Symposium	on	The	Rationality	of	Perception* Introduction Susanna	Siegel The	Rationality	of	Perception	concerns	two	epistemic	questions.	The	first	question concerns	the	interface	between	an	individual's	mind	and	their	cultural	milieu.	Can the	epistemic	status	of	a	culturally	entrenched	presumption	be	transmitted	to	an individual	who	unreflectively	absorbs	it? The	second	question	concerns	the	relationship	within	an	individual's	mind	between their	perceptual	experiences,	and	their	beliefs,	desires,	suspicions,	fears,	and	other outlooks	that	influence	them.	Can	the	epistemic	status	of	an	individual's	prior outlook	be	transmitted	to	a	perceptual	experience,	when	the	outlook	shapes	the experience? The	Rationality	of	Perception	makes	the	case	that	both	kinds	of	epistemic transmission	are	possible.	I	start	with	normative	concepts	from	analytic epistemology:	well-foundedness	and	ill-foundedness.	Traditionally,	these	concepts applied	to	beliefs	held	by	an	individual,	but	not	to	perceptual	experiences	of	an individual,	nor	to	culturally	entrenched	presumptions.	I	argue	that	the	concept	can be	extended	in	both	of	these	directions.	These	normative	concepts	can	apply	more widely	than	has	traditionally	supposed. The	bulk	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	is	devoted	to	the	question	about	the	intrapersonal	interface	between	perceptual	experience	of	an	individual	and	her	prior outlook.	The	main	thesis	is: Rationality	of	Perception	(RP):	Both	perceptual	experiences	and	the processes	that	give	rise	to	them	can	be	rational	or	irrational. For	example,	suppose	Jill	fears	that	Jack	is	angry	and	suspects	he	is.	When	she	sees him,	he	looks	angry	to	her,	due	to	her	fearful	suspicion.	There	are	versions	of	this case,	I	argue,	in	which	strengthening	her	fear	in	response	to	experience	would	be unreasonable. Another	example:	Vivek	is	an	excessively	vain	performer.	To	him,	the	faces	in	the audience	range	in	their	expression	from	neutral	to	pleased.	Remarkably,	no	one	ever looks	disapproving.	Vivek's	vanity	influences	the	character	of	his	perception. Depending	on	his	self-conception,	how	a	scene	looks	to	him	will	differ,	even	when	all other	conditions	stayed	the	same. *	Many	thanks	to	symposiasts	Endre	Begby,	Harmen	Ghijsen,	and	Katia	Samoilova for	engaging	so	robustly	with	The	Rationality	of	Perception	and	for	writing	such interesting	and	thoughtful	responses	to	it. 2 What	should	Jill	and	Vivek	believe,	in	response	to	their	visual	experiences?	Could you	blame	Jill	for	strengthening	her	belief	that	Jack	is	angry,	once	she	sees	him?	Not really.	Yet	since	the	problem	originates	in	her	own	mind,	what	else	besides	her mind's	own	working	is	there	to	blame?	In	this	contet,	the	concept	of	blame	has	no clear	application.	To	address	what	Jill	or	Vivek	should	believe,	we	need	a	different normative	concept.	And	since	some	effects	on	perceptual	experience	by	prior outlooks	are	epistemically	good	or	harmless,	whereas	others	are	epistemically	bad, what's	needed	is	a	framework	for	analyzing	the	epistemically	relevant	features	of the	routes	to	perceptual	experience	that	shows	how	to	draw	this	distinction. A	framework	that	can	do	this	is	inference.	When	we	draw	inferences	from	our beliefs	to	other	beliefs,	we	reason	from	information	we	have	already.	When	our inferences	are	epistemically	good	they	redound	well	on	us	as	rational	subjects,	and when	they	are	epistemically	bad,	they	redound	poorly	on	us	on	rational	subjects. There	are	two	standard	ways	for	an	inference	to	be	bad:	the	inputs	to	the	inference can	be	unjustified,	or	the	transition	to	the	conclusion	can	be	improperly	constrained. The	inferentialist	version	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	is	that	perceptual experiences	can	be	the	conclusions	of	epistemically	evaluable	inferences.	Just	as	the conclusions	of	inferences	from	beliefs	to	other	beliefs	redound	well	or	poorly	on	us as	rational	subjects,	according	to	Inferentialist	RP,	the	same	is	true	of	perceptual experiences	that	are	conclusions	of	inference.	Inferentialist	RP	distinguishes epistemically	better	and	worse	routes	to	perceptual	experience	by	better	and	worse inferences. In	this	way,	it	finds	a	more	extensive	scope	for	epistemically	evaluable inference	than	is	traditionally	assumed. Epistemic	charge If	the	main	theses	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	are	correct,	then	perceptual experiences	are	among	the	mental	phenomena	that	redound	well	or	badly	on	the subject's	rational	standing,	and	that	their	epistemic	status	can	be	modulated	by inferences.	My	label	for	the	property	that	measures	the	epistemic	power	and rational	standing	of	an	experience	is	epistemic	charge.	Just	as	electrical	charge	can be	conducted	from	one	material	to	another,	epistemic	charge	can	be	transmitted between	experiences	and	other	mental	states.	An	example	of	an	epistemically charged	mental	state	is	a	belief	that	is	either	justified	or	unjustified.	As	justification is	usually	construed,	beliefs	themselves	are	the	bearers	of	this	epistemic	normative status. The	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	says	that	perceptual	experiences	can,	in themselves,	manifest	an	epistemic	status.	They	are	not	merely	an	enabling	condition for	other	mental	states	to	manifest	such	a	status.	Nor	are	they	merely	contributors to	determining	the	epistemic	status	of	beliefs	as	either	well	or	poorly	justified, though	they	play	this	role	as	well.	