www.crossingdialogues.com/journal.htm DIALOGUES Crossing Dialogues Association 55 Science and Mysticism: A Complex Distinction DAVID TRAFIMOW Department of Psychology, MSC 3452 New Mexico State University P.O. Box 30001 Las Cruces, NM 88003-8001 email: dtrafi mo@nmsu.edu DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2012; 5(2): 55 In their interesting article, Trevors and Saier (2012) strongly distinguished between science and mysticism. I quote the last two sentences of their conclusion: Science has allowed some humans to understand the universe at a profound level. Other have decided that the best way to understand the universe is through supernatural entities. Although there is a difference between the two, the difference is less clear than Trevors and Saier make it out to be. Trevors and Saier argue at some length that science and mysticism are distinguishable because scientifi c content is testable whereas mystical content is not. I disagree. Mystical content often is simply wrong. For example, consider Genesis, where it states explicitly: "And God said, 'let there be a fi rmament in the midst of the waters, and let it separate the waters from the waters'" Do our spacecraft crash into the fi rmament when we send them into outer space? Do they splash into the upper waters? The answer to these questions, and other potentially embarrassing questions, is a resounding "no!" It is easy to search mystical sources and show that content is plain wrong or even self-contradictory. Therefore, because much mystical content already has been falsifi ed, it clearly is testable. Let us briefl y consider the testability of scientifi c theories. It is well established that scientifi c theories make predictions only in combination with auxiliary assumptions that set initial conditions or fulfi ll other purposes. If a prediction fails, it could be the fault of the theory or of at least one auxiliary assumption (e.g., Lakatos, 1978). Thus, even in science, absolute falsifi cation is impossible and we are stuck with something less than that, which we might term "reasonable" falsifi cation. In addition, as Trafi mow (2009) demonstrated, unless a theory has been combined with all possible sets of auxiliary assumptions to see if a testable prediction results, which is impossible to do in practice, there is no way to prove that the theory cannot make a testable prediction. Even mystical content, that many think cannot be tested, might be testable with appropriate auxiliary assumptions (see Trafi mow for examples). Because much mystical content already has been proven wrong under the standard of reasonable falsifi cation, and it is likely that additional mystical content will be proven wrong in the future, it is invalid to insist that mystical content is untestable. The valid distinction is not between scientifi c and mystical content, but rather between scientifi c and mystical people or traditions. For example, many Jews or Christians either ignore or reinterpret obviously wrong biblical content. It is possible to take scientifi c or mystical sources more or less at face value, and to be more or less interested in testing for the truth of scientifi c or mystical content. Also, the same person can be scientifi c and mystical - scientifi c to function well in the world and mystical for emotional satisfaction. The person's mysticism might interfere with, aid, or not infl uence scientifi c functioning. In conclusion, the science-mysticism distinction does not represent a true dichotomy, or even two poles of a single continuum. The differences between science and mysticism are more complex, and are to be found at least as much in people and traditions, as in content. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences REFERENCES Lakatos, I. The methodology of scientifi c research programmes. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978. Trevors JT, Saier HS Jr. Mysticism and science: two products of the human imagination. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro sciences 2012;5:25-28. Trafi mow D. The theory of reasoned action: A case study of falsifi cation in psychology. Theory & Psychology 2009;19:501-518.