volume	19,	no.	3 january	2019 Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? Darren Bradley University of Leeds © 2019 Darren	Bradley This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/019003/> 1. Introduction What	if	your	peers	tell	you	that	you	should	disregard	your	perceptions? Worse,	what	if	your	peers	tell	you	to	disregard	the	testimony	of	your peers?	How	should	we	respond	if	we	get	evidence	that	seems	to	undermine	our	epistemic	rules?	Several	philosophers	have	argued	that epistemic	rules	are	indefeasible.	I	will	argue	that	all	epistemic	rules	are defeasible.	The	result	is	a	kind	of	epistemic	particularism,	according	to which	there	are	no	simple	rules	connecting	descriptive	and	normative facts. I	will	argue	that	this	type	of	particularism	is	more	plausible	in epistemology	than	in	ethics.	The	result	is	an	unwieldy	and	possibly	infinitely	long	epistemic	rule	-	an	Uber-rule.	I	will	argue	that	the	Uberrule	applies	to	all	agents,	but	is	still	defeasible	-	one	may	get	misleading	evidence	against	it	and	rationally	lower	one's	credence	in	it. Section 2 explains the problem of undermining and three possible	responses.	Section	3	explains	the	indefeasibility	view,	and	section 4 argues against it. Section 5 argues against contributory rules, and Section	6	contains	the	core	of	the	positive	proposal,	arguing	that	the problem	can	be	solved	by	understanding	epistemic	rules	as	hedged. Section	7	develops	the	proposal	using	a	generalization	of	the	concept of	admissible	evidence.	Section	8	extends	and	defends	the	resulting position	-	where	the	only	unhedged	rule	is	a	single	Uber-rule.	Section 9	compares	our	position	to	Quinean	holism.	Section	10	concludes. 2. The Problem of Undermining and Three Responses In	this	section	I	will	explain	the	problem	of	undermining,	and	the	response	that	epistemic	rules	are	indefeasible.	In	the	next	section	I	will argue	that	this	response	is	ad	hoc. Consider	some	epistemic	rules	that	have	been	discussed	in	the	recent	literature: darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) Third,	the	normative	concepts	in	the	consequent	should	be	understood	in	the	epistemic	sense,	as	opposed	to	the	pragmatic	or	any	other sense.	For	example,	if	you	are	offered	$1m	to	believe	in	God,	there	is	a sense	in	which	you	ought	to	believe	in	God.	I	am	not	concerned	with this	pragmatic	sense	of	'should'. Fourth, the	normative concepts in the consequent should	be	understood	as	relative	to	the	agent's	situation.	There	is	a	sense	of	'ought' in	which	you	ought	to	believe	p	iff	p	is	true.5	There	is	also	a	sense	of 'ought'	in	which	you	ought	to	believe	p	iff	p	is	justified	in	your	situation.	It	is	this	latter	sense	which	I	will	use.6 Fifth,	I	take	'defeasible'	to	mean	'can	be	rationally	doubted'. Sixth,	I	will	call	rules	like	these	"simple"	to	distinguish	them	from the	complicated	Uber-rule	I	will	defend	in	sections	6	and	7. Seventh, the antecedents contain specific positive claims about agents'	states,	but	do	not	contain	totality	facts	e.g. 'the	agent	has	no other	perceptions/testimony'. Our	problem	is	that	it	is	easy	to	generate	cases	where	narrow-scope rules	conflict	or	undermine	themselves.	For	an	example	in	ethics,	suppose	a	crazed	murderer	asks	you	where	their	target	is.	The	principle not	to	lie	conflicts	with	the	principle	to	prevent	others	from	coming	to harm.7	For	an	example	in	epistemology,	suppose	a	table	looks	red	but you	are	told	that	it	is	blue.	Perception	conflicts	with	Testimony. The	epistemology	literature	has	focussed	on	cases	where	a	rule	is self-undermining.	Start	with	a	case	of	peer	disagreement: Suppose	that	you	and	a	friend	independently	evaluate	a factual	claim,	based	on	the	same	relevant	evidence	and arguments.	You	become	confident	that	the	claim	is	true. But	then	you	find	out	that	your	friend	-	whose	judgment you	respect	-	has	become	just	as	confident	that	the	claim is	false.	Should	that	news	at	all	reduce	your	confidence	in 5. See	Fassio	(2018	2.b.)	for	discussion	of	the	truth	norm	of	belief. 6. Hedden	2012	p.	344. 7. This	is	a	problem	for	Kantian	ethics.	See	Timmerman	(2013). Testimony	If	an	agent's	situation1	includes	testimony	that x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x. (Compare	Elga	[2007],	Titelbaum	[2015].) Perception If an agent's situation includes a perception that	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that x. (Compare Chisholm [1966], Huemer [2000], Pryor [2000],	Boghossian	[2008].)2 Credence-chance link	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	full	belief	that	the	chance	of	x	is	y%,	then	the	agent	is	rationally required	to	have	credence	in	x	of	y%.	(Compare	Lewis's [1980]	Principal	Principle.)3 Let me make some clarificatory comments about these rules. First, these rules have descriptive (by	which I	will	mean non-normative) concepts	in	the	antecedent	and	normative	concepts	in	the	consequent, making	them	narrow-scope	rules.4 Second,	the	supervenience	of	the	normative	on	the	non-normative entails	that	there	will	be	some	such	narrow-scope	rules.	One	can	take them	to	be	grounding	principles. 1. The	term	'situation'	is	used	by	most	authors	in	this	literature.	Titelbaum	offers a	definition	of	'situation':	"I	will	assume	only	that	whatever	the	true	theory of	rationality	is,	it	may	specify	certain	aspects	of	an	agent's	circumstances	as relevant	to	determining	which	overall	states	are	rationally	permitted	to	her. Taken	together,	these	relevant	aspects	comprise	what	I'll	call	the	agent's	'situation.'"	I	take	it	this	is	compatible	with	all	authors'	usages. 2. It is controversial	whether this rule requires a different treatment, as how things	look	is	not	a	psychological	attitude.	I	think	similar	rules	will	still	hold for	non-attitudinal	psychological	states,	but	it	won't	matter	for	my	arguments. 3. Lewis formulated the	Principal	Principle in terms	of conditional epistemic probabilities	e.g.	Cr(A	|	Known	chance	of	A is	x	and	E)	=	x,	and I	do	not intend to	diverge from	this	version. I	have	used	a	conditional to	show	the similarity	to	the	other	rules.	More	on	this	in	section	7. 4. Narrow-scope	rules	have	the	form	[if	p	then	you	ought	to	believe	q].	A	widescope rule would have the form 'you ought to believe [if p then q]'. See Broome	(1999). darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) without believing Testimony. So Elga's argument against Testimony implicitly	assumes	that	rational	agents	are	never	Akratic. Although I've no interest in defending anti-Akrasia, I think	AntiAkrasia	is	plausible,	and	that	we	cannot	block	Elga's	argument	by	simply	allowing	Akrasia.9	So	I	will	grant	Anti-Akrasia	and	block	Elga's	argument	for	a	different	reason. Returning to the	main thread, let's distinguish three ways of responding to the self-undermining problem. One might ignore colleagues	and	maintain	a	high	credence	in	Testimony.10	When	it	comes to	your	belief	in	being	conciliatory,	you	should	stubbornly	ignore	your colleagues.	Conciliatoriness	is	indefeasible.	The	result	is	that	rationality has	what Titelbaum calls "fixed points"	-	these are propositions expressing the rules of rationality, and they are indefeasible. These rules	have	built-in	restrictions	to	ensure	they	cannot	be	undermined, so	Titelbaum	calls	them	"restricted	rules". A	second	response,	which	I	will	defend,	is	the	view	that	you	should be	moved	by	your	colleagues.	Testimony	might	start	off	with	a	high prior,	but	you	can	get	evidence	against	it	and	decrease	your	credence, just	like	any	other	belief.	(And	if	you	rationally	disbelieve	that	some rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality,	then	it	doesn't	apply	to	you.)	I	will develop	this	view	using	the	distinction	between	hedged and unhedged 9. See	Horowitz (2014) for a	number	of powerful arguments against	Akrasia. Elga	(2010)	doesn't	mention	Akrasia;	Titelbaum	(2015)	discusses	Akrasia	in detail,	but	doesn't	engage	with	Elga's	argument.	Here	is	an	objection	to	my view:	"Your	position	is	that	there	are	no	simple	unhedged	rules;	as	Anti-Akrasia	is	a	simple	unhedged	rule,	how	can	you	assume	Anti-Akrasia?"	Response: On	the	view	I	will	develop,	if	Akrasia	is	ever	rational,	it	will	be	rational	only in	highly	unusual	cases,	e.g.	where	you	rationally	believe	that	an	expert	tells you: 'p	and	you	should	not	believe	p'.	This is	a	strange	situation	(compare Worsnip	2018	p.	24),	so	we	should	expect	to	be	in	a	strange	belief	state.	No such	situation	arises	in	the	case	Elga	discusses,	so	I	don't	think	allowing	Akrasia	is	a	good	way	to	block	Elga's	argument.	