LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 351 Deleuze	and	Guattari's	Semiorhythmology:	A	Sketch	for	a	Rhythmic	Theory	of	Signs by	IAIN	CAMPBELL Abstract I	propose	in	this	text	a	rhythmic	theory	of	signs	drawn	from	the	thought	of	Gilles	Deleuze	and Félix	Guattari.	I	name	this	theory	a	semiorhythmology.	I	suggest	that	the	theory	of	rhythm	developed	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus	(1980)	can	be	understood,	in	part,	as	the	culmination	of	the	diverse set	of	inquiries	into	signs	that	both	Deleuze	and	Guattari	undertook,	individually	and	together, beginning	in	the	1960s.	I	first	outline	Deleuze's	theory	of	signs	as	a	theory	of	encounter	as	developed	in	Proust	and	Signs	(1964)	and	Difference	and	Repetition	(1968),	following	which	I	sketch Guattari's	engagements	with	signs	and	semiotics	throughout	the	1960s	and	1970s,	particularly through	his	notion	of	«a-signifying	semiotics»	and	the	concept	of	the	«diagram»	he	adapts	from the	semiotics	of	Charles	Sanders	Peirce.	I	close	by	showing	how	these	heterogeneous	theories	of the	sign	are	drawn	together	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus	through	the	Spinozist	reading	of	the	ethology of	Jakob	von	Uexküll	and	the	theorisation	of	rhythm	in	the	form	of	the	refrain. Introduction I	am	going	to	propose	here	that the	account	of	rhythm	that	Gilles	Deleuze	and	Félix Guattari	develop	in	1980's	A	Thousand	Plateaus	(1987)	can	be	understood,	in	part,	as	a rhythmic	theory	of	signs,	and	that	it	marks	the	culmination	of	the	diverse	set	of	inquiries into	signs	they	both,	together	and	individually,	undertook	beginning	in	the	early	1960s. By	considering	how	these	heterogeneous	engagements	are	brought	together	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus	I	hope	to	evoke	something	of	the	character	of	the	complex	assemblage	that is	«Deleuze-Guattari»,	while	suggesting	that	their	theory	of	rhythm	could	provide	a	distinctive,	heterodox	contribution	to	semiotics.	I	will	develop	this	with	reference	to	a	proposed	plurality	of	sign	behaviours,	and	especially	to	sign	behaviours	occluded	by	standard accounts	of	signs.	Following	Anne	Sauvagnargues's	description	of	the	action	of	a	«critical» Deleuzo-Guattarian	rhythm1	as	a	«rhythmology»	(Sauvagnargues	2016b:	134),	I	name	the rhythmic	theory	of	signs	I	will	provisionally	outline	here	a	semiorhythmology. But	there	are	immediate	hurdles	to	developing	a	theory	of	signs	through	Deleuze	and Guattari's	thought.	What	could	these	two	profound	critics	of	representation	have	to	say 1 A	rhythm	which	is	«not	meter	or	cadence»	but	rather	concerns	«the	Unequal	or	the	Incommensurable»	(Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987:	313). LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 352 about	the	exemplary	representational	notion	that	is	the	sign?2	For	Michel	Foucault	representation	is	the	key	feature	of	the	classical	account	of	the	sign	(Foucault	2002:	72),	and, from	Aristotle	treating	words	as	conventionally	determined	signs	of	affections	of	the	soul (De	interpretatione,	16a1-29)3	through	to	Charles	Sanders	Peirce's	account	of	signs	as	representations	(Peirce	1998a:	5)	and	Ludwig	Wittgenstein's	suggestion	that	signs	may	only be	alive	in	their	use	(Wittgenstein	2009:	§432),	there	seems	to	be	little	in	the	way	of	resources	in	the	history	of	philosophy	for	detaching	signs	from	a	dependent	role	of	representing something beyond themselves.4 Moreover, the dominant theory of signs that Deleuze	and	Guattari faced in	their time	was	that	of	Ferdinand	de	Saussure, for	whom «sign»	named	an	inseparable	coupling	of	signifier	and	signified	(Saussure	2011:	67).	This makes	Deleuze	and	Guattari's	notion	of	«a-signifying	semiotics»	seem	like	an	oxymoron: how	could	semiotics,	the	study	of	signs,	proceed	without	a	concern	for	how	these	signs signify?	What	is	a	sign	if	it	does	not	signify? Equally,	sign	and	rhythm	may	seem	an	unlikely	pairing.	Take,	for	instance,	the	work	of Henri	Meschonnic.	Meschonnic	is	a	theorist	who	at	first	glance	seems	closely	aligned	with Deleuze and	Guattari, not only through developing his own critique of representation (Meschonnic	2011:	43),	but	furthermore	in	aligning	this	critique	with	a	theory	of	rhythm that challenges	and	exceeds traditional	definitions: against the common	association	of rhythm	with	meter,	order,	and	proportion,	Meschonnic	aims	to	revive	a	Heraclitean	notion	of	rhythm	as	continuous	flow	(Meschonnic	2011:	140),	an	affective,	transformative, pluralistic	rhythm	(Meschonnic	2011:	54).5	But	not	only	is	Meschonnic's	understanding of	rhythm	«irreducible	to	the	sign»	(Meschonnic	1981:	705),	there	is	moreover	a	«conflict»,	even	«war»	(Meschonnic	2011:	81),	between	rhythm	and	sign,	between	«continuum and	discontinuum,	against the	unthought	and	commonplace ideas»	(Meschonnic	2011: 62).	For	Meschonnic	the	sign	is	the	representation	of	language,	and	a	representation	that presents itself not as a representation but as the «nature and truth» of language (Meschonnic	2011:	66).	This	is	enacted	through	a	dualism	that	assumes	and	asserts	a	split –	of	signifier	and	signified, form	and	content,	mind	and	body	(Meschonnic	2011:	43)	– where the representation	of language stands	over and above language itself. The sign names	everything	that	is	dead	in	language	(Meschonnic	2011:	83),	everything	that	puts	a stop	to	movement,	and	to	pay	heed	to	rhythm,	for	Meschonnic,	is	to	undermine	this	split 2 Deleuze's	declaration	in	the	preface	to	Difference	and	Repetition	that	«[w]e	propose	to	think	difference	in	itself	independently	of	the	forms	of	representation	which	reduce	it	to	the	Same»	(Deleuze 1994:	ix)	could	stand	as	a	slogan	for	his	work	as	a	whole,	while	on	Guattari's	account	the	ultimate function	of	representation	is	to	cut	us	off	from	reality	(Guattari	1984b:	92).	These	references	could be	supplemented	with	countless	others	spanning	everything	the	two	wrote. 3 I	have	referred	here	to	the	standard	English	edition	of	Aristotle	edited	by	Jonathan	Barnes	(Aristotle 1984). 4 See	Cassin	&	al.	(2014a)	for	a	philosophical	history	of	the	word	and	concept	«sign». 5 Meschonnic	draws	here	from	Émile	Benveniste's	important	genealogical	and	etymological	account of	the	term	«rhythm»	(Benveniste	1971:	281-88). LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 353 that	the	sign	marks,	to	recover	the	continuity	beneath	discontinuity	and	with	it	the	life	of language. Meschonnic's	critique	of	the	sign	is	familiar	across	French	thought	in	the	second	half	of the twentieth-century, where a rejection of the Saussurean sign accompanies the widespread break with structuralism at the end of the 1960s.6 But it highlights the question	of	why	Deleuze	and	Guattari	seem	to	find	in	the	sign	a	significant	spur	to	thought, as	well	as	the	problem	of	how	the	seemingly	conflicting	notions	of	sign	and	rhythm	are	to be	drawn	together.	