Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear University	of	Nebraska–Lincoln colinmclear.net | mclear@unl.edu February	10, 2016 Abstract Call	the	idea	that	states	of	perceptual	awareness	have	intentional	content, and	in	virtue	of that	aim	at	or	represent	ways	the	world	might	be, the	'Content	View.' I argue	that	though Kant	is	widely	interpreted	as	endorsing	the	Content	View	there	are	significant	problems	for any	such	interpretation. I further	argue	that	given	the	problems	associated	with	attributing the	Content	View to	Kant, interpreters should instead	consider	him	as	endorsing	a form of	acquaintance	theory. Though	perceptual	acquaintance	is	controversial	in	itself	and	in attribution	to	Kant, it	promises	to	make	sense	of	central	claims	within	his	critical	philosophy. He	who	merely	senses	and	does	not	judge	does	not	err. Thus	every	error	lies	in judgement. Judgements	are	actions	of	the	understanding	and	of	reason. Wiener	Logik, 24:833. Contemporary	philosophers	of	mind	commonly	speak	of	the	representational	or	'intentional' content	of	a	mental	state. Mental	states	are	intentional-that	is, have	intentional	content-just in	case	they	aim	at	or	are	directed	towards	some	actual	or	possible	object, property, or	state	of affairs. Call	the	idea	that	states	of	perceptual	awareness	have	intentional	content, and	in	virtue	of	that aim	at	or	represent	ways	the	world	might	be, the	'Content	View.' What	I want	to	discuss	here	is the	Content	View	as	an	interpretation	of	Immanuel	Kant's	conception	of	perceptual	experience, or	in	his	terminology, the	having	of	an	empirical	intuition. I argue	for	two	claims. First, that	the	Content	View	is	an	unsatisfactory	interpretation	of	Kant	despite	the	extremely widespread	embrace	of	it	in	contemporary	Kant	scholarship. Second, that	given	the	problems associated	with	attributing	the	Content	View	to	Kant, interpreters	should	consider	him	as	endorsing	a	form	of	acquaintance	theory. In	particular, interpreters	should	eschew	interpreting Kant	as	ascribing	to	any	form	of	sense-data	acquaintance	theory	in	favour	of	attributing	to	him the	view	that	mind-independent	tracts	of	a	subject's	environment	are	partially	constitutive	of	the subject's	perceptual	states.1 This	form	of	environmental	acquaintance, however	controversial in	itself	and	in	attribution	to	Kant, promises	to	make	sense	of	central	claims	within	his	critical philosophy. 1 For	contemporary	proponents	of	various	forms	of	perceptual	acquaintance	with	elements	of	the	subject's	environment, see	Martin	2000, Travis	2004, Brewer	2006, Martin	2006, Travis	2006, Travis	2007, Fish	2009, Brewer	2011. 1 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear I do	not	intend	for	the	positive	portion	of	my	argument	to	be	fully	made	here. It	requires, at the	very least, a substantive	discussion	of the	argument	of the	Transcendental	Deduction, an	examination	of	various texts	concerning	Kant's views regarding	hallucination, as	well as consideration	of	his	epistemology. I pursue	these	issues	elsewhere.2 But	I do	hope	to	show here that	much	of the	contemporary	Kant scholarship is	mistaken in its largely	unexamined assumptions	concerning	how	best	to	place	Kant	with	regard	to	the	philosophy	of	perception, and	that	a	constructive	reorientation	towards	a	more	plausible	and	historically	accurate	(though perhaps	unexpected)	interpretation	of	his	view	is	possible. The	paper	proceeds in	six	parts. First, I shall	discuss the	Content	View	more thoroughly. Second, I will	introduce	some	of	Kant's	terminology	and	discuss	his	view	of	the	cognitive	faculties	and	their	respective	roles. I then	discuss	two	opposing	interpretations	that	nevertheless	both presuppose	the	Content	View	in	their	readings	of	Kant. In	section	four	I provide	three	arguments which	tell	against	Kant's	endorsing	the	Content	View. Finding	the	Content	View	wanting	as	an interpretation, I examine, in	section	five, alternative	ways	of	understanding	Kant's	notion	of	perceptual	givenness, first	in	terms	of	acquaintance	with	mind-dependent	sense-data	and	second in	terms	of	acquaintance	with	the	subject's	environment. Finally, in	section	six, I summarize the	argument	of	the	paper. 1 The	Content	View I am	calling	the	view	that	experiential	states	possess	their	intentional	status	in	virtue	of	relations to	content, the	'Content	View'.3 A contemporary	proponent	of	the	Content	View, Susanna	Siegel, explains	the	view	as	follows. the	Content	View	can	be	refined	into	a	proposal	that	finds	the	following	similarity between	visual	experiences	and	beliefs: like	beliefs, maps, and	newspapers, visual experiences	have	contents, and	just	as	the	contents	of	beliefs	are	conditions	under which	the	belief	state	is	true, so	the	contents	of	experiences	are	conditions	under which	the	experience	is	accurate. According	to	this	proposal, experiences	are	the kinds	of	states	that	can	be	accurate, and	their	contents	are	conditions	under	which they	have	this	status. (Siegel	2010, p. 30) 2 I make	a	start	on	these	issues	in	McLear	2015, McLear	Forthcoming	a, Mclear	Forthcoming	b. 3 Here	and	throughout I will	simply	assume	that the	specification	of	additional	conditions	may	well	be	needed	to successfully	characterize	the	occurrence	of	an	experience	and	its	content, causal	conditions	being	the	most	obvious. So	the	'in	virtue	of'	relation	between	subject	and	content	need	not	be	the	whole	story. But	it	is	the	story	I am	mainly concerned	with	here. Hence, I will	stick	with	the	less	complicated	explication	of	the	Content	View	as	stated	above. February	10, 2016 2	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear So, according	to	the	Content	View, part	of	what	it	is	for	a	mental	state	to	count	as	an	experience is	that	it	can	be	evaluated	for	its	correctness, and	the	conditions	of	its	correctness	are	determined by	its	content. It	is	important	that	the	nature	of	the	relation	to	content	in	virtue	of	which	the	experience	occurs	be	understood	as	requiring	more	than	the	experience's	merely	being	non-arbitrarily associated with	a	representational	content. For	one	might	plausibly	agree	that	there	are	non-arbitrary conditions	for	associating	experiences	with	particular	representational	contents, without	thereby thinking	that	experience	is	something	that	is	had in	virtue	of a	relation	to	a	representational	content.4 It	is	this	'in	virtue	of'	claim	which	I take	to	be	the	distinctive	claim	of	the	Content	View. Given	this	characterization	of	the	Content	View	it	might	be	helpful	to	see	how	it	would	work in	a	toy	example.5 Suppose, for	example, that	an	experience	E has	the	following	content	C: (C) That	cup	is	white This	content	determines	a	correctness	condition	V: (V) S's	experience	E is	correct	iff	the	cup	visually	presented	to	the	subject	as	the content	of	the	demonstrative	is	white	and	the	content	C corresponds	to	how	things seem	to	the	subject	to	be	visually	presented Here	the	content	of	the	experiential	state	functions	much	like	the	content	of	a	belief	state	to determine	whether	the	experience, like	the	belief, is	or	is	not	correct. But	a	proponent	of	the Content	View	might	also	argue	for	the	existence	of	perceptual	contents	that	are	not	conceptual in	nature. Whichever	kind	of	content	is	appealed	to, it	is	the	fact	of	the	state's	having	content that	determines	a	correctness	condition	that	allows	token	mental	states	with	that	content	to	map, mirror, or	otherwise	track	aspects	of	the	subject's	environment. I believe	that	the	Content	View	has	been	assumed	by	many	interpreters	as	best	describing Kant's	position	concerning	the	nature	of	experience. 2 Kant's	Dictum Now	that	Kant	has	come	up, I want	to	briefly	introduce	some	of	his	terminology. Kant	distinguishes	two	distinct	faculties	in	the	cognition	of	empirical	objects. The	first	he	calls sensibility, the	function	of	which	is	to	make	objects	consciously	available	to	a	subject. The	second	faculty 4 See	Pautz	2009	for	discussion	of	difficulties	surrounding	a	proper	characterization	of	the	Content	View. Pautz	considers	experience	to	be	straightforwardly identical with	a	particular	kind	of	relation	to	a	representational	content. 5 For	this	way	of	setting	up	the	position	see	Schellenberg	2011, 726. February	10, 2016 3	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear is	that	of	the understanding, whose	function	is	to	enable	a	subject	to	think	about	the	objects given	by	sensibility	(A19/B33; See	the	references	section	for	a	key	to	the	abbreviations	used	to refer	to	Kant's	works). Sensibility	yields	what	Kant	calls	'intuitions'	(Anschauungen)	(A19/B33)	whereas	the	understanding	yields	'concepts'	(Begriffe)	(A19/B33). Kant	defines	intuitions	and	concepts	as	forms of	conscious	objective	awareness	(A320/B376–7), and	more	broadly, as	types	of	what	he	terms 'Vorstellung', commonly	translated	in	English	as	either	'representation'	or	'presentation.'6 Issues arise	with	both	of	these	translations, but	I will	follow	convention	in	translating	it	as	'representation'	in	what	follows. The	main	point	I wish	to	emphasize	in	introducing	Kant's	technical	terminology	is	his	firm separation	of	the	faculty	of	sensibility	and	the	intuitions	it	yields	from	that	of	the	understanding and	the	concepts	it	spontaneously	generates. Kant	famously	put	the	division	this	way, Our	nature	is	so	constituted	that	our	intuition	can	never	be	other	than	sensible; that is, it	contains	only	the	mode	in	which	we	are	affected	by	objects. The	faculty, on the	other	hand, which	enables	us	to	think	the	object	of	sensible	intuition	is	the	understanding. To	neither	of	these	powers	may	a	preference	be	given	over	the	other. Without	sensibility	no	object	would	be	given	to	us, without	understanding	no	object	would	be	thought	...	What's	more, these	two	faculties	or	capacities	cannot exchange	their	functions. The	understanding	is	not	capable	of	intuiting	anything, and	the	senses	are	not	capable	of	thinking	anything. (A51/B75) Here	Kant indicates that it is	a	necessary	condition	of	being	given	an	object that	a	subject's sensibility	be	put	into	operation. Moreover, Kant	very	firmly	emphasizes	that	each	faculty	plays a	special	role	in	the	broader	cognitive	life	of	a	subject, and	these	roles	are	not	to	be	exchanged (see	also	A50/B74, A51/B75–6, A271/B327). Kant	elsewhere	makes	remarks	that	suggest	the	operation	of	a	subject's	sensible	receptivity is	also sufficient for	being	given	an	object. For	example, consider	what	Kant	says	right	at	the beginning	of	the	first	chapter	of	the	first Critique. He	says, 6 The	translation	of Vorstellung as	'representation'	has	figured	in	prominent	English	translations	by	Kemp	Smith	and Guyer	and	Wood. 'Presentation'	figures	in	the	Hackett	translations	by	Werner	Pluhar. Though	I think	'presentation' is	a	more	neutral term, and for that reason	preferable to 'representation', it sits	poorly	with	Kant's	Latin	gloss	of 'Vorstellung'	as	'representatio' in	the	'Stufenleiter'	passage	at	A320/B376. For	further	discussion	of this issue	see the	Pluhar translation	of the	first Critique, Kant	1996, p. 22, n. 73. Susanna	Schellenberg	(2011, p. 714)	goes so	far	as	to	attribute	the	Content	View	to	Kant	solely	on	the	basis	of	the	'Stufenleiter'	passage. But	we	should	not conclude	solely	from	a	translation	of	'Vorstellung'	as	'representation'	that	Kant	endorses	either	a	representationalist or	an	indirect	realist	theory	of	perception. The	terminology	used	must	make	sense	of, and	cohere	with, Kant's	overall view. February	10, 2016 4	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear Objects	are	given	to	us	by	means	of	sensibility, and	it	alone	yields	us	intuitions; they are	thought	through	the	understanding, and	from	the	understanding	arise	concepts. (A19/B33) One	way	of	reading	this	text	takes	it	as	stating	that	sensibility	is	the	faculty	by	means	of	which objects	are	given	to	us, and	the	relevant	representational	kind	by	which	this	is	done	is	that	of intuition. Similarly, the	understanding	is	the	faculty	by	means	of	which	objects	are	thought, with the	relevant	representational	kind	being	that	of	concepts. One	might	nevertheless	object	that	the	text	falls	short	of	a	clear	commitment	to	the	sufficiency	of	sensibility	alone	in	giving	an	object, for	it	is	perhaps	possible	to	read	the	text	as	saying that	though	objects	are	given by	means	of sensibility, the	understanding	nevertheless	plays	a necessary	role	in	their	being	given	as	well.7 However, further	textual	evidence	that	Kant	considers	sensibility	sufficient	for	giving	objects	may	be	found	in	the	introduction	to	the	Transcendental Deduction	(§13), In	contrast	[to	the	pure	forms	of	intuition], the	categories	of	the	understanding	do not	at	all	put	forward	conditions	under	which	objects	in	intuition	can	be	given	to	us. Consequently, objects	could	indeed	appear	to	us	without	their	being	necessarily related	to	functions	of	the	understanding, and	therefore	without	the	understanding	containing	their	conditions	a	priori. (A89/B122; see	also	A90/B122–3, B132, B145) As	other	commentators	have	noted, this	passage	clearly	says	that	objects	may	be	given	in	intuition	independently	of	any	act	of	the	understanding.8 Therefore, given these	seemingly	straightforward	pronouncements	as to the	separate	cognitive	roles	of	sensibility	and	understanding	in	providing	for	empirical	cognition	of	objects, it seems	that	an	interpretation	of	Kant	which	respects	these	pronouncements	is	preferable	to	one that	does	not. Letus	call	this	interpretation	of	the	division	of	cognitive	labor	between	the	sensibility	and understanding	'Kant's	Dictum.' It	says, 7 Thanks	to	Stefanie	Grüne	for	impressing	this	point	on	me. 8 See	Hanna	2005, Hanna	2008, Allais	2009, Schulting	2012. Some	have	argued	that	this	apparent	statement	of	sufficiency	is	misleading	or	even	inconsistent	with	the	views	Kant	develops	in	the	body	of	the	Transcendental	Deduction. See, for	example, Wolff	1963, pp. 156–7; Longuenesse	1998, pp. 226–7. On	my	view	such	interpretations	fail	to fully	appreciate	Kant's	arguments	concerning	the	nature	of	intuition	in	the	Transcendental	Aesthetic, and	attribute	to Kant	an	unnecessarily	strong	set	of	demands	on	objective	representation. For	further	argument	about	the	necessary conditions	of	objective	representation	see	McLear	2011, McLear	Forthcoming	c. Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee for	urging	clarity	on	this	point. February	10, 2016 5	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear (Kant's	Dictum)	Sensibility	is	sufficient	for	giving	an	object	but	the	understanding is	necessary	for	thinking	it Hence, one	desideratum	for	interpreting	Kant	is	that	one's	interpretation	respects	Kant's	Dictum.9 As	we	shall	see, one	of	the	problems	with	attributing	a	version	of	the	Content	View	to	Kant	is that	one	thereby	fails	to	respect	Kant's	Dictum. 3 Proponents	of	the	Content	View At	this	point	I want	to	provide	some	evidence	for	thinking	that	contemporary	interpreters	of	Kant, who	otherwise	differ	quite	markedly	concerning	the	interpretation	of	his	perceptual	theory, agree that	he	endorses	the	Content	View. Perhaps	the	most	prominent	recent	interpretation	of	Kant	as	endorsing	the	Content	View	is found	in	John	McDowell's	1994	book Mind	and	World. McDowell's	project	there	is	to	show, given	certain	presuppositions	concerning	the	nature	of	justification, how	it	is	that	experience can	play	a	justificatory	and	not	merely	causal	role	in	the	fixation	of	belief. In the	course	of this	argument	McDowell	articulates	very	clearly	a	commitment	to	construing	representational content	as	the	kind	of	thing	that	is	correct	or	incorrect. He	says, The	very	idea	of	representational	content	brings	with	it	a	notion	of	correctness	and incorrectness: something	with	a	certain	content	is	correct, in	the	relevant	sense, just	in	case	things	are	as	it	represents	them	to	be. I can	see	no	good	reason	not	to call	this	correctness	'truth.' But	even	if, for	some	reason, we	reserve	that	title	for correctness	in	this	sense	when	it	is	possessed	by	things	with	conceptual	content, it seems	a	routine	thought	that	there	can	be	rational	connections	between	the	world's being	as	a	possessor	of	one	bit	of	content	represents	it	and	the	world's	being	as	a possessor	of	another	bit	of	content represents it, independently	of	what	kind	of content	is	in	question.10 McDowell	explains	the	close	connection	between	the	idea	of	representational	content	and	that of	correctness	in	terms	of	the	normative	character	of	any	world-directed	mental	state, a	paradigmatic	instance	of	which	is	judging	that	something	is	the	case. He	says, 9 Similarly, whether	the	understanding	is	sufficient	by	itself	to	think	of	objects	is	a	difficult	issue. I suggest	a	way	of understanding	how	thought	might	have	an	object	independent	of	intuition	in	the	final	section. In	any	case, neither intuition	nor	thought	is	sufficient	for cognition, for	this	requires	both	together. 10 McDowell	1996, p. 162. Many	of	McDowell's	interlocutors	share	similar	views. See	Evans	1982, p. 202; Peacocke 1992, pp. 55, 65; Burge	2003, p. 506. February	10, 2016 6	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear To	make	sense	of	the	idea	of	a	mental	state's	or	episode's	being	directed	towards the	world, in	the	way	in	which, say, a	belief	or	judgement	is, we	need	to	put	the state	or	episode	in	a	normative	context. A belief	or	judgement	to	the	effect	that things	are	thus	and	so-a	belief	or	judgement	whose	content	(as	we	say)	is	that things	are	thus	and	so-must	be	a	posture	or	stance	that	is	correctly	or	incorrectly adopted	according	to	whether	or	not	things	are	indeed	thus	and	so. (If	we	can	make sense	of	judgement	or	belief	as	directed	towards	the	world	in	that	way, other	kinds of	content-bearing	postures	or	stances	should	easily	fall	into	place). (McDowell 1996, pp. xi–xii) Here	McDowell	claims	that	beliefs	and	judgements	have	a	particular	way	of	disclosing	the	world to	a	subject	and	that	this	is	a	way	in	which	we	might	understand	world-directed	mental	states more	generally. He	further	claims	that	the	way	in	which	a	mental	state	is	directed	at	the	world	is in	terms	of	its	possessing	a	correctness	condition	concerning	how	the	world	in	fact	is. McDowell then	relates	his	understanding	of	such	world-disclosing	or	world-directed	states	to	perceptual experience. We	should	understand	what	Kant	calls	'intuition'-experiential	intake-not	as	a bare	getting	of	an	extra-conceptual	Given, but	as	a	kind	of	occurrence	or	state	that already	has	conceptual	content. In	experience	one	takes	in, for	instance	sees, that things	are	thus	and	so. That	is	the	sort	of	thing	one	can	also, for	instance, judge. (McDowell	1996, p. 9) McDowell	here	utilizes	Kant's	term	'intuition'	(Anschauung)	which	McDowell	equates	with	'experiential	intake.' So	he	endorses	the	idea	that	intuition	has	content	(being	necessary	for	our 'taking	in'	that	something	is	the	case), and	that	it	is	in	virtue	of	this	content	that	the	experiential state, together	with	the	world, is	either	correct	or	incorrect. From	this	we	can	conclude	that intuitions	have	representational	content, that	this	entails	that	such	content	is	assessable	for	its correctness, and	that	intuitions	with	content	are	thereby	mental	states	assessable	for	their	correctness. Hence, McDowell's	interpretation	clearly	understands	Kant	as	endorsing	a	version	of the	Content	View. We	can	get	a	better	sense	of	those	positions	which	contrast	with	McDowell's	proposed	interpretation	by	first	looking	at	a	contemporary	advocate	of	the	existence	of	non-conceptual	content. Christopher	Peacocke	has	articulated	an	influential	conception	of	the	representational	content of	a	subject's	spatial	representations-what	he	dubs	'scenario'	content-which	involve	ways	of filling	out	space	around	the	perceiver	(Peacocke	1992, Ch. 3). Peacocke	does	not	claim	any basis	in	Kant	for	the	view, but	it	has	a	clear	resonance	with	Kant's	conception	of	spatial	representation	as	cognitively	basic. Scenario	contents	are	determined	by	labelling	a	fixed	origin February	10, 2016 7	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear (usually	one	of	the	perceiver's	body	parts, e.g.	the	centre	of	the	chest), axes	(e.g.	directions	with respect	to	the	centre	of	the	subject's	chest), and	a	time. Specification	of	a	scenario	content	in this	manner	yields	correctness	conditions. A fully	specified	scenario	content-a	'positioned' scenario-will	be	correct	when	the	space	around	the	perceiver	at	that	time	matches	the	content of	the	subject's	representation	of	that	space, and	the	orientation	of	surfaces	and	objects	in	it (Peacocke	1992, p. 63). Consideration	of	Peacocke's	notion	of	scenario	content	helps	clarify	the	non-conceptualist opposition	to	McDowell's	conceptualism. Scenario	content, qua	non-conceptual, differs	from the	kind	of	representational	content	that	McDowell	recognizes	in	two	important	ways. First, scenario	contents	are	contents	attributed to the subject regardless	of	what	other	conceptual capacities	the	subject	may	have. Scenario	contents	are	thus	meant	to	capture	aspects	of	the percieving	subject's	experience	that	may	well	outrun	the	subject's	own	capacities	for	articulation.11 Second, scenario	contents	are	correct in	a	manner that is	altogether	distinct from	propositional	contents, which	are	true	or	false	depending	on	whether	the	conditions	set	out	by	the concepts	constituting	the	proposition	are	satisfied. In	contrast, scenario	content, much	like	the content	of	a	map	or	a	recording, is	accurate	or	inaccurate. It	thus	admits	of	degrees	of	approximation.12 Thus, for	the	non-conceptualist, while	it	is	still	the	case	that	a	subject's	mental	states	only count	as	representational	in	virtue	of	possessing	correctness	conditions, the	nature	and	articulability	of	these	correctness	conditions	differs	radically	from	those	set	out	by	the	conceptualist. We	can	see	these	two	features	of	non-conceptualism	at	work	in	an	interpretation	of	Kant	that is, in	many	ways, directly	opposed	to	McDowell's	conceptualism. Robert	Hanna	has	argued	that, for	Kant, sensible	intuitions	possess	wholly	non-conceptual	representational	content. We	can see	this	in	two	quotes	from	Hanna, the	first	of	which	describes	the	non-conceptualist	position and	attributes	it	to	Kant, while	the	second	articulates	in	greater	detail	the	kind	of	representational content	Hanna	thinks	is	present	in	perceptual	experience. Non-conceptualism	holds	that	non-conceptual	content	exists	and	is	representationally	significant	...	Non-conceptual	cognitive	content	in	the	contemporary	sense	is, for	all	philosophical	intents	and	purposes, identical	to	intuitional	cognitive	content in	Kant's	sense. (Hanna	2005, p. 248) 11 Endorsement	of	this	thesis	sometimes	goes	under	the	name	'state	non-conceptualism'	or	'relative	non-conceptualism'. See	Heck	2000, Speaks	2005; for	usage	in	the	Kant	literature	see	Allais	2009, Hanna	2005, 2008, 2011b. 12 See	also	Burge	2003. This	conception	of	non-conceptual	content	also	goes	under	name	'content	non-conceptualism' or	'absolute	non-conceptualism.' See, again, Heck	2000, Speaks	2005. February	10, 2016 8	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear essentially	non-conceptual	content	is	either	accurate	or	inaccurate, and	as	I have suggested, inherently	poised	for	use	in	the	intentional	actions	of	conscious	animals. (Hanna	2008, p. 58) We can thus see that for Hanna, intuitional content is non-conceptual but nevertheless representational-it expresses an accuracy condition in virtue of which the mental state represents	some	portion	of	the	mind-independent	world. Hanna's	position	(both	on	its	own	and as	attributed	to	Kant)	regards	this	nonconceptual	content	as	essentially	veridical, indexical, and context	dependent.13. But	the	basic	presumption	which	drives	Hanna's	non-conceptualism	is the	same	as	that	of	McDowell's	conceptualism. A mental	state	counts	as	a	state	of	perceptual awareness-that	is, a	'world-directed'	state-only	in	virtue	of	having	a	representational	content which	sets	a	correctness	condition	for	the	state. Hence, Hanna, like	McDowell, articulates	an interpretation	which	endorses	the	Content	View. I take	it	that	McDowell's	and	Hanna's	views	are	representative	of	two	extremes	regarding interpretations	of	Kant's	understanding	of	the	content	of	intuition. McDowell, at	least in	the discussion	inMind	and	World, argues	that	intuition	is	through	and	through	conceptual. That	is, McDowell	understands	the	representational	content	of	perception	as	the	same	kind	of	content	as is	found	in	beliefs	or	thoughts. So	the	content	of	an	experience	is	a	conceptually	structured, truthevaluable	proposition.14 Hanna, in	contrast, argues	that	intuition	has	absolute non-conceptual content-it	has	a	structure	essentially	different	in	nature	from	that	of	conceptual	content.15 Hanna	and	McDowell	articulate	the	basic	shape	of	recent	debate	concerning	the	interpreta13 Hanna	2006, Chs	1–2; Hanna	2011b 14 McDowell	has	since	changed	his	view. A more	current	specification	of	it	states	that	intuition	is	not	propositional	in structure	though	it	nevertheless	possesses	conceptual	content. See	McDowell	2009. However, since	McDowell	still construes	the	content	of	intuition	as	intentional	and	conceptual, bringing	with	it	a	normative	notion	of	correctness, I consider	even	his	more	current	statements	to	be	an	expression	of	the	Content	View. See, for	example, McDowell 2013, where	he	explicitly	says	that	it	is	'in	virtue	of	having	content	as	they	do	that	perceptual	experiences	put	us	in such	[i.e.	cognitive]	relations	to	things'	(p. 144). 15 Hanna	2011a, p. 354; see	also	Hanna	2005. In	correspondence, Hanna	has	emphasized	the	extent	to	which	he considers	his	position	as	broadly	inclusive, embracing	aspects	of	disjunctivism	and	relationalism. However, since	he continues	to	endorse	the	thesis	that	it	is	only	in	virtue	of	the	correctness	conditions	of	a	subject's	mental	states	that they	count	as	cognitively	related	to	the	world, he	falls, for	my	purposes, within	the	ambit	of	the	Content	View	as	I have	articulated	it	above. February	10, 2016 9	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear tion	of	Kant's	views	concerning	perceptual	experience.16 So	whether	a	perceptual	experiential state	has	conceptually	structured	content	(McDowell), or	non-conceptually	structured	content (Hanna), it	is	in	virtue	of	the	state's	aiming	at	a	way	the	world	might	be, and	thus	having	a	correctness	condition, that	the	state	counts	as	a	form	of	perceptual	awareness. In	the	next	section I examine	three	arguments	as	to	why	Kant	must	reject	this	claim. 