Civil	War	and	Revolution1 Please	note:	This	is	a	prepublication	draft	of	a	paper	forthcoming	in	The Oxford	Handbook	of	Ethics	and	War,	edited	by	Seth	Lazar	and	Helen	Frowe. Please	cite	published	version	at: http://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199943 418.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199943418-e-22?rskey=tCIguS&result=1 Abstract:	The	vast	majority	of	work	on the	ethics	of	war focuses	on traditional wars	between	states.	In	this	chapter,	I	aim	to	show	that	this	is	an	oversight	worth rectifying. My strategy will be largely comparative, assessing whether certain claims	often	defended	in	discussions	of	interstate	wars	stand	up	in	the	context	of civil conflicts, and	whether there	are	principled	moral	differences	between the two	types	of	case.	Firstly,	I	argue	that	thinking	about	intrastate	wars	can	help	us make progress on important theoretical debates in recent just war theory. Secondly, I consider	whether certain kinds of civil	wars are subject to a	more demanding standard of just cause, compared to interstate wars of nationaldefence. Finally, I assess the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war, and whether this renders insurgencies	harder	to	justify	than	wars	fought	by	functioning	states. Keywords:	Civil	War;	Revolution;	Insurgencies;	Cecile	Fabre;	Consent 1.	Introduction It is often claimed that war just isn't like it used to be.2	Most strikingly, the majority	of	armed	conflicts	now	occur	within the	borders	of	states,	rather than across	international	borders	(or	combine	the	two).	According	to	one	study,	of	the 118 armed conflicts that have occurred between 1989 and 2004, only 7	were interstate	wars.3	More	anecdotally,	at	the	time	of	writing	a	horrific	civil	war	has raged in	Syria for	over three	years,	Ukraine teeters	on the	brink	of	descending into	internecine	conflict,	and	the	fledgling	Iraqi	state	is	facing	violent	opposition from	powerful	sub-state	actors.	In	short,	intrastate	conflict	is	now	very	much	the norm	rather	than	the	exception. Interestingly, given these facts, there have been remarkably few sustained treatments	of	civil	war	within the	recent	resurgence in interest in the	ethics	of 1	Thanks	to	Cecile	Fabre,	Henry	Shue,	Cheyney	Ryan,	Janina	Dill,	Michael	Gibb,	and	Bernard	Koch for	stimulating	discussion	of	a	very	early	draft,	and	to	Seth	Lazar	and	Helen	Frowe	for	detailed and	extremely	helpful	comments. 2	For	an influential example, see	Mary	Kaldor,	New	and	Old	Wars:	Organised	Violence	in	a	Global Era,	2nd	Edition,	(Cambridge: Polity	Press,	2007 3	Lotta	Harbom	and	Peter	Wallensteen,	'Armed	Conflict	and	its	International	Dimensions',	Journal of	Peace	Research	42,	No.5	(2005),	623-635. 2 war.	4	Most	discussions	remained	focused	on	traditional	wars	between	states.5	In this	chapter,	I	aim	to	show	that	this	is	an	oversight	worth	rectifying.	My	strategy will	be	largely	comparative,	assessing	whether	certain	claims	often	defended	in discussions of interstate wars stand up in the context of civil conflicts, and whether	there	are	principled	moral	differences	between	the	two	types	of	case.	In Section	2,	I	argue	that	thinking	about	intrastate	wars	can	help	us	make	progress on an important theoretical debate in recent just war theory. In Section 3, I consider	whether certain kinds of civil	wars are subject to a	more demanding standard	of	just	cause,	compared	to	interstate	wars	of	national-defence.	Finally, in Section 4, I assess the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war, and whether this renders insurgencies	harder	to	justify	than	wars	fought	by	functioning	states. In order to provide a frame for our inquiry, I will, following Cecile Fabre, understand	civil	wars to	be	armed	conflicts that: are fought	between	sub-state groups and their own government, or among non-state factions within a community;	are	fought	over	political	goals;	involve	a	level	of	violence	that	passes a	threshold	of	severity;	in	which	each	belligerent	party	has	the	ability	to	impose significant	casualties	on	the	other.6 2.	The	Theoretical	Significance	of	Non-Traditional	Conflicts While	the	majority	of	my	discussion	will	concern	the	substantive	permissibility of resorting to civil	war, I begin by discussing how the issue of intrastate	war bears upon a central debate in contemporary just war theory at a more theoretical	level.7 2.1	Two	Approaches	to	the	Morality	of	War A	key	fault	line	within	current	discussions	concerns	how	we	should	understand the	relationship	between	the	moral	principles	that	govern	warfare	and	those	that 4	As	William	V.	O'Brien	observed	over thirty	years	ago, "Logically, there	should	be	an	elaborate jus	ad	bellum	and	jus	in	bello	for	revolutionary	war,	but	development	of	such	a	doctrine	has	never been seriously attempted."	William	V.	O'Brien,	The	Conduct	of	Just	and	Limited	War	(New	York: Praeger,	1981),	p.23. 5	Though the tide does seem to be turning. See, Ned Dobos, Insurrection	and	Intervention:	The Two Faces of Sovereignty (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan	War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012),	Ch.4;	Christopher	Finlay,	'Legitimacy and	Non-State	Political	Violence',	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy,	18,	No.3	(2010),	287-312;	Allen Buchanan, 'The Ethics of Revolution and Its Implications for the Ethics of Intervention', Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs 41, No.4 (2013), 292-323; Mattias Iser, 'Beyond the Paradigm of Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence',	in	Saba	Bazargan	and	Sam	Rickless	(eds),	The	Ethics	of War (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press, forthcoming). In	addition, two	monographs	on	this topic are forthcoming: Christopher Finlay, Terrorism and the Right to Resist: A Theory of Just Revolutionary War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Michael Gross, The Ethics of Insurgency:	A	Critical	Guide	to	Just	Guerrilla	Warfare	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press). 6	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.135. 7	The following section draws on Jonathan Parry, 'Just	War Theory, Legitimate Authority, and Irregular	Belligerency',	Philosophia	(forthcoming). 3 apply	to	'ordinary'	acts	of	violence	carried	out	in	non-military	contexts.	Positions on	this	question	can	be	divided	into	two	broad	camps. A reductivist approach treats warfare as	morally continuous	with all other activities,	its	permissibility	determined	solely	by	familiar	justifications	for	killing and	injuring	that	we	accept	in	all	other	circumstances.	8	On	this	view,	for	any	act of justified killing in war, there are justified killings outside of war that are justified on	precisely the same grounds. In terms	of identifying these grounds, reductivists	standardly	hold	that intentional	killing in	war is	primarily justified in terms	of individuals' rights of selfand	other-defence,	with collateral killing justified	by	considerations	of	lesser-evil.	Justified	war	is	simply	an	aggregation	of violent	acts,	each	of	which	is	justified	in	one	of	these	two	ways. In opposition, exceptionalist approaches deny that the morality of war is exhausted	by	ordinary	interpersonal	morality.	In	conditions	of	war,	the	standard moral principles governing harming are either replaced or (more plausibly) supplemented	by	additional	moral	considerations.	On	this	view,	for	at	least	some acts	of justified	killing in	war, there	are	no justified	killings	outside	of	war	that are justified	on	the	same	grounds.	An	exceptionalist	view	is	often	motivated	by arguing	that	there	are	classes	of	killing	in	war	that	are	intuitively	permissible	or impermissible,	but	which	cannot	be	justified	or	prohibited	solely	by	appealing	to individuals' defensive rights or to standard lesser-evil justifications.9	If these judgements	are	to	be	vindicated,	we	must	identify	additional	moral	properties	in war capable of generating additional permissions to kill, or restrictions on killing, beyond those identified by reductivists. What differentiates exceptionalists	is	the	particular	properties	that	they	identify	as	playing	this	role. Here	I	outline	four	prominent	versions,	which	need	not	be	exclusive.10 2.2	Varieties	of	Exceptionalism One important strand of exceptionalism locates the relevant properties in features of the belligerent groups participating in an armed conflict. On a collectivist	version	of	this	view,	reductivism	is	incomplete	because	it	ignores	the fact	that	war	is	something	that	individuals	do	together	as	co-members	in	morally important kinds of association. More specifically, the claim is that the relationships between co-members in certain kinds of group are capable of altering the	moral status of acts of violence carried out by	members.11	On one interpretation of this view, these relationships generate additional moral 8	For	book	length	reductivist	treatments	of	war,	see	Jeff	McMahan,	Killing	in	War	(Oxford:	Oxford University	Press,	2009);	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War;	Helen	Frowe,	Defensive	Killing	(Oxford:	Oxford University	Press,	2014). 