The Animal Ethics of Temple Grandin: A Protectionist Analysis 1 Introduction 2 Uncorrected author's proof. 3 Temple Grandin is well known as a representative of both people with 4 autism and of the meat industry. She rose to prominence through the work of 5 Oliver Sacks, whose 1995 book, An Anthropologist on Mars, was named after a 6 phrase Grandin used to describe her life as a person with autism in a non-7 autistic world, one that contains social and emotional cues she finds difficult 8 to decipher. Grandin has since gone on to become a bestselling author in her 9 own right, and writings by and about her highlight her career as a designer of 10 humane slaughterhouses. In both her popular books as well as over 100 peer-11 reviewed articles she has published as an animal scientist, Grandin frequently 12 addresses issues related to the ethical status of animals, and makes arguments 13 to the effect that when animals are killed in her system the result is ethically 14 superior not only to traditional slaughter but also to vegan agriculture. 15 Systems designed by Grandin have long handled over half the cattle killed 16 for food in Canada and the United States (Grandin 2001: 103). Facilities she 17 designed are also located in Europe, Asia, Australia and South America. 18 Chances are good that readers of this work who eat meat will have consumed 19 beef, pork or chicken processed according to Grandin's method at least once. 20 As for Grandin's ethical ideas as they pertain to animals, they have been 21 disseminated by CNN, NBC and the BBC, not to mention every major 22 newspaper in the English-speaking world.1 In terms of her industrial impact 23 1 For a small sampling of Grandin's electronic media coverage see Grandin 2009c. Typing Grandin's name into the Factiva newspaper database calls up over 1,600 articles from across the English-speaking world. 2 and audience, Grandin is one of the world's most influential voices on animal 24 issues. 25 In spite of Grandin's prominence, animal ethicists have taken little interest 26 in her work.2 Although the ethics of killing and eating animals that are killed 27 painlessly has been extensively analysed, the discussion to date has been at an 28 abstract level, with little attention to the question of whether or to what 29 degree existing systems such as Grandin's have eliminated pain from the 30 slaughter process (e.g. Singer 1993; Višak 2013). Similarly, Grandin's writings 31 frequently defend omnivorism as superior to vegetarianism or veganism. 32 Given the size of her audience, these arguments are among the most widely 33 read arguments, pro or con, on the ethics of eating meat. As such the need to 34 analyze them also is overdue. 35 What follows is an attempt to bring animal protection theory to bear on 36 Grandin's work, in her capacity both as a designer of slaughter facilities and 37 as an advocate for omnivorism. Animal protection is a better term for what is 38 often termed animal rights, given that many of the theories grouped under 39 the animal rights label do not extend the concept of rights to animals (e.g. 40 Singer 1990, McMahan 2002). Animal protection thus is an umbrella term for 41 theories such as those of Singer, Regan (2004), McMahan and Cochrane 42 (2012). Despite their differences, such theories eschew speciesism and grant 43 equal moral weight to the interest animals have in avoiding suffering relative 44 to the similar interest of human beings. With the exception of Singer, who 45 argues that it is permissible to kill merely sentient animals so long as they are 46 2 Gary Francione and Jeff McMahan are among the few animal theorists to comment on Grandin. See the brief discussions in Francione 1996: 99-100, 199-202, and 2008: 74-5 and McMahan 2002: 200-03. Peter Singer discusses lobbying efforts to persuade McDonald's to hire Grandin in Singer 1998: 166-77. I have not been able to find any scholarly discussion of Grandin's defence of meat-eating. 3 replaced, all such theorists call into question the practice of systematically 47 killing animals when nutritious plant-based alternative are widely available. 48 My analysis endorses these two widely held views in the animal protection 49 literature regarding animal suffering. As such it seeks to be ecumenical across 50 such approaches by appealing to ideas they all agree on, with the exception of 51 Singer's outlier view on the replaceability of merely sentient beings (Singer 52 2011: 94-122).3 53 I outline the nature of Grandin's system of humane slaughter as it 54 pertains to cattle. I focus on her cattle system because it is the one she has 55 devoted the most time and energy to developing and is the system with 56 which she has long been most identified.4 I then outline four arguments 57 Grandin has made defending meat-eating. Two of these arguments appeal to 58 evolutionary considerations while a third posits the fact that we cannot but 59 help grant moral significance to membership in the species Homo sapiens, 60 which inevitably entails a lower moral status for livestock and other animals. 61 Grandin's fourth and final argument maintains that when the slaughter 62 process is performed correctly it yields moral insights of a kind not attainable 63 through the cultivation of plant food. On a protection-based approach, I 64 argue, Grandin's system of slaughter is superior to its traditional counterpart. 65 Grandin's success as a designer of humane slaughterhouses however is not 66 matched by any corresponding success in offering a moral defence of meat-67 eating. Despite, or perhaps because of, the popularity of her work, Grandin's 68 arguments for continuing to eat animals are noteworthy only in how 69 disappointing and rudimentary they are. If we can thank Grandin for making 70 3 For critical discussion of Singer's view on killing animals see Višak (2013: 46-70). 4 For an analysis of Grandin's system of slaughter for chicken see Chapter Five of Lamey (2019). 4 a difference in the lives of millions of farm animals, her work can also be 71 criticized for not engaging the moral status of animals with the depth and 72 rigor that the issue deserves. 73 Grandin's Method of Slaughter 74 Grandin has written that much of her success in working with animals 75 comes from the fact that "I see all kinds of connections between their behavior 76 and certain autistic behaviors" (2006a: 172).5 She gives the example of 77 responses to high-pitched noise. Just as someone whistling in the middle of 78 the night will cause her heart to race more than it would that of a non-autistic 79 person, animals are easily startled by noises such as a bell or the sudden hiss 80 of an air brake (2006a: 169). Grandin's system therefore not only minimizes 81 high-pitch sounds that animals can hear, it also eliminates many visual details 82 that loom large from an animal's point of view. In the case of cows for 83 example, an entire herd can stop if it comes across a swinging chain, which 84 will cause the lead cow to move its head back and forth with its swing. 85 Similarly, strong visual contrasts such as shadows, light reflecting in a puddle 86 or a drain running across the animals' path will cause balking. Even 87 something as seemingly minor as a styrofoam cup on the ground or a piece of 88 cloth flapping in the wind can cause a herd to freeze up (2006a: 167-8). 89 Grandin's system meticulously avoids all such distractions that can cause the 90 animals to stop moving. 91 5 Karen Davis has challenged Grandin's claim that her system of slaughter is inspired by her autism. "Many of the problems Grandin presents herself as uniquely spotting in the slaughterhouse environment are the kinds of things that an intelligent non-autistic sees on entering an inbred culture" (Davis 2005: 1). Grandin's emphasis on a link between autism and animal behaviour is noticeably more pronounced in her popular books than in her academic writings and may sometimes be slightly exaggerated. However, I am more inclined to accept it than Davis is. Among other reasons, there have been cases of other autistic people identifying strongly with animal behaviours (e.g. Price-Hughes 2004). 