Sextus Empiricus : his outlook, works, and legacy Autor(en): Machuca, Diego Objekttyp: Article Zeitschrift: Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie = Revue philosophique et théologique de Fribourg = Rivista filosofica e teologica di Friburgo = Review of philosophy and theology of Fribourg Band (Jahr): 55 (2008) Heft 1 Persistenter Link: http://doi.org/10.5169/seals-761193 PDF erstellt am: 10.07.2018 Nutzungsbedingungen Die ETH-Bibliothek ist Anbieterin der digitalisierten Zeitschriften. Sie besitzt keine Urheberrechte an den Inhalten der Zeitschriften. Die Rechte liegen in der Regel bei den Herausgebern. Die auf der Plattform e-periodica veröffentlichten Dokumente stehen für nicht-kommerzielle Zwecke in Lehre und Forschung sowie für die private Nutzung frei zur Verfügung. Einzelne Dateien oder Ausdrucke aus diesem Angebot können zusammen mit diesen Nutzungsbedingungen und den korrekten Herkunftsbezeichnungen weitergegeben werden. Das Veröffentlichen von Bildern in Printund Online-Publikationen ist nur mit vorheriger Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber erlaubt. Die systematische Speicherung von Teilen des elektronischen Angebots auf anderen Servern bedarf ebenfalls des schriftlichen Einverständnisses der Rechteinhaber. Haftungsausschluss Alle Angaben erfolgen ohne Gewähr für Vollständigkeit oder Richtigkeit. Es wird keine Haftung übernommen für Schäden durch die Verwendung von Informationen aus diesem Online-Angebot oder durch das Fehlen von Informationen. Dies gilt auch für Inhalte Dritter, die über dieses Angebot zugänglich sind. Ein Dienst der ETH-Bibliothek ETH Zürich, Rämistrasse 101, 8092 Zürich, Schweiz, www.library.ethz.ch http://www.e-periodica.ch Diego Machuca Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy Nowadays Pyrrhonism is alive and well. This necessarily means that there is considerable interest in the works of Sextus Empiricus, since he is our chief source for Pyrrhonian skepticism.1 Until not long ago, however, the predomi¬ nant tendency among scholars of ancient philosophy was to regard Sextus' oeuvre merely as a key source of information about other thinkers and schools whose views would otherwise be even more obscure or completely unknown. Paradoxically, his writings were not read as what they essentially are: a detailed account of Pyrrhonism by one of the leading representatives of this philosophical movement. The reason seems to have been that Pyrrhonism was deemed to lack the cogency and import of the Dogmatic philosophies.2 There were, of course, some exceptions, such as Léon Robin,3 Karel Janâcek,4 and Charlotte Stough,5 along with scholars from the nineteenth century, the most important of whom was Victor Brochard.6 But it is particularly since the 1980s that there has been a strong trend to assess more highly the importance 1 Interest in Sextus' writings is in part reflected in the recent publication of an important number of new translations of them. Among these are the following: ANNAS, Julia / BARNES, Jonathan: Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonism. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2000 (1994); Mates, Benson: The Skeptic Way. Sextus Empiricus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism. New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press 1996; BETT, Richard: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists. Oxford: Clarendon Press 1997; Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005; PELLEGRIN, Pierre: Sextus Empiricus: Esquisses Pyrrhoniennes. Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1997; PELLEGRIN, Pierre / DALIMIER, Catherine / DELATTRE, Daniel / DELATTRE Joëlle / PÉREZ Brigitte: Sextus Empiricus: Contre les professeurs. Paris: Éditions du Seuil 2002; FlÜCKIGER, Hansueli: Sextus Empiricus: Gegen die Dogmatiker. St. Augustine: Academia 1998; SPINELLI, Emidio: Ses to Empirico: Contro gli etici. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1995; Sesto Empirico: Contro gli astrologi. Napoli: Bibliopolis 2000. 2 Following Sextus' usage, I will employ "Dogmatic" and its cognates to refer to any nonPyrrhonian thinker, outlook, or philosophy. 3 ROBIN, Léon: Pyrrhon et le scepticisme grec. Paris: PUF 1944. 4 JANAÔEK, Karel: Prolegomena to Sextus Empiricus. Olomouc: Nâkladem Palackého Univer¬ sity 1948; Die Hauptschrift des Sextus Empiricus als Torso erhalten? In: Philologus 107 (1963) 271277; Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Methods. Prague: Charles University 1972. I only refer here to Janâcek's most influential works. For a complete list of his many important writings on Pyr¬ rhonism, see BARNES, Jonathan: Diogenes Laertius IX 61-116: The Philosophy ofPyrrhonism. In: HAASE, W. (ed.): Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 36.6. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 1992, 4241-4301, at 4298-4299. 5 STOUGH, Charlotte: Greek Skepticism. A Study in Epistemology. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press 1969. 6 BROCHARD, Victor: Les Sceptiques grecs. 4th ed. Paris: Le livre de poche 2002 (1887). Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 29 of Pyrrhonism as a philosophy. The spate of works on Pyrrhonian skepticism that have been published since then is characterized, in general, by high schol¬ arly quality and analytic depth. The change of attitude towards Skepticism7 has been, in fact, part of a reevaluation of the Hellenistic and Imperial ages as a whole, which are now widely regarded as original and stimulating periods of thought. However, it must first be noted that, unlike other Hellenistic and Imperial philosophical currents, the Pyrrhonism found in Sextus' writings has been regarded by some scholars as key to understanding the origin and development of early modern philosophy. Second, again unlike other philosophies from the Hellenistic and Imperial ages, Skepticism has considerably influenced contemporary epistemology. More specifically, the so-called Five Modes of Agrippa as expounded by Sextus have shaped a great deal of the current epistemological debates about the possibility of knowledge and justification, even if not all the parties to these debates are aware of the Pyrrhonian origin of the problematic they are dealing with. The purpose of this paper is twofold: to discuss some challenging issues concerning Sextus' works and outlook, and to offer an overview of the influ¬ ence exerted by Sextan Pyrrhonism on both early modern and contemporary philosophy. In the course of doing so, it presents the status quaestionis on the topics examined. Section 1 summarizes the scant information we possess about Sextus' life, deals with the structure, content, and chronology of his writings, and touches on the question of his originality as an author. Section 2 addresses the problem of Sextus' relationship with the Empirical and the Methodical schools of medicine. Section 3 is devoted to an analysis of the different types of Skepticism that seem to coexist in his works. This analysis is relevant both for the question of the uniformity of Sextus' philosophical stance and for the history of the Pyrrhonian movement. Finally, Section 4 deals briefly with the reception of Pyrrhonism in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, and exam¬ ines the influence that Sextus' works have had on the development of both early modern and contemporary philosophy. It also summarizes some of the key differences between Pyrrhonian skepticism and its early modern and con¬ temporary counterparts. 1. Life and writings Little is known about the life of Sextus Empiricus. With regard to when he lived, D. K. House, in his excellent article on Sextus' life, points out that the evidence "is of such a nature that one cannot do any more than set a limit on the possible dates of Sextus which range from A.D. 100 to the first part of the 7 Henceforth, I will use "Skepticism" with a capital "S" to refer specifically to Pyrrhonism. 30 Diego Machuca third century".8 Though it is true that it is not possible to set a date with precision, most scholars agree to place Sextus in the latter part of the second century AD.9 Concerning where he lived and worked, the situation is not bet¬ ter, since there is no conclusive evidence in support of any particular place.10 But we can eliminate Alexandria (see Pyrröneioi Hypotypöseis [PH] III 221) and, with less assurance, Athens (see PH I 98, Adversus dogmaticos [AD] II 145). As regards Sextus' philosophical outlook and profession, we have reliable information based on both internal and external evidence. First, Sextus writes as a representative of the Pyrrhonian philosophy, making use of the first per¬ son plural when describing and explaining it (see esp. PH I 17-24, 187-209). The external evidence confirms that he was a Skeptical philosopher, since Diogenes Laertius includes Sextus in the chronological list of Pyrrhonists which he offers at the end of his Life ofTimon (DL IX 115-116). Diogenes tells us that Sextus was the pupil of Herodotus and the teacher of Saturninus, and that he wrote "the ten books of the Skeptical Commentaries {ta deka tön Skeptikön [seil. HypomnëmatônJ) and other fine works" (DL IX 116). Second, Sextus was a physician, as is made clear by some passages of his works. He speaks of Asclepius as the "founder of our science" (Adversus mathematicos [AM] I 260). In another passage, he observes that in a disease there are two kinds of abatement, and that "we recommend a varied diet not for this abatement [i.e., that of the particular attack that occurs for the most part before the first third day] but for the abatement of the entire disease" {PH II 238). When arguing that people's judgments about good and bad are in con¬ flict, Sextus says that he will base his treatment of this issue on the example of health, because "the discussion about this is very familiar to us" {AD V 47). One may assume that this familiarity is that of a doctor who is actively en¬ gaged in his profession. Also, in the course of his attack against astrology, Sex¬ tus points out that, "in medicine, we have observed that a puncture of the heart is a cause of death, having observed along with it not only the death of Dion, but also of Theon and Socrates and many others" {AM V 104). This pas¬ sage may be interpreted as describing Sextus' own experience as a doctor. In addition, he refers to his now lost Medical Commentaries {Iatrika Hypomnêmata), in which he examined in detail the position of the physician Ascle8 HOUSE, D.K.: The Life ofSextus Empiricus. In: The Classical Quarterly 30 (1980) 227-238, at 231. 9 See, e.g., ANNAS, Julia / BARNES, Jonathan: The Modes of Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985, 16; DECLEVA CAIZZI, Fernanda: L'elogio del cane. Sesto Empirico, Schizzi pirroniani I 62-78. In: Elenchos 14 (1993) 305-330, at 328-330; BARNES, Jonathan: Introduction. In: ANNAS / BARNES: Sextus Empiricus, xi-xxxi, at xii; STRIKER, Gisela: Historical Reflections on Classical Pyrrhonism and Neo-Pyrrhonism. In: SiNNOTT-ARMSTRONG, Walter (ed.): Pyrrhonian Skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press 2004, 13-24, at 23 n. 1; BETT : Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, ix-x. 10 See HOUSE: The Life ofSextus Empiricus, 231-234. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 31 piades (AD I 202). Finally, he speaks of his Empirical Commentaries (Empeirika Hypomnêmata), in which he showed that the term empeiria is also applied to tecbnë (AM I 61). Judging by its title, this work must have dealt with Empirical medicine. Scholars have generally supposed that the Empirical Commentaries are probably the same as the Medical Commentaries.11 In the light of the passages just referred to, it is significant that in his extant works Sextus makes frequent use of medical examples and information (see PH I 44, 51-52, 71, 80, 93, 101-103, 126-127, 131, 133, II 237-240, III 280-281; AD I 179, II 188, 219-221; AM I 95, 307-308, II 49). The internal evidence about Sextus' profession is confirmed by the external evidence since, as we will see in the next section, we also know from Diogenes Laertius and a pseudoGalenic work that Sextus was a physician. While the writings of other Pyrrhonists have been lost except for frag¬ ments and summaries we possess two complete works and an important part of a third by Sextus: the three books of the Pyrröneioi Hypotypöseis (Pyrrhonian Outlines), the six books of the Pros Mathëmatikous (Against the Learned or Professors), and the five extant books of the Pros Dogmatikous (Against the Dogmatists). The latter two are better known by their Latin titles of Adversus mathematicos and Adversus dogmaticos, respectively. It is important to note that, in our manuscripts, AD is attached to the end of AM. It is clear, however, that they are two different works. First, AD I 1 refers back to a general treat¬ ment of Pyrrhonism which has just been made but which corresponds to nothing that is found in AM I-VI. Second, the beginning and the end of AM clearly show that it is a self-contained work (see AM I 1, VI 68). Unfortu¬ nately, scholars conventionally refer to the five surviving books of AD as AM VII-XI, even though they know that this designation is incorrect. The reason I have spoken of the five "surviving" books of AD is that Karel Janâcek has convincingly argued that what we know as AD are only the extant books of a work that also included a part dealing with the same issues as the first book of PHP2 This hypothesis allows us to explain the otherwise inexplicable references to previous discussions found in some of the books of AD (see I 1, 29, 345, III 195, V 144, 167). As these discussions parallel topics addressed in the first book of PH, some scholars thought that in the passages H See BROCHARD: Les sceptiques grecs, 334; HOUSE: The Life ofSextus Empiricus, 234; ALLEN, James: The Skepticism ofSextus Empiricus. In: HAASE, W. (ed.): Aufstieg und Niedergang der römi¬ schen Welt II 36.4. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 1990, 2582-2607, at 2583 with n. 8; PELLEGRIN: Sextus Empiricus, 11. 12 See JANÂCEK: Die Hauptschrift des Sextus Empiricus. 