4 Three	arguments	against	the	Content	View In	Kant's	writings	one	finds	outlined	three	distinct	though	related	arguments	which	implicitly or	explicitly	tell	against	Kant's	holding	that	perceptual	experience	is	fundamentally	a	relation to	a	representational	content. The	first	is	based	on	a	view	of	sensory	deception-call	this	the Argument	from	Deception. The	second	concerns	Kant's	views	on	the	nature	of	structured	representational	content	itself-call	this	the Argument	from	Combination. The	third	depends	on Kant's	modal	requirements	on	cognition-call	this	the Argument	from	Modality. I will	discuss these	in	turn. 4.1 The	Argument	from	Deception One	of	the	main	attractions	of	the	Content	View	is	that	it	promises	an	account	of	how	sensory illusion	is	possible. For	example, according	to	the	Content	View, the	reason	why	the	two	horizontal	lines	in	the	Müller-Lyer	illusion	look	unequal, even	when	one	knows	that	they	are	not, is	due	to	the	fact	that	they	are	sensorily	represented	as	being	unequal	in	length. Because	of	the sensory	inaccuracy	of	the	representation	of	the	line	lengths	one	may	be	led	to	make	make	false judgements	concerning	their	lengths. So, for	the	proponent	of	the	Content	View, empirically false	beliefs	generated	by	a	case	of	illusion	may	be	explained	by	the	inaccuracy	or	incorrectness	of	sensory	representation	itself, and	the	independence	of	sensory	representation	from	belief explains	how	sensory	illusion	can	persist	even	in	the	face	of	opposing	belief. Thus, prima	facie	evidence	for	Kant's	denial	of	the	Content	View	would	lie	in	Kant's	denying that	sensory	illusion	is	best	understood	as	inaccurate	sensory	representation. That	Kant	makes just	such	a	denial	is	seen	in	two	passages	from	his	published	work. 16 There	are	a	great	many	other	ways	to	articulate	the	notion	that	intuition	has	content	within	the	limits	set	by	Hanna and	McDowell. For	example, 'imagist'	views	(e.g. Longuenesse	1998)	which	deny	that	intuition	has	conceptual content, but	assert	that	it	is	the	result	of	an	imaginative	synthesis, hold	that	the	images	which	constitute	experiential	consciousness	are	constructions	according	to	conceptual	rules. Hence, in	so	far	as	the	images	purport	to	be representational	they	must	be	attributed	a	content	determined	by	the	rules	of	their	construction. In	my	terms, this amounts	to	a	variation	of	the	Content	View. See	Longuenesse's	discussion	of	concepts	as	rules	for	sensible	synthesis, Longuenesse	1998, pp. 50ff. See	also	Anderson	2001, Land	2012. Watkins	2008, pp. 519–20	also	suggests	an imagistic	view, though	it	is	not	fully	articulated. Other	views	that	seem	compatible	with	this	include	Strawson	1966, Strawson	1970, Sellars	1978, Ginsborg	1997, Ginsborg	2006. Schulting	2012	is	a	good	recent	example	of	how	this debate	is	still	defined	almost	entirely	in	terms	of	the	positions	set	by	McDowell	and	Hanna. February	10, 2016 10	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear In the introduction	of the	Transcendental	Dialectic	of the	first Critique, Kant	denies that illusion	is	a	product	of	sense	perception. He	says, truth	and	illusion	are	not	in	the	object	in	so	far	as	it	is	intuited	[Denn	Wahrheit oder	Schein	sind	nicht	im	Gegestande, so	fern	er	angeschaut	wird], but	are	in	the judgement	made	about	the	object	in	so	far	as	it	is	thought. Hence	although	it	is correct	to	say	that	the	senses	do	not	err, this	is	so	not	because	they	always	judge correctly	but	because they	do	not judge	at all. Thus	both truth	and	error, and hence	also	illusion	as	the	process	of	mistakenly	leading	to	error, are	to	be	found only	in	the	judgement, i.e., only	in	the	relation	of	the	object	to	our	understanding. (A293–4/B350) Here	Kant	denies	that	what	is	delivered	by	sensibility-namely	'the	object	insofar	as	it	is	intuited [angeschaut]'-consists in something	assessable for truth	or error. Error is a	product	of the relation	of	the	object	to	the	understanding-that	is, in	the	object	as	it	is	judged. Kant	makes	a	similar	point	in	his	1798 Anthropology	from	a	Pragmatic	Point	of	View. The	senses	do	not	deceive. This	proposition	is	the	rejection	of	the	most	important but	also, on	careful	consideration, the	emptiest	reproach	made	against	the	senses; not	because	they	always	judge	correctly, but	rather	because	they	do	not	judge	at all. Error	is	thus	a	burden	only	to	the	understanding. (An §11	7:146) Though	Kant	does	not	specifically	mention	intuition	here, the	view	expressed	seems	essentially a	reiteration	of	the	position	expressed	in	the	previous	quote	and	is	repeated	extensively	in	the logic	lectures	(LL 24:83ff., 103, 720ff., 825ff.). The	senses	do	not	err	because	they	do	not	judge. Kant	thus	looks	to	be	making	a	simple	argument	about	the	relation	of	sensing	to	error. Call	this Kant's Argument	from	Deception. Here	is	a	preliminary	statement	of	it: (1)	Truth	and	error	are	found	only	in	judgement (2)	The	senses	do	not	judge, only	the	understanding	does Therefore (3)	The	senses	do	not	deceive, for	the	deliverances	of	sense	lack	truth-apt	content However, the	key	claim	of	the	second	premiss, that	the	senses	do	not	judge, is	ambiguous, for	Kant	tends	to	uses	'judgement'	(Urteil)	in	a	manner	consistent	both	with	the endorsement of	a claim, and	with	the	content	(what	we	would	call	the	proposition)	expressed	by	a	claim. Another way	of	putting	this	is	that	Kant's	usage	of	'judgement'	is	ambiguous	between	one	which	concerns February	10, 2016 11	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear the content of	a	propositional	attitude	rather	than	what, following	Frege, we	now	consider	to be	the	'force'	of	that	attitude.17 Judgement	in	this	latter	sense	denotes	an act of	assertion	or expression	of	the	attitude	of	belief. Occasionally	Kant	will	signal	the	distinction	between	content	and	force	by	using	the	transitive	verb	'beurteilen'	and	its	nominative	'Beurteilung'	for	denoting	the	act	of	assertion	(e.g. CPrR 5:57–8), and	the	nominative Urteil for	denoting	the	content	asserted. But	Kant	does	not	always do	this. This	ambiguity	leaves	the	interpreter	in	somewhat	of	a	bind, for	until	it	is	resolved	no conclusion	may	be	reached	concerning	Kant's	acceptance	of	the	Content	View. The	first	disambiguation	of 'judgement', according to	which the senses simply	convey	a representational	content	without	endorsing	or	denying	it, is	compatible	with	Kant's	holding	that sensory	experiences	occur	in	virtue	of	the	subject's	representing	a	content	(though	again, this content	is	neither	affirmed	nor	denied). In	order	that	the	Argument	from	Deception	count	as	an argument	against	the	Content	View, premiss	(2)	must	be	disambiguated	in	favour	of	the	second sense	of	'judgement', which	is	to	say	that	Kant	must	be	understood	as	claiming	that	the	senses do	not	convey	any	representational	content	capable	of	determining	a	correctness	condition	at all. That	Kant	holds	the	first	position, is	perhaps	suggested	by	his	account	of	error. Kant	defines error	as	the	taking-for-true	(für	Wahrheit	gehalten)	of	some	falsehood	or	vice	versa	(JL 9:53; see also	LL 24:83, 720, 814, 824).18 Thus	error	is	a	feature	of	taking	an	incorrect	attitude	towards the	content	of	some	claim	rather	than	a	feature	of	the	content	itself. If	we	understand	Kant's conception	of	judgement	as	the	taking	of	some	particular	attitude	of	holding-for-true	then	we can	see	why	he	links	the	lack	of	sensory	error	to	the	lack	of	judgement. The	senses	do	not	err because	they	do	not	take	up	an	attitude	towards	their	content. Since	they	refrain	from	taking such	an attitude they cannot take an incorrect attitude. So there is no judgement in sense 17 Frege	1879/2007	is	often	considered	one	of	the	first	philosophers	to	clearly	distinguish	between	a	judgement	and	its content, §2, pp. 1–2. For	discussion	of	this	point	see	Geach	1960, p. 223; Bell	1979, Ch. 3; Owen	2007. 18 This	was	not	an	uncommon	way	to	understand	error. G.	F.	Meier	defines	error	in	his Vernunftlehre (Meier	1752)-his treatise	on	logic, with	which	Kant	was	deeply	conversant-as	either	taking	the	true	for	false	or	the	false	for	true	(§109; RL 16:29). In	Meier's	case, the	bearers	of	truth	and	falsity	are	cognitions	rather	than	judgements	(§11; RL 16:4). But this	is	not	obviously	in	opposition	to	Kant's	view	since	Meier's	definition	of	a	cognition	as	a	sum	of	representations	or the	act	whereby	a	representation	of	a	thing	is	wrought	would	seem	to	conform	well	to	Kant's	conception	of	cognition as	the	relation	to	an	object. February	10, 2016 12	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear experience	though	there	is	still	content	conveyed	in	virtue	of	having	the	experience.19 The	plausibility	of	Kant's	holding	instead	the	second	position, in	which	content	is	missing from	what	is	conveyed	by	the	senses	and	is	instead	generated	by	an	act	of	judgement, depends on	appreciating	the	way	in	which	propositional	content	and	judgement	were	linked	by	philosophers	in	the	modern	tradition. For	example, in	the	most	influential	treatise	on	logic	of	the	17th century, Arnauld	and	Nicole's Port-Royal	Logic of	1662, they	define	a	proposition	in	terms	of the	comparison	of	two	ideas	in	judgement	where	one	(the	predicate)	is	affirmed	or	denied	of the	other	(the	subject).20 The identification of the proposition	with the act of bringing together ideas in a judgement	would	therefore	suggest	that	the	reason	the	senses	do	not	deceive	is	that	they	are	incapable	of	bringing	together	ideas	in	the	manner	requisite	to	form	a	proposition-the	vehicle	of correctness-and	thus	cannot	err. G.	F.	Meier's	definition	of	judgement	as	'the	representation	of a	logical	relationship	between	concepts'	suggests	a	similar	conception	(Meier	1752, §292; in	RL 16:81). Hence	Kant, influenced	as	he	was	by	Meier, could	easily	have	endorsed	this	position. These	considerations, in	and	of	themselves, do	not	decide	which	of	the	two	disambiguations of	premiss	(2)	is	endorsed	by	Kant. Fortunately, I think	some	headway	in	deciding	between	these two	positions	can	be	made	by	considering	remarks	concerning	combination	in	the	argument	of the	B-Deduction, to	which	we	will	now	turn. 4.2 The	Argument	from	Combination The	Argument	from	Deception	turns	on	Kant's	notion	of	a	judgement. So	what	is	a	judgement (Urteil)	for	Kant? In	the	1783 Prolegomena he	defines	it	as	follows. The	unification	of	representations	in	a	consciousness	is	judgement	...	thinking	is the	same	as	judging	or	as	relating	representations	to	judgements	in	general. (Pr §22	4:304; see	also	JL §17	9:101; LL 24:928) 19 One	might	worry	that	Kant	could	not	really	hold	this	first	position	because	he, like	other	modern	philosophers, did not	adequately	distinguish	between	acts	of	predication	and	the	assertion	or	endorsement	of	the	whole	proposition in	which	the	predication	occurs. See	Geach	1960, Nuchelmans	1983, Hylton	1984, Buroker	1993, Buroker	1994, Owen	2003, Owen	2007. For	criticism	of	this	interpretation	see	Ott	2002, Ott	2004, van	der	Schaar	2008. However, Kant	clearly	does	distinguish	predication	from	assertion	in	his	discussion	of	problematic	judgement	in	the	Metaphysical	Deduction	((A74–5/B99–100); Ott	2004, p. 50.) It	therefore	at	least	possible	that	Kant	may	hold	a	version	of the	Content	View	in	which the	content	of intuition is	construed in terms	of	problematic judgement. This	would apparently	respect	at	least	one	disambiguation	of	premiss	two	of	the	Argument	from	Deception. According	to	this disambiguation, the	senses	do	not	judge, not	in	the	sense	of	lacking	judgemental	content, but	in	the	sense	that	they do	not	assert, of	the	problematic	content	they	possess	or	convey, that	it	is	true	or	false. 20 See	Arnauld	and	Nicole	1662/1996, p. 82. See	also	the	discussion	of	propositions	and	judgement	in	Buroker	1993, Buroker	1994. February	10, 2016 13	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear This	text	indicates	that	a	judgement	is	the	relating	of	different	representations	together	in	one consciousness. What	kind	of	representations? Kant	indicates	that	what	are	linked	in	judgement are concepts. He	says	this	in	a	variety	of	places. Here	is	one	clear	statement	from	the	third Critique: The	concepts	in	a	judgement	constitute	its	content	(that	which	pertains	to	the	cognition	of	the	object)	...(CJ §35	5:287; see	also	B146, B283; JL 9:101; LL 24:928) judgements, for	Kant, are	unified	conceptual	representations	that, in	bringing	together	concepts to form	propositions, are the	bearers	of truth	and falsity. So	we	should	distinguish	between judgemental	content, which	is	simply	the	propositional	content	constituted	by	the	unity	of	conceptual	representations, and	judgemental	act, which	is	the	act	whereby	such	unity	is	effected. According	to	this	sketch	of	Kant's	theory	of	judgement, judgements	consist	of	concepts	that, due	to	an	act	of	the	mind	in	which	they	are	unified	in	one	consciousness, are	brought	together	to form	truth-bearing	contents	(I leave	open	how	exactly	the	transcendental	unity	of	apperception accomplishes	this). We	may	contrast	the	logical	relations	in	which	representations	stand	in	an act	of	objective	judgement	to	the	manner	in	which	representations	are	related	in	a	sensory	event or	act. In	sensory	experience	representations	are	related	to	each	other	non-logically, and	merely as	to	their	form	in	either	space	or	time. Hence, their	logical	combination	is	not	given, but	rather made. This	is, I think, Kant's	point	in	§15	of	the	second	edition	version	of	the	Transcendental Deduction. There	Kant	says, a	manifold's	combination	[Verbindung]	as	such	can	never	come	to	us	through	the senses; nor, therefore, can	it	already	be	part	of	what	is	contained	in	the	pure	form of	sensible	intuition. For	this	combination	is	an	act	of	spontaneity	by	the	power	of representation	[Vostellungskraft]; and	this	power	must	be	called	understanding, in order	to	be	distinguished	from	sensibility. (B129–30) Here	Kant	argues	that	the	kind	of	combination	by	which	the	understanding	connects	distinct representations	simply	cannot	be	carried	out	by	passive	sensibility. He	continues: Hence	all	combination	is	an	act	of	understanding	...	