5 92 Image One: A Curved Handling Chute 93 94 At a structural level, one of the most distinctive features of a plant 95 designed by Grandin is its curved handling chute, which is located between 96 the holding pens and the slaughter facility proper. The chute's design 97 principles are rooted in animal behaviour research (Grandin 2003). This is 98 evident in the fact that the chute has solid walls. The location of a cow's eyes 99 on the sides of its head gives it almost 360  panoramic vision, but only when 100 looking ahead does it have binocular eyesight. The lack of depth perception to 101 the side or rear means that even distant objects in those directions can appear 102 to be within the animal's flight zone. Solid walls in the chute eliminate the 103 possibility of the animal seeing people or other distractions outside of the 104 facility that might startle them (Grandin 1983a: 2). 105 The curvature in the chute follows a similar logic. It is more efficient than 106 a straight chute as the cows cannot see people or moving objects up ahead, 107 which can cause them to balk. Cattle will also not enter a chute that bends too 108 sharply, which to them appears to be a dead end. In Grandin's system the 109 degree of curvature allows entering cows to see at least two body lengths 110 ahead. In nature cows will move in a circle to keep an eye on possible 111 6 predators and both the curve in the chute and the single-file width exploit this 112 natural tendency (Grandin 2002b). The end result is that rather than plant 113 personnel having to force a herd through the chute, most cows will willingly 114 walk through on their own. 115 People with autism often experience anxiety and panic attacks, 116 particularly in unfamiliar situations. Grandin was able to diminish her 117 anxiety by building a so-called Squeeze Box, a device which she lies in to have 118 even pressure applied to both sides of her body, an experience which many 119 autistic people find soothing. Grandin's Squeeze Box, which is now sold 120 commercially, was inspired by an animal husbandry device known as a 121 squeeze chute, which is used during vaccination and other procedures in 122 which an animal needs to be immobilized. Grandin's slaughter system in turn 123 employs a device partly inspired by her Squeeze Box, which is known as a 124 conveyor restrainer. It is what is waiting for the animals at the end of the 125 handling chute after they enter the slaughterhouse, where they are 126 immediately immobilized in a low-stress manner. 127 128 Image Two: The Conveyor Restrainer 129 130 As image two illustrates, a leg-spreader bar and false floor position the 131 animals so that as they step forward their weight shifts onto a conveyor belt. 132 7 The walls of the conveyor restrainer are again solid, but unlike the handling 133 chute they apply pressure to the animal's body, firmly enough to keep the 134 animal in place, but not so hard as to cause gouging. The absence of noise and 135 the experience of motion in an upright position have a calming effect on the 136 animal, as does the presence of other animals, particularly when they are 137 close enough to touch each other and are all from the same herd. A rack 138 above the animal's head prevents lunging by eliminating the sight of people 139 and other threatening figures deep inside its flight zone. In a beef plant the 140 conveyor belt is additionally shaped so as to fit a bull's brisket. As the animal 141 moves forward it is brought to the stunning platform where a plant employee 142 is waiting with a captive bolt stunner. The stunner operator positions the gun-143 like tool on the animal's forehead to fire a bolt into its brain, a procedure 144 which when properly performed instantly knocks the animal unconscious, 145 thereby resulting in a painless method of death (Grandin: 1995: 1, 2009a: 1).6 146 Elements such as the handling chute and the conveyor restrainer illustrate 147 the technical details of Grandin's system. Yet Grandin has often stressed that 148 the most important element of her system is not any mechanical aspect, but 149 the way it is used. As she puts it, "the best equipment in the world is 150 worthless unless management controls the behavior of plant employees" 151 (2006a: 175). A key aspect of her system therefore involves plant audits. 152 Unannounced inspectors record the success rate of various procedures 153 throughout the animals' time inside a facility. In a beef plant for example 154 auditors observe the slaughter of set number of cows, such as 50, 100 or 1,000, 155 6 Grandin has separate guidelines for electric stunning, a potentially painless method used on pigs and sheep, and ritual slaughter methods (kosher and halaal) that prohibit stunning and require placing the animals in a head-immobilizing device before its throat is slit. See respectively Grandin (2008) and Grandin and Regenstein (1994). 8 and record what percentage of them are instantly rendered insensible with 156 one shot of the bolt gun, marking employee performance according to the 157 following criteria: 158 159 Excellent = 99 to 100 per cent of animals killed with one shot 160 Acceptable = 95 to 98 per cent of animals killed with one shot 161 Not acceptable = 90 to 94 per cent of animals killed with one shot 162 Serious problem = under 90 per cent of animals killed with one shot 163 164 Other audited criteria include the number of animals that slip, fall or 165 vocalize while inside the facility, how many are still conscious when they 166 reach the bleed rail and the rate at which employees use cattle prods, with use 167 on up to 25 per cent of processed animals rated acceptable. If an employee 168 commits a wilful act of abuse, such as hitting an animal or applying a prod to 169 its rectum or other sensitive area, it is grounds for automatic audit failure. 170 Publicly available summaries of audits conducted between 2007 and 2015 171 indicate a total of 187 audits performed at unidentified beef facilities (Grandin 172 2018). Of these 172 audits (92 per cent) resulted in a pass, often with very high 173 scores: 137 audits (74 per cent) recorded 99 to 100 per cent of cattle being 174 successfully stunned with one shot of the captive bolt gun. Fourteen audits 175 resulted in failure and two required a re-audit following a corrective action 176 letter. Grounds for failure ranged from cutting off the leg of a conscious cow 177 to touching a cow with a cattle prod on a sensitive part of its body. Plants 178 were re-audited when more than two per cent of cows fell during live 179 handling or more than five per cent vocalized during handling and stunning. 180 Such scores are broadly representative of how most plants have performed 181 9 since Grandin's program was adopted at the turn of the century (Singer: 1998: 182 166-77). Plants that incorporate Grandin's technology and auditing method 183 generally score highly. 184 Grandin has frequently framed the appeal of her system in economic 185 terms. Animals that go through her system have been measured to have the 186 same level of the stress hormone cortisol as they do when undergoing 187 vaccination (Grandin 1998). They also receive fewer bruises than at traditional 188 slaughter plants (Grandin 2000). These and other factors increase the value of 189 the animal's carcass, factors which Grandin frequently cites to suggest that a 190 humane system is a more profitable one (Grandin 1983b, 2000, 2009b). 191 Grandin's Arguments for Omnivorism 192 Grandin's writings offer an ethical rationale for her system of slaughter. 193 That rationale is one that recognizes animals' interest in avoiding suffering, 194 but stops short of advocating a plant-based diet. "Often I get asked if am a 195 vegetarian," she has written. "I eat meat, because I believed that a totally 196 vegan diet, in which all animal products are eliminated, is unnatural" (2006a: 197 235). Grandin's writings present a series of arguments to the effect that her 198 system is superior not only to traditional slaughter, but that eating meat is 199 superior to veganism, on grounds that appeal not only to "naturalness" but 200 more purely normative concerns. Fully assessing Grandin's animal ethic 201 therefore requires examining the justifications for the superiority of meat-202 eating that she has put forward. 