In	addition	to	this	role,	they	manifest	an	epistemic standing	in	themselves. Epistemic	charge	is	a	way	to	measure	the	epistemic standing	of	an	experience.	And	just	as	beliefs	that	are	very	well	justified	can transmit	their	justification	to	subsequent	beliefs	formed	on	their	basis,	similarly 3 experiences	that	are	highly	epistemically	charged	can	transmit	their	charge	to subsequent	beliefs	formed	on	their	basis. According	to	the	Inferentialist	version	of	RP,	epistemic	charge	can	be modulated	by	inference.	Poor	inferences	can	reduce	the	epistemic	charge	an experience	has	below	a	baseline,	relative	to	which	beliefs	based	on	the	experiences give	you	good	reason	to	believe	that	things	are	the	way	the	experience	presents them	as	being.	For	instance,	if	you	want	to	know	whether	there	is	any	mustard	in the	fridge,	you	can	open	the	door	to	look.	You	can	discover	that	a	fear	of	running	out of	mustard	is	unfounded,	by	opening	the	fridge	and	seeing	a	jar	of	mustard	there. Here,	your	experience	has	a	baseline	amount	of	epistemic	charge.	By	contrast,	in cases	of	perceptual	hijacking,	perceptual	experiences	may	end	up	with	less	than	a baseline	amount	of	epistemic	charge,	and	therefore	with	less	epistemic	power	to provide	justification	for	subsequent	beliefs	formed	on	their	basis. 4 Replies	to	Begby,	Ghijsen,	and	Samoilova Susanna	Siegel 1.	Reply	to	Begby 1.1	Blameworthy	vs.	Ill-founded Whit	forms	his	racialized	beliefs	about	black	people	passively,	absorbing	his	outlook from	his	cultural	milieu.	I	argue	that	the	process	by	which	Whit's	beliefs	are	formed and	maintained	redound	badly	on	him	epistemically.	He	is	less	rational	than	he could	be,	if	he	didn't	have	these	beliefs. Begby	assumes	that	if	an	individual's	having	a	belief	redounds	badly	on	her,	then she	is	culpable	and	blameworthy	for	having	that	belief.	In	characterizing	my	view, he	takes	this	assumption	for	granted: "the	ill-foundedness	doesn't	simply	detract	from	the	justification,	it	renders the	resultant	belief	irrationally	and	epistemically	blameworthy."	[page number	to	be	inserted] "It	may	be	that	such	beliefs	aren't	just	lacking	in	some	epistemically	relevant dimension,	e.g.	justification.	Rather,	they	are	actually	irrational.	And	to	the extent	that	they	are	irrational	,	they	reflect	poorly	on	the	epistemic	subject: the	subject	is	epistemically	culpable	for	acquiring	and	maintaining	the belief	in	question."	[page	number	to	be	inserted] "to	the	question	of	whether	he	is	being	irrational,	and	therefore blameworthy,	in	believing	as	he	does,	I	stand	firm:	so	far	as	Siegel's	example gives	us	any	reason	to	believe,	he	might	be	doing	exactly	what	he	should	be doing	(epistemically	speaking)	in	forming	the	belief	that	he	does."	[page number	to	be	inserted] I	reject	Begby's	assumption.	Having	a	belief	could	redound	poorly	on	your	rational standing,	even	if	you	are	not	culpable	or	blameworthy	for	having	that	belief. If	you solve	a	logic	puzzle,	your	rational	standing	is	greater	than	it	would	be	if	you	had	all the	information	you	needed	to	solve	the	puzzle	but	reasoned	poorly	with	that information.	In	the	scenario	where	you	reason	poorly,	you	might	be	doing	the	best you	can	with	the	resources	you	have.	But	there	is	no	point	in	blaming	you,	and	it seems	wrong	to	say	that	you're	blameworthy.	If	we	analyze	poor	rational	standing in	terms	of	blame,	we	won't	be	able	to	straightforwardly	characterize	your reasoning	as	poor. In	the	kinds	of	cases	I	discuss	in	The	Rationality	of	Perception,	the	concepts	of	blame and	culpability	have	no	clear	application.	Blame	implies	that	the	person	doing	the blaming	can	rightfully	ask	the	blamed	person	do	something	differently,	such	as change	their	beliefs,	or	apologize,	or	compensate	anyone	they	may	have	harmed. Culpability	is	the	flip-side	of	blame.	These	normative	notions	are	made	for appraising	and	regulating	social	relationships.	In	this	respect,	they	belong	with 5 other	epistemic	normative	notions	designed	to	help	shape	social	relationships,	such as	the	notions	that	determine	when	it	is	reasonable	to	trust	another	person	or	social entity,	or	the	notions	of	immanent	critique	and	external	critique	that	figure	in	the theory	of	social	criticism. By	contrast,	the	purpose	of	the	normative	notions	I	work	with	is	to	describe	the normative	facts	of	the	situation,	rather	than	to	devise	ways	to	improve	them. Throughout	The	Rationality	of	Perception,	I	assume	that	there	are	facts	about	what rational	standing	different	possible	subjects	would	have,	given	their	overall	outlook and	how	it	was	formed.	The	main	point	of	my	analysis	of	Whit's	case	is	that	among the	many	marks	left	on	an	individual's	mind	by	their	social	context,	we	find	an impact	on	the	status	of	their	beliefs	as	well-founded	or	ill-founded.	Just	as	we	can study	the	effects	of	variously	sized	social	contexts	on	cognition,	I	argue,	we	can	also study	the	effects	of	those	contexts	on	rational	standing. Begby	rejects	my	conclusion	on	the	grounds	that	Whit	"may	have	done	everything right",	and	is	"performing	ideally	well,	epistemically	speaking,	with	limited resources."	As	per	Begby's	title,	Whit	is	thinking	straight	in	a	warped	environment. Once	one	disconnects	redounding	poorly	on	one's	rational	standing	from	being culpable,	one	could	in	principle	agree	with	Begby	that	Whit	blamelessly	forms	and maintains	his	belief	and	is	not	culpable,	while	still	holding	that	Whit's	belief redounds	poorly	on	him.	Begby	says	his	"his	main	concern	[is]	not	about justification,	but	about	the	question	of	epistemic	culpability".	