Ralph Schumacher (ed.) Perception and Realicy From Descaftes to the Present : i l mentis PADERBORN )e indeed, couldn't be a rent perceptuai idiorn, much l rwo sons of instances will s' being at lcast one central tual. jectual seeing, because it is t (which I dont sharc) about r what are roughly visibilia a.l cases for which (c) below ü. Now consider threc'tcsts' loosely) 'X' is an intentional rr directed torvard somcthing 'hole sentential clauscs with verb docsn't guarantee truth 'esn't tuarantee truth preser 'ntent, bccausc it satisfies (a): de delighdully plain by thc white king asks Alicc if shc Ly on thc road" and the king :h as I can do see real peoplc, nality than a test for it, and equendy, wc can rcgard it as nsed ways to mark out the e't. Satisfying (a) is sufficient rtensional'). >roposal to replace objctual ual idiom. Thc first is that it ogical one. No doubt, some I information unavailablc to t ignore thc cpistcmological vidence we may havc about uld climinate the mismatch so much an argumcnt as a ur theories if the world wcre ,sing it so. Rather my mono rer than vice-versa, llichaelAl,ot SEN SE EXI'ERIENCE, CONCEPTS AND CONTENT Objections to Dat:il.w and MtDot;ell Philosophcrs dcbatc whcdrcr all, sonre or none o1 the represcntational contcnt ol our scnsory experience is conccptual, but the tcclnical term "concept" has different uses. It is commonly linkcd rnore or less closcll withthe notions ofjudgcmcnt and rcasoning, but that leavcs opcn thc possibiüty that these tenr.rs sharc a systetnatie arlbiguity or indctcmrinacy. Donald Davidson, honcver, holds an uncquivocrrl and consistcnt, iIparadoxical vicw tlut thcrc arc strictly spcaking no psychological states with representational or intcntionalcontent except rhe propositional anitudcs of languagc users, sincc thc sourcc or fundamental bearcr of intcntionality is thc cmployed scntence. Accordingly hc claims that what has contcnt in ordinary sense experience is not scnsation, but propositional belief caused, but not justified, by s ensation. Johr.r Mcl)owell, sharing sure oiDavidson's prcmiscs, holds a lcss para doxrcal, but (l will argue) equivocal and hcohercnt view tbat post-infantile human sensory cxpcriencc must havc content in so far as it is rvhat grounds pcrccptual bclicl but that this conrent is itself conceprual or propositional, dcpendent on languagc and culture. Reasons .rrc givcn in thc prescnt anicle for rejecting both views, and their common prcmiscs. It is argued that perceptual or sensory statcs havc intcntional contcnt which is no more conccptual or propositional dran the world is. Recognition that pcrccptual content and conceptual contcnt arc, in a ccrtan unsurprising wa5 incommensurablc allows lbr a n.tore realistic understanding of the relationship bct*,cen Lmguagc and the world as we experience it. 244 N{ichael Aycrs 1. DavrosoN oN sENSArroN AND tsEt-tEF ln "A Coherence Thcory of Tnrth and Kno*lcdge"r Davidson advances what might bc callcd "two dogmas oi idcalism"2: first, rhc claim that the idca oi a confrontadon between beücfs and reality to rcsr thc truth oI the be)icfs is absurd; second, the claim that the pursuit of coherence among our bcliefs is the only rvay in which we can jusn{y thcm. His principal arguncnt is that nothing can count as a reason for holding a beliet i. e. for holding a sentence tn-re, cxcept anorher bclicf. Consequently "the relation betwccn a sensation and a beliefcannot bc logical since sensations arc not beliefs or othcr propositional anitudcs." For Davidson, "Thc notion of in{orrnation . . . applies in a non-mctrphorical wav only to cngendered beliefs". Davidson's supponing argument first anacks dre vien', in r-'tfect, hat scnsations havc a givcn qualitative charactcr and thereforc justify basic beliefs that do not go be1'ond that given charactcr. Hc quickly wins that old banle over again, also rebuning an anernpt to found sense-daturn theory on the principlc that, as a mattcr of how language is used, "if wc bclieve we have a scnsation, we do." Against the Iatter he argues that, cvcn i{it were true, all that n'ould follow is rhat thcrc are beliefs whose cxistcnce analytically cnrails rheir own lxth, nor that sensations jusrfy beliefs. He idcntfics an "obvious thought" lying behind such cmpiricist vrcws, namcly that "sensations arc what connect thc rvorld and our belicfs, and thel are candidatcs for justil.iers becausc wc are often ar', are of thcm". His gencral argumenr against this thought is that any such justfication depends on thc awareness, rvhich is simply anothcr beliel Davidson now considcrs "a bolder tack" bv the empiricist: Suppose *,e say that sensations thtmsclvcs . justi\ cenain bcliefs that go beyond what is given in sensedon. So, under cenain conditions, having the senserion ofseeirrg agrecn lighr flashirg may jusufy the bclicf that a green )ight is flashing. It is truc, Davidson responds, that the äeäe/ that somcone is having a scnsaric,n of seeing a green lighr flashing rnay under ccnain circumstances, for those who possess it, makc probable the belie'{ that a green üght is flashing, but that is an ' Reprinrc'dinI..l.epore(ed.). ttuthd d httot'reütnn:tu.statilcs on tlx PlnLtoplry olltouLlDaxiÄon (Bas Blacksell, Oxford, 1986), pp.10/-19. All quorarions are lrom p. III. 2 This is not lighdy s:rid. Both principles, *hich it is onc pu'posc of rhis p:rper to rebut. are grven rop billing by üre philosopher * ho w.rs pc'rhrps re first modem L-uropan idealisr, Rich.vd bunnogse. Ilc likens rhe anempt