9	For	both	sides	of	the	objection,	see	Seth	Lazar,	'The	Responsibility	Dilemma	for	Killing	in	War:	A Review	Essay',	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	38,	No.2	(2010),	180-213. 10	For	a	more	detailed	discussion,	see	Seth	Lazar's	chapter	in	this	handbook. 11	See, for example, Christopher Kutz, 'The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal	Law	and	War',	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	33,	No.2	(2005),	148-180;	George	Fletcher, Romantics	at	War:	Glory	and	Guilt	in	the	Age	of	Terrorism,	(Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press, 2002). 4 reasons for or against killing in war, which defeat whatever reasons would otherwise determine their permissibility. On another, the relevant deontic alterations follow from the different ways in which participants in collective actions	bear	responsibility	for	their	actions,	compared	to	private	actors. A different version of group-based exceptionalism focuses on the idea that the	leaders	or	governing	institutions	of	certain	organisations	possess	legitimate authority over their	members. This authority consists in the	moral power to issue	commands	and,	by	doing	so,	place	the	subjects	of those	commands	under obligations	to	act	as	directed.12	Authority-based	exceptionalism	holds	that,	under certain conditions, individuals may be all-things-considered required to obey commands	to	cause	(or	refrain	from	causing)	harm	in	war.	Importantly,	this	may include cases	where harming	would be impermissible (or permissible) on the basis	of	the	command-independent	reasons.13	Authoritative	commands	may	thus provide	an	independent	source	of	permissions	and	constraints. An	alternative	strand	of	exceptionalism	emphasises	the	fact	that	warfare	is	a highly structured and convention-bound	practice. The central claim is that the existence of conventional norms makes an important difference to the moral permissibility of killing in war, compared to killing in the absence of these conventions. This view is	most at home	within a broader contractualist	moral theory, according to which the	moral status of (at least some) actions are (at least partly) the product of agreement, either actual or idealised, among a relevant class of contractors. For contractualist exceptionalists the moral permissibility of certain actions in war is determined by whether a norm permitting or prohibiting those actions would be accepted as binding by belligerents.	For	example,	on	Yitzhak	Benbaji's	development	of	this	view,	a	class of	killing	in	war	is	morally	permissible	if	it	is	sanctioned	by	a	convention	that	is (i) mutually advantageous to opposing parties, (ii) fair, and (iii) accepted (at least	tacitly)	by	participants.14	This	may	include	killings	that	would	be	prohibited by	pre-contractual	moral	principles. A	different	convention-based	view	does	not	ground	exceptional	norms	in	the transformative	power	of	agreement,	but	instead	in	the	moral	importance	of	the outcomes promoted by conventions containing those norms, such as reducing 12	For	useful introductions,	see Joseph	Raz, 'Introduction' in Joseph	Raz	(ed),	Authority	(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 1-19; Scott Shapiro, 'Authority' in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University	Press,	2002),	382-439. 13	For	discussion,	see	David	Estlund 'On	Following	Orders in	an	Unjust	War', Journal	of	Political Philosophy	15, No.2 (2007), 213-234; Jonathan Parry 'Authority and Harm' (unpublished	ms); Massimo	Renzo, 'Democratic	Authority	and	the	Duty	to	Fight in	Unjust	Wars',	Analysis	73,	No.4, (2013), 668-676; Massimo Renzo, 'Duties of Citizenship and Just War' (unpublished ms); Cheyney	Ryan, 'Democratic	Duty	and the	Moral	Dilemmas	of	Soldiers',	Ethics	122,	No.1 (2011), 10-42. 14	Yitzhak	Benbaji,	'The	Moral	Power	of	Soldiers	to	Undertake	the	Duty	of	Obedience',	Ethics	122, no.	1 (2011),	43-73; 'The	War	Convention	and the	Moral	Division	of	Labour',	The	Philosophical Quarterly	59,	No.237	(2009),	593-617. 5 suffering in war. This view which I term pragmatic humanitarian exceptionalism	is	typically	motivated	by	the	thought	that	norms	for	war	must be implementable and action-guiding in real-world scenarios. Since (by hypothesis)	combatants	will	be	unable	or	unwilling	to	act	in	accordance	with	the moral	principles	identified	by	reductivists,	and	institutionalising	these	principles in	law	would	be	counter-productive,	they	are	practically	irrelevant.	Instead,	war ethicists should be concerned with identifying rules for war whose implementation would do as much good as realistically possible, taking the abilities	and	motivations	of	actual	participants	in	war	into	account.15 2.3	The	Relevance	of	Non-Traditional	Conflicts We can begin to appreciate how intrastate conflicts bear on the reductivist/exceptionalist	debate	by	noting	a	key	difference	between	these	two approaches. Whereas reductivism is universal in scope, evaluating all acts of killing and injuring in terms of two invariant principles, exceptionalist approaches	are	necessarily	scope-restricted.	On	these	views,	the	moral	status	of (at	least	some)	acts	of	killing	depends	on	whether	those	acts	take	place	within	a conflict that has the particular properties that exceptionalists identify as generating additional	moral permissions and/or restrictions.	16	For example, it may	depend	on	whether	the	conflict	it	is	fought	by	certain	kinds	of	collective	or political	authority,	or	whether	it	falls	within	the	scope	of	a	binding	agreement	or pragmatically	justified	convention. With	this	in	mind,	the	key	feature	of	modern	conflict	I	want	to	emphasise	is its sheer diversity. In particular, compared to the traditional Westphalian paradigm	of	warfare	between	sovereign	states,	today's	conflicts	are	fought	by	a wide range of 'irregular' belligerents. This diversity poses three related challenges for exceptionalist views, though the extent to	which each bites	will depend on the particular form of exceptionalism under consideration. By contrast,	none	of	these	challenges	arises	for	reductivism	given	its	universality. The	first	holds	that	exceptionalism,	even	if	correct in	principle, fails	to	have much practical significance, because the relevant exceptionalist properties are far less likely	to	obtain in irregular	conflicts	than	in	traditional interstate	wars. Given	the	infrequency	of	interstate	wars,	exceptionalist	approaches	will	not	offer much guidance in the majority of real-life conflicts. This objection is perhaps most clear in the case of contractualist exceptionalism, which almost always takes	states	(or	perhaps	only 'decent'	states17)	to	be	the	relevant	parties	to	the agreement.	Hence,	in	conflicts	in	which	at	least	one	party	is	not	a	(decent)	state, exceptional norms will not arise. But a similar point can be made, mutatis 15	See,	for	example,	Henry	Shue,	'Do	We	Need	a	'Morality	of	War'?'	in	David	Rodin	and	Henry	Shue (eds),	Just	and	Unjust	Warriors:	The	Moral	and	Legal	Status	of	Soldiers'	(Oxford:	Oxford	University Press,	2008),	87-111. 16	Thanks	to	Seth	Lazar	for	helping	me	formulate	this	thought	more	clearly. 17	Benbaji,	'The	Moral	Power	of	Soldiers	to	Undertake	the	Duty	of	Obedience',	p.	45. 6 mutandis,	against	group-based	versions	of	exceptionalism.	Since	it	is	no	easy	task to show that even functioning states possess the kind of collective agency or political	authority required to	bring	exceptionalist	norms into	play,	we	may	be sceptical	that	more	loosely	structured	sub-state	groups	will	be	able	to	do	so. A	second	challenge	begins	by	noting	an	important	adequacy	requirement	for exceptionalist approaches: If one holds that the permissibility of harming depends	on	whether	it	takes	place	within	a	conflict	that	has	specific	properties, then one	must be able to draw a clear boundary between the conflicts which exhibit those properties and those which do not. Call this the demarcation requirement. 18 Without demarcation, exceptionalism will assign an indeterminate	moral	status	to	many	acts	of	harming	being	neither	permissible nor	impermissible	which	is	a	serious	defect	in	any	normative	theory.	Given	this, a potential challenge for exceptionalism (and group-based exceptionalism in particular)	is	that	modern	wars	hugely	complicate	the	task	of	demarcation.	