Instead, agents act on moral judgements because their actions satisS some extraneous want or desüe that an agent may have, e-g., the desire to do what is right. And, the extemdist cm readily accept such a conclusion. The intemalist, however, cannot: he holds that a beüef about what one ought to do motivates without the help of a desire, not because it Ieads to the satisfaction of some preference or desùe. Dancy might respond here by arguing that whiie no one ever acts on a moral judgement because it is right to do so, but only because it will, for example, mitigate the pain of a lover, or make a f'iïend happy, this is only because Wiere may be no generd reason for doing what one should."'" Dancy argues that there are particular reasons, rather than one general reason, for acting moraliy, and, correspondingly, that there is more than one type of moral belief that can motivate an agent to act. Thus, an agent can be rnotivated to act morally by the belief that her action will cause a peson pain or that her action will bring about the happiness of a child, and so on. YeS my objection can be made to work here too. It may be held that no one wili p u m e something like the mitigation of another's pain for its own sake, but only for extraneou reasons, e.g., because an agent does not like pain or because he wants to make others happy, and so on. But the internalist cannot admit that people are motivated to mitigate pain only because they desire something which cornes f?om doing so; the intemalist holds that one is 100 Dancy 1993, 10. motivated to mitigate pain because in the circumstance in which the action takes place the stopping of pain is the morally correct thing to do, and this is why we are motivated to stop the pain. And, if the externalist may be allowed this move against the intemalist, then it seems to demonstrate that agents are not motivated to pursue good for its own sake, but for other extraneous reasons. And, this contravenes intemalist dogma It appears that Dancy is caught in a dilemma. If he argues that no one pursues evil for its own sake, then the same argument can be made for the case of someone who allegedly pursues good for its own sake. If Dancy wants to maintain that agents pursue good for its own sake, then he must concede that there could be some agents who pursue evil for its own sake. No matter which hom of the dilemma he takes, we get the same result: intemalism is undermined. Intemalism is undemiined if Dancy takes the first hom, because it seems to be the case that no agent pumes good because he believes he ought to, but because he desires something which cornes fiom it; absent that desire, the agent would fail to be motivated. Intemalism says the opposite of this contention. Therefore, internaiism is false. Moreover, intemaiism is undermined if Dancy takes the second horn of the dilemma, because on this horn it follows that there are agents who believe that what they are doing is evil, but pursue evil despite this knowledge. lnternaiism denies this thesis. Therefore, internaiism is false. I must be clear about m y objection. I do not think that it undemiines internalism because a desire happens to be present when an agent is motivated to act morally; an intemaüst can readily admit that one can be motivated to act in accord with morality and desire to do so. Wh& my objection says is that it is possible that when agents act on moral judgernents the only reason they do so is becme their actions satisfy some extraneous want or desire. Absent the desire, no agent would not be motivated to act rnorally. And the i n t e d i s t cannot accept this result. Thus, Dancy's response to the possibility of the existence of the amoralist and the wicked penon fails. Since his response fails, his argument for interndism is undermined. Extemalisrn thus remains the stronger theory. I think that there are two rejoinders to my argument here, but that both fail. We might interpret Dancy's objection to the wicked person as an objection against the possibility of there being any such thing as "pure evil." Rather, evil is simply the privation of good. There is no evidence that this is what Dancy does Say, but he rnight suggest this as a defense given that if there is no such thing as pure evil, it would impossible for an agent to pursue it. Hence, it is impossible for there to be a wicked person as conceived, since a wicked person pursues pure evil. If there is no such thing as a wicked peaon, then the objection poses no problem for internalism. However, 1 think that this is a queer metaphysical doctrine. 1 think it is implausible, if not empincally fdse, to deny that there is such a thing as "pure evil." Hence, it seems implausible to deny that there are people who pursue evil for its own sake. Consider events like the Holocaust or mass warfare; prima facie these events are instances of positive evil in the world. Furthemore, 1 wodd deny that evil is defined in t e m of good, such that evil is merely the absence of good. The claim that evil is merely the absence of good can be questioned by pointing out the symmetrical possibility that there is ody evil in the world, and that good is nothing more than the absence of evil. To decide between these two alternatives, one would have to rely on one's theological leaning, and so on. In other words, there may be no deep philosophical or metaphysical distinction between a world predicated on evil and a world predicated on good. Moreover, it seems to be the case that the argument against Dancy could be made to work even if1 accepted the queer metaphysical doctrine that there is no such thing as pure evil. Instead of maintainhg that there is a person who pursues d l for its own sake, 1 could maintain that there is a person who pursues the annihilation of good for its own sake. This postulation stili poses a problem for intemdism in the ways I put forth above. The second rejoinder is this: my argument appears to be a ñn-se~uihu. '~ ' 1 argued that perhaps we can only make sense of Jesus's putative pursuit of good for its own sake ifwe construe his pursuing of good not for its own sake, but for extraneous reasons. 1 claimed that it follows h m this that an agent never pursues~ood for its own sake, i.e., a belief that something is good never motivates. But this is a non-sequitur. For it might be the case that a person does not always pursue good for its own sake, but it does not follow that one never pursues good for its own sake. Perhaps it is the case that one sometimes pursues good for its own sake, and sometimes one pursues good for extraneous reasons. The correct response here is to argue that even if it is the case that some people do pursue good for its own sake some of the tirne, then arguably people pursue evil for its own sake some of the t h e . This response is in keeping with my contention that the two cases are to be treated symmetricaUy. And, if it is tme that some people sometimes pursue evil for its own sake, then intemalism is false. 101 Thanks to Margaret Carneron for bringing this objection to my attention. 3.3 Weakness of Wi and The Person Sufferhg From Accidie Dancy thinks that most cognitive theones of motivation fdl prey to the problem of weakness of will and the problem of the penon suEering fiom accidie. 'O2 Hence, if his cognitive account of motivation is to supersede these ùieories it needs to find an answer to these challenges. In this section, I will detail Dancy's response to these objections. 1 deai with his response to the problem of weakness of will £ k t . uitemalism holds that if the total cognitive state of an agent is sufficient for . motivation in one situation, then it mwt be sufficient for motivation in analogous situations. But the very same state can be present without generating action in the same circumstances when an agent is suffering fkom weakness of d l . But, then, it must have been fdse that the state was sufficient for action in the first case. It must have been the case that there was something else, in addition to the cognitive state in the first case, which motivated the agent to act, namely, a desire. It seems that Dancy's theory is lacking something which explains action, e.g., a desire. Thus, it must be false. 1 O3 In reply, Dancy argues that this argument rests on a false premise, and thus is unsound. Dancy articulates the response this way: "[the argument] is unsound because it makes a basic assumption which the cognitivist [internalist] does not need to share, [namely,] that if a state is anywhere sufncient for action it must be everywhere ~utficient" '~ Dancy's contention directly contravenes Hume's suggestion that there are states which are essentially motivating, i.e., desires, and states which are contingently lm Dancy 1993, 12. 103 Dancy maintains that this argument is more a refutation "of cognitivism in the theory of motivation," (22) rather than a refutation of intemalism. 104 Dancy 1993,22. motivatingy Le., b e l i e f~ . ' ~~ On Hume's account there are states whîch, when they are present, always motivate in the absent of contrary motivations, Le., which cannot be present without motivating an agent to act, and states which contingently motivate, but never in their own right. Dancy thus claims that there is nothing resembling beliefs and desires as conceived by Hume. Rather, there are "intrinsicully motivating states, which can be present without motivating, but which when they do motivate do so in their own right. They c m motivate in their own right, and so are not Humean beliefs; but they cm be present without rnotivating, and so are not Humean desires."'06 But what takes place when a state which is intrhsically motivating is present, but does not motivate? Dancy argues that "when this happens [when an intrinsically motivating state is present, but fails to motivate] there wilI be an explanation of it and we should expect to give this in terms of the presence of some feature in the second case which defused the ability of the original cognitive state to rñtivate."'~' Presurnably, the explanation that Dancy has in mùid will include reference to weakness of will. Dancy's response to the problem of the person sufFering fiom accidie is similar to the response to the problem of weakness of will. According to Dancy, "people who suffer from accidie are those who just don? care for a while about things which would normaily seem to them to be perfectly good reason for action."'08 Accidie c m be brought on by such things as depression. Accidie is a problem for the intemalia because in such a case - - IO5 Beliefs are contingently motivating states because they motivate an agent to act onIy in the presence of a desire. 106 Dancy 1993,24. Io7 Dancy I993,24. tW Dancy 1993.5. an agent believes that she is under a moral obligation, but fails to be motivated by that belief. But intemaiism says that beliefs motivate; therefore, intemalism must be false. Dancy's response to this objection depends on the notion of an intrinsicdy motivating state. He replies as follows: the flexibility introduced by the notion of an intrinsicaily motivating state is surely just what we need to account for accidie. What we assert is that a state which is here sunicient for action may elsewhere not be. Where it is not sunicient, there will be an explmation for this. And we have introduced no restriction on the sort of explanation that we are prepared to couutenance. Sometimes the reason will be carelessness or inattention; sometimes it will be despair, sometimes it will be an excess of alcohol; sometimes it will be a neurologicai disorder; and sometimes it will be clinical depression. 'O9 Thus, if accidie cm be included in what counts as an explanation as to why a state failed . to motivate, Dancy 's pure theory can quite easily accommodate the pro blem of accidie. Thus, for Dancy the problem of weakness of will and the problem of accidie are no problem for his intemalism if he is allowed to posit the existence of an intrinsicaily motivating state. I do not think that the Humean (the extefnalist) would disagree with Dancy's claim that weakness of will and accidie can prevent a state, which usually would motivate an agent to act, fiom motivating an agent to act. But neither do 1 think that this claim licenses a rejection of Hume's daim that there are essentially motivating states and contingently motivating states. The Humean can argue that, though a desire is an essentially motivating state, it can sometimes be present and fail to motivate an agent to act; but this does not entail that it is not an essentially motivating state. The failure of the 109 Dancy 1993,25. state to motivate cm be explained by some factor like weakness of wili, accidie, and so on. The Humean can argue that it is true that people who are s u f f e ~ g fiom weakness of will and accidie are not moved to act by the reasons they take themselves to have, because cases where an agent is suffiering fiom weakness of will, accidie, is dnink, and so on, are just those cases in which the agent fails to act in ways that they otherwise desire to act. The Humean conception of rationality says that the rational thing for an agent to do is to rnaXiI11iZe the satisfaction of her de~ues.''