CONTENTS Curriculum Vitae  Publications of Keping Wang XIX/i In Honour of Professor Keping Wang 1. MYRTO DRAGONA-MONACHOU: Search for a global ethics:Confucius and ancient Greek moral philosophy ................................................................... 192. EUGENIO BENITEZ: Philosophy, Translationand Transcultural Aesthetics ................................................................................................................................. 293. KEVIN M. BRIEN: Marx and the Living Flower .................................................................... 444. DAVID E. COOPER: The Promiscuity of Belief ................................................................... 635. CHRISTOS C. EVANGELIOU: Socrates: as Teacher of Virtue ................................. 776. JOHN P. LIZZA: Free Speech and Universal Dialogue ............................................... 907. ERIC THOMAS WEBER: Lessons for Leadershipfrom Keping and Dewey ........................................................................................................................................... 1008. ROBERT WILKINSON: Reflections on Chinain the Work of Leibniz, Wolff and Kant ............................................................................................. 1129. JIYUAN YU: An Ambiguity of Happiness in Aristotle:Living Well and Acting Well .............................................................................................................................. 13610. LIU YUEDI: Zhuangzis Hole Analogyand Platos Cave Allegory: An Analytic Aesthetics ........................................................ 152 XIX/ii Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ethics, Aesthetics 11. PANOS ELIOPOULOS: The Loss of Life in the ExistentialistOutlook of Miguel De Unamunoand in the Ancient Greek Tragedy ......................................................................................................... 172 12. JOLANTA JASKOLOWSKA: The Poetic Syllogism:Chance and the Understanding of Plot in Aristotles Poetics ........................... 18313. GRIGORIOS KARAFILLIS: Identity and Classification of Values ....... 19614. BARRIE MCCULLOUGH: Cultural Studiesand the Art of Ruling in Platos Republic ...................................................................................... 20715. ELEANOR MULHERN: One Son Only: Iliad Xxiv. 485-551:Achilles, Priam and the Ransom of Hector ............................................................................... 22316. MARY MULHERN: Predicamentsand Predicables in Aristotles Metatheory .................................................................................. 23517. CHRISTOS Y. PANAYIDES: Heraclitus and the Theory of Flux ......... 25118. ANDREY PAVLENKO: Èåùñssá and ÈÝáôñïí:From Logos to Paradox (Tragedy of Representation) ............................................... 27019. VANGELIS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS: The Mainframeof an Adequate and Effective Environmental Ethics ................................................... 28220. CHRISTOPHER VASILLOPULOS: The Fatal Embrace:Modern Political Thought and the Greek Experience ............................................... 29321. MOSTAFA YOUNESIE: Farabi Method towardsAristotles Eudemonia ............................................................................................................................................. 306 10 CONTENTS νANGELIS D. PROTOP ΑΡADAΚIS ΤΗΕ MAINFRAME OF ΑΝ ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS During the last two centuries, occidenta1 philosophical meditation has triumphantly adνanced through preνiously poorly charted fields. Science has real10cated the methods as wel1 as the goals of philosophy, forcing scholars to adνance a little further, embrace new cognitiνe chal1enges and οοττοεροαο to new social needs. As a result, our eνeryday life has become easier and ουι world is a better place to liνe ία. But still, an optimum situation is not achieνed. As a matter of fact, there are more things at stake ίη our era than there were in preνious ones. Even basic prerequisites for a prosperous life are not fully met. For the first time in the history of mankind, we can not eνen be sure about the surνiνal of ουι planet, not to mention well being οί it's liνing entities -man included. So far, where ίε the improνement? .