In	a world in	which the	de	facto	ability to employ large-scale organised violence is restricted	to	clearly	identifiable	state-actors,	demarcation	may	appear	relatively straightforward. But this is not our	world. Instead, the empirical	messiness of contemporary conflicts presents a spectrum of cases ranging from regular interstate	wars down to	mere large-scale banditry that exhibit exceptionalist properties to greater and lesser degrees. To satisfy the demarcation requirement, exceptionalists must venture into the untidy range of cases between these two	poles	and	provide	non-arbitrary	criteria	which	both	clearly identify	the	relevant	thresholds	at	which	exceptionalist	norms	are	activated,	and do so	without generating unintuitive results in particular cases (more on this below).	This	is	a	pretty	demanding	task. A third challenge questions whether exceptionalism can make good on its promise to vindicate certain intuitive judgements about the permissibility of killing	in	war,	when	applied	to	non-traditional	conflicts.	These	cases	may	reveal	a lack of alignment between our judgements and the properties that exceptionalists	invoke	to	explain	them.	More	specifically,	irregular	conflicts	may provide cases in which (i) the intuitive judgements persist, but the putative explanatory properties are absent, or (ii) the properties remain, but our judgements of permissibility shift dramatically. Such counter-examples would suggest that the exceptionalist has either failed to identify the relevant properties	that	explain	the	judgements,	or	that	the	original	judgements	ought	to be	jettisoned,	in	which	case	the	appeal	to	exceptionalism	lacks	motivation. For example, contractualist exceptionalism is often invoked to support the intuition that combatants are permitted to kill their armed opponents in	war, independently of whether their wars are just or unjust. However, if this 18	For a discussion of demarcation in the context of the laws of war, see David Luban, 'War Crimes: The Laws of Hell' in Larry May (ed),	War: Essays in Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge	University	Press,	2008),	266-288. 7 permission	is	grounded	in	a	contract	between	states,	then	presumably	it	will	not apply	to	soldiers	who	fight in	unjust	wars	against	non-state	belligerents.	These individuals	therefore	commit	serious	moral	wrongs	by	fighting.	But	I	doubt	that defenders	of	the	equal	permission	think	that	its	scope	is	restricted	in	this	way.	If so,	we	will	have	cases in	which	the	target judgement	persists in	the	absence	of the	putative	explanatory	properties.	A	similar	problem	emerges	if	one	takes	the prohibition on targeting non-combatants to be grounded in contractual considerations,	even	if	the	class	of	contractors	is	somehow	broadened	to	include non-state	parties.	For	it	is	unlikely	that	a	contract	prohibiting	these	tactics	would satisfy the mutual advantage, fairness and actual acceptance conditions in conflicts involving militarily weak sub-state actors, who may be significantly disadvantaged	by	the	ban.19	If	we	think	that	the	prohibition	still	holds	strong	in these	cases,	it	is	not	clear	that	contractualism	can	account	for	our	judgements. Collectivist versions of exceptionalism	may also be susceptible to counterexamples. Again, one application of this view is that it helps support common views	about	killing	in	war	that	are	difficult	to	subsume	within	ordinary	morality, such	as	the	permission	to	fight	in	wars	that	lack	a	just	cause.	But,	as	David	Rodin has pointed out, appealing to the moral significance of collective action risks extending	the	scope	of	these	permissions	to	conflicts	in	which	they	intuitively	do not apply, since "Football violence, warring criminal gangs, mafia vendettas, family feuds,	and	most forms	of	ethnic	and	racially	motivated	violence	are	also mediated through group relations."20	To avoid this implication, the relevant collectivist properties need to be refined. One plausible response restricts exceptional permissions to political belligerent collectives, defined as groups "engaged in violence in support of political goals, in the sense of aiming at creating	(or	restoring)	a	new	collective	ordering"21.	This	certainly	excludes	many groups, but it still seems controversially inclusive. For example, ISIS surely counts as a political collective on this conception, but I think most just war theorists would be reluctant to attribute any special permissions to ISIS combatants, even if, counter-factually, they restricted their attacks to military targets.22	However,	once	we	start tightening	up the collectivist conditions	even further	it	is	hard	to	see	how	we	can	avoid	excluding	many	states	from	the	scope of exceptionalist permissions. For example, one obvious way of excluding organisations	like	ISIS	is	to	appeal	to	the	moral	undesirability	of	the	group's	aim. However, once we employ such a moralised conception of what counts as a 19	Benbaji	comes	close	to	conceding	this,	but	attempts	to	show,	on	empirical	grounds,	that	weak parties would consent to a revised version of the prohibition. Yitzhak Benbaji, 'Justice in Asymmetric Wars: A Contractarian Analysis', Law	and	Ethics of	Human	Rights 6, No.2 (2012), 172-200.	For further	discussion	of the	moral force	of	agreements in the	context	of	asymmetric wars,	see	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	Ch.7. 20	David	Rodin,	'The	Moral	Inequality	of	Combatants:	Why	jus	in	bello	Asymmetry	is	Half-Right'	in Rodin	and	Shue	(eds),	Just	and	Unjust	Warriors,	44-68	at	p.65. 21	Kutz,	'The	Difference	Uniforms	Make',	p.176. 22	On	this	point,	see	Robert	E.	Goodin,	What's	Wrong	With	Terrorism?	(Malden,	MA:	Polity	Press, 2006),	Ch.1. 8 political collective, then it looks like states fighting unjust wars will also be excluded.23	Non-traditional	conflicts	thus	provide	a	rich	source	of	tricky	cases	in which	to	test	our	intuitions,	which	in	turn	impose	additional	constraints	on	the task	of	demarcation	outlined	above. Pragmatic humanitarianism may also have rather revisionary implications when	extended	beyond	core	cases	of	interstate	conflict.	This	is	surprising,	since the	view	is	typically	deployed	in	support	of	certain	legal	orthodoxies,	such	as	the equal impunity granted to all combatants in war provided they attack only military	targets.	The	claimed	justification	for	this	neutrality	is	that	it	incentivises restraint, thereby	reducing	the	suffering	that	war	causes.	However,	consistency would seem to	demand that the same	pragmatic rationale for determining the content	of	rules	for	conduct	in	war	should	also	determine	their	scope.	If	a	set	of rules is justified in virtue of the valuable outcomes their implementation promotes,	then	we	should	recommend	their	application	to	any	conflict	in	which doing	so	has	a	sufficiently	good	chance	of	achieving	this	result.	To	demonstrate, consider	a	non-traditional	conflict	such	as	the	Mexican	drug	'wars',	which	cause huge amounts of suffering, especially to civilians. Furthermore, imagine that it were	possible	to	impose	a	neutral	system	of	rules	on	this	conflict,	which	granted equal	impunity	to	state	soldiers	and	to	armed	cartel	members,	and	that	doing	so would significantly reduce harm to civilians. Under these conditions, practical humanitarianism should recommend doing so.24	If we find this intuitively unacceptable, or at least troubling, this casts doubt on whether practical humanitarianism	successfully	justifies	these	practices	in	the	standard,	interstate cases.25 The challenges sketched above clearly do not suffice to settle the reductivism/exceptionalism debate. As mentioned, much will depend on the particular	brand	of	exceptionalism	and	the	specific	substantive	judgements	that it is invoked	to	support.	But I	hope	to	have	shown	that thinking	about	cases	of non-traditional conflict provides a useful standpoint from which to make progress	on	this	issue. 3.	Insurgencies,	Interstate	Wars,	and	Just	Cause I now turn to the	moral justification of resorting to civil	war, focussing on an important	sub-set	of	these	cases, in	which	members	of	a	sub-state	group	resort to war against their own state. Term these insurgencies. This include cases of 23	Rodin,	'The	Moral	Inequality	of	Combatants'. 24	For an argument that elements of the laws of war should be extended to this conflict, see Carina Bergal, 'The Mexican Drug War: The Case for a Non-international Armed Conflict Classification',	Fordham	International	Law	Journal	34	(2011),	1042-1088. 25	For a	more detailed version of this objection, see	Kutz, 'The	Difference	Uniforms	Make'. For further	discussion,	see	Finlay,	'Legitimacy	and	Non-State	Political	Violence'.	