Bias	and	Perception* Susanna	Siegel To	appear	in	"Knowledge,	Justice,	and	the	Social	Mind",	eds.	E.	Beeghly	and	A.	Madva How	do	biases	influence	perception?	If	we	select	a	culturally	specific	bias	for	the	purposes of	illustration,	then	we	can	address	this	question	from	three	perspectives:	from	the receiving	end	of	biased	perception,	using	cultural	analysis;	from	within	the	biased perceiver's	mind,	using	cognitive	science;	and	from	the	perspective	of	epistemology. This entry	will	consider	all	three	perspectives	and	discuss	their	relationship.	The	culturally specific	example	will	be	a	type	of	racialized	perception	found	in	the	U.S.A..	The	epistemic consequences	of	racial	bias	in	this	context	has	deep	implications	for	how	reasonable	it	can be	to	act	on	what	one	'sees'	when	those	perceptions	are	influenced	by	bias,	and	this	entry will	introduce	those	consequences	at	the	end. 1.	Cultural	analysis In	a	narrative	that	is	easy	to	recognize,	George	Yancy	(2008)	describes	a	type	of	microinteraction	between	strangers: When	followed	by	white	security	personnel	as	I	walk	through	department	stores, when	a	white	salesperson	avoids	touching	my	hand,	when	a	white	woman	looks with	suspicion	as	I	enter	the	elevator,	I	feel	that	in	their	eyes	I	am	this indistinguishable,	amorphous,	black	seething	mass,	a	token	of	danger,	a	threat,	a rapist,	a	criminal,	a	burden	.	.	. In	the	US,	narratives	resembling	this	one	have	long	been	found	in	many	registers,	such	as memoir	(Coates	(2015),	Cadogan	(2018)),	fiction,	film,	music,	poetry,	ethnography,	and social	scientific	studies	(Glaser	2014),	including	psychological	studies	of	stereotype	threat (Steele	2011)	and	studies	in	political	sciences	of	the	effects	on	political	attitudes	of	contact with	the	criminal	justice	system	(Lerman	and	Weaver	2014).	Some	renditions	of	this narrative	detail	what	it	is	like	to	navigate	public	space	when	the	possibility	of	being responded	to	as	a	threat	or	likely	criminal	is	salient,	including	the	often	elaborate	efforts and	adjustments	made	to	prevent	that	response,	or	reverse	it,	or	negotiate	it	in	some	other way.	Other	versions	of	the	same	narrative	highlight,	encourage,	and	enforce	the	point	of view	of	the	reactor,	such	as	the	high-profile	Willie	Horton	ad	in	the	1988	US	election Mendelberg	2001,	the	political	scientist	John	DiIulio	introduction	in	the	1990s	of	the concept	of	a	"superpredator"	to	describe	black	youth	who	were	supposedly	prone	to	crime (DiIulio	1996,	Hinton	2016),	and	around	the	same	time,	analytic	philosopher	Michael Levin's	defense	of	racialized	fear	Levin	1992). The	wealth	of	cultural	production	of	narratives	casting	black	men	in	this	role	makes	it plausible	that	this	racial	attitude	is	widespread,	and	part	of	what	people	embedded	in	U.S. *	Thanks	to	Jada	Wiggletonlittle	and	the	editors	for	helpful	suggestions	and	to	Adam	Nahari	for	assistance with	the	bibliography. 2 society	have	to	respond	to	both	from	within	their	minds	and	in	the	behavior	of	other people.	Here's	a	portrait	of	how	the	same	attitudes	might	inhabit	a	differently	positioned person,	who	I'll	call	Whit. Whit	is	eighteen	years	old.	He	has	always	lived	in	the	same	town,	in	the	early-twenty-firstcentury United	States.	He	inhabits	a	world	of	a	white	people.	All	of	the	people	that	he	and his	parents	take	themselves	to	depend	on	are	white.	White	people	are	his	neighbors,	his teachers,	his	schoolmates,	the	professionals	that	regularly	interact	with	his	family (accountants,	teachers,	doctors,	lawyers,	mechanics,	local	religious	figures,	and	community leaders),	his	friends	and	his	family's	friends,	his	local	politicians,	police	officers,	restaurant owners,	and	people	he	sees	when	he	goes	to	restaurants. Whit	knows	that	elsewhere,	not	everyone	is	white.	He	knows	there	are	black	professionals of	all	kinds.	He	knows	that	in	other	places,	distant	from	where	he	lives,	there	are neighborhoods	where	people	are	mainly	black,	where	they	tend	to	be	much	poorer	than	his family	is,	and	where	many	people	his	age	have	a	lot	of	contact	with	the	criminal	justice system.	He	doesn't	know	personally	anybody	who	lives	there. If	Whit	were	asked	to	assess	the	productive	capabilities	or	personal	credibility	of	a	man who	is	black,	he	would	tend	to	be	disproportionately	doubtful.	And	if	he	expressed	or	acted on	his	doubt,	he	would	not	face	any	challenges	from	the	people	within	his	usual	social horizons.	In	this	way,	Whit	has	little	in	his	mind	or	life	to	pull	against	his	absorption	of	the attitude	that	black	men	are	dangerous. Whit's	racial	isolation	is	the	kind	that	Allport	(1954)	predicted	would	make	a	person	more likely	to	absorb	the	presumption	depicted	in	the	narratives,	rather	than	contesting	the presumption	or	discounting	it.	Of	course	like	any	individual's	outlook,	Whit's	cannot	be entirely	predicted	by	social	context.	And	conversely,	Whit's	social	situation	is	not	the	only route	to	the	racial	attitude	he	ends	up	with. The	fact	that	Whit's	attitude	is	normal	worsens	his	society. From	the	point	of	view	of people	on	the	receiving	end	of	Whit's	reactions,	his	attitude	will	be	obviously	unjustified. Imagine	stepping	into	a	line	at	an	automatic	teller	machine	where	Whit	and	his	friends	are waiting,	and	seeing	their	palpable	discomfort	as	they	look	uneasy	and	make	sure	their wallets	are	deep	inside	their	pockets.	Or	imagine	asking	Whit	for	directions,	and	finding him	ill	at	ease	in	talking	to	you,	seemingly	suspicious	of	whether	what	you	want	is	really directions,	as	opposed	to	something	else.	In	these	situations,	you'd	think	Whit	and	his friends	were	in	the	grip	of	a	fear	that	they	were	projecting	onto	you.	There's	nothing	more you	could	do	to	manifest	the	ordinariness	of	your	own	behavior.	