32 Diego Machuca of AD in question Sextus is referring back to that work.13 However, this can¬ not be so for several reasons. In the first place, with respect to the issues dealt with at AD V 162-166, at AD V 167 Sextus says that he has "spoken more accurately about these matters in the lectures on the Skeptical end". Now, the issues discussed at AD V 162- 166 do not correspond to those dealt with in the chapter on the end of Skepti¬ cism (PH I 25-30), but to those addressed in the chapter on the criterion of Skepticism (PHI 21-24). Unless one supposes a slip on Sextus' part, he cannot be referring to PH I, but to a now lost part of AD. The second reason is that, if the passages of AD refer back to PH I, we must assume that Sextus used the general account of Pyrrhonism provided in that book as a preliminary to the specific account given both in PH II-III and in AD I-V. However, this is highly implausible.14 Furthermore, at the begin¬ ning of the first book of AD Sextus tells us: "The general character of the Skeptical ability has been indicated with the appropriate treatment, having been sketched out both directly and by way of a division of its neighboring philosophies. It remains, next, to explain also its application to the parts [of philosophy]" (AD I 1). The way in which Sextus expresses himself here im¬ plies that he is referring back to topics that have just been discussed in a preceding part of the same work, so it would be utterly awkward if the passage quoted were a back-reference to PH I. In addition, when Diogenes compares the order of the Ten Modes that he follows in his exposition with the orders in Sextus, Aenesidemus, and Favorinus, he indicates that the Ninth and the Tenth in his list are, in Sextus' list, the Tenth and the Eighth, respectively (DL IX 87). However, the Ninth Mode in Diogenes is also the Ninth in Sextus, whereas the Tenth in Sextus corre¬ sponds to the Fifth in Diogenes. Several explanations have been proposed: Diogenes made a mistake, or a scribe miscopied the text, or the order which Diogenes ascribes to Sextus corresponds to the order which the latter followed in his account of the Ten Modes contained in a part of AD that is no longer extant.15 This last explanation gets support from the fact that, at AD I 345, Sextus makes reference to his previous discussion of the "Ten Modes of Aene¬ sidemus". This mention of Aenesidemus can be taken as an indication that Sextus is not referring to PH because, in the chapter of PH I in which he ex13 See, e.g., BROCHARD, Les sceptiques grecs, 332 with nn. 3-4; BURY, R. G. (trans.): Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1935, 3 n. a; ROBIN: Pyrrhon, 197. 14 See BAILEY, Alan: Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonean Scepticism. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2002, 101. 15 See esp. BARNES: Diogenes Laertius, 4278-4279. See also ANNAS / BARNES: The Modes of Scepticism, 29; BRUNSCHWIG, Jacques: Introduction and notes to Book IX. In: GOULET-CAZÉ, M.-O. (dir.): Diogene Laërce: Vies et doctrines des philosophes illustres. Paris: Le livre de poche 1999,1121 n. 7 Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 33 pounds the Ten Modes of suspension of judgment (PHI 36-163), he does not ascribe them to Aenesidemus, but to "the older skeptics" (PHI 36). One may therefore think that, at AD I 345, Sextus is referring back to an exposition of the Ten Modes made in a lost part of AD. Finally, as we will see later on, several scholars have maintained that PH is later than AD. If this is the case, then it is impossible that the passages of AD mentioned above refer back to PH I unless one supposes that the references were added after PH had been written. With regard to AD, it must also be noted that Jerker Blomqvist has con¬ vincingly argued that the work Skeptica in ten books to which Diogenes refers at DL IX 116 is AD, so that the part of this work which is no longer extant would have consisted of five books.16 This interpretation is supported, first, by the fact that in AM Sextus refers to his Skeptika (AM I 26) or Skeptika Hypomnëmata (AM I 29, II 106, VI 52) and that these are references to AD: I 26 refers back to AD III 359-440 (as the parallel at AD V 225 shows), I 29 to AD I 29-446 (as the parallel at AD V 232 shows), II 106 to AD II 300-481, and VI 52 to AD II 131.17 Also, the manuscripts, at the beginning and/or the end of AD II-V, identify these books as the seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth books of Sextus' Skeptika or of his HypomnëmataM There are two other facts that support Blomqvist's thesis. First, at AD I 446 and II 1, Sextus refers to AD I as a whole with the word hypomnëma (commentary). Second, at AM III 116, Sextus speaks of the "commentary against the grammarians and that against the physicists"; the subject dealt with in this passage of AM III makes it clear that the commentary against the physicists is AD III-IV. It is worth noting that some scholars have maintained that, in DL IX 116, Diogenes is most likely referring to the six books of AM plus the five remain¬ ing books of AD, since these eleven books are grouped together as a single work in the manuscripts. These scholars argue that the reason Diogenes speaks of ten books is that books III and IV of AM were originally a single book.19 This hypothesis presents some problems. First, it requires the im¬ plausible supposition that the initial part of AD was already lost in Diogenes' time and that he (or his source) owned a copy in which the five extant books of AD had already been attached to AM. Second, if we concede that this did happen, we must be prepared to accept that Diogenes (or his source) failed to 16 BLOMQVIST, Jerker: Die Skeptika des Sextus Empiricus. In: Grazer Beiträge 2 (1974) 7-14. 17 See BLOMQVIST: Die Skeptika, 11-12. 1 ^ See BLOMQVIST: Die Skeptika, 13-14 with n. 24. 19 See BROCHARD, Les sceptiques grecs, 331 n. 3; JANÂCEK, Karel: Ta deka ton Skeptikôn. In: IRMSCHER, J. and al. (eds.): Miscellanea critica aus Anlass des 150 jährigen Bestehens der Verlags¬ gesellschaft und des graphischen Betriebes B.G. Teuhner. Teubner: Leipzig 1964, 119-121; ALLEN: The Skepticism, 2583; BrunSCHWIG: Introduction and notes, 1145 n. 3. Cf. POLITO, Roverto: The Sceptical Road. Aenesidemus' Appropriation ofHeraclitus. Leiden/Boston: Brill 2004, 23 n. 39. 34 Diego Machuca realize that AM and AD are two distinct works, and that the passages of AM that mention the Skeptika refer to AD and do not apply this title to AM together with the extant books of AD. In AM Sextus speaks of certain topics dealt with en tois Pyrröneiois (see AM I 282, VI 58, 61). Though one might think that this work Pyrröneia is identical with PH, the topics referred to in the first two passages do not correspond to any of the contents of PH. Indeed, at AM I 282 Sextus points out that in his Pyrröneia he talked about some of the reasons why Pyrrho constantly read Homer's poetry; and at AM VI 58 he observes that in that work he dealt with other arguments that prove that sound (phone) is nothing. Neither topic is addressed in PH, but note that, although in the remaining books of AD there is no discussion of Pyrrho's interest in Homer, there is an argument against the existence oiphonë (see AD II 131). As for AM VI 61, in this passage Sextus tells us that, in his Pyrröneia, he showed that time is nothing. In this case, we do find arguments that time does not exist both at P//III 136-150 and at AD IV 189-247. Now, if we analyze AM VI 58 carefully, we come to the conclu¬ sion that the Pyrröneia are actually identical with AD and, hence, that AM VI 61 refers to AD IV 189-247 and not to PH III 136-150. For at AM VI 58 Sextus tells us: "It is also possible to make use of many other arguments concerning [the non-existence of sound], through which, as I said, we went in detail, commenting on them in the Pyrröneia (en tois Pyrröneiois hypomnëmatizomenoi diexëeimen)". Sextus indicates here that, in a previous passage, he said that in his Pyrröneia he had examined the arguments against the existence of sound. That passage is found at AM VI 52, where he observes: "That sound is non-existent has been shown by us in the Skeptical Commentaries (en tois skeptikois bypomnëmasi) on the basis of the testimony of the Dogmatists". AM I 52 and 58 make it plain that the Skeptika Hypomnëmata are identical with the Pyrröneia,20 Moreover, it is clear that the phrase en tois Pyrröneios presup¬ poses a noun like hypomnëmasi. In this regard, note that at AM VI 58 Sextus makes use of the related verb hypomnëmatizein-, something very similar occurs at AM I 26, where he mentions the Skeptika together with the same verb: en tois skeptikois hypemnësamen. Therefore, it is plain that AD was entitled either Skeptika Hypomnëmata or Pyrröneia Hypomnëmata-, Sextus uses one or the other of these titles interchangeably simply because, though in his extant writ¬ ings he employs skeptikos much more often than Pyrröneios, he takes them as synonyms. If the hypothesis under consideration is correct, then we know that in the lost part of AD there was a discussion of (i) Pyrrho's interest in Homer's poetry, and (ii) various arguments against the existence of sound since whereas at AD II 131 we find one argument of this type, at AM VI 58 20 Cf. BLOMQVIST: Die Skeptika, 12. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 35 Sextus says that in the Pyrröneia he examined in detail "many other argu¬ ments". In the chapter of PH I in which he examines whether the Academic phi¬ losophy is the same as Skepticism, Sextus considers whether Plato may be deemed "purely Skeptical" and points out that "we deal with this more fully in our Commentaries (Hypomnëmata)whereas in PH he treats the question in an outline (PHI 222). Though some may think that it is impossible to iden¬ tify the work to which this title refers,21 it has been suggested that the work in question is the Skeptical Commentaries,22 As already indicated, Sextus refers to AD I as a whole with the word hypomnêma {AD I 446, II 1). The suggestion under consideration is perfectly compatible with the hypothesis about the part of AD which is no longer extant. For, just as AD I-V is in general terms an expanded version of PH II-III, so too the lost part of AD must have been an expanded version of what we find in PH I. Therefore, we can assume that, in the chapter of the lost part of AD in which he examined whether the Aca¬ demic philosophy is the same as Skepticism, Sextus expounded at more length the reasons why Plato cannot be considered a real Skeptic. In Sextus' surviving writings, we find references to other works by him which are no longer extant i.e., which cannot be identified with those we still possess. In Section 1,1 already mentioned the Medical Commentaries {AD I 202) and the Empirical Commentaries {AM I 62), which are perhaps identical. Sextus also speaks of his Commentaries on the Soul, in which he discussed the Pythagoreans' metaphysical theory of numbers {AD IV 284) and showed that soul is nothing (AM VI 55). Let us now turn to the structure and content of Sextus' surviving writings, beginning with PH. As its title indicates, this work offers an outline of the Pyrrhonian philosophy (see PHI 4), and Sextus reminds us of this fact when he treats a subject briefly (see PHI 206, 222, 239; II 1, 79, 185, 194; III 1, 114, 167, 279). The first book of PH presents what Sextus calls a "general account" of Pyrrhonism: among other things, it offers a definition of Skepticism, ex¬ plains the criterion and the aim of the Skeptical philosophy, expounds the modes that induce suspension of judgment and the modes against causal ex¬ planations, and explains the Skeptical expressions and the differences between Skepticism and its neighboring philosophies. This general account is invalu¬ able because it is the only remaining detailed exposition of the nature of Pyr¬ rhonism by one of its representatives. Books two and three of PH are devoted to the "specific account", i.e., they expound the attack against the three parts into which post-Aristotelian philosophy was commonly divided, namely logic, physics, and ethics. Book two deals with "logic", which comprises both 21 This is the view of PELLEGRIN: Sextus Empiricus, 183 n. 1. 22 See ANNAS / BARNES: Sextus Empiricus, 58 n. 241. 36 Diego Machuca what we call logic stricto sensu and what we call epistemology. Book three dis¬ cusses both "physics" (PHlll 1-167) i.e., metaphysics and philosophy of sci¬ ence and ethics (PH III 168-279). Book three ends with a most interesting chapter that explains why the Pyrrhonist makes use of different types of arguments: just as a doctor employs different kinds of drugs depending on how severe is the affliction of his patient, so too does the Pyrrhonist, wishing out of philanthropic motivation to cure the rashness and conceit of the Dog¬ matists, employ different kinds of arguments depending on the severity of their disease (/Will 280-281). The first two remaining books of AD (Against the Logicians) deal with logic; books three and four (Against the Physicists) address physics; book five (Against the Ethicists) discusses ethics. These five books cover, on the whole, the same subjects as the last two books of PH, but they are much lengthier than PH II-III, examine a number of important topics which are not included in these two latter books23 and, more importantly, the outlook of AD V seems to be incompatible with that of PHlll, on which more in Section 3. It is per¬ haps worth noting that the titles of the extant books of AD do not appear in the manuscripts, but have been introduced by modern editors.24 The choice of the titles, however, can be justified by (i) in the manuscripts AD I bears the heading "The first of Sextus' books against the logicians", and (ii) in several passages of AD we find references to the investigation, the argument, or the refutation against the logicians or the physicists (see AD I 25; II 300, 481; IV 1, 77, 310, 351; V 225).25 To this we may add that (i) at AM I 35, Sextus speaks of his refutations against the physicists, and (ii) at AM III 116, as we saw, he re¬ fers to a commentary against the physicists, both being references to AD III- IV. Finally, the six books of AM which is Sextus' least read and studied work deal with the "liberal arts" (a possible translation of the Greek mathëmata), namely grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, and music. The books are then entitled Against the Grammarians (Pros Grammatikous), Against the Rhetoricians (Pros Rhetoras), Against the Geometers (Pros Geömetras), Against the Arithmeticians (Pros Arithmëtikous), Against the Astrologers (Pros Astrologous), and Against the Musicians (Pros Mousikous)-, though in the manuscripts the second book actually bears the title On Rhetoric (Peri Rhëtorikës).2b That these titles were used by Sextus himself seems to be con¬ firmed by the fact that, in a number of passages of AM, he refers to the inves23 For instance, AD I 46-260 offers a most valuable survey of the Dogmatists' views for and against the criterion of truth which is not found in PH II. 24 See BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, 45; Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, xi n. 5. 