Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 1 Jon	Alan	Schmidt A	Neglected	Additament:	Peirce	on	Logic,	Cosmology,	and	the	Reality	of	God Abstract Two	different	versions	of	the	ending	of	the	first	additament	to	C.	S.	Peirce's	1908	article,	"A Neglected	Argument	for	the	Reality	of	God,"	appear	in	the	Collected	Papers	but	were	omitted from The Essential Peirce. In one, he linked the hypothesis of God's Reality to his entire theory	of	logic	as	semeiotic,	claiming	that	proving	the	latter	would	also	prove	the	former.	In the other, he offered a final outline of his cosmology, in which the Reality of God as Ens necessarium is indispensable to	both the	origin	and	order	of	our	existing	universe	of	Signs. Exploring	these	passages,	as	well	as	the	unpublished	manuscript	drafts	of	the	article,	provides important insights into the key concepts of instinct and continuity within Peirce's comprehensive	system	of	thought. Keywords:	Peirce,	God,	logic,	instinct,	cosmology,	continuity,	semeiotic 1.	Introduction Charles	Sanders	Peirce's	article	in	the	October	1908	issue	of	The	Hibbert	Journal,	"A	Neglected Argument for the Reality of God" (hereinafter "A Neglected Argument"), has long been controversial	among	scholars	of	his	thought.	Some	consider	it	to	be	one	of	his	most	significant writings, while others find it problematic for one reason or another. Unfortunately, its presentation in volume 6 of the Collected Papers has occasionally caused confusion in the secondary literature. It includes the text as it originally appeared in print as CP1 6.452-485, followed	by	an	"Additament"	as	CP	6.486-491,	and	then	a	section	on	"Knowledge	of	God"	as	CP 6.492-493.	Accompanying	footnotes	date	CP	6.486-491	"c.	1910,"	state	that	CP	6.491	"is	from an	alternate	draft,"	and	reveal	that	CP	6.492-493	is	actually	"From	an	unpaginated	fragment,	c. 1896." The	Peirce	Edition	Project	(PEP)	included	"A	Neglected	Argument"	in	volume	2	of	The	Essential Peirce	(EP2	2:434-450)	and	provided	an	endnote	with	helpful	background	information: At	the	end	of	July	1908,	the	Hibbert	editor,	L.	P.	Jacks,	let	Peirce	know	...	that	he	found Peirce's contribution to be of "permanent value," but that, because of the paper's complexity,	he	wanted	Peirce	"to	summarize	the	article	in	a	concluding	page	or	two,	to be	added	to	the	article"	...	Peirce	wrote	two	versions	of	his	addendum,	which	he	called "Additament."	Jacks	published	the	second	one	without	title,	a	mere	blank	line	serving	to separate	it	from	the	end	of	the	article.	(EP	2:551n14) It	turns	out	that	CP	6.452-480	is	the	article	proper,	CP	6.481-485	is	the	second	additament,	CP 6.486-490 is the first additament-composed in 1908, not 1910-and CP 6.491 is part of a different	ending	for	the	latter.	Consequently,	the	PEP	editors	chose	another	arrangement: Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 2 The	"Additament"	published	in	the	present	edition	combines	the	first	five	paragraphs	of Peirce's	first	version	of	the	text	...	with	the	full	text	of	the	second	version.	The	reason	for this	amalgamation is that	only in the first	version	did	Peirce	clearly identify "a	nest	of three	arguments"	that	is	then	referred	to	in	the	second	version.	(EP	2:551n14) As	a	result	of	this	decision,	except	for	the	first	two	sentences-one	in	the	main	text,	the	other in	an	endnote-CP	6.490-491	is	omitted	entirely.	The	PEP	editors	explained	their	rationale	for this: The	bracketed	ellipsis	at	the	end	of	the	previous	paragraph	indicates	that	the	text	of	the first	"Additament"	continues	beyond	that	sentence	(for	three	pages	and	a	half)	but	has not	been	included	here	to	avoid	both	a	rough	transition	and	an	overlap.	(EP	2:551n15) However, both versions of the	missing content contain a fair amount of	material that is	not duplicated	in	the	second	additament,	and	hence	is	absent	from	EP	altogether.	That	is	the	basis for	the	title	of	this	essay,	which	explores	the	key	ideas	that	Peirce	discussed	in	those	passages, as	well	as	the	unpublished	manuscript	drafts	of	"A	Neglected	Argument"	(R3	841-844;	1908). We	will	begin	with	Peirce's	bold	claim	that	merely	recognizing	the	soundness	of	his	theory	of logic as semeiotic would, at least to some degree, also warrant adopting the hypothesis of God's Reality. This leads to his arguments for humanity's surprising efficiency at making accurate	conjectures	about	nature,	which	prompted	him	to	acknowledge	an	objection	that	can only	be	addressed	after	delving into the	details	of	his	cosmological	account	of the	origin	and order of our existing universe of Signs. This in turn hinges on Peirce's phenomenological Categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness-hereinafter 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns for convenience4-and their proper arrangement in the hierarchy of Being, which he helpfully illustrated	using iconic	diagrams	embodying	the	significant relations	among	the	parts	of	what they	represent.	The	resulting	summary	is	Peirce's	description	of	creation	as	God's	great	symbol, argument,	and	poem,	emphasizing	the	underlying	continuity	of	all	things-i.e.,	of	Reality	itself. 2.	Peirce's	Theory	of	Thinking Although it comes last, it is likely that CP 6.491 was in the initial draft ending of the first additament, and that this was later replaced by CP 6.489-490. There are only minor discrepancies	through	the	citation	of	a	1904	article	by	William	James,	but	what	follow	are	very different	characterizations	of	the	third	"peculiarity	of	the	hypothesis"	of	God's	Reality.	CP	6.490 affirms "its commanding influence over the	whole conduct of life of its believers," while CP 6.491-restored	to	how	Peirce	originally	wrote	it-states	the	following: On	the	other	hand,	among	the	many	pertinent	considerations	which	have	been	crowded out	of	this	article,	I	may	just	mention,	in	the	third	place,	that	it	could	have	been	shown that the hypothesis of	God's Reality is logically not so isolated a conclusion as it	may seem.	On	the	contrary,	it	is	so	connected	with	a	theory	of	the	nature	of	thinking,	that	if this be proved, so is that. Now there is no such difficulty in tracing experiential consequences	of	this	theory	of	thinking	as	there	are	in	attempting	directly	to	trace	out other	consequences	of	God's	reality.	(R	844:13[4]) Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 3 Here	Peirce	acknowledged	an	important	way	in	which	the	retroductive	conjecture	of	the	Reality of God is unlike a typical scientific hypothesis: It does not readily lend itself to deductive explication and inductive evaluation.5 He proposed instead undertaking those steps	with his "theory	of	the	nature	of	thinking,"	claiming	that	the	link	between	the	two	is	such	that	proving the latter-which he evidently viewed as a much easier task-would suffice to prove the former. This raises several interesting questions: (1) To	what	was Peirce referring here as "a theory of the nature of thinking"? (2) How is it connected logically with "the hypothesis of God's	Reality"?	(3)	What	"experiential	consequences	of	this	theory	of	thinking"	could	we,	with comparatively little difficulty, deductively trace and inductively test in order to prove it? (4) Would	that	really	also	prove	"the	hypothesis	of	God's	Reality"? Both	"theory	of	the	nature	of	thinking"	and	"theory	of	thinking"	were	unusual	expressions	for Peirce to employ; neither appears elsewhere in CP or EP. He did state that "Logic, regarded from one instructive, though partial and narrow, point of view, is the theory of deliberate thinking" (CP	1.573,	EP	2.376;	1906). In the	draft	preface for	a	book	whose	working title	was Meaning,	Peirce	also	wrote	that	"logic is	the	theory	of	thinking	so	far	as	thinking	conduces	to the attainment of truth" (R 634:11; 1909), and added that "in the present state of our knowledge	logic	should	be	regarded	as	coextensive	with	General	Semeiotic,	the	a	priori	theory of signs" (R 634:15). Hence he presumably had in mind his entire broad notion of "Logic considered	as	Semeiotic"	(CP	8.377;	1908)	when	he	wrote	"A	Neglected	Argument." There	are	other clues in the related	manuscripts.	