The	Phenomenology	of	Kantian	Respect	for	Persons Uriah	Kriegel	&	Mark	Timmons1 Forthcoming	in	Respect,	R.	Dean	&	O.	Sensen,	eds.,	Cambridge	UP Abstract	::	Emotions	can	be	understood	generally	from	two	different	perspectives:	(i)	a third-person perspective that specifies their distinctive functional role within our overall cognitive economy	and (ii) a first-person	perspective that attempts to capture their	distinctive	phenomenal	character,	the	subjective	quality	of	experiencing	them.	One emotion	that	is	of	central	importance	in	many	ethical	systems	is	respect	(in	the	sense	of respect	for	persons	or	so-called	recognition-respect).	However,	discussions	of	respect	in analytic	moral	philosophy	have	tended	to	focus	almost	entirely	on	its	functional	role,	in particular	the	behaviors	that	respect	disposes	us	to	engage	in	(or	refrain	from).	Here	we wish	to	investigate	the	phenomenal	character	of	respect,	what	it	is	like	to	feel	respect	for persons.	Since	Kant	is	the	reference	point	for	modern	discussions	of	respect,	we	try	to reconstruct	Kant's	account	of	the	phenomenology	of	respect,	but	also	endeavor	to	refine his	account	in	light	of	our	own	phenomenological	observations. 1.	Respect	and	Moral	Phenomenology In the opening chapter of his book The Conscious Mind, David Chalmers (1996) argues that	many	mental terms lead	a "double life": they	have	a	psychological life and	a	phenomenological	life.	To	say	that	a	term	T	leads	a	double	life	is	to	say	that	Ttokens tend to	cluster into two	distinct types,	each	expressing	a	different	concept. Thus, we use the word "pain" in two discernibly different ways, expressing two different concepts, which we may call the psychological concept of pain and a phenomenological concept of pain. These concepts may or may not pick out the same	property,	but	however	that	turns	out,	they	are	distinct	concepts.2 1 This chapter is thoroughly collaborative; the	order	of authorship is alphabetical.	Work for it	was supported by the French National Research Agency's grants ANR-11-0001-02 PSL* and ANR-10LABX-0087.	A	version	of	this	paper	was	delivered	at	the June	2020	meeting	of the	North	American Kant	Society.	We	are	grateful	to	the	audience	there,	in	particular	Lucy	Allais. 2	Chalmers	himself	thinks	they	turn	out	to	also	pick	out	different	properties,	but	this	does	not	fall	out of	the	thesis	of	the	double	life	of	mental	terms.	The	argument	for	it	arrives	rather	later	in	the	book (mostly	Ch.	2).	The	purview	of	the	double-life	thesis	thus	concerns,	in	the	first	place,	only	the	realm	of concepts. 2 What are these notions of "psychological concept" and "phenomenological concept"? According to Chalmers, mental phenomena can be conceived either in terms of their functional role within the subject's psychological economy, or in terms of their phenomenal character, what it is like for their subject to undergo them.	The	psychological	conception	of	mind	characterizes	mental	phenomena	thirdpersonally	in	terms	of	their	causal	relations	to	each	other	and	to	the	environment; the phenomenological conception characterizes them first-personally in terms of their phenomenal or subjective feel. Thus the former focuses on the	mechanical dimension	of	mental	life,	the	latter	on	its	experiential	dimension.	Most	mental	terms, suggests Chalmers, can be understood either as expressing a third-person, functional-role conception of the relevant	mental phenomenon	or as expressing a first-person, phenomenal-character conception of it. Thus, mental states can be classified	as	pains	either	because	(roughly)	they	are	caused	by	harmful	stimulation and cause	aversive reaction	or	because they feel that	particular	unpleasant	way – they hurt. Correspondingly, the term "pain" can be used to express either (i) the concept of a mental state caused by harmful stimulation and causing aversive reaction or (ii) the concept of a	mental state that feels that unpleasant	way. The former	is	the	psychological	concept	of	pain,	the	latter	the	phenomenological	concept of	pain.3 The	double-life thesis seems	particularly compelling for the	emotions. Fear tends to be triggered by objects or events that appear dangerous and tends to provoke	characteristic	reactions	of	fight	or	flight;	these	causes	and	effects	of	fear	are publicly observable and third-personally describable. But fear also feels a certain unmistakable	way,	a	way	it	is	much	harder	to	describe	in	public	language;	when	any token conscious fear occurs, only one person experiences the relevant instance of that feeling. Crucially, it is unclear how one could "read off" the phenomenal character of fear from a complete specification of fear's functional role. Likewise, anger	tends	to	be	triggered	by	wrongs,	offenses,	slights,	etc.	and	to	provoke	a	pull	to rectification	and/or	revenge.	But in	addition, it involves	a	distinctive,	unpleasantly 3	Unless	we recognize this ambiguity	of "pain,"	we	are liable to fall into	puzzle	and	paradox.	Thus, when a toothached subject	must suddenly attend to a fire in the kitchen and no longer feels her toothache,	does	it	still	qualify	as	pain?	When	she	feels	again	the	toothache	after	the	fire	has	been	put out, is she feeling the same	pain	as	before	or	a	new,	numerically	distinct	pain?	Such	questions	are readily	answered	once	we	distinguish	between	the	psychological	and	the	phenomenological	concepts of pain. When we do, it becomes straightforward that unfelt pain qualifies as pain in the psychological sense but not in the phenomenological sense, and accordingly, our subject has the same pain throughout in the psychological sense but two different pains in the phenomenological sense. The underlying reason is that while the subject's toothache-related state during the fire preserves	much	of	the	functional	role	it	had	before	the	fire,	it	loses	its	phenomenal	character	entirely. (At	least	this	is	what	the	description	of	the	case	as	involving	unfelt	pain	suggests.	One	might	of	course contest	this	description,	with	different	implications	arising	for	what	to	say	about	such	cases.) 3 consuming subjective feeling or experience, which cannot in any obvious	way be "read	off	of" its functional role.	Thus fear	and	anger can	be conceptualized in two systematically	distinct	ways:	in	terms	of	functional	role	or	in	terms	of	phenomenal character. That is, they can be conceptualized either psychologically or phenomenologically. Similar remarks apply in all likelihood to most other emotions.4 ge Among the emotions most central to ethical theory is respect. Of particular significance is the kind	of respect highlighted	by	Kant –	what is sometimes called "respect for persons as such." This is the respect we feel toward someone not because	of	her	particular	accomplishments	or	attributes,	but	simply	because	she	is	a person. It is the kind of respect we have toward x when x's being a person is sufficient	ground	for	our	respecting	x. If the double-life thesis is on the right track, such respect can be conceptualized	in	two	different	ways.	On	the	one	hand,	it	can	be	characterized	thirdpersonally in terms	of its	distinctive functional	role in	our	psychological	economy, the	kinds	of	causes	and	effects	that	tend	to	trigger	it	and	tend	to	be	provoked	by	it. To seek the right such characterization is to engage in the	moral psychology of respect	for	persons.	