(Note	that	the	rules	I	discuss	are narrow-scope	epistemic	rules,	while	Anti-Akrasia	is	a	wide-scope	coherence requirement	[Worsnip	2018].)	Thanks	to	a	referee	for	pressing	this	point. 10. Elga	(2010)	and	Titelbaum	(2015)	defend	this	type	of	approach.	Elga	writes: "[O]ne	should	be	moved	by	disagreement	about	some	subject	matters,	but	not about	disagreement	itself	..."	(p.	184). the	disputed	claim?	Conciliatory	views	on	disagreement answer	"yes."	(Elga	2010	p.	175) Elga	(2007) initially	defended	a	conciliatory	view.	For	simplicity,	we can	consider	the	most	extreme	conciliatory	view: Testimony If	an	agent's situation includes testimony that x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x. But	Elga	found	that	many	of	his	colleagues	disagreed	with	him.	Elga writes: Suppose that you	have a conciliatory view	on	disagreement, but you find out that your respected [colleague] disagrees.	He	has	arrived	at	a	competing	view	(about	disagreement),	and	tells	you	all	about	it.	If	your	conciliatory view	is	correct,	you	should	change	your	view.	You	should be pulled part way toward thinking that your friend is right.	In	other	words,	your	view	on	disagreement	requires you	to	give	up	your	view	on	disagreement.	(p.	179) So	Testimony looks	unstable: if	Elga receives testimony	against	Testimony, and	applies	Testimony,	he	must	give	up	Testimony.8	Conciliatory views sometimes call for their own rejection.	This is the selfundermining	problem. There is an important implicit premise in Elga's argument we should	make	clear	–	Anti-Akrasia. Anti-Akrasia:	It	is	never	rational	to	believe	[x	and	I	should not	believe	x] Without	Anti-Akrasia	a	rational	agent	could	believe	testimony	(i.e.	believe	x if	someone	tells	you	x)	and	also	believe	that	one	should	not believe	testimony.	The	former	is	the	lower-level	belief	x;	the	latter	is a	higher-level	belief	about	beliefs.	The	agent	would	follow	Testimony 8. See	Elga	2010	p.	181–2	and	Titelbaum	2015	p.	271. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) Hedged Unhedged Absolute Me,	Holton?	Väyrynen? Sections	6,	7	and	8 Elga,	Lasonen-Aarnio, Titelbaum. Sections	3	and	4 Contributory End	of	section	6 Ross,	Christensen? Section	5 I	argue	against	contributory rules in	section	5. I	will	defend	hedged rules	in	sections	6	and	7.	In	the	next	two	sections	I	will	explain	and then	argue	against	restricted	rules. 3. Restricted Rules Elga (2010) defends the first option	-	restriction	-	arguing that we need	to	make	a	modification	to	Testimony	to	make it immune	from defeat. Titelbaum (2015) builds on this and suggests that epistemic rules	have	the	following	form:13 Restricted Testimony: If	an	agent's	situation	includes	testimony that x, the agent is rationally required to	believe that	x	-	unless14	x	contradicts	[Testimony15]. If	x	contradicts	Testimony,	then	ignore	x	and	continue	believing	other	testimony.16 13. Titelbaum doesn't actually defend Restricted Testimony. His point is that epistemic	rules	must	have	this	form,	whatever	they	turn	out	to	be. 14. 'Unless'	means	'if	not'.	Roughly,	if	there	is	no	contradiction,	then	believe	testimony.	Notice	this	says	nothing	about	what	to	do	if	there	is	a	contradiction. That's	why	we	need	the	next	line. 15. The	original text	says "this rule". I	assume 'this rule' refers to	Testimony. It won't	matter	much	if it	refers	to	Restricted	Testimony.	I	argue	that	holding such	rules	to	be	indefeasible	is	ad	hoc,	whatever	their	exact	content	is. 16. I've added "If x contradicts Testimony, then ignore x and continue believing other testimony." Titelbaum isn't explicit about how to respond if x rules.11	Hedged rules	have ceteris paribus clauses, stating situations where the rule fails to apply;	one such situation is	where	you rationally	disbelieve	that	some	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality.	I	will	argue	that	rules	of	rationality	are	hedged	-	one	can	always	get	evidence against	them	being	requirements	of	rationality.	The	result	is	that	there are	no	"fixed	points",	no	rules	that	rational	agents	should	always	believe	to	be	requirements	of	rationality	-	all	are	defeasible. A	third	response	is	also	worth	discussing.	There	is	a	different	way to	weaken	Testimony,	suggested	by	Christensen	(2010,	2013).12	Distinguish	absolute	and	contributory rules.	Absolute	rules	have	a	consequent that	says	that	you	are	required	to	be	in	some	state,	or	to	perform	some action;	contributory	rules	have	a	consequent	that	says	that	you	have	a reason	to	be	in	some	state,	or	to	perform	some	action.	Applied	to	epistemology,	absolute	rules	say	what	you	should	(or	should	not)	believe, whereas	contributory	rules	say	what	counts	in	favour	of	(or	against)	a belief.	Testimony	is	an	absolute	rule;	but	consider	a	contributory	version	of	Testimony: Contributory Testimony:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	testimony	that	x,	then	the	agent	has	a reason	to	believe	that	x. Paradox	is	avoided	because	one	can	have	a	reason	to	believe	x	and	a reason	not	to	believe	x.	But	I	will	reject	contributory	rules	due	to	cases of	"valence-switching",	i.e.	where	what	is	usually	a	reason	for	becomes a	reason	against. Here	is	a	map	of	the	main	positions,	the	sections	in	which	they	are discussed and (tentative) suggestions for	where some	philosophers might	be	placed: 11. See	Holton	2002;	Väyrynen	2006,	2009;	Schroeder	2004	section	5. 12. See	Dancy	(2013	section	1).	Christensen's	(2010	p.	203–4;	2013	p.	92–3)	talk of	"ideals"	could	be	understood	as	talk	of	unhedged	contributory	rules.	His earlier	work	(e.g.	2007)	suggests	that	there	is	a	residual	bad-making	feature of	violating	ideals/rules,	in	which	case	the	rules	would	not	be	contributory. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) in	her	current	situation.	An	agent	can	reflect	on	her	situation	and	come	to	recognize	facts	about	what	that	situation	rationally	requires.	Not	only	does	this	reflection	provide	her	with	justification	to	believe	those	facts;	that	justification	is	ultimately	empirically	indefeasible.17	(p.	276) But	this	is	very	hard	to	believe.	Christensen	(2013)	writes: Suppose	...	that	I	follow	[Properly	Restricted	Testimony] and remain absolutely confident in its correctness, despite the fact that it's rejected	by	many	epistemologists I	respect,	and	even	rate	as	my	superiors	in	philosophical skill.	How	should	I	view	my	own	reasoning	on	this	topic? Should	I think	that	while	I'm	generally	only	moderately reliable when I think about philosophy, nevertheless when I think about arguments for general conciliation, and	for	not	being	conciliatory	about	conciliation,	I'm	especially	immune	from	error?	That	seems	extremely	dubious.	(p.	89) Given the difficulty of formulating rational rules, the claim that	we should	be	certain,	or	even	highly	confident,	of	what	they	are,	even	in the	face	of	opposing	arguments,	seems	to	me	untenable. Furthermore, suppose you do hear testimony against some (correct)	rule	of	rationality.	Titelbaum	suggests	that	you	should	not	believe such	testimony	to	any	degree.	It	naturally	follows	that	you	should	not 17. Titelbaum	adds	a	footnote,	saying	that	the	rules	"could	be	opposed	by	empirical	evidence	pointing	in	the	other	direction	....	But	those	propositional	justifications	are	ultimately	indefeasible	in	the	sense	that	the	empirical	considerations	will	never	outweigh	them	and	make	it	all-things-considered	rational for	the	agent	to	form	false	beliefs	about	what	her	situation	requires."	I	don't understand	this.	If	empirical	considerations	can	count	against	the	rules,	why can't	we imagine increasingly strong empirical considerations that eventually	outweigh	the	rules?	And	the	restrictions	he	places	on	the	rules	seem	to ensure	that	empirical	considerations	cannot	count	against	rational	rules	at	all. And	his	later	claim	(section	6)	that	the	Fixed	Point	Thesis	leads	to	the	Right Reasons	view	suggests	that	empirical	evidence	cannot	count	against	rational rules. Restricted	Testimony cannot	undermine itself. It says	we should	believe	testimony	on	most	topics,	but	not	with	regard	to	the	question	of whether	we	should	believe	testimony.	It	follows	that	our	credence	in Restricted	Testimony	should	stay	the	same,	even	in	the	light	of	opposing	testimony.	Thus,	Restricted	Testimony	is	indefeasible	by	testimony. Titelbaum	(2015)	defends	similar	restrictions	on	all	epistemic	rules, e.g.: Restricted Perception:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	a	perception	that	x,	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe that	x	-	unless	x	contradicts	[Perception].	