Outside	of	Whit's	world, many	people	would	easily	pick	up	on	the	ample	cues	that	indicate	innocuous	everyday activity.	Due	to	their	racial	attitudes,	Whit	and	his	friends	either	don't	take	in	these	cues,	or they	discount	them.	In	these	ways,	their	perception	is	compromised. The	examples	of	Whit's	obtuseness	and	Yancy's	experience	in	the	elevator	gives	us	two common	manifestations	of	racialized	bias	in	social	perception.	Yancy	describes	what	it	is like	to	be	perceived	when	you	are	on	the	receiving	end	of	that	kind	of	bias-influenced 3 perception.	And	Whit's	scenario	shows	us	how	someone	unknowingly	steeped	in	racialized bias	could	end	up	with	perceptions	that	are	congruent	with	the	bias,	without	having	a	clue about	either	the	bias	or	its	effects	on	perception. 2.	Cognitive	science Alongside	cultural	analysis,	psychological	experiments	provide	evidence	that	racial attitudes	can	operate	even	in	the	minds	of	people	who	would	explicitly	disown	the hypothesis	that	black	men	are	dangerous.	For	instance,	consider	a	set	of	experiments designed	to	test	how	racial	attitudes	impact	perception: -A	mild	human	collision	where	one	person	pushes	another	is	seen	as	aggressive	or playful,	depends	on	the	perceived	race	of	the	pusher	(Duncan	1976,	Sagar	and Schofield	1980). -A	face	in	a	picture	is	matched	(for	coloring)	to	a	darker	to	a	lighter	patch, depending	on	the	racial	label	written	under	the	face	(Levin	and	Banaji	2006,	see Firestone	and	Scholl	2015	for	discussion). -A	boy	in	a	photograph	said	to	be	accused	of	a	felony	is	estimated	to	be	older	when the	child	is	black	than	when	he	is	latino	(Goff	et	al.	2014). -A	man	categorized	as	black	is	estimated	to	be	both	bigger	and	stronger	than	a	man of	the	same	size	and	strength	who	is	categorized	as	white	(Wilson	et	al	2017). -Emotions	are	detected	at	lower	thresholds	when	they	are	congruent	with stereotypes	linking	anger	to	Morroccan	men	and	sadness	to	white	Dutch	men,	as measured	by	implicit	association	tests	(Bijlstra	et	al	2014). How	should	these	experiments	be	interpreted? An	important	distinction	is	the	difference	between	visual	appearances	(a	kind	of	perceptual experience),	and	the	beliefs	or	judgments	you	form	in	response	to	them.	Perceptual experiences	are	the	conscious	aspects	of	perception,	in	which	the	things	you're	perceiving are	presented	to	you	in	a	certain	way.	For	instance,	when	you	put	a	straight	stick	in	water and	suddenly	it	looks	bent,	your	visual	experience	presents	it	as	bent,	but	what	you	believe or	judge	is	that	it's	straight.	We	don't	always	believe	our	eyes,	and	that	situation	shows	that there's	a	difference	between	what	you	experience	and	what	you	believe	in	response	to	it. We	can	also	appreciate	the	difference	between	experience	and	judgment	by	considering cases	where	what	you	judge	in	response	to	perception	goes	beyond	what	you	see.	For example,	if	you're	looking	for	your	brother	in	the	kitchen,	and	see	that	the	kitchen	is	empty, your	experience	tells	you	about	what	is	in	the	kitchen,	and	then	you	infer	on	the	basis	of	the experience	that	your	brother	isn't	there.	Here,	you	do	believe	your	eyes.	But	in	addition, you	also	form	other	beliefs	that	go	beyond	what	you	experience. 4 It's	useful	to	have	a	way	to	discuss	the	ways	a	perceptual	experience	presents	things	to	you, and	that's	the	point	of	the	notion	of	the	contents	of	experience.	If	the	stick	looks	bent	even when	you	know	it's	straight,	then	the	contents	of	your	visual	experiences	include	"it's	bent". Contents	characterize	your	perspective	on	the	world	in	perceptual	experience.	Your experience	is	accurate	if	things	are	the	way	you	experience	them,	and	they're	inaccurate	if things	aren't	that	way.	The	experience	of	the	stick	is	inaccurate. The	experiments	listed	earlier	raise	the	question	whether	the	background	expectations	are affecting	perceptual	experiences,	or	only	beliefs	formed	on	the	basis	of	those	experiences. For	example,	in	the	case	of	the	collision:	does	the	pusher	look	aggressive,	or	do	some perceivers	just	believe	he	is,	on	the	basis	of	how	he	looks	to	them? It	can	be	difficult	to	test	experimentally	whether	the	effect	shapes	the	content	of	the experience,	or	rather	influences	people	respond	to	their	experiences.	But	we	can understand	a	range	of	different	ways	in	which	bias	can	affect	perception,	even	if	we	don't know	from	cognitive	science	where	exactly	the	effects	lie. We	can	see	the	potential	range	of	effects	on	perception	by	focusing	on	different	possible interpretations	of	the	result	of	an	experiment	done	by	Keith	Payne.	The	experiment	was designed	to	test	the	influence	of	racial	attitudes	on	categorizing	the	things	you	see	(Payne 2001). Weapon	categorization:	Participants	in	an	experiment	are	shown	an	object	quickly and	asked	to	press	a	button	designated	for	"gun"	if	it	is	a	gun,	and	a	different	button if	it	is	a	hand	tool-pliers,	wrench,	or	a	drill.	Before	they	see	the	object,	they	are quickly	shown	a	man's	face.	The	man	is	either	black	or	white.	Participants frequently	indicate	"gun"	when	shown	a	tool,	but	more	frequently	make	this	error following	a	black	prime,	compared	with	a	white	prime.	(Payne	2001) When	participants	in	Payne's	experiment	misclassify	a	pair	of	pliers	as	a	gun,	there	are many	possible	ways	in	which	they	might	in	principle	arrive	at	their	misclassification. •	Disbelief:	The	pliers	look	to	the	subject	exactly	like	pliers.	But	the	subjects disbelieve	their	perceptual	experience,	and	misclassify	the	object	as	a	gun. •	Bypass:	The	pliers	look	to	the	subject	exactly	like	pliers.	Subjects	do	not	respond	in any	way	to	the	experience-not	even	by	disbelieving	it.	