The	published	article-also found in	R	841, with minor differences-contains a somewhat lengthy rendition of what Peirce named the "humble	argument"	in	both	additaments,	followed	by	a	relatively	brief	discussion	of	the	three Stages	of	Inquiry	and	their	logical	validity.	However,	what	appears	to	be	the	very	first	draft	has it	the	other	way	around,	as	these	introductory	comments	anticipate: Yet this	argument	has seldom	been	much insisted	upon	by theologians for the reason that,	persuasive	as	it	is,	it	has	not	seemed	to	them	to	be	logical.	This	I	conceive	has	been due to a false theory of logic; and consequently the main substance of the present paper	must	be	a	brief	abstract	of	a	defence	of	a	theory	of	logic	according	to	which	the theological	argument	in	question	is	as	logically	sound	as	it	certainly	is	persuasive. Thus, I	am	to	outline	two	arguments,	one	supporting	the	other.	The	latter,	which	I	will designate	as	the	humble	argument,	although	every	mind	can	feel	its	force,	rests	on	far too	many	premisses	to	be	stated	in	full.	Taking	the	general	description	of	it	as	a	minor premiss, and a certain theory of logic as a major premiss, it will follow by a simple syllogism that the humble argument is logical and that consequently whoever acknowledges	its	premisses	need	have	no	scruple	in	accepting	its	conclusion.	(R	842:1011) What	Peirce	here	called	"a	certain	theory	of	logic"	is	presumably	the	same	thing	as	"a	theory	of the	nature	of	thinking"	and	"this	theory	of	thinking"	in	CP	6.491.	It	is	the	major	premiss,	and	"a general description of" the humble argument is the minor premiss, of "a simple syllogism" whose	conclusion	is	"that	the	humble	argument	is	logical."	Notice	the	modesty	of	this	assertion; rather	than	demonstrating	the	Reality	of	God,	Peirce	sought	merely	to	show	that	anyone	who Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 4 embraces	his theory	of logic, and recognizes that the	humble	argument is consistent	with it, "need	have	no	scruple	in	accepting	its	conclusion."6	He	continued: Only, of course, it becomes necessary to establish the major premise, which is the theory of logic; and it is sufficiently clear that to do this in a thoroughly satisfactory manner	would	involve	going	over	the	whole	of	the	critical	branch	of	logic	and	showing that the theory in question satisfactorily explains every variety of argument. Now I cannot,	within	reasonable	limits,	consider	more	than	the	main	genera	of	arguments.	So much, I will do. The subsidiary arguments of a mixed character, although highly important	in	actual	reasonings,	cannot,	within	my	limits,	be	considered.	Moreover,	the critical branch of logic really, even more than apparently, depends upon the very difficult	and	still	vexed	analytical	branch,	whose	problems	could	not	easily	be	brought	to the apprehension of ordinary readers, to say nothing of the task of laying the foundations	for	their	scientific	solutions.	(R	842:11-13) This	confirms	the	wide	scope	of	Peirce's	"theory	of logic,"	encompassing	not	only	the	"critical branch," but also the "analytical branch" on which it depends, which he elsewhere called "speculative	grammar"	(e.g.,	CP	2.93;	1902	and	CP	1.191,	EP	2:260;	1903).	The	difficulty	of	the problems posed by the latter, to which Peirce here alluded, is familiar to anyone who has wrestled	with his various attempts to classify Signs during the first decade of the twentieth century.	What he emphasized next, to make up for his inability to lay everything out "in a thoroughly	satisfactory	manner,"	is	telling: But fortunately,	we	have	an instinct for that	which is rational, and	upon that	ordinary readers	ought to rely.	Accordingly,	while I cannot	here	present a thoroughly scientific defence	of	my	theory	of	logic,	I	shall	hope	to	make	it	appear	reasonable.	(R	842:13-14) Despite	this	stated	misgiving,	after	a	single	paragraph	outlining	the	"humble	argument,"	Peirce proceeded to	write	dozens	of	pages	expounding	on the three stages	of	a complete inquiry- retroduction, deduction, and (especially) induction-in considerable detail. Some of this text appears	as	CP	2.755-772	under	the	heading,	"The	Varieties	and	Validity	of	Induction,"	but	with no	indication	that it is	connected	with	"A	Neglected	Argument"; in	fact, it is incorrectly	dated "c.	1905." Two	different	versions	of	the	last	several	paragraphs	terminate	with	equal	abruptness.	Perhaps Peirce realized that he had far exceeded the allotted length and would have to start over, almost	from	scratch.	In	any	case,	a	later	fragment	includes	this	summary: My main concern is to show that that line of reflexion which I call the Neglected Argument is	an	argument,	and	a	particularly strong	one,	of the	kind	with	which	every positive	scientific inquisition	must	begin.	The lowliest	minds	will rest	content	with	this without	any	fault	in	their	conclusion	or	their	logic;	while	the	more	critical,	may	still	their lingering doubts, by completing the line of inquiry which the Neglected Argument opens; while on its concomitants they may base another Argument supporting the former,	and	so	be led	on	to	further	reflections,	remarks,	and	experiences	which	attain all	the	force	of	sound	induction,	the	highest	grade	of	certainty	to	which	the	human	mind can	attain	on	any	Real	subject.	(R	843:36-37[6-7]) Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 5 Peirce	here	implied	that	for	many-perhaps	most-the	humble	argument	is	sufficient	by	itself to	ground	belief	in	the	Reality	of	God;	and	for	those	not	fully	satisfied	by	it,	it	serves	instead	as the	initial	step	of	a	more	rigorous	investigation.	Both	outcomes	are	consistent	with	his	"theory of	the	nature	of	thinking,"	as	captured	in	this	imaginative	metaphor	from	the	published	article: Over the chasm that yawns between the ultimate goal of science and such ideas of Man's	environment	as, coming	over	him	during	his	primeval	wanderings in the forest, while	yet	his	very	notion	of	error	was	of the	vaguest,	he	managed	to	communicate	to some	fellow,	we	are	building	a	cantilever	bridge	of	induction,	held	together	by	scientific struts	and	ties.	Yet	every	plank	of	its	advance	is	first	laid	by	Retroduction	alone,	that	is to	say,	by	the	spontaneous	conjectures	of	instinctive	reason;	and	neither	Deduction	nor Induction	contributes	a	single	new	concept	to	the	structure.	Nor	is	this	less	true	or	less important	for	those	inquiries	that	self-interest	prompts.	(CP	6.475,	EP	2:443,	R	841:5051) We	may	now	formulate	Peirce's	"simple	syllogism"	accordingly. Major premiss ("theory of logic"): Every process of thought that produces a spontaneous	conjecture	of	instinctive	reason	is	logical. Minor premiss ("general description"): The humble argument is a process of thought that	produces	a	spontaneous	conjecture	of	instinctive	reason. Conclusion:	"[T]he	humble	argument	is	logical."7 3.	Peirce's	Pragmaticistic	Proofs Peirce indicated in	"A	Neglected	Argument" that the	primary	experiential consequence	of	his theory of thinking is that humans should exhibit a remarkable tendency to generate retroductive conjectures that successfully withstand subsequent deductive and inductive scrutiny.	He then	contended	that this is	exactly	what	we find to	be the	case,	attributing it to what	Galileo	called	"il lume	naturale"	and	advocating	"that it is the	simpler	Hypothesis in	the sense	of	the	more	facile	and	natural,	the	one	that	instinct	suggests,	that	must	be	preferred"	(CP 6.477,	EP	2:444-445,	R	841:58).8	He	also	explicitly	rejected	the	alternative	explanation: But	may	they	not	have	come	fortuitously,	or	by	some	such	modification	of	chance	as	the Darwinian	supposes?	