to gct at reJir_v other*,rse rhan drough our norrons to lixrking behind a rnnror in the hopc ofscting clirecdy vh.u is sccn in rhe reilecnon. ISunhoggc wrore in dre 1670s, r hundred ycns before K.urr's (irr7u of htrc Rcalu. Unlike hir succcssor, Berkelel bur like Kant, he wrs r 'gbhrl'iderlxt, not limiting his idcrlisnr to re mnteri:rl world. Lrnlikc K,rnt, but like Quiic, , 'c a.sueu that arrl rysrem ofnodons is optn to repl.rcement br yrmc nrorc coherenr system. (See'Burüogge, tuchird', Rrzrlcrlsc Engdopudu I Ph;ltNl1,). .ND BELIEF I Davidson advances what re claim that the idca oi a uth of the beliefs is absurd; I our beliefs is the only way is that nothing can count as ) tru€, except anothcr belief. :eJicf cannot be logicalsince rdes." For Davidson, "The :al way only to engendered ew, in effcct, that sensations fy basic beliefs that do not t old banle over again, also he principlc that, as a matter sation, we do." Against hc bllow is that there are beliefs not that sensations justily rind such empiricist vicws, nd our beliefs, and they are hem". His general argument rds on the awarcncss, which rpiricist: ain beliefs that go beyond *'hat ;the scosarion of seeing a green thng. neone is having a sensation 'cumstances, for those who rt is flasbrng, but that is an n the I'klnplrl of Dodd Da""innn o m p . 1 l l . cf tiis prper ro rebut, are given top mpern idealix, Richard llurthoggc. notions to looking beirind a rnirror ogge wrore in rhe I 670s, a hund*d r, Berkelel, but lihe Kant, he l as .r like Kant, but like Qurne, he arsued : cohcrent sl stern. (See'Burthogge, Objecrions to Davidson arrrl l\{cDo*ell 241 inierence liou one beliel to another belicL lt is not a crsc of r sensatior.r justilying thc pcrccivcr's bclict. The view that a sensarion can justily a bclief about the world indcpendcntly of a bclici about the sensation leads, Davidson suggcsts, to absurdity: "Suppose lthe perceivcrl bclievcd he didn't have the sensation. W'ould thc scnsation still justify him in the belief in an objective flashing grecn ligirt?" First, it should be notcd that, on this "bolder" ernpiricist tack, a bclief rhat a grccn light is flashing "goes beyond what is given in" thc scnserion of a green light flashingr - "beyond", no doubt, bccausc the sensation could exist without thc belief's being true. So anyone who nkcs such a linc holds that r'hat is "given" in a scnsory state is either the sensory state itscll or somc intenul object of the sensory state which falls shon oi bcing the extemal green light llashing. Vhat wc havc, then, is just a gcneric vcrsion of scnsc-datun thcory "bolder" only in allorving infercncc to somcdring other than sense data. I)avidson simply ignorcs a fundamentally diflerent linc of thought rvith a respectable empiricist ancestry.l This other approach to perception takes it that rvhat is "given" in a sensation of a grccn light ashing (errn, it might be held, "inrnediatcly givcn", since nothing is given before it) is just that, a grcen )ight flashing. So what is given or presentcd in our complcx, but intcgrated perceprual state whcn rvc pcrccivc r red, harcl and heavy matcrial cube by both sight and touch is the variously qualiticd cubc, not a set of internal impressions or sense data takcn to bc rcd and cuboid, i{ not hard and hcavy. In tÄat scnsc, a perceptual belief about the world (by thc vcry notion of a percqnal6elie\ docs zrot "go bcyond what is given in" sensation. Accordingly it may be said that perceptual beüefs arc groundcd on scnsation not only in vinue of being caused by sensation, but in vinue of deriving their intentionai contcnr tioru thc intcntional content oI sensory states. That, on dris vicw, is what believing one s senses is. No inlercncc is involved, and there is no intennediary. \üc just acccpt what the senses conjointly give. In ignoring this possibiliry Davidson in effect assumcs without arb.ument his own view thar scnsarions, not bcing propositional attitudcs, caolot havc intcntional content. Yet surely that is an issuc in qucstion, perhaps, since the demise of scnsc datum thcory the rrrain issue in questron. Sccond, why agrcc that a sensation could only bc involvcd in grounding e belief about the rvorld via a bclicf about the scnsation? lt is again bcgging thc main qucstion to assume that Lrirrdreness is ncithcr morc nor lcss than (appropriate)y I Tr dcpan from Dar idson\ cxpressirn 'st nsation ol Jc.,rg ', $ h'.h he pres urnab\ rerds as 'sensaotrr we hxve lrtren seeng . .'(bv anr|rgy *ith, s.ry, :cnsatnn ol we.rriless) in order ro avod myrhlrrg like dre (by his Ljghts) nnslerding expressron,'visualsensation ofa cubc'. + Cf, e.g., Hobbcs, 1)r (nryn t.ti.l 6; Ilriii.2 L Analydcd phikrsophers someunres use rhc tem 'empiricism' nrore or less exclusively for vicws which, like classic sense darum dreon, posrul.rte enrtics roughly equivrlcntro I lumcan inrpressions. That m,rv rn p.rrt bc'due ro a dangercus approach to dre history of mi cm philxophv *hich assumes progress hom contusion ro, ar .rny rate, con sirtencl', with Hunre as drc mosr consLstent empincist, ckxesr to the erchctypc and so nrost worrh considenng. - - - - - - - . a 212 Nlichael Ayers caused) äel2cy'. lndecd, such conlidcnt rctluction is strikingly implausiblc in so f:u as paradign-ntic awareness, ensor]. awareness of the cnvirorur-rent, seems clearly independent of bcliel \X/c do not Jwavs, as we sry, bclie.'s our eyes.5 As for Davidson's rhetorical appeal ro thc possibiliry of a subject who has a sensation rvirhout belicvirg that she has it, an appropriare response dcpends on dre case he has in mind.6 Is it, perhaps, somerhing likc blindsight? 