Forthcoming	in	Biology	and	Philosophy Animal	Morality:	What	is	The	Debate	About? Simon	Fitzpatrick sfitzpatrick@jcu.edu Abstract Empirical studies of the social lives of non-human primates, cetaceans, and other social	animals	have	prompted	scientists	and	philosophers	to	debate	the	question	of whether morality and moral cognition exists in non-human animals. Some researchers	have	argued that	morality	does	exist in several	animal species,	others that these	species	may	possess	various	evolutionary	building	blocks	or	precursors to	morality,	but	not	quite	the	genuine	article,	while	some	have	argued	that	nothing remotely resembling	morality can be found in any non-human species. However, these	different	positions	on	animal	morality	generally	appear	to	be	motivated	more by different conceptions of how the term "morality" is to be defined than on empirical disagreements about animal social behaviour and psychology. After delving deeper into the goals and	methodologies of various of the protagonists, I argue	that,	despite	appearances,	there	are	actually	two	importantly	distinct	debates over animal morality going on, corresponding to two quite different ways of thinking about what it is to define "morality", "moral cognition", and associated notions.	Several	apparent	skirmishes	in	the	literature	are	thus	cases	of	researchers simply	talking	past	each	other.	I	then	focus	on	what	I	take	to	be	the	core	debate	over animal morality, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural kind. I argue	that	this	debate	is	in	fact	largely	terminological	and	non-substantive.	Finally,	I reflect	on	how	this	core	debate	might	best	be	re-framed. 1. Introduction In recent years, there has been	much interest in	whether	morality exists in some non-human animals (henceforth, "animals"), or, put differently, whether some animals possess a moral psychology: whether they possess the requisite psychological	capacities	to	engage	in	some	form	of	moral	cognition	and	action-for instance,	make	judgments	of	moral	approval	or	disapproval	about	others'	behaviour, internalize and enforce	moral rules or norms, and act for	moral reasons (e.g., act punitively towards another individual because of a moral evaluation of that individual's	behaviour). Such	questions	have	been	prompted	by	a	burgeoning	empirical	literature	on the	remarkably	complex	and	intricate	social	lives,	particularly	of	our	closest	primate 2 relatives, but also of other social	mammals like elephants, domestic dogs,	wolves, whales,	dolphins,	and	rats,	and	even	some	non-mammalian	species,	such	as	ravens. For example, chimpanzees appear to engage in third-party policing of behaviour, which	seems	to	indicate	the	existence	and	enforcement	of	norms	of	conduct	within their	communities	(de	Waal,	1996,	2014;	Rudolf	von	Rohr,	et	al.,	2012).	Special	place is typically	accorded to infants, for instance, such that	aggression towards them is met	with	loud	protests	and	active	intervention	on	the	part	of	uninvolved	bystanders (Rudolf von Rohr, et al., 2011, 2015).	Many other social	mammals also appear to enforce various behavioural norms. For instance, many species of primate, along with dogs, wolves, and dolphins, engage in elaborate play rituals and appear to punish individuals that break the rules governing such interactions, such as ostracizing	animals	that	play	too	aggressively	(Flack	and	de	Waal,	2004;	Bekoff	and Pierce, 2009). There has also been	work that purports to indicate other-directed emotional	capacities	like	sympathy	and	empathy	that	have	long	been	thought	to	be important in	human	moral	cognition	and	motivation	(see	Bekoff	and	Pierce,	2009; Andrews	and	Gruen,	2014	for	reviews).	In	a	famous	study,	rhesus	monkeys	refused to	press	a	lever	to	receive	food	(even	in	to	the	point	of	near	starvation),	when	they discovered	that this	would	result in	another	monkey	receiving	an	electronic	shock (Wechkin	et	al.,	1964).	Though	this	result	could	be	explained	in	a	variety	ways	(e.g., the	monkeys	merely	avoided	doing	something	that	caused	an	aversive	stimulus),	a not	unreasonable	interpretation	is	that	the	monkeys	recognized	and	wished	to	avoid causing	distress	in	others,	suggesting	some	degree	of	sympathetic	concern.	Similar pro-social helping behaviours suggestive of empathy and sympathy have been documented	in	several	species,	including	rats	(Bartal	et	al.,	2011;	Sato	et	al.,	2015), and chimpanzees, who have been shown to direct consoling behaviours towards losers	after	fights	(de	Waal,	1996;	Fraser	and	Aureli,	2008)	and	display	physiological signs	of	emotional	arousal	in	response	to images	of	violence	or	other	chimpanzees displaying	fearful	or	distressed	facial	expressions	(reviewed	by	Rudolf	von	Rohr	et al.,	2011). 3 In	light	of	such	research,	various	scientists	and	philosophers	have	proposed accounts of the moral capacities of animals, their similarities and differences to those	of	human	beings,	and	of	the	evolution	of	morality	more	generally. At	most	generous	end	of	the	spectrum	are	researchers	like	Bekoff	and	Pierce (2009), Rowlands (2012; 2017),	Musschenga (2013), Andrews and	Gruen (2014), and	Monsó	(2015),	all	of	whom	argue	that	at	least	a	core	subset	of	the	psychological capacities	that	underlie	human	morality	are	far	from	uniquely	human,	but	are	rather things that we share with many social animals. Whatever differences may exist between	their	moral	psychologies	and	moral	systems	and	those	of	humans-none	of these	authors	deny	that	there	are	such	differences-should	be	seen	as	differences	in the extent and sophistication of moral capacity. Researchers like de Waal (1996, 2006a; Flack and de	Waal, 2000) are rather less generous, however, arguing that what we find in animals, particularly other primates, is proto-morality: various psychological	"building	blocks"	or	"evolutionary	precursors"	to	morality,	but	not	the fully-fledged article. They argue that while there is important evolutionary continuity here, a crucial evolutionary change occurred uniquely in the human lineage,	giving	rise to	genuine	morality	(see	also Joyce,	2006;	Kitcher,	2006,	2011; Rudolf von	Rohr	et al., 2011;	Boehm,	2012;	Haidt, 2012; Suddendorf, 2013;	Prinz, 2014).	At	the	other	end	of	the	spectrum	are	researchers	like	Korsgaard	(2006)	and Ayala (2010), who deny, albeit for different reasons, that anything remotely resembling	morality	or	a	moral	psychology	can	be	found	in	animals.	Even	de	Waal's claim that some species possess "building blocks" of morality goes too far, amounting to a comparison between apples and oranges, so different are the capacities of non-humans from what is required to possess the genuine article. These	authors	thus	regard	the	capacity	for	moral	cognition	as	representing	"a	break with	our	animal	past"	(Korsgaard,	2006,	p104). One of the interesting things about this debate is that there has been relatively	little	disagreement	about	the	empirical	data.	Though	much	of	the	relevant research is controversial, largely for methodological reasons, since much of it consists	of	anecdotal	reports	of	animal	behaviour,	and	because	there	has	been	some inconsistency between the results of field and lab-based studies of pro-social 4 behaviour (see de	Waal, 2006a; Bekoff and Pierce, 2009; Rudolf von Rohr et al., 2011;	Tomasello,	2016), it is	not the	data itself that	has	been	the	primary	focus	of this debate. Nor, indeed, has there been much disagreement about what specific psychological capacities can	be inferred from this data.1	Rather, the	disagreement has	mostly	been	about	the	standard	that	"genuine"	or	"proto"-moral	creatures	must live	up	to-not	what	psychological	capacities	particular	species	actually	possess,	but what	capacities	they	must	have	in	order	for	us	to	describe	them	as	having	morality or	proto-morality.	Indeed,	even	those	who	generally	fall	into	the	same	camp	on	the question	of	whether	animals	have	morality	or	a	moral	psychology	endorse	different definitions	of	what	it	is	to	have	such	a	thing,	or	to	possess	"precursors"	or	"building blocks" of morality. The question I want to press in this paper is the metaphilosophical	one:	what	counts	as	getting	this	standard	or	definition	right? Though,	as	we	will	see,	it	isn't	easy	to	keep	descriptive	and	normative	issues apart, to be clear, the debate is ostensibly about	what it is to have	morality or a moral	psychology in the	descriptive rather than	the	normative senses	of "morality" and	"moral".	Normative	definitions	of	these	terms	are	tied	to	some	account	of	what are	the	correct	or	ideally	rational	moral	beliefs,	attitudes,	actions,	and	so	forth-this is the sense in which philosophers might talk about the "demands" or "requirements"	of	morality.	Purely	descriptive	definitions,	however,	are	meant	to	be independent of such	normative claims about	what	morality requires (Gert, 2016). For instance, a neo-Nazi may be regarded as having a "morality" or a "moral psychology" in the descriptive senses of these terms, insofar as she/he possesses psychological capacities that enable the holding of various beliefs and attitudes about moral issues. However, a neo-Nazi might not be regarded as having a "morality" in the normative sense, insofar as we may want to regard she/he as possessing	false	or	irrational	beliefs/attitudes,	or	as	behaving	in	a	morally	incorrect 1	One important	area	of	disagreement concerns the type	of empathetic capacity	present in	various species.	This	is	linked	with	disagreement	about	the	putative	link	between	the	type	of	empathy	taken to	be	important	for	morality	and	mind-reading,	and	disagreement	about	the	mind-reading	capacities of animals (see fn.3 for further discussion). Some researchers have also disputed whether social norms can actually exist in animals with limited	mind-reading and social learning capacities (see Andrews,	2009;	Tomasello,	2016). 5 way.	Failure	to	appreciate	this	distinction	has led	to	some	unfortunate	episodes in the debate over animal morality. For instance, some researchers have taken the question	of	whether	morality	or	moral	cognition	exists	in	animals	to	amount	to	the question of whether they behave in ways that we might regard as morally praiseworthy	(see,	for	instance,	Jensen	et	al.,	2007	on	whether	chimpanzees	have	a sense	of	fairness).	However,	as	several	commentators	have	pointed	out	(e.g.,	Joyce, 2006;	de	Waal,	2006b;	Bekoff	and	Pierce,	2009),	whether	or	not	animals	behave	in ways that	we	might judge to	be right	or	good	according to	a	particular	normative standard is as irrelevant to the question of whether they are capable of moral cognition	or	action	as the	repulsiveness	of	National	Socialism is to the	question	of whether	it	constitutes	a	moral	system	in	the	descriptive	sense	of	"moral". Of	course,	the	meta-philosophical	question	posed	above	is	not	unique	to	the debate	over	animal	morality.	Many	of	the	descriptive	accounts	of	what	it	is	to	have	a morality	or	moral	psychology	that	have	been	offered	in	this	context	are	inspired	by various of the	main traditions in	moral philosophy (in particular, sentimentalism and	Kantianism),	each	of	which	can	be	regarded	as	offering	different	definitions	of these	and	other	related	notions-including	what	it	is	to	engage	in	moral	reasoning or	moral	judgment,	be	a	moral	agent,	and	of	the	primary	concerns	or	subject	matter of morality more generally. Indeed, it is an under-appreciated feature of moral philosophy the extent to which these different traditions assume quite different conceptions of the target of	moral theory.	With respect to the bounds or subject matter of morality, there is also currently a vigorous debate in cognitive science concerned	with the nature of human	moral psychology. Haidt (2012) has argued that	much	of	the	field	has	adopted	what	he	refers	to	as	a	"liberal"	conception	of	the moral	domain,	focused	on	issues	of	harm	and	fairness,	ignoring	more	"conservative" concerns,	such	as	purity,	respect,	and	group-loyalty,	meaning	that	many	important aspects	of	human	moral	psychology	have	largely	gone	unstudied.	Haidt	argues	that this	is	partly	due	to	the	influence	of	the	work	of	Turiel	and	colleagues	(Turiel,	1983), who have offered a psychological account of the putative difference between genuine	"moral"	judgments	and	so-called	"conventional"	normative	judgments	(e.g., normative judgments about matters of etiquette and taste), according to which 6 moral judgments concern issues	of harm	and fairness and	display a characteristic psychological	profile	quite	different	to	that	of	conventional	normative	judgments- for instance, they	are	typically	regarded	as	universal,	authority-independent,	more serious, and tend to be justified by appeal to notions of harm, rights, and justice. This	account	of	the	moral/conventional	distinction	has	come	in	for	much	criticism, including from Haidt, who has argued that it illegitimately places many "conservative"	concerns	outside	of	the	moral	domain.	