203 Grandin's most sophisticated argument does not originate with her. 204 Rather she credits an argument made by Stephen Budiansky that "had a 205 profound effect on [her] thinking" regarding animals (2006a: 235). Budiansky 206 offers a coevolutionary defence of meat-eating. Coevolution occurs when one 207 10 species triggers evolutionary change in another. In Budiansky's view, this 208 principle explains the rise of modern agriculture, which is not merely the 209 creation of human beings but, in a real sense, is the creation of domesticated 210 animal as well. Such a view is inspired by the work of anthropologist David 211 Rindos, who has put forward a co-evolutionary explanation for plant 212 domestication (Rindos 1984). Budiansky innovates on Rindos not only by 213 extending his theory to animal domestication, but by invoking it as an 214 argument against veganism. According to Budinasky, were we to attempt to 215 abolish meat farming, we would be turning our back on the metaphoric 216 equivalent of a moral contract between human beings and domesticated 217 animals, one that benefits not only us but also the animals (Budiansky 1999). 218 Coevolution is known to occur in nature with symbiotic species. 219 Budiansky gives the example of an African species of melon that only grows 220 outside the tunnels of aardvarks (1999: 84). The aardvarks eat the melons and, 221 through their toilet habits, plant the melons' seeds in fertile mounds. Unlike 222 all other wild cucurbits (the species to which melons belong) the variety eaten 223 by aardvarks do not contain a bitter toxin. This increases the reproductive 224 fitness of the melons, as they are able to reproduce by having their seeds 225 distributed by the aardvarks. The aardvarks have access to a safe and 226 abundant water supply, and so benefit from sharing a habitat with melons. 227 Thus although the aardvarks have a greater influence on the evolutionary 228 history of the melons than vice versa, both species benefit from the 229 relationship (1999: 84). 230 On Budiansky's account something similar has happened between human 231 beings and food animals. He asks us to imagine the original contact between 232 human beings and members of the species that eventually became 233 11 domesticated. Such contact occurred over 9,000 years ago, shortly after the 234 end of an ice age. During periods of climactic upheaval, many species of 235 mammals and birds would have undergone a process known as neoteny, 236 whereby traits associated with juvenile members of a species are retained into 237 adulthood. "All young mammals and birds," Budiansky writes, "show a 238 curiosity about their surroundings, an ability to learn new things, a lack of 239 fear of new situations, and even a nondiscriminating willingness to associate 240 and play with members of other species," (1999: 77-8). Adults that retained 241 such juvenile characteristics would have increased their reproductive fitness 242 during an ice age, as they would have been more likely to seek out and 243 inhabit new territories after their original habitats were iced over. Given that 244 such animals would have come in contact with human beings soon after, they 245 would have increased their reproductive fitness in a second way, in that their 246 more curious and gentler nature would have allowed them to occupy what 247 was in effect a new habitat, the human sphere of domestication. 248 Budiansky invokes the concept of preadaptation to summarize the initial 249 contact between humans and domesticated species (1989: 5). Preadaptation is 250 misunderstood if it is taken to imply an intentional or teleological process of 251 change. It rather refers to a process whereby an adaptation or other trait that 252 evolved to perform one function is used for a new, potentially unrelated 253 function. In this case, curiosity and other traits helpful in seeking out new 254 natural habitats preadapted sheep, cows, horses pigs and chickens to be 255 suitable for domestication. The process of change in the animals would only 256 have continued after domestication began, as domesticated animals 257 increasingly took on docility and other characteristics that separated them 258 from their wild counterparts. The result thousands of years later is that food 259 12 animals are now adapted to occupy the ecological niche that is human 260 agriculture. 261 For Budiansky, the evolutionary history of domesticated animals creates 262 an onus on us to continue raising them for food. This is because 263 domestication is not a purely cultural process. Cultural matters we regard as 264 subject to our control. Budianksy gives the example of someone saying that 265 we should not abolish nuclear weapons on the grounds that they are the 266 natural product of evolution. Such a person would fail to adequately 267 distinguish culture from nature (1999: 163). With regard to food animals 268 however, their genetic character and behavior "is arguably much more the 269 product of evolution in its truest sense, something that is not subordinate to 270 human consciousness. The fate of these species was dictated by nature more 271 than by man's cultural institutions" (1999: 164). Were veganism to become 272 popular, it would represent an abandonment of our ethical responsibilities to 273 the animals whose destiny we now find intertwined with our own. Or as 274 Budiansky puts it in the article that first caught Grandin's eye, "we now have 275 no choice but to care for animals that as a result of thousands of years of 276 evolution are genetically programed to depend on us" (1989: 5). 277 Grandin takes over from Budiansky the notion that food animals benefit 278 from our consumption of them. One benefit they gain is an ability to 279 reproduce in large numbers. With almost a billion cattle in the world, there is 280 no danger of them going extinct any time soon (Statista 2018). But another 281 thing animals gain from agriculture is a more merciful death than they would 282 experience in the wild. Starvation, exposure, being torn apart by another 283 animal: against this backdrop, being knocked unconscious and killed with a 284 bolt through the brain would seem the far better option (Grandin 2006a: 235). 285 13 Grandin's second argument makes a separate appeal to evolution. 286 Grandin has noted that she once tried vegetarianism and found that it made 287 her physically ill. She suggests that people with autism and similar conditions 288 may be physically unable to live on a meat-free diet. People with conditions 289 such as autism are of course only a small portion of the population, and 290 Grandin does not invoke her experience as a justification for universal meat-291 eating. Instead she speculates on a possible genetic link between being autistic 292 and having a metabolism that requires eating meat, a speculation which in 293 turn leads her to offer an evolutionary justification of meat eating that does 294 apply to the general population: 295 296 [U]ntil someone proves otherwise I'm operating from the 297 hypothesis that at lest some people [such as people with 298 autism] are genetically built so that they have to have meat 299 to function. Even if that's not so, the fact that humans 300 evolved as both plant and meat eaters means that the vast 301 majority of human beings are going to continue to eat both. 302 Humans are animals, too, and we do what our animal 303 natures tell us to do. (Grandin and Johnson 2005: 180). 304 305 This is Grandin's second evolutionary argument against plant-based diets. 306 Whether or not people with autism have a special need for meat, she 307 suggests, it is a fact about our species that we evolved as omnivores. 308 Veganism is thus not as natural as meat-eating. Ethicists who advocate meat-309 free diets may do so due to an interest in animals, but in an important sense, 310 they overlook our own needs as animals. 311 A third argument Grandin has offered to justify omnivorism over 312 veganism involves a different appeal to biology. It occurs when Grandin 313 grapples with the question of why a human being and an animal with similar 314 cognitive abilities should occupy different moral statuses. Grandin uses the 315 example of a cow and a mentally handicapped child with the same level of 316 14 cognitive development. It is perfectly acceptable to sell or kill the cow, she 317 notes, but forbidden to do the same to a handicapped child. Grandin asks 318 why the handicapped child or human newborn should have more protection 319 than the bovine (2002a: 2). This of course is a question that frequently occurs 320 in the debate over the ethical status of animals, in which the standard 321 approach is to think of the handicapped child or newborn as an orphan (in 322 order to focus on his or her direct moral worth, rather than indirect status 323 acquired through relationships with others). 324 Grandin does not attempt to give a complete answer to this question. She 325 notes that there are arguments for and against assigning moral significance to 326 species-membership that she does not deal with. Grandin does however offer 327 one reason for the different moral status of cognitively disabled child and cow 328 that a complete answer will presumably have to take into account. It is that 329 species membership is something we cannot help but grant strong moral 330 weight to. As with her first evolutionary argument, this is a claim by Grandin 331 that again highlights our animal identity. "Why should [a] retarded child or 332 human newborn have more protection than a cow?," Grandin asks. "One 333 reason is that the child is our own species and we protect our own species. 334 Even lions do not usually dine on lion for dinner . . . there is an instinct to 335 protect one's own kind" (2002a: 2). Thus for Grandin there is something 336 illusory about the thought that we might disregard species membership as a 337 moral category. The moral significance of being Homo sapiens is something 338 moral theory can seek to explain but not overcome. 339 Grandin's final argument against veganism is inspired by her work in 340 religious slaughterhouses. According to Grandin, slaughterhouse employees 341 can be divided into three different categories. The first are those who adopt a 342 15 mechanical approach. They become desensitised to their work, and kill 343 animals with the same rote indifference with which they might staple boxes 344 moving along a conveyor belt (1988: 119). The second group are sadists. They 345 begin to enjoy killing and deliberately torture the animals, justifying their 346 actions with rationales such as "it is going to die in five minutes so it does not 347 matter how I treat it" (1988: 120). The third and far superior approach sees 348 killing as part of a sacred ritual. This understanding, which Grandin 349 commonly observes in Jewish and Muslim slaughterhouses, exhibits respect 350 for the animals and approaches slaughter within a ritualised framework, one 351 that places limits on the act of killing and prevents it from spiralling out of 352 control (1988: 121). 353 Grandin has frequently drawn parallels between her slaughter system and 354 the sacred ritual approach. She has for example described personal rituals she 355 observes in and around non-religious slaughterhouses, such as bowing before 356 entry, as well as religious experiences she has had during the killing process 357 (1988: xx, 2006a: 230). Grandin's religious understanding of slaughter draws 358 of a wide range of sources, from traditional theism to sacrificial practices in 359 Pagan Greece to popular accounts of the Eastern notion of Karma. But in 360 general, two ideas pervade her discussion of sacred rituals. One is that the 361 moment of slaughter can make us aware of a larger cosmic order (2006a: 229-362 30). The second is that killing is a type of therapeutic release for the 363 slaughterer: encountering death makes us more appreciative of life (2006a: 364 229). The first of these ideas could potentially be embraced by members of a 365 wide variety of religious traditions, while the second could in principle be 366 embraced by a non-believer. Taken together, both notions suggest that 367 16 appropriately conducted slaughter can generate moral knowledge of a kind 368 not generated in the cultivation of plant food. 369 370 Criticism 371 What are we to make of Grandin and her unique contribution to modern 372 agriculture? As a feat of engineering, her system of slaughter combines 373 technical ingenuity and insight into animal behaviour. Grandin's design is 374 based on empathetic insight into animal perception. Whether or not one 375 thinks the empathetic element extends far enough should not stand in the 376 way of recognizing that Grandin's system represents a progressive step 377 against the backdrop of traditional agriculture. 378 Grandin's system however has gaps and limitations. One is that Grandin's 379 system allows more painful killing than is formally permitted by U.S. law. 380 The 1958 Humane Methods of Slaughter Act legally requires that all pigs and 381 cows killed for food be unconscious at the time of death. That the law was 382 never enforced explains how Grandin's system could represent an 383 improvement over what came before (Jones 2008). Grandin however 384 maintains that a 100 per cent painless kill rate is not possible. As a 385 government report Grandin was involved with put it, "Dr. Grandin believes 386 that effectively stunning animals on the first try 100 per cent of the time is 387 unachievable-that is why she proposed an objective scoring method as an 388 alternative" (GAO 2004: 18; Grandin 2006b: 133). 389 This is an important point that is often overlooked. Painless slaughter was 390 thought for several decades to be an appropriate standard to aim for from the 391 ideal point of view. It remains in principle, if not at the level of enforcement, 392 the standard of American law. Grandin, who may have a more detailed grasp 393 17 of industrial slaughter than anyone else alive, urges that we accept the 394 inevitability of suffering as part of animal slaughter. As much as her system 395 seeks to reduce suffering in practice, therefore, at an ideal level it 396 simultaneously represents a greater tolerance of animal suffering. This is 397 because of the five per cent of painful animals deaths Grandin considers 398 acceptable. As one NGO report pointed out, "[e]ven if 100 per cent of 399 slaughter plants were able to meet [Grandin's] standards, it would meant that 400 185 million chickens, 1.8 million cattle and sheep and one million pigs may be 401 killed inhumanely each year in the United States" (Jones 2008: 86). Grandin's 402 method ultimately confirms something critics of industrialized animal killing 403 have long maintained. Suffering is an inescapable part of the process.7 404 Food animals can live for years but typically only spend a few hours at a 405 slaughter facility. Grandin's system does not address many forms of suffering 406 that can take place prior to slaughter. These forms include practices such as 407 castration, branding, animal fighting and intensive confinement. Grandin's 408 guidelines also say nothing about what an animal is fed prior to slaughter or 409 issues having to with the manipulation of an animal's size and body 410 structure. Grandin notes that it is now common for dairy cows to be bred at 411 such a size their feet can no longer support their bodyweight (Grandin 2001: 412 107). Grandin's approach, which does not implement welfare regulations that 413 require economic sacrifice, does not address such issues. 414 Grandin's system finally is designed to reduce animal suffering but not 415 animal killing. This is a limitation, for two reasons. First, it seems plausible to 416 7 Grandin's system also currently does not involve any labelling program. This means that unless one eats only meat from McDonald's, Burger King or other restaurant chains whose suppliers employ Grandin's system, there is no way for consumers to know when they are buying meat from animals killed in one of Grandin's facilities. 18 grant some moral weight to the interest of at least vertebrate animals in 417 continued existence. Imagine a sick dog or cat that will die unless we give it 418 an injection (McMahan 2008: 67). Suppose that the animal's ailment, while it 419 will end the animal's life, will cause it no pain. If we were to give the animal a 420 shot we would be causing it some pain for the sake of extending its life. It 421 seems intuitive to think that a certain amount of pain from the injection 422 would be justified if it extended the animal's life by some non-trivial amount. 423 If so then from a non-speciesist, and thus protectionist, point of view, it is 424 reasonable to grant at least some moral weight to the interests that cows and 425 pigs have in continued existence, an interest Grandin's system does not 426 recognize. The second reason why Grandin's concern with reducing suffering 427 but not killing is a limitation is that it has an absurd implication. Such a view 428 suggests that we should painlessly kill dogs, cats and other animals so as to 429 avoid the possibility of them suffering (McMahan 2002: 201). If they have an 430 interest only in avoiding suffering and not living, we spare them suffering 431 while depriving them of nothing of value by painlessly killing them as soon 432 as possible. This outcome however is at odds with the intuition that no wrong 433 is done when animals are allowed to live relatively pain-free lives. 434 These considerations should be born in mind when humane slaughter is 435 put forward as an alternative to veganism at an idea level. The fact that 436 humane slaughter does not completely eliminate acts of suffering during 437 slaughter; does not address significant suffering that occurs before slaughter; 438 and does not recognize farm animals' legitimate interest in not being killed, 439 all suggest that it is not an ideal outcome for farm animals when such an ideal 440 is informed by a philosophy of animal protection. 441 19 However, for all that animal suffering remains a legitimate subject of 442 concern in facilities audited by Grandin, it is likely to be a far greater concern 443 in plants that do not even attempt to follow her guidelines. If it seems 444 unlikely that Grandin's system has taken all suffering out of animal slaughter, 445 it seems equally unlikely that it has made no difference either. The handling 446 chutes and other elements that reduce an animal's stress in its final hours are 447 improvements over previous slaughter systems which did nothing to reduce 448 the terror animals experienced immediately before death. For this reason, 449 pointing out problems with Grandin's approach at an ideal level should not 450 be taken to show that nothing is gained when plants adopt her approach. 451 On an ethical level, Grandin's system encourages slaughterhouse 452 operators to give moral weight to the issue of animal suffering. In this way it 453 shares an important commitment with animal protection theory. All else 454 being equal, it is better for an animal to be killed in a manner recommended 455 by Grandin that it would be for it to die according to a method of slaughter 456 which gave no weight to the animal's suffering, such as killing it with a 457 sledgehammer, an approach still used in parts of the developing world. 458 Although sledgehammers have not been used in American slaughterhouses 459 since the 1950s, slaughter continued to be carried out with little regard for the 460 animals' welfare long after this time (Singer 1990, Warrick 2001). Grandin's 461 system has raised awareness regarding food animal welfare and reduced their 462 suffering. Despite its flaws at an ideal level, in the non-ideal world we 463 actually inhabit, Grandin's method of slaughter has been a force for good. If it 464 is not as good as embracing veganism, its superiority over traditional 465 slaughter is still worth recognizing. 466 20 Some proponents of protection theory might dispute this verdict, on the 467 grounds that Grandin's system actually makes life worse for animals than 468 traditional slaughter. Programs such as Grandin's, for example, "are 469 commonly cited by agribusiness during legislative deliberations and used to 470 argue that it is not necessary to pass legislation to prevent cruel farming 471 practices" (Farm Sanctuary 2005: 3). This raises the possibility that more 472 rigorous legal protection for farm animals might exist but for the rise of 473 humane slaughter. By the same standard, the existence of Grandin's system 474 might cause some people to continue to eat meat, and so participate in the 475 wrong of killing animals, who would have otherwise eschewed meat had 476 traditional slaughter remained the norm. 477 In response to this objection, it bears noting that resisting regulatory 478 change is a failing of the agribusiness industry, not Grandin's system itself. 479 There is no contradiction in viewing Grandin's system of slaughter as better 480 than traditional slaughter and also favouring increased regulatory protection 481 for animals. Indeed, there is no contradiction between ranking humane 482 slaughter better than inhumane slaughter but second best to vegan 483 agriculture. It also seems to underestimate the intellectual creativity of the 484 agribusiness sector to think that if Grandin's system did not exist, its 485 representatives would be unable to find some other rationale for opposing 486 greater regulation. 487 As for people who would have stopped eating meat, I am unaware of 488 anyone who actually falls into this category, and the concern that some such 489 people may exist would seem speculative. Suppose however we grant that 490 some such people do exist. The objection would still only be worth heeding if 491 they were above a trivial number. Meta-analysis of survey data obtained 492 21 between the mid-1990s and 2018 suggests that between two and six per cent 493 of the American public identify as vegetarians. A significant portion of this 494 group however also report "eating meat when asked to list everything they 495 ate during two non-consecutive 24-hour periods" (Šimčikas 2018). When 496 people who eat meat are removed from the survey data approximately one 497 per cent of the population identifies as vegetarian and does not eat meat, an 498 amount that has not significantly changed since the mid-1990s (Šimčikas 499 2018). Let us imagine that without the existence of Grandin's system, the 500 percentage of vegetarians would double to two percent of the population. In 501 other words, let us assume that the absence of Grandin's system would be as 502 powerful a motivator to adopt vegetarianism as all actually existing 503 motivations combined. Even under this generous assumption, the number of 504 additional people who would have become vegetarian is small. Given the 505 large number of animals now processed by Grandin's system, it does not 506 seem reasonable to view the reduction in their suffering as being outweighed 507 by the failure of the vegetarian population to rise from one to two percent. 508 Even in such a world, the reduced suffering of the vast majority of animals 509 killed to feed 98 percent of society would be a significant moral gain. 510 Another reason some protectionists may not rank Grandin's system 511 superior to traditional slaughter is due to the thought that it increases 512 profitability. As Gary Francione puts it, Grandin's work means that meat 513 companies are "becoming better at exploiting animals in an economically 514 efficient manner by adopting measures that improve meat quality and worker 515 safety" (2008: 75). On this understanding of Grandin's system, the ostensible 516 22 concern with animal well-being is a fig leaf obscuring its real rationale, which 517 is the more efficient exploitation of animals.8 518 This objection takes at face value Grandin's frequent assertions that a 519 humane system is also a more profitable one. Grandin's discussion of the 520 economic impact of humane slaughter however is often couched in general 521 terms. Neither Grandin's popular writings nor her academic texts discuss the 522 economic costs of implementing her system. When she has specified possible 523 cost savings they have sometimes turned out to be small. In 1995 for example 524 Grandin calculated that bruises of fed steers and heifers cost the industry $22 525 million per year, or one dollar per animal (Grandin 2000). At the time a 500-526 600 pound steer would have sold for $330-$400 (Shulz 2018). This raises the 527 possibility that the economic advantages of Grandin's system may be 528 minimal. Independent studies of the economic impact of farm animal welfare 529 regulations also document that they can increase rather than reduce costs. 