7 Herc, to bc rough, braindarnagcd subjccts can successfully rclI whcn, lor exarnple, a green light is flashing in an occluded p.rn of the normal field of sight although they do not (independently) hlow how or why thcy can do so. Although such hunches arc caused by (somc o1) thc mechanisrrrs o{ s ight, ro thc subjcct thel seenr to be no morc dran guesscs. lstbis a sensation's occurring w ithout a belief th.rt it is occurring? Let us grant it, although ir is norc natural to say rhat *hat is missing is the sensation itself, not just a bclief that it exists. \X./hat is clcar is that thc dificrence bctwecn blindsight and nonnal vision consists in somedring other than that in the laner case rhc subiccr äe/r',res that she is having the "scnsation". For that bclief could bc prescnt just becruse thc subject knows thar she is blindsighted and that thc )rght is flashing; or, indccd, it too could simply be a hunch causcd by thc blirdseeing.N The diffcrencc betu cen bJindsight and standard vision is a matter ofconscious awareness, not belief, and the arvarencss in question is sensory an arencsse ofobjccrs, not a distinct sccond-order awarcness ol a sensory srate. On rhe otl.rcr hand, Davidson might intend l quitc differcnt possibility, such as a case in which thc percciver has forgonen or nctcr kncrv *hat green looks Like, and so docs not re,rlisc that hc is seeing oq therefore, having a visualsensation fa 3reez light. Yet that supposition docs not rule ir out tlut thc perc.-iver's visual surx.rtiun 5 lor txlrplr. \1rr *hrpxJ.r rhne-l'hrJ Fgürr flidng du,,ugh rhe ruured chrpel, rntl put rhe experielce down to imagination (rr halluLinarion). It uas in ficr a pranhsrer n f.rncv tlresi. l)id she dren prctivt him? Virs she rwue othimi I raku jt riar rbeories ofperccptit,n ürar dc'nranJ,r neg,rlve answer to the first quesrion are simplv mistrkcn (of c,'urse shc saw thc m:rn); and tlat t poriore arswer r.r rhc setond nu,v rn,sle,rd only "r r, {ar ,rs tiere nrry be a ccn,un conversarional rrrplic,ru,,n üat shc beliercd her cyes (as with üc claln that shc :zv tL,zt tLe nun t:a nÄrl). Supposc thrt stre h;rl not just glimpserl hrn, t'ur prid tbsr rnmtjon tL, hrn, lrJ yet:rill iudgcJ rhrr rhe srs hallucinaring. Vlro rould dren deny thar dre las asarc of thc man, or dut she sa* rhat he was rcbcd? 6 The senscrLerum rheonst would presLrnrablv respond that no one iorlr/ percei'e a sense-danrm *iüorl knou urg it, :nd rlcre w<,ulJ he st,rndolf. llut ,x rny rnttryrttation wc sure\ nectl nxrre cxphnation as to jusr how rlre subiect is supposed ro h:ve rie sensarion wiriout believing that shc h,rs it. 7 As described bv L:wrence Veiskralrz, li'ü,gl't:,t Q^c 5tu4 nnd î bnPlLarzlri {Oxfor.l 1986). 8 tn wtuch casc dre ca,,srlitv "f üe hclief qould be at Le,rst r bit dif{crent ir.rm dr.rr of dr,: ot'rnral prrcepr,,al behef, but on üis see below ' Or ton'iious scnson f,wrrcncss'. ur catc torrcote w:nrs to :rseribe thc par,td.rxital strtc ol untonscious awa.eness to dre blindsighte.l. ikngly implausible in so far environment, secms clearly I believe our eyes.s As for ubject who has a sensation rnse depends on the case he ?7 Here, to bc rough, brainrle, a green light is flashing in üey do not (indcpcndcntly) ches are caused by (some oi) no more than guesses . Is this ng? Let us grant it, although sation itseU, not just a be)ief veen blindsight and normal rcr case the subject beliet'es I be prescnt;ust bccausc the 3ht is flashing; or, indeed, it tg.8 The difference between ,warcncss, not belicf, and thc , not a distinct second-order lifferent possibiliry such as a v what green looks like, and I a visual scnsation o{ a grren , perceiver's visual sensation rgh the ruined ch,rpel, and put dre a prankster in fancy rlrcss. Did shc t perception r:rt demand :r neg:rtive saw the man); and drat :r posidre a certain convcrsational implication tLa m ua rubu\. Supgrse üat , and yet still judged that she wrs man, or üat she saw thar he was one coaiJ percene a sense d:rum nterpretation we surcly nced rnorc msation withour believing üat shc nd iss Inpbdtlons (Oxlord 1986). : dif{erent from drar oI the nomtl ribe the pradoxicrl state of unconObjecrions to Davidson rnd lvlcDorvcll 243 supplies hirr witb the appropriatc visual grounds Ior the bclief which hc docs mrt have. l0 ln gencral, our possession of grounds for a bclicf is compatible with our not havng thc bclicf, and cvcn with our not recognizing that we do possess grounds for it. rr So s,bat is to be said in rcsponsc to Davidson's argument depends on thc kind of casc bcing supposed, but on any supposirion it is difficult to see reason to accept his conclusion, Davidson's aryument radicallv rnisrcprcscnts a basic kind o[ reason giving. If I have sccn a ccnain clearly obscrvable event occur, such as a grcen light's flashing, I generally take myself to necd no funhcr rcason for my belief that it occurrcd. I mcct demands for J reason sirnply by saying that I saw it happen, but that is not ro appeal, as tothe prcmisc ofan inlcrence, either to a belief thulsaw it happcn or to a ,er'e/ about dre content of m\' \'isual scnsations. I am simply explaining how I am rvcll placcd to knorv what I knor,, and what grounds my bclicf indeed, whv no inlerence was necessary. In such cascs my attention will normally havc bccn on rvhat was observed or presented, not on my own scnsory state of rnind, my visual