On	the	other	hand,	this	kind	of	respect	can	also	be	characterized first-personally in terms of its distinctive phenomenal character, the subjective experience of occurrently feeling respect for a person. To seek the right firstpersonal characterization of respect's phenomenal character is to engage in the moral	phenomenology	of	respect	for	persons. In	describing	the	kind	of	respect	we	are	interested	in	as	an	emotion	–	that	is, as an experiential episode the subject feels on particular occasions as part of her stream	of consciousness –	we do not intend to deny that it can also occur in our mental life as an attitude, that is, as a tacit or latent state that characterizes the 4	There	are	in	fact	three	features	traditionally	thought	to	make	up	the	core	of	mental	life:	functional role,	phenomenal	character,	and	intentional	content.	The	psychological	conception	of	mind	focuses	on the first, the phenomenological conception on the second.	What about the third? Is there also an intentional	conception	of	mind?	Such	a	conception	could	very	likely	be	formulated,	but	in	the	present context	it	would	be	more	profitable	to	note	that	the	notion	of	intentionality	itself	splits	in	two.	On	the one	hand,	we	have	the	notion	of	intentionality	as	based	on	functional	role,	perhaps	long-armed	role that	includes	connections	to	the	environment	and	actions	(Harman	1987).	On	the	other	hand,	there	is also the notion of intentionality as based on satisfaction conditions constituted by phenomenal character	(Horgan	and	Tienson	2002,	Loar	2003).	In	light	of	this,	we	might	just	distinguish	two	kinds of intentionality – psychological intentionality and phenomenal intentionality – and to build the former into the psychological conception of mind and the latter into the phenomenological conception	(Kriegel	2010). 4 subject's	standing	stance	toward	the	world.	On	the	contrary,	we	countenance	both	a respect-emotion and a respect-attitude.5 However, we focus here on the emotion rather	than	the	attitude	because,	arguably,	phenomenal	character	is	more	essential to	an	emotion's	nature,	whereas	what	is	more	essential	to	an	attitude's	nature	is	its functional role.	And	what	we	want to	pursue	here is the	moral	phenomenology	of respect. In analytic moral philosophy, by far the most contributions to our understanding	of	respect	for	persons	have	come	from	moral	psychology,	not	moral phenomenology. Thus, in his seminal "Two Kinds of Respect," Stephen Darwall (1977) isolates a kind of respect he calls "recognition-respect," which he distinguishes	from	"appraisal-respect"	and	characterizes	as	follows: There is a kind of respect which ... consists, most generally, in a disposition to weigh appropriately in one's deliberations some feature of the thing in question and to act accordingly...	To	say	that	persons	as	such	are	entitled	to	respect	[of	this	kind]	is	to	say	that	they are	entitled	to	have	other	persons	take	seriously	and	weigh	appropriately	the	fact	that	they	are persons in	deliberating	about	what to	do.	Such	respect is recognition	respect...	(Darwall	1977: 38) It is clear that	what	Darwall has in	mind	with	his	notion	of recognition-respect is what	we	have	called	above	respect	for	persons	–	or	at	least	that	respect	for	persons is	a	special	case	of	recognition-respect	(namely,	the	case	where	the	fact	recognized is	that	someone	is	a	person).	But	it	is	also	clear	that	what	Darwall	has	in	mind	is	a phenomenon	characterized	in	terms	of	functional	role.	This	becomes	evident	when Darwall	offers	his	fuller	account	of	recognition-respect: Some fact or feature is an appropriate object of [recognition] respect if inappropriate consideration	or	weighing	of	that	fact	or	feature	would	result	in	behavior	that	is	morally	wrong. To	respect	something	is	thus	to	regard	it	as	requiring	restrictions	on	the	moral	acceptability	of actions	connected	with	it...	To	have	such	respect	for	the	law,	say,	is	to	be	disposed	to	regard	the fact that something is the law as restricting the class of actions that would be morally permissible.	(Darwall	1977:	43) This	account	of	recognition-respect	clearly	proceeds	by	trying	to	correctly identify an	attitude	with	a	distinctive	functional	role.6	Respect	for	persons	is	said	to	be	that 5 We also acknowledge there are complicated questions surrounding their relationship. On one end of the spectrum is the view that the attitude is the psychologically substantive state here, with the emotion being a sort of occasional epiphenomenal spurt. On the other end of the spectrum, there is the view that the attitude is nothing but the disposition to undergo the emotional experience, so that we really have no handle on the attitude independent of our handle on the emotion. And there is any number of in-between options. We bracket those issues here. 6 Moreover, the attitude in question is, for Darwall, precisely the attitude Kant had in mind in discussing	respect: "it is to	recognition	respect	of	persons that	Kant	refers	when	he	writes, 'Such	a being	is	therefore	an	object	of	respect	and,	so	far,	restricts	all	(arbitrary)	choice'"	(Darwall	1977:	45). 5 mental state which is triggered by persons (or objects appearing to one to be persons)	and	which	provokes	a	narrowing-down	of the	potential	courses	of	action toward	those	objects	(and	does	so	in	light	of	these	objects	appearing	to	be	persons). Other treatments of respect in the extant literature follow a very similar pattern,	disagreeing	mostly	on	the	correct	analysis	of	respect's functional	role.	We do	not	wish	to	call into	question	the insight into	the	nature	of	respect	afforded	by such	analyses.	We	suspect,	however,	that	there	is	an	additional	and	complementary kind of insight into the nature of respect that could be had, one obtained by articulating the phenomenal character of respect – what it is like for us to occurrently	experience	respect	for	someone	solely	on	account	of	her	being	a	person. We suspect, moreover, that here too, the subjective quality of respect cannot be "read	off"	from	any	specification	of	respect's	functional	role,	however	exhaustive.	A full portrait of respect for persons would thus comprise both a psychological chapter	and	phenomenological	chapter,	tracing	out	both	the	functional	role	and	the phenomenal character characteristic of respect as an attitude and as an emotion. Since	the	literature	has	tended	to	focus	on	the	moral	psychology	of	respect,	here	we focus	on	the	moral	phenomenology	of	respect. ge The	literature's	focus	on	functional	role	is	not	accidental.	There	is	a	sustained	worry that first-person inquiry into phenomenal feel is bound to run into principled difficulties.	Thus,	the	deliverances	of	introspection	of	our	lived	experience	are	often thought	to	be	untrustworthy.	In	addition,	it	is	unclear	how	we	might	put	into	words those deliverances, whatever their epistemic status. It is a familiar refrain in discussions of conscious experience, after all, that phenomenal character is ultimately ineffable,	or	perhaps	more	accurately incommunicable: it can	be	named, but	it	cannot	be	described.	No	informative	account	of	the	phenomenal	character	of seeing yellow can be offered to the colorblind, arguably. By the same token, one might	claim,	no	informative	account	of	what	it	is	like	to	feel	respect	could	be	offered to someone constitutionally incapable of feeling it. If so, it is unclear how	moral phenomenology could contribute anything substantial to our understanding of respect. We have addressed elsewhere some of these foundational issues stalking moral	phenomenology	and	indeed	phenomenology	writ	large	(Horgan	and	Timmons 2005,	2008,	Kriegel	2008,	2015	inter	alia).	Heeding	the	precept	that	the	proof	is	in the pudding, however, here we would like to consider what kind of phenomenological pudding could be	made of respect for persons!	We propose to 6 simply	go	ahead	with	the	project	of	characterizing	the	phenomenal	character	of	such respect,	with	the	hope	that	the	very	possibility	of	intelligible	discussion	of	the	topic would	constitute	a	retroactive	partial	demonstration	of	the	project's	viability.	