530 One study for example found that the introduction of minimum space 531 requirements for egg-laying hens saw the price of eggs increase nine percent 532 (Mullaly and Lusk 2018). Although the study looked at the egg rather than 533 beef industry it nevertheless serves as a reminder that welfare measures need 534 not save the industry any money. The claim that Grandin's system makes the 535 exploitation of animals more efficient thus remains unproven. 536 But Even if Grandin's system did increase profitability this would not 537 gainsay its status as an improvement on traditional slaughter. The meat 538 industry has long been extremely efficient to begin with. During the period in 539 which Grandin's system has been in operation, there has been little chance of 540 the general public converting to vegetarianism, let alone veganism, en masse. 541 8 An anonymous reviewer raised this objection. 23 For the overwhelming majority of the animals involved, the realistic options 542 were being slaughtered according to either Grandin's method or its less-543 humane predecessor. The reduction in suffering Grandin's system represents 544 is justified even if it comes at the cost of some gain in industry efficiency, 545 particularly if that gain is small or negligible. 546 Grandin's Arguments for Omnivorism Revisited 547 As we saw, two of Grandin's four arguments for meat-eating involved an 548 appeal to evolution. Anyone who follows contemporary political debates will 549 recognize in Grandin's work a curious shift that often occurs when 550 evolutionary theory is invoked in contentious moral disputes. Although 551 evolutionary theory emphasises flux, adaptation and change on an 552 explanatory level, it is frequently invoked at a normative level to prevent or 553 rule out some innovation or shift. The defence of traditional gender roles 554 offered by evolutionary psychologists against feminist critiques is a well-555 known example. In Grandin's case, the "unnatural" option in question is 556 switching to a meat-free diet. In this way her work reflects the time and place 557 in which it was written, North America after the rise of evolution as not only 558 a biological paradigm, but a cultural touchstone as well. 559 Grandin has something in common with other writers who make 560 normative appeal to evolutionary processes. Such thinkers commonly take it 561 for granted that if such processes have normative implications, they must be 562 conservative. That is, it seems routine for thinkers who make normative 563 appeals to Darwinism to overlook the possibility that evolutionary theory 564 might challenge the status quo in a given field. In Grandin's case, she appeals 565 to a concept of what is natural in an evolutionary sense to ground a 566 conservative stance toward animal agriculture. Yet such an argument passes 567 24 over in silence the many aspects of industrial farming that violate or redirect 568 the animals' normal biological functions. 569 As an example, consider the account Grandin offers of the steps a farmer 570 took to breed pigs at an economically efficient rate: 571 572 Each boar had his own little perversion the man had to do to 573 get the boar turned on so he could collect the semen. Some 574 of them were just things like the boar wanted to have his 575 dandruff scratched while they were collecting him. (Pigs 576 have big flaky dandruff all over their backs.) The other 577 things the man had to do were a lot more intimate. He might 578 have to hold the boar's penis in exactly the right way the 579 boar liked, and he had to masturbate some of them in exactly 580 the right way. There was one boar, he told me, who wanted 581 to have his butt hole played with. "I have to stick my finger 582 in his butt, he just really loves that," he told me. Then he got 583 all red in the face. I'm not going to tell you his name, 584 because I know he'd be embarrassed (Grandin and Johnson 585 2005: 103). 586 587 The activity Grandin describes here is a form of beastiality, something 588 boars do not spontaneously seek out with humans, with whom they cannot 589 reproduce. The sexual element may make us squeamish, but it symbolizes a 590 larger truth about agriculture. When it is practiced on an industrial scale it 591 requires frustrating or redirecting an animal's normal behaviors or biology, 592 most obviously through confinement, but also through procedures mentioned 593 above such as castration. Grandin's evolutionary perspective asks us to take 594 seriously the idea that an animal's evolved nature is relevant to determining 595 how we should treat it. But even if we grant for the sake of argument that 596 evolutionary theory should be conceived of in normative terms, it is not clear 597 why its implications are necessarily conservative. It could just as easily be 598 taken to justify a radical critique of the meat industry and the many 599 "unnatural" acts in involves. Even if Grandin's normative understanding of 600 revolutionary theory is correct, in short, it seems inadequate. For there are 601 25 many elements of modern agriculture that do not meet the standard of 602 naturalness Grandin appeals to in her evolutionary mode. 603 But let us look beyond this general consideration to the specific 604 evolutionary arguments that Grandin offers. As we saw, the first one took 605 over the idea of co-evolution from Budiansky, whose argument was in turn 606 inspired by the work of archeologist David Rindos. A potential danger that 607 can occur when a theory from one discipline is invoked to settle a debate in 608 another is that the theory in question is mischaracterized as being more 609 settled and authoritative in the home discipline than is in fact the case. I 610 believe this has happened with Budiansky's appropriation of Rindos. He does 611 not adequately acknowledge that while Rindos's theory is a respectable one 612 within archeology, it has inevitably been subject to criticism and debate. 613 In a review of theories of domestication for example, archeologist Peter 614 Bellwood notes that the domestication of plant crops took place with different 615 speeds in different regions, and that Rindos's emphasis on co-evolution is 616 better able to explain the gradual domestication of fruits and tubers that took 617 place in regions such as New Guinea and the Amazon than the sudden 618 explosion of cereal crops that took place in China and Mesopotamia 619 (Bellwood 2005: 25). Bellwood cautions against "one line explanations" for 620 something as complex and regionally diverse as the rise of agriculture, and 621 argues that co-evolution is more appropriately regarded as one among many 622 concepts that need to be invoked to explain the origin of domestication. To 623 the degree that there are grounds to doubt the history of domestication 624 Budiansky relies on, therefore, there will also be grounds to doubt the 625 normative implications Budiansky derives from that history. 