THOMAS AqUINAS ON ESTABLISHiNG THE IDENTITY OF ARISTOf'T,F'S CATEGÔ'-C I.''rrr_cccccr \ nO.t+trltr.> Paul Symington Providing a philosophical justification for the specific number and identity of Aristotle's categories is a task that dates back at least to Simplicius's commentary on Aristotle 's Categories (ca. 6th century A.D.).' Scholastics from the thirteenth century onward addressed this issue, which they called ntfui.entia pratdicamentarum, ostly in commentaries on Aristotle's Catcgoies! Two related questions were pertinent. The first asked whether Aristotle provided an adequate list of categories and the second asked whether a philosophical justification could be given for the specific items on the list.itAlthough the latter task predates Albertus Magnus (ca. l20B B0), he is credited as being the first scholastic to attempt it.t Albertus established a method of arriving at a list of the I Rrr :r recent translation ol' Simplicius's commcntary on Aristotle's Calegties, sct Simplicius: On Aistotb'.r Cute.Eia 1-1, trans. Michacl Chasc (Ithaca, 2003). Scc csp. pp. 74 9 t . '  Robcrt Andrcws idcnt i f lcs othcr tcxts that o l fcrcd opportuni ty fbr mcdieval commcn{rrtors to addrcss the topic of thc sulf'ximtia, such :rs Aristotle's Maaplgtsiu Y, PlV"tiu lll, and Topics I, in "Question Commentarics on thc Catzgorfu.s in thc Thirteenth Ccntury" Melioetto 26 (2001), 292. Although Aquinas may be thc {irst scholastic to rc lcr to Simpl ic ius, hc docs not sccm to bc {ami l iar wi th Simpl ic ius 's. just i l ic : r t ion f ' thc numbcr and idcnt i ty of thc catcgor ies. H<>wcvrr , R:rdulphus Br i t<> shows {anr i l iar i ty wi th Simpl ic ius 's t reatmcnt. Scc Wi l l ianr E. McMahon, "Radulphus Br i to on the Suflicie ncy ol' rhe Categorie.s," Cahint de I'in;titut lu moyen'Age grec et ktin 39 (l99l'1, 86. For a topical discussion of thc vurrious philosophic:rl qucstions gcneratcd around Aristotlc's Categoie.s, ee Jorge J. E. Gracia and Lloyd Ncwton, "Mcdieval Thcorics ol' Cnkgories," Sran/iml Encyckpetlia o/ Philosoltllt, l4 April 2006, <http://plato.stanlord. cd u,/ c n trics/ mc dieval-C atzgoies > (8 Au gu st 2006). ' Se e Giorgio Pini, "Scotus on Dcducing Aristotle 's Catcsorics," Lt trarktion m&lihtalzs des Catzgoias (XII'-X' sildzs): XIIIe Symltosium urolilm de kgil1ue et tle simanhque midianlt, cds. Jodl Biard and Irdne Rosicr-Catach (Louvain, 2003), p. 2a.' Albcrtus Maenus, Liher de Predicarnentis 7.1, ALhuti Magni Operu omniu, l, cd. A. Borsnct (P.rris, lB90), pp.270 72. For a discussion ol' Albcrtus M:rgnus on thc cattsorics, sce William E. McMahon, 'Albert the Great on the Sem:rntics ol' thc Categories of Substancc, Quantity, and Quality," Histoiographia l;inguisticaT, f /2 JgB0), l4r 57 and E. P Bos and A. C. van dcr Hclm, "Thc Division of' Being over the Categories According to Albert the Grcat, Thom:rs Aquin:rs and Duns Scotus," in John Duns Scotus: Rmewal o/' Philosopllt: Acts o/ the Third Slmposium (hgtni4ed b-y the Dutth. Society ./itr Media,nl Philnsoplyt Medium Aatum (Ma1 23 arul 21, 1996), ed. E. P Bos, (ELEMENTA: Schriftcn zur Philosophie und ihrer Problcmgcschichtc) 72 (Amstcrdam, 1998), pp. l83 96. ] ne*ton l f 119-144. indd l19 l 3/34008 7:59:08 PM r20 PAIJL SYMINGTON categories from the modes of predication. Thomas Aquinas followed Albertus's lead and tried to establish an exhaustive categorial division of being by showing that there are only so many ways in which predicates are said of subjects.5 Although Aquinas never wrote a commentary on Aristotle's Categories, he provided two closely relatedjustifications for the list of categories Qpraedicantenta) in his commentaries on the Metaplrysics (Book ! lect. 9) and the Physics (Book III, lect. 3).(j Moreover, Aquinas's account was historically more influential than Albert's, even though Aquinas's discussions of the topic are relatively brief. Although the division of the categories is metaphysically fundamental and interesting, as well as hotly debated among scholastics, the secondary literature on Aquinas's contribution to the problem of sffiienti.a praedicanuntarzn is scant. In f,act, not only is the literature devoted specifically to it meager, but the discussion is often altogether ignored in broad discussions of Aquinas's metaphysics.T This is not surprising given Aquinas's brief and elliptical treatment of it. 'fhe issue, however, has not escaped the attention of a few scholars, includingJohn \Mppel, who has provided the most detailed treatment of Aquinas's view to date. The purpose of this article is to offer an alternative interpretation of Aquinas's view. The key pasqage i; his statement that "those things that are said to L, ,rrunduni,. $H.qf.lgnifo in every manner the figures of predication [i.e., the -odes 3i predication].';" I argue that this passage is crucial to a proper understanding of Aquinas's derivation 5 In "Catcgories in Aristotle," Michacl Frcde intcrprets the Aristotcliztn c:rtr:grrics :rs kinds ol prcdications rathe r th:rn kinds o1' prcdicatcs. ln Studie.r in Ai.rlotle. cd. DominicJ. O'Mcara (W:rshington, D.C., l98l) , pp. I 24. He also c la ims that in Aristotle's works there is not "any sign of a systematical dcrivation of' the cateeories, e.e., in tcrms ol a sct of lormal li:tturcs" (p. 22) In contrast, Aquinas holds I) that thc catcgorics (prodicammta) arc substancc and nine accidcnts, and 2) tht list of catcsorics can bc establishcd accordins to ftrrmal lt::rturcs of prop<lsitions (namcly, thc modcs o{' pred ication or .liguras praulicali onis).b Thrrmas Aquinas, In tluoiedm hbros Metaph,^tsitorum Aisloteli-s etpo.silio, cds. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Tur in, 1950); hcrcaf tcr c i tcd as ' In Mel . 'Through the chaptcr, I either provide my own translations of thc tcxt r>r modifications of John P R<rwirn's translation, Commatla4l on Arbtotlz's Mctaphysics.' St. Tltomar lrTzrazr (Notre Damc, 1995). Thomas Aquinas, In octo libros Plyticorum Ai,sloleli-t etpositio, ed. P M. Maggir)lo (Turin, 1954); hcrcaftcr cited as '1n P[lr.' 7 See, {br cxamplc, Eleonorc Stump,,4Tzrnar iTh" Arguments ol' ke Philnnfho.L), (Ncw York, 2005) and Robert Pasnzru and Christopher Shiclds, The Philosoph,y o.l' Aquinas (Bouldel 2004). Eticnnc Gilson:rlso does not mention itin Being and Some Philnsophus (Toronto, 1952), p.55. 8 In Met.5.9, n. 889: "quod illa dicuntur cssc secundum.re, quaecumque siqnilicant f ip;uras praedicat ionis." Rrr thc passaec of Ar istot lc to which Aquinas rcfcrs, scc Metabhysic.c 5.7. I n.*,on f l l l9l44. indd 120 I 3/32008 7:59:09 PM noilal'rc' / AqrnNAS ON THE IDENTITY OF A.'S (I[TEU)NE.\ of the categories and that \Mppel's account does not adequately take it into consideration. This passage indicates a key feature of Aquinas's approach: that the categories are identified and distinguished from each other based on essential propositions, i.e., secundum se or per se propositions, which have predicates that are essentially related to their subjects. Consequently, in the first section of this chapter, I present Wippel's interpretation of what Aquinas means by secundunt -tc as it relates to the modes of predication and I point out some dimculties with it.1) To be more precise, problems arise with \Mppel's interpretation because he does not take into account Aquinas's focus on per se modes of predication. In the second section of this chapter, I offer an interpretation of what Aquinas means by secu.ndum se when he describes the modes of predication from which the categories are established. Specifically, I interpret secundumse to refer to three <>f the lorr per se modes of predication as they are discussed in the Posterilr Anal)tics: pinto nodo, secundl m0d0, and quarto nndl per se predication.'(' My claim is that Aquinas determines the number of categories by reflecting on the ways in which the predicates of per sa propositions are related to the subjects of other such per.re propositions. Finally, in the third section I show how Aquinas establishes the categories from the modes of per se predication. For the sake of brevity, I focus mainly on substance, quantity, and quality and provide only a sketch of how Aquinas deals with the remaining categories. 1'John E Wippcl , "Thomas Aquinas's Der ivat ion ol ' thc Ar istotc l ian Catcsor ies (Prcdicamcnts)," Journnl o/ the Histolt o/ Philosopllt 25 (1987), 13 34 and The Metaph,y.siuil Thought o/' Thorna: Aquinrts (lNirshingtt>n, D.C., 2000), pp. 208 28. Othe r scholars with simi lar interprctat ions of Aquinas's v icw arc Giorgio Pin i , "Scotus on Dcdu<: in51 Aristot lc 's C:r tcgor ics." and E. P Bos and A. C. van dcr Hclnr , "Thc Div is ion of ' Beins ovcr thc Catcsorics Aecording to Albcrt the Grcat, Thomas Aquinrrs :rnd Duns Scotus." r" Thonras Aquinas, E$osilit Libi Postzriorurn, Sandi Th.ornru de Atluino Olwa omnia, Leonine cdi t ion (Romc, 1989), 1.2; hcrcaf tcr c i ted as 'Posl . An. 