2^ Cf. BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, xi n. 5. 26 See BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, 45. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 37 tigation, the refutation, the objections, or the commentary against the gram¬ marians, the rhetoricians, et cetera (see AM I 41, 160; II 48, 52, 72, 113; III 93, 116; IV 34; V 106; VI 28, 37, 56). As to the structure of the work, Sextus first offers a proem (AM I 1-8), and then divides the discussion between general ar¬ guments against the mathêmata (AM I 9-40) and particular arguments against each of them which are expounded in the rest of the work. The discussion of grammar (AM I 41-320) is almost as long as that of the other mathêmata in AM II-VI. It is important to note that the outlook adopted in AM has been deemed to differ from the official Pyrrhonian stance expounded in Sextus' other surviving writings. This is the view of Janâcek, who has considered the perspective of AM to be of such a nature as not to be Skeptical. This issue will be discussed more fully in Section 3. Regarding the order of composition of Sextus' extant works, it must first be noted that most specialists consider AM to be the latest of his surviving writings. Although it seems clear that AM is later than AD because in the for¬ mer we find back-references either to the extant or to the lost parts of AD (see AM I 26, 29, 33, 35, 282; II 106; III 116; VI 52, 58, 61), some scholars have ar¬ gued that these references could be later additions.27 There is, however, no evi¬ dence that supports this hypothesis. As for the chronological order of PH and AD, while some scholars have remained neutral,28 others have maintained that PH is earlier than AD. This view has been defended particularly in the philological works of Janâcek, who has proposed it on the basis of stylistic and terminological comparisons.29 In his opinion, such comparisons show that the style of AD is better than that of PH. This order of composition of PH and AD had already been adopted by Brochard,30 and Janâcek's arguments have been judged as sound by some pre¬ sent-day interpreters.31 Quite a few scholars, however, have suggested that AD actually predates PH. This view has been defended especially by Richard Bett, 27 See, e.g., Bett, Richard: La double 'schizophrénie' de M. I-VI et ses origines historiques. In: DELATTRE, Joëlle (ed.): Sur le Contre les professeurs de Sextus Empiricus. Lille: Presses de l'Université de Charles-de-Gaulle-Lille 3 2006, 17-34, at 34. 28 Allen: The Skepticism, 2583; BARNES, Jonathan: Scepticism and the Arts. In: HANKINSON, R. J. (ed.): Method, Metaphysics and Medicine. Studies in the Philosophy of Ancient Medicine. Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing 1988, 53-77, at 55; Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causa¬ tion. Observations on the Scepticism of Sextus Empiricus. In: HAASE, W. (ed.): Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 36.4. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 1990, 2608-2695, at 2618 n. 36; Diogenes Laertius, 4270 n. 150; Introduction, xiii-xiv; FlORIDI, Luciano: Sextus Em¬ piricus. The Transmission and Recovery ofPyrrhonism. New York: Oxford University Press 2002, 10, 108 nn. 34-35. 29 See esp. JANÀCEK: Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Methods. 30 See BROCHARD: Les sceptiques grecs, 332. 31 See, e.g., DUMONT, Jean-Paul: Le scepticisme et le phénomène. 2nd ed. Paris: Vrin 1985 (1972), 164 n. 26; ANNAS, Julia: The Morality of Happiness. New York/Oxford: Oxford Uni¬ versity Press 1993, 360 n. 24; SPINELLI: Sesto Empirico: Contro gli etici-, BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus, 102-103. 38 Diego Machuca who has affirmed that stylistic and terminological considerations are worthless for determining the chronological order of Sextus' surviving writings and has argued that AD is earlier than PH for three reasons. The first reason is that there are important similarities between the Skepti¬ cism of AD V and that adopted by Aenesidemus, as well as significant differ¬ ences between the latter and the Skepticism expounded in the ethical section of PH III. This indicates that the Pyrrhonism found in this section corre¬ sponds to a later phase in the Pyrrhonian tradition, since "it is reasonable to suppose that the order of Sextus' own works reflects the order of the versions of Pyrrhonism with which each conforms".32 The second reason is that close comparison between the parallel passages of PH III and AD V shows that the ethical section of the former is the revised and improved version of the latter-33 Recently, Bett has also argued that the ar¬ gumentation and layout of PH II are, in several respects, superior to those of AD I-II, which indicates that the former is a cleaned-up version of the latter.34 It must be noted that the examination of the parallel passages of PH and AD has also led other scholars to maintain that AD is earlier than PH. Concerning some of the parallels between PH II and AD I-II, David Glidden and Jacques Brunschwig have maintained that the discussions in the former are superior to those in the latter, and that Janâcek's stylistic considerations are consistent with PH being an improved version of AD.35 With regard to the parallel discussion of signs in PH II and AD II, Theodor Ebert has affirmed that the latter's version is inferior to the former's, from which he has concluded that the source of AD is earlier than that of PHfb Though Ebert talks about the chronology of the sources of Sextus' writings, it is reasonable to apply his conclusion to these writings themselves in fact, it is not clear why he restricts his conclusion to the chronology of the sources. Finally, Gisela Stri¬ ker and Pierre Pellegrin have contended that the reworked versions of PH in¬ tend to respond to objections raised by the arguments advanced in ADA7 The third reason that Bett offers to support his view is that, when there are parallel passages between DL IX, AD V, and PH III, the passages of AD V are 32 BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xxiv. 33 See BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xi, xxv-xxvi, 257-271, 274-276. 34 See BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, xxv-xxx. 35 See GLIDDEN, David: Skeptic Semiotics. In: Phronesis 28 (1983) 213-255, at 227, 246 n. 24, 253 n. 183; BRUNSCHWIG, Jacques: Le problème de l'héritage conceptuel dans le scepticisme: Sextus Empiricus et la notion de kritërion. In: BRUNSCHWIG: Etudes sur les philosophies hellénistiques. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France 1995, 289-319, at 296 n. 1. 36 See EBERT, Theodor: The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs in Sextus Empiricus. In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 5 (1987) 83-126, at 91-95, 97, 99-100, 118, 123. 37 See STRIKER, Gisela: Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquillity. In: STRIKER: Essays on Hellenistic Epistemology and Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996, 183-195, at 191; PEL¬ LEGRIN: Sextus Empiricus, 12. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 39 much closer to those of DL IX than the passages of PH III.38 The reason this fact indicates that AD is earlier than PH is that Diogenes does not use Sextus' writings to compose his account of Pyrrhonism, since there exist major differ¬ ences between both writers.39 Hence, in the parallel passages of their works, Diogenes and Sextus must be drawing on one or more common sources.40 Given that it is clear that AD V is closer to the source(s) than PH III, it is nec¬ essary to suppose that "Sextus composed M XI first, with the common source or sources in front of him, and then revised (and contracted) M XI, without further direct consultation of the common source or sources, so as to produce the ethical portion of P//HI".41 To Bett's reasons for affirming that PH is later than AD, we may add another: if the Commentaries to which Sextus refers at PH I 222 are the Skep¬ tical Commentaries, and this work is to be identified with AD, then we must conclude that AD predates PHP2 Though in his writings Sextus expounds and attacks the positions of a wide range of thinkers and philosophical schools from the Presocratics onwards, his main rivals are the Stoics. The Stoics in question are almost always those from the Early and Middle Stoa.43 This corresponds, in fact, to a general feature of Sextus' work: most of the philosophers and schools that he mentions and dis¬ cusses are not contemporary with him. The reason is not that he considered the views of his contemporaries to be of much less import than those of ear¬ lier thinkers, and hence not to be worth examining, but that he heavily relied and drew on earlier Pyrrhonian sources. We also know that he directly or in¬ directly drew on skeptical Academic sources (see, e.g., AM II 20, 43), which in part accounts for the central place the Stoics from the first centuries BC occupy in his writings. If this hypothesis is correct, then it could be taken as evidence that Sextus was little more than a copyist, who limited himself to reproducing what he found in his sources. In fact, scholars have, with some recent exceptions, regarded Sextus as a completely unoriginal thinker.44 But al38 See BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xxvii. 39 See esp. BARNES: Diogenes Laertius, 4249-4256, 4263-4272; also POLITO: The Sceptical Road, 23-24. 40 See BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xxvi-xxvii, 272-273; Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, xix. 43 BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xxvii-xxviii. Bett also thinks that PH is later than AM, but recognizes that in this case the evidence is less compelling (see BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xi, 225, 266-270; La double 'schizophrénie', 33-34). 42 Cf. DECLEVA CAIZZI: Sesto e gli scettici. In: Elenchos 13 (1992) 279-327, at 284 n. 11. 43 An exception is found at PH I 65, where Sextus refers to Stoics contemporary with him. On this passage, see esp. DECLEVA CAIZZI: L'elogio del cane, 318-320. 44 On the question of Sextus' originality and his reliance on earlier sources, see BROCHARD: Les sceptiques grecs, 335-340; BARNES: Scepticism and the Arts, 57 with n. 11; Introduction, xv-xvi, xix; SPINELLI, Emidio: Sextus Empiricus, the Neighbouring Philosophies and the Sceptical Tradition (again on Pyr. I 220-225). In: SlHVOLA, J. (ed.): Ancient Scepticism and the Sceptical Tradition. 40 Diego Machuca though Sextus never claims to be proposing a new kind of philosophy and although he draws to a very considerable extent on various sources, there are some facts that make it necessary to qualify that opinion. First, we have seen that close comparison between the parallel passages of AD and PH shows that there are substantial differences between the two works which are to be explained by the fact that Sextus revised and modified the material he took from his sources. Second, in several passages he introduces his own stance on the subject under consideration by using expressions such as "it seems to me". For example, in the chapter in which he examines the connection between the Empirical and Methodical sects and the Pyrrhonian philosophy, Sextus says that the Skeptic "might rather adopt, as it seems to me (ös emoi dokei), the socalled Method" (PH I 236). It is possible that the content of this chapter of PH is to be ascribed to Sextus himself, who as a doctor was well acquainted with the positions of the medical sects. Similarly, in the chapter of PH I which examines the relationship between the positions of the different Academies and Skepticism, Sextus clearly distinguishes his own view from others' when discussing Arcesilaus' outlook. He first points out that "Arcesilaus certainly seems to me {emoi dokei) to share the Pyrrhonean discourse, so that his way of thought and ours are almost one and the same" {PHI 232), and offers the rea¬ sons why this is so. He then refers, without placing trust in what he reports, to the Dogmatic views which, according to others, Arcesilaus espoused {PH I 233-234).45 2. Sextus' relationship with the medical schools The evidence presented in the previous section established that Sextus was a doctor. There is nothing surprising in this fact, not only because in antiquity there was a close relationship between philosophy and medicine, but also be¬ cause quite a few Pyrrhonists were doctors or at least had some kind of medi¬ cal knowledge.46 A case worth mentioning is that of Timon, who according to Diogenes taught medicine to his son (DL IX 109). If this information is accu¬ rate, then the intimate connection between Pyrrhonism and medicine dates back to an early phase in the history of Pyrrhonism, since Timon was the most important of Pyrrho's immediate pupils. In addition, in Sextus' exposi¬ tion of the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus, we find a number of medical examples Acta Philosophica Fennica 66). Societas Philosophica Fennica: Helsinki 2000, 25-61, at 35-36, 44-46, and n. 39; SVAVARSSON, Svavar Hrafn: Review ofANNAS / BARNES: Sextus Empiricus. In: Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2001.02.30; BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, xix-xx. 45 See MACHUCA, Diego: The Pyrrhonist's ataraxia and philanthröpia. In: Ancient Philo¬ sophy 26 (2006) 111-139, at 12S. Cf. IOPPOLO, Anna Maria: Sesto Empirico e I'Accademia scettica. In: Elenchos 13 (1992) 169-199, at 179-185. 46 For a complete list of all the possible Pyrrhonian physicians of whom we have some information, see BARNES: Pyrrhonism, Beliefand Causation, 2613 n. 20. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 41 (see PHI 44, 51-52, 71, 80, 93, 101-103, 126-127, 131, 133). These may be ad¬ ditions by Sextus, but it is also possible that they formed part of Aenesidemus' original formulation of the Ten Modes, in which case they could be taken as evidence of the latter's interest in medicine.47 This point is important because Aenesidemus is a key figure in the history of the Pyrrhonian movement, as he was responsible for the revival of Pyrrhonism in the early first century BC. In his list of Pyrrhonists, Diogenes refers to Sextus as Sextos ho empeirikos, i.e., "Sextus the Empiricist" (DL IX 116). The sobriquet "Empiricus" indicates that Sextus was a member of the Empirical school of medicine. Diogenes also says that Sextus' pupil was Saturninus, "himself an Empirical doctor too" (DL IX 116). In addition, in the Introductio seu medicus a work probably dating from the second century AD which the manuscripts erroneously ascribe to Galen we find a further reference to Sextus as an Empirical doctor. The pseudo-Galen talks about "Menodotus and Sextus, who strengthened [the Em¬ pirical school] in precision" (XIV 683 Kühn [K]). Medical Empiricism ex¬ tended from the third century BC to the second century AD and was, accord¬ ing to the division found particularly in Celsus (first century AD) and Galen (second century AD), one of the three main medical "sects" of the Hellenistic and Imperial ages, the other two being the Rationalist or Dogmatic and the Methodical.48 It is worth noting that, in some passages of his works, Sextus himself refers to these three schools (see PH I 236-241; AD II 156, 191, 204, 327-328). That Sextus was an Empiricist seems to be confirmed by the fact that he wrote the Empirical Commentaries. One might object that this does not prove by itself that Sextus belonged to the Empirical sect, since we cannot rule out the possibility that in that work he expounded the Empirical stance solely in order to attack it, just as in his extant writings he expounds and attacks the 47 See DECLEVA CAIZZI, Fernanda: Aenesidemus and the Academy. In: The Classical Quarterly 42 (1992) 176-189, at 178. 48 On medical Empiricism, see EDELSTEIN, Ludwig: Empiricism and Scepticism in the Teaching of the Greek Empiricist School. In: EDELSTEIN: Ancient Medicine. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 1967, 195-203; MUDRY, Philippe: La préface du De medicina de Celsus. Lausanne: Imprimerie des Arts et Métiers 1982; Le scepticisme des médecins empiriques dans le traité De la médecine de Celse: modèles et modalités. In: VOELKE, A.-J. (ed.): Le scepticisme antique. Perspectives historiques et systématiques Cahiers de la Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie 15). Genève/Lausanne/Neuchâtel 1990, 85-96; FREDE, Michael: The Ancient Empiricists. In: FREDE: Essays in Ancient Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press 1987, 234-260; The Empiricist Attitude towards Reason and Theory. In: HANKINSON: Method, Metaphysics and Medicine, 79-97; An Empiricist View of Knowledge: Memorism. In: EVERSON, S. (ed.): Companions to Ancient Thought I. Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990, 225-250; HANKINSON, R. J.: Causes and Empiricism: A Problem in the Interpretation of Later Greek Medical Method. In: Phronesis 32 (1987) 329-348; MATTHEN, Mohan: Empiricism and Ontology in Ancient Medicine. In: HANKINSON: Method, Metaphysics and Medicine, 98-121; STOK, Fabio: La scuola medica Empirica a Roma. Problemi storici e prospettive di ricerca. In: HAASE, W. (ed.): Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II 37.1. Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter 1993, 600-645. 42 Diego Machuca views held by the Dogmatists in the different areas of philosophy. However, if the Empeirika Hypomnëmata had been a work against the Empiricists, its title probably would have been Pros Empeirikous {Against the Empiricists), for in the previous section we saw that Sextus uses the construction pros + accusa¬ tive to refer to his books against the Dogmatists. In addition, the title Em¬ peirika Hypomnëmata bears an evident resemblance to Skeptika Hypomnëmata. Given that the aim of this latter work is not to attack the Skeptical philoso¬ phy, but to offer an account of it from the point of view of one of its repre¬ sentatives, one may suppose that in the Empeirika Hypomnëmata Sextus held a positive view of Empiricism. Even if the two arguments just advanced were deemed inconclusive, we should recognize that the fact that Sextus wrote a work on Empirical medicine is significant when considered in conjunction with the external evidence that he was an Empiricist. Empiricists and Pyrrhonists were closely related in antiquity, since besides Sextus and Saturninus, we know of other Pyrrhonists who were Empiricists or were deemed to be associated with Empiricism. First, the physician men¬ tioned along with Sextus in the passage of the Introductio seu medicus quoted above is Menodotus of Nicomedia, who flourished in the first part of the sec¬ ond century AD. He figures in Diogenes' listing of Pyrrhonian philosophers as the teacher of Herodotus, Sextus' teacher; he is the first in that listing to be labeled an Empirical doctor (DL IX 116). In this respect, it is worth noting that in the Subfiguratio empirica {SE), which is one of our main sources of information about the epistemology of the Empirical medical school, Galen constantly refers to Menodotus' views (see SE 46, 49, 65, 67, 69, 82, 84, 87 Deichgräber [D]). This has led some scholars to think that Galen probably drew on a work by Menodotus to compose SE.49 Second, another Empirical doctor to whom Galen refers in this work is "the Pyrrhonist Cassius" {SE 49 D), who is probably the same as "Cassius the Skeptic" mentioned by Diogenes (DL VII 32, also 34). In the Preface to his De medicina which is our earliest source for medical Empiricism Celsus speaks of Cassius as "the most tal¬ ented doctor of our age" {Praefatio 69). Third, Galen points out that the Em¬ piricists considered Timon as one of their forerunners {SE 43 D), which is a recognition that their outlook was in part influenced by Pyrrhonism. Finally, Galen also tells us that Menodotus praised Pyrrho {SE 84 D), and compares the Empiricist's attitude with Pyrrho's {SE 82-83, 84-85 D). From a philosophical point of view, medical Empiricism and Pyrrhonism have several features in common. First, in the De sectis ingredientihus {SI), Galen observes that the Empiricists maintain that the disagreement {diaphö49 E.g., BROCHARD: Les sceptiques grecs, 326, 383; MUDRY: Le scepticisme des médecins empi¬ riques, 87. Contra PERILLI, Lorenzo: Menodoto di Nicomedia e i principi délia medicina empirica. In: BRANCACCI, A. (ed.): Antichi e moderni nella filosofia di etd imperiale. Napoli: Bibliopolis 2001, 267-297, at 279-285. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 43 nia) among the Dogmatists about non-evident things (ta adëla) is unresolvable (anepikritos), and that this kind of disagreement is the sign of inapprehensibility (akatalëpsia) (SI 11-12 Helmreich [H]). Similarly, Celsus points out that the Empiricists affirm that nature is inapprehensible (non comprehensibilis) because of the disagreement (discordia) that exists among philosophers and doctors about non-evident causes and natural functions, there being no reason to prefer one view to the others (,Praef 27-28). The ideas and terminology found in these passages of Galen and Celsus constantly appear in Sextus' ac¬ count of Pyrrhonism (see, e.g., PH I 98, 165, II 32-33, 56, 222, 259, III 6, 56; AD I 380; AM I 171, 320). Second, in SE Galen remarks that the Empiricist adopts with regard to medicine the same attitude the Skeptic adopts with re¬ gard to the whole of life: he is in a state of uncertainty as regards non-evident things and follows what is evident as a criterion of action (SE 82 D, cf. PH I 21-24). Third, Galen also tells us that the Empiricists doubt whether there are causes or not (De causis procatarcticis XIII 162), which is in perfect agreement with the Pyrrhonian attitude (see, e.g., PH III 17-29). In this regard, it has been suggested that some of Sextus' arguments against causation were taken from the Empiricists.50 Fourth, both the Empiricists (see Galen, SI 10 H; De causis continentibus 23 K; pseudo-Galen, De optima secta I 149 K, Definitiones medicae XIX 396 K) and the Pyrrhonists (see PH II 97-133, AD II 141-299) reject the indicative sign and accept the recollective or commemorative sign.51 Fifth, at the beginning of SE Galen says that, just like the Skeptics, the Em¬ piricists do not want to be called after a man, but prefer to be known by their frame of mind (SE 42 D). Although Sextus observes that "Pyrrhonian" is one of the appellations of the Skeptical stance (PH I 7) and Diogenes Laertius points out that the Skeptics were called Pyrrhonian (DL IX 69), the latter re¬ ports that Theodosius, in his Skeptical Summaries, argued that the Skeptical philosophy should not be called Pyrrhonian. One of the reasons is that, since it is impossible to know another person's state of mind, we cannot know Pyrrho's mental disposition (DL IX 70). Finally, Celsus tells us that, to indicate that they cannot prefer one Dogmatic theory to another, the Empiricists use the expression cur potius...quam\ "Why, indeed, would someone believe in Hippocrates rather than in Herophilus? Why in this latter rather than in Asclepiades?" (Celsus, Praef. 28). As Philippe Mudry has pointed out, the Latin cur potius...quam reminds us of the Greek dia ti mallon tode ë tode ("why this rather than that?").52 This expression is, according to Sextus, a variant of the phrase ou mallon, by which the Pyrrhonist expresses that the conflicting opin¬ ions, arguments, or theories which he is examining appear to him to be of 50 BARNES: Pyrrhonism, Beliefand Causation, 2614. 51 On the influence of Empiricism on Sextus' treatment of sign-inference, see Section 3. 52 MUDRY: La Préface, 118; Le scepticisme des médecins empiriques, 89. 44 Diego Machuca equal force (isostheneia), so that he cannot assent to any of them (see PHI 188- 191, 213, also AM I 315).53 According to Michael Frede, medical Empiricism not only influenced Sextan Skepticism, but also contributed to the revival of the Pyrrhonian philosophy in the first century BC,54 which means that Aenesideman Skepticism, too, was influenced by Empirical epistemology. What seems clear is that, in the complex relationship between Empiricism and Pyr¬ rhonism, the influence was mutual. There exists, however, a serious difficulty concerning the association of Pyrrhonism with Empiricism. When examining, in the last chapter of PH I, the question whether medical Empiricism is the same as Skepticism, Sextus points out that, despite what some claim, "it must be recognized that, if in¬ deed (eiper) that [form of] Empiricism makes assertions about the inapprehensibility of non-evident things {tön adëlôn), then it is not the same as Skepti¬ cism, nor would it be appropriate for the Skeptic to attach himself to that school" (PHI 236). Even though Sextus uses a conditional sentence here, the rest of the passage confirms that he attributes to the Empiricists the assertion that non-evident things are inapprehensible. For he adds that the Skeptic could rather adopt the stance of medical Methodism, a school which arose in the first century AD.55 The reason is that "it alone of the medical schools seems not to speak with rashness about non-evident things, presuming to say whether they are apprehensible or inapprehensible, but, following the things which appear {ta pbainomena), it gets from them what seems to be beneficial, in accord with the practice of the Skeptics" {PHI 237, emphasis added). This is because everything the Methodists say about their therapeutic practice falls within the concept of "compulsion of the affections" {anagkë patbön), which is one of the four aspects of ordinary life, in which the Skeptic participates {PH I 237-239). Sextus also tells us that, like the Skeptic, the Methodist makes a non-Dogmatic use of words, as is seen in the case of the terms "common fea¬ tures", "pervade", and "indication" {PH I 239-240). Finally, after referring to the similarities between Pyrrhonism and Methodism, Sextus concludes that, "judging from these and similar points, it must be said that the way of thought {agôgë) of the medical Methodists has some affinity with Skepticism more than the other medical schools and in comparison with them, not absolutely" {PH I 241). Thus, in the last chapter of PH I, Sextus explicitly distinguishes 53 For other points of contact between Empiricism and Pyrrhonism, see MUDRY: La Préface, 83, 120-121, 190; Le scepticisme des médecins empiriques, 90-92. 34 FREDE: The Ancient Empiricists, 245. 55 On Methodism, see FREDE: The Method of the So-called Methodical School ofMedicine. In: BARNES, J. / BRUNSCHWIG, J. / BURNYEAT, M. / SCHOFIELD, M. (eds.): Science and Speculation. Studies in Hellenistic Theory and Practice. Cambridge/Paris: Cambridge University Press/Editions de la Maison des Sciences de l'Homme 1982, 1-23; PlGEAUD, Jackie: Les fondements du métho¬ disme. In: MUDRY, P. / PlGEAUD, J. (eds.): Les Écoles médicales a Rome. Genève: Droz 1991, 7-50. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 45 Skepticism from Empiricism, and although he associates the former with the stance of the Methodical school, he does not affirm a complete identification between Skepticism and Methodism. It is therefore no surprise that Sextus does not claim here to be a member of either medical school. It is significant, however, that he does not mention any point of divergence between Skepti¬ cism and Methodism. In this regard, it is also important to note that none of the chapters of the section of PH I in which Sextus explains the differences between Skepticism and each of its neighboring philosophies (PHI 210-241) is devoted to medical Methodism. That the Empiricists adopted the kind of negative Dogmatism that Sextus ascribes to them in PH is confirmed by our chief sources for medical Empiri¬ cism. First, Celsus declares, as we saw, that the Empiricists maintain that nature is inapprehensible (Praef. 27). Second, Galen points out that the Em¬ piricists affirm that the unresolvable disagreement among the Dogmatists about non-evident things is the sign of inapprehensibility (SI 11-12 H). Fi¬ nally, Galen tells us that Empiricists and Methodists differ on a key point: the former affirm that non-evident things are unknowable (agnöstd), whereas the latter say that they are useless (achrësta) (SI 14 H, cf. SI 16). It is important to remark that the point on which Sextus bases his rejection of the claim that Empiricism and Pyrrhonism are identical is one of the points on which he bases his distinction between the neo-Academic and the Skeptical philosophies. When examining the relationship between Skepticism and the so-called New Academy, which is that of Carneades and Clitomachus (PH I 220), Sextus observes that one of the differences between them is that the neoAcademics affirm that everything is inapprehensible, whereas the Skeptic thinks that it is possible that some things may be apprehended (PH I 226). Similarly, in the first chapter of PH, Sextus tells us that the followers of Carneades and Clitomachus, and other Academics, asserted that the things in¬ vestigated in philosophy are inapprehensible (PH I 3).56 The similarity be¬ tween the Empirical and the neo-Academic positions as they are portrayed by Sextus is clear. It is worth mentioning two other points of contact between the Empirical sect and the New Academy. First, the Empiricists make use of the notion of "the plausible" (to pithanon) (see S/9-10 H; cf. Celsus, Praef. 