Colour	Experiences	and	'Look'	Sentences Wylie	Breckenridge Last	modified	1st	June	2018 Introduction We	have	colour	experiences.	When	you	look	at	the	patch	below	you	have	a	colour	experience	of	the patch	(I	will	assume	that	grey	is	a	colour).	You	also	have	a	shape	experience,	and	perhaps	other	kinds of	experience,	but	in	this	chapter	I	am	interested	mainly	in	colour	experiences. We	have	ways	of	describing	our	colour	experiences.	One	common	way	in	English	is	to	use	a	sentence whose	main	verb	is	'look'.	For	example,	we	might	(correctly)	describe	your	colour	experience	of	the patch	above	by	using	the	following	'look'	sentence: The	patch	looks	grey	to	you This	description	does	not	completely	specify	your	colour	experience,	because	'grey'	is	too	general	a colour	term	–	we	would	have	to	use	a	more	specific	one,	such	as	'dark	grey',	or	something	even	more specific.	Nevertheless,	it	is	a	true	description. There	are	other	'look'	sentences	that	we	might	use.	If	it	is	understood	that	we	are	talking	about	your visual	experience,	rather	than	someone	else's,	then	we	might	drop	'to	you'	and	simply	say: The	patch	looks	grey Care	needs	to	be	taken	here	–	we	might	use	this	same	sentence	to	talk	about	how	the	patch	looks	to people in general, not just to you on this occasion, so this use of the sentence might be misunderstood. We	might	use	a	variety	of	other	expressions	in	place	of	'grey': The	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	do The	patch	looks	to	you	like	a	grey	thing The	patch	looks	to	you	as	if	it	is	grey The	patch	looks	to	you	to	be	grey If we want to be non-committal about the presence of a patch, perhaps to allow that you are hallucinating, then we might use one of the following sentences (although each involves saying something	slightly	different	from	above): It	looks	to	you	as	if	you	are	seeing	a	grey	patch There	looks	to	you	to	be	a	grey	patch	in	front	of	you I've	been interested for	a	while in	what	we	mean	by these	sentences.	More	generally, in	what	we mean by 'look' sentences when we use them to describe our colour experiences. Even more generally,	in	what	we	mean	by	'look'	sentences	when	we	use	them	to	describe	our	visual	experiences as	a	whole. I	call these	uses	visual	experience	uses	of 'look'	sentences.	Not	all	of	our	uses	of 'look' 2 sentences are visual experience uses.	When I say, 'I looked out the window', I am using a 'look' sentence	but	it	is	not	a	visual	experience	use,	because	I	am	not	describing	a	visual	experience.	I	am interested	just	in	our	visual	experience	uses. My	aim	in	this	chapter	is	not	to	develop	a	theory	of	what	we	mean	by	our	visual	experience	uses	of 'look'	sentences	–	I	have	already	done	that, in	Breckenridge	(2018).	Rather,	my	aim	is	to	defend	an assumption	that that theory	makes	– that in	our	visual	experience	uses	of 'look'	sentences	we	use 'look'	with	just	a	single	meaning.	I	will	also	argue	that	the	theory	gives	a	unified	account	of	all	of	our visual	experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences	(which,	if	the	theory	is	right,	are	not	as	various	as	it	might initially	seem). I	will	start	by	briefly	illustrating	the	theory	that	I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018). What	we	mean	by	'look'	sentences To	illustrate	the	theory	that	I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018)	I'll	work	through	an	example	–	our	use of 'The	patch looks	grey	to	you' to	describe	your	visual	experience	of the	patch	at the	start	of this chapter. We use each constituent of the sentence to express a property of events. We conjoin these properties	to	get	a	property	of	events	that	we	express	by	the	sentence	as	a	whole.	Then,	when	we assert	the	sentence	we	assert	that	there	is	an	event	that	has	this	property.	I'll	work	through	this	stepby-step. First,	by	the	verb	'look'	we	mean	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	(i.e.	an	event	in	which	things look	some	way	to	some	one)(	I	am	using	'things'	non-referentially	here,	to	allow	that	there	might	be no	thing	that	looks	anyway,	as	might	be	the	case	during	a	hallucination).	We	use	'look'	because	we are	talking	about	a	visual	experience;	had	we	been	talking	about	a	tactile	experience	then	we	might have	used	'feel'	instead. Next,	to	the	verb	'look'	we	add	the	present	tense	marker	'-s',	to	get	the	tensed	verb	'looks'.	By	'-s' we	mean the	property	of occurring	now.	What	we	mean	by 'looks' is the conjunction	of	what	we mean	by	'look'	and	what	we	mean	by	'-s';	that	is,	the	conjunction	of	the	property	of	being	a	looking event	and	the	property	of	occurring	now;	that	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	and	occurring now.	We	use	the	present	tense	marker	'-s'	because	we	are	talking	about	an	event	that	is	occurring	in the	present;	had	we	been	talking	about	an	event	that	occurred	in	the	past	then	we	might	have	used the	past	tense	marker	'-ed'	instead. Next,	to	the	tensed	verb	'looks'	we	add	the	complement	'grey',	to	get	the	verb	phrase	'looks	grey'. By 'grey'	we	mean the	property	of	occurring in	a	certain	way. Looking	events, like	events	of	many other	kinds,	occur	in	various	ways.	What	is	it	for	a	looking	event	to	occur	in	a	certain	way?	The	kind looking	event is	a	determinable	kind	– it	has	determinates.	Each	of these	determinates is	a	way	of looking.	For	a	looking	event	to	occur	in	a	certain	way	is	for	it	to	be	of	one	of	these	determinate	kinds. Which	way	do	mean	by	'grey'?	That's	a	bit	complicated	–	I'll	call	it	'w'	for	now	and	come	back	to	this. By	'looks	grey'	we	mean	the	conjunction	of	the	property	that	we	mean	by	'looks'	and	the	property that we mean by 'grey'. That is, the conjunction of the property of being a looking event and occurring	now	and	the	property	of	occurring	in	way	w.	That	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event and	occurring	now	and	occurring	in	way	w.	We	use	'grey'	because	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	it does; had it looked some other way then we might have used some other adjective ('red', for example). 3 Next,	to	the	verb	phrase	'looks	grey'	we	add	the	modifier	'to	you',	to	get	the	verb	phrase	'looks	grey to you'. By 'to you' we mean the property of having you as an experiencer (someone who is experiencing the event). By 'looks grey to you'	we	mean the conjunction of the property that	we mean by 'looks grey' and the property that we	mean by 'to you'. That is, the conjunction of the property of being a looking event and	occurring now	and	occurring in	way	w and the	property of having	you	as	an	experiencer.	That	is,	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event	and	occurring	now	and occurring	in	way	w	and	having	you	as	an	experiencer.	We	use	'to	you'	because	we	are	talking	about your visual	experience	of the	patch;	had	we	been talking	about	mine, for	example, then	we	might have	used	'to	Wylie'	instead. Next,	to	the	verb	phrase	'looks	grey	to	you'	we	add	'The	patch',	to	get	the	sentence	'The	patch	looks grey	to	you'.	By	'The	patch'	we	mean	the	property	of	having	the	patch	as	a	stimulus	(something	that is	stimulating	the	event).	By	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	mean	the	conjunction	of	the	property that	we	mean by 'looks grey to you' and the property that	we	mean by 'The patch'. That is, the property	of	being	a looking	event	and	occurring	now	and	occurring in	way	w	and	having	you	as	an experiencer and the property of having the patch as a stimulus. That is, the property of being a looking event and occurring now and occurring in way w and having you as an experiencer and having the patch as a stimulus. We use 'The patch' because we are talking about your visual experience	of	the	patch;	had	we	been	talking	about	your	visual	experience	of,	say,	a	cloud,	then	we might	have	used	'The	cloud'	instead. Finally,	what	we	mean	by the sentence	when	we	assert it is that there is an	event	which	has this property.	So	we	mean: There	is	an	event	e	such	that	e	is	a	looking	event	and	is	occurring	now	and	is	occurring	in	way	w and	has	you	as	an	experiencer	and	has	the	patch	as	a	stimulus So	which	way	do	we	mean	by	'grey'.	In	short,	it	is:	the	way	that	grey	things	look.	That	is,	the	way	w such	that	grey	things	look	w.	Here	I	intend	'grey	things	look	w'	to	be	understood	generically.	So,	we might refer to it as: the way w such that it is generically true that grey things look w. Or, less ambiguously,	as:	the	way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	looking	events	whose	stimulus	is	grey occur in	way	w.	Actually,	there	are	many	such	ways,	varying in	their	degree	of	generality.	By 'grey' we	mean	the	most	specific	one	of	these.	So,	by	'grey'	we	mean: The	maximally	specific	way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	looking	events	whose	stimulus	is grey	occur	in	way	w So,	adding	this	to	the	above,	what	we	mean	by	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	is: There is an	event e such that e is a looking	event and is occurring	now	and is occurring in the maximally	specific	way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	looking	events	whose	stimulus	is	grey occur	in	way	w	and	has	you	as	an	experiencer	and	has	the	patch	as	a	stimulus Our	use	of	'grey'	in	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	to	mean	a	way	of	looking	is	an	application	of	a	more general mechanism that we have for using adjectives to mean ways of occurring. We might use 'proud'	in	'John	walks	proud',	for	example,	to	mean	a	certain	way	of	walking	(the	maximally	specific way	w	such that it is generically true that	walking	events	by	proud	people	occur in	way	w),	or	we might	use	'American'	in	'Brad	talks	American'	to	mean	a	certain	way	of	talking	(the	maximally	specific way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	talking	events	by	American	people	occur	in	way	w),	etc. It is convenient to say that	by 'grey' in 'The	patch looks grey to you'	we	mean: the	way that grey things	look.	But	care	needs	to	be	taken	here.	One	might	wonder,	given	that	grey	things	look	all	sorts 4 of	ways in	different	conditions,	whether	there is	such	a	thing	as	the	way	that	grey	things look.	But 'the	way	grey things look' is shorthand for 'the	maximally specific	way	w	such that it is	generically true that looking	events	whose	stimulus is	grey	occur in	way	w',	and if this is	properly	understood then	it	is	quite	plausible	that	there	is	such	a	way.	First,	whether	it	is	generically	true	that	grey	things look	w	does	not	depend	on	how	grey	things	actually	look.	Compare	turtles:	there	is	a	generic	reading of 'turtles	are long-lived'	on	which it is true,	even	though	the	vast	majority	of turtles	die just	after birth.	I	intend	'grey	things	look	w'	to	be	understood	generically	in	the	same	kind	of	way.	Second,	the way	of	looking	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	grey	things	look	w	might	be	a	fairly	general	way –	it	need	not	be	a	very	specific.	This	is	another	reason	to	think	that	there	might	be	such	a	thing	as	the way	that	grey	things look,	even if there is	some	variation in	the	way	that	grey	things	actually look. Compare	dogs:	there	is	such	a	thing	as	the	way	that	dogs	swim,	even	though	individual	dogs	swim	in all	kinds	of	ways.	This	way	is	not	a	very	specific	way	–	it	some	more	general	way.	