﻿ Preface The﻿collection﻿begins﻿with﻿three﻿critical﻿appraisals﻿of﻿the﻿potential﻿for﻿high﻿technology﻿and﻿intelligent﻿ machine﻿solutions﻿to﻿resolve﻿large-scale﻿social,﻿economic﻿and﻿environmental﻿problems.﻿Our﻿first﻿chapter﻿is﻿from﻿Rick﻿Searle,﻿our﻿co-editor.﻿This﻿chapter﻿leads﻿for﻿two﻿reasons.﻿One,﻿it﻿is﻿easily﻿amplified﻿by﻿ succeeding﻿contributions﻿as﻿it﻿touches﻿on﻿many﻿of﻿the﻿themes﻿running﻿through﻿the﻿text﻿as﻿a﻿whole.﻿Rick﻿ confronts﻿social-political﻿problems﻿arising﻿with﻿the﻿increased﻿automation﻿and﻿indeed﻿out-sourcing﻿of﻿ social-political﻿life﻿through﻿intelligent﻿machine﻿technologies.﻿From﻿the﻿reliance﻿on﻿smart-phones﻿to﻿locate﻿ friends﻿and﻿to﻿coordinate﻿political﻿movements,﻿to﻿the﻿automation﻿of﻿surveillance﻿and﻿thus﻿to﻿the﻿dangers﻿ of﻿technologically﻿enforced﻿neo-feudalism,﻿Rick's﻿purpose﻿is﻿profound,﻿and﻿the﻿case﻿that﻿he﻿presents﻿ disturbing.﻿Writing﻿that﻿"the﻿most﻿potent﻿critique﻿against﻿digital﻿teleology﻿is﻿that﻿it﻿results﻿in﻿a﻿kind﻿of﻿ moral﻿atrophy﻿where﻿human﻿beings﻿become﻿the﻿puppets﻿of﻿a﻿world﻿they﻿have﻿themselves﻿dreamed﻿up",﻿ Rick﻿points﻿out﻿that﻿some﻿researchers﻿pursuing﻿artificial﻿intelligence﻿at﻿once﻿believe﻿that﻿their﻿efforts﻿ will﻿result﻿in﻿artifacts﻿"that﻿will﻿then﻿go﻿on﻿to﻿destroy﻿humanity."﻿The﻿relationship﻿with﻿the﻿introductory﻿ pages﻿of﻿this﻿preface﻿is﻿clear﻿enough.﻿Rick﻿confronts﻿the﻿issue﻿with﻿candor﻿constituting﻿the﻿second﻿reason﻿ for﻿this﻿entry's﻿lead﻿role﻿in﻿the﻿text: Eschatological determinism of such a sort has more in common with religious fundamentalism than it does science, and raises serious doubts over the goals of those who have heretofore not faced major ethical or political design constraints when building the Internet or pursuing artificial intelligence. ... The fact of the matter is that technological development is less about human survival this century let alone the "destiny" of life in the universe than it is about political and economic power as it is manifest right now. Our﻿second﻿chapter﻿is﻿from﻿Chris﻿Bateman,﻿a﻿philosopher﻿of﻿games,﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿a﻿programmer﻿and﻿leading﻿ designer﻿of﻿narrative﻿structures﻿for﻿games﻿and﻿virtual﻿environments.﻿Chris﻿embraces﻿the﻿immediacy﻿of﻿ our﻿situation﻿as﻿established﻿in﻿the﻿first﻿chapter,﻿setting﻿out﻿from﻿the﻿following﻿dilemma:﻿"Having﻿decided﻿ that﻿we﻿can﻿make﻿anything,﻿we﻿must﻿now﻿ask﻿the﻿vital﻿question:﻿should﻿we?"﻿He﻿weaves﻿discussion﻿on﻿ two﻿burgeoning﻿fields﻿of﻿intelligent﻿machine﻿technologies,﻿automated﻿transport﻿and﻿smart﻿weaponry,﻿ in﻿terms﻿of﻿Kantian,﻿utilitarian﻿and﻿virtue﻿based﻿approaches﻿to﻿ethics﻿of﻿technology﻿finding﻿at﻿the﻿heart﻿ of﻿these﻿industries﻿a﻿deep﻿yet﻿neglected﻿moral﻿disconnect﻿between﻿stated﻿aims﻿and﻿actual﻿results,﻿with﻿ the﻿growing﻿dependency﻿on﻿both﻿the﻿technologies﻿and﻿the﻿distancing﻿that﻿they﻿afford﻿from﻿unpleasant﻿ consequences﻿constituting﻿a﻿profound﻿symptom﻿of﻿what﻿he﻿terms﻿"cyberfetish". Through﻿the﻿glaring﻿moral﻿angle﻿of﻿cyberfetishism,﻿Chris﻿confronts﻿social-political﻿issues﻿of﻿a﻿form﻿ and﻿in﻿a﻿frame﻿reinforcing﻿Rick's﻿first﻿chapter.﻿Chris'﻿analysis﻿draws﻿out﻿the﻿co-dependent﻿nature﻿of﻿the﻿ human﻿propensity﻿to﻿fall﻿under﻿what﻿the﻿first﻿chapter﻿covers﻿under﻿the﻿heading﻿of﻿"algocracy",﻿the﻿rule﻿ of﻿automation﻿through﻿algorithm,﻿with﻿human﻿beings﻿ultimately﻿molded﻿in﻿service﻿to﻿the﻿medium﻿of﻿ xv Preface their﻿own﻿ignoble﻿dependency.﻿Chris'﻿cyberfetish﻿drags﻿into﻿the﻿open﻿the﻿essence﻿of﻿technology,﻿that﻿it﻿ is﻿habit﻿incarnate,﻿not﻿only﻿addictive﻿but﻿an﻿externalization﻿and﻿artifactualization﻿of﻿dependency,﻿with﻿ the﻿technological﻿world﻿of﻿our﻿making﻿directly﻿affording﻿the﻿exercise﻿of﻿recently﻿acquired﻿tastes﻿and﻿ supporting﻿habits.﻿Should﻿one﻿generation's﻿habits﻿prefigure﻿the﻿freedom﻿of﻿future﻿generations﻿to﻿embody﻿ different﻿habits,﻿healthier﻿habits,﻿as﻿these﻿prior﻿habits﻿are﻿entrenched﻿in﻿layers﻿of﻿technological﻿dependence?