scnsation,12 and my belief is well grounded preciscly on .vhat was prcsented, not on a premise about my psychological conditron. Vhat I say rr justification rn sayrng that I saw a grecn Jight's llashing cenaidy exprcsses a bclicf, but it is a thought wofthy oI Lewis Caroll that I hcrc justify my belief by another bcliel as if ir was my belieztitg that I sew it happen, rathcr rhan my having secn it happen, which supplies my justiiication or ground. Lct us make a comparison. Supposc it is askcd, 'Does this photograph justify thc bclicf that so[leone was shooting at Presidcnt Kcnncdy irom the ground?' Obviously we need all kinds oi bclicls about the photograph before we get to ask this qucstion, bcliels about who took ir and wherc, whcrc it has bccn sinec the event, wherher it has bccn tampcred rvith, and so Ionh. Suppose wc rightly r0 ()r:rnung for the s.rkc of.ugLrnreru thr hc d(^-s aor h;rrr thar beliel But if the perteiver ncurg rle concepr green belicvcs th.rr he is seeurg somedrxrg ol rlar sh.rdc (sce Mcl)owell's norion ot demonstrutiie conctps, discusscd bel,rl), and thar sh,rde is a sh:de ofgreen, doesrir he belicre fr.rr he is sccing sonrctling grcen (.urcl clorsn\ ht s.'c ir a srcen)l Corrpare: if a lour sirted 6gurc wuh just tm par.rllel sidcs is cellcd a trrptziurn (Brnish me,rrnng), .rnd I beleve rlat I am pd(ci\ur[ J lour snled figrre ivnh just oo p.rr:rl1cl srclcs (.rrld rnr in fact sceing it rhar war.), don'r I believe th.rt I am pcrceiving a trapcziurl (.rml donl I percene n a .r trrpezium), *lrerhcr or not I know what n rs callcd (in Ilritain or anl where else)l \!hat it r :rpproprilc to sev here abour rny belief depends on rhe context, ancl on rvhat is n qucsrion, jusr because these af{ecr r}e converslnnal nnpücacions of what is s:rd. rr lf *c lr, have a bclief on certrur grounds, dren le l illrccognitu * har it is drar groLurtls dre belief: e.g. shen \re bclie'e \fhrt le see, we km,w the ground of rhe beLlel, *h1, we hrve u. 12 Thcrc is r qucstion ol *har it r ro pay attemion ro d:e senstion, as r4lxrscri ro ns obiccr, w)rich neecl not be rddress.'d herc. Anr appn,rch like l)avidson's woulcl seem to frce hr-rge problems dcaling wiü scnsory aucntron: how rloes one lotus atremon on an objecr oi Dalrl, epan hom thhkng hard ,tt- \ t 241 MichaelAye,rs have the appropriare bclicls about its credcntials, anrl are no* focusing on whatrhc pirorogr'rph presenrs (or re-presents), th" "u.nt, ,".ora"J, ,1"-inor,,g."pt tvisual conrcnr, Vouldnt ir bc .t,tivery,, as Descanes ;;,r; ;;$;:;,::jil":il,ö äTjj::,,:iff:iT;evcnts phororraphed, since onJy a beljef can j*r,f"'" frjiJ *J-r-ono,og..pnis nor a belicf? Suppose somconc said that she b.f.r.J;;"; K;";f,u *., ,no,at from the ground beruuse sIrc belwie,t,hr, ,h. 1',hJt;;;;;r, l*,]*, ;r", r., ",suppose, unqucsrroncd credentialrground. wotLldnl *.,r,* u" i',J,l"l,l.Pa''ii'il:ü:1T"'iT,T1äSffi ..Hactually justificd this second berief, as Lf, instcaä of ,"iir"f ",',vrr", i" aa**,rabout it, shc had simply said, ,,Look at rh. pl,,r;;;i,:;;r:, ,"il*rui.",i.n,,,Al:d s'ouldnt we look closelv "r thc phoiograpi, o. ."rh", ", 1,. ..o,lr.nr, h.photographed world as jt were. in order to irar" ".l"ri.r-*" ,r"n ,."r_g onthe fence by the nound was indccd l-;g a ,ji.l ,qnA *o"llrli';or u" to* ::.i:*:i.:"1.*:1.1: o*j.*,lo,n iustirl; both rh" i;dl"-.I,, r,", o.*.aywJs snor ar tronr the grrrund and rhc belitf rhat it dcpictcdsomcon" shoorurg ult Ttt T "n: swoop.rhc phoro-conrenr iusrilies or gl"ra, S",f-l A*;udgcmcnt jff:1,1.1. r.}::t1hed rr.1c or .rflais .rnd rtre juJg.in",,i,t.",',r,.'pr,,,osr-,pn. J:i: sö;i{ }:,äiT.i,:::'_i:5:Hi:i,.,'J +fi;HI" [:l*;:ii:assened abour the world mav be justified by l har a photogr"pt ,t o_, "Uor, ,t . ..-. 11:lr:n th..;r*r wr), srvrlF ,.I saw ir happen,, is drawing attention to whatgruunds or lusr rcs my elarrn about rhe norld, not stating a ircmisc. A percep_tual experielce or scnsation is, of coursc, ".1 .üH"r",r. fär,'" phocogr"ph both ::l:,:i::11,":i in ir.,r p,srernr( r,,tc. t c.rn io.,k .u,d poi,,r "r . ;I,oräg.,"pr, i,,.il. |i l"':: ': i. ': l l::-:rlont ar .r fcrL(pru.:J crpcrrurrrc,.r,, I i.ur p,,inr .ri rt, o[,jcir. ::::1 I p:r, .u I\ obt(cr n, pornrrng . rl)( L,\pl.riür)(c, .r.. I ian p,,jnr ,u a ;i:,1:ili::'äf iIT1,1,:1;gT:','"31,ff äTffi l:]:m jl;*non-inlerentially groundcd on zrl c_rpcri.n... a r.t","j "f ,ri.r"'igi.Jair1"**.is rhat, although the deliverances of che sense, are dcfeasiLlc, and scnsible appear_ ffi:ä::T::lftim;m*l sensrdons "1' 19', ., ph;;;"pil *., the,world. rhe analosr n itb p,.,',;tä:iln'*äil n*;?:liiT:::#,:; wnh conceptual content can be based on a rcprc\r,ntariotl, or prcsentabon, withnon conceptual content; and how it can be an appropriare ana iuii.i"rl, ,".1rurr. ::..i1..^q-r::, i"t " rcason or iustificarkrn si,r,ply io iniic"t" thnr ,"pr"r"n,",,or,, o,lnenüon rtre occurrence of that prescntation. \Mrat is asscncd .* b" b"r.d unrvhlr is tnlcl. nranilcrt in ,.n."