If	their	theory	of	rhythm	is	a	theory	of	signs,	by	common	conceptions of	the	sign	it	is	scarcely	recognisable	as	such.	Indeed,	James	Williams	has	suggested	that Deleuze «never develops a full philosophy of the sign» (Williams 2016: 120), and moreover that «it is	hard to argue that the concept of the sign is crucial to his	metaphysics»	(Williams	2016:	121).	While	I	will	dispute	Williams's	latter	claim,	I	agree	that	we cannot	say	that	either	Deleuze	or	Guattari	has	a	«philosophy	of the	sign»,	and	that	we rather	find	across	their	work	a	set	of	diverse	inquiries	that	do	not	have	any	immediately cohesive character. But I take this plurality to be a positive characteristic	of their engagement with signs, and believe that the figure of rhythm provides a means to accommodate	such	a	semiotic	pluralism. To	lay	the	groundwork	for	the	Deleuzo-Guattarian	semiorhythmology	I	propose	I	will begin	with	Deleuze	and	Guattari's	earlier	inquiries	into	signs,	and	work	forward	towards exploring	how	these	are	manifest	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus.	I	will	start	by	considering	how Deleuze,	first	in	1964's	Proust	and	Signs	(2008)	and	then	elaborated	in	1968's	Difference and	Repetition	(1994),	conceives	of	the	sign	as	something	like	a	site	or	source	of	encounter.7	Following	this	I	will	track	Guattari's	thought	on	signs	from	his	early	elaborations	on Lacanian	thought	through	to	his	progressive	development,	following	the	1972	publication of	Anti-Oedipus	(1983),	of	a	«mixed	semiotic»,	proposed	as	an	alternative	to	the	Saussurean	theory	of	the	sign.	I	will	show	that	the	most	theoretically	profound	outcome	of	this	is a	radically	revised	version	of	Charles	Sanders	Peirce's	notion	of	the	diagram,	which	motivates	much	of	both	Guattari's	and	Deleuze's	thought	to	come.	I	will	suggest	that	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus	these	two	strands	of	inquiry	are	drawn	into	conjunction	with	a	biosemiotics outlined	through	a	Spinozist	reading	of	the	early	twentieth-century	ethologist	Jakob	von Uexküll,	all	of	which	together	allow	for	the	construction	of	the	concept	of	the	refrain,	the modulating, rhythmic assemblage which draws diverse semiotic practices into consistency.	What	I	set	out	here	is	only	a	sketch	of	a	set	of	engagements	with	signs	each	of 6 Though	Meschonnic	contends	that	Saussure	was	widely	misread	within	structuralism	(Meschonnic 2011:	48),	and	the	recent	discovery	of	Saussure's	manuscripts	has	complicated	the	widespread	break with	his	thought.	See,	for	example,	Maniglier	(2018)	on	Derrida's	critique	of	Saussure	in	light	of	what is	now	known	of	Saussure's	theory. 7 For	now	I	will	leave	aside	another	unorthodox	line	of	inquiry	into	signs	that	could	be	extrapolated from	1969's	The	Logic	of	Sense	(1990).	Here	Deleuze	implies	an	alternative	to,	or	at	least	an	expansion of, the	preeminent	signified-signifier	conception	of	the	sign	by	turning	to	the	logical	theory	of	the Stoics.	For	the	Stoics	the	incorporeal	lekton,	the	utterable,	gives	signification	an	explicitly	temporal and	heterogeneous	character.	(See	Cassin	&	al.	2014b). LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 354 which	is	immensely	rich	in	its	own	right,	but	I	hope	to	suggest	why	further	inquiry	into these,	individually	and	in	relation,	could	serve	to	open	many	fruitful	lines	of	research. Deleuze's	pre-Guattari	theory	of	signs Deleuze's	most	sustained	and	direct	engagement	with	signs	prior	to	A	Thousand	Plateaus	comes	in	his	Proust	and	Signs,	published	in	1964	and	expanded,	but	not	revised,	in 1970	and	again	in	1976.	The	first	version	of	this	text	has	the	remarkable	feature	of	seeming	to	construct	a	concept	of	the	sign	sui	generis,	bearing	little	apparent	relation	to	the dominant	Saussurean	conception.	Deleuze	starts	Proust	and	Signs	with	a	rejection	of a common	opinion:	the	«search»	of	Proust's	In	Search	of	Lost	Time is	not,	says	Deleuze,	a matter	of	recollection,	of	the	involuntary	memory	with	which	Proust	is	most	associated, but	rather	what	Deleuze	calls	an	«apprenticeship»	(Deleuze	2008:	3).	The	time	in	focus	is not	the	time	of	the	past	but	of	the	present	and	future,	of	what	Jean-Jacques	Lecercle	calls «the	time	necessary	for	learning»	(Lecercle	2010:	77).	And	for	Deleuze	what	this	involves in	Proust's	work	is	«the	exploration	of	different	worlds	of	signs»	(Deleuze	2008:	4),	elaborating	on	what	he	terms	the	«worldly	sign»	(Deleuze	2008:	5),	signs	of	love,	sensuous impressions	or	qualities,	or,	«material	signs»	(Deleuze	2008:	9),	and,	finally,	the	signs	of art. Like	the	signs	of	representation,	these	are	still	signs	of	something.	But	it	seems	that	this something	is	not	defined	referentially.	It	is	not	a	case	of	a	given	signifier	referring	to	its signified.	More	important	than	what	these	signs	are	signs	of	is	who	or	what	«emits»	them. This	means	that	not	only	is	the	notion	of	signs	at	work	here	contrary	to	its	commonplace sense;	so	too	is	that	of	learning.	The	accumulation	of	facts,	of	the	appropriate	forms	that conventional	signs	take,	would	not, for	Deleuze,	constitute learning	properly	speaking. Learning rather always constitutes a challenge to common sense, to «stock notions» (Deleuze	2008:	18)	and	«habitual»	(Deleuze	2008:	19)	ways	of	understanding	the	world. Learning,	undergoing	the	apprenticeship	in	signs,	is	then	a	process	of	interpretation and	explication,	of	rethinking	and	renewing	how	one	perceives,	understands,	and	engages with	the	world.	Lecercle	considers	this	perhaps	the	most	important	aspect	of	the	theory of signs	Deleuze develops here: that signs are not conceived objectively, or rather, in terms	of	an	objectivism	where	the	object	emitting	the	sign	holds	the	secret	to	it,	nor	subjectively,	where	the	work	of	signs	would	be	merely	subjective	association,	but	are	rather «deeper»	than	both	object	and	subject	(Lecercle	2010:	83).	Deleuze	puts	forward	a	conception	of signs	where the interpreter	and their	world	are co-implicated. Signs	do	not merely	tell	us	about	what	they	signify	but	directly	impinge	on	thought,	force	thought	into a	constructive	act	of	interpretation	that	changes	the	form	that	thought	itself	takes. How	does	Deleuze	produce	such	an	unorthodox	account	of	signs?	There	is	a	hint	to	the philosophical	grounding	of	this	account	at	the	beginning	of	his	Nietzsche	and	Philosophy LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 355 (2006a),	from	two	years	earlier.	Following	Nietzsche,	Deleuze	states	that	«[t]he	whole	of philosophy	is	a	symptomatology,	and	a	semiology»	(Deleuze	2006a:	3).8	On	this	account	a phenomenon	«is	not	an	appearance	or	even	an	apparition	but	a	sign,	a	symptom	which finds	its	meaning	in	an	existing	force»,	and	to	engage	with	signs	is	to	interpret	forces.	