﻿Through﻿his﻿discussion,﻿Chris'﻿question﻿thus﻿becomes﻿not﻿so﻿much﻿what﻿are﻿we﻿to﻿build,﻿but﻿for﻿ what﻿world﻿of﻿affordances﻿do﻿we﻿wish﻿to﻿be﻿held﻿accountable. Our﻿ third﻿chapter﻿continues﻿ this﻿critical﻿ revision﻿of﻿ the﻿promise﻿of﻿ smart-machines,﻿digging﻿ into﻿ the﻿problem﻿of﻿environmental﻿sustainability﻿from﻿the﻿perspective﻿of﻿sustainability﻿scientist﻿and﻿civil﻿ engineer﻿Nak﻿Young﻿Seong﻿with﻿editor﻿and﻿co-author﻿Jared﻿Gassen.﻿On﻿this﻿view,﻿history﻿demonstrates﻿ that﻿so-called﻿technological﻿"solutions"﻿to﻿social-political﻿problems﻿are﻿not﻿really﻿solutions﻿at﻿all,﻿and﻿ rather﻿evidence﻿shows﻿them﻿to﻿be﻿problems﻿in﻿disguise.﻿New﻿technologies﻿require﻿new﻿materials,﻿new﻿ industries,﻿new﻿logistic﻿paths,﻿and﻿create﻿new﻿-﻿sometimes﻿unknown﻿or﻿unsuspected﻿–﻿pollutants﻿and﻿other﻿ problems﻿arising﻿from﻿those.﻿The﻿authors﻿take﻿on﻿controversial﻿issues,﻿such﻿as﻿the﻿use﻿of﻿water﻿resources﻿ expended﻿to﻿simply﻿cool﻿the﻿massive﻿NSA﻿data﻿collection﻿center﻿in﻿Utah,﻿and﻿argue﻿that﻿the﻿expense﻿to﻿ future﻿generations﻿in﻿the﻿form﻿of﻿irremediable﻿environmental﻿damage﻿cannot﻿be﻿justified.﻿Rather﻿than﻿ technological﻿"solutions"﻿causing﻿only﻿further﻿technological﻿problems﻿in﻿need﻿of﻿solution,﻿the﻿authors﻿ recommend﻿that﻿we﻿step﻿back﻿and﻿reassess﻿our﻿options﻿in﻿light﻿of﻿new﻿ways﻿of﻿understanding﻿sustainability﻿and﻿natural﻿resources.﻿Seong﻿and﻿Gassen﻿advise﻿for﻿the﻿employment﻿of﻿"low-tech"﻿sustainable﻿ and﻿effectively﻿non-polluting﻿energy﻿resources﻿like﻿trees﻿as﻿responsible﻿bases﻿for﻿future﻿economies﻿rather﻿ than﻿hanging﻿the﻿hopes﻿of﻿humanity﻿on﻿inherently﻿deadly﻿and﻿ultimately﻿uncontrollable﻿technologies﻿like﻿ nuclear﻿power﻿only﻿to﻿require﻿robotic﻿laborers﻿to﻿eventually﻿brave﻿an﻿irretrievably﻿polluted﻿and﻿deadly﻿ toxic﻿natural﻿environment. Where﻿the﻿third﻿chapter﻿hints﻿at﻿the﻿evolutionary﻿significance﻿in﻿any﻿project﻿pursuing﻿a﻿machineleveraged﻿break﻿from﻿the﻿womb﻿of﻿human﻿evolution,﻿the﻿fourth﻿chapter﻿penned﻿by﻿powerhouse﻿Luis﻿Moniz﻿ Pereira﻿and﻿Fernando﻿Cardoso﻿demonstrates﻿how﻿these﻿natural﻿forces﻿may﻿have﻿shaped﻿human﻿moral﻿ capacities﻿in﻿the﻿first﻿place.﻿From﻿an﻿evolutionary﻿psychological﻿perspective﻿in﻿which﻿counterfactual﻿ reasoning﻿arises﻿alongside﻿predictive﻿capacities﻿associated﻿with﻿capacities﻿for﻿belief﻿revision﻿in﻿light﻿ of﻿especially﻿social﻿information﻿sourced﻿to﻿other﻿members﻿of﻿an﻿"ethical﻿association"﻿of﻿moral﻿agents,﻿ Cardoso﻿and﻿Pereira﻿are﻿able﻿to﻿illustrate﻿how﻿communication﻿of﻿moral﻿commitment﻿helps﻿to﻿strengthen﻿ in-group﻿cooperation,﻿thereby﻿shedding﻿light﻿on﻿some﻿of﻿the﻿themes﻿raised﻿so﻿far﻿in﻿this﻿Preface﻿as﻿these﻿ communications﻿become﻿at﻿least﻿co-determinative﻿of﻿satisficing﻿goal﻿conditions﻿going﻿forward. Their﻿evolutionary﻿psychological﻿approach﻿to﻿modeling﻿morally﻿significant﻿decision﻿spaces﻿is﻿deceptively﻿simple,﻿as﻿it﻿plausibly﻿accounts﻿for﻿the﻿evolutionary﻿emergence﻿of﻿group-level﻿behavior﻿patterns﻿ associated﻿with﻿moral﻿and﻿ethical﻿abilities﻿and﻿institutions,﻿respectively.﻿The﻿models﻿are﻿built﻿from﻿Prospective﻿Logic﻿Programming﻿(PLP),﻿and﻿the﻿authors﻿review﻿their﻿program﻿in﻿some﻿detail.﻿Details﻿aside,﻿ PLP﻿"supports﻿the﻿view﻿that﻿autonomous﻿agents﻿are﻿those﻿capable﻿of﻿anticipating﻿and﻿reasoning﻿about﻿ hypothetical﻿future﻿scenarios"﻿with﻿prospective﻿cognition﻿"essential﻿for﻿proactive﻿agents﻿working﻿with﻿ partial﻿information﻿in﻿dynamically﻿changing﻿environments."﻿This﻿describes﻿us﻿in﻿our﻿collective﻿situation﻿ today.﻿Cardoso﻿and﻿Pereira's﻿confessedly﻿"limited"﻿agents﻿in﻿equally﻿limited﻿decision﻿spaces﻿regardless﻿"do﻿ illustrate﻿a﻿rudimentary﻿sort﻿of﻿reflective﻿equilibrium﻿over﻿possible﻿ends"﻿and,﻿with﻿these﻿consequences﻿ known,﻿"meta-reasoning﻿techniques﻿are﻿applied﻿to﻿weigh﻿the﻿partial﻿scenarios"﻿exactly﻿as﻿we﻿weigh﻿out﻿ possible﻿ends﻿for﻿pursuing﻿this﻿or﻿that﻿line﻿of﻿scientific﻿research,﻿for﻿example.