."p.n",,a". On D;r id'un s model, .r" he plrs rr, are now focusing on what recordcd, thc photograph's : pioure thus 'taken objecg az1 conclusion about the a bcliel and a photograph ved that Kennedy was shot ,hotograph (wi r ia, let us e shooting at him from the cn whether the photograph elling us what shc beheued ,h that's my justification"? >r rather at its content, the 'hcther the man lcaning on And wouldnt tlar be how Le judgement that Kennedy picted somconc shooting at :ounds both the judgement nent about the photograph, se judgements, for example rt. The point is that what is horograph shows about thc s drawing attention to what tating a prcmise. A percep- 'nt frorn a photograph both point at a photograph itscJf, , as I can point at its object. erience, as I can point at a ng at an objcct scen I invitc ,er than I can make a claim d epistemological difference :asiblc, and sensible appearre not, as photographs are, justify anlr judgcmcnt about allow us to scc how a bclicf ation, or prcscntation, with riare and sullicient rcsponse icate that representation, or s asscncd can bc bascd on ()Lrjections to D,rvidson and lvlcDo*,ell 2+5 'Ihe relation bcnvecn r sensetion end a beüef cannot bc logicel . . \\"har dren is rhe rehrion? Thc ansscr is, I think obvious: the relation is ceusJ. Scnsalions causc sorne beLieti and in g!!5 sense .rre rhe Lresis or ground of those belie.fs. But a causai explanarion of a bclicf docs not sl, orv ho* or whv e belief is justili:d. So whcn I want to krow rvhat is in the next roorr, and go and look, I am simply putting mysef in circumstances wl.ricb arc likely to causc a belicf, one way or anothcr, as to what is in thc ncxt room. lt helps to rurn rnl hcad this way and that, in order to have sensations which, in thc contcxt of rny current belicf-sysrcm, will causc ccnain belicfs about the contents of thc roorn. Somc o{ these beliels may be about drc scnsations I am h:rving. I may even infer a bclief about thc contcnts r>f the room frorn a beliel about a sensation I am having. But none oi these sensorily stimulatcd bclicfs arc justficd or well-grounded except in so far as thcy suppon one another and fit into lny on going bclicilsystem, tailored as necessary, Photographs are even lurther than scnsations arc from being beliets. On a Davidsonian vicw, thcn, my peering at rhe phorograph (or, wc might pur it, peering rto the photograph) is not cndeavouring to see, or to judge, whcthcr thc pbotograph justilies the judgcn.rent (i. c., shows) that Kcnnedy was shot at from thc ground, but is putting myscff in a position {or the photograph to causc a belief about the events photographed, or a bclicl about the photograph frorr which I can inlir a bclicf about the events photographed (or a bcJic'l about my sensarrons from which I can infer a bclicf about the photograph, fron.r which .. ., ctc.). I can thcn sct ml bcliciagainst thc beliefofthe person who belicvcs that the photograph records someone airning a riflc. My belief can perhaps, cor.rlirrn or disconfrm hcr bcliel but neither oI our beliefs is, or could bc, well grounded, or ior that matter i lJ-grounded, o,ccpt on .,thcr h.L.i.. This analysis of the status and role oi pal;rably non-linguistic representations rr is surcly untcnablc, with rcspect both to phorographs and to cxpcricnce.Just one way of bnngLng out its untenability is through the poinr that it represents thc perccircr as simplv having a hunch or yen to belicvc somcthing about the circumstances bc is ir.r. Or rather, it makcs available only a certain way of distinguishing between a perceptual belief and a merc hunch: thc diffcrcncc can only lie in the way in which thc bcüc* arc caused. On a Davidsonian view, wc pircrbc that somethins is so when our belicf is causcd h tbe igbt n^ay. But this externalist proposal ignores thc subjcctive or phenonenal "internal" diffcrencc bctween a belief grounded on sensc expcricncc and a ncrc hunch. D I sry palpabl,t vtn lÄguistic, t,o:rvoid rhe questlrrr *herher bclicts rre,,frheir nan,re linguisric oa tor th.u m,rner (r1it is diütn:ut), 'conceprual'. \fidrout somerlnng lke Drv'd$n's prcmisc thar scntencr.s arc d1c brsic berrcrs ofcontent, there seems no rc'rson to rcjccr tic notion of unconceptu.rlized belitfs or thoughts (as opposcd ro Itcgcan 'Thoughs'). But iusr here I mr :llsring riat, cvcn if bcilets .rre cssenrially lmguisric. thcre:re other palpabl,v non-linguistic, norr conccprual bearers oico,'.," .p'"' whch bc'liels can bc grounJed. i 246 Michael Aycrs 'Io take agrin thc rcvcaling cxarnple o[ blindsighr, nhat mekes the diffcrcnce from thc nonrral c.1se of visual pcrccption cannot simplv Lre that somc panicular paft ofthe brain does nor nake it.s usual activc contriburion. For riro is tr' .*. rn absraction lrom empirical invcstigation, s har is thc physiobgv of "the right *ay " to acquirc a tisual belief? The dificrcncc is th.n in nonralperception and perceptual belief the objecrs of the bclie{ are presented, or "givcn", to or in consciousnr:.s, and it is the brain damage rcsponsible lbr this rnanifest diffcrence which supplics evidence of the physiology of normal perception and, indeed, of the physiological Dasls or conscloLlsness. In normal perception, moreover, objccts are presented from a point of vieq located in their place on an integrated egoccntric pcrceptual field, in thc rvorld as perccivcd by irll sensory means frorn here. Our overall, integrated perceptu,rl sute, that is to say, tloes not iust present objects "our there" in thc world, but does so through presenting our bqües (i.c. ourselvcs) ar oursclves; and also, at least coa:-sely', both the spatiai relations of cxtcrnal bodies to oursclves antl the causality throu$ which thcy come to be presenrcd. rr It is of the nature of scnsory prcscntation, rhat is to say, that in prcscnting objects the senscs present (enough of) our physit:l-cum episternic reladon to rhosc objects. Hence the content o{ sensc cxperience is such as to allow us not onlv to hnow somcthing abour our environment, but to know how we lnow it. To put the point anothcr way, rhat