The impact	of such	a	Nietzscheanism	can	be	heard in several	ways throughout	Proust	and Signs,	as	in	the	echo	of	Nietzsche's	discussion	in	The	Gay	Science	of	a	«sign-world»	«debased to its lowest common	denominator» (Nietzsche 2001: §354)	when	Deleuze describes the	«stupid»	and	«stereotyped»	worldly signs	of	high society, characterised	by their	«vacuity»	(Deleuze	2006:	5).	Pierre	Klossowski	likewise	took	Nietzsche's	philosophy,	especially	in	its	early	years,	to	be	a	«combat	against	culture»,	that	is,	the	world	of signs,	and	argues	that	in	opposition	to	this	culture	of	signs	Nietzsche	ultimately	proposed a	«culture	of	affects»	(Klossowski	1997:	14).	With	Klossowski's	thought	on	Nietzsche	developing	in	parallel	and	in	dialogue	with	Deleuze's	own,	Klossowski's	suggestion	that	this «culture	of	affects»	concerns	a	«semiotic	of	impulses»	(Klossowski	1997:	15)	is	suggestive of	how	Deleuze	can	take	Nietzsche	as	the	source	for	a	radically	non-Saussurean	theory	of signs.9 Four	years	later,	Difference	and	Repetition	seems	to	confirm	this	reading,	with	the	opening	pages	announcing	Nietzsche	as	a	thinker	concerned	with	«put[ting]	metaphysics	in motion,	in	action	...	producing	within	the	work	a	movement	capable	of	affecting	the	mind outside	of all representation	...	of substituting	direct signs for	mediate representations» (Deleuze	1994:	8,	my	emphasis).10	Again,	as	in	Proust	and	Signs,	signs	are	associated	with learning, and learning, as before, is not conceived of simply as the	passage from	nonknowledge	to	knowledge,	the	discovery	of	solutions,	laws,	and	generalities	that	then	dissolve	the	problems	they	pertained	to	(Deleuze	1994:	164).	Learning	rather	names	«the subjective acts carried out when one is confronted with the objecticity of a problem (Idea)»,	not	an	act	of	recognition	but	rather	the	explication	of	an	internal	difference	that no	given	solution	can	eliminate.	And	again	learning	is	associated	with	signs,	where	it	is said	that	learning	«takes	place	not	in	the	relation	between	a	representation	and	an	action (reproduction	of	the	Same)	but	in	the	relation	between	a	sign	and	a	response	(encounter with	the	Other)»	(Deleuze	1994:	22). Here	Deleuze	outlines	a	more	thorough,	metaphysical	account	of	signs,	remarking	that they	involve	heterogeneity	«in	at	least	three	ways»: 8 Guillaume	Collett	has	recently,	in	the	pages	of	this	journal,	mapped	the	development	of	what	he	terms a	«symptomontology»	in	Deleuze	and	Guattari's	thought,	beginning	with	this	text	(2018). 9 Daniel	W.	Smith	has	also	noted	that	the	signs	of	love	of	Proust	and	Signs	have	much	in	common	with a	Nietzschean	notion	of the	phantasm	(or	simulacrum),	key to	Klossowski's reading	of	Nietzsche (Smith	2005:	13-14). 10 Furthermore,	a	footnote	credits	Klossowski	with	having	demonstrated	a	link	«between	eternal	return	and	pure	intensities	functioning	as	'signs'»	(Deleuze	1994:	331n16),	and	Klossowski	receives several	more	important	references	throughout	the	text. LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 356 first,	in	the	object	which	bears	or	emits	them,	and	is	necessarily	on	a	different	level, as	though	there	were	two	orders	of	size	or	disparate	realities	between	which	the	sign flashes;	secondly, in themselves, since	a	sign	envelops	another	«object»	within the limits	of the	object	which	bears it,	and incarnates	a	natural	or	spiritual	power	(an Idea);	finally,	in	the	response	they	elicit,	since	the	movement	of	the	response	does	not «resemble»	that	of	the	sign.	(Deleuze	1994:	22-23) Again	the	sign	is	not	reducible	to	either	object	or	subject,	not	only	working	across	them but	producing	the	terms	that	are	retroactively	named	as	a	subject-object	relation.	Learning	is	not	imitation	but	rather	practical	engagement,	and	teachers	are	not	those	who	say «do	as	I	do»	but	rather	those	who	say	«do	with	me».	Deleuze	uses	the	example	of	swimming,	where learning	to	swim	is	not	primarily	a	case	of imitating	an instructor,	nor	of imitating	the	movement	of	the	water,	but	rather	involves	staging	an	encounter	with	the movement	of	the	water	around	us,	of	«grasping»	it	«in	practice	as	signs».	To	learn	is	«to constitute	this	space	of	an	encounter	with	signs»;	in	other	words,	to	open	ourselves	to	a disorienting,	alien	outside,	to	immerse	ourselves	in	a	problem	(such	as	the	swimmer	with the	problem	of	the	sea),	to	place	the	relations	that	constitute	our	bodies	into	relation	with the	relations	that	constitute	the	problem,	and	to	give	consistency	to	the	new	field	this	then constitutes.11 Where the	account	of	signs in	Difference	and	Repetition seems to	expand	on that	of Proust	and	Signs	is	in	extensively	accounting	for	the	ontological	and	epistemological	level at	which	encounters	with	signs	take	place,	and	this	is	thematised	through	the	notion	of sensation.	Deleuze	takes	the	concern	of	the	«transcendental	empiricism»	he	affirms	to	be «apprehend[ing]	directly	in	the	sensible	that	which	can	only	be	sensed,	the	very	being	of the	sensible»	(Deleuze	1994:	57-58).	«That	which	can	only	be	sensed»	names	the	primary characteristic	of	the	encounter,	an	encounter	not	of	something	recognised	and	readily	understood	but	of	«[s]omething	in	the	world»	that	«forces	us	to	think»	(Deleuze	1994:	139). The	object	of	this	encounter	is	the	sign	(Deleuze	1994:	140):	it	is	the	sign	that	forces	us	to think,	that	«cause[s]	problems»	(Deleuze	1994:	164). In outlining this conception of the encounter Deleuze begins with Plato, who for Deleuze	is	an	exception	in	the	history	of	philosophy	in	not	subordinating	apprenticeship to knowledge (Deleuze 1994: 166) and in establishing a temporal notion of thought (Deleuze	1994:	142).	But	Plato,	on	Deleuze's	account,	does	not	yet	capture	the	«being	of the	sensible».	For	this	Deleuze	must	turn	to	biology,	and	it	is	in	linking	signs	and	habituation	that	the	primacy	of	sensation	becomes	clear.	Deleuze	remarks	on	how	«[e]very	organism,	in	its	receptive	and	perceptual	elements,	but	also	its	viscera,	is	a	sum	of	contractions,	of	retentions	and	expectations»	(Deleuze	1994:	73),	a	«primary	vital	sensibility» through	which	behaviour	is	developed	and	enacted	in	relation	to	a	domain	of	encountered 11 Ronald	Bogue	elegantly	details	some	aspects	of	Deleuze's	account	of	learning	(Bogue	2004). LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 357 signs.	On	Deleuze's	account	of	the	organism,	«[t]he	whole	domain	of	behaviour,	the	intertwining	of	artificial	and	natural	signs,	the	intervention	of	instinct	and	learning,	memory and	intelligence,	shows	how	the	questions	involved	in	contemplation	are	developed	in	the form	of	active	problematic	fields»	(Deleuze	1994:	78).	But	while	in	this	account	Deleuze refers primarily to the purely historical and philosophical resources of Bergson and Hume,	in	fact	the	importance	of	the	physical	sciences	to	Deleuze's	thinking	of	signs	is	manifest	here	in	his	reliance,	at	this	point	often	unacknowledged,	on	the	philosophy	of	modern science	developed	by	Gilbert	Simondon. Deleuze	does credit Simondon for	showing	«that individuation	presupposes	a	prior metastable	state»	(Deleuze	1994:	246),	and	cites	here	the	significance	of	Simondon's	concept	of	«disparateness»,	or	disparation,	the	notion	that	it	is	a	disparity	between	two	orders	brought	into	relation	that	motivates	the	process	of	individuation.	