Before starting,	however,	some	general	remarks	might	prove	useful. In mathematics, an axiomatic system's primitives are officially taken to be incommunicable. Nonetheless, they are thought to be understood informally in terms	of	their	theoretical	role	within	the	relevant	system.	Thus,	notions	appearing in the theorems of a given axiomatization of Euclidean Geometry are defined in terms	of	notions	appearing	in	the	system's	axioms;	but	the	notions	appearing	in	the axioms are understood only in terms of their role within these axioms (Hilbert 1900).	Indeed,	the	axioms	can	be	thought	of	as	nothing	more	than	descriptions	of	a web	of	interrelations	among	opaque	nodes,	with	each	node	designated	by	a	different conceptually	primitive	notion.	Our	grasp	on	the	nature	of	these	nodes	is	exhausted by the interrelations specified in these axioms. These theoretical roles can be articulated	most	straightforwardly	using	Ramsey	sentences:	sentences	asserting	the existence of something that satisfies a vast collection of descriptors (Lewis 1966, 1972). This approach could be imported into	moral phenomenology, with central phenomenological observations regarding some types of	moral experience taking the role of the axioms in a	mathematical system. Consider, if only for the sake of illustration, the following collection of broadly phenomenological observations about respect, harvested more or less verbatim from the Stanford Encyclopedia entry	on	respect	(Dillon	2018): • Respect is a particular mode of apprehending the object: the person who respects	something	pays	attention	to	it	and	perceives	it	differently. • Respect	often	feels	like	trying	to	see	the	object	clearly,	as	it	really	is	in	its	own right,	and	not	seeing	it	solely	through	the	filter	of	one's	own	desires	and	fears or	likes	and	dislikes. • Respect feels object-generated rather than wholly subject-generated, something that is owed to, called for, deserved, elicited, or claimed by the object. • Respect	feels	deliberate,	a	matter	of	directed	rather	than	grabbed	attention, of	reflective	consideration	and	judgment. • Respect involves	"a	deontic	experience"	– the	experience	that	one	must	pay attention	and	respond	appropriately. • We	respect	something	not	because	we	want	to	but	because	we	recognize	that we	have	to	respect	it. 7 • Respect is the recognition of something "as directly determining our will without	reference	to	what	is	wanted	by	our	inclinations"	(Rawls	2000:	153). • Respect feels reason-governed: it feels like we cannot respect a particular object	for	just	any	old	reason	or	for	no	reason	at	all. • Respect feels universalizing, in the sense that if F is a respect-warranting feature of object O, then respecting O on account of F commits us, other things	equal,	to	respecting	other	things	that	also	have	feature	F. A comprehensive moral phenomenology of respect would involve a great many observations	of	this	sort,	which	could	then	be	'Ramsified'	to	capture	the	theoretical role of the experience of respect in the theory, thus providing the reader with a textured	sense	of	respect's	phenomenal	character.7 This	approach	presupposes	that	there	is	sufficient	uniformity	among	people's respect experiences, something that may well be called into question (Gill 2008, Sinnott-Armstrong 2008). Certainly there may be little uniformity at a very fine grain	of	determinacy.	At	the	same	time,	one	might	hope	that	at	a	sufficient	level	of generality,	certain	recurring	patterns	might	be	found	interpersonally,	such	that	even if different subjects find it difficult to produce similar phenomenological descriptions of respect, when they consume phenomenological descriptions of respect,	some	descriptions	simply	resonate	with	–	command	assent	from	–	many. In keeping with our pudding gambit, here we will assume that there is sufficient	uniformity	in	people's	respect	experiences	to	make	it	possible	to	produce descriptions of those experiences – descriptions which do, or would, command widespread	assent.	The	challenge	is	how	to	characterize	the	common	component	of felt	respect	for	persons	in	as	substantive	and	informative	a	manner.	Discussions	of respect for	persons in the	extant literature	often	start	out from	Kant's	remarkably influential	account	of	it.	Here	too,	though,	philosophers	have	tended	to	focus	on	the functional role, rather than phenomenal character, Kant assigned to respect. We believe, however, that Kant's moral writings contain fundamentally accurate, if somewhat incomplete, characterizations of the phenomenal character of recognition-respect; characterizations that can be more fully developed and defended	against	various	objections.	In	what	follows,	we	propose	to	build	on	Kant's insight but in a	more overtly phenomenological direction than is common in the extant literature. We propose, in other words, to develop a broadly Kantian phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	for	persons.	This	task	will	occupy	us	for	the 7 Note that although for Lewis specifying a theoretical role for a term was supposed to go hand in hand with offering a functionalist assay of the T's denotation, the two are separate moves. When T is a term appearing in a phenomenological theory, T's theoretical role is the role it plays in an overall phenomenological, hence non-functional, characterization of T's denotation. 8 next two sections. In the final section, we	will briefly consider some outstanding challenges,	pointing	the	way	for	further	research.8 2.	Kant	on	the	Experience	of	Recognition-Respect: I.	A	Footnote	in	the	Groundwork Kant's account of the phenomenology of recognition-respect is found	primarily in his	1797	Doctrine	of	Virtue	(part	II	of	the	Metaphysics	of	Morals),	where	he	discusses duties of virtue toward others.9 However, already in the 1785 Groundwork the feeling of respect is described in some detail in a long footnote, where, having characterized	duty as "the necessity of an action from respect for law" (G	4:400), Kant	responds	to	a	potential	worry	that	reference	to	respect	is	merely	"an	obscure feeling"	that	has	no	place	in	a	purely	rationalist	ethical	theory	(G	4:401n).	It	is	worth quoting the footnote almost in full (leaving out the first sentence that raises the worry),	and	in	two	parts.	Inserting	bracketed	numbers	to	separate	individual	claims Kant	makes,	the	passage	reads: [T]hough	[0]	respect	is	a	feeling,	[1]	it	is	not	one	received	by	means	of	influence;	[2]	it	is	instead	a feeling self-wrought (selbstgewirktes) by means of a rational concept and [3] therefore specifically different from all feelings of the first kind,	which can be reduced to inclination or fear.	[4]	What	I	cognize	(erkenne)	immediately	as	a	law	for	me	I	cognize	with	respect,	[5]	which signifies	merely	consciousness	of	the	subordination	of	my	will	to	a	law	without	the	mediation	of other	influences	on	my	sense.	[6]	Immediate	determination	of	the	will	by	means	of	the	law	and consciousness of this is called respect, [7] so that it is regarded as an effect of the law on the subject,	[8]	and	not	as	the	cause	of	the	law. Of	these	eight	claims,	only	4	and	5	clearly	include	phenomenological	observations.10 However, they reveal what is at the heart of this feeling of respect, namely, consciousness	of the	subordination	of	one's	will to the law,	not	mediated	by	one's antecedent	desires	or	aversions.	This	consciousness	of	subordination,	in	its	fullness, involves	further	elements: 8 Note well: we do not wish to claim that Kant's only notion of respect is that of recognition-respect; on the contrary, we agree with Darwall (2008), that some of it concerns a kind of moral appraisal-respect. Thus, in the second Critique, Kant describes the feeling of respect one experiences upon witnessing the moral merit expressed in another's action as "a tribute that we cannot refuse to pay to merit, whether we want to or not" (KpV 5:77). Here the topic appears to be moral appraisal-respect. But the passages we will focus on in the main text seem to us to be clearly about recognition-respect. 