perccption of objeas is always from the subject's point of vicw (taking 'point of view' in a broader than purely spatial sensc) is itself a ncccssary condition of its being perception, and of our having pcrccptuaL klorvledge. Hcrc, then, is a iundamentai rcason why rhere is no possibihry oi explaining pcrccption,rnd perccptual knowledgc b terrns of a purely extena)isr conccption of 'the right * ay' for perceptual bcliefs to be caused. A pcrccpruaJ stare or belief is caused in 'the rigbr way' only ii the acrual causalitv and the perceivcd causality are matching. Thc poinr is analogous to one that can be madc rvith respeü to in{erred knowlcdge. Rouglrlr,, we know a läcr by inlcrcnce if the fact has comc to cause the corresponding beJief by just the route postulatcd in thc inJerence on rvhich thc belie{ is grounded. That pcrccptual awareness in gencral includes (coarse or panial) awareness of its own causa-litv docs not, of course, mie out illusion or hallucination, or cven the conccptual possibiliq of a comprchcnsive 'brain-irr-a-vat' dclusion. 1s Yet rt is a pan t{ P,rc rhe r.rilronrl vitw, dcpcndenr on an unre,r}suc ihlrrretion of perceprion from,rrenrr, rh.rt causalitr eauor be presenred in scnse exptriencr. l'ercepuort rs csrcntiallv, inseparably inv,rh ed *;rh action wuhrn thc sensory field, in looking, per:ring, .'nen,Jirg, ':hangi'rg onc's point of view, feelmg, grasping, smfäng, ctc. Contr,rry to: long-embeddcd conccpoonofrle /roctzrrJ, cxptricnrialcomeu i imbucd qi6 :n :*:reness of causality as an essendal pan of what it is to experience oneself rs in the world r'hich docs nor mean rl:t in order to ha.'c eüpcrience we rnust have thc coacEr of causality (on wfreh, see below, poruz, esp. note 34). 15 lfwe expecr:o nru.,h frorn a tenrble philosophv of percepno n, rhcn nonc will seem temble. Davidsrn. op. c;t. p.312-1. scenrs to take it to be a scrious shoncomurg oi my ra:lysis of perception rhar it what makes the differencc ,ply be that somc particular rution. For who is to say, in rysiology of "the right way" al perception and perceptual n", to or in consciousness, st difference which supplics indeed, of the physiological :nted from a point of view, rceptual field, in the world verall, integrated pcrccprual ut thcre" in the world, but s) as ourselves; and also, at ndies to ourselves and the It is ofthe nature of sensory the senses prescnt (cnough eüs. Hence the content of rnow something about our the point another way, that oint of view (uking 'point itseJf a ncccssary condition I knowledge. Here, then, is i explaining perception and :onception of 'the right way' r belief is caused in the right rliry are matching. Thc point ferred knowlcdgc. Roughly, usc the corresponding belief the belief is grounded. use or panial) awareness of or hallucination, or even the ,at' delusion. Is Yet it is a pan :rn of perceprion from agency, that ssentirlly,urseparablyi,rvolved ür nnging one\ point of view, feeling, f the derm,rrrl, experienti,rl conrent '*har it is to expericncc oneself ,rs rience we must have the iozcqpr of n none will seem tenable. 1)avidson, J any analysis of pcrccption that it Objcctions to Davidson ancl lVlcDowcll 247 of the crucial subjective diflcrcncc bctrvcen a well-groundcd perccptual bcJief and a mcrc hunch about the situation that in fact causcd that hunch through perccptual mechanislns,16 Bv thc samc tokcn it is a condirion of our bcing in demonstrativc contact with tlle world of our bcing acqtahttecl wirh anyrhhg rarher rhan sunply havmg gcncric thouglrts that tend to be appropriatc ro rhe states of affairs ürat cause then. 2. Mcl)owrr-r ()N THE coNchpruAr- (]ONTENT OF EXPERIF]NCE Againsr f)avidson, John McDowcll insists, in his book Mind and Vrrrld, that scnsc cxperience can, a{ter all, ground pcrccptual bcJic{.r7 Nevenheless, much likc Davidson, McDowellascribes the "Myth of the Given" to the supposition rhat non conceptual input, somcthing not itself judgemental in forn.r bur given in sensauon, could sen'e as a ground or *,arrant lbr an observational judgcmcnt could heve a rolc in "thc sp.rcc ofrcasons". He agrccs with Davitlson that nothing which is not a thought could implv or probabilify or, in general, ground a thought, 'thoughts" in this sense being inherently conccptual, indccd propositional thoughts tlarp. But hc rcasonably complains that to see the relation betwccn scnsations and their objects as purely causal Jeaves out an csscndal ingredient, not only of crnpirical justfication, but also of the conte* of 6ehe[. For it is in its imolication with exoeriencc that the whole corpus of our belicfs conuins rnore dr.rn "mpty .vnra*, .rnd caprurcs something of what the world is likc. McDorvcll's solution is to arguc thar scnsc expcricncc can have a just icatory role just because it comcs aircady conccptualized. Adopting Kantian terrninology, hc clain.rs that the c<xrperation berwccn "rcccptivity" (sensibility) and "spontanc ity" (udgcrncnt) is such that their contribudons arc not cvcn notionally separablc: "ln experience one takcs in, 1or instance sees, that things arc rhus and so" (Miul and tVorld, p.26). "Iixperience", it sccms, is propositional in forrn, but ir is nor dLrs nor rehue r gcncr.rl slcpticism. h is uuc drat drt sense drrum dreorv hc ltilks r.iscs a lplerxr sceptical problcm, bur drar is thr problen ofhow re o,cr gei rc crnccirc of cxrernrl dlngs '9alnrlly rlifferent F,rm our perc,:ptions' (Hunrc, Tnatt c ol I Inur Nxwt, l.ii.6), rathcr than dre supposed problern of üe possibilirv