I	answer	that	three	or	four	independent	methods	of	computation show that it would be ridiculous to suppose our science to have so come to pass ... There	is	a	reason,	an	interpretation,	a	logic,	in	the	course	of	scientific	advance;	and	this indisputably	proves	to	him	who	has	perceptions	of	rational,	or	significant,	relations,	that man's	mind	must	have	been	attuned	to	the	truth	of	things	in	order	to	discover	what	he has	discovered.	It	is	the	very	bed-rock	of	logical	truth.	(CP	6.476,	EP	2:444,	R	841:54-56) Peirce	included	specific	calculations	in	the	manuscripts	to	substantiate	this	claim.	In	one	draft, he	invoked	"the	game	of	twenty	questions"	(R	842:21),	in	which	even	the	best	players	usually require	the	full	allotment	of	"yes"	or	"no"	answers: Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 6 This shows that the class of objects from which the answerer will have made [h]is selection is composed of nearly 220 single objects, or about a	million. Therefore, it is pretty clear that the number of facts with any one of which a conjecture might conceivably	connect	a	surprising	fact	is,	at	the	very	least,	a	million.	Consequently,	if	the conjecturer	were	completely	in	the	dark	...	he	would,	on	the	average	have	to	make	some half	million	of utterly	wrong conjectures	before	he lit on the right one	...	The	darkest mysteries of nature, instead of half a million false conjectures, have not called for a score.	(R	842:22-24) Peirce	then	gave	as	examples	the	orbit	of	Mars	(18	false	hypotheses	by	Kepler	before	the	true one),	the	acceleration	of	a	falling	body	(only	one	by	Galileo),	and	the	nature	of	light	(seven	by various people over the centuries). He also cited "Bernoulli's kinetical theory of gases" and "Dalton's atomic theory" as instances when "the very first definite theories were right" (R 842:25-26).	In	a	later	draft,	he	took	another	approach: It is evident ... that there must be as many independent characters as there are of possible single things ... and evidently there must be as many logically simple hypotheses that	might	be	proposed to	explain	any	given	hypothesis.	Now	well known facts	enable	us	to	assert	that	of	corpuscles	alone	there	are	more	than	1064	in	the	visible universe. But 1014 being the number of seconds in three million years exceeds the number	of	hypotheses	mankind	would	ever	yet	have	lit	upon	since	our	appearance	on earth; so that the odds	would be 1050 to 1,-which	means "utterly overwhelming,"- against	the	right	explanation	of	any	given	fact	having	ever	yet	entered	into	the	mind	of man	by	chance;	to	say	nothing	of	the	labor	of	testing	each	hypothesis.	(R	843:62&64[6061]) Nevertheless, in	the	published	article,	Peirce	was	careful	not	to	overstate	the	prowess	of	this human	instinct: But is it a fact that	man possesses this	magical faculty?	Not, I reply, to the extent of guessing	right	the	first time,	nor	perhaps	the	second;	but	that	the	well-prepared	mind has	wonderfully	soon	guessed	each	secret	of	nature	is	historical	truth.	All	the	theories	of science	have	been	so	obtained.	(CP	6.476,	EP	4:444,	R	841:54) Spontaneous	conjectures that	qualify	as	genuine insights	are	only likely to	arise "wonderfully soon"	in	a	mind	that	is	"well-prepared."	Through	deliberate	training,	we	can	become	more	and more	"attuned	to	the	truth	of	things,"	especially	when	we	concentrate	on	a	particular	field	of inquiry. Even	if	these	"proofs"	of	Peirce's	theory	of	thinking	are	convincing,	there	is	still	the	matter	of whether this is adequate to "prove" the hypothesis of God's Reality. In CP 6.491, Peirce admitted	an	"obvious"	and	"redoubtable"	objection: For	example, it	may	be	said	that	since	I	compare	man's	power	of	guessing	at	the	truth with	the	instincts	of	animals,	I	ought	to	have	noticed	that	these	are	entirely	explained	by the	action	of	natural	selection in	endowing	animals	with	such	powers	as	contribute	to the	preservation	of	their	different	stocks;	and	that	there is	evidence	that	man's	power Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 7 of	penetrating	the	secrets	of	nature	depends	upon	this,	in	the	fact	that	all	the	successful sciences have been either mechanical in respect to their theories or psychological ... Metaphysics, however, cannot adapt the human race to maintaining itself, and therefore the	presumption is that	man	has	no such	genius for	discoveries about	God, Freedom,	and	Immortality,	as	he	has	for	physical	and	psychical	science;	and	the	history of	science	supports	this	view.	(R	844:14-15[5-6]) Hartshorne and Weiss inserted CP 6.492-493 at this point, presumably to serve as Peirce's response, even though he wrote it more than a decade earlier. However, the manuscript includes	additional	remarks	that	serve	precisely	that	purpose: This	opens	an	interesting	question	of	logic	to	which	I	have	devoted	much	study,	with	the result of fully satisfying myself that man's power of divining the truth is not so circumscribed. My reply to this	objection	could	not	be	given	here	nor in	any	piece to	be read	at	one sitting.	My	reply	would	show	that	whatever	general	conduct	of	a	race	would	fit	or	disfit its	individuals	to	the	life	to	come,	may	be	expected	also	to	adapt	or	maladapt	the	race itself to maintaining its footing in this world; and further to show, through its pragmaticistic	interpretation,	that	the	belief	in	the	Ens	necessarium	would	according	as it	were	true	or	false,	fit	or	disfit	individuals	to	eternal	life	hereafter.	And	consequently, natural	selection	naturally	will	act	here	on	earth	to	the	cultivation	of	this	belief,	if	it	be true,	and	to	its	suppression	if	it	be	false,	just	as	it	acts	in	respect	to	ordinary	morality.	(R 844:15[6]) Since	Peirce	mentioned the "pragmaticistic interpretation"	of "the	belief in	Ens	necessarium" here, and offered "hints" regarding "the pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium" in CP 6.490, unpacking this additional "neglected argument" requires first conducting a careful analysis	of	that	other	version	of	the	ending	of	the	first	additament. 4.	Peirce's	Considered	Cosmology The published article begins by stating, "The word 'God' ... is the definable proper name, signifying	Ens	necessarium;	in	my	belief	Really	creator	of	all	three	Universes	of	Experience"	(CP 6.452, EP 2:434, R 841:1). Although some have interpreted Peirce's views as amenable to pantheism or panentheism, in several manuscript fragments Peirce appended an emphatic denial	that	God	is	immanent	in	Nature	or	the	three	Universes: ...	Who,	out	of	Nothing,	less	than	a	blank,	is	creating	all	three	Universes	of	experience.	I do	not	mean,	then,	a	"soul	of	the	World"	or	an	intelligence	is	"immanent"	in	Nature,	but is	the	Creator	of	the	three	Universes	of	minds,	of	matter,	and	of	ideal	possibilities,	and of	everything	in	them.	(R	843:11[1]) Indeed,	meaning by "God," as throughout this paper	will be	meant, the Being	whose Attributes	are, in	the	main,	those	usually	ascribed	to	Him,	Omniscience,	Omnipotence, Infinite	Benignity,	a	Being	not	"immanent	in"	the	Universes	of	Matter,	Mind,	and	Ideas, but	the	Sole	Creator	of	every	content	of	them	without	exception	...	(R	843:18&20[1-2]) Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 8 But	I	had	better	add	that	I	do	not	mean	by	God	a	being	merely	"immanent	in	Nature," but	I	mean	that	Being	who	has	created	every	content	of	the	world	of	ideal	possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and the world of all minds, without any exception whatever.	(R	843:25[4]) These passages shed valuable light on not only Peirce's concept of God, but also the three Universes, which are metaphysical counterparts of the phenomenological Categories that pervaded	his	philosophical	thought:	1ns,	2ns,	and	3ns.9	"A	Neglected	Argument"	identifies	them as	consisting	of	(1)	Ideas,	(2)	Brute	Actuality,	and	(3)	Signs;	they	evidently	also	include	(1)	ideal possibilities,	(2)	Matter	and	physical	facts,	and	(3)	Mind	and	minds.	