29, 56 Note that Sextus' claim that the neo-Academics denied the apprehensibility of things has been deemed to be historically inaccurate by scholars. See, e.g., STRIKER, Gisela: On the Differences between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics. In: STRIKER: Essays, 135-149, at 136; Scepticism as a Kind of Philosophy. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 83 (2001) 113-129, at 124; BONAZZI, Mauro: I Pirroniani, l'Academia e l'interpretazione scettica di Piatone. In: BONAZZI, M. / TrabaTTONI, F. (eds.): Piatone e la tradizione platonica. Studi di filosofia antica. Milano: Cisalpino 2003, 181-219, at n. 81; BRUNSCHWIG, Jacques: The Beginnings of Hellenistic Epistemology. In: ALGRA, K. / BARNES, J. / Mansfeld, J. / Schofield, M. (eds.): The Cambridge History ofHellenistic Philosophy. Paperback edition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005, 229-259, at 233. Cf. Hankinson, R. J.: The Sceptics. 2nd ed. London/New York: Routledge 1998 (1995), 114-115. 46 Diego Machuca 41), which is taken as a criterion by the neo-Academics (see Cicero, Academica II 33, 59, 99-105; PH I 227-229, AD I 166-189, 401, 435-438). Second, the Empiricists affirm that, in the speculations about non-evident matters, it is possible to argue on either side (Celsus, Praef. 39: in utramque partem disseri posse), which immediately reminds us of the Academic disputatio in utramque partem (see Acad. II 7, 105, 108, 124, 133; I 46). Such similarities between Em¬ piricism and Academic skepticism have led some scholars to maintain that the skeptical Academy exerted a strong influence on medical Empiricism.57 It has also been suggested that the existence of this intimate connection between both positions is the reason Sextus could not accept the identification of Pyr¬ rhonism with Empiricism, and that his interest in distinguishing the former from Academic skepticism was stronger than his own relationship with the Empirical school.58 However, if Sextus was an Empirical doctor and was particularly interested in distinguishing Pyrrhonism from Academic skepti¬ cism, why did he not try minimizing the influence of the latter on medical Empiricism instead of affirming that it is not appropriate for the Pyrrhonist to attach himself to the Empirical school? Be that as it may, the existence of a close relationship between Empiricism and Academic skepticism would be a serious obstacle for the claim that Empiricism and Pyrrhonism were closely associated, except that Academic skepticism, in its radical form, has several key features in common with Pyrrhonism and exerted an important influence on it.59 There are three other passages of Sextus' work which mention the Empiri¬ cists. In the first, he argues that the sign is not among perceptible things because these are unteachable, whereas the sign is taught. He gives as examples the signs used in navigation and astrology and those used by "the Empirical doctors (tois empeirikös iatreuousin), such as flushing and swelling of the ves¬ sels and thirst and other things, which the person who has not been taught does not grasp as signs" (AD II 204). Unfortunately, this passage does not tell us anything about Sextus' view of medical Empiricism. The second passage is AD II 327-328, where Sextus points out that, con¬ cerning proof, "the Dogmatic philosophers and the Rationalist doctors posit it, the Empiricists do away with it, and perhaps also Democritus and the 57 See EDELSTEIN: Empiricism and Scepticism, 198 with n. 11, 201 with n. 19; and esp. MUDRY: La Préface, 78, 116, 118, 132, 142, 163; Le scepticisme des médecins empiriques, 92-96. 58 lOPPOLO, Anna Maria: Accademici e pirroniani nel II secolo D.C. In: ALBERTI, A. (ed.): Realtà e ragione. Studi di filosofia antica. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore 1994, 85-103, at 94. 59 See DECLEVA CAIZZI, Fernanda: Pirroniani ed Accademici nel III secolo a.C. In: FLASHAR, H. / GlGON, O. (eds.): Aspects de la philosophie hellénistique. Vandoeuvres/Genève: Fondation Hardt 1986, 147-183, at 148, 177-178; Sesto e gli scettici, 292; STRIKER: On the Differences-, Skepticism as a Kind of Philosophy, 124, 127-128; MACHUCA, Diego: Review of BRITTAIN, Charles: Cicero: On Academic Scepticism (Indianapolis: Hackett 2006). In: Bryn Mawr Classical Review 2006.11.07. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 47 Skeptics have kept it in suspension of judgment, making use of the 'no more' expression". Insofar as the Empiricists deny the existence of proof, they dis¬ tance themselves from the Skeptics, who suspend judgment. This passage is in agreement with PH I 236, because both portray the Empiricists as negative Dogmatists and make it clear that Skepticism is not the same as medical Em¬ piricism. Hence, AD II 327-328, too, runs counter to the claim that Sextus was an Empiricist. The third passage that mentions the Empiricists has puzzled the interpret¬ ers. In his discussion of the indicative sign, Sextus points out that "some, such as the Empirical doctors and the Skeptical philosophers, say that [non-evident things] are not apprehended (më katalambanesthaï)" (AD II 191). Before exam¬ ining this text, it is worth noting that Galen states that the Empiricists accept neither the existence of indication nor that of the signs of things which are non-evident by nature (SI 10 H). Even though he does not explicitly say that the Empiricists deny their existence, the passage seems to indicate that this was the position they adopted. Sextus' and Galen's passages are clearly related: if (i) indication is the logical inference from the evident to the non-evident (see SI 7, 10 H) and the indicative sign is that by means of which one can ap¬ prehend things that are non-evident by nature (see PH II 99; AD II 151, 154155), and (ii) the Empiricists consider indication and indicative signs to be non-existent, then (iii) they must affirm that non-evident things are not (and cannot be) apprehended. One may think that, at AD II 191, Sextus is implic¬ itly ascribing to the Skeptics the same reasoning and, hence, the same assertion he condemns in PH. In fact, this is what some scholars have thought, since they have considered AD II 191 to be at odds with PHI 236 or to express ap¬ proval of the Empiricists.60 There is, however, no real conflict between AD II 191 and PHI 236. But before explaining why, I would like to point out that, if we accept that at AD II 191 Sextus is espousing the Empirical view he rejects in PH, we will have an ambiguous attitude towards medical Empiricism, but this time in the very same work. For, as we saw, at AD II 327-328 Sextus clearly distances himself from the negative Dogmatism adopted by the Em¬ piricists as regards the existence of proof, whereas at AD II 191 he allegedly espouses the Empiricist's negative Dogmatism as regards the apprehensibility of non-evident things. Hence, even if we grant that Sextus changes his mind at AD II 191, we cannot affirm that AD in its entirety adopts a view of Empiri¬ cism different from that of PH. The reason AD II 191 does not run counter to PHI 236 is that, in the for¬ mer passage, Sextus merely remarks that the Skeptic and the Empiricist say that non-evident things are not apprehended, not that they are inapprehen60 See ROBIN: Pyrrhon, 197; Barnes: Pyrrhonism, Beliefand Causation, 2620 n. 43; FLOR1DI: Sextus Empiricus, 7. 48 Diego Machuca sible. Only to the extent that both make note of that fact do they have some¬ thing in common; they differ as to their explanations of it: the Empiricist says that non-evident things are not apprehended because he believes that they are inapprehensible owing to the non-existence of the indicative sign, whereas the Skeptic says that they are not apprehended because, as a matter of fact, he has been unable to apprehend them owing to the apparently equal force or equipollence (isostheneia) of the arguments pro and con the existence of the indica¬ tive sign. Indeed, Sextus tells us that, when he advances arguments against this kind of sign, his intention is not to prove its nonexistence, but rather to show that the arguments against the reality of the sign appear to be equal in force to those which purport to prove its existence (see PH II 103, AD II 159-161; cf. PH II 133, AD II 298).61 One might object that the Skeptic, too, says that things are inapprehensible (see, e.g., PHII 71, III 45, 50; AD II 170). However, this difficulty is only apparent, since at PH I 200 Sextus explains that, when the Skeptic says "All things are inapprehensible", he is not making an asser¬ tion about how things really are, but is merely reporting that the things he has so far investigated appear to him inapprehensible owing to the equipollence of the opposites. There is still a difficulty with regard to the Pyrrhonist's attitude to Em¬ piricism both in PH and in AD. For we saw that, in both works, Sextus rejects the indicative sign and accepts the recollective sign, and that in this he is in agreement with the Empiricist. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibil¬ ity that, in the passages in which Sextus defends the recollective sign, he is not arguing in propria persona, but only dialectically. But even if it is the case that he accepts the recollective sign, this in no way entails the nonexistence of key differences between Pyrrhonism and medical Empiricism, which are those that Sextus himself identifies both in PH and in AD. As for AM, it seems that in this work Sextus adopts a more sympathetic view of medical Empiricism. First, at the beginning of his discussion of astrol¬ ogy, Sextus explains that his assault will not be directed against astronomy, but only against astrology. The reason is that the former, "like agriculture and navigation, is an observation (tërësis) based upon the phenomena, from which it is possible to predict droughts and floods, plagues and earthquakes" (AM V 2; cf. AD II 270). Sextus seems here to recognize implicitly an affinity between Pyrrhonism and medical Empiricism, since the notion of tërësis was funda¬ mental to the latter. This impression is reinforced by the fact that agriculture and navigation as examples of skills based solely on observation or experience are found in Celsus' exposition of the Empirical doctors' stance (see Praef. 3132). However, one cannot exclude the possibility that, in line with the cha61 A similar interpretation of AD II 191 is defended by HOUSE: The Life ofSextus Empiricus, 237. See also BROCHARD: Les sceptiques grecs, 331. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 49 meleonic style of argumentation characteristic of Pyrrhonism, Sextus accepts the predicting power of astronomy, agriculture, and navigation solely in order to set a contrast with astrology that makes it possible to undermine it. Second, in the fifth book of AM Sextus also points out that just as in medicine we have observed (etêrësamen) that a puncture of the heart is a cause of death, having observed along with it not only the death of Dion, but also of Theon and Socrates and many others, so too in mathematics [i.e., astrol¬ ogy, as AM V 1 makes clear], if it is credible that a particular configuration of the stars is indicative of a certain type of life, then certainly it has been observed not once on one single occasion, but many times on many occasions. (AM V 104) This passage offers a good description of the Empirical stance, and the case chosen a puncture of the heart as a cause of death is mentioned by Galen when explaining the position of medical Empiricism (SE 58 H).62 It seems that, in the passage quoted, Sextus is describing his own medical experience, in which case he is recognizing a connection between his outlook and that of the Empiricists'. Once again, however, we cannot completely discount the possi¬ bility that he is using the medical example in question only to argue against astrology. Now, if one thinks that in the two passages quoted Sextus is not merely arguing dialectically and accepts the common view that AM is the last of his surviving writings, then one may suppose that, by the time he wrote AM, he had already modified his view of Empiricism. In fact, Jean-Paul Dumont has maintained that in AM Sextus "perçoit déjà la première possibilité d'une in¬ duction empirique qui l'éloigné de plus en plus de l'école méthodiste".63 In general, scholars have adopted the view that in AM Sextus adopts an outlook which amounts to that of medical Empiricism, as is seen especially in his use of the notions of tërësis and paratërësis.64 It must be emphasized that, even if it is the case that in AM Sextus accepts the Empirical notion of observation as a secure foundation on which to base certain technai, this does not in any way imply his acceptance of the view that non-evident things are inapprehensible or of the view that there is no proof. Hence, crucial differences between Pyr¬ rhonism and Empiricism still remain. I would like to note that, to solve the conundrum about Sextus' relation¬ ship with Empiricism, several scholars have suggested that, at PH I 236, he does not reject Empiricism tout court, but only a particular form of Empiri62 The same example is also found in Sextus' account of the recollective sign (see AD II 153, 158). 63 DUMONT: Le scepticisme et le phénomène, 164 n. 26. See also DESBORDES, Françoise: Le scepticisme et les 'arts libéraux': une étude de Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos I-VI. In: VOELKE: Le scepticisme antique, 167-179, at 170. 63 See BARNES: Scepticism and the Arts, 69-70; SPINELLI: Sesto Empirico: Contro gli astrologi, 49-51; Non scire per causas... In: SPINELLI: Questioni scettiche. Letture introduttive al pirronismo antico. Roma: Lithos 2005, 81-113, at 101-102. 