of glob,rl error. The fomrer prohlcm, of course, rites not arise tor rhe 16 Tf i' f."r"r. uf p....prion aml us rclatrrn ro attcrnpts rti deline kmrrvledge rs explrred in nry ZaEr l 1?Alr,r,1)st', csp. !h! l5 .rnd 19-21. See .rlvr Bill Brewer, Ibrcption and tua:oa, ch.e, and nr1 r.' i.u. "ls all percepnr:i content onctptull",l,Lilx,phual Bok 13.t, pp.5-17. r/ MrlLrwell, lhrul anJ liltlt, p.la5: 'b mv picrurc irrpressir s are, so ro speJk, r,rnsp:rrent. lr dre picture common ro StLlars rncl l),rvidson thev rre op:rque thev do not rhcmstlves discl,se dre world to one.' Davidson, actording ro McDoweil, of{ers iro ratronal constrarnt, but t'uy causar intluence' on our bejiefs 'trom (,u!sidc' (p. la). t 248 Michael Alcrs to be undcrstood, in Davidson's way, simply as one kind of beliefs (say, observalonal beliefs) in the system of beliefs. ln expericncc, onccps rvbich arc "actively" exercised in judgcment arc "passivelv" exercised in sensibility. So something other than belief, something propositional but not itself a propositional anitudc, exists in "the space of rcasons" (id., pasim). Anlmporlant, thoroughly un-Kantian consequcnce of Mcl)owell's conception of "active" thought is in effcct a concession to Quinean coherentism, in that the concepts cxcrciscd in passive sensibility, grvrng sensation irs intentional content. are held to be thcmsclvcs liablc to rer rsion or refashioning as thcy arc cmployed in our whole revisable system ofbeliefs or world view. Consequently even the most immediately obscrvational conccpts (and thcrefore perceptual contcnts)r8 arc in prhciple open to reshaping in the hght of wider considerations, although McDowell says that thc prospcct is "no doubt unreal" in such cases. 'ü4rat arc we to make of this argument, and McDowell's purponed path benveen the Scylla of "the Mlth of the Given" and thc Charybdis of cohcrence without conrcnt? A questionablc prcmisc, prcny obviously, is the principle he shares with Davidson rhar what does not have the form of a judgernent cannot ground or be the basis of a judgcment. \trc can allow both pbilosophers an easy victory on the question n'hether something not of judgemcntal form can, in somc strictly logicalsense of the tcnr.r, il.rply, cntril, probabilify, or be a reason for a judgement. Stricdy logical rclarions very likely only hold between conceprualized contents. Logic cannot be parted Irom language. But, as I have alrcady suggcstcd in rcsponse to Davidson's argumcnt, wc livc in daily employrner.rt of the notion that a belief or judgement or dcscription which is propositionalin {om rnay be based or grounded on somcthing which is zot propositional in form, or not conccptualized, or indccd which is not a kind of thing that could possibly be either of these things. My dcscription of a zebra, for exarrple, may be based on perceivcd zebras, living or stuffed, or on photographs, drawings or models of zcbras, nonc of which arc propositional or conccptual in form. \{&y then should it be thought that the cxpericnccs and memodes that are necessary for rny descrrption to bc based on these things must themselves be propositional or conccprual? re Hcrc various thLngs migbt be said. It might be sard that rny description of a zebra is not really, philosophicallv spcaking, bascd on thcsc oferus, but on cen:in pcrs, prcciscly those facts stated in the description. Yet that is to replace what is relatively straighdorward and clear with something grcady fishy'. Tälk of "facts" 18 Thc implierrion is thet pcrceptual content, and not jLrst n'hu *e,;1we perceive, is tighdv linked to our.urrent system ofconcepts (ct. Richard Ron1, 'PragnaLism, Davidson.rnd Truth', ir t-epore (!t.), op. cu., pp.l3l-5s). TLe lbk would hrve to be Logical, not contirgcnt or causal. 19 I -ill concentr.rre on dcscriptions, to avoid rhe issucovcr whcthcr thcre can bt' inarticul.rte bellefs and judgemenrs, which are thernselves preconcepruai or non conceptual. (No doubt therc can be, aml rre,) jnd of bcliefs (say, observarncepts which are "activcly" Lsibiliry. So something other rpositional anitudc, cxists in rrougbly un-Kantian conser is in effect a concession to in passive scnsibilitl giving :selves Iiable to revision or le system ofbeliefs or world 'ational concepts (and thcrc- ;haping in the light of wider pect is "no doubt unreal" in :ll's purponed path between ybdis of coherencc without the principle he shares with dgement cannot ground or rsophers an easy victory on form can, in some strictly be a reason for a judgement. :n conceptualized contents. ready suggested in rcsponse of thc notion that a belief or nmay be bascd or grounded rt conceptualized, or indecd eittrer of thcse things. My r perceived zebras, living or zebras, none of which arc ruld it bc thought that the description to be based on :eptual? 1e id that my description of a these ofoecrs, but on certain let that is to replace what is ireatly fishy. Talk of "facts" 'e ryy we perceive, is nghdy lidred m, Davidson and Trudr', in kpore t conüntent or causal. 