Philosophy and Phenomenological Research doi: 10.1111/phpr.12134 © 2014 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC Thought and Thing: Brentano's Reism as Truthmaker Nominalism URIAH KRIEGEL Institut Jean Nicod Introduction The ontological theory of the later Franz Brentano is often referred to as 'reism.' But what exactly is reism, and how is it related to modern-day nominalism? In this paper, I offer an interpretation of Brentano's reism as a specific variety of nominalism. This variety, although motivated by distinctly modern concerns about truthmakers, adopts a strategy for providing such truthmakers that is completely foreign to modern nominalism. The strategy rests on proliferation of coincident concrete particulars. For example, 'Socrates is wise' and 'Socrates is Greek' are made true, respectively, by wise-Socrates and GreekSocrates, where wise-Socrates and Greek-Socrates are two coinciding but numerically distinct concrete particulars (which also coincide with Socrates). 1. Reism and Nominalism The curious term 'reism' is associated with the parsimonious ontology of Franz Brentano and Tadeusz Kotarbinski. At least starting 1904, Brentano maintained that 'there is nothing other than things' (Brentano 1930: 68), where 'things' (Dinge or Realia) is supposed to exclude propositions, states of affairs, abstracta, possibilia, ficta, merely intentional objects, and more.1 Brentano's positive characterization of a thing is as an individual 1 There is some scholarly debate as to when exactly Brentano held this view. His student Alfred Kastil has popularized the notion that Brentano's ontology has gone through several phases (see the introduction to Brentano 1930), with reism constituting the final or penultimate phase. (Some scholars maintain that Brentano had one last change of heart, circa 1915-two years before his death-whereby he replaced material concrete particulars with spacetime regions potentially filled with concrete particulars (see Brentano 1976).) Personally, I am very skeptical of Kastil's reading and tend to think Brentano was always a reist. This is supported by both textual and philosophical considerations. Textually, unpublished lecture notes of Brentano's 1867 W€urzburg course on metaphysics (see, e.g., manuscripts 31451, 31535, and 31985 in the W€urzburg archives) show relatively clear commitment to THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 1 object: 'If one conceives of something in individual terms, then one is also conceiving a thing' (Brentano 1933: 19). Brentano never published his reistic writings, but two collections of relevant essays, letters, and lecture notes were edited and published posthumously by his devoted students Oskar Kraus and Alfred Kastil (Brentano 1930, 1933). It is Kotarbinski who coined the term 'reism,' to name the view he developed in the 1920s and defended most fully in his 1929 book Gnosiology (Kotarbinski 1929).2 He then retroactively applied the term to Brentano's later views (Kotarbinski 1966).3 Kotarbinski formulated reism as the conjunction of two theses: (i) that every entity is a thing and (ii) that no entity is a state of affairs, property, or relation. Although there is some debate over the ultimate degree of similarity between Brentano's and Kotarbinski's views (see Smith 2006), they are clearly in the same spirit.4 This paper focuses on Brentano's reism. Its goal is twofold: to get clear on what the view is, and to make a prima facie case for its plausibility. I will not argue that Brentano's reism is the one true ontological theory, but rather for the following more nuanced thesis: if one is antecedently attracted by (i) a nominalist ontology and (ii) a truthmaker approach to ontological theorizing, then whereas the current literature showcases three theoretical options to choose among, Brentano's reism represents a fourth viable option (no less prima facie plausible than the other three). One might wonder whether 'reism' is just an odd name for what we know today as nominalism. There are, however, two reasons to keep the reism (Baumgartner 2013: 236). Philosophically, Brentano's theory of judgment, articulated explicitly already in Brentano 1874, fits a bit too perfectly with reism for this to be a coincidence-more on this in §4 below. 2 The book's Polish title translates into Elements of the Theory of Knowledge, Formal Logic and Methodology of the Sciences; it is the English translators who thought to bestow on it a pithier title. 3 Kotarbinski was a student of Kazimierz Twardowski's in Lvov (now in the Ukraine), after the latter returned from Vienna, where he worked with Brentano from 1885–1889. Despite this history, Kotarbinski was unaware of Brentano's later ontological views until Twardowski wrote him a letter about this after the publication of Kotarbinski 1929. Kotarbinski then started to apply the term 'reism' to Brentano's views in the early thirties. 4 There is one straightforward respect in which the two views differ: Kotarbinski was a materialist, and therefore held that every thing is a material thing, whereas Brentano was a substance dualist (though one who accepted that mental processes are lawfully grounded in neurophysiological processes-see Brentano 1874 I Chap. 3), who therefore held that there are both material and immaterial things. What Smith (2006) argues, however, is that Brentano's very notion of a thing is a formal notion that is supposed to cover anything we might think about. But while there are some passages that may suggest this reading, as we already saw many others indicate unequivocally that a thing is an individual object (see the quote from Brentano 1933: 19). 2 URIAH KRIEGEL term 'reism.' First, as I will show in the remainder of this section, modern nominalism is usefully divided into three different types, only one of which dovetails with reism. More importantly, as I will show in the rest of the paper, reism's strategy for 'saving the appearances'-read: producing truthmakers for all the pre-philosophical truths we would like to philosophically ratify-is radically different from modern nominalists.'5 * * * The term 'nominalism' is commonly used in two relatively independent areas of philosophy. It is used in the philosophy-of-mathematics literature to designate the rejection of abstract objects such as numbers. In the literature on the metaphysics of properties, meanwhile, it is used to designate the rejection of universals. Thus the term 'nominalism' is used ambiguously in modern philosophy (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2011). We should therefore distinguish three views that go by 'nominalism': rejecting abstracta, rejecting universals, and rejecting both. A nice way to appreciate this is through Donald Williams' (1953) scheme for a four-way classification of putative entities. The scheme is the product of two cross-cutting distinctions: between particulars and universals and between concreta and abstracta. These yield a matrix of four ontological categories: concrete particulars, abstract universals, abstract particulars, and concrete universals (see Figure 1). Apparent examples of concrete particulars include Beyonce and my laptop. Apparent examples of abstract universals include fame and grayness. Apparent examples of abstract particulars include Beyonce's-fame and my-laptop's-grayness. Apparent examples of concrete universals include Beyonce-ness and my laptop's haecceity.6 How to draw the concrete/abstract and particular/universal distinctions in a principled but extensionally adequate manner is a controversial matter we need not resolve here. What matters for our purposes is that Williams' fourfold categorization allows us to divide nominalistic ontologies into three types. The first is anti-universals nominalism: (N1) There are only particulars (concrete and abstract). We may call the second anti-abstracta nominalism: 5 This is the case with Brentano's reism at least; Kotarbinski's will be set aside here. 6 The qualification 'apparent' in the last four sentences is needed because proponents of each view can be sparse about what kinds of entities of the relevant categories there are. For example, according to nihilists (Rosen and Dorr 2002, Sider 2013) there are no composite concrete particulars, so no such thing as Beyonce; according to sparse theorists of abstract universals (see Lewis 1983), there are no such properties as fame; and so on. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 3 (N2) There are only concreta (particular and universal). Finally, we may call strict nominalism the view that frowns on both universals and abstracta: (N3) There are only concrete particulars. Brentano' term 'thing' is intended to capture Williams' concrete particulars.7 To that extent, Brentano's reism should be identified with strict nominalism.8 As we will see, Brentano's version of strict nominalism is thoroughly heterodox. Yet his case for it is remarkably modern, and is driven by considerations of parsimonious truthmaking. Earlier commentators have often pinned Brentano's case for his reism on a single argument, to do with the univocality of 'something' in such statements as 'S thinks of something'-an argument that has been dismissed as inconclusive (Wolenski Concrete Abstract Particular Kant Kant's wisdom Universal Kant-ness wisdom Figure 1. Williams' Categorization 7 Brentano is explicit in many places on his rejection of abstract universals and abstract particulars, especially states of affairs. As for concrete universals, Brentano discusses them less often. Still, in one undated dictation, about Duns Scotus on substance, he speaks of 'the wholly imaginary fiction of an haecceity.' (Brentano 1933: 112). 