50 Diego Machuca cism.65 This view has been defended particularly by Michael Frede, who has claimed that Sextus only criticizes the early Empiricists' Dogmatic stance and that medical Empiricism was radically transformed under the influence of Pyrrhonists such as Menodotus, Theodas and Sextus.66 A few remarks about Frede's interpretation are in order. First, at PHI 236 Sextus does not mention any difference within the Empirical sect with respect to the view that nonevident things are inapprehensible, but ascribes this view to the sect as a whole. Likewise, at AD II 327-328 he does not say that only some Empiricists deny the existence of proof. Third, Sextus was certainly better acquainted with the position of later Empiricists than with that of the early Empiricists, so that it is reasonable to assume that his criticisms were directed particularly against the former. Fourth, if Sextus was one of the Pyrrhonists who saw the need to revise the Empirical stance and did so, it is not clear why he does not tell us, at PH I 236-241, that there is a form of Empiricism compatible with Pyrrhonism. At PH I 237, he explicitly says that the Methodical school seems to be the only medical sect that refrains from saying whether non-evident things are apprehensible or inapprehensible. Fifth, even though Celsus pre¬ dates the Empiricism of the second century, still it is significant that he at¬ tributes to the Empiricists, without differentiating between them, the affirma¬ tion that things are inapprehensible. Finally, Galen, who is well acquainted with the Empiricism of the second century, ascribes to all Empiricists, not only to some of them, the view that non-evident things are unknowable or in¬ apprehensible. In the previous section, we saw that the evidence found in Sextus' works makes it clear that he was a physician, which is in agreement with the external evidence. As regards his affiliation to one of the medical sects, in this section we have shown, first, that although some sources affirm that he was an Em¬ pirical doctor and although some passages of his works may be interpreted as expressing a sympathetic view of Empiricism, Sextus emphasizes essential dif¬ ferences between the Empiricist and the Pyrrhonist, and says that it would not be appropriate for the latter to attach himself to the Empirical sect. Sec¬ ond, even though he recognizes strong affinities between Methodism and Pyrrhonism, he does not equate the two and does not claim to belong to the Methodical school. 65 See EDELSTEIN: Empiricism and Scepticism, nn. 8, 24; FREDE: The Ancient Empiricists, 252; HANKINSON: Causes and Empiricism, 347; ALLEN: The Skepticism, 2587; Rationalism, Empiricism, and Scepticism: Sextus Empiricus' Treatment of Sign-inference. In: ALLEN: Inference from Signs. Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001, 87-146, at 90-91; BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, ix; Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, ix; BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus, 93-94. 66 See FREDE: The Ancient Empiricists, 251-252, also 248-249, 256-257; The Empiricist Attitude, 95-96; An Empiricist View, 250. Cf. BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus, 93-94, who surprisingly does not mention Frede's papers. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 51 3. Varieties of Skepticism in Sextus' oeuvre In Sextus' works, it is possible to detect different approaches and positions which seem to correspond to differing varieties of Skepticism and to reflect his use of various sources to compose his writings. These sources are only sometimes identifiable due to a general trait of his works: they rarely mention the names of other Pyrrhonists and only incidentally provide us with scant in¬ formation about the history of Pyrrhonism.67 In this section, the most signifi¬ cant differences and tensions detectable in Sextus' oeuvre will be examined. Let us begin with the different sets of modes by means of which the Skep¬ tic seeks to induce suspension of judgment (epochë). In book one of PH, Sextus expounds the Ten Modes (PHI 36-163) and the Five Modes (PHI 164-177). These two sets of modes differ in nature: whereas each of the Ten Modes ap¬ plies to a particular conflict of perceptual appearances or opinions, the Five Modes are thematically neutral and of universal application, since they can be employed in relation to any assertion or doctrine.68 In this case, it is possible to identify Sextus' sources. First, as we saw, at PH I 36 he ascribes the Ten Modes to "the older Skeptics", and at AD I 345 he speaks of "the Ten Modes of Aenesidemus" (tous para tö Ainësidëmô deka tropous). As already noted, we also know from Diogenes that Aenesidemus made use of the Ten Modes (DL IX 87).69 Second, Sextus ascribes the Five Modes to "the more recent Skeptics" (PH I 164), whereas Diogenes attributes them to Agrippa (DL IX 88), of whom we know nothing, except that he probably lived in the first century BC. It must be noted that Sextus also expounds the Two Modes of suspension of judgment (PH I 178-179), but they actually work by the application of three of the Five Modes and most likely derive from Agrippa.70 Now, both the fact that the Aenesideman and the Agrippan modes differ in character and the fact that they were proposed by Skeptics belonging to different phases of the Pyrrhonian tradition indicate that they correspond to differing types of 67 Cf. DECLEVA CAIZZI: Sesto e gli scettici, 279-280; Pirrone, pirroniani, pirronismo. In: BURKERT, W. / GEMELLI MarCIANO, L. / MaTELLI, E. / GRELL!, L. (eds.): Fragmentsamm¬ lungen philosophischer Texte der Antike Le raccolte dei frammenti di filosofi antichi. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1998, 336-353, at 336. 68 On the Ten Modes, see esp. ANNAS / BARNES: The Modes of Scepticism; also STRIKER, Gisela: The Ten Modes of Aenesidemus. In: STRIKER: Essays, 116-134; GAUKROGER, Stephen: The Ten Modes ofAenesidemus and the Myth ofAncient Scepticism. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 3 (1995) 371-387; HANKINSON: The Sceptics, chapter IX; SPINELLI, Emidio: I died tropi scettici. In: SPINELLI: Letture introdutive, 27-60. On the Five Modes, see esp. BARNES, Jonathan: The Toils of Scepticism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1990; also HANKINSON: The Sceptics, chapter X. 69 Scholars have usually thought that Aenesidemus was not strictly the author of the Ten Modes, but their compiler. 70 See BARNES: The Toils ofScepticism, 116-119. 52 Diego Machuca Skepticism.71 It is important to remark, however, that although the Ten Modes and the Five Modes differ in their scope and force, they are not incom¬ patible and their joint presence in Sextus' work does not threaten the coher¬ ence of his Pyrrhonism. A second case to be mentioned concerns the vexed question of the scope of the Pyrrhonian epochë, namely, is it directed solely towards philosophico-scientific beliefs or does it extend over all beliefs, including those of ordinary people? This difference of scope corresponds to the distinction between an "urbane" Pyrrhonism, which is a moderate or mitigated form of skepticism that does not call into question everyday beliefs, and a "rustic" Pyrrhonism, which is a radical or extreme form of skepticism that undermines all beliefs alike, no matter whether they are theoretical or ordinary. The term "urbane" was coined by Jonathan Barnes, while the term "rustic" was taken by him from Galen, who speaks of the agroikopyrröneioi, i.e., "rustic Pyrrhonists" {De differentia pulsuum VIII 711 K, De praenotione ad Posthumum XIV 628).72 In drawing this distinction, Barnes was referring to a debate between Myles Burnyeat and Michael Frede in which the former affirmed that Sextus' Pyr¬ rhonism is rustic and the latter that it is urbane.73 Restricting his analysis to PH, Barnes has clearly shown that both kinds of Pyrrhonism can be found in that work and has proposed two possible explanations of this fact. The first accounts for the coexistence of both types of Pyrrhonism in the light of Sex¬ tus' description of the Skeptic's philanthropic therapy at PHlll 280-281: de¬ pending on the seriousness of a person's disease of Dogmatism, the Skeptic will make use of different kinds of arguments which vary in their power and scope.74 The second possible explanation is that, to compose his writings, Sex¬ tus drew on various sources which presented different forms of Pyrrhonism.75 71 This fact is not surprising, since we know that ancient Pyrrhonism was not a uniform philosophical stance, but had a history and therefore underwent significant changes. On this, see BROCHARD: Les sceptiques grecs; BARNES: Pyrrhonism, Belief and Causation, 2617; Diogenes Laertius, 4247 n. 30; BETT, Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xix-xxiii; Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, xiv-xv, xix-xxiv; and esp. his Pyrrho, his Antecedents, and his Legacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press Bett 2000. 72 See BARNES: Pyrrhonism, Beliefand Causation, 2618. 73 See BURNYEAT, Myles: Can the Sceptic Live his Scepticism? In: BURNYEAT, M. / FREDE, M. (eds.): The Original Sceptics. A Controversy. Indianapolis: Hackett 1997, 25-57; The Sceptic in his Place and Time. In: BURNYEAT / FREDE: The Original Sceptics, 92-126; FREDE, Michael: The Sceptic's Beliefs. In: BURNYEAT / FREDE: The Original Sceptics, 1-24; The Sceptic's Two Kinds of Assent and the Possibility ofKnowledge. In: BURNYEAT / FREDE: The Original Sceptics, 127-151. See also GLIDDEN: Skeptic Semiotics; STOUGH, Charlotte: Sextus Empiricus on Non-Assertion. In: Phronesis 29 (1984) 137-164; HANKINSON, R. J.: Values, Objectivity and Dialectic; The Sceptical Attack on Ethics: its Methods, Aims, and Success. In: Phronesis 39 (1994) 45-68, at 53, 67-68; FINE, Gail: Sceptical Dogmata: Outlines of Pyrrhonism I 13. In: Méthexis 13 (2000) 81-105; BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus, chapters 7-9, 11. 74 See BARNES: Pyrrhonism, Beliefand Causation, 2691-2692. 75 See BARNES: Pyrrhonism, Beliefand Causation, 2690; Introduction, xxiii-xxiv. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 53 Another tension has to do with Sextus' discussion of sign-inference (PH II 97-133, AD II 141-299), in which he distinguishes between the commemora¬ tive or recollective sign (hypomnëstikon sëmeion) and the indicative sign (endeiktikon sëmeion) .76 The recollective sign is defined as "that which, having been evidently co-observed with the signified, at the same time as it manifests itself, while the other thing remains non-evident, leads us to a recollection of the thing which was co-observed with it but is now not manifesting itself evi¬ dently" (PH II 100, cf. AD II 152). For its part, the indicative sign is that which "signifies that of which it is a sign not by having been evidently co-ob¬ served with the signified, but from its own nature and constitution" (PH II 101, cf. AD II 154). The problem arises because, although Sextus points out that the Pyrrhonist rejects the indicative sign and accepts the recollective sign, as a matter of fact (i) some of the arguments he advances against signification seem to undermine confidence not only in the indicative sign but also in the recollective sign, and (ii) the endorsement of the recollective sign presupposes that there are evident things which are apprehended directly, but this is some¬ thing about which the Pyrrhonist suspends judgment (see PH II 95; AD I 2526, II 141-142). This tension is related to the previous one, since it may be ex¬ plained by the rustic and urbane tendencies that coexist in Sextus' writings: the rustic Pyrrhonist rejects all signs alike, whereas the urbane Pyrrhonist only rejects the indicative sign because it is a theoretical construction accepted by Dogmatic philosophers and Rationalist doctors (see AD II 156).77 Follow¬ ing Robert Philippson, James Allen has argued that the aforementioned dis¬ tinction between two kinds of signs did not originate in the philosophical arena, but in the dispute between the Rationalist and the Empirical doctors, and that Sextus applied to philosophical theories of signification a distinction which is therefore alien to them.78 In Allen's view, in Sextus' discussion of signs "two different controversies have been conflated: the Empiricists' battle with Rationalism and the Pyrrhonists' battle with dogmatic philosophy".79 The endorsement of the recollective sign and the arguments that undermine only the indicative sign are Empirical and hence correspond to the first con¬ troversy,80 whereas the arguments that are effective against both kinds of sign 76 On Sextus' discussion of signs, see GLIDDEN: Skeptic Semiotics; EbERT: The Origin of the Stoic Theory of Signs-, ALLEN, James: Rationalism, Empiricism, and Scepticism: Sextus Empiricus' Treatment ofSign-inference. In: ALLEN: Inference from Signs. Ancient Debates about the Nature of Evidence. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2001, 87-146. 77 Cf. BARNES: Pyrrhonism, Beliefand Causation, 2646-2649. 78 See ALLEN: Rationalism, Empiricism, and Scepticism. Allen's interpretation has forcefully been challenged by EBERT, Theodor: La théorie du signe entre la medicine et la philosophie. In: Kany-Turpin, J. (ed.): Signe et Prédiction dans l'Antiquité. Saint-Etienne: Publications de l'Université de Saint-Etienne 2005, 51-63. Cf. GLIDDEN: Skeptic Semiotics, 225-229, 236-238. 79 Allen: Rationalism, Empiricism, and Scepticism, 108. 80 Cf. GLIDDEN: Skeptic Semiotics, 228-232, 242. 54 Diego Machuca and the suspension of judgment about evident things are Pyrrhonian and therefore correspond to the second controversy. If Allen's interpretation is correct, then in Sextus' treatment of sign-inference it is possible to detect two distinct approaches, the one corresponding to the kind of skeptical stance es¬ poused by the Empirical doctors, the other corresponding to the more radical skepticism adopted by the Pyrrhonists or at least by part of them. Now, if one considers the Empiricists to be urbane skeptics as does Hankinson81 then the tension under consideration may be taken, once again, as a subclass of that between the urbane and the rustic forms of Pyrrhonism. However, we may perhaps free Sextus from this third tension if, like Glidden, we maintain that his endorsement of recollective signs is just another case of the applica¬ tion of the dialectical strategy that characterizes the Pyrrhonian argumenta¬ tion: the Pyrrhonist makes use of any argument or doctrine at his disposal in order to counter the objections directed against him, but without endorsing such argument or doctrine in propria persona.82 A further tension detectable in Sextus' writings concerns his discussion of ethics. Sextus tells us that the ethical part of philosophy "seems to deal with the distinction among good, bad, and indifferent things" (PH III 168), and that "almost all unanimously suppose that ethical inquiry is about the distinction between things good and bad" (AD V 2). As we saw in Section 1, Sextus ad¬ dresses ethics in the second part of book three of PH and in book five of AD, but there are also passages from book one of PH that are relevant to this mat¬ ter, among which is the exposition of the Tenth Mode of Aenesidemus. In at least part of those texts, Sextus adopts what may be called the official Pyrrho¬ nian stance, namely, to refrain from making any positive or negative assertion about the nature and existence of the good, the bad, and the indifferent. To be more precise, he suspends judgment about (i) what the good, the bad, and the indifferent are, (ii) what things these notions apply to, and (iii) whether there is anything good, bad, or indifferent by nature. According to Sextus, by sus¬ pending judgment not only about ethical matters, but about all matters the Skeptic attains the states of undisturbedness (ataraxia) and happiness (eudaimonia). At variance with this official Pyrrhonian stance, however, some pas¬ sages of AD V seem to attribute to the Pyrrhonist both a type of negative Dogmatism and a type of moral realism. In those passages, the Pyrrhonist seems to adopt in propria, persona three beliefs which are incompatible with a thoroughgoing Skepticism, namely: (i) that nothing is by nature or invariably good, bad, or indifferent, (ii) that things can be deemed to be objectively good, bad, or indifferent only in relation to a person in specific circumstances, 81 See HANKINSON: Causes and Empiricism, 347-348. 