Someone	who	shared Begby's	concern	might	then	agree	with	my	main	point	that	Whit's	belief	redounds poorly	on	him. But	Begby's	comments	suggests	that	he	disagrees	with	my	main	point,	because	he thinks	the	epistemic	badness	in	Whit's	case	is	located	wholly	outside	Whit's	mind. According	to	Begby's	assumption	linking	poor	rational	standing	to blameworthiness,	since	Whit	is	not	culpable	for	his	racialized	belief,	that	belief	does not	redound	poorly	on	him	either.	I	disagree. Whit's	friends	and	associates	have	the	same	racialized	beliefs	that	Whit	has.	From their	point	of	view,	the	ease	with	which	Whit	maintains	his	outlook,	the	utter	lack	of dissonance	it	causes	in	him,	and	his	unreflective	comfort	in	his	outlook	all	belong	to the	trappings	of	reassurance	by	which	their	beliefs	are	maintained.	The	workings	of Whit's	mind	are	part	of	the	working	of	the	cultural	milieu,	and	they	impact	the minds	of	the	people	around	him.	Whit's	mind	is	not	simply	a	landing	pad	on	which social	forces	leave	their	mark.	Similarly,	the	racialized	presumption	that	Whit absorbs	is	entrenched	in	his	milieu	in	part	because	other	people's	minds	already operate	the	way	his	comes	to	operate. In	these	ways,	individual	minds	are	not epistemically	separable	from	the	bad-making	features	of	his	social	environment. Since	Whit	and	his	friends	are	in	exactly	the	same	epistemic	situation	when	it	comes to	racialized	beliefs,	Begby's	position	entails	that	they	are	all	thinking	straight.	The "warped	environment"	then	has	to	be	analyzed	independently	of	the	operation	of 6 their	minds.	This	consequence	erases	robs	us	of	the	resources	we	need	to	analyze just	what	it	is	that's	warped	about	the	environment.	Part	of	what's	warped	is	that the	outlook	shared	by	Whit	and	his	friends	feels	normal	to	them.	It's	part	of	their social	habitus. To	study	the	epistemic	impact	of	social	contexts	on	individuals'	minds,	we	need normative	notions	that	can	link	the	individual's	mind	with	their	social	milieu.	The normative	notions	of	ill-foundedness	and	well-foundedness	can	draw	this	link,	even though	these	notions	have	traditionally	been	employed	in	analytic	epistemology only	within	the	minds	of	individuals.	My	analysis	of	Whit's	case	takes	an	epistemic notion	designed	for	analyzing	belief-forming	processes	within	an	individual,	and makes	the	case	that	it	has	a	wider	application	to	the	interface	between	individuals' minds	and	their	social	context. How	does	the	notion	of	ill-foundedness	extend	to	the	interface	between	the individual's	mind	and	her	social	milieu? When	an	individual's	belief	is	ill-founded,	it is	formed	or	maintained	epistemically	badly.	Ill-foundedness	of	a	belief	is	distinct from	failing	to	be	supported	by	evidence	–	another	dimension	of	justification.	A person	could	have	strong	evidence	for	p,	even	when	their	belief	that	p	is	ill-founded. This	could	happen	if	the	means	by	the	belief	is	formed	or	maintained	does	not	take account	of	the	evidence.	For	instance,	you	might	have	strong	evidence	that	I'm	angry at	you,	and	then	your	belief	that	I'm	angry	at	you	would	be	evidentially	supported. But	for	all	that,	your	belief	could	be	ill-founded,	because	the	reason	you	have	it	(and keep	on	having	it)	is	that	it's	Wednesday,	and	every	Wednesday	you	think	that everyone	is	mad	at	you.	Here,	the	factor	that	explains	why	you	have	the	belief	is independent	of	the	evidence	you	have	for	it.	The	fact	that	ill-foundedness	of	a subject's	belief	is	distinct	from	evidential	support	is	one	reason	why	we	need	more fine-grained	set	of	notions	than	the	term	"justification"	allows. Similarly,	Whit's	racialized	belief	could	be	ill-founded,	regardless	of	whether	the evidence	he	has	for	it	is	good	(because	nothing	in	his	social	milieu	pulls	against	it and	some	things	seem	to	favor	it),	or	bad	(because	it	is	spotty	or	misleading	or impacted	by	moral	factors),	or	some	of	each. The	point	of	the	notion	of	ill-foundedness	is	to	bring	into	focus	the	normative significance	of	the	ways	we	have	of	forming	and	maintaining	beliefs.	At	the	level	of cultural	milieu,	we	can	find	a	potential	disconnect	between	evidence	that	counts	in favor	of	a	proposition,	and	the	factors	that	explain	why	that	proposition	is entrenched	in	a	culture.	It	could	have	been	part	of	a	cultural	myth	that	everything material	has	a	weight,	even	before	Euler	and	Newton	made	the	discoveries	that	gave rise	to	our	current	concept	of	weight	(on	which	nothing	material	is	too	small	to	be measured	by	weight).	In	that	scenario,	the	culturally	entrenched	presumption	could start	out	ill-founded,	and	end	up	well-founded. By	locating	the	epistemic	badness	outside	Whit,	Begby's	verdict	has	no	resources	to describe	the	epistemic	impact	on	Whit	of	his	social	context. It's	the	difficulty	of distinguishing	social	from	individual	that	makes	the	notion	of	blame	and	culpability 7 ill-suited	as	tools	of	normative	analysis.	By	contrast,	the	notion	of	ill-foundedness does	better	at	connecting	and	individual	to	her	social	context.	What's	needed	to complete	the	picture	is	a	better	understanding	of	how	social	practices	enable	the absorption	of	ill-founded	presumptions.1 1.2	Assertion	in	the	USA In	making	the	case	that	ill-foundedness	can	be	transmitted	from	the	mind	of	the world	to	an	individual's	mind,	I	compare	the	epistemology	of	testimony	between individuals	with	the	epistemology	of	testimony	between	an	individual	and	their social	milieu.	