A	few	months	later,	Peirce gave similar descriptions of "three	Universes,	which are distinguished by three	Modalities of Being"-but	with	habits, laws,	and	(especially)	continua	as	constituents	of	the	third	one-in	a draft letter to Lady Victoria	Welby (EP 2:478-479; 1908),	where they served as the basis for dividing	his	ten	semeiotic	trichotomies	into	(1)	Possibles,	(2)	Existents,	and	(3)	Necessitants. The	second	additament	characterizes	the	humble	argument	as	"that	course	of	meditation	upon the	three	Universes	which	gives	birth	to	the	hypothesis	and	ultimately	to	the	belief	that	they,	or at	any	rate	two	of	the	three,	have	a	Creator	independent	of	them"	(CP	6.483,	EP	2:448).	Which one	might	not?	Peirce	provided	the	answer	in	one	of	the	drafts,	and	also	clarified	why	he	was arguing	for	the	Reality	of	God,	rather	than	the	existence	of	God: Thus, He is so	much like a	mind, and so little like a singular Existent (meaning by an Existent,	or	object	that	Exists,	a	thing	subject	to	brute	constraints,	and	reacting	with	all other Existents,) and so opposed in His Nature to an ideal possibility, that we may loosely	say	that	He	is	a	Spirit,	or	Mind.	(R	843:26[5]) This	brings	us	to	CP	6.490: A	full	exposition	of	the	pragmaticistic	definition	of	Ens	necessarium	would	require	many pages;	but	some	hints	toward	it	may	be	given.	A	disembodied	spirit,	or	pure	mind,	has its	being	out	of	time,	since	all	that it is	destined	to	think	is	fully in its	being	at	any	and every	previous time.	But in	endless time it is	destined to think	all that it is capable	of thinking.	Order is	simply	thought	embodied in	arrangement;	and	thought	embodied in any	other	way	appears	objectively	as	a	character	that is	a	generalization	of	order,	and that, in the lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce, 'Super-order.' It is something like uniformity. The idea	may be caught if it is described as that of	which order	and	uniformity	are	particular	varieties.	Pure	mind,	as	creative	of	thought,	must,	so far	as it is	manifested	in	time,	appear	as	having	a	character	related	to	the	habit-taking capacity,	just	as	super-order	is	related	to	uniformity.	(R	844:6) God	is	"pure	mind,"	and	hence	may	not	be	completely independent	of	the	(third)	Universe	of Mind,	while	nevertheless	being	the	Creator	of	everything	else in	that	Universe,	as	well	as	the other two	Universes in their entirety.	Pure	mind is "out	of time"	and creates thought,	which when	"embodied	...	appears	objectively"	as "super-order,"	of	which	order	and	uniformity	are familiar exemplifications. The thought-creating character of pure	mind is to the habit-taking capacity	as	super-order	is	to	uniformity.	Since	uniformity	is	a	particular	variety	of	super-order, the	habit-taking	capacity	must	be	a	particular	variety	of	the	thought-creating	character	of	pure Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 9 mind. Note that all of these concepts-mind, thought, order, uniformity, habit-taking-are paradigmatic	examples	of	3ns. At	first	glance,	this	might	seem	to	contradict	Peirce's	earlier	cosmological	writings,	such	as	an oft-cited	narrative	in	"A	Guess	at	the	Riddle": Out	of	the	womb	of	indeterminacy	we	must	say	that	there	would	have	come	something, by the	principle	of	Firstness,	which	we	may	call	a flash.	Then	by the	principle	of	habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash	was in some sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would	have	come	other	successions	ever	more	and	more	closely	connected,	the	habits and	the	tendency	to	take	them	ever	strengthening	themselves,	until the	events	would have	been	bound	together into	something like	a	continuous	flow.	(CP	1.412,	EP	1:278; 1887-1888) Most commentators have interpreted these and similar remarks as indicating that 1ns came first,	so	to	speak,	followed	by	2ns	and	then	3ns-all	as	chance	events.10	Peirce	acknowledged	as much	in	one	manuscript	draft	of	"A	Neglected	Argument,"	calling	it	his	"original	hypothesis"	as defended	in	six	articles	in	The	Monist	of	1891-1893.11	However,	he	then	added: But	during	the	long	years	which	have	elapsed	since	the	hypothesis	first	suggested	itself to	me,	it	may	naturally	be	supposed	that	faulty	features	of	the	original	hypothesis	have been	brought	[to]	my	attention	by	others	and	have	struck	me	in	my	own	meditations	... Professor	Ogden	Rood	pointed	out	that	there	must	have	been	some	original	tendency	to take	habits	which	did	not	arise	according	to	my	hypothesis	...	(R	842:113-114[127-128]) If	the	tendency	to	take	habits	was	truly	"original,"	then	3ns	must	have	preceded	1ns	and	2ns	in some	sense.12	Furthermore,	if	God	created	all	Ideas	(1ns)	and	Matter	(2ns),	while	God	Himself	is Mind (3ns), then the latter	must	be	primordial relative to the	other two.	As	we	will see, this resolution comes from recognizing that Peirce associated "the	womb	of indeterminacy"	with 3ns,	rather	than	1ns	as	one	might	initially	assume. Returning to CP 6.490, a difficult passage comes next. In context, it is best understood as a reductio	ad	absurdum for	any	claim	that	our	existing	universe	came	about	on its	own,	out	of absolutely	nothing: Now	imagine,	in	such	vague	way	as	such	a	thing	can	be	imagined,	a	perfect	cosmology of the three	universes. It	would	prove	all in relation to that subject that reason	could desiderate;	and	of	course	all	that	it	would	prove	must, in	actual	fact,	now	be	true.	But reason	would	desiderate	that	that	should	be	proved	from	which	would	follow	all	that	is in fact true	of the three	universes;	and the	postulate from	which	all this	would follow must	not	state	any	matter	of	fact,	since	such	fact	would	thereby	be	left	unexplained.	(R 844:6-7) The "postulate"	underlying	a "perfect cosmology" cannot rely	on "any	matter	of fact,"	which would	then	have	to	be	accepted	as	inexplicable.	Peirce	could	never	countenance	this,	because it	blocks	the	way	of	inquiry	(CP	1.139,	EP	2:49,	RLT13	179-180;	1898).	Instead: Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 10 That perfect cosmology must therefore show that the whole history of the three universes, as it has been and is to be,	would follow from	a premise	which	would not suppose them to	exist at all.	Moreover, such	premise	must in	actual fact	be true.	But that premise must represent a state of things in which the three universes were completely	nil.	Consequently,	whether	in	time	or	not,	the	three	universes	must	actually be	absolutely	necessary	results	of	a	state	of	utter	nothingness.	(R	844:7) But	how	can	anything	possibly-let	alone	actually,	much	less	necessarily-result	from	"a	state of	utter	nothingness"?	On	the	contrary,	in	that	state	there	can	be	no	super-order	at	all: We	cannot	ourselves	conceive	of	such	a	state	of	nility;	but	we	can	easily	conceive	that there	should	be	a	mind	that	could	conceive it, since,	after	all,	no	contradiction	can	be involved in	mere	nonexistence.	A state in	which there should	be	absolutely	no superorder	whatsoever	would be such a state of nility. For all Being involves some kind of super-order	...	Any	such	super-order	would	be	a	super-habit.	Any	general	state	of	things whatsoever	would	be	a	super-order	and	a	super-habit.	(R	844:7) No	order,	no	uniformity,	no	habits,	no	generality,	and	thus	no	3ns-in	short,	there	is	no	Being within "such a state of nility," because "all Being involves some kind of super-order." Consequently,	the	Reality	of	God-necessary	Being,	transcendent	3ns-is	the	only	postulate	or premise	that	can	account	for	the	reality	of	all	three	Universes,	without	already	assuming	it.	God as	eternal	mind	conceived	the	state	of	nility,	and	then	created	everything	else: In	that	state	of	absolute	nility,	in	or	out	of	time,	that	is,	before	or	after	the	evolution	of time,	there	must	then	have	been	a	tohu-bohu	of	which	nothing	whatever	affirmative	or negative	was true universally. There	must have been, therefore, a little of everything conceivable.	