In	each	of	these	instances,	the assumption is that there is a correct account of the relevant concepts (morality, moral domain,	moral judgment, moral norm, moral agency, etc.) to be had. This clearly	gives	rise	to	the	question	of	how	we	are	tell	when	we	have	in	fact	locked	on to	the	correct	account	of	any	of	these	notions. My	inspiration	for	asking	this	meta-philosophical	question	comes	from	Stich and colleagues (Nado	et al., 2009; Stich,	2009),	who	have	pressed it in relation to much	recent	work	in	human	moral	psychology,	particularly	the	Turiel	tradition	and the	putative	moral/conventional distinction. They regard	Turiel and colleagues as attempting	to	articulate	moral	judgment	as	a	psychological	natural	kind	(defined	by the characteristic subject	matter and psychological profile described above). This contrasts with the standard approach of philosophers towards defining such notions,	which	typically	involves	some	form	of	conceptual	analysis.	Ultimately,	Stich and colleagues argue	on the	basis of some	empirical	work (e.g.,	Kelly et al., 2007; Fessler	et	al.,	2015)	that	the	Turiel	account	fails	to	pick	out	a	really	existing	natural kind	and	that	there	is	no	good	reason	to	believe	in	the	existence	of	a	psychologically distinct	sub-class	of	normative	judgments	that	we	can	regard	as	genuinely	"moral" as	opposed	to	merely	"conventional". After describing the main contours of the current debate over animal morality (Section 2), I will utilize Stich and colleagues' distinction between conceptual analysis and	natural kind approaches to	defining "morality" and argue that	we	can	find	representatives	of	both	types	of	approach	in	the	current	literature (Section 3). After delving deeper into the goals and methodologies of these two approaches, we will see that, despite appearances, there are actually two importantly	distinct	debates	over	animal	morality	going	on.	This,	of	course,	implies 7 that	several	of	the	apparent	skirmishes	in	the	current	literature	are	actually	cases	of researchers	simply	talking	past	each	other.	I	will	then	focus	on	what	I	take	to	be	the core debate that has been going on, which is concerned with understanding the nature and phylogenetic distribution of morality conceived as a psychological natural	kind	(Section	4).	I	will	argue	that	this	debate	is	in	fact	largely	terminological and	non-substantive.	Finally,	I	will	reflect	on	how	this	core	debate	might	best	be	reframed	(Section	5).	I	will	argue	in	favour	of	a	more	fine-grained	approach	that	asks not	whether animals possess a "moral" or "proto-moral" psychology, but	whether they	possess	certain	more	tightly	defined	psychological	mechanisms. 2. Moral	animals? In	their	book,	Wild	Justice,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	define	"morality"	as: ...a	suite	of inter-related	behaviours	that	cultivate	and	regulate	the	complex interactions	within	social	groups.	These	behaviours	relate	to	well-being	and harm.	And	norms	of	right	and	wrong	attach	to	many	of	them.	(2009,	p7) Bekoff and Pierce adopt the view-common to many evolutionary theories of morality-that	morality	evolved to facilitate	and improve levels	of	co-operation in the small-scale communities that our ancestors lived. The idea is that codes of conduct that regulate individual behaviour, inhibit selfishness, discourage free riding, reduce intra-group violence, and increase group cohesiveness make cooperative	endeavours	easier	and	more	effective, and	were thus likely	adaptive for our ancestors, who depended on co-operation with others for survival and successful reproduction. Similar fitness benefits may have accrued from them having	a	basic	level	of	concern	for	the	interests	of	others	in	their	group.2	However, Bekoff	and	Pierce	see	no	reason	to	think	that	morality	evolved	only	recently	in	the human	lineage,	since	the	ancestors	of	many	other	animals	plausibly	also	lived	in	rich social	ecologies	that	involved	co-operative	endeavours	like	hunting,	defence	against 2	Though	they	do	appear	open	to	the	possibility	of	group	selection	playing	a	role	in	the	evolution	of some	aspects	of	morality,	as	they	define	it,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	lean	towards	the	view	that	the	evolution of	mechanisms that produce	pro-social behaviours can	be explained	without necessarily having to invoke	selection	at	the	level	of	groups	(see	also,	Joyce,	2006;	de	Waal,	2006a). 8 predators, care for infants, grooming, play, and so forth, and thus plausibly also needed	the	"social	glue"	that	morality	is	taken	to	provide. Bekoff	and	Pierce	(2009,	p8)	argue	that	the	empirical	evidence	for	morality in	animals	comes	in	three	clusters:	the	co-operation	cluster,	which	includes	putative instances	of	"altruism,	reciprocity,	trust,	punishment	and	revenge"	in	many	species; the	empathy	cluster,	which	includes	various	other-directed	behaviours	suggestive	of "sympathy, compassion, caring, helping, grieving, and consoling"; and the justice cluster, which includes behaviours suggestive of "a sense of fair play, sharing, a desire for	equity, expectations	about	what	one	deserves	and	how	one	ought to	be treated, indignation, retribution, and spite". Their claim is thus that many social animals possess a variety of psychological capacities-including other-directed emotional capacities like sympathy and empathy,3 pro-social and altruistic motivation,	and	a	primitive	sense	of	"right	and	wrong"	tied	to	various	social	norms4 3 Though the terms "sympathy" and "empathy" are sometimes used interchangeably, Bekoff and Pierce	recognize	a	distinction	between	empathy	as	a	type	of	emotional	mimicry	(feeling	what	another is	feeling)	and	sympathy	as	having	an	emotion	on	behalf	on	another	(feeling	for	the	other)	(see	also Prinz,	2011).	They	also take	empathy to	come in	various	degrees	of complexity, ranging from lowlevel emotional contagion, where an emotion is triggered in an individual as result of merely observing a behavioural cue from another (such as a distressed or fearful facial expression), to cognitive	empathy,	where the individual is	able to fully	adopt the	emotional	perspective	of	another and	understand	the	reasons	for	it	(e.g.,	understanding	that	another	individual	is	fearful	and	what	has caused	this).	The	latter	requires	a	rich	mind-reading	capacity,	while	lower	levels	of	empathy	needn't require	any	ability	to	represent	others'	mental	states.	Sympathy	is	similarly	taken	to	come	in	varying degrees of complexity, reflecting the extent to which individuals are able to put themselves in another's	situation. Following de Waal (2006a), Bekoff and Pierce regard cognitive empathy as the type of empathy most relevant to morality, since it involves genuine recognition and understanding of another's	emotional	state,	and	are	willing	to	attribute	full-blown	cognitive	empathy	to	several	species (de	Waal	restricts	this	capacity	to	apes).	Others	are	much	more	sceptical	about	cognitive	empathy	in animals, largely	because	of	doubts	about their	mind-reading	capacities.	Andrews	and	Gruen	(2014; see	also	Gruen,	2015)	provide	an	account	of empathy	and its	putative connection	with	morality in apes	that	tries	to	carve	some	space	between	emotional	contagion	and	full	cognitive	empathy.	Monsó (2015)	argues	that	even	emotional	contagion	can	be	viewed	in	moral	terms;	hence,	the	debate	over animal	morality	can	be	fully	separated	from	the	debate	over	animal	mind-reading. 4 Bekoff and Pierce take these social norms to exist in the form of implicit expectations about appropriate and inappropriate behaviour: animals respond to norm violating behaviour with protests	(e.g.,	"waa"	barks	in	chimpanzees),	or	with	punitive	behaviours	of	their	own	(e.g.,	refusing	to play with animals that have played too roughly), but needn't have any conscious or reflective understanding of the relevant norm itself. Much of human thinking about social norms has been claimed	to	be like	this	(e.g.,	Nichols,	2004;	Sripada	and	Stich,	2006;	Haidt,	2012). In	many,	perhaps most, cases, human social norms are unconsciously internalized early in development, and all the individual typically has conscious access to are the agonistic emotional states (like anger) that 9 that	exist	within	their	communities-that	make	them	worthy	of	being	regarded	as moral beings, insofar as these psychological traits are plausibly homologues or analogues	to	those	that	underlie	central	aspects	of	human	morality.5	This is	not	to deny that human morality and moral cognition and chimp or wolf morality and moral cognition are different in important	ways. For instance, they claim that the content	of	morality is importantly "species-relative", so the	moral	norms	of chimp communities	are	likely	quite	different	to	those	of	wolf	or	human	communities,	and that different species may have more sophisticated moral capacities than others. But,	at	a	general level, the	capacity to	possess	morality is	something that	we	share with many other mammals, including, they argue, "bonobos, chimpanzees, elephants, wolves, hyenas, dolphins, whales, and rats", and potentially even with some	non-mammalian	social	animals	like	ravens	(2009,	p83). Bekoff	and	Pierce	build	much	of	their	account	on	the	work	of	de	Waal,	a	key pioneer of the contemporary study of the rich emotional and social lives of nonhuman	primates.	However,	de	Waal	himself	isn't	prepared	to	go	as	far	as	Bekoff	and Pierce. Instead, de	Waal (1996, 2006a; Flack and de	Waal, 2000) sees himself as modernizing	the	position	of	Darwin	in	The	Descent	of	Man: accompany their observing norm violating behaviour and the intrinsic	motivation to punish norm violators. 5	Though	Bekoff	and	Pierce	tend	to	talk	about	"patterns"	and	"clusters"	of	"moral	behaviours",	their focus is really on the internal psychological mechanisms that drive these behaviours. It is the possession	of	these	mechanisms	that	make	animals	moral	beings,	on	their	view,	not	the	behaviours per	se (Musshenga,	2013).	For instance, they	emphasize	the following	"threshold	requirements" for being	a	moral	animal: [A] level of complexity in social organization, including established	norms	of behaviour to which	attach	strong	emotional	and	cognitive	cues	about	right	and	wrong;	a	certain level	of neural	complexity that	serves	as	a foundation for	moral	emotions	and for	decision	making based	on	perceptions	about	the	past	and	the	future;	relatively	advanced	cognitive	capacities (a	good	memory,	for	example);	and	a	high	level	of	behavioural	flexibility	(2009,	p83). Moreover, when discussing instances of pro-social and altruistic behaviour, they emphasize that merely	acting	to	help	another	individual	at	cost	to	oneself is insufficient	for	the	behaviour	count	as moral behaviour. What matters is the underlying	motivation-i.e., whether the behaviour is the product	of	a	desire	to	help	that	is	itself	other-regarding.	Hence,	when	they	talk	about	altruism	as	an instance	of	moral	behaviour,	what	they	mean	is	psychological	altruism,	not	just	so-called	"biological" altruism, which is defined exclusively in terms of reproductive fitness, without reference to underlying	motivation. 10 Any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, the parental	and	filial	affections	being	here	included,	would	inevitably	acquire	a moral	sense	or	conscience,	as	soon	as	its	mental	powers	had	become	as	well, or	nearly	as	well	developed,	as	in	man	(Darwin,	1871,	p68-69). Darwin	was	sympathetic to the	sentimentalist tradition	of	moral	philosophers like David Hume and Adam Smith that rooted human moral cognition in sentiment, particularly our ability to empathize with others, and argued that our moral sentiments	should	be	seen	as	an	outgrowth	of	the	pro-social	instincts	and	emotional capacities	of	our	non-human	ancestors,	which	we	share	with	many	other	species.	In a similar vein, de Waal points to what he regards as the evolutionarily ancient "building	blocks"	of	moral	cognition-sympathy	and	empathy	towards	others,	prosocial	and	altruistic	motivation,	and	what	he	calls	a	primitive	"sense	of	fairness"	tied to social norms-which we share with other primates (apes, in particular). However,	like	Darwin,	de	Waal	argues	that	there	is	a	key	difference	between	human morality and the sentiments and social norms of other animals. Darwin largely adopted	the	view	of	Hume	and	Smith that the	possession	of	a true	moral	sense	or "conscience"	required	not	just	capacities	for	empathy	and	sympathy,	or	the	capacity to make judgments about others' behaviour, but also a special type of reflective capacity.	For	Hume,	this	was	the	ability	to	"perceiv[e]	the	duties	and	obligations	of morality" (Hume, 1978, p468), and to abstract away from one's own situation to make judgments from a position of impartiality. For Darwin, it	was the ability to self-consciously reflect on one's actions and motives, "and of approving or disapproving of them" (1871, p85). It	was this capacity for critical self-reflection, which	came	with	the	evolution	of	increased	"mental	powers"	in	humans	(Rowlands, 2012).6	De	Waal	doesn't	explicitly locate the	difference in such	a capacity for selfreflection,	but	rather	in	the	scope	and	explicitness	of	human	moral	codes: 6 In this respect, Darwin seems to have viewed the human moral sense as a by-product of the evolution	of	sophisticated	reasoning	capacities,	rather	than	a	specific	psychological	adaptation	in	its own right (Ayala, 2010). He also suggested that the development of human	moral norms (i.e., the content	of	specific	moral	belief	systems,	rather	than	the	psychological	mechanisms	that	underlie	the capacity	to	have	such	systems)	was	shaped	by	a	process	of	cultural	group	selection: 11 Instead of merely ameliorating relations around us, as apes do, we have explicit teachings about the value of the community and the precedence it takes,	or	ought	to	take,	over	individual	interests.	