So	too	with	the	way that	grey	things	look. Do	we	mean	anything	else	by	'look'? I	have	just	briefly illustrated	the	theory	that I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018),	of	what	we	mean	by our	visual	experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences.	According	to	this	theory	we	mean	the	same	thing	by 'look'	in	every	case	–	the	property	of	being	a	looking	event.	But	is	this	right?	It	has	been	said	that	we have	various	uses	of	'look',	even	when	it	comes	to	describing	visual	experiences.	It	is	not	always	clear whether	the	claim	is	that	we	mean	different	things	by	'look'	itself	or	by	'look'	sentences	as	a	whole.	I will	consider	both	possibilities. In	this	section I	consider	the	first	possibility. I	will look	for	evidence that	we	mean	different	things	by	'look',	and	argue	that	there	is	no	such	evidence.	In	the	next	section I	will	consider	the	second	possibility.	I	will	look	at	a	variety	of	things	that	we	are	purported	to	mean by	'look'	sentences,	and	argue	that	they	give	us	no	good	reason	to	think	that	we	mean	anything	by our visual experience uses of 'look' sentences that is not accounted for by the theory that I have developed. Various	categories	of	complements In	our	visual	experience	uses	of 'look' sentences	we	use,	as the	complement	of 'look',	expressions from a variety of syntactic categories. Here are some that we	might use to describe your colour experience	of	the	patch	at	the	start	of	this	chapter: The	patch	looks	grey The	patch	looks	a	grey	thing The	patch	looks	of	a	grey	colour The	patch	looks	like	a	grey	thing The	patch	looks	greyer	than	the	page The	patch	looks	how	grey	things	look The	patch	looks	as	if	it	is	grey The	patch	looks	to	be	grey Among the complements here are an adjective phrase ('grey'), a noun phrase ('a grey thing'), a preposition phrase ('of a grey colour'), a comparative phrase ('like a grey thing', 'greyer than the page'),	a	relative	clause	headed	by	'how'	('how	grey	things	look'),	a	phrase	headed	by	'as	if'	('as	if	it	is grey'),	and	a	'to'-infinitive	('to	be	grey'). More	carefully, I	should	say	that	surface	form	suggests	that	we	use	complements	from	a	variety	of syntactic categories. It could be, instead, that the complements include one or	more constituents that	are	not	visible	on	the	surface,	disguising	the	fact	that	they	are	actually	all	of	the	same	syntactic category.	If	that's	so	then	the	reason	that	I	am	about	to	consider,	and	reject,	doesn't	even	get	started. 5 But	even	if	we	do	use	expressions	from	a	variety	of	syntactic	categories	this	does	not	show	that	we use	'look'	with	more	than	one	meaning	in	these	uses.	For	consider	the	'live'-sentences	below: I	live	here I	live	in	Wagga	Wagga I	live	near	Canberra I	live	where	my	parents	live I	live	closer	to	Sydney	than	Melbourne In these sentences we use complements from a variety of syntactic categories – a noun phrase ('here'), a preposition phrase ('in Wagga Wagga', 'near Canberra'), a relative clause headed by 'where'	('where	My	parents	live'),	and	a	comparative	phrase	('closer	to	Sydney	than	Melbourne')	(in these	examples	I	am	using	'live'	in	the	sense	of	'reside',	rather	than	'be	alive').	But	in	these	sentences we	does	not	use	'live'	with	a	variety	of	meanings	–	we	use	it	with	a	single	meaning	(I	take	this	to	be clear).	So	the	fact	that	we	use	a	verb	with	complements	from	a	variety	of	syntactic	categories	does not	show	that	we	use	the	verb	with	more	than	one	meaning.	(What's	going	on	in	the	case	of	'live',	I suggest, is	that	we	have	various	ways	of	specifying	a location,	more	or less	specifically. I	would	say the	same	of	the	'look'	case	too.) Paraphrasing The	verb	'pick'	is	ambiguous.	What	we	(generally)	mean	by	it	in	the	first	example	below	is	different from	what	we	(generally)	mean	by	it	in	the	second: John	picked	some	strawberries	for	dinner John	picked	the	door	on	the	left One	way	to	see	that	what	we	mean	is	different	in	each	case	is	to	come	up	with	a	paraphrase	of	each and	compare	them.	In	the	first	example	(but	not	the	second)	we	mean	something	like	'pluck'	–	it	is true	of	events	which	can	(near	enough)	be	described	as	'plucking'	events;	in	the	second	example	(but not the first)	we	mean something like 'choose' – it is true of events	which can (near enough) be described	as	'choosing'	events.	Since	plucking	is	not	choosing,	what	we	mean	by	'pick'	in	each	case	is different.	Call	this	evidence	from	paraphrasing	that	'pick'	is	ambiguous. Is there any evidence from	paraphrasing that 'look' is ambiguous? There is,	when	we consider	all uses	of	'look'	sentences	(not	restricting	to	visual	experience	uses).	Consider	the	following: John	looked	embarrassed John	looked	at	his	mum In the first example above (but not the second), 'look' means something like 'visually appear', whereas	in	the	second	example	(but	not	the	first)	it	means	something	like	'visually	observe',	or	'gaze'. But	there	is	not,	as	far	as	I	can	tell,	any	evidence	from	paraphrasing	when	we	confine	our	attention to visual experience uses of 'look' sentences. I cannot see any way to show, by coming up with different	paraphrases,	that	we	mean	different	things	by	'look'	when	we	use	them	to	describe	visual experiences.	Consider	the	following	sample: The	patch	looks	grey He	looks	a	character Those	women	look	in	love 6 She	looks	like	a	duck The	top	line	looks	longer	than	the	bottom	line John's	mum	looks	how	she	always	looks It	looks	as	if	these	tomatoes	are	ripe They	look	to	be	tired When	trying	to	paraphrase 'look' in	each	case I	keep	coming	up	with	more	or less the	same	thing, something	like	'visually	appears'. It is important that the task in each case is to paraphrase just the word 'look', not the whole sentence.	