﻿Thus﻿understood,﻿the﻿real﻿ promise﻿of﻿this﻿approach﻿is﻿to﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿monitor﻿the﻿influence﻿of﻿different﻿psychologically﻿realistic﻿proxvi Preface social﻿characteristics﻿on﻿the﻿emergence﻿of﻿ethical﻿institutions﻿within﻿increasingly﻿large﻿populations﻿of﻿ complementary﻿agents,﻿thus﻿providing﻿a﻿medium﻿for﻿the﻿simulation﻿of﻿similar﻿problems﻿in﻿more﻿complex﻿ decision﻿environments﻿and﻿with﻿more﻿robust﻿cognitive﻿agents﻿in﻿the﻿future.﻿Luis﻿and﻿Fernando﻿conclude﻿ by﻿pointing﻿to﻿future﻿work﻿in﻿the﻿simulation﻿of﻿imitation,﻿deception,﻿and﻿emulation﻿at﻿the﻿agent﻿level,﻿ and﻿thusly﻿they﻿expect﻿to﻿refine﻿our﻿understanding﻿of﻿morality﻿as﻿an﻿evolutionarily﻿emergent﻿property,﻿ writing﻿confidently﻿that﻿"future﻿work﻿further﻿integrating﻿moral﻿philosophy﻿with﻿programming﻿will﻿establish﻿necessary﻿logical﻿supports﻿to﻿complete﻿the﻿task"﻿and﻿that﻿"although﻿the﻿processes﻿within﻿us﻿are﻿ complex,﻿their﻿complexity﻿is﻿not﻿inaccessible"﻿to﻿properly﻿configured﻿computational﻿models﻿thereof.﻿ Models﻿ like﻿ these﻿are﻿great﻿ tools﻿ for﻿policy-makers﻿and﻿social﻿engineers﻿going﻿forward,﻿and﻿a﻿good﻿ deal﻿of﻿the﻿general﻿project﻿in﻿intelligent﻿machines﻿depends﻿on﻿the﻿value﻿of﻿these﻿kinds﻿of﻿simulations﻿in﻿ delivering﻿on﻿some﻿of﻿their﻿anticipated﻿promise﻿in﻿helping﻿to﻿solve﻿coordination﻿problems﻿in﻿realizing﻿ a﻿healthy,﻿organic﻿and﻿flourishing﻿yet﻿technologically﻿rich﻿world. Where﻿Fernando﻿and﻿Luis﻿offer﻿an﻿illustrative﻿logic﻿of﻿human﻿morality﻿and﻿the﻿growth﻿of﻿human﻿ethical﻿ institutions﻿through﻿the﻿enactment﻿thereof,﻿our﻿fifth﻿chapter﻿develops﻿a﻿mirror﻿on﻿morality﻿also﻿from﻿an﻿ evolutionary﻿foundation﻿but﻿here﻿through﻿the﻿smart﻿manipulation﻿of﻿"big﻿data".﻿Rafal﻿Rzepka﻿and﻿Kenji﻿ Araki﻿of﻿the﻿Graduate﻿School﻿of﻿Information﻿Science﻿and﻿Technology﻿at﻿Hokkaido﻿University﻿detail﻿the﻿ use﻿of﻿text-mining﻿techniques﻿to﻿build﻿a﻿portrait﻿of﻿contextually﻿dependent﻿morally﻿significant﻿terms﻿as﻿ they﻿are﻿used﻿by﻿human﻿beings﻿in﻿everyday﻿(online)﻿life,﻿and﻿from﻿this﻿battery﻿of﻿information﻿deliver﻿ representative﻿judgments﻿in﻿similar﻿contexts.﻿They﻿adopt﻿a﻿bottom-up﻿intuitionist﻿perspective,﻿allowing﻿ a﻿portrait﻿of﻿morality﻿to﻿arise﻿from﻿everyday﻿moral﻿language﻿rather﻿than﻿have﻿episodes﻿cherry-picked﻿to﻿ suit﻿model-theoretical﻿preconceptions﻿of﻿moral﻿conduct﻿in﻿order﻿to﻿capture﻿the﻿emotional﻿motivations﻿ of﻿moral﻿action,﻿"empathy",﻿writing﻿ that﻿"evolution﻿equipped﻿us﻿with﻿emotional﻿ reactions﻿ that﻿were﻿ originally﻿meant﻿for﻿survival,﻿and﻿then﻿to﻿flourish﻿as﻿societies"﻿at﻿least﻿in﻿part﻿through﻿the﻿expression﻿of﻿ such﻿feelings.﻿One﻿advantage﻿of﻿this﻿approach﻿is﻿that﻿they﻿are﻿able﻿to﻿"take﻿advantage﻿of﻿the﻿fact﻿that,﻿ for﻿the﻿time﻿being,﻿the﻿only﻿constantly﻿growing﻿data﻿that﻿is﻿relatively﻿easy﻿to﻿process﻿is﻿textual"﻿and﻿to﻿ use﻿this﻿text-based,﻿symbolic﻿information﻿to﻿reliably﻿gauge﻿moral﻿judgments﻿elicited﻿through﻿human﻿ moral﻿emotional﻿mechanisms.﻿Unlike﻿that﻿of﻿the﻿previous﻿chapter,﻿their﻿approach﻿does﻿not﻿involve﻿the﻿ reduction﻿to﻿fairy-tale﻿terms﻿of﻿complex﻿moral﻿dilemmas,﻿and﻿rather﻿avoids﻿"sophisticated﻿algorithms"﻿ in﻿order﻿to﻿"concentrate﻿on﻿automatically﻿collecting﻿and﻿analyzing﻿descriptions﻿of﻿human﻿behaviors"﻿ during﻿"everyday﻿life﻿situations﻿available﻿to﻿current﻿or﻿near﻿future﻿devices﻿with﻿natural﻿language﻿processing﻿capabilities."﻿Thusly,﻿Rafal﻿and﻿Kenji﻿provide﻿both﻿a﻿portrait﻿of﻿morality﻿as﻿actually﻿expressed,﻿as﻿a﻿ sort﻿of﻿mirror﻿on﻿a﻿"fourth-person"﻿moral﻿construct,﻿as﻿well﻿as﻿an﻿approach﻿to﻿data-set﻿modeling﻿useful﻿ in﻿evaluating﻿expressed﻿moral﻿judgments﻿of﻿current﻿and﻿future﻿first-personal﻿agents﻿relative﻿context. The﻿potential﻿for﻿moral﻿web-bots﻿auto-texting﻿to﻿influence﻿online﻿discourse﻿is﻿a﻿scary﻿prospect,﻿and﻿ quite﻿near﻿given﻿the﻿fifth﻿chapter.﻿In﻿our﻿sixth﻿chapter,﻿Melanie﻿Swan﻿looks﻿behind﻿the﻿moral﻿responses,﻿ into﻿the﻿minds﻿of﻿the﻿respondents,﻿themselves.