The	state	activated	by	the black	prime	controls	their	classification	error	directly,	bypassing	their	experience. •	Cognitive	penetration:	The	pliers	look	to	the	subject	exactly	like	a	gun,	due	to	the influence	on	perceptual	experience	of	a	cognitive	state	activated	by	the	black	prime. •	Attention:	The	pliers	look	somewhat	like	a	gun,	because	the	state	activated	by	the black	prime	directs	the	subjects'	attention	to	features	of	the	pliers	that	are 5 congruent	with	being	a	gun	(metallic),	and	away	from	features	incongruent	with being	a	gun	(shape). •	Introspective	error:	The	pliers	look	to	the	subject	exactly	like	pliers.	But	subjects make	an	introspective	error	in	which	they	take	themselves	to	experience	a	gun. The	introspective	error	makes	them	misclassify	the	object	as	a	gun. •	Hasty	judgment:	The	pliers	look	to	the	subject	somewhat	like	pliers	and	somewhat like	a	gun.	Before	perceiving	enough	detail	to	decide	the	matter	on	the	basis	of	what they	see,	subjects	judge	that	the	object	is	a	gun,	due	to	the	state	activated	by	the black	prime. •	Disowned	behavior:	The	pliers	look	to	the	subject	exactly	like	pliers.	But	the	state activated	by	the	black	prime	guides	the	behavior	of	pushing	the	button	that	subjects use	to	indicate	their	classification	verdict.	Subjects	immediately	afterward	will regard	their	answer	as	mistaken. These	options	differ	from	one	another	along	several	dimensions.	Some	options	impact	the content	of	a	judgment,	rather	than	the	content	of	perceptual	experience	(Disbelief,	Bypass, Introspective	error).	Other	options	impact	the	content	of	experience,	either	by	influencing it	directly	(Cognitive	penetration)	or	by	selecting	which	features	will	be	attended (Attention).	A	different	dimension	of	influence	constrains	the	role	of	the	experience	in making	a	judgment	(Bypass,	Haste),	or	in	producing	behavior	(Disowned	behavior).	These options	illustrate	the	possibility	that	perception	could	have	less	impact	on	behavior	than we	might	have	supposed-even	when	we	are	engaged	explicitly	in	a	classification	task	that we	would	normally	use	perception	to	accomplish.	Perception's	usual	role	in	guiding behavior	is	neutralized. These	different	ways	that	a	prior	state	can	influence	perception	can	be	systematized	using two	philosophical	distinctions.	The	first	distinction	is	between	perceptual	experiences	and judgments	(or	beliefs)	formed	in	response	to	them.	The	second	distinction	is	between	two aspects	of	perceptual	experiences:	their	contents,	as	opposed	to	the	role	of	the	experience in	the	mind.	Haste,	Bypass,	Disowned	behavior	and	Disbelief	all	illustrate	ways	that racialized	bias	can	influence	the	role	of	the	experience	in	the	mind.	Cognitive	penetration and	Attention	illustrate	ways	that	racialized	bias	can	influence	the	contents	of	experience. Payne's	results	are	probably	best	explained	by	the	Disowned	Behavior	option,	given	a follow-up	experiment	that	allowed	participants	to	correct	their	responses	(Stokes	and Payne	2010).	But	the	distinctions	between	different	potential	analyses	show	us	a	range	of ways	that	prior	states	including	racialized	bias	can	influence	perception. One	way	to	influence	perception	is	to	influence	patterns	of	attention,	and	these	patterns	in turn	can	affect	the	contents	of	experience.	In	the	context	of	Payne's	experiment,	attention could	be	directed	to	different	parts	of	the	object,	depending	on	the	influence	of	racialized bias.	Other	experiments	suggest	that	racialized	bias	can	influence	the	distributions	of 6 attention	across	wider	scenes,	and	the	bias	can	function	as	what	psychologist	Jennifer Eberhardt	calls	a	"visual	tuning	device".	Here's	an	example. Crime-suggestive	acuity:	After	being	shown	a	man's	face	in	a	subliminal	prime, participants	are	shown	a	sequence	of	progressively	less	degraded	images,	beginning with	visual	noise	and	ending	with	a	clear	image	of	an	object	and	asked	to	indicate when	they	can	recognize	the	object.	They	identify	crime-relevant	objects	(guns	or knives)	at	lower	thresholds	than	crime-irrelevant	objects,	after	being	shown	a	black man's	face,	compared	to	crime-irrelevant	objects,	and	compared	to	crime-relevant objects	after	being	shown	a	white	man's	face.	(Eberhardt	et	al.	2004) This	experiment	belongs	to	a	series	from	which	Eberhardt	concludes	that	there	is	a	twoway	association	between	the	concepts	'black'	and	'crime'. In	the	task	described	above,	a racialized	prime	prompts	attention	to	crime-related	objects.	In	a	different	task,	priming with	crime-related	objects	prompts	attention	to	black	male	faces	as	opposed	to	white	male faces.	Attention	is	measured	using	a	dot-probe	task.	In	the	experiment,	two	faces	of	men appear,	one	black	and	one	white,	and	then	both	disappear	and	a	dot	appears	in	a	position	of one	of	the	faces.	The	task	is	to	find	the	dot.	When	participants	are	primed	with	a	crimerelated object	before	they	see	the	faces,	they	find	the	dot	faster	when	it	replaces	the	black face. The	crime-prime	seems	to	facilitate	attention	to	black	faces. Associations So	far,	I've	discussed	a	range	of	ways	for	racialized	bias	to	influence	perception,	using experiments	from	cognitive	science	to	illustrate	behavior	that	could	be	underwritten	by	a range	of	different	psychological	relationships	between	bias,	perceptual	experience,	and perceptual	judgment.	The	experiments	we've	discussed	activate	what	the	experimenters call	a	"stereotypical	association"	between	the	concepts	'black	man'	and	'danger'	or	'crime' (Eberhard	2001,	Payne	2006).	It	is	unlikely	that	the	content	of	racialized	biases	is independent	of	gender	categories,	and	the	experiments	discussed	so	far	focus	exclusively on	men	(Johnson	et	al	2012).	A	wide	range	of	black	feminist	writings	from	the	U.S.	have long	discussed	the	ways	that	racialized	narratives,	dynamics,	and	representations	of	race have	different	contours	depending	on	whether	they	focus	on	men	or	women	(Cooper	1872, Murray	1970,	Crenshaw	2015,	Dotson	2017,	Morris	2016).	Like	the	experiments	I'm discussing,	I	focus	on	men	here.	When	it	comes	to	the	general	structure	of	racialized	bias, though,	there's	reason	to	think	the	structure	will	be	the	same	whether	the	racialized	bias concerns	men	or	women,	even	if	the	contents	differ.	For	instance,	according	to	Johnson	et	al 2012,	black	women	are	perceived	as	more	masculine	and	Asian	men	are	perceived	as	more feminine. An	analysis	of	racialized	bias	in	terms	of	associations	between	concepts	could	mislead	us as	to	the	underlying	structure	of	the	racialized	bias.	When	the	experimenters	say	that participants	make	a	"stereotypical	association,"	they	are	saying	that	the	mind	moves	from one	concept	to	another.	We	can	better	understand	what	kind	of	movement	of	the	mind	this could	be	by	drawing	a	few	more	distinctions	(cf.	chapter	1	of	this	volume.	G	Johnson). These	distinctions	will	later	help	us	analyze	the	epistemic	impacts	of	racialized	bias. 7 First,	here	are	two	different	ways	to	associate	concepts	X	and	Y,	such	as	'salt'	and	'pepper.' Minimal	association	between	concepts:	transition	from	isolated	concepts	expressed by	words:	e.g.,	"drip"	to	"drop,"	"salt"	to	"pepper,"	"tic"	and	"tac"	to	"toe." This	kind	of	movement	between	concepts	is	a	mental	analog	of	the	verbal	phenomenon	in which	a	person	hears	"salt"	and	(perhaps	upon	being	prompted	to	report	the	word	that first	comes	to	mind)	says	"pepper."	Associative	transitions	can	also	be	made	between thoughts. Minimal	association	between	thoughts:	transition	from	thought	involving	X	(Xthoughts)	to	thoughts	involving	Y	(Y-thoughts),	with	no	constraints	on	which thoughts	these	are. In	a	minimal	association	between	thoughts,	whenever	one	thinks	a	thought	involving	the concept	'salt'-such	as	that	the	chips	are	salty,	or	that	the	soup	needs	more	salt,	or	that	salt on	the	roads	prevents	skidding-	one	is	disposed	to	think	a	thought-any	thought- involving	the	concept	'pepper.'	A	minimal	association	between	thoughts	is	therefore	a	kind of	association	between	concepts.	When	it	is	used	in	a	salt-thought,	the	concept	'salt' triggers	a	pepper-thought.	But	which	thoughts	are	triggered	is	not	constrained	by	the semantic	relationships	between	them. Both	kinds	of	minimal	associations	leave	entirely	open	what	standing	attitudes	the	subject has	toward	the	things	denoted	by	the	concepts,	such	as	salt	and	pepper.	A	subject	with	a minimal	association	may	have	zero	further	opinions	about	salt	and	pepper,	if	for	her,	the concepts	are	no	more	related	than	the	words	"tic"	"tac"	and	"toe."	If	she	does	have	further opinions,	she	may	think	that	salt	goes	well	with	pepper,	that	salt	and	pepper	should	never be	seen	or	tasted	together,	that	where	there	is	salt	there	tends	to	be	pepper,	that	salt	and pepper	are	exclusive	seasonings,	or	any	of	an	enormous	variety	of	other	thoughts.	No standing	outlook	about	how	the	things	denoted	by	the	concepts	are	related	belongs	to	a minimal	association. A	minimal	association	between	'black'	(or	a	more	specific	racial	concept)	and	'crime'	could be	an	artifact	of	a	presumption	that	black	men	are	especially	unlikely	to	be	holding	a	crimerelated	object.	If	they're	not	an	artifact	of	this	kind	of	presumption,	and	they	are	merely minimal,	they	do	not	belong	to	the	same	phenomenon	as	the	racialized	perceptions	and attitudes	discussed	in	section	1.	Minimal	associations	are	also	unable	to	explain	several other	experimental	results	from	cognitive	science: The	shooter	task:	Participants	in	an	experiment	play	a	video	game.	They	are supposed	to	press	either	a	button	designated	for	"shoot"	or	"don't	shoot,"	depending on	whether	the	person	they	see	on	the	screen	(the	target)	is	holding	a	gun	or	an innocuous	object-such	as	a	cell	phone	or	wallet.	The	targets	are	men.	Sometimes the	men	are	black,	sometimes	white.	Participants	more	frequently	press	"shoot" when	shown	an	unarmed	black	target	than	they	do	when	shown	an	unarmed	white 8 target	(Correll	et	al.	2002,	Correll	et	al.	2007,	Plant	and	Peruche	2005,	Glaser	and Knowles	2008,	James	et	al.	2013). Age	overestimation:	Participants	are	shown	a	picture	of	a	boy	aged	10–17,	paired with	a	description	of	a	crime	that	the	boy	is	said	to	have	committed.	They	are	asked to	estimate	the	boy's	age.	Across	subjects,	the	pictures	of	boys	and	their	names change,	but	the	crime	descriptions	stay	the	same.	Both	police	officers	and	collegeage	laypersons	overestimate	the	age	of	black	boys	by	at	least	four	years	when	the crime	is	a	felony,	but	overestimate	ages	of	white	and	latino	boys	by	only	two	years, for	the	same	crime.	On	a	scale	of	culpability,	black	boys	are	rated	more	culpable	than white	or	latino	boys	for	the	same	crime.	(Goff	et	al.	2014) Looking	deathworthy:	Defendants	in	capital	crimes	whose	victims	are	white	are more	likely	to	be	sentenced	by	juries	to	death,	the	more	stereotypically	black	their faces	appear.	(Eberhardt	et	al.	2006) Minimal	associations	do	not	predict	the	Looking	Deathworthy	result,	or	age overestimation.	These	results	link	'black	man'	and	with	negative	concepts	in	a	specific	way, not	just	minimally.	Minimal	associations	also	do	not	predict	one	pattern	of	shooting	error over	any	other.	That's	because	a	minimal	association	between	'black'	(or	a	more	specific racial	concept)	and	'crime'	could	be	an	artifact	of	many	different	presumptions.	For instance,	it	could	be	an	artifact	of	the	presumption	that	black	men	are	especially	unlikely	to be	holding	a	crime-related	object.	But	the	results	of	the	experiments	would	not	be explained	by	that	presumption.	It	would	not	explain	why	participants	are	so	ready	to	press "shoot"	when	the	target	is	black. The	fact	that	that	minimal	associations	can't	explain	these	results	strengthens	the	idea	that culturally	prevalent	attitudes	sometimes	operate	in	the	minds	of	individuals	in	ways	that are	typical	of	beliefs.	