82 See GLIDDEN: Skeptic Semiotics, 238-243. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 55 and (iii) that the attainment of ataraxia and eudaimonia is possible only if one holds (i) and (ii) (see AD V 69-78, 114, 118, 130, 140, 185). Most of the interpreters that have examined the Pyrrhonism expounded in AD V have adopted either of two views. Some have maintained that AD V ul¬ timately presents the same type of Pyrrhonism as PH.K Others have held that AD V differs from the Pyrrhonism of PH and that it is incompatible with the Pyrrhonian outlook.84 Distancing himself from both views, Bett has pro¬ pounded an original interpretation of the Skepticism of AD V. He admits that this book expounds a position different from the Skepticism defended in PH, but affirms that "this is not in itself grounds for criticism; there is no reason why M XI should be obliged to conform to the canons of PH. M XI's distinc¬ tive view is consistent in its own terms, and can be legitimately understood as a variety of skepticism".85 In his view, this form of Skepticism corresponds to that espoused by Aenesidemus, whereas the outlook expounded in PH and the other four books of AD conforms to a variety of Skepticism that was later in¬ troduced in the history of Pyrrhonism particularly by Agrippa.86 Though Bett's interpretation is forcefully argued for, it faces some problems, the most important of which is that it requires one to accept that, in AD, the key Pyr¬ rhonian notion of epochë takes on two radically incompatible senses.87 A final case concerns AM, in which it is possible to detect the following three tensions. First, even though the general arguments Sextus puts forth at AM I 9-40 undermine all forms of teaching and learning and all mathëmata alike, in some passages he indicates that his assault is directed only against cer85 McPHERRAN, Mark: Pyrrhonism's Arguments against Value. In: Philosophical Studies 60 (1990) 127-142; ANNAS: The Morality of Happiness-, HANKINSON: Values, Objectivity and Dialectic-, NUSSBAUM, Martha: Skeptic Purgatives: Disturbance and the Life without Belief. In: NUSSBAUM: The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1994, 280-315; SPINELLI: Sesto Empirico: Contro gli etici. 84 Annas / BARNES: The Modes of Scepticism-, ANNAS, Julia: Doing without Objective Values: Ancient and Modern Strategies. In: EVERSON, S. (ed.): Companions to Ancient Thought IV. Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1998, 193-220; STRIKER: The Ten Modes; Ataraxia: Happiness as Tranquillity, SVAVARSSON, Svavar Hrafn: Pyrrho's Undecidable Nature. In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 27 (2004) 249-295. 85 BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, xiii. 86 See BETT, Richard: Sextus's Against the Ethicists: Scepticism, Relativism or Both? In: Apeiron 27 (1994) 123-161; Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists, introduction and commentary; Pyrrho, chapter 4, esp. section 3; La double 'schizophrénie', 29-31. Let us add that Bett has recent¬ ly considered it possible that AD I-II contain traces of the Aenesideman variety of Pyrrhonism, namely, negative arguments purporting to establish that the Dogmatists' logical and epistemological theories are wrong. He claims, however, that in AD I-II that earlier material is used to counterbalance the positive arguments advanced by the Dogmatists in order to induce suspension of judgment (see BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Logicians, xxiii-xxiv). 87 For critical discussion of Bett's interpretation, see ANNAS, Julia: Review o/BETT: Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists. In: The Philosophical Review 108 (1999) 137-139; MACHUCA, Diego: Resena de BETT: Pyrrho. In: Méthexis 14 (2001) 155-158, at 157-158; The Pyrrhonist's ataraxia and philanthröpia, 121-123. 56 Diego Machuca tain kinds of mathëmata or a certain way of conceiving them. Thus, in AM I Sextus distinguishes between two sorts of grammar, and cautions us that his attack is aimed at theoretical grammar, not at what he calls "grammatistic", since this is most useful for life {AM I 44-56). Likewise, in AM V he draws a distinction between astrology and astronomy, and points out that his on¬ slaught is directed only against the former {AM V 1-2); and in AM VI he dis¬ tinguishes between music as a science and music as an instrumental skill, and indicates that his attack is aimed at the former (AM VI 1-3). In addition, Sex¬ tus points out that, unlike the Epicureans, he will not criticize poetry {AM I 299), and mentions other mathëmata or technai which the Skeptic appears to accept because they are useful for life, namely medicine, navigation, and agri¬ culture (see AMI 51, V 2, cf. II 13). Second, although Sextus distinguishes the Pyrrhonists' type of argumentation from that of the Epicureans in that the latter purport to establish the uselessness of the mathëmata for attaining wis¬ dom, whereas the former consider this to be a Dogmatic assertion {AMI 1, 5), at times he seems to appropriate the Epicurean arguments against the mathë¬ mata (e.g., AM I 49-55, 171-172, 320, V 47). Finally, even though as a Pyrrhonist Sextus is supposed to suspend judgment on the mathëmata {AM I 6-7, 28, 144, 171-173, II 99), a large part of his arguments have a negative Dogmatic conclusion, namely, that the mathëmata do not exist (e.g., AM I 90; II 60, 88; VI 5, 59, 61). Scholars have adopted different views on the character of AM. First, Janâcek has maintained that in this work Sextus abandons the Skepticism he espouses in his other surviving writings,88 and Guido Cortassa has affirmed that Sextus does not apply the Skeptical way of thought (hë skeptikë agôgë) to his discussion of the mathëmata.89 For his part, Jonathan Barnes has explained the joint presence of a radical and a moderate form of Skepticism by having recourse to the two possible ways he proposes to account for the coexistence of the rustic and the urbane varieties of Pyrrhonism in PH. The first explanation is that the above-men¬ tioned "schizophrenia" is the result of Sextus' use of both Pyrrhonian and Epicurean sources. The second explanation, favored by Barnes, consists in drawing an analogy between the Pyrrhonist's arguments and the physician's drugs: the Pyrrhonist will make use of different kinds of argumentative drugs depending on the seriousness of his Dogmatic patient's condition.90 In general, interpreters have maintained that the outlook of AM does not (completely) differ from that of PH and AD, and hence that it is genuinely 88 See jANÂàEK: Sextus Empiricus' Sceptical Methods, 87, 133. 89 See CORTASSA, Guido: Sesto Empirico e gli 'egkuklia mathëmata': un'introduzione a Sext. Emp. Adv. Math. I-VI. In: GlANNANTONI, G. (ed.): Lo scetticismo antico. vol. II. Napoli: Bibliopolis 1981, 713-724, at 719-720. 90 See BARNES: Scepticism and the Arts, 73-77. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 57 Pyrrhonian.91 They have argued (i) that the divergences between AM and Sex¬ tus' other extant writings are to be explained by their different subject matter, not by their supposedly differing outlooks; (ii) that Sextus' approach to grammar and rhetoric is in agreement with his explanation, at PHI 187-208, of the sense in which the Skeptical expressions or utterances (phonai) must be interpreted; (iii) that his attitude towards mathëmata such as grammatistic and astronomy is consistent with the Skeptical didaskalia technôn, which PHI 2124 presents as one of the four aspects that constitute the Pyrrhonist's criterion of action; (iv) that the arguments with negative conclusions are not designed to establish these conclusions, but to counterbalance the beliefs of "the learned", so as to induce suspension of judgment; (v) that at least part of Sex¬ tus' negative arguments against the mathëmata are merely ad hominem; and (vi) that in AM Sextus makes use of terminology and types of argument such as the Modes of Agrippa that are characteristic of Pyrrhonism as expounded in his other extant works. Finally, Bett has recently proposed a new interpretation of AM. In his opinion, the tensions detectable in this work are to be explained by Sextus' drawing on different Pyrrhonian sources and by his failure to adapt fully ear¬ lier Skeptical arguments to his later version of Pyrrhonism. Those arguments would have the same origin as the negative arguments found in the fifth book of ADA2 From what has been said about the differences and tensions that can be de¬ tected in Sextus' writings, it would seem that we must draw the following conclusion: Sextus drew on different sources which expounded different varie¬ ties of Pyrrhonism, and he seems to have confined himself to reproducing what he found in them without trying to integrate those differing types of Pyrrhonism. If this were so, he would have been a mere copyist as far as his use of those sources is concerned. However, given the differences that exist between AD V and the ethical section of PH III, we must rather conclude that, although he heavily relied and drew on earlier sources, at least in some cases he reworked the material he took from them, possibly in order to adapt it to various purposes. 91 See KRENTZ, Edgar: Philosophic Corcerns in Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos I. In: Phronesis 7 (1962) 152-160; DESBORDES: Le scepticisme et les 'arts libéraux'', HANKINSON: The Skeptics, 251-256; SLUITER, Ineke: The Rhetoric of Scepticism: Sextus against the Language Specialists. In: SlHVOLA: Ancient Scepticism, 93-123; BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus, 105-109; PELLEGRIN: Intro¬ duction. In: PELLEGRIN / Dalimier / DELATTRE / DELATTRE / PÉREZ: Sextus Empiricus, 9-47, at 10-27; PELLEGRIN: De l'unité du scepticisme sextien. In: DELATTRE: Sur le Contre les professeurs, 35-45; MACHUCA, Diego: Review o/PELLEGRIN / DALIMIER / DELATTRE / DELATTRE / PÉREZ: Sextus Empiricus. In: Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004) 503-510, at 505-509. 92 See BETT: La double 'schizophrénie'. 58 Diego Machuca 4. SEXTUS' LEGACY The history of Pyrrhonism did not end with Sextus and his immediate succes¬ sors, since it has had a tremendous impact on both early modern and contem¬ porary philosophy. First, historians of ideas have shown that the Renaissance rediscovery of Sextus' works played a key role in the formation of early mod¬ ern thought. Second, many contemporary epistemologists have vigorously discussed the Pyrrhonian arguments against the rational justification of our beliefs, even if most of them are not well acquainted with the writings of Sex¬ tus and the other sources for Pyrrhonism. In addition, Pyrrhonian ideas have recently been used to develop a new kind of ethical skepticism. Before dealing with the influence of Pyrrhonism on both early modern and contemporary philosophy, a few words about its reception in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages are in order. As regards the former period, it must first be noted that Pyrrhonian arguments are detectable in the work of the thirdcentury Neoplatonist Plotinus.93 Second, knowledge of Pyrrhonism is attested in the fourth century in the writings of Gregory of Nazianzus and the em¬ peror Julian.94 There is also evidence of knowledge of the Pyrrhonian philoso¬ phy in Neoplatonic commentators of the fifth and sixth centuries, namely Syrianus, Ammonius, Asclepius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus, Elias, and David.95 It is important to remark, however, that in Late Antiquity Pyr¬ rhonism lost its force and influence as a kind of philosophy. As for the Middle Ages, knowledge of Pyrrhonism is also attested, of which two examples may suffice. First, Photius, the ninth-century Patriarch of Constantinople, offers in his Bibliotheca an invaluable summary of Aenesidemus' lost Pyrrhonian Discourses. Second, three early-fourteenth-century manuscripts of a Latin translation of PH by Niccolo da Reggio are extant, but this translation appears to have had no diffusion. In general, in the Middle Ages direct acquaintance with Pyrrhonian texts was rare, and interest in and discussion of Skeptical arguments were very limited, with the result that Pyr¬ rhonism had no real impact on medieval thought.96 In that period, Academic 93 See O'MEARA, Dominic: Scepticism and Ineffability in Plotinus. In: Phronesis 45 (2000) 240-251. 94 See ANNAS / BARNES: The Modes ofScepticism, 18; FlORIDI: Sextus Empiricus, 12-13. 95 See FLÜCKIGER, Hansueli: The ephektikoi in the Commentators. In: BRANCACCI, A. (ed.): Philosophy and Doxography in the Imperial Age. Firenze: Leo S. Olschki Editore 2005, 113-129. 96 See SCHMITT, Charles: The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern Times. In: BURNYEAT, M. (ed.): The Skeptical Tradition. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of Cali¬ fornia Press 1983, 226-251, at 226-227 with n. 6; FLORIDI: Sextus Empiricus, 13-25, 63-69. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 59 skepticism was better known than Pyrrhonism thanks especially to Augustine's Contra Academicos.97 It is only from the Renaissance onwards that Pyrrhonism began to recover the force it had had particularly from the first century BC to the second cen¬ tury AD. The pioneering book on the influence of Pyrrhonism on early mod¬ ern thought is The History of Scepticism by Richard Popkin. Since its first edition, which spans the period from Erasmus to Descartes,98 through the second, which extends the investigation to Spinoza,99 to the last, which reaches back to Savonarola and forward to Bayle,100 this book has had an enormous impact on historians of early modern thought. Popkin's central thesis is that early modern philosophy developed out of a skeptical crisis which first arose in the religious sphere with the quarrels between Catholics and Reformers about the correct rule of faith, and then spread as to cover phi¬ losophy and the sciences. The leading role in this crisis was played by the re¬ discovery and revival of ancient Pyrrhonian arguments, thanks especially to the publication of Henri Estienne's Latin translation of PH in 1562 and of Gentian Hervet's Latin translation of AM and AD in 1569.101 Hence, that skeptical crisis was more specifically what Popkin liked to call a crise pyrrhonienne. According to his interpretation, the history of early modern philoso¬ phy is, at least to a very large extent, the history of the different strategies which early modern thinkers adopted to deal with the Pyrrhonian crisis. The view just outlined was also developed by Popkin in dozens of essays on vari¬ ous early modern thinkers, some of which were collected in his The High Road to Pyrrhonism,102 There have been two main reactions to Popkin's position. On the one hand, several scholars have sought to reinforce it either by further investigat¬ ing the impact that skepticism had on the views of figures already studied by him, or by revealing its influence on other early modern thinkers. This line of research has gained force in the last years, as it is shown by the publication of several collective volumes dealing with the impact of skepticism (especially 97 See SCHMITT: The Rediscovery, 227; MAIERÙ, Alfonso / VALENTE, Luisa: Scetticismo e criticismo nel Medioevo. In: DE CARO, M. / SPINELLI, E. (eds.) : Scetticismo. Una vicenda ftlosoftca. Roma: Carocci 2007, 39-65, at 39-50. 98 POPKIN, Richard: The History ofScepticism from Erasmus to Descartes. Assen: van Gorcum 1960. 99 POPKIN: The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza. Berkeley: University of California Press 1979. 100 POPKIN: The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle. New York: Oxford University Press 2003. 1^1 For a comprehensive and detailed study of the transmission and recovery of Sextus' works, see FLORIDI: Sextus Empiricus. See also SCHMITT: The Rediscovery. 102 PoPKIN, Richard / WATSON, Richard / FORCE, James (eds.): The High Road to Pyrrhon¬ ism. Indianapolis: Flackett 1993. 60 Diego Machuca Pyrrhonian skepticism) on early modem philosophy.103 On the other hand, a few scholars have argued that Popkin's view about the central role played by Pyrrhonism in shaping early modern thought is overstated. This is because (i) other types of skepticism and other philosophical traditions such as Platonism, Epicureanism, and Stoicism played an equally important role, and (ii) skepticism (broadly construed) had much less impact on the thought of certain figures such as Montaigne, Mersenne, Gassendi, and Descartes than Popkin thinks.104 In any case, what seems to be incontestable is that Popkin has shown that Pyrrhonism was one of the intellectual forces that molded early modern philosophical discussions. Of course, the fact that Pyrrhonism influenced early modern philosophy and hence early modern skepticism does not mean that there do not exist significant differences between ancient and early modern skeptical arguments. Myles Burnyeat has argued that one crucial difference is that the existence of the external world was not one of the targets of the Pyrrhonian attack, and that it only started to be called into question by the skeptical arguments ex¬ pounded in Descartes' works. In this respect, Pyrrhonism is less radical than early modern skepticism.105 Although this view about the scope of the Pyrrhonian arguments have generally been accepted among scholars,106 Gail Fine has lately made a strong case against it.107 If it is the case that Pyrrhonism did not call into question the existence of the external world, then it also differs from contemporary skepticism, since external world skepticism is one of the most common forms of contemporary skepticism. There are other differences between Pyrrhonian and contempo¬ rary skepticism, of which three are worth mentioning. The first is that, whereas contemporary skeptical arguments are directed primarily against knowledge claims, Pyrrhonian arguments are more radical insofar as they call 103 See, e.g., MOREAU, Pierre-François (ed.): Le retour des philosophies antiques à l'âge classique. Tome II: Le scepticisme aux XVIe et au XVIIe siècle. Paris: Albin Michel 2001; PAGANINI, Gianni (ed.): The Return of Scepticism from Hohhes and Descartes to Bayle. Dordrecht: Kluwer 2003; Maia NeTO, José / POPKIN, Richard (eds.): Skepticism in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Thought: New Interpretations. Amherst, New-York: Humanity Books 2004. 104 See AYERS, Michael: Popkin's Revised Scepticism. In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy 12 (2004) 319-332; PERLER, Dominik: Was There a Pyrrhonian Crisis' in Early Modern Philosophy? A Critical Notice of Richard H. Popkin. In: Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 86 (2004) 209-220. 105 See BURNYEAT, Myles: Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and Berkeley Missed? In: The Philosophical Review 91 (1982) 3-40. 106 E.g., EVERSON, Stephen: The Objective Appearance of Pyrrhonism. In: EVERSON (ed.): Companion to Ancient Thought II. Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, 121-147; HankinSON: The Skeptics; COLIVA, Annalisa: Lo scetticismo sull'esistenza del mondo esterno. In: De CaRO / SPINELLI: Scetticismo, 185-209. 107 See FINE, Gail: Sextus and External World Scepticism. In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2003) 341-385. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 61 into question the rational justification or warrant of our beliefs.108 The second difference has to do with the opposite ways in which the Pyrrhonist and the contemporary skeptic conceive of the relation between philosophical reflec¬ tions and ordinary beliefs. It has been argued that the contemporary skeptic "insulates" his skepticism from his everyday life, so that his ordinary beliefs are immune from philosophical doubt. By contrast, the Pyrrhonist's philoso¬ phical reflections have direct bearing on his everyday beliefs and actions, since Pyrrhonism is a way of life.109 The third difference is that, whereas the contemporary skeptic typically adopts a negative Dogmatic stance, the Pyr¬ rhonist suspends his judgment. For example, the contemporary ethical skeptic denies the existence of objective moral values; the Pyrrhonist, by contrast, suspends judgment as to whether anything is good or bad by nature.110 Given that the differences just referred to may give the impression that Pyrrhonism has had no influence on contemporary philosophy, it must be noted that such an impression is misleading, since a considerable number of present-day philosophers have found in Sextus' writings a valuable resource of ideas, arguments, or challenges. The clearest example is probably Robert Fogelin, who in his Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification111 pre¬ sents and defends a "neo-Pyrrhonian" stance. In a nutshell, Fogelin's neo-Pyrrhonist is an urbane Pyrrhonist who is not interested in the attainment of ataraxia by the adoption of epochë and who does not make any use of the Modes of Aenesidemus but bases his skepticism solely on the Modes of Agrippa.112 Fogelin examines how the argumentative strategies found in Sex¬ tus' writings can be applied to present-day epistemological debates and pur¬ ports to show that the contemporary epistemological theories he considers namely foundationalism and coherentism cannot meet the Agrippan chal¬ lenge.113 Recently, he has also argued that externalism and contextualism can108 See, e.g., ANNAS / BARNES: The Modes ofScepticism, 7-8; BAILEY: Sextus Empiricus, 1-9. 109 See esp. BURNYEAT: The Sceptic in his Place and Time', also ANNAS / BARNES: The Modes of Scepticism, 8-9; ANNAS, Julia: Scepticism about Value. In: POPKIN, R. (ed.): Scepticism in the History of Philosophy: A Panamerican Dialogue. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996, 205-218, at 210-211; Doing without Objective Values, 216-219. For critical discussion of the view that the contemporary skeptic insulates his philosophical reflections from daily life, while the Pyrrhonist does not, see BETT, Richard: Scepticism and Everyday Attitudes in Ancient and Modern Philosophy. In: Metaphilosophy 24 (1993) 363-381. 110 On the differences between Pyrrhonism and contemporary ethical skepticism, see ANNAS: Scepticism about Value-, Doing without Objective Values; MACHUCA, Diego: The Local Nature ofModern Moral Skepticism. In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (2006) 315-324. 111 FOGELIN, Robert: Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. New York: Oxford University Press 1994. 112 For a contrast between Fogelin's neo-Pyrrhonism and its ancient ancestor, see STRIKER: Historical Reflections. 113 See also FOGELIN, Robert: Précis of Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997) 395-400; What does a Pyrrhonist Know? In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997) 417-425. 62 Diego Machuca not meet that challenge either.114 Fogelin's work has awakened a lively inter¬ est in both Pyrrhonism and neo-Pyrrhonism among contemporary epistemologists, who have adopted either a critical or a sympathetic attitude towards both types of skepticism.115 Another example of the influence of Pyrrhonism on the philosophical stance of a contemporary thinker is found in the type of ethical skepticism es¬ poused by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, which in some respects is close to Foge¬ lin's neo-Pyrrhonism. Sinnott-Armstrong has recently defended what he calls a "moderate Pyrrhonian moral skepticism", according to which, although no moral belief can be justified without qualification, moral beliefs can be mod¬ estly justified relative to particular contrast classes, none of which is deemed to be really appropriate or relevant.116 Besides the formulation and discussion of neo-Pyrrhonian outlooks, a large part of contemporary epistemological debates have revolved around the chal¬ lenge to the rational justification of our beliefs posed by the Agrippan modes. Coherentists, foundationalists, infinitists, and contextualists have proposed different ways to deal with that challenge,117 even if not all of them are aware of its Pyrrhonian origin. In addition, Agrippan Pyrrhonism has recently been studied in connection with the current discussions of epistemic luck. In this regard, it has been claimed that the skeptical challenge posed by the Modes of Agrippa is concerned with the problem of "reflective" epistemic luck and not with that of "veritic" epistemic luck, and hence that the Pyrrhonian attack is not directed against knowledge simpliciter but only against internalist knowl114 See FOGELIN, Robert: The Sceptic's Burden. In: International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999) 159-172; The Skeptics Are Coming! The Skeptics Are Coming! In: SlNNOTT-ARMSTRONG: Pyrrhonian Skepticism, 161-173. 115 See DRETSKE, Fred: So Do We Know or Don't We? In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997) 407-409; MOSER, Paul: The Relativity of Skepticism. In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997) 401-406; STROUD, Barry: Unpurged Pyrrhonism. In: Philoso¬ phy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1997) 411-416; Contemporary Pyrrhonism. In: SlNNOTTARMSTRONG: Pyrrhonian Skepticism, 174-187; WILLIAMS, Michael: Fogelin's Neo-Pyrrhonism. In: International Journal of Philosophical Studies 7 (1999) 141-158; The Agrippan Argument and Two Forms of Skepticism. In: SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG: Pyrrhonian Skepticism, 121-145; SlNNOTT-ARMSTRONG, Walter: Classy Pyrrhonism. In: SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG: Pyrrhonian Skepticism, 188-207; SORENSEN, Roy: Commercial Applications of Skepticism. In: SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG: Pyrrhonian Skepticism, 208-232; SOSA, Ernest: Two False Dichotomies: Foundationalism/Coherentism and Internalism/Externalism. In: SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG: Pyrrhonian Skepticism, 146-160. 116 See SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, Walter: Moral Skepticisms. New York: Oxford University Press 2006. 117 See, respectively, DAVIDSON, Donald: A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge. In: LEPORE, E. (ed.): Truth and Interpretation. Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Oxford/New York: Basil Blackwell 1986, 307-319; HARMAN, Gilbert: Skepticism and Foundations. In: LUPER, S. (ed.): The Skeptics. Contemporary Essays. Aldershot: Ashgate 2003, 111; KLEIN, Peter: How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism. In: LUPER: The Skeptics, 75-94; and WILLIAMS: The Agrippan Argument. Sextus Empiricus: His Outlook, Works, and Legacy 63 edge, so that Pyrrhonism is compatible with widespread externalist knowl¬ edge.118 The current discussions of topics and arguments found in Sextus' works are a clear proof that Sextan Pyrrhonism continues to exert a considerable in¬ fluence on the development of philosophy.119 Abstract The present paper has two objectives. The first is to examine some difficult issues concerning Sextus Empiricus' works and outlook, namely: (i) the character and chronology of his writings, (ii) his relationship with the Empirical and the Me¬ thodical medical sects, and (iii) the different positions that seem to coexist in his works. The second objective is to offer an overview of the impact of Sextan Pyr¬ rhonism on the development ofboth early modern and contemporary philosophy. 118 See PRITCHARD, Duncan: Epistemic Luck. Oxford: Clarendon Press 2005. 119 I take this opportunity to thank Mauro Bonazzi, Fernanda Decleva Caizzi, Theodor Ebert, Anna Maria Ioppolo, Philippe Mudry, Lorenzo Perilli, Ineke Sluiter, Emidio Spinelli, Fabio Stok, and Svavar Svavarsson for kindly sending me copies of some of their works. I am also grateful to Dominic O'Meara for his suggestions.