But	Deleuze's	regular	mentions	of	disparity	across	Difference	and	Repetition	should	all	be	read	with	Simondon	in	mind,	as	when	he	defines	«signal»	as	a	«system	with	orders	of	disparate	size»	and «sign»	as	«what	happens	within	such	a	system,	what flashes	across	the intervals	when communication	takes	place	between	disparates»	(Deleuze	1994:	20).12	With	these	definitions	Deleuze seems to	name	as	his «sign»	what	Simondon	calls a «signal» (Simondon 2005:	257),	and	what	the	sign	does	when	it	is	forcing	thought	is	expose	thought	to	the «coexistence	of	contraries»	(Deleuze	1994:	141).	For	Deleuze,	as	for	Simondon,	«[e]very phenomenon	refers	to	an	inequality	by	which	it	is	conditioned.	Every	diversity	and	every change	refers	to	a	difference	which	is	its	sufficient	reason»	(Deleuze	1994:	222).	The	condition	for	anything	appearing,	being	actualised	or	presented	as	a	solution	to	a	problem,	is disparity,	and	the	sign	spans	this	disparity, the	shock	to	thought that it forces,	and	the solutions	produced. That	Simondon	allows	Deleuze	to	elaborate	and	expand	the	Nietzschean	theory	of	signs of	Proust	and	Signs through	a (perhaps	still fledgling)	materialist account	of	sensation then	sets	the	conditions	for	Deleuze	to	ultimately	be	able	to	bring	this	theory	of	signs	into contact	with	the	semiotics that	Guattari	had	at the	same	time	made	tentative	steps	towards,	and	that	he	continued	to	develop	across	the	1970s.	I	will	now	turn	to	that	work. Guattari's	semiotic	inquiries Prior	to	Deleuze	and	Guattari's	Anti-Oedipus,	Guattari's	most	significant	attempt	to	theorise	signs	was	«From	One	Sign	to	the	Other»,	originally	a	letter	to	Lacan	written	in	1961 and	published	in	article	form	in	1966.	Guattari	takes	the	autonomy	and	priority	that	Lacan assigns	to	the	signifier	over	the	signified	(Lacan	2006:	415)	as	permission	to	develop	a wildly	creative	and	expansive	approach	to	signs,	a	move	that	Guattari	only	later	realised 12 My	account	of	Deleuze's	debt	to	Simondon	here	owes	much	to	the	writings	of	Anne	Sauvagnargues. (Sauvagnargues	2016a). LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 358 marked	a	significant	departure	from	Lacan	(Guattari	2006:	34).	In	this	text	Guattari	set himself	the	ambitious	task	of	discovering	a	«prototype	of	the	sign	that	would	be	able	to account for all creation on its own» (Guattari 2015: 185). Among the diverse lines of thought	Guattari	develops,	the	notion	that	most	persists	in	his	work	is	that	of	the	«pointsign»,	at	this	time	a	functionally	undividable	entity	engendered	by	two	«splotches»	which by	themselves	do	not	yet	constitute	signifying	material.	Three	of	these	point-signs	make up	a	«basic	sign»,	which	can	be	enchained	and	encoded	into	complex	semiotic	systems (Guattari	2015:	184).13 The	notion	of	the	point-sign	drops	out	of	Guattari's	writings	until	it	is	reformulated,	in his	preparatory	texts	for	Anti-Oedipus,	as	the	Nietzschean	«power-sign»	(Guattari	2006: 224),	which itself	does	not	appear in	Anti-Oedipus,	where	«points-signs» receive	occasional	reference	but	little	elaboration.	For	the	remainder	of	the	1970s,	however,	Guattari devotes	a	large	part	of	his	work	to	re-theorising	signs	and	semiotics.	This	direction	had been	hinted	at	early	in	his	preparations	for	Anti-Oedipus	when	he	remarks	that	«I	think it's	with	Hjelmslev,	maybe Peirce» (Guattari	2006:	38) that the	key to	departing from structuralism	lies.	A	concern	with	Peirce's	notions	of	the	diagram	and	diagrammatization appears	throughout	these	writings,	where	the	power-sign	is	equated	with	a	«diagrammatization	of	the	sign»	(Guattari:	46)	and	associated	with	a	«deterritorialized	polyvocality» (Guattari	2006:	72).	This	signals	that,	unlike	Deleuze	up	to	this	point,	Guattari	is	keen	to develop	his	inquiries	into	signs	with	some	traditional	semiotic	theories	in	mind. Peirce,	despite	his	founding	role	in	semiotics,	is	nevertheless	a	somewhat	unconventional	figure	in	that	field.	His	tripartite	division	of	signs	into	icons,	indexes,	and	symbols (Peirce	1998a:	5)	contrasts	with	the	binaries	that	operate	across	structuralist	accounts, and	his	minimal	definition	of	a	sign	as	being	«something	which	stands	to	somebody	for something	in	some	respect	or	capacity»	(Peirce	1931-35:	2.228)	offers	a	flexibility	and open-endedness	that	few	other	accounts	do.	But	here	already	Guattari	suggests	a	distinction	from	Peirce	by	speaking	of	«a	passage	from	iconization	to	diagrammatization»	(Guattari	2006:	77),	a	formulation	that	could	make	little	sense	to	a	Peirce	for	whom	the	diagram is a type	of icon.	For	Peirce	each	of the types	of icon	– image,	metaphor, and	diagram (Peirce 1931-35: 2.277) – operate through a relation of resemblance. Guattari would agree	with	regards	to	the	image	and	the	metaphor,	but	he	finds	something	different	at work	in	the	diagram.	That	Guattari	then	turns	the	diagram	to	political	ends,	in	a	passage entitled	«Icons	and	Class	Struggle»	(Guattari	2006:	188),	begins	to	suggest	why. For	Guattari,	signification	has	an	immediately	political	character.	Against	standard	understandings	of	the	signifier-signified	relation	as	«arbitrary»	(Saussure	2011:	67)	or	«conventional»	(Peirce	1998a:	9),	Guattari	argues	that	this	relation	is	«at	root	merely	the	expression	of authority	by	means	of signs» (Guattari	1984b:	88).	Guattari contends that 13 Janell	Watson	offers	an	illuminating	reading	of	the	importance	of	this	moment	of	Guattari's	thought (Watson	2009:	32-39). LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 359 meaning	does	not	come	from	language	itself,	but	rather	from	«very	real	social	power	formations»	(Guattari	1984c:	169),	and	he	speaks	of	a	«linguistic	machine»	that	serves	to systematise	and	structure	these	power	formations.	To	remain	at	the	level	of	language	is to	avoid	questioning	the	operations	of	power	that	underlie	it	(Guattari	1984b:	82).	At	issue	for	Guattari,	then,	is	that	approaches	that	make	signification,	language,	or	the	symbolic primary	do	not	and	cannot	adequately	account	for	the	real	diversity	of	semiotic	systems, and	he	suggests	that	«[o]ne	type	of	meaning is	produced	by	the	semiotics	of the	body, another	by	the	semiotics	of	power	(of	which	there	are	many), yet	another	by	machine semiotics»	(Guattari	1984c:	164).	In	short,	Guattari	is	challenging	methods	that	suppose the	adequacy	of	a	single	semiotic	–	specifically	that	of	signification	–	and	raising	the	question	of	by	what	means	a	single	semiotic	can	be	seen	to	unify	diverse	semiotic	systems, «where	all	other	poly-centred	semiotic	substances	can	become	dependent	on	a	single	special	stratum	of	the	signifier»	(Guattari	1984a:	75). The	new	role	of	analysis	then	becomes	a	matter	of	mapping	«the	non-signifying	semiotic	dimensions	underling, illuminating,	and	deconstructing	every	discourse»	(Guattari 1984b:	104).	