﻿Melanie﻿confronts﻿the﻿issue﻿of﻿"reality"﻿as﻿a﻿public,﻿ethical﻿ sphere,﻿open﻿to﻿private﻿manipulation,﻿noting﻿that﻿this﻿only﻿becomes﻿an﻿issue﻿as﻿technologies﻿empower﻿ the﻿direct﻿manipulation﻿of﻿everyday﻿perception﻿and﻿action,﻿with﻿her﻿focus﻿being﻿the﻿dedicated﻿industry﻿ of﻿perception﻿management﻿through﻿the﻿physical﻿integration﻿of﻿human﻿perceivers﻿with﻿smart﻿perception﻿ management﻿nano-machines.﻿She﻿speculates﻿over﻿possible﻿"killer﻿applications"﻿for﻿perception﻿management﻿technologies﻿proffered﻿by﻿"nanocognition",﻿including﻿memory﻿management﻿services﻿which﻿nullify﻿painful﻿memories﻿by﻿destroying﻿neural﻿assemblies﻿encoding﻿them,﻿"bias﻿reduction"﻿as﻿a﻿means﻿for﻿ physically﻿correcting﻿for﻿error-prone﻿prejudice,﻿and﻿even﻿the﻿direct﻿sharing﻿of﻿point-of-view﻿experience,﻿ suggesting﻿possibilities﻿for﻿conflict﻿resolution.﻿Possible﻿applications﻿like﻿these﻿raise﻿issues﻿of﻿"neural﻿ xvii Preface privacy"﻿–﻿as﻿neural﻿structures﻿embody﻿information,﻿how﻿should﻿this﻿information﻿be﻿dealt﻿with,﻿perhaps﻿ as﻿a﻿commodity﻿or﻿as﻿a﻿matter﻿of﻿state﻿censorship﻿and﻿law﻿enforcement?﻿Tools﻿such﻿as﻿those﻿under﻿development﻿by﻿the﻿authors﻿of﻿the﻿previous,﻿fifth﻿chapter,﻿may﻿well﻿serve﻿as﻿means﻿for﻿the﻿monitoring﻿of﻿ large-scale﻿social﻿engineering﻿projects﻿employing﻿technologies﻿such﻿as﻿those﻿under﻿Melanie's﻿scope,﻿ perhaps﻿eventually﻿prior﻿to﻿the﻿literal﻿expression﻿of﻿moral﻿emotion﻿altogether.﻿Her﻿chapter﻿also﻿resonates﻿ with﻿the﻿deep﻿themes﻿that﻿had﻿established﻿themselves﻿in﻿the﻿collection﻿thusfar,﻿recalling﻿for﻿instance﻿Chris﻿ Bateman's﻿"cyberfetish"﻿from﻿the﻿second﻿chapter,﻿and﻿with﻿her﻿treatment﻿of﻿technological﻿co-dependency﻿ feeding﻿equally﻿well﻿Seong﻿and﻿Gassen's﻿contribution.﻿For﻿example,﻿Melanie's﻿discussion﻿allows﻿us﻿to﻿ ask﻿if﻿the﻿best﻿use﻿of﻿natural﻿resources﻿is﻿in﻿the﻿development﻿of﻿technologies﻿helping﻿us﻿to﻿perceive﻿only﻿ pleasant﻿things,﻿or﻿permitted﻿things,﻿or﻿if﻿these﻿resources﻿are﻿best﻿directed﻿to﻿other﻿ends.﻿It﻿may﻿well﻿be﻿ a﻿symptom﻿of﻿a﻿collective﻿human﻿cyberfetish﻿to﻿expect﻿intelligent﻿machines﻿to﻿make﻿all﻿of﻿our﻿painful﻿ memories﻿go﻿away,﻿and﻿to﻿fashion﻿new﻿ones﻿only﻿the﻿way﻿that﻿we﻿would﻿want﻿them﻿beforehand. Our﻿seventh﻿chapter﻿continues﻿the﻿assay﻿of﻿ethical﻿implications﻿due﻿transformative﻿human﻿integration﻿with﻿intelligent﻿machine﻿technologies.﻿Focusing﻿on﻿human﻿enhancement﻿in﻿competitive﻿–﻿especially﻿ business﻿-﻿environments﻿in﻿terms﻿of﻿the﻿"biopolitics"﻿of﻿human-machine﻿integration,﻿the﻿author,﻿Ben﻿ Tran,﻿asks﻿"whether﻿enhancement﻿technologies﻿will﻿actually﻿make﻿our﻿lives﻿happier".﻿Ben﻿delineates﻿ ethics﻿of﻿human﻿enhancement﻿issues﻿according﻿to﻿an﻿"expanding﻿circle"﻿of﻿individual,﻿professional﻿and﻿ societal﻿levels﻿of﻿organization.﻿Defining﻿"societal concerns"﻿as﻿"the﻿broad﻿interests﻿of﻿society,﻿which﻿ may﻿be﻿frustrated﻿by﻿ the﻿adoption﻿of﻿human﻿enhancement",﻿Ben﻿follows﻿medicine﻿ in﻿distinguishing﻿ between﻿enhancement﻿and﻿repair,﻿drawing﻿into﻿critical﻿view﻿the﻿costs﻿–﻿especially﻿societal﻿costs﻿–﻿due﻿ the﻿ over-emphasis﻿ away﻿ from﻿ reparative,﻿ pro-social﻿ applications﻿ of﻿ technology﻿ and﻿ towards﻿ selfish,﻿ personal﻿performance﻿oriented﻿applications.﻿ In﻿ the﻿competitive﻿business﻿environment,﻿wherein﻿pressures﻿for﻿performance﻿are﻿high,﻿what﻿are﻿the﻿implications﻿of﻿a﻿'pay﻿to be able to﻿play'﻿ethics﻿of﻿human﻿ enhancement?﻿One﻿may﻿become﻿a﻿better﻿stockbroker﻿due﻿to﻿an﻿integration﻿with﻿an﻿intelligent﻿machine,﻿ or﻿through﻿"nanocognition"﻿for﻿example,﻿but﻿is﻿this﻿making﻿one﻿also﻿a﻿better﻿person?﻿A﻿better﻿world?﻿ Opening﻿with﻿review﻿of﻿ethical﻿approaches﻿to﻿these﻿issues,﻿ the﻿broad﻿concern﻿for﻿the﻿transformative﻿ influence﻿of﻿technology﻿on﻿human﻿beings﻿remains﻿at﻿the﻿fore.﻿Ben's﻿chapter﻿affords﻿a﻿critical﻿reflection﻿ on﻿immediate﻿business﻿culture,﻿as﻿concerns﻿for﻿autonomy,﻿sustainability,﻿and﻿virtue﻿are﻿shelved﻿in﻿the﻿ face﻿of﻿threats﻿from﻿competitors,﻿yet﻿it﻿is﻿in﻿this﻿environment﻿that﻿everyday﻿people﻿–﻿us﻿-﻿live,﻿adapt﻿or﻿ die,﻿and﻿express﻿their﻿moral﻿judgments.