If	we	ask	what	social	mechanisms	enable	individuals	to	absorb presumptions	in	the	seamless	way	that	Whit	does,	we'd	have	to	look	to	social practices	as	well	as	to	discursive	"messages"	in	advertising,	narratives,	and	other discursively	structured	cultural	products	(a	point	emphasized	by	Haslanger). But	for	the	purpose	of	asking	whether	ill-foundedness	is	transmitted	from	a	social milieu	to	an	individual,	I	find	it	useful	to	compare	the	epistemic	features	of	the transmission	with	the	epistemology	of	testimony,	so	that	we	can	locate	similarities and	differences. I	grant	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	ill-foundedness	is	not	transmitted	in	interpersonal	testimony.	If	your	mother	tells	you	the	water	is	unsafe	to	drink	and	you believe	her,	but	her	belief	in	that	the	water	is	dangerous	is	ill-founded,	then according	to	the	view	I	grant	for	the	sake	of	argument,	you	could	end	up	a	wellfounded	belief. My	point	in	granting	this	position	is	to	show	that	the	considerations that	favor	it	do	not	extend	to	the	relationship	between	an	individual	and	her	cultural milieu.	Those	considerations	include	the	facts	that	your	mother	is	concerned	for you,	and	that	she	is	making	an	assertion	with	the	purpose	of	conveying	information for	your	benefit.	By	contrast,	neither	of	these	factors	apply	to	the	interface	between the	mind	of	the	world	and	an	individual. Begby	worries	that	this	disanalogy	would	apply	only	to	a	society	in	which	no	one ever	explicitly	asserted	the	thing	about	black	men	that	Whit	comes	to	believe,	but the	outlook	was	conveyed	in	other	ways.	If	it	were	common	practice	to	assert	the thing	that	Whit	believes,	then	that	would	be	a	case	of	interpersonal	testimony.	And	I granted	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	Whit	would	be	justified	in	believing	what	he's told,	for	instance	by	his	mother	or	aunts	or	uncles.	On	that	variant	of	Whit's	case, Begby	suggests,	by	my	own	lights,	Whit's	racialized	beliefs	should	come	out	wellfounded.	He	concludes	that	my	analysis	applies	only	to	a	specific	cultural configuration	of	racism,	one	found	in	a	stretch	of	American	history	in	which	antiblack	racist	assertions	are	rare,	but	anti-black	racist	practices	are	rife. In	reply,	even	if	Whit's	beliefs	were	maintained	in	part	by	explicit	assertions	of	the sort	Begby	envisions,	they	could	still	be	maintained	in	part	by	the	social	practices and	other	aspects	of	the	cultural	milieu	that	make	those	assertions	seem	so	natural 1	I	thank	Sally	Haslanger	for	helping	me	see	this	point. 8 to	Whit.	We	thus	have	a	case	of	one	factor	getting	washed	out	by	a	large	set	of	other factors.	By	comparison,	if	a	creature	had	nineteen	eyes	and	one	of	them	didn't	see well,	its	vision	could	still	be	overall	okay,	as	the	distortions	brought	on	by	the	bad eye	would	wash	out	among	the	information	taken	in	by	the	other	eighteen	good eyes.	Similarly,	even	if	one	factor,	assertion,	is	a	good-making	feature	of	the	route	by which	Whit's	belief	is	formed	and	maintained,	there	could	be	a	host	of	other	factors distinct	from	assertion	that	contribute	to	the	maintaining	of	his	belief,	such	as	the naturalness	of	his	friends'	racialized	beliefs.	And	in	my	example,	as	I	initially described	it,	there	would	still	be	such	a	host	of	factors,	even	if	Whit	sometimes heard	people	assert	the	content	of	his	racialized	belief. It	is	not	especially	realistic	to	suppose	that	no	one	ever	asserts	anti-black	racist sentiments,	in	any	stretch	of	American	history.	Since	assertions	about	social	groups only	seem	reasonable	against	a	background	social	setting	that	provides	trappings	of reassurance,	it's	plausible	that	those	trappings	carry	the	most	weight	in	maintaining beliefs	like	Whit's.	If	Whit	had	different	friends,	different	books,	or	a	different pattern	of	curiosity,	his	racialized	beliefs	would	sit	less	easily	with	him.	But	part	of the	scenario	is	that	Whit	lacks	precisely	these	things. 2.	Reply	to	Ghijsen 2.1.	Grounds	for	epistemic	charge What	features	of	perceptual	experiences	might	explain	what	makes	them	rationally assessable?	I	consider	two	options.	The	Inferential	Ground	hypothesis	says	that perceptual	experiences	are	rationally	assessable	when	and	because	they	are conclusions	of	inferences.	The	Phenomenal	Ground	hypothesis	says	that	they	are rationally	assessable	when	and	because	they	belong	to	a	subject's	overall	outlook	on the	way	the	world	is. Ghijsen	is	suspicious	of	both	answers.	In	response	to	the	Phenomenal	Ground hypothesis,	he	asks	"why	would	phenomenal	character	have	any	role	to	play	in grounding	the	rational	status	of	perceptual	experience?".	He	considers	my	answer that	such	experiences	belong	to	the	subject's	overall	outlook,	because	they	have	a presentational	phenomenal	character,	and	that	since	one's	overall	outlook	redounds well	or	badly	on	a	subject,	so	do	the	parts	of	that	outlook.	Ghijsen	then	objects	that unconscious	reactions	could	also	form	part	of	one's	outlook,	and	concludes	that presentational	phenomenal	character	is	irrelevant	to	grounding	rational	status. I	agree	with	Ghijsen	that	unconscious	beliefs	contribute	to	one's	outlook.	Why would	the	fact	that	both	unconscious	beliefs	and	perceptual	experiences	contribute to	one's	outlook	show	that	the	presentational	phenomenal	character	is	irrelevant? Ghijsen	suggests	that	on	my	view,	unconscious	beliefs	and	perceptual	experiences both	contribute	to	one's	overall	outlook	in	virtue	of	their	"representational	content". If	having	this	kind	of	content	is	sufficient	for	grounding	epistemic	charge,	he 9 reasons,	then	there	is	no	obvious	role	left	for	phenomenal	character	to	play.	