Ουτ ancestors may not haνe had the luxury of fast transportation, immediate information οι adequate medical treatment, still they could take some things for granted: they positively knew that they and their successors would be giνen the minimum of chances: they, at least, would haνe a place to liνe. Π that is the case, what went wrong? Obνiously, somebody has not done his part. Wheneνer problems appear, specific scientists are entitled to deal with them and solνe them. Science is adνancing due to and in accordance with practical difficulties. If enνironment is endangered, there is a specific scientific cast to blame. Might they be the enνironmentalists? Defmitely τιοτ, Enνiromenta1ists inform us οτι how an ecosystem works, and which should our actions be ίη order Ιο rescue οι to improνe its functions. They can ιιοι force us to act in faνour or, to the detriment of it. They can not ίωρΙΥ what is the right thing to do and what should we abstain of. That ίδ an ethica1 philosopher's duty. Are there the ethicists Ιο blame? Ifyes, what for? ΤΗΕ MAINFRAME OF ΑΝ ADEQUATE ΑΝD EFFECTlVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 283 One might notice that Ecoethics now days are advancing, ethical committees are being world wide formed, green policies are being adopted. ΑΠ these happen due to environmentaI ethicists' efforts. It appears to be ιιο ground for blame. It would be meaningless to argue that ethics aηd, Ια particular, its most specialized branch, Ecoethics, detήmeηt the eηvironmental case. Πnot the better aπaηgemeηts still achieved, it is not due to bad ίατετιιίοτιε or inadequacy, but mostly due to the complexity of the issue aηd its interconnectioηs with Ιιιιπιετι activities. Ευνίτουωευτ is not aη isolated issue like, for example, euthanasia, which philosophers can easily focus οα aηd attempt to provide their proposals. Εενίτοτιment is everywhere. Απ ethicist οειι not deal with ίι ία vacuum, as if ίι was some kiηd of mind game οτ an intellectual challenge. When it comes to environmental issues, the situation becomes urgent and pressing, yet it requires caution aηd dedication of the highest degree. Ροτ, wheη a particular issue is settled, a braηd ηew οτιο, internally associated with the former, arises. Due to that, in my belief, it is necessary for someone willing to deal with environmental ethics to be specific, precise and always focused. Maybe ίι was the lack of the above mentioned attributes that has caused delay and coηfusion to the environmeηtal issue. Nowadays, he who deals with environmental issues will probably get Ιοει aηd fiηd himself driven to uηfamiliar teπaίn, such as ontology οτ religion. Ιε the man superior to other living species? Can we attήbute ethical merit to nοn living matter? Are we eηtitled by the Creator with stewardship over the world? Ιε ίι probable that animals share an immortal sou1? May intrinsic value be attached to sentience alone, or sentiments count morally as well? Ιε ίτ sound to argue that the whole has ethical priority to the individual, οτ could that lead us to a slippery slope situation, misleading ιιε to ethical appreciation οί fascisms οί any kind? All these questions are familiar to anyone who is even superficially engaged to environmental ethics. They constitute important as well as misleading matters. For when the questions are provocative and ample, it is easy for εοπιεοτιε to get driven away οί the pήmary goal. Eηviroηmental ethics' Ρήmary goal should aηd could only be the 284 VANGEl1S D. PROTOPAPADAKIS survival and floUΉshing οί life οτι earth as we know ίι.' It would be useless and detrimental, as well, to charge enνironmental ethics with duties that belong to a broader field οί meditation. If the goal is the above mentioned, the οηlΥthing missing is the means to the end. The only way οί achieving the pre-mentioned aim is to form an adequate ethical structure to sustain the preservation οί the enνironment. Α structure to be adequate, Ιιhas to be solid and broadly applicable. If not, it will fall apart like a castle built ου sand, leaving environment and its inhabitants pray to a society which entirely lacks ethical compass. For an ethics to be solid and broadly applicable it takes to be clear, inductive, stable, ρτεεοτίριίνε and, in υο case, contradictive. That is because ethics are to be adopted by the majοήty οί people to be effective, and such a majοήty hardly never is moderately informed οτι ethical matters. An ethics to be inductive means that one step has to be followed by another, pacing slowly from simple to more complex issues, always keeping in mind aim and pήnciple. ΤΟ be presCΉptive, an environmental ethics has to attήbute intήnsic value to the environment and its components, that means lifeless matter, υοιι sentient life, sentient τιοιι human life and, finally, humans. If not successful in this effort, conclusions may be paradoxical. For instance, ίτ may be argued that one ought to respect sentient τιοιι human life, but has υο prima facie duty to protect the life sustaining ecosystems.2 It ίε the same as to insist that we are ethically obliged to respect and protect someone, but we are permitted to destroy his residence endangering his future existence.3 Furthermore, the ίαιτίυείο value οί each component should not exceed the value οί every other. Equality ία the possession οί value is the οηlΥway to avoid further complications. Ιί not, we may be forced to reach the conclusion that some beings are ethically prior to others, which ίε an untoward as well as an inconvenient one. That is because we should entitle some one to judge the amount οί ethica1 value that beings possess and to form an ερρτορτίετο ethical hierarchy. However, who would be οί such ethical πιετίτ and skill to fit to that role? Further more, ίί we adopt a hierarchy οί πιετίι, we may be 1. Leopold Α.,Α Sαnd COltnty Almαnαc, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1949. 