Humans	go	much	further	in all	of	this	than	the	apes	[...]	which	is	why	we	have	moral	systems	and	they	do not.	(2006a,	p54) The	sentiments	and	social	norms	of	non-human	primates	are	too	local	and	specific to interactions between individuals to count as being genuinely	moral. De Waal argues that this	widening of concern to the community as a	whole, giving rise to genuine	moral belief systems in the	human lineage,	was	partly the	product of the evolution of warfare. As communities became larger and engaged in greater and more	deadly	inter-group	conflict,	the	harmony	and	cohesiveness	of	the	community became even more important, leading to more explicit and more general rules governing behaviour. De Waal also places emphasis on the evolution of human language as a tool for regimenting and transmitting genuine moral norms and judgments.	Albeit	with some important	differences in	detail, Joyce (2006),	Kitcher (2006, 2011), Rudolf von Rohr et al. (2011), Boehm (2012), Haidt (2012), and Suddendorf (2013),	among	others,	have	made	similar	claims to	de	Waal	about the continuity	yet	distinctiveness	of	human	morality	and	animal	proto-morality. In	a	widely	cited	commentary	on	de	Waal's	claims	about	the	"building	blocks" of	morality	being	present	in	other	species,	Korsgaard	(2006)	argues	that	true	moral cognition	requires: [N]ormative	self-government...	a	certain	form	of	self-consciousness:	namely, consciousness of the grounds on which you act as grounds... you have a certain	reflective	distance	from	the	motive,	and	you	are in	a	position	to	ask It	must	not	be forgotten that	although	a	high standard	of	morality	gives	but	a slight	or	no advantage to each	man	and	his children	over the	other	men	of the same tribe, yet that an advancement in the standard of	morality and an increase in the number of	well-endowed men	will	certainly	give	an	immense	advantage	to	one	tribe	over	another	(1871,	p159). Modern theorists of the evolution of morality disagree about the extent to which human moral capacities are themselves psychological adaptations or by-products of adaptations for other functions,	and	about	the	extent	to	which	the	specific	content	of	human	moral	codes	and judgments have	been	shaped	by	genetic	rather	purely	cultural	evolution	(for	a	survey,	see	Machery	and	Mallon, 2010). 12 yourself	"but	should	I	be	moved	in	that	way?	Wanting	that	end	inclines	me	to do	that	act,	but	does	it	really	give	me	a	reason	to	do	that	act?	(2006,	p113) This	might	sound	like	Darwin's	point	about	the	ability	to	reflect	on	one's	actions	and motivations	being	distinctive	of	human	moral	psychology.	However, in contrast to Darwin	and	de	Waal,	Korsgaard	does	not	see	this	core	feature	of	moral	cognition	as a	part	of	a	continuum	that	includes	the	proto-moral	capacities	of	animals,	but	rather as	representing	a	fundamental	discontinuity	in	nature.	It	is	thus	a	mistake	to	regard animals	as	even	proto-moral	beings.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	Korsgaard	adopts	a largely	Kantian	conception	of	moral	psychology,	centred	not	on	sentiment,	but	upon a capacity for rational deliberation about the normative justification for one's actions	and judgments ("ought I	perform	this	action?"; "is this the judgment that I should	make	in	this	situation?").	Though	one	can,	in	a	loose	sense,	regard	de	Waal's "building	blocks"	as	precursors	to	human	morality,	in	so	far	as	they	were	in	place	in our ancestors before they became	moral beings, there is no sense in	which these capacities can be regarded as continuous with the reflective capacity that constitutes	the	special	ingredient	in	human	moral	psychology: [I]t is the proper use of this capacity-the ability to form and act on judgments	of	what	we	ought	to	do-that	the	essence	of	morality	lies,	not	in altruism	or	the	pursuit	of	the	greater	good.	So	I	do	not	agree	with	de	Waal... The	difference	here	is	not	a	mere	matter	of	degree.	(Korsgaard,	2006,	p1167). Other	advocates	of	discontinuity include	Ayala (2010),	who	argues that the capacity for genuine moral judgment and agency requires very sophisticated reasoning capacities that, he argues, are plausibly absent in non-humans. These include: i) the ability to anticipate the consequences of one's actions for others, which requires the ability "to anticipate the future and to form	mental images of realities not present or not yet in existence";7 ii) the ability "to perceive certain 7	There	is	strong	evidence	that	many	animals	are	capable	of	anticipating	the	future	and	predicting	the likely outcomes of their actions (e.g., Clayton and Dickinson, 1998; Martin-Ordas et al., 2010). However, Ayala seems to have something more sophisticated than mere causal reasoning and anticipation	in	mind-something	more	like	what is	often	referred	to	as	"mental	time	travel",	which 13 objects	or	deeds	as	more	desirable	than	others",	which	requires	a	capacity	for	highly abstract thought; and iii) the ability to	make reflective choices between different courses	of	action	(2010,	p9018-9019).	Because	he	regards	each	of	these	capacities as necessary conditions for genuine moral cognition and agency, Ayala thus also denies	any	form	of	"incipient"	morality	in	animals. Bekoff	and	Pierce	respond	to	those	more	sceptical	about	animal	morality	by acknowledging	that	there	are	significant	cognitive	differences	between	humans	and animals. For instance, they accept de Waal's claim that only humans are able to explicitly	formulate	and	teach	moral	norms	via	language,	and	Korsgaard's	claim	that animals likely lack the rich	meta-cognitive capacities required for normative selfgovernment. However, they argue that these are differences within the moral domain,	not	between	moral	humans	and	non-moral	(or	proto-moral)	animals: We view each of these possibly unique capacities (language, judgment) as outer	layers	of	the	Russian	doll,	relatively	late	evolutionary	additions	to	the suite	of	moral	behaviours.	And	although	each	of these	capacities	may	make human	morality unique, they are all grounded in a	much deeper, broader, and	evolutionary	more	ancient	layer	of	moral	behaviours	that	we	share	with other	animals.	(2009,	p141) Similarly,	Andrews	and	Gruen	(2014)	criticize	the	tendency	of	philosophers like	Korsgaard	to	focus	on	"the	most	rarefied	and	linguistically	mediated"	aspects	of human	moral	cognition	and	behaviour: Once	we	are	able	to	look	past	the	most	salient	examples	of	human	morality, we	find	that	moral	behaviour	and	thought	is	a	thread	that	runs	through	our daily activities, from the micro-ethics involved in coordinating daily behaviours like driving a car down a crowded street [...] to the sharing of someone's joy in	getting	a	new	job	or	a	paper	published. If	we ignore	these sorts of	moral actions,	we are overintellectualizing human	morality (2014, p194). involves	the	ability	to	mentally	project	oneself	backward	or	forward	in	time,	and	is	widely	held	to	be uniquely	human,	largely	because	it	is	thought	to	require	a	particularly	rich	form	of	self-consciousness (e.g., Suddendorf, 2013; though see	Clayton	and	Dickson,	2010).	The type	of	mental time travel	he regards	to	be	most important for	morality	also involves	being	able	to	project	oneself into	someone else's	situation	in	time-for	instance,	being	able	to	anticipate	what	their	emotional	state	would	be. 14 Such	a	less	intellectualized	conception	of	what	it	is	to	think	and	behave	morally-for instance,	Gruen's	(2015)	own	"entangled	empathy"	account,	which	requires	just	that one	has	some	understanding	of	another's	situation	and	needs,	and	how	to	respond to their situation-is	much friendlier to including the	capacities for	sympathy	and empathy	and the tight social bonds	and relationships	of apes, in	particular, inside the	moral	domain.8 Another	important	contribution	to	this	debate	comes	from	Rowlands	(2012). He	criticizes	Bekoff	and	Pierce	for	offering	too	expansive	a	definition	of	what	it	is	to have a moral psychology, including the capacities underlying various helping behaviours and social norms,	which need not, he argues, be seen in	moral terms. Indeed, he suggests that they have essentially defined "morality" so broadly as to make the	question	of	whether	animals can	be	moral	beings	uninteresting. Instead, Rowlands	argues	that	the	real	question	is	whether	animals	are	capable	of	acting	for moral reasons. He adopts a largely sentimentalist account of moral motivation, according	to	which	one	can	act	morally	if	one	is	moved	by	certain	emotional	states, such	as	compassion	at	the	plight	of	an	other,	which	may	incline	one	to	act	so	as	to alleviate	their	suffering,	or indignation	at	another's	actions,	which	may	incline	one to behave punitively towards them.9 He adopts an externalist theory of moral content,	according	to	which	particular	emotional	states	represent	moral	properties if they bear appropriate causal relations to them. Crucially, Rowlands argues, a creature	need	not	be	aware	of	these	relations	in	order	for	these	emotional	states	to have	moral	content	and	constitute	moral	reasons	for	action. Against those Kantians, Aristotelians, and sentimentalists (Rowlands includes	Hume	and	Darwin	here)	that	have	claimed	that	genuine	moral	motivation 8 Andrews and Gruen (2014) argue that this recognition and concern for others needn't require particularly rich	mind-reading capacity. Hence, cognitive empathy needn't be necessary for	moral empathy. 9	Rowlands	does	not regard this as the	only route to	moral action.	Hence, he	departs from	a strict sentimentalism	by allowing for the	possibility of	moral action	being	produced	by "cold" reasoning processes, without affective states having to play a necessary role. However, he thinks that such cognitive	forms	of	moral	motivation	are	probably	unique	to	humans. 15 requires	that	one	at	least	sometimes	be	consciously	aware	of	one's	reasons	and	be able	to	reflect	on	their	normative force,	Rowlands	points	to	the	case	of	Myshkin,	a character based on the prince from	Dostoyevsky's	The Idiot.	Myshkin experiences what	seems	like	compassion	for	others	and	is	thus	compelled	to	act	in	ways	that	we would	ordinarily	regard	as	kind	or	compassionate,	yet	lacks	the	capacity	to	subject these	feelings	and	actions	to	critical	scrutiny.	He	is	unable	to	consciously	recognize these	emotional	states	as	reasons	for	action	and	unable	to	think	about	whether	they are the correct ones to have in the circumstances. Since he lacks these capacities, Rowlands	argues	that	Myshkin	cannot	be	morally	evaluated	(praised	or	blamed)	or held	morally	responsible	for	his	actions,	and	thus	should	not	be	regarded	as	a	fullyfledged	moral	agent.	However,	it	is	plausible	to	regard	him	as	a	moral	subject,	since he	is	surely	motivated	by	emotions	that	track	moral	considerations-his	feelings	of compassion	are	caused	by	others'	suffering,	and	he	clearly	acts	in	order	to	alleviate this suffering. Thus, Rowlands argues that Myshkin possesses a genuine moral psychology,	but	one	that	operates	on	a	more	"visceral"	level	than	that	of	full	moral agents.	Even	if	he	lacks	the	reflective	capacity	for	full	moral	agency,	he	can	still	act for moral reasons. In so doing, Rowlands tries to diffuse various traditional philosophical arguments for denying that	Myshkin's	motivations can	be genuinely moral.	The	result	is	that	social	animals	that	also	lack	these	reflective	capacities,	but, like Myshkin, are capable of possessing other-directed emotional states (like sympathetic	distress)	that	track	moral	considerations	and	play	a	causal	role	in	their behaviour, may also be regarded as moral subjects.10 Of course, the question of which	species	actually	satisfy these	conditions for	moral	subjecthood is,	Rowlands emphasises, an empirical one, but he sees the work on animal emotion cited by Bekoff and Pierce and de Waal as providing at least a prima facie case for the existence	of	non-human	moral	subjects.11 10 Monsó (2015) points out that Rowlands' externalist account of what it is to track moral considerations	allows	that	animals	that	lack	the	capacity	for	full	cognitive	empathy	may	still	possess, and	be	motivated	by,	moral	emotions.	Even	emotions	produced	by	emotional	contagion	can	count	as moral. 11 For their part, Bekoff and Pierce (2009, p144-145) express scepticism about the traditional philosophical	concept	of	moral	agency	and	argue	that	its	application	to	animals	is	"likely	to	promote 16 3. Two	debates The debate over animal morality has featured relatively little empirical disagreement	about	what	animals	and	humans	are	able	to	do	or	not	do,	to	the	extent that	one	can,	as	I	have, lay	out	the	contours	of the	debate	while	saying little	about the	empirical	data	itself.	Rather,	the	dispute	has	mostly	been	about	where	to	draw the boundary of morality and moral cognition. However, though there has been much	debate	about	different	definitions	of	what	it	is	to	possess	morality	or	a	moral psychology, there has been next to no explicit discussion of what standard of correctness should be used for evaluating these rival definitions. Yet, the debate appears to make no sense unless we assume that there is such a standard. The protagonists	clearly	do	not	see	themselves	as	merely	offering	stipulative	accounts	of morality* or morality†. The debate is taken to be substantive and not purely terminological. One	difficulty	is	that	theorists	can	and	have	offered	definitions	of	"morality" and	"moral"	at	all	sorts	of	different	levels:	in	terms	of	behaviour,	in	terms	of	content (e.g., the characteristic subject	matter of	moral norms or judgments), in terms of form	or	character	(e.g.,	the	logical	or	psychological	structure	of	moral	judgments	or moral	norms),	in	terms	of	underlying	processes	or	capacities	(e.g.,	the	possession	of certain types of emotion or reasoning processes), and so forth. But, setting that complication aside for the	moment, what, in general, is it to define "morality" or "moral"?	