~ But when an agent is suffering £kom a psychological fading, she fails to act rationaily; she fails to make it as likely as possible that she get what she most wants. By the agent's own lights she is irrational. We explain the agent's irrationality by appeal to some feature which is present in the case where the agent acts irrationaily, but which was not present in the case where the agent acted rationally, e.g., weakness of d l , accidie, d d e n n e s s , and so on. For the Humean, when an agent makes a moral judgement and she is not suBering from weakness of will, accidie, not an amoralist, and so on she will be motivated to act in accord wiui what the mord judgement enjoins, because she desires to do what the judgement prescribes. However, when an agent is weak-willed, sufEering fiom accidie, or what not, her actions do not follow her desires. She fails to act on the reasons beliefs and desires she takes herself to have. Thus, by her own lights she is acting irrationdy. 110 See Gauthier 1975. To illustrate my point, consider the following scenario. Imagine that a man's chiid is drowning in his backyard pool. From the window of bis house the man sees the child, and he strongly desires to save the child fiom drowning. Further, he believes that if he leaves his house and jumps into the pool, he can Save the child. But the man is s u f Z e ~ g fkom agoraphobia and, hence, is unable to leave the confines of his houe to Save the child. Consequently, the child dies. What explains his inaction? Clearly in this situation the man suffers Eom a psychological failing, e-g., agoraphobia, and this explains why he did not act in a way that he had most reason to act? Given this case, the Humean can agree with Dancy that certain psychological failings can preclude an agent fkom acting in ways that he has, by his own lights, most reason to act. The Humean, then, can agree that on this occasion an essentially motivating state failed to motivate. Moreover, if the father was not suffering from a psychological failing, he wouid have saved tlïe child. When an agent suffers fiom psychological faihgs, his actions do not foliow the perceived strength of the reasons he takes hunself to have. The Humean can admit that essentially motivating states are motivating just if the agent whose states they are is not suffering fiom weakness of will, accidie, and so on. " ' in this case, doesn't the man simply have an overwhehing d e s k to stay inside? I argue not It is Unportant to make a distinction h m between having a strong desire to do x and king compelled to do x. In this case, the m m is compelled to stay inside in virtue of the fa* that he is afflicted with agoraphobia No amount of convincing, ùicfuding pointing to the fact that he strongly desires that his child not drown, will move him to act in accord with the reauins he bas. His agoraphobia causes him to act irrationally. But perhaps he is compelled to have a desire to stay inside. If this is the case, then he has an irrational desire. His desire is inational bccause it is based on a false belief which is caused by his agoraphobia, namely, that if he goes outside something bad will happen to him. His desire is irrational because it is caused by a belief which is itself imtional to hold given that desires rhat are caused by irrational beliefs are themselves irrational. Either way he acts irrationally: he fails to make it as likely as possible that he get wwhat he most wants, namely, to save his child fiom drowning. But perhaps my example misses the point.112 Thus far 1 have assumed that what happens in cases where an agent is suffering fkom weakness of will, accidie and so forth, is that the agent's motivations are overridden by contrary motives. But Dancy's position might well be that what happens in these cases is that a penon is simply not motivated at dl. 1 think that there are two responses to this claim. First, if what I have said above is Dancy's actual intention, it does not appear clear what he could have in mind. For it is typically the case that when an agent s a e r s fiom wealaiess of will and accidie her . motivations are typically ovemdden by contrary motives rather than simply tnincated. Moreover, I think that Hume can accommodate Dancy's objection and, thus, demonstrate that it is false that there are no such things as essentially motivating states. Consider again the case of the man who is suffering fiom agoraphobia. The way that I devised the case, the man's motivations were ovemdden by his psychological failing; but suppose instead that he was dru&. He sees that his child is drowning, but because he is dnuik he f d s to act on the reasons which he takes himself to have, Le., what he believes is good is not what he is motivated to do. If Hume allows that there are such cases, as 1 think he can, then he can argue that the drunicemess cuts off the motivation, but that were the man sober he would have moved to Save the child. Again, the state would be an essentially rnotivating case just if the man is sober. Thus, Hume can conclude that a state will be essentiaily motivating just ifa person is not suffering fiom a psychological failing, not dnink, not sick, and so on. Thus, Dancy's contention that there is no such thing as an essentially rnotivating state is false. 112 'ïhanks to Rich Campbell for pointing this out, What Dancy has to demonstrate is that it is impossible for a person who is not suffering nom weakness of will, accidie or other such psychological failings to believe that she has a reason to do something, and still not be mcved to act, e-g., as in the case of the amoralist. But Dancy does not seem to be able to explain what happens in such situations, for the agent is not suffering from any psychological Ming which could explain her failure to be motivated. 1 suppose Dancy might maintain that such a person could not exist, because if a person realiy did believe that she was under a moral obligation, then she wouid be motivated But this begs the question against the Humean and the possibility that a person can believe she has a mord reason to do something, but not be motivated to act in accord with that reason. Thus, Dancy's response to the problern of weakness of will is flawedIt is here that externalism ernerges as the stronger theory of motivation, because it cm explain why an agent does not act in the way that morality enjoins; she fails to act in that way because she lacks a desire. T'us, externalism is explanatorily more potent than Dancy's internalism and emerges as a stronger theory. In response to this objection, Dancy argues that a moral belief can fail to motivate an agent to act even when he is not suffering nom weakness of wiH, accidie, and so on. Dancy argues that this follows fiom his daim that there are intrinsically motivating States. The notion of an intrinsically motivathg state makes it possible to claim that "what are reasons [for action] hem may not be the same reasons there, because of the presence of M e r reasons in the second case."'" This putatively follows from the fact that Wie ability of a consideration to motivate can be affected by background conditions which are not themselves rnotivat~rs.""~ 1 suspect that what Dancy dubs 'background conditions' are just dinerent non-moral properties; his point here is just that what is morally salient can change from situation to situation. In some situations a consideration will count in favour of an action. Further, in some situations a consideration will count against an action, while in others it will be irrelevant to how the agent ought to act. Of course, in the cases where the consideration fails to be a reason for action there will be an explmation of this fact. But this directly contravenes the (cornmon) assumption that reasons are general in the sense that that if a consideration counts as a reason in one case, then it counts as a reason in every case. Let's cail this assumption The Genemiist Assumption (GA). In the next section, 1 defend GA against Dancy's objections. Further, 1 claim that since it is true that if a reason functions in one case to motivate action, then it functions to motivate in every case, the notion that there are intrinsically motivating states must be false, since it entails the possibility that the very same mord reason can function to motivate in some situations and not othen, even if the situations do not differ in their non-moral properties. 3.4 Particularism Undermined Dancy's argument in favour of the notion of an intrinsically motivating state entails his daim that GA is false. He takes his claim that GA is fdse to be a positive argument in favour of his normative theory, namely, particularism. 1 now examine this theory. 1 argue that particularism is false. If Dancy's particularism is fdse, then his claim that there are intrinsically motivating states is false. And, since this claim forms the foundation of his tt4 Dancy 1993.24. reply to the problem of weakness of will and accidie, his reply fails. Therefore, Dancy's account of motivation is undermined by the problem of weakness of will and accidie. Dancy claims that we should accept that a belief-state cari be sufficient to motivate action on one occasion but not in another, without adding a further state to explain action, e.g., a desire. For instance, imagine that I believe that action x will increase pleasure. Dancy suggests that this belief might motivate on one occasion, not motivate on another. According to Dancy, if we accept the notion of an htrinsicdly motivating state, it follows that mord reasons bc t ion in the same way: the same consideration may count as a reason for doing an action in one case, yet not count in an another. Thus, that something increases pleasure c m h c t i o n as a reason for doing an action in one case, but perhaps not in another situation. This is Dancy's normative theory, which he calls particularism. Dancy claims that particularism is the view that are no general moral d e s or "substantial moral p~ciples."l's He articulates the core thesis of paaicularism this way: "a property F of one action may be a reason for me to do that action, even though the F-ness of another action rnay be morally indifferent or even count 3-1 16 as a reason against doing it. He links up particularism and the notion of an intrinsically motivating state this way: "What we see here is that changes in the attendant circurnstances can alter rather than overwheim the moral tendency of a particular property. This is just like the ability of other mental States . . . to alter rather than to -11s Dancy 1993,66. II6 Dancy 1993.55-56. ovenvhelm the motivation of a motivating state. It is the crucial respect in which the logicd behaviour of reasons is like that of morally relevant properties.""7 The moa appropriate way to demonstrate the core thesis of particularism is by example. Imagine that the proponent of GA asserts that pleasure is always a reason for doing an action. But Dancy argues that in many cases it c m be a reason against doing an action. For example, that my friends and 1 receive pleasure fiom being taken to a movie can constitute a reason for taking my fnends out for a movie, but that I receive pleasure fkom torturing young babies c m count as a reason against my action. Translated into moral psychology, Dancy's claim amounts to the suggestion that the belief that my action increases pleasure can in one case, e.g., that of taking my fiends to a movie, constitute a reason for me to act, but the very same belief can collstitute a reason against my action in another case situation, e-g., that of torturing babies. Thus, it must be fdse that a moral reason hc t ions in the same way in every situation, and false that a belief representing that moral reason functions in every case to motivate an agent to act. How might the generalist reply to this objection? A possible response could be to argue that we can always alter general reasons for action in the following way: 'Pleasure counts as a reason for action except in situation x, y, r' If this was the d e , then it wouid still be a general reason for doing an action. Thus, in dl cases, except x, y, and z, pleasure counts as a reason for action. Further, in every case, except x, y, and z, the belief representing the morai d e motivates an agent to act, except in circumstances, x, y, and z. The generalist can aiways simply revise and improve her principles to meet with the Il7 Dancy 1993,56. objections Dancy puts fonvard. Ifthe generalist makes this move, then she cm claim that a reason does fiinction as motivation to act in al1 circumstances except , x, y, z, and hence that a belief state embodying those reasons functions to motivate action in al1 situations except x, y, and z. If this is the case, then particuiarism about moral reasons is false; and, if it is false, then it is fdse that there are intrinsically motivating states, since that there are intnnsically motivating states entails that moral reasons are not general. There are two objections to this proposal. First, perhaps this reply commits the generalist to an implausible account of general principles in the sense that there would be * so many extenuating circumstances, e-g., so many circumstances like x, y, and z, g e n e h g so many principles that it would be impossible for one agent to remember them and act on them. That is, the principles in question may become so specified that they wouid be too detailed to be useful to the agent.' l8 But this is hardly an objection to GA. Particularism f d s prey to the same problem. Dancy suggests that the way to identiQ moral reasons in certain cases is to identfi what is salient in a certain case.' lg But an agent may find it equally hard to discem what is morally salient in each case, since there is no principle to which the agent can appeal which can discem for him what is the right thing to do in each case. Further, it might well be equally difficuit for the agent to pick out which property would constitute a moral reason and a reason for action. So both GA and particularism fa11 prey to the same problem The second objection to the above proposal is this. Dancy