8 Smith (2006 §14) argues that Brentano's notion of a thing is a formal one and is supposed to cover anything that can be the object of a presentation (Vorstellung). But although Brentano does stress that only things can be objects of presentation, he takes this to be a substantive rather than trivial claim, something that requires argument and does not simply fall out of the meaning of words. For example, in a 1914 letter to Kraus he writes: 'I shall begin at once, today, by giving you what I believe to be a simple and rigorous proof of the fact that only things can be objects of our presentations. . .' (Brentano 1930: 94). Such a proof would presumably be unnecessary if the claim were intended to be tautological. 4 URIAH KRIEGEL 2012) and even 'extraordinarily bad' (Simons 2006: 89). But this argument merely makes a move at a relatively advanced stage of the dialectic.9 To properly understand the source of Brentano's attraction to reism, we must start from much more basic considerations pertaining to the truthmakers of simple declarative sentences. 2. Reism and Truthmakers A traditional and rather commonsense ontology admits not only things (in the sense of concrete particulars), but also (i) properties and (ii) states of affairs comprising things and properties. Such an ontology is straightforwardly suggested by our language and thought. This can be appreciated through the demand for truthmakers. Consider the following truth: (T1) Beyonce is famous. Since T1 is true, something in the world must make it true; it must have a truthmaker. The truthmaker, it is natural to suppose, is the state of affairs of Beyonce being famous. This state of affairs is a structured entity, involving as constituents a particular thing, Beyonce, and a property, fame, connected in a specially intimate way ('instantiation' or 'exemplification'). Although intimately connected in this state of affairs, the two constituents can come apart and combine with other entities to compose different states of affairs. Consider the following truth: (T2) Beyonce is two-legged. Its truthmaker appears to be the state of affairs comprised of the particular Beyonce and the property of two-leggedness (intimately connected). It is the same Beyonce from the truthmaker of T1 but intimately connected to a different property. Or consider the following truth: (T3) Chalmers is famous. Here the truthmaker appears to be the state of affairs comprised of Chalmers and fame, again intimately connected. Thus the selfsame fame appears to be a constituent of two different states of affairs. Following Armstrong (1978), most contemporary ontologists would prefer theorizing it 9 Moreover, the argument is clearly accompanied by two further arguments (Brentano 1930: 108) which are supposed to address the same stage in the dialectic. It is true, however, that several letters to Kraus from the same period highlight the argument from univocality. The univocality argument appears most prominently in an essay dictated by Brentano toward the end of his life (Ibid.). THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 5 as an Aristotelian in re universal rather than a Platonic ante rem universal, but still as a universal.10 This kind of ontology, admitting not only particular things but also (in re) universals and states of affairs, has become quite popular over the past three decades. Truthmaker considerations have been essential in the case for it (see Armstrong 1997, 2004). Thus strict nominalism has been strongly undermined by what we may call the truthmaker challenge: the challenge of identifying truthmakers for such truths as T1–T3 featuring concrete particulars exclusively. What strategies are available to the strict nominalist in trying to meet the truthmaker challenge? In the modern literature, two broad strategies can be discerned; we may call them ostrich nominalism and paraphrase nominalism. * * * According to ostrich nominalism (Devitt 1980), in a standard subject-predicate sentence only the subject term is ontologically committing; predicates are not. (This is supposed to fall directly out of the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment: to be is to be the value of a variable, that is, something we quantify over.11) Consequently, the truth of T1 and T2 does not require positing anything beyond Beyonce, and the truth of T3 anything beyond Chalmers. There is no need to posit further entities, such as fame, which would be shared by Beyonce and Chalmers (nor states of affairs that have these further entities as constituents). It is not immediately clear how the ostrich nominalist proposes to address the truthmaker challenge. She might claim either (a) that truths such as T1 do not require truthmakers, or (b) that they have concrete particulars such as Beyonce as truthmakers. The problem is that both are highly problematic. Consider first (a). It has sometimes been claimed that certain special truths-notably negative existentials-require no truthmakers. For example, 'There are no dragons' is true but nothing makes it true.12 It is much harder, 10 An in re universal is an immanent universal that inheres in the particulars that instantiate it. What makes it a universal, then, is not the fact that it is 'outside spacetime' (as an ante rem, transcendent universal does), but the fact that it is fully present at different places at the same time. My green car is fully present in a single place at a time; the state of Hawaii is present in different places (different islands) at the same time, but is only partially present in each distinct place; the in re universal Greenness, by contrast, is present at the same time in all places occupied by green things, and moreover is fully present in each such place. 11 See Quine 1949. 12 See Mulligan et al. 1984, Simons 2000, 2008, and Lewis 2001. A friend of states of affairs or facts might posit 'absence facts,' such as the fact that there are no dragons. It would then be the presence of an absence that makes true truths of the form 'there are no Fs.' But many ontologists understandably find it distasteful to posit presences of absences as genuine chunks of the world. 6 URIAH KRIEGEL however, to accept that such positive truths as T1–T3 have no truthmakers. 13 For that would mean that the truth of even the simplest positive truths is inexplicable, brute, and groundless. On this view, we are to smile on T1 and frown on ~T1, but there is no reason why; some sequences of symbols are true and some are false, and nothing explains why the ones are favored and the other disfavored. This is hard to believe. Consider next (b): the view that T1 is made true by Beyonce herself. This is triply problematic. First, it is unclear why Beyonce's existence, on its own, makes true 'Beyonce is famous' rather than 'Beyonce is unfamous'-the subject term is the same in both sentences, after all. Secondly, when presented with a truthmaker, one expects to be able to infer a truth. Presented with rain, I can infer that 'It rains' is true. Likewise, when presented with Beyonce, I can infer that 'Beyonce exists' is true. However, I cannot infer that 'Beyonce is famous' is true. Thirdly, (b) has the untoward consequence that T1, T2, and all other Beyonce truths have the same truthmaker. Let me expand somewhat on the last problem. It has sometimes been held that different truths can have the same truthmaker, in particular when one is more fundamental than the other. For example, 'Beyonce is famous' and 'Beyonce is famous or eight-foot-tall' are both made true by Beyonce's being famous; 'Beyonce is a homo sapiens' and 'Beyonce is a mammal' are both made true by Beyonce being a homo sapiens; and so on. Arguably, however, atomic truths at the fundamental level should each have its own distinct truthmaker.14 Consider three truths about Tony the lepton: 'Tony has mass m,' 'Tony has electric charge C,' and 'Tony exists.' It is implausible to hold that all these truths about Tony have the same truthmaker. After all, they say different things about the world, so we should expect different aspects of the world to make them true. One way to think of this is in terms of the connection between a statement's truthmaker and its truth-conditional content. To a first approximation, and at least as restricted to fundamental truths, one would expect the following connection: if entity E is the truthmaker of (true) statement T, then T's truth-condition is the condition that E exist. Insofar as T's content or meaning is captured by its truth-condition, 13 An atomic truth is a truth no part of which is a truth. Some might object that truths such as T1 are not all that simple, since the property of being famous is rather complex. But this is a distracting feature of the example, which we could replace with a truth about some particle P having mass M. 14 It is a separate question how to best characterize the ideas of one truth being more fundamental than another and of a truth to being fundamental tout court (that is, have no other truth more fundamental than it). This issue is actively debated in current ontology-see Williams 2010 for recent discussion. Here I will assume that even if we do not yet have any consensus on the nature of fundamentality, typically we know it when we see it. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 7 then, T's content is given by the condition that E exist. Likewise, at least as restricted to atomic fundamental truths without co-referential terms, when T1 and T2 have different contents, they have different truth-conditions. That is, there are different entities E1 and E2, such that E1's existence is T1's truth-condition and E2's existence is T2's truth-condition. Therefore, E1 should be T1's truthmaker and E2 should be T2's. Thus we should expect T1 and T2 to have different truthmakers * * * Most nominalists have adopted a more flexible strategy with respect to truthmakers, whereby truths such as T1 are paraphrased into statements whose ostensible truthmakers are comprised entirely of concrete particulars. Perhaps the best-known version of this is class nominalism (see Lewis 1983). Call the class of all famous things 'Jimmy.' Then T1 can be paraphrased into: (P1) Beyonce is a member of Jimmy. What this means is that T1's truthmaker consists in Beyonce's membership in the set of all famous concrete particulars.15 Another version of this strategy is mereological nominalism (see Quine 1950). Call the mereological fusion of all famous concrete particulars 'Johnny.' Then T1 can be paraphrased into: (P2) Beyonce is a part of Johnny. A third version is resemblance nominalism (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2002). Consider Chalmers, Obama, the Eiffel Tower, and every other famous concrete particular. According to this view, the truthmaker of T1 is just Beyonce's resemblance to all these things. That is, T1 can be paraphrased into: (P3) Beyonce resembles Chalmers, Obama, the Eiffel Tower, . . . The full sentence here would have to be closed with the complete list of metaphysical celebrities. The basic idea is to invert the intuitive direction of constitution between Beyonce's fame and her resemblance to other famous things: it is not that she resembles them because she too is famous, but rather she is famous precisely because she resembles them. Much of the current debate over what I have called strict nominalism concerns the question of whether any of these versions can provide the 15 To make the example more precise, we might replace reference to the property of being famous with reference to a much more precise property, such as being heard of by 55% of humans over the age of 6. 8 URIAH KRIEGEL requisite truthmakers without smuggling in universals or abstracta. For example, it is sometimes claimed that P1–P3 appear to invoke not only concrete particulars, but also some illicit relation between them: P1 invokes a membership relation, P2 a parthood relation, and P3 a resemblance relation.16 Proponents of class, mereological, and resemblance nominalism, meanwhile, attempt to show either that the invocation of the relevant relation is merely apparent or that it is real but innocuous. For example, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2002: 115) develops a form of resemblance nominalism that posits resemblers without resemblance relations among them. It would nonetheless be nice if we could devise a version of nominalism that offered different truthmakers for different fundamental truths without even appearing to invoke illicit relations. This is where Brentano's work becomes interesting: his reism is combined with an original and surprising account of the contents of sentences and judgments that provides a fourth paraphrase strategy for nominalism. 3. Brentano's Reistic Paraphrases Sentences such as T1 lend themselves to state-of-affairs truthmakers mainly because of their subject-predicate structure: it is natural to think that the subject term refers to a concrete particular, the predicate term to a universal, and the copula to the intimate connection between them. According to Brentano, however, the subject-predicate structure is an accidental feature of public-language sentences. Ultimately, sentences derive their meaning from the mental states they express. In particular, indicative sentences derive their meaning from judgments. But crucially, judgments do not have a subjectpredicate structure. They do not involve predication at all. Brentano's case for this proceeds by showing that all four types of categorical proposition in Aristotle's square of opposition can be 'transformed' into existential propositions (Brentano 1874 II Chap. 7): (A) 'Every singer is famous' can be transformed into 'There is not a non-famous singer.' (E) 'No singer is famous' can be transformed into 'There is not a famous singer.' 16 On the face of it, these relations would appear to be universals, fully present in different places at the same time. For example, the membership relation holds not only between Beyonce and Jimmy, but also between Chalmers and Jimmy, Obama and Jimmy, and so on. Similarly for the parthood relation. As for the resemblance relation, it holds not only among all famous things, but also among all two-legged things, all long-haired things, and so on. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 9 (I) 'Some singers are famous' can be transformed into 'There is a famous singer.' (O) 'Some singer is not famous' can be transformed into 'There is a non-famous singer.' These categorical propositions are the atomic propositions in Aristotelian logic; hypothetical propositions are molecular but can also be paraphrased into existentials: 'If a singer is famous, then she is rich' can be paraphrased into 'There is not a non-rich famous singer' (see Brentano 1874: 218, 1911: 299).17 Brentano does not explicitly consider how to paraphrase particularized propositions, such as expressed by T1, whose apparent form is <a is F>. But it is clear from some of his remarks in other contexts that he treats them as having the (I) form.18 If so, T1 would be paraphrased into: (P4) There is a famous Beyonce. Some other renderings may be more expressive: 'There is a famous Beyoncething,' 'There is a famous Beyoncesque concrete particular,' or some such.19 But the point is that Brentano's paraphrase offers an alternative to the standard modern nominalist paraphrases P1–P3. Given that for Brentano every categorical is paraphraseable into an existential, this sort of paraphrase is available for every indicative with a subject-predicate surface structure.20 17 Brentano writes: 'The proposition, "If a man behaves badly, he harms himself," is a hypothetical proposition. As far as its meaning is concerned, it is the same as the categorical proposition, "All men who behave badly harm themselves." And this, in turn, has no other meaning than that of the existential proposition, "A man who behaves badly and not harm himself does not exist," or to use a more felicitous expression, "There is no such thing as a man who behaves badly and does not harm himself."' (1874: 218) Presumably, this applies not only to the conditionals Brentano considers, but also to other truth-functional composites of atomic propositions. Chisholm (1976) works this out in some detail, though not unproblematically. 18 See, e.g., Brentano's (1982 Chap. 2) discussion of mereological relations among colored spots in lectures from around 1890. 19 As for relational particularized statements, such as 'John loves Mary,' they would presumably have to be paraphrased into 'There is a Marry-loving John(-thing).' Identity statements such as 'John is identical to John' would be paraphrased into the likes of 'There is a self-identical John' or 'There is a John-identical John,' while informative identity statements, such as 'Tully is Cicero,' would be paraphrased into the likes of 'There is a Cicero-identical Tully.' 20 Brentano states his commitment to this explicitly in his conclusion of the discussion of the apparently predicative structure of judgment: 'The reducibility of all categorical propositions, indeed the reducibility of all propositions which express a judgment, to existential propositions, is therefore indubitable' (Brentano 1874: 218; my italics). 