(p.	273) And	not	only	can	rules	undermine	themselves	-	they	can	undermine each	other,	e.g.	you	might	be	told	that	your	perception	is	unreliable.	To block	Restricted	Testimony	from	undermining	other	rules,	Titelbaum defends: Properly Restricted Testimony: If an agent's situation includes	testimony	that	x,	the	agent	is	rationally	...	required to	believe	x	-	unless	x contradicts [a] truth	about	what rationality	requires.	(p.	274) This	structure	is	intended	to	generalize	to	all	rules,	e.g.: Properly Restricted Perception: If an agent's situation includes	a	perception	that	x,	the	agent	is	rationally	required to	believe	that	x	-	unless	x	contradicts	a	truth	about	what rationality	requires. Titelbaum	suggests	that	we	should	have	credence	1	in	the	rules	of	rationality;	they	are	indefeasible fixed points.	To	use	his	memorable	phrase: mistakes	about	rationality	are	mistakes	of	rationality: [E]very agent possesses a priori, propositional justification	for	true	beliefs	about	the	requirements	of	rationality contradicts	Testimony,	but	I	think	he	must	be	committed	to	this	line.	I'll	leave this	implicit	when	not	needed. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) This is	close to	saying that fundamental rules	are those that	are	not defeasible.	But	then	the	question	is:	Why	should	we	think	that	there are	any	such	rules?	Indeed	I	will	argue	that	there	are	none. Elga argues that fundamental rules are dogmatic using the following	example:	Imagine	a	magazine,	Consumer Reports,	consistently rating itself as the	best consumer	magazine.19	When faced	with the complaint	that	the	magazine	is	biased	when	it	recommends	itself,	Elga endorses	an	editor	saying: To	put	forward	our	recommendations	about	toasters	and cars is to put them forward as good recommendations. And	we	can't	consistently	do	that	while	also	claiming	that contrary recommendations are superior. So our always rating	ourselves #1	does	not result from	an	arbitrary	or ad	hoc	exception	to	our	standards.	We	are	forced	to	rate ourselves	#1	in	order	to	be	consistent	with	our	other	ratings.	(p.	185) But	I	think	this	brings	out	the	importance	of	the	distinction	between fundamental	and	non-fundamental rules.	The	advice	of	a consumer magazine	is	not	a	plausible	candidate	to	be	a	fundamental	rule,	and it	is	easy	to	imagine	cases	where	Consumer Reports	allows	that	its	recommendations can	be	defeated. Suppose the editor of	Consumer Reports knows	that	her	rival	magazine	has	a	larger	budget	and,	as	a	result, makes	recommendations	based	on	more	evidence.	This	editor	should recommend that consumers rate this rival	magazine's recommendations	over	those	of	Consumer Reports.	It	would	be	ad	hoc	for	the	editor to	ignore	evidence	against	her	magazine's	recommendations. It is only fundamental epistemic rules that are plausibly (non-adhocly) indefeasible. Elga needs to argue that there are simple fundamental	epistemic	rules,	and,	to	get	the	consequences	he	wants	regarding	the	peer	disagreement	debate,	he	needs	to	argue	that	Restricted 19. Based	on	Lewis	(1971). believe	you	have	any reason,	no	matter	how	weak,	to	reject	that	rule	of rationality.	We	are	led	to	the	view	that	what seems like evidence doesn't even count as evidence. Lasonen-Aarnio18 is sympathetic to this view, writing	that	it	"rests	merely	on	a	desire	to	avoid	paradox"	(p.	342).	But this	position	seems	at	least	as	paradoxical	as	any	of	the	alternatives. So	where	did	we	go	wrong? I	will	argue in the	next section that Elga's	(2010) initial	move	to	a	restriction	on	Testimony	-	a	move	extended	by	Titelbaum	-	was	a	step	in	the	wrong	direction. 4. Elga's Argument for Ubiquitous Indefeasibility When	faced	with	a	rule	that	undermines	itself,	Elga	modifies	the	rule so	that	it	ignores	evidence	that	threatens	to	undermine	itself.	But	this looks	ad	hoc.	What	reason	do	we	have	to	believe	this,	other	than	the fact	that	it	avoids	the	undermining	problem?	After	all,	most	of	our	beliefs	are	subject	to	doubt	in	the	light	of	opposing	evidence,	so	why	are beliefs	about	disagreement	different? Elga	argues	that	all fundamental	epistemic	rules	must	be	non-underminable.	He	writes: In	order	to	be	consistent,	a	fundamental	...	rule	...	must be	dogmatic	with	respect	to	its	own	correctness.	(p.	185) But	what	does	'fundamental'	mean	here?	Elga	(2010)	writes: a	fundamental	[rule]	is	one	whose	application	is	not	governed	...	by	any	other	[rule]	....	(p.	179) 18. "It	may	come	as	a	surprise that in	some	cases	a	state	can	be	perfectly	epistemically	rational	even	if	one	has	what	would	seem	like	strong	evidence	for thinking	that	it	is	not"	(Lasonen-Aarnio	2014	p.	342,	italics	added).	Although the	next	sentence	does	seem	to	count	the	apparent	evidence	as	real	evidence. And she then says, "That	one should	believe that	one shouldn't	φ	doesn't entail	that	one	shouldn't	φ"	(p.	343).	So	it	seems	Lasonen-Aarnio	does	accept that there is evidence	against	φ,	which	affects	higher-level	beliefs	but	not first-order	beliefs,	and	thus	she	accepts	Akrasia. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) circumstances,	his	duty	to	save	the	child	[outweighs]21	his duty	to	meet	Betty.	(p.	256) Let's	say	that	rules	which	can	be	outweighed	are	contributory.	And	we can	take	it	that	the	distinguishing	feature	of	contributory	rules	is	that there is a residual bad-making feature	when they are not followed, even	when	not	following	them	is	the	right	thing	to	do	(due	to	other, weightier rules).22	When rules are voided, there is no residual badmaking	feature.	In	this	section	I	will	argue	against	contributory	rules in	epistemology. In	meta-ethics,	contributory	rules	are	associated	with	Ross	(1930), who	argued	that	we	have	numerous	duties,	and	what	we	ought	to	do depends on the overall weighting of these duties. In epistemology, the	analogous	view is that	we	have	numerous	epistemic reasons to believe,	and	what	we	epistemically	ought	to	believe	depends	on	the overall	weight	of	these	reasons.	We	can	make	this	explicit	by	weakening	the	consequent	of	our	rules: Testimony:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	testimony	that x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x to Contributory Testimony:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	testimony	that	x,	then	the	agent	has	a reason	to	believe	that	x. (Assume for	now	that the rule is	unhedged.)	This	avoids the	undermining	problems	above.	An	agent	who	has	testimony	that	x	and	a	perception	that	not	x	has	a	reason	to	believe	x	and	a	reason	to	believe not x.23	No paradox;	what they should believe depends on the correct	weighing	of	these	reasons.	And	an	agent	who	doesn't	believe	that 21. Frederick	uses 'overridden'	but I	prefer 'outweighed',	which	makes	explicit that	they	still	have	weight. 22. Schaffer	2015	p.	659. 23. Similarly, testimony against Testimony is compatible with Testimony still providing	a reason	to	believe	testimony. Testimony	(or	something	similar)	is	among	them.20	But	no	such	arguments	are	offered.	So	restricting	Testimony	to	make	it	indefeasible	is ad	hoc	after	all. Someone	might	object	that	what	is	fundamental	is	some	other	rule that is more complicated than Testimony (and Titelbaum takes no stand	on	what	the	fundamental	rules	are).	But	once	we	start	making qualifications,	we	are	on	the	path	to	the	Uber-rule	and	the	view	that all	rules	are	defeasible.	This	is	the	path	I	think	we	should	be	on.	Before presenting	my	positive	view, I	will	argue	in	the	next	section	against contributory rules in	epistemology. (Those	uninterested in contributory	rules	can	skip	the	next	section	without	loss	of	continuity.) 5. Against Contributory Rules Distinguish	two	types	of	defeasible	rules	-	rules	can	be	outweighed,	or they	can	be	voided	(and	possibly	both).	Frederick	(2015)	makes	the	distinction	as	follows: [N]ormally,	if	Alf	promises	Betty	that	he	will	meet	her	for lunch,	Alf	thereby	acquires	a	duty	to	meet	Betty	for	lunch. However,	if	Alf's	promise	to	Betty	was	made	under	threat of	force,	his	promise	fails	to	engender	that	duty,	because the	circumstance	was	duty-voiding. Normally, if	Alf	has	the	duty	to	meet	Betty for lunch, then he ought to	meet Betty for lunch.	However, if on his	way	to	meet	Betty	he	sees	a	child	drowning	in	a	pool, and	he	can	save	the	child	without	much	risk	to	himself, then	Alf	has	a	duty	to	save	the	child	....	If	Alf	cannot	both save	the	child	and	meet	Betty	for	lunch,	he	has	two	duties which	conflict.	Perhaps	all	would	agree	that	Alf	ought	to save	the	child;	but	his	duty	to	meet	Betty	remains.	In	the 20.	This	is	worth	emphasizing.	Although	Elga	is	not	explicit	that	conciliationism is a fundamental rule, it	must be	one if Elga's argument that fundamental rules	are	indefeasible	is	to	have	implications	for	conciliationism. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) In the basic case, you are standing outside the library, when	you see	Tom	Grabit exit,	pull a	book from	under his	shirt,	cackle	gleefully,	and	scurry	off.	This	gives	you pretty	good	reason	to	believe	that	Tom	just	stole	a	book from	the	library. Case	2 is just the same	as the	first case, except that Tom	has	an	identical	twin,	Tim,	from	whom	you	can't	visually	distinguish	him.	In	this	case,	it	has	seemed	to	the judgment	of	many	philosophers	that	your	visual	evidence is	not	a	reason	to	believe	that	Tom	stole	a	book.	(p.	333–4) But	Schroeder	thinks	your	visual	evidence	remains	a	reason	to	believe that	Tom	stole	a	book.	To	demonstrate	this,	he	extends	the	example: Consider	a	third	version	of	the	case,	exactly	like	the	other two	except	that	in	the	third	case,	in	addition	to	Tim,	Tom has	a	third identical	sibling,	Tam,	from	whom	you	can't visually distinguish him. This third case underwrites a compelling	argument	against	the	intuitive	judgment	that in	the	second	case,	your	visual	evidence	was	no	reason	to believe	that	Tom	stole	the	book.	For	if	you	go	on	to	conclude,	in	the	third	case,	that	Tom	stole	the	book,	then	you are	doing	worse	than	if	you	had	gone	on	to	conclude	this in	the	second	case.	Your	reason	to	believe	that	Tom	stole the	book	therefore	doesn't	seem	to	have	gone	away	in	the second	case;	it	merely	seems	to	have	gotten	substantially weaker.	(p.	334) Schroeder	seems	to	be	right	about	this	case,	where	the	defeater	weakens	the	strength	of	the	reason.	But	I	don't	see	how	he	can	say	the	same about	the	previous	case	in	which	a	drug	makes	blue	things	look	red and	red	things	look	blue.	In	that	case,	the	defeater	changes	the	valence of	the	reason,	i.e.	what	was	a	reason	for	becomes	a	reason	against.	So contributory	rules	are	still	too	strong. Contributory	Testimony	is	a	requirement	of	rationality	still	plausibly has	a	reason	(a	weak	one)	to	believe	testimony. My	objection	is	that	contributory	rules	say	that	a	feature	that	is	a reason	to	believe	x	is	always	a	reason	to	believe	x.	And	it	is	plausible that in	some	cases	a feature that	usually is	a reason	to	believe	x	becomes	a	reason	to	believe	not	x.	And	it	is	especially	plausible	in	epistemology	with	regard	to	Perception: [I]n	a	case	where	I	...	believe	that	I	have	recently	taken	a drug	that	makes	blue	things	look	red	and	red	things	look blue,	the	appearance	of	a	red-looking	thing	before	me	is reason for	me to	believe that there is a	blue,	not a red, thing	before	me.	It	is	not	as	if	it	is	some	reason	for	me	to believe	that	there	is	something	red	before	me,	but	that	as such	a	reason	it	is	overwhelmed	by	contrary	reasons.	It	is no	longer	any	reason	at	all	to	believe	that	there	is	something	red	before	me;	indeed	it	is	a	reason	for	believing	the opposite.	(Dancy	2013) These strong	undercutting defeaters24	provide	an	argument for reasons holism:	"a	feature	that	is	a	reason	in	one	case	may	be	no	reason	at	all, or	an	opposite	reason,	in	another"	(Dancy	2004	p.	7). The	consequence	here	is	that	even	the	contributory	version	of	Perception is	refuted.	There	are	situations in	which	the	perception	of	a red-looking	thing	is	no reason at all	to	believe	it	is	red.	Similar	examples for	Testimony	can	be	devised,	perhaps	where	the	agent	finds	herself inside	a	logic	puzzle	on	the	island	of	Liars.	So	we	should	reject	contributory	epistemic	principles	as	too	strong. Schroeder	(2011)	objects	that	there	is	still	a	reason,	just	a	weaker one.25	He	uses	the	following	case: 24.	Undercutting	defeaters suggest that	one's	ground for the	belief is	not sufficiently	indicative	of	the	truth	of	the	belief	-	the	ground	here	being	the	experience.	See	Pollock	1967. 25. Schroeder	(2011	fn.	8)	does	not	actually	deny	reasons	holism.	Nevertheless, the	argument	he	offers	can	be	naturally	understood	as	an	argument	against reasons	holism. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) 6. Hedged Rules Let's	recap.	So	far	I	have	argued	that	it	is	ad	hoc	to	hold	that	simple epistemic	rules	are	indefeasible,	and	that	epistemic	rules	are	not	contributory.	My	positive	view	is:	For any (simple or complex) epistemic rule, rational agents can acquire evidence that it is not a requirement of rationality, causing them to decrease their credence that it is a requirement of rationality. If	the	credence	is	low	enough,	the	rule	does	not	apply	to	the	agent	(by Anti-Akrasia). Let's	connect	this	to	familiar	views	in	ethics.	Recall	Frederick's	example: if	Alf's	promise to	Betty	was	made	under threat	of force,	his promise fails to	engender that	duty,	because the situation	was	dutyvoiding.	So,	starting	with	a	simple	ethical	rule: if	you	promised	to	p,	then	you	are	required	to	p it is	plausible that	you	have	no reason to	p if the	promise	was	made under	duress.	The	simple	ethical	rule	can	be	voided.	In	order	to	allow for	this,	we	need	the	full	rule	to	be: if	you	promised	to	p,	then	you	are	required	to	p,	unless the	promise	was	made	under	duress. We'll	say	that	the	full	rule	is	hedged.28 In	epistemology,	using	the	example	of	Perception,	a	better	specification	of	the	rules	would	move	us	from: 28.	This idea has been suggested in	meta-ethics by	Holton (2002) and	Horty (2007).	Horty	writes that "the	general	principle that lying is	wrong	should be taken to	mean simply that lying is	wrong	by	default	-	that is, to a	first approximation,	that	once	we	learn	that	an	action	involves	lying,	we	ought	to judge	that it is	wrong,	unless	certain	complicating	factors interfere"	(p.	23). Holton	suggests that	ethical rules	need 'That's it'	clauses	stating that there are	no	other ethically relevant features, e.g. 'Any	action that	has such-andsuch	features	and	That's	It is	wrong'.	One	choice-point	here	is	whether	the hedge	lists	a	manageable	number	of	exceptions	(e.g.	'under	duress')	or	is	a place-holder	for	an	open-ended	list	of	exceptions	(e.g.	'and	there	are	no	other relevant	normative	features').	This	is	the	topic	of	section	8.	See	Field	(2000	p. 135	and	Appendix)	for	related	points. Furthermore,	a	motivation	for	wanting	contributory	reason	in	ethics	does	not	apply	to	epistemology.	A	strong	motivation	for	contributory	reasons	in	ethics	is	a	need	for	outweighed	reasons.	Dancy	writes: Scanlon	[who	is	taken	to	reject	contributory	rules26]	has ...	deprived	himself	of	the	idea	of	a	defeated	reason,	and thereby prevented himself even from addressing the question	what	the	appropriate	response	is	to	such	a	thing. Normally	we	would	speak	of regret	and residual	duties, but if all conflict is, as Scanlon suggests,	merely apparent, there are	no	defeated [outweighed] considerations capable	of	demanding	regret,	and	nothing	to	generate	a residual	duty.27	(Dancy	2004	p.	26) The idea that contributory reasons keep their force even when defeated	is	most	plausible	in	ethics,	especially	if	we	think	of	our	ethical system	as	consisting	in	duties.	Our	duties	remain	even	if	they	are	defeated	by	other	duties.	Your	duty	not	to	lie	remains,	even	if	you	have	a stronger	duty	to	save	a	life	by	lying. By contrast, our epistemic duties do not seem to have the same power	to	remain	even	if	defeated.	For	example,	suppose	you	see	a	redlooking	table in	a	situation	where	you	know	you	have	taken	a	drug that	makes	blue	things	look	red	and	red	things	look	blue.	You	don't believe that the table is red.	Do you regret that you	have	not lived up	to	your	epistemic	duty	to	believe	things	are	as	they	appear	to	be? Surely	not.	A	signature	feature	of	a	violation	of	a	contributory	rule	is that	it	involves	a	residual	bad-making	feature.	But	there	doesn't	seem to	be	anything	bad	about	believing	the	table	is	blue.	So	the	contributory	view	looks	to	be	unmotivated	in	epistemology.	So	the	rejection of	contributory	rules	is	more	plausible	in	epistemology	than	in	ethics. 26. I	am	neutral	on	whether	this	is	a	good	interpretation	of	Scanlon. 27. This argument is central to Dancy's position. He later (p. 28–9) rejects Holton's	Principled	Particularism	for	the	same	reason. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) response,	I	suggest	that	the	agent	can	move	straight	to	a	stable	state in	which E has higher credence than before and that-Perception-isa-requirement-of-rationality-in-this-situation	has	lower	credence	than before. So	situations	where	rules	appear to	conflict	are in fact	situations where	the	rules	are	incompletely	specified.	