might argue that by adding reference to particular cases a generalidon is particularized. This would concede 111 McNaughton 1988, 197. [19 Dancy 11 1-1 16: to the particularist that there is nothing that dl right or wrong acts have in common. Prima facie this looks like a reply, but on closer inspection it really isn't. This follows fiom the fact that particularism denies that there are moral d e s or substantive moral principies. But in the cases where the moral rule is rectified to apply only to certain cases, it still remains the case that in d l situations, except x, y, and there is something that dl these acts have in common, e.g., they either increase or decrease pleasure. There is nothing prohibithg the generalist from constructing another d e which applies to cases x, y, z, and, hence, nothing stopping the generalist fiom saying that there is something the same thing wrong or right about al1 cases x, y, z. Further, a general rule need not be a d e which covers al i acts. A general d e may be very specific and cover only particular cases, but it is still a generai d e that is to be followed in particdar cases. This is something the particularist denies. However, a better reply to Dancy on behalf of GA c m be generated Erom closer examination of the above cases. In the first example, that my Eends received pleasure fkom king taken to a movie counted as a reason for taking my fnends to a movie, but that 1 received pleasure fkom torturing babies counted as a reason against my torturing babies. What Dancy seerns to be objecting to here is not so much that pleasure counts as a reason for action in every case, but that pleasure can count as a reason for action in cases where one is deriving pleasure fiom something which is obviously (intuitively speaking) immoral. The exponent of GA might reply by saying that pleasure counts as a reason for action in al1 those cases where pleaswe is not derived fkom an immoral act. What counts as a reason for action in the generalist view is not pleasure simplicirer, but pleasure fiom what is not immoral. Further, our rejection of the moral wrongness of deriving pleasure fkom torturing babies seems to depend less on the circumstances in which the action takes place, which is sornething on which Dancy places great emphasis, and more on the fact that torturing babies is just plain wrong, and there is a general moral d e against it. Turning to moral psychology, the promuigator of GA could Say that a belief that an action gives pleasure motivates one to act only in those cases where the pleasure is not derived fiom an immoral act Thus, this belief will be a reason for action in d l cases where the action-is not immoral. This would bumess GA nom Dancy's objection and enable those who espouse GA to c l a h that if a moral reason functions as a reason for action in one case, then it serves as a reason for action in every case (except where the action is immoral). So pleasure counts as a reason for action in al1 cases, but pleasure fiom what is immoral counts as a reason against action. nie same can be said for beliefs and motivation. There is another reply to Dancy's objection to GA. imagine that it is a general nile that 'It is wrong to lie in circumstances x'. What follows fiom this rule is that whenever one finds one's self in cUcurnstances x, one ought not to lie. But this is a general d e which is impervious to Dancy 's daim that the same reason for action does not always hc t ion as a reason for action, given differing circumstances. Dancy cannot claim that the altered circumstances alter the mord reason, because the circumstances are identical in their non-moral properties, and so on. And, if we take it that a moral property is fixed or fashioned by its non-moral properties, then if a situation is identical in al1 its nonmoral properties, it will be identicai in al1 its moral properties. Aiternatively, if the nonmoral properties (Le., the facts which comprise the circumstance in which 1 act) of a situation differ, then the moral properties cliffer. Again, the exponent of GA can argue that a belief that lying is wrong can function as a reason for action in ail x-like cases. Thus, Dancy's objection to GA can be met And if it can be met, Dancy's claim that a moral reason does not aiways function in the same way must be fdse; hence, it must be false that a mental state c m be present in one case and motivate, yet be present in another case and not motivate, since this entails particularism about moral reasons, and that . doctrine is false. If this is this so, then Dancy's attempt to jhis argument against weakness of wili and accidie fails. 3.5 The Argument From Directions of Fit In the 1st chapter (2.2), I reported McNaughton as arguing that a single state could have the direction of fit of both a belief and a desire. He made this suggestion in order to avoid falling prey to the argument fkom directions of fit. According to this argument, the best way to distinguish between beliefs and desires is to apped to the notion of directions of fit. On this view, beliefs and desires have different and opposing directions of fit. Beliefs fûnction to represent the world, and their being tme is their fitting the wortd. The direction of fit of a belief is the mind-to-world direction, i.e., a belief state is one which must fit the world. Desires do not function to represent the world as it is; they fuaction to move agents to act in accord with the content of their desires. A desire has the world-tomind direction of fit, Le., it is a state with which the world must f i t This is why desires move agents to act. Dancy expresses the distinction this way: "a belief is a state which aims to be caused by the truth of its content, whiie desire is a state which aims to cause its own content to becorne mie.w120 But this way of distùiguishing beliefs and desires poses a problem for Dancy's copnitivist internalism in the following way. Without the presence of two distinct states, each with a difEerent direction of fit, action is impossible. In order for an agent to be motivated to act she r e q d s both a belief and a desire. But Dancy's c l a h that two belief representations, one representing how things are, the other representing that a certain action wouid change those things in a certain way, is enough to rnotivate an agent to act, does not ascnbe to an agent a state with the direction of fit of a desire. Thus, it does not explain why an agent acted. According to Dancy, what foms the basis of the claim that a motivating state must be comprised of two different states with two different directions of fit is a "Cartesian metaphysics."'21 The main idea behind this view is that "the mind and the world are radically independent and therefore [this view] conceives of the world as 9,122 intrinsically inert. The world is inert in such a way that it "contains nothing important or relevant to action and choice."lu Dancy suggests that if we accept this view, we have to accept that "for there to be action there must be a desire present, for rational action is inconceivable without a state which motivates one to rnake the world be the way [that desire] conceives of it king. 5,124 "O Dancy 1993,28. 12' Dancy 1993,3 1. 122 Dancy 1993,3 1. 123 Dancy 1993,31. 124 Dancy 1993,3 1. Dancy rejects this metaphysical view and with it the notion of direction of fit. His pure theory is commined to the claim that an agent's beliefs can, in and of themselves, motivate her to act. But what Dancy is suggesting with this latter daim is that "what motivates is the matter of fact believed, not the believing it."'25 For Dancy, facts, not beliefs, motivate agents to act, and this directly contradicts the daims made by Cartesians. On Dancy's view, to Say that beliefs are what intrinsically motivate is just to Say that %at there are facts which ineiasically make a difference to how we shodd act."lZ6 If we assert this, then we have abandoned the Cartesian metaphysical view. And, since the Cartesian metaphysical view cannot ailow for the c lah that there are "Tacts which intrinsically make a different to how we should act,"'" both the rnetaphysical view and the notions of directions of fit which reject it are flawed. This is an ingenious rebuttal to the argument fkom directions of fit. However, 1 think that it fails. Dancy began his discussion of motivation by arguing over what is the best account of the considerations which motivate action and so explain action. However, this last argument is no longer tackling this subject; it has moved on to discuss what ju~~ifies action. Thus, there is a distinction between what motivates and explains action and what justifies action. It is his failure to respect this vital distinction which forms the bais of my reply to this objection. Brink argues that the phrase 'reasoiis for action' can be read in two different ways. First, we can make reference to an agent's reasons for action in an attempt to articulate lu Dmcy 1993,32. " Dmcy 1993,32. In Dancy 1993,32-. what motivates an agent and so explains her action. According to Brink, "here we use 'reasons for action' to refer to the considerations that motivate an agent and so explain her actions."'** Second, we can read 'reason for action' as "good or jufi~ing reas~ns."'~~ An agent cm have explanatory reasons for action without having justifjhlg reasons. Brink gives the following example to hel p illustrate the distinction: if 1 am a light-bulb eater, my belief that light bulbs are nutritious and my desire to be healthy constitute my reason, in the fmt expianatory sense, for eating iïght bulbs. Although presumably I do not have a reason, in this second justificatory sense, to eat light bulbs.13* This exampie helps illustrate where Dancy has gone wrong in his objection. It is important to separate the agent's belief fiom the content of the agent's belief. But Dancy fails to do just this. In the above case, to explain an agent's action we appeal to her beliefs and desires, such that if we asked the agent 'Why did you eat the light buib?' she wouid answer 'Because 1 believed that it was good for my heaith, and 1 desire to be heaithy.' What motivates the agent and so explains her action is her belief and her desire, not a fact. So in explainhg an agent's action we must make reference to her beliefs and desires. As Michael Smith points out: "The distinctive feature of a motivahg reason to 0 is that, in virtue of having such a reason, an agent is in a state that is explanatory of her a i n g . . . Given that an agent who has a rnotivating reason to 0 is in a state that is in a way potentiaiiy explanatory of her +hg, it is thus naturai to suppose that her motivating reason is itselfpsychoZogicaIlj real."'3' Furthemore, Smith continues, "it would seem to lzs Brink 1989.39. Brink 1989,39. ''O Brink 1989.39 13 L Smith I994,96. be part of our concept of what it is for an agent's reasons to have the potential to explain her behaviour that her having those reamns is fact a about her; that the goals that such ~ 1 3 2 reasons embody are her goals. Motivating reasons are thus psychological states, "states that play a certain explanatory role in producing action, [rather than fact~] ." '~~ By contrast, in the case in which we are trying to surmise what codd possibiy be jusfification for an agent's action, we are not going to look at her psychological -tes (Le., facts about that agent); rather we are going to Look at what facts may justiw her action. Smith cdls justifying reasons normative reasons. L34 On Smith's account, 90 say that sorneone has a normative reason to 0 is to Say that there is sorne normative requirement that she as, and is thus to Say her @-hg is justified fiorn the perspective of the normative system that generates the requirement."135 For Smith, normative reasons are best thought of as facts or propositions about what we ought to do. How does this distinction undemine Dancy's objection to the argument fiom directions of fit? If the Humean plays up this distinction, then it seems that he can reject the Cartesian metaphysical outlook according to which the world is inert, and hold that there are facts which justi.@ our actions, but still retain the c l a h that an agent's actions are explained by appeal to her psychological states, namely, beliefs and d e ~ i r e s . ' ~ ~ If the Humean does this, then he is able to still appeal to the notion of directions of fit to explain why an agent acted-13' And, if this is so, then Dancy wili need to find an answer 13' Smith 1994,96. 13' Smith 1994, 96. Smith 1994,95-96 & 13 1-1 32. 13' Smith 1994.95. " Smith does just this, but more on that in the next chapter. '" How can the Humean have it that mere facan justiv action? For my pqoses, I do not think that this question really needs anmering. 