But	the	question	remains	of	what	it	could	mean	for	a	semiotics	to	be	nonsignifying	or	a-signifying.14	Considering	Peirce's	division	of	signs	will	be	useful	here,	and will	suggest	why	and	how	Guattari turns	to the	diagram.	Peirce	distinguishes	between three	kinds	of	signs:	first,	likenesses,	or	icons;	second,	indications,	or	indices;	and	third, symbols,	or	general	signs	(Peirce	1998a:	5).	Icons	«serve	to	convey	ideas	of	the	things	they represent	simply	by	imitating	them»,	indices	«show	something	about	things,	on	account of their	being	physically	connected	with	them»,	and	symbols	«have	become	associated with	their	meanings	by	usage».	It	is	perhaps	not	quite	right	to	say	that	these	are	classes	of signs	so	much	as	they	are	aspects	or	functions	of	the	sign:	for	Peirce	semiosis	involves accounting	for	how	each	of	these	functions	is	a	part	of	any	given	sign	we	encounter.	What Guattari's	positions	suggests,	on	these	definitions,	is	that	the	semiotic	of	signification	operates	solely	at	the	level	of	the	symbol,	and	what	Guattari	is	doing	is	trying	to	accommodate	the	icon	and	the	index.	Among	many	semioticians,	linguists,	and	philosophers,	signs that	are	«only»	icons,	indices,	or	mixes	of	the	two	are	often	not	considered	to	be	signs	and are	rather	named	as	signals,	and,	as	Guattari	scholar	Gary	Genosko	puts	it,	Guattari	is	aiming	to	«rethink	and	regain	the	lowly	status	of	signals»	(Genosko	2009:	89). Guattari	does	this	across	the	1970s	through	a	continually	refined,	but	generally	tripartite,	distinction	of	semiotics.	In	1973's	«The	Role	of	the	Signifier	in	the	Institution»,	for example,	Guattari	demarcates	1.	non-semiotic	encodings,	2.	signifying	semiologies	(symbolic and signification), and 3. a-signifying semiologies, while 1976's «Meaning and 14 As	far	as	I	can	discern	Guattari	uses	these	terms	interchangeably. LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 360 Power»	distinguishes	1.	natural	encodings,	2.	icons,	and	3.	signifying	and	a-signifying	semiotics.15	That	his	categorial	distinctions	undergo	subtle	shifts is indicative	of the	care Guattari	takes	to	avoid	making	distinctions	that	are	too	final	or	absolute,	anticipating	his and	Deleuze's	claim	that	every	semiotic	is	ultimately	a	mixed	semiotic,	though	it	is	also evidence	of	the	terminological	fluidity	–	and	sometimes	looseness	–	that	poses	a	hurdle	to the interpretation	of	his thought. I	will	not	detail these categories	here	–	excellent	accounts	exist	elsewhere,	such	as	across	the	writings	of	Gary	Genosko	(2009)	and in	the work	of	the	cultural	theorists	Lawrence	Grossberg	and	Bryan	Behrenshausen	(2016)	– and for	now	will limit	myself to	picking	out	some	key	aspects for	my	argument	going ahead. When	discussing	natural	encodings,	or	non-semiotic	encodings,	Guattari	stresses	that even	the	most	minimal	discursive	rendering	of	the	natural	realm	involves	a	translation into	signs	(Guattari	1984c:	167).	Natural	encodings	themselves	are	not	yet	a	semiotic	substance, and	as such	no	direct translation from this	system to	another system	can take place.	This	is	suggestive	of	one	of	the	most	prominent	themes	of	Guattari's	work	in	the 1970s,	namely	his	view	the	sciences	are	not	concerned	with	the	«discovery»	of	external realities	as	such,	but	are	rather	always	creative	and	constructive	in	themselves,	producing something	new	when	they	make	models	of	the	natural	world	(Guattari	1984b:	90).	This kind	of	scientific	procedure	with	regards	to	natural	encodings,	alongside	what	he	names the	«sign	machines»	of	economic,	musical,	or	artistic	«technico-semiotic	complexus»,	are instances	of	what	Guattari	will	call	«a-signifying	semiotics»	(Guattari	1984a:	75). But	care	should	be	taken	to	resist	any	too-hasty	distinction	between	a	negatively	construed,	repressive	signifying	semiotic	and	a	positively	construed,	liberatory	a-signifying semiotics	–	that	in	«Meaning	and	Power»	it	seems	that	the	exemplary	«a-signifying	machine»	is	capitalism	is	enough	to	suggest	a	more	complex	relation	(Guattari	1984b:	85). These «a-signifying semiotics» are also named «post-signifying semiotics» (Guattari 1984a:	75),	and	should	not	be	understood	as	being	wholly	distinct	from	signification:	they are	still	«based	on»	signifying	semiotics	and	«cannot	do	without	props	of	this	kind».	From a	practical	perspective	we	could	envision	this	through	how,	for	example,	the	work	of	science	takes	place	in	state	or	even	corporate	institutions.	Despite	this,	Guattari	says	that	asignifying	machines	use	signifying	semiotics	only	as	a	tool,	«an	instrument	of	semiotic	deterritorialization,	making	it	possible	for	the	semiotic	fluxes	to	form	new	connections	with the	most	deterritorialized	material fluxes».	The intention	with	a-signifying	semiotics	is thus	to	produce	a	new	relation	between	the	world	of	signs	and	the	world	of	things	(that is,	the	material	world,	though	the	term	«material»	will	require	further	interrogation),	or to	reinvest	in	this	relation	that	is	sidelined	and	obscured	by	signifying	semiotics. 15 Both	Deleuze	and	Guattari	later	decide	to	use	«semiology»	to	refer	to	linguistic	approaches	and	«semiotics»	to	a	more	general	and	inclusive	study	of	signs	of	which	semiology	is	only	one	part,	though earlier	in	his	work	on	signs	Guattari	seems	still	to	use	the	terms	interchangeably. LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 361 As	with	Deleuze's	thinking	of	signs,	this	takes	the	form	of	a	critique	of	representation. Guattari	suggests	that	representation	is	the	operative	form	that	signification	takes,	and that	it	takes	the	form	of	a	«snapshot»	of	«the	totality	of	intensive	reality»	or	«the	totality of	fluxes»	(Guattari	1984b:	87),	immobilised	and	formalised	to	conform	to	«the	world	of dominant	significations	and	received ideas».	What is	key	to	representation is that	«the sign	never	refers	directly	to	reality»	(Guattari	1984b:	92),	and	that	instead	of	the	diverse connections	that	make	up	«reality»	it	is	«cut	up»	into	a	«denoted»	reality	and	«world	of images».	With	this	comes	a	reduction	of	the	polyvocality	of	expression	into	the	«bi-univocal	mode»	of	subject	and	object	(Guattari	1984b:	92-93).	With	regards	to	representation, Guattari	states	his	desire: What	I	want	to	recover	are	the	indices,	the	residual	traces,	the	escapes	into	transversality,	of	a	collective	arrangement	of	utterance	[collective	assemblage	of	enunciation] which,	under	whatever	circumstances,	constitutes	the	real	productive	agency	of	every semiotic	machinism.	