Telling	as	Joint	Action:	comments	on	Richard	Moran's	The	Exchange	of	Words (penultimate	draft:	7.19.19.	Forthcoming	in	Philosophy	and	Phenomenological Research) Krista	Lawlor	(klawlor@stanford.edu) In	The	Exchange	of	Words	Richard	Moran's	overarching	thesis	is	that	a	proper understanding	of	telling	is	of	great	significance	for	the	epistemology	of	testimony.	In particular	he	claims	that	a	proper	view	of	telling	is	the	key	to	providing	an	antireductive	account	of	testimony.	Most	of	EW	is	not	about	the	argument	for	antireductivism,	because	Moran's	aim	is	also	to	expand	our	conception	of	the	scope	of the	epistemology	of	testimony,	to	include	questions	about	normative	relations between	speaker	and	addressee.	Moran's	principle	claim	is	that	particular normative	relations	between	a	speaker	and	her	addressee	are	what	make	it	the	case that	telling	produces	a	testimonial	reason.	(Especially,	the	relation	of	the	speaker	to the	addressee	when	the	speaker	freely	takes	responsibility	for	the	truth	of	P.) Consequently,	the	book	is	an	exploration	of	the	way	the	relevant	normative relations	of	speaker	and	addressee	are	put	in	place	by	a	linguistic	act.	Moran emphasizes	that	telling	is	governed	by	linguistic	practices	that	enable	special	kinds of	publicity	or	openness	in	the	relationship	of	speaker	and	addressee,	without	which openness	the	relevant	normative	relations	would	not	be	effected. This	exploration	of	Moran's	is	fascinating	and	creates	new	vistas	at	the	intersection of	epistemology,	philosophy	of	language	and	moral	psychology.	Unsurprisingly, there	are	challenges	in	fitting	together	the	various	elements	Moran	appeals	to	in	the course	of	creating	his	account	of	telling.	What's	striking	about	the	book	is	the evolution	the	reader	finds	within	it,	from	an	account	of	telling	focused	on	the authority,	freedom	and	self-knowledge	of	the	speaker,	to	an	account	of	telling	that highlights	the	role	of	the	audience.	I	found	this	one	of	the	most	exciting developments	of	Moran's	work,	and	in	what	follows,	I	explore	some	questions	this development	gives	rise	to,	as	well	as	some	possibilities	it	presents. Authority,	freedom	and	self-knowledge	of	the	speaker Moran	emphasizes	that	the	speaker	has	authority,	freedom	and	self-knowledge	in performing	her	speech	act.	The	speaker	has	authority	over	her	communicative intention,	as	well	as	over	the	particular	illocutionary	act	she	performs.	She	"plays	an authoritative	role	in	determining	the	illocutionary	status	of	her	utterance	(e.g., Krista Lawlor  10/6/2019 7:56 PM Formatted: Font:Italic 2 as	promise	or	assertion),	..."	[129	my	emphasis].	Authority	to	make	up	one's	mind regarding	one's	intentions	and	other	mental	states	is	a	familiar	theme	in	Moran's earlier	work,	and	we	see	that	idea	extended	here	to	include	the	illocutionary	status (aka	"force")	of	the	speaker's	utterance. The	speaker	also	has	freedom	in	the	performance	of	the	telling-freedom without	which	the	act	would	not	have	its	special	reason-giving	power: ...	it	is	essential	to	the	distinctive	reason	for	belief	that	I	get	from	being	told that	it	proceeds	from	something	freely	undertaken	by	the	other	person	[the speaker].	Only	as	a	free	declaration	does	it	have	that	value	for	me.	[45] We	don't	find	much	in	the	book	in	the	way	of	a	positive	account	of	the	relevant	sense of	freedom,	but	at	a	minimum,	freedom	requires	that	the	person	is	conscious	of	her action: ...	a	specific	assumption	of	responsibilities	is	essentially	an	expression	of	a person's	freedom,	something	that	only	makes	sense	as	consciously	assumed. [61] Freedom	has	a	central	role	in	distinguishing	testimonial	reasons	from	other	sorts	of reasons	for	belief: ...dependence	on	someone's	freely	assuming	responsibility	for	the	truth	of	P, presenting	herself	as	a	kind	of	guarantor,	provides	me	with	a	characteristic reason	to	believe,	different	in	kind	from	anything	provided	by	impersonal evidence	alone.	