1 need mercly assert that it is a possibility. However, Smith does give an to the clairn that what motivates and so explains action is that an agent has a desire and a belief, that is, two states having different and opposing directions of fit. He has failed to do this, so we should reject his account of motivation for failing to ascribe to the agent states with the correct direction of fit to explain the agent's action. But perhaps Dancy's point is that a fact c m both justiS and explain action. Agents can and do deliberate on what they believe is right and in virtue of this deliberation be moved to act. In order for this reply to help Dancy out it would have to be the case that agents always act in accord with what they believe is right, but this wodd beg the question against the arguments from direction of fit. The argument fiom directions of fit requires that for an agent to be moved to act an agent must possess both a belief and a desire, Le., two states with different directions of fit. Al1 Dancy's repty says is that an agent is moved by a state with the direction of fit of a belief and, hence, this is really no answer. Further, agents sometimes act contrary to what they believe is right, e.g., when they are suffering fiom weakness of wili, accidie, and so on. It is not clear how Dancy could expiain what is motivating agents to act in these situations. But perhaps there is another way for a fact to both explain and justie. For example, the fact that @hg is right can explain why 1 corne to believe that @-hg is right. This belief c m in conjunction with my desire to do what is right explain why I a. Thus, a fact, in cases where 1 have access to the fact and have a desire to do the right thing explains and justifies my 4-hg. This is a legitimate move, but it plays ri@ into the Humean's hands, - . answer to this question. He argues that there is a tact of the matter about what it is rational to desire. It is rational to desire whnt al1 hilly rational, epistcmically privileged agents would desire in a given situation. If an agent desires otherwise, thea his action is not justifie4 though it can stil1 be explained by reference to beliefs and desires. for it suggests that a desire must be present for an agent to act, that is, it says that a state with the direction of fit of a desire must be present to motivate and so explain and agent's action. But this is just the Humean's motivation view. Moreover, this move would have the consequence of undermining Dancy's entire theory because he denies both that a desire needs to be present for an agent to have reason for action and that a desue plays a causai role in action. It appean that what Dancy really objects to here is not the Humean account of action explanation, but the Humean account of normative reasons, or reasons which justifi our actions. According to the Humean conception of rationality, it is rational to make it as likely as possible that one will get what one most desires. That is, it is rational for you to maximize the satisfaction of your currently held desires. This is the 'maximiPng9 conception of rati~nality.'~~ Hume thought that what motivates and so explains action is that an agent has both a belief and a desire. Moreover, Hume thought that the having of a desire is what justifies an action. Dancy c m reject Hume's account of normative reasons, but this rejection does not entail the rejection of Hume's account of motivating or explanatory reasons. Thus, even if we grant Dancy's objection to the Humean account of nonnative reasons, Hume can still hang on to his account of explanatory or motivating reasons. And, if this is the case, then Dancy fds prey to the argument from directions of fit. Dancy might try to reply by arguing that what motivates action is two belief representations, and that what explains why an agent acted was that he had these two 138 See Gauihier, 1975. beliefs. But this really is no reply at all, since the Humean asks why this shouid motivate an agent to act and so explain why an agent acted. And we fhd that no m e r on Dancy's behdfis forthcoming. Dancy does Say, against the Humean, that facts justi@ our actions. However, this is no objection to the Humean because as 1 have argued above, the exponent of the Humean account of motivation can maintain with Dancy that what justifies an action is that there is a matter of fact about what you ought to do. What the proponent of the Humean account of motivation rejects is that a fact can explain why an agent acted. If the exponent of the Humean conception of motivation accepts that facts can j u s m , but not motivate action, then the this type of Humean can accept Dancy's criticism and still maintain that what motivates and explains action is a combination of beliefs and desires. Thus on the Humean's motivational view, one can be aware of a fact that justifies an action, but not be motivated because one lacks a desire which is necessary for action. The burden of proof thus rests squarely with Dancy; he must show us how it is that two belief representations can motivate and so explain action. Obviously Dancy cannot claim that facts by themselves motivate, since an agent can be ignorant of a fact. A fact can motivate only if an agent is aware of it or has a belief which represent. that fact. And, if this is true, then beliefs will have to enter into the picture when explainhg action, though facts can enter into the picture in j e i n g action. Furthet, if beliefs somehow motivate action and, hence, explah action, then Dancy has to show how this is the case, over and above rejecting the Cartesian metaphysical picture. If, as 1 have argued, the Humean can reject Cartesian metaphysics, then the he can still quite plausibly ask Dancy what motivates and explains action. Dancy cannot sbply assert that beliefs have this job, because that would be to fail to answer the very question which required Dancy to address the argument fiom directions of fit in the first place. ïhere is one more point that needs to be made clear. When the Humean agrees with Dancy that facts can play a role in justiQing action, he is not saying that what motivates and explains action is a fact of the matter. The proponent of the Humean conception of motivation is merely saying that facts justify actions, but have no ability whatsoever to motivate nor explain action. What motivates and explains action is a combination of beliefs and desires. Dancy has failed to show us that this is false. Therefore, we should reject his cognitive intemaiism on the grounds that it fails to provide a plausible answer to the argument fiom directions of fit. 3.6 Further Problems for the Pure Theory In this section 1 want to demonstrate that Dancy's pure theory, in addition to its inability to meet Humean-type objections, is problematic on its own terms. There is something not quite right with the claim that what motivates an agent is the "gap" between the two representations. For what is it about that gap which motivates an agent to "close" it? Surely Dancy c m o t Say that it is a desire, because that would collapse his theory into Humeanism. But then what is it that moves me fkom, for example, beliewig that my girlfiend is in pain and that if I give her the morphine, her pain will cease, to relieving that pain? Perhaps it is that 1 prefer that she not be in pain, or that 1 want to show her my love, or that 1 want tu be a nice person. Yet Dancy cannot appeal to such claims because they are al1 desires, and he thinks that it is not desires but the two representations or beliefs that motivate me to act. Further, he does not want to suggest that the second representation is a desire, since that would completely undermine his case against Hume; that is just what Hume holds. But then the reason why 1 am moved to close the gap remauis a mystery! Dancy cannot even suggest that 1 do it because 1 want to do what is right, for that again would be an appeal to a desire. It mut, then just be the mere fact that 1 believe that my gidfiiend is in pain, and that 1 believe that i can, if 1 act, relieve that pain. But why shouid these beliefs motivate me? I have suggested several answers to these questions, al1 of which Dancy must reject, since they force him to embrace some kind of Humean account of desire. Thus it remains a complete mystery why I am motivated to "close" the gap between the two representations. Now, Dancy does suggest that without a desire action is impossible, but for logical, rather than causal r e a ~ o n s . ' ~ ~ So perhaps Dancy can appeal to his own concept of desire to explain why an agent was motivated to close the gap betweenkvo representations. But this Dancy cannot do given that on his theory it tums out that a desire is caused by, not the cause of, motivation. It would seem odd to say that one's desire motivated one's action and was caused by one's being motivated to act. Thus, this provides us with no answer to what in fact motivates agents to close the gap between hvo representations. Moreover, to concede that a desire motivated action would be to veer dangerously close to coiiapsing into Humeanism about motivation. Dancy might attempt to reply here by arguing that king motivated is to be in a state of desire; but what explains king in a state of desire and being motivated is the cognitive gap between the two representations. I am not inclined to accept this reply. 139 Dancy 1993,20. Recall that Dancy denies outright that a desire is causally required for action and that a desue is needed to explain why an agent acted. To claim that being rnotivated just is to be in a state of desire, then, appean to render the desire-state entkely superfluous to his account of action-explanation; moreover, the state of desire which, he alleges, is concomitant with being motivated, appem to play no causal role in an agent's being motivated to act. Therefore, either the state of desire is aitogether superfluous for explanation or it is causally inelevant. Dancy is aiso faced with difficulties in cases where there is more than one second representation which related to a first representation. Consider the case above where 1 believe that my girlfiend is in pain and 1 believe that if 1 were to give her the morphine her pain would be rnitigated. Imagine that 1 also have a second belief representation which looks like this: 1 believe that if 1 rub my girkend's lower back, then her pain wiil be mitigated. In this case there are two second representations. M a t in Dancy's theory can explain how I pick between the two representations in action-selection? It certainiy cannot be that 1 desire one over the other. The probiem is exacerbated by the fact that, according to Dancy, the two representations are reaily no dBerent fiom each other. Dancy argues that we should see the content of the second belief representation "as that of the subjunctive conditional 'If 1 r ~ l 4 0 were to act in such and such a way, this would be the resuit. The two representations are in some way analogous because they have the same consequent, viz., my giriffiend's pain is rnitigated. For Daacy, when an agent acts, she acts to make the consequent of the 110 Dancy 1993,28. subjunctive conditional true, but not the subjunctive conditional it~elf. '~' What seems to follow from this, though, is that how my girlniend's pain is mitigated does not matter, since 1 am not acting to make how I am mitigating the pain tme. Al1 that I am acting to make true is the consequent of the subjunctive conditional which represents the content of the second representation, i.e., content of the belief. But there are difficulties here. Suppose 1 believed that were I to kill rny girlfiriend, then her pain would be relieved. Dancy argues that I am acting to make the consequent of this subjunctive conditional me. But there are two actions which 1 could take to make the consequent tme, and it does not seem to be the case that Dancy has given a clear directive to the agent in order for her to decide which action she should take to make the consequent true. If this is the case, then there is no way to decide which second representation (Le., which subjunctive conditional) is the one upon which I should act. Dancy fails to provide us with such a decision mechanism, and so his notion that the gap berneen representations motivates me to act m u t be flawed. Notice that Daacy cannot claim that the latter second representation that 1 suggested is d e d out because it is obvious that I would not desire the death of my girlfiiend. He cannot concede this because this wouid be to concede that a desire played a part in deciding which of the second representations was the one upon which 1 acted. And if he did this, it would no longer be the case that it was a belief alone which motivated me to close the gap. Dancy might attempt to suggest that which representations motivate me to act are the representations which represent the morally best state of affairs. Retuming 141 Dancy 1993,28-29. to the case above, we can assume the situation in which 1 give my girlfiend the morphine is the morally best state of aflairs, rather than the situation in which 1 kill her to relieve her pain. This is an appropriate response, but 1 do not think Dancy is out of trouble here. Imagine that there are two morally best second representations. In the situation above suppose I have the followiag two beliefs: (1) If I give my girlfiend die morphine, her pain will be relieved. (2) If 1 give her some opium, here pain will be relieved. For the sake of argument suppose that these two representations represent equally "morally best" States of affairs there is a tie for "morally best". How cm Dancy explain which representation motivates me? He cannot Say that the moraily best one does, because there are two morally best ones. But this is his last line of defense against the objection that it rernains a mystery what moves me to close the gap between my two representations. Of course, Hume's dictum is no better in cases where an agent has two equally strong desues for some state of &airs. But Hume's account of motivation remains the stronger theory because it can explain why the gap between two representations is salient to an agent and, hence, why an agent would be moved to close it. Dancy's account of motivation according to which an agent is motivated to act by the gap between two representations, has trouble explainhg why an agent regards the gap between two representations as salient to her, and why she is motivated to bring it about that the gap is closed. 