Naming and Referring: The Aftermath of the Kripkean Revolution Heidi Savage SUNY Geneseo Table of Contents Preface: Philosophy of Language and Theories of Names Chapter 1: Classical Referential Theories of Names 1.1 Classical Millianism and its Problems 1.1.1 The Meaning of Empty Names 1.1.1.2. Significance 1.1.1.3 Negative Existentials 1.1.2 Substitution and Propositional Attitudes 1.2 Classical Descriptivism and its Problems 1.2.1 Kripke's Modal, Epistemic, and Semantic Arguments Chapter 2: Kripkean Contemporary Referential Theories of Names 2.1 The Mill-Kripke Theory and its Problems 2.1.1 Persistent Worries About Empty Names 1.3.1.1 The Semantics-Pragmatics Distinction 2.1.2 Persistent Worries About Propositional Attitudes 2.1.2.1 Distinguishing Aprioricity from Necessity 2.2.2.1 Distinguishing Synonymous from Non-synonymous Empty Names and Its Metaphysical Consequences 2.2 The Frege-Kripke Theory and its Problems 2.2.1 Empty Names 2.2.1.1 Sense without Reference 2.2.1.2 The Modal Profiles of Empty Names 2.2.1.3 The Causes of Empty Names Chapter 3: General Objections to Referential Theories of Names 3.1 Different Types of Empty Names 3.1.1 Failed Referential Empty Names 3.1.2 Intentionally Non-referential Empty Names 3.2 Descriptive Names 3.2.1 The Shifty Character of Descriptive Names 3.2.2 Kripke's Semantic Argument and The Problem of Accidental Reference 3.3 Non-referential Uses of Proper Names 3.1.1 Quantificationally Bound Uses 3.1.2 Deictic Uses 3.1.3 Comparatively Descriptive Uses 3.1.4 Anaphorically Bound Uses 3.4 The Type-token Problem 3.2.1 The Meaning of Name-types 3.2.2 The Meaning of Name-tokens 3.2.3 The Lexicon 2 Chapter 4: Non-referential Theories of Names: Predicativism 4.1 Classical Predicativism 4.1.1 As Predicates with One Member 4.1.2 As Predicates with Multiple Members 4.2 Contemporary Predicativism 4.2.1 Meta-linguistic and Non-meta-linguistic Predicativism 4.2.2 Relational and Non-relational Predicativism 4.2.3 Deictic and Non-deicitic Predicativism 4.3 Problems for Predicativism 4.3.1 Name-predicates and the Properties They Express 4.3.2 Kripke's Circularity Objection 4.3.3 Implausible Consequences for The Nature of Naming 4.3.4 Referential Uses of Proper Names Chapter 5: Singly Context-sensitive Theories of Names 5.1 Variabilism About Names and its Problems 5.1.1 The Meta-linguistic Problem 5.1.2 The Use-mention Problem 5.1.3 The Meaning of a Free Variable 5.2 Indexicalism About Names and its Problems 5.2.1 The Rigidity of Names Across Contexts of Utterance 5.2.2 The Equivocation Problem with Entailments 5.3 General Problems for Context-sensitive Theories of Names 5.3.1 The Rigidity of Names 5.3.2 The Ambiguity of a Name-type's Semantic Value Chapter 6: The Kripkean Context of Introduction Theory of Names: Dual Context-sensitivity 6.1 Name-types, Name-tokens, and Name-token Uses 6.1.1 Kaplan on the Identity of Words 6.1.2 Peter Strawson's Concept of Name-token Uses 6.2 Name-types as Dually Context-sensitive Expressions: The Role Contexts of Utterance and Contexts of Introduction 6.2.1 Name-tokens and Contexts of Introduction 6.2.2 Name-token Uses and Contexts of Utterance 6.3 The Meaning of Proper Names as De jure Rigid Expressions 6.3.1 Name-tokens as De Jure