9 English translations are from the Cambridge Edition of Kant's works. Our abbreviations for the relevant works are: 'G' for the Groundwork, 'KpV' for Critique of Practical Reason, and 'MS' for the Metaphysics of Morals. 10 The second conjunct in 6 is also phenomenological, but it appears to merely recapitulate 5. As for 1-3, 78, and the first conjunct of 6, these appear to concern causal antecedents rather than phenomenal constituents of respect. 9 [9]	Respect	is	properly	the	representation	of	a	worth	that	infringes	upon	my	self-love.	Hence	[10] there	is	something	that	is	regarded	as	an	object	neither	of inclination	nor	of	fear,	though	it	has something analogous to both. [11] The	object of respect is therefore simply the law, and [12] indeed	the	law	that	we	impose	upon	ourselves	and	[13]	yet	[regard	it]	as	necessary	in	itself. [14] As	a	law	we	are	subject	to	it	without	consulting	self-love;	[15]	as	imposed	upon	us	by	ourselves	it is	nevertheless	a	result	of	our	will;	and	[16]	in	the	first	respect	it	has	an	analogy	with	fear,	[17]	in the	second	with	inclination.	[18]	Any	respect	for	a	person	is	properly	only	respect	for	the	law	(of integrity	and	so	forth)	of	which	he	gives	us	an	example.	[19]	Because	we	also	regard	enlarging our	talents	as	a	duty,	[20]	we	represent	a	person	of	talents	also	as,	so	to	speak,	an	example	of	the law	(to	become	like	him	in	this	by	practice),	and	[21]	this	is	what	constitutes	our	respect.	[22]	All so-called	moral	interest	consists	simply	in	respect	for	the	law.	(G	4:401n;	emphases	original). We	may	set	aside	remarks	18-21,	which	appear	to	concern	moral	appraisal-respect, and concentrate on the remaining elements, which concern recognition-respect proper.11 As a feeling brought about not by external triggers, but by one's own intellectual apprehension of an abstract principle (see [1]-[2]), Kant's feeling of respect	is	suffused	with	a	cognitive	or	intellectual	dimension.	There	is	a	(somewhat old-fashioned)	way	of	thinking	of	feelings	that	cast	as	purely	sensory,	often	visceral, experience (James 1984). But on our (more modern!) conception of emotional feelings, they are much more complex, more textured experiences incorporating, among	other	things,	a	proprietary	cognitive	phenomenology, that is, the	experience of	engaging	in	conceptual	thought	(for	this	conception	of	emotional	phenomenology, as involving	cognitive	phenomenology	as	constituent, see	Kriegel	2014). It is	clear that this kind of cognitive phenomenology is much more central to Kant's conception	of	what it is like	to	experience	recognition-respect	than	anything	to	do with,	say,	visceral	sensations. If one revisits the sampling of phenomenological observations cited in the previous	section,	it is	clear	that	many,	if	not	all,	are	reflected	in	Kant's	description. At	the	same	time,	Kant's	formulations	are	more	specific	in	phenomenological	detail, thus yielding a distinctively Kantian conception of respect. One can detect, moreover, several "clusters" of salient phenomenological elements from Kant's description. One	cluster	revolves	around	awareness	of	the	moral	law	in	the	experience	of respect: • Recognition-respect	is	a	particular	mode	of	apprehending	a	person,	in	which one	pays	attention	to	and	perceives	her	or	him	differently.	In	particular: 11 Recall that appraisal respect is Darwall's label for the kind of respect which contrasts with recognitionrespect and which is grounded in appreciation of a person's individual accomplishment or attributes. 10 • Recognition-respect	involves	awareness	of	the	moral	law.	[4] • Recognition-respect	has as its focus the	moral law	and its relation to	one's desires	and	aversions.	[11] • Recognition-respect requires trying to apprehend clearly the relation between	the	moral	law	and	one's	desires	and	aversions.	[5] • Recognition-respect is a representation of a worth that infringes on one's self-love	(one's	self-regarding	desires	and	aversions).	[9] • Recognition-respect	involves	exercising	one's	agency	by	imposing	the	law	on oneself.	[12] This	last	claim	paves	the	way	to	the	core	phenomenal	feature	of	recognition-respect, namely,	the	subordination	of	one's	will	to	the	moral	law: • Recognition-respect involves heeding the law without consulting self-love. [14] • That	is,	recognition-respect	involves	actively	subordinating	one's	desires	and aversions	to	the	moral	law.	[15] • Recognition-respect is object-generated in the sense that the	moral law is experienced as demanding that	moral reasons be given normative priority over	reasons	grounded	in	self-regarding	desires	and	aversions.	[13] • At	the	same	time,	recognition-respect	is	also	an	expression	of	agency:	it	is	a deliberate, directed attention, rather than grabbed attention, of reflective consideration	and	judgment.	[Implicit	in	12] In addition to the active subordinating of one's will to the moral law, Kant also highlights	one's	awareness	of	doing	so: • Recognition-respect requires apprehending a subordination relation obtaining	between	the	moral	law	(and	its	particular	requirements)	and	one's desires	and	aversions.	[5] • It thus involves apprehending the normative superiority of the moral law (including its particular requirements) compared to reasons grounded in one's	desires	and	aversions.	[Implicit	in	5] • Recognition-respect involves	the	recognition	of	the law	directly	determining one's	will	without	reference	to	one's	desires	and	aversions.	[14] Finally, Kant also	makes two claims about phenomenal overlaps between respect and	fear,	on	the	one	hand,	and	inclination,	on	the	other: • Recognition-respect, because it involves attending to the subordination of one's	desires	and	aversions	to	a	law	whose	normative	force	is	independent	of 11 our will, is similar to fear insofar as it has something exogenous (willindependent)	about	its	source.	[14,	16] • However, because it also involves an exercise of one's will whereby one actively	subordinates	desires	and	aversions	to	the	requirements	of	the	moral law, recognition-respect is also similar to inclination insofar as it has something	endogenous	(will-based)	about	its	sources.	[15,	17] These	similarities	to	fear	and	inclination	may	seem	quite	incidental	to	recognitionrespect,	but	they	appear	to	resurface	stubbornly	in	Kant's	descriptions	of	respect. 3.	Kant	on	the	Experience	of	Recognition-Respect: II.	The	Contrastive	Phenomenology	of	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue Phenomenological Ramsey sentences offer one kind of phenomenological perspective	on	the	experience	of	respect	for	persons.	Another	potentially	instructive perspective	may	be	provided	by	phenomenal contrasts,	whereby	core	phenomenal features	of	respect	are	put	in	sharp	relief	by	the	contraposition	of	the	experience	of respect with the experience of neighboring moral experiences.12 By meticulously comparing	and	contrasting the	experience	of respect	with the	experience	of	other moral	emotions	–	such	as	guilt,	shame,	admiration,	and	so	on	–	one	could	inform	our grasp	of	the	phenomenal	character	distinctive	of	respect	for	persons. Kant does not offer anything like this kind of comprehensive web of phenomenal contrasts. However, in Kant's final work in moral philosophy, the Metaphysics	of	Morals,	part II, the	Doctrine	of	Virtue,	he	offers focal	remarks	about recognition-respect for persons, often by juxtaposition with a certain (ethically fundamental)	kind	of	love.	