10 URIAH KRIEGEL The real question is how exactly to understand the paraphrase-a question we will return to shortly.21 If all atomic judgments have existential content of the form 'There is an A,' then to a first approximation, their truthmakers always consist in the existence of some sort of concrete particular (an A). Thus, once T1 is paraphrased into P4, we can appreciate that its truthmaker is simply the existence of a famous Beyonce. Here famous-Beyonce is a concrete particular, so the truthmaker of T1 can be seen to require nothing more than the existence of some concrete particular. No illicit relation even appears prima facie to be involved.22 Furthermore, it is clear why this concrete particular makes true T1 and not ~T1. The latter would be made true by the existence of an unfamous-Beyonce, not a famous-Beyonce. Moreover, T1's is a different truthmaker from T2's: the latter's is two-legged-Beyonce, which is a concrete particular numerically distinct from both Beyonce and famousBeyonce (more on this in §4). It is true, at the same time, that Brentano's reism posits many more concrete particulars than we are accustomed to recognizing: in addition to Beyonce, it posits famous-Beyonce, two-leggedBeyonce, long-haired-Beyonce, and so on. We will consider this apparent liability in §5. The question that arises immediately is of course this: What kind of entity is famous-Beyonce, and how is it related to Beyonce (and to twolegged-Beyonce)? I address this question in the next section. 4. Substance and Accident in Brentano's Ontology Brentano (1933) makes some very puzzling remarks on such relationships as between Beyonce and famous-Beyonce: that (a) Beyonce is a substance while famous-Beyonce is an accident, but (b) both are things,23 and (c) Beyonce is proper part of famous-Beyonce,24 though (d) an 21 Another question, which I bracket here, is how plausible Brentano's view that all judgments are existential is. 22 Brentano (1933) does maintain that in addition to such concrete particulars as Beyonce and Chalmers, there are also their parts and certain fusions of them. It does not follow, however, that there also exist parthood relation between them-though Brentano certainly expresses himself carelessly in this regard in many texts. (It should be remembered, at the same time, that these texts were not prepared for publication, but were mostly lecture notes.) 23 In particular, the accident is a thing, a concrete particular (see Brentano 1933: 19, 22, 47–8). Thus 'accident and substance are things in the same sense' (1933: 48). 24 Brentano's mereological account of the substance/accident distinction, casting the substance as a proper part of its accident, is developed most focally in an undated dictation entitled 'Derivation of the concept of a Substance' (Brentano 1933: 111–5). Since it is a dictation, we can know that it dates from the last ten years of Brentano's life (1907–17), when Brentano was already blind. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 11 unsupplemented proper part.25 (How) can we make sense of these claims? In this section, I present a model of the relationship between Beyonce and famous-Beyonce that illuminates these claims (and their motivation). The first part of the section expounds the model, the second part shows how it illuminates the four puzzling claims. * * * It is clear that on Brentano's view, entities such as famous-Beyonce are things in the very same sense in which Beyonce is a thing. This means that famous-Beyonce is a fully determinate concrete particular: one that has two legs, long curly hair, is a singer, is from Houston, has a daughter named Blue Ivy, and so on.26 It, or rather she, extends in all three spatial dimensions, just as Beyonce does. In these respects, famous-Beyonce is very unlike a trope or abstract particular such as Beyonce's-fame: the former is something you can bump into, the latter is not; the former has two legs and long hair, the latter is legless and hairless. Speaking carelessly for the sake of exposition, we might say that famous-Beyonce has all the same properties as Beyonce. This is doubly careless. First, for the reist, strictly speaking there are no properties, since there are only things. So any claim about properties must be understood metaphorically or fictionalistically (as in: 'in the fiction of properties, famous-Beyonce has the same properties as Beyonce'), as a ladder to be thrown after its use. Secondly and more importantly, even within the property fiction, it would be inaccurate to say that Beyonce and famous-Beyonce share all their properties. Rather, Beyonce and famous-Beyonce share all their non-modal and non-temporal properties, but differ in their modal and temporal properties. Thus, Beyonce has the property of being possiblyunfamous, whereas famous-Beyonce does not. Likewise, Beyonce has the property of existing in 1986, whereas famous-Beyonce does not. But for any non-modal, non-temporal property F, Beyonce has it iff famousBeyonce does. (The reason for excepting modal and temporal properties is 25 An unsupplemented part is one that has no other part to supplement it and make up the whole. There is no question that this is something Brentano is committed to: 'How, then, is this differentiation [of a whole from its logical part] occurs? One is supposed to say: by adding a second logical part. But this is not the case. When we compare "red thing" and "colored thing" we find that the latter is contained in the former, but we cannot specify a second thing that could be added to the first as an entirely new element.' (Brentano 1933: 112) This unsupplemented parthood characterizes the relationship between substance and accident: 'Every accident contains its substance as a part, but the accident is not itself a second, wholly different part that is added to the substance' (Brentano 1933: 19; see also 1933: 47, 115). 26 Brentano writes: 'Everything that is, is fully determinate, but we often conceive of a thing without conceiving it in all its determinations' (Brentano 1933: 22). This is precisely why 'accident and substance are things in the same sense' (1933: 48). 12 URIAH KRIEGEL that they interact with the identity and existence conditions of their bearers in a way other properties generally do not. We can see this from the way identity talk often leads to talk of identity across worlds and across times.) Suppose for the sake of exposition that the essential properties of people are their biological origins (Kripke 1972). What, on this view, are Beyonce's essential properties? Call the relevant sperm Mathew and the relevant egg Tina. Then Beyonce's only essential properties are (i) originating-from-Mathew and (ii) originating-from-Tina. Beyonce could not fail to have these properties without failing to be altogether. Now, Beyonce also has the property of being famous, but she has it accidentally: she could become utterly unknown without ceasing to exist. On the model I want to propose, this is the crucial difference between Beyonce and famous-Beyonce in Brentano's ontology. Unlike Beyonce, famous-Beyonce could not cease to be famous without ceasing altogether. So famous-Beyonce has three essential properties: (i) originating-from-Mathew, (ii) originatingfrom-Tina, and (iii) being famous. Now, it may well be that biological origins are not essential to human beings, contrary to Kripke. Perhaps some other property F is, such that F determines Beyonce's identity and persistence conditions. We would then say that, on Brentano's view, Beyonce's essential property is being F, whereas famous-Beyonce's essential properties are (i) being F and (ii) being famous; two-legged-Beyonce's essential properties are (i) being F and (ii) being two-legged; famous-two-legged-Beyonce's essential properties are (i) being F, (ii) being famous, and (iii) being two-legged; and so on. I will continue to conduct the discussion assuming the essentiality of origins, but do so merely for ease of exposition. On this way of understanding the relation between Beyonce and famousBeyonce, the two are simply coincident objects, somewhat as the statue and the clay are often claimed to be.27 A minority of philosophers holds that the statue and the lump of clay are numerically identical; this is 'one-thingism.' But most philosophers are 'two-thingists,' holding that the statue and the clay happen to be collocated but are nonetheless distinct entities. Typically, this is motivated precisely by citing differences in modal (or temporal) properties: the statue could not (or did not) survive shuttering to pieces, but the clay could (or did) (see Baker 1997). My suggestion is that we understand Brentano's view on substance and accident on the model of the statue and the clay. Call this the coincidence model. In a way, Brentano's reism can be seen as a sort of 'many-thingism' 27 What is coincidence? When the coincident concrete particulars are material, this coincidence amounts to collocation. But the notion of coincidence must be wider than that of collocation: in Brentano's ontology, there are also a-spatial concrete particulars-mental substances-and those would coincide, but would not be collocated, with their mental accidents. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 13 that posits a great multitude of coinciding concrete particulars. It recognizes not only the statue and the clay, but also the shapely-statue, the beige-statue, the hard-clay, and so on. Still speaking metaphorically, or within the property fiction, we may say that these many things coincide and have the same non-modal and non-temporal properties, but differ in their modal and temporal ones. To repeat, this talk of difference in properties is metaphorical (or fictionalistic) in the coincidence model. For Brentano, strictly speaking there are no properties. Literally, then, Beyonce and famous-Beyonce are simply brutely numerically different things.28 Ultimately, there is nothing in virtue of which they are different, nothing that accounts for their difference. More generally, Brentano takes the individuation of things as an inexplicable primitive: things are just different, nothing makes them different. This may seem initially puzzling, but of course every ontology must take something as primitive. For each candidate 'something,' we naturally prefer some metaphysical explanation over primitivism. Yet we cannot give a metaphysical explanation for all of them. Somewhere in our ontology we must accept a primitive. Brentano's primitive is the individuation of concrete particulars-they are primitively different, without anything making them different. Upon reflection, the identity and difference of concrete particulars is a perfectly reasonable spot to go primitivist. For it may well be independently plausible. It is commonly thought that properties are not powerful enough to individuate particulars: there could be a world with relativistic space in which there is nothing but two qualitatively indistinguishable spheres floating about (Black 1952). This has motivated some to posit haecceities to account for the individuation of particulars. But it is hard to see what this buys us. The idea is that John and Mary are different because (i) John'shaecceity and Mary's-haecceity are different and (ii) the difference between John's-haecceity and Mary's-haecceity is brute and inexplicable. But how is this better than saying simply that (iii) the difference between John and Mary is brute and inexplicable? Brute individuation of haecceities is no less brutal than brute individuation of concrete particulars. Given that we have no independent handle on what haecceities actually are, introducing them into our ontology appears entirely epidialectic.29 Thus brute individuation of concrete particulars may well be independently plausible (see also Hazlett 2010). But even if it were not so plausible, and represented a cost, it would 28 We can speak literally only if we use a fictionality operator, saying something like this: in the fiction of properties, Beyonce and famous-Beyonce have different modal or temporal properties; they share properties F1,. . ., Fn, but while in Beyonce Fi,. . ., Fk are essential and the rest are accidental, in famous-Beyonce Fi,. . ., Fk plus Fm are essential and the rest are accidental. 29 This is probably why Brentano unequivocally rejects 'the wholly imaginary fiction of an haecceity' (Brentano 1933: 112). 14 URIAH KRIEGEL not be a pointless cost. For it buys us a fourth option for a strictly nominalist ontology.30 It might be objected that the analogy with the statue/clay case is too weak to render intelligible the present interpretation of Brentano's reism. In the statue/clay case, there is an asymmetry between the two things, insofar as the clay constitutes the statue (but the statue does not constitute the clay). Coincidence is a symmetric relation, observes the objector, but we can make sense of it only in conjunction with the asymmetric relation of constitution. There are no cases of coincidence without constitution. In contrast, Brentano's reism involves many coincident things with no asymmetric relation between them: famous-Beyonce, two-legged-Beyonce, long-hairedBeyonce, and so on are all on a par, with no constitution relations obtaining among them. My response is twofold. First, coincidence without constitution is nowise excluded by the statue/clay case. Suppose Sculp and Tor are sculptors commissioned by City Hall to collaborate on a new clay statue for the city square. Through a misunderstanding, Sculp is under the impression that they are to sculpt a duck, while Tor is under the impression that they are to sculpt a rabbit. Improbably, the misunderstanding is never discovered, and their collaboration results in a duck-rabbit contraption. On the reasonable assumption that sculpture individuation is sensitive to sculptor intentions, it is not implausible to hold that the city square ends up hosting three coincident objects: the clay, the duck sculpture, and the rabbit sculpture. Although the clay asymmetrically constitutes both the duck sculpture and the rabbit sculpture, the coincidence relation between the two sculptures is perfectly symmetric. At the very least, then, we can use the relationship between Sculp's and Tor's sculptures as a model for famous-Beyonce and two-legged-Beyonce. Admittedly, in this case both sculptures individually depend asymmetrically on a third item, in that neither could exist without the clay but the clay could exist without either. But we find this feature in Brentano's reism as well: famous-Beyonce, two-legged-Beyonce, long-haired-Beyonce, and the like all depend asymmetrically on Beyonce: none of the former could exist without the latter but the latter could exist without any of the former. It is for this reason, in fact, that Brentano considers Beyonce a substance and famous-Beyonce, two-legged-Beyonce, and long-haired-Beyonce accidents. 30 Arguably, this cost is not special to Brentano's reism, but must be accrued by any ontology that buys us a strictly nominalist ontology without illicit relations and with distinct truthmakers for distinct fundamental truths. For if there are no illicit relations and properties posited, then we cannot appeal to such properties and relations to characterize concrete particulars and thereby account for their difference in terms of their different characteristics. It then becomes hard to see what else we could appeal to in order to explain their difference. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 15 * * * The coincidence model makes sense of Brentano's four puzzling claims. Start with Claim (a): Beyonce is a substance, famous-Beyonce an accident. The traditional notion of a substance is that of an entity enjoying independent existence; an accident is an entity whose existence depends on another's. To say that famous-Beyonce is an accident of Beyonce whereas Beyonce herself is a substance, then, is to say that famous-Beyonce's existence depends on Beyonce's whereas Beyonce's existence does not depend on anything else's. The first part of this falls out of the coincidence model straightforwardly. In the model, Beyonce and famous-Beyonce have all the same (non-modal, non-temporal) properties, but different subsets of these are essential. For Beyonce, the essential subset is S2: {originating-from-Mathew, originating-from-Tina}. For famous-Beyonce, it is S3: {originating-from-Mathew, originating-from-Tina, being famous}. Note that every member of S2 is also a member of S3, whereas not every member of S3 is a member of S2. It follows that there is a possible circumstance in which all members of S2 are co-instantiated but not all members of S3 are (namely, the circumstance in which Beyonce exists but is not famous), but no possible circumstance in which all members of S3 are co-instantiated but not all members of S2 are. 31 The instantiation of all S2's members is thus a precondition for the instantiation of all S3's members (but not vice versa). Within the coincidence model, this means that Beyonce's existence is a precondition for famous-Beyonce's (but not vice versa). That is, famous-Beyonce's existence depends on Beyonce's, which means that the former is an accident of the latter. More generally, we may say that for any concrete particulars x and y, x is an accident of y iff the set of y's essential properties is a proper subset of the set of x's essential properties.32 We may then say that x is a substance iff there is no y such that x is an accident of y. 31 I speak of set members being instantiated because the members in this case are properties. 32 This implies that two-legged-famous-Beyonce is an accident of famous-Beyonce, hence an accident of an accident, which may be thought implausible. However, it is hard to see in this implication a major liability for the view-upon reflection it is not all that surprising: just as ontologists are generally comfortable with higher-order properties (e.g., the property of being Jimmy's favorite property), they should be comfortable with higher-order accidents. In any case, Brentano explicitly accepts such higher-order accidents (see Brentano 1933: 49, 114). 