As	we	will	see,	consideration	of	this	question	leads	to	the	conclusion	that there	are	actually two	quite	different	debates	over	animal	morality,	which	need	to be	carefully	distinguished. 3.1 Conceptual	analysis	vs.	natural	kind	approaches	to	defining	"morality" philosophical confusion and should ultimately be avoided". However, they do suggest that animal behaviour can be morally evaluated within the context of animal communities, such that the behaviour	of	a	wolf towards	a fellow	wolf is	morally	evaluable,	but "predatory	behaviour	of	a	wolf towards	an	elk	is	amoral". 17 Taking	their	cue	from	Taylor	(1978),	Stich	and	colleagues	(Nado	et	al.,	2009;	Stich, 2009)	distinguish	between two	different types	of approach to	defining "morality", which	employ	different	criteria	for	what	it is	to	get	the	definition	right:	conceptual analysis	and	natural	kind	approaches.12 Though	conceptual	analysis	can	take	many	forms,	Stich	and	colleagues	focus on	a	common	version	that	is	employed	in	many	areas	of	contemporary	philosophy. One	begins	with	a	common	sense	understanding	of	the	concept	to	be	analysed-for instance,	the	concept,	moral	judgment.	This	might,	for	instance,	be	based	on	certain commonly recognized instances or distinctions (e.g., that there is a distinction between judgments about canonical	moral issues and judgments about	matters	of taste or etiquette). A philosophical analysis of the concept is then proposed, typically	involving	a	set	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	application	of	the concept. This analysis is then tested against intuitions about whether or not the concept	does	actually	apply in	various	actual	or	hypothetical	cases.	The	analysis is taken to stand or fall depending on how	well it	matches up	with these intuitions over	a	wide	range	of	cases.13 While	empirical	data	may	be	relevant	to	the	conceptual	analysis	approach,	in so	far	as	it	elicits	intuitions	about	the	application	of	the	concept	under	analysis	and can thus be used to test the adequacy of proposed analyses, the natural kind approach is,	according	to	Stich	and	colleagues,	much	more	of	an	empirical	project. Natural	kinds	are	real	categories	of	thing	that	exist	in	nature,	independently	of	our beliefs about them, and which can support inductive generalizations (Bird and Tobin, 2015). Here, one may begin with an intuitive or theoretically motivated conception	of	what,	say,	a	moral	judgment	is.	Like	the	conceptual	analysis	approach, 12	Stich	and	colleagues	also	talk	about	a	third	type	of	approach:	Oxford-style	linguistic	analysis.	This would	involve	studying	how	people	use	moral	terms	in	ordinary	language.	I	won't	discuss	that	sort	of approach	here, since I don't think that any	of the	protagonists to the	debate over animal	morality would	see	themselves	as	engaging	in	such	a	project. 13 The introduction to	Wallace and	Walker (1970; cited by Stich and colleagues) provides a nice summary	of various conceptual analyses of	moral rule that can	be extracted from the literature in moral	philosophy	and	the	problems	that	they	face.	Stich	is	a	longstanding	critic	of	conceptual	analysis in philosophy, and thus Stich (2009) expresses much scepticism about this approach to defining "morality". 18 this	might	involve	pointing	to	some	intuitively	clear	instances	and	non-instances	of the	kind.	However,	one	then	conducts	empirical	investigation	into	the	properties	of the clear instances, seeking to articulate certain	essential or typically co-occurring properties	that	individuate	the	kind,	and	which	can	then	play	a	role	in	explaining	the various	generalizations	that	can	be	made	about	its	instances.	Crucially,	this	may	lead one to revise the starting conception in various	ways-for instance, deciding that what one	might have previously regarded as an instance of the kind is really not (e.g.,	in	the	case	of	the	natural	kind,	water,	an	articulation	of	the	kind	in	terms	of	an essential	property-possession	of	the	chemical	structure,	H2O-implies	that	certain clear, odourless liquids	are	not really instances	of	water), or	deciding that certain putative essential properties are not really essential to the kind (e.g., modern biology forces us to abandon the vitalist claim that living organisms are distinguished from non-living things by the possession of some intrinsic nonphysical property). In this respect, the standard of correctness is empirical: how well does the proposed articulation of the kind match up with what we find in nature?	Moreover, it is nature that ultimately has the last say about	whether the putative kind is an actually existing natural kind at all (consider phlogiston and caloric),	and	the	properties	that	something	must	possess	in	order	to	be	an	instance of	the	kind. Stich and colleagues view the Turiel account of the moral/conventional distinction	as	an	example	of	this	latter	approach	(see	also	Kumar,	2015).	Turiel	and colleagues have marshalled an impressive amount of cross-cultural and developmental	evidence,	which	is	claimed	to	show	that	neuro-typical	humans	(both pan-culturally	and	at	a	fairly	early	age)	respond	to	violations	of	prototypical	moral norms quite differently to violations of prototypical conventional norms. This characteristic psychological profile (universality, authority-independence, greater seriousness)	is	also	claimed	to	go	along	with	a	characteristic	subject	matter-issues of	harm	and	fairness-which	play	a	distinctive	role	in	the	justifications	that	people tend to	offer for their judgments.	These	psychological	properties can therefore	be read, Stich and colleagues suggest, as supposedly constituting a nomological cluster-a set of typically co-occurring properties that are	meant to individuate a 19 distinct	psychological	kind:	moral judgment.14	Hence, though	Turiel	and	colleagues were initially inspired by the philosophical literature on moral judgment, rather than	attempting to specify the content	of the	concept of	moral judgment, they are best interpreted	as	doing something	more	akin to	what	physicists sought to	do in providing	an	empirical	account	of the	nature	of	heat.	Crucially, as is the	case	with heat,	the	ultimate	outcome	of	such	an	approach	may	bear	little	relationship	to	prior folk concepts or armchair philosophical analyses. For instance, on Turiel and colleagues'	account,	a	judgment	that	has	the	psychological	profile	of	a	conventional judgment wouldn't count as a moral judgment, irrespective of what intuition or one's	favoured	philosophical	account	of	moral	judgment	might	say. As	we	will	see,	what	I	want	to	call	the	conceptual	approach	to	animal	morality is	rather	more	complex	than	the	picture	that	Stich	and	colleagues	paint	of	traditional conceptual	analysis in	philosophy-in	particular, the	methodology isn't just	one	of testing proposed analyses against intuitions about the application of the relevant concept.	Nonetheless, Stich and colleagues' distinction	does	help	us to isolate two quite	different	approaches	to	the	question	of	whether	morality	exists	in	animals. 3.2 Conceptual	vs.	natural	kind	approaches	to	animal	morality Though it is also	possible to read	his account	of	moral	motivation	as	describing	a natural kind (see Section	4),	Rowlands is quite explicit that	he sees	his	project as one	of	"conceptual	analysis	and	clarification"	(2012,	p33),	and	though	there	is	more to	his	case	than just	an	appeal to intuition,	much	of	his	discussion	of	Myshkin	and 14	Stich	and	colleagues	suggest	that, if	Turiel	and	colleagues	are	right, then	moral judgments	would constitute something like a homeostatic property cluster (HPC) kind (Boyd, 1999). HPC kinds are individuated	by	clusters	of	typically	co-occurring	properties,	where	this	clustering	can	be	explained in terms	of	a shared	underlying	casual (homeostatic)	mechanism. In this instance, the	homeostatic mechanism would presumably be the particular psychological processes that underlie moral as opposed to conventional judgments. Crucially, unlike on classical essentialist accounts of natural kinds,	members	of	HPC	kinds	needn't	share	sets	of	properties	that	are	both	necessary	and	sufficient for	kind	membership,	which	is	why	the	HPC	account	has	become	popular	as	an	account	of	biological and	psychological	kinds,	which	tend	to	exhibit	significant	internal	variability,	but	nonetheless	display stable	clusterings	of	properties-in	virtue,	for	instance,	in	the	case	of	biological	species,	of	a	shared evolutionary	history. 20 the distinction between moral subjects and moral agents clearly fits with the traditional	methodology	of	conceptual	analysis	that	Stich	and	colleagues	describe. Rowlands'	main	claim	is	that	there	is	a	distinction	to	be	drawn	between	the concepts of moral motivation and moral responsibility (or evaluability). His preliminary argument for this distinction is that analyses that equate the two via some	form	of	reflection	condition	don't	match	up	with	what	intuition	seems	to	tell us	about	Myshkin. Intuitively,	Myshkin	does	act	for	moral	reasons,	even	though	he lacks the capacity for critical moral reflection on his motivations and actions. However,	because	he	lacks	this	reflective	capacity,	intuitively,	Myshkin	ought	not	be regarded	as	worthy	of	praise	or	blame.	Hence,	we	have	a	reason	to	at	least	entertain the	possibility	of	a	distinction	between	moral	subjects	(who	act for	moral	reasons, but need not be morally responsible) and full-blown moral agents (who act for moral reasons and are morally responsible/evaluable for their actions).15 This opens the door for animals without rich reflective to potentially act for moral reasons. I	want	to	stress	that	this	isn't	the	only	argument	that	Rowlands	gives	for	the claim that creatures without rich reflective capacities can act for moral reasons. However, at least at the outset,	much hangs on our intuitions about	whether the concepts	of	moral	motivation	and	moral	responsibility	apply	to	Myshkin.	In	so	far	as intuition	suggests	that	the	former	but	not	the	latter	apply,	that	provides	preliminary support for Rowlands' externalist analysis of what it is to act for moral reasons. Most	of	the	rest	of	the	book	is	concerned	with	developing	this	analysis	and	rebutting various Kantian and Aristotelian arguments for resisting the intuition that Myshkin's motivations are genuinely moral. The use of the Myshkin case also assumes that sceptics about animal morality, like Korsgaard, are engaged in the same project, and Rowlands (2017) suggests such sceptics are often inclined towards invoking reflection	conditions in	analyses	of	moral	motivation	because	of 15	Rowlands	(2017)	makes	the	same	sort	of	argument	in	the	case	of	the	notorious	real	life	10-year-old killers	of	Jamie	Bulger.	Intuition	suggests	that	10-year	olds	lack	full	moral	responsibility,	but	also	that these	boys	were	motivated	by	(bad)	moral	reasons-for	instance,	they	reported	planning	on	killing	a child	that	day. 21 the intuition that non-human animals cannot be	moral beings-for instance, that they are simply prisoners of their desires and that such creatures cannot act for truly	moral reasons.	The	Myshkin	case	and the	arguments	he	builds	around it are thus designed to trump that intuition and undermine Korsgaard's claim that normative self-government is necessary for a creature to be able to act for truly moral reasons. In	addition,	Rowlands' criticism	of	Bekoff	and	Pierce	also	seems to presuppose this type of approach. His claim is essentially that their expansive definition of what it is to be a	moral creature	misses the core component of the concept-acting for moral reasons. He takes this to be demonstrated by various examples of behaviour sufficient for a creature to be regarded as a moral being under their account, but which are not intuitively moral behaviours at all (see Rowlands,	2012,	p25-32). However,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	do	not	actually	seem	to	be	engaged	in	that	type of	classic	philosophical	project.	They	don't	seem	to	be	interested	in	our	concepts	of moral motivation or moral agency. Rather, they explicitly regard morality as a biological	phenomenon,	and	seem	to	reject	the	idea	that	it	is	something	that	can	be defined	at	a	conceptual	level.16	Hence,	the	definition	they	offer	of	"morality"	isn't,	I suggest,	meant	to	be	an	articulation	of	the	concept	of	morality.	Rather,	it	is	meant	to pick	out	a	natural	kind.	Like	Turiel	and	colleagues	on	moral judgment,	Bekoff	and Pierce seem to see content as important, claiming that	moral behaviours concern "harm and well-being". However, their principal focus is on the evolutionary function of morality. They take morality qua natural kind to be a cluster of psychological	capacities (and	associated	behaviours) that	can	be	grouped	together according	to	a	common	proper	function,	which	is	to	facilitate	and	increase	levels	of co-operation within groups of social animals. At least in its broad outlines, this evolutionary-functional account is common to many theories of the evolution of 16	I	don't	mean	to	imply	that	Rowlands	thinks	that	the	capacities	that	underlie	what	it	is	to	be	a	moral being cannot be understood in biological terms. He does hold these capacities to be a product of evolution by natural selection. Korsgaard appears similarly open to evolutionary explanations for normative	self-government.	