Ontological Imperialism Barry Smith Presented at GIScience 2000: First International Conference on Geographic Information Science, Savannah, Georgia October 28, 2000 2 information systems databases organizations language-communities sciences religions maps 3 = a system of concepts pertaining to a given domain ... concepts that are more or less coherently specified Each involves a certain conceptualization 4 'An ontology is a specification of a conceptualization' (Gruber) Tom Gruber's Definition 5 – a common system of concepts in terms of which different information communities can talk to each other and exchange data Why make ontologies? To provide a stable forum for translation and interoperability as between different conceptualizations 6 Ontology, for Gruber, is a branch of KR It starts with our conceptualizations, and sees how far we can push through from there to a description of corresponding domains of objects ('models') 7 KR Ontology deals with the generated correlates of both good and bad conceptualizations – with surrogate created worlds – with 'universes of discourse' 8 Not all conceptualizations are equal Bad conceptualizations: story-telling, myth-making, legacy information systems based on insecure foundations ... Good conceptualizations: science (mostly) what else? 9 Two sorts of conceptualizations bad conceptualizations = relate merely to a created, surrogate world good conceptualizations = transparent to some independent reality beyond 10 A transparent conceptualization is a partition of reality 11 Alberti's Grid 12 Ontology should foster transparent conceptualizations (veridical perspectives on reality) It should provide a constraint on conceptualizations (Guarino) 13 Transparent conceptualizations The sciences provide us with a good first clue as to what these are 14 Scientific conceptualizations = those based on theories which have survived rigorous empirical tests 15 Universe 16 Periodic Table 17 PerspectivalismPerspectivalism Different conceptualizations may represent cuts through the same reality which are skew to each other ... astronomy ... chemistry ... 18 California Land Cover Complementary perspectives 19 All veridical perspectives are equal, but some are more equal than others 20 Cerebral Cortex 21 Science and prediction The perspectival cuts through reality yielded by the different sciences capture dimensions of reality in relation to which we can develop predictive theories 22 Scientific conceptualizations are transparent they illuminate some features of the underlying reality and trace over others 23 Are there transparent conceptualizations outside science? 24 The Empty Mask (Magritte) 25 the conceptualization of core common sense ... it, too, is transparent ... it, too, illuminates some features of the underlying reality and traces over others = the conceptualization shared by children and adults in everyday perceiving and acting 26 Common-sense reality = the world as apprehended via the conceptualization of core common sense (the middle-sized world) = the world of mothers, chairs, cats, rivers, and trees = the normal environment or niche which human beings share in common 27 core common sense is true mothers, chairs, cats, rivers and trees exist if we did not have many true beliefs about such objects we would all be dead 28 All human beings are experts as concerns common-sense reality ... but our shared knowledge is tacit only, it does not take the form of explicit theory 29 Aristotle, the world's first ontologist, provides an explicit theory of common-sense reality 30 Table-Top SpaceCommon-sense re lity is first of all the world of table-top space, of animals, furniture, toys ... – a space centered on objects 31 Aristotle's Theory of Categories is a catalog system for the world of objects of table-top scale 32 siamese cat species organism animal mammal genera From Species to Genera 33 siamese cat species animal mammal genera category organism category 34 siamese cat species organism animal mammal genera category substance object thing 35 pekinese mammal cat organism substancespecies, genera animal instances frog 36 pekinese mammal cat organism substancetypes animal tokens frog 37 Common nouns pekinese mammal cat organism substance animal c mon nouns 'cat' proper names 'Kermit' frog 38 Our common-sense knowledge involves substances which pertain to what a thing is: a cat a man a planet 39 and accidents, which pertain to how a thing is at some time: red hot in the agora sun-tanned spinning attributes plus processes 40 quality color red Accidents, too, form trees scarlet R=175, G=54, B=24 41 Accidents: Species and instances instances (this or that token instance of redness here, now) quality color red scarlet R232, G54, B24 species, genera 42 Substance as object, thing this statue this cocktail this frog clay vodka organophosphate vs. Substance as stuff, matter 43 Objects vs. fields form matter 44 scientific reality = (roughly) fields (matter + energy) common-sense reality = objects plus attributes and processes quantitative qualitative 45 The opposition objects vs. fields in the realm of accidents too 46 Objects vs. fields in the realm of accidents too form matter R=175, G=54, B=24 'red' 47 Two different perspectives on reality: the qualitative (objects, attributes, processes) the quantitative (fields: matter, energy) both transparent to the reality beyond 48 (one is cruder, coarser than the other) 49 science brings a finer mesh 50 Two different perspectives: Aristotle helps us with the qualitative perspective (of objects, attributes, processes) Science helps us with the quantitative perspective (of fields) 51 Serious theoretical problems confront the attempt to bridge the divide between these two perspectives – these have analogues in the practical problems confronting cartographers who need to transform quantitative field data into qualitative forms ... and in the practical problems confronting builders of user interfaces for GISystems 52 But more: we face serious theoretical problems in extending Aristotle's ontology to the geospatial realm 53 Ontology of geographic forms We still lack a good theory of the geographic realm as this is cognized in ordinary human cognition Mark and Smith NSF Grant BCS-9975557: "Geographic Categories: An Ontological Investigation" 54 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 55 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 56 Theory of vagueness How can -based conceptualizations be transparent, if the world is shaped like this ? 