16 URIAH KRIEGEL Since S3 is not a proper subset of S2, Beyonce is not an accident of famous-Beyonce. For Beyonce to be a substance, there would have to be no other thing Beyonce is an accident of. Now, one might claim that there clearly does exist proper subsets of S2, for example S1: {originating-from-Mathew}. This appears to imply that Beyonce, whose essential subset of properties is S2, is an accident of the thing whose essential subset is S1-call it 'Mathew-originating-Beyonce.' If Beyonce is an accident of Matheworiginating-Beyonce, then Beyonce is not a substance after all. One could defend Brentano here by claiming that S2 misrepresents the doctrine of the essentiality of origins, and should be replaced with S2*: {originating-from-Mathew&Tina}. The idea would be that while S1 is a proper subset of S2, it is not a proper subset of S2*. More deeply, however, we should remember that the essentiality of origins is not Brentano's view, but simply one we have used to illustrate how his nominalism works. Brentano's own view, as we saw above, is that things individuate brutely. There are no specific characteristics in virtue of which Beyonce is the thing she is; she is what she is and that is all there is to it. Thus, there is a difference between the truthmakers of the following two truths: (T4) Beyonce originates from Mathew and Tina. (T5) Beyonce exists. Only the truthmaker of T5 is Beyonce herself. At most, then, we could say that the essential subset of Beyonce's properties is S0: {Beyonce-ness}. 33 Clearly, S0 has no proper subset. Accordingly, there is no thing of which Beyonce is an accident. In other words, Beyonce is a substance. Consider next Claim (b): both Beyonce and famous-Beyonce are things. It might seem odd that Brentano should use the term 'accident' to describe concrete particulars, since traditionally accidents were thought of as properties. But if the crucial feature of accidents is that (unlike substances) they 33 In truth, we cannot even say this, if it is taken to suggest that for Brentano what makes Beyonce the thing she is is some individual nature or haecceity special to her. For as noted, Brentano rejects haecceities. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 17 are incapable of independent existence, it is perfectly reasonable within a reistic framework to consider concrete particulars incapable of independent existence to be accidents. Since famous-Beyonce's existence depends on other existents, it is an accident-despite being a concrete particular. Beyonce is a substance not simply because she is a concrete particular, but because she is a concrete particular whose existence depends on no other's. This appears to entitle Brentano to say that there is only one substance in one place at one time, thus respecting the old principle of the 'impenetrability' of substance.34 There may be many concrete particulars in the same place at the same time, but only one substance in a place at a time. Particularly perplexing is Brentano's claim that (c) Beyonce is a proper part of famous-Beyonce. More generally, for Brentano a substance is always a proper part of each of its accidents. This otherwise odd claim makes sense, however, in the coincidence model. Suppose again that Beyonce's essential properties are S2 and famous-Beyonce's are S3. Thinking of S2 and S3 as sets of properties, we said that the former is a proper subset of the latter. But if we think of S2 and S3 as sums of properties, we can say that the former is a proper part of the latter. Now, since in the reistic framework there are forsooth no properties, literally we can only speak directly of the objects, saying that Beyonce is (primitively) a proper part of famousBeyonce. But the metaphor or fiction of essential properties of coinciding objects helps us see why we should say this. Brentano's most perplexing claim is doubtless (d): although Beyonce is a proper part of famous-Beyonce, famous-Beyonce has no other part that supplements Beyonce. More generally, every substance is an unsupplemented proper part of each of its accidents. This is an extremely bizarre claim. Given that the table-leg is only a proper part of the table, we can be certain that the table has some other part that supplements the leg, that 'makes the table whole' so to speak. But Brentano insists this is not the case with Beyonce and famous-Beyonce: the latter has no other part but the former. It is natural to dismiss this as straightforwardly incoherent (Simons 2006: 92); it certainly contravenes classical mereology's axiom of supplementation (if x is a proper part of y, then there is a z, such that z is part of y and z does not overlap x). However, although there may be better ways to put it, the idea is not unmotivated, and the coincidence model can help us see why. Let us continue to indulge the supposition that in Beyonce's location there is one thing whose essence is originating-from-Mathew&Tina and a second thing whose essence is originating-from-Mathew&Tina + being-famous. For there to be something that supplements the first thing and makes whole the second thing, there would have to exist, in the same location, also a thing 34 Brentano is clearly sympathetic to the impenetrability principle (see Brentano 1933: 154). 18 URIAH KRIEGEL whose essence is just being-famous. This would be a thing with all the same (non-modal, non-temporal) properties as Beyonce, but whose only essential property is being famous-call it 'The Famous.' If The Famous existed, then it could supplement Beyonce and make whole famous-Beyonce. But Brentano evidently thinks there simply is no such thing as The Famous. And for good reason: The Famous would have to reappear elsewhere to make up the difference between Chalmers and famous-Chalmers, at which point The Famous no longer looks like an irrepeatable concrete particular.35 Furthermore, The Famous would have to be something that can change every property but its fame; it could in principle be a famous singer one moment, a famous rock the next, and a famous concept the moment after-an odd entity to welcome into one's ontology. The upshot is that since The Famous does not exist, it cannot supplement Beyonce and 'make up the difference' with famous-Beyonce. Accordingly, Beyonce is an unsupplemented proper part of famous-Beyonce.36 The coincidence model helps us see, then, how Brentano ends up with unsupplemented parts. His terminological choice may have been infelicitous. Chisholm, in an exemplary exercise of interpretive charity, tries to defend him by suggesting that he simply 'takes the term "part" somewhat more widely than it is ordinarily taken' (Chisholm 1978: 202). Nonetheless, it might be wiser to devise a new term for the wider relation ('dependence' would not be bad!) and reserve the term 'parthood' for the relation that obeys the axiom of supplementation.37 5. Objections and Replies In this final section, I consider a variety of objections to Brentano's reism, in the hope of showing that it is truly a viable fourth option for truthmaker nominalism. The first objection to consider is that Brentano's reism is unacceptably counterintuitive: it contravenes the intuitions that (i) it is rare to have more than one concrete particular in one place at one time and that (ii) there are entities shared among different concrete particulars-universals. However, 35 Brentano makes this point in the following passage: 'Suppose an atom were capable of thinking: then the thinking atom would be a while which, if the atom ceased to think, would be reduced to one of its parts. But one could not at all say that its thinking could be preserved if the atom ceased to exist. . .If another atom were to think the same thing, it would differ from the first not only qua atom but also qua thinking thing; as thinking thing it would be individuated by the individuality of the atom' (Brentano 1933: 115). 36 As before, all this property and essence talk must be understood metaphorically or fictionalistically. 37 This would involve giving up on the mereological construal of dependence, but that does not seem so much worse than keeping the mereological construal at the price of changing the meaning of 'part.' THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 19 Brentano can readily explain away these conflicts with intuition. First, the intuitive pull of (i) is largely inherited from the principle of impenetrability, which is frequently and mistakenly conjoined with the idea that only substances are concrete particulars (itself a philosophical dogma rather than a folk intuition). Once we reject this second idea, we see that the principle of impenetrability can be respected without commitment to (i). Furthermore, Brentano is not alone in feeling the need to posit such curious coincident particulars as famous-Beyonce and two-legged-Beyonce; he fits squarely in an Aristotelian tradition stretching from Aristotle's own discussion of the relationship between the man and the musical man (in Physics I.7) to Kit Fine's more recent discussion of 'qua objects' (Fine 1982) such as the manqua-musical and Beyonce-qua-famous. Meanwhile, the explanation for (ii) is that although the psychological reality of judgments is such that they are all existential, public-language sentences have a subject-predicate surface grammar that misleads us into parsing the world into entities that correspond to subject terms and entities that correspond to predicates (namely, universals).38 Once we realize the real structure of judgments, and tailor our ontology to provide truthmakers to them (rather than to public-language sentences), the pull to universals ought to dissipate. It may be objected that positing so many things in Beyonce's spacetime is not only unintuitive but also egregiously unparsimonious. There might well be infinitely many Beyonce truths, in which case Brentano would have to posit infinitely many concrete particulars sharing Beyonce's spacetime-a crowded ontology indeed. However, Brentano's ontology cannot be worse off here than the currently popular 'Armstrongian' ontology discussed in §2. After all, that ontology faces just as many truths, to which it too wishes to provide truthmakers. It is just that its truthmakers tend to be states of affairs rather than concrete particulars. Still, they are ontological posits/entities/quantifiabilia/ontoids all the same.39 Admittedly, Armstrong (2004: 10) makes a number of moves that allow for economy in truthmakers, mostly using his 'entailment principle': if E makes true p, and p entails q, then E makes true q. However, nothing prevents Brentano from adopting the entailment principle (but with E ranging over concrete particulars rather than states of affairs), and accordingly incorporating parallel economies in his reism. Just as Armstrong rejects the state of affairs of Beyonce-being-famous-or-eight-foot-tall and lets Beyonce38 On the misleading structure of language, see Brentano 1930: 71–3 (a fragment from 1905). 