'Thc l?rct hat thc conrmcnurry <>n Lhc Poslzrior Analltits is believcd to h:rve been written roughly at thc sanre tinrc as thc commcntary r:n the MekQhysia (bctwccn 1269 72) nrakcs it pcrtinent lirr trur discussion. Scc The Ctmltitl.qe Companion h Arluinas, eds. Norman Kretzmzrnn and Eleonorc Stump (l{cw York, 1993), p. 283. In addition, both tcxts discuss modes o{' predication. Also, although these three modes ol' prcdication arc awkwardly named (I n:fer to thrce nrodcs of prcdication but therc is n<> krlio molol. I l\tll<>w tlre convention in thc secondary lite rrturc ol' n:rming c:rch spccilic nrodc according to thc Latin ordinal uscd in thc tcxt. Sce William M. Walton, "The Second Mode of Necess:rry or Per Se Propositions Accordinc to St. Thomas Aquinas," The Modun Schoohnan 29 (1951 52), 293 306. Aquinas idcntifies tuio modo in Post. An. l.l0 as not a modc ol prerdication but rathcr on" *.y r. unclerstand rhe rerm '1ttr: far at givni lar i ntcr rPlLlalio n_ ,. , . _ lt oF secundnur-. se., se e Fotlpt f-lL lnernV, ttBe\fu and, frco{ied+torl in ngeinS y-4 Predicotion' W Infehrcf^l ior s ^ l a : -" , r ( w*sh ,n3 fon , D.6 ' :F ln t Cafho l )< un ivers ; ty oF f t * le r i co ' ?res i f i i c ) : PP' 173-2?6 ' I l 2 l I o.*ton t l I l9-144. indd 121 I 3/3/2008 7:59:09 PM i r22 PAL'L SYI4INGTON I. John Wppel's Interpretati.on In this section I focus exclusively on \\4ppel's interpretation of Aquinas's derivation as it is presented in his commentary on the Maaplqtsirs Y, 9, focusing specifically on \A4ppel's understanding of Aquinas's statement that "those things are said tobe secundum sr that signify in every manner the modes of predication."rr I also crit icize Wippel's interpretation insofar as it is neither sufficient for establishing the number and identity of the categories from modes of predication, as Aquinas claims, nor compatible with the general context of Aquinas's discussion. To be fair to \Mppel, howeveq it should be noted that he offers an accurate overview of the text in which Aquinas establishes the list of categories. He notes that Aquinas identifies three ways in which a predicate can be related to its subject in a proposition. In the first way, (1) "the predicate is really identical with that which serves as the subject,"'2 and these propositions signify substance. The example that \{ippel provides to illustrate this is "Socrates is an animal." In a second way, (2) "a predicate may be taken from something which is in the subject."r:rIf the predicate is absolutely in the subject and follows from the matter (2a), then the category of quantity results, but if it follows from the form (2b) of the subject, then the ca-tegory of quality results. Wppel does not give examples of, nor ai..trrcr%l*.'u predicate is understood to be in a subject either according to the matter of the subject or according to its form. It is possible that he would say that "Socrates is five-feet tall" and "Socrates is bald" are examples in which the predicate is said to be in the subject because the lormer signifies how much the subject is and the latter how the subject is. If, however, the predicate is taken not absoiutely but in relation to something other than the subject (2c), then relation is expressed. Although Wppel does not provide an example, he might say that "Socrates is the teacher of Plato" is an example of this. In a third way, (3) "a predicate may be derived from something which is realized outside the subject."'+ Again, \Vippel provides no examples to illustrate this, nor does he discuss how a predicate is understood to be realized outside the subject. Rather, he simply claims that the various Lt In Met. 5.9, n. 889. I Wippcl, Metulthysical Thought o/' Tlnrnar AquiruLs, p.213. 13 I b i d . , p . 214 . , r Ib id. { newton fl 119-l44.indd 122 ,Or*, ,,-rn,, ," I r ' - ( i+4 lN- , fo ' AqurNAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.'S QTTEGORIES 123 ways in which the predicate is denominated by that which is realized outside the subject yield the remaining categories. For example, if the predicate in any way measures the subject (3a c), in combination with other conditions) then the categories of place (e.g., "Socrates is in the marketplace"), time (e.g., "The play is at dusk") and position (e.g., "Socrates is sitting") result. If the predicate does not measure the subject (3d), then habit (e.g., "Socrates is shod") results. The last two categories, action (e.g., "Socrates is cutting") and passion (e.g., "The paper is being cut") are signified by those predicates that are only "partly present in the subject (3e f;."t" \Vippel cites an earlier passage in which Aquinas states that "those things are said to be secundum sethat signify in every manner the modes of predication."r{; He notes that "Thomas begins [the derivation] with the observation that according to Aristotle those things are said to be in the proper sense (secundunt se rather than only per accidens) which signify different figures of predication [i.e., modes of predication]."17 However, \A4ppel does not expand any further on this passage, leaving us with three questions. First, what does he take 'figures of predication' to mean? Second, what is the antecedent o 'those things,' i.e., to what do 'those things' refer? Do they refer to "predicates," "subjects," "the various significations of the copula," "propositions," or something else? Third, what does it mean for something to be said to be secundunt se('in a proper sense') and how is this different from that which is said to be pn accidtns? I will address each question in turn. Figures of Predication In discussing the meaning of 'figures of predication,' Wippel refers to both'modes of predicating' Qnodus pratdicandi) and'modes of predication' (modus praedhationis). Wippel does not distinguish between these two terms and seems to use them interchangeably.r{r He simply says that the categories are distinguished according to different modes or ways of predicating. r i I b i d . . o . 215 . ti In Met. 5.9, n. BB9. '7 Wippcl, Metnplgvsital Thought of Th.omu Aquinu, p. 212. 18 In keeping with Aristotle's and Aquinas's ueneral thcory of psychology, I urke it that a'proposition' is the objcct of the sccond :rct of thc intellect, and that'prcdicating' is thc activity itsel[. Thus, 'predication'would bc thc abstract form of 'predicating'. I newton 1] l l9-14,1. indd 123 l 3/3/2008 7:59: l0PM t 2+ PAUL SYN{INGTON Of those names which are predicated, continues Thomas, some signify what something is, that is to say, substance. Some signify how it is (quality), and others how much there is (quantity), and so on. Therefore, in accord with each of these suprerne modes of predicating, ,ssd nlust signify the same thing, i.e., what something is, or what kind it is, or how much there is, etc. For instance when we say that man is an animal, the ternr 'is' sienifies substance. When we say a man is white, the verb 'is' signifie s quality. "' In this passage, \Mppel identifies "modes of predicating" as the basic ways in which a predicate says something of its subject andlXpoints out that each category is distinguished according to a different-mode of predicating. A predicate that expresses what the subject is signifies substance, one that expresses how the subject is expresses quality, etc. For example, since both "Socrates is an animal" and "Bucephalus is a horse" have predicates that say what the subject is, the essa of each proposition must signift substance. Likewise, "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is bald" signify quality because they have predicates that show how the subject is. To put it another way, "white" and "bald" are answers to the question "How is Socrates?" Thus, two propositions that have predicates that relate to their subjects in the same way (e.g., both propositions have predicates that signify what the subject is) signify the same category. \Atren Wippel refers to the signification of esse) he means the copula 'is' in a proposition. In a simple subject-predicate proposition the copula functions to unify the subject and predicate in a single signification, so that a proposition as a whole can f signify a substanc"e or iccident according to thi sense of the predicate. For example, the proposition "Socrates is an animal" signifies ubstance, and "Socrates is white" signifies an accident (viz., quality). The Antecedent of 'those things' This understanding of what \Mppel means by 'modes of predication' or'modes of predicating' helps us to understand the second question posed above concerning how Wippel understands 'those things' in Aquinas's statement that "those things are said to be secundum J/ that signify in every manner the modes of predication."2o Although \Mppel does not identify the antecedent of 'those things', his brief treatment re Ib id. 2n In Mel. 5.9, n. 889 I n.*on f l l l9l44. indd 124 t - 1612008 7:59r10PM ho it4|;ct AqurNAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.'S ()17DGORIL.