(R	844:7-8) This is	an	allusion	to	Genesis	1:2;	the	Hebrew	phrase	tohu	wa	bohu is	translated	as	"formless and void," and Peirce elsewhere identified it with "the indeterminate germinal Nothing" (R 942:19;	c.	1898).	He	also	once	described	the	initial	situation	in	semeiotic	terms	reminiscent	of the	opening	statement	of	the	Gospel	of	John,	"In	the	beginning	was	the	Word	[logos]": If	we are to explain the universe,	we	must assume that there	was in the beginning a state	of things in	which there	was	nothing, no reaction	and	no	quality, no	matter, no consciousness,	no	space	and	no	time,	but	just	nothing	at	all.	Not	determinately	nothing. For that which is determinately not	A supposes the being of	A in some	mode. Utter indetermination. But a symbol alone is indeterminate. Therefore, Nothing, the indeterminate of the absolute beginning, is a symbol. That is the way in which the beginning	of	things	can	alone	be	understood.	(EP	2:322;	c.	1904) Rather	than	"utter	nothingness,"	it	was	"utter	indetermination,"	and	thus	"a	little	of	everything conceivable"-an	infinite	spectrum	of	genuine	possibilities,	but	still	no	actualities	or	necessities: We	start,	then,	with	nothing,	pure	zero	...	It	is	the	germinal	nothing,	in	which	the	whole universe	is	involved	or	foreshadowed.	As	such,	it	is	absolutely	undefined	and	unlimited Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 11 possibility-boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom. So	of	potential	being	there	was	in	that	initial	state	no	lack. Now the	question arises,	what necessarily resulted from that state of things?	But the only	sane	answer	is	that	where	freedom	was	boundless	nothing	in	particular	necessarily resulted.	(CP	6.217-218;	1898) This conforms to Peirce's definition of a continuum-which, like a symbol, is another paradigmatic example of 3ns. It does not consist of any	multitude of	discrete individuals, as Georg Cantor and others held, but of potential individuals exceeding all multitude that are welded together, and hence indistinct (CP 6.185, RLT 247; 1898). Even this description is misleading,	because	the	contiguous	individuals	do	not	comprise	the	continuum;	the	latter	is	the more	fundamental	concept	(CP	6.191,	RLT	258;	1898).	Continuity	is	generality,	and	generality	is impossible	in	the	absence	of	super-order	and	super-habit.	Finally,	from	CP	6.490: There	must	have	been	here	and	there	a little	undifferentiated	tendency	to	take	superhabits.	But such	a	state	must tend to increase itself. For	a tendency to	act in	any	way combined	with	a	tendency	to	take	habits	must	increase	the	tendency	to	act	in	that	way. Now	substitute	in	this	general	statement	for	"tendency	to	act	in	any	way"	a	tendency	to take habits, and we see that that tendency would grow. It would also become differentiated	in	various	ways.	(R	844:8) This	says	much	the	same	thing	as	the	last	sentence	quoted	above	from	"A	Guess	at	the	Riddle." Clearly	Peirce	did	not	change	his	basic	cosmology	over	the	intervening	two	decades;	he	simply clarified	that	the	Reality	of	God	is	indispensable	to	it.14 5.	Peirce's	Diagrammatic	Discourse Such an understanding is compatible with Peirce's extensive remarks on the subject in his eighth	and	final	Cambridge	Conferences	lecture	(CP	6.192-208,	RLT	258-263;	1898).	According to	that	detailed	account,	"the	existing	universe,	with	all	its	arbitrary	secondness,	is	an	offshoot from, or an arbitrary determination of, a	world of ideas, a Platonic	world [1ns]" (CP 6.192). However, "the process of derivation" began "in the utter vagueness of completely undetermined and dimensionless potentiality [3ns]" (CP 6.193); it was "a contraction of the vagueness	of	that	potentiality	of	everything	in	general,	but	of	nothing	in	particular"	(CP	6.196). As	a	result,	"The	general	indefinite	potentiality	became	limited	and	heterogeneous"	(CP	6.199); specifically: The	very	first	and	most	fundamental	element	that	we	have	to	assume	is	a	Freedom,	or Chance,	or	Spontaneity	[1ns],	by	virtue	of	which	the	general	vague	nothing-in-particularness [3ns] that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite qualities. The second element	we	have to	assume is that there	could	be	accidental reactions [2ns]	between those qualities. The qualities themselves are mere eternal possibilities. But these reactions	we	must	think	of	as	events.	(CP	6.200) Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 12 Within	space	and	time,	"all	that	there is, is	First,	Feelings;	Second,	Efforts;	Third,	Habits";	and ultimately,	"dead	matter	would	be	merely	the	final	result	of	the	complete induration	of	habit reducing the free play of feeling and the	brute irrationality of effort to complete death" (CP 6.201). Peirce's goal throughout this discussion was "to secure to thirdness its really commanding function,"	while	recognizing	"that	Firstness,	or	chance,	and	Secondness,	or	Brute	reaction,	are other	elements,	without	the	independence	of	which	Thirdness	would	not	have	anything	upon which	to	operate"	(CP	6.202).	As	"the	clue	...	to	guide	us	through	the	maze,"	he	proposed	that "the clean blackboard" can serve as "a sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," differing from it by having only two dimensions rather than "some indefinite multitude of dimensions."	A	chalk	line	drawn	on	the	blackboard	represents	the	spontaneous	introduction	of a	brute	discontinuity.	However,	the	mark	itself	it	is	not	really	a	line;	it	is	a	surface	with	its	own continuity,	which	is	entirely	derived	from	and	dependent	on	that	of	the	underlying	blackboard. The	only	true line is	the limit	of	the	white	and	black	areas,	and	this is	the	discontinuity-"the reaction	between	two	continuous	surfaces	into	which	it	is	separated"	(CP	6.203). Peirce thus acknowledged that all three Categories-whiteness or blackness (1ns), their boundary (2ns), and the continuity of each (3ns)-are necessary for the reality of the chalk mark	(CP	6.205).	However,	the	continuity	of	the	blackboard	(3ns)	is	primordial,	in	the	sense	that its	reality	precedes	and	sustains	that	of	anything	drawn	upon	it;	this	is	"its	really	commanding function."	A	chalk	mark	that	persists,	rather	than	being	erased,	represents	the	establishment	of a	habit-which	is	also	entirely	derived	from	and	dependent	on	the	continuity	of	the	underlying blackboard: This	habit	is	a	generalizing	tendency,	and	as	such	a	generalization,	and	as	such	a	general, and	as	such	a	continuum	or	continuity.	It	must	have	its	origin	in	the	original	continuity which is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which	is	essentially	general.	(CP	6.204) As	additional	marks	are	drawn	and	persist, they join together	due	to	other	developing	habits and become "reacting systems," which aggregate and merge into larger such systems (CP 6.206-207). Eventually, "out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual	universe	of	existence	in	which	we	happen	to	be"	(CP	6.208). This	was	not	the	first	time	that	Peirce	had	employed	such	an	illustration	during	the	Cambridge Conferences	series.	In	the	third	lecture,	he	stated: The	whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a continuum, upon	which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the essential Secondness of Existence, a discontinuous	mark-like	a line figure	drawn	on the	area	of the	blackboard. (RLT	162; 1898) We	can	harmonize	the	two	passages	by	invoking	an	aspect	of	Peirce's	concept	of	a	continuum that	he	attributed	to	Immanuel	Kant:	It	is	"that	of	which	every	part	has	parts	of	the	same	kind" (CP 6.168; 1903). Each "Platonic world" is represented on the continuous blackboard by a melded group of	white	marks, so these	must also be conceived collectively as a continuous blackboard in	some	sense.	