David	Rodin	pursues a	structurally	similar	line	of	objection	regarding	the	content	of	pragmatic	humanitarian	norms,	as opposed	to	their	scope.	David	Rodin,	'The	Morality	and	Law	of	War',	in	Huw	Strachan	and	Sibylle Scheipers (eds),	The	Changing	Character	of	War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 446463. 9 revolution (in	which insurgents aim to replace the government of their state), secession	(in	which	insurgents	aim	to	annex	and	govern	a	portion	of	their	state's territory, leaving the state's sovereignty over the remainder of its territory unchallenged), and rebellion (in which insurgents aim to force specific policy changes or concessions, without challenging the regime's general claim to govern.) Despite several prominent figures in the history of political philosophy denying that violently opposing the state is ever permitted – Kant most notoriously	–	few,	if	any,	contemporary	theorists	accept	this	extreme	view.	While it is uncontroversial that insurgencies could be justified under certain circumstances, the	specific	question	I	will	consider is	whether insurgencies	are subject	to	a	different	justificatory	burden	at	the	bar	of	jus	ad	bellum,	compared	to traditional	interstate	wars	of	national-defence. There	are	several	fairly	obvious	respects	in	which	insurgents	may	be	morally disadvantaged.	Firstly, sub-state actors typically lack the	military and	material resources that states possess, and so may find it more difficult to satisfy the requirement that	war	have	a reasonable	chance	of success.	However, the	mere fact that insurgents cannot achieve their aims by conventional	military	means does	not licence the conclusion that they fail the success condition, since	nonconventional	warfare	could	still	be	effective. This reveals a second possible justificatory asymmetry, since nonconventional methods may be additionally morally objectionable, even if effective. For example, in certain cases effectively waging an insurgency may require intentionally targeting	non-combatants,	either to	weaken	the	enemy	or to	coerce	support	for	the	insurgents.	26	Assuming	that	attacking	non-combatants is particularly difficult to justify, wars that require such methods inherit this additional	justificatory	burden. Thirdly, insurgencies may be more difficult to justify in terms of the requirement that	war	be the last resort, since sub-state	groups	may	be	able to press their claims by legal means, or by non-violent resistance.27	This is particularly likely to be true within broadly liberal-democratic societies.28	By contrast,	these	options	may	not	be	available	for	states	facing	outside	aggression. However, this cuts both ways, since sub-state groups often lack access to international	arbitration	procedures	that	are	available	to	states.29 Fourthly, the fact that	sub-state	groups	generally	have	fewer	members	than states	is	not	only	relevant	to	their	ability	to	satisfy	the	success	condition,	but	also to	whether	insurgencies	fought	on	their	behalf	are	proportionate.	This	is	because 26	For detailed discussion of the latter, see Buchanan, 'The Ethics of Revolution and its Implications	for	the	Ethics	of	Intervention'. 27	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.150. 28	Jeff McMahan criticises Palestinian terrorist attacks for this reason (among others). Jeff McMahan,	'Just	Cause	for	War',	Ethics	and	International	Affairs	19,	No.3	(2005),	1-21	at	p.12. 29	On this point, see Anna Moltchanova, 'Stateless National Groups, International Justice and Asymmetric	Warfare',	Journal	of	Political	Philosophy	13,	No.2	(2005),	194-215. 10 the	amount	of	collateral	harm	that	it	is	permissible	to	cause	in	pursuit	of	a	waraim is sensitive to the number of individuals who will benefit from its achievement. Holding the amount of collateral harm constant, the smaller the group	contemplating	resorting	to	insurgency,	the	harder	it	will	be	to	satisfy	the proportionality	criterion.30 However, while practically important, the foregoing asymmetries are of limited philosophical interest, since they can be viewed as simply tracking contingent differences in the non-normative facts, rather than any deep	moral distinction between the two types of conflict. By contrast, as Cecile Fabre has emphasised, two factors are genuinely distinctive about insurgencies: They involve	the	use	of	organised	violence	(i)	by	non-state	actors	(ii)	against	their	own state and its officials.31	Our topic, then, is whether the political status of the insurgents,	and	the	special	relationship	between	them	and	their	state,	can	ground a	deeper	justificatory	asymmetry	between	insurgencies	and	interstate	conflicts.	I return	to	political	status	in	the	next	section.	Here	I	discuss	the	moral	significance of	insurgents'	relationship	to	their	state. One	natural	way	of	appealing	to	the	special	relationship	between	insurgents and	their	states	concerns	the	requirement	of	just	cause.	More	precisely,	it	may	be argued that this relationship affects the threshold of severity at which rights violations become candidates for remedy by military means. Perhaps the relationship places an additional constraint on resorting to war against one's own	state, thereby	raising	the	threshold	of injustice	required	to	generate	a just cause for insurgency, compared to a war against outside aggressors.32	On this view,	there	is	a	restrictive	asymmetry	between	insurgencies	and	interstate	wars. This line	of	argument	has	recently	been forcefully	opposed	by	Cecile	Fabre. For Fabre, the fact that belligerents in civil wars stand in a state-subject relationship is irrelevant to	whether	or	not the insurgents	possess	a just	cause for	war,	and	so	"what	counts	as	a	just	cause	for	an	interstate	war	also	counts	as	a just cause for	a civil	war, and	vice	versa."33	Term this the	equivalence	thesis.	An important	part	of assessing the comparative	permissibility	of insurgencies	will thus	depend	on	the	truth	of	the	equivalence	thesis.	In	what	follows	I	set	out	three possible	challenges. 3.1	National	Partiality 30	Some	have	found	it	unintuitive	that	whether	a	political	community	may	resort	to	war	depends on the size of its population (for example, Seth Lazar, 'National	Defence, Self-Defence, and the Problem	of	Political	Aggression', in	Cecile	Fabre	and	Seth	Lazar (eds),	The	Morality	of	Defensive War	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014),	11-39	at	p.33).	However, it	seems	to	me	far	more implausible	to	claim	that	the	numbers	don't	matter. 31	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	Ch.4. 32	It is	worth	pointing	out that	potential just causes for insurgency	need	not involve the target state	violating	the	rights	of	its	own	citizens.	Injustices	committed	by	a	state	against	non-members could	also	generate	a	just	cause	for	insurgency,	even	if	it	is	internally	benevolent. 33	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.165. 11 The first,	which forms	Fabre's	main target in	defending the	equivalence thesis, appeals	to	our	having	special	obligations	towards	co-nationals	in	order	to	justify a restrictive asymmetry. On this view, considerations of partiality impose a higher threshold of injustice in order to justify resorting to war against one's own	state,	compared	to	external	aggressors,	since	doing	so	requires	killing	and injuring	one's	co-nationals. However,	the	normative	claim	underpinning	this	view	is	more	controversial than	one	might	think.	Firstly,	one	cannot	simply	appeal	to	the	widely	shared	anticosmopolitan intuition that partiality to co-nationals is	permissible in order to show that co-nationality makes insurgencies harder to justify. For this is compatible	with	the	permissibility	of	weighing	the	interests	of	co-nationals	and outsiders equally. Instead, it must be claimed, more strongly, that partiality towards co-nationals is obligatory. Secondly, it is questionable whether these obligations	are	able	to	do	the	moral	work	required.	For	example,	the	view	seems to	imply	that	if	a	gang	of	thugs	threaten	to	inflict	a	certain	level	of	harm	on	me, the	amount	of	harm	it	is	permissible	for	me	to	cause	in	self-defence	(either	to	the attackers	or to	bystanders)	depends	on	whether I am	attacked	by co-nationals within my home territory, or by foreigners while aboard. This seems highly counter-intuitive. Furthermore,	even	if	defensible,	the	normative	claim	may	not	in	fact	support the	desired	conclusion.	