The	issue	is	about	how	we	are	to	determine	which	evolved	capacities	are moral	capacities. 22 morality (e.g., Sober and Wilson, 1997; Joyce, 2006; Kitcher, 2011; Haidt, 2012; Greene,	2013),	which	see	it,	in	one	way	or	another,	as	a	psychological	adaptation	for group	living.	The	difference	is	that	Bekoff	and	Pierce	are	more	expansive	in	terms	of what	capacities	they	claim	to	share	this	common	evolutionary	function,	and	are	thus more liberal	about	what	types	of	psychology	a	creature	can	possess in	order	to	be classified	as	having	a	moral	psychology.17 In his arguments against what he refers to as the veneer theory, which regards	morality	as	an	artificial	overlay	on	our	biological	nature,	de	Waal (2006a) also regards	morality as a biological phenomenon to be understood in functional terms. He adopts	much the same position as Bekoff and Pierce	when it comes to grouping together capacities that	he regards to	be "building-blocks" of	morality- other-directed emotions, pro-social and altruistic motivation, primitive social norms.	Each	of	these	represent	psychological	adaptations	to	the	demands	of	social life, sharing broadly the same function of improving levels of co-operation and group	cohesiveness.	However,	de	Waal	restricts	the	natural	kind,	morality,	to	human beings	by	including	only	those	capacities	that	allow	the	scope	of	social	norms	to	be widened	to	the	community	as	a	whole	and	for	them	to	be	externalized	in	language, the idea being that these facilitate even better levels of co-operation and group cohesiveness than one finds in other primates. He thus regards morality to be a specific adaptation to greater co-operative demands placed on our hominin ancestors.	The	result	is	that	we	have	two	related	but	distinct	natural	psychological kinds: the cluster of proto-moral capacities shared with other primates (and potentially	other	social	mammals),	which	constitute	(in	Bekoff	and	Pierce's	words)	a social	glue,	and	the	cluster	of	moral	capacities	unique	to	humans,	which	constitute	a better	social	glue. 17	It	is	worth	noting	that	this	appeal	to	function	requires	a	different	conception	of	natural	kinds	to	the HPC account that Stich and colleagues appeal to when making sense of the claims of Turiel and colleagues, since that account has difficultly in accommodating function (rather than clustering of properties in virtue of an underlying causal mechanism) as a criterion for kind membership (Ereshefsky	and	Reydon,	2015).	Other	theories	of	natural	kinds	are	friendlier	to	such	functional	kinds (e.g.,	Ereshefsky	and	Reydon,	2015;	Slater,	2015). 23 It	seems,	then,	that	Rowlands	and	Korsgaard	are	actually	engaged	in	quite	a different debate to Bekoff and Pierce and de	Waal. The former are engaged in a disagreement over whether particular moral concepts can be applied to the psychological	states	and	behaviours	of	various	animals.	The	issue	is	about	correctly categorizing	animal	behaviour	and	psychology	either	as	falling	inside	or	outside	the moral domain, but drawing the boundaries of this domain is a matter of investigating the content of these concepts. The latter group of researchers, however-and	here,	I	think,	we	can	also	include	most	of	the	other	authors	cited	in Section	2-seem	to	be	pursuing	quite	a	different	project:	understanding	the	nature and distribution of	morality as a biological phenomenon-a	psychological	natural kind. This is an empirical rather than conceptual project, and may, like investigations	into	other	natural	kinds,	lead	to	definitions	of	"morality"	that	depart significantly from the content of pre-existing folk concepts or philosophical analyses.	As	Bekoff	and	Pierce	put	it: We	want	to	detach	the	word	morality	from	some	of	its	moorings,	allowing	us to	rethink	what	it	is	in	light	of	a	huge	pile	of	research	from	various	fields	that speaks	to	the	phenomenon.	(2009,	p12). In	this	respect,	the	two	groups	have	largely	been	talking	past	each	other.	For instance,	when	Korsgaard	says	that	de	Waal's	"building	blocks"	have	little	to	do	with morality because the "essence of morality" is normative self-government, "not altruism	or the	pursuit	of the	greater	good"	(2006,	p116), she is	making	what	she takes	to	be	a	conceptual	point-it	is	basically	a	category	mistake	to	regard	instances of altruism or sympathetic concern as having anything to do with morality. However,	the	capacities	de	Waal	cites	aren't	meant	to	be	building	blocks	of	human morality in a conceptual sense, but in an evolutionary one, and they are to be regarded	as	continuous	with the	capacities that	underlie	human	moral	psychology because	of	their	functional,	not	conceptual,	similarity. In	response	to	Korsgaard,	de	Waal	says	something	that	is	quite	illuminating in	this	context: 24 To neglect the common ground with other primates, and to deny the evolutionary	roots	of	human	morality,	would	be	like	arriving	at	the	top	of	a tower	to	declare	that	the	rest	of	the	building	is irrelevant,	that	the	precious concept of "tower" ought to be reserved for its summit.	While	making for good academic fights, semantics are mostly a waste of time. Are animals moral?	Let	us	simply	conclude	that	they	occupy	several	floors	of	the	tower	of morality. Rejection of even this modest proposal can only result in an impoverished	view	of	the	structure	as	a	whole.	(2006b,	p181). Here,	de	Waal	seems	to	recognize	that	Korsgaard's	project is	more	of	a	conceptual one	than	his,	which	is	to	understand	the	evolutionary	roots	of	morality	conceived	as a	natural	kind.	Yet,	his response to	her	simply	misses the	point: for	Korsgaard,	de Waal's "tower	of	morality" isn't a tower	of	morality at all, and to regard the	other floors	below	the	summit	as	having	anything	to	do	with	morality	in	her	sense	of	the term is to	change the	subject.	Rowlands	makes	a	similar	observation	about	Bekoff and	Pierce's	(2009,	p140-1)	earlier	quoted	"Russian	doll"	response	to	Korsgaard: [T]heir response seems curiously off-target... Korsgaard claims that the ability to reflect on or form judgments about what we ought to do is the essence of morality. Any behaviour that is not subject to this sort of normative self-reflection is not moral behaviour... appearances notwithstanding.	(Rowlands,	2012,	p111) However, Rowlands himself also seems to	misunderstand	what Bekoff and Pierce and de	Waal are doing: from their perspective it	makes perfect sense to talk of a "tower" or "Russian doll" of morality if "morality" is defined in evolutionaryfunctional	terms.	These	researchers	are	thus	clearly	talking	at	cross-purposes. 3.3 "Morality"	and	normativity So	far,	I	have	tried	to	show	that	these	two	groups	of	researchers,	who	are	ostensibly engaged in the same debate over whether animals possess morality or a moral psychology, actually adopt quite different methodologies when it comes to determining	what	it	is	for	a	creature	to	possess	such	a	thing.	One	group	(Korsgaard and	Rowlands) largely	sees this	as	a	conceptual	project,	while the	other (de	Waal, Bekoff	and	Pierce,	and	most	of	the	other	authors	cited	in	Section	2)	seem	to	conceive 25 of	the	project	as	one	of	uncovering	the	nature	of	a	psychological	natural	kind.18	Part of the	reason for this	methodological	difference	when it	comes to	determining the answer	is	that	the	two	groups	also	interpret	the	question	of	what it is	to	possess	a morality	or	a	moral	psychology	quite	differently. It	is	very	important	to	understand	why	philosophers	like	Korsgaard	regard	a capacity	for	normative	self-government	to	be	the	essence	of	morality.	As	Rowlands points out, the key idea-which seems to be common to many philosophical traditions,	not	just	the	Kantian	tradition	to	which	Korsgaard	owes	her	allegiance-is that	this	kind	of	reflective	capacity	is	necessary	in	order	for	a	creature	have	control over its motivations, and for the creature to exercise autonomy. Such control/autonomy	is	seen	as	necessary	in	order	for	both	motivations	and	actions	to count	as	genuinely	moral: A motivation can count as moral when it is morally normative. And a motivation	can	be	morally	normative	only	when	its	subject	has	control	over it. Control consists in the ability to critically reflect on or scrutinize one's motivations	(a	claim	endorsed	by	both	Kant	and	Aristotle),	and	this	may	be	a function	of	the	practical	wisdom	that	allows	one	to	grasp	the	morally	salient features	of	a	situation...	There	can	be	no	(moral)	normativity	without	control. That is why animals cannot be moral subjects: they cannot control their motivations	and	so	those	motivations	have	no	normative	status.	(Rowlands, 2012,	p122) This	passage	illustrates	a	key	point:	for	philosophers	like	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands, descriptive	claims	about	moral	psychology-e.g.,	what	constitutes	moral	judgment, moral	reasoning,	or	moral	motivation-are	crucially	bound	up	with	high-level	meta- 18	It	would	be	too	strong	to	say	that	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands	regard	the	debate	over	animal	morality as entirely conceptual. For instance, Korsgaard	would be forced to abandon her view if empirical research	established	that	normative	self-government	was	in	fact	beyond	the	psychological	capacity	of human	beings	or	that	our	reflective	capacities	never	played	a	role	in	our	putatively	moral	behaviour. The	same	would	hold	for	Rowlands	if	cognitive	science	established	that	other-directed	emotions	play no motivational role in human or animal behaviour. Hence, both would accept that empirical research could show that the conditions of their respective analyses of what it is to be a moral creature fail to be	met by prototypically	moral creatures (i.e., human beings) and thus should be abandoned	or	modified.	Both	also	regard	it	to	be	an	empirical	question	as	to	which	species	actually turn out to be	moral creatures, given	whatever analysis is finally accepted.	However, that is quite different	from	seeing	empirical	research	as	the	primary	tool	for	determining	what	morality	is,	which is	the	position	of	the	natural	kind	approach. 26 ethical	questions	about	the	nature	of	normativity	and	moral	value.	Morality	is	here regarded	as	inherently	normative:	it	makes	normative	claims	on	us.	To	have	a	moral psychology is to, in	some	sense, to live	within	the	world	of	such	normative	claims. Rowlands	and	Korsgaard's	primary	concern	in	considering	whether	animals	can	be said to	have	a	moral	psychology is thus	whether they	possess	psychological	states that can be viewed as having	what Rowlands calls	normative grip-whether they have	the	right	kind	of	normative	status	or	"oughtness"	to	them.	Crucially,	this	notion of normative status	or oughtness isn't a	purely	psychological one. It is not simply about the causal role that particular psychological states (such as other-directed emotions)	play in	driving the	behaviour	of the creature; it is about	whether these states	have	appropriate	sensitivity	to	"the	morally	salient	features"	of	the	situation. In this	respect,	a	creature	can	only	possess	a	moral	psychology if its	psychological states stand in an appropriate metaphysical relationship to	moral properties-in particular,	whether these properties (however they are to be understood) can be seen as making normative claims on the creature.19 Thus, when Rowlands talks about	a	creature	acting	for	moral	reasons,	this	is	a	claim	about	the	normative	status of	the	psychological	states	that	motivate	the	creature's	actions.	What	this	means	is that	the	answer	to	the	question	of	what	counts	as	a	genuinely	moral	psychology	and whether	animals	can	have	such	a	psychology	depends	on	the	account	that	we	give	of the nature of normativity and moral properties, and hence of the grounds for morality. In this sense, moral psychology is fully enmeshed in the classic foundational	questions	of	meta-ethics. Korsgaard (1996)	has	a	rich	and	complex	account	of	normativity	and	of	what it	is	for	morality	to	make	normative	claims	on	us	as	human	beings,	the	full	details	of which are beyond the scope this paper. However, the basic idea is that the normativity of morality stems from "the reflective structure of human consciousness":	''The	source	of	the	normativity	of	moral	claims	must	be	found	in	the agent's own will'' (1996, p19); ''Autonomy is the source of obligation, and in 19	It	is	important	to	note	that	standing	in	this	relationship	shouldn't	require	that	one	must	have	the correct	moral	beliefs	or	attitudes,	otherwise this	might rule	out the	possibility	of someone like the neo-Nazi	possessing	a	moral	psychology. 27 particular of our ability to obligate ourselves'' (1996, p91). Since reflection is the source of moral normativity, creatures without such reflective capacity simply cannot live in the	world	of the	normative, the	world	of	values,	or "the	kingdom	of ends".	