3.7 Conclusion If what I have said about Dancy's pure theory is correct, then we should reject it tout court. Like McNaughton, Dancy has failed to justify his theory beyond its initial intuitive appeai. But if this is the case, then we reaily have no justification for buying into it. Both McNaughton and Dancy attempted to maintain that the bea solution to the moral problem 1 sketched in the fkst chapter is to reject the Humean account of motivation and argue that a moral judgement expresses a belief about the way the world is, morally speaking, and that a moral judgement can motivate an agent to act. 1 have argued against this view that either it is false or that the Humean account of motivation can be defended against its objections. In the next chapter, I take up a rather different view. This is the view of Michael Smith. Smith argues that the best way to solve the moral problem is to find a way in which one can hold simdtaneously that moral judgements express beliefs, that morai judgements motivate agents to act, and that a complete motivating state is comprised of both a belief and a desire. 1 now tum to Smith's theory. Miehael Smith: Cognitivisrn, [nternalism and Bumeanism at Once In chapter one 1 sketched what Michael Smah calls "The Moral Roblem". It c m be expressed succmctly m the form of the folIowing inconsistent triad: 1. Moral judgements of the f o m 'It is right that 1 a' express [only] a nibject's beliefs about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what it is right for her to do. 2. L€ someone judges that it is right that she as then, ceteris paribus, she is motivated to 0. 3. An agent is motivated to act in a certain wayjust in case she has an appropriate desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume's terms, distinct existences. The moral problem arises because it seemsprimafucze impossible to hold all three statements consistently. h the previous two chapters, I canvassed the gews of David McNaughton and Jonathan Dancy with respect to the solubdity of the mord problem B 0th argue that an intuitively plausible solution requires rejecting 3 while embracing 1 and 2. 1 have maiotained that either they cannot effectively rebut 3, or that their theones themselves are flawed in thek own right. I tentativrly concluded that there is somethmg fundamentally wrong with their ways of solving the problem In this chapter, I discuss Michael Smith's putative solution. Smith, unlike McNaughton and Dancy, argues that the best solution to the moral problem requires demonstratmg a way m which all three propositions can be held consistently. Smith thus holds that morality is objective and practical, and that motivation requires a desire. His theory is at once cognitivist, internalist and Humean in ts '" Smith 1994, 12. 85 conception of motivation. He attempts to establish this view by arguing that Hume is correct to c lah that belief and desire are distinct existences which motivate and so exploh action. But Hume is wrong to think that what it is rational for us to do is to make it as likely as possible that we get what we rnost desire; that is, Hume's account of rationality is false. Smith thus cofzsfntcts an anti-Humean account of rationality. Smith's solution to the moral problem tums on his reinterpreration of 2. A morai belief is a belief about what we have reason to do, and the comection between beliefs and motivation is established by Smith's own theory of rationalify. In this chapter, 1 argue that Smith fails to give convincing reasons for why we ought to accept internaiism, and that there is something very wrong with his anti-Humean account of rationality. 4.1 The Practicality Requirement Broadly speaking, intemalisrn is the view that there is an intemal or conceptual comection between an agent's believing or recognizing that she is under a moral obligation and being motivated to act in the way enjoined by that obligation. In other words, if an agent believes that she is under a morai obligation, she will be motivated to act rnorally. Several difYerent daims f d under the rubric of intemalism. Smith defends two. First, there is the c l a h that "If an agent judges that it is right for her to in c, then she is either rnotivated to do in c, or she is practicaily irrational."'" Smith calls this the practicality requirement.'" The second fom of internalisrn Smith calls rationalisrn: "If it '" Smith 1994, 6 1. 144 On the practicality requirernent the comection between the agent' s belief and her motivation is defeasible because the connection can be severed when the agent is suffering h m weakness of will, and the like. is right for agents to @ in circumstances c, then there is a reason for agents to @ in c."'~' On Smith's view, rationalism entails the practicality requirement in virtue of the fact that if an agent has a reason to do 0 in c, then an agent is motivated, if rational, to do 4 in c (where one's being rational is understood as one's acting in accord with the reasons one has). Smith defends both of these claims against David ~ r i n k " ~ and Philippa ~oot '~ ' . Brink takes issue with the practicality requirement, while Foot dissents to rationali~rn.'~~ Exponents of the practicality requirement argue th& if an agent believes that it is right for her to O, then she is motivated to @. David Brink argues that the practicality requirement is false, for there are people for example, amoralists who judge it right to a, but fail to be motivated by that consideration. The possibility of the amoralist is inconsistent with the practicaiity requirement. Therefore, the practicality requirement is false. In response, Smith argues that although the amoralist attempts to make moral judgements, she fails to do so. But Smith does not think that this decides the issue, since it appears to be the case that there is no non-question begging way to decide whose concept of the amoralist is right.'50 But Smith claims not to be troubled by Brink's objection since he has a separate argument which establishes the truth of the practicality requirement and, correspondingly, the falsity of the daim that there are arnoralists. According to Smith, it is a "strikiag fact" that there is a reliable connection between a good and strong-willed agent's changing her mord views and her changing her -- '" Smith 1994,62. '46 Bnnk 1989. 147 Foot 1972. 148 It is important to point out that the claims that Smith endeavors to defend are conceptual claims, rather than substantive claims. See Smith 1994,63066. '49 BBrink 1989.45-50. LM Smith 1994,68-71. motivation. The reliable connection manifests itself in the fact that "a change in motivation follows reliably in the wake of a change in moral judgement, at l e s t in a good and strong-willed person."'51 To illustrate this, consider the foliowing scenario. Imagine that Bill and Ron are arguing over the moral permissibility of abortion. Bill believes that abortion is fiindamentally wrong and is motivated to bring it about that there are no more abortions. Ron believes that it is morally permissible to allow women to procure abortions and is motivated to bring it about that women be allowed to procure abortions. After a long conversation, Ron convinces Bill that it is morally permissible to allow women to procure abortions. According to Smith, if Bill is "a good and strong-willed person a new motivation will follow in the wake of b s ] new j~d~ernent.""~ Since Bill no longer believes that abortion is wrong and now believes that abortion is morally permissible, he will now be motivated to bring it about that women be allowed to procure abortions. Smith suggests that since there is a reliable connection between an agent's moral judgement and his motivation, both promulgatoa of the practicality requirement and externaiists alike will have to explain how this is. There are two ways to explain this fact about the reliable connection. Those who accept the practicality requirement can explain the reliable connection interna& by appeal to the content of the mord judgement done. On this view, since an agent who believes that it is Bght to 0 will be motivated to 0, it cornes as no surprise that a change in moral belief is followed by a change in motivation in a good and strong-willed person. nius, as Smith puts it, "if an agent judges it right to in C, and she has not denved this 151 Smith 1994, 7 1. 152 Smith 1994,72.'~mith asks us to assume that Bill is a good and strong-willed individual. judgement from some more fundamental judgement about what it is right to do in C, then, absent weakness of will and the like, the defender of the practicality requirement can insist that she will be motivated non-derïvatively to in C. This is because, [on Smith's view], a non-denvative deske to in C is what her judgement that it is nght to in C causes in her."'" Extemdists, of course, cannot argue that a moral belief or the content of a moral obligation is what motivates an agent to act, since they hold that it is something extemal to moral judgements which motivate agents to act mordly. Smith suggests that the only way for the extemalist to explain the reliable connection between moral judgement and motivation is to appeal to the "motivational disposition [agents have] in virtue of which [they] count as a good person."'" That is, externalist will have to explain the reliable connection by appeal to the content of an agent's moral motivation. According to Smith, the content of an agent's moral motivation on the externalist's view will consist in a "motivation to do the right t l ~ i n ~ . " ' ~ ~ The reliable connection is expiained by the fact that agents have a non-derivative desire to do what is right, and it is in virtue of having this disposition that when an agent changes her moral views her motivation changes. Smith argues that there is something wrong with the externalist's proposai. Consider the case of Bill and Ron described above. Smith argues that Ron's motivations are "denvative because they are denved fiom [his] curent judgement about what the right thing to do is together with [bis] basic moral motive: a non-derivative concem to do '53 Smith 1994.73. Smith 1994.73. t 5s Smith 1994.74. what is ~ ~ h t . " " ~ Ron cares only derivatively for the things he thinks are right in v h e of the fact that he has ody one non-derivative concem: to do what is right. Al1 other desires flow fiom this concern. However, Smith argues that there is something very wrong with the extemalist's proposal: it attributes the wrong content to the motivational dispositions possessed by a good and strong-willed agent. The extemalkt is cornmitted to the claim that an agent cares only derivatively for the things he thinks are right. But as Smith explains: Good people care non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe of their children and firiends, the weil-being of their fellows, people getting what they deserve, justice, equality, and the Iilce, and not just one thing : doing what they believe to be the right thing . . . Indeed, common sense tells us that being so motivated is a fetish or moral vice, not the one and only rnorai v ï r t ~ e . ~ ~ ~ ' The ody way that an externalist can explain the reliable connection bebeen an agent's moral belief and his motivation is to put forth a false account regarding a good person's motivations, thereby elevating a moral fetish into the one and only moral vimie. Thus, extemalism shodd be rejected. The explanation put forth by Smith faces no such difficdties, so it is to be preferred to extemaiisrn. One might find Smith's objection to the extemalist's account of the explanation of the reliable connection between moral judgement and motivation less than pleasing. It merely begs the question against the extedis t . The externalist claims that the motivational disposition of an agent is that he desires non-derivatively to do what is right, while Smith thinks that the motivational disposition which we ascribe to an agent says - - - 156 Smith 1994,74. '" Smith 1994,75. that an agent is motivated to do the right thing because he cares about these things for their own sakes; doing these things does not satis@ some other desire that he has, e-g., the desire to do what is nghtThe extemalist might say that his account of the motivationai dispositions of an agent is intuitively plausible, while the practicality requirement exponent denies this. How may we decide between these views? The fact that we typically think that a good-penon is one who cares nonderivatively for what he believes is right does not produce an argument in favour of the intemalist position. It looks like we are merely battling over intuitions regarding the plausibility of the content of the motivational dispositions we ascnbe to agents. Further, it is not clear that Smith is on the right track here. For we often describe an agent as doing things not for their own sakes but because of some other reason. For exampie, imagine a religious man named John. John loves his wife and children and attends church weekly. One day at lunch John is having a conversation with a CO-worker. He asks John "Why do you care for your children and wife?" Suppose John answers him by saying: "Because that is what God commands." John's CO-worker might consider his response strange, but 1 doubt he would think that John was not a good person. On Smith's view, however, John would fail to be a good person because he fails to care non-denvatively for the well-being of his family. For example, John does what is nght because he has a non-derivative desire to do what God says he ought to do. Further, such people as Jesus, Mother Theresa, and so on, would al1 fail to be good people, because they attempt to mitigate world hunger, and so on, not because they care non-derivatively for these things, but because they care non-derivatively for doing what God commands. Thus, it looks Mce we have intuitions on both sides of the fence here. Smith's account of the dispositions a good person has is dso flawed in other respects. Imagine the case of Sue, who cares about justice, and so cares only that people get equal concem and respect Due to her direct concem for justice, Sue ensures that people are given a basic minimum income, food, shelter, and so on. But Sue does not care directly about ensuring that people have adequate income, housing and food. Sue cares directly about people being treated justly, Le., with equal concem and respect. On Smith's view, however, Sue would not count as a good peson; her dispositions are not that of a good person's. But this begins to seem counter-intuitive given that we might well describe a person with such dispositions as a good person. These cases illustrate that our evaluations of individuals u s d y cornes down to the way in which we intuitiveiy conceive of a good and strong-willed person. But if there are intuitions on both sides of the fence, then we do not have a decisive reason to reject the extedist 's explanation of the reliable connection between moral judgment and motivation. Both Smith and the e x t e d i s t face the sarne predicament: we hit bedrock regarding who is right with respect to who counts as a good person. The ody way that Smith can prove that intemalkm is preferable to extemalism would be to provide us with an independent argument for his account of what a good penon is. He has failed to do this. Therefore, we have no reason to accept intemalism over externdism But his would be too quick. 