(Guattari	1984b:	93) Guattari	speaks	of	this	as	«foster[ing]	a	semiotic	polycentrism»	(Guattari	1984a:	7778),	and,	semiotically	speaking,	the	goal	is	to	recognise	that	«signs	work	on	things	prior to	representation»	(Guattari	1984a:	76,	translation	modified;	Guattari	2012:	454),	that	is, that	signs	and	things	come	together	in	ways	that	are	independent	of	any	ideal	conception of	their	relation. These	are	not	goals	that	Guattari	leaves	behind,	but	there	is	a	tension	here	that	seems unresolved,	a tension	between	a-signifying	semiotics	as	relying	on	signifying	semiotics and	a-signifying	semiotics	as	championing	pre-linguistic	expression.	Moreover,	the	apparent	proximity	between	the	flows	of	capitalist	markets	and	«the	most	deterritorialized	material	fluxes»	that	Guattari	seems	to	conceive	as	having	liberatory	potential	is	suggestive of	the	tendency	in	Deleuze	and	Guattari	that	has	led	Slavoj	Žižek	to	hyperbolically	summarise one common critique by naming	Deleuze as «the ideologist of late capitalism» (Žižek	2012:	163).	As	such	it	is	important	that	Guattari	later	clarifies	what	it	means	to	say that	a-signifying	semiotics	are	post-signifying	semiotics,	when	specifying	that	they	do	not involve	a	simple	reversion	to	a	pre-linguistic,	pre-signifying	state: this	does	not	therefore	mean	a	return	to	the	myth	of	a	«natural»	semiotic.	On	the	contrary,	it	means	getting	beyond	semiotics	centring	upon	human	beings	and	moving	irreversibly	towards	semiotics	involving	technological	and	theoretical	systems	that	are ever	more	differentiated,	more	artificial,	and	further	from	primitive	values.	The	problem	is	no	longer	one	of	trying	to	straddle	de-territorialized	fluxes,	but	of	getting	ahead of	them.	(Guattari	1984b:	98) LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 362 While	it	is	not	yet	clear	what	it	would	mean	to	«get	ahead	of»	deterritorialized	fluxes, what	is	nevertheless	stressed	here	is	that	post-signifying	semiotics	has	an	important	critical	element. It	remains	the	case	that there is	a	certain	proximity	between	the flows	of capital	and	the	flows	of	pre-linguistic	desire	and	expression,	but	now	we	hear	that	while «there	is	...	no	meaning	in	the	ups	and	downs	of	the	stock	market»,	capitalist	power	nevertheless	«seeks	to	control	the	non-signifying	semiotic	machines»	(Guattari	1984c:	171): describing	capital	as	the	«model	of	models»,	Guattari	argues	that	the	function	of	capitalism	consists	in	«reducing	the	multiplicities	of	desire	to	a	single	undifferentiated	flux	–	of workers,	consumers,	etc.»	(Guattari	1984b:	85). As	such	there	is	an	aspect	of	a-signifying	semiotics	that	resists	the	notion	that	what	this term	implies	is	a	simple	immersion	into	the	flows	that	underlie	signification,	chief	among them	the	flows	of	capital.	The	image	here	is	of	a-signifying	semiotics	as	a	critical	and	constructive	procedure,	one	that	aims	to	disarticulate	semiotics	from	both	a	reliance	on	signification	and	any faith in	a	pre-signifying	state.	To	articulate this	complex,	polyvalent character	of	a-signifying	semiotics,	Guattari	turns	to	Peirce's	notion	of	the	diagram. As	noted, for	Peirce	the	diagram	is	a type	of icon.	When	explaining	what	an icon is, Peirce	notes	that	photography	is	in	some	respects	instructive	insofar	as	a	photograph	can be	seen	to	imitate	exactly	that	which	it	represents,	but	on	the	other	hand	photographs	are «physically	forced	to	correspond	point	by	point	to	nature»,	a	characteristic	of	the	index (Peirce	1998a:	6).	More	apt	when	speaking	of	icons	are	the	sketches	of	sculptors	or	painters,	or	the	reasoning	of	mathematics,	with	likenesses	being	«the	very	hinges	of	the	gates of	their	science». In	this	context,	the	diagram	is	a	particular	type	of	icon,	one	that	suppresses	certain	features	of	the	object	it	refers	to	so	as	to	allow	the	mind	«more	easily	to think	of	the	important	features»	(Guattari	1998b:	13).	This	suppression	can	be	to	the	extent	that	the	diagram	can	resemble	its	object	«not	at	all	in	looks»	but	only	in	respect	to the	relation	of	parts.	In	this	sense	for	Peirce	the	diagram	is	a	kind	of	likeness,	mental	or physical,	that	allows	the	path	that	reasoning	should	take	to	be	more	easily	conceived. While	the	icon	is	said	by	Peirce	to	have	«no	dynamical	connection	with	the	object	it represents»	(Guattari	1998a:	9), in the form	of the	diagram,	such	as those	of	algebraic formulae,	it	can	be	said	to	have	the	«capacity	of	revealing	unexpected	truth»	(Peirce	193135:	2.279).	Guattari	is	not	as	concerned	with	reasoning	and	a	search	for	truth	as	Peirce	is, but	it	is	nevertheless	something	like	this	aspect	of	the	diagram	that	interests	him.	Compared	to	the	image,	the	diagram	«far	more	efficiently	and	precisely»	includes	«the	articulations	whereby	a	system	operates»	(Guattari	1984c:	170),	but,	more	than	this,	Guattari suggests	that	this	capacity	for	revealing,	or,	rather,	producing	the	unexpected	necessitates separating	the	diagram	from	the	still-representational	figure	that	is	the	icon.16 16 There	is	not	the	space	in	this	article	to	go	into	why	this	break	with	Peirce	is	necessary	in	Peirce's terms,	but in	short	I	take	it	to	be	a	result	of	how	Peirce's	conception	of	reasoning,	of	interpreting signs,	is	ultimately	not	open-ended	but	is	always	said	to	be	moving	towards	a	«true	interpretation» or	«final	opinion»	(Peirce	1998c:	496). LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 363 Guattari	refers	to	Peirce's	assertion	that	algebraic	equations	are	diagrams,	suggesting that they function	as	signs	«in	place	of the	objects they	relate to,	independently	of	any effects	of	signification	that	may	exist	alongside	them»	(Guattari	1984c:	170-71).	But	how he	is	differentiating	himself	from	Peirce	is	reflected	more	clearly	in	how	there	is	something	not	entirely	satisfying	in	Peirce	using	the	example	of	a	sketch	for	a	painting	or	sculpture	when	describing	icons.	We	can	readily	affirm	that	a	certain	likeness	holds	between	a painting	and	its	preparatory	sketch.	But	it	would	not	be	right	to	say	that	a	sketch	imitates a	painting,	or	even	vice-versa.	In	the	first	case	this	is	simply	because	the	sketch	precedes the	painting,	and	in	the	second	it	is	because,	while	the	painting	in	one	respect	imitates	the sketch,	this	far	from	exhausts	the	relation	between	them.	It	seems	rather	that	the	sketch, as	diagram,	is	taken	as	a	guide	or	catalyst	to	creating	something	that	was	not	present	in the	diagram	itself,	something	unexpected. As	such,	when	Guattari	is	conceiving	of	diagrams	he	does	not	understand	them	to	be presenting	a	likeness	of	an	object	that	can	in	theory	be	fully	comprehended	by	the	mind. They	should	rather	be	seen	to	be	bringing	about	a	process	that	has	no	necessary	direction or	goal,	but	which	rather	takes	as	its	premise	only	to	make	«signs	work	flush	to	material flows» (Guattari	1984b:	88, translation	modified;	Guattari	2012:	419; see	Alliez	2015: 145),	to	use	the	relational	detail	and	refinement	of	the	diagram	to	set	into	motion	signbehaviours	that	evade	signification	and	modulate	material flows	themselves.	By losing «aboutness»	as	a	criterion	for	the	diagram	and	giving	it	a	kind	of	ontological	primacy	as the	sign	closest	to	the	real,	Guattari	can	bring	the	diagram	into	line	with	his	critique	of representation	(Genosko	2009:	102).	