This	avoids	the	smell	of	ad hoccery	-	we	are	not	asserting	that	rules	are	immune	to	conflicting	evidence;	we	are	placing	limits	on	when	the	rule	applies,	a	move	which is familiar in	ethics	and	philosophy	of	science.31 It is	also	familiar in epistemology	-	it	is	the	strategy	suggested	by	Lewis	(1980)	regarding objective	chance	which	I	develop	in	the	next	section. 7. Two Types of Inadmissibility Let's	start	with	a	simple	credence-chance	link: Credence-Chance Link:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	full belief	that	the	chance	of	p	is	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally required	to	have	credence	of	p	in	x. This	rule	does	not	apply	in	all	situations.	An	agent	can	have	evidence that	justifies	their	having	credences	that	differ	from	the	chances.	Call such evidence inadmissible. The	most familiar form is evidence that gives	us	direct	information	about	the	event.	For	example,	if	you	see	a fair	coin	landing	Heads	in	a	crystal	ball	you	know	to	be	reliable,	you should	not	have	credence	of	1⁄2	that	it	will	land	Heads.	This	is	an	opposing	defeater.	So	the	Credence-Chance	Link	should	be	hedged.	Indeed, Lewis	defended	a	hedged	version	of	the	Credence-Chance	Link	-	the Principal	Principle	(PP),	of	which	we'll	use	a	simplified	version:32 31. Compare	Cartwight	(1983),	Pietroski	and	Rey	(1995). 32. Precisely,	it	says:	"Let	C	be	any	reasonable	initial	credence	function.	Let	t	be any	time.	Let	x	be	any	real	number	in	the	unit	interval.	Let	X	be	the	proposition	that	the	chance,	at	time	t,	of	A's	holding	equals	x.	Let	E	be	any	proposition	compatible	with	X	that	is	admissible	at	time	t.	Then	C(AIXE)	=	x"	(p.	266). This	brings in	various features	which	aren't relevant to	our concerns.	One that is	worth	mentioning is that	Lewis's rule requires that agents	not	only have	credences	that	match	the	known	chances,	but	also	update	in	such	a	way Perception: If an agent's situation includes a perception that	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that x to Hedged Perception:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	a	perception	that	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe that	x,	unless	they	have	evidence	against	Perception.29 What	if	an	agent	does	have	evidence	against	Perception?	I	suggest	we take	Hedged	Perception	to	include: If	they	have	evidence	against	Perception,30	then	their	credence that	Perception is a requirement	of rationality in this	situation	should	decrease. Where there is	moderate evidence that Perception is not a requirement	of	rationality	in	this	situation,	the	rational	agent	might	retain	a middling	credence that	Perception is	a requirement	of rationality in this	situation. Where	there	is	overwhelming	evidence	that	Perception is	not	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	this	situation,	the	rational	agent might	disbelieve	that	Perception	is	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	this situation. Assuming Anti-Akrasia, (which links beliefs about the requirements	of	rationality	with	requirements	of	rationality),	it	follows that	Perception	is	not	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	this	situation.	A fortiori,	Perception	is	not	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	all	situations. A referee objects that	where believing E is based on Perception, which	is	then	undermined	by	E,	the	support	for	E	vanishes,	thus	the rule	is	believed	again,	and	the	position	is	diachronically	unstable.	In 29.	Notice	that	although	Hedged	Perception	contains	'unless',	it	is	very	different from	Titelbaum's restricted rules.	Restricted rules tell us to ignore evidence that	conflicts	with	the	rules;	hedged	rules	tell	us	to	lower	credence	in	the	rules (in	our	situation)	when	there	is	evidence	undermining	them. 30.	I	intend	this	to	cover	cases	where	the	evidence	is	that	Perception	fails	to	apply	in	their	current	situation,	and	cases	where	the	evidence	is	that	Perception fails	to	apply	in	all	situations. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) to have credence of x in p, unless they have evidenceinadmissible-relative-to-the-Credence-Chance-Link, or unless they have evidence-inadmissible-relative-to-the-PP*. I	suggest	that	other	rules	work	the	same	way,	and	that	we	need	to	generalize	the	notion	of	inadmissibility	to	apply	to	the	other	rules. Let's	work	through	how	this	applies	to	Testimony. Testimony:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	testimony	that	x, the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	x. Like the	Credence-Chance	Link, this	needs to	have	exceptions	built in.	One	type	of	exception	occurs	when	the	agent	has	other	evidence against	x.	Perhaps the	agent	has	directly seen that	x is false; this is an	opposing	defeater.	A	different type	of exception	would	be if the agent	rationally	believes	that	the	person	testifying	is	unreliable;	this is	an	undercutting	defeater.	Or	suppose	an	apparently	reliable	agent tells	them	that	Testimony	is	false;	this	is	a	more	general	undercutting defeater,	relevant	to	other	testifiers	too.	Call	evidence	that	justifies	an agent in	not	believing testimony inadmissible-relative-to-Testimony.	So Testimony	should	be	hedged	as	follows: Hedged Testimony: If an agent's situation includes testimony that x, then the agent is rationally required to believe that x, unless they have evidence that is inadmissible-relative-to-Testimony. Mutatis	mutandis	for	other	simple	epistemic	rules	(including	Hedged Testimony).	Thus,	I	suggest	that	all	simple	epistemic	rules	are	hedged. The	undermining	problems	disappear,	as	the	problem	cases	described situations	where	the	agent	does	have	evidence	inadmissible	to	some rule,	so	the	agent	has	low	credence	that	the	rule	is	a	requirement	of rationality,	so	by	Anti-Akrasia	(which	links	beliefs	about	the	requirements	of	rationality	with	the	requirements	of	rationality),	the	rule	does not	apply.34	We	have	arrived	at	my	view	that	epistemic	rules	will	be 34.	Objection: Our hedged simple rules will almost never apply. Hedged PP If an agent's situation includes full belief that the chance of p is x, then the agent is rationally required to have credence of p in x,	unless they have inadmissible evidence. But	there	is	a	second	type	of	inadmissible	evidence	that	has	not	been discussed in the objective chance literature	-	the	Credence-Chance Link	can	have	undercutting	defeaters.	There	might	be	evidence	that	reduces	your	confidence	that	a	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality.33	Suppose	an	apparently reliable	agent tells	you that chance is	not something	which	your	credences	should	match.	You	might	be	confused	by such	a	statement,	but	this	confusion	is	surely	enough	to	justify	your credences'	not	perfectly	matching	the	chances.	Such	evidence	reduces confidence	in	the	Credence-Chance	Link. Similarly, suppose	an	apparently reliable	agent tells	you that the PP is false (i.e. even	with the	hedge). Then you should lower your credence	that	PP is	a	rule	of	rationality.	So	PP	also	needs	to	be	hedged. Just as the hedge of the	Credence-Chance Link generated the PP,	we need	a	new	principle	generated	by	the	hedge	of	the	PP. One	way to	systematize	all this is to	make the	concept	of	admissibility	relative	to	a	rule.	So	we	can	restate	PP	as: PP*: If an agent's situation includes full belief that the chance of p is x, then the agent is rationally required to have credence of x in p, unless they have evidence-inadmissible-relative-to-the-Credence-Chance-Link. And	PP*	needs	to	be	hedged	in	turn: Qualified PP*:	If	an	agent's	situation	includes	full	belief	that the	chance	of	p	is	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required that,	given	any	possible	admissible	evidence,	they	will	continue	to	do	so.	We could	set	up	all	our	rules	in	the	same	way,	but	I	will	use	the	simpler	formulation.	Thanks	to	x. 33. Such	evidence	most	directly	reduces	your	confidence	that	a	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	your	situation;	a	fortiori	it	reduces	your	confidence	that a	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality	in	all	situations. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) epistemic	rules,	this	position	is	still	defensible	as	an	epistemic	theory. So	in	the	next	section	I	will	defend	an	Uber-rule. Before	that,	there	is	a	loose	end	to	tie	up.	Suppose	we	accept	hedged rules	-	are	they	contributory	or	absolute?	In	the	ethics	case,	we	used: Hedged, Absolute: If you promised to p, then you are required	to	p,	unless	the	promise	was	made	under	duress, etc. But	the	alternative	is: Hedged, Contributory:	If	you	promised	to	p,	then	you	have a	reason	to	p,	unless	the	promise	was	made	under	duress, etc. The advantage of contributory rules is that they don't undermine themselves	or	each	other;	but	we	have	no	need	of	this	advantage	here, as	the	hedge	can	ensure	that	there	is	no	conflict.	