gical grcal 6) 's rort from "Thro Communitieo," C-ommunities," nd '.A Que$ion of 'this paper. Howad riticisms. The paper h Potter, and Nancy bnily. CRITICIZING TI{E FEMINIST CRMIQUE OF OBJECTIVTTY E. R. Klein Univenity of North Florida science, it would s€em is not s€xless; she is a man, a father and infected too" _ virginia woolfi 1. Introduction This quotation has beoome the battle cry of feminisl philosophers ofscience. It has led many a feminisl to searchfor, and oo-"Jr, .,ort numbersof historical (and contemporary) exampres of sexism ,u,,ooodiog the scien-tific enterprise. Most feminisr critiques focus on the practice of science. That is, theycririci?E both "the ua)6 in which women are inhibited from enrcring into ryience professions'2 and the wap in which science has, and is, being used(by men) to oppress women. some feminist philosophers of science, however, focus on the scientif-i" ryt !4 irself by oiticizing the classical desiderata of the scientific method. special focus is paid to the notion of objectivig. objectivity, claim*T"' is only "ostensibly [the] non-involved stance.'s In actGrty, ii is tne male stance. Therefore, the story goes, our respect for the scientific method is simply an outoome of our traditional (sexisf henoe, male-biase<r) pottical inclinations. . Practice-critiques, then, claim only to demonstrate that men in the sciences are s€xisq that they are infected. But method-critiques are intended to lhow something far more provocative: namely, that science is, asentially, sexist; that t is infectedRanz Ptps 18 (Frll t99ll: 5749, Copyrighr o 1993. 57 58 REASON PAPERS NO. 18 This paper concentrates on the -method-critiques of feminist philosoohersandattempts.o'.0",non,.rateth€t.theircasg_thatscienceisessen. iiallv male_biased, via"tlri-ir Jri,rquo of o'pctiuityhT not b en made' ln addition, I will show inat naO' it been made' and the call rc feminize science answered, such changes would, ultimately, hurt women' 2. Interpretations of Objectivity The concept of objectiviry is fleshed-out in a number of different ways by a number of different ffi?#";;i nrq Bleier and Catharine MacKinnon' .obiectivity, O .ynoofro* ** t "vatue-free stance"'4 and the "non-invotveo stance,"s 'd;t"#ty' gi"ryo Fox Ketter states that the objectivist ideologi proclaims 5Ji'ioGot"'6 a characterization similar to Jean Grimshaw,s understanding-"'i "ii*li*ty as "impartiality.'z And S-andra Harding has an entirely oine?eit oi" on in" -n."pt of obiectivity' she claims that objectivity ..is nor ;;rir"d through value-neutrility";s for, according to Harding, the paradigm models of objective science are those studies explicitly oi'"ti"J-uy moruily and politically emancipatory interests-thatis,byinterestsineliminatingsexist'racist'classist, and culturally coercive understandings of nature and social life.s Iwillexamineeachofthethreedifferentinterpretationsof objeaivity-(r1 pofiil*fiy emanciPatory-' (2) value-ftee-or non-innolved' and (3)impartiariry"''Jititil'rest-inorderto'show:(1)thatthefirstinterpretation is too uocon**ionat to tate seriousiy u. "'t"tg"t for philosophical criricism rrom eitier ^i"*.iri or ooor"minirt camPs; p1 tn"t the second caricatures trr" "onlpi"i'"ti*iitit 1"io W mosi'scientiss and philosoohers of science unO' tn"refoie' need "til"'defended from feminist criti' iism; ano (3) that only the tnirC.interpr"otioo properly'characterizes objectivity and, ,t *, oJy il is a worthy !"tg;;f feirinfut criticism; but that the criricisms leveled ';;"iil i -n*rirO ;; i" terms of impartiality and disinterest__ar" oo, ,i"fr"i-"oi-foirf"iming that science, itself, is sexist' "' o'tff:#gr^K:::'"!tK1""'*.y oas' I think' "l'19.v been thoroughrv criticized uy rrisiin snrader-Freche,,".io tn"t"fore, I will merely point out the relevant passage in her critique'. Schrader-Fritrette smtes that because Harding is not employing the term 'objectivity' in iu ordinary cRmcI2 sense"'herust defended it, and I tive . [that i becomes more ob inrcrests...hc laYs claim to obje ClearlY, Harding ity more fullY or rett above. Until she has t ftom classicaF2 philosr nists.l3 B. ObjectivitY as value' The form of the stanoe is quite simPlr method; the desfe to therefore, "science,J a UnfortunatelY fc free stance is not ess the second Premise' et Most "Postmodt nize that "nature is n pointed out, we now realiz their obiects of mental physics' under observatt struments a sig [llhe scientific This is not an (see below)' Toulmin ity in a way that ack tific studY (be theY o Such restructu: sEnce; however, it d ing the desire and at ExamPles of abound. TheY occur' putes at conferences evaluate the work ol CRMCIZING THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE 59 rf feminist philosort science is essennot been made. ln e call to feminize )men. different wap by a harine MacKinnon, and the "non-inhat the objectivist lar to Jean Grimrd Sandra Harding g. She claims that rfor, according to hose studies rmancipatory racist, classe and social rterpretations of non-involved, and the first interpreI for philosophical ) that the second rtists and philosolom feminist critiharacterizes objeccism; but that the paftiality and disis sexist. I been thoroughly merely point out sense . . . her use is question-begging both because she has not defended it, and because this sense of the term is highly stipula_ tive . . lthat is,] she does nor explain how sciintific work becomes more objective by being direcied by morar and political interests . . . -how work e4pressing moral and political values lap claim to objectivity.u clearly, Harding must either develop this unusual account of objectiv-ity more fully or retreat to one of the more ordinary senses described above. until she has done this, her account is neither worthy of criticism from-classicall2 philosophers of science, nor deserving of defense by femi_ nkts.13 B. Objectivity as value-free The form of the feminist argument against objectivity qua a value-fr,lstan:e -is -quite simple: A value-free stanoe is essentia[ to tn" scientific method; the desire to achieve a value-ftee stance is an androcentric goal; therefore, "science ls a masculine project."lf unfortunately for the feminists, this first premise is false-a value-free stance is not essential to science or the scientific method; therefore, the second premise, even if true, speaks to a straw acoount. Most "postmodern"ls scientists (and philosophen of science) recog-nize that "nature is no longer at arm's length..ro ar st"pt "o Toulmin trsspointed out, we now realiz&, [that] the interaction between scientists and their objeca of study is a two-way affair. . . . Even in fundamental phpics, for instance, the fact that subatomic particles are under observation will make the influence of the piysicists' in_ struments a significant element in the phenomena themselves... fihe scientific observer is now-willy-nilly-also a participant.t, This is not an acceptance of subjectivit',; that wourd be going too far (see below). Toulmin has only restructured the classical *o."pi orlulectiv_ ity in a way that acknowledges that we can no longer tt""t ooj".s of scientific study (be they other peopte or elecrrons) in purely objeaiheo ways. such restruauring does not depend on the riotioi of a value-ftee stance; however, it does maintain the spirit of classical objeaivity by stressing the desire and attempt to remain uiUiasea. Examples of not-quite-value-free,but-nonetheless-unbiased acts abound" They occur, for example, any t:ms we adjudicate philosophical disputes at @nferences, moderate philosophical anaipes in ihe classroom, or evaluate the work of our students. To quote Toutmin again: its ordinary 60 REASON PAPERS NO. 18 In all these cases, to be -objective does not require us to be uninterested, triui'i''-0"*iO bf interests or feelings; it requires us only to "txol*"t"ig" tt'ot".int1ests and feelings' to discount anv resulting uii** "io prejudices' and to do our best to act in " di"iot"tttted waY'to Feminist criticism which is aimed at obiectiviq :-î"''":t::"t"" stance' value-neutrality, non-involvedness' or "nlnter"*ieoness simply misses the point. . *,;:T?r"##rH,fl of science and scienti'c methodolost do address the concept of objectivity in is more t";hiJ;; form-via lie notion of a disinterested or ffi;# rl"'."-*r,i;..-t,ill claiming that the classical concept is sexist' #;'itr;;"ni tioot of criticisms are offered' The first focuses on the n"*"o"oii*f rendering' of the texts of science u, anoro""nit in"."*oo focuses on the claim that "humans cannot be impartial ";;;d,,*-iecorden oi,n" world."re Both are problematic. 1The hermeneutical faltacy'P: ntt' kind of criticism focuses on the factthatobiectivityhasbeeng"no",i,,dmale,whilesubjectivityhasbeen genderized female' ,---^ /â *o-., faminists) from a number of Such genderization is obvious (to many fe inists) n avenues: feminist ffiiJ; ioi"rpr"tlii-on, urlrury criticism, and psychoanalvsis. irst to name ""i"*' rt " ttlln tnai nere ut" o'"yt to " 'read science 'u, u i""t' [which] ;;i the social t*ni"e-the hidden symbolic and cultural agendas<f p"rp.r,"orv [cisinterffizo ctaims and practices"'2l This "reading" of text "#t;;ttiaten1tJ i#ioito) thal s:rence is "inextricably conneaea wiin*specinc mayufile ' ' ' needs and desires''z2 This kind ";;"#;;u,i*t "oio"nce is illegitimate because it presup" poses precis"ry ;;;-u"iog tn"u"ogJ; ;*d thatthe concept of 'disinterestedstance.isitsermale-biased.'tosimptyadoptanandrocentnc interpretationwithoutoffering,o'"1*tinltioo.t6'suchanadopdonisto beg the question' . . -- -r:--d,,iar The hermeneutical "feason" is not the2 No sucn thing as obiectivity ' ti@l t i only justification iem'inlst critio *PPty;"; I"i""lt-T"rclassicat notion of objectivitv. rn"o ifril;;;;t"t 'i"it it that we can never act in a dis- *,"t*affirg;? Is this a fact of human psychologr or the logicavepistemological outcome ; il fact thar ttrere-is io'oisinterested stance to be had? a The psyiiotogical point' 1t1"mttsi critics meaT the former' then the,, claim-rn"i'1if,o-*un 6einp *n"iilo-; in a disinterested wa/'-is in the same uno oi trouble ,0", ,orroo]i; ,h" psychological egoist's claim that ..human beingp can never uo ""a"pjio tn"ii oo'o best interest'" As an CR empirical thesis, unfalsifiable. The argum a disinterested r (e.g., when we ri students earned I b. The ePis ably not what fe shortcomings in from being disin If the onll tory of male4o stance is the onl Unfortunal the no-unbiased thority Thomas Kuhnian s theories at [demonstn objeaivea And without ob Of course, debate: Is he n against objectiv say that at besl that he has not BrieflY, K of his version Either it suPpc on the one har the other. As I the possibilitY Paradigms."zi Although radical reading inists cannot si commensurabil of criticism of the other han particular feml work [n eithe pletely Kuhn-il Luire us to be lgs; it requires gS, to discount best to act in a value-free stanse, simply mises the hodologl do address n-via the notion of lg that the classical [ered. ing of the texts of n that "humans can' e Both are problem' ricism focuses on the lubjectivity has been r) ftom a number of ism, and psychoanalys to " 'read science en symbolic and culrnd practices."2l This t science is "in€xtrilesires.'22 F because it presupthe concept of 'dislopt an androentric rch an adoPtion is to il "reason" is not the [e classical notion of r never act in a disthe logicavePistemod stance to be had? ean the former, then disinterested waY'-is rlogical egoist's claim best interesL" As an I I I I CRMCIZING THE FEMINIST CRMQUE 61 empirical thesis, the egoist's claim is either false (e.g., Mother Theresa) or unfalsifiable. The argument against the claim that "human beings can never act in a disinterested way" follonn suit-as an empirical thesis, it is either false (e.g., when we rationally decide , not merely arbitrarily choose, which of our students earned an "A") or unfalsffiable. b. The epistemological point. The psychological interpretation is probably not what feminist critics have in mind. The point is not that there are shortcomingp in the human psychological mechanism which prevent one ftom being disinterested, but that there is no unbiased stance to be had. If the only stance is a biased stanse, then, given science and its history of maledomination, this bias translates into the idea that the male stanoe is the only stanoe. Unfortunately, feminists (in the literature) do not directly argue for the no-unbiased-stance claim. Instead, they often appeal to the (male) authority Thomas Kuhn. They claim that the Kuhnian strateg/ of arguing that ohervations are theory-laden, theories are paradigm-laden, and paradigms are culture-laden... [demonstrates that] there are and can be no such thinp as . . . objective23 facts.24 And without objective facts there can be no objective, i,e., unbiased, stance. Of coune, relying upon Kuhn leaves an important question open for debate: Is he right? Although a thorough discussion of Kuhn's arguments against objectivity would fall outside the scope of this paper, suffice it to say that at best there is vast body of philosophical literature which claims that he has not made his case against objectivity.x At wont, he is wrong. Briefly, Kuhn's concept of incommensurability (which is at the heart of his venion of relativism) is caught betwe€n the horns of a dilemma. Either it supports radical incommensurability which entails unintelligibility on the one hand; or it allows for intelligibility and therefore objectivity on the other. As Israel Scheffler has pointed out, "[olbjectivity requires simply the possibility of intelligible debate over the comparative merits of riral paradiqms."26 Although it is not clear whether Kuhn himself actually supports the radical reading of the inoommensurability claim,zl it is certain that the feminists cannot simply rest on their Kuhnian laurels. If Kuhn is a radical incommensurabilist, then feminisl critics of science must take the vast body of criticism of (Kuhnian) relativism seriously and attempt a rejoinder. If, on the other hand, Kuhn is not a radical incommensurabilist, then these particular feminist arguments against objeAivity cannot be based on his work ln either case, it seems, lhe feminists will have to develop a oompletely Kuhn-independent attack on objectivity. REASON PAPERS NO. 18 c further evidenc cannot be mn contradiction), lf, on the equally plausib but because thr of the evidence Harding t ism and antise that is, she has point is only t be had, then fe If, on tht dence, then it classical concel b. The lry means when sh nize the hypol thinlc that scic true? Fine, so I Does this are ever wronl mean relativel5 are committed to relativism, t criticism. To a wrong,32 presu precisely what Under tl ists. c. Relatit is that the fen is hard to im claim that fen ism is an unte. Furthern relativism, it t sical notion t account of scit d Hardil dilemma. That to address all Her efforts ha scientists (and 62 3. Is the Feminist Project Committed to Relativism? ^ *"":::f#'{":{riffi,n"ots.wirh respecr to the critique or objectivity were cotrect' ##;;i;lo' tn" Jemin'ists is unclear; for if there is oo iisintere*teo lunutlJ;;; to be.h;;' then the only stance would be a stan@ biased uy 'o'i!li" ioi *t" culture' sex' or whatever)' under such a i"i"tiuirii" interpretation, scientific theories are never about the 'vay tninil;;;I"i;;h"i";1 oo "'lvav2s things are"' scientific theories are about tn? way things a1e for this culure'that s6'you'ot me" Such an iot",p'"tuti*' hoo'o"i' goel yl entail the need for a feminist interpretatioo of tnJ'li"*int method' but rather an abandonment of the enterprise or science "i;;i" If objectMty is at the heart of the scientifie method, then its removal would be fatal'2e "'"Kf##::Ai:;kth the pragmatic probrems."{ :-tlt a rerativistic interpretation, it is it"po'oot to note. tn"' inott feminists' including Hardins. have n"n", o#o"im|i"*ur" "'iu tn" brand "relativism'" Harding' ffiiuuy, has tried to tackle the issue' 7. "Old" Harding' ln The Sciznce Questlo!' Harding claims that "the leap to relativism mislrasps-feminist-projects"'30'*t -Td- "leap" is ui;usiineo' she argues' because feminist inquirers are never saylns that sexist and antisexist claims "," 'q'iuii, il;ili;' ' ' ' 1ej"io"n'" t:i l:ffit \,'' nonfeminist claims 'n'V U" inconclusiw in some cases' ' ' ' [A]gnosticism ano tfr ffi;il;;;" hypothetical. character of all scientific claims are quite different ep'istemorogical stances from relativism' t"toi*""" *hether or not^feminis$ take a relativistic stan@' it is hard to imagine a coherent defense of eognitive relativism wnJJone thinls"of the conflictin$ claims'3t So what exactly is Harding's poiotl -. a Agnostic*m^'*lZii'it^?Harding might T' Tlgg one of three possible claims. fnl n r, ir that if oo"-U"fi"no'sexist and antisexist claims are equauy pr"u.iui", tnen oneis not r.;;tily committed to relativism' I 8Er€o, but this Ooes'not help her *tt' f* 'oth " position is' nonetheless' ;totfj"#:H*:lttr"1r relarivism depends on wtry. someone maintains an agoostic poritili.'r one maintains r"l"n u position because both claims are support.d by;;; *ic"ot" tq*uv-*"u' tnii it compatible with absolutism. Absolu,oo fr"i"*"iooio p*i'i; oi "gootriitm-a position of equal suppo" roJoJJ !:* *o'b$;uy incoipatible) theories pending CRITICIZING THE F:EMINIST CRITIQUE 63 ritique of objecr: for if there is sBnce would be rer). eories are never s are." Scientific s6, yolt, ol me" d for a feminist ndonment of the of the scientifie such a relativistic s, including Harrdvism." Harding' g claims that "the nd antisexist inist w. non- . . . [A]gnosracter of all sBnces ftom a relativistic of cogrritive ,31 aking one of three nd antisexist claims tted to relativism' I ion is, nonetheless' someone maintains because both claims ,adble with absolutism-a Posidon of ie) tbeories Pending further evidence. It may be that although one believes that both positions qrnnot be correct lwniin may simply be a recognition of the law of noncontradictio n), one is unable, at this time, to rationally choose ' If, on t'tre other hand, one claims that both sexism and antisexism are equally plausible positions, not because the evidence for both is legitimate Vit Uiciuse there is no objective stance from which to judge the legitimacy of the evidence at all, then one is committed to relativism. Harding does not make it clear which reason for adopting both sexism and antisexism as plausible she is denying that the feminiss maintain; that is, she has not .ud" clear what is motivating feminist agnosticism. The point L only that if the motivation is that there is no objeaive stance to 6" h"d, then feminists are committed to relativism' i, on tne other hand, the motivation is simply to await further eviden@, then it is not clear what reasons Harding has left for criticizing the classical concept of objectivity' b. The hypotheticat churacter of scicnce. Nor is it clear what Harding means wnen sh-e sap feminists are not relativists simply becausg they recognize the hypothetical character of scientific claims. Does this mean she thinks that ;cientific claims are only conjertures, postulates, or contingently true? Fine, so do classical scientists and philosophers of science. Does this mean one avoids relativism by denying that scientific claims are ever wrong? It depends on what one means by lrrong'. Does 'rrrong' mean relativety wrongi or reatly wrong? If the former, then yes, feminists are committed to reta'iivism; if-the latter, then feminists are not mmmitted to relativism, but then, again, it is not clear what of interest is left of their criticism. To acknowleOgE tnat the claims of science can be wtong, really wrong,32 presupposes th*at there is an objective concgPt of -right, which is p.""iiity wtrat is being denied by -the.feminist philosophgo.o.f science. ' under this interpretation, feminisa are either relativists or objectivists" c. Relativism is an untenable position. Perhaps all Harding is saying is that the feminist position cannot be equated with relativism because "it is hard to imagine a coherent defense of cognitive relativism"'33 But to claim that feminisS could not be committed to relativism because relativism is an untenable position is merely a case of wishful thinking. Furthermore, if f".ioitt philosophen of science are not embracing relativism, it becomes difficult tb see why nonfeminist science, via the classical notion of objectivity, is being challenged at all and why Kuhn's account of science is offered in defense' d. Harding,s dilemma. Harding has set herself between the horns of a dilemma. That is, in her attempt to save the feminist account from having to address all the problems of rehtivism, she has weakened the account' Her efforS have foiceO the feminist position to be something that classical scientiss(andphilosophersofscience)wouldfinduninterestingandun. REASON PAPERS NO. 18 ( edlY vall If some are t mine which a belief that ePi It seems commit thereforr between practicel because HSC final analPis "standpoint e Harding, Pret Why she atte necessitate it, c. Iudgn that Harding, relativism, wa "feminist stal cally absoluti feminism is si Withou ward some a, least worthY would requirt garden-variet Therefc tions to obje mental" relal Uludgn able in Relativ men's I Furthermore relativism voi@s , embrace [iut many counte In oth, *j*fHlliil", ,n"n, that Harding.has not made her case thar rhe inference from feminism'to-ietatiuism mitgtuspt the feminisl -!-l:j""t 2 "New" Harding' ln her rno't '"""nt work' however' Harding no longer attemPts to. sh;; that feminism is not committed to relativism' Her newtackistoclalmttratfeminismiscommittedtorelativism,thoughonly to historicatlsociofogicaVcutiural (HSC) relativism' not to judgmental rela' tivis\y distinguishing j$ry'"oPl i:li:1""*-"an epistemological relativism that denies ,n" !"o.iiuiiity of any reasonable standards for adjudicating between competing .Iruioo;"t-' too' i-tsc relativism, Harding hopes to both embrace relarivism ffii", uooio io logical and pragmatic pitfalls. she is unsuccessfuL ction without a diference. Fint, the iudgmentavHsc dichotomy makes a Aistinction which pulls no.epistemic weight' for HSC relativism, at least the *w'it-i" pi*"nt"o uy Harding' is not an epistemological thesis at an. In *i":;\:;;;;;-wh;'ituoii'ag'? ' she desoibes HSC relativism as a respect for historical (or sociological or cultural) relativism [which]it"il;-;;roriostartiigone'sthinking'-fifferent social groupt"iloolo'n"* crr"ttit pattems oj nllice and belief and diff;;; slnoaros for judging them; -these practices' belieh ano standards can be exptaiieo by different historical interests, values, and agendas' " ' ' (WS'152) Thisaccountismerelyadescriptionofindividualsorsocieties,of what is often calted;;;;;i retativism." The belief that cultural relativism istrueisnotonlynotequivalenttoepistemologicalrelativism'itiscompatible wirh the u"uJtnilepistemological relativism is false' Furthermore' i{sc retativis,t i, ;;; uiitt"i' me trutn to1 jafjU) :l T:. relativism is a purely empirical ;;"* li i' tn" pmosopnicauyprgvg3tive thesis-that there is no way to adjudicate bet\i/een, nd u"ri"it bf differ"ot individuals' cultures, etc.-tha-t -Jo."* epistemologiss. unfortunately for Harding' once her positioi ""isc ,"t"ti"irm-"ue.omes epistemically relativistic enough to becoml piil"t"pni*ly interesiing' it camot.be distinguished from judgm"o,"f ,""fJ,I"iro,'unO, tn"t"f*e, is-susceptible to all of the lat' ter's problems' ,, , --'^i..)at r.irowhe Hardins wants to avoidb. Harding Not realty a relativbt' Maybe "tiô'l judgmentalretauvsm-u**"sheisnotarela.tivistatall.Shedoesclaim that not atl social values and interests have the same bad effects upon the ,otift' of research' So-me have sysrcmatically generated less partial *o oii"r"a beliefs than others{r than purponcase that the inProject. :ver, Harding no to relativism. Her rism, though only fiilgmental relamological relativs for adjudicating ng hopes to both ic pitfalls. She is ,ntal/HSC dichotfor HSC relativn epistemological re describes HSC ) relativism g. Different lractice and se practices, lt historical s or societies, of cultural relativism rtivism, it is comilse. Furthermore, SC relativism is a ative thesis-that ferent individuals, tely for Harding, nically relativistic be distinguished to all of the latg wants to avoid She does claim e bad effects ly generated ran purponCRMCIZING THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE edly value-free research. . . . (WS, 14/-) If some are not as bad, then there must be standards by which to determine which are and which are not. The belief in such standards entails a belief that epistemological relativism is false. It seems that HSC relativism does not commit one to the fufther epistemological claim that there are therefore no rational or scientific gtounds for making judgments between various patterns of belief and their originating social practioes, values, and consequences (I7S, 152) because HSC relativism is not a form of epistemological