www.crossingdialogues.com/journal.htm DIALOGUES Crossing Dialogues Association 50 ADHD, Truth, and the Limits of Scientifi c Method GORDON TAIT School of Cultural and Language Studies in Education, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia email: g.tait@qut.edu.au DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2009; 2(2): 50-51 This paper makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate over the validity of the psychological construct, ADHD. While not ruling out the possibility that something of value may lie at the core of this diagnosis, the authors articulate a clear set of problems with the research logic that forms the foundation of the disorder itself, reaching the conclusion that there appears to be insuffi cient, valid scientifi c evidence for the demarcation of a coherent and independent disease entity. Foremost among these problems is, arguably, the inability of the ADHD advocates to structure their investigative studies around the possibility of hypothesis refutation, rather than simply constant confi rmation. As such, the dominant model of ADHD research largely seems to involve fi nding data that corroborates a pre-existing belief in the disorder's legitimacy. The authors make their case effectively and thoughtfully. As a way of articulating some of the epistemological fl aws in ADHD reasoning, the production of truth is dichotomised within the paper into two contrasting approaches, a 'top down' model, one that locates truth within the utterances of the powerful (eg. the dictates of scientifi c experts), and a 'bottom up' approach, as characterised by rigorous scientifi c observation and testing, followed by the formulation of empirically valid and replicable psychological entities (eg. a proper use of the scientifi c method). While recognizing the utility of this artifi ce within the logic of this paper, it does raise two fundamental questions about such a description of the production of truth. The fi rst is whether this somewhat reductionist model of truth production masks more than it elucidates, after all, as Foucault (1980) points out, truth is linked in a circular relation between the systems of power that produce it, and the effects of power which it induces. So, whereas the authority/truth binary of the 'top down' model certainly has currency within modernist discourses, particularly those surrounding constructs such as ADHD, it may be counter-productive to view this in opposition to truths produced through the practical, mundane mechanics of data collection and analysis. Linked to this concern, the second question involves the apparent faith placed by the authors in the scientifi c method, the implication being that the 'bottom up' approach, as guided by a idealised version of that method, produces a form of truth stripped of the fl aws of the 'top down' model-vested interest, bias, truth by committee-perhaps even the truth ('eventual empirical verifi cation'). Setting aside questions of what this latter objective might actually encompass, the issue here is it has been argued, often convincingly, that what is being asked of the scientifi c method is actually beyond its scope. As Feyerabend (1978) notes, the 'rigorous' scientifi c method is, in practical terms, simply a generally nebulous collection of rules and procedures, applied unevenly and pragmatically, and supplemented by other equally unscientifi c methods, results, biases, and presuppositions. Certainly, not the promised land of truth-detection. These relatively minor quibbles aside, the two high points of an already-excellent paper involve, fi rst, the observation that all attempts to place ADHD on a sound epistemological footing may well be a waste of time, and that perhaps a return to fi rst principles is in order. Second, the authors should be congratulated for the wonderfully articulate, and appropriate, way they conDialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences DIAL PHIL MENT NEURO SCI 2009; 2(2): 50-51 Tait clude their paper. These two sentences should be a mandatory ending for all academic articles, scientifi c or otherwise. If only some researchers into ADHD possessed a similar grasp of the limits of their own truth claims. 51 REFERENCES Feyerabend P. Science in a free society. Verso, London, 1978. Foucault M. Truth and power. In: Gordon C. (Ed) Selected interviews and other writings 1972–1977 by Michel Foucault. Brighton, Harvester Press, 1980.