And	if	there	is	no	conflicting	rule,	then	surely	a	promise	to	p	means	that	you	are	required	to p;	the	Hedged,	Absolute	rule	is	correct. The	epistemology	case	looks	similar. Hedged, Absolute:	If	it	looks	red,	then	you	should	believe it	is	red,	unless	you	rationally	believe	you	have	recently taken	a	drug,	etc. Hedged, Contributory: If it looks	red,	then	you	have	a	reason	to	believe	it	is	red,	unless	you	rationally	believe	you have	recently	taken	a	drug,	etc. The	stronger	Hedged,	Absolute rule looks	plausible, so I tentatively endorse	it. 8. For the Uber-rule So	far	I	have	argued	that	the	link	between	descriptive	and	normative concepts	can	be	described	only	by	a	tapestry	of	interlocking	hedged not	the	simple	rules	with	which	we	began,	but	complex	rules	full	of hedges. Dancy	(2004)	attributes	an	analogous	view	to	Scanlon	(1998):35 Scanlon's view	... seems to be that	... there are no actual	conflicts,	only	appearances	of	conflict.	If	two	of	our [rules]	seem	to	get	in	each	other's	way,	what	this	shows is	that	at	least	one	of	them	is	incompletely	specified,	and the	matter is	resolved	by	a	more	complete	specification. Suppose	we	[can	help	someone	in	need	at	the	cost	of	killing	someone	else].36	The	idea	here	is	that	in	a	proper	understanding	of	the	[rule]	that	requires	us	to	help	those	in need,	there	would	probably	be	included	an	exception	to that	duty	for	all	cases	where	to	help	one	we	have	to	kill another.	Properly	understood,	therefore,	the	duty	to	help cannot	conflict	with	the	duty	not	to	kill.	(p.	25) But a new danger emerges if the complexity spirals out of control. Starting	with	simple	rules,	can	the	exceptions	be	finitely	stated?	Ideally, we	would	like	to	have	finite	exceptions,	as	this	would	allow	a	manageable	set	of	rules	that	could	be	used	to	guide	our	deliberation. I don't know if this is possible, so I	will concede the point, and defend	the	possibility that the	exceptions	are	open-ended.	The idea is	that,	even	if	we	are	left	with	an	infinite	list	of	exceptions	to	simple Perception	might	start:	"If	it	looks	like	p,	then	believe	p,	unless	you	have	reason	to	distrust	your	vision	or	...."	Anyone	who	has	ever	experienced	an	illusion	does	have	some	such	reason.	This	point	is	correct	-	hedged	simple	rules might rarely	apply to	any	actual	people	-	but this is	not	a	problem.	Again, compare	the	Principal	Principle.	Lewis	formulated	it	to	apply	only	to	initial credence	functions,	so	it	does	not	apply	to	any	real	people.	Nevertheless,	it	is (if	correct)	a	substantive	and	informative	rule	of	rationality. 35. Dancy	cites	Scanlon	(1998	p.197–200).	But	Dancy	admits	that	the	interpretive claim	is	not	beyond	dispute,	and	I	refrain	from	attributing	this	to	Scanlon. 36.	Bizarrely,	the	original	sentence	is	"Suppose	we	face	a	choice	between	killing one	person	and	helping	another." I take it	Dancy intended to	describe the example	I	use. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) so the	prior distribution encodes	what agents should	believe given any	evidence.	The	prior	distribution	can	encode	an	Uber-rule. Are	there	any	simple	rules	that	apply	in	all	situations,	i.e.	all	over the	Venn	diagram?	I	see	no	reason	to	expect	so.	We	cannot	say	you should	believe	your senses,	because there is	possible	evidence	/	areas	of the	Venn	diagram	where	you	should	not	believe	your	senses. Indeed,	for	any	simple	rule	you	might	state,	there	is	possible	evidence /	areas	of	the	Venn	diagram	where	you	should	not	follow	that	simple rule.	The	best	we	could	hope	for	would	be	patterns	in	some	areas	of the	Venn	diagram	that	could	be	helpfully	described	with	simple	rules. We	might	make	a	comparison	with	Humean	laws.	For	the	Humean, laws	do	not	explain	events;	events	are	fundamental	and	laws	are	derived from	events, so	Humean laws	are just informative summaries. Similarly,	in	Bayesian	epistemology	the	priors	are	fundamental;	some simple	epistemic	rules	might	be	derived	from	the	priors,	but,	like	Humean	laws,	they	are	just	helpful	summaries.39 For	a	further	intuitive	argument,	consider	some	difficult	question, such	as the	correct credence that climate	change is	man-made. Is it plausible	that	a	finite	number	of	simple	epistemic	rules	would	generate	the	rational	credence?	It	strikes	me	as	entirely	implausible. In	the	rest	of	this	section	we'll	consider	two	objections	to	the	Uberrule	based	on	(i)	guidance	and	(ii)	coherence. 8.1. Guidance Lasonen-Aarnio (2014) offers the most detailed discussion, and 39.	Thus	simple	rules	can	still	help	explain	rational	requirements;	we	just	have	to remember	that	the	simple	rules	are	themselves	explained	by	the	priors.	So this	seems	compatible	with	Christensen's	comment:	"If	we	ask	why	the	disagreement	of	other	competent	thinkers	with	the	same	evidence	should	affect my	confidence,	the	correct	explanation	may	still	be	that	since	their	disagreement	is	evidence	that	my	initial	belief	was	based	on	an	epistemic	error,	it	creates	rational	pressure	to	give	credence	to	the	claim	that	my	initial	belief	was based	on	error,	and	that	...	this	creates	rational	pressure	to	back	off	of	that initial	belief	to	at	least	some	extent"	(Christensen	2013	p.	93,	italics	added). However,	Christensen	(2010	p.	203–4)	offers	some	considerations	that	suggest	that	some	simple	rules	are	explanatory	in	a	stronger	sense	than	I	allow. rules.	Can	these	rules	be	finitely	stated?	If	not,	we	have	a	version	of particularism: Principled Particularism:	Any	finite	set	of rules	will	be insufficient	to	capture	all	normative	truths.37 Thus	the	connection	between	descriptive	and	normative	truths	is	expressible	only	with	an	infinitely	long	rule:	an	Uber-rule.	With	this	one Uber-rule,	which	presumably	does	not	undermine	itself,	the	problems of	undermining	are	avoided. I	will	defend	the	Uber-rule	in	epistemology.	As	far	as	I	can	tell,	the term	'Uber-rule'	was	introduced	by	Christensen	(2010)	and	described as	follows: Suppose we specify, for every possible evidential situation in	which an agent	may find herself,	what the appropriate doxastic response is. The result	would be an overarching rule	which took into account every sort of evidence.	We	might then	think	of that	rule	as	encoding the	one	and	only	true	epistemic	[rule].	(p.	203) I	add	that	the	Uber-rule	cannot	be	finitely	expressed.	This	position	can be	generated	by	conjoining	an	infinite	number	of	simple	rules,	or	positing	a	finite	number	of	simple	rules	with	at	least	one	infinitely	long hedge.	As	the	Uber-rule	applies	in	all	situations,	it	is	unhedged;	I	will argue	below	(8.2)	that	it	is	also	defeasible. So	far	the	only	detailed	discussions	of	the	Uber-rule	have	argued against it.38 Let me sketch a way of thinking about rationality that makes	an	Uber-rule	plausible.	Instead	of	thinking	about	rationality	as emerging	out	of	simple	rules,	think	of	the	Bayesian	approach	where agents begin with a prior distribution of probabilities. Imagine all epistemically	possible	worlds	on	a	vast	Venn	diagram.	Bayesians	only allow updating by conditionalization (or Jeffrey conditionalization), 37. Compare	Holton	(2002)	and	McKeever	and	Ridge	(2006	p.	16). 38.	Christensen	(2010,	2013),	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2014). darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) However,	this	position	might	be	harder	to	defend	in	epistemology than	in	ethics.	In	ethics,	often	only	a	small	number	of	considerations are	relevant	to	whether	a	particular	action	is	right.	But,	turning	to	epistemology,	consider	whether	I	should	trust	my	vision	and	believe	there is	a	red	table	in	front	of	me.	Presumably	the	track-record	of	my	vision is	relevant,	so	every	visual	experience	in	my	life	-	and	whether	it	was veridical	-	will	be	relevant.	And	we	already	seem	to	have	a	rule	that	is too	complicated	to	guide	me. At	this	point	we	could	retreat	to	the	view	that	although	we	can	never	(or	not	always)	say	that	there	are	no	other	relevant	features,	these other	relevant	features	can	be	rationally	ignored.	Defending	the	view that	there	are	more	reasons	than	we	normally	take	into	account,	Mark Schroeder	(2005)	writes: If	God	made a list of all of the pros and cons of some course	of	action,	it	might	be	infinitely	long.	But	you	can't possibly	take	everything	into	account	-	only	the	reasons near	the	top	of	the	list.	