1 cannot help think that there is something not quite right about the people in the examples 1 have given above. It does appear that a good penon cares for the things she thinks morally important directiy. Further, despite the fact that this is just an intuition, it does appear to be both a very strong one and a very good one. Let us see if there is any way in which extemalism can take account of it. Smith suggests that if the extemalist wants tu explain the reliable connection he has to ascribe to the agent in question a non-denvative desire to do what is right. The other desires which an agent may have are derived from this desire. But the eaemalist might just reject this proposal. On the altered e x t e d i s t view, what distinguishes good people fiom others is that they have many dinerent nomderivative desires, or direct moral concems, for their family, for the well-king of others or for justice. What explains the reliable connection between motivation and mord judgment on the extemaiist view is an agent's desire to do what she is obligated to do for its own sake. Let us suppose that I become convinced that something which I now hold to be morally worthy is no longer moraily worthy. If 1 desire to do dl those things which I deem to be morally worthy directiy, then presumably if 1 am a good and strong-will person, 1 will now, given my desire, corne to have direct concem for what 1 now believe is morally worthy. What explains the reliable connection is that 1 have a non-derivative desire to do what is nght for its own sake, and this takes account of the intuitions while leaving the plausibility of extemalism intact. Moreover, Alexander Miller158 argues that Smith's explanation of the reliable connection between a moral judgemwt and motivation in a good and strong-willed ,9159 person "is no explanation at dl. Both the intemaiist and the extemalist are aîtempting 158 Miller, 1996. 159 Miller, 1996, 1 71. to explain the fact that if an agent judges that it is nght to in circumstances C then, if the agent is not sufTering from some psychologicai failing, she wili be motivated to a. But what is the nature of this reliable comection between moral judgement and motivation? Miller suggests that the nature of the connection is either conceptuai or empiricai. If the reliable connection is conceptual in nature, then Smith has assumed the huth of intemalism and so begged the question. If the connection is conceptual in nature, then it is a fact that it is a conceptuai tmth that if an agent judges it nght to @, then she will be motivated to a, if she is not suffering from a psychological failing. But, as Miller explains: "if we view the reliable comection between moral judgement and motivation in a good and strong-willed person as conceptual in nature, then intemalism cannot explain this fact, because the fact to be explained is simply the tmth of internaiism. The attempted explanation reduces to: internaiism is m e because internalism is true."'60 Thus, since Smith's argument is clearly question begging, it cannot provide us with a more plausible explanation of the reliable comection than externalism. Now suppose that the diable connection between moral judgement and motivation is empirical in nature. If so, then it is an empirical tmth that if an agent judges that it is right to 0 in C then, if an agent is not suRering from a psychologicd failing, then she will be motivated to a. Miller argues that if this is the case, "the intemalist cannot provide an explanation of this fact because it is inconsistent with the statement of intemalism itselfi internalisrn claims that this fact obtains as a matter of conceptual necessity and so is constrained to deny that it consists in the obtaining of a mere empiricd reguIarity."161 In sum: Smith is caught in a dilemma. If the reîiable connection between moral judgement and motivation in a good and strong-willed person is conceptual in nature, then Smith's employment of the practicality requirement assumes the tmth of the practicality requirement and so begs the question against the extemalist. If the reliable connection is empirïcal in nature, then employing the practicality requirement to explain this fact amounts to a denial of the practicality requirement because it says that the connection is concephial. Either way Smith's employment of the practicaiity requirement to explain the reliable connection fails. In response, Smith argues that it is tnie that the reliable connection that he is trying to explain is in fact conceptual, but that he does not beg the q u e & ~ n . ' ~ ~ According to Smith, the practicality requirement expresses a conceptuai tmth. The argument in favour of the practicality requirement begins with the claim that it is a "striking fact" that when a good and strong willed person agent judges it right to a, she is motivated to O. Both intemaikm and extemalism should explain this fact. However, I have already argued that extemalism (in addition to internalism) can explain this fact plausibly. Smith restates his argument in the following way so as to demonstrate that it does not beg the question against the extedist . The extemalist denies that the practicality is a conceptual truth in v h e of the fact that, according to the extemalist, it is possible that a person an arnoralist, for instance c m believe that something is right, not be suffenng '" Miller 1996. 173. 16' Smith 1996. 175-176. frorn a psychological failllig, but fail to be motivated by that consideration. The extemaiist thus accepts the following: "If an agent judges it right to <O in C, and she is an amoralist, then, even if she does not suffer fiom weakness of will and the like, she will not be motivated to in c."IQ Smith c d s this Arnoralist Extemalism (AE). I f it tums out that this staternent is tme, then the practicality requinment is fdse. Smith argues that it is impossible for there to be an amorafist and, hence, that the practicality requirement is not false. Smith suggests that if the extemalist accepts the above concephial truth about the amoralist, then he is comnitted to accepting the following conceptual truth regarding the moralist: "If an agent judges it right to in C, and that agent in a moralist, then she is motivated to @ in C, at least absent weakness of ~ i l l . " ' ~ ~ Smith cdls this Weak Moralist intemalism (MI). What marks the ciifference between the moralist and the amoralist for the extemalist is that moralists possesses the following "executive virtue": "the Wtue of being disposed to conform their motivations to their moral beliefs in a reliable way, at least absent weakness of will and the ~ike."'~' Smith maintains that MI is a statement of the "striking fact" that constitutes the premise in the argument in favour of the practicality requirement. The striking fact is this: if an agent judges it right to in C, and that agent is good and strong-willed, then she is motivated to in C. If this is the case then Smith's argument no longer begs the question, since the extemalist is committed to holding it as a conceptual tnith. As Smith explains: "Just as Weak Moraiist Intemalism is a conceptuai 163 Smith 1996, 176. 164 165 Smith 1996, 176. Smith 1996,177. truth, a conceptual truth to which externalists are c o d t t e d by their definition o f the 'amoralist', it follows that the srriking fact is a conceptual truth as well indeed the very same conceptuai mith and that extemalists are therefore committed to it.'7'66 Smith suggests that since both intemalist and extemalist alike must accept MI, they both must give an explanation of it. Smith argues that o d y the internalist cm explain MI in a plausible way. But if the argument 1 gave ukwe is right, then Smith is wrong. Moreover, is it true that the extemalist m u t accept MI ? Smith argues that the extemalist is committed to embracing MI because he holds AE. But the extemalist might well jettison the c l a h about the possibility of the amoralist, but still maintain that the comection between moral judgement and motivation is purely contingent, which entails rejecting MI. That is, the externalist can reject the c l a h that he holds AE and so reject that he holds MI. Rejecting the daim that there are amoralists does not amount to letting go of one of the central claims of externalism. After all, the main impetus behind embracing extemalism follows fiom the fact that an extemalists embrace the Humean account of motivation. On this view, what motivates an agent to act is not the moral belief on its own, but the moral belief in conjunction with a desire (which is external to the moral judgement). Now, Smith accepts that the Humean account of motivation is right, so he cannot object to the extemalist account of motivation. And, if the extemalist drops his account of the amoralist, then he is no longer committed to accepting MI as a conceptuai tnith, given that he was forced to do this because he held AE. But MI represents the first premise in Smith's argument in favour of the practicality requirement. 166 Smith 1996, 177. If the extemalist rejects the fint premise in the argument as false (given that Smith argued that the fïrst premise was sometbg that both the internaikt and the externalist accept), then the argument in favour of the practicality requirement is unsound. If Smith relies on the claim that the MI has to be accepted by both the intemalist and the extemalist in order to refute extemaiist, and the extemaiist can deny that he holds MI, then Smith has no argument in favour of the practicality argument or against extemalism. 4.2 Rationalism The second form of internaiism which Smith defends is called rationalism. Rationalism is the daim that if an agent believes that she ought to 0 in C, then there is a reason for her to 0 in C. The main point behind Smith's rationahm is as follows: "It is a platitude that an agent has a reason to act in a certain way just in case she wodd be motivated to act in that way if she were rational. And it is a consequence of this platitude that an agent who judges herself to have a reason to act in a certain way who judges that she would be so motivated if she were rational is practically irrational if she is not motivated to act a c c ~ r d i n ~ l ~ . " ~ ~ ~ Philippa ~ o o t ' ~ * argues that we shodd reject the rationalist claim that moral obligations, which express facts, are facts about our reasons for action. Foot's argument begins by noting Kant's distinction between categorical and hypothetical imperatives. Hypothetical imperatives express reiwns for action just if the agent to whom the imperative is directed has a desire which is served by acting on the imperative. Absent the desire, the imperative no longer gives the agent reason for action. In contrast, categorical 167 Smith 1994,62. 