Moreover,	the	diagram	can	be	utilised	in	departing from	representation	insofar	as	it	can	be	deployed	to	extract	signs	from	their	representational	and	signifying	uses,	and	put	them	into	contact	with	material	fluxes.	As	he	describes this	in	the	final	version	of	his	semiotics	before	A	Thousand	Plateaus,	in	The	Machinic	Unconscious,	the	role	of	the	diagram	is	not	to	«denote»	a	fully	constituted	referent,	but	to produce	it	(Guattari	2011:	216). This	conception	of	the	diagram	allows	Guattari	to	finally	give	a	complete	account	of	the «point-signs»	he	first	formulated	in	the	early	1960s,	now	also	referred	to	by	the	names «part-signs»	and	«particle-signs».	As	he	will	later	put	it,	these	point-signs	do	not	«simply secrete	significations»	but	constitute	a	«bringing	into	being»	(Guattari	1995:	49).	This	creative	power	can	be	assigned	to	the	part-sign	due	to	it,	in	Guattari's	words,	«elud[ing]	the coordinates	of	time,	space	and	existence»	(Guattari	1984b:	84)	–	which	I	take	to	mean	that they	precede	any	specific	signifying	regime	which	would	organise	spaces	and	times in particular	ways,	that	is,	that	the	spaces	and	times	that	part-signs	work	within	are	not	predetermined.	This	itself	is	possible,	using	a	term	that	takes	us	back	to	Simondon	and	that is	used	by	both	Guattari	and	by	Deleuze in	his later	explication	of the	signs	of	cinema, because	these	signs	consist	of	«signaletic	matter»	(Guattari	2013:	40;	Deleuze	1989:	29).17 In	this	conception	signs	are	not	neutral	and	static,	with	no	role	awaiting	them	but	their 17 Or	«signaletic	material». LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 364 referential	use.	They	rather	maintain	something	intensive	and	plastic	to	them,	being	reducible	to	identifiable	individuals	only	temporarily	and	arbitrarily. Where	Deleuze	and	Guattari's	two	extremely	different	accounts	of	signs	meet	is	that they	are	both	intensive	theories	of	signs,	and	both	thinkers	put	extensive	work	into	freeing	the	intensive	qualities	of	the	sign	from	its	static	articulation	in	the	representations	of signifying semiotics. Peirce is useful again in suggesting	what a combination of their thought	implies.	Where	Guattari	extracts	the	diagram	from	the	icon	as	a	non-representational	motor	of	thought	and	practice,	Deleuze's	binding	of	sign,	sensation,	and	encounter recalls Peirce's	description of the index as «[a]nything	which startles	... in so far as it marks	the	junction	between	two	portions	of	experience.	Thus	a	tremendous	thunderbolt indicates	that	something	considerable	happened,	though	we	may	not	know	precisely	what the	event	was»	(Peirce	1998a:	8).	They	«shock»	us	out	of	our	habitual	ways	of	imagining how	things	are,	they	force	us	to	«think	otherwise	than	we	have	been	thinking»	(Peirce 1931-35:	1.336).	The	question	now	is	of	how	these	two	aspects	come	to	relate,	and	I	will propose	that	what	allows	for	this	relation	is	rhythm. Diagrammatism	and	rhythm It	is	across	A	Thousand	Plateaus	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari	provide	their	richest	account of	signs,	yet	it	proves	difficult	to	extract	a	clear	theory	of	signs	from	this	text	alone.	This	is not	because	of	any	lack	of	precision,	but	is	rather	attributable	the	vast	scope	of	the	analysis and deployment	of signs in this text.	Near	one third	of the book – from	plateau 2, «10,000	B.C.:	The	Geology	of	Morals	(Who	Does	the	Earth	Think	It	Is?)»,	to	plateau	7,	«Year Zero:	Faciality»	–	engages	with	theories	of	semiotics	and	signs,	with	and	against	which Deleuze	and	Guattari	begin	to	construct	their	key	concepts.	The	sudden	absence	of	these terms	after	plateau	7	is	not	a	rejection	of	them	but	rather	a	transposition	of	the	vocabulary of	signs	into	the	new	vocabularies	they	develop,	and	bearing	Deleuze	and	Guattari's	previous analyses in	mind can highlight some	ways in	which these theorisations of signs thread	through	the	rest	of	the	text. The	question	of	what	a	diagram	is	and	what	it	does	is	one	that	Deleuze	and	Guattari continually	pose	and	repose. In	A	Thousand	Plateaus it	receives	perhaps its	most	vivid determination	in	plateau	5,	«587	B.C.-A.D.	70:	On	Several	Regimes	of	Signs».	This	plateau most	prominently	concerns	an	elaboration	on	the	demarcations	of	semiotic forms	that Guattari had developed throughout the 1970s. The immensely rich «pragmatics» of a «mixed	semiotic»	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1987:	119,	139)	they	develop	is	an	analytical	framework	deserving	of full	explication	by itself,	but for	now	I	will	continue	to focus	on	the diagram.	Here	the	«diagrammatic function» is a function	of	«destratifying»	(Deleuze	& Guattari	1987:	134),	of	unpicking	the	structures	of	signifying	semiotics	in	the	name	of	«an experimentation	in	life».	It	is	a	case	of	extracting	signs	from	regimes	of	signs	and	bringing LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 365 them	onto	the	«plane	of	consistency»,	comparable	to	what	Guattari	had	earlier	called	material	fluxes.	Diagrams	have	a	«piloting»	role	–	they	«[do]	not	function	to	represent,	even something	real,	but	rather	construct	a	real	that	is	yet	to	come»	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1987: 142),	they	«are	constantly	setting	things	loose»	from	regimes	of	signs,	«particles-signs» that	no	longer	correspond	to	given	representations	or	Ideas	–	and	Deleuze	and	Guattari strikingly	speak	of	the	diagram	possibly	resulting	in	«a	patois	of	sensual	delight,	physical and	semiotic	systems	in	shreds,	asubjective	affects,	signs	without	significance	where	syntax,	semantics,	and	logic	are	in	collapse»	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1987:	147). How?	Taking	a	moment to consider	Deleuze's	work	on	painting,	Francis	Bacon:	The Logic	of	Sensation	(2003),	published	shortly	after	A	Thousand	Plateaus,	may	help	us.	Here again,	as in	Difference	and	Repetition,	Deleuze	thematises	the	work	of	signs	(though	he rarely	uses	that	word)	in	terms	of	sensation.	As	in	the	earlier	text	sensation	is	a	matter	of encounters	that	cannot	be	readily	accommodated	into	our	common	sense	ways	of	thinking,	but	here	there	is	an	additional	aspect	in	the	consideration	of	how	sensations	are	made to	relate,	how	they	are	organised	as	in	works	of	art.	This	contrasts	with	the	at	times	curiously	nominalist	account	of	encounters	in	Difference	and	Repetition,	and	the	concept	that Deleuze	turns	to	in	order	to	answer	this	question	is	that	of	the	diagram.	In	Francis	Bacon the	diagram	is	concretely	conceived	as	«the	operative	set	of	asignifying	and	nonrepresentative lines	and	zones, line-strokes	and	colour-patches»	that	underlie the figurative givens	of	a	painting	(Deleuze	2003:	101),	and	in	this	it	is	«indeed	a	chaos,	a	catastrophe, but	also	the	seed	of	an	order	of	rhythm»	(Deleuze	2003:	67,	my	emphasis).	