(p.	15) So	we	could	be	guided	by the	Uber-rule	by	paying	attention to the most	important	parts	of	the	rule	for	our	situation. A	problem	might	remain if someone insisted that	guidance	must be	provided	by	the	full	epistemic	theory,	i.e.	the	whole	Uber-rule.	The full	Uber-rule	cannot	be	finitely	formulated,	and	perhaps	we	cannot	be guided	by	rules	we	cannot	formulate. But	an	agent	might	be	guided	by	the	rules	without	being	able	to formulate	them.	For	example,	when	you	judge	that	a	sentence	is	ungrammatical,	you	are	guided	by	linguistic	rules	that	you	are	unable	to formulate. Furthermore,	you	might	even	be	disposed	to	get	the	rules	wrong	if you	tried	to	formulate	them.	For	example,	Arpaly	(2003)	argues	that Huckleberry	Finn	is	guided	by	the	true	moral	rules	in	not	turning	in an	escaped	slave,	even	if	he	wrongly	believes	that	he	should	turn	in focusses	on	two	main	worries.	Start	with	the	worry	that	we	cannot	be guided	by	the	Uber-rule:40 Now,	the	problem	for	the	Uber-rule	view	is	that	an	Uberrule	just	doesn't	seem	like	the	kind	of	rule	that	can	offer genuine	guidance.	For	one,	it	cannot	even	be	expressed as	a	set	of	finite, informative	generalisations.	...	Even if one	argues	that	subjects	manage	to	genuinely	follow	the Uber-rule	by	employing	more	ordinary	kinds	of	epistemic rules	as	heuristic	guides,	the	fact	remains	that	they	need guidance	to	follow	the	Uber-rule	itself.	Hence,	the	Uberrule is	a	very	awkward	candidate for	a	rule	that is itself supposed to	play the role	of	offering	genuine	guidance. (p.	333) In	my	view	the	Uber-rule	need	not	offer	guidance.	I	prefer	the	Bayesian	view	above,	according	to	which	agents	are	"guided"	by	their	priors and	the	evidence. Still, Lasonen-Aarnio's worry may survive as the worry that we mere	mortals	are	unable	to	be	guided	by	the	full	ideal	prior	probability function,	which	requires	assigning	probabilities	to	an	infinite	number of	propositions.	So	let's	address	this	worry	in	the	form	that	LasonenAarnio	puts	it	-	that	the	Uber-rule	cannot	offer	guidance. In	response,	it	is	arguable	that	an	Uber-rule	could	offer	guidance. In	the	happiest	cases,	agents	know	that	the	ceteris	paribus	clause	of	a simple	rule	is	true,	i.e.	other	things	are	equal,	so	they	can	be	guided by	the	rule.	For	example,	someone	who	has	conclusive	reason	to	believe	that	their	senses	are	reliable	can	follow	Perception,	and	Perception	will	be	one	part	of	the	larger	Uber-rule.	Though	never	guided	by the	entire	Uber-rule,	agents	might	usually	be	guided	by	the	part	of	the rule	that	is	relevant	to	them	-	it	looks	red,	there	are	no	other	relevant features,	so	believe	it	is	red.41 40.	Compare	Boghossian	2008	p.	496. 41. See	Väyrynen	(2008)	for	a	detailed	defence	of	a	similar	position	in	metaethics. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) Uber-rule	in	that	situation	are.	...	Now	imagine	that	you hear	an	epistemology	oracle	tell	you	that	the	recommendations	made	by	the	Uber-rule	in	the	very	situation	you are	in	right	now	are	incorrect.	In	so	far	as	the	rule	is	complete	...	the	chart	must	say	something	about	your	current situation.	Imagine	that,	as	the	chart	tells	you,	the	rule	recommends	being	in	state	S.	But in	so	far	as	the	oracle is to	be	trusted,	doesn't	her	testimony	act	as	a	higher-order defeater	for	any	such	recommendation?	(p.	331) As	stated,	I	think	this	imagined	situation	is	incoherent.	The	problem is	that	we	are	imagining	a	case	where	you	are	told	that	the	Uber-rule is	incorrect.	But	we	have	defined	'Uber-rule'	as	the	correct	rule.	So	any rule	that	fails	to	be	correct	isn't	the	Uber-rule.	So	any	speaker	who	tells you	the	Uber-rule	is	incorrect	is	saying	something	incoherent,	and	you should	not	follow	their	advice.44	Even	worse,	we've	been	told	that	it	is an	"epistemology	oracle"	who	is	telling	us	the	Uber-rule	is incorrect. Presumably,	the	phrase	'epistemology	oracle'	applies	only	to	someone who speaks the truth. So 'epistemology oracle' cannot be correctly applied	to	anyone	who	tells	us	the	Uber-rule	is	incorrect	(under	any mode	of	presentation),	as	the	Uber-rule	is	by	definition	correct. A	coherent	scenario in	this	area is that	a	rational	agent	might	be told	something false	about the	Uber-rule	by	a	plausible-looking	but misleading	informant.	And	what	might	be	worrying	Lasonen-Aarnio is	the	thought	that,	in	this	scenario,	agents	can	have	rational	doubts about	the	content	of	the	Uber-rule.	It	looks	paradoxical	for	the	Uberrule	to	apply	in	all	situations,	be	unhedged,	and	yet	be	defeasible.45 I	think	paradox	can	be	avoided.	Let's	work	through	a	case.	Suppose the	sum	total	of	your	evidence	is	a	current	red	experience.	Suppose	the 44. They	might	say,	"The	rule	you	are	following	is	incorrect",	but	that's	a	different situation,	as	it	involves	a	different	mode	of	presentation	of	the	Uber-rule. 45. Compare	Christensen	(2013):	"If	the	agent	continues	to	follow	the	Uber-rule while	doubting	its	correctness,	it	seems	inevitable	that	she	will	in	some	cases violate [Anti-Akrasia]" (p. 93).	The	example shows	how	we can	doubt the Uber-rule	without	Akrasia. the	slave.42	Huckleberry	Finn's	inability	to	formulate	the	rules	does	not stop	him	from	being	guided	by	the	rules. Perhaps	our	position	in	epistemology	is	analogous	to	Huckleberry Finn's	position	in	ethics.	We	cannot	formulate	the	Uber-rule	any	more than	Huckleberry	Finn	can formulate the	ethical rules.	But it is	possible	that	his	compassion	makes	him	perform	the	right	action,	so	there is	a	sense	in	which	he	is	guided	by	ethical	rules.	Similarly,	it	is	possible that our good sense, or epistemic intuition,	makes	us form rational beliefs,	so	there	is	a	sense	in	which	we	are	guided	by	the	Uber-rule.43 To	sum	up,	although	the	Uber-rule	is	incompatible	with	some	views that involve	strong	requirements	on	our	ability to formulate	and	be guided	by	normative	rules,	such	strong	requirements	can	be	rejected. 8.2 Coherence Lasonen-Aarnio's	other	worry	is	that	there	might	be	no	Uber-rule	to be found	-	"finding	a rule	not susceptible to	defeat is surely	harder than	merely	defining	one	to	be	such!"	(p.	331).	The	idea	seems	to	be that	the	concept	of	an	Uber-rule	might	be	incoherent,	just	as	the	concept	of	a	square	circle	is. One	might immediately	be suspicious	here	-	surely, for any	possible	evidential	state,	there	is	a	rational	response,	and	the	Uber-rule states	what	the	rational	responses	are.	Nevertheless,	Lasonen-Aarnio offers	the	following	case	to	defend	this	position: [A]ssume	that	you	are	staring	at	a	chart	representing	the Uber-rule: for each possible epistemic situation	... the chart	specifies	what the	recommendations	made	by	the 42. See	Raz	(2000) for further	discussion.	One	might	be tempted to	appeal to the	familiar	distinction	between	a	theory	of	rightness	and	a	decision-making procedure	(Bales	1971).	But	we	are	working	only	with	the	subjective	ought, so	the	theory	of	rightness	looks	irrelevant	(or	perhaps	better:	the	distinction collapses). 43. A	different	problem	with an infinitely long	Uber-rule is that	we	would	be unable	to	grasp	epistemic	concepts.	Thus,	Jackson,	Pettit	and	Smith	(2000) give	a	semantic	objection	to	particularism.	This	seems	to	be	a	good	reason	for positing	a	long	but	finite	rule. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) As	a	final	point	in	defence	of	the	Uber-rule,	it	is	worth	emphasizing Holton's point that Principled Particularism is compatible with utilitarianism: [S]uppose	you	were	a	utilitarian.	Then	you	couldn't	determine	which	action	to	perform	on	the	basis	of	a	list	of pleasures	and	pains	caused	by	possible	actions	of	yours. You	would	need	to	know,	in	addition,	that	these	were	all the	pleasures	and	pains	that	each	action	caused;	and	that these	were	all	your	possible	actions.	(p.	206) No	matter	how	much	of the	world	we	describe, it is	not enough to ensure that an act is right	-	rightness	depends	on the	whole	world, just	as	generalizations	like 'all	swans	are	white'	do.47	Similarly, if	we focus	on	narrow-scope	rules	with	descriptive	antecedents	without	totality	facts,	then	we	can	never	stop	at	finite	rules	-	what	you	ought	to believe	depends	on	your	whole	mental	state.	But	this	doesn't	rule	out This	follows	from	the	internalist	intuition	that	agents	have	epistemic	access to	the	rationality-makers.	But	one	can	have	rational	false	beliefs	about	what others	should	believe: Titelbaum's-Principle-I-Deny:	For	any	given	agent	and	situation,	if	they	are mistaken	about	what	one	should	believe	in	a	situation	other	than	their own,	then	they	are	making	a	mistake	of	rationality. The	difference	can	be	put in terms	of the	scope	of the	quantifiers.	