We	would	expect	there	to	be	differences	between	the	meanings	of	these	sentences	as	a whole, differences that	we	might be able to bring out by paraphrasing the sentences. But	we are looking	for	differences in	the	meaning	of	the	word	'look' in	these	sentences,	and	evidence	for	that must	come	from	paraphrasing	just	the	word	'look'. Non-contradiction Coming up with evidence from paraphrasing that a word is ambiguous might require us to be explicitly	aware	of	any	ambiguity,	so	perhaps	the	reason	why	there	is	no	evidence	from	paraphrasing that	'look'	is	ambiguous	in	visual	experiences	uses	of	'look'	sentences	is	not	that	it's	not	ambiguous, but that	we	are	not	explicitly aware	of the	ambiguity. The	next kind	of evidence	does	not require explicit	awareness,	just	implicit	awareness. Another	way	to	see	that	'pick'	is	ambiguous	is	to	see	that	there	is	a	reading	of	the	sentence	below	on which it expresses a non-contradictory proposition, a reading that is made more salient by emphasising	the	second	occurrence	of	'pick'. John	picked	the	door	on	the	left,	but	he	didn't	pick	the	door	on	the	left Call	this	evidence	from	non-contradiction	that	'pick'	is	ambiguous. It is important that the reading in question is made more salient by emphasising the second occurrence of 'pick', rather than by emphasising some other expression in the sentence. If there were a non-contradictory reading of the sentence that is made	more salient by emphasising the second	occurrence of 'door' instead, then that	might be evidence that 'door' is ambiguous, but it would	not	be	evidence	that	'pick'	is	ambiguous: John	picked	the	door	on	the	left,	but	he	didn't	pick	the	door	on	the	left Is	there	evidence	from	non-contradiction	that	'look'	is	ambiguous?	There	is,	when	we	consider	'look' in	all	of	its	uses.	Consider	the	sentence	below: John	looked	over	the	moon,	but	he	didn't	look	over	the	moon There is a reading of this sentence, one that is made more salient by emphasising the second occurrence	of	'look',	on	which	it	expresses	a	non-contradictory	proposition	(a	proposition	that	is	true if	John	visually	appeared	over	the	moon	but	did	not	direct	his	gaze	over	the	moon). But	there is	no	evidence,	as	far	as I	can	tell,	when	we	just	consider	visual	experience	uses	of 'look' sentences.	None	of	the	sentences	below	has	a	non-contradictory	reading	that	is	made	more	salient by	emphasising	the	second	occurrence	of 'look',	and	as	far	as I	know	the	same	is	true	for	all	visual experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences. 7 The	patch	looks	grey,	but	it	doesn't	look	grey He	looks	a	character,	but	he	doesn't	look	to	be	a	character Those	women	look	in	love,	but	they	don't	look	to	be	in	love She	looks	like	a	duck,	but	she	doesn't	look	like	a	duck The	top	line	looks	longer	than	the	bottom	line,	but	it	doesn't	look	longer	than	the	bottom	line John's	mum	looks	how	she	always	looks,	but	she	doesn't	look	how	she	always	looks It	looks	as	if	these	tomatoes	are	ripe,	but	it	doesn't	look	as	if	these	tomatoes	are	ripe They	look	to	be	tired,	but	they	don't	look	to	be	tired Conjunction	reduction Because	'pick'	is	ambiguous	we	have	the	following	phenomenon.	Suppose	that	John	wants	to	give	a flower to	his girlfriend;	he	doesn't know	much	about flowers, so	his	mum	chooses	an	appropriate one	in	the	garden,	which	he	then	plucks;	but	he	does	know	a	lot	about	timing,	so	he	chooses	the	best moment to	give the flower.	There is	a reading	of the first sentence	below	on	which it	expresses	a proposition that is true in these circumstances. But any such reading of the conjunction-reduced second sentence requires understanding 'pick' in a certain kind of	weird	way, sometimes called a zeugmatic	reading	of	'pick'	(see	Quine	(1960,	p.	130)). John	picked	a	rose	and	John	picked	the	ideal	time	to	give	it John	picked	a	rose	and	the	ideal	time	to	give	it Call	this	evidence	from	conjunction	reduction	that	'pick'	is	ambiguous. We get the same phenomenon for 'look' when considered in all of its uses. If John appeared embarrassed	while	gazing	out the	window, then	there is	a true interpretation	of the first	sentence below,	but	any	true	interpretation	of	the	second	requires	a	zeugmatic	reading	of	'look'. John	looked	out	the	window	and	John	looked	embarrassed John	looked	out	the	window	and	embarrassed But	we	do	not	get	this	phenomenon	for	'look'	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences.	For any	circumstances	in	which	there	is	a	true	interpretation	of	the	first	sentences	below,	there	is	a	true interpretation	of	the	second	sentence	that	does	not	require	a	zeugmatic	reading	of	'look'. The	patch	looks	grey	and	the	patch	looks	a	square	thing The	patch	looks	grey	and	a	square	thing John	looks	like	a	philosopher	and	John	looks	as	if	he	thinks	like	one	too John	looks	like	a	philosopher	and	as	if	he	thinks	like	one	too The	sky	looks	how	it	usually	looks	but	the	sky	looks	slightly	less	cloudy The	sky	looks	how	it	usually	looks	but	slightly	less	cloudy Bill	looks	smarter	than	Ben	but	Bill	looks	to	be	less	wise Bill	looks	smarter	than	Ben	but	to	be	less	wise There may be pragmatic reasons why it is odd to use instances of some of these – it may, for example,	be	misleading	to	use	'and'	rather	than	'but'.	But	to	be	misleading	in	that	kind	of	way	is	not to	be	zeugmatic. 8 Question	formation Because	'pick' is	ambiguous	there	are	contexts	in	which	the	conversation	below	would	be	perfectly felicitous	(note	the	emphasis	on	'pick'	when	A	repeats	her	question): A:	What	did	John	pick? B:	He	picked	a	rose. A:	No,	that's	not	what	I	meant.	What	did	John	pick? If 'look' is	ambiguous	then	there	should	be	similarly	felicitous	conversations.	