[45] And	Moran	argues,	it	is	this	dependence	of	the	speaker's	freedom	that	makes testimonial	reasons	distinctive	and	irreducible	to	the	sum	of	other	kinds	of	reasons or	evidence.	Moran	thus	stands	opposed	to	reductivists,	who	would	treat testimonial	reasons	as	depending	on	an	inference	from	evidence,	and	who	do	not give	any	significant	role	to	"the	speaker's	freedom	and	the	hearer's	dependence	on	it" in	the	production	of	a	testimonial	reason.	[45] Finally,	the	speaker	has	a	special	kind	of	self-knowledge	of	the	illocutionary	status of	her	utterance.	Here	also,	Moran	sounds	a	theme	that	is	familiar	in	his	earlier	work, where	self-knowledge	of	one's	intentions	and	attitudes	is	practical	knowledge-that is,	knowledge	without	inference	from	observation: 3 It	is	not	by	self-observation	that	the	speaker	knows	this	[illocutionary status]... [152] ...	the	speaker's	knowledge	of	the	illocutionary	status	of	her	utterance	is practical	as	well	as	institutional...	[216] These	qualities	of	the	speaker's	act-her	authority,	freedom	and	self-knowledge	in telling-are	connected	and	essential	if	the	speaker	is	to	be	in	a	position	to	provide her	addressee	a	reason	of	this	distinctively	testimonial	kind.	Moran	also	holds	that these	qualities	are	not	sufficient	for	the	production	of	a	testimonial	reason:	telling requires	the	speaker	to	tap	into	social	linguistic	conventions	in	appropriate	ways, and	to	gain	the	recognition	of	appropriate	addressees.	With	these	further requirements,	some	questions	arise:	What	exactly	is	the	role	of	the	addressee,	and how	are	we	to	understand	the	authority,	freedom,	and	self-knowledge	of	the speaker	in	light	of	the	addressee's	role?	And	stepping	further	back,	How	do linguistic	practices	affect	the	speaker's	freedom,	self-knowledge	and	authority? The	role	of	the	addressee Moran	sees	a	role	for	the	addressee	on	the	ground	floor	of	telling: ...	there	is	a	prior	involvement	of	others	in	the	speaker's	ability	to	confer	a particular	status	on	her	words,	one	that	adds	a	further	dimension	to	the authority	that	is	specifically	illocutionary	and	its	second-personal	dimension. For	naturally	the	speaker	can	only	appeal	to	the	freedom	of	another	person, and	bind	herself	to	it	in	specific	ways,	if	this	appeal	is	recognized	by	the	other person.	[134	my	emphasis] The	addressee's	recognition	is	not	simply	an	awareness	of	an	already	constituted telling	for	what	it	is;	rather,	his	recognition	is	necessary	for	the	utterance	to constitute	the	specific	form	of	normative	relation	found	in	telling	(as	opposed	to	a warning,	etc.). Recognition	is	not	all	the	audience	contributes.	Moran	goes	on	to	suggest	that	the speaker's	practical	knowledge	of	her	illocutionary	act	depends	on	the	addressee's practical	knowledge: For	the	act	of	asserting	or	promising	to	take	place	the	two	parties	have	to both	understand	and	'know	together'	what	it	is	that	they	are	doing,	for	this shared	knowledge	is	the	formal	cause	of	the	reality	of	the	act	of	illocution itself.	[167] 4 If	we	accept	Moran's	view	about	the	necessity	of	the	addressee's	recognition	and practical	knowledge	in	constituting	a	telling,	some	questions	arise.	For	instance: How	can	we	reconcile	the	requirement	of	shared	practical	knowledge	with	the speaker's	authority	to	constitute	her	utterance	as	a	telling?	How	can	we	reconcile this	requirement	with	the	speaker's	practical	(i.e.	non-observational)	self-knowledge of	her	speech	act	as	a	telling?	Is	a	testimonial	reason	only	constituted	where	there	is shared	practical	knowledge? Telling	as	Joint	Action I	believe	Moran	may	have	satisfying	answers	to	some	of	these	questions	if	we	follow his	view	to	its	logical	conclusion.	