2. Stone C., SllOllld Trees Have Stαnding?, Los Angeles: Kaufrnann, 1974. 3. Protopapadakis Ε. D., Ecoethics, Athens: Sakkoulas, 2005:32-40. ΤΗΕ MAINFRAME OF ΑΝ ADEQUATE AND EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 285 involved in a slippery slope situation. We could easily accept an ethical priority of wholes to single individuals, which ίδ an ethically perilous acceptance, dynamically leading to misanthropy and different k:inds of fascism.4 Therefore, an environmental ethics should be an egalitarian one when it comes to value possession and Ρrίοήty affairs. Υet, as perilous as the task might be, the need for attήbuting intrinsic value το the environment remains. Ροι that kind of va1ue is most prescήΡtίve and stable over time. Recognition of intήnsίc value creates a ρτίαιε facie direct moral duty οτι behalf of moral agents to respect and revere the carrier or the possessor of that value.5 One might argue that attributing intrinsic value το nature is not the only way to reach an ethical structure capable of sustaining the preservation of the environment. We could, as well, focus οτι the instrumental values that environment holds. As a matter of fact, we could much easier, that way, derive ethical imperatives acceptable by the majority of mankind.6 Νο one could ever deny that the preservation of flora and fauna is essentia1 to humans because they provide ιιε aesthetic pleasure and supply us with oxygen. Such a view usually referred Ιο as anthropocentric focuses ου human interests in the preservation of the environment. Νοιι human objects do ιιοτ posses some kind of value as such, but because they are means Ιο valued ends: the human wel1being. That way it would be self evident that people do have an ethical duty to care for and protect the environment, as their care is not really focused οα environment but, in fact, takes into consideration only their own and other people welfare. Such an ethics would be clear and solid enough, hence most effective. Nevertheless, ίι would be ιιοι at all stable over time. It is evident, for example, that a forest possesses instrumental value, as the major provider of oxygen, which is essential to human life. However, as technology advances, ίτ ίδ very possible that oxygen may be mechanically produced in the future. Which one will be the instrumenta1 value of forests then? None, since their existence would not any more be valuable to 4. Callicott J. Β., In Defense ofthe Land Ethic: Essays in EnVΊronmεntaZ PhiZosophy, A1bany: SUNY Press, 1989. 5. Nress Α., "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement" in Deep Ecology for the 21st CentllIY, G. Sessions (ed.), Boston: Shambhala, 1995. 6. Frankena W., SocialJustice, Spectrum Books, 1962:19. 286 VANGELlS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS mankind. Οτι the contrary, deforestation would have much more ethical merit, since ίι would provide housing to the homeless and vast areas for agricultural purposes. One might insist οιι the aesthetic value of the forests, which, as well, ίε an instrumental va1ue. But the wilderness ίε accessible to few people nowadays, hence an aristocratic form of rejoice.7 Οιι the other hand, virtual rea1ity could provide us the means of wide spread rejoice, accessible by anyone. Or, there could be artificial fauna created for aesthetical admiration. If a rare species of butterfly has οηlΥ aesthetic va1ue, what keeps as of outηumbeήηg ίι ίη order to make it accessible by people ίτι much visited museums οτ putting ίι οιι stamps? It is evident that such an anthropocentric view faces the environment as a mechanica1 producer οτ as a state of art but, clearly, the environment ίε not on1y that. Furthermore, philosophy should deal with reality as well as with probability, as far as the probability ίε not antithetic to logic. Ethics, as well, when ίτι the state of formation, should be greatly considerate about slippery slope situations. That means, al1possible consequences positive as well as negative ones should be taken into consideration, otherwise moral agents may be involved in untoward situations. If nature is οοηsidered as a mere supplier, τιο means would be able to prevent an ecological catastrophe ίτι τιο longer obviously beneficia1. Finally, an ethics which is based οιι opportunity and chance ίε not a stable one at all. Thus, an environmental ethics to be stable is to be τιοιι anthropocentric. The next step to an ethics stable over time is to render it self standing and independent from other sciences. That means that it should be not approached ίη consequentialistic terms. Consequentialism attaches ίοττίιιείο value to the aftermath of an ethical choice. The ρτίmary goal is to achieve the optimum balance of pleasure over pain for the maximum number of individua1s. Especially essential to consequalistic analysis is the capability of feeling pain and pleasure.8 The former ίε intήnsically disvalued, while the later is considered to carry 7. Stretton Η., Cαpitαlίsm, Socίαlίsm αnd the environment, Cambήdge: Cambridge University Press, 1976:211. 