And	indeed	there	are, when	we consider 'look' in	all of its uses – there are contexts in	which the conversation	below is felicitous	(take	a	context	in	which	John	looked	through	binoculars	at	the	couple	next	door	and	what he	saw	made	him	look	embarrassed). A:	How	did	John	look? B:	He	looked	through	binoculars. A:	No,	that's	not	what	I	meant.	How	did	John	look? If	we	use	'look'	with	more	than	one	meaning	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences	then there should be similarly felicitous conversations. But as far as I can tell there are no such conversations.	There	is	no	context	in	which	the	conversation	below,	for	example,	is	felicitous. A:	How	does	the	patch	look? B:	The	patch	looks	as	if	it	is	grey. A:	No,	that's	not	what	I	meant.	How	does	the	patch	look? The emphasis is important. The are felicitous conversations	with different emphasis. For example, consider	a	context	in	which	there	are	two	patches.	Then: A:	How	does	the	patch	look? B:	The	patch	looks	as	if	it	is	grey. A:	No,	that's	not	what	I	meant.	How	does	the	patch	look? A	stronger	conclusion? I have argued that there is no evidence from syntactic variety, from paraphrasing, from noncontradiction,	from	conjunction	reduction,	or	from	question	formation	that	we	use	'look'	with	more than	one	meaning	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences.	Perhaps	this	can	be	made	into	an argument for a stronger conclusion, that	we	don't use 'look'	with	more than one	meaning in our visual	experience	uses	of 'look'	sentences.	The	argument	goes	as follows: if	we	did then	we	would have	evidence	of	at	least	one	of	these	kinds;	we	don't	have	evidence	of	any	of	these	kinds;	therefore, we	don't.	I'm	not	sure	whether	the	first	premise	of	this	argument	is	true. Do	we	mean	anything	else	by	'look'	sentences? In	the	previous	section	I	argued	that	we	have	no	good	reason	to	think	that	we	mean	different	things by	'look'	in	our	visual	experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences.	What	about	the	sentences	themselves?	Do we	mean	anything	by them	that is	not	accounted for	by the theory that I	develop in	Breckenridge (2018)? I	will consider	a fairly	exhaustive list	of	purported	uses	of 'look' sentences,	and	argue in	each	case that	either	(a)	we	have	no	such	use,	or	(b)	if	we	do	have	such	a	use	then	it	is	not	a	visual	experience 9 use, or (c) if we do have such a use then it is already accounted for by the theory that I have developed.	If	this	is	right	then	we	have	no	good	reason	to	think	that	we	mean	anything	by	our	visual experience	uses	of	'look'	sentences	that	is	not	accounted	for	by	the	theory	that	I	have	developed. I	start	by	considering	five	purported	uses	that	I	think	are	of	the	second	kind	–	if	we	do	have	such	uses then	they	are	not	visual	experience	uses. Tentative	assertion	use It	has	been	claimed	(e.g.	by	Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Quinton	(1955,	1973),	and	Ayer	(1940,	1956)) that	we sometimes use 'look' sentences to	make tentative assertions. For example,	we	might use 'The	patch	looks	grey'	to	tentatively	assert	that	the	patch	is	grey.	If	we	use	'The	patch	looks	grey'	to tentatively assert that the patch is grey then we use it to assert that the patch is grey, because tentative	assertion	is	assertion,	in	which	case	we	must	mean	by	the	sentence	that	the	patch	is	grey. So	the	view	can	be	put	as	follows: There	is	a	use	of	'O	looks	F'	on	which	we	mean	that	O	is	F Non-visual	use Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Jackson	(1977,	pp.	30-1),	and	Leeds	(1975,	p.	199)	have	all	claimed	that	we have	a	non-visual	use	of	'look'	sentences.	They	would	say	something	like	this: There	is	a	use	of	'It	looks	(to	S)	as	if	P'	on	which	we	mean	that	there	is	evidence	(not	necessarily visual)	(for	S)	that	P Inclination-to-believe	use Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Chisholm	(1957,	1965,	1966),	and	Travis	(2004)	all	make	something	like	the following	claim: There	is	a	use	of	'O	looks	F	to	S'	on	which	we	mean	that	S	is	inclined	to	believe,	on	the	basis	of her	visual	experience	of	O,	that	O	is	F Chisholm calls this the 'epistemic' use of 'look' sentences; I shall follow Price in calling it the inclination-to-believe	use. What-would-be-judged	use Vesey	(1956,	1971a,	1971b)	and	Dretske	(1995)	each	make	what	amounts	to	the	following	claim: There	is	a	use	of	'O	looks	F	to	S'	on	which	we	mean	that	if	S	were	to	judge,	on	the	basis	of	how	O looks	to	her,	and	with	no	reason	to	think	otherwise,	she	would	judge	that	O	is	F Vesey	calls	this	the	'epistemic'	use	of	'look';	Dretske	calls	it	the	'doxastic'	use.	I	will	call	it	the	whatwould-be-judged	use. Visual	evidence	use Jackson	(1977)	makes	something	like	the	following	claim: 10 There	is	a	use	of	'It	looks	(to	S)	as	if	P'	on	which	we	mean	that	there	is	visually	acquired	evidence (for	S)	that	P He	calls this the 'epistemic'	use,	but to	avoid	confusion	with	how	others	have	used	the 'epistemic' label	I	shall	call	this	the	visual	evidence	use. I	hope	that	it's	clear	enough	that	if	there	are	these	uses	then	none	of	them	is	a	visual	experience	use, because none of them is a use on which we describe visual experience.	We	might be describing something that is somehow connected with a visual experience, but we are not describing visual experience	itself. Comparative	use Various	people	(for	example	Chisholm	(1957,	pp.	45-6),	Vesey	(1956,	1971a,	1971b),	Jackson	(1977, pp. 31-3), Travis (2004), Leeds (1975, p. 200), Dretske (1995, pp. 67-9) and Pettit (2003)) have claimed	something	like	the	following: There	is	a	use	of	'O	looks	F	(to	S)'	on	which	we	mean	that	O	looks	(to	S)	the	way	F	things	look Vesey	calls	this	the	'resemblance'	use	of	'look'	sentences;	I	will	follow	Chisholm	and	Jackson	in	calling it	the	comparative	use. None	would agree that 'the	way F things look' is the right	definite	description to	use	here	– each would	use	a	more	qualified	one.	