\ of the issue seems to suggests that the modes of predication are the various ways in which predicates are related to subjects. Therefore, it would seem that Wppel understands 'those things' (ilk) to mean the modes of predication that he identifies, such as "what the subject is," "how the subject is," "how much the subject is," etc. However, if this were the case, Aquinas's passage would have the following interpretation: the specific modes of predication are said to be secundunt se that signify in every manner the modes of predication (and the categories are established from them). That is, the modes of predication that \Mppel identifies l) are the modes of predication that are said to be in a proper sense and 2) are the modes of predication from which the catesories are derived. t25 ;z "Secundum se"r 4+V+65This interpretation in turn provides us with an answer to the question 6k4'1 concerning what it means for modes of predication to be said'sacundunt ,ie.' \Mppel points out that secundum se is opposed t<> per accidtns and translates the former as "in a proper sense." Thus, it would be reasonable to infer from this that per accidens in this context may be translated as "in an improper sense." Consequently, in the passage in question, "in a proper sense" qualifies "modes of predication" in that only propositions that have predicates that are related to their subjects according to one of the ten supreme modes of predication are'secundunt se.'For example, a proposition that ts seatndu,?, reis one in which the predicate says what the subject is or is one in which the predicate says how the subject is, etc. Also, those propositions that have predicates that are not related to their subjects according to one of these ways are secundurn ailidens. This indicates how, for Wppel, categories are distinguished according to modes of predication. "Socrates is a man," "Bucephalus is a horse," and'A man is rational," signify substance because they have predicates that show what their subjects are and "Socrates is white" signifies quality because the predicate says how the subject is. Now let me turn to some problems with Wppel's understanding of Aquinas's view First, Wippel seems to present two independent ways of "distinguishing" or "deriving" the categories.zr This could be called'the ?r It may be controversi:rl to intcrprct Wippcl as cquatine thc terms 'de riving' and distinguishing.' Howeveq thcre :rrc sevcral re:rsons why I bclievc hc docs so. l) He neMon fl 119-14-4.indd 125 l/3/2008 7:59: l0PM ,l 'V;''$;; ---z 1 2 6 PAIIL S\A4INGTON problem of two derivations.' On one hand, he says that the categories "are distinguished according to the different modes or ways of predicating,"22 and then identifies the mode of predication specific to each category. For example, propositions with predicates that express what the subject is signify substance (e.g., "man is an animal") and propositions that express how the subject is signi$' quality (e.g., "Socrates is bald-"). On the other hand, he presents the "derivation" of the categoriesh from propositions that express a relationship between the subject and ,,6lbn predicate according to three ways: "In one way, the predicate is really . ^ (04"r^.. identical with that which serves as the subject;';':: "'' a seconcl way,lf+t'."1d b"O !l& predicate may be taken from something *hi.h i, in the subjecr:''tr u116 ( S//t,|.ol P 0{ -' ?"in a third major way, a predicate may be derived from something which g ttf I i, O n S ' is realized outside the subject."2:' Thus, it appears that he has a problem A U0 | '-' of two derivations. That is, he seems to have two accounts for how T the list of categories is established. This problem arises because there is no discernable relation between the so-called ten supreme modes of predication and the three ways in which a predicate is related to its subject. This is problematic because Aquinas only presents one way of establishing the categories in the text. \Mppel does not discuss how the modes of predicating that show how the subject is or how much the subject is are related to that in which the predicate is taken from something in the subject. That is, if "Socrates is white" distinguishes the category of quality because it shows how the subject is, what is the significance of Aquinas sayine that "white" as understood in the ncver dc{ incs 'der ivat ion ' but hc docs usc both tcrnrs in vcrv s imi l : r r contcxts: "Thonras would have us appeal . . . to d ivers i ty in modes ol ' prcdicat i< in in ordcr t t , rcndcr crpl ic i t thc distincti<ln bctwccn subst:rnce and accidcnt in tcncral, and :rlso to dcrive thc nine suprcmc c l : rsses of accidents" (p. 2 l l ) . I t would makc scnsc to say that . just as substancc is distinguished fionr accident, so to the ninc catcqorics arc distinguishcd I'rom ezrch othcr as wcll. 2) Aquinas never uscs a tcrm that corrcsponds to Wippcl's tcrnr 'dcrivation.' Rathcq Aquiniis uses tcrn)s such as distinguuntur irncl diriditur to discuss thc s<rcalled dcrivation of thc catceorics. Thus, when Wippe I uses the te rm 'distinguish' in thc contcxt ol' thc catcsorics it is rc:rsonirblc to hold th:rt hc uscs it interchangably with the tcrm 'dcrivc.' 3) Hc st:rtes th:rt thc catesorics"arc tlistinguishal:rccordins to diflirent modes or ways of prcdicat ing" (p. 212) and immediatc ly a l ter ident i ly ing these modes of prcdicating throueh which thc czrtegorics :rre distinguished he proceeds directly to discuss thc dcriv:rtion ol' the categorics. It is dillicult to undcrshnd how the categories arc distineuishcd and derived lrom the modcs of prcdication if 'distinguished' and 'dcrivcd' do not h:rve the s:rmc mc:lnrns. " I b i d . . o . 212 . , 3 I b i d . . 213 . , + I b i d . . 2 l 4 . 25 Ib id. newton_fl 1t9-l.l4.indd 126 l l3200S l:.se:r0 eV I no itnlicS / AqUINAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.'S CA'IEGOI{1.)S subject "Socrates" according to the form of the subject is a way of distinguishing the category of quality from other categories? Indeed, it appears that the first account presented by Wppel obviates the need for the second one. A second problem with Wippel's interpretation specifically peftains to the way that Aquinas establishes the category of substance. Wippel suggests that substance is "derived" when a predicate is "really identi- :;';#l:.',fJl:jTil'''il';::fi :i,11 i:';#.n-ffj.:1',lH: example, in "Socrates is an animal," "Socrates" is really identified with "animal" and "animal" says what the subject "Socrates" is. Given these factors, according to Wippel, the proposition signifies substance. This is in contrast to "Socrates is white," which does not signify substance because the predicate is neither identified with the subject nor does it show what the subiect is. However, ,-rot only is the conclition in which the preclicate is really identified with the subject not mentionecl by Aquinas, but it is also trJTT:,ffi l?T:,$:il::Jff f ,'#;":*:il:"#Xfi::,',,'.?: that do not. This is because there are propositions that have predicates lhat are identified with their subject and yet do not signi$ substance. Consider the following examples: "\A/hite is a color," 'A surface is a continuous quantity," or "This patch of color is red." In these propositions the predicate is identified with the subject and shows what the subject is. "\4rhite" is really identified with "color" in the sense that white really is a color. Also, a particular patch of color that is red is -l such that "red" is identified with that patch of color. But none of these -i(itJ ---, propositions directly signifies substance. Thus Wppel's suggestion is not (4\4t ' .1 . I suf f ic ient forestabl ish ingthecategoryof substance.This isaproblem .froult-, ni*V because Aquinas's proceclure aims to distinguish propositions from each 5'' f (i1' other that signify different categories from a consideration of the way t ) \ t VL in which predicates are related to subjects.2T he fact that Wippel's interpretation does not take this into account leads one to infer that he has misinterpreted Aquinas's position. 2' j Ib id. , p.213. Al l Aquinas s: iys is th:r t in one wzry a "predicate statcs what thc subjcct is, as when I say Socrzrtcs is an animal." In Met 5.9, n. B9l. 27 In Met.5.9, n. 890: "Et propter hoc ea in quac div id i tur e ns pr imo, d icuntur esse praedicamcnm, quia d ist inguuntur sccundum divcrsum modum praedic:rndi . " t27 I n.*,on rZ l19l44. indd l l7 l 3612008 7:59:10PM L Z O PAUL SYMINGTON Third, \A/ippel does not offer an interpretation of how Aquinas estabIishes the categories that is consistent with the overall meaning of the text. As a consequence, \A/ippel's interpretation fails to show how all ten categories are said to be entia secundum se, which is a fundamental claim of Aquinas in the text. In lect. 9, Aquinas is commenting on Aristotle's text in which he discusses the various ways that being is said.28 The text is divided into the following distinct sections. l) In n. 885, Aquinas provides an overarching division in which being is said (ezs dicitur) either secundum se or secundunt amfulnu.2\t Furthermore, it is important to note that in this section Aquinas says that these two ways that being is said are not the same as the division of being into substance and accident.30 Rather, he says that the division of being secundunt se and secundunt accidens "is understood according to whether something is predicated of something else either essentially lpu tt) or accidentally Ipu accidens]."'3t 2) Next, in nn. 886 BB, Aquinas subdivides the latter division and discusses the nature of being that is said accidentally (secundun acci.dens); namely, that which is predicated accidentally. 