In	that	work,	Kant	sets	forth	a	system	of	mid-level	duties – duties that mention act types, such as beneficence and gratitude, that are grounded in the	more abstract, high-level categorical imperative, and from	which one	can	infer	concrete	duties	taking	into	account	one's	particular	circumstance.	He divides	mid-level duties to others into duties of love toward others and duties of respect for others.13 Importantly, by "love" Kant does not mean anything like romantic love.	Already in the	Groundwork, he	distinguishes	between	pathos-based love	(pathologische	Liebe)	and	a	duty-based	love,	which	he	calls	"practical love"	(G 4:399).	The	former	is	a	passion,	something	that	happens	to	us	rather	than	something we directly control. In consequence, it	makes no sense to command such love. In contradistinction,	practical	love	is	something	that	can	very	sensibly	be	commanded, 12 This contrast methodology is heavily used in current discussions of perceptual experience (see notably Siegel 2011), as well as so-called cognitive and conative (or agentive) phenomenology (see Kriegel 2015). 13 He also discusses duties to oneself, which we may set aside here. 12 because	it is	not	a	passion	but	an	action	–	something	that	we	actively	adopt.	What we	adopt	is	a	principle	of	action	toward	the	loved	one.	To	that	extent,	practical	love is	an	action-guiding,	ethically	relevant	emotion	in	the	way	respect is.	Yet	there	are several	striking	and	instructive	contrasts	between	the	two. First	of	all,	the	duty	of	love	requires	most	fundamentally	that	one	adopt	the maxim of making the well-being of others an end to be promoted. By contrast, complying	with	duties	of	respect	requires,	most fundamentally, that	one	adopt	the maxim	of "limiting our self-esteem	by the	dignity of humanity in another	person" (MS	6:449).	The	experience	of	respecting	another	person	involves	a	felt	exhortation not to use her	merely as a	means to our own ends. But it does not involve a felt exhortation	to	adopt	her	ends	as	our	own,	that	is,	to	commit	ourselves	to	pursuing these	ends	as	though	they	were	our	own	ends	(though	respect	certainly	appears	to be	compatible	with	such	commitment	–	see	G	4:430).	By	contrast,	it	is	of	the	essence of	the	experience	of	practical	love	that	the	other's	ends	are	taken	on	as	though	they were our own. This is perhaps the	most fundamental difference between the two experiences. From this fundamental difference flows another basic and quite abstract difference: the duty of respect embodies an essentially "negative" requirement, whereas the duty of love embodies a "positive" requirement. To that extent, the experience	of	practical	love	toward	a	person	involves	a	felt	motivation	to	engage	in certain actions, whereas the experience of respecting a person involves a felt motivation	to	refrain	from	certain	actions.	The	experience	of	practical	love	is	that	of being	motivated	to	go	ahead	and	do	something	for	the	furtherance	of	the	loved	one's ends,	whereas	the	experience	of	respect	is	that	of	being	motivated	to	pull	back	and let	the	respected	one	pursue	her	ends. One suspects, however, that the contrast between recognition-respect and practical	love	runs	deeper	than	the	two	states'	relations	to	others'	ends	and	affects also relations to	means. For it follows from the foregoing that	when a person	we both	love	and	respect	chooses	what	we	think	is	the	instrumentally	wrong	means	in the	pursuit	of	her	ultimate	end,	our	love	for	the	person	and	our	respect	for	her	will issue	conflicting	recommendations:	our	love	for	the	person	makes	us	palpably	want to correct	her choice	of	means, or	otherwise to intervene to avoid the failure and disappointment	we	expect	to	attend	her	ill	thought	out	choice	of	means.	In	contrast, our respect for the	person	makes	us feel the	obligation to	allow	her to "make	her own mistakes" in pursuing her life autonomously, despite the failure and disappointment	we	predict	for	her.	The	point	is	well	articulated	by	Connie	Rosati	in her	discussion	of	a	related	point	by	Darwall	(2002:	14-16): 13 [We]	must leave room for at least two attitudes that we	may take toward a person. One attitude	we	may	take	is	concern,	treating	her	as	a	being	with	a	welfare.	A	second	is	respect, treating	her	as	a	being	with	dignity	–	an	autonomous	agent.	Out	of	respect	for	a	person,	we may	honor	her	choices	even	when,	out	of	concern	for	her,	we	would	favor	a	different	choice for	her	sake.	(Rosati	2009:	321) Rosati's	"concern"	can	be	thought	of	as	a	phenomenal	component	of	practical	love.	It is	this	component	that	makes	practical love	go	beyond	adoption	of	the	loved	one's ends	to	a	willingness	(in	some	circumstances)	to	overrule	the	loved	one's	choice	of means. In its more negative, more modest "approach," respect is unwilling to overrule	the	respected	person's	choice	of	means	–	and	does	not	require	adoption	or pursuit	of	her	ends	in	the	first	place. ge The feeling of modesty is in fact crucial to Kant's phenomenological portrait of respect in the Doctrine of Virtue. Recall that at the heart of Kant's Groundwork conception	of	recognition-respect is the idea	of	subordination. In	a	similar	vein, in discussing	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue the	duties	of	respect	toward	others	–	including duties to	refrain from	arrogance,	defamation,	and	ridicule	–	Kant	notes that	at the heart	of	disrespect	for	others	is	a	"lack	of	modesty	in	one's	claims	to	be	respected	by others"	(MS	6:462).	This	is	what	Kant	calls	self-conceit	(Eigendünkel).	This	suggests that	the	phenomenology	of	recognition-respect	involves	the	experience	of	modesty at	its	core.	In	contrast,	modesty	appears	to	be	entirely	orthogonal	to	love,	including practical	love:	neither	modesty	nor	immodesty	is	characteristic	of	either	love	or	the absence	thereof. Underlying	this	contrast	between	respect	and	love	is	another,	more	general but equally crucial difference between the two: respect is essentially egalitarian, whereas love is essentially discriminatory. In loving someone and committing oneself	to	pursuing	her	ends	as	though	they	were	one's	own,	one	is	singling	out	the person, pulling her out from the crowd so to speak, and giving her personhood a special	weight.	In	contrast,	it	is	of	the	very	nature	of	respect	that	recognition-respect is	owed	to	everyone	equally.	One	may	speculate	that	the	reason	for	this	is	that	it	is psychologically	possible for	us to	negatively avoid treating	everybody as	means to our own ends, but not psychologically possible for us to positively take on everybody's	ends. In one striking passage, Kant presents what is perhaps the	most dramatic phenomenal	difference	between	(recognition-)respect	and	(practical-)love.	Drawing an analogy	with laws of attraction and repulsion in the natural	world of physical causes,	he	writes: 14 In speaking of laws of duty (not laws of nature) and, among these, of laws for human beings' external	relations	with	one	another,	we	consider	ourselves	in	a	moral	(intelligible)	world	where, by analogy	with the	physical	world,	attraction and repulsion bind together rational beings (on Earth).	The	principle	of	mutual	love	admonishes	them	constantly	to	come	closer	to	one	another; that	of	respect	they	owe	one	another,	to	keep	themselves	at	a	distance	from	one	another.	. .	(MS 6:449) This	passage	comes immediately	after	Kant	has indicated that	one's	duties	of love and	respect	"are	basically	always	united	by	the	law	into	one	duty"	(MS	6:448),	which he illustrates with the example of beneficence (Wohltun) – a duty of love. He remarks	that	the	obligation	to	help	others	in	need	(e.g.	the	poor)	should	always	be tempered	by	respect for	one's	beneficiary, "to	spare	him	humiliation	and	maintain his	respect	for	himself"	(MS	6:448-9). What	exactly	to	make	of	Kant's	force	analogy	has	been	a	topic	of	discussion	in the	secondary	literature.14	One	thing	that	should	be	pointed	out	is	that	the	contrast between	a	drawing-nearer	force	and	a	distancing	force	parallels	nicely	the	contrast, discussed	above,	between	the felt	desire to	do	something for the	other	and the felt need	to	pull	back.	