For	when	a	community	has fissured	to the	point	where civil	war is a genuine possibility, often along ethnic or cultural lines, it seems doubtful that there exist particularly strong bonds of co-nationality between members of the belligerent groups capable of grounding special obligations. Hence,	it	is	unclear	that	the	distinction	between	those	to	whom	we	have	special obligations and those to whom we do not will reliably track the distinction between	those	we	must	kill in	order	to	wage	an	insurgency	and	those	we	must kill	in	order	to	resist	external	aggression. 3.2	The	Obligation	to	Obey A	different argument in	defence	of a restrictive	asymmetry focuses on the fact that	states	claim	a	right	to	rule,	correlated	with	an	obligation	to	obey	on	the	part of their subjects. The central idea is that these political obligations impose an additional	constraint	on	waging	war	against	one's	own	state.	Given	this,	a	greater injustice is required in order to generate a just cause for insurgencies, since these	obligations	must	be	overridden. However, the	defender	of the	equivalence thesis is	unlikely to	be	moved	by this.	Modern consensus	holds that states	have legitimate authority in virtue of serving	or	benefitting	their	subjects	in	some	relevant	respect.	When	a	state	fails to	carry	out	its	legitimating	functions,	it	forfeits	its	right	to	rule,	thus	relieving	its subjects of any obligation to obey. If we understand a just cause for war as consisting, roughly, in threatened rights violations of sufficient gravity to warrant	remedy	by	large-scale	lethal	force,	then	it	seems	uncontroversial	that	if 12 a	state	is	committing	wrongs	of	this	magnitude	against	its	own	citizens, it	must thereby have forfeited its authority. In other words, if a rights violation is of sufficient	seriousness	to	warrant	remedy	by	means	of	war	when	imposed	by	an external	aggressor,	then	it	is	also	of	sufficient	seriousness	to	void	a	state's	right to	rule.34	Hence,	political	obligations	cannot	constrain	just	causes	for	insurgency. Interestingly, however, the conjunction of two common views regarding, respectively, the limits of political authority and the permissibility of national defence	casts	some	doubt	on	the	obviousness	of	this	claim.	Firstly,	it	is	generally accepted that states don't have to be maximally just or infallible in order to successfully perform their legitimating functions. States	may retain a right to rule	while still committing 'tolerable' injustices.35	Secondly, common intuitions about	permissible	national	defence	suggest	that	the	threshold	at	which	injustices generate	a	just	cause	for	war	is	considerably	lower	than	that	of	serious	violations of basic human rights, such as genocide and severe oppression. For example, many	believe that it is permissible to	wage	war against 'bloodless aggressors', who aim to violate only 'lesser' rights, such as those to political selfdetermination,	territory,	property,	or	certain	social	and	political	goods.36 The equivalence view is most plausible if we set a high threshold for just causes	for	war,	in	terms	of	grievous	breaches	of	human	rights.	It	is	very	doubtful that a state could commit such wrongs against its citizens while retaining its legitimacy.37	However, the lower we set the just cause threshold, in line with common views about bloodless aggression, the weaker the equivalence thesis becomes. For if wars are permissible in defence of comparatively minor interests, then it is not obviously implausible that states could retain their authority	while	committing	injustices	comparable	to	bloodless	aggression.	If	so, political obligations could potentially constrain just causes, thus supporting a restrictive	asymmetry	between	insurgencies	and	interstate	wars. Of	course,	this	brief	argument	does	not	suffice	to	show	that	the	equivalence thesis is	mistaken. It	remains	open	to	a	defender	of	the	thesis	to	argue	that	we reject one	of the two	views	with	which is in tension.	Most	plausibly, they	may argue	that	we	should	jettison	intuitions	about	permissible	national-defence	and instead adopt a higher just cause threshold. In fact, one	may invoke intuitions about the permissibility of insurgency directly in support of doing so. A quick glance around the world reveals a fairly large number of non-state groups suffering	what	may	be	called	'bloodless	injustice'	at	the	hands	of	their	state,	such as	a	frustration	of	rights	to	political	self-determination.	But	I	doubt	that	many	of 34	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.137. 35	For	a	defence	of	the	claim	that	unjust	states	may	still	be	legitimate,	see	David	Copp,	'The	Idea	of a	Legitimate	State',	Philosophy	and	Public	Affairs	28,	No.1	(1999),	3-45. 36	For extensive discussion of bloodless aggression, see the collection of essays in Fabre and Lazar	(eds),	The	Morality	of	Defensive	War. 37	In defending the equivalence thesis, Fabre invokes precisely this type of violation. Similarly, Buchanan discussion of permissible revolution is explicitly limited to those waged against 'Resolute	Severe	Tyrannies'.	'The	Ethics	of	Revolution	and	its	Implications	for	Intervention'. 13 us	think	that	such	groups	have	a	straightforward	just	cause	for	lethal	resistance, in the same	way that	we are inclined to in the case of states facing bloodless aggression.38	Unless there is some principled explanation for the intuitive asymmetry between killing in defence of rights to self-determination that are currently enjoyed and killing in order to realise those rights when they are wrongly	denied	(as	I	have	suggested	there	may	be),	consistency	requires	taking either	a	considerably	more	permissive	view	of	insurgency,	or	a	more	restrictive view	of	national	defence.	To	me,	the	latter	seems	the	more	palatable.39 3.3	Fiduciary	Obligations It is also possible to challenge the equivalence thesis on the ground that the threshold	of	injustice	required	to	generate	a	just	cause	for insurgencies	may	be lower than that for interstate wars. In other words, there is a permissive justificatory asymmetry between insurgencies and interstate wars. To my knowledge, no one in the contemporary literature has explicitly advanced this view.40	However, an argument for it can be constructed by combining two arguments that have been advanced in other contexts, and	which are at least prima	facie	plausible. The	first	argument	begins	with	the	idea	that	states	and	their	officials	stand	in a fiduciary relationship to their subjects, having a special obligation to	protect them	and to	act in their interests.41	These	obligations	obtain	regardless	of	how well or poorly the state in fact serves its citizens, for it is not a condition of having	certain	responsibilities	that	one	does	a	good	job	of	discharging	them.	In virtue	of	these	obligations,	states	and	their	officials	can	wrong	their	subjects	in	a distinctive	and	particularly	egregious	manner.42	For	example, John	Gardner	has argued that a victim suffers a graver wrong if they are unjustly harmed by a police officer, rather than an ordinary citizen, for the same reasons that one would	be if	harmed	by	one's	parent	rather than	a	stranger.43	This thought	may 38	As	Seth	Lazar	has	pointed	out	to	me, it	may	be	objected	that	this intuition	is	not	tracking	the fact	that	these	groups	lack	a	just	cause,	but	the	fact	that	are	likely	to	fail	to	meet	some	other	ad bellum	requirement.	Admittedly,	it	is	hard	to	tell.	But	in	support	of	my	claim,	we	might	imagine that	these	groups	have	a	magic	button,	which	if	pressed	will	result	in	their	instantly	having	a	fully functioning	state	of	their	own,	but	will	cause	the	deaths	of,	say,	5000	soldiers	and	police	officers of	the	(bloodlessly)	oppressive	regime,	as	well	as	1000	civilians. Given	the	certainty	of	success and	the	favourable	numbers, if	we	think	(as	I	am	inclined	to)	that	pushing	the	button	would	be impermissible,	this	suggests	that	the	intuition	is	in	fact	tracking	the	just	cause	requirement. 39	For	a	more	detailed	version	of	this	argument	from	consistency,	see	Jeff	McMahan,	'What	Rights May	We	Defend	By	Means	of	War?'	in	Fabre	and	Lazar	(eds),	The	Morality	of	Defensive	War,	114155	at	pp.133-135. 40	Though	Mattias	Iser	defends	several	of	the	elements	of	such	an	argument.	Iser,	'Beyond	the Paradigm	of	Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence' 41	See, for example, Evan Fox-Descent, 'The Fiduciary Nature of State Authority', Queens Law Journal	31	(2005),	259-310. 42	See,	Iser,	'Beyond	the	Paradigm	of	Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence' 43	John Gardner, 'Criminals in Uniform', in Anthony Duff, Lindsey Farmer, Sandra Marshall, Massimo Renzo and Victor Tadros (eds), The Constitution of Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University	Press,	2012),	97-118. 