8. Bentham J., Int1"Od~lctionto tlrePΙincίples ο! Morαls αnd Legίslαtίon, cp. XVΠ, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948. ΤΗΕ MA/NFRAME OF ΑΝ ADEQUATE ΑΝΟ EFFECTlVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHJCS 287 ίαιτίυείο value. Therefore, one should abstain from acts that produce pain, unless they are inevitable -that means they produce greater pleasure than pain to the greater number of beings. Thus, humans should abstain from eating meat, as the pain inflicted to animals could be easily avoided with ιιο essential cost to mankind.9 That is because the amount of protein gained from animal flesh can be adequately substituted by vegetable protein. But that way, ethics trespass biology and dietology teuain. As far as dietology indicates that vegetable protein is equivalent to meat protein ία τιιιιτίοτιτ value, the case ίε ethically stable. Ethics is not self standing anymore, though. As dietology advances, Ιτ may be manifested that meat protein is essential to Ιιιιman τιιιττίιίοη, not exchangeable to vegetable οτιο." Ιτι that case, the consequentialistic argument τιο loner stands. One should say that ethics should be informed by reality, so there is nothing wrong ία taking into consideration other sciences' conclusions. Well, information is quite different to formation. Ethics should be informed but not formed by actual facts. Ethics should form reality, not the other way. Το render the argument clearer, we could use a more complex example. The hunting of whales, analysed οτι an utilitarian basis, is ethically disapproved since ίι inflicts pain to those close kinanimals without producing any benefits which could not substituted by other means. Ια grassroots terms whale hunting produces more pain than pleasure, therefore ίτ possesses ethical disvalue. However, a whole culture may be based ου whale huηting. Small societies residiηg ίη specific places, an ethical system adopted by people, a way of life, a specific sentimental state, these are side factors which should be taken ίτιιο consideration before a conclusion οα the value of the specific practice is reached. As apparent, the case iηvolves psychology, εοοίοlogy, applied economics, ethics and social sciences as well. Por example, psychology may coηclude that those people occupied ίτι whale hunting could not alter their way of life. Economics could indicate that the cessation of the practise would be detrimental to the Norwegian economy as a whole. Ιτι that case, the ethical assessmeηt ofwhale 9. Singer Ρ., 'ΆΙΙ animals are equal" ίn Applied Ethics, Ρ. Singer (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986:221-222. 10. Lappe F. Μ., Diet for α smαll plαnet, New γ ork: Ballantine, 1971:4-11. 288 VANGELlS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS hunting as a practice bearing ethical disvalue would not any longer stand. Being consequentialistic, ethics cede their domain to other sciences. Not only that, ίτ also adopts the "is and ought" fallacy, infeπίng an ought from fact. However, as mentioned above, ethics is intended to form reality. If this wasn't true, humans should be permitted killing each other according to their natural abilities, since ίι happens in nature. Law, culture, obedience to rules and self commitment wou1d be mere intellectual occupation with υο practica1 va1ue. Furthermore, there had to be a scientific committee available whenever decisions concerning environmental issues should be made. Βeaήng in mind the need for stability, independency, efficiency and simplicity for an ethics conceming the environment, we have to reject consequentialism. Ιτι my belief, environmental ethics shou1d be a deontological example. Deontology applies intrinsic value not to the consequence of an ethical decision, but to the rule according to which the decision ίε formed. In philosophical terms we could call that an a ρτίοτί approach, while consequentialism uses an a ροετοιίοτί one. Deontology holds some rules οί intrinsic value, with which the acts of moral agents should comply. For instance, murder is always denounced, whether produces benefits or not. Reverence for life is always a value