'a Foot 1972. imperatives are requirements which give agents reason for action whether or not the agent to whom the imperative is directed has a desire to act on the irnperative or has a desire which is served by acting on the imperative. Kant thinks that the requirements of morality are categorical imperatives and, thus, are requirements which give agents reason for action independent of desires. Roughly speaking, Kant holds what Smith calls rationalism. Foot agrees with Kant that moral requirements express categorical imperatives. They are categorical imperatives because the 'shodd' claim in a moral judgement for example, 'You should not murder' is buttressed by pointing out some feahire of the agent's situation, a situation which other agents face with difZerent desires and circumstances. Foot suggests that if we accept this fact, we have to recognize that the very same categorical use of 'should' is found in expressions of the requirement of etiquette. For instance, suppose 1 contravene a requkement of etiquette by belching at the dinner table. Foot argues that it is right to Say of me that 1 should not have acted as 1 did despite the fact that acting in accord with the requirements of etiquette serves no desire of mine. As with the requirements of rationality, the 'should' c l a h of etiquette is buttressed by pointing out some salient feature of my circumstances, circumstances which are faced by other agents with different desires, and do on. Foot maintains that by reflection on the fact that the requirements of etiquette and the requirements of morality are both categorical, we see that the exponent of the rationalist conceptuai claim is caught in a dilemma. No one puts forth the clah that requirements of etiquette are requirements of reason or rationditdespite the fact that they express categoncal imperatives. One who disobeys mies of etiquette is not thereby irrational. And, since the rationalist will be forced to admit this, he is forced to admit that the requirements of mordis. are not requirements of reason or rationality. if the rationalist wants to hold that the requirements of moraiity are requirements of reason, he will have to provide an argument to support this claim. But Foot argues that to hold this view would be to Say something fdse, since there is nothhg irrational in asking whether one has reason to act in the way morality enjoins. This follows Erom the fact that Foot thinks that irrational actions are "those in which a man in some way defeats his own purposes, doing what is cdculated to be disadvantageous or to frustrate [an 97 169 agent's] ends. Failing to act on mord judgements results in no such irrationality. Thus, the requirements of morality are not requirements of reason and, hence, rationalism is false. Smith is not persuaded by Foot's view according to which morality is a system of hypothetical irnperatives."O Moreover, Smith suggests that ''there is a single, powerfuI line of argument in favour of the rationaiist conceptuai claim. The argument trades on the truism that we expect agents to do what they are morally required to do.""' Smith's "powerful" argument can be put as follows: Moral requirements apply to agents insofiir as they are rational. And, it is a conceptuai tnith that if an agent believes that he is under a moral obligation, and he is rational, we expect him to act in the way his moral obligation enjoins. Being rational "must therefore suffice to ground our expectation that rational -169 Foot 1972,3 10. 170 t71 Smith 1994,80-85. Smith 1994,85. agents will do what they are morally required to do."'" This c m be the case, Smith argues, only if we think that "moral requirements that apply to agents are categoncal requirements of reãon.""~ To Smith's mind, the crucial premise in this argument is that we expect rational agents will do as their moral beliefs enjoin. How does Smith justify this crucial premise? Smith argues that what justifies this premise is that "the appropriateness of a whole range of moral attitudes depends on the truth of the rationalist's conceptual claims," Le., the. crucial premise. It is a tnusm that we regularly disapprove or approve of people's behaviour fiom the mord point of view. When an agent acts wrongly we disapprove of her action, and when an agent acts nghtly we approve. And the attitudes of approval and disapproval are apposite only "when there exists groundî for legitimate expectation 9,174 about how sorneone will behave. We c m disapprove of an agent oniy if we expect rational agents to do what they morally ought to do. The legitimacy of this expectation is grounded in the fact that people are rational. As Smith puts it: "Being rationai s a c e s to ground the expectation that people do what they are moraily reqiiired to do. Givea that moral approval and disapproval are ubiquitous, the truth of the rationalist conceptuai cfairn seems to be entailed by the fact that the preconditions of mord disapproval and approval are ~atisfied.""~ Unfortunately, Smith's daim that the fact that it is legitunate to approve or disapprove of agent's actions presupposes that it is plausible to assume that people will 172 Smith 1994,85, in Smith 1994,85. 174 Smith 1994 89. 175 Smith 1994,90. act morally. To my mind, this daim seems radicaliy false. Consider the following thought e~~eriment. l '~ Imagine that we corne in contact with a world, cal1 it w,, which is similar to out own world, wo, with the exception that the inhabitants of world w1 are consequentialists while we are deontologists. Thus, the moral theory of the inhabitants of w, picks out the naturai property Z as the property in vimie of which things are right. But the inhabitants of w, are deontologists and their moral theory picks out the property Y as the property in Whie of which things are right. Suppose we invite an inhabitant of w, to our world, wo. Upon mival, the inhabitant of wl begins to commit al1 kinds of acts which, according to the moral views of w,, are immoral. Now, we know that we cannot expect the inhabitant of w1 to act in the way we think that agents of wo morally ought to act. Yet, it seems to be the case that to disapprove of his actions is, in a strong sense, legitimate. But if it is legitimate to disapprove of his behaviour without presupposing that it is reasonable to assume that he will act morally (as per w,), then it follows that it is simply not true that our practice of approval and disapproval at wo presupposes that we believe that agents fiom any worid, w,, w,, w, . . . w,,, will act morally (as per wo). Suppose, further, that the newly arrived guest begins to observe our practices and finds them uîterly reprehensible. Might he also not cry out "1 disapprove of what you wo dwellers are doing." If so, then it again follows that it is not a precondition of disapproval and approval that we assume that agents will act as moraiity enjoins at w,. Smith might dissent to this story on the grounds that the inhabitants of w, did not understand that what they were doing was reprehensible to the inhabitants of w,. Perhaps '" For the pwposes ofthis thought experimmt, I will assume that the inhabitants of the different worlds have equally justified moral views. once they arrived at knowledge of the moral conventions that we have, they rnight have been expected to act morally. But this reply will not help Smith because the visitors might have learned ail there is to know about our moral conventions, but still not be inclined to act in the way we think they mordly ought Yet, we would d l think that it was appropriate to disapprove of their behaviour despite the fact that we have no such belief regarding the fact that agents typically act as rnoral i~ enjoins at w,. It is no rnatter that my objection is merely the product of philosophical fantasy. Let us consider a Iess fanciful example. Suppose that there are two families living side by side. One family ernbraces consequentialism and one family espouses deontology. Now, it is clear that the two f d e s are going to have divergent moral views. Further, given that they are familiar with each other they both know what each other's moral views will be given a certain situation. Now, both families know that the other will act contrary to each other's moral views. However, this does not stop the families fiom disapproving of each other's behaviour. In fact, we need no such presupposition to ground our practice of disapproval and approval. And, Smith's argument in favour of rationalism requires that the premise, according to which we expect rational agents will do as their moral beliefs enjoin, be tme. Since it is fdse, we have no reason to accept his view of rationalism.'" 4.3 Smith's Account of Normative Reasons In this section I will outline Smith's argument in favour of the c l a h that moral judgements are both objective and practical. Smith attempts to demonstrate this daim by - - -ln Moreover, perhaps our practice of approval and disapprovai presupposes to a certain extent that people will not act as they morally ought, and that this is why that practice is so widespread. Why else would we bother to approve and disapprove if we didn't think that this could make people do what they othexwise would not. distinguishing between what he caiis motivationai reasons and normative reasons. Consider the claim that "F has a reason to 0." This clah can be understood in two ways. Smith suggests that to Say that F has a normative reason to @ is equivalent to saying m a t there is some normative requirement that CF as] and is thus to Say that F ' s 0-hg] is justified nom the perspective of the nomative reason that generates that requirement."'7a According to Smith, normative reasons are best thought of as truths or propositions about what we ought to do. The salient feature of normative reasons is that they justi@ action. Motivational reasons, on the other hand, are not justificatory. As Smith explains: "The distinctive feature of a motivating reason to Q> is that, in virtue of having such a reason, an agent is in a state that is exp2añtor-y of her a-ing, at least other things king equal.""g Since an agent who has motivating reasons is in a state which is potentially explanatory of her action, motivating reasons are better thought of as psychological states. With this distinction in minci, we can tum to Smith's analysis of normative reasons which, he contends, is the key to solving the moral problem. On Hume's account of motivational reasons, the reasons which motivate agents are comprised of both a desire and a means-end belief Hume also thought that what justifies an agent in acting is that this would to make it as likely as possible that she get what she most wants. That is, an agent acts rationaily when she maximizes on her currentiy held desires. This is Hume's account of donali ty and, thus, Es account of normative reasons. Smith argues that Hume's account of motivational reasons is correct, in 179 Smith 1994,95. Smith 1994,96. but that this account of normative reasons, Hume's account of ratiodity, shouid be rejected. Smith's account of normative rasons begins with a p d e . Recall the distinction between motivating and normative reasons. Smith argues that we c m employ both types of reasons to explain action and they are thus in potential conflict with each other. According to Smith, there are two perspectives fiom which to explain human action: the intentional and the deliberative. From the intentional perspective we explain action as resdting fiom an agent's beliefs and desires. Her action is caused by her motivating reasons. Yet, we can also explain action fiom the deliberative perspective. When explainhg action fkom this perspective we do not cite an agent's motivating reasons to explain her action; we explain an agent's action by appeal to her values, i.e., what she takes to be her normative reasons. The deliberative perspective is a peGpective from which to explain action because it appears that deliberating on what to do given her values an agent can be moved to act. Smith argues that the problem here "is to explain how deliberation on the basis of our values can be practicai in its issue to just the extent rm it ~S."'~O Agents deliberate; as a consequence of deliberation on what to do given her values, an agent can be moved to act. In order to explain just how this happens it is important to figure out just what it means to value something. Smith suggests that there are two candidates: valuing can be understood in ternis of belief, or in tems of desire. Smith rejects the claim that valuing amounts simply to desiring."' Thus, he is left with lm Smith L994,136. 18t Smith 1994, 137147. the claim that valuing is believing. But if vaiuing is believing, and if Hume is correct that an agent is rnotivated just if she has a desire (and a means-end belief), how can valuing be both a belief and be practicd? Smith argues that there is a conceptual connection between believing that something is desirable and desiring. The conceptuai connection can be expressed as follows: "If an agent believes that she has a normative reason to a, then she rationally should desire to a."'" This conceptmi ûuth follows from Smith's analysis of normative reasons. Two questions arise with respect to the conceptuai comection between believing something desirable and d e s i ~ g . First, what is it for an agent to have a normative reason? Second, what is it to be rational? To answer the first question Smith attempts to give an analysis of normative reasons which demonstrate the comection between believing something desirable and desiring. According to Smith, "it is a platitude to Say that it is desirable that we do what we wouid desire to do if we were fully rational; that what we have normative reason to do is what we would desire that we do if we were Mly rati~nal ."'