14 gain further support from the idea that the distinctive wrongness of crimes against	humanity	lies	in	the	fact	that,	in	these	cases,	the	institutions	of	the	state are turned on those they are meant to protect.44	This argument, if successful, establishes a moral asymmetry between unjust harms inflicted by one's own state	and	equivalent	harms	imposed	by	external	aggressors. It does	not, however, suffice to show that there is a	permissive asymmetry between just causes for insurgencies and interstate wars. To do so, a second argument must be invoked from the self-defence literature, concerning the factors	that	determine	whether	defensive	harm	is	proportionate.	While	there	is general	agreement	that	the	amount	of	defensive	harm	it	is	permissible	to	inflict on	aggressors is sensitive to the	amount	of	physical	harm their victim's	would otherwise	suffer, several theorists	argue that the	degree	of	wrongfulness of the harm	is	also	relevant.45	The	basic	thought	is	that	individuals	have	an	interest	not simply	in	avoiding	harm,	but	also	in	avoiding	being	wronged	or	disrespected	by others, which ought to be reflected in the content and limits of our defensive rights.	Other	things	being	equal,	the	graver	the	violation	threatened,	the	greater the	amount	of	harm	it	is	permissible	to	cause	to	prevent	it.	For	example,	victims may inflict	more	harm in	defending themselves	against intentional rather than merely	negligent	harm,	or	against	being	harmed	as	a	means	rather	than	as	a	sideeffect.46 Taken together, these two arguments support the conclusion that the threshold	of	unjust	harm	required	to	generate	a	just	cause	for	insurgencies	may be	lower	than	the	threshold	for	defence	against	external	aggression,	other	things being equal.47	The existence of fiduciary obligations magnifies the wrong individuals suffer	when they	are	harmed	by their	own	state, thereby justifying defensive actions that would not be permissible in their absence. This is in contrast to the equivalence view, which gives the impression that victims of states	that	grossly	fail	to	perform	their	legitimating	functions	should	regard	their assailants	as	morally	on-a-par	with	strangers. 4.	Authority,	Consent	and	Popular	Support 44	See, for example, Richard Vernon, 'What is a Crime Against Humanity?', Journal of	Political Philosophy	10,	No.3	(2002),	231-249;	David	Luban,	'A	Theory	of	Crimes	Against	Humanity',	Yale Journal	of	International	Law	29	(2004),	85-163. 45	Jonathan Quong offers the most detailed argument for this position of which I am aware. 'Proportionality	in	Defensive	Harm'	(unpublished	ms).	For	other	endorsements,	see	Iser,	'Beyond the	Paradigm	of	Self-Defense?	On	Revolutionary	Violence';	Yitzhak	Benbaji,	'Culpable	Bystanders, Innocent	Threats	and	the	Ethics	of	Self-Defense',	Canadian	Journal	of	Philosophy	35,	No.4	(2005), 585-622;	Frances	Kamm, 'Self-Defense,	Resistance, and	Suicide:	The	Taleban	Women', in	Helen Frowe and Gerald Lang (eds), How	We	Fight (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 75-86; Frowe,	Defensive	Killing,	Ch.5. 46	Quong,	'Proportionality	in	Defensive	Harm'. 47	One	possible	exception	being	cases	in	which	the	just	cause	for	insurgency	is	grounded	solely	in the	target	state's	treatment	of	outsiders.	See	n.31	above. 15 As	we	saw	in	the	previous	section,	insurgents	may,	as	a	contingent	matter,	be	at	a disadvantage in terms	of their	ability to	satisfy the	requirements	of last resort, reasonable prospect of success, and proportionality. In addition, the special relationship	between	insurgents	and	their	state	opponents	may	affect	whether	a given injustice generates a just cause for war. But these do not exhaust the standard requirements of jus ad bellum. Mainstream just war theory also includes the criterion of 'legitimate authority'. In the broadest terms, the criterion	holds	that	in	order	to	be	justified,	wars	must	be	initiated	and	fought	by a	certain	kind	of	belligerent	entity.	This	is	standardly	interpreted	to	mean	a	state, a	coalition	of	states,	or,	more	permissively,	certain	non-state	entities	that	aspire to	statehood.	While	comparatively	under-theorised	in	contemporary	debates,	the authority criterion is clearly crucial to answering our next question: To what extent does the political status of insurgent groups ground a justificatory asymmetry between insurgencies and traditional interstate wars? For if the standard interpretation of the criterion is correct, at least the majority of insurgencies	will	be	automatically	unjustified. However, for precisely this reason, many find the authority criterion extremely	implausible.	Most	obviously,	it	seems	open	to	clear	counter-examples. For	one, it implies	that	a	sub-state	group	facing	genocide	or	enslavement	could not	permissibly	wage	war	against	their	oppressors,	even	if	they	satisfied	all	other requirements for just	war.	This is very	hard to	believe.	More theoretically, the criterion	is	also	deeply	at	odds	with	a	broadly	reductivist	approach,	according	to which	the	initiation	and	waging	of	wars	can	be	justified	as	a	composition	of	acts of	permissible	defensive	harming	between	individuals.	Since	it	is	not	a	necessary condition	of	permissible	selfor	other-defence that	one	have	a	certain	political status, or be authorised by someone who does, the authority criterion seems morally	redundant. Two conclusions	may	be drawn from these objections. An	abolitionist view holds that the authority requirement should be entirely jettisoned.48	If a war satisfies the	remaining	ad	bellum	criteria, this is	sufficient for its	permissibility. On this	view, the	political status	of	belligerents cannot	ground	any	deep	moral asymmetry between insurgencies and interstate	wars. A reformist	view denies the	sufficiency	claim.	Instead, it	aims	to	retain	the	criterion	in	a	more	plausible form,	which both avoids absurd implications and is compatible	with justifying war	in	terms	of	the	rights	and	interests	of	individuals. One promising way of rehabilitating the criterion, suggested by several writers,	is	to	replace	the	formal	property	of	statehood	with	the	normative	notion of consent.49	The underlying claim is that it is an independent and necessary 48	See, for example, Fabre, Cosmopolitan	War, Chs.3-4; Uwe Steinhoff, The Ethics of War and Terrorism	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	Ch.1. 49	Finlay, 'Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence'; Anne Schwenkenbecher, 'Rethinking Legitimate Authority', in Fritz Allhoff, Nicholas G. Evans, and	Adam	Henschke (eds),	Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War (Abingdon: Routledge 2013), 161-170; Lionel McPherson, 'Is 16 condition	of	permissible	defensive	force	that	the	beneficiaries	consent	to	it	or,	at very	least,	do	not	overtly	refuse.	Term	this	the	consent	principle.50	On	this	view, an	entity's	having	the	authority	to	wage	war	consists in its	being	authorised	to do so by those on	whose behalf the	war is fought.	Without this authorisation, waging	war	is	impermissible,	even	if	all	other	conditions	are	met. Though	consent	is	intended	to	impose	an	independent	constraint	on	all	forms of	armed	conflict,	it	is	particularly	salient	in	the	case	of	wars	fought	by	sub-state belligerents, since these groups typically lack the institutional mechanisms to demonstrate	that	they	have	popular	support,	and	are	often	criticised	for	claiming to fight in the name of others without a sufficient mandate. So, while this reformist view	does	not automatically	disqualify these groups from	having the authority	to	wage	war	(thus	avoiding	the	counter-examples	mentioned	above),	it may still provide support for the claim that insurgencies are harder to justify than	wars	fought	by	functioning	states	(if	we	grant	the	empirical	assumption	that sub-groups	are less likely	to	be	representative	of	those	they	fight	on	behalf	of). The question, then, is	whether, and to	what extent, the consent principle	does impose	a	genuine	constraint	on	war. 4.1	Against	the	Consent	Requirement The consent principle gains considerable support from our judgements about simple	cases	of	other-defence.	Consider	the	following	example: Elevator:	Victor	is	taking	a	ride	in	an	elevator.	Agatha	hates	Victor	and begins	to	saw	through	the	elevator	cable	in	order	to	kill	him.	Richie	is walking	by	and	is	able	to	shoot	Agatha	with	his	sniper	rifle	before	she succeeds in killing Victor. However, Victor is committed to nonviolence	and	refuses	Richie's	defensive	assistance. In this case it does seem	wrong for Richie to kill Agatha in defence of Victor (assuming	Victor	is	mentally	competent,	aware	of	the	facts,	etc.).	Victims	occupy a	morally	privileged	position	within	the	morality	of	defence	it	is	their	interests that	are	at	stake	after	all	and	this	gives	them	the	exclusive	right	to	decide	if	and how	those	interests	are	defended.51	The	role	of	consent	thus	tracks	an	important distinction between there merely being a potential justification for defensive harm	and	a	particular	agent's	actually	having	that	justification.	