For the	sake	of	clarity, let	us	differentiate the latter	by	calling it	a Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 13 "whiteboard" instead, noting again that its own continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. It is then "a discontinuous mark" on one particular	whiteboard	that	represents	"this	Universe	of	Actual	Existence." Peirce declared plainly the pedagogical approach that he was utilizing by describing his cosmology in such terms: "Now the clue that I mentioned consists in making our thought diagrammatic	and	mathematical,	by	treating	generality from	the	point	of	view	of	geometrical continuity, and	by	experimenting	upon the	diagram" (CP	6.204).15	As	he	had	explained years earlier: [Diagrammatic reasoning] consists of constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose	parts shall	present	a	complete	analogy	with those	of the	parts	of the	object	of reasoning,	of experimenting	upon this image in the imagination, and	of	observing the result	so	as	to	discover	unnoticed	and	hidden	relations	among	the	parts.	(CP	3.363,	EP 1:227;	1885) Furthermore,	"The	skeletonization	or	diagrammatization	of	the	problem	serves	more	purposes than	one;	but	its	principal	purpose	is	to	strip	the	significant	relations	of	all	disguise"	(CP	3.559; 1898).	Two	questions	now	arise:	What	are the relevant	parts	of the	blackboard	diagram,	and what	significant	relations	does	it	embody	and	expose?	Initially	it	seems	that	the	only	parts	are the	blackboard	itself	and	the	chalk	marks	upon	it;	and	the	only	relations	are	the	discontinuity	of the	boundary	between	black	and	white,	and	how	the	continuity	of	the	marks	depends	on	that of	the	underlying	blackboard.	The	aggregation	of	persistent	marks	entails	additional	relations. With	further	consideration	comes	the	recognition	that	chalk	marks	do	not	just	randomly	appear on a	blackboard, especially	not in intelligible	patterns such	as the "new	curve" that emerges when	they	"multiply	themselves	under	the	habit	of	being	tangent	to	the	envelope"	(CP	6.206). Instead, someone has to draw them; and this person's relation to them is that of creator to creation: Those	who	express	the	idea	to	themselves	by	saying	that	the	Divine	Creator	determined so	and	so	may	be	incautiously	clothing	the	idea	in	a	garb	that	is	open	to	criticism,	but	it is,	after	all, substantially the	only	philosophical	answer to the	problem. (CP	6.199,	RLT 259;	1898) As	Peirce	later	wrote: A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is absolutely nothing; and therefore	pure	nothing	was such a chaos. Then	pure indeterminacy	having	developed determinate	possibilities,	creation	consisted	in	mediating	between	the	lawless	reactions and	the	general	possibilities	by	the	influx	of	a	symbol.	This	symbol	was	the	purpose	of creation.	Its	object	was	the	entelechy	of	being	which	is	the	ultimate	representation.	(EP 2:324;	c.	1904) God	as	Ens	necessarium,	eternal	pure	mind,	creative	of thought (third	Universe), imagines	an inexhaustible continuum of real possibilities and their combinations (first Universe), and exercises	perfect	freedom	in	choosing	which	of	these	to	actualize	(second	Universe).	This	is	the Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 14 hierarchy of Being in terms of Peirce's three Categories (3ns→1ns→2ns). The sequence of events in each case consists of spontaneity followed by reaction and then habit-taking (1ns→2ns→3ns).	The	evolution	of	states	within	our	existing	universe	(CP	1.409,	EP	1.277;	18871888) is from complete chaos in the infinite past, through this ongoing process at any assignable	date,	to	complete	regularity	in	the	infinite	future	(1ns→3ns→2ns).16 6.	Peirce's	Semeiotic	Synechism In	other	words,	cosmology	is	not	reducible	to	cosmogony;	it	concerns	not	only	what	occurred	in the	distant	past,	but	also	what	is	happening	right	now: This development of Reason consists, you will observe, in embodiment, that is, in manifestation.	The	creation	of the	universe,	which	did	not take	place	during	a certain busy	week, in	the	year	4004	B.C.,	but is	going	on	today	and	never	will	be	done, is this very	developement	of	Reason	...	Under	this	conception,	the ideal	of	conduct	will	be	to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering	the	world	more	reasonable	whenever,	as	the	slang	is,	it	is	"up	to	us"	to	do	so. In	logic,	it	will	be	observed	that	knowledge	is	reasonableness;	and	the	ideal	of	reasoning will be to follow such methods as must develope knowledge the most speedily. (CP 1.615,	EP	2:255;	1903) We	have the	opportunity to	participate	voluntarily in	God's still-unfolding	creative	activity	by "rendering	the	world	more	reasonable."	In	semeiotic	terms: ...	the	universe is	a	vast	representamen,	a	great	symbol	of	God's	purpose,	working	out its	conclusions	in	living	realities.	Now	every	symbol	must	have,	organically	attached	to	it, its Indices	of	Reactions	and its Icons	of	Qualities;	and	such	part	as	these	reactions	and these qualities play in an argument that, they of course, play in the universe-that Universe	being	precisely	an	argument	...	The	Universe	as	an	argument is	necessarily a great	work	of	art,	a	great	poem-for	every	fine	argument	is	a	poem	and	a	symphony- just	as	every	true	poem	is	a	sound	argument.	(CP	5.119,	EP	2:193-194;	1903) According	to	Peirce,	"Reality,	therefore,	can	only	be	regarded	as	the	limit	of	the	endless	series of	symbols.	A	symbol is	essentially	a	purpose, that is to	say, is	a	representation	that	seeks	to make	itself	definite,	or	seeks	to	produce	an	interpretant	more	definite	than	itself"	(EP	2:323;	c. 1904).	Moreover,	"An	Argument	is	a	sign	which	distinctly	represents	the	Interpretant,	called	its Conclusion, which it is intended to determine" (CP 2.95; 1902). In the published article, he stated, "An 'Argument' is any process of thought reasonably tending to produce a definite belief"	(CP	6.456,	EP	2:435,	R	841:6),	and	later	added: The hypothesis of God is a peculiar one, in that it supposes an infinitely incomprehensible	object,	although	every	hypothesis,	as	such,	supposes	its	object	to	be truly conceived in the hypothesis. This leaves the hypothesis but one way of understanding itself; namely, as vague but as true so far as it is definite, and as continually tending to define itself more and more, and without limit ... Thus, the hypothesis	will lead	to	our	thinking	of	features	of	each	Universe	as	purposed;	and	this will	stand	or	fall	with	the	hypothesis.	Yet	a	purpose	essentially	involves	growth,	and	so Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 15 cannot be attributed to	God. Still it	will, according to the hypothesis, be less false to speak	so,	than	to	represent	God	as	purposeless.	(CP	6.466,	EP	2:439-440,	R	841:29-31) In summary, our existing universe is a Representamen-specifically, an Argument, and therefore	a	Symbol;	a	manifestation	primarily	of	3ns,	but	necessarily	involving	elements	of	1ns (Icons	of	Qualities)	and	2ns	(Indices	of	Reactions).	The	Dynamic	Object	is	God	Himself,	infinitely incomprehensible	to	us;	and	the	Immediate	Object	is	God's	purpose,	which	is	the	development of Reason-including the growth of our knowledge of God, and of all three Universes of Experience that	He	has created	and is still creating. The Interpretant is the	Conclusion, living realities that our existing universe is constantly working out-the Immediate Interpretant serving	as	the	range	of	possibilities	from	which	individual	Dynamic	Interpretants	are	actualized, and	the	habit-taking	tendency	developing	some	of	these	into	Final	Interpretants.	This	Argument produces a belief that is initially vague, but continually becomes more and more definite, without	limit.17 We	are	at	last	in	a	position	to	understand	Peirce's	reply	to	the	objection	that	the	competence of	humanity's	instinctive	reason	is	limited	to	"the	secrets	of	nature."	If	the	cosmology	detailed above	is	correct,	then	there	is	no	such	discontinuity	in	Reality	itself,	our	experience	thereof,	or the knowledge that it provides.18 Given the success of our spontaneous conjectures in mathematics, phenomenology, and the special sciences, why would metaphysics be any different?	