They	contribute	to	the	interpretation	of	information,	they	lead	to inferences,	and	they	guide	action. 3.	Epistemology If	racialized	bias	operates	in	the	mind	in	the	same	basic	ways	as	beliefs,	then	nothing	in	the structure	of	such	biases	precludes	them	from	being	epistemically	evaluable	in	the	same way	that	beliefs	can	be.	Beliefs	are	evaluable	along	two	dimensions: first,	they	can	be	true or	false,	and	second,	they	can	be	proper	responses	to	a	subject's	evidence	or	not.	The	most general	version	of	the	second	dimension	is	that	beliefs	can	be	formed	and	maintained epistemically	well	or	epistemically	badly. A	belief	or	judgment	is	ill-founded	if	it	is	formed or	maintained	epistemically	badly,	and	in	contrast	it	is	well-founded	if	it	is	formed	and maintained	epistemically	well.	Being	ill-founded	or	well-founded	is	distinct	from	being	true or	false.	True	beliefs	can	be	ill-founded,	and	well-founded	beliefs	can	be	false. We've	seen	that	racialized	bias	can	influence	perception	in	several	different	ways,	by affecting	the	contents	of	perceptual	experience,	the	role	of	experience	in	the	forming 9 beliefs,	or	the	contents	of	beliefs	formed	in	response	to	perception.	These	functional differences	involve	different	kinds	of	epistemic	impact	on	the	perceiver. For	instance,	in	the	Bypass	scenario,	you	have	very	good	grounds	from	your	experience	to think	that	the	thing	you're	seeing	is	a	tool,	but	you	end	up	judging	that	it's	a	gun.	Here,	your judgment	is	ill-founded,	because	it	is	formed	in	a	way	that	does	not	take	account	of	the evidence	you	have.	By	contrast,	if	you	look	in	the	fridge	for	some	mustard	and	see	the	jar	on the	shelf,	normally	you	have	very	good	reason	to	think	that	there's	mustard	in	the	fridge.	If you	believe	that	there's	mustard	in	the	fridge	on	the	basis	of	seeing	it,	then	your	belief	is well-founded.	If	there	is	mustard	in	the	fridge,	and	you	believe	that	there	is,	but	you	believe this	because	you	have	a	superstition	that	mustard	appears	in	the	fridge	when	the	sun comes	out	and	disappears	when	the	sun	goes	behind	the	clouds,	then	your	belief	is	true	but ill-founded. If	we	want	to	know	what	kind	of	epistemic	impact	racialized	bias	makes	on	perception,	we can	treat	racialized	bias	as	an	ill-founded	belief.	And	then	we	can	ask:	what	epistemic impact	would	an	ill-founded	belief	make	on	perception? A	first	observation	is	that	if	perceptual	judgment	ends	up	congruent	with	ill-founded racialized	bias,	then	perception	is	pressed	into	service	of	an	ill-founded	outlook,	either	by making	the	outlook	seem	supported	by	experience	via	cognitive	penetration	or	attention, or	by	making	experience	irrelevant	to	judgment	(bypass,	introspective	error). A	second	observation	when	ill-founded	bias	influences	perceptual	experience	through cognitive	penetration,	as	special	philosophical	problem	arises.	Here	is	a	simple	example. Jack	and	Jill	have	a	complicated	relationship.	One	day,	Jill	is	worried	that	Jack	is	angry	with her.	She's	anxious	to	see	him	so	that	she	can	figure	out	where	things	stand.	When	she	sees him,	her	suspicion	that	he's	angry	affects	the	way	he	looks	to	her.	In	reality,	Jack's expression	is	neutral.	If	you	saw	him,	his	face	would	look	neutral	to	you.	But	he	looks	angry to	Jill. Does	Jill's	visual	experience	give	her	reason	to	believe	that	Jack	is	angry? On	the	one	hand,	if	Jack	really	looks	angry	to	Jill	when	she	sees	him,	and	she	has	no indication	that	her	experience	is	due	to	her	fear,	then	what	else	could	Jill	reasonably believe	about	Jack's	emotional	state,	other	than	that	he's	angry?	To	her,	that's	just	how	he looks.	From	Jill's	point	of	view,	she's	in	an	utterly	ordinary	circumstance. On	the	other	hand,	it	looks	like	what's	happening	to	Jill	is	that	fear	is	leading	to	her	belief, via	an	experience.	If	it's	wrong	to	base	your	belief	on	an	unfounded	fear,	why	should	be okay	to	base	your	belief	on	an	experience	that	comes	from	an	unfounded	fear? The	philosophical	problem	is	that	this	simple	Yes-No	question	has	no	simple	answer.	It	is called	the	problem	of	hijacked	experiences,	to	capture	the	idea	that	in	these	cases, perceptual	experience	is	hijacked	by	fear,	and	in	being	overly	influenced	by,	it's	overly influenced	by	a	factor	that	in	some	intuitive	sense	shouldn't	be	steering	it	(Siegel	2016, 2017). 10 Since	the	problem	takes	the	form	of	a	Yes-No	question,	one	form	its	solution	could	take	is	to argue	that	one	of	these	answers	is	correct. In	the	rest	of	this	section,	I	explore	the	position that	the	correct	answer	is	No,	it's	not	reasonable	for	Jill	to	believe	her	eyes,	because perceptual	experiences	can	actually	be	formed	irrationally	or	rationally,	in	response	to expectations	–	even	if	you	have	no	idea	how	your	perceptions	came	about.,	and	even	if you're	not	aware	of	the	fact	that	you	in	effect	reasoned	your	way	to	your	experience	from your	expectations.	Believing	that	someone's	happy	just	because	want	them	to	be	happy	is called	wishful	thinking.	Believing	that	someone's	angry,	or	dangerous,	just	because	we	fear that	they	are	is	called	fearful	thinking. This	position	says	that	Jill's	situation	is	like	fearful	thinking	–	except	its	fearful	seeing,	and fearful	seeing	redounds	just	as	badly	on	a	person	as	fearful	thinking	does	(At	least,	when the	fear	is	unfounded).	It	is	called	the	Rationality	of	Perception	solution	to	the epistemological	problem	(Siegel	2017,	Clark	2018). This	of	course	is	not	the	only	solution.	Some	say	No,	but	give	a	different	backstory	about why	No	is	the	right	answer	(Lord	2019,	Ghijsen	2018,	McGrath	2013a,	2013b,	Peacocke 2018).	Others	say	Yes	(Pautz	2019,	Huemer	2013,	Fumerton	2013).	