Ghijsen construes	phenomenal	character	as	something	"over	and	above"	representational content,	and	therefore	a	potential	ground	for	epistemic	charge	distinct	from	the feature	that	plays	this	role	in	unconscious	belief. But	presentational	phenomenal character	is	too	closely	tied	to	representational	content	to	provide	a	distinct	feature in	the	way	Ghijsen	envisions.	When	your	perceptual	experience	presents	you	with the	property	roundness,	for	example,	it	attributes	the	property	to	something,	and your	experience	is	correct	only	if	something	is	round.2 Ghijsen's	complaint	about	the	Inferential	Ground	hypothesis	is	that	it	won't	classify demon-induced	perceptual	experiences	as	rationally	assessable,	so	long	as	those experiences	are	caused	by	an	external	manipulator	rather	than	by	any	inferential process	internal	to	the	subject.	Ghijsen	thinks	(and	thinks	it	is	plain)	that	if	any perceptual	experiences	are	irrational,	demon-induced	experiences	are. "[O]nce	one	allows	that	perceptual	experiences	themselves	already	redound on	our	rationality,	then	these	types	of	demon-induced	experiences	should look	exactly	like	the	kind	of	experiences	that	would	redound	badly	on	our rationality."	[page	numbers	to	be	filled	in	later] Why	would	demon-induced	experiences	redound	badly	on	a	subject,	when	the subject's	own	mental	capacities	played	no	role	in	bringing	about	those	experiences? The	conceit	of	The	Rationality	of	Perception	is	that	processes	that	occur	within	a subject's	own	mind	and	are	of	her	own	mental	doing	are	paradigms	of	rationally appraisable	processes.	If	such	processes	culminate	in	perceptual	experiences,	then those	perceptual	experiences	are	appraisable	as	well.	By	contrast,	demon-induced experiences	bypass	the	reasoning	capacities	of	a	subject	entirely. Ghijsen's	criticisms	of	the	two	hypotheses	are	related.	Both	draw	on	and	extend	his earlier	point	(Ghijsen	2016)	that	the	phenomenal	character	of	experiences	does	not bestow	them	with	the	epistemic	power	to	be	unjustified	justifiers.	If	phenomenal character	can't	bestow	any	power	to	justify	without	needing	justification,	he reasons,	it	can't	ground	rational	standing	either.	And	since	proponents	of	the Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	agree	that	presentational	phenomenal	character isn't	enough	to	make	perceptual	experiences	into	unjustified	justifiers,	he	thinks they	should	go	farther	and	hold	that	such	phenomenal	character	can't	provide justification	in	the	new	evil	demon	scenario,	where	the	experiences	are	induced	by	a demon	rather	than	resulting	from	the	subject's	own	inferences	or	other	cognitive machinations. We	thus	have	two	points	of	major	disagreement,	both	central	to	the	disputes between	internalist	and	externalist	approaches	to	justification.	First,	Ghijsen	thinks 2	For	further	discussion	of	the	relationship	between	presentational	phenomenal character	and	representational	content,	see	Siegel	(2010)	chapter	3. 10 presentational	phenomenal	character	plays	no	epistemic	role	in	perceptual justification,	whereas	I	think	it	does.	Second,	Ghijsen	thinks	that	degrees	of reliability	correlate	with	degrees	of	justification	and	ground	rational	standing, whereas	I	think	they	don't. On	the	second	debate,	it	is	hard	to	see	how	mere	degrees	of	reliability	could	ground the	rational	standing	of	anything.	The	height	of	a	seedling	reliably	indicates	how long	it	has	been	in	the	earth,	but	the	plant	does	not	thereby	have	a	rational	standing, and	neither	does	its	height.	When	reliabilists	claim	that	degrees	of	justification	are measured	by	degrees	of	reliability	of	a	belief,	they	are	often	taking	as	understood that	beliefs	redound	well	or	badly	on	a	subject,	and	aiming	to	explain	how	justified or	unjustified	those	beliefs	are. On	the	first	debate,	Ghijsen	is	right	to	ask	what	gives	presentational	phenomenal character	such	extraordinary	power	to	bestow	justification.	It	might	seem	that	if anything	has	the	power	to	bestow	justification,	it	would	be	the	fact	that	normally, perceptual	experiences	facilitate	knowledge	of	the	environment	(Peacocke	1999), rather	than	phenomenal	character	itself,	when	construed	as	a	property	of experiences	that	supervenes	on	the	internal	state	of	the	subject's	mind,	rather	than on	that	plus	the	mind's	relation	to	things	in	the	environment. My	reason	for	favoring	the	Phenomenal	Ground	hypothesis	is	that	it	accommodates the	seemingly	simple	fact	that	seeing	the	mustard	in	your	fridge	can	give	you	reason to	think	that	it	is	there,	while	also	accommodating	the	potential	adverse	effects	of wishful	or	fearful	seeing.	My	reason	for	rejecting	phenomenal	conservatism	is	that	it gives	the	wrong	results	in	key	cases	of	cognitive	penetration.	In	any	of	the	three versions	recapped	by	Ghijsen,	the	Phenomenal	Ground	hypothesis	preserves	the idea	that	perceptual	experience	easily	carries	the	weight	we	naively	think	it	does	in providing	justification,	while	respecting	the	ways	that	our	own	mental	processes can	detract	from	the	its	role. 2.2	Modulating	epistemic	power A	second	strand	in	Ghijsen's	critique	focuses	on	whether	inference	can	modulate	the epistemic	powers	of	experience.	