Chisholm	would	use	'the	way	F	things	ordinarily	look',	or	'the	way	F things	might	ordinarily	be	expected	to	look'.	Jackson	would	use	'the	way	an	F	thing	normally	looks	in C	to	S',	for	certain	conditions	C	and	observers	S	determined	by	the	context	of	utterance.	Leeds	would prefer 'the way F things usually look in daylight', or 'the way F things usually look in standard conditions'.	Dretske	would	add	reference	to	an	observer,	and	also	his 'discriminatory	clause':	by	'O looks	F	to	S'	we	mean	that	O	looks	to	S	the	way	F	things	normally	look	to	S,	and	O	looks	different	to	S from certain other non-F things. Despite these differences, they all agree that once the definite description	is	suitably	qualified,	perhaps	in	a	way	that	allows	the	meaning	of	'O	looks	F	(to	S)'	to	vary across	contexts	of	utterance,	the	claim	above	is	true. I	agree	that	we	do	have	such	a	use,	and	that	it	is	a	visual	experience	use.	But	it	is	already	accounted for	by	the	theory	that	I	develop	in	Breckenridge	(2018).	I	would	formulate	the	claim	as	follows: There	is	a	use	of	'O	looks	F	(to	S)'	on	which	we	mean	that	O	looks	(to	S)	the	maximally	specific way	w	such	that	it	is	generically	true	that	F	things	look	w Phenomenal	use Price	(1932,	1941,	1964),	Quinton	(1955,	1973),	Vesey	(1956,	1971a,	1971b),	Chisholm	(1957,	1965, 1966),	and	Jackson	(1977)	all	claim	that	we	sometimes	use	'look'	sentences	to	directly	describe	our visual	experiences.	I	think	we	can	understand	the	claim	to	be	this: There is a	use	of 'O looks F to S'	on	which	we	mean that S's visual experience	of	O,	or some feature	of	the	experience,	is	F Price calls this the 'basic' use, Vesey calls it the 'optical' use, and Chisholm calls it the 'noncomparative'	use.	I	will	follow	Jackson	in	calling	it	the	phenomenal	use. 11 I take it that if	we	do	have	such	a	use then it is	with	a restricted	class	of complements	of 'look'	– colour adjectives such as 'grey', and perhaps also shape adjectives such as 'square'. It would be implausible to	extend it to	adjectives such	as 'heavy'	– it is implausible that there is a	use	of 'The patch looks heavy to you' on which we	mean that your visual experience of the patch, or some feature	of	it,	is	heavy,	since	visual	experiences	and	their	features	are	not	the	kinds	of	things	that	can be	heavy.	Jackson	explicitly	acknowledges	this	restriction:	"The	phenomenal	use	is	characterized	by being	explicitly	tied	to	terms	for	colour,	shape	and/or	distance...	That	is,	instead	of	terms	like	'cow', 'house',	'happy',	we	have,	in	the	phenomenal	use,	terms	like	'red',	'square',	and	'longer	than'"	(1977, p.	33). If	we	do	have	such	a	use	of	'look'	sentences	then	it	is	clearly	a	visual	experience	use.	But	I	don't	see any	reason	to	think	that	we	have	such	a	use. I	will	consider	and	reject the	reasons	that	have	been given	for	thinking	that	we	do.	Quinton	and	Vesey	simply	claim	without	argument	that	we	have	such	a use.	Chisholm,	Price	and	Jackson	each	give	arguments	–	I	will	consider	their	arguments	in	turn. Chisholm Chisholm	(1965,	pp.	50-3)	discusses 'appear'	rather	than	'look'. I take it	that	he	would	be	happy	to say the same thinks about 'look', so I'll modify his discussion to 'look', to match the rest of this chapter. Chisholm	argues	that	we	have	a	phenomenal	use	(he	calls	it	the	'noncomparative'	use)	by	appealing to	something	like	the	sentence	below: Things	which	are	grey	usually	look	grey	in	daylight He	claims	that	this	sentence	is	ambiguous,	between	a	reading	on	which	it	is	'analytic'	and	a	reading on	which	it	is	'synthetic'.	On	its	analytic	reading	it	can	be	paraphrased	using	the	first	sentence	below, and	on	its	synthetic	reading	it	can	be	paraphrased	using	the	second. Things which are grey usually look in daylight the way things which are grey usually look in daylight There	is	a	certain	way	of	looking,	looking	grey,	such	that	things	which	are	grey	happen	to	usually appear	that	way	in	daylight The reason why it has these two readings, Chisholm seems to think, is that 'look' itself has two readings	– it	can	be	read in	the	comparative	sense,	but	also in	a	distinct	phenomenal	sense.	When 'look'	is	read	in	its	comparative	sense,	to	look	grey	in	daylight	is	to	look	the	way	things	which	are	grey usually look in daylight, and this accounts for the analytic reading. When 'look' is read in its phenomenal	sense,	however, 'looks	grey' is	an	unanalysable	predicate,	and it is	this	sense	of 'look' that	accounts	for	the	synthetic	reading. Leeds (1975)	argues,	against	Chisholm, that if there is such	an	ambiguity there is	no	need to think that	it	is	due	to	an	ambiguity	in	'look'.	I	think	that	Leeds	is	right.	Here	I	will	present	my	own	version of	what	is	essentially	Leeds'	argument. Leeds suggests, and I agree with him, that talk about the sentence being ambiguous between analytic and synthetic readings is	unclear, and that the	ambiguity	Chisholm is	pointing to is	better brought	out	by	embedding	the	sentence	in	a	modal	context.	Thus,	rather	than	the	original	sentence being	ambiguous	between	analytic	and	synthetic	readings, let's	take	the	fact	to	be	explained	to	be that	the	sentence	below	is	ambiguous	between	true	and	false	readings. 