﻿Through﻿our﻿collaboration,﻿we﻿make﻿it﻿this﻿way. Jai﻿ Galliot's﻿ chapter,﻿ our﻿ eighth,﻿ with﻿ welcome﻿ candor﻿ braves﻿ the﻿ so-called﻿ "responsibility﻿ gap"﻿ between﻿consequence﻿and﻿locus﻿of﻿responsibility﻿as﻿it﻿appears﻿to﻿be﻿enlarged﻿through﻿the﻿distancing﻿ afforded﻿intelligent﻿machines﻿in﻿an﻿already﻿cloudy﻿field﻿of﻿automated﻿warfare.﻿Jai﻿writes﻿that﻿moral﻿responsibility﻿is﻿located﻿in﻿agents﻿which﻿"intentionally﻿make﻿a﻿free﻿and﻿informed﻿causal﻿contribution﻿to﻿any﻿ act﻿in﻿question,﻿meaning﻿that﻿they﻿must﻿be﻿aware﻿of﻿the﻿relevant﻿facts﻿and﻿consequences﻿of﻿their﻿actions,﻿ having﻿arrived﻿at﻿the﻿decision﻿to﻿act﻿independently﻿of﻿coercion﻿and﻿were﻿able﻿to﻿take﻿alternative﻿actions﻿ based﻿on﻿their﻿knowledge﻿of﻿the﻿facts"﻿and﻿moves﻿from﻿here﻿to﻿discuss﻿ways﻿in﻿which﻿technologically﻿ mediated﻿agency﻿including﻿semi-autonomous﻿war﻿machines﻿complicate﻿matters.﻿For﻿example,﻿he﻿deftly﻿ isolates﻿the﻿ways﻿in﻿which﻿distant﻿drone﻿operators﻿are﻿unable﻿to﻿form﻿"a﻿view﻿of﻿the﻿'bigger﻿picture'﻿...﻿ perhaps﻿limiting﻿responsibility"﻿and﻿rather﻿pursues﻿again﻿a﻿central﻿theme﻿in﻿preceding﻿contributions,﻿ that﻿we﻿integrate﻿the﻿machines﻿as﻿we﻿integrate﻿others﻿with﻿limited﻿responsibility,﻿as﻿partly﻿responsible.﻿ Jai﻿writes﻿that﻿"We﻿need﻿to﻿move﻿away﻿from﻿the﻿largely﻿insufficient﻿notion﻿of﻿individual﻿responsibility,﻿ upon﻿which﻿we﻿typically﻿rely,﻿and﻿move﻿towards﻿a﻿more﻿complex﻿notion﻿of﻿collective﻿responsibility,﻿ which﻿has﻿the﻿means﻿and﻿scope﻿to﻿include﻿non-human﻿action."﻿One﻿way﻿to﻿smooth﻿this﻿integration﻿is﻿ xviii Preface to﻿level﻿morality﻿down﻿to﻿a﻿common﻿denominator,﻿and﻿Jai﻿endorses﻿such﻿a﻿pass﻿"primarily"﻿because﻿ "classical﻿accounts﻿raise﻿endless﻿questions﻿concerning﻿free﻿will﻿and﻿intentionality"﻿insoluble﻿"from﻿a﻿ practical﻿perspective﻿aimed﻿at﻿achieving﻿results﻿here﻿and﻿now."﻿His﻿approach﻿is﻿instead﻿to﻿"conceive﻿of﻿ moral﻿responsibility﻿as﻿less﻿of﻿an﻿individual﻿duty﻿and﻿more﻿of﻿a﻿role﻿that﻿is﻿actively﻿defined﻿by﻿pragmatic﻿ group﻿norms"﻿with﻿the﻿upshot,﻿on﻿his﻿account,﻿being﻿that﻿we﻿can﻿then﻿begin﻿to﻿ascribe﻿responsibility﻿to﻿ institutions﻿and﻿machine﻿agents﻿for﻿the﻿roles﻿that﻿they﻿fulfill﻿in﻿achieving﻿consequences﻿worthy﻿of﻿moral﻿ reprobation,﻿and﻿with﻿"the﻿greatest﻿share﻿of﻿responsibility﻿...﻿ascribed﻿to﻿the﻿most﻿capable﻿agents." Where﻿Jai's﻿focus﻿is﻿on﻿military﻿applications﻿of﻿intelligent﻿machines﻿and﻿the﻿ethical﻿distance﻿afforded﻿ human﻿operators﻿thereof,﻿the﻿next﻿and﻿ninth﻿chapter﻿takes﻿on﻿the﻿ethical﻿implications﻿of﻿distancing,﻿and﻿ de-distancing,﻿technologies﻿in﻿the﻿field﻿of﻿education.﻿The﻿situation﻿as﻿described﻿by﻿authors﻿James﻿Willis﻿ III﻿and﻿Viktoria﻿Strunk﻿is﻿clear,﻿with﻿discourse﻿in﻿"ethics﻿in﻿technology,﻿specifically﻿at﻿the﻿granular﻿level﻿ of﻿learning﻿analytics﻿...﻿at﻿an﻿intellectual﻿crossroads."﻿And,﻿their﻿warning﻿for﻿educators﻿especially﻿is﻿no﻿ less﻿dire:﻿"Unless﻿principled﻿ideas﻿are﻿brought﻿within﻿the﻿public﻿sphere﻿of﻿technological﻿development,﻿the﻿ speed﻿of﻿scientific﻿innovation﻿will﻿render﻿ethics﻿of﻿technology﻿misguided﻿at﻿best﻿and﻿obsolete﻿at﻿worst."﻿ For﻿ethical﻿discourse﻿to﻿become﻿practically﻿mute﻿within﻿the﻿field﻿of﻿education﻿is﻿troubling﻿as﻿technology﻿ affects﻿contemporary﻿public﻿and﻿for-profit﻿education﻿in﻿increasingly﻿suspect﻿ways.﻿For﻿instance,﻿authors﻿ Willis﻿and﻿Strunk﻿point﻿out﻿that﻿"in﻿near﻿live-time,﻿administrators,﻿faculty﻿members,﻿and﻿researchers﻿are﻿ able﻿to﻿assess﻿a﻿student's﻿activity,﻿engagement,﻿and﻿potential﻿outcome,﻿through﻿predictive﻿algorithms".﻿ Bentham's﻿"panopticon"﻿comes﻿immediately﻿to﻿mind,﻿as﻿this﻿technology﻿affords﻿the﻿potential﻿to﻿dramatically﻿reduce﻿the﻿costs﻿of﻿oversight﻿around﻿few﻿distanced﻿administrators.