Taken	together,	Moran's	claims	about	the	role	of the	addressee	point	to	the	idea	that	telling	is	a	joint	action.1	This	is	a	deep	insight, and	a	transformative	one.	Some	linguists-a	minority-share	this	idea	about	speech acts,	and	see	joint	action	on	the	part	of	speaker	and	audience	at	every	level	of communication.	As	(Clark	1996)	spells	out	of	the	idea,	speech	acts	involve	a proposal	for	joint	action	by	the	speaker,	taken	up	or	modified	by	the	addressee;	in the	case	of	telling,	the	speaker	S	proposes	to	the	addressee	A	that	they	jointly change	A's	beliefs	about	p,	and	if	the	audience	accepts	the	proposal,	he	gets	a	reason to	believe	P,	but	if	he	rejects	the	proposal,	no	reason	to	believe	P	is	constituted	by the	speaker's	utterance.	(Moran	may	prefer	to	say	that	S	proposes	that	they	jointly provide	A	with	a	new	reason	to	believe	p.)	The	joint	act	they	engage	in	is	comprised of	tiers	of	sub-actions	on	both	the	addressee's	and	the	speaker's	part.	For	the	act	to convey	a	particular	content	requires	a	construal	that	is	accepted	by	both	speaker and	addressee,	and	signaled	as	accepted;	for	the	act	to	have	the	illocutionary	force	of a	telling	requires	the	addressee	to	recognize	and	signal	his	recognition	of	this	force as	intended	by	the	speaker,	and	so	on. Moran	can	exploit	the	jointness	of	the	act	of	telling	in	order	to	answer	some questions	that	arise	with	acknowledgement	of	the	hearer's	role	of	recognition.	For instance,	because	the	total	joint	action	of	telling	is	comprised	of	sub-acts,	we	can find	room	for	joint	and	individual	authority,	joint	and	individual	freedom	and knowledge	of	what	speaker	and	addressee	are	about.	The	speaker	retains	sole authority	to	determine	her	illocutionary	intention,	even	if	she	shares	authority	over the	illocutionary	status	of	her	utterance.	The	sub-act	of	uttering	with	a	specific communicative	intention	is	the	act	of	the	speaker	alone	("authoring"	the	utterance [219]),	but	only	upon	being	recognized	by	the	addressee	as	an	utterance	is	that	act part	of	a	larger	act	in	which	her	uttering	"P"	has	the	illocutionary	force	of	a	telling that	P. 5 Joint	Practical	Knowledge? What	about	our	question:	Is	a	testimonial	reason	only	constituted	where	there	is shared	practical	knowledge?	Here,	Moran's	view	faces	pressure	from	our	pretheoretic	judgments-the	requirement	on	joint	action	that	it	involve	joint	practical knowledge	is	quite	demanding.	Let's	consider	some	cases: Confession:	Genie	dimly	perceives	someone	in	the	room	with	her,	and	makes	a deathbed	confession	about	a	past	crime.	Her	audience	knows	what	she's	doing,	but Genie	is	unable	to	perceive	his	signals	back	to	her,	and	so	no	joint	knowledge (practical	or	otherwise)	is	produced. Callous:	Henrietta	says	to	her	husband,	"I'm	missing	a	sock	again"	and	while	he knows	what	she's	saying,	he	doesn't	signal	as	much;	neither	does	he	come	to	believe that	Henrietta	is	missing	her	sock-let's	imagine	through	sheer	indifference	to	her plight. Soapbox:	Ingrid	is	on	her	soapbox	and	says	to	Augie	that	he	is	one	of	the	saved; Augie	recognizes	Ingrid's	communicative	intention,	but	refuses	to	join	her	in	an action	of	telling-he	lowers	his	gaze	and	quickly	walks	away. In	all	these	cases	the	audience	recognizes	the	speaker's	intentions,	but	through	lack of	signaling	or	lack	of	receipt	of	signals,	we	have	a	lack	of	joint	practical	knowledge.	I think	it	natural	to	say	that	in	Confession,	Genie's	provides	her	audience	with	a testimonial	reason	to	believe	she	committed	the	crime;	in	Soapbox,	Ingrid	does	not provide	Augie	with	a	testimonial	reason,	however	weak	it	may	be,	to	believe	that	he is	saved.2	In	Callous,	we	may	want	to	say	that	Henrietta	does	provide	a	testimonial reason,	or	we	may	not-we'll	return	to	this	case. Confession	in	particular	puts	pressure	on	the	claim	that	joint	practical	knowledge	is necessary	for	telling.	