For	the	latter,	the will	of	the	victim	must	be	engaged.	Rescuers	thus	wrong	the	victim	by	defending Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?', Ethics	117, No.3 (2007), 524-546, Seth Lazar, 'Authorisation and	the	Morality	of	War'	(unpublished	ms). 50	Here	I	borrow	Allen	Buchanan's	terminology. 'The	Ethics	of	Revolution	and	its	Implications	for the	Ethics	of	Intervention.' 51	For	more	detailed	discussion,	see	Cecile	Fabre,	'Permissible	Rescue	Killings',	Proceedings	of	the Aristotelian	Society, 109 (2009), 149-164. See also, Finlay, 'Legitimacy and Non-State Political Violence'. 17 him against his express wishes, even if they do not wrong the attacker. More specifically,	they	commit	the	distinctive	wrong	of	paternalism.52 Despite its appeal in these cases, an obvious difficulty with invoking the consent	principle	as	a	constraint	on	war	is	that	groups	are	not	simply	individuals writ	large.	There	is	no	straightforward	sense	in	which	a	victim	group	can	consent to	or	refuse the	use	of force	on its	behalf in the	same	way	an individual	victim can.	However,	an	obvious	solution	here	is	to	appeal	to	majority	consent	in	these cases.	While	the	proportion	of	consent	required	is	unlikely	to	be	precise,	it	seems plausible	that	if	a	clear	majority	of	the	members	of	a	victim	group	refuse	war	on their	behalf,	then	defending	them	would	violate	the	consent	principle	and	so	be impermissible. The problem, however, is that intuitive judgements militate against the straightforward move to a majoritarian version of the consent principle. Consider	the	following	case53: Multiple Elevator: Victor and four others are taking a ride in an elevator.	Agatha	begins	to	saw	through	the	elevator	cable	in	order	to kill its	occupants	because	she	hates	them.	Richie	is	walking	by	and	is able	to	shoot	Agatha	with	his	sniper	rifle	before	she	succeeds	in	killing the five. Victor consents to Richie's defensive assistance, but the remaining four victims refuse due to their commitment to nonviolence. In this case, a clear majority of victims explicitly refuse defence, yet it seems permissible for Richie to use defensive force nevertheless. The explanation of why	defence	is	impermissible	in	the	original	Elevator	case	does	not	apply	here. While	individuals	may	have	the	right	to	decide	whether	or	not	their	own	lives	are defended,	this	does	not	extend	to	the	lives	of	others.	This	seems	true	even	if	the victim group is not a pure aggregate of individuals, but is instead	made up of individuals linked by morally significant 'unifying relations', such as shared ethnicity, culture or conception of the good. 54 As Andrew Altman and Christopher	Heath	Wellman	put	it,	when	lives	are	at	stake,	"It	seems	dubious	to hold	that	a	group	has	this	type	of	normative	dominion	over	its	members."55 Given this result, some conclude that it cannot be a necessary condition of permissible	war	that	the	majority	of	the	victim	group	consent	to	its	prosecution, 52	On	a	fairly	standard	characterisation,	an	action	is	paternalist	if	it	involves:	(i)	interference	with an	individual;	(ii)	against	their	will;	(iii)	for	the	sake	of	their	good. 53	Based on a case in Andrew Altman and Christopher Heath Wellman, 'From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination: Human Rights and Political Violence', Ethics	118, No.2 (2008), 228-257	at	p.244. 54	I	borrow	this	phrase	from	McMahan,	'Intervention	and	Collective	Self-Determination'. 55	Altman	and	Wellman,	'From	Humanitarian	Intervention	to	Assassination',	p.243. 18 or even that	many consent.56	In cases where: (i) consent is mixed among the members of a victim group, and (ii) defending those	who do not consent is a condition	of	defending	those	that	do,	a lack	of	consent	does	not	render	defence impermissible. In other	words, provided that some	members	of a victim	group consent to defence (or are not competent to refuse) the consent principle is satisfied.57 Of	course,	this	is	not	to	deny	that	consent	may	play	an	important	indirect	role in justifying	war. For example,	widespread refusal	may	provide good evidence that a proposed	war	would not be justified, or render it unlikely to succeed.58 The claim is that the consent of the victims does not place an independent constraint on defensive war, at least in any minimally realistic case. If this sceptical view is correct, then the fact that insurgents are typically less representative of those they fight on behalf of, compared to state belligerents, would	not	provide	any	independent	support	for	the	claim	that	insurgencies	are harder	to	justify. 4.2	A	Qualified	Defence	of	Consent I	believe	that	both	the	simple	majoritarian	view	and	the	strong	sceptical	view	are mistaken. The correct account of the role of consent in justifying war lies somewhere in the middle. While the sceptics are correct that majority or widespread	consent	is	not	always	required	for	permissible	defence,	this	does	not licence	the	stronger	conclusion	that it is	never	(or	rarely)	required. In	order	to defend	a	more	robust	consent	requirement,	one	must identify	a	relevant	moral difference between defensive wars and mixed-consent cases like Multiple Elevator,	which	explains	why	broad	consent	may	be	required	in	the	former	but not	the	latter.	Here	I	sketch	two	possible	responses	of	this	type. 4.2.1	Individual	vs.	Collective	Rights One	strategy	identifies	a	distinction	in	the	kinds	of	rights	that	are	at	stake	in	the two types of case. It points out that just causes for war not only include preventing	rights	violations	such	as	death,	enslavement,	and	other	atrocities,	but also defending rights to political and social goods such as territory, independence, and self-determination.59	The argument concedes that majority consent is	not	a	requirement for	defending	the	former	class	of	rights	(as in	the Multiple Elevator cases), but holds that it is required for defending the latter. Since	wars and insurgencies are	often,	perhaps typically, justified	by	appeal to 56	For	different	arguments	against	the	consent	principle,	see	Buchanan,	'The	Ethics	of	Revolution and	its	Implications	for	the	Ethics	of	Intervention.' 57	McMahan,	'Humanitarian	Intervention,	Consent,	and	Proportionality'. 58	Altman and Wellman, 'From Humanitarian Intervention to Assassination'. Interestingly, however, there is empirical evidence that civilian support for insurgencies often depends on military	success,	rather	than	vice	versa.	Kalyvas,	The	Logic	of	Violence	in	Civil	War,	Chs.	4-5. 59	Though this will depend on one's views about the bloodless aggression/injustice question raised	in	the	previous	section. 19 political goods (national liberation struggles spring to mind most obviously), majority	consent	is	therefore	usually	required. But	why should this	difference in rights ground	a	difference in the consent requirement?	One	answer	points to	a	difference in the	strength	of the interests that the rights protect. While the value of majority rule may trump the importance	of	protecting	less	weighty	political	rights,	when	it	comes	to	our	most stringent	rights	(such	as	those	to	life	and	limb),	this	value	pales	in	comparison.60 However, this	doesn't	seem	to	be	the	right	answer.	Consider	a	variation	on	the Multiple	Elevator case, in	which	Agatha threatens to inflict a	much less severe harm on her five victims, a vicious pinch say, which Richie can avert by defensively	pinching	Agatha.	If the	severity-based	explanation	were	correct,	we would	expect	to judge	that	defending	the	victims	in	the	face	of	majority	refusal would be wrong. Yet defence still seems permissible. As in the original case, while	each	victim	has the	right to	decide	whether their interests	are	defended, this	does	not	extend	to	the	interests	of	others. A	more	promising	explanation	appeals	to	a	distinction	in	the	type	of	rights	at stake,	rather	than	the	weight	of	the	interests	they	protect.	On	this	view,	majority consent among the members of a victim group is required when the rights violations threatened are collective rights, such as those to territory or selfdetermination, but not when the relevant rights are individual	rights, such as those	to	life	and	limb.	A	full	account	of	collective	rights	is	far	beyond	the	scope	of this	chapter.	