Are	Conspiracy	Theories	a	Force	for	the	Good? Daniel	Cohnitz	is	professor	of	theoretical	philosophy	at	Utrecht	University	and president	of	the	European	Society	for	Analytic	Philosophy. The	NSA	spies	on	you.	Before	Edward	Snowden	leaked	classified	information	in 2013,	which	confirmed	this	claim,	many	would	probably	have	shrugged	it	off	as	a "mere"	conspiracy	theory.	What	about	now?	Is	the	theory	that	the	NSA	spies	on you	still	a	conspiracy	theory,	now	that	it	is	a	widely	held	(and	apparently	wellevidenced)	belief? It	seems	common	to	think	that	it's	not.	That	Caesar	was	murdered	by	a conspiracy	of	Roman	senators,	or	that	9/11	was	the	outcome	of	a	conspiracy among	members	of	al-Quaeda	does	not	make	these	historical	accounts conspiracy	theories.	For	many,	the	latter	requires	that	there	is	an	element	of speculation,	perhaps	paranoia	in	the	belief	of	such	theory. Interestingly,	most	philosophers	who	work	on	conspiracy	theories	disagree	with that	common	understanding	of	the	term.	They	find	it	hard	to	identify	features that	make	conspiracy	theories	an	intrinsically	bad	explanation	type,	in	part because	some	initially	suspicious	conspiracy	theories	(like,	perhaps,	the	theory that	the	NSA	is	spying	on	you)	later	turned	out	to	be	true.	Instead,	these philosophers	argue	that	"conspiracy	theory"	should	be	defined	widely:	a conspiracy	theory	is	the	explanation	of	an	event	that	cites	conspiring	agents	as	a salient	cause.	Consequently,	we	are	all	conspiracy	theorists.	Everyone	who believes	that	some	historical	event	came	about	thanks	to	the	successful	secret collaboration	of	several	individuals	believes	in	a	conspiracy	theory	and	thus	is	a conspiracy	theorist,	and	surely	everyone	believes	this	of	some	event. Since	some	of	these	accounts	are	true	and	known	to	be	true	(e.g.	that	the assassination	of	Caesar	was	due	to	a	conspiracy),	believing	in	a	conspiracy theory	as	such	can't	be	irrational	or	misguided.	In	principle	then	there	is	nothing wrong	with	conspiracy	theories	or	belief	in	such	theories.	Of	course,	sometimes conspiracy	theories	are	mistaken	and	sometimes	they	are	believed	on	the	basis of	insufficient	evidence,	but	that	is	the	possible	fate	of	every	theory.	There	is nothing	that	makes	conspiracy	theories	particularly	irrational,	doubtful	or	fishy, just	because	they	are	conspiracy	theories. Accordingly,	attempts	by	psychologists	and	sociologists	to	investigate	the psychological	and	social	profile	of	conspiracy	believers	might	be	seen	as	nothing but	a	witch-hunt.	In	a	recent	public	statement,	a	group	of	social	epistemologists and	sociologists	(Matthew	R.	X.	Dentith,	Lee	Basham,	David	Coady,	Ginna	Husting, Martin	Orr,	Kurtis	Hagen,	Marius	Raab),	even	argue	that	such	witch-hunt endangers	our	(development	towards	an)	open	society.	In	their	paper,	Social Science's	Conspiracy-Theory	Panic:	Now	They	Want	to	Cure	Everyone,	which	was published	last	year	by	the	Social	Epistemology	Review	&	Reply	Collective,	they	say: "[W]e	believe	that	it	is	not	conspiracy	theorizing	that	is	the	danger,	but rather	the	pathologizing	response	to	conspiracy	theories. The	antidote	to	whatever	problems	conspiracy	theories	present	is vigilance,	not	some	faux	intellectual	sophistication	which	dismisses conspiracy	theories	out	of	hand.	It's	really	quite	simple	when	you	think about	it:	conspiracy	theorising	is	essential	to	the	functioning	of	any democracy,	or	indeed	any	ethically	responsible	society." The	argument	behind	it	is	that	conspiracy	theorising	keeps	the	public	in	critical control	of	the	people	in	power	and	might	prevent	the	latter	from	doing	serious harm.	Such	critically	minded	citizens	should	be	interested	in	developing	an	even more	open	society	with	institutions	that	exercise	mutual	control,	one	might	add, because	that's	what	makes	conspiring	much	harder.	