12 Necessarily:	things	which	are	grey	usually	look	grey	in	daylight Chisholm's	claim	then	translates	as	this: this	sentence is	ambiguous,	between	a	true	reading	and	a false reading, and this is because 'look' is ambiguous, between a comparative sense and a phenomenal	sense. The problem for Chisholm is that if there is a comparative reading of 'look'	which is as Chisholm claims it is, then it alone can account for the true and false readings of this sentence. On the comparative	reading	of	'look',	it	can	be	paraphrased	as	follows: Necessarily:	things	which	are	grey	usually	look	in	daylight	the	way	things	which	are	grey	usually look	in	daylight This sentence is structurally ambiguous, between a reading on	which the definite description 'the way	things	which	are	grey	usually look	in	daylight' is	within	the	scope	of	the	operator	'necessarily', and	a	reading	on	which	the	operator	'necessarily'	is	within	the	scope	of	the	definite	description	'the way	things	which	are	grey	usually	look	in	daylight'.	We	can	represent	the	two	readings	as	follows: Necessarily:	the	way	w	such	that	grey	things	usually	look	w	in	daylight	is	such	that:	grey	things usually	look	w	in	daylight The	way	w	such	that	grey	things	usually	look	w	in	daylight	is	such	that:	necessarily:	grey	things usually	look	w	in	daylight The	first	is	true	but	the	second	is	false	(it	might	have	been	that	grey	things	usually	look	w'	in	daylight, where	w'	is	not	the	way	grey	things	actually	look	in	daylight).	So	the	ambiguity	here	can	be	explained as	a	structural	ambiguity	in	the	sentence,	rather	than	as	a	lexical	ambiguity	in	the	verb	'look'.	There	is, then, despite what Chisholm thinks, no good reason here to think that we have a use of 'look' sentences	that	is	distinct	from	the	comparative	use. Price Here	is	an	argument	in	the	style	of	ones	given	by	Price	(1964,	pp.	15-16): If	the	patch	looks	grey	in	the	comparative	sense,	then	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look. Why does the patch look the	way grey things look? Because the patch looks grey. This is an informative	answer.	Since	it	is	an	informative	answer,	we	cannot	be	using	'the	patch	looks	grey' comparatively,	because	then	it	would	amount	to	saying	that	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things look	because	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look,	and	that	is	not	informative.	Thus,	there	is a	use	of	'The	patch	looks	grey'	which	is	not	the	comparative	use. If	this	argument	is	sound	it	does	not	show	that	the	extra	use	is	the	phenomenal	use,	but	it	does	at least	show	that	there	is	an	extra	use	of	'The	patch	looks	grey',	in	addition	to	the	comparative	use. Nevertheless, I do not think that the argument is sound, because it has a false premise. The argument	goes	as	follows.	Consider	the	following	two	sentences: The	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look,	because	the	patch	looks	grey The	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look,	because	the	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look There is	a	reading	of	the	first	sentence	above	on	which it is informative;	but	there is	no	reading	of the second sentence	on	which it is informative; so there is a reading	of 'The	patch looks grey' on which	it	does	not	mean	'The	patch	looks	the	way	grey	things	look',	for	otherwise	there	would	be	no 13 such	difference	between	the	two	sentences;	so	there	is	a	use	of	'The	patch	looks	grey'	distinct	from the	comparative	use. But	the	second	sentence	does	have	a	reading	on	which	it	is	informative	–	at	least	one	that	is	just	as informative	as	any	reading	of	the	first.	Consider	the	analogous	sentence	below: John	loves	the	prettiest	girl	in	class,	because	John	loves	the	prettiest	girl	in	class This	has	a	reading	on	which	it	is	not	informative.	But	it	also	has	a	reading	on	which	it	is	informative. The	informative	reading	can	be	given	as	follows: John	loves	the	prettiest	girl	in	class,	because	John	loves	x,	and	x	is	the	prettiest	girl	in	class In the same	way, the second sentence above has a reading on	which it is informative, a reading which	can	be	given	as	follows: The patch looks the	way grey things look, because the patch looks	w, and	w is the	way grey things	look This	reading	is	at	least	as	informative	as	any	reading	of	the	first	sentence	on	which	it	is	informative. For	the	first	to	be	informative	we	need	to	understand	it	as	meaning	something	like	'The	patch	looks the	way	grey	things	look,	because	the	patch	looks	grey	(and	that's	the	way	grey	things	look)'.	This	is no	more	informative	than	the	informative	reading	of	the	second	sentence. Jackson Jackson	(1977,	ch.	2)	argues	that	we	have	a	use	of	'look'	sentences	which	is	neither	the	comparative use	nor	the	inclination-to-believe	use	(which	he	calls	the	'epistemic'	use).	His	argument	is	this: We	have	a	use of	'look'	sentences	on	which	what	we	mean	by	'The	patch	looks	grey'	cannot	be given	by	reference	to	the	way	grey	things	look	to	certain	observers	in	certain	conditions,	nor	by reference	to	beliefs; if this	were	the	comparative	use	then	what	we	mean	by 'The	patch looks grey' could be given by reference to the	way grey things look to certain observers in certain conditions,	so it is	not	the	comparative	use; if it	were	the inclination-to-believe	use	then	what we mean by 'The patch looks grey' could be given by reference to beliefs, so it is not the inclination-to-believe	use; thus, it is	neither	the	comparative	use	nor	the inclination-to-believe use. He	takes	this	additional	use	to	be	the	phenomenal	use. I	agree	with	Jackson	that	we	have	a	use	of 'look'	sentences	on	which	what	we	mean	by	'The	patch looks	grey'	cannot	be	given	by	reference	to	the	way	grey	things	look	to	certain	observers	in	certain conditions, nor by reference to beliefs. But I disagree with Jackson that this use is not the comparative	use,	because,	unlike	Jackson, I	think	that	what	we	mean	by	the	comparative	use	need not	(in	fact,	should	not)	be	given	by	reference	to	certain	observers	in	certain	conditions. Jackson	takes	it	that	the	comparative	use	of	