we	cannot	represent	anything as	combined	in	the	object	without	ourselves	having	combined	it	beforehand; and that, among	all	representations, combination	is	the	only	one	that	cannot	be	given through	objects, but-being	an	act	of	the	subject's	self-activity-can	be	performed only	by	the	subject	himself. (B129–30) February	10, 2016 14	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear Kant	says	here	that	combination	absolutely	cannot	be	given, but	must	rather	be	provided	through an	act	of	the	understanding. Since	we	know	from	the	above	discussion	of	Kant's	theory	of	judgement	that	the	content	of	a	judgement	requires	a	combination	of	concepts, we	can	conclude	that sensibility	cannot	provide	a	judgemental	content	because	it	cannot	act	to	combine	the	content in	the	requisite	manner. Hence, Kant	must	reject	the	possibility	of	an	intuition's	having	such content in	virtue	of the fact that sensibility is	passive	and therefore	unable to	engage in the kind	of	combinatorial	unifying	activity	requisite	for	judgement.21 The	fact	that	combination	is required	for	truth-apt	representational	content	might	be	taken	to	mean	that	intuition	is, prior to	such	combination, a	purely	subjective	form	of	representation	without	any	relation	to	a	particular. But, if	so, it	becomes	unclear	how	intuition	could	ever	fulfil	its	role	of	giving	objects to	consciousness	as	Kant's	Dictum	requires. Alternatively	then, intuition	may	present	a	particular	to	consciousness	without	the	intuition's	being about the	particular.22 Kant	may	thus	think that	mental	states	only	get	to	be	aimed	at	or	about	things	when	cognitive	processes	requiring discursive	acts	of	the	understanding	are	brought	into	play. So	if	we	combine	Kant's	Dictum	that	sensibility	is	sufficient	for	intuiting	objects	while	the understanding is	necessary for thinking them	with the	point	made in the	passages from	§15 above	that	no	combination	can	be	given	in	sensibility, we	get	the	conclusion	that	the	intuition of	an	object	is	not	accomplished	in	virtue	of	a	relation	to	a	truth-apt	content, for	such	content	can only	be	the	result	of	relating	representational	elements	together	via	an	act	of	the	understanding. We	thus	have	a	new	argument	against	the	Content	View. Call	this	new	argument	the Argument from	Combination. (1)	Only	judgements	may	be	true	or	false (2)	The	truth	or	falsity	of	a	judgement	depends	on	the	existence	of	a	logical	relation between	its	representational	elements (3)	Logical	relations	between	representations	depend	on	an	intellectual	act-viz. combination (4)	Sensibility	is	incapable	of	performing	intellectual	acts, so	the	intuitions	it	provides	cannot	be	true	or	false 21 Proponents	of	the	Content	View	might	read	this	passage	as	indicating	that	sensibility	alone	cannot	produce	intuitions, but	only	sensations	which	themselves	require	combination	into	intuitions. Against	this, Kant	typically	talks	about synthesis	or	combination	as	operative	on	a	manifold	of	intuition	rather	than	a	manifold	of	sensation	(e.g. A78–9/B104– 5, A99)	and	he	thinks	of	pure	intuitions, which	by	definition	lack	any	sensory	content, as	possessing	a	manifold	in need	of	unity. So	whatever	Kant	means	by	the	unification	of	a	manifold, he	does	not	at	all	obviously	mean	that synthesis	is	performed	on	a	series	of	discrete	sensations. For	further	discussion	of	how	Kant	is	using	the	notion	of combination	in	the	B-Deduction	see	McLear	2015. 22 For	discussion	and	defence	of	this	view	of	intuition	see	Parsons	1992, Allais	2009. February	10, 2016 15	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear (5)	Intuition	gives	us	objects	(from	Kant's	Dictum) Therefore (6)	No	intuition	gives	an	object	in	virtue	of	a	content	that	is	true	or	false The	Argument	from	Combination	is	thus	an	argument	concerning	a	necessary	condition	on what	it	is	to	be	a	truth-apt	representational	content. Such	content	must	have	a	special	kind	of order	relating	its	elements, and	this	order	can	only	come	about	through	the	cognitive	activity of	a	spontaneous	intellect.23 In	this	manner	Kant	remains	within	the	early	modern	construal	of propositions	as	kinds	of	intellectual	acts	(of	predication	or	combination). His	view	is	obviously sophisticated in that it	allows for	a	distinction	between	predication	and	assertion	so that	he can	allow	for	non-asserted	propositions	as	part	of	the	content	of	hypothetical	judgements. But Kant	nevertheless	thinks	of	representational	content	as	requiring	the	intellectual	activity	of	the understanding. The	Argument from	Combination is an independent argument against the	Content	View interpretation, but	it	also	helps	disambiguate	the	problematic	premiss	(2)	of	Kant's	Argument from	Deception.24 Since	Kant	regards	the	content	of	judgement	as	dependent	upon	a	unifying act	of	the	understanding, and	sensibility	as	unable	to	carry	out	such	acts, it	must	be	the	case that	sensibility	cannot	convey	truth-apt	representational	content. Hence, the	Argument from Combination	demonstrates that	Kant	must endorse the second reading	of	premiss (2)	of the Argument	from	Deception-namely, that	the	senses	do	not	convey	truth-apt	representational content.25 So	the	revised	Argument	from	Deception	looks	like	this: 23 A related	position	that	Kant	might	be	thought	to	hold	is	one	where	sensible	intuition	conveys	material	that	is	not itself	truth-assessable, but	is	nevertheless	apt	to	be, and	which, upon	being	synthesized, becomes so. Would	this be	a	version	of	the	Content	View? It	would	seem	to	depend	on	the	nature	of	what	is	conveyed	by	sensibility. If	this material	is	both	not	truth-apt	(or	otherwise	correct, etc.) and fails	to	make	something	mind-independent	present	to consciousness, then	we	do	not	really	have	a	case	of	perception. Presumably	then, perception	would	be	understood	to require	synthesis	and	we	would	thus	have	a	version	of	the	Content	View. But	this	would	mean	that	sensibility	cannot independently	establish	a	cognitive	relation	to	an	object	and	thus	that	Kant's	Dictum	is	violated. Alternatively, the material	conveyed	by	the	senses	is	not	truth-apt	and does make	an	object	present	to	consciousness, in	which	case it is	a	version	of	an	acquaintance	view, which	I discuss	below. Thanks to	Ted	Sider	and	Vera	Flockhart for	each suggesting	versions	of	this	alternative	to	me. 24 The	Argument	from	Combination	will	seem	convincing	only	to	those	who	have	not	accepted	a	dominant	line	of interpretation	in	Kant	studies	(e.g. Sellars	1968, Pippin	1982, Kitcher	1990, McDowell	1994, Longuenesse	1998, McDowell	1998, McDowell	2003, Land	2006, Land	2008, Griffith	2010, Kitcher	2011)	which	reads	the	argument of	the	Transcendental	Deduction	(particularly	in	the	second	edition)	as	requiring	that	the	understanding	be	operative on	sensibility	for	intuition	of	objects	to	occur. This	'Intellectualist'	requirement	is	a	clear	violation	of	Kant's	Dictum. To	be	sure, there	are	texts	which	seem	to	support	Intellectualism, and	more	needs	to	be	said	in	defence	of	Kant's Dictum. For	discussion	of	these	issues	see	Allais	2009, McLear	2011, Tolley	2013, McLear	2015. 25 As	I shall	suggest	in	Sect. 5.2	below, the	combination	of	a	no-content	view	of	perception	with	the	claim	that	there are	cases	of	perceptual	deception	means	that	Kant	ought	to	be	read	as	endorsing	a	doxastic	theory	of	perceptual error. February	10, 2016 16	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear (1)	Truth	and	error	are	found	only	in	judgement (2)	Sensibility	(and	thus	the	senses)	is	not	capable	of	the	combinatorial	act	necessary	for	judgement. Therefore (3)	The	senses	do	not	deceive, for	the	deliverances	of	sense, in	virtue	of	not	being combined, are	not	truth-apt However, even	with these two	arguments in	hand there remains	one further strategy for attributing	the	Content	View	to	Kant. The	discussion	thus	far	has	been	mostly	centred	on	the issue	of	truth-apt	representational	content. In	contrast, many	advocates	of	a	non-conceptualist version	of the	Content	View	do	not think that the content	of an	experience is truth-apt, for they	think	truth-aptness	is	had	only	by	conceptually	structured	content.26 Instead, these	nonconceptualists	conceive	the	content	of	experience	in	terms	of	accuracy. Since	Kant	only	clearly discusses	truth-apt	content, there	seems	to	be	an	open	possibility	that	he	endorses	this	more minimal	notion	of	the	content	of	intuition	understood	in	terms	of	mere	accuracy. Against this	possibility	we	should	note	first that	Kant, to	my	knowledge, never	speaks	of the	accuracy	of	intuition, as	opposed	to	the	truth-aptness	of	judgement.27 So	unlike	the	texts appealed	to	in	the	Argument	from	Deception, the	Content	View	has	no	clear	textual	basis	for attributing	the	accuracy	view	to	Kant. Second, Kant	does	clearly	indicate	in	the	passage	cited from	the	first Critique in	support	of	the	Argument	from	Deception	that	neither	illusion	nor	error are	given	in	what	is	intuited	but	rather	only	in	what	is	judged.28 So	he	clearly	does	not	think	that error	and	illusion	are	to	be	accounted	for	by	appeal	to	the	representational	content	of	intuition understood	in	terms	of	accuracy. This	is	a	surprising	result	if	he	in	fact	endorses	the	minimal notion	that	the	content	of	intuition	determines	an	accuracy	condition. Hence	I see	no	reason	as	to	why	the	arguments	from	Deception	and	Combination	would not	extend	more	broadly	to	include	not	only	truth-apt	judgements	but	also	accuracy	conditions. 26 Prominent	examples	include	Peacocke	1992, Burge	2003, Burge	2010. 27 There	are	passages	where	Kant	might	be	taken	as	indirectly	speaking	or implying	this	view. For	example, in	the Refutation	of	Idealism, Kant	argues	that	the	'intuitive	representation'	(anschauliche	Vorstellung)	of	outer	things	leaves open	whether	those	things	exist. Their	existence	must instead	be	determined	by	appeal to	the	causal	coherence of	those	intuitive	representations	with	others	(B278). This	might	suggest	that	an	intuition	represents	the	existence of	some	object	but	the	extent	to	which	this	representation	is	accurate	must	be	determined	by	appeal	to	the	causal criterion. There	are	two	immediate	problems	with	this	reading. First, it	is	unclear	whether	Kant	means	the	same	thing by	'intuitive	representation'	as	he	does	by	representation	in	outer	intuition. Second, the	context	of	this	passage	has Kant	wanting	to	make	room	in	his	theory	of	intuition	for	the	possibility	of	dreams	and	hallucinations. It	is	not	at	all obvious	that	he	need	make	room	for	such	possibilities	by	appealing	to	the	Content	View. I pursue	this	point	further in	my	'Kant's	Disjunctivism.' Thanks	to	Stefanie	Grüne	for	discussion	of	these	issues. 28 Kant	is	also	recorded	as	asserting	this	in	numerous	texts	from	his	logic	lectures, see	LL 24:83, 84, 87, 103, 146, 156, 720, 813, 825, 833. February	10, 2016 17	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear Nevertheless	one	might	find	these	textual	considerations	less	than	compelling	and	remain	attracted	to	the	idea	that	Kant	endorses	some	version	of	the	Content	View	in	thinking	that	correctness	conditions	are	required	for	objective	representation	in	empirical	intuition. However, there is	one	further, quite	general, argument	that	can	be	brought	to	bear	against	Kant's	holding	the Content	View. We	will	discuss	this	in	the	next	section. 4.3 The	Argument	from	Modality There	is	a	general	argument	against	Kant's	holding	the	Content	View	which, if	it	succeeds, does so	whether	the	correctness	conditions	set	by	the	content	of	intuition	are	understood	in	terms	of truth-aptness	or	accuracy. This	argument, which	I call	the Argument	from	Modality, stems	from general	conditions	Kant	sets	on	theoretical	cognition. The	argument	depends	on	what	Andrew Chignell has called	Kant's 'Modal	Condition' (Chignell 2010, Chignell 2011)	on theoretical cognition	(I will	drop	the	modifier	from	here	on). Kant	states	it	clearly	in	the	second	edition preface. To	cognize	an	object, it	is	required	that	I be	able	to	prove	its	possibility	(whether by	the	testimony	of	experience	from	its	actuality	or	a	priori	through	reason). But	I can	think	whatever	I like, as	long	as	I do	not	contradict	myself, i.e., as	long	as	my concept	is	a	possible	thought, even	if	I cannot	give	any	assurance	whether	or	not there	is	a	corresponding	object	somewhere	within	the	sum	total	of	all	possibilities. But	in	order	to	ascribe	objective	validity	to	such	a	concept	(real	possibility, for	the first	sort	of	possibility	was	merely	logical)	something	more	is	required. (Bxxvi) Here	Kant	contrasts	merely	logically	possible	thought, in	which	one	brings	together	logically compossible	concepts, with	the	kind	of	real	empirical	possibility	necessary	for	cognition. Kant distinguishes	between	the	two	sorts	of	possibility	in	terms	of	the	notion	of	cancellation	(Aufhebung). The	subject	matter	of	a	thought	is	logically	possible	if	the	thought's	constituent	concepts may	be	combined	in	judgement	without	contradiction, and	thus	without	being	logically	cancelled	out (A151/B190; NM 2:171–2). The	subject	matter	of	a thought is really	possible, in contrast, if	it	can	be	shown	that	the	subject	matter	to	which	the	thought	corresponds	consists of	properties	which	are	mutually	empirically	compossible	and	not, in	Kant's	terms, 'really	repugnant.' This	is	perhaps	best	illustrated	with	examples	involving	physical	forces	(e.g.	opposite motions, opposing	attractive	and	repulsive	forces; see	also	A264–5/B320–1). Moreover, Kant considered	a	further	kind	of	repugnance, wherein	the	subject itself is	'cancelled	out'. In	other words, according	to	Chignell	it	would	be	impossible	for	any	being	to	exist	that	would	instantiate such	repugnant	properties	(Chignell	2011, pp. 144–5). In	order	for	knowledge	to	be	possible, the	demonstration	of	the	real	possibility	of	the	object	of	knowledge	must	be	secured. February	10, 2016 18	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear Chignell	puts	the	Modal	Condition	this	way: (Modal	Condition) Necessarily, S knows	that p only	if	S is	in	a	position	to	prove the	real	possibility	of	the	objects	referred	to	in p29 Chignell	then	glosses	this	as	follows: The	claim	is that in	order to	count	as theoretically	cognizing	an	object (having theoretical	knowledge	about	it), I must	be	able	to	provide	full-blown	proof	(and not	just	probabilistic	opinion	or	hypothesis)	that	it	is	really	possible. So, even	if	I have	a	valid	argument	with	apparently	plausible	premisses, the	conclusion	can't count	as	cognition	or	knowledge	unless	I am	able	to	prove	that	there	is	no	real repugnance	amongst	the	predicates	of	the	concepts	involved. (Chignell	2011, p. 146) One	of	the	ways	discussed	by	Chignell	by	which	such	proof	might	be	provided	is	via	'appeals to	experience	or	the	experience	of	others'	(p. 146). But	if	this	is	the	case	then	experience	must be	able	to prove the	real	possibility	of	the	subject	matter	of	the	judgement	and	do	so	in	virtue of	some	feature	of	the	experience	itself.30 The	question	is	how	it	might	do	this. Answering	this question	will	demonstrate	why	the	Content	View	cannot	adequately	satisfy	the	Modal	Condition. If	experience	is	to	provide	proof	of	real	possibility	then	it	must	have	features	which	thought alone	does	not. If	experience	is	conceived	along	the	lines	suggested	by	the	Content	View, what would	those	features	be? This	is	a	particularly	pressing	question	for	the	Content	View	because	it considers	experience	and	thought	to	be	similar	in	a	variety	of	ways. For	example, they	are	both attitudes	to	content, and	the	content	in	both	cases	sets	veridicality	conditions	on	mental	states that	possess	them. It	seems	clear	then	that	the	content	of	an	experience	cannot	be	simply	the same	as	the	content	of	a	thought, otherwise	experience	would	be	no	better	situated	to	satisfy the	Modal	Condition	than	thought. The	most	promising	strategy	for	bringing	Kant's	remarks	in	line	with	the	Content	View	is	to distinguish	the	content	of	intuition	from	that	of	thought	(or	judgement	generally)	and	to	claim that	experience	satisfies	the	Modal	Condition	in	virtue	of	the	content	of	the	intuitions	that	partially	constitute	an	experience. A defender	of	the	position	that	Kant	endorses	the	Content	View might	argue	here	that	the	relevant	difference	in	content	between	experience	and	thought	is	that 29 Chignell 2011, p. 146. Note that in the argument that follows I go	beyond	any	claims	concerning the	Modal Condition	that	Chignell	might	himself	endorse. 