'A man is musical" and "Socrates is white" are beings that are said secundunt accidens because they predicate accidents of substances and their predicates are not essentially predicated of their subjects.3'  3) Finally, in nn. 889*94, Thomas turns to the former division and discusses that which is said to Yse secundunt se. It is in this context that he states that "those things that are said to be secundum.re in every manner signify the modes of predication":r:j and it is in this context that he establishes the list of categories (n. 892). An understanding of how the text is divided and how the so-called derivation text f its into it reveals some significant problems with \Mppel's interpretation. On the one hand, \{ippel states that the mode of predication that reveals the category of quality is that in which the predicate shows how the subject is. Therefore, since "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is musical" are propositions that have predicates that show how the subject is, they must signify the category of quality. On '8 In Met.5.9, n. BB5: "Hic Phi losophus dist ingui t quot modis d ic i tur ens." '  1 ' Ib id. : "ens dic i tur quoddam sccundum sc, et quoddam secundum accidcns." r0 Ib id. : "Sciendum klmen est cuod i l la d iv is io cnt is non est eadcnr cum i l la d iv is ione qu ; r d i v i d i r u r cns i n subs t : r n t i : r n r i t : r r c i dcns . " 'rr Ibid.: "Undc patct quod divisio entis secundum sc et secundum accidcns, attenditur secundum quod al iquid praedicatur de al iquo pcr se vel per accidcns." r Ib id. , n. 886: "Ostendi t quot modis d ic i tur ens per accidens. . .cum accidens praedicatur de subiccto, ut cum dic i tur , honto est musicus." :r:r Ibid., n. 889. newton f l l19l44 . indd 128 3/3,2008 7:59:10 PM no ;tallcs AqurNAS ON THE rDENTrry OF A.'S O|TEGORIES 129 the other hand, Aquinas states that being "secundltnt se is divided into the ten categories, of which nine are accidental kinds":Jl and being secundum J, refers to essential predication. However, both "Socrates is white" and "Socrates is musical" are said secundum af,cidens. Therefore, since propositions that have predicates that say how the subject is have predicates that are predicated accidentally (secundunr. auidms), this cannot be the mode of predication from which quality is established. Rather, the mode of predication from which all the categories are derived must be related to essential predication.:i:' Finally, I question Wippel's overall understanding of Aquinas's approach to establishing the categories. I disagree with \Mppel's suggestion that Aquinas's text provides a way to discover the categories, if by 'discover' Wppel means that the technique for distinguishing the categories is in itself a way of determining the meaning of each of the categories. That is, since the term 'discover' has the connotation of "being made known," the suggestion that through the technique presented by Aquinas one discovers definitions or characteristics of specific categories is misguided. Rather than discovering the catesories, Aquinas's technique merely distinguishes or divides propositions that signify different categories according to the logical properties of propositions. Wippel seems to hold that for Aquinas "Socrates is human" is a way of understanding the meaning of substance signified by the proposition because the predicate says what the subject is. In contrast, I " Ib id. , n. 885: "Quod cx hoc patct , quia ipsc postmodunr, cns sccundunr se div id i t in dcccm praedicamen[r , quorum novcm sunI dc gcncrc accidcnt is ." : r : 'P in i fo l lows Wippcl in h is intcrpretat ion in "Scotus on Dcducing Ar istot le 's Catceor ics," p. 26: in " thc prcdicat ion 'man is whi tc ' , ' is ' s igni l ies a qual i ty , and so on. Since thcre zire ten kinds of prcdicatc some thing Aquinas dcmonstrated too. . . thcrc arc te n difle rcnt meaninss of' the vcrb 'to be'.... Hcncc, sincc prcdicates are classilicd into ten gener:r accordins to wh:rt thcy siunify, hc could concludc thut therc arc ten scncra of bcin.g." Earlier in thc tcxt Pini statcs that "Sincc a predicate can bc attributed to its subject in tcn diflbrcnt ways, hc could conclude that the re wcrc tcn diflcrcnt modcs of ' bc ing" (pp. 25, 26). The s:rmc cr i t ic ism :rppl ics to Pin i 's intcrprcurt ion: al thou{rh Aquinas holds that the ' is ' in thc proposi t ion "Socr: r tcs is whi tc" cxprcsscs a meurphysical accidcnt, such :r proposition cannot bc used to deducc thc catccory of quality. This is similar to thc intcrpreurtion given by Bos and van dcr Hclm in "The Div is ionof BeingovertheC:r tegor ics,"pp. I87 89.Twoothcrt r ratmentsof Aquinas's on the sufiientiapraedicammtorum arc of note. They fbllow a similar linc of interprctation as Wippel: M. Marina Scheu in The Cate.qoies qf Beinq in Arktotb and Sl. Thomru (Washington D.C., 1944), pp. 60 6; and Stanislas Breton, "Lzr ddduction thomistc dcs catieorics," Rnue philosophique dcItuuain 60 (1962), 5 32. Scheu stresses Aquinas's logical approach in dcriving the modes of being (p. 63). However, Scheu treatmcnt is bricf and does not expand on thc various modes of prcdication. neqon f l l l 9 l , l4 . indd 129 l/3/2008 7i59:1 I PM 1 3 0 PAIJ'L SYMINGTON hold that Aquinas identifies "Socrates is human" as signiflring substance in the following way: l) every proposition that has a given logical form signifies substance (what this logical form specifically is will be discussed in the third section); 2) "Socrates is human" has that given logical form; 3) therefore, "Socrates is human" signifies substance. Aquinas does not provide a way of discovering what propositions signifying categories mean (e.g., that "Socrates is human" signifies substance, which means "what the subject is") but rather a way of distinguishing propositions from each other in a way that parallels the categorial division of being. In support of this, Aquinas states that "that into which being is first divided (diriditul are called categories because they are distinguished (distinguuntur) according to different modes of predicatinS."t" In addition to this, I contend that Aquinas emphatically does not establish the division of being into the categories by identifying the ten supreme modes of predicating ("what the subject is," "how the subject is," etc.) but rather establishes the categories through the three ways that predicates may be related to their subjects. r+z*f okzul II. Per se Predicati.on a d the ldenti\t of the Categoriu The starting point for my interpretation of the way that Aquinas establishes the categories is based on the passage in which he says that being said secundunt se and secundun auiders "is understood according to whether something is predicated of something else either essentially fper se] or accidentally lper accidensl."37 I claim that the categories are established through the modes of per se (i.e., essential) predication.rrlln this section I develop some points crucial to understanding Aquinas's procedure for establishing the categories from per se modes of predication; namely, that a successful way to establish the categories is by identifying dil ferences in the predicational structure of per se propositions.:ir) Next, I 3tt In Me|.5.9, n. 890. My cmphasis. 31 In Met.5.9, n. BB5 Latcr in his comnrentrrry (n. 1054), Aquinas spccilically idcntifics lhe vari<rus mczrnings ol 'secundum.re' with the various me:rnings <>l' 'pa.se' prcdiczrtion as it is found in the Postuior Antlytics. ri{} For a discussion of thc varil,us scnscs of morlu, in Aquinas, especi:rlly as it plays a role in his metaphysics, sce John Tirmarchio,'Aquinas's Division of Being According to Modes of Eristing," Ratieu oJ'Metalthl.sics 54,3 (2001),585 613. ne Rrr the dillerencc bctwccn pa.se pru>positi<tns tnd fr se predication, see lh. 18 abovc. ] neuon-fi,l19-144.indd I30 3n2008 7:59: l l PM po ito$cs / AqUINAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.'S ()IIEGORIE.\ introduce the various per se modes of predication-namely, pimo ntodo, secundl modo and quartl nndl per st and distinguish them from the per accidens modes. Each mode of predication indicates how a predicate is related to its subject. Furthermore, I show that each per se mode of predication satisfies the two criteria of per se predication; viz.: l) the predicate is predicated universally of the subject and 2) the subject, or something possessed by the subject, is the cause of the predicate. This provides a foundation for the third section of this chapter (III) in which I discuss how Aquinas establishes the various categories from per .r, modes of predication.H) As previously mentioned, Aquinas's derivation of the categories that I am focusing on is found in the fifth chapter of his commentary on the Metaplgysics.In order to understand Aquinas properly, however, one must consider the larger context of the passage. The general issue that Aquinas addresses in this section of his commentary concerns the various significations of 'being'; that is, the basic senses of the term.rr He begins by noting that for Aristotle the term ezs signifies either szs per se or ens per acci.deni.t2 This is the division of being into substance Qper se) and accidents Qper accidtns). Howeve4 Aquinas makep anpthep distinction of rzs into being that is said secun&t , i uncil:ri7r?,lr,7tiilAi This latter division of being refers to the various senses of the copula ('is') in a proposition. Because the copula of a proposition is a kind of being ('is' is a cosnate of 'being'), being that is said secunduzl se refers to propositions in which the predicate is essentially or per se predicated of its subject. There are two important features of the copula. First, it signifies what the predicate and subject taken together signifr.