Expressions: Semantic Instrumentalism, Name-tokens, and Linguistic Improv 6.3.2 Name-token Uses as Rigid Expressions: Donnellan's Historical Account 6.4 A Montague-Kripke Model: Semantic Value and Kripkean Content 6.4.1 The Bipartite Nature of the Meaning of a Proper Name 6.4.2 Fregean Sense and Semantic Value 6.4.3 Russellianism and Semantic Content 6.4.4 The Semantic Value of a Name-token: Types of Contexts of Introduction 6.4.5 The Rigid Semantic Content of a Name-token Use 6.4.5.1 Referential Name-token Uses 6.4.5.2 Non-referential Name-token Uses 3 Chapter 7: Defending the Context of Introduction Theory 7.1 Different Types of Empty Names 7.1.1 Empty Names with Referential Semantic Value and Their Lack of Semantic Content 7.1.2 Empty Names with Non-referential Semantic Value and Their Content 7.1.3 Truth-apt Discourse Containing Empty Names 7.2 Descriptive Names 7.2.1 Referential Semantic Value 7.2.2 Time-sensitive Rigid Content 7.3 A Kripkean Account of Non-kripkean Uses 7.3.1 Quantificationally Bound Uses 7.3.2 Deictic Uses 7.3.3 Comparatively Descriptive Uses 7.3.4 Anaphorically Bound Uses 7.4 Compositionality and Predication 7.3.1 Fregean Conceptions of Semantic Composition 7.3.2 The Verb 'is' as a Lexical Item 7.3.3 The Polysemy of the Verb 'is' Chapter 8: The Context of Introduction Theory: Consequences for Metaphysics and Logic 8.1 Modal Profiles as Determining the Criterion Ontological Commitment 8.2 Positive Free Logic 8.3 Kripkean Promissory Footnotes: Analyticity 8.3.1 Analytic and Synthetic: Transcendental Conditions on the Derivability of Sentences 8.3.2 A priori and A posteriori: Transcendental Conditions on Coming to Know a Sentence's Truth-value 8.3.3 Necessity and Contingency: Transcendental Conditions on Determining a Sentence's Truth-value Chapter 9: Knowledge and The Context of Introduction Theory: Epistemic Consequences 9.1 Competence with Names 9.1.2 Understanding Name-types 9.1.3 Understanding Name-tokens 9.1.4 Understanding Name-token Uses 9.1.5 Kripke's Circularity Objection 9.2 Giving Names 9.2.1 Performatives and Constatives 9.2.2 Meta-linguistic Performatives 4 Chapter 10: Conclusion 10.1 The Distinction Between Semantic Value and Semantic Content 10.1.2 Intuitionism and Truth Conditional Semantics 10.2 Types of Expressions 10.2.1 Generics 10.2.2 Bare Plurals 10.2.3 Quantifiers 10.2.4 Anaphora 10.2.5 Domain Specifiers 10.3 Intensional Semantics 10.3.1 Rejecting Carnap's Concept of Intension 10.3.2 An Intuitionistic Concept of Intension 10.4 The Concept of Reference 10.5 Compositionality 10.5.1 Grammaticality: Conventions and Stochastic Regularity 10.5.2 The Syntax-Semantics Distinction as a Transcendental Distinction 10.6 Contextualist, Minimalist, Dynamic, and Stochastic Regularity Semantics 10.6.1 Contextualism: Magical Compositionality 10.6.2 Minimalism: Meaning for Omniscient Beings 10.6.3 Dynamism: Hindsight is 20/20 10.6.4 Stochastic Regularism 10.6.4.1 The Stability and Projectability of Meaning 10.6.4.1.1 Dead Metaphors: A Case Study 10.6.4.2 The Ease of Childhood Acquisition of Any Language 10.6.4.2.1 The Artificial-Natural Language Distinction as Myth 10.6.4.2.2 Technological, Musical, and Mathematical Learning 10.6.4.3 Implications for the Philosophy of Mind