Hence,	nothing	they	do	or	think	can	have	anything	to	do	with	morality,	except insofar as they make moral claims on us qua creatures with the right type of reflective	capacity. All	of	this	lies	in	the	background	of	Korsgaard's	response	to	de	Waal.	This	is why	normative	self-government	is	the	essence	of	morality	and	animals	lack	even	the building	blocks	of	morality.	This is	also	why it insufficient for critics	of	Korsgaard (e.g.,	Musschenga,	2013;	Andrews,	2015)	to	respond	to	her	denial	of	animal	morality by	citing	the	empirical	work	in	cognitive	science	on	the	apparent	rarity	of	reflection in	everyday	"moral"	cognition	in	humans	(e.g.,	Haidt,	2001;	Mikhail,	2011).	For	one thing,	Korsgaard	can	emphasize	that	neuro-typical	humans	still	have	this	reflective capacity,	even	if	it	is	rarely	and	imperfectly	deployed,	so	these	humans	can	still	live within	the	world	of	the	normative,	while	animals	cannot.	But,	most	importantly,	she can	claim	that	this	work	tells	us	nothing	about	normativity	and	hence	about	moral psychology,	as	she	conceives	of	it. Rowlands'	goal	is	to	undermine	such	intellectualist	accounts	of	what	it	is	for a	creature's	psychological	states	to	have	normative	status.	He	argues	that	the	notion of control or autonomy invoked by Kantians like Korsgaard is elusive and that adding in a capacity for reflection, by itself, fails to explain how particular psychological states can gain normative status. This opens the door for an externalist (rather than internalist intellectualist) account of what it is to have normative	sensitivity	to	morally	salient	features	of	a	situation.	Add	to	this	a	broadly consequentialist account of moral properties, and we have an account of moral normativity that allows that the motivational states of unreflective animals and creatures	like	Myshkin-e.g.,	other-directed	emotions,	which	track	others'	suffering or	well-being-can	be	regarded	as	genuinely	moral	reasons	for	action. This shows why the kind of conceptual analysis project Korsgaard and Rowland's are pursing is rather more complex than the picture of conceptual analysis	we	get	from	Stich	and	colleagues.	Defining	what	counts	as	genuinely	moral 28 cognition and motivation isn't just about comparing proposed analyses with intuitions	about	the	application	of	the	concepts.	It	is	also	crucially	bound	up	with	a variety of background theoretical concerns about the nature of normativity and moral properties and what it is for one's psychological states to track, or be appropriately sensitive to, such things-Rowlands depends on a broadly consequentialist theory (and, arguably, a form of moral realism [Monsó, 2015]), while Korsgaard adopts a form of Kantian constructivism. This means that the resultant	analyses	can	be	revisionary	with	respect	to	ordinary	folk	intuitions	about the	application	of	these	concepts,	in	so	far	as	this	is	necessary	to	meet	the	relevant background theoretical constraints (this is	why the	Myshkin case can't do all the work	for	Rowlands). However,	most importantly, this also shows	why the two groups interpret the	question	of	what	it	is	to	possess	a	moral	psychology	and	whether	animals	have such a psychology quite differently. Despite their disagreements, Rowlands and Korsgaard	agree	that	this	is	a	question	fundamentally	bound	up	with	philosophical theorizing	about	the	nature	of	moral	normativity.	The	issue	is	whether	animals	can have	psychological	states	with	normative	status-whether	they	can	live	within	the world of values. However, de Waal and Bekoff and Pierce do not seem to be concerned with such high-level philosophical issues about the nature of moral properties	and	what it is to	be	psychologically sensitive to the	normative.	Though they	do	make approving references	here and there to the sentimentalist tradition (de Waal makes several references to Adam Smith, for instance) and to other philosophical theories	of	morality,	neither	of them	offer,	or claim to	presume,	any account of normativity or	moral value. They	are concerned	with	whether animals make normative evaluations in a purely psychological sense-for instance, judgments of disapproval about others' behaviour-but this isn't sufficient for normativity	in	the	sense	at	stake	for	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands,	since	one	has	to	show that	such judgments	make	normative	claims	on the	animal (i.e., that they	bear the appropriate relationship to moral properties, however that relationship and the properties	themselves	are	to	be	understood),	rather	than	just	playing	a	causal	role in	driving	behaviour. Indeed, their project	would still seem to	make sense even if 29 one	were	to	deny	that	there	is	such	a	thing	as	moral	normativity	or	moral	value	in the	sense	of	interest	to	meta-ethicists,	or	that	humans	possess	psychological	states with normative status. The issue, for them, is about uncovering the psychological mechanisms	that	underlie	morality,	conceived	as	a	psychological	natural	kind-i.e., the extension of what we ordinarily regard as moral thinking or motivation- whether	or	not this	matches	up	with	what comes	out	of	a	meta-ethical	account	of what	moral	normativity	is,	and	whether	any	animals	possess	instances	of	this	kind. Hence,	what	we	have	here	are	two	very	different	conceptions	of	what	it	is	to do	moral	psychology.	The	approach	of	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	falls	broadly	in line with the interdisciplinary field that now gets called "empirical moral psychology",	exemplified	by	researchers like	Nichols	(2004),	Mikhail	(2011),	Haidt (2012), Greene (2013), Prinz (2014), and	many others. For such empirical	moral psychologists, the	discovery, for instance, that	normative	reflection is	rare in	most actual human	beings is a compelling reason to downplay its role in human	moral cognition. Whatever normative or meta-ethical implications might be taken to follow from the answers that are given, questions about what counts as moral judgment,	moral	reasoning,	and	so	forth,	are	seen	as	empirical	questions	that	can,	at least	at	the	outset,	be	bracketed	off	from,	say,	an	account	of	moral	value.	However, for Korsgaard and Rowlands' brand of moral psychology, how one answers such questions	is	crucially	philosophically	loaded,	and	it	is	impossible	to	understand	the motivations for their respective	accounts	of	what it is to	have	a	moral	psychology without understanding their background assumptions about the nature of moral value. I	don't	want	to	downplay	the	interest	or	the	importance	of	the	meta-ethical issues that form the background to Rowlands and Korsgaard's contributions. Rowlands, for instance, thinks that the question of whether there is an adequate account	of	normativity	that	can	potentially	be	applied	to	the	psychological	states	of animals is particularly important for thinking about our ethical responsibilities towards	them.	If	it	turns	out	that	some	animals	are	capable	of	doing	good	qua	moral subjects, then, Rowlands (2012, p250-254) argues, this should incline us towards the	view that these creatures	are	worthy	of	moral respect.	Although they can't	be 30 praised	(or	blamed) for	what they	do	(since they lack full	moral	agency), they	are capable of making the world a better place, and are thus deserving of a type of respect	that	goes	beyond	simply	admiring	their	aesthetic	or	other	properties.20	That said, I do think that there is something fishy about defining	moral cognition and motivation in such a	way that it corresponds to one's preferred account of	moral normativity	and	moral	value.	The	idea	seems	to	be	that	we	can	save	the	normative force of	morality if	we	define it like this, hence anything that doesn't fit	with this account	of	normativity	can't	really	be	morality.21	This	savours	somewhat	of	stacking the deck, and certainly runs against the view of many contemporary metaethicists-including, for instance, Joyce (2006) and Kitcher (2011)-that the best way	to	approach	the	classic	foundational	questions	of	meta-ethics	is	to	start	from	an empirically	informed	account	of	the	nature	and	evolution	of	moral	cognition,	rather than	have	one's	account	of	the	nature	of	moral	cognition	depend	on	prior	answers	to these	questions. Nonetheless, what I think is curiously missing from the discussions of Rowlands	and	Korsgaard	(given	how	careful	they	are	in	other	respects),	along	with various	commentaries	from	others	on	their	putative	engagements	with	de	Waal	and Bekoff	and	Pierce	(e.g.,	Musschenga,	2013;	Andrews,	2015),	is	awareness	of	the	fact 20	Although	claims	about	the	supposedly	unique	place	of	human	beings	in	the	world	of	the	normative have often been used to justify our using animals for food and other purposes, Korsgaard (2006, p119) actually views the implications of what she believes to be our normative uniqueness quite differently:	"As	beings	who	are	capable	of	doing	what	we	ought	and	holding	ourselves	responsible	for what	we	do,	and	as	beings	who	are	capable	of	caring	about	what	we	are	and	not	just	about	what	we can	get for	ourselves,	we	are	under	a	strong	obligation	to treat the	other	animals	decently,	even	at cost	to	ourselves". 21 That kind of strategy seems to be particularly central to the Kantian tradition. As I read the Groundwork, Kant starts from the presupposition that morality can't be universal and rationally compelling unless	we view it as springing from the dictates of reason and thus based on a priori rather than a posteriori foundations. This leads to an account of what it is to engage in moral cognition and action. Hence, epistemic and metaphysical concerns about the grounds of morality drive	Kant's	account	of	what	moral	cognition	and	action	are.	Similarly,	Korsgaard's	(1996)	response to	what	she	calls	"the	normative	problem"	and	her	concerns	about	traditional	forms	of	metaphysical moral realism,	drive	her	account	of	what	normative thinking	consists in.	Rowlands is less	guilty	of this, regarding his sentimentalist account of moral motivation as at least partly motivated by empirical	evidence	about	the	role	of	emotions	in	human	moral	behaviour.	After	raising	problems	for reflection-based	accounts	of	normativity,	Rowlands	(2012,	chapter	9)	takes	seriously	the	possibility that normativity	might be an illusion, but he still seems to think that understanding the nature of moral	motivation	and	whether	animals	can	act	for	moral	reasons	requires	that	we	have	an	account	of moral	normativity	in	place. 31 that,	in	focusing	on	issues	of	normativity,	they	are	pursing	a	completely	different	sort of	project	from	the	one	that	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	are	pursuing.	Rowlands, in particular, sees himself as correcting the logical flaws in the arguments of researchers like	Bekoff	and	Pierce	when	they	claim	that	animals	are	moral	beings. For instance, following on from his above quoted critique of Bekoff and Pierce's response	to	Korsgaard,	Rowlands	says	this: In	invoking	the	Russian	doll	analogy,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	have,	in	effect,	issued an invitation:	why don't you think of	morality in this	way? Korsgaard and Kant	would	likely	respond	with	a	firm	"No	thanks."	To	have	any	impact,	the offer	needs	to	be	strengthened	into	something	more	like	an	offer	that	cannot be	refused.	(2012,	p111-12). But, Bekoff and Pierce shouldn't really be seen as being in genuine dialogue	with Kantian conceptions of morality. That would be to confuse two related, but nonetheless distinct, sets of issues: issues about the normative status (in the metaphysical	sense)	of	the	psychological	states	of	these	animals-whether	they	live in the	world of values, as Kantians conceive of it, for instance-and issues solely about whether these states represent instances of a natural kind, irrespective of their normative status. It is no failing of Bekoff and Pierce that their account of morality isn't going to be accepted by Kantians that want something completely different	from	an	account	of	morality	than	what	they	claim	to	provide. We've	seen	that	the	putative	engagements	between	researchers	like	de	Waal and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	and	researchers	like	Korsgaard	and	Rowlands	over	whether animals possess a	moral psychology are actually not genuine engagements at all; these	researchers	have	simply	been	talking	past	each	other	and	in	more	ways	than one. This is one respect in which the current debate over animal morality is unproductive.	I	now	want	to	focus	on	what	I	take	to	be	the	core	debate	over	animal morality: the	one that	de	Waal,	Bekoff and	Pierce, and	most	of the	others cited in Section 2 are engaged in,	which is concerned	with the nature and distribution of morality conceived as a natural kind, but	which isn't directly concerned	with the meta-ethical issues that pre-occupy Rowlands and Korsgaard. Rowlands and 32 Korsgaard's accounts can	be reconstructed in this light.	However, I	want to argue that	this	debate,	as	it	stands,	is	in	fact	largely	terminological	and	non-substantive. 4. The	core	debate:	merely	terminological? The	notion	of	psychological	natural	kinds	is	fundamental	to	standard	conceptions	of the	subject	matter	and	methodology	of	modern	cognitive	science	(e.g.,	Fodor,	1974; Griffiths, 1997;	Machery, 2009).22 Andrews (2015) provides a nice description of this	methodology-what	she	calls	the	calibration	approach-in	the	study	of	animal cognition: [W]e	start	with	a	theory	about	the	nature	of	some	mental	property,	then	we use	that	theory	to	make	a	considered	judgment	about	whether	some	animal has that property, and use that judgment to empirically investigate the property.	