+3 For example, the copula of "Socrates is an animal" signifies Socrates-the-animal (the specific unified extramental being). Second, the copula is classified or characterized according to the way in which the predicate of a proposition 1" Tlrc textual basis I'<rr my inte rprctation is nrainly Lhc Cornmenkn_y on the Metutlth,ysits Y 9. Due to its similarity with the passage in Plytsicslll.5, I usc the latter parallcl tcxt only lor purpui( ' \ of r rmpl i l icat ion. at In Met. 5.9. n. BB5. '! Aristotlc, Metaphlsits 5.7 (l0l7aB). t' ' Scc: Gyula Klima, 'Aquinas' Thcory ol' the Copula," Itgical Analysis and Hisnry ol' Philnsolth,"t 5 (2002) and "Thc Semantic Principles Underlying S:rint Thomas Aquinas's of Bcing," Melieual Philosolhy and Theokgy 5 (1996), B7 l4l; Pini, "Scotus on Assertion and thc Copula: A Comparison with Aquinas," in Medieztal Thuies on Assuiz,e and,\'on Assulhte Inngvllgs. Act.s of the 1lth Eurolnan Svmpo.sium on Malieral l-ogit and Sanantics, Rome, fune 11 1:1,2002,cds. A. Maier i l and L. Vr lcntc (Fi rcnze,2004),307 31. t 3 t i : s  io l newlon |7 119l44 . indd l l l 3/32008 7:-59: l l PM 132 PAI,'L S\MINGTON is related to its subject. For example, the copula in "Socrates is an animal" is an ens secundumsd because the proposition has a predicate that is essentially related to its subject. The reason why the copula can be characterized in this way is because it has the specific function of relating the predicate to the subject in a proposition. The ways in which the copula relates the predicate to the subject can be characterized in different ways. An understanding of the two features of the copula helps us to interpret Aquinas's statement that Aristotle "divides being secundam.t/ into the ten categories, of which nine are accidents."{r By this, Aquinas means that even though the nine accidents of being are per accidens, they are entia secundum Ja in the sense that they can be signified by propositions that have secundum .rc copulas That is, all ten categories can be signified by being that is said secundunt rd because any proposition in which an essential predication occurs has a copula that signifies any one of the ten categories, including any of the nine accidental categories. For example, "White is a color" has a copula that is both secundunt se and signifies the category of quality (which is an ens per acci.dens), whereas "Socrates is white" is a proposition that has a copula that signifies a per accidens being and is itself secundltnl anidrns. Similarly, "Socrates is an animal" has a copula thal is secundunt ra and signifies a per rc being (substance). Although a substance is an ens per se and accidents are ens per accidens, both substance and accidents can be signified by propositions with copulas that are entia secundunt sa. To simpli$r matters, instead of referring to a proposition's copula, I will use the phrase 'a per se predication' or 'a per "rd proposition' to reler to a proposition in which the predicate is essentially related to its subject.t5 \4/hen Aquinas states that those things that are said secundunt se signif' the figures of predication [i.e., modes of predication], he means that per se propositions or predications provide an understanding from which the categories are established. \{hen this interpretation of secundum sa (meaning "per se predication") is coupled with Aquinas's statement that "being must be narrowed down (contrahinr) to diverse kinds (viz., categories) according to a different mode of predication from that of genus and species] because being is said in as many ways as the ways ' * In Met.5.9, n. BB5. r:' Following Wippe l, I will usc thcsc two tcrms intcrchanecably. I newon_fl_l19-l4.l.iDdd 132 3/34008 7:59: l I PM no / AqurNAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.' S (AIEGORIE.\ in which something is predicated,"$ the result is that the categories are distinguished from each other in the following way: propositions that signify different categories are divided from each other by identifying differences among the modes of per se predication. This procedure shows how being is divided into categories by dividing propositions that signifi different categories by distinguishing per se propositions from each other according to different ways that a predicate can be per se predicated of subjects. Although it may be counter-intuitive to interpret secundum seas referring exclusively to propositions in which the predicate is essentially or per se related to its subject, there are several reasons to do so. The first is that it heeds Aquinas's explicit admonition that "being is said in a certain way according to itself and in a certain way according to accidents, nevertheless, it must be noted that that part of being is not the same with that division in which being is divided into substance and accidents."rT hat is, it avoids conflating the meaning of ens per se with ens secundum se; per se being refers to substance and being secundunt se refers to a proposition in which there is an essential relation between subject and predicate. Second, it resolves the issue of the sense in which the nine accidents can be understood as being secundunt se. This interpretation allows us to understand how the nine accidents are on the one hand not entia per se, because this applies to substance alone (and accidental being is dependent on the being of substance), and on the other hand, because the nine categories are still fundamental extramental entities, not reducible to anything else (e.g., not reducible to entia lter se); they are fundamental entities that can be identified through, and correspond to, fundamental differences among pet sr propositions. Third, it allows Aquinas's argument for the categories to avoid the charge of a non sequi.tur fallacy. Aquinas would indeed be guilty of such a charge if he held that "The categories are established from the modes . -r I Lo b of predication," follows from "The categories are established by seeing ^ sldltll Lo, which propositions happen to signifi which categories;" foi example, - 'Sho d'l.o) o" t that "Socrates is an animal," establishes the category of substance OtlTSt,tt i l î because it signifies ubstance. Merely stating that a given proposition oUOfO-t'- 'r 'n In Met. 5.9, n. 890: "Undc oportct, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa senera secundum diversum modum pracdicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum esscndi; quia 'quot ies ens dictur ' , idest quot modis a l iquid praedicatur ." ' ' In Ma.5.9. n. 885. r33 ne*or t7 l l9l44. indd 133 3,a4008 7:59: l l PM t 3+ PATIL S\'}IINGTON signifies substance is not the same as establishing the category of substance from a mode of predication. For in this case, no appeal is made to the way in which the predicate is related to its subject; ratheq appeal is made only to the metaphysiqal category a particular proposition happens to signify. 5o#{?"'5;d., To. the categories to be established, it must be shown how propositions having copulas which signify a specific mode of per se predication can be used to distinguish different categories. In contrast to rA/ippel's interpretation t Aquinas establishes the ten categories by reflecting on the three pn se modes of predication as they are established in the Postnior Anafuftcs I.aB There he gives two criteria of per se predication. According to one, a predicate must be universally predicated of its subject-meaning that the predicate is found in each of the things that are included in its subject.tll According to the second criteria, "the subject or something possessed by the subject [must be.] the cause of the predicate.":'0 This second criterion is based on the fact that since the term 'per' ('by') signifies a causal relation it is necessary that there be a causal feature for all per se predications.:'r In contrast, accidental predication obtains when at least one ol these two criteria are not met. Aquinas goes on to say that there are three general modes of predication that meet these two criteria: printo nndo, secundo m0d0 and quartl modo.t'2 himo nodo pn se predication obtains "when the definition or something posited in the definition is predicated of something."s3 Examples of this mode occur in "Socrates is a man," "White is a color" and "Humans are animals." This mode meets the two criteria because every 'o As previously mcntioncd, Aquin:rs will subscquently idtntily secundum sepredication witlt ltu.re predication \nh\s Commenktrl on th.e Metaltb.sic.r, nn. 1054 1567. +s Po.rt. An. 1.9, lines 47, 48. to Posl .An.1.10, l incs l9 24: "Sicutautem hcc preposi t io 'per 'designat habi tudinenr cause qu:rndo al iquid cxtrancum cst causa c ius quod at t r ibui tur subier : to, i ta quando subicctum uel a l iquid c ius cst c: rusa c ius quod at t r ibui tur c i , c t h<lc s igni f iczr t 'pcr sc ' . t t Post . An. L l0, l incs 8,9: "Circa pr imum scicndum cst quod hec prcposi t io 'pcr ' desisnat habi tudincm causc." 