﻿This﻿trend﻿is﻿further﻿exacerbated﻿ by﻿MOOCs﻿and﻿AI,﻿whereby﻿the﻿monetization﻿of﻿education﻿encourages﻿the﻿removal﻿of﻿human﻿educators﻿ from﻿the﻿financial﻿equation﻿altogether.﻿Willis﻿and﻿Strunk﻿note: In late 2014, a company that provides online professional development notified its adjunct instructors that their current positions will cease to exist due to computer-mediated, algorithmic response to discussion posts, supplemented with "peer-to-peer" dialogue. While the tenets of computer-based interaction and peer-to-peer assessment may be debated, the replacement of human expertise with computer-generated responses gives personal evidence of the replacement of the scholar. The age of automated teaching is nigh. Running﻿through﻿this﻿chapter's﻿discussion﻿is﻿the﻿sense﻿of﻿education﻿–﻿and﻿life﻿–﻿as﻿an﻿art,﻿as﻿opposed﻿ to﻿the﻿sense﻿of﻿education﻿as﻿a﻿sort﻿of﻿machining,﻿and﻿of﻿course﻿this﻿wing﻿of﻿the﻿division﻿runs﻿through﻿ Dewey﻿and﻿Peirce﻿to﻿the﻿Greeks.﻿From﻿this﻿traditional﻿stance,﻿Willis﻿and﻿Strunk﻿propose﻿that﻿the﻿goal﻿ of﻿education﻿for﻿educators﻿remains﻿for﻿"students﻿to﻿learn﻿from﻿their﻿mistakes﻿and﻿be﻿able﻿to﻿apply﻿those﻿ skills."﻿However,﻿with﻿education﻿coming﻿increasingly﻿under﻿the﻿influence﻿of﻿increasingly﻿automated﻿ economies﻿of﻿scale,﻿pressures﻿from﻿"the﻿now﻿accepted﻿business﻿model﻿of﻿education",﻿alongside﻿social﻿ pressures﻿to﻿deliver﻿education﻿in﻿relatively﻿easily﻿quantifiable﻿pursuits﻿like﻿Science,﻿Technology,﻿Engineering﻿and﻿Mathematics﻿(STEM),﻿are﻿mounting﻿against﻿the﻿retention﻿of﻿this﻿professional,﻿practical,﻿ and﻿ultimately﻿democratic﻿political﻿attitude.﻿Willis﻿and﻿Strunk﻿write:﻿"Because﻿there﻿is﻿money﻿to﻿be﻿ made﻿in﻿education,﻿it﻿is﻿easily﻿accepted﻿for﻿many﻿in﻿the﻿business﻿world﻿to﻿think﻿of﻿students﻿as﻿customers,﻿education﻿as﻿a﻿service/end﻿product,﻿and﻿faculty﻿as﻿replaceable﻿entertainers."﻿This﻿monetization﻿of﻿ education﻿has﻿infiltrated﻿scholarship,﻿as﻿professors﻿are﻿hired﻿to﻿teach﻿but﻿are﻿evaluated﻿on﻿(quantity﻿of)﻿ publications.﻿One﻿casualty﻿has﻿been﻿the﻿quality﻿of﻿published﻿scholarship,﻿with﻿scandals﻿involving﻿falsified﻿experimental﻿data﻿common﻿enough.﻿Instead﻿of﻿rewarding﻿pro-social﻿education,﻿the﻿monetization﻿ of﻿education﻿has﻿turned﻿"publish-or-perish"﻿into﻿"publish-and-profit",﻿a﻿model﻿fitting﻿for﻿a﻿novelist,﻿but﻿ xix Preface undeserving﻿of﻿the﻿academy﻿as﻿traditionally﻿conceived.﻿Finally,﻿"pay-to-open-publish"﻿digital﻿platforms﻿ favor﻿those﻿with﻿the﻿financial﻿resources﻿to﻿afford﻿offering﻿personal﻿journal﻿publications﻿for﻿free﻿across﻿ the﻿Internet.﻿These﻿being﻿easily﻿accessed﻿to﻿those﻿without﻿access﻿to﻿adequate﻿university﻿libraries﻿come﻿ to﻿dominate﻿the﻿field﻿of﻿ideas﻿along﻿with﻿their﻿authors,﻿and﻿so﻿the﻿model﻿further﻿deteriorates﻿into﻿simple﻿ finance.﻿The﻿academy﻿is﻿ruled﻿by﻿demagogues﻿who﻿personally﻿profit﻿from﻿its﻿podiums﻿and﻿the﻿influence﻿over﻿culture﻿that﻿this﻿represents,﻿rather﻿than﻿satisfying﻿the﻿original,﻿democratic﻿aims﻿of﻿education. The﻿tenth﻿chapter﻿in﻿this﻿collection﻿is﻿a﻿standout,﻿placed﻿here﻿as﻿an﻿extension﻿of﻿the﻿discussion﻿on﻿ education﻿from﻿the﻿realm﻿of﻿AI-assisted﻿human﻿education﻿to﻿that﻿of﻿the﻿human﻿assisted﻿education﻿of﻿AIs.﻿ Opening﻿with﻿the﻿recognition﻿that﻿research﻿into﻿AMAs﻿is﻿"not﻿only﻿important﻿for﻿equipping﻿[artificial]﻿ agents﻿with﻿the﻿capacity﻿of﻿making﻿moral﻿judgments,﻿but﻿also﻿for﻿helping﻿us﻿better﻿understand﻿[human]﻿ morality﻿ through﻿ the﻿creation﻿and﻿ testing﻿of﻿computational﻿models﻿of﻿ethical﻿ theories",﻿ authors﻿Ari﻿ Saptawijaya﻿and﻿Luis﻿Pereira﻿build﻿an﻿especially﻿readable﻿ethical﻿bridge﻿from﻿individual﻿morality﻿to﻿ collective﻿human﻿ethics﻿out﻿of﻿the﻿aged﻿timber﻿of﻿evolutionary﻿game﻿theory,﻿resulting﻿in﻿a﻿sprawling﻿yet﻿ deeply﻿grounded﻿tour de force﻿on﻿human﻿and﻿artificial﻿morality.﻿They﻿begin﻿by﻿reviewing﻿foundational﻿ work﻿in﻿artificial﻿agency﻿and﻿applications﻿in﻿morally﻿significant﻿contexts﻿(e.g.