57 via some sort of distortion ? (so that common-sense concepts would be like cookie-cutters, cleaving reality at non-existing joints) ? 58 No: common sense does not lie ... our common-sense concepts are soft at the edges and are employed by us accordingly 59 they have a built-in sensitivity to the difference between focal and borderline instances focus penumbra 60 Fuzzy logic illegitimately transforms this qualitative space into a quantitative field of precise probability assignments x is red with probability 93.748 % 61 How to produce a qualitative theory of vagueness ? – a theory of the way in which our common-sense concepts apply to reality in such a way as to comprehend an opposition between focal and penumbral instances ? open problem ... implications for the understanding of error, approximation ... 62 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 63 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 64 Is everything in common-sense reality either a substance or an accident? 65 Armchair Ontology 66 Positive and negative parts positive part negative part (made of matter) (not made of matter) Armchair Ontology or hole 67 Negative parts (holes): not made of matterAristotle neglects features of the common-sense world not made of matter Examples: property rights obligations institutions spatial regions spatial boundaries 68 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 69 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 70 In the realm of table-top space boundaries are not ontologically problematic: table-top objects have clear boundaries they never share boundaries they never overlap they do not flow, merge, split they do not change their genus as they grow they do not change their genus from season to season 71 they do not change their genus according to what they abut contrast: mountain – valley 72 Bona Fide Objects The objects of table-top space have bona fide boundaries = boundaries which exist independently of our cognition 73 Fiat Boundaries = boundaries which exist only in virtue of our demarcations Fiat objects = objects with fiat boundaries 74 Examples of fiat objects Two-dimensional fiat objects: census tracts postal districts Wyoming 75 Three-dimensional fiat objects the Northern hemisphere the 3-dimensional parcels to which mineral rights are assigned the Klingon Empire 76 Controlled Airspace 77 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 78 How to produce a theory of the common-sense geographic realm ? 1. theory of vagueness 2. mereology (theory of wholes and parts, including negative parts) 3. the theory of fiat boundaries 4. qualitative geometry and qualitative topology 79 Holes in the ground Bone fide boundaries at the floor and walls with a fiat lid 80 What is a valley ? 81 Grand Canyon 82 mountain is the most prominent kind of geographic object in the common-sense ontology. But it is absent from the scientific ontology as a kind of thing ... the latter includes slope steepness and direction at every point, but represented as fields What is a mountain ? 83 Mountain bona fide upper boundaries with fiat base: 84 where does the mountain start ? 85 Everest Mount Everest 86 Mont Blanc from Chatel 87 Question: Are mountains bona fide or fiat objects? Did mountains exist before human cognitive agents came along? 88 Bona fide mountain (tops) Miquelon_and_Saint_Pierre_Island 89 Are all holes fiat objects ? hollows tunnels cavities 90 Did hollows and tunnels exist before human cognitive agents came along? Rabbit holes, worm holes Geospatial forms as precursors of evolution 91 What is a lake ? 92 A filled hole ? 93 What is a lake ? 1. a three-dimensional body of water ? 2. a two-dimensional sheet of water ? 3. a depression (hole) in the Earth's surface (possibly) filled with water ? are dry lakes lakes? or merely places where lakes used to be? 94 Each of these has problems: If we take: 1. a lake is three-dimensional body of water then a lake can never be half full Open problem: ontology of liquids 95 What's the point ? 96 Common-Sense Reality Why is it important for GIScience that we get the ontology of common-sense reality right? 97 Science is important for engineering Well, ... it's important that we get the ontology of physics right because physics is a basis for engineering: ... bridges and airplanes are engineering products in which physical reality is embedded 98 Why is naive ontology important? It's important that we get the ontology of common-sense reality right ... ... because GISystems are engineering products in which common-sense reality is embedded 99 We need to keep track of form because that's what users know 100 Many biological sciences relate to the common-sense world of qualitative forms: Ecology (need for ontology of niches or habitats) Biogeography Palaeontology = science of common-sense reality as it existed before human beings evolved 101 Many spatial science and engineering disciplines need to span the bridge between the qualitative perspective of common sense and the quantitative, field-based perspective: Meteorology Hydrology Demography Epidemiology Urban Systems 102 Geomorphology – here, too, different ways of slicing up reality 1. landscapes are continuous (fields) – view of contemporary geomorphology 2. landscapes consist of mountains, valleys, lakes – view of ordinary cognitive agent What is the relation between these two ? 103 The interest of geomorphologists in micro-processes (entrainment and transport of sediments, groundwater effluxes, weathering, etc.) ... is motivated precisely by attempts to understand form (morphe = Greek 'form') Can science just ignore mountains, valleys, floodplains ? 104 Ontological Imperialism (Modest Version) as far as possible our theories, information systems, databases should be compatible with the ontology of common sense 105 This constraint can lead to better standards The U.S. Spatial Data Transfer Standard (SDTS) defines a lake as: "any standard (sic) body of inland water" 106 Applied to information systems it can reduce errors (natural frames and slots) increase robustness (remember Aristotle) bring better user interfaces (at both ends) ... boost virility ... cure all known ailments ... clean ovens 107 http://ontology.buffalo.edu