So,	is	conspiracy	theorising not	actually	a	danger	to	our	current	political	system,	but	rather	a	force	for	the good? I	believe	that	these	philosophers	and	sociologists	are	right	in	thinking	that	the problem	with	(certain)	conspiracy	theories	is	not	their	explanation	type,	and	that the	fault	of	conspiracy	theories	needs	to	be	identified	on	a	case	by	case	basis	in the	many	ways	in	which	people	make	mistakes	when	theorising.	But	from	that	it doesn't	follow	that	conspiracy	theorising	in	a	society	is	largely	a	force	for	the good	or	that	we	should	welcome	it	in	the	interest	of	an	open	society. On	the	contrary,	conspiracy	theorising	is	a	danger	to	the	institutions	of	the	open society,	and	this	can	be	shown	on	the	basis	of	social	epistemological considerations	alone. In	any	case,	it	can	already	be	made	plausible	on	the	basis	of	empirical	evidence. Have	a	look	around	at	countries	that	were	on	a	path	to	open,	democratic societies	with	separation	of	power,	freedom	of	speech,	etc.	and	in	which conspiracy	theories	have	played	a	significant	role	in	political	campaigns	that	led to	political	change.	The	examples	I	have	in	mind	are	Turkey,	Hungary,	Poland, and	the	USA.	In	all	these	cases,	the	political	change	induced	was	then	not	at	all towards	a	general	strengthening	of	the	institutions	of	open	societies	so	that these	could	better	exercise	mutual	control.	On	the	contrary,	the	change	was towards	a	mutilation	of	these	institutions	and	a	development	away	from	an	open society	towards	a	closed	society	that	displays	elements	of	an	autocracy. Now,	obviously,	in	all	these	cases	there	is	a	variety	of	factors	that	came	together and	led	to	the	particular	political	development.	I	don't	want	to	argue	that	it	is only	due	to	conspiracy	theorising	that	these	countries	got	off	the	path	to	an	open society.	But	I	do	want	to	argue	that	conspiracy	theorising	has	been	a	causal factor	in	this	process.	There	is	an	epistemological	explanation	for	the	turn	these societies	took. To	see	this,	reflect	for	a	minute	on	the	things	you	know	and	why	you	know	them. Most	of	that	knowledge	stems	from	testimony.	A	lot	of	it	stems	from	the testimony	of	people	that	you	do	not	know	personally	but	that	you	have	trusted anyway	because	you	realized	that	they	have	the	relevant	expertise	on	the	matter. You	get	knowledge	from	reading	the	news,	watching	TV,	reading	books, attending	classes	in	college	or	school,	talking	to	a	physician	or	a	lawyer.	The	fact that	you	attain	knowledge	on	the	basis	of	what	you	read,	see,	and	hear	there	is due	to	the	fact	that	the	people	that	certain	institutions	(like	the	media,	the universities,	colleges,	and	schools)	present	as	experts	actually	are	experts. Now,	unless	we	have	intimate	insight	into	these	institutions	ourselves	and	know how	journalists,	scientists,	lawyers,	physicians,	etc.	work;	how	they	are	trained and	selected	and	what	track	record	they	have	of	getting	things	right,	we	are typically	not	in	a	position	to	evaluate	ourselves	whether	trust	in	these	experts	is justified.	But	then	how	do	we	realize	their	expertise?	Well,	typically	we	do	that on	testimony	as	well.	You	picked	it	up	from	people	that	you	already	trusted	on	a personal	level	like	your	parents	and	others	in	your	close	vicinity	–	who	told	you that	you	can	also	trust	these	institutions	and	their	experts.	Your	parents,	or	those others	in	your	close	vicinity	had	themselves	then	either	direct	personal	reasons to	trust	specific	experts	(perhaps	based	on	personal	acquaintance)	or	also indirect	reasons	for	such	trust,	based	on	the	testimony	of	yet	others. For	such	networks	of	trust	to	lead	to	knowledge,	this	must	somewhere	bottom out	in	(collective)	direct	knowledge	of	the	reliability	of	the	procedures	used	to generate	the	knowledge	in	the	first	place.	But,	typically,	most	people	do	not	have that	direct	knowledge. You	learn	from	your	physician	that	you	should	vaccinate	your	children	because the	benefits	far	outweigh	the	possible	health	risks	this	might	pose	for	your children.	You	don't	know	what	the	evidence	for	that	claim	is,	you	don't	typically check	the	data	that	your	physician	bases	her	recommendations	on.	