He	agrees	that	etiology	of	experiences	can modulate	epistemic	power,	but	disagrees	that	the	notion	of	inference	helps	explain how	this	modulation	occurs. His	initial	criticism	of	my	account	of	inference	is	that	it	fails	to	predict	that experiences	he	considers	"intuitively	[epistemically]	good"	end	up	with	that	status. In	his	example,	drawn	from	Lyons's	(2011)	discussion,	an	ill-founded	but	true	belief about	the	prevalence	of	snakes	puts	a	subject	on	the	lookout	for	them,	leading	her	to notice	more	snakes	than	she	would	without	any	such	belief.	Ghijsen	observes	that since	the	prior	belief	that	there	are	snakes	around	helps	cause	an	experience,	if	one then	strengthens	one's	original	belief	on	the	basis	of	snake-experiences,	the transition	will	have	the	same	components	as	a	circular	inference.	My	account	of inference,	Ghijsen	says,	lacks	the	resources	to	explain	why	these	snake-experiences 11 are	not	inferential	responses	to	the	prior	belief	that	there	are	snakes	around,	and therefore	why	the	beliefs	formed	on	the	basis	of	those	experiences	are	not	as	poorly justified	as	circular	inferences. When	I	discuss	this	case	in	chapter	6,	I	take	it	as	a	datum	that	directing	spatial attention	is	not	part	of	the	role	of	premise-states	in	inference. Directing	spatial attention	is	a	way	of	starting	off	a	perceptual	process,	and	one's	pattern	of	attention need	not	affect	how	that	process	unfolds.3	In	Lyons's	example,	the	fact	that	your attention	has	been	directed	downward	does	not	affect	what	you	see	when	you	look at	the	ground.	If	you	had	looked	at	the	ground	because	you	were	shy,	or	because	the light	from	the	sun	was	too	bright,	you	would	see	the	same	snakes	as	the	ones	seen by	Lyons's	character	who	is	on	the	lookout	for	snakes.	The	fact	that	this	vigilant person's	experiences	are	shaped	by	what	he	is	actually	seeing	leads	Ghijsen	to	say that	those	experiences	are	"intuitively	good". Ghijsen	worries	that	I	haven't	said	enough	to	justify	my	assumption	that	the influence	of	prior	belief	on	spatial	attention	falls	outside	the	subject-matter	of theories	of	inference.	A	reductive	theory	of	inference	would	purport	to	identify features	essential	to	inference	that	are	missing	here.	But	this	method	of	delineating the	subject-matter	is	not	open	to	me,	Ghijsen	observes,	since	I	claim	to	illuminate the	nature	of	inference	without	offering	any	reductive	analysis	of	it. My	reply	is	that	we	infer	from	information	we	have	already,	whereas	Lyons's	case involving	taking	in	new	information	about	the	location	of	particular	snakes	and drawing	conclusions	exclusively	from	that	new	information.	Suppose	I	want	to	know whether	you've	reached	the	top	of	the	stairs,	so	I	look	up	the	staircase,	see	that	you are	at	the	top,	and	form	the	belief	that	you	are	now	one	floor	above	me.	Do	we	need a	theory	of	inference	to	tell	us	whether	or	not	I	have	inferred	that	you	reached	the top	of	the	stairs	from	my	desire	to	know	where	you	are?	This	case	does	not	seem	to be	a	borderline	case	between	inference	and	non-inference,	and	it	is	exactly analogous	to	Lyons'	snake	case.	I	am	drawing	the	conclusion	that	you	are	at	the	top of	the	stairs	from	my	visual	experience.	My	desire	preceded	and	helped	cause	my experience,	but	it	does	not	enter	into	my	reasoning	at	all. Because	cases	like	Lyons's	snake	example	or	my	staircase	example	fall	clearly outside	the	subject-matter	of	theories	of	inference,	we	don't	have	to	rely	on	the resources	of	those	theories	to	determine	whether	or	not	those	cases	belong	to	the phenomena	that	these	theories	aim	to	illuminate.	A	skeptic	who	holds	there	is	no such	thing	as	epistemically	appraisable	inference	would	take	issue	with	any purported	division	of	mental	processes	into	inferential	ones	and	non-inferential ones.	But	their	criticisms	would	apply	to	any	philosophical	theory	that	takes	an inference	as	an	epistemically	interesting	phenomenon,	not	just	to	the	inferentialist version	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis. 3	Feature-based	attention	can	affect	how	it	unfolds,	as	Carrasco	(2011)	and	others have	argued. 12 In	a	different	version	of	the	snake	case,	the	prior	belief	would	both	direct	attention and	combine	with	perceptual	information	one	gets	when	one	attends	to	the	places here	likely	to	be	to	yield	the	experience	that	there's	a	snake	nearby.	By	contrast	to the	role	of	prior	beliefs	in	Lyons's	snake	case,	this	kind	of	role	is	a	paradigm	of inference	to	perception. A	further	criticism	from	Ghijsen	concerns	this	kind	of	inference.	According	to Ghijsen,	"sensory	stimulation	are	always	going	to	underdetermine	the	conclusion" that	shapes	a	percept,	and	so	every	case	of	inference	to	percepts	will	count	as	a	case of	poor	inference,	unless	it	is	supplemented	with	additional	assumptions.	I	describe how	Jill's	fear	could	makes	her	conclude	that	Jack	is	angry	from	her	experience	of Jack's	blank	stare,	where	the	conclusion	takes	the	form	of	an	anger-experience.	If	the transition	is	an	inference,	I	explain,	then	it	manifests	Jill's	sensitivity	to	the	rational relationships	as	Jill	sees	them	between	Jack's	blank	stare	and	her	background assumptions	that	link	his	blank	stare	to	anger. Ghijsen	charges	that	my	analysis	of	this	case	"simply	stipulates	how	to	deal	with	[it] ...rather	than	arguing	that	the	inferential	account	best	explains	what	is	going	on	in the	case."	Since	Jill	is	a	fictional	character,	there	is	no	independent	fact	of	the	matter about	what	psychological	mechanisms	produce	her	experience.	