Or	you	can	say	both,	by saying	Yes	in	some	ways	and	No	in	others. Like	most	philosophical	problems,	this	problem has	many	possible	solutions. The	Rationality	of	Perception	solution	is	especially	interesting	for	two	kinds	of	reasons. First,	it	can	make	a	difference	in	legal	contexts.	The	social	versions	of	the	perceptual hijacking	are	especially	vivid	and	extreme	when	perception	leads	quickly	to	violence,	and often	death.	In	the	first	decades	of	the	21st	century	cases	like	these	have	been	brought	them to	the	front	of	political	discussion	were	Black	Lives	Matter	movement.	There	was	the shooting	and	killing	of	12-year	old	Tamir	Rice	in	Cleveland,	where	the	officers'	decided	to shoot	within	a	few	moments	of	perceiving	the	boy,	who	they	were	told	had	a	gun, describing	the	boy	as	"about	20	years	old".	There	was	the	killing	of	eighteen	year	old Michael	Brown	by	officer	Darren	Wilson,	who	testified	to	a	grand	jury	about	how	Michael Brown's	face	looked	to	him	when	they	were	physically	struggling	by	saying	that	Wilson "had	the	most	intense	aggressive	face.	The	only	way	I	can	describe	it,	it	looks	like	a	demon, that's	how	angry	he	looked." We	don't	know	exactly	what	perceptual	experiences	these	particular	officers	have,	just	as we	don't	know	whether	to	interpret	psychological	results	as	concerning	experience	or judgment.	So	the	cases	don't	necessarily	give	us	more	instances	of	the	problem	of	hijacked experience,	since	that	problem	is	specific	to	influences	on	perceptual	experience. But	to	think	through	possible	solutions	to	that	problem,	we	don't	need	actual	cases	of influences	on	experience.	We	can	use	hypothetical	versions	of	the	actual	cases,	where	we just	assume	for	the	sake	of	argument	that	racialized	expectations	gave	rise	to	perceptual experiences	in	which	young	people	appear	threatening	and	dangerous	to	the	perceivers. And	then	we	can	ask:	if	these	perceptual	experiences	were	manifestations	of	racialized 11 attitude	that	black	boys	and	men	are	dangerous,	is	it	reasonable	for	people	having	those perceptual	experiences	to	believe	their	eyes? It	will	seem	reasonable	to	them.	In	fact	it	will	seem	as	reasonable	as	it	is	to	conclude	that there's	mustard	in	the	fridge,	when	you	open	the	door	and	see	the	mustard.	But	these examples	make	clear	the	consequences	of	letting	your	solution	to	the	problem	be	guided	by how	things	seem	to	the	perceiver.	The	idea	that	perceptual	experiences	can	come	about irrationally	helps	us	see	why	we	don't	have	to	be	guided	in	that	way. Police	officers	are	legally	allowed	to	use	force	based	on	perception	of	threat,	so	long	as their	perception	is	defined	as	reasonable	–	and	it's	prosecutors,	judges,	juries	or	grand juries	that	are	allowed	to	determine	what's	reasonable.	It	is	hard	to	see	how	you	could	have a	police	force	at	all,	without	leeway	for	using	force,	and	hard	to	see	how	you	could	have	a decent	policy	about	such	leeway	without	something	like	a	reasonable	person	standard.	The difficulty	comes	in	applying	the	standard.	(For	discussion,	see	reading	suggestions	under "Bias	and	the	Law"). Both	the	officer	who	shot	and	killed	Tamir	Rice	(Timony	Loehmann)	and	the	one	who	shot and	killed	Michael	Brown	(Darren	Wilson)	were	not	convicted,	and	their	actions,	and therefore	their	beliefs	about	threat,	were	found	by	the	legal	system	to	be	reasonable. Those	verdicts	mobilized	thousands	people	who	felt	that	what	the	officers	did	couldn't possibly	have	been	reasonable	responses	to	the	situation,	because	they	their	estimations	of the	threat	or	danger	posed	by	these	young	people	was	so	far	off	the	mark	(Lebron	2017). When	those	juries,	judges	or	prosecutors	determine	whether	a	defendant's	perception	is reasonable,	they're	supposed	to	consider	what	a	reasonable	person	in	the	defendants' circumstances	would	believe	about	whether	they	face	an	imminent	severe	threat,	and	if	so, how	imminent	and	severe	that	threat	is.	They	are	supposed	to	ask	what	would	be reasonable	to	believe	about	those	things,	in	those	circumstances. On	the	prevailing	view,	both	in	philosophy	and	in	law,	what	it's	reasonable	for	people	to believe	depends	in	part	on	how	it's	reasonable	to	respond	to	the	way	things	look	to	them (in	this	case,	the	way	other	people	look	to	them).	How	one	comes	to	have	the	perceptual experiences	they're	responding	to	isn't	supposed	to	matter.	If	someone	looked	dangerous to	you,	it'd	be	reasonable	for	you	to	believe	that	they're	dangerous.	And	if	you	looked dangerous	to	someone	else,	you	should	excuse	them	if	they	become	agitated	upon	seeing you,	because	it's	reasonable	to	be	agitated	in	response	in	danger. On	the	Rationality	of	Perception	view,	the	reasonableness	of	a	belief	doesn't	just	depend	on how	you	respond	to	the	perceptions	you	have.	It	can	also	depend	on	which	perceptual experiences	you	have	in	the	first	place.	For	instance,	the	danger-experience	could	be inferred	from	unreasonable	expectations	built	into	racial	prejudice,	and	then	it	will	be	an experience	that's	not	reasonable	to	have.	This	way,	when	we	assess	what	a	reasonable person	under	similar	circumstances	would	believe,	we	need	not	hold	constant	their experience.	A	reasonable	person	in	similar	circumstances	would	not	have	an	experience that	they	inferred	from	an	unreasonable	prejudice. 12 Finally,	the	Rationality	of	Perception	view	challenges	the	idea	that	perceptual	experience occurs	prior	to	reasoning	in	the	mind.	We	reason	from	information	we	have	already, whereas	perception	is	a	way	of	taking	in	new	and	current	information	about	the environment.	We're	used	to	thinking	about	perceptual	experience	as	part	of	what	we respond	to,	rather	than	already	a	response	to	what	we	believe,	suspect,	or	feel.	We	think	of perceptual	experience	that	way	because	we	feel	passive	with	respect	to	it.	