The	results	of	that	investigation	may	cause	us	to	tweak	our	theory, our	considered	judgment,	or	both.	(Andrews,	2015,	p22) She	provides	several	examples	of	the	approach	at	work,	and	shows	how	it	can	help us to	move forward, both in terms of understanding the real nature of particular mental	properties	and	determining	how	widely	shared these	properties	are in the animal	kingdom. One of the implications of this way of thinking about the methodology of cognitive	science	is	that	the	discovery	that	some	putative	psychological	term	fails	to pick out a clear natural kind seems to constitute a reason to eliminate it from cognitive	scientific	discourse	(Griffiths,	1997;	Machery,	2009).	For	example,	there	is general agreement amongst cognitive scientists that "intelligence" and "memory" 22	The	notion	of	natural kinds is, of course, itself a contested	one,	with	many	different accounts	of what natural kinds are (see Bird and Tobin, 2015; Slater, 2015)-so many, in fact, that Hacking (2007,	p238)	doubts	whether	there	is	"a	precise	[or]	vague	class	of	classifications	that	may	usefully be	called	the	class	of	natural	kinds".	There	is	also	controversy	about	what	account	of	natural	kinds	is best for cognitive science.	As	noted earlier, the	HPC account (Boyd, 1999) is popular, but faces its problems	(see,	e.g.,	Ereshefsky	and	Reydon,	2015).	I	don't	want	to	commit	to	any	particular	account of natural kinds or psychological natural kinds, but I will take it for granted that there do exist psychological	natural	kinds	that	can,	at	least	partly,	be	understood	in	terms	of	their	function.	Hence,	I will not take the	more radical approach to critiquing the core debate over animal	morality,	which would	be	to	challenge	the	very	legitimacy	of	talking	about	natural	kinds	in	general	or	specifically	in cognitive	science. 33 are not legitimate theoretical terms because neither term refers to a category of thing	that	has	the	hallmarks	of	a	natural	kind.	The	view	is	that	there	is	no	such	thing as general intelligence, only more fine-grained types of cognitive capacity subserved	by	a	wide	variety	of	different	neurological	mechanisms. Similarly,	memory turns	out	not	to	be	a	unified	psychological	category,	rather	there	are	many	different types	of	memory (semantic	memory,	declarative	memory, and so forth), also subserved	by	quite	different	neurological	mechanisms. In	this	vein,	Stich	and	colleagues	argue	that,	despite	the	impressive	empirical evidence that Turiel and colleagues have marshalled, their account of moral judgment	actually	fails	to	describe	a	really	existing	psychological	natural	kind,	since one	can	find	many	instances	where	prototypical	moral	judgments	don't	display	the characteristic psychological profile they regard as typical of the kind (e.g., they aren't	viewed	by	experimental	participants	as	authority-independent	or	universal), and instances where judgments concerning putatively conventional matters (e.g., violations of norms that don't obviously concern issues of harm and fairness) display	the	"moral"	rather	than	"conventional"	profile	(Kelly	et	al.,	2007;	Fessler	et al., 2015).	Hence, the	Turiel account of	moral judgment	qua psychological natural kind fails to accurately carve nature at its joints: there isn't enough of a nominological	clustering	here	to	say	that	we	have	a	genuine	natural	kind.	Stich	and colleagues go so far as to suggest that the term "moral judgment", when used to refer to a distinct sub-set of normative or evaluative judgments,	might, therefore, need	to	be	eliminated	from	the	vocabulary	of	cognitive	science.23 However,	despite	the	problems	that	Stich	and	colleagues	have	identified	with the	Turiel	account	of	the	moral/conventional	distinction	(for	responses,	see	Sousa, 23 Once again, the assumption seems to be that if Turiel and colleagues are right,	moral judgment would constitute something like an	HPC	kind.	Hence, Stich and colleagues' argument is that	moral and	conventional	normative judgments	don't	display sufficiently stable clusterings	of	properties to constitute different psychological kinds. Kelly and Stich (2007) also argue that the psychological processes	that	underlie	the	two	putative	types	of	judgment	are	likely	the	same,	which	would	threaten the idea of there being two different homeostatic mechanisms. Stich and colleagues do, however, regard	the	more	general	category	of	normative	judgment	as	a	genuine	natural	kind. Sinnott-Armstrong and	Wheatley (2014) make a different type of argument for a similar conclusion: the category,	moral judgment, is	dis-unified in	a similar	manner to	memory, so fails to constitute	a	genuine	natural	kind. 34 2009; Kumar, 2015), there remains the possibility of other ways of thinking of morality as a psychological natural kind. In the case of the debate over animal morality, Andrews expresses a certain amount of optimism about using the calibration	approach	to	eventually	determine	"the	sort	of	capacity	required	to	make the	moral-looking behaviour into truly	moral behaviour" (2015, p184). I am less optimistic than Andrews, however. To explain why, let us review some of the different	accounts	that	have	been	proposed	for	defining	morality	qua	psychological natural	kind. As	we've	seen,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	adopt	a	very	broad	view,	lumping	together capacities	for	empathy	and	sympathy	and	other	potential	mechanisms	for	producing various (psychologically) altruistic helping and consoling behaviours, capacities underlying the internalization and enforcement of social norms (like norms governing play and the treatment of infants in chimpanzees, say), and more cognitively sophisticated capacities for explicitly formulating and promulgating social	norms,	explicit	normative	reflection,	and	so	forth,	that	may	only	be	present	in humans.	Once	again,	their	reason	for	lumping	these	capacities	together	into	a	single category	is	that	they	are	assumed	to	share	broadly	the	same	evolutionary	function: they each represent	ways of facilitating social co-operation and cohesion-that is the	purpose	of	morality,	as	Bekoff	and	Pierce	conceive	of	it. Musschenga	(2013)	also	offers	a	functional	definition.	However,	his	is	slightly more	restrictive	in	that	it	explicitly	builds	in	the	idea	that	morality	only	truly	exists when there are	norms	or rules.	While empathetic or altruistic behaviours	may	be the	product	of internalized	social	norms,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	appear	to	allow	for	the possibility	of	there	being	moral	creatures	with	capacities	for	empathy	and	altruism, but	without	social	norms.24	Musschenga's	functional	definition	is	as	follows: 24 Although Bekoff and Pierce (2009, p83) include "established norms of behaviour" under their threshold requirements for being a moral creature, their original definition of "morality" actually seems	to	leave	open	the	possibility	of	there	being	moral	behaviours	in	animals	(e.g.,	instances	of	prosocial	and	altruistic	behaviour)	that	aren't	necessarily	guided	by	psychologically	internalized	norms, since, when describing which behaviours are moral, it says only that "norms of right and wrong attach	to	many	of	them"	(2009,	p7). 35 Morality	cultivates	and	regulates	social	life	within	a	group	or	community	by providing rules (norms) which fortify natural tendencies that bind the members together-such as sympathy, (indirect) reciprocity, loyalty to the group	and	family,	and	so	on-and	counter	natural tendencies that frustrate and	undermine	cooperation-such	as	selfishness,	within-group	violence	and cheating.	(2013,	p102) Musschenga stresses that norms don't have to be explicitly formulated or consciously understood to count as moral in this sense, but can be implicit-for instance,	"humbly	internalized"	in	the	sense	of	Railton	(2006). As	we've	seen,	de	Waal	labels	most	of	the	capacities	identified	by	Bekoff	and Pierce	as	"proto-moral"	and	restricts	the	term	"moral"	for	those	that	enable	humans to	explicitly	formulate	and	promulgate	social	norms	that	concern	the	community	as a whole: proto-morality is a social glue, but	morality (so understood) is a better social glue. Here, again, morality is to be understood in evolutionary-functional terms,	but	its	adaptive	function	is	defined	more	narrowly	than	on	Musschenga	and Bekoff	and	Pierce's	accounts,	hence	"morality"	picks	out	a	narrower	set	of	capacities. Kitcher (2006, 2011) offers a similarly narrowed functional definition of	what he terms	"the	ethical	project".	Kitcher	grants	other	apes	with	capacities	for	sympathy, empathy,	and	psychological	altruism,	but	argues	that	these	capacities	are	limited	in important	ways, and claims that a linguistically-mediated capacity for "normative guidance"-essentially,	a	capacity	to	internalize	and	enforce	commands,	particularly in reference to one's own behaviour-evolved in early hominins specifically to remediate the repeated "altruism failures" from which other apes, particularly chimpanzees,	suffer.	The	function	of	morality	is	thus	to	overcome	what	Kitcher	sees as	the	fragility	and	instability	of	the	societies	of	our	ape-like	ancestors.25 Rudolf	von	Rohr	et	al. (2011)	adopt	a	very	similar	position to	de	Waal	and Kitcher	in	their	taxonomy	of	social	norms,	restricting	the	term	"moral"	to	norms	that are "collectivized": norms that are publicly understood by each member of the 25 Kitcher (2011) uses this descriptive definition to build a form of pragmatic ethical naturalism, where	a	notion	of	ethical	truth	(and	with	it	a	normative	standard	for	assessing	ethical	propositions) is constructed from this conception of the adaptive function of	morality (for discussion, see Joyce, 2014). 36 community as norms of the community, rather than just existing in the form of implicit or personal expectations about appropriate and inappropriate behaviour. They argue that this collectivization of norms requires the capacity for sharedintentionality (the ability to actively share one's	mental states	with others and to understand that others have, for instance, the same goals or beliefs as oneself), which is	widely	believed to	be	unique to	humans, and,	probably, language.	Hence, while animals like chimpanzees possess	what they call "proto-social norms", they lack	genuine	morality. Joyce (2006) and Prinz (2014) shift the focus from moral norms to the capacity for moral judgment as the essence of morality. Much like Turiel and colleagues, Joyce	characterizes	moral judgments	as	possessing	a	particular	kind	of psychological clout and inescapability to them. However, he also draws a fundamental	link	with	concepts	like	merit	and	desert.	He	argues	that	other	primates likely can make primitive normative judgments: for instance, judgments of disapproval	about	others'	norm-violating	behaviour.	However,	they	can't	make	truly moral judgments because they plausibly can't judge, for instance, that a punitive response to another individual's behaviour is	merited or deserved. Such concepts are,	Joyce	argues,	likely	beyond	the	reach	of	non-linguistic	animals.	Prinz	identifies genuinely	moral	judgments	with	dispositions	to	feel	certain	complex	selfand	otherdirected	emotions	like	guilt,	shame,	and	contempt:	to	judge	something	to	be	wrong	is to	be	inclined	(e.g.,	upon	reflection)	to	feel	such	emotions	towards	the	creature	that did	the	thing	in	question.	Such	complex	moral	emotions,	he	suggests,	are	probably uniquely	human.26 Others	can	be	seen	as	requiring	more	cognitive	sophistication than just the capacity to	make	moral judgments in	either	of the	senses just	described.	As	noted earlier, Hume can be read as holding that to have a genuinely moral psychology requires	that	one	be	capable	of	departing	from	one's	private	situation	and	adopting a	position	of	impartiality,	while	Darwin	held	that	only	when	a	capacity	for	normative 26	Prinz (2011)	argues that	empathy is	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient for	moral judgment.	Unlike Joyce,	Prinz	(2014)	does	not	regard	the	capacity for	moral judgment	as	a	biological	adaptation,	but rather	as	a	byproduct	of	other	uniquely	human	adaptations. 37 self-reflection emerges do we have genuine morality (Rowlands, 2012). We can reconstruct Korsgaard's claims in a similar light, requiring a particularly sophisticated	from	of	meta-cognition,	as	does	Ayala's	account. In contrast,	we can reconstruct Rowlands as claiming that it is a sufficient (but not a necessary) condition for morality qua natural kind to be instantiated when there is the capacity for behaviour motivated by other-directed emotions. Similarly, for Andrews and Gruen (2014), it is sufficient to demonstrate the existence of morality to show that members of a particular species are at least implicitly	sensitive-e.g.,	via	other-directed	emotional	capacities-to	the	needs	and interests	of	others. One	can take issues	with	each	of these	accounts in	various	ways.	However, the	key	question	for	our	purposes	is	on	what	grounds	should	any	of	these	proposals be preferred to any of the others as an articulation of the extension of the terms "morality" or "moral"? Once again, the assumption seems to be that this isn't a purely	terminological	dispute,	but	one	of	actual	substance.	