relativism. ln the final analpis, HSC relativism is Harding's misnomer for her feminisl "standpoint epistemolog/' of old. After all, HSC relativism is, according to Harding, precisely what "standpoint epistemologies call for" (WS, 142). Why she attempts to defend relativism at all, since her aceount does not nec€ssitate it" is unclear. c Judgmental relativism b not a problem. I believe the best answer is that Harding, although she does not want to be liable for the problems of relativism, wants even less to be slapped with the charge of dogmatism. If a "feminist standpoint" is not a form of relativism, then it is epistemologically absolutist. As such, some defense must be offered; if none is, then feminism is simply dogma. Without the smokescreen of relativism, Harding will have to put forward some argument as to why a feminist epistemological standpoint is at least worthy of consideration. Unfortunately, this kind of positive account would require offering reasons, which in turn requires some @mmitment to garden-variery, i.e., objective, evidence. Therefore, in order to maintain consistency with her original objections to objectivity, Harding continues to defend relativism, even real "judgmental" relativism, from attack ln one lastditch effort, Harding claims that f]udgmental relativism is not a problem originating in or justifiable in terms of the lives of marginalized group,s [i.e., women]... Relativism arises as a problem only ftom the perspective of men's lives. (WS, 154) Furthermore, she claims that "an implicit acceptance of . . . judgmenul relativism . appears to be the only condition under which women's voices . . . can be heard" (n/S, 155). She asks: "Isn't feminism forced to embrace [judgmental] relativisn by its condition of being just one among many counter-cultural voices?" (tt1s, 155). In other words, Harding was unable to maintain any kind of interest6 REASON PAPERS NO. 18 CRI remain sexist; it become glnocnntr Feminists n not mean the ac{ mitment to its u way. 5. Conclusion To sum up, I hat infected-has not lnsofar as t developed in ten cept. Insofar as Kuhn are unhelPl Finally, I h women to give u1 defending the Po and, instead, ma cleanse science o not be particular women.4o l. Virginia Woolf' 7l 2. Nancy Tuana, "Rr 89, no. 2 (1990), PP. 3. Catharine MacKi Theory," Si6rs, vol' 4, Ruth Bleier, Sctat 5. MacKinnon, "Feu 6. Evetyn Fox Kellt Press, 1985), P. 12 7. Jean Grimshaw, I Press, 198'6), p' 83. 8. Sandra Harding, Press, 1986), P. 29. 9. IbA., pp. 249-50. 10. Kristin Shrader' vol. 76 (1988), PP. 4 ll. Ibid., p. l'l'i.. ing distinction between HSC relativism and judgmental relativism' In additiJn, she could not opt for absolutism, because this would make her account either self-renriing or dogmatic. Her only strates/ was to admit that feminist critiques of classical epistemolos/ are committed to relativism uoC ,n"o to appeai to the claim thai feminists have no other alternative'r 4. Relativism: Not Good for Women If feminiss are relativists, then there are some serious pragmatic problems with which they will have to contend. With respect to theory choice in science, a feminist (relativistic) scientific method leaves one with the ability to choose evidence or theory in the one way fhat classical science oondemns-taking seriously criteria other than our reasoned decisions based on evidence. To relativize the warrantability of a theory with respect to personal or Political motivations is to do precisely what we ought not. For feminisS to adopt such a negative response to obiectivity misses the spirit of their originai intent-to make the sciences less sexist. Their poUtiLf point is that science has misused its power and has hurt women in ih" pro.or. However, the ability to say that science has been wrong ,"qoito that one forgo relativism u19 develop an account. of science which oo t"f" feminist criticism seriously.3? At the very least, this requires one to be able to point to objective evidence-not evidence for feminists or evidencn for ien, bat wiO"nc" simpliciter. To make sense of the fact that ,o**n" misus€s evidence, or brings political and personal desires into play when deciding on the worth of a theory, requires, at some level, a commitment to obiectivity.3t Furth'ermori, it is important for feminists to realize that insofar as they have been able to track sexism-make sense of where it is coming rrom and why-and defend the position that specific men or specific research projects are sexist, ferninists have appealed to the very same objec. tive criteria *nicn they deny exist or claim exist only for men. If feminists accept reiativism, they must rclllizg that decision making, by their own lights, will be left to either providenoe or politics. If they leave decision mutiog to the former, their chances for emancipation are at best fifry-fifty. If they leave it to the latter, the odds against are even great' er. For men hold all the cards. The only hope for this acmunt with respect to theoly choice in science is to presuppose a fs6inist political agenda and then develop those lunJ orrty tlrose) scilntinc theories wnicn are consistent with feminist goals' rni, ,"i offer political and personal gains, but only at the cosr of trivializing ,n" u".y potition which allowed ieminists to initiate the serious criticislm tnat i"iinc" is sexist. By presupposing feminist goals, science \ilill 18 ental relativism. In addi_ ) this would make her / strateg/ was to admit committed to relativism no other alrcrnadve.36 CRMICIZING THE FEMINIST CRIIfQUE 67 remain sexist; it will oease to be androcnntric only because it wilr haveberome gmocnntric. Feminists must make peace with the concept of objectivity. This does 1-1.,ji"-lh:."