possessor, whether the life οί the specific individual ίε good or evi1.These are clear rules, easy for people to understand, stable over time, a1ready proven sufficient ία forming an ethics which hitherto sustained οοοίdental civilization. The question is whether deontology is applicable to environmental ethics or a paradigm shift should be needed. If deontology ίε such a sufficient approach, then why has it hitherto failed ίτι forming an ethics capable of preventing the obvious and omnipresent exploitation and destruction of the environment? The problem lies ίτι distinguishing a ρτίοτί values in nature, such as life, sentience, self identity, consciousness or εοιιί." Deontology, due to ίιε inner structure, ίδ unable to function without attήbuting a ρτίοτί values as such. That ίε because individuals or beings are not to be ethically respected as such, but only as possessors of specific values. As 11. Vlastos G., "Justice and Equality" in Equality: Selected Readings, L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997:120-133. ΤΗΕ MAINFRAME OF ΑΝ ADEQUATE ΑΝΟ EFFECTIVE ENV/RONMENTAL ETH/CS 289 for people and higher animals, it is quite easy to establish an appropriate reverence of their existence, ίοι they possess the majority of the pre mentioned attributes. However, when it comes to rocks οτ brooks, insects or serpents, viruses οτ bacteria and, most of all, ecosystems, ίτ is very difficult to deontology to stand its grounds. For ίτ would be preposterous to attribute life or sentience to rocks, self identity to viruses, soul to ecosystems and consciousness to termites. Every effort aiming to apply such attήbutes to non-sentient life is destined to end υρ in bizaue argumentation. So, what will ίι be? Το use Bentham's phraseology, should we leave τιου sentient natural existence without redress to its possible tormentors? Ι suppose not even one of us should like that. The main principles of occidental ethical deontology are reverence οί life, respect of ones autonomy and dignity, abstention of acts who endanger other people's interests and well being. Any act complying with these ΡήncίΡΙes ίε ethically valued, while al1opposite disvalued. But what do we really mean when we state that someone οτ something is alive? Of course that it exists,but not only that. For a rock exists as well, but is not alive at all. Life is far more than that, it includes conscience, self identity, sentience etc. Sometimes life is independent from existence, since one can reasonably argue that a beloved person who recently passed away lives in his memory or that Plato is alive through his philosophy, though both obviously do not exist. But one may be heavily insulted if another speaks ίΙι of his passed away beloved person, meaning that ίι ίε life itself we revere and not existence. It would be life ίτι any form that has intrinsic value, whether actual οι not, whether existing οι absent. Autonomy, οτι the other hand, ίε intήnsίcaΙΙΥvalued ίη fact as well as an idea. One that argues in favour of slavery is equally to blame as one who practices slavery. Rules and pήnciples are not actual beings, just ideas; therefore they are applicable to both ideas and existing entities. This reasoning seems stable enough as far as it goes unchallenged. Ροι instance, do we have to respect only livingbeings,whether they exist οτ not? When it comes to a dead body, we only can admit that it just exists, but ίτ ίε not alive.Υet principle indicates that ίι must be treated with respect. As a matter of fact, people often consider it a major αίσιε to offend a dead body than to mistreat a living person. If one hits another he is 290 VANGELlS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS said to be quick tempered οτ lacking manners, but when a corpse ίε being kicked we call the perpetrator malicious and evil. The same applies to a person in permanent vegetative state. Though apparently he lacks life, sentience, self identity, prospect οτ any other property we usually attach to life, it is strictly prohibited to be treated ίυ a bad way even in the absence of those who might be dissatisfied by such a treatment. Ιιι these cases, it is mere existence that we are ethically obliged to revere. Life is just one form of existence. There are many forms of life, and much more ways of existing. Α living person is the possessor of both life and existence, and we ought to respect him. Α dead person is only existing, but we ought to show him due respect as well. In fact, we can face life only as a subset of the total, which is existence. Further more, when we talk about dignity οτ autonomy, we are obviously referring to a form of existence. People fight and die for such ideas, so they obviously exist for they have the power to in:fluence and manipulate. The same applies to sentience οτ self consciousness. They are not ways of living but ways of