If	in	response	we	allow	that	audience	recognition	alone suffices	for	reason-giving,	then	we	run	into	trouble	with	Soapbox,	where	no testimonial	reason	is	generated.	How	might	Moran	respond? The	perspective	of	telling	as	a	joint	action	is	analytically	useful	in	sorting	some	of the	complexities	in	these	cases.	If	we	confine	ourselves	to	audience	recognition	of speaker	intention	and	shared	practical	knowledge,	we	have	too	few	tools	to distinguish	our	cases.	But	we	can	distinguish	cases	if	we	remember	that	the	joint	act of	telling	involves	a	speaker	proposing	and	an	audience	accepting	a	proposal	for joint	action.	Acceptance	of	the	speaker's	proposal	to	provide	a	reason	is	required	if	a testimonial	reason	is	to	be	constituted.	(Although	audience	acceptance	is	itself 6 signaled	in	a	paradigm	case	of	telling,	it	need	not	be	signaled	for	the	telling	to	occur.) In	Confession,	Genie's	audience	is	willing	to	enter	the	joint	action,	but	in	Soapbox Ingrid's	is	not.	Arguably,	this	marks	the	important	difference	in	the	two	cases. What	acceptance	of	the	speaker's	proposal	itself	requires	is	a	matter	for	further inquiry.	Still	further	cases	give	us	reason	to	acknowledge	that	acceptance	need	not require	any	willingness	on	the	actual	audience's	part	to	engage	in	the	joint	project	of listening.	After	all,	there	are	cases	where	despite	the	audience's	reluctance,	a speaker	has	told	him	something.3	This	suggests	that	there	are	normative	demands on	listeners-perhaps	we	should	talk	about	the	acceptance	of	the	reasonable audience	in	the	setting.	If	that's	so,	then	for	a	testimonial	reason	to	be	produced,	it must	be	possible	for	a	reasonable	audience	to	accept	the	speaker's	proposal. Consider	Henrietta's	case	in	this	light.	The	case	can	be	split	into	subcases.	Is	her husband	really	callously	indifferent,	or	does	Henrietta	have	a	history	of	maundering, and	her	husband's	lack	of	responsiveness	to	her	random	remarks	has	become routine	between	them?	Our	judgment	that	these	features	matter	to	testimonial reason-giving	is	itself	a	hint	about	something	we	took	for	granted	in	Soapbox	and Confession-namely,	we	took	for	granted	the	appropriateness	of	the	audience's acceptance	or	rejection	of	the	speaker's	proposal. If	our	judgment	of	whether	a	testimonial	reason	is	constituted	depends	on	our	sense of	the	appropriateness	of	the	audience's	acceptance	of	the	speaker's	proposal,	then we	need	to	understand	this	further	normative	feature	of	telling.	Confession	and Soapbox	suggest	that	linguistic	conventions	may	have	a	significant	role	in determining	appropriateness.4	Readiness	to	listen	to	a	dying	person's	confession and	lack	of	readiness	to	listen	to	random	public	address	are	arguably	each appropriate	by	default	in	our	linguistic	practice.	Callous	illustrates	a	further	feature of	appropriateness	judgments,	namely,	the	role	of	the	(reasonable)	audience's assessment	of	the	speaker's	credibility,	understood	broadly	to	include	not	just	her trustworthiness	but	also	her	epistemic	competence. Again	our	newfound	perspective	on	telling	as	joint	action	may	be	analytically revealing.	We	find	that	evidence	of	credibility	may	be	weighed	at	two	distinct moments,	the	moment	before	accepting	the	speaker's	proposal	to	jointly	provide	the audience	a	reason,	and	the	moment	after	acceptance,	after	the	audience	has	reached a	joint	construal	of	what	the	speaker's	reason	is	to	be	a	reason	for.	(Compare	[5859].)	The	latter	moment	has	received	a	fair	bit	of	attention	in	the	literature	on	the epistemology	of	testimony,	but	the	former	not	as	much.	