~~ Smith's analysis of this platitude tums out to be the followhg: The platitude tells us that what it is desirable for us to do is what we would desire that we do ifwe were fulty rational. In other words and now we are tuming the platitude into an analysis, for we are making explicit distinctions that are at best only implicit in the platitude it tells us that what it is desirable to do in certain circumstances let's cal1 this the 'evaluated possible world' is what we, not as we actuaUy are, but as we would be in a possible world in which we are W y rational let's cail this the 'evduating possible world' would want ourseives to do in those circumstances. That is, it tells us that facts about the desirability of acting la2 183 Smith 1994, 148. Smith 1994, 150. in certain ways in the evaiuated world are constituted by facts about the desires we have about the evduated world in the evaluating world."'" In this way, Smith dernomtes that moral judgements are beliefs about what an agent has normative reasons to do, and what he has nonnative reasons to do is what he would desire to do if he were fidly rational. And, if we believe that an agent would desire something if rational, then the agent ought rationaliy to desire the thing in question. Moral judgements thus express beliefs about the reasons agents have for action. Smith still needs to answer the second question regarding the nature of a rational agent. Bernard ~ i l l i a m s ' * ~ argues that to be fully rational requires that an agent have no false beliefs, al1 relevant true beliefs, be insaimentally rational and have a vivid imagination. Smith adds to this list a reflective equifibrium condition. According to Smith, fully rational deliberating agents bring their desires into a sort of systematic unity by adding more specific or more general desires to their set. This last condition is important for Smith because he thinks that on the basis of proper deliberation (e.g., in Williams's case exercise of the imagination, and in Smith's case the exercise of systematic justification) an agent can arrive at new, undenved desires and destroy old underived desires. Thus far we have not really said how it is that Smith's account of normative reasons is anti-Humean. The distinction between Smith and the Humean here lies in the way in which they conceive of normative reasons. Smith believes that the judgement that there is a normative reason for agents to act is equivalent to the judgement that it is 184 Smith 1994,15 1. 185 WiIliams 1979. desirable that they act. Hume thought that normative reasons were relative to agents, given their Merent motivational sets. Smith takes the opposite route, arguing that normative reasons are non-relative: thus, if an agent has a reason to in circumstances C, then everyone has a reason to @ in C. Smith puts the point this way: "Consider, for example, the schematic claim 'It is desirable that p in circumstances C.' On the nonrelative conception of normative reasons, this claim has a straightforward tmth condition: it is desirable that p in C just in case we would dl desire that p in C if we were fully rational."la6 Here is where Smith's account of rationality differs sharply from Hume's. On Hume's view the concept of practical reason is inherently relative: what x has reason to do depends on the desires of x and what y has reason to do depends on the desires that y has, and so on. In the following section, 1 will critically evaluate Smith's account of normative reasons. 4.4 Smith's Account of Normative Reasons Undermined To recap, on Smith's view, morai beliefs are beliefs about what an agent thinks she has normative reason to do, and someone believes that she has a normative reason to carry out some behaviour, only ifshe believes that she would desire to carry out that behaviour, if she were rational. We can link this last claim with motivation by demonstmting the conceptual connection between an agent's normative reasons and her desires in the following rnanner: if an agent believes that were she rational, she would desire some course of action, then she is rational just if she desùes to carry out that course of action. Roughly speaking, the rasons which one has for action depend on the tmth of the Smith 1994, 166. counterfacnial: an agent desires to do whatever she would want herself to do if she were rational, where being rational satisfies Smith's collstraints on rationality. The viability of Smith's link between what an agent has normative reason to do and what she desires to do tunis on the daim that if an agent believes that were she rational, she would corne to desire a, then she is rational just if she desires to O. Elsewhere Smith says that the belief that an agent would desire something if she were rational causes in the rational agent a desire to do what she believes she has normative reason to do. But why should this (a) cause in an agent a desire and (b) be accepted by the Humean? It remains utterly mysterious how it is that the mere fact that an agent believes that she would desire something were she rationai, causes her to have a desire and be motivated. For, as Hume thought, beliefs and desires are distinct existences. But if this is the case, then it does not appear to be the case that Smith has established that a belief can cause in an agent a desire to do what beliefs enjoin. Of course, Smith might argue that an agent might have a moral desire, e.g., a desire to act moraily. This moral desire could explain why the belief that there is a normative reason in favour of a certain course of action causes in agents a desire to act morally; the desire is acquired as a means to sa t i smg the moral desire, i.e., the desire to act morally. Obviously, however, Smith would reject this possibility: for this explanation flies in the face of his c l a h that it is the content of a moral judgement which gives agents reason for action insofar as they are rational. But then it is d l not clear how the belief causes in agents a desire to do what their belief enjoins. Moreover, why shouid the Humean accept that an agent has reason to do an action on the grounds that, in a counterfactuai situation in which she was fully rational, she wodd desire to do that action? For Hume, the counterfachial claim represents a mere belief, and beliefs do not motivate, so why shouid uiis belief motivate? Smith seems to have faiied to defend this central aspect of his account of normative reasons. Furthemore, Christian ~iller'" argues that the counterfactuai account of practical reason faces a dilemma As Piller explains: "either it rnistakes successful action for rational action (if what we have remn to do is identified with what we would desire to do if we were fully rational), or it imposes either a mistaken or a useless standard of rationality (if what we have reason to do is identified with what we believe that we wodd desire to do if we were fuily inf~rmed)."'~~ Smith suggests that the centrai tenet behind his account of normative reasons is the c l a h that an agent has a reason to do what she would desire to do were she Mly rational. The first horn of Piller's dilemma is as follows. Smith thinks that normative reasons are the reasons which justify our actions. Now consider the following situation put forth by Smith: Suppose 1 now desire to drink a gin and tonic and believe 1 can do so by mixing the stuff before me with the tonic and drinking it . . . Suppose M e r that this belief is false; that the stuff before me is petrd rather than gin. Surely it would be appropriate for the outsider to Say I have no reason to mix this stuffwith tonic and drink it. Yet 1 have both the relevant belief and desire. '*' Piller 1996. In Piller 1996,36 1. 189 Smith 1994,94; See aIso Williams 1979, 18. For the sake of argument let us suppose that I do not mix the tonic with the petrol. According to Piller, Smith seems committed to the admission that since 1 act in accord with my normative reasons 1 thereby act ratiodly. Yet, upon reflection, it seems irnplausible to assume that 1 did act rationally; it was solely a matter of luck that 1 acted in accord with my normative reasons given that 1 was ignorant of them. Piller puts his objection more generally as follows: "we act in accordance with our normative reasons if we act in the way that turns out to be best for us. But acting rationally and acting in a way that turns out to be best for us are not the same. Smith's theory of normative reasons should not exclude the possibility that r a t i o d actions, Le., actions justified by normative reasons, might fail to achieve their ends. To capture this conceptual possibility is a condition of adequacy on any theory of rationality. 3,190 Now, Smith might attempt to circumvent what look to be counter-intuitive implications of his theory of rationality by suggesting that not only must an agent act in accord with normative reasons she has, but she must dso believe that she has these reasons. But this seems to be a costly move for Smith. If it is a precondition that for an agent to be rationai she must not only act in a accord with her normative reasons but aiso believe that she has those normative reasons, then his account of rationaiiv becomes irnplausibly strong. Here's why. In the example above, whether an agent drinks the petrol and tonic or not, she would have acted irrationdy. If she drank the petrol and tonic, she would have acted inritionally because she would have acted against the normative reasons she has. However, if she did not dRnk the petrol and tonic, then she acted irrationally '90 Piller 1996,362. since she did not act in accord with the normative reasons she had becaw she was unaware that she had them. Thus, either Smith's counterfactual account of practical reasons arrives at the wrong resuits or it is useless (on the grounds that it fails to render any results at ail). Smith also suggests, contra the Humean, that the (normative) reasons we have are requirements of rationaiity and these reasons are not agent-relative. The concept of having a reason for action is a non-relative concept in the sense that: if an agent has a reasons to CD in circumstances C, then every rational agent who faced the same circumstances has reasons to a. This is how Smith establishes that the requirements of morality are categoncal imperatives, i.e.. requirements of reason which bind on al1 agents. But 1 do not think that Smith has established the fact that reasons for action are non-relative. To illustrate, consider the other-worldly types which we saw in 4.2. The difference between the visitors from the other planet, inhabitants of w, and the inhabitants of our world, wo, is that they are consequentialists and we are deontologists. Thus, they ciiffer over what nature property an action has in virtue of which it is right or wrong; the . inhabitants of w, think that it is naturai property 2, while the inhabitants of wo thllik it is natural property Y. Now, suppose that the inhabitants of wo have satisfied Smith's requirements of rationality, Le., we have no false beliefs, al1 relevantly tme beiiefs, we have used our imagination and our desires are systematically justified in reflective equilibnum. As a consequence of satisfying these requirements we have converged on what it is rational to do in certain moral situations. Now, suppose that the inhabitants of w, have read Smith's book and have attempted to satisQ Smith's requirernents of rationality. Imagine that they have no false beliefs, al1 relevantly me beliefs, and they have deiiberated so that their desires are systematically justified in reflective equilibriurn. As a consequence of thek satisfj4ng Smith's requirernents, they too have converged on what it is rational for agents to do in certain mord situations. Yet each of the two groups has completely different sets of moral reasons. Let us suppose that we aU get together at an inter-galactic meeting, and at the meeting we witaess a certain act. In response, the humans react with horror, but the wl inhabitants seem unmoved; in fact, they seem glad about it. Now each group attempts to convince the other of its moral position. However, since each groups begins with a diffierent stamng point for example, the members of the group differ in theu most basic desires they c a ~ o t begin to agree on anything and thus remain unmoved by the other groups. The obvious response here is to argue that either the wo dwellers or the w, dwellers have not reached full rationaliv. But that does not seem to be the case. The problem with Smith's account of rationality is that it imposes no constmints on the first values or desires that an individual, or group of individuals, can have. As a resuit of this, people with radically different intuitions, desires, values, and so on, can arrive at radically different, yet Mly rational, accounts of what they have normative reason to do. Smith requires a constraint on what it is to have a rational first value; but he has failed to provide such a constraint. Smith might just argue that the scenario which 1 have constnicted is just the product of philosophicai fmtasy, and not a realistic possibiiity. But this would be a mistake, given that, mutatis mutandis, we could change the two groups fiom consisting of people who are fiom other planets to people who are nom different societies. it is at least possible that people who corne fiom different societies will arrive at radically different moral judgements, though they have satisfied the requirements of full rationality. It is in virîue of the fact agents may begin with any desires whatever that agents arrive at different fully justified accounts of normative reasons. Thus, Smith's account of normative reasons is not agent-neutral. Since Smith requires an agent-neutrd account of normative reasons to conclude that moral judgments can be objective and practical, and he fails to provide one, Smith's answer to the moral problem fails. 4.5 Conclusion Ln this chapter, 1 have argued that Michaei Smith has failed tu establish the truth of intenialism, and that his accowt of normative reasons is flawed. Smith has thus failed to solve the moral problem. Like David McNaughton and Jonathan Dancy, Smith c m o t demonstrate that moral judgements are inherently practical. For the most part, I have not defended any positive view, though 1 have attempted to provide at least aprima facie case in favour of extemalism about moral motivation; according to this case, an agent is motivated not by a mord judgement itself, but by things extemal to that judgement, e.g., the agent's desires. Moreover, I have attempted to defend the Humean account of motivation agairist various objections. 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