52 Aquinas does mention another scnse in which something isltu se(viz., hrtiomolo). Howevcr, this "mode is not:r modc ol' predicating, but rathcr a modc of existing." Rrr in this se nse, Lhe lo se significs something th:rt is alone, as sornething singular in the gcnus o f subshnce . Pos t . An .1 .10 , l i nes l l 7 21 . 53 Po,s l An. 1.10, l ines 25 30: "Pr imus ergo modus dicendi pcr sc cst quando id quod at t r ibui tur a l icui pert inct nd formam eius, ct quia d i f t in i t io s igni l icat lormam ct essent iam rei , pr imus modus c ius quod cst 'pcr se 'cst quando prcdicatur dc al iquo di l l in i t io ucl a l iquid in d i f t in i t ionc posi tum." newon f7 l l9l44. indd 134 3Rl2008 7:59: l l PM yro it^tid / AqurNAS ON THE IDENTITY OF A.'S (A'fIt(nRIL.\ 1 3 5 proposition of this form has a predicate that is predicated universally of its subject insolar as the predicate is contained in the definition of the subject. Also, the predicate is linked to its subject causally insofar as the predicate signifies the essence of the subject. Secundo modo per se predication obtains "when the subject is posited in the definition of a predicate, which is a proper accident of the subject."5r This mode occurs in 'A surface is colored" and "Humans have the capacity to laugh." A characteristic of thislez se mode of prediction is that it involves predicates that are property terms Qpropid. This mode of predication meets the two criteria as well. First, the predicate is universally predicated of.i1s subiect; for example, every surface has the preclicate "colored"'SFJtot"a of it. Second,the predicate is causally linked to the subject in that even though the predicate is not in the definition of the subject, the subject is signified in the definition of the predicate; in 'A surface is colored," the definition of 'colored' includes the notion of "surface." Because of this, this mode of predication is determined by a relationship between the predicate and the subject in which the predicate is understood to be in the subject. @nrta ntodo per se, the most obscure of the modes, obtains when "the preposition per designates a condition of efficient cause or other. . . Ibut] the predicate is in fact in the subject on account of itself.":':' Aquinas says that this mode of predication occurs in "Having been slaughtered, it died." This mode of predication can also be understood to meet the two criteria of having a predicate that is universally predicated of its .1. subject and having a predicate that is understood to be causally linked'"t -j3*" subject. First, in the example given, the predicate "it died" is universally predicated of that which has been slaughtered. Second, the predicate is linked to the subject according to an efficient cause: the slaughtering is understood as the efficient cause of the death of the animal. This per.ia mode of predication is said to signify an extrinsic 5 t Pos tAn .1 .10 , l i nes 64 67 : "Unde secundus modus d i cend i ' pc r sc ' c s t qu : rndo subicctum poni tur in d i f l ln i t ionc prcdicat i quod est propr ium :rcc idcns c ius." 55 Po . s t .An . l . 10 , l i nes I22 35 : "Dc indccumd ic i t : i t ema l i omodoe rc . , pon i t quanum modum, secundum quod hcc preposi t io 'pcr 'desienat habi tudincm causc c l l ic icnt is ucl cuiuscunquc:r l tcr ius (cxtr insccc). Et idco dic i t quod quicquid inest unicuiquc propter sc ipsum, pcr se dic i tur de eo, quod ucx) non proptcr ipsum inest a l icui , per accidcns dicitur, sicut cum dico: 'Hoc ambul:rntc coruscat': non enim propter id quod zrmbulat, coruscaui t , sct hoc dic i tur secundum accidcns. Si uero quod praedicatur ins i t subiecto proptcr ipsum, pcr sc inest, ut si dicamus quod inter-fectum interiit: mani{'estum est quod proptcr id quod inter lectunr cst , intcr i i t , er non cst : rcc idens quod inter l i :c tum intere:tt." neMon U l l9-144. indd l l5 3/32008 7:-59:12 PM 1 3 6 PAI,'L SYMINGTON cause betlveen subject and predicate even though it is stated in such a way that it is pu se. Although Aquinas is clear that the categories are established through per se predrcation (this is evident when one considers the statements "being secundum se is divided into ten categories, of which nine are accidental kinds" and "the division of being secundam se and seatndunt accidens follows according to which something is predicated of another either per se or per accidensi),t"i he does not explicitly mention the three specific mocles of pu se pidication in either of his commentaries on Metaplrysics ! 9 or Plrysits III, 5. Ilowever each mode can be identified in the text. For example, secundo ntodo predication is understood as having predicates that are in the subject because the predicates signify the subject itself, and Aquinas describes such a relationship between subject and predicate as that mode of predication from which quality and quantity are derived.5T Likewise, he refers to a way in which a predicate is related externally to its subject, and this is how he characterizes quarto tnodo per sr predication. Furthermore, the modes of per se predication are contrasted by Aquinas with the modes of per accidens predication.:"r He identifies three modes of per accidens predication. The first obtains when a term signifying an accident is predicated of another term that also signifies an accident; for example, "The just is musical." The second type of per acciderc predication obtains when a term signifying substance has a term signifyins an accident predicated of it; for example, "The man is musical." The third type of per acci.dtru predication obtains when a term signifying substance is predicated of a term that signifies an accident; lor example, "The musical is a man." These modes of predication do not meet the criteria of pn se predication. These differences between per se and per acci.dens predication clari$t the procedure Aquinas follows to establish the number and identity of the categories. How he does this is the subject of the next section (IIf . However, here I offer an overview of Aquinas's procedure. First, he focuses on per .te modes of predication; that is, he focuses on propositions that are characterized bv one of the three bn se modes of oredication. 56 In Met. 5.9. n. 885. i7 In MeL 5.9, n. 892: "Secundo modo ut praedicatum sum:r tur secundum quod incst subiecto: quod quidem pracdic:r tum, vcl incst c i pcr se et absolutc, ut conscqucns materiam, et sic cst quantitas: vel ut conscquens form:rm. ct sic est qualitas." 38 In Met. 5.9. nn. 886 BB. 4)4 newton f7 119-l4,l.indd lf6 38/2008 '7:59:t2PM /ho iPhd AqurNAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.'S CA' r'EGORIIi.t For example, he would group "Socrates is a man," "Bucephelus is a horse" and 'A human is a rational animal" together because they have the primo modo per se predicational form. He would group 'A surface is colored" and 'A human has the capacity to laugh," together because they each have the secundo nvdl per se predicational form. Finally, he would identify "Having been slaughtered, it died," as having the quarto nndo per se predication. Separating propositions such as these from each other according to the kind of per se modes of predication that they have is Aquinas's procedure for distinguishing the categories from each other. Any two given per se propositions that have different predicational structures signify different categories. No two per se propositions that have different per se modes of predication signify the same category. In short, Aquinas establishes ubstance through pri.nto nndo predication; quantity, quality and relation through secundo nndo predication; and the remaining six categories through qumto ntodo predication. Second, after he groups propositions according to the differentprr se modes of predication that they have, he further subdivides propositions in the same group according to differences in the way that predicates are related to their subjects in the group. For example, a given proposition that has secundo modo predication can signify quantity, quality or relation. Thus, Aquinas identifies the distinctive way in which predicates are related to subjects in propositions that signify quantity from the way in which predicates are related to subjects in propositions that signify quality. It is by way of division and subdivision of propositions according to their predicational features that Aquinas establishes the identity of the categories. III. The Deilaion of the Categorfus font per se preditati.on In nn. 889-894 of the text, Aquinas presents a justification of the list of categories and refers enigmatically to the modes of predication. Since Aquinas presupposes o much about how the modes of predication are used to establish the list of categories, in this section I present in detail how Aquinas establishes pecific categories from per.rd modes of predication. Specifically, I show how substance, quantity and quality are derived and then indicate how the remaining categories could be established. Although Joseph Owens suggests that because of its ontological priority substance "is too striking to need defense in a metaphysical r37 I n.