﻿medicine),﻿and﻿from﻿there﻿ move﻿quickly﻿to﻿review﻿their﻿logic﻿programming﻿(LP)﻿approach﻿to﻿modeling﻿morality,﻿with﻿the﻿discussion﻿illustrating﻿how﻿their﻿work﻿captures﻿many﻿hard﻿points﻿present﻿in﻿contemporary﻿ethical﻿discourse.﻿ They﻿demonstrate﻿how﻿LP﻿is﻿able﻿to﻿articulate﻿"trolley﻿problems"﻿popular﻿in﻿fields﻿of﻿experimental﻿moral﻿ philosophy﻿and﻿neuro-ethics﻿(typically﻿imaging)﻿studies,﻿for﻿example.﻿Their﻿framework,﻿as﻿in﻿the﻿previous﻿chapter﻿with﻿Pereira,﻿chapter﻿4,﻿is﻿deceptively﻿simple﻿as﻿it﻿quite﻿powerfully﻿captures﻿these﻿inherently﻿ dramatic﻿moral﻿decision﻿spaces.﻿This﻿section﻿on﻿trolley﻿problems﻿is﻿especially﻿effective.﻿Saptawijaya﻿ and﻿Pereira﻿are﻿able﻿to﻿render﻿the﻿logic﻿driving﻿their﻿models﻿of﻿individual﻿moral﻿reasoners﻿in﻿extremely﻿ clear﻿terms﻿while﻿taking﻿advantage﻿of﻿the﻿narratives﻿inherent﻿in﻿everyday﻿discourse﻿over﻿similar﻿moral﻿ dilemmas.﻿To﻿this﻿compelling﻿portrait﻿of﻿independent﻿moral﻿reasoning,﻿the﻿second﻿section﻿on﻿collective﻿ morality﻿contributes﻿the﻿lesson﻿that﻿"Added﻿dependency﻿on﻿cooperation﻿makes﻿it﻿more﻿competitive﻿to﻿ cooperate﻿well"﻿thus﻿making﻿it,﻿for﻿any﻿individual﻿agent,﻿"advantageous﻿to﻿invest﻿in﻿shared﻿morals﻿in﻿ order﻿to﻿attract﻿partners﻿who﻿will﻿partake﻿of﻿mutual﻿and﻿balanced﻿advantages."﻿Their﻿review﻿of﻿research﻿ in﻿ethics﻿at﻿this﻿level﻿of﻿organization﻿covers﻿some﻿fascinating﻿ground,﻿including﻿for﻿example﻿an﻿evolutionary﻿appropriation﻿of﻿conscience﻿as﻿traditionally﻿understood.﻿That﻿Ari﻿and﻿Luis﻿are﻿able﻿to﻿integrate﻿the﻿ individual﻿with﻿the﻿collective﻿consistently﻿with﻿traditional﻿terms﻿like﻿conscience﻿via﻿traditional﻿symbolpushing﻿LP﻿models﻿is﻿a﻿fascinating﻿discussion.﻿Readers﻿primarily﻿interested﻿in﻿this﻿degree﻿of﻿analytical﻿ clarity﻿would﻿be﻿well-advised﻿to﻿begin﻿this﻿volume﻿with﻿this﻿chapter,﻿number﻿10. The﻿eleventh﻿chapter﻿is﻿from﻿Rick﻿Searle,﻿co-editor﻿and﻿also﻿author﻿of﻿the﻿first﻿chapter.﻿Rick's﻿entry﻿ serves﻿as﻿a﻿capstone﻿for﻿this﻿section﻿on﻿autonomy,﻿education,﻿evolution﻿and﻿violence.﻿"Robots﻿in﻿Warfare﻿ and﻿the﻿Occultation﻿of﻿the﻿Existential﻿Nature﻿of﻿Violence"﻿takes﻿on﻿now﻿well-established﻿positions﻿on﻿ the﻿ethics﻿of﻿artificial﻿agents﻿in﻿the﻿industry﻿of﻿war.﻿Early﻿on﻿in﻿his﻿discussion,﻿Rick﻿fixes﻿on﻿an﻿insight﻿ into﻿the﻿nature﻿of﻿the﻿problem,﻿writing﻿that﻿"the﻿essential﻿ethical﻿question"﻿is﻿missed﻿"by﻿too﻿strong﻿a﻿ focus﻿on﻿technology"﻿to﻿such﻿a﻿degree﻿that﻿the﻿"state﻿of﻿the﻿technology﻿decides﻿the﻿ethical﻿questions"﻿for﻿ us,﻿as﻿if﻿–﻿once﻿the﻿right﻿tech﻿is﻿in﻿place﻿–﻿we﻿can﻿finally﻿turn﻿our﻿morality﻿over﻿to﻿machines﻿designed﻿ to﻿do﻿the﻿work﻿for﻿us. xx Preface Rick﻿is﻿especially﻿suspicious﻿of﻿the﻿high-tech﻿business﻿of﻿warfare,﻿noting﻿that﻿a﻿different﻿set﻿of﻿incentives﻿arise﻿for﻿"a﻿military﻿made﻿up﻿of﻿human﻿soldiers﻿where﻿the﻿goal﻿is﻿to﻿finish﻿a﻿conflict﻿as﻿quickly﻿and﻿ with﻿the﻿least﻿human﻿damage﻿(at﻿least﻿to﻿one's﻿own﻿side)"﻿than﻿that﻿arises﻿for﻿"manufactures﻿of﻿military﻿ robots"﻿incentivized﻿"to﻿generate﻿as﻿much﻿revenue﻿as﻿possible﻿during﻿a﻿conflict"﻿and﻿even﻿accompanied﻿ with﻿"a﻿perverse﻿incentive﻿to﻿encourage﻿conflict."﻿Taking﻿the﻿just﻿war﻿tradition﻿as﻿his﻿touchstone,﻿Rick﻿ considers﻿contributions﻿of﻿intelligent﻿machine﻿technologies﻿to﻿the﻿processes﻿leading﻿up﻿to﻿and﻿during﻿war,﻿ drawing﻿special﻿attention﻿to﻿the﻿democratic﻿responsibility﻿of﻿free﻿human﻿beings﻿to﻿not﻿engage﻿in﻿unjust﻿ wars﻿regardless.﻿To﻿sharpen﻿this﻿point,﻿he﻿reminds﻿us﻿of﻿the﻿human﻿costs﻿of﻿war,﻿and﻿not﻿in﻿dead﻿but﻿in﻿ terms﻿of﻿what﻿had﻿traditionally﻿been﻿referred﻿to﻿under﻿the﻿heading﻿of﻿"spiritual"﻿or﻿"psychic"﻿damage.﻿ War﻿breaks﻿hearts,﻿ruins﻿lives,﻿empties﻿futures.﻿And,﻿war-enabling﻿technologies,﻿they﻿afford﻿a﻿numbing﻿ distance﻿from﻿the﻿purposeful﻿ruin.﻿Rick﻿is﻿able﻿to﻿trace﻿the﻿depths﻿of﻿implications﻿to﻿which﻿I﻿point﻿now﻿ through﻿current﻿literature,﻿coming﻿to﻿the﻿question﻿-﻿from﻿where﻿arises﻿the﻿moral﻿disgust﻿required﻿to﻿stop﻿ systematic﻿violence﻿if﻿not﻿from﻿the﻿bereaved﻿bellies﻿of﻿generations﻿of﻿morally﻿wounded?