*qTTT orany specific "*:nl of objectivity, onty a mm_m*ment to its underrying spirit-to do one's rest rc act l; an unbiasedway. 5. Conclusion To sum up, I have argued that the feminist case against science-that rr isinfected-has not been made. Insofar as the interpretation of the_classical concept of objectivity isdeveloped in terms of a varue-free il;;, ir cari€rure$ the classical con_cepl Insofar as it is developed in ;; of disinterestedness, appears .oKuhn3.re -unhetpfur ano.a ru'nn-ino"p"oi-"ot case has nor been made.Fina[y, I have attempted to ,'ho* that it is in the best interest ofwomen ro give uo ,O:,t:y"::, figh_t againsr objecriviry.-ff,"/rnoufd ceasedefending the poriticar party line, --scielnce is a man, -science is infected,.and' insread' make gooo use of tn" .ttical concept of objeaivity tocleanse science of irs sexist praaices, arLoyel such an enterprise would ffi;H.fi"*cularly feminisq ii wourc, n""ennirers; o"h;;peciauy for 1. Virginia Ytor.lllt, Iluec Gr! -r?zr (New yort hT*:. Brae, and World, 193g). l,!TZ flffi:,lZlU-",:-r.T te' fnqui'v'; eia' x^a"o]',,i r-,i,,ion, wr. ilSlTtHfTdh;ff?ir%,HTl;irerhod, aad rhe srare An Agenda ror 4. Ruth Bleier, Sciarce .ra-ciirao Of,i" V.f, p"*gon precs, l9&4), p. 4.5. MacKinnon, ..psminisnn,_t|larricn,'Metbod, ;;;" sbre,,, p. 53g. fj:AdT. r*ter, nefletions '^ -c^L*;; s"**i fv"*-i"o* yate univenity 3r*n% @td Fanini& Thir*ing (Minneapolis: uniwrsity of Minnesora r.J:tr-rff;;t: The sciqce ausam in Faninion 0thaca, Ny: corneu Univenity 9. IbU., W. Zlg-SO. il filT"l5i:';Ti:3;.iff* or rhc sciotcc au6&n in Faninion,n g,,,il,& ,ll. IbA., p. 444. lus pragmatic problems inist (relativisric) scien_ loenoe or theory in the eriously criteria other relativize the warrant_ al motivations is to do e to objectivity misses nces less sexist. Their nd has hurt women in rnce has been nnong ount of science whicf, t, this requires one to for feminists or eviense of the fact that onal desires into ptay ,ome level, a commit_ nlize that insofar as ,-where it is comingrrc men or specific the very sane bulecr men. hat decision making, or polirics. If they emancipation are at ainst are even greato theory choice in then develop those with feminist goals. the cost of trivializ_ le the serious critigoals, science will 68 REASON PAPERS NO. 18 CRI knorrledge can be st aspects of rcientific o Feminist Critique of 5-33; see p.7). Unfot not clear what is intet 30. Flarding, The Sck 31. Ibid., p.27. 32 There is also the or wrong can be kno 33. Harding, The Scit 3. In informal discut on this dilemma. He 1991., at Johns HoPl dilemmn. Her respottl 35. tlarding, Whov references to this bm 36. A similar "ten Epistemologn An Im 37. This point has b Whot C0, She Ktowi 38. Steven Yate6, in no. 4 (1992), argues s 39. This is reminiscei for women is not 8lt mainstream academic 40. Special thanks to Yates, and David Fet 12. I use the term ,classtcal' instead of otraditional" since I belicve that the latter term iE too easy a target for feminist criticism' 13. Actually, Harding *"n"rs on this Point. In Sandra Harding, ..Starting from Women's Lives: Eight Resources for Maximizini Objectivity," Iotunal of Social Philasophy ' vol' 21 (1991), PP' 14049, she claims that.--iri"iiilia"g objectMry requires crirically examining not only those beliefs that difier b€tween individuals . . . rui also those that are held by virtually a,eryone who gets to count as inside the "scientific community"' (p' 149) This morre, though, I will argue below, onii rer"1 to make the feminist objection impotent and uninteresting, for ,, ,ori,o what the classical account has ahrays been committed to. Furthermore, in trer mci rccent book, lrhose science? rrhose Knowlcdge? (Ithaca' NY: cornell university rr*,-irij, Harding goes back to the more radical psitioa of rhe Sciatcc Que.sion. st " *te*iuly 'uppotti :6u.iTtY'y" but onV after distinguishing what she purpce$ misnames .*."k" "Lio*iity-the desire for unbiased research-from 'strong" objectMty-research biasJ by emancipatory desires. Then, by $uPporting only "strong" objecrMry, she is clearlylrpf"ymg itre term_'oU;ectMry' to mean-_something radicslly dillerentftomwhater,eryone"l.'ooo.shrader-Frecherte'scriticismstil|holds' 14. Harding, The Sciance Question,p'111' 15. By this phrase I .""n1oy scieniist or philosopher of science since the darelopment of subatomic PhYsics. ii. -st"pt "n Toulmin, '"The Construal of Realitf Criticism in Modern 8nd Postmodern Science," n The Poltics tf nt e'*'n , ed' \i' J' T' Mitcheu (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983)' P. 112' t7. Ibid", P. lO3. 