*,on 1] l19l4rt . indd 137 I 3/3/2008 7:-59:12 PM I 138 PAI]'L S\MINGTON context," Aquinas seeks to establish it based on the per se modes of predication.ie A predicate can be per se related to its subject in a first way "when the predicate expresses what the subject is, just as when I say, 'Socrates is an animal,' for Socrates is that which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signi$' first substance since it is a particular substance, about which all things are predicated."6') Aquinas is referring to those propositions that are printo modo per sa, in which "the definition [of the subject] or something posited in the definition [of the subject] is predicated of the subject."')r By reflecting on propositions that have this mode of predication one can see a further relationship between the terms of the subjects and predicates of such propositions. One can identify those propositions that have subjects that "are not predicated of another subject but other things are predicated of them."'j2 This yields per sr propositions that signify primary substance. For example, "Socrates is an animal" signifies substance because it is a pino nndo proposition in which the subject cannot Y:e pi.rno molo predicated of anything else. However, it could be asked whether this mode of printo ntodo predication distinguishes those propositions that signify primary substance from those that signify primary accidents.(j:r lbr example, are "Socrates is an animal," and "This patch of color is white" (if this patch of coior really is white) both pri.nto ntodo per se prcpositions in which the subject cannot be pino ntodo per se predicated of anything else? The answer is that although both propositions are pi.nto nrcdl per.rd propositions, there is a further difference betlveen them that distinguishes ubstances from other categories. Indeed, both propositions have subjects that cannot be per se predicated of another, for neither'Socrates'nor'this patch of color' can be predicated of anything else. However, whereas "Socrates is an animal" is such that the predicate 'animal' cannot be secundo ntodo predicated of any other subject, "This patch of color is white" does have a predicate ('white') that can be secundo mldn per se predicated of another subject; namely, 'a surface'. That is, in secundo nodo predication "1' J<rseph Owens, ln Elnnentary Chistian Metalthtsit,s (Milwaukcc, 1963), p. 115.^' In Mel. 5.9, n. 891: "fJno modo curn cst id quod cst subicctum) ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socr:rtcs est id quod est anim:rl. Et hoc pracdicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, qu:re est substantia particularis, dc qua omnia praedicantur." t ' t Posl . An. 1.10. l incs 25 30. 62 I n Me l . 5 . l 0 , n . B9B . b3 This is discussed by Aristotle in Categoies 3 (la16 lb9) where he makes thc lirurfbld distinction bctwccn being'predicated of' and being'in' another. neMon f7 l l9l44. iDdd 138 3812008 7159:12PM ,", inttu AqUINAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.'S QITEGORIE.\ 1 3 9 the predicate is related to a subject in two ways. In one way, it is related to the subject of the proposition as a determination of the subject. This is in virtue of the fact that it is a predicate in a proposition; Aquinas held that "the predicate is compared to the subject as form is to matter."6+ In the second way, the subject is itself signified by the predicate independently of the subject. For example, in "This patch of color is white" (if this patch of color really is white) "surface" is signified by the predicate "white." Consequently, this proposition is distinguished from per se propositions that signify substance because no proposition with a predicate that can be secundo ntodo predicated of another signifies substance. Therefore, primary substance is sufficiently identified through printo ntodo predrcation insofar as per se propositions that signify substance have predicates that are exclusive to pinto ntodo predication. From the derivation of primary substance, Aquinas moves to the derivation of quantity, qua.lity and relation. He indicates that a predicate is related to its subject in a second way, "when a predicate is understood according to what is in [inest] a subject. For instance, a predicate is in the subject/er se and absolutely as following lrom its matter, and in this way it is quantity. Or, a predicate is in the subjectler se and absolutely as something following from its form; in this way it is quality, or it is not in it absolutely but in respect to another, and then it is relation."(;:' Quantity, quality and relation are established through propositions that signify secundo modo per se predication. Aquinas states in the Commentary on the Postnior Anal2its I, that the 'per' of per se predication, because it is a causal notion, "designates a condition of material cause, just as when it is said that a body is colored by way of its surface because a surlace is the proper subject of color."(;t; Thus, the subject signified "' Aquinzrs, Etpositio Libi Priumeniar, l.B, n. ll. 65 In Met.5.9, n. 892: "Secundo modo ut pracdic:r tunr sumzrtur secundum quod inest subiccto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest c i pcr sc ct absolutc, ut conscquens materi:rm, et sic cst quantitas: vcl ut conscqucns ltrrmam, ct sic cst qualitas: vcl inest ei non absolutc, scd in rcspcctu ad alius, ct sic cst ad aliquid." Tir borrow a phr:rsr: lrom Walton (supra, fh. 10, pg. 306) quantity and quality arc rclated to substancc as mnttcr and lorm rcspcctively in an onlological scnsc, whcrc:rs both quantity :rnd quality arc lbrmal determinations of a subsurnce, where subsurnce is the matter, in a hgital sense. Although it scems that Aquinas bclicvcs th:rt rel:rtion is establishcd through setundo modo prcdication, he does not show how it is established through this mode in ci thcr ln Met.5.9 or 5.17 whcrc hc discusscs the scnsc of re lat ion. 66 Post . An.1.10, l incs 14 l7: "quandoque autem habi tudinem causae mater ia l is , sicut cum dicitur quod corpus cst coloratum pcr superficiem, quia scilicct proprium subiectum color is superf ic ics est . " See:r lso l incs 5l 67: "Sccundus modus dicendi per sc cst quando hec preposi t io 'per 'dcsienat habi tudincm cause mater ia l is , prout sc i l icet newton f l 119-l . l4. indd 139 3Bl2008 ?:59:12 PM I PAUL S\ANINGTON by the subject of a secundo nodo per sa proposition is the material cause (logically speaking) of the predicate. Quantity and quality are derived from an examination of the relationships between subjects and predications of secundo tnodo pn se propositions insofar as they exist absolutely in their subject. However, since both of these categories are established from secundo modo per se propositions, what further predicational understanding can be used to determine how propositions that signifi quantity can be distinguished from those that signify quality? Aquinas offers a clue for dividins quantitv from qu4[- , ity in \. lect. 15 (where he specifically discusses t"h.'r.n.Fof 'ryanttl l5 1] e SetlS that "only in the genus quantity are some things signified as subjects [of properties] and others as properties [themselves]."(j7 The category quantity is signified by secundo ntodo per se propositions that have predicates that not only are secundo modo predicated of its subject but also the term of the predicate can itself be the subject of a different property. For example, in 'A body is surfaced" (i.e., 'A body has a surface") the term 'surface' of the predicate itself can be the subject of the sentndo modo per sa predicate 'colored' (i.e., "The surface is colored."). Thus, "The body has a surface" signifies quantity. Another example of this could be "The body has mass." The term 'mass' of the predicate is secundo ntodo predtc.ated of 'body' and it also can be the subject in the secundo ntodo proposition "The mass is heal),." Therefore, according to this mode of secundo modo predication "The body has mass" signifies quantity. In this way quantity is established throush secundl modo per se predicationOn the contrary this criterion does not apply to terms that signify quality. For example, in "The surface is white," 'white' signifies a property because it signifies its proper subject 'surface' in its definition. However, 'white' itself cannot be the subject of a property. For id cui a l iquid at t r ibui tur est propr ia matcr ia et propr ium subicctum ipsius. Oportct : rutem quod pnrpr iurn subiectum ponatur in d i f f in i t ione:rccidcnt is , c luandoquc quidem in obl iquo, s icut cum:rccidcns in abstracto di f t in i tur , ut cum dic imus quod s imi tas cst curui tas nasi ; quandoque ucro in rccto, ut cum :rcc idcns def in i tur in concreto, ut cum dic imus quod s imus est nasus curuus. Cuius quidem rat io est quia cum csse accidcnt is depende:rt:r subiccto, oportet etiam quod dillinitio eius significans csse ipsius contincat in sc subicctum. Vnde secundus modus diccndi per se est quzrndo subicctum poni tur in diflinitione prcdicati quod cst proprium accidcns eius." 67 In Mel .5. l5, n. 983: "Nam sola qu:rnt i&rs habct d iv is ionem in partcs propr ias post subs&rntiam. Albedo enim non potest dividi, et per consequcncs ncc intclligitur indiv iduare nis i per subicctum. Et indc cst , quod in solo quant i r r t is generc al iqua signific:rntur ut subiecLr, ali:r ut passioncs." 