39 To regard an ontology as more extravagant only because its posits are concrete particulars rather than states of affairs would be to regard concrete particulars as somehow 'more real' than states of affairs. But even if we could make sense of the expression 'more real,' it would be quite ironic for the opponent of nominalism to rely on the greater reality of concrete particulars! 20 URIAH KRIEGEL being-famous make true 'Beyonce is famous or eight foot tall,' Brentano could reject the concrete particular famous-or-eight-foot-tall-Beyonce and let famous-Beyonce make true 'Beyonce is famous or eight foot tall.'40 By adopting Armstrong's entailment principle, Brentano can guarantee his reism will be just as economical as Armstrong's ontology. The only difference, to repeat, is that it appeals to unusual concrete particulars to do a job that Armstrong assigns to states of affairs.41 The Armstrongian ontology may in fact be at a disadvantage in this area. For although it posits the exact same number of token entities as Brentano's, in the process it invokes a greater number of types of entity. It posits not only concrete particulars but also states of affairs, as well as such constituents of states of affairs as properties and relations (construed as universals).42 By contrast, reism posits only concrete particulars. So however it scores on token-parsimony, reism certainly outscores the Armstrongian ontology on type-parsimony. This is especially significant if, as some philosophers have argued (Lewis 1973), only type-parsimony matters in philosophy. On this view, two ontologists can sensibly argue over whether there are ducks or only particles arranged duck-wise, but how many token ducks there are is the zoologist's rather than ontologist's business. (It is not a virtue of an ontological theory that it posits 173 ducks rather than a million.) If this is right, then reism's commitment to a great number of concrete particulars does not inflate its ontology in a relevant way.43 It may be objected that Brentano's reism involves other ontological extravagances. Most notably, Brentano admits into his late ontology not 40 More generally, Brentano could shun 'disjunctive things' just as Armstrong shuns disjunctive stats of affairs. Importantly, if reism does not posit disjunctive things, it becomes rather unlikely that it would have to posit infinitely many things where Beyonce is. 41 In fact, Brentano presents an explosion argument against state-of-affairs ontologies (Brentano 1930: 108). If in addition to such concrete particulars as Beyonce, there are also such states of affairs as Beyonce's-existence, says Brentano, then it is unclear why there should not also be such states of affairs as Beyonce's-existence's-existence, Beyonce's-existence's-existence's-existence, and so forth. 42 This consideration will bear only against any state-of-affairs ontology that takes states of affairs to be structured entities involving things, properties, and relations as constituents. This is of course the commonsensical and traditional picture, but there are also views that treat states of affairs as simple and unstructured, and that on the contrary attempt to assay things, properties, and relations in terms of certain collections of states of affairs (see Skyrms 1981). Such a 'primitivist' state-of-affairs ontology would not be at a typeparsimony disadvantage relative to reism. 43 Personally, I am somewhat skeptical of Lewis' view here. It seems to me that reism's proliferation of concrete particulars, though limited to one type of entity, is nonetheless driven by philosophical rather than empirical considerations, and therefore is very much the philosopher's business (see Nolan 1997). However, it is still worth noting that if one holds the view that only type-parsimony matters, this certainly casts reism as greatly superior to its more traditional competitor. THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 21 only substances and accidents (as two kinds of concrete particular), but also every plurality (Mehrheit) of substances and every part of a substance (see Brentano 1933: 19). However, it is clear that none of these ontological 'additions' is needed to meet the truthmaker challenge. To that extent, they seem 'optional.' Given Brentano's concern for parsimony, and given that these pluralities and parts do not seem to render any explanatory services to him, one might wonder why he did make room for them in his ontology. And one suspects the answer is that he considered them, in today's jargon, an 'ontological free lunch.' They are, in Armstrong's (1997: 12) apt phrase, 'no addition of being.' On this line of thought, the only beings in Brentano's ontology that 'cost something' are the substances and accidents-both concrete particulars. The rest 'comes for free.'44 * * * If there are harmful objections to Brentano's reism, then, they probably target the specifics of the theory rather than general issues of intuitiveness and parsimony. One such objection might be that Brentano's paraphrases fail to get rid of states of affairs. Even if we paraphrase T1 into P4, and hold that what makes 'Beyonce is famous' true is simply the existence of famous-Beyonce, that famous-Beyonce exists is a state of affairs in its own right. It is a fact that famous-Beyonce exists, just as it is a fact that Beyonce does. After all, the judgment that famous-Beyonce exists is a propositional attitude, whose truthmaker is the Russellian proposition, or state of affairs, that famous-Beyonce exists. We may distinguish between predicative and existential states of affairs, and note that paraphrasing T1 into P4 moves us from the former to the latter as our ostensible truthmaker, but it is not enough to rid us of states of affairs altogether. However, Brentano clearly rejects this view of existentials' truthmakers, holding that T1 and P4 are made true not by the existence of famous-Beyonce, but famous-Beyonce herself. Brentano is explicit on this, writing in a 1906 letter to Marty that 'the being of A need not be produced in order for the judgment "A is" to be. . .correct; all that is needed is A' (Brentano 1930: 85). That is, it is concrete particulars themselves, rather than some states of affairs or facts regarding their existence, that make true existential judgments. In a 44 A more friendly objector might suggest that Brentano missed out on a potential economy. Once we have in place famous-Beyonce, two-legged-Beyonce, long-haired-Beyonce, and so on, it is unclear why we need to admit Beyonce in addition: the former could collectively make true 'There is a Beyonce.' The result would be a sort of 'reductive reism,' whereby Beyonce is nothing but the collection of all Fi-Beyonces. In response, I only wish to say that I am open to the possibility that this would indeed be a reistic improvement on Brentano's ontology. 