30 Note	that	Kant	thinks	that	merely	possible	experiences	can	also	provide	the	needed	proof	to	satisfy	the	Modal	Condition. See	A771/B799	and	the	discussion	in	Chignell	2011, p. 146. My	concern	is	with	how	experience	could	do this, so	I will	stick	to	the	simpler	case	of	actual	experience. February	10, 2016 19	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear perceptual	content	consists	of	singular	propositions, and	therefore	incorporates	actual	elements of	the	perceiving	subject's	environment	in	a	way	that	mere	thought	does	not.31 Kant	is	very clear	that	intuition	is	singular	while	thought	is	merely	general	(A68/B93; A320/B376–7; JL 9:91; Pr	4:281). If	experience	(specifically	intuition)	has	singular	content	while	thought	does	not, so the	argument	goes, then	experience	is	in	a	position	to	provide	proof	of	actuality	because	the content	of	an	experience	can	include	particular	objects	in	the	subject's	environment, thereby making	them	part	of	the	content	of	the	subject's	mental	states.32 Thus, according	to	this	suggestion, experiential	states, in	virtue	of	their	singular	content, provide	proof	of	real	possibility. The	subject, it	might	be	claimed, could	not	be	in	the	experiential	state	she	is	in	if	the	object constituting	the	content	of	that	state	were	not	really	possible. So, trivially, since	the	subject	is in	the	particular	experiential	state	she	is	in, the	object	which	is	part	of	the	content	of	that	state must	be	really	possible. Despite the	obvious	attractiveness	of	understanding the	distinction	between thought	and experience	along	such	lines, I am	not	convinced	that	appeal	to	singular	content	is	enough	to satisfy	the	Modal	Condition. First, the	singular	content	theorist	faces	a	dilemma. Either	the	singular	content	of	an	experience	is	part	of	the	nature	of	the	experience	or	it	is	not.33 In	either	case	problems	arise. Let	us take	these	in	turn. On	the	one	hand, the	theorist	might	consider	singular	content	as	partially	constitutive	of the	nature	of the	subject's	perceptual	experiences. In this	case	we	have	the	means	to	argue that the content of the experience is in a	position to	prove the real possibility of beliefs or judgements	concerning	that	content, but	we	lose	the	Content	View's	neat	explanation	of	illusion and	hallucination. To	understand this recall that, according to the	Content	View, what it is for an	experience to	be the	kind	of experience it is, including its	phenomenal character, is determined	by	the	content	to	which	one	is	related	in	virtue	of	which	one	has	that	experience. According	to	the	constitutive	view	of	singular	content, since	what	it	is	to	have	a	particular	kind	of experience	involves	entertaining	that	particular	singular	content, it	would	be	impossible	for	there to	be	a	phenomenally	matching	hallucination	(or	illusion)	which	lacked	that	content.34 Hence, 31 There	are	a	variety	of	different	ways	in	which	we	might	understand	the	nature	of	such	singular	content. For	example the	content	might	be	so-called	Russellian	propositions, consisting	of	a	particular	object	and	a	property	of	that	object (or	the	universal	of	which	that	property	is	an	instance). I leave	open	here	the	exact	characterization. For	discussion of	some	different	possibilities	see	Siegel	2010. 32 An	influential	argument	along	these	lines	was	made	by	Strawson	(1959); see	also	Brewer	1999. 33 I understand	the	notion	of	a	'nature'	here	as	that	which	makes	a	particular	experience	the	kind	of	experience	that	it	is and	thus	as	playing	a	significant	explanatory	role	with	respect	to	issues	such	as	phenomenal	character, introspection, behaviour, etc. See	Martin	2004, Fish	2009	for	discussion. 34 Some	proponents	of	the	Content	View	have	also	argued	that	it	is	unintelligible	to	understand	elements	of	a	subject's environment	as	literally	constituting	the	intentional	content	to	which	one	is	related. See, e.g., McDowell	1984, Burge 1991, 2007. February	10, 2016 20	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear the	Content	View's	attractively	straightforward	way	of	accounting	for	sameness	of	phenomenal character	between	introspectively	indistinguishable	experiences	by	sameness	of	content	would be	lost. On	the	other	hand, the	theorist	may	take	singular	content	as	determining	the	correctness conditions	for	particular	token	experiences	but	not	as	constitutive	of	the	nature	of	the	subject's experiences	themselves. However, if	the	nature	of	the	experience-understood	as	the	type	of mental	content	that	makes	the	experience	the	kind	of	experience	that	it	is-is	independent	of the	subject's	actual	environment, then	it	is	no	longer	clear	how	the experience provides	any proof	of	real	possibility, as	opposed	to	the	singular	content	present	in	some	token	instance	of that	experience. This	way	of	objecting	does	assume	that	it	must	be	features	of	the	experiential type	rather	than	merely	its	tokens, which	are	relevant	to	satisfaction	of	the	Modal	Condition. An	advocate	of	the	Content	View	interpretation	might	plausibly	deny	this. What	is	more, the Kantian	texts	are	simply	silent	with	respect	to	this	issue	of	whether	mental	types	or	their	tokens are	relevant	to	satisfaction	of	the	Modal	Condition. It	seems	reasonably	to	worry, however, that reliance	on	this	distinction	is	anachronistic, and	to	that	extent	unsatisfactory	as	an	interpretation of	Kant's	views. Independently	of	this	first	problem	there	is	a	second, and	more	general, problem	that	the Content	View	faces	in	satisfying	the	Modal	Condition. Kant's	objection	to	the	rationalist	claim that thought	alone	might	be	sufficient for	cognition	consists, at least in	part, in	arguing that the	means	by	which	thought	structures	its	content	(i.e.	non-contradiction)	is	not	sufficient	for determining	whether	the	property	picked	out	by	the	predicate	really	can	inhere	in	the	object referred	to	by	the	subject. So	we	need, in	proving	the	real	possibility	of	the	relevant	object, a	means	of	getting	at the	object	with its	properties that	goes	beyond	what	can	be	cognized by	means	of	logical	principles	alone. The	Content	View, however, fails	to	do	this	because	it remains	at	too	abstract	a	level, a	level	at	which	there	is	nothing	in	the	experience	itself	to prove whether the relevant	object	has the relevant	property (more	precisely: whether the relevant property	is	really	compossible	with	the	other	properties	inherent	in	the	object). This	is	true	even for	the	singular	content	theorist, for	there	is	nothing	in	the	content	itself	which	indicates	that	the universal	attributed	to	the	particular	object	can	really	inhere	in	that	object. This	is	supposed to	be	one	of the	virtues	of the	Content	View, in that it	allows	a straightforward	explanation of	perceptual	error	by	postulating, in the	case	of illusion, the representation	of	an	object	as instantiating	properties	which	it	does	not	actually	possess. But	by	emphasizing	the	importance of	the	subject's	relation	to	a	representational	content, the	Content	View	cannot	explain	how	a relationship	between	bits	of	content	(e.g.	an	object	and	a	universal)	can	prove	the	real	possibility (much less the	existence)	of	a	corresponding relationship	between	bits	of the	world (e.g.	an object	and	a	particular	property	instance). Hence, the	very	same	problem	that	seems	to	afflict February	10, 2016 21	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear thought	(at	least	according	to	Kant)	would	also	seem	to	afflict	experience, understood	as	the Content	View	suggests. In reply to these considerations, the proponent of the	Content	View	may argue that the Modal	Condition	can	only	be	satisfied	by	some	version	of	the	Content	View	because proof of the	real	possibility	of	the	subject-matter	of	a	judgement	requires	the	production	of	epistemic reasons, and	it	would	seem	that	only	a	state	with	representational	content	could	function	in producing	such	reasons.35 The	idea	here	is	that	if	the	experience	is	to	prove	the	possibility	of its	subject	matter	then	it	must	be	able	to	function	as	a	premiss	(or	something	along	these	lines) in	a	deductive	argument	of	which	the	real	possibility	of	the	subject-matter	of	the	judgement	is the	conclusion. Something	like	this	view	would	seem	to	have	been	part	of	McDowell's	motivation	for	his	(and supposedly	Kant's)	conceptualism. McDowell	argues	that	there	must	be	normative	conditions that	govern	the	occurrence	of	experiences	if	they	are	to	count	as	justifying	our	empirical	beliefs, and	they	must	so	count	if	we	are	to	have	empirical	knowledge	of	the	mind-independent	world (see	McDowell	1996, pp. xiv–xvii, and	Ch. 1). Two	things	may	be	said	in	reply	to	this. First, the	argument	presupposes	what	Jim	Pryor	has called	the	'Premise	Principle'-namely, that	the	only	thing	which	may	justify	a	belief	that p is a	state	whose	content	is	a	proposition	that	could	be	used	as	a	premiss	in	an	argument	for p (Pryor	2005, p. 189). Pryor	notes	several	reasons	why	one	might	reject	this	principle. The	most important, for	our	purposes, is	that	the	principle	fails	to	distinguish	between	a	justifier-what makes	it	the	case	that	one	is	justified	in	believing	that p-and	the	justification	that	one has for one's	belief	that p, in	the	sense	of	an	argument	one	has	or	can	make	in	support	of p. For	example, one	justifier	in	coming	to	believe	that	one	has	a	headache	is	the	sensory	experience	of	having	a	pain	in	one's	head. The	headache	qua	mental	state	is	a	justifier	for	believing the	proposition	that	one	has	a	headache. But	one's	headache	cannot	figure	as	a	premiss	in	an argument	and	thus	violates	the	Premise	Principle. However, it	also	seems	entirely	appropriate to	say	that	it	is	one's	headache, and	not	merely	some	proposition	concerning	one's	headache, which	(at	least	partially)	justifies	one	in	believing	that	one	has	a	headache. Kant's	notion	of	an	epistemic	ground	seems	to	reflect	this	distinction	between	a	justifier	and the justification	one	has for	a	belief. Kant	considers	a	ground	to	be 'that from	which	something	can	be	cognized'	(LL 24:42). In	the	Canon	of CPR,	Kant	describes	holding-for-true	(Fürwahrhalten)	or	'Assent'	as	concerned	with	two	different	kinds	of	grounds-one	objective	and one	subjective	(A820/B848). As	I understand	Kant's	notion	of	an	objective	ground, it	is	simply	anything	that	renders	probable	the	truth	of	a	judgement	to	which	one	Assents	(LL 24:143–4, 147, 194; JL 9:81–2). The 35 Thanks	to	the	editor	of Mind for	emphasizing	to	me	the	importance	of	this	objection. February	10, 2016 22	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear notion	of	probability	here	is objective in	the	sense	that	it	does	not	depend	on	the	subject's	capacity	to	grasp	the	probabilistic	relations	between	the	ground	and	the	truth	of	his	judgement. Kant	calls	such	a	subjective	grasp	'plausibility'	(Scheinbarkeit). Probability	is	concerned	with	things. Plausibility	is	concerned	with	whether, in the	cognition, there	are	more	grounds	for	the	thing	than	against	it. (LL 24:883; see also	LL 24:145, 194–5; JL 9:82; RF 16:436, R2603–4) Plausibility	and	probability	are	distinct	types	of	relationships. The	status	of	an	objective	ground as	sufficient	depends	on	probability, not	plausibility. In	contrast, Kant	describes	subjective	grounds	as	'causes	[Ursachen]	in	the	mind'	of	the	subject, which	rest	on	the	'particular	constitution	of	the	subject'	(A820/B848). An	Assent	is	justified when	the	justifier-the	objective	ground-is	also	one	which	the	subject	has	in	virtue	of	its	being	part	of	the	cause-the	subjective	ground-of	her	Assent.36 The	fact	that	Kant	considers	the objective	ground	of	an	Assent	to	be	an	objective	probability	rather	than	a	proposition	suggests that	he	does	not	endorse	the	Premise	Principle. Second, McDowell	himself	explicitly	denies	the	Premise	Principle	in	his	more	recent	work, arguing	that	there	is	a	difference	between	an	experience's	being	conceptual	and	its	being	propositional, and	that	his	concern	is	to	argue	only	for	the	former	(McDowell	2008). Thus	it	is	not clear	why	we	should	endorse the	Premise	Principle if	even its	primary	proponent	no longer endorses	it	(if	he	ever	did). With these	considerations in	mind	we	can	now	state the	Argument from	Modality	more precisely: (1)	For	at	least	some p, where p is	an	empirical	proposition, we	know	that p (2)	Knowledge	that p requires	proof	of	the	real	possibility	of p (3)	Where p is	an	empirical	proposition, the	relevant	proof	must	come	via	objective perceptual	experience	(as	opposed	to	mere	sensation) (4)	Since, according	to	the	Content	View, it	is	the	correctness	condition	specified by	the	content	of	an	experience	that	makes	it	objective, it	is	the	content	of	the	experience	that	must	play	the	relevant	explanatory	role	in	any	proof	of	real	possibility (5)	This	content	is	either	(a)	an	empirical	proposition; (b)	a	non-empirical	proposition; (c)	a	non-propositional	content (6)	If	(a), then	the	account	is	viciously	circular; if	(b), then	the	account	is	not	relevant to	empirical	proof; if	(c), the	there	must	be	an	account	of	how	the	object, property, 36 I am	simplifying	things	here	somewhat. For	further	discussion	see	Stevenson	2003, Chignell	2007, Pasternack	2011. February	10, 2016 23	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear state	of	affairs, etc., which	constitutes	the	non-propositional	content	is	itself	really possible. But	this	seems	to	require	appeal	to	either	(a), (b), or	some	further	really possible	object Therefore (7)	Appeals	to	a	content	specifying	a	correctness	condition	as	the	means	of	satisfying	the	Modal	Condition	are	either	circular	or	irrelevant	[by	(1)–(6)] (8)	But, by	hypothesis, for	at	least	some p, we	know	that p [restatement	of	(1)] Therefore (9)	For	at	least	some p that	is	known, the	objective	perceptual	experience	which proves	the	real	possibility	of	p	does	so	in	a	way	that	is	logically	prior	to	that	experience's	possession	of	a	correctness	condition	[by	(1), (7)] (10)	However, according	to	the	Content	View, no	objective	perceptual	experience is	logically	prior	to	a	correctness	condition	specified	by	its	content Therefore (11)	Kant	does	not	endorse	the	Content	View	[by	(9), (10)] Premisses	(1)–(3)	are	background	premisses	which	Kant	plausibly	endorses. Premiss	(4)	is entailed	by	the	combination	of	the	Content	View	with	the	Modal	Condition. Premisses	(5)	and (6)	straightforwardly	express	worries	concerning	circularity	and	relevance. It	should	be	noted that	the	worry	about	relevance	occurs	so	long	as	we	limit	the	domain	of	empirical	propositions to	those	concerned	with	empirical	beliefs	about	specific	elements	of	a	subject's	environment. There	are	some	empirical	beliefs, for	example	that	the	state	of	a	physical	object	causally	depends on	its	prior	state	and	circumstances, which	are	(according	to	Kant)	a	priori	demonstrable. This is	part	of	the	point	of	the	section	of	the	first Critique which	Kant	calls	the	'Analytic	of	Principles.' But	such	a	priori	proofs	do	not	extend	to	demonstrating	the	real	possibility	of	particular	empirical judgements	concerning	particular	experienced	objects	(e.g. 