Yet,	when	these	different accounts	are	placed	side	by	side,	it	is	hard	to	see	what	justification	there	can	be	for regarding	one	of	them	as	having	any	greater	claim	to	the	term	"morality"	than	the others.	Crucially,	though	each	of	these	accounts	makes	substantive	empirical	claims about human and animal psychology and evolution that might turn out to be mistaken	in	various	ways,	the	primary	differences	between	them	when	it	comes	to categorizing	various	psychological	capacities	or	mechanisms	as	inside	or	outside	the moral	domain	don't appear to turn	on such	claims.	For instance, Joyce	and	Bekoff and Pierce can agree that animals possess capacities for empathy and sympathy, pro-social and altruistic motivation, that they can make primitive normative judgments	in	accordance	with	social	norms	that	exist	in	their	communities,	and	that these	traits	broadly	share	a	similar	evolutionary	function	of	improving	levels	of	cooperation	and	social	cohesion.	They	can	also	agree	that	only	humans	likely	possess the concepts	of	merit and	desert. Joyce	and	Bekoff and	Pierce can	also	agree	with Prinz	that	only	humans	are	capable	of	feeling	emotions	like	guilt	and	shame.	All	of them can	potentially agree	with de	Waal, Rudolf von	Rohr et al., and	Kitcher that only	in	human	communities	do	there	exist	explicitly	shared	norms	of	conduct,	with 38 Hume	and	Darwin	that	only	humans	are	capable	of	engaging	in	conscious	normative reflection and adopting a position of impartiality, and with Korsgaard that only humans have the capacity for normative self-government. The disagreement between these researchers seems to concern	not the	nature	of these capacities	or which of them we share with other animals, but solely which grouping of them deserves	a	particular label.	Hence, it is	hard	to	see	what	empirical	discovery	could help us decide between them. In this respect, the situation appears to be quite unlike	classic	disagreements	about	the	nature	of	natural	kinds,	such	as	whether	heat is a type of fluid or molecular kinetic energy, where the disagreement is clearly resolvable	via	empirical	investigation. Interestingly, Joyce (2014) draws the comparison between accounts of the nature and evolution of moral judgment with discussions about the nature and evolution of language. Historically, linguists, particularly those in the Chomksian tradition, have tended to get upset if animal communication systems such as the honey	bee	waggle	dance	or	primate	alarm	calls	are	referred	to	as	"languages",	since they like to reserve the term "language" for communication systems that have complex hierarchical and recursive syntactic structure. However, from the perspective of pre-theoretical classification, intuitions clearly appear to vary on whether	these	are	languages	or	not.	More	recently,	Chomskians	(e.g.,	Hauser	et	al., 2002)	have	seemed	to	accept	that	there is	no	debate	of	substance	to	be	had	about whether the term "language" should be understood in a broad fashion to include such	non-syntactically	structured	communication	systems,	or in	a	more	restrictive way	to	refer	solely	to	communication	systems	with	such	structure.	As	Joyce	notes: There is no answer to the question of	which idea captures	what is "really" language;	our	vernacular	concept	of	language	is	simply	not	so	fine-grained	as to license one answer while excluding the other. Faced with the query of whether vervet	monkeys, say, have a language, the	only sensible answer is "In	one	sense	yes	and	in	one	sense	no."	(2014,	p272) Joyce continues, "The same may be true of morality. The vernacular notion of a moral judgment may simply be indeterminate in various respects, allowing of a variety	of	precisifications,	with	no	particular	one commanding	acceptance" (ibid.). 39 That	seems	right	to	me.	However,	Joyce	goes	on	to	say	that	his	account	is	an	account of moral judgment "strictly construed", and that we can only countenance the possibility	of	chimpanzees	possessing	the	capacity	for	moral	judgment	"very	loosely construed". It is unclear	why	we should grant him this use of "strict" and "loose", since it implies different degrees of correctness of usage.	What I think	we should take away from this comparison is that it is fine for linguists to adopt the term "language"	as	a term	of	art	and	give it a	precise	definition for their	own	purposes that	would	exclude,	say,	vervet	monkey	alarm	calls,	but	there	is	no	genuine	question as	to	whether	this	is	"strict"	or	"loose"	usage.	In	other	words,	"language"	can	be	used to	refer	to	(at	least)	two	different	putative	natural	kinds-the	set	of	communication systems that would include human natural languages like English and vervet monkey alarm calls, or to the subset of such communication systems that utilize hierarchical	recursive	structure-but	there	is	no	question	of	which	kind	should	be seen	as	having	greater	degree	of	ownership	over the term-i.e.,	which	constitutes real	language.	Similarly,	it	is	fine	for	Joyce	to	use	the	term	"moral	judgment"	to	refer only to creatures that possess the concepts of merit and desert-excluding, for instance,	the	negative	reaction	of	a	chimpanzee	towards	a	conspecific	that	attempts infanticide-but there is no question of whether this constitutes real moral judgment. My	claim,	then,	is	that	the	core	debate	over	animal	morality	does	seem	to	be concerned	with the nature and distribution of a variety of what	may be genuine psychological	natural	kinds,	namely	capacities	for	empathy	and	sympathy	and	other potential	capacities	that	may	produce	altruistic	behaviour,	capacities	to	internalize and enforce norms of conduct of various sorts, capacities for various types of normative judgment or evaluation, reflective normative reasoning, and so forth. There may also be groupings of these capacities that constitute genuine natural kinds-for instance, in virtue of sharing a common evolutionary function. Clearly, much	work	has to	be	done to	understand the	nature	of the cognitive	mechanisms that underlie these capacities, and when and why they might have evolved. However, the question of which of these, or which grouping of them, if any, constitutes	"morality"	or	mere	"proto-morality"	is	not	a	substantive	one;	it	is	merely 40 terminological.	One	may	wish	to	appropriate	the	terms	"morality",	"moral",	"protomoral",	to	pick	out	some	particular	set	of	these	capacities,	but	there	is	no	reason	to regard any such	way of doing so as	more or less correct. Like language, the pretheoretical	concept,	morality,	just	isn't	precise	enough	to	give	us	a	principled	reason to	endorse	one	over	any	of	the	others. In	places,	Bekoff	and	Pierce	suggest	a	pragmatic	justification	for	their	broad definition	of	"morality": The concept of animal morality encourages a unified research agenda. An exploration of moral behaviour in animals allows a number of seemingly distinct	research	agendas	in	ethology-research	on	animal	emotions,	animal cognition,	and	diverse	behaviour	patterns	such	as	play,	cooperation,	altruism, fairness,	and	empathy-to	coalesce	into	a	coherent	whole.	(2009,	p54) They	also	claim	that	this	shifts	the	focus	to	looking	for	cognitive	similarities	between humans and animals and that this can produce unexpected and important discoveries.	But,	of	course,	those	that	pursue	cognitive	differences	between	humans and animals as their guideline and wish to adopt more restrictive definitions of "morality" for that	heuristic	purpose	could	say	much	the	same. In	any	case, surely what really matters is the nature of the underlying cognitive similarities and differences, and that we actively look for such things, not the terms we use to describe them. Whether or not we use terms like "morality" or "proto-morality" seems	entirely	beside	the	point.27 5. Concluding	remarks At	this	point,	it	might	be	suggested	that	Rowlands	and	Korsgaard	actually	have	the right idea: if the	pre-theoretical concept of	morality is importantly indeterminate, such	that	it	admits	precisification	in	terms	of	a	variety	of	different	putative	natural 27	It	might,	of	course,	turn	out	that	similar	problems	exist	with	respect	to	other	terms	in	this	debate. "Empathy",	in	particular,	has	also	been	the	subject	of	terminological	disagreement	(e.g.,	what	is	real empathy? Is emotional contagion really empathy?), as has "social norm" (e.g., can there really be social	norms	without	mindreading	and	language?).	If	that	is	the	case,	then	similar	conclusions	should follow:	what	matters	is	the	nature	of	the	relevant	psychological	capacities	and	associated	behaviours possessed	by	humans	and	animals,	not	the	terms	used	to	describe	them. 41 kinds, it seems that it is only	by appealing to some substantive	moral theory that one	can	have	a	principled	reason	to	pick	out	some	set	of	psychological	capacities	as constitutive of real or	genuine	morality. Hence,	what I have called the conceptual approach	to	animal	morality	might	be	seen	as	having	an	advantage	over	the	natural kind	approach:	we	do	actually	have	to	import	heavy	duty	philosophical	assumptions about the nature of	moral value, normativity, and so forth, in order to determine whether	morality	really	does	exist	in	animals-that	question	cannot	be	rendered	as a	purely	empirical	one,	if	it	is	meant	to	be	more	than	a	matter	of	mere	terminology. However, while I think that there is much to admire, for instance, in Rowlands'	(2012)	externalist	consequentialism	and	its	application	to	animals,	given the	seeming	intractability	of	the	philosophical	debates	over	such	issues	and	the	fact these are not waters in which they originally wanted to tread, I think that researchers	like	de	Waal	and	Bekoff	and	Pierce	would	be	well	advised	to	continue	to stay	clear	of	the	metaphysics	of	normativity.	Hence,	insofar	as	the	core	debate	over animal morality is indeed meant to be both independent of substantive philosophical theorizing about the nature of moral value, and a debate of real substance,	not	mere	terminological	preference,	it	needs	to	be	re-framed-there	isn't anything	of	value	to	be	had	debating	whether	"morality"	or	"proto-morality"	exists in	animals. As the discussion and the end of the previous section indicates, my suggestion is that researchers should adopt a more fine-grained taxonomic approach, focused on uncovering and delineating the particular psychological capacities and	mechanisms that underlie the kinds of social behaviours that have been the subject of this debate. Of course, in this respect, I am not suggesting something that researchers haven't already been doing. However, such details about, for instance, the sorts of other-directed emotional capacities present in various	species	or	the	various	types	of	social	norms	present	in	animal	communities (and	how	they	might	be	acquired	and	have	evolved	over	time),	have	often	been	lost behind	headline	claims	about	"morality".	The	fact	that	research	agendas	have	often been	driven	by	prior	conceptions	of	what	counts	as	morality	or	moral	behaviour	has also	meant	that	some	social	cognitive	capacities	have	received	more	attention	than 42 others.	Hence,	what	I	am	suggesting	is	that	these	sorts	of	details	ascend	to	the	fore, and	that	they	be	separated	from	questions	about	"morality"	or	"proto-morality". Finally, it might be objected that one important reason to keep the core debate	focused	on	whether	morality	exists	in	animals	concerns	the	potential	ethical ramifications	of the issue, given that some common	arguments against the ethical considerability of animals and in defence of our using particular species for food, medical research, entertainment in zoos and circuses, and so forth, presume that morality	is	uniquely	human	and	constitutes	an	ethically	relevant	difference	between humans	and	other	animals.28	Musschenga	(2013),	for	instance,	argues	that	ascribing morality to some animal species would erase an important potential ethical difference	maker between them and	us, and should lead us to treat these species with	more	respect	than	might	otherwise	be	the	case.29 Again, however, it seems that what really matters when it comes to determining	what	bearing,	if	any,	the	core	debate	over	animal	morality	might	have on	questions	about the	ethical status	of	animals, concerns the	nature	of the	actual psychological similarities and differences between humans and animals, not	what terms	we	use to	describe them.	For instance,	when	philosophers try to	defend	the ethical superiority of human beings by saying things like, "Normal human life involves	moral tasks,	and	that is	why	we	are	more important than	other	beings in nature" (Machan,	2002,	p10), it is	not the	use	of the term	"moral" that is really	of significance,	but	what	specific	capacity	is	claimed	to	constitute	the	ethical	difference maker,	exactly	what	this	capacity	is	taken	to	consist	in,	which	species	possess	it,	and whether its presence	or absence can really support particular ethical conclusions. Thus, although the terms "moral" and "morality" might perhaps have more 28	For	instance,	one	sometimes	hears	it	said	that	rights	can	only	be	extended	to	members	of	a	moral community,	or	that	only	creatures	that	are	themselves	capable	of	participating	in	moral	deliberation can	have	direct	ethical	status. 29	As	noted	earlier,	Rowlands	also	argues	that	attributing	morality	to	particular	species	should	lead us	to	treat	them	with	greater	respect.	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