﻿In﻿this﻿way,﻿Rick﻿ brings﻿home﻿one﻿of﻿the﻿deep﻿threads﻿running﻿through﻿the﻿contributions﻿to﻿this﻿volume,﻿that﻿scholarship﻿ at﻿every﻿level﻿eventually﻿grounds﻿out﻿in﻿the﻿world﻿that﻿it﻿helps﻿to﻿shape. The﻿final﻿chapter﻿of﻿this﻿volume﻿comes﻿from﻿Aleksandar﻿Malecic﻿of﻿the﻿University﻿of﻿Nis,﻿Serbia,﻿ and﻿is﻿the﻿most﻿difficult﻿of﻿the﻿collection.﻿The﻿chapter﻿attempts﻿to﻿articulate﻿an﻿elegant﻿application﻿of﻿ Aristotle's﻿four﻿causes﻿across﻿apparently﻿different﻿levels,﻿or﻿manifestations,﻿of﻿the﻿material﻿universe﻿including﻿human﻿consciousness.﻿Aleksandar﻿sets﻿out﻿from﻿the﻿notion﻿of﻿a﻿"strange﻿loop"﻿which﻿describes﻿ the﻿progress﻿of﻿a﻿system﻿as﻿it﻿moves﻿upwards﻿or﻿downwards﻿in﻿a﻿hierarchy,﻿e.g.﻿levels﻿of﻿organizational﻿ complexity,﻿only﻿to﻿arrive﻿at﻿where﻿it﻿left.﻿His﻿discussion﻿winds﻿through﻿an﻿interesting﻿review﻿of﻿quantum﻿ theories﻿and﻿gravitation,﻿but﻿strange﻿loops﻿are﻿common﻿to﻿moral﻿fables,﻿old﻿cultural﻿lessons﻿that﻿remain﻿ in﻿everyday﻿practice,﻿e.g.﻿"rock,﻿paper,﻿scissors".﻿Thus,﻿this﻿approach﻿comes﻿at﻿the﻿essentially﻿embodied﻿ and﻿embedded﻿–﻿situated﻿–﻿character﻿of﻿cognition﻿in﻿a﻿way﻿that﻿preserves﻿figurative﻿connections﻿with﻿ mystical﻿and﻿mythical﻿appropriations﻿of﻿the﻿human﻿condition.﻿Moreover,﻿it﻿adds﻿something﻿essential﻿to﻿ naturally﻿arising﻿consciousness﻿that﻿challenges﻿similar﻿ascription﻿to﻿an﻿artificial﻿agent.﻿Aleksandar﻿writes: Consciousness is not an epiphenomenon of Newtonian physics. Metabolism and repair in living beings are necessary ingredients of any really self-aware (containing the model of the environment and itself within the environment) entity capable to adapt its own point of view (context, formal cause) according to known circumstances. The﻿portrait﻿here﻿given﻿is﻿interesting﻿because﻿it﻿effectively﻿posits﻿that﻿consciousness﻿arises﻿from﻿the﻿ embodied,﻿embedded﻿and﻿anticipatory﻿structure﻿of﻿cognition,﻿and﻿that﻿this﻿structure﻿is﻿itself﻿common﻿to﻿ all﻿natural﻿systems.﻿Accordingly,﻿Aleksandar﻿writes﻿that﻿"Strange﻿loops﻿aren't﻿a﻿recipe﻿for﻿the﻿creation﻿ of﻿conscious﻿machines﻿in﻿a﻿causal﻿world,﻿so﻿much﻿as﻿a﻿requirement." Aleksandar﻿makes﻿the﻿case﻿that﻿artificial﻿consciousness﻿as﻿typically﻿conceived﻿is﻿impossible.﻿Consciousness﻿arises﻿with﻿purpose,﻿purpose﻿with﻿final﻿cause,﻿and﻿final﻿cause﻿–﻿as﻿essential﻿to﻿the﻿form﻿of﻿ any﻿natural﻿consciousness﻿–﻿necessarily﻿involves﻿a﻿relationship﻿between﻿that﻿arising﻿consciousness﻿and﻿ its﻿unique﻿end.﻿Aleksandar﻿writes: In order to have a self-aware computer, one needs to figure out the way to create a program with "strange" causal loops. Since over thirty years after this idea was proposed there still aren't such selfaware algorithms and machines, one has to ask what is wrong with it. xxi Preface Aleksandar's﻿discussion﻿is﻿complicated﻿by﻿its﻿breadth﻿of﻿implication.﻿For﻿one,﻿it﻿confronts﻿us﻿with﻿ the﻿likelihood﻿that﻿our﻿business﻿with﻿technology﻿occludes﻿an﻿enlightening﻿window﻿on﻿our﻿natural﻿condition﻿which,﻿so﻿long﻿as﻿this﻿view﻿is﻿blocked,﻿denies﻿an﻿opportunity﻿to﻿reform﻿our﻿technological﻿projects﻿ with﻿this﻿natural﻿condition﻿in﻿view.﻿In﻿aiming﻿for﻿something﻿other﻿than﻿consciousness﻿in﻿a﻿machine,﻿we﻿ run﻿the﻿risk﻿of﻿leveling﻿human﻿experience﻿down﻿to﻿those﻿processes﻿obvious﻿in﻿the﻿artificial﻿instantiation﻿ thereof.﻿We﻿become﻿intelligent﻿machines,﻿by﻿default,﻿unless﻿–﻿as﻿Aleksandar﻿so﻿energetically﻿proposes﻿ –﻿we﻿recognize﻿that﻿in﻿this﻿anticipatory﻿structure﻿of﻿cognition,﻿and﻿agency,﻿we﻿have﻿the﻿power﻿to﻿choose﻿ those﻿ends﻿towards﻿which﻿we﻿move.﻿We﻿have﻿the﻿power﻿to﻿direct﻿ourselves,﻿and﻿to﻿coordinate﻿with﻿others﻿ in﻿the﻿achievement﻿of﻿ends﻿that﻿are﻿good,﻿if﻿not﻿for﻿the﻿business﻿of﻿technology﻿in﻿its﻿every﻿established﻿ application,﻿then﻿for﻿those﻿who﻿are﻿born﻿to﻿live﻿in﻿terms﻿of﻿it. Jeffrey White Korean Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, KAIST, South Korea xxii