18. Ibid., P. LlZ. 19. Harding, The Scicnce Qu*ion , p' 83' 20. The original acrually i"o" .t"tu"-oeutral." t am gMng the case ils most symPathetic reading. 2t. Harding, The Scierce Quesion , p' 23" n.Ibu. 23.Hardingactusllyequateslalue.neutralitywith.objective,here.Thistellsmethatshe too reads the majority of feminists' criticisms of the classical concept of objectMty as directed to the straw notion of value-neutrality' ?A. Ibid., P.102. 25. Just to name a fen: Israel scheffler, sciqce otd subiectivity (Indianapolis' IN: BobbsMerrifl, 1967); carl rt. ro.aig, The trtstifcation -of sciaxifrc chorge- (Dordrechc Reidel' l97l); W. H. Novton-smir;,-Th, fudor;ality of-kience (London: Routledge and lGgan Paul, 1981); and Haney siegel, Rclativint Refr:t4 (Dordrecht l"i9"t:.1:t?)' 26. Israef Schefller, 'vision"ano Rerolution: A Pmtscript to Kuhn"' PUlosophy of Sciance' vol. 39 (1972), PP. 36614; sce P' 369' //. Steven yares, for o".fr",'u"rioo that Kuhn reiecb rhe radical reading, citing Klrhn's "f4mmensurabilit!, cot-pl,,lifity, Communica-biliryj' fhilasoptty of^.':i*' Awciation (1982), vot. 2, ed. reterf,sq"in i,la Thgmas .Nickles (East l-ansing: Philcophy of science Association, 19g3), pp, OeSijS. yat€s claims that Kuhn;s ideas are actually quite simil'ar to Schetflcls and that their real dilference lies in lhe rhetoric, not the substance, of their worlc Because of this, he claims that "therc is nothing lor the feminists.to erploit in any aocuratereadingofKuun;theysimPlydonotundersrandhim.''(Personalcorrespondence' August l99Z) 28.orevenl9dyJthingsare.Feministcriticismmustbemorethanjustanacknorvledgment ofpluralism,forpluratrsmiscompatib|ewithclassicalscienceandphilcophyofscience 29.Thispointhasuoo-,=*goi'"obysomefeministphilmophersofscience.ElizabcthFee' for exanple, claims ttrat a 'frotion Lf oUj111ty "need not ' ' ' go so lar as to reject the shole human etrort to *.pin""o the wlnd in rational tcntts' nor the idea that forms of CRMCIZING THE FEMINIST CRMQUE knowledge can be subjected to critical evaluation and empirical testing. . . . [T']hece are aspeds ;f acientific objectMty which should be preserved and defended" (Elizab€th Fee, "A fiminlst Critique of Scientinc ObiectMty," Sciarce for the Peoplc ' July/August L982, pp. 5-33; eee p. 7). Unfortunately, 8s will be shorrm belo*', once such a concession is made, it is not clear what is interesting or Prortocative about the feminist project. 30. Harding, Tlrc Sciarce Quation ' P. 1$. 31. Ibid., p. tl. 32 There is also the implicit denial of skepticism, that is, a prcsuppoition tbat what is right or wnotrg can be knonrn at all. 3. tlarding Thc Sciqrce Quqtiott , p.27. 34. In infornal discussion with Harding wer the phone (in 1989)' I questioned her directly on this dilemma. Her response was that I was lo read her book more carefully' ht€r in 1991, at Johns Hopkins University+here she was a guest lsturer-I Po6€d the 88me dilemma. Her response was indirect and unsatisfactory. 35. I-larding, lfhos sciance? who& IOowMge? (see n. 13 above), p. 13* subsequent referene to this book (hereafter It{9) will be given in parenthercs in the tef,t. 36. A similar ..tension" has been pointed out by Margareta Halberg, "Fcminist Epistemologn An lmpcsible Project," Radical Philasophy, vol' 53 (1989)' p. 6. 37. This point has bcen appreciated by some feminists, See' for example, Lorraine Codg Wtut Cot Slu lgtow? (lthaca, NY: Cornell University Precs, l99l), pp. 45,25.5,319'2o38. Staren Yates, in "Multiculturalism and Epistemolog," htblic Atrain QuoUIy, vol. 6, no.4 (l%r'2), argues 8 generalized version of this same Point. 39. This is rcminiscent of a point often made by Christina Sommers; that is, what is good for women is not alwaln entailed by (or even ompatible with) what is being pushed by mainstream academic feminisS. ,t0. Special thanks to Harvey Siegel, Kristin Shrader-Frechette, Christina Sommers, Sterren Yatcs, and David Fcnner for their helpful comments 8nd en@uragement' 69 I the latter term i8 loo larting from Women's al Philwphy, vol. 21 c beliefs that ditfer Eryone who gets to fst objection impotent been committed to, wlcdgc? (Ithaca, NY: rdical pcition of thc tistinguishing what she parchJrom "srong" porting only "8trong" n comething radically till holds. F the development of dern and Pctmodern lhicago: University of : its most sympathetic Thb tells me that she rcept of objectMty as dianapolis, IN: Bobbcr (Dordr€ch[ Reidel, Routledge and lGgan I, 1984. PUlortuprty of Sciare, reading, citing Kuhn's f Sciauc Awiation Philcophy of Sciencc ctualy quite oimilar to he rubstancg of Oeir oists to crploit in ary rton8l corr€spond€nce, st an acknowledpent cophy of science science" Elizabeth Fee, ro hr as to reject tbe the idea that forms of