'drere can be ioanicularc beliefs and nal. (.'lo doubt there can be, ard trbj..rions to D.rriJ..,n .rnJ Me L.t"rr cLl 219 is just too obviously a projection o[ propositional fonn onto reality. Zcbras arc unproblematic objects as "lacts" arc not. Much the samc gocs ior "states of af{airs". Il I sct out cithcr to depict or to describe a material object such as a zcbra, it's the ofea that I am trying to capture, one rvay or anothcr, with pencil or words, not a set of facts or states of:rf{airs. \Xhich facts I do succced rn stating will suriply be conscqucnt on the means I emplov to dcscribe the object and on how much of my description is tmc. \Mrich facts I succeed in dcpicting in my picture will depend on which tn.rc dcscriptions of thc objcct would also be truc descriptions of thc object as I have drawn it, thc object "in" the picturc. Thc dcscnptions will bc propositional and therelore conccptual, but neither the objcct as it is nor the object as I havc dcpictcd it, (the picture contcnt) arc propositional or conceptual. The same goes, as far as I can scc, lbr thc object as I expericncc it, tire content of my cxpericnce. Ar account oi rhis conrcnr, likc an account of anything cisc, will be propositional; but not thc content itsell Argument against rhe notion of non-conceptual or non propositional content, cspecialiy thc suggestion that such a notion is in itsell a i,crrr of'thc Myth of thc Given', is liablcto slip into thc prcsupposition that 'non conceptual' meazs, in effect, 'non intentional'. lt wouid rhen be a tautoiogy that giving an account of expericnrc, supposing cxpericncc to bc non-conceptual, would bc giving an account of blanh, non-intentional quliz, Yct, ol course, once classiel scnse datum theory has been discardcd, thc claim that experience l.ras 'non-conceptual contcnt'is the claim that it has non corlccptual hteniorwl contcnr. Thar is to say, what is held to be non-conceptual is the ua1 thirys are presentetl h expoience, thc scnsory mode ol presentation, not somc mysterious, "immcdiately" prcscnted rlental intermediarics bctween perceiver and externai things. ln cftect, the assenion that scnse expcricnce has non conccptual, non-propositional contcnr is the assenion that thc way thc world is presented in sensc expcricnce is not quasi-linguistic. It is difficult to see how making this comrnon-sensical asscnion is cndorsing anlthing describablc as 'the Myth of thc Givcn'. That well-n'orn, but compelling \Vittgensrcinian argurncnt20 ro the effect rhat an accompanying image or mentalpicturc could not possibly be the vehicle of linguistic meaning can herc bc cmploycd in rcverse, in order to dcmonstrate that the content of a mcntal image or picture or scnsory cxpcrience or perceptual statc could not possibly be propositional or conceptual. Fbr if such contcnt rvere propositional or conccptual, it would do vcry wcll a-s the vehicle of linguistic meaning. \XJhy not? Thosc who accept he argumcnt about mcaning, but are also preparcd to arguc that the intentionality of scnsation is due to scnsory cxperience's being, as Srrarvson 20 Cenerrlll ascribed to Wntgcnsteir, but previousll used by Russell, ,liar b,sL ol .tlpll,lcct.,r.. a Mr.h.rcl Alrrs puts it, "pcnrcated by concepts",2l at least owe thc rcst of us an answer to that qucsrion. To come itt the sanc point lrom a slightly different direcdon, a picturc of a horse sranding undcr a trec does not have the logical fom or thc precisc. concepnraüy dctcnninate content of the judgcmcnc that a horse is standing under a trec. Much criticisrn has righdy bccn pourcd on \Wingenstein's errly idca that judgements arc vcry like pictures, but the idca that pictures are ven like judgernents is recrprocrlly problcmatic. Yet the ven' nature of pictorial contcnt is prcffy obviously tighdy bound up with the nature of the visuai contcnt on wluch pictorial contcnt is e'ssendally parasitic. Both are, in thc core sense, aesthetic, indeed visual. A representational picturc capturcs irs objects literally from a pobt of view, as seen. \XÄy should it bc supposed that visual contcnt is conccptual when picrori,rl content so cvidently is not? R.rther, acsrhctic conrent. r'bether pictori or scnson, is rn a cert.lin scrrsc incommensuuble with conccotual contcnr. and each has rts own kinds o[tlcrcrminacy and indeterrnin.rev. In onc way r picturc is rrx,re precise than a judgemcnt, for a judgement might bc illustratcd, as it were, bl inJefinitely many determinate pictures. Yet in another wry it is less precise, since i-ndcfinitcly many detenninatc things might be said o{ the content of a picturc. A pictorial content no more has ro be proposition-shapcd b order to bc described than a clescnption has to have picrrrial mcaning in order to be illustrated. Nonc of this irnplies an unbridgeabJc opposition between rhe proposirional and thc picrorial. lndeed sotrlled 'dcmonstrat jvc concepls'rnav rling.le rhe rwo, if whet is derronstratcd owcs its d.'monstrability to its having bccn dcpictcd. So we may sar' 'Mary has just that complcxion', as we point to the lacc of a girl in a soap advertisement. \fc ovcnly employ the dcpicted face, as wc might have ernployed an actual facc, in saying sometiing which could not, nken precisell', have been said rtithout refernng to what is non-conceptual. Conversely, as in somc 'conceprual an', pictorial and propositional conrenr may be fuscd in pictures which depict, among othcr dringsj sentences, and rvhich arc consequently not seen in the same wav bv non-readsrs as by readcrs.zz 2r PI,.SI,.,'"'.',], 'l'erccpdon and its i)bje.G, in C F i\lacdonrld (ed,.), lbt:cpritn aru! ltlottiry: E::,ry; 1rt\ottJ n A J A)cr. Sr:aw son's a4prncnt nrecll illusrates rhe tenclency of ionieprualists to assume that iltentionJ content, sirrply in beingintentronal, is by dre sametokcn conccprual. lor cnu.ism, see my 'Can there be e Ne*, Empiricisrn?', h Ar,ccalng: of thc Tu-enttc$ ri,rll Q'nscss of PhtLuop\, vol.7,lL n l)htlo*tpl4. ed. M:rk D. Cedncv. (llo*ling tircc'n, Ohