BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 83 : 4 0992\ 671 philosophy is that numerous possible direc_ tions remain open for the future. JeN Gor.rNsxr Gtnter B. Fettweis; Giinther Hamann, (Editors). Uber lgnaz von Born und die Societdt der Bergbaukunde: Yortriige einer Gedenkveranstaltung zur 200. Wiiderkehr des Grfrndungstages im September t7B6 der dlt e s te n inte rnat io nalen w is s e ns c haftlic he n Gesellschaft. (Osterreichische Aiademie der _ Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-Historische_ Klasse, Sitzungsberichte, 533.) (Verciffentlichungen der Kommission ftir Geschichte der Mathematik, Naturwissenschaften und Medizin, 49.) 153 pp., illus., apps., bibls. Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wiisenschaften, 1989. DM 40 (paper). The life of earth and mining scientist Ignaz Elder von Born and the founding and-"ccomplishments of his Society of Mining Science, the first international scientffic or] ganization, inspired the Austrian Academy of Sciences' 1986 commemoration of the 200th anniversary ofthe society's founding. The editors, G0nter Fettweis and Giinthir Hamann, have organized four significant articles,_beginning with Hamann'J biography of Born (1742-1791). Born's intefectual and scientific life exemplified the Enlightenment pansophic spirit and utilitarian agenda. The holder of several important geological and mining academic and professional posts, Born was committed to Eu_ rope-wide geological field research and practic4mining and metallurgical applications. His own mineralogical-experiments contributed to the quantitative chemical classification of minerals. His Freemasonry epitomized his cooperative creed-internitional in scale-an effort obvious in his meticulous scientific publications and recognized in the esteem accorded him. His belief in scientific advancement through international ties resulted in the founding in 1786 of the Society of Mining Scienci_ later the Austrian Academy of Sciences_ the seed of international scientific union. Grinter Fettweis turns the discussion to the society and its agenda in physical geology, mineralogy, mining and metallurlical technology and history, and general p[ysical science. Gunnar Almgren and Anders Heltzen discuss the cloie Scandinavian association with the society, focusing on Swedish contributors in iron and copper met4llurgy, mineralogy, and assaying. Last, Alfred Weiss provides a thought-pr6voking backdrop of contrasts in later eighte-enth-century mining, the historiography of which reflected a modified view of nitural resources and practical science that was gyayed by the exigencies of European politics, economics, and rising mercantilism. The general unfamiiiarity with Born's importance, his time, and his bibliography are ideally remedied in this compaci Urit lomprehensive presentation. In addition, the reproduction of the short-lived society's two rare published volumes (1789, ll.yJ), essentially the first international scientific journals, contributes a graphic insight into the early cooperative exchange of siientific ideas and information. ' WTLLTAM J. Mcpeer I Nineteenth Century Nahum Kipnii. History of the principle of Interference of Light. (Science Networks His-torical Studies, 5.) 271pp., illus., figs., tables, app., bibl., index. Basel,/Boston: Birkhiiuser Verlag, 1991. $78. Since the 1960s the early nineteenth-century revolution in optics has been the subject of considerable scholarly discussion. Complementing the recent work of led Z. Buchwald, which stresses the contributions of A. J. Fresnel, this newest account of the rise of the wave theory argues for the preeminence of Thomas Young in the whole atrair. The argument turns on the proposition that Young's discovery, the prin;iple of interference, was the most important optical-innovation of the period and the key io the fortunes of the wave theory. The interference of light was a hard-won concept to which Young was led only after having grasped the principles of the iuperposition of waves and acoustical interference. By applying the interference principle to optical phenomena, he produced a farranging theory of "periodical colors" that was mathematical in form and confirmed by experiment. Why the theory failed to evoke a positive response has long been a ptzzle. Often it has been noted that Young's mode of presentation was terse, fragmented, and difficult to follow. In addition, of course, there was the substantive problem that to accept 672 BOOK REVIEWS-ISE, 83 :4 (1992) Young's theory was to impugn the corpuscular theory, which held universal sway and was incapable of accommodating interference. Interpreted physically, what could Young's principle mean but the interference of waves? Here Nahum Kipnis introduces a novel consideration. Until about the middle of the second decade of the century, when Fresnel began to press the case for waves, the orientation of physicists was basically qualitative and physical rather than mathematical. In optics this meant that the nature of light, whether corpuscular or wavelike, was the overriding issue, and under the circumstances there was little chance for Young's theory to receive a favorable hearing. With the passage of time, however, a movement to mathematize physics took hold, and when Fresnel (possessed ofmore knowledge of Young's work than is usually supposed) reintroduced the principle of interference, the stage was set for a more positive evaluation of its claims. For the principle ofinterference to benefit from the keener appreciation for mathematics, it needed to be decoupled from the wave theory, since corpuscular optics remained as deeply entrenched as it had been in 18fi). This, Kipnis argues, is what happened. When the jury of the Academy of Sciences with a majority of emissionists awarded the annual physics prize to Fresnel in 1819, they were not sanctioning the wave theory; rather, they were acknowledging the success of a mathematical treatment of diffraction based upon the principle of interference. Now emissionists, no less than undulationists, adopted the principle. Only later was the wave theory generally adopted, brought in by the back door when it was realized that interference and the wave nature of light were inextricably linked. Set out deftly by Kipnis, the argument has a certain plausibility. But by its exclusive emphasis on what admittedly may have been the main prop of the wave theory, it undervalues other components of the optical revolution and diverts attention from the whole. Did the wave theory triumph simply as an incidental wrapper around a useful mathematical principle or as a total theory combining quantitative precision with a unitary explanation for a wide array of diverse phenomena? On the whole, the empirical findings that challenged and in the end validated the wave theory are slighted in this account. While care is lavished on mathematical derivations, references to experiments are brief, generalized, and abstract. The optical revolution awaits its Shapin and Schafer. But all in all Kipnis deserves high praise for an admirable book. It displays a thorough mastery of the literature, including unpublished dissertations; it gives good grounds for amplifying or revising conventional accounts of a number of specific matters; and it cogently develops a fresh and provocative thesis without being ponderous. One could only wish that before publication the manuscript had been gone over by a sharpeyed copy editor whose native tongue was English. Stylistic slips and typographical errors abound. Rossnr H. Strrruex Brigitte Lottfi. Die Suche nach der Wissenschaftlichkeit der Physiologie in der Zeit der Romantik (Medizin in Geschichte und Kultur, 17.) xii + 262 pp., bibl., index. Stuttgart/New York: Gustav Fischer Verlag, 1990. DM 78 (paper). Brigitte Lohf lets her physiologists speak for themselves. Having combed through an enonnous body of little-known literature, she is in a position to present a remarkably rich impression of the philosophical issues at stake for the so-called sciences of expeience (Edahrungswissenschaften) at t}te beginning of the nineteenth century. By concentrating on what contemporary scientific writers had to say about the metaphor of a "path" to knowledge, the tortuous routes from perception to knowledge, their ambivalent esteem for empiricism over speculation, the limits of experiment, and the process of gathering and gluing together the fragments of individual experiences into a systematic science of experience, Lohtr splinters the monolithic image of romantic science that once plagued the historiography of Naturphilosophie. In place of earlier visions of romantic science as a unified discourse, we get the sense ofa babel of sometimes overlapping concerns. Lohf follows a swelling trend to use formulations like "physiology in the age of romanticism" in place of "romantic physiology." One may legitimately object that it is not so easy to slip through the clutches of historical concepts. But this move does enable Lohtr to address the philosophical reflections of actively engaged investigators of nature without explaining them away in terms of clichds about the evils of specula-