If	credibility	assessment	and 7 not	simply	convention	is	at	work	in	Soapbox,	then	it	provides	an	illustration	of	this second	moment:	Augie's	assessment	of	Ingrid's	credibility	is	required	to	make	his refusal	to	enter	joint	action	with	her	appropriate. The	speaker's	practical	knowledge Perhaps	Moran	would	prefer	to	stand	firm	and	maintain	that	telling	requires	joint practical	knowledge.	So,	Confession	is	not	a	case	of	telling.	The	difficulty	of	the practical	knowledge	requirement	goes	deeper,	though.	Consider	this	case: Blurting:	Sabine	plays	tennis	with	her	friend;	she	enjoys	the	camaraderie	and exercise,	but	her	attitude	toward	winning	is	significantly	more	relaxed	than	that	of her	friend.	Generally,	she	finds	it	easy	enough	to	tolerate	his	aggressive	play	and over-reactions	when	he	loses,	but	one	day	she	blurts	out,	"you	are	so	competitive!" Moran	holds	that	blurted	assertions	count	as	tellings.	About	such	cases,	he	writes: We	express	our	freedom	not	only	in	our	considered	actions,	but	also	in	the actions	that	go	wrong,	or	are	forced	upon	us,	and	the	outbursts	that	we immediately	regret.	Blurting	something	out	when	you	meant	to	keep	silent	is still	a	different	matter	from	either	talking	in	one's	sleep,	or	having	the utterance	of	those	words	be	produced	by	electrical	stimulation	of	the cerebral	cortex.	And	the	epistemic	significance	for	the	audience	is	entirely different	in	the	two	kinds	of	cases:	in	relating	to	the	words	produced	by electrical	stimulation	we	may	learn	something,	but	what	we	learn	need	not be	dependent	on	such	assumptions	as,	e.g.,	whether	the	person	had	any understanding	of	the	words	themselves,	or	any	sense	that	she	was	providing anyone	with	a	reason	to	believe	something.	[62] Moran	is	right	that	although	blurting	happens	without	the	benefit	of	the	speaker's deliberate	or	self-aware	utterance	planning,	the	speaker	is	still	on	the	hook	for	what she's	done	in	a	way	she	wouldn't	be	if	her	utterance	were	caused	by	electric stimulation	of	her	brain.	The	question	of	the	moment	is,	does	the	speaker	have practical	knowledge	of	her	action?	And	the	answer	seems	to	be	no.	Sabine	knows what	she	has	done	when	she	hears	the	words	escaping	her,	or	sees	the	look	on	her friend's	face	and	realizes	what	she's	uttered.	Blurted	telling	places	even	greater pressure	on	the	view	that	telling	requires	joint	practical	(i.e.	non-observational) knowledge,	since	here,	even	the	speaker	arguably	lacks	practical	knowledge	of	her act.5 8 If	we	think	of	telling	as	joint	action,	Blurting	is	a	very	useful	case	to	think	through. Sabine	doesn't	deliberately	plan	her	utterance	so	in	what	sense	does	she	propose	a joint	project	in	which	she	gives	her	friend	a	reason?	The	question	is,	how	to	continue seeing	telling	as	joint	action,	if	we	drop	the	practical	knowledge	requirement? We	have	options	here.	Models	of	joint	action	differ	over	their	accounts	of	what makes	for	the	jointness	of	joint	action.	Some	accounts	invoke	special	kinds	of	shared mental	state,	special	kinds	of	interlocking	intentions,	or	special	kinds	of	plural agents,	while	some	minimalist	accounts	require	no	interlocking	intentions,	but	only shared	goals	and	expectations	(Butterfill	2012).	It	is	an	open	question	how	we should	think	of	the	joint	action	of	telling.	Children	engage	in	joint	actions	well	before the	capacity	emerges	for	forming	complex	interlocking	intentions.	Arguably	telling (along	with	assuring,	warning,	questioning,	etc.)	has	a	fundamental	place	in	the learning	of	more	complex	forms	of	social	coordination.	Social	beings	that	we	are,	we can	be	drawn	into	joint	action	without	advance	planning,	and	without	deliberate intention.	Perhaps	then,	Blurting	shows	us	that	the	minimalist	option	is	correct	for telling.	