'look'	sentences	is	such	that	there	is	some	expression,	S, which refers to or quantifies over certain people, and some expression, C, which refers to or quantifies	over	certain	conditions,	such	that	the	following	is	true: By	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to S	in	C 14 I	believe,	contrary	to	this,	that	by	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	just	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to you the way grey things look, where 'the way grey things look' is to be understood generically. Jackson's arguments do not work against this account of the comparative use. I will consider Jackson's argument that what we mean by 'The patch looks grey to you' cannot be given by reference	to	the	way	grey	things look	to	certain	observers in	certain	conditions,	and	briefly	explain how it does not show that	what	we	mean cannot be given in terms of the	way grey things look, understood	generically. Jackson	argues	that	there	are	no	expressions	S	and	C	which	make	the	sentence	above	true	but	nontrivial. He	starts	by	considering	the	following	account: By	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to you	in	normal	circumstances He	points	out	that	this	cannot	be	right.	Suppose	that	you	see in	shades	of red,	but	with	extremely good red vision – you can	make amongst reds the same	number of discriminations that a normal sighted	person	can	make	amongst	colours	in	general.	Then	it	might	be	true	that	the	patch	looks	the way	grey	things	look	to	you	in	normal	circumstances,	but	false	that	the	patch	looks	grey	to	you. He	next	considers	an	account	that	refers	to	people	other	than	you: By	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to most	people	in	normal	circumstances He	points	out	that	how	things	look	to	you	does	not	depend	on	the	existence	of	other	people	–	things might	look	grey	to	you,	even	if	no	one	else	did,	does,	or	will	exist.	So	it	will	not	do	to	make	reference to	other	people. He	also	points	out	that	there	is	a	problem	explaining	what	'normal	circumstances'	are	in	a	way	that does not make these accounts trivial.	What are normal circumstances? Perhaps circumstances in daylight: By	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	look	to you	in	daylight But	your	eyes	might	be	dazzled	in	daylight	in	such	a	way	that	grey	things	do	not	look	grey	to	you	in daylight,	but	they	do	look	grey	to	you	under	low	intensity	light	instead. He next considers explaining 'normal circumstances' as being circumstances which best facilitate colour	discrimination.	But,	he	points	out,	these	are	circumstances	that	exaggerate	colour	differences, so	they	are	circumstances in	which	things look	more	different in	colour than	they	really	are,	so	do not	look	the	colour	they	are. The	only	way	of	correctly	specifying	what	normal	conditions	are,	he	concludes,	makes	these	accounts trivial:	normal	circumstances	are	those	in	which	grey	things	look	grey	to	you.	But	by	'The	patch	looks grey	to	you'	we	do	not	mean	something	trivial. Jackson then argues that there is reason to think that the account cannot be right, for any actual observers	or actual circumstances. There	might	be	a shade	of colour, call it c, such that the	patch 15 looks	c	to	you	even	though	no	object	actually	is	c.	Then	it	would	be	true	that	the	patch	looks	c	to	you but not true that the patch looks the way c things look to you (or anyone else) in normal circumstances	(or	any	other	circumstances)	–	since	there	are	no	c	things	there	is	no	such	way.	This will be case for any value of S that is an actual observer and for any value of C that is an actual condition. Jackson	considers	a	counterfactual	fix: By	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	grey	things	would look	to	you	in	normal	circumstances	if	there	were	any He	argues	(successfully,	I	think)	that	this	cannot	be	right	either. Jackson	concludes	that	by	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	do	not	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you the	way	grey	things	look	to	S	in	C,	for	any	values	of	S	and	C. I	agree	–	we	will	not	be	able	to	find	appropriate	values	for	S	and	C.	But	I	think	that	we	don't	need	to in	order to	state	what	we	mean	by	the	comparative	use.	According	to	the	theory	that I	develop in Breckenridge	(2018),	by	'The	patch	looks	grey	to	you'	we	mean	that	the	patch	looks	to	you	the	way	w such	that	grey	things	look	w.	Here,	'grey	things	look	w'	is	to	be	understood	generically;	it	expresses	a relation	between	the	property	of	being	an	event	in	which	a	grey	thing	looks	some	way	to	someone, and	the	property	of	being	an	event	that	occurs	in	way	w.	A	generic	like	this	can	be	true	even	if	there are	no	actual	events	in	which	a	grey	thing	looks	some	way	to	someone.	In	particular, it	can	be	true even	if	there	are	no	actual	grey	things. References Ayer,	A.	J.	(1940),	The	Foundations	of	Empirical	Knowledge	(London:	MacMillan	Press). Ayer,	A.	J.	(1956),	The	Problem	of	Knowledge	(London:	MacMillan). Breckenridge,	W.	(2018),	Visual	Experience:	A	Semantic	Approach,	(Oxford:	OUP). Chisholm,	R.	M.	(1957),	Perceiving:	A	Philosophical	Study	(Ithaca,	NY:	Cornell	University	Press). Chisholm,	R.	M.	(1965),	"'Appear',	'Take',	and	'Evident'",	in	R.	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(1973),	The	Nature	of	Things	(Boston:	Routledge	&	Kegan	Paul). Travis,	C.	(2004),	'The	Silence	of	the	Senses',	Mind	113,	pp.	57-94. Vesey,	G.	(1956),	'Seeing	and	Seeing	As',	Proceedings	of	the	Aristotelian	Society	56,	pp.	109-24. Vesey,	G. (1971a), 'Analysing	Seeing II', in	F.	N.	Sibley (ed.),	Perception:	A	Philosophical	Symposium (London:	Methuen),	pp.	133-7. Vesey,	G.	(1971b),	Perception	(London:	MacMillan	Press).