In	any	case,	whatever	one	makes	of	the	force	analogy,	intriguing	as it	is,	an	interpretation	of	Kant's	conception	of	recognition-respect	should	do	justice to the idea that considerations of practical love and respect are in some ways distinct,	"pulling"	so	to	speak	in	opposite	directions,	yet	are importantly	conjoined in one's moral involvement with others. The flavor of this opposing-forces idea should be preserved in articulating Kant's (and, we would add, Kantian) phenomenology	of	recognition-respect.	Indeed,	we	may	think	of	this	as	a	constraint on	an	account	of	respect	qualifying	as	properly	Kantian. To summarize, we have pointed out six phenomenal contrasts between recognition-respect and practical love, as they arise from	Kant's discussion in the Doctrine	of	Virtue.	They	are:	(1)	refraining	from	using	the	other	as	means	to	our	own ends	(respect)	versus	committing	to	taking	on	the	other's	ends	as	though	they	were our	own	(love);	(2)	negative	felt	demand	to	pull	back	(respect)	versus	positive	felt demand to act (love); (3) a felt need to let the other pursue her ends using the means she deems suitable (respect) versus a felt desire to overrule the other's choice of means, the better to serve the pursuit of her ends (love); (4) the felt exercise of modesty (respect) versus the complete absence of either modesty or immodesty (love); (5) an egalitarian feeling of treating all persons the same (respect) versus the discriminating feeling that gives some person a special treatment	(love);	(6)	the	felt	"repulsion"	keeping	one	at	a	distance	from	the	object	of 14 See, for example, Baron 1997, Johnson 1997 and Filippaki 2012, and Sanchez Barboa (ms). 15 one's experience (respect) versus the felt "attraction" drawing one closer to the object	of	one's	experience	(love). 4.	Filling	out	the	Kantian	Phenomenology	of	Recognition-Respect Unfortunately, the Doctrine of Virtue does not contain a passage that neatly condenses	all	of	Kant's	main	phenomenological	observations	about the	experience of recognition-respect (the way the Groundwork footnote discussed in §2 does). However, with a schematic characterization of Kant's phenomenal-contrast-based account of recognition-respect now before us,	we	may try to articulate a Ramsey sentence that captures those observations as they come across in the	Doctrine of Virtue.	We	take	up	this	task	in	the	next	section. Before starting, though, it is worth keeping in mind that Kant's primary concern	here	is	with	the	phenomenology	of	the	complex	experience	of	respect,	and not	just	the	phenomenology	of	acting	in	ways	that	are	merely	outwardly	respectful, regardless	of	one's feeling toward the	object	of such	outward	behavior.	There is	a kind	of "performative respect"	we	show	someone	when	we	are	polite toward	her, avoid	rude	or	overtly	inconsiderate	behavior	toward	her,	and	so	on.	Such	behaviors are nonetheless compatible with having arrogant or ridiculing private thoughts about	the	person.	For	Kant,	this	would	still	be	a	case	of	self-conceit	and	a	failure	to recognition-respect	the	person. Our	task	in	this	section,	then,	is	to	develop	a	more	determinate	conception	of Kantian recognition-respect that builds on Kant's own schematic characterization but	may also go beyond it. To	make the experience of respect vivid in our	minds during	the	discussion,	we	begin	with	two	vignettes	that	we	take	to	be	representative of	at	least	some	common,	indeed	typical,	experiences	of	recognition-respect.	Now,	in an	agent	who	has	the	virtue	of	respect,	her	actions	will	routinely	express	her	respect for	others	automatically	and	without	effort,	in	a	way	that	may	make	the	associated phenomenology relatively subtle and	hard to discern.	Our cases therefore involve effortful respect, respect that does not comes easy to the person doing the respecting.	The	point	is	to	make	more	manifest	the	phenomenology	of	recognitionrespect	experienced	on	some	occasion	of	recognizing	a	duty	toward	others. Case 1: Jones is a professor teaching a course in philosophy to first-year undergraduates.	During	one	particular	class	session,	he	responds	to	a	student's question in a curt manner, which conveys a dismissive attitude toward the question and the student. Later that day, in thinking about that class session, and,	in	particular,	about	his	handling	of	the	student's	question,	he	feels	sheepish 16 and slightly ashamed of his curt, dismissive reply, which now strikes him as telegraphing	a	sense	of	intellectual	superiority	over	the	student.	He	realizes	that his	manner conveyed	a lack	of respect for the student	– something	he (mostly successfully)	aims	to	avoid	–	and	that	on	this	occasion	he	was just too	anxious about	keeping	to	the	course	material	and	pressing	ahead	with	his	lecture.	More than	that,	Prof.	Jones	is	well	aware	that	he	is	sometimes	mildly	irritated	by	this student,	whose	questions	tend	to	be	off	the	mark.	Jones	comes	to	think	that	the combination	of	his	feeling	toward	this	particular	student	and	the	felt	pressure	to get	through	course	material	is	what	prompted	his	manner	of	reply.	As	a	result	of these reflections, Jones vows to himself that he	won't let such pressure get to him	when	dealing	with	students	in	future.	He	is	now	primed	to	put	his	vow	into practice, having	wallowed in his shame sufficiently long that he feels a strong motivation to avoid the same moral mistake in the future. In the very next session, the same student asks a question about the course material, again betraying fundamental misunderstanding. But this time Jones puts aside competing considerations and attends patiently to the question, delivering a thoughtful and cheerful reply at a proper level of sophistication for being understood	by	the	student	and	the	class.	Moreover,	he	does	so	while	genuinely inhabiting a feeling of respect for this student as a person whose possible intellectual limitations do not	make him any less of a person. Overall, Jones's demeanor	conveys	a	proper	attitude	of	modesty	in	answering	the	student,	thus deliberately	overcoming	any	negative	feelings	he	may	have	toward	this	student's philosophical	acumen. Case	2:	Prof. Jones	is,	by	the	way,	a	fresh	tenure-track	hire	of	his	department's, and often discusses topics of	mutual interest with his senior colleague Smith. One	day,	over lunch,	they	end	up	discussing	the	wider issue	of	what	one	might want	out	of	an	academic	career	as	a	philosopher, sharing	with	each	other that although intellectual illumination and philosophical wisdom are what they ultimately value	more, the desire for professional recognition and success can often	be	felt	more	vividly.	Smith	then	offers	Jones	a	number	of	wise	tips	she	has garnered	or	formulated	to	herself	over	the	years	–	tips	essentially	about	how	to avoid the temptations of professional vanity when the latter comes at the expense	of	pursuing	that	which	they	both	just	claimed	to	genuinely	value	more. Toward the end of the lunch, however, as the discussion veers back to more mundane	matters, Jones	proudly	and	joyfully	reveals	to	Smith	that	he	has	been approached	to	apply	for	a	prestigious	fellowship;	the	fellowship	would	force	him to	work	on	a	topic	he	is	not	really	interested	in,	he	says,	but	on	the	other	hand	it involves	spending	a	semester	at	a top	department,	where	he	will	make	contact with some of the leading figures in his area, and the salary is higher to boot. 17 Smith finds odd the discrepancy between Jones' stated life goals in the conversation they just had and the unbridled enthusiasm he shows for this fellowship.	