For	any agent	and	situation, there	are	epistemic rules they	ought to	believe	are requirements	of	rationality;	but	there	are	no	epistemic	rules	they	ought	to	believe	are	requirements	of	rationality	in	all	situations.	Another	way	of	putting this	is	that	you	can	be	rationally	mistaken	about	what	someone	else	should believe, but not about	what you should believe.	Why the asymmetry? Because	what	an	agent	should	believe	depends	on	their own	higher-order	beliefs about	rationality,	whereas	what	an	agent	should	believe	does	not	depend	on someone else's	higher-order	beliefs	about rationality.	The	asymmetry	can	be read	off	the	Anti-Akratic	rule	(this	is	an	ad	hominem	criticism	of	Titelbaum, as	Anti-Akrasia	is	central	to	his	theory)	-	it	is	irrational	to	believe	p	and	believe	that	it	is	irrational	to	believe	p;	it	is	not	irrational	to	believe	p	and	believe that	it	is	irrational	for	someone	else	to	believe	p.	Titelbaum	(2015)	mentions this	possible	asymmetry	but	immediately	rejects	it:	"[E]very	plausible	story I've	been	able	to	come	up	with	is	generalizable:	it	applies	just	as	well	to	an agent's	conclusions	about	what's	rationally	required	in	other	situations	as	it does	to	conclusions	about	what's	required	in	her	current	situation"	(p.	276). 47. Compare	Schroeder	2011. Uber-rule	says	that	the	rational	response	to	this	evidence	is	to	be	90% certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you.	You	are	rational,	so	you are	90%	certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you.	And	you	are reflective,	so	you	have	the	second-order	belief	that	the	Uber-rule	says that	agents	with	the	sum	total	of	a	red	experience	should	be	90%	certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	them.	Say	you	are	n%	certain of	this	second-order	belief.	Now	add	an	informant	who	says	(falsely) that	the	rational	response	to	your	current	red	experience	is	to	be	only 50%	certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you. Distinguish	first-order	and	second-order	responses.	The	most immediate response is lowering your second-order credence that the Uber-rule	says	that	agents	with	exactly	the	evidence	of	a	red	experience	should	be	90%	certain	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	them. This	falls	from	n%.	The	first-order	response	is	that	your	credence	that there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you	drops	below	90%.	If	you	fully	trusted	the	informant,	it	would	fall	to	50%,	but	let's	say	it	settles	at	70%. There	is	no	violation	of	the	Uber-rule.	Your	epistemic	position	has changed	-	your	evidence	now	includes	the	red	experience	and the testimony.	And	it	is	compatible	with	this	story	that	the	recommendation of the	Uber-rule for someone	with this evidence is "Have 70% credence	that	there	is	a	red	object	in	front	of	you." No	paradox	so	far.	Perhaps	the	problem	is	that	you	can	doubt	the content	of	the	Uber-rule.	You	are	not	certain	that	the	Uber-rule	recommends	a	90%	credence	that	there	is	a	red	object	to	agents	with	just	a red	experience.	Similarly,	you	should	not	be	certain that	70% is the rational	credence	in	your	current	situation.	But	a	rational	agent	may doubt	the	Uber-rule	without	believing	that	the	beliefs	it	prescribes	are irrational.	The	possibility	that	your	credence	should	be	more	than	70% needs	to	perfectly balance	the	possibility	that	your	credence	should	be less	than	70%.46 46.	What	about	Titelbaum's	memorable	phrase	-	mistakes	about	rationality	are mistakes	of	rationality?	I	can	endorse	this	phrase	if	we	fill	it	out	as	follows: Titelbaum's-Principle-I-Accept:	For	any	given	agent	and	situation,	if	they	are mistaken	about	what	they	should	believe	in	their	situation,	then	they	are making	a	mistake	of	rationality. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) used	to	refer	to	either	of	these	properties.	(Compare:	There	is	nothing rational	about	an	ideal	gas.	The	assumption	of	the	idealness	of	a	gas	is analogous	to	the	assumption	of	the	probabilism	of	agents.49) In one sense, this type of revisability is stronger than	Quine allowed,	for	one	way	Quine	thinks	we	might	give	up	a	sentence	is	a	way that	we	would	naturally	describe	as	a	change	in	the	meaning	of	the sentence.	(Quine	denied	that	we	could	separate	meaning	change	from belief change, due to his rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction.)	Whereas	I	am	happy	to	talk	about	propositions	and	inclined	to hold that	no	proposition is immune from revision.	But there are related	Quinean	views	that	I	do	not	endorse. First,	I	do	not	reject	the	a	priori.	I	think	the	Principal	Principle	(and other	principles)	are	a	priori	yet	defeasible.	Some	philosophers	identify	the	a	priori	with	immunity	from	revision	-	so	I	reject	the	"a	priori" only	in	this	sense.50 Second, I do	not reject analyticity. Let an analytic sentence	be a sentence	that	one	can	be	in	a	position	to	justifiably	believe	in	virtue	of understanding	it.	This	allows	the	existence	of	defeaters	that	block	the justification.	One	can	reject	an	analytic	sentence	as	false	if	one	mistakenly	doubts	that	it	is	analytic.51	Imagine	being	told	that	'All	bachelors are	men' is false	by	a	misleading	but	eminent	source.	Or	being	told that	you	have	ingested	a	drug	that	generates	false	beliefs	about	which sentences	are	analytic.	It	might	be	rational	to	reject	the	sentence,	so even	analytic	sentences	are	not	immune	from	revision.52 49.	Hájek	2006. 50.	Casullo	(2003)	argues	that	there	is	no	experiential	indefeasibility	condition in	the	concept	of	a	priori	justification;	and	Summerfield	(1991)	and	Thurow (2006)	argue	that	a	priori	justification	is	defeasible	by	experience. 51. Alternatively, perhaps analytic sentences can	be rejected in the sense that they	are	believed	to	fail	to	usefully	apply	to	the	world.	For	example,	one	can reject	the	sentence	'Ether	conducts	heat'	on	the	grounds	that	there	is	no	ether. Eklund	(2017	p.	89)	holds	that	analytic	sentences	can	be	false. 52.	Williamson	(2007)	writes	that	"the	central	idea	behind	epistemological	conceptions	of	analyticity is that, in	such	cases, failure to	assent is	not	merely good	evidence	of	failure	to	understand;	it	is	constitutive	of	such	failure"	(p. 73).	I	reject	the	analytic	in	this	sense. generalizations.	So	this	version	of	particularism	is	not	devastating	for normative	theorizing. This	completes	my	defence	of	the	Uber-rule.	In	the	next	section,	I will	connect	the	resulting	position	to	broader	issues	regarding	defeasibility	and	the	a	priori. 9. Against Certainty I	argued	in	the	previous	section	that	even	the	Uber-rule	can	be	rationally	doubted.	This	supports	a	view	associated	with	Quine	-	that	no statement is immune from revision.	Epistemic rules are good candidates	for	statements	that	are	immune	from	revision,	so	by	arguing	that they	are	not	immune	from	revision,	the	general	case	that	no	statement is	immune	from	revision	is	supported. Still,	I	have	only	discussed	narrow-scope	rules	connecting	descriptive	with	normative statements.	My	position	does	not entail that	no statement	is	immune	from	revision.	For	example,	one	might	still	hold that	rational	agents	are	certain	of	tautologies. Nevertheless,	I	think	rational	doubt	can	be	raised	even	about	tautologies, and for similar reasons. For example, suppose a heavenly voice	tells	you	that	p-and-not-p,	or	tells	you	that	your	credences	should sum	to	0.8.	Baffling	situations	for	sure,	but	they	seem	to	provide	some reason	to	doubt	tautologies.48 This	is	a	challenge	to	Bayesianism,	which	models	agents	as	probabilistic,	and	so	requires	that	agents	are	certain	of	tautologies.	I	think the Bayesian should respond that their models, like most models, make	idealizations	-	that	is,	they	make	assumptions	that	are	known to	be	false	in	order	to	make	the	model	easier	to	work	with.	Probabilism is	such	an	assumption.	So	probabilistic	agents	in	Bayesian	models	are idealized;	but	they	are	not	necessarily	ideal,	in	the	sense	of	being	perfectly	rational.	We	have	unfortunate	terminology	where	'ideal'	can	be 48. See	Williams	(forthcoming)	for	a	defence	of	"rational	illogicality";	Schechter (2013)	offers	related	arguments	against	being	certain.	At	odds	with	this	is	the literature	based	on	McFetridge	(1990)	(e.g.	Hale	2002,	Ahmed	2000,	Leech 2015),	which	seems	to	assume	that	there	must	be	some	rules	which	are	immune	to	doubt. darren	bradley Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules? philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	19,	no.	3	(january	2019) –––	(2011). Disagreement,	Question-Begging,	and	Epistemic	Self-Criticism.	Philosophers' Imprint 11	(6):1–22. –––	(2013).	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