existing. Α person who lacks self consciousness is alive as one who does not, but they exist Ίη different ways. It is that fact, that they exist, that we have the duty to respect. If it is existence in some of its forms that we respect, then it should be proven why we shouldn't we do the same ίτι all other ones. Why should we respect a dead body but not a valley οτ a ιιοτι sentient organism? One might argue that ίτ is justified οιι account of each ones past history. Α dead person has a personal history while a forest has not. Yet, a dead person is to be transformed into a valley, and, anyway, in his present situation he exists the same way as any natural being does, being used by nature for τιιιιτίιίοα purposes as any decaying debήs is. Further more, if what we call personal history is just a succession of acts and achievements, Ι suppose that even a termite could be recognized some. Ιε ίι because he formerly was the possessor of an immortal soul? One who argues that way is about to embrace theology, therefore he is not reasoning in safe ethical grounds. Many religions hold that natural beings posses an immortal soul but that, as well, is not philosophy. We are in need to prove οτι a philosophical basis that a human corpse differs essentially from a tree trunk in the way they both exist. Ι think that nothing can be even slightly convincing οτι that. One might also ΤΗΕ MAINFRAME OF ΑΝ ADEQUATE ΑΝD EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 29ί argue that respect of a being iS due to his human nature. That means we have the duty to respect existence only ία its human form. That argument as well can not stand the challenge. Why only ίη its human form? Is it because of life? Life is proven to be an weak excuse. Is it due to sentience? Sentience has been proven likewise. Ι8 it becau8e of its formation? But then we would have υο moral duties to deformed war victims, whether living οτ not. Is it because of the immortal soul? Even if we accept the hazard of trespassing theology's terrain, we would be embarrassed by the vulgarity of the argument: we ought to revere a person due to something we have never seen, having properties which we arbίtraήΙΥ recognize and which once were, but are not anymore. Frankly, Ιwould be very thankful to be shown a reason why we should count human existence ίη al1 ίιε forms differently to every other natural existence. Humans are just a noble contribution to the variety of existence οιι earth. Therefore, when we argue ου moral agents' duty to respect life, ίη fact we are referήng to the ethica1 merit of existence. Using that term we could only be referring to existence ίη every form, from sentient to insentient life, from organic nature to lifeless matter. Reverence for existence ίη ίιε every form is a safe ground for the foundation of environmental ethics. Ιτι my ορίαίοτι, ιιο. peculiar reasoning or paradigm shift is needed in order to achieve an ethics capable of sustaining preservation of integrity,stability and beauty of the environment. We could just be driven to an adequate ethics by analyticity, reasoning ίτι an inductive and stable way. Ια any case, we shall keep ία mind the principal purpose: the formation of ethics comprehensive, stable, solid, prescriptive enough, far from unnecessary novelty οτ unwanted revolutionary tendencies, one which could easi1y be adopted by mankind and which could lead to the reverence of the environment and the preservation of biodiversity οα earth. Ιυ my ορίυίοα, such an ethics could be based ου the deontological principle of reverence for existence, which appears to be a powerful ethical imperative. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bentham J., Introduction to the Prίncίples 0/ Morαls αnd Legίslαtίon, cp. xvII, Oxford: Basil Blackwel1, 1948. 292 VANGELlS D. PROTOPAPADAKIS Callicott J. Β., Ιn Defense of the Land Ethic: Essays ίn Enνironmental Philosophy, AIbany: SUNY Press, 1989. Frankena W., Sociαl Jllstice, Spectrum Books, 1962. Lappe F. Μ., Diet lor α smαll plαnet, New York: Ballantine, 1971. Leopold Α, Α Sand County Almanac, Oxford: Oxford Uniνersity Press, 1949. Nress Α, "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Moνement" in Deep Ecology lor tlle 21" Centltly, G. Sessions (ed.), Boston: Shambhala, 1995. Protopapadakis Ε. D., Ecoethics, Athens: Sakkoulas, 2005:32-40. Singer Ρ., "AIl animals are equal" inApplίed Ethics, Ρ. Singer (ed.), Oxford: Oxford Uniνersity Press, 1986:221-222. Stone C., Should Trees Haνe Standing?, Los Angeles: Kaufmann, 1974. Stretton Η., Cαpitαlism, Sociαlism αnd the environment, Cambήdge: Cambridge Uniνersity Press, 1976. Vlastos G., "Justice and Equality" in Equality: Selected Readings, L. Pojman & R. Westmoreland (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997. Vangelis D. Protopapadakis Depαrtment ΟΙPhilosophy, Pedαgogy αnd Psychology, University ο! Athens