But,	for	our	purposes,	we	need	only	highlight	one	important	feature of collective rights,	which that is that	while such	rights	can	be	grounded in the interests of individuals – namely, individuals' interests in enjoying certain collective	or	communal	goods	–	they	can	only	be	exercised	collectively.61	No	one member	can	unilaterally	exercise	a	collective	right	on	his	or	her	own,	including authorising	third-parties	to	act	on	that	right.62	Rather,	some	collective	procedure is required in order to successfully do so, majority decision-making being a paradigmatic	example. This feature of collective rights, it	may be argued, explains	why, in certain cases, the consent of the majority of the members of a victim group is a necessary condition for justifying defensive	war.	When a just cause for	war is based	purely	on	individual	rights	(such	as	a	war	of	defence	against	mass	murder or	enslavement),	each	individual	right-holder	has	the	moral	power	to	authorise	a third-party to defend their rights, which is unaffected by the refusal of other victims.	By	contrast,	if	the	just	cause	is	grounded	in	the	defence	of	interests	that 60	Schwenkenbecher, 'Rethinking	Legitimate	Authority'.	For	a	different	take	on	the	link	between severity	and	consent,	Fabre,	Cosmopolitan	War,	p.155 61	On	this	point,	see	Allen	Buchanan,	Secession:	The	Morality	of	Political	Divorce	from	Fort	Sumter to	Lithuania	and	Quebec	(Boulder,	CO:	Westview	Press,	1991),	pp.74-75.	See	also,	Joseph	Raz,	The Morality	of	Freedom,	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1986),	p.208. 62	For a related discussion of authorisation in the context of defending jointly-held rights, see Fabre, Cosmopolitan	War (esp. Ch.2) and Seth Lazar's review of the same in Ethics	124, No.2 (2014),	496-412. 20 are	protected	by	collective	rights,	that	right	can	only	be	permissibly	acted	upon by	those	who	have	been	collectively	authorised	to	do	so.	So,	while	it	is	false	that majority consent is a necessary condition for all wars, it may be true for a (possibly	large)	subset. It	should	be	noted,	however,	that	one	could	resist	this	conclusion	by	adopting a	high threshold	view	of just cause,	as	discussed in the	previous	section.	For if the	kind	of interests	protected	by	collective	rights	are	not important	enough	to justify large-scale killing, then having the consent of the victims of collective rights	violations	is	practically	irrelevant	for	justifying	war	in	their	defence. 4.2.2	Consent	and	Proportionality A different strategy aims to show that widespread consent among the victim group	may	be	required	even	when	the	rights	threatened	are	purely	individual.	It locates the relevant	difference	between	defensive	wars and cases like	Multiple Elevator in the fact that the former typically involves collaterally killing innocents,	which	must be justified as a	matter of proportionality. On the view under consideration, the consent of the victims plays two distinct roles in establishing whether defending them is proportionate, by determining (i) whether	certain	good	effects	are	admissible	in	the	proportionality	calculation	and (ii)	whether	certain	bad	effects	are	discounted. The	argument	for	the	first	claim	rests	on	a	particular	view	of	the	normative effect that follows from a victim refusing defensive assistance. The basic thought,	familiar	from	discussions	of	paternalism,	is	that,	by	refusing,	the	victim removes their interests from the 'pot' of values that may be appealed to in justifying defensive harm. One	way of capturing this idea is by thinking of an individual's	refusal	as	morally	equivalent	to	their	non-existence,	for	the	purposes of justifying harm. Hence, in justifying defence rescuers may only invoke the interests	of	those	victims	that	have	not	been	rendered	ineligible	by	their	refusal. This	view	accounts	for	why	majority	consent	is	intuitively	not	required	in	the Multiple Elevator case. Though each of the four non-consenters successfully withdraw their interests from the pot of eligible values, this does not render defence	impermissible	because	the	interests	of	the	single	consenter	are	sufficient to justify the total	amount	of	defensive	harm. Were the	non-consenters	not to exist, it	would still be permissible to kill Agatha in defence of Victor. It is this particular feature	of the	case that	explains	why	the	number	of	refusing	victims seems morally irrelevant. But, crucially, this feature is absent in cases where defending	members	of	a	victim	group	also	requires	collaterally	killing innocent persons, such as defensive wars. To demonstrate, consider a variation on the Multiple	Elevator	case: Collateral Elevator: Victor and four others are taking a ride in an elevator.	Agatha	begins	to	saw	through	the	elevator	cable	in	order	to kill its	occupants	because	she	hates	them.	Richie	is	walking	by	and	is 21 able	to	blow	up	Agatha	with	his	grenade	before	she	succeeds	in	killing the five.	However, doing so	will also kill an innocent bystander as a side effect. Victor consents to Richie's defensive assistance, but the remaining four victims refuse due to their commitment to nonviolence. In this case, the interests of the single consenter are not sufficient to justify defence. Were the four non-consenters not to exist, Richie would not be permitted to defend Victor, because collaterally killing one innocent person would	be	disproportionate.	In	fact,	the	absence	of	just	one	of	the	victims	could	be enough to render defence disproportionate, depending on	where one sets the relevant	threshold. If	we	accept	the	idea	that	individuals	have	this	kind	of	normative	control	over their good, the refusal of members of the victim group may be much more relevant to the permissibility of defensive force than the sceptic alleges. By refusing,	victims	diminish	the	amount	of	value	that	may	be	invoked	in	order	to justify collateral harm. Since wars usually involve considerable amounts of collateral harm, widespread refusal by the intended beneficiaries of that war may	significantly	count	against	it	being	proportionate. Whereas	the	first	argument	for	the	dependence	of	proportionality	on	consent focuses	on	victims	qua	beneficiaries,	the	second	focuses	on	victims	qua	objects	of collateral	harm.	For	it	will	often	be	the	case	that	defending	a	group	of	victims	by means of war will risk significant collateral harm to members of that group (perhaps	especially	so	in	the	case	of	insurgencies,	which	are	often	fought	in	close proximity to their putative beneficiaries). The argument rest on the plausible idea	that	the	amount	of	harm	it	is	permissible	to	impose	in	order	bring	about	a good effect is sensitive to whether those	who	will be harmed (as opposed to benefitted)	consent	to	its	imposition.	For	example,	consider	the	standard	Trolley Case, in which one person is collaterally killed in order to save five. Let's stipulate that five lives is the precise threshold at which killing one is permissible.	Now	imagine	a	variation	in	which	there	are	only	four	victims	on	the main	track,	but	the	single	person	on	the	side-track	freely	consents	to	being	killed for the	greater	good. In this case, the	victim's consent intuitively	makes	all the difference,	rendering	permissible	an	otherwise	disproportionate	act	of	collateral killing. Generalising somewhat (and ignoring some important complications), this result	suggests	that	defensive	actions	that	would	otherwise	be	disproportionate in virtue of the risk of harm imposed on	members of the victim group can be rendered permissible in virtue of the consent of a sufficient number of those victims.	This	is	because	consent	can	permit	discounting	certain	bad	effects	in	the proportionality	calculus. As	with	the	argument	from	collective	rights,	these	two	proportionality-based arguments do not show that widespread consent within a victim group is 22 necessary	in	order	to	justify	all	defensive	wars.	But,	taken	together,	they	provide firm support for the idea that insurgents may be at a moral disadvantage compared	to	state	actors	(on	the	empirical	assumption	that	insurgent	groups	are generally	less	likely	to	be	representative	of	those	on	whose	behalf	they	claim	to fight.)63 5.	Conclusion According to perhaps the most popular method for doing moral and political philosophy, one systematically compares one's judgements about particular cases	and	about	general	principles,	and	then	goes	through	a	process	of	revising these judgements where necessary in order to bring them into a state of coherence and mutual support. If there is a general lesson to be learnt from issues I have sketched in this chapter, it is that when it comes to the task of uncovering	the	morality	of	war,	we	will	need	to	include	our	judgements	about	a much wider range of cases as inputs into this reflective process. These may require	some	interesting	revisions	in	order	to	be	accommodated. 63	For	different	arguments in support	of a similar conclusion, see	Lazar, 'Authorisation	and the Morality	of	War'.