Jill's	scenario	is	an occasion	for	describing	what	various	routes	to	experience	could	be	like,	rather	than an	explanandum	for	theories	of	how	experiences	of	anger	can	arise. In	describing	the	various	different	routes	to	Jill's	experience	that	could	fill	out	the fiction,	Ghijsen	contrasts	merely	causal	routes	from	Jill's	fear	to	her	experience	with inferential	ones,	and	asks	how	my	theory	can	distinguish	between	a	merely	causal, non-inferential	route	by	which	she	moves	from	a	blank-stare	experience	of	Jack's face	to	an	experience	of	his	face	as	angry,	and	an	inferential	route	in	which	the conclusion	is	not	warranted	by	the	inputs.	My	answer	is	that	distinctively	inferential responses	are	found	in	both	epistemically	faulty	inferences	and	epistemically	goes ones,	but	not	in	merely	causal	transitions.	The	difference	comes	from	the	way	in which	the	subject	responds	to	the	blank-stare	experience.	Because	my	theory	is	nonreductive,	there	is	no	further	analysis	of	what	kind	of	response	this	is,	though	we can	characterize	such	responses	indirectly	in	several	ways,	as	I	do	in	Chapter	5.	If Ghijsen	thinks	any	non-reductive	theory	of	inference	would	be	inadequate,	then	that is	where	the	issue	needs	to	be	joined,	and	his	objections	to	an	inferentialist	version of	the	Rationality	of	Perception	thesis	will	be	derivative	of	more	general	concerns. 3.	Reply	to	Samoilova Samoilova	argues	that	the	framework	of	epistemic	charge	can	help	analyze	cases where	high	stakes,	moral	considerations,	or	other	contextual	factors	raise	the amount	of	justification	needed	for	knowledge.	Samoilova	calls	this	level	of justification	needed	in	these	cases	the	justificatory	highline.	Consider	Dretske's classic	pair	of	cases	involving	the	perception	of	birds	(1981).	In	case	1,	you	see	a 13 duck	in	a	pond,	with	markings	distinctive	of	Gadwall	ducks,	such	as	a	white	patch	on wing. As	it	happens,	it	really	is	a	Gadwall	duck.	In	some	versions	of	this	situation, you	could	know	that	it's	a	Gadwall	duck	on	the	basis	of	your	visual	experience together	with	your	ability	to	recognize	this	kind	of	duck. Case	2	is	just	like	case	1,	except	you	learn	that	an	ornithologist	has	a	hypothesis	that Siberian	Grebes	have	starting	migrating	through	the	area,	and	those	birds	are	hard to	distinguish	from	Gadwall	ducks.	The	crucial	difference	between	them	is	a	mark	on the	belly,	but	from	your	perspective	can't	see	the	belly	of	the	duck	because	it	is swimming.	The	ornithologist's	hypothesis	gives	you	some	reason	to	think	that	the bird	you	are	seeing	is	a	Siberian	Grebe	rather	than	a	Gadwall	duck. Dretske	argues	that	in	case	2,	your	knowledge	of	the	ornithologist's	hypothesis	has raised	the	bar	for	knowing	that	it's	a	Gadwall	duck.	If	you	checked	its	belly	you	could know	that	it's	a	Gadwall	duck,	but	as	things	stand,	you	don't	know,	even	though	if you	hadn't	learned	about	the	ornithologist's	hypothesis,	you	would	know. If	Dretske	is	right,	one	explanation	for	why	you	don't	know	in	case	2	is	that	a	single set	of	psychological	resources	gives	you	less	justification	in	case	2	than	it	gives	you in	case	1.	These	resources	are	your	visual	experience	and	your	beliefs	about	what Gadwalls	look	like. If	in	case	2	you	added	to	those	resources	a	further	visual experience	in	which	you	saw	the	duck's	belly	(and	saw	that	it	looks	as	a	Gadwall's belly	would	look,	rather	than	looking	the	way	a	Grebe's	belly	would	look),	you	could meet	the	higher	bar	for	knowledge. But	when	we	focus	on	the	visual	experiences	you	actually	have	in	case	1	and	case	2, for	all	we've	said,	the	epistemic	potency	of	those	experiences	is	the	same	before	you look	at	the	duck's	belly	and	afterward.	What	would	help	you	reach	the	highline	is	a further	experience	that	tells	you	what's	on	its	belly not	any	augmented	epistemic power	of	experience,	or	any	additional	epistemic	charge	that	would	go	with	it. Dretske's	example	does	not	illustrate	Samoilova's	main	claim,	but	in	other	types	of cases	the	notion	of	epistemic	charge	could	help	analyze	what	enables	someone	to reach	a	justificatory	highline.	We	need	a	pair	of	cases	that	vary	in	how	much justification	is	needed	for	knowledge,	and	then	we	need	to	hold	constant	a phenomenal	type	of	experience	across	a	pair	of	cases,	as	well	as	any	relevant background	beliefs.	We	can	then	consider	whether	the	extra	justification	called	for in	the	high-stakes	case	could	be	provided	by	the	experience,	due	to	the	route	by which	the	experience	was	formed	in	the	subject's	mind.	Samoilova	claims	that	there are	such	cases,	and	her	central	observation	is	that	if	experience	could	provide	the extra	justification	that's	needed,	then	the	change	in	justification	provided	by	the same	experience	across	cases	could	be	expressed	as	differences	in	epistemic	charge. Here	are	two	examples. 14 First,	imagine	a	judge	whose	job	is	to	watch	a	series	of	divers	dive	into	a	swimming pool,	and	assess	how	well-executed	their	dives	are.	The	judge	watches	the	divers carefully	from	the	time	they	position	themselves	at	the	edge	of	the	diving	board until	they	hit	the	water,	noting	their	posture	at	each	stage	and	their	overall trajectory	as	they	flip	and	turn	and	twist.	For	each	dive,	there's	a	paradigmatic	way to	execute	it,	and	the	judge	assesses	how	closely	each	diver's	trajectory	follows	the contours	it	is	meant	to	follow. We	can	imagine	that	part	of	the	judge's	expertise	consists	in	knowing	how	the diver's	body	should	be	positioned	at	each	moment,	and	how	various	positions	and micro-movements	interact.	