140 newton f l l l9l44. indd 140 3/3/2008 7:59: I2 PM r^o ifl"tld / AqurNAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.' S Q4' nGORIE.\ example, rn the secundo ntodo per sa proposition "The white is colored," the proper subject in the definition of colored is not "white" but rather, "sulface." Secundo modo per se propositions that signify quantity can be distinguished from those that do not according to this predicational criterion. For example, 'A human being is capable of laughter" does not signi! quantity even though a human being is divisible into parts and capable of laughter is a property of human beings. In this proposition, "capable of laughter" cannot be the subject of a property and "a human being" cannot be predicated secundo ntodo per sa of anything else. Therefore, propositions such as 'A human is capable of laughter," and 'A surface is colored" both signify the category quality because both "capable of laughter" and "colored" are properties that cannot be the subject of properties. In this way, quality is derived from the mode of secundo ntodo per se predication insofar as it is made distinct from substance and quantity. Aquinas says that quantity is derived from per sr propositions l\%rUrr, the predicate is in the subject according to a material cause (Thi,{isThe- second criteria of per se predication). 'i'his relates to the charaderistic of per se propositions that signify quantity in which rhe te.rm ..! !9 to"predicate can both be the subject of another property and itself j1|a property in the following way: a quantity can be the material cause of another property. Insofar as quantities flow from the matter of a substance, it can be the material cause or subject of qualit ies whereas rO i*aliCgqualities cannot be. For this reason, Aquinas states in his Commentaryt 0n? Y _*lictTttle Plryncs that "qualities are founded upon quantity."(;rlAquinas holds .n t'I-. ' r that quantity is similar to substance in that it shares the characteristic of ..ii i+n" being able to be the subject of properties."" Qualities are said to follow from the form of a substance because they are similar to substantial forms insofar as they cannot be the subject of properties. Aquinas says that "a predicate is referred to a subject in a third way when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject."70 This is directly related to quarto ntodo per se predication in the Commentary on the Posteior Anafuti.cs I, in which the'per' of per se "may even designate a condition of extrinsic cause."7' The remaining six categories are derived through this mode of predication. t '8 In Ph,ys.3.5, n.322. 6q Ib id. v) In Met. 5.9, n. 892. 7t Post . An. 1.10, l ines 17 24: "dcsignat ct iam habi tudincm c:rusae xtr insece." l 4 l I newon F / l l9 l44 . indd I ,1 l 3/312008 7:59:13 PM j t42 PAL'L SYMINGTON @Larto modo per se may involve a relation of efficient causation between subject and predicate. The example that Aquinas gives of such a per se proposition is "Having been slaughtered, it died." He says that "it is clear that on account of that which has been slaughtered, it [the animal] died, and it is not accidental that that which has been slaughtered should die."72 Although the proposition that Aquinas cites as an example is rather awkward, he says that a relation of external cause is signified in the relationship between the predicate and subject. There are three major components in this proposition: "the animal," "having been slaughtered" and "died." The animal is implicit in this proposition. A relationship of efficient cause is understood between the predicate and the subject: the slaughter was the efficient cause of the animal's death. At the same time, the predicate is universally predicated of the subject: everything that has been slaughtered has died. From 1ar se propositions such as these, Aquinas supposedly understands that the remaining categories can be derived. Unfortunately, Aquinas leaves us in the dark about how specific modes of Enrto ntodo per se predication signify and di.fferentiate propositions that signify one or another of the .""-u-*ggpi6categories. However, it would seem that the additional categories fre derived from quarta ntodo per se propositions in which the external causes signified in the per se relationship between the subject and predicate are understood to be in common to other quarto nrodo per se propositions. For example, there may l>e quarto nialo propositions in which the external relationship between the subject and predicate is understood in such a way that the predicate measures the subject in some way, and then one could derive the categories of time, place and position.T3 Now that I have presented Aquinas's view, an interesting observation can be made regarding the relationship among the categories. An interesting result of Aquinas's view concerns the question of how accidents 72 Pos t .An . 1 .10 , I i n cs l 22 35 : "De indccumd ic i t : i t em l r l i omodoc t c . , pon i t qu t r r t um modum, sccundum quod hec pre positio 'pcr' dcsienat habitudincm causc cfiicicntis ue I cuiuscunque al ter ius <extr insccc>. Et idco dic i t quod quicquid incst unicuiquc proptcr sc ipsu m, per se dic i tur dc co, quod uero non proptcr ipsunr incst a l icui , pcr accidens dicitur, sicut cunr dico: 'Hoc ambulantc corusc:rt': non e nim propter id quod ambul:rt, coruscauit, set hoc dicitur sccundum accidens. Si uero quod praedicatur insit subiecto proptcr ipsum, per se incst , ut s i d icamus quod inter lectum inter i i t : mani lestum est quod proptcr id quod interfe'ctunr cst, intcriit, ct non cst accidens quod interl'cctum inte rc:r t. " 13 In Met 5.9. n. 892. I nefron fi llg'l4.l.indd 142 t - 3Al2008 7:59:13 PM a \\c>.td" -no ' AqurNAS ON THE TDENTTTY OF A.'S (A\EGORIIi.' l+3 can be understood to be both per accidens according to its metaphysical sense and, at the same time, are independent from each other as the most basic kinds of being. Accidents, although they are notper su beings (this is the status of substance only) they are secundum se in the sense that each category corresponds to a unique per se mode of predication. However, a discernable dependent relationship can be observed between lar .iz propositions that signify accidents and those that signify substance. On one hand, 'color' is not formally reducible to the form or essence of "rational animal" because 'color' is not predicated prinrc nodo per se of 'Socrates'. On the other hand, 'colored' is secundo ntodo per se predtcated of 'surface.' 'Surface' is secundo nndl per sa predicated of 'body.' 'Body' ispninro ntodo per se predicated of 'Socrates'. Therefore, in one way, 'color' is dependent on substance because it is the ultimate subject of predication. In another sense, 'color' is a secundum sebeing. It has 'quality' printo ntodo per se predicated of it and in this sense quality is not in any way reducible or dependent on any substance or subject insofar as it is notpnmo modo per se predicated of any substance.TtThis interesting characteristic of accidents is mentioned by Aquinas at the end of his discussion. He says that on one hand, "the word 'white' signifies a subject in as much as it signifies whiteness as an accident. Thus, it is necessary that as a consequence it includes in it the notion of a subject. For the being of an accident is 'to be in'... . [On the other hand] although whiteness ignifies an accident, it does not do so only as an accident but according to the mode of a substance."ir' 'Ihat which signifies according to the mode of substance is signified accordins to pino ntodo per se predication, which is true of "\A4-ritqis a color." nr{-t IY. Concltuion In order to understand Aquinas's justification for the list of categories, I have provided an interpretation of the text that tries to make most sense of it according to its textual context rather than focusing on only 7 f I n "Langu : rgeandLoe i c , "E . J .Ashwor thpo in t sou t t ha tacha rac te r i s t i co l ' con crete accide nt terms (c.g., 'white') is that they "have :r doublc relation, on one hand to substanti:rl things, for only substances can be literatc or white, and <in the other hand to thc qualities of literacy or whitcness." The Camhidge Comltonion to Medieml Philo.sophy Qt{cw York, 2003), pp. 73 96, p. 86. i5 In Met.5.9, n. 894. J n.*on l f l l9-14.{. indd 143 l 3Bl2008 7:59:13 PM 1+4 PAI,IL SYMINGTON an aspect of the text. For example, I present an account that tries to understand Aquinas's words at the beginning of the text that states both that all ten categories are secundunt ss and that secundum se is not understood to mean "substance" @eing per se) but rather per se predication. This interpretation has been illuminated by an examination of the varieties of per se predication in Commentary on the Posteior Anafutics I, 9 & 10. However, given the elliptical treatment of the topic by Aquinas, my task of trying to establish a more unified understanding of it within its textual context has come at the cost of engaging in a certain amount of reconstruction of Aquinas's thought on the matter.i(; 76 Special thanks toJorgcJ. E. Gracia, Lloyd Ncwton, Giorgio Pini, andJcff Bxrwe r Ibr their careful and insightlul comments :rnd suggestions throughout various stases ol ' th is ar t ic le. n€wton fl ll9-l44.indd 144 34/2008 7:59:13 PM