626 26 Let us assume however that Budiansky's historical account is correct. Even 627 if that were the case, his argument would still face a problem. Why should a 628 co-evolutionary account of the origins of animal agriculture have the 629 normative implication that we must continue to eat meat? Rindos, it is worth 630 noting, does not see any conservative implications following from co-631 evolutionary theory as it applies to plants. "Although I call for a 632 nonintentionalistic interpretation of the evolution of agricultural systems, this 633 is not to be read as support for the status quo; indeed, the reverse is true" 634 (Rindos 1984: 285). Rindos gives the example of plant-breeding projects and 635 agricultural developments that arise in response to food shortages. If the co-636 evolutionary theory is correct, he argues, then it will only enhance the 637 breeding of improved crops and other conscious agricultural changes (1984: 638 284). If coevolution does not entail conservatism in the case of plants, why 639 should things be any different with animals? 640 It is a shortcoming of Budiansky's account that he does not answer this 641 question. He instead seems to take it for granted that if animal agriculture had 642 a non-intentional origin, this implies that we have a moral obligation to 643 continue raising animals for slaughter. Such an assumption however is 644 unlikely. Since the time of David Hume, philosophers have debated whether 645 it makes sense to see is-claims as entailing ought-claims. Even critics who 646 reject Hume's unbridgeable divide between facts and values acknowledge 647 that moral claims can be derived from factual statements in a simplistic and 648 hasty way. In Budiansky's case, his particular transition from the realm of 649 causation to that of justification is bedeviled by two issues that undermine his 650 conclusion that "we have no choice" but to continue eating pigs, chickens and 651 cows. 652 27 The first problem is that his claim that we must continue raising animals 653 to eat them is at odds with by Budiansky's reliance on the concept of a 654 preadaptation. On Budiansky's telling, the docility and other traits that made 655 some species suitable for domestication originally arose for a different reason 656 in nature. Yet if that is the case, it means there is no necessary link between a 657 trait's continued existence and its continuing to perform the same function. In 658 the United States for example some vegans currently operate sanctuaries for 659 farm animals, where cows, pigs and chickens receive food and shelter for the 660 purpose of their own protection rather than slaughter. If factory farms 661 declined while the number of such sanctuaries increased, it would represent a 662 form of domestication detached from the purpose of meat eating. Something 663 similar would happen if our society saw a widescale conversion to Hinduism, 664 in which we no longer raised cattle for beef but regarded them as holy 665 creatures, allowing them to walk the streets as they do in India. 666 Such new forms of domestication are worth considering not because they 667 are likely to happen any time soon, but because they illustrate the conceptual 668 possibility of docile animals continuing to exist without being raised for food. 669 Such a transition would only be in keeping with Budiansky's narrative of 670 preadaptation. Yet when it comes to defending the status quo regarding meat 671 eating, Budiansky equates the idea of domesticated animals continuing to 672 exist with the idea of their continuing to perform the same function. This is 673 inconsistent with the evolutionary story he tells, which separates the question 674 of a trait's continued existence from its continuing to perform the same 675 function. 676 The second problem with Budiansky's argument cuts deeper. It has to do 677 with the bedrock notion that if something has an evolutionary rather than 678 28 intentional origin, that fact obliges us to preserve the thing in question. There 679 are aspects of our own biology that are the result of non-conscious 680 evolutionary forces, yet we do not take this to rule out change and 681 intervention regarding those traits. Human beings for example evolved so as 682 to be susceptible to viruses and to reproduce through sex. None of these 683 biological truths however show that a moral wrong occurs when someone 684 takes anti-viral medication or practices birth control. A co-evolutionary 685 understanding of the origin of agriculture no more obliges us to preserve 686 agricultural practices that arose nine thousand years ago than an evolutionary 687 understanding of biology obliges us to preserve aspects of our own biological 688 identity that are even older. 689 Grandin links her evolutionary account to the idea that food animals 690 themselves benefit from domestication, in that they experience a death more 691 merciful than that which they experience in the wild. It is not clear however 692 why this is relevant. An animal dying in nature has a different consequence 693 than one killed for food. When it is eaten by another predator or decomposes 694 into the earth, it contributes to the ongoing existence of other animal and 695 plant life. It is doubtful that there is currently any realistic way for ecosystems 696 to sustain themselves other than through the natural cycle of life and death. It 697 is plausible therefore to think animal deaths in the wild are necessary, in a 698 way that raising and killing them for food is not. 699 Grandin's second evolutionary argument holds that human beings had 700 evolved so as to require both meat and plant food. This claim overlooks 701 evidence suggesting that the health impact of vegetarian diets is either 702 positive or neutral. The official view of the American Dietetic Association's 703 for example is that "appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total 704 29 vegetarian or vegan diets, are healthful [and] nutritionally adequate . . . Well-705 planned vegetarian diets are appropriate for individuals during all stages of 706 the life cycle, including pregnancy" (ADA 2009: 1266). That meat-free diets 707 can be healthy has also been acknowledged by national dietician associations 708 in Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom (DAA 2018, DOC 2003, BDA 709 2005). Such statements remind us that it is possible to live a healthy life 710 without eating meat. This is surely why vegans have existed for thousands of 711 years, and why they exist in large numbers in places like India today. 712 But the primary reason dieticians' statements are worth noting is to 713 illustrate the standard of proof that Grandin must meet to substantiate her 714 claim that avoiding meet is not in keeping with our biology. She would have 715 to explain away the nutritional evidence running counter to her suggestion, 716 and present negative health evidence of her own. That Grandin does neither 717 of these things suggests that she may misunderstand the sense in which it is 718 accurate to say our species evolved as both plant and meat eaters. We are 719 natural omnivores in the sense that we are able to digest either plant or 720 animal foods, not in the sense that our biology requires us to continue to 721 consume both. Grandin is therefore wrong to say that our evolutionary 722 history rules out widespread veganism. 723 In recounting her own experience on a vegetarian diet, Grandin suggests 724 that the situation may be different for people with autism. This is a more 725 limited claim, but it also suffers from a lack of evidence. Unlike her habit 726 elsewhere in her writings, Grandin does not cite any scientific evidence for 727 her empirical claim about autistic physiology. Nor does she take note of the 728 experience of other autistic authors who have given up meat without 729 reporting any negative health consequences (O'Neill 2000: 225; Hull 2018). 730 30 Meat-free diets are in fact fairly common among autistic people, in part 731 because they have a lower level of food acceptance than the general public 732 (Ledford and Gast 2006). As a guide to food issues for autistic adults notes, 733 "many of us are vegetarians or vegans, or 'want to be,' or are working toward 734 the goal of vegetarianism" (Clark 2002: 1). Such factors suggests that Grandin 735 either has made a false generalization from her own experience, or wrongly 736 blamed her vegetarian diet for health problems that were caused by another 737 source. 