Rhythm	here is conceived of a diastolic-systolic expansion	and contraction of self and	world out of chaos	(Deleuze	2003:	42),	but	the	diagram	allows	this	notion	of	rhythm	to	be	detached from	its	phenomenological	origin,	and	the	movement	of	rhythm	is	no	longer	in	the	dynamic	constitution	of	subject	and	world,	but	a	movement	only	between	milieus	in	permanent	relation	to	chaos. The	diagram,	then,	serves	to	draw	signs	together,	to	articulate	sensation	without	overdetermining	it	through	reference	to	subject	or	Idea	and	while	keeping	it	in	motion.	It	is what	Kamini	Vellodi	calls	a	«synthesizer	of	difference»	(Vellodi	2014:	94n51).	And	it	performs	this	synthesis	rhythmically.	This	allows	us	to	more	readily	link	the	account	of	signs in	the	first	third	of	A	Thousand	Plateaus	to	the	remarkable	set	of	inquiries	into	rhythm	and ontology	that	are	constructed	later	in	this	text.	We	can	hear	this	notion	of	the	diagram	at work,	for	example,	in	the	famous	account	of	the	refrain.	In	The	Machinic	Unconscious,	Guattari	defines	refrains	as	«basic	rhythms	of	temporalization»	(Guattari	2011:	108):	the	refrain	produces	a	kind	of	internal	cohesion,	consisting	in	what	Anne	Sauvagnargues	acutely describes	as	«the	discordant	set	of	diverse	rhythms	by	which	we	configure	ourselves» (Sauvagnargues	2016b:	125),	but	it	is	in	this	discordance	that	it	holds	within	it	too	capacities	of	machinic	mutation	(Guattari	2011:	122). Take	the	example,	drawn	from	Proust,	of	the	wasp	and	the	orchid,	used	in	both	The Machinic	Unconscious	and	A	Thousand	Plateaus.	The	encounter	between	the	two	produces LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 366 a	«surplus	value	of	code»	(Guattari	2011:	122;	Deleuze	&	Guattari	1987:	10),	by	which their	specialisation	of	internal,	territorial	functions	meet	and	produce	a	relation	that	is not	merely	the	totalized	sum	of their	codings,	but	rather	a	new	assemblage	combining elements	of	these	codes	in	novel	ways.	This	is	an	example	that	Guattari	mentions	as	early as	his	Anti-Oedipus	writings,	and	here	it	is	conceived	in	terms	of	«sign-points»	(Guattari 2006:	45),	a	detachment	of	signs	from	their	organic	unity	as	they	are	emitted	and	encountered	by	heterogeneous	bodies	(Guattari	2006:	183).	This	presentation	of	unpredictable encounters	between	bodies,	the	apprenticeships	in	signs	they	both	undertake	in	relation to	the	emitter	of	signs	that	each	is	for	the	other,	leads	Deleuze	and	Guattari	to	the	crucial Spinozist	question	that	guides	the	creative	impulse	of	their	work:	«What	can	a	body	do?» (Deleuze	and	Guattari	1987:	256). Deleuze	conjoins	this	question	to	his	earlier	thought	in	Spinoza:	Practical	Philosophy (Deleuze	1988:	17-18).	Here	and	elsewhere	Deleuze	takes	on	the	question	of	what	a	body can	do	by	turning	to	the	ethology	of	Jakob	von	Uexküll,	an	ethology	that	in	Uexküll's	own words	involves	a	study	of	perceptive	and	effective	signs	(Uexküll	2010:	47).	For	Deleuze ethology	is	a	«long	affair	of	experimentation,	requiring	a	lasting	prudence,	a	Spinozan	wisdom that implies the construction of a plane of immanence or consistency» (Deleuze 1988:	125)	precisely	insofar	as	it	concerns	not	knowing	in	advance	what	a	body	can	do, of	what	affects	it	is	capable.	Experimentation	takes	the	form	of	a	practice	without	telos. The	accounts	of	Uexküll's	thought	we	find	in	A	Thousand	Plateaus	and	Spinoza	are	very similar:	Uexküll's	animal	world	is	defined,	for	Deleuze	and	Guattari,	by	looking	for	«the active	and	passive	affects	of	which	the	animal	is	capable	in	the	individuated	assemblage of	which	it	is	part»	(Deleuze	&	Guattari	1987:	257);	that	is,	in	Uexküll's	terms,	the	signs	it perceives	and	the	signs it	produces. It is	not	a	matter	of	generic	characteristics,	but	of relations	that	are	not	presumed	or	predetermined	and	must	be	experimentally	forged.	As such	Deleuze	and	Guattari	can	draw	on	Uexküll's	notion	of	the	milieu	(or	Umwelt)	to	define	doubly	the	singular,	closed	unity	of	any	given	assemblage	and	the	manner	in	which this	closed	unity	relates	to	other	assemblages:	construction	and	expression. What	is	relevant	in	Uexküll's	«stroll	into	unfamiliar	worlds»	(Uexküll	2010:	57)	is	no longer	the	study	of	the	animal	as	an	organic	whole	that	relates	to	an	external	environment, but	rather	the	various	relationships	between	the	elements	that	make	up	an	environment as,	in	their	entirety,	a	particular	type	of	machinic	assemblage.	With	ethology,	«every	point has	its	counterpoints:	the	plant	and	the	rain,	the	spider	and	the	fly.	So	an	animal,	a	thing, is	never	separable from	its	relations	with	the	world»	(Deleuze	1988:	125).	As	Deleuze notes	in	The	Fold,	echoing	but	extending	Uexküll: [a]t	its	limit	the	material	universe	accedes	to	a	unity	in	horizontal	and	collective	extension,	where	melodies	of	development	themselves	enter	into	relations	of	counterpoint,	each	spilling	over	its	frame	and	becoming	the	motif	of	another	such	that	all	of Nature	becomes	an	immense	melody	and	flow	of	bodies.	(Deleuze	2006b:	155) LA	DELEUZIANA	–	ONLINE	JOURNAL	OF	PHILOSOPHY	–	ISSN	2421	3098 N.	10	/	2019	–	RHYTHM,	CHAOS,	AND	NONPULSED	MAN 367 This	gestures	towards	Uexküll's	concern	with	conceiving	of	the	processes	of	individual, enclosed milieus as part of a wider yet wholly inaccessible whole: a concern, as Sauvagnargues	puts	it,	of	a	«rhythmology»	(Sauvagnargues	2016b:	133),	expressing	time «less	as	it	is	lived	than	it	is	inhabited,	as	bundles	of	sensory	signs	by	which	we	extract	a territory from surrounding milieus through consolidation and habit» (Sauvagnargues 2016b:	126).	To	inhabit	is	to	refuse	any	supremacy	of	the	subject	or	Idea,	to	posit	nature as	the	site	of	a	vast	and	diverse	set	of	processes	of	experimentation,	to	encounter	and	to express,	to	be	implicated	in	the	transitory,	partial	organisation	of	intensive	signs:	to	take part in	a semiorhythmology.	What I	have	offered	here is	only	a skeleton	of this semiorhythmology	–	a	diagram	of	it,	perhaps,	albeit	an	incomplete	one	–	and	I	hope	others	will take	the	opportunity	to	explicate	it. BIBLIOGRAPHY Alliez,	É.	(2015).	"Structuralism's	Afters:	Tracing	Transdisciplinarity	through	Guattari	and Latour".	Theory,	Culture	&	Society,	32	(5-6),	139-158. Benveniste,	E.	(1971).	Problems	in	General	Linguistics.	(Trans.	By	M.E.	Meek).	Coral	Gables, FL:	University	of	Miami	Press. Bogue,	R.	(2004).	"Search,	Swim	and	See:	Deleuze's	apprenticeship	in	signs	and	pedagogy of	images".	Educational	Philosophy	and	Theory,	36	(3),	327-342. Cassin,	B.,	Galland-Szymkowiak,	M.,	Laugier,	S.,	de	Libera,	A.,	Nef,	F.,	&	Rosier-Catach,	I. (2014a).	"Sign,	Symbol".	In	Cassin,	B.	(ed.),	Dictionary	of	Untranslatables:	A	Philosophical	Lexicon.	(Trans.	by	S.	Rendall,	C.	Hubert,	J.	Mehlman,	N.	Stein,	M.	Syrotinski,	trans. ed.	by	E.	Apter,	J.	Lezra,	M.	Wood).	Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	974-990. 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