'there	is	a	red	and	round	physical object	in	front	of	me'). Finally, premiss	(10)	is	simply	another	way	of	stating	the	basic	claim	of the	Content	View. According	to	that	view	it	is	in	virtue	of	a	sensory	state's	content	that	it	counts as	an	objective	perceptual	experience, so	it	cannot	be	the	case	that	the	status	of	an	experience as	objective	is	logically	prior	to	its	content. The	proponent	of	interpreting	Kant	as	endorsing	the	Content	View	will	likely	want	to	reject (6). One	might	argue	here	that	correctness	conditions	do	not	stand	in	need	of	proof	in	the	way that	empirical	judgements	do. But	this	seems	an	arbitrary	claim. Surely	one	of	the	reasons	for attributing	content	to	an	experience	is	that	the	content	which	determines	what	one	experiences February	10, 2016 24	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear is	the	very	same	(or	very	similar)	content	which	determines	what	(e.g.) one	believes	or	knows. This	seems	particularly important for the	conceptualist	about	content. But if this is the	case then	one	must	be	able	to	prove	the	possibility	of	this	content	in	a	way	which	does	not	resort either	to	general	a	priori	principles	or	other	experiences. Since, according	to	Kant, there is no other	way	to	provide	such	proof, the	correctness	conditions	could	never	themselves	be	objects of	knowledge. This	obviously	places	such	content in	an	awkward	position	to	be	part	of the ultimate	justification	or	warrant	of	all	empirical	knowledge. If	the	above	three	arguments	against	the	Content	View	are	correct, then	either	Kant	does	not endorse	the	Content	View	or	his	overall	view	is	incoherent. On	grounds	of	charity, it	seems	best to	construe	Kant	as	endorsing	a	theory	of	experience	which	is	other	than	(and	does	not	entail)	the Content	View. In	the	remaining	sections	of	this	paper	I suggest	and	criticize	some	other	possible theories	he	might	endorse. In the	end, I shall	argue that	his remarks	concerning	deception, the	constitution	of	content, and	the	Modal	Condition	sit	best	with	a	view	of	experience	as	a primitive	acquaintance	relation	between	a	perceiving	subject	and	particular	properties	of	the spatio-temporal	world. 5 Acquaintance	and	perception Let	me summarize the ground covered so far. I have presented	Kant's views regarding the two	stems	of	empirical	cognition-sensibility	and	understanding. I called	the	thesis	that	each stem	of	cognition	makes	a separate	contribution to	cognition, in	which sensibility	gives	objects	and	the	understanding	allows	thought	of	those	objects	'Kant's	Dictum.' I then	argued	that prominent	interpretations	of	Kant	presuppose	that	perceptual	experience	must	be	understood representationally-that	is, in	terms	of	the	Content	View. Finally, I presented	three	arguments for	rejecting the idea that the	senses	convey	content in the	manner	required	by the	Content View. I argue	in	the	remainder	of	this	paper	that	if	we	reject	the	idea	that	states	of	perceptual	awareness	are	relations	to	representational	content	then	there	are	two	broad	strategies	we	can	pursue, both	commensurate	with	a	form	of	acquaintance. On	the	one	hand, we	construe	perceptual awareness	as	constituted	by	acquaintance	with	sense-data.37 On	the	other	hand, Kant	might 37 One	might	construe	sense-data	views	as	versions	of	the	Content	View, for	they	would	seem	to	be	equally	committed to	the	claim	that	perception	occurs	in	virtue	of	representation. The	only	difference	is	that, in	the	case	of	sense-data views, perception	requires	an	appeal	to	a	mind-dependent	sensory	object. This	would	be	a	mistake. Sense-data views	explain	the	features	of	an	experience	in	virtue	of	a	primitive	relation	to	a	mind-dependent	sense-datum	whose features	explain	the	features	of	one's	experience. Representation	of	the	mind-independent	objects	that	one	indirectly perceives	only	comes	in	at	a	derivative	level. Sense-data	views	thus	explain	experience	in	a	manner	fundamentally different	from	the	Content	View. For	discussion	see	Jackson	1977, Robinson	1994, Foster	2000, Fish	2010, Martin unpublished. February	10, 2016 25	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear endorse	a	form	of	direct	perceptual	acquaintance	between	a	subject	and	her	mind-independent environment. In	the	next	few	sections	I examine	each	of	these	options. I argue	that	sense-data views	threaten	several	significant	Kantian	commitments, and	that	an	interpretation	according	to which	subjects	have	acquaintance	with	mind-independent	aspects	of	their	environment	is	the most	preferable	interpretation. 5.1 Acquaintance	with	Sense-Data The	arguments	presented	in	Sect. 4	entail	that	intuitions	lack	representational	content. Nevertheless, in	accordance	with	Kant's	Dictum, intuitions	are	supposed	to	'give'	something	to	the consciousness	of	a	subject. We	therefore	may	be	tempted	to	think	that	the	given	in	intuition is	something	other	than	an	object	in	the	perceiving	subject's	environment. The	most	obvious candidate	for	such	an	object	is	something	mind-dependent-that	is, a	sense-datum.38 There	are	two	basic	forms	which	a	sense-data	interpretation	of	Kant	may	take. On	the	first, sense-data	are	mental	proxies	for	their	physical	causes, whose	existence	and	nature	is	inferred from	the	existence	and	nature	of	sense-data. Call	this	position Representative	Realism.39 Alternatively, sense-data	are	not taken	as	mind-dependent proxies for their indirectly	perceived	underlying	causes, but rather	as	metaphysically	or logically constituting the	physical world. This	is	the	view	known	as Phenomenalism. On	the	Phenomenalist	approach, broadly	speaking, the	physical	world	is	constructed	from mind-dependent phenomenal objects and relations	between those	objects.40 Thus, on	one prominent	version	of	this	theory	articulated	by	James	Van	Cleve, physical	objects	are	'virtual' and	are	the	result	of	logically	relating	various	sensory	objects	or	states	to	one	another.41 Both	of	these	views	are	problematically	attributed	to	Kant. I will	take	them	in	turn. 38 Note	that	when	the	notion	of	a	sense-datum	was	initially	employed	by	Moore	it	did	not	have	this	connotation	of mind-dependence. However, the	views	of	Moore, Russell, and	Price	quickly	moved	towards	a	view	of	sense-data	as mind-dependent, and	that	is	the	notion	I make	use	of	in	what	follows. See	Russell	1912, Price	1932, Moore	1953. 39 See	Lowe	1995, Ch. 3	for	discussion	of	the	view	with	respect	to	Locke. See	also	Mackie	1976, Yolton	1984. 40 For the	sake	of	convenience I shall talk	of	mind-dependent objects but I could just	as	easily	be talking	of	minddependent states. On	this	latter	view	the	mind-dependent	relata	are	not	reified	into	distinct	objects	of	consciousness, but	are	rather	understood	as	modes	or	ways	of	being	conscious. This, for	example, is	the	way	in	which	Van	Cleve favours	the	expression	of	his	Phenomenalism. See	Van	Cleve	1999, Ch. 1. I do	not	think	anything	I say	here	turns	on how	the	view	is	articulated, so	I will	stick	with	the	simpler	act-object	model. All	that	matters	is	that	the	physical	objects which	play	a	role	in	our	thought	and	talk	about	the	world	are	ultimately	ontologically	and	logically	supervenient on	forms	of	subjectivity, construed	either	as	objects	or	states. The	primary	significance	of	using	'object'	talk	with regard	to	sense-data	is to	capture	the	phenomenology	of	presence	and	opposition	that	characterizes	experiential consciousness. 41 Van	Cleve	describes	this	interpretation	of	Kant	clearly	in	Van	Cleve	1999, pp. 8–12. For	other	prominent	Phenomenalist	interpretations	see	Turbayne	1955, Bennett	1966, Strawson	1966, Wilkerson	1976, Wilson	1984. February	10, 2016 26	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear Representative	Realism: According	to	Representative	Realism, what	is	given	by	sensibility	is not	any	part	of	the	subject's	environment, but	rather	a	mind-dependent	sense-datum. This	sensedatum	stands	as	a	proxy	for	the	indirectly	perceived	tract	of	the	mind-independent	environment which	causes	it. The	main	problem	with	Representative	Realism	as	an interpretation	of	Kant is that	while it	respects	Kant's	Dictum	it	threatens	the	intelligibility	of	his	general	project	of	grounding	the possibility	of	empirical	knowledge. According to	Kant's	Dictum, the	understanding's role is to	allow	thought	of	the	given, but	since	the	given	is	a	mere	sense-datum, traditional	sceptical worries	immediately	seem	to	arise. How	can	one	move	from	premisses	concerning	the	nature	of one's	sense-data, to	a	conclusion	regarding	the	nature	of	the	unknown	physical	world	causing those	sense-data? Perhaps	one	can	make	an	abductive	argument	construing	the	physical	word as	the	'best'	explanation	of	one's	sense	data, but	this	sort	of	conclusion	is	much	less	firm	than the	kind	of	apodictic	certainty	which	Kant	thought	necessary	to	ground	the	physical	sciences (B163; MFNS 4:468). To	be	sure, Kant	does	say	things	that	suggest	that	the	sensory	appearances	we	cognize	do represent, or	at	least	go	proxy	for, some	underlying	causes	or	set	of	causes	of	which	we	cannot have	knowledge. appearances	are	only	representations	of	things	that	exist	without	any	cognition	of what	they	might	be	in	themselves. (B164) the	word	'appearance'	must	already	indicate	a	relation	to	something	the	immediate representation	of	which	is, to	be	sure, sensible, but	which	in	itself, without	this constitution	of	our	sensibility	...	must	be	something, i.e., an	object	independent	of sensibility. (A252) These	passages suggest that the	appearances	we	cognize	have	an	underlying	ground	whose nature	we	cannot	know. But	they	do	not	require	that	we	understand	the	appearances	as	merely subjective	modifications 'in our heads' as it	were, nor that	we	understand their grounds in terms	of	specifically	physical	causes. Kant	also	speaks	in	ways	which	identify	appearances	with things	as	they	are	in	themselves	that	appear	(Bxxvi–vii). Furthermore, since	Kant	is	quite	clear that	natural	science	concerns	itself	with	the	natural	world	and	that	nature	is	to	be	understood as	the	'sum	[Inbegriff ]	of	all	things, insofar	as	they	are	objects	of	the	senses'	(MFNS 4:467), he cannot	be	thinking	that the	physical	world	is	distinct from	and	explains	sensory	objects. So despite	its	initial	compatibility	with	Kant's	Dictum, Representative	Realism	seems	a	poor	choice for	interpreting	Kant's	notion	of	the	sensible	given. A final	reason	to	doubt	that	Kant	endorses	Representative	Realism	is	that	the	position	seems to	suggest	precisely	the	kind	of	view	of	our	access	to	the	physical	world	that	Kant	attacks	in February	10, 2016 27	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear both	the	A-edition	Fourth	Paralogism	and	the	B-edition	Refutation	of	Idealism. Kant	argues	in both	texts	that	the	existence	of	objects	distinct	from	the	subject	is	not	inferred	but	immediately perceived	(A371; B276). This	would	be	simply	impossible	according	to	Representative	Realism. Phenomenalism A prominent	alternative	strategy	for	understanding	Kant is to	deny	that the	sensory	given	is	supposed	to	be	a	representational	proxy	for	physical	objects. Instead, Kant is interpreted	as	a	Phenomenalist, and	physical	objects	are	themselves	understood	as	constituted	from	sense-data. This	position	comports	well	with	Kant's	Dictum	and	avoids	the	kind	of problems	raised	against	Representative	Realism. Nevertheless	it	has	problems	of	its	own. Against	Phenomenalism	as	an	interpretation	of	Kant	stand	a	multiplicity	of	considerations which	have	been	well	detailed	in	the	literature.42 I shall	simply	summarize	them	as	follows: (i)	Kant's	explicit	rejection	of	Berkeley	(B70–1, B274; Pr	4:288–9, 293, 374) (ii)	Kant's	claim	that	his	notion	of	appearances	implies	things	which	appear	(Bxxvi, A251–2; Pr	4:315) (iii)	Kant's	rejection	of	a	Cartesian	privileging	of	the	inner	over	the	outer	(B274–9, A367–380) (iv)	Kant's	contention	in	the	Aesthetic	that	empirically	real	objects	and	the	space in	which	they	exist	are	part	of	one	public	space	(A25/B39) (v)	Kant's	distinction	between	primary	and	secondary	qualities	(A28/B44; A38/B55) (vi)	Kant's	realism	about	the	unobservable	entities	of	natural	science	(A226/B237; A522/B550) (vii)	Kant's	arguments	in	the	Principles	that	empirically	real	objects	exist	through time, exist	when	unperceived, and	stand	in	causal	relations	to	one	another	(A182– 2/B225–226, A185/B228, B257) (viii)	Kant's	claim	that	we	do	not	know	what	the	objects	of	inner	intuition	(i.e. mental	states)	are	in	themselves	(A38/B54-5, B150–57) (ix)	Kant's	rejection	of	a	experiential	kind	common	to	both	perception	and	hallucination	(B275, B278–9; An	7:161)43 While the	proponent	of	Phenomenalism	may	have	ways	of	dealing	with	at least	some	of these	points, there	nevertheless remains	a	clear interpretative	cost in	attributing the	view to Kant. There is, moreover, a general	mistake	which the	Phenomenalist interpretation	makes of	which	all	of	these	other	considerations	may	be	seen	as	symptoms. The	Phenomenalist, in explaining	the	possibility	of	our	knowledge	of	material	objects, must	account	for	the existence 42 See	Collins	1999, Allais	2004	for	extensive	discussion. 