Moreover,	God	is	not	completely	independent	of	the	third	Universe,	which	includes our	minds	and	continuity itself; and	our	disposition to	generate true	hypotheses is	especially well-suited	to	that	Category: It	appears	to	me	that	the	clearest	statement	we	can	make	of	the	logical	situation-the freest from all questionable admixture-is to say that	man has a certain Insight, not strong enough to be oftener right than wrong, but strong enough not to be overwhelmingly more often wrong than right, into the Thirdnesses, the general elements,	of	Nature.	(CP	5.173,	EP	2:217;	1903) Peirce's favorite name for his comprehensive system of thought	was "Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity" (CP 6.202, RLT 261; 1898) and "insists upon the idea of continuity	as	of	prime importance in	philosophy" (CP	6.169;	1902).	The	hypothesis	of	God	as Ens	necessarium	explains	not	only	the	origin	of	the	three	Universes	of	Experience,	but	also	their order (cosmos)-what "A Neglected Argument" calls the "homogeneities of connectedness" within each of them, as	well as the "homogeneities and connections between two different Universes, or all three" (CP 6.464-465, EP 2:438-439, R 841:24&26).19 Peirce went on to describe	the	natural	results	of	observing	and	contemplating	these	with	no	particular	agenda: ...	in	the	Pure	Play	of	Musement	the	idea	of	God's	Reality	will	be	sure	sooner	or	later	to be	found	an	attractive	fancy,	which	the	Muser	will	develop	in	various	ways.	The	more	he ponders	it,	the	more	it	will	find	response	in	every	part	of	his	mind,	for	its	beauty,	for	its supplying an ideal of life, and for its thoroughly satisfactory explanation of his	whole threefold	environment.	(CP	6.465,	EP	2:439,	R	841:29) Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 16 ...	any	normal	man	who	considers	the	three	Universes in	the light	of	the	hypothesis	of God's Reality, and pursues that line of reflexion in scientific singleness of heart, will come to be stirred to the depths of his nature by the beauty of the idea and by its august practicality, even to the point of earnestly loving and adoring his strictly hypothetical	God,	and	to	that	of	desiring	above	all	things	to	shape	the	whole	conduct	of life and all the springs of action into conformity with that hypothesis. Now to be deliberately and thoroughly prepared to shape one's conduct into conformity with a proposition is neither more nor less than the state of mind called Believing that proposition, however long the conscious classification of it under that head be postponed.	(CP	6.467,	EP	2:440,	R	841:32-34) The same outcomes presumably await each one of us who engages in good faith in such meditations	as	Peirce	recommended.20 Notes 1 Citations given as CP with volume and paragraph number(s) and year(s) originally written are from (Peirce 1931-1958). 2 Citations given as EP with volume and page number(s) and year(s) originally written are from (Peirce 1992-1998). 3 Citations of Peirce given as R with manuscript number(s) and year originally written are per (Robin 1967). The manuscripts are maintained by Houghton Library at Harvard University. Page numbers correspond to the microfilm sequence as reproduced in the digital images made available online (http://fromthepage.com/collection/show?collection_id=16) by the Scalable Peirce Interpretation Network (SPIN), followed by Peirce's handwritten page numbers [in square brackets] where he provided ones that differ. 4 Richmond (2005) introduced these handy abbreviations (also http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/richmond/trikonic.htm). They are especially useful when diagramming relations in terms of Peirce's Categories; in particular, the six possible "vectors" for moving through them (see note 16). 5 Clarke (1977) highlighted this difficulty and derived "the outline of a scientific methodology for theology" (p. 286) from Peirce's solutions in CP 6.490-491. Daniel-Hughes (2015) similarly distilled "a Peircean program for theology" (p. 121) from the article as a whole. 6 Reuter (1994) was highly critical of the published article because it "fails to accomplish what it sets out to do: compel belief in the reality of God" (p. 290); but Peirce's actual objective was clearly much less ambitious. In fact, Canteñs (2004) recognized that, "if one finds Peirce's argument persuasive, then the classical and contemporary evidentialist's criteria for determining what is to be considered a rationally justified belief in the reality of God is undermined" (p. 771). 7 Atkins (2016) offered a comparable formalization, using Peirce's alternative term for retroduction: "(1) Abduction is a valid inference form under the conditions noted earlier. (2) Certain lines of thought that lead to belief in God's reality are abductive inferences that satisfy those conditions. So, (3) belief in God's reality is rationally acceptable" (p. 112). The conditions are: "(1) one has no significant countervailing reasons to deny it, (2) it explains some phenomenon, (3) it has experimental consequences such that it can be put to the test, and (4) it is natural in the sense that it is the one instinct suggests" (p. 110). Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 17 8 Nubiola (2004) focused on this aspect of "A Neglected Argument" and presented it as a properly formulated abduction (CP 5.189, EP 2:231): The efficiency of the scientist (guessing right between innumerable hypotheses) is a really surprising fact. If God were the creator of human cognitive abilities and of nature this efficiency would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that God is the creator of human minds and nature. However, as Gary Fuhrman pointed out in e-mail correspondence, "human minds and nature come from the same source" and "human minds are part of nature" are equally plausible explanations that do not require the Reality of God. 9 It is impossible to provide an adequate explanation of Peirce's Categories in a few sentences. Very briefly, they are the only three types of indecomposable elements that together comprise "the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not" (CP 1.284; 1905). 1ns is quality, feeling, spontaneity, vagueness, possibility; 2ns is reaction, effort, bruteness, determinacy, actuality; and 3ns is mediation, thought, purpose, generality, regularity. All three Categories are always there in every phenomenon, but one of them may be predominant from a particular point of view. For example, in Peirce's semeiotic, an icon, such as a painting, primarily relates to its object through some kind of resemblance (1ns); an index, such as a fingerprint, due to a physical or other direct connection (2ns); and a symbol, such as a word, by means of a convention or rule (3ns). For one of Peirce's most extensive expositions of his Categories, see CP 1.417-520 (c. 1896). 10 Nathan Houser's introductory retelling of "Peirce's cosmological story" (EP 1:xxxii-xxxiii) is typical in this regard. His statement that, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the chaos is self-actualizing" reflects what is problematic about such an interpretation-it leaves the emergence of something from nothing, or at least the crucial transition from 1ns (possibility) to 2ns (actuality), unexplained. Examples of other relevant passages include CP 6.585 (1890), CP 8.317 (1891), CP 6.33 (EP 1:297; 1891), CP 6.262 (EP 1:347; 1892), and CP 6.606&612 (1893). Some of them begin to anticipate the later developments that are emphasized in this essay. 11 The six articles appear as CP 6.7-34, CP 6.35-65, CP 6.102-163, CP 6.238-271, CP 6.287-317, and CP 6.588-618; the first five also appear as EP 1:285-371. They include the last four of the six passages referenced in note 10. 12 Peirce supposedly had intended to author a seventh installment that would have clarified this very point: Had a purposed article concerning the principle of continuity and synthetising the ideas of the other articles of a series in the early volumes of The Monist ever been written, it would have appeared how, with thorough consistency, that theory involved the recognition that continuity is an indispensable element of reality ... Yet even in its truncated condition, an extra-intelligent reader might discern that the theory of those cosmological articles made reality to consist in something more than feeling [1ns] and action [2ns] could supply, inasmuch as the primeval chaos, where those two elements were present, was explicitly shown to be pure nothing ... the third category-the category of thought, representation, triadic relation, mediation, genuine thirdness, thirdness as such-is an essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, since this category (which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit) can Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 18 have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being of feeling on which to act. (CP 5.436, EP 2:345; 1905) 13 Citations given as RLT with page number(s) are from (Peirce 1992). 14 Short (2011) curiously denied that Peirce ultimately had a cosmology at all, claiming that he abandoned any such notion after 1898, only briefly mentioning the passage quoted in note 12, and saying nothing about CP 6.490. By contrast, Rohatyn (1982) described the latter as "an interesting and worthwhile argument for the existence [sic] of God" (p. 68). He rearranged it into an Argumentation in Peirce's sense (CP 6.456, EP 2:435, R 841:6), with nine distinct steps, and then raised five objections. In a delightful twist, Rohatyn proceeded to answer them on Peirce's behalf, concluding that CP 6.490 "is a defensible piece of tightly controlled cosmological speculation, worthy of our philosophical attention" (p. 73). 15 Hull (2005) suggested that "the method for arriving at the God-hypothesis is fundamentally tied to a general theory about the use of diagrams in our reasoning" (p. 494), and that this is what Peirce meant by "a theory of the nature of thinking" in CP 6.491. 16 Guardiano (2015) also discerned three distinct but complementary interpretations of Peirce's cosmological writings by adopting each individual Category's point of view when analyzing them. As arranged in this paragraph of the essay, they align with the perspectives that Guardiano associated with 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns, respectively. Because of such "trichotomic logic" and other "unique theoretical merits," he argued that "Peirce's theory amounts to a reasonable abduction" (p. 313). Richmond (2005) labeled the corresponding vectors as "representation," "order," and "process," respectively (p. 460). 17 A semeiotic cosmology is to be expected, if indeed the hierarchy of Being follows the vector of representation (see note 16). Raposa (1989) understood Peirce's approach as a "theosemiotic" in which "the problem of religious knowledge is to be conceived primarily as a problem of signinterpretation" (p. 148). Atkins (2016) called the sharing of a true belief by multiple persons "cognitive welding" (p. 154) and added, "When all of our external cognitions [3ns], wills [2ns], and sentiments [1ns] overlap with God's, then we will all be welded into the universal continuum. This unity is not yet understood in our sciences but can be comprehended in poetry and in religion" (p. 163). 18 Raposa (1989) made much the same point: "If all of reality is continuous, then everything is potentially a sign of God's presence" (p. 146). Daniel-Hughes (2015) commented that what is often named "the scientific argument" in the secondary literature-"the third argument of the nest" (CP 6.488, EP 2:446, R 844:2)-would be better designated as "the continuity argument" (p. 122, note 4). 19 Hull (2005) posited that the published article "may be read as Peirce's offering toward a method of reasoning about true continua" (p. 498). In her view, this involves treating the three Universes of Experience as mathematical sets or collections, and then using diagrams to explore their relations. The blackboard illustration was her primary example. 20 This essay was prompted by a series of discussions that took place via the Peirce-L e-mail list (http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm) in the late summer and early autumn of 2016. I appreciate the helpful feedback that I received from the diverse community of inquirers who participate in that forum. I am especially grateful to the moderator, Gary Richmond, who (among other things) introduced me to the notion that the blackboard in Peirce's diagram represents a kind of "ur-continuity" or primordial 3ns, which served as a theater for the Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 19 emergence of all three Categories as we experience them in our existing universe; Edwina Taborsky, who disagreed with me forcefully on multiple occasions, thereby repeatedly challenging me to sharpen my thinking and argumentation; and Jeffrey Downard, who founded SPIN and directed me to its website (see note 3), which will surely be an invaluable resource to Peirce scholars for many years to come. I also owe thanks to the anonymous reviewers who provided helpful suggestions that improved the final version of the text. References Atkins, Richard Kenneth (2016). Peirce and the Conduct of Life: Sentiment and Instinct in Ethics and Religion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Canteñs, Bernardo (2004). "Overcoming the Evidentialist's Challenge: Peirce's Conjectures of Instinctive Reason and the Reality of God." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 40:4, 771-786. Clarke, Bowman C. (1977). "Peirce's Neglected Argument." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 13:4, 277-287. Daniel-Hughes, Brandon (2015). "The Neglected Arguments of Peirce's Neglected Argument: Beyond a Theological Dead-End." American Journal of Theology & Philosophy 36:2, 121-139. Guardiano, Nicholas Lee (2015). "The Categorial Logic of Peirce's Metaphysical Cosmogony." The Pluralist 10:3, 313-334. Hull, Kathleen (2005). "The Inner Chambers of His Mind: Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God as Related to Mathematical Experience." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 41:3, 483-513. Nubiola, Jaime (2004). "Il Lume Naturale: Abduction and God." Semiotiche 1:2, 91–102. Peirce, Charles Sanders (1931-1958). The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Peirce, Charles Sanders (1992). Reasoning and the Logic of Things: The Cambridge Conferences Lectures of 1898, Kenneth Laine Ketner, ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Peirce, Charles Sanders (1992-1998). The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Nathan Houser, Christian Kloesel, and The Peirce Edition Project, ed. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Raposa, Michael (1989). Peirce's Philosophy of Religion. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. Reuter, Robert (1994). "Peirce and Testing the God-Hypothesis." The Southern Journal of Philosophy 32, 289-302. Signs vol. 9: pp. 1-20, 2018 ISSN: 1902-8822 20 Richmond, Gary (2005). "Outline of trikonic: Diagrammatic Trichotomic." In Conceptual Structures: Common Semantics for Sharing Knowledge, Frithjof Dau, Marie-Laure Mugnier, and Gerd Stumme, ed. Berlin: Springer, 453-466. Robin, Richard S. (1967). Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. Rohatyn, Dennis (1982). "Resurrecting Peirce's 'Neglected Argument' for God." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 18:1, 66-74. Short, Thomas L. (2011). "Did Peirce Have a Cosmology?" Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 46:4, 521-543.