And	that makes	sense:	if	presented	with	the	empirical	data	and	their	statistical	analysis, most	people	would	be	unable	to	see	whether	the	data	seems	uncorrupted	and whether	the	conclusions	drawn	from	it	are	justified.	They	are	better	off	believing their	physician,	because	she	is	the	expert. In	her	judgment,	to	be	sure,	your	physician	will	be	relying	on	other	expert testimony	herself.	The	statistical	methods	she	is	using	were	developed	and checked	by	statisticians	who	themselves	used	mathematical	methods	that	they did	not	verify,	etc.	This	division	of	cognitive	labour	in	our	complex	societies	is not	just	a	matter	of	saving	us	valuable	time.	It	is	a	matter	of	necessity.	We	cannot check	all	the	interdependent	knowledge	claims	in	our	society	because	it	would be	impossible	to	acquire	all	the	expertise	that	we'd	need	for	doing	this. So,	on	the	one	hand,	our	society	with	its	division	of	cognitive	labour	and	its institutions	that	train	and	systematically	educate	highly	specialized	and knowledgeable	experts,	and	that	provide	incentive	structures	and	selection processes	which	lead	to	reliable	and	trustworthy	performance	of	these	experts, generates	a	lot	of	knowledge.	However,	on	the	other	hand,	this	does	not	by	itself guarantee	that	everyone	can	automatically	benefit	from	the	generated knowledge.	One	needs	to	happen	to	stand	in	a	number	of	stable	enough	personal trust	relations	of	the	right	kind	in	order	to	be	able	to	get	oneself	to	trust	in	the output	of	these	knowledge	generating	institutions. After	all,	for	all	that	most	people	directly	know	about	academia,	the	media	and the	schools,	and	for	all	knowledge	of	facts	they	observed	themselves	and	that they	can	use	in	order	to	verify	claims	made	by	members	of	these	institutions,	this "generated	knowledge"	could	all	just	be	a	major	scam.	Which	brings	us	back	to our	conspiracy	theorists. In	many	of	the	contemporary	problematic	conspiracy	theories,	the	relevant conspirators	are	many,	if	not	all	of	the	institutions	that,	in	open	societies,	are supposed	to	exercise	mutual	control.	Big	pharma	lobbies	politicians	and	pays scientists	and	the	media	to	convince	everyone	else	that	vaccinations	are beneficial	and	pretty	harmless	to	the	recipient	in	order	to	make	profit. If	you	think	you	have	reason	to	believe	such	a	conspiracy	theory,	this	has repercussions	for	your	epistemic	situation.	Let	us	assume	that	you	falsely	believe that	vaccination	is	harmful	for	the	recipient	but	that	this	is	covered	up	in	the	way and	for	the	reasons	described	above. The	heuristic	rules	that	the	relevant	institutions	provide	for	the	identification	of expertise	(e.g.	having	a	scientific	degree,	being	employed	at	such	an	institution, etc.)	will	then	become	useless	to	you	(unless,	of	course,	you'd	see	that	the institutions	react	appropriately	to	the	alleged	fraud	by	firing	corrupt	scientists	or journalists,	which,	of	course,	they	don't,	since	your	theory	is	false).	It	will	also impact	the	way	you	view	the	rest	of	the	trust	network.	Those	members	of	your family	or	your	immediate	vicinity	who	initially	provided	a	pathway	to	benefit from	the	knowledge	produced	by	the	institutions	of	your	society	are	now unreliable.	You	don't	need	to	think	that	they	tried	to	mislead	you,	it	is	sufficient to	think	that	they	too	have	been	misled.	And	indeed,	if	pressed	on	details	of	your new	vaccination	conspiracy	theory	they	don't	have	direct	evidence	that	they	can provide	against	it,	right?	So,	they	naively	believed	on	hearsay,	and	you	can	now "enlighten"	them. As	a	result,	however,	you	are	cut	off	the	knowledge	generated	in	your	society. Presumably	you	have	a	residual	core	of	personal	trust	relations	left.	At	least those	relations	with	your	fellow	"truthers",	the	people	who	put	you	initially	in the	know	about	the	purported	large-scale	conspiracy	that	is	going	on	in	your society.	