In	speaking	as	she	does,	Sabine	does	express	a	belief,	and	a	goal	(getting	her friend	to	notice	his	aggressiveness),	by	doing	something	she	doesn't	intend	(in	the sense	of	plan)	to	do. Moran	surely	gets	it	right	when	he	says	telling	"can	be	more	or	less	reflective,	more or	less	deliberate,	more	or	less	voluntary	or	under	duress."	[62]	This	goes	for	the audience	as	well:	listening,	too,	can	happen,	despite	one's	intentions	to	ignore,	or lack	of	practical	knowledge	of	one's	listening. The	question	we	are	left	with	is,	how do	we	square	the	messy	facts	about	telling	with	our	understanding	of	joint	action? I've	suggested	we	might	modify	our	understanding	of	the	joint	action	of	telling,	to take	account	of	a	lack	of	joint	practical	knowledge.	The	aim	of	the	modification	is	to let	us	retain	Moran's	insight	that	telling	is	joint	action	and	his	idea	that	the normative	relations	involved	in	telling	are	what	put	testimonial	reasons	in	place. Moran	is	also	absolutely	right	that	the	epistemology	of	testimony	needs	a	better understanding	of	telling.	Reflection	on	his	book	should	convince	us	that	the	idea	of telling	as	a	joint	action	is	the	place	to	start.6 9 Butterfill,	Stephen.	2012.	"Joint	Action	and	Development."	The	Philosophical Quarterly	62	(246):	23–47. Clark,	Herbert	H.	1996.	Using	Language.	Cambridge	University	Press. Jacobson,	Daniel.	1995.	"Freedom	of	Speech	Acts?	A	Response	to	Langton." Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	24	(1):	64–78. Langton,	Rae,	and	Jennifer	Hornsby.	1998.	"Free	Speech	and	Illocution."	Legal Theory	4	(1):	21–37. Wieland,	Nellie.	2007.	"Linguistic	Authority	and	Convention	in	a	Speech	Act	Analysis of	Pornography."	Australasian	Journal	of	Philosophy	85	(3):	435	–	456. 1	Moran's	closing	statements	[219-20]	point	directly	to	telling	as	joint	action. 2	Due	to	space	limits,	cases	are	perilously	under-described.	Moreover,	"tell"	is	context-sensitive-on some	occasions	we	use	"tell"	to	refer	to	a	sub-act,	on	other	occasions	the	total	joint	act.	Of	a	particular speech	act,	in	a	context	where	it	matters	what	the	speaker's	intentions	were,	we	might	say	"S	told	A that	P",	but	in	a	different	context	where	it	matters	that	audience	accepted	S's	word,	we	may	say	of	the same	speech	act	that	"S	failed	to	tell	A."	Similarly,	if	we	probe	these	cases	looking	to	answer	whether a	reason	was	constituted	and	rejected,	or	never	constituted	in	the	first	place,	we	may	find	judgments varying	with	which	partner's	performance	we	are	assessing,	and	if	we	are	inclined	to	blame	or	excuse. 3	Such	cases	are	at	the	heart	of	the	work	of	feminist	theorists	(Langton	and	Hornsby	1998).	There	is much	to	be	said	here,	and	there	is	a	growing	literature	springing	from	earlier	concerns	with	speech acts	and	silencing.	(Jacobson	1995)	introduces	the	idea	of	a	competent	auditor. 4	The	interplay	of	possibly	competing	roles	for	conventions	and	speaker	intentions	is	thorny	ground. See	(Wieland	2007),	on	which	I	don't	mean	to	take	a	stand	here-I	merely	want	to	suggest	the importance	of	linguistic	convention	in	our	interpretation	of	such	cases. 5	Just	what	blurting	is	deserves	more	attention.	I	assume	it	involves	speech	without	intentional utterance	planning.	Since	practical	knowledge	is	had	in	virtue	of	having	an	intention	on	which	one acts,	Sabine	has	no	practical	knowledge	of	her	blurted	speech.	What	if	Sabine	blurts	in	a	sensory deprivation	tank-isn't	her	knowledge	non-observational?	I	would	answer,	her	knowledge	of	her	act (if	she	has	any)	owes	to	her	reasoning	from	evidence	accessible	to	her-e.g.	from	"hearing	her	voice on	the	inside"	via	bone-conducted	vibrations,	etc.;	her	knowledge	does	not	owe	to	her	intention	to speak,	as	she	does	not	have	such. 6	Thanks	to	Sarah	Brophy,	David	Hills,	Ram	Neta,	Josh	Petersen,	and	Sarah	Vernalis.