738 In addition to advancing evolutionary arguments, Grandin, as we saw, 739 took up the question of why we extend a greater moral status to a disabled 740 human than we do to an animal with a similar level of cognitive ability. Her 741 response was that biologically, we have an instinct to protect our own kind. 742 Given how the handicapped and other groups have historically been 743 ostracized, this claim requires more support than Grandin provides. 744 However, even if Grandin is right, it still does not justify the moral chasm that 745 separates animals from severely mentally handicapped humans. An instinct 746 to protect members of our own kind only precludes higher moral status for 747 animals if morality must always overlap with what our instincts tell us to do. 748 Anger and sexual attraction may be instinctive, however, but we do not take 749 this to show that giving reign to our temper or our sexual impulses is always 750 justified. So even if we did have an instinct to protect every member of our 751 own species, it would not justify a lower moral status for animals. 752 Grandin's final argument invoked the moral knowledge generated by 753 slaughter. This argument has special significance, in that people with autism 754 have traditionally been thought to have such empty interiors as to rule out the 755 very possibility of inner self-examination. The autistic psyche was long 756 31 likened to an "empty fortress," as the title of a book on autism once put it 757 (Bettelheim 1972). Grandin's reflections on slaughter as a ritual serve as a 758 valuable reminder that the inner lives of people with autism can be rich and 759 complex enough to engage in the quest for meaning that is often associated 760 with religion. An exhaustive account of the ethical significance of Grandin's 761 writings would need to give special emphasis to this aspect of her work. 762 When it comes to the narrow issue of the ethical status of animals, 763 however, Grandin's reflections do not justify continuing to kill them for food. 764 One reason is the perennial problem of religious arguments not holding 765 legitimacy for people who do not share the religion in question. The idea that 766 killing animals places us in touch with a larger cosmic order makes 767 supernatural assumptions that many modern readers do not share and for 768 which Grandin offers no justification. Even if we overlook this, however, 769 there are other grounds on which someone who took a religious view of the 770 universe could have a similar experience. They might read a religious text, or 771 pray or reflect on animal birth rather than death. Even if we grant the 772 importance of cosmic awareness, therefore, there are surely other ways to 773 achieve it than through mechanized killing, which could be abolished without 774 reducing the possibility or likelihood of spiritual development. 775 A similar problem holds with Grandin's claim that killing animals helps 776 us see the value of life. Even if it is always true-and Grandin's account of 777 sadist slaughterhouse employees suggests it is not-it is unlikely we will stop 778 valuing life if we stop eating meat. If anything, an ethics of affirming life 779 seems most in keeping with a refusal to kill animals when we do not have to. 780 There is a noticeable difference between Grandin's work as a designer of 781 slaughterhouses and her work as a critic of veganism. When it comes to 782 32 designing slaughterhouses, Grandin is focused and methodical. She works 783 from an interlocking set of principle drawn from animal behaviour research 784 and applies them in a systematic way to the problem of slaughterhouse 785 design. When it comes to addressing the problem of veganism, by contrast, 786 Grandin invokes a series of ad hoc arguments derived from many different 787 sources, ranging from evolutionary theory to spiritual experiences she has 788 had inside slaughterhouses. Taken individually, none of her arguments 789 succeed. Collectively, they highlight a major blind spot in Grandin's writings. 790 In the matter of veganism, Grandin has for years criticized it on unjustified 791 grounds. Despite her valuable contributions to the well-being of animals as a 792 designer of humane slaughterhouses, this is a serious shortcoming of her 793 work. 794 Conclusion 795 One of Grandin's most popular works, Thinking in Pictures, contains a 796 photograph of a Buffalo-handling facility Grandin designed for a wildlife 797 refuge in Oklahoma. Bison who pass through the facility are auctioned off 798 once a year to private breeders, so the facility ultimately serves the purpose of 799 slaughter. But that is not its only function. It is also used for conservation 800 purposes, as when Buffalo in the park require veterinary attention. As such, 801 the photo gives rise to reflection on alternative uses for Grandin's gifts. In a 802 more humane universe than ours, one can imagine Grandin having 803 opportunities to use her unique insights into animal behaviour for a purpose 804 other than slaughter. Which is to say, for a purpose other than endless and 805 unnecessary killing. 806 As it stands, the Grandin who exists in our universe warrants both 807 praise and criticism. Many of the criticisms offered above could be avoided if 808 33 Grandin admitted that vegetarianism was morally superior to meat 809 consumption, and instead defended humane slaughter as a second-best 810 compromise. The great value of her system is that it has the capacity to make 811 a difference in a world of meat eating, which animal protection advocates to 812 date have not been able to eliminate. Grandin's misguided attempts to 813 portray humane slaughter as superior to veganism defend her approach at 814 the wrong level. She opposes it to veganism in ideal terms, when it is more 815 plausible regarded as a pragmatic compromise at the non-idea level. 816 Grandin's writings speak to a real ethical impulse in the way they focus on 817 the moral issues surrounding slaughter. Grandin's particular method of 818 addressing those issues, however, allows a meat-eating society to maintain a 819 compartmentalized view of animals, one that never implicates consumers in 820 the negative aspects of meat production. Just how indulgent Grandin's 821 approach is toward the appetite for meat can be seen by comparing it to 822 compromise views that fall short of veganism yet nonetheless call for reduced 823 meat consumption. One such view for example recommends a diet that 824 includes a limited amount of free-range beef alongside plant foods (Davis 825 2003). Another holds that the average person would be better off cutting meat 826 consumptions of all kinds, whether it is beef, chicken or anything else (Pollan 827 2006). A third possible compromise is the "vegan before six" diet. It sees 828 dinner is the only meal of the day in which meat is consumed, and even then 829 only in small amounts (Parker-Pole 2009). 830 These diets all have something in common. They are all premised on the 831 view that it is reasonable to ask people to make changes regarding the 832 amount of meat they consume. Grandin's dietary ethic is different from these 833 compromise views in that it does not ask the average meat-consumer to 834 34 reduce the amount of meat in his or her diet even slightly. On Grandin's 835 account one could have a daily diet of bacon for breakfast, chicken for lunch 836 and steak for dinner and still have done all one could to reduce animal harm. 837 Perhaps it is unsurprising that the meat industry would embrace a reformer 838 with this particular message. One has to wonder however how far we can go 839 in reducing animal harm when the amount of meat consumed remains off the 840 table of discussion. Grandin's animal ethic is one with real moral value. Yet 841 from the point of view of protection theory it ultimately signifies not how far 842 our society has come regarding animals, but how far we still have to go. 843 Bibliography 844 845 ADA. (2009). 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