It	never	feels	like we're	reasoning	our	way	to	experience.	Going	with	that,	we're	used	to	locating	perceptual experience	off	the	grid	of	moral	or	epistemic	evaluation.	The	Rationality	of	Perception picture	is	different.	It	puts	perceptual	experience	on	par	with	beliefs	when	it	comes	to justification	and	morality. 13 References Allport, G. (1954). The Nature of Prejudice. Addison-Wesley. Bijlstra, G. et al (2014). Stereotype Associations and Emotion Recognition. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 40(5), 567–577. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167213520458 Clark, A. (2018). Priors and Prejudices: Comments on Susanna Siegel's The Rationality of Perception. Res Philosophica, 95(4), 741-750. Coates, T. N. (2015). Between the World and Me. Random House. Cooper, A. J. (1892). A Voice from the South. Aldine Printing House. Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., and Wittenbrink, B. (2002). The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate Potentially Threatening Individuals. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83(6), 1314-1329. Correll, J., Park, B., Judd, C. M., Wittenbrink, B., Sadler, M. S., and Keesee, T. (2007). Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92(6), 1006. Crenshaw, K. (2015). Black Girls Matter. Ms. Magazine, 25(2), 26-29. Dilulio, J. (1996). My Black Crime Problem, and Ours. City Journal, 6(2), 14-28. Dotson, K. (2017). Theorizing Jane Crow, Theorizing Unknowability. Social Epistemology, 31(5), 417430. Duncan, B. L. (1976). Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping of Blacks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34(4), 590-598. Eberhardt, J. L., Goff, P. A., Purdie, V. J., and Davies, P. G. (2004). Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87(6), 876-893. Eberhardt, J. L., Davies, P. G., Purdie-Vaughns, V., and Johnson, S. L. (2006). Looking Deathworthy: Perceived Stereotypicality of Black Defendants Predicts Capital-Sentencing Outcomes. Psychological Science, 17(5), 383-388. Firestone, C. and Scholl, B. (2015) Can you experience 'top-down' effects on perception?: The case of race categories and perceived lightness. Psychonomic Bulletin Rev. 2015 Jun;22(3):694-700. doi: 10.3758/s13423-014-0711-5. Fumerton, R. (2013). Siegel on the Epistemic Impact of 'Checkered' Experience. Philosophical Studies, 162(3), 733-739. Cadogan, G. (2018) "Black and Blue". in The Fire This Time, ed. Jesmyn Ward. New York: Scribner. 14 129-144. Ghijsen, H. (2018). How to Explain the Rationality of Perception. Analysis, 78(3), 500-512. Glaser, J. (2014). Suspect Race: Causes and Consequences of Racial Profiling. Oxford University Press. Glaser, J. and Knowles, E. (2008). Implicit Motivation to Control Prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44(1), 164-172. Goff, P. A., Jackson, M. C., Di Leone, B. L., Culotta, C. M., and DiTomasso, N. A. (2014). The Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(4), 526-545. Hinton, E. (2016). From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime. Harvard University Press. Huemer, M. (2013). Epistemological Asymmetries Between Belief and Experience. Philosophical Studies, 162(3), 741-748. James, L., Vila, B., and Daratha, K. (2013). Results from experimental trials testing participant responses to White, Hispanic and Black suspects in high-fidelity deadly force judgment and decision-making simulations. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 9(2), 189-212. Johnson, D.J. and Wilson, J.P. (2019) "Racial Bias in perceptions and size and strength: the impact of stereotypes and group differences" Psychological Science.	https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619827529 Johnson, K. L., Freeman, J. B., & Pauker, K. (2012). Race is gendered: How covarying phenotypes and stereotypes bias sex categorization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(1), 116–131. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0025335 Lebron, C. J. (2017). The making of black lives matter: A brief history of an idea. Oxford University Press. Lerman, A. and Weaver, V. (2014). Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control. University of Chicago Press. Levin, M. (1992). Responses to Race Differences in Crime. Journal of Social Philosophy, 23(1), 5-29. Levin, D. T., and Banaji, M. R. (2006). Distortions in the Perceived Lightness of Faces: The Role of Race Categories. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 135(4), 501. Lord, E. (forthcoming). The Vices of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. McGrath, M. (2013a). Phenomenal Conservatism and Cognitive Penetration: the 'Bad Basis' Counterexamples. Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, 225247. Oxford University Press. McGrath, M. (2013b). Siegel and the Impact for Epistemological Internalism. Philosophical Studies, 162(3), 723-732. 15 Mendelberg, T. (2001). The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality. Princeton University Press. Morris, M. (2016). Pushout: The Criminalization of Black Girls in Schools. The New Press. Murray, P. (1970). The Liberation of Black Women. Words of Fire: An Anthology of Black Feminist Thought, 186-198. The New Press. Pautz, A. (forthcoming) The Irrationality of Perception. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Payne, B. K. (2001). Prejudice and Perception: The Role of Automatic and Controlled Processes in Misperceiving a Weapon. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81(2), 181. Payne, B. K. (2006). Weapon Nias: Split-Second Decisions and Unintended Stereotyping. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 15(6), 287-291. Peacocke, C. (2018). Are Perceptions Reached by Rational Inference? Comments on Susanna Siegel, The Rationality of Perception. Res Philosophica, 95(4), 751-760. Plant, E. A., and Peruche, B. M. (2005). The Consequences of Race for Police Officers' Responses to Criminal Suspects. Psychological Science, 16(3), 180-183. Sagar, H. A. and Schofield, J. W. (1980). Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and White Children's Perceptions of Ambiguously Aggressive Acts. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39(4), 590-598. Siegel, S. (2016) Epistemic Charge. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 115(3), 277-306. Siegel, S. (2017) The Rationality of Perception. Oxford University Press. Steele, C. (2011). Whistling Vivaldi: And Other Clues to How Stereotypes Affect Us. Norton. Stokes, M. B. and Payne, B. K. (2010). Mental Control and Visual Illusions: Errors of Action and Construal in Race-Based Weapon Misidentification. The Science of Social Vision, 295-305. Wilson, J. P., Hugenberg, K., & Rule, N. O. (2017). Racial bias in judgments of physical size and formidability: From size to threat. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 113(1), 59–80. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspi0000092 Yancy, G. (2008). Elevators, Social Spaces, and Racism: A Philosophical Analysis. Philosophy and Social Criticism, 34(8), 843-876. Glossary	terms Bias: 16 Implicit	bias: Associations: Minimal	associations: Ill-founded:	a	mental	state	is	ill-founded	just	in	case	it	is	formed	or	maintained epistemically	badly. Recommendations	for	additional	reading Association	and	associationism	in	psychology: Mandelbaum, Eric, "Associationist Theories of Thought", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/associationist-thought/>. Implicit	bias	in	psychology: Lai,	C.	K.,	et	al.	(2016).	Reducing	implicit	racial	preferences:	II.	Intervention	effectiveness across	time. Journal	of	Experimental	Psychology:	General,	145,	1001-1016. Lai,	C.	K.,	et	al	(2014).	Reducing	implicit	racial	preferences:	I.	A	comparative	investigation of	17	interventions.	Journal	of	Experimental	Psychology:	General,	143,	1765-1785. Bias,	implicit	bias,	reasonableness,	and	the	law: R.	Bollinger	(2017)	"Reasonable	mistakes	and	regulative	norms"	Journal	of	Political Philosophy 25:1	196-217. M.	Brownstein	(2017)	The	implicit	mind.	Oxford B.	Harcourt	(2007)	Against	Prediction	University	of	Chicago	Press. C.	Lee,	Murder	and	the	reasonable	man G.	Loury	(2002)	The	Anatomy	of	Racial	Inequality.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University	Press. R.	Schauer	(2003)	Profiles,	Probabilities,	and	Stereotypes.	Cambridge:	Harvard	University Press. Epistemology	and	belief: R.	Basu	(2019)	"The	wrongs	of	racist	beliefs"	Philosophical	Studies	(forthcoming) K.	Dotson	(2018)	"Accumulating	Epistemic	Power"	Philosophical	Topics 46:1. J.	Munton	(2017)	"The	eye's	mind:	perceptual	process	and	epistemic	norms" Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):317-347. 17 S.	Siegel	(2011)	Cognitive	Penetrability	and	Perceptual	Justification	Nous	. S.	Siegel	(2013)	The	Epistemic	Impact	of	the	Etiology	of	Experience	–	Symposium	with comments	by	Richard	Fumerton,	Michael	Huemer,	Matthew	McGrath	and	replies. Philosophical	Studies	162 Cultural	analysis: T.	Coates	(2015)	Between	the	world	and	me J.	Ward,	ed.	(2018)	The	Fire	This	Time Lebron,	C.	(2017)	The	making	of	Black	Lives	Matter:	A	brief	history	of	an	idea.	Oxford University	Press. Web	resources Ethics	in	the	World	series	–	Book	talk	on	The	Rationality	of	Perception	(focuses	on	cultural analysis	and	the	problem	of	hijacked	perception) http://forum-network.org/lectures/susanna-siegel-rationality-perception/ Brains	Blog	on	The	Rationality	of	Perception	(focuses	on	inference	and	epistemology): http://philosophyofbrains.com/category/books/susanna-siegel-the-rationality-ofperception Study	questions 1.	Bias-induced	illusions	could	differ	with	respect	to	how	long	they	persist	in	light	of further	information.	For	example,	suppose	someone	sees	a	black	man	as	angry	even	though his	facial	expression	is	neutral.	What	kinds	of	factors	would	you	expect	to	make	an	illusion like	this	end,	once	it	begins?	What	kinds	of	experiments	could	measure	the	persistence	of illusions? 2.	Suppose	you	knew	someone	was	susceptible	to	bias-induced	illusions,	and	you	had	to brainstorm	ways	to	make	them	less	susceptible	to	them.	What	strategies	come	to	mind? Are	they	focused	around	individuals,	groups	who	have	the	same	susceptibilities,	groups that	differ	greatly	in	their	susceptibilities?	What	advantages	and	drawbacks	do	the potential	strategies	have? 3. Can	you	think	of	examples	besides	racialized	bias	where	someone's	perceptions	are inflected	with	their	antecedent	commitments?	Can	you	find	examples	of	this	in	fiction?	In the	cases	you	come	up	with,	does	the	influence	help	the	person	epistemically,	or	make	it worse	for	them,	or	both? 4.	In	discussing	Levin	and	Banaji	(2006),	Firestone	and	Scholl	(2015)	argue	that	the	effect isn't	due	to	racial	on	the	basis	of	a	second	study	in	which	the	"black"	face	still	looked	darker even	though	the	images	were	blurred	in	ways	that	masked	the	features	that	standardly 18 elicit	the	racial	categorizations	"black"	and	'white.	If	the	original	effect	is	stronger	than	the subsequent	one,	does	the	critique	by	Firestone	and	Scholl	settle	whether	racial	categories affect	the	perception	of	lightness? 5. Some	people	think	that	our	biases	directly	affect	perception	(how	things	look	to	us) whereas	other	people	think	that	biases	only	affect	the	judgments	and	interpretations	we form	on	the	basis	of	what	we	see	(what	we	think	about	how	things	look).	What	kinds	of evidence	might	help	us	decide	between	these	two	possibilities?