Your	interest	will	be	that	none	of	the	institutions	that	have	failed	you will	get	in	between	you	and	those	you	personally	trust.	It	will	be	rational	for	you to	prefer	an	information	flow	architecture	that	gives	you	unfiltered	and immediate	access	to	information,	coming	from	persons	to	which	you	(believe	to) stand	in	a	direct	trust	relation. This	is	rational	for	someone	who	believes	a	false	conspiracy	theory,	because	for her	it	seems	that	the	institutions	that	are	meant	to	filter,	mediate,	or	cross-check information,	are	all	corrupt	or	broken.	Note	that	even	though	personal	trust	is necessary	to	participate	in	the	knowledge	generated	in	your	society,	your	trust	in its	institutions	is	not	completely	based	on	testimony.	For	one	thing,	you	may	have direct	evidence	that	the	experts	in	your	society	can't	be	completely	incompetent. Technology	typically	works	and	makes	progress,	occasionally	things	turn	out	the way	that	politicians	promised	such	that	you	experience	the	consequences	of	that improvement	yourself.	But	normally	you	also	observe	that	when	things	go	wrong, there	are	correcting	mechanisms:	journalists	report,	say,	that	scientists	falsified their	data,	and	politics	and	academia	react	properly.	Studies	are	retracted, perhaps	laws	are	changed	in	order	to	ensure	higher	standards,	policies	that	were based	on	the	misinformation	are	changed,	the	scientists	get	punished	or	fired. Thus,	in	order	to	have	trust	in	the	institutions	of	your	society,	you	don't	need	to believe	that	everything	is	always	going	well.	But	you	need	to	believe	that	when things	go	wrong,	the	mutual	control	mechanisms	of	these	institutions	will	detect and	correct	the	mistakes,	and	you	have	occasionally	evidence	that	this	indeed happens. Now,	as	we	already	noted	before,	in	case	that	you	believe	a	false	conspiracy theory,	none	of	this	happens.	The	vaccination	program	doesn't	stop,	scientists just	deny	the	allegations,	politicians	even	discuss	to	introduce	a	formal	duty	to vaccinate	in	order	to	force	vaccination	sceptics	like	you	to	comply.	You	can directly	observe	that	the	system	is	broken.	Why	should	you	want	corrupt institutions	to	become	even	stronger? If	you	get	someone	who	you	personally	trust	into	power	–	perhaps	even	into presidency	-,	you	will	not	be	interested	in	having	that	person's	actions	controlled by	corrupt	institutions.	The	influence	of	these	institutions	would	need	to	be reduced,	their	political	power	limited,	the	swamp	must	be	drained.	It	will	be rational	to	prefer	the	destruction	of	(what	actually	are)	institutions	of	the	open society.	That	is	precisely	what	we	can	empirically	observe	when	open	societies take	an	autocratic	turn	based	on	false	conspiracy	theories. We	started	with	the	observation	that	conspiracies	sometimes	happen	and	that, therefore,	belief	in	a	conspiracy	theory	can't	be	irrational	just	because	you believe	that	certain	events	are	orchestrated	by	a	conspiracy.	Indeed,	uncovering actual	conspiracies	in	our	society	is	important.	Conspiracy	theorising	might occasionally	be	onto	something,	and	when	it	is	we	need	to	know.	So,	shouldn't one	conclude	that	conspiracy	theorising	is	an	important	force	for	the	good	in	our society?	Shouldn't	we	tolerate	the	growth	of	false	conspiracy	theories	as	a harmless	(and	sometimes	even	somewhat	entertaining)	side-effect	of	an important	control	mechanism? I	have	argued	that	this	would	be	naïve.	False	conspiracy	theories	are	dangerous for	the	institutions	of	open	societies.	They	undermine	and	eventually	destroy	the trust	network	that	is	necessary	for	these	institutions	to	perform	their	primary functions.	As	a	consequence,	their	very	existence	may	be	put	in	question.	It	is thus	necessary	that	we	understand	why	(some)	people	are	prone	to	believe	false conspiracy	theories	even	though	the	evidential	situations	for	these	theories seems	objectively	bad.	This	will	require	epistemological,	sociological	and psychological	research	on	conspiracy	theories	and	their	believers.	This	is	not	a witch	hunt.