43 I defend	this	last	point	in	detail	in	my	'Kant's	Disjunctivism.' February	10, 2016 28	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear of	objects	in	terms	of	subjective	capacities	and	materials, so	that	the	subject	genuinely	makes	or constructs	the	objects	of	her	knowledge. And	while	the	metaphor	of	'maker's	knowledge'	has been	a	popular	one	in	the	interpretation	of	Kant, it	ignores	one	of	his	most	vehemently	made points-namely, that	the	objects	of	perception	and	knowledge	exist	wholly	independently	of us, and	it	is	only	what	we	know	of	them	that	depends	on	aspects	of	our	subjectivity	(Pr	4:293; Bxxvi–vii, B276–7, A491–2/B519–20).44 For	some, these	interpretative	costs	are	beside	the	point, for the	best, or	at least	most intelligible, philosophical position	attributable to	Kant, they	hold, is a	Phenomenalist	one. If Phenomenalism	cannot	be	squared	with	all the	textual	evidence, so	much	the	worse	for	the texts. Phenomenalism	might	seem	less	attractive	an	interpretation	if	we	have	a	viable	alternative with	which	to	juxtapose	it. I have	argued	that	the	Content	View	is	not	a	viable	interpretation	of Kant. In	the	next	section	I want	to	suggest	an	alternative, compatible	with	Kant's	Dictum, but without	the	problem	of	'maker's	knowledge'	as	raised	by	Phenomenalism. 5.2 Acquaintance	with	the	Environment Since, as	I argued	above, representation	involving	correctness	conditions	requires	combination, and	such	combination	can	only	be	effected	by	an	act	of	the	understanding, intuition	cannot itself	provide	a	form	of	propositional	(or	propositionally	structured)	awareness. Instead, intuition	must	be	a form	of	non-propositional	awareness. Given the	difficulties	associated	with sense-data	views, and	the	general	requirements	on	cognition	as	detailed	by	the	Argument	from Modality	above, it	seems	best	to	see	whether	Kant	might	plausibly	think	of	empirical	intuition as	immediately	acquainting	a	subject	with	her	environment.45 Visual	and	tactile	experience	are perhaps	the	most	prominent	sense	modalities	for	acquainting	a	subject	with	her	environment, and	do	so	in	obviously	distinctive	ways. But	both	of	these	sensory	modalities	(as	well	as	the others)	provide	a	form	of	access	to	the	environment-that	is, they	make	it immediately	available to	consciousness	in	a	particular	sensory	way.46 44 See	Hintikka	1965	for	discussion	of	Kant	on	maker's	knowledge. Pritchard	1909, Ch. 9	castigates	Kant	for	thinking that	maker's	knowledge	is	a	genuine	form	of	knowledge. In	contrast, Van	Cleve	1999, p. 11	argues	that	it	is	the	only way	to	make	sense	of	Kant's	'Copernican	Revolution.' 45 The	notion	of	immediacy	I have	in	mind	here	is	both	psychological	and	epistemic. Psychologically	speaking, there is	no	other	psychological	state	of the	(whole)	subject in	virtue	of	which	she	is	acquainted	with	her	environment. Epistemically	speaking, the	warrant	a	subject	gains in	virtue	of	being	acquainted	with	her	environment	does	not depend	on	warrant	the	subject	has	for	any	of	her	other	doxastic	states. 46 Kant specifies that three	of the	five senses, namely sight, touch, and	hearing, are forms	of 'objective' empirical intuition	(An	7:154)	in	virtue	of	being	more	conducive	to	physical	object	cognition	than	introspective	cognition	of the	subject's	own	state. The	other	two	senses, taste	and	smell, are	'subjective'	and	have	less	to	do	with	our	perception of	objects	than	with	our	'enjoyment'	(Genuss)	in	the	object	(7:154). It	is	thus	possible	that	Kant	thinks	the	sensory modes	of	taste	and	smell	do	not	provide	outer	intuitions	at	all. February	10, 2016 29	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear The	term	'acquaintance'	has	connotations	often	associated	with	its	deployment	by	British philosophers	as	an	epistemically foundational	mental	state	which	must itself	satisfy	stringent epistemic	conditions.47 The	stringent	character	of	these	epistemic	conditions, such	as	possessing	infallible	knowledge	of	the	existence, identity, and	nature	of	what	is	experienced, convinced figures	such	as	Russell	that	acquaintance	relations	cannot	hold	between	subjects	and	their	environment	but	rather	only	between	subjects	and	mental	items	(e.g. sense-data)	or	universals.48 But	if	we	reject	these	epistemic	assumptions	and	instead	construe	acquaintance	specifically in	terms	of	a	partially	constitutive	relation	holding	between	the	perceived	environment	and	the mental state	of the	perceiving	subject, then the	way is	open to reading	Kant	as	endorsing	a genuine	form	of	mind–world	acquaintance.49 The	'Environment	View'	that	I shall	characterize	here	is	more	the	delineation	of	a	family	of views	rather	than	a	particular	view	itself. Its	main	claim	is	that	the	perceptual	consciousness of	a	perceiving	subject	is	partially	constituted	by	her	environment.50 This	Environment	View construes	mind	and	world	as	far	more	intimately	related	than	typically	allowed	by	externalist views	of	mental	content, for	it	construes	the	nature	of	the	mental	states	themselves, rather	than simply	their	token	instances, as	determined	by	particular	aspects	of	the	subject's	environment.51 The	subject's	environment	constitutes the	contours	of	her	experience in the	way, to	use	one contemporary	philosopher's	turn	of	phrase, a	hillside	constitutes	the	contours	of	the	landscape of	which	it is	part	(Fish	2009, p. 6). This	intimate	constitutive	relation	is	typically	appealed to in	order to	explain the	phenomenal	character	which	the	experience	has. But it	may	also be	used	to	explain	other	aspects	of	our	cognitive	lives. I shall	discuss	three	below-namely, 47 For	discussion	for	and	against the	epistemically	privileged	status	of	states	of	acquaintance	see	Lewis	1929, Price 1932, McDowell	1984, McDowell	1991, Brewer	1999. 48 Russell	1912, 46–7; Russell	1910, reprinted	in	Russell	2004, Ch. 10. 49 There	are	a	considerable	number	of	readings	of	Kant's	doctrine	of	Transcendental	Idealism	which	allow	for	cognitive relations	with	mind-independent	objects. See, for	example, Paton	1936, Langton	1998, Allison	2004, Ameriks	2005, Bird	2006. One	interpretative	line	to	which	I am	particularly	sympathetic	argues	that	in	outer	sense	genuinely	mindindependent	objects	appear	despite	the	fact	that	features	of	their	appearance	importantly	depend	on	the	nature	of perceiving	minds. See	Allais	2004, Allais	2007, Rosefeldt	2007, Allais	2011, Ameriks	2011	for	discussion. However, I defend	no	specific	interpretation	of	Transcendental	Idealism	here. All	I wish	to	point	out	is	that	there	are	multiple readings	of	Kant's	idealism	available	that	are	compatible	with	my	suggested	interpretation	of	his	perceptual	theory. 50 Susanna	Schellenberg	calls	this	family	of	views	'austere	relational	views', See	Schellenberg	2011. John	Campbell articulates	what	he	calls	a	'Relational	View'	in	Campbell	2002, ch. 6. In	my	terminology, austere	relational	views and	Campbell's	Relational	View	are	all	more	specific	versions	of	what	I am	calling	the	'Environment	View.' I think there	are	important	similarities	between	Kant's	view	and	Campbell's. However, since	Kant	never	directly	addresses many	of	the	issues	addressed	by	Campbell, there	is	some	indeterminacy	in	what	Kant	would	think	regarding	various specifics	of	Campbell's	account. See	Allais	2009	and	Gomes	forthcoming	for	discussion	of	Kant	that	draws	upon Campbell's	work. 51 Tyler	Burge, for	example, argues	that	though	we	may	assign	particular	objects	to	the	content	of	particular	token	mental states	in	which	perceptual	demonstratives	are	applied, there	is	no	sense	in	which	the	objects	are	actual constituents of	those	mental	states. This	holds	despite	Burge's	rather	radical	externalism	regarding	the	content	of	mental	states generally. See	Burge	1991, Burge	2009, Burge	2010	as	well	as	the	postscript	to	Burge	1977	in	Burge	2007. February	10, 2016 30	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear Kant's	conception	of	the	structure	of	thought, his	Modal	Condition	on	cognition, and	his	theory of	perceptual	error. All	three, I argue, are	best	understood	alongside	his	endorsement	of	the Environment	View. We	will	take	these	points	in	turn. First, Kant's	motivation	for	endorsing	the	Environment	View	stems, at	least	in	part, from	his distinction	between thought	of the logically	possible	and	cognition	of the really	actual (and therefore	really	possible). This	in	turn	depends	on	Kant's	model	of	the	nature	of	the	content	of thought	as	(as	I shall	call	it)	'specificational.' One can think, for example, about aardvarks by thinking a thought	which specifies discriminating	features	of	aardvarks	and	predicates	something	of	a	thing	or	things	satisfying	those features, for	example	'A medium-sized, burrowing, nocturnal	mammal	native	to	Africa	makes a	poor	house	pet.' Though	there	is	no	specific	aardvark	one	thinks	about	in	essaying	such	a thought, one	is	nevertheless	thinking	about	aardvarks	and	not	other	things	by	thinking	of	features	which	they	and	only	they	all	have, and	predicating	something	of	objects	satisfying	those features. When	specification	gets	sufficiently	rich	one's	thought	is	correspondingly	less	general, and	may	apply to just	one	object, such	as the	object	corresponding to the thought that 'the largest	outdoor	sitting	bronze	Buddha	is	in	Hong	Kong.' In	contrast	to	thought	via	specification, one	might	think	of	an	object directly, without	appeal to	a	specification	of its features. Direct thoughts	might include, for	example, indexical	and demonstrative thought. One	might think, for instance, on	the	occasion	of	seeing	the largest outdoor	sitting	bronze	Buddha, that	'that is	a	big	statue', where	such	a	thought	does	not	require the	specification	of	its	object	via	its	features. The	object	is	simply there before	the	mind. Call such	thoughts	'direct'	thoughts. One	important	difference	between	specificational	and	direct	thought	concerns	the	conditions	of	their	success	or	failure. This	is	most	plain	if	we	assume	that	in	order	for	a	thought	to have	a	subject	matter	it	must	have	a	truth-value. Operating	with	this	assumption	we	see	that specificational	and	direct	thoughts	have	very	different	conditions	under	which	they	may	be	assigned truth-values. Specificational thought	does	not require the	existence	of	any	particular object in	order	for	it to	have	a	truth	value. If it	successfully	specifies	an	object	or	class	and correctly	attributes	some	property	to	it, it	is	true, otherwise	it	is	false. Specificational	thought thus	has	a	subject	matter	whether	or	not	any	particular	individual	exists. Direct	thought, in	contrast, requires	the	existence	and	availability	to	thought	of	particular	individuals	if	it	is	to	have	a truth-value, and	hence	a	subject	matter. Kant	does	not	allow	that	thought	can	take	a	direct	form, for	he	describes	the	structure	of human	thought	as	involving	inherently	general	concepts	that	can	always	apply	to	more	than	one particular	object	(A68/B93, A320/B377; JL 9:91).52 This	generality	of	concepts	is	antithetical 52 For	helpful	discussion	of	this	point	see	Thompson	1972, Anderson	2004, Anderson	2005, Grüne	2009. February	10, 2016 31	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear in nature to direct thought, for even if such a general thought	manages to specify just one individual, it	could	have	been	the	case	that	another	individual	was	instead	so	captured	without the	thought's	changing	character	in	any	way.53 This	is	in	contrast	to intuition whose	singularity implies	that	only	intuition	can	cognitively	relate	a	subject	to	a	particular	object, or	aspect	thereof, in	a	manner	which	makes	particulars	significant	for	characterizing	the	subject's	mental	states	(JL 9:91, 97; A655/B683ff.). The	motivation	for	Kant's	endorsement	of	this	model	of	thought	is	clearer	when	we	set	it against	the	early	modern	context	from	which	it	derived. When	we	examine	the	characterization	of	the	content	and	structure	of	thought	in	the	early	modern	era	we	can	see	that	the	specificationist	model	was	widespread. Versions	of	it	appear	in	the	influential Logic of	Arnauld	and Nicole, in	the	nominal	essences	of	Locke, and	in	the	singular	concepts	of	Leibniz.54 And	though Kant	significantly	departs	from	the	early	modern	era's	specificationist	model	in	his	denial	of	the possibility	of	specifying	the	complete	characteristics	of	any	individual	in	thought	alone	(JL §11, note	9:97; A655/B683ff.), he	does	seem	to	otherwise	retain	the	common	conception	of	thought as	specification. The	link	between	specification	and	generality	could	then	credibly	lead	to	a rejection	of	the	notion	that	direct	thought	is	possible. So, on	Kant's	view, if	we	are	to	have	cognitive	access	to	particulars, they	must	be	available in	a	way	which	is	not	thought-like	in	structure, and	this	is	precisely	the	role	of	intuition	(JL §15 9:99).55 We	can	then	make	singular use of	thought	(LL 24:567), in	conjunction	with	actual	or previous	intuitions, in	order	to	have	cognitions	of	particular	empirical	objects	that	may	then	be linked	with	other	cognitions	to	form	a	body	of	scientific	knowledge-a Wissenschaft (JL 9:72). Second, adoption	of	the	Environment	View	seems	central	to	the	satisfaction	of	Kant's	Modal Condition	on	cognition. We	have	already	seen, in	section	4.3	above, that	empirical	intuition must	provide	a	confrontation	with	really	compossible	features	of	things	and	not	merely	their logically	compossible	representation. If	the	Argument	from	Modality	is	correct	then	the	Content View	cannot	satisfy	the	Modal	Condition. Similar	problems	beset	sense-data	views, for	they (Representative	Realism	and	Phenomenalism	both)	separate	what	is	subjectively	apprehended (sense-data) from the subject-matter of empirical judgement (the	public physical object), so there	can	be	no	subjectively	apprehended	proof	of	the	real	possibility	of	the	judgement's	subject 53 For	a	similar	point	concerning	Russell	see	Travis	2006, Ch. 2. 