For	instance,	a	twist	at	time	t	can	be	well-executed	only if	the	diver	was	aligned	properly	at	the	earlier	time	t*,	so	registering	the	proper alignment	at	t*	helps	the	judge	assess	how	well	executed	the	twist	is	at	time	t.	Like many	tasks,	a	complex	dive	will	involve	a	host	of	such	interactions. And	they provide	the	judge	with	ample	opportunity	for	inferences	as	she	watches	the	dive unfold	–	both	inferences	to	beliefs,	and	inferences	to	experiences.	For	instance,	once she	sees	that	the	diver	has	left	the	board	with	enough	power	to	reach	an	optimal height,	but	not	so	much	as	to	exceed	it,	she	can	infer	that	that	the	twist	will	finish	at the	optimal	time	so	that	she	can	hit	the	water	with	an	untwisted	body. And	this basis	for	inference	is	in	principle	available	to	her	experience	of	the	dive	at	the	next moment. We	can	compare	the	judge's	experience	of	a	diver	who	is	about	to	hit	the	water	with a	novice's	experience	of	the	same	diver.	The	judge	and	the	novice	might	both experience	the	diver's	body	as	configured	in	the	exact	same	way,	and	their perspective	might	be	such	that	their	experiences	are	the	same.	But	the	judge's experience	could	have	more	epistemic	power	than	the	novice's,	if	the	way	in	which it	is	caused	by	the	diver's	actual	configuration	is	informed	by	the	judge's	knowledge of	how	various	micro-features	of	the	diver's	movement	interact.	In	a	high-stakes situation,	the	epistemic	power	of	judge's	upgraded	experience	could	meet	the Samoilovan	highline,	while	novice's	experience	would	not.	As	Samoilova	points	out, this	difference	could	be	reflected	in	the	amount	of	epistemic	charge	belonging	to each	experience.	It's	easy	to	picture	a	high-stakes	situation	here.	Whether	a	diver wins	a	competition	could	depend	on	the	judge's	verdict,	and	the	verdict	could	in turn	depend	on	how	the	dive	looks	to	the	judge	when	she	sees	it. In	suggesting	that	epistemic	charge	can	help	analyze	different	epistemic contributions	of	experience	in	cases	where	the	standard	for	knowing	is	higher	than usual,	Samoilova	emphasizes	that	inference	can	modulate	epistemic	charge	of experience.	But	to	illustrate	the	phenomenon	she	brings	into	focus,	in	which experiences	can	be	potent	enough	to	reach	a	justificatory	highline,	any	modulator	of epistemic	charge	would	work.	This	brings	me	to	a	second	example	of	two 15 experiences	that	are	phenomenally	the	same	but	differ	in	epistemic	charge,	with	the result	that	one	of	them	meets	a	justificatory	highline	whereas	the	other	does	not.4 Consider	a	chess	match,	in	which	a	chess	expert	is	playing	one	game	and	a	novice	is playing	a	separate	game.	By	chance,	at	one	point	in	their	respective	games,	expert and	novice	face	the	same	configuration	on	the	board,	and	in	response,	they	both make	the	same	move.	The	novice	just	happened	to	notice	the	move,	whereas	the chess	expert,	like	chess	experts	generally,	perceives	the	board	as	chunked	into patterns	poised	for	attack	or	defense	(Chase	and	Simon	(1973)).	The	move	made	by both	expert	and	novice	was	evident	from	focusing	on	a	'chunk'	of	the	board	that highlighted	the	pieces	poised	for	attack. It's	this	spatial	chunk	that	the	novice happened	to	notice. Here,	it's	the	same	visual	experience	that	gives	expert	and	novice	grounds	for thinking	that	the	move	that	they	both	end	up	making	is	a	good	move.	What	is	the content	of	their	shared	experience	of	the	board?	One	option	is	that	their	experiences present	the	affordance	of	moving	a	piece.	A	different	option	is	that	the	experiences present	only	'thin'	content,	such	as	spatial	configuration	of	pieces.5 Either	way,	the expert	comes	to	have	that	content	trough	a	process	of	perceptual	learning	in	which she	learns	to	chunk	configurations	of	pieces	into	a	single	unit	(this	process	is	called "unitization"	in	the	theory	of	perceptual	learning),	whereas	the	novice	simply	hits on	the	unit	by	chance.6 If	perceptual	learning	modulates	the	amount	of	epistemic	charge	the	expert's experience	has,	compared	with	the	novice's	experience	of	the	same	structure,	then it's	a	further	question	whether	it's	modulated	by	inference.	It	could	instead	be modulated	by	recognitional	skill.	If	so,	that	modulation	would	illustrate	a	noninferentialist	version	of	the	Rationality	of	Perception. Bibliography M.	Carrasco	(2011)	Visual	attention:	The	past	25	years.	Vision	Research	51:1484– 525. W.	Chase	and	H.	Simon	(1973)	"Perception	in	Chess"	Cognitive	Psychology	4:	55-81. K.	Connolly	(2017)	"Perceptual	Learning"	The	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy (Summer	2017	Edition),	Edward	N.	Zalta	(ed.).	URL	= <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/perceptual-learning/>. 4	Thanks	to	Zoe	Jenkin	for	discussion	of	both	this	case	and	the	results	in	Chase	and Simon	(1973). 5	On	thin	content	see	the	debate	between	Byrne	and	Siegel	(2017). 6	On	unitization	and	other	mechanisms	of	perceptual	learning,	see	Connolly	(2017). 16 F.	Dretske	(1981)	The	pragmatic	dimension	of	knowledge.	Philosophical	Studies	40 (3):	363--378. H.	Ghijsen	(2016).	The	real	epistemic	problem	of	cognitive	penetration. Philosophical	Studies,	173(6):1457-1475. J.	Lyons	(2011)	"Circularity,	reliability,	and	the	cognitive	penetrability	of perception".	Philosophical	Issues	21(1):289-311. C.	Peacocke	(1999)	Being	Known.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. S.	Siegel	(2010)	The	Contents	of	Visual	Experience.	New	York:	Oxford	University Press. S.	Siegel	and	A.	Byrne	(2017)	"Rich	or	Thin?"	In	B.	Nanay,	ed.	Current	Controversies in	Philosophy	of	Perception.	New	York:	Routledge.	57-80.