She	is	about	to	dampen	his	excitement	with	a	pregnant	remark,	but just as she is about to do so, something holds her back. She contemplates the notions that his youth may make Jones hungrier for validation than she can relate	to,	and	that	perhaps	he	knows	best	just	how	much	prestige	he	must	chase in	order	to	calm	down	the	desire	for	it	and	be	able	to	concentrate	better	on	what genuinely	matters to him	most. She even considers that, all said and done, he may	ultimately	have	ends	different	from	hers,	and	that's	okay	too	–	"people	are just	different,"	she	tells	herself.	She	warmly	wishes	him	success	in	his	application and	congratulates	him	for	being	approached	in	the	first	place,	remarking	that	it is	a	sign	of	a	rising	notoriety	and	that	he	should	be	proud	of	himself. Reflection	on	these	scenarios	and	keeping	in	mind	the	phenomenal	features	brought into sharper relief through the contrast with practical love, we offer a phenomenological portrait of recognition-respect for persons that highlights four main	groups	of	observation. A first and paramount group of phenomenological observations pertain to the	central	role	of	modesty	in	recognition-respect	(which	comes	across	most	vividly in	Case	1): • Recognition-respect for	persons (respect,	hereafter) is	a	particular	mode	of apprehending	another	person,	in	which	one	pays	attention	to	and	perceives that	person	differently.	In	particular: • The attention one pays to the other person is an expression of one's modesty.15 • The	modesty	in	question	has	as	its	focus	oneself	and	the	other	person. • Respect	as	modesty	requires	trying	to	apprehend	clearly	a	particular	relation between	oneself	and	the	other	person. • Respect as	modesty requires apprehending,	more specifically, a relation of equality	between	oneself	and	the	other. This	modesty	is	not	experienced	as	spontaneous,	let	alone	as	groundless.	Rather,	it is experienced as grounded in a special intrinsic	worth that the respected	person possesses	–	what	we	might	call,	following	Kant	(G	4:434),	dignity: • Respect as	modesty is a representation of a	worth possessed by the other person	as	a	person	with	dignity	equal	to	one's	own	dignity. 15 For defense of an account of modesty in terms of attention, see Bommarito 2013. 18 • Respect as	modesty is a	worth that infringes on one's self-love and strikes down	one's	self-conceit. • Respect as modesty requires recognition of the dignity of the other as directly	determining	one's	will	regardless	of	one's	desires	and	aversions. • Respect	for	persons	is	thus	object-generated	in	the	sense	that	representation of	the	dignity	of	the	other	is	experienced	as	demanding	that	consideration	of this	dignity	be	given	normative	priority	over	considerations	of	self-love. • At the same time, respect is also an expression of agency: it is deliberate, directed	attention,	rather	than	grabbed	attention. • Respect involves exercising one's agency in that "I keep	myself within	my own	bounds"	(MS	6:450), in	the	sense	that I	refrain	from	unjustly	elevating myself	over	others	by	denigrating	their	worth.16 In addition, there is an important group of phenomenological observations pertaining	to	the	role	of	respect	in	relating	to	ends	and	means	(highlighted	by	Case 2): • Respect for persons involves a keen sense of when one is dealing with another in just the way one does in part because of what one expects to obtain	from	the	other	in	virtue	of	so	dealing. • To that extent, respecting a person involves being aware when we start seeing	her,	if	only	in	part,	only	qua	means	to	our	own	ends. • Respect	involves	the	feeling	of	overcoming	the	temptation	to	see	others	only in	terms	of	what	they	afford	oneself	in	one's	pursuit	of	one's	own	ends. • Respect	involves	a	degree	of	emotional	acceptance	of	others'	goals	and	ends, even	when	they	differ	in	important	ways	from	one's	own. • Respect	also	involves	an	element	of	acceptance	of	others'	chosen	means. • Respect as acceptance, like respect as modesty, is grounded in an apprehension	of	the	other	as	equal	to	oneself	at	the	deepest	level. • It	is	also	grounded	in	full	appreciation	of	the	distinctness	or	otherness	of	the other	–	the	fact	that	she	harbors	an	internal	life	which	is	ultimately	separate from	one's	own. Finally, there	are	also	two	phenomenological	observations	worth	making	about	an affective	valence	involved	in	the	experience	of	respect: • Respect,	because it requires	subordinating	self-love	and	striking	down	selfconceit,	involves	a	negative	feeling	of	humility. 16 Our continuation of the quoted remark is a gloss on the remainder of the sentence, which in full reads: "I keep myself within my own bounds so as not to detract anything from the worth that the other, as a human being is authorized to put upon himself." 19 • At	the	same	time,	because	it	involves	a	representation	of	one's	equality	with others, respect typically involves also a	positive, almost cathartic feeling	of being	in	community	and	fellowship	with	other	human	beings. As	before,	in	order	to	capture	the	theoretical	role	of	recognition-respect	for	persons in	the	theory,	we	may	construct	a	Ramsey	sentence	that	includes	these	observations (plus presumably additional ones) asserting the existence of an emotion that satisfies	all	or	most	of	these	elements. It	might be objected that our portrait of respect is	much too complex and over-intellectualizing, casting respect as an incredibly sophisticated emotion few would actually be able to experience. In response, we would like to stress two points.	First,	and	most	importantly,	while	some	of	the	descriptors	just	used	deploy high-level	concepts, it	does	not follow	that	a	person	needs to	possess the	relevant concepts	to	just	experience	respect.	The	reason	is	that,	in	general,	a	person	need	not be in	a	position to	articulate	and	accurately	conceptualize	every	experience	she is capable of undergoing. Second, however,	we	would like to insist that recognitionrespect really is one of the most intellectual emotions in the standard human psychological repertoire, teeming with cognitive phenomenology, and is indeed much	less	frequently	experienced	than,	say,	guilt	or	joy. 4.	Outstanding	Challenges	and	Further	Research We have attempted to offer a phenomenological (first-personal) rather than psychological	(third-personal)	characterization	of	Kantian	respect	for	persons,	as	it comes	through	both	in	the	Groundwork	and	in	the	Doctrine	of	Virtue.	Naturally,	the above is just an initial sketch, almost an illustration, of	what a phenomenological approach to respect would look like. We want to close with discussion of three major	challenges	to	the	project	that	may	open	fruitful	avenues	of	research	into	the phenomenology	of	respect. The	first	and	most	straightforward	challenge	is	that	Kant's	phenomenological characterization	of	respect	is	inadequate.	For	instance,	several	scholars	have	argued that	Kant	casts	respect	as	overly	abstract	and	intellectual.	One	immediate	worry	is that	Kant	often	characterizes	respect	as	intentionally	directed,	in	the	first	instance, not	at	persons	but	at	the	law,	and	to	that	extent	gets	wrong	the	intentional	content of	respect	(Drummond	2006:	2).	As	Kant	himself	puts	it,	"every	respect	for	a	person is	properly	only	respect	for	the	law	.	.	.	of	which	he	gives	us	an	example"	(G	4:401n). In response, one	might allow that respect for persons is intentionally directed at persons	after	all,	but	is	so	directed	in	virtue	of	being	directed	at	the	law	(somewhat as	an	auditory	perception	can	be	directed	at	a	bus	in	virtue	of	being	directed	at	the sound	of the	bus's	engine).	