54 See	Arnauld	and	Nicole	1662/1996, pp. 39ff.; Buroker	1993, p. 470; Leibniz	1686/1989, Bks	8–9; Locke	1690/1975, II.xii.1–8, II.xxiii.3–14; Nuchelmans	1983, Ch. 4; Mates	1986, Ch. 5. 55 Some readers	may	find this problematic, for they	might read the argument of the	Transcendental	Deduction as attempting	to	show	how	even	intuition	must	be	propositionally	cum	categorically	structured	if	anything	objective	is to	be	perceptually	represented. Aside	from	the	obvious	way	in	which	such	a	reading	disregards	Kant's	Dictum, it	also assumes	that	there	is	no	other	way	to	read	the	Deduction's	argument. For	some	discussion	see	Tolley	2013, McLear forthcoming. I plan	to	address	this	issue	further	in	future	work. February	10, 2016 32	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear matter.56 But	the	Environment	View, unlike	these	other	proposed	interpretations, does	show	how the	Modal	Condition	could	be	satisfied. Empirical	intuition	provides	the	indefeasible	warrant necessary	for	proof	of	real	possibility	in	virtue	of	a	perceiving	subject's	perceptual	state	being partially	constituted	by	the	very	elements	of	her	environment	which	constitute	the	subject-matter of	her	empirical	judgements.57 Thus	the	question	of	the	real	possibility	of	the	subject-matter	of an	empirical	judgement	is	trivially	satisfied	by	appeal	to	the	relevant	empirical	intuition	which makes	that	subject-matter	immediately	cognitively	available. The	Environment	View	also	comports	well	with	Kant's	limitation	of	objectively	valid	judgement	to	within	the	bounds	of	sense. According	to	the	Environment	View, Kant	understands	sense perception	(i.e. outer	intuition)	as	immediate	cognitive	access	to	the	sensible	characteristics	of a	particular	spatial	and	temporal	thing. This	access	holds	in	virtue	of	the	particular's	sensible features	being	partially	constitutive	of	the	subject's	perceptual	state. Such	cognitive	access	puts a	subject	possessing	the	requisite	recognitional	conceptual	capacities	in	the	position	to	know (barring	defeaters)	that	judgements	concerning	the	relevant	perceived	object	are	valid.58 This is	not	to	say	that	intuition	is	a	necessary	condition	for	one's	thoughts	to have a	subject	matter, for	thoughts	may	limn	the	space	of	possibilities	independently	of	intuition	(at	least	in	so	far	as one	has	the	requisite	concepts).59 However, in	order	for	one's	thoughts	to	count	as	pieces	of knowledge one	must	be	able	to	demonstrate	the	actuality	of	their	subject	matter	and	the	veracity of	their	specification, which	is	precisely	the	role	that	intuition	fills	with	regard	to	concept-using beings.60 Perception	thus	allows	one	to	'prove	the	possibility'	of	the	object	of	one's	thought, by presenting	the	very	subject	matter	of	the	thought	to	the	consciousness	of	the	thinker	(Bxxvi). In	situations	where	the	Modal	Condition	goes	unfulfilled	one	lacks	the	wherewithal	to know or demonstrate that	one's	thoughts	have	successfully	specified	their	subject	matter. This	lack 56 A sense-data	view	may	well	be	able	to	provide	proof	of	real	possibility, and	thus	indefeasible	warrant, for	beliefs concerning sense-data, but	it	cannot	provide	the	necessary	warrant	for	beliefs	concerning	aspects	of	one's	physical environment. Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	urging	clarification	on	this	point. 57 Note	though	that	while	being	acquainted	with	elements	of	one's	environment	might	be	necessary	for	the	provision of	such	warrant, it	may	well	not	be	sufficient. I leave	the	issue	of	sufficient	conditions	open	here. 58 For	a	contemporary	defence	of	similar	views	see	Johnston	2006, Kalderon	2011, though	neither	attributes	such	a view	to	Kant. 59 A nice	example	of	this	is	Mendeleev's	having	delineated	the	basic	character	and	number	of	elements	in	the	Periodic Table	in	1869	without	having	had	experimental	cum	empirical	evidence	for	the	existence	of	many	of	the	specific elements	occupying	places	on	the	table. 60 Allais	2009	occasionally	suggests	the	stronger	claim	that	intuition	is	necessary	for	thought	to	have	content	or	objective reference. For	example, she	says	that, 'the	role	of	intuition	is	that	of	ensuring	that	our	thoughts	latch	onto	the	world- that	we	succeed	in	referring	to	objects. Referring	to	an	object	is	most	standardly	taken	to	mean	something	which happens	at	the	level	of	thought: having	a	thought	which	succeeds	in	latching	onto	the	object'	(p. 391). If	her	claim were	correct	then	specificational	thought	could	not	have	a	subject	matter	independent	of	the	possibility	of	that	subject matter	being	presented	in	perceptual	experience. For	reasons	that	I state	below	I think	this	cannot	be	the	correct interpretation	of	Kant. February	10, 2016 33	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear of	knowledge	of	the	success	of	one's	specification	means	that	not	only	does	one	lack	insight into the	successful reach	of	a thought to its	object, one	also lacks	any	insight	as to	whether the	thought	is unsuccessful in	reaching	its	object. We	see	this	clearly	in	what	Kant	says	in	the chapter	on	phenomena	and	noumena	concerning	the	application	of	the	categories	beyond	the bounds	of	possible	experience. I call a concept problematic if, although containing no contradiction and also cohering	with	other	cognitions	as	a	boundary	of	given	concepts	involved	in	them, its	objective	reality	cannot	be	cognized	in	any	way	...	we	have	an	understanding that	problematically	extends	further	than	this	sphere	of	appearances. (A255/B310) Hence, the	categories	may	well	reach	all	the	way	to	things	in	themselves	(i.e. noumena)	and thus	allow	us	to	think	of	things	in	themselves	in	a	(logically)	structured	manner. The	problem	is that	since	objectively	valid	judgement	depends	upon	access	to	the	subject	matter	of	the	judgement, and thus	upon input from	sensibility, we	cannot	have	knowledge	of the	successful	or unsuccessful	specification	of	noumenal	objects	(i.e. objects	as	they	are	in	themselves)	by	the unschematized	categories. Thus, our	claims	concerning	such	objects	must	always	be	problematic	in	nature-neither	their	success	nor	failure	can	be	demonstrated.61 This	way	of	understanding	the	reach	of	our	concepts	also	helps	explain	Kant's	stance	concerning	the	theoretically	doubtful	but	still	rationally	legitimate	status	of	beliefs	concerning	God and	the	non-empirical	self. The	fact	that	we	cannot	have	any	sensory	consciousness	of	such entities	does	not	entail	that	we	cannot	have	thoughts	about	them, for	we	may	nevertheless	be able	to	think	of	them	specificationally. But	since	our	only	access	to	such	beings	(if	they	exist)	is specificational, we	cannot	make	objectively	valid	judgements	concerning	them, for	we	could never	demonstrate their real	possibility, which	entails that	our judgements	concerning them cannot	count	as	knowledge. This	makes	clear	how	God	and	the	soul	could	be	both	intelligible topics	of	inquiry	while	nevertheless	failing	to	be	topics	of	knowledge.62 A potentially	helpful	way	of thinking	about intuition, and	one that is in line	with	Kant's propensity	for	juridical	analogies, is	to	think	of	intuition	as	a	cognitive	analogue	of	the	writ	of habeas	corpus. In	the	court	of	Reason, where	cognitive	claims	are	made	by	the	Understanding, one	must	be	able	to	'produce	the	body'	which	those	claims	concern. If	one	cannot	produce 61 Ameriks	1985	makes	a	similar	point: 'the	Kantian	can	say	that	(pace Jacobi)	what	goes	beyond	the	sensible	is	not	a wholly	amorphous	domain	but	rather	something	which	can	be	allowed	some	sort	of	conceptual	order. This	order	is one	that	holds	for	all	thinkers, and	it	can	even	be	made	determinate	by	us	as	long	as	we	have	another	type	of	data than	the	spatiotemporal	to	make	use	of, as	in	fact	occurs	with	our	moral	faculty'	(p. 24). Ameriks	here	also	makes the	salutary	point that, according to	Kant, there	are	other	means	by	which	we	gain	knowledge (if	only practical knowledge)	of	the	validity	of	our	concepts-namely, by	means	of	our	practical	moral	faculty. 62 For	extensive	discussion	see	Chignell	2007, Chignell	2009, Chignell	2010, Chignell	2011; cf. Pasternack	2011. February	10, 2016 34	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear such	a	body	then	the	status	of	those	claims	must	remain	problematic, rendering	the	court	unable to	come	to	a	determinate	verdict. Finally, the	Environment	View	also	seems	the	best	fit	for	Kant's	theory	of	perceptual	error. As noted	in	section	4.1, Kant	indicates	that	error	is	due	to	an	act	of	judgement	by	the	understanding rather	than	any	misrepresentation	of	things	on	the	part	of	the	intuitions	delivered	by	sensibility. Kant	thus	seems	to	think	that	perceptual	error	is doxastic, in	the	sense	that	perceptual	error	is the	outcome	of	erroneous	belief	formation, rather	than	taking	error	to	be	something	that	can	be inherent	in	perceptual	experience	itself.63 Hence, the	theory	of	perception	which	best	satisfies	Kant's	Modal	Condition, and	is	also most compatible	with the views	of sensibility, understanding, and judgement as elaborated by the	Argument from	Deception	and the	Argument from	Combination, is	one	according to which	perceptual	experience	is	a	form	of	acquaintance	with	one's	environment-that is, the Environment	View	must	be	Kant's	view. 6 Summary The	Content	View	attempts	to	explain	perceptual	experience	in	terms	of	a	relation	to	a	representational	content. I have	marshaled	three	arguments	(Deception, Combination, and	Modality) showing	why	an	interpretation	of	Kant	according	to	the	Content	View	is	deeply	problematic. Hence, pace the	Content	View, intuition	does	not	err	or	deceive, and	the	intellectual	acts	of combination	necessary	to	generate	representational	content	capable	of	being	correct	or	incorrect	are	performed	by	the	understanding, they	are	not	present	in	intuition. Since, on	pain	of	violating	what	I have	called	'Kant's	Dictum', we	must	nevertheless	respect the	role	of	intuition	in	giving	objects	to	consciousness, I suggested	that	we	reject	the	presumption	that	perceptual	states	must	aim	at	ways	the	world	might	be, and	in	that	way	be	correct or incorrect	concerning	how	things	are. Rejection	of this	assumption leaves the interpreters with	some	version	of	an	acquaintance	view, which	we	can	sort	into	two	general	kinds-namely, sense-data	views	and	environment	views. I argued	that	sense-data	interpretations	face	significant	textual	and	philosophical	hurdles	in	being	attributed	to	Kant. I then	sketched	my	positive alternative-the	Environment	View-which interprets	Kant	as	endorsing	a	conception	of	perception	as	acquaintance	with	one's	environment. The	notion	of	acquaintance	was	cashed	out 63 A doxastic	explanation	of	perceptual	error	seems	to	have	been	relatively	widespread	in	the	seventeenth	and	eighteenth	centuries. Descartes	suggests	such	a	view	in	the	fourth	of	hisMeditations (Descartes	1985; II 39–40). Arnauld and	Nicole	also	put	forward	such	a	view	in	their Logic (Arnauld	and	Nicole	1662/1996, p. 59). Closer	to	Kant's time, we	saw	that	Meier	endorsed	a	view	of	error	as	a	product	of	judgement	(see	n. 20	above). For	contemporary proponents	of	a	doxastic	theory	see	Brewer	2008, Genone	2014. There	is	obviously	much	to	say	about	whether	such a	doxastic	theory	is	a	convincing	theory	of	perceptual	error, but	I shall	not	pursue	that	matter	further	here. February	10, 2016 35	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear in	terms	of	the	subject's	perceptual	state	being	partially	constituted	by	her	environment. It	is in	virtue	of	this	constitutive	relationship	that	perceptual	experience	can	fulfil	its	role	in	giving objects	to	consciousness, thus	proving	the	real	possibility	of	empirical	judgement	and	providing the	necessary	grounds	for	cognition. Interpreting	Kant	as	advocating	a	perceptual	acquaintance	theory	is	surely	controversial. But I believe	the	Environment	View	holds	great	promise	for	bringing	together	a	variety	of	strands	in Kant's	thought	concerning	our	cognitive	relation	to	the	world	while	being	both	consistent	with his	central	texts, and	without	appealing	to	a	kind	of	idealism	which	he	abhorred, wherein	we are	supposed	able	to	literally	bring	into	existence	the	objects	of	our	thought	and	experience.64 64 Various	people	gave	helpful	comments	and	encouragement	during	the	process	of	writing	this	paper. Thanks	to	Lucy Allais, Andrew	Chignell, Stefanie	Grüne, Robert	Hanna, Derk	Pereboom, Tobias	Rosefeldt	and	the	participants	in	his colloquium, and	Clinton	Tolley. Thanks	also	to	the	editor	ofMind and	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	helpful	comments on	various	parts	of	the	paper. February	10, 2016 36	| 46 Kant	on	Perceptual	Content Colin	McLear Bibliography Quotations	from	Kant's	work	are	from	the Akademie	Ausgabe, with	the	first Critique cited	by the	standard	A/B edition	pagination, and	the	other	works	by	volume	and	page. Translations primarily	follow	the	Cambridge	Editions	of	the	Works	of	Immanuel	Kant, general	editors	Paul Guyer	and	Allen	Wood. 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