22 URIAH KRIEGEL slogan: The truthmakers of existentials are not existences but existents. To support this position, Brentano argues that existential judgments are in fact not propositional attitudes. They are objectual attitudes in the sense in which loving x and liking y are often claimed to be. While it is true that existential judgments involve mental commitment to the existence of something, for Brentano this commitment is not part of the judgment's content; it is an aspect of its attitude.45 We may put this by saying that a judgment accepting the existence of a does not represent a-as-existent, but instead represents-as-existent a.46 The existence-commitment is a modification of the manner in which the judgment does its representing. It is not part of what the judgment represents, but of how it represents.47 Accordingly, when we judge that famous-Beyonce exists, the psychological reality of our mental act is again not as plain as the surface grammar of the corresponding report suggests. Rather, the psychological reality is this: the judgment's content is exhausted by famous-Beyonce; the commitment to her existence comes in only at the level of attitude. Since the judgment's content is exhausted by famous-Beyonce, famous-Beyonce constitutes its entire truthmaker. There is no need to posit a state of affairs of famous-Beyonce-existing. Importantly, it is only at this late stage of the dialectic that Brentano adduces his aforementioned argument from the univocality of 'something.' The burden of the argument is to show that existential judgments are directed at something in the same sense in which objectual attitudes such as loving and liking are directed at something. Thus it is inaccurate to represent Brentano as expecting that argument to carry the burden of proving reism. It carries a much more limited burden: to prove that once the existential paraphrases are available for truths in need of truthmakers, it is the thing itself that functions as their truthmaker, not the (fact of the) thing's existence.48 45 In more Brentanian terminology: it is not an aspect of the object of consciousness, but of the mode of consciousness (1973a: 201). 46 Meanwhile, a judgment rejecting the existence of a represents-as-nonexistent a. 47 What motivates this to Brentano, among other things, is his conviction that existence is not an attribute (1874: 229). Since existence is not an attribute, (true) existentials cannot be understood as attributing existence to something: if things do not have such an attribute, any judgment which attributed it to them would be erroneous. Therefore, existence cannot be part of the judgment's content. 48 We can appreciate this by noting that the opening paragraph of the 1914 essay in which the argument appears sets the essay's agenda precisely in terms of the threat of existential states of affairs supplanting things as truthmakers: 'There are even those who would say that, if a certain thing does not exist, then there is the non-being of that thing, and that, if a certain thing does exist, then there is, not only the thing, but also the being of the thing, as well as the being of the being of the thing. (Brentano 1930: 107) This impression is reinforced by considering Brentano's statement of his argumentation's conclusion in Paragraph 8 of the essay, which opens as follows: 'Strictly speaking, then, it is obvious that there is no thought of the being of A. We think only of the A itself' (Ibid.: 109). THOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 23 Another objection might target Brentano's account of the substance/accident distinction in terms of unilateral dependence.49 Consider the following two truths: (T5) Beyonce exists. (T6) Beyonce is spatially extended. Presumably, T5 is made true by Beyonce, whereas T6 is made true by extended-Beyonce. Within the reistic framework, it is plausible to consider Beyonce and extended-Beyonce two numerically distinct things. It is also plausible, now, that Beyonce cannot exist without extended-Beyonce existing (she is incapable of disembodied, extensionless existence).50 To that extent, Beyonce's existence depends on extended-Beyonce's. If so, Beyonce is not a substance after all, since her existence depends on something else's. The same reasoning can be repeated with obviously fundamental truths, such as 'Tony the lepton exists' and 'Tony the lepton has mass.' Presumably, Tony cannot exist without massy-Tony, but intuitively Tony is the substance and massy-Tony the accident. To my knowledge, Brentano nowhere addresses this objection. There are several options open to him, however. One is to accept that Beyonce and Tony are not substances, offering the status of a substance to fewer things than expected. The cost here is that he may well end up with no substances at all, as this kind of example reproduces quite easily. A second option is to hold that, appearances to the contrary, Tony and mass-Tony are one and the same thing (as are Beyonce and extended-Beyonce). The cost here is that we end up assigning the same truthmaker to different fundamental truths, which makes Brentano vulnerable to a tu quoque from the ostrich nominalist. A third option for Brentano is to modify his account of substance so a substance's existence is allowed to depend on another thing's existence, provided the dependence is not unilateral. Thus, since extended-Beyonce's existence depends on Beyonce's just as much as Beyonce's does on extended-Beyonce's, Beyonce comes out a substance after all. The cost here is that extended-Beyonce seems to come out a substance as well (as does 49 Recall that on Brentano's account, x is an accident of y iff x depends for its existence on y, and x is a substance iff there is no y such that x is an accident of y. Thus what makes one entity an accident of another is the unilateral ontological dependence of the former upon the latter. 50 Responding that Beyonce is in the first instance a soul perfectly capable of disembodied existence would be exploiting a distracting feature of the example, namely, that it has to do with a person. The objector could run the same objection with something else, say my old car Mia. Mia had no soul, and could certainly not exist unextended. But intuitively it was a substance in the same sense Beyonce is. 24 URIAH KRIEGEL massy-Tony), thereby violating the impenetrability principle. A fourth option is to simply rid reism of the substance/accident distinction and give all concrete particulars equal status. The emerging view is still strictly nominalist, though there is something unintuitive about it, and there is a sense that it leaves out an important metaphysical distinction: Beyonce and Tony certainly seem in some sense ontologically prior to famous-Beyonce and massy-Tony. A final option-most plausible, it seems-is to go beyond dependence relations and appeal to something like the modern notion of grounding. More accurately, we need to envisage a grounding-like relation R that holds between concrete particulars (rather than between facts or states of affairs), such that Beyonce bears R to extended-Beyonce but extended-Beyonce does not bear R to Beyonce (and Tony bears R to massy-Tony but not conversely). Brentano does speak sometimes of substances sustaining (erhalten) accidents, and we may use this term for the relation R. The claim would be that Beyonce sustains extended-Beyonce but extended-Beyonce does not sustain Beyonce (similarly for Tony and massy-Tony). To be sure, we would then need to show why this grounding-like sustaining relation is unilateral even though the dependence is bilateral. However, some story should be possible to devise here, given that Beyonce is (as we saw above) associated with {Beyonce-ness}, whereas extended-Beyonce is (presumably) associated with {Beyonce-ness, extendedness}, and the former is a proper subset of the latter. In any case, appealing to the notion of sustaining does not mean positing a relation in addition to concrete particulars. Although it is true that (T7) Beyonce sustains extended-Beyonce, T7 can be paraphrased into (T8) There is an extended-Beyonce-sustaining-Beyonce. Ultimately, it is the existence of this strange concrete particular that ensures Beyonce's status as a substance. Conclusion Brentano's reism is a form of nominalism, but one distinguished by (i) being strict in the sense of shunning both universals and abstracta and (ii) opting for an unusual strategy of thing-proliferation to meet the truthmaker challenge. I have argued that this view, though requiring some time to get used to, is a perfectly viable fourth option for truthmaker nominalism (in addition to the more familiar class, mereological, and resemblance nominalTHOUGHT AND THING: BRENTANO'S REISM AS TRUTHMAKER NOMINALISM 25 isms). Two costs associated with it are the brute individuation of concrete particulars and the need for a grounding-like notion of sustaining. But every ontological theory has its costs and liabilities, including the modern forms of strict nominalism (as is clear from the extant literature). In addition, all forms of strict nominalism are equally vulnerable to certain general objections (see, notably, Jackson 1977). It has not been my purpose here to suggest that Brentano's reism is The Ontological Truth. Rather, my goal has been to show that any ontologist with nominalist predilections and a sensitivity to truthmaker considerations in ontological theory-choice should seriously consider Brentano's reism as a viable option-an option at least as prima facie plausible as the more familiar forms of nominalism.51 References Aristotle. Physics. Trans. R. Waterfield. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Armstrong, D. M. 1978. Nominalism and Realism: Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1997. A World of States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Truth and Truthmakers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Baker, L. R. 1997. 'Why Constitution is not Identity.' Journal of Philosophy 94: 599–621. 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