Some	philosophers	have	charged,	however, that	Kant's 20 focus	on	respecting	persons	only in	virtue	of	respecting	their	humanity,	or	only in virtue of their exemplifying the law, is too "cold" and impersonal. The	problem is that	Kant's	conception	of respect for	persons fails to	do justice to	a	commonsense conception, grounded in everyday, ordinary phenomenology, according to which respecting	persons	"takes	in"	the	wholeness	of	the	person	as	particular	agents	with particular aims, interests, and concerns (Noggle 1999). Robin Dillon nicely summarizes	the	abstractness	objection	when	she	writes	that	the	Kantian	conception of	respect	for	persons abstracts from	all	particularities,	regarding	the	details	of	our	selves	as	contingencies irrelevant to	our	intrinsic	moral	worth.	The	morally	significant	feature	of	persons	on	this	view	is	something abstract	and	generic,	not	what	distinguishes	one	individual	from	another	but	what	makes	us	all indistinguishably	equal.	An	individual	human	being	is	an	object	of	respect	only	insofar	as	she	is an instance of the universal type, 'being with the capacity for rationally autonomous moral agency.'	It	is,	in	the	words	of	the	categorical	imperative,	the	'humanity	in	us'	that	matters	morally and	so	calls	for	respect.	(Dillon	1992:	116) Because	Kantian	respect	is	focused	on	an	abstract	feature	that	all	persons	share,	it	is claimed	to	be	"distant,"	"cool,"	"detached,"	as	well	as	being	indiscriminate,	as	if	the particular	person	who	has	the	abstract	property	being	respected	could	be	switched out for any other particular person – and one's respect	would remain exactly the same	(and	equally	appropriate). There are two	possible approaches to this challenge.	One is to try to show that	Kant's	conception	of	respect	is	much	less	abstract	and	impersonal	than	scholars have claimed (see Bagnoli 2003). The other is to concede the generic and indiscriminate character of Kantian respect but defend it as a fitting reflection of nature	of recognition-respect.	We	are tempted	by this latter approach. In fact,	we suspect	that	authors	who	demand	a	more	"particularist"	conception	of	recognitionrespect will find that the latter ends up collapsing into practical love. If one is impressed by the need to distinguish love and respect (or, more generally, one moral	emotion	that	brings	people	closer	and	makes	the	agent	adopt	the	other's	ends as	her	own	and	another	moral	emotion	that	protects	the	separateness	of	people	and makes	the	agent	avoid	treating	others	as	means),	then	one	must	indeed	cast	respect as	rather	abstract	and	indiscriminating.	This	is	of	course	just	a	sketch	of	a	response. We	do	not	pretend	to	have	argued	for	it	with	these	rudimentary	remarks;	merely	to have	pointed	in	the	direction	of	response	to	which	we	are	attracted. A	related	challenge	is	that	even	if	Kant's	phenomenology	of	respect	is	broadly accurate, it cannot by itself be morally foundational, requiring instead supplementation by	more "pathos-based"	moral emotions, such as love, empathy, and care (see Dillon 1992, Sherman 1998). The objection may be put 21 impressionistically as follows: an ethical system based entirely on a force of "repulsion" that keeps people at a distance is a somewhat grim and uninviting system. Surely care	and concern for the	happiness	of	others	must	play	a role in a comprehensive	ethical	theory. In	response,	we	can	only	agree	with	the	objector's	sentiment.	But	we	do	not agree	that	Kant	has	missed	this	point.	His	very	distinction	between	duties	of	respect and	duties	of	love	is	indicative	of	his	sensitivity	to	it.	Duties	of	practical	love	include beneficence (or "good-doing" – Wholtun) and sympathetic feeling. The duty of sympathetic feeling is an "indirect" duty in the sense that fulfilling it plays a significant	role	in	providing	one	with	information	and	motivation	to	fulfill	one's	duty of	beneficence.	Proper	sympathetic identification	with	another's	plight	puts	one in touch with factors about her or his situation that are morally relevant in determining how one	might be of help. Kant claims that sympathetic feeling is a natural instinct,	which,	when	cultivated,	can	serve	to	motivate	one	to	perform	acts of	beneficence	that	"representation	of	duty	alone	might	not	accomplish"	(MS	6:457). So	unlike duties of respect, fulfilling one's duty of beneficence toward others	will typically involve	sympathetic feeling. Importantly,	because	the	duty	of	beneficence is an "imperfect" duty, it allows for latitude in complying with it, and so the phenomenology	of	beneficence	will typically	not involve	a felt	demand,	or	at least not one of the same strength as experienced in cases of recognition-respect. Although	in	cases	of	close	personal	relationships	duties	of	love	and	of	respect	tend to	"fuse,"	it	is	important	in	Kant's	scheme	that	the	differences	between	them	not	be lost in one's theorizing. It remains that a complete	understanding	of	Kant's	moral phenomenology	requires	a	more	precisely	articulated	picture	of	the	complementary roles	of	pathos-based	moral	emotions	(paradigmatically:	love)	and	pathos-free	ones (paradigmatically:	respect). A	different	challenge	to	the	present	project	is	that	the	phenomenal	character of conscious experiences of respect is a	morally insignificant aspect of respect. In one	version, the	objection	may	be that feeling	respect toward	a	person is	a	highly energy-consuming	thing,	requiring	as it	does	apprehending	the	person	in	the	right way	and	framing	one's	relation	to	her	in	a	very	specific	way.	We	could	certainly	not be	expected	to	enter	this	emotionally	taxing	state	every	time	we	crossed	a	person	on the	street.	If	so,	moral	life	cannot	be	governed	by	this	kind	of	emotion.	Some	other way	of	negotiating	our	social	life	morally	would	have	to	be	devised. Our tentative response has two parts. On the one hand, we would like to concede the point about the emotional cost of constant jolting into a state of experienced	respect.	What	should	morally	govern	our interactions	with	others,	on our	view,	is,	ideally,	a	trained-in	virtue	of	respect	(or	"respectfulness").	This	virtue	of 22 respect	is	best	thought	of	as	a	cluster	of	automatized,	unconscious	dispositions,	and to that extent calls for a psychological, third-person, functional-role-based characterization rather than our phenomenological, first-person, phenomenalcharacter-based one. At the same time, we insist that while some of the manifestations constitutive of the relevant disposition are behavioral, others are experiential, and are just as constitutive.	A	person	who consistently acted toward other	persons in all the	ways required	by recognition-respect, but	whose internal experience	as	she	did	so	conformed	to	none	of	the	phenomenological	observations cited above, could hardly be properly described as having the virtue of respect. (Thus, a respectful zombie would appear to be inconceivable!) To that extent, a complete functional characterization of the virtue of respect presupposes a phenomenological characterization of the experience of respect. It remains, however, that	a fuller	account	of the	respective	roles	of respect-as-experience	and respect-as-virtue in a Kantian ethics would be required for a defense of the significance	of	a	phenomenology	of	respect	for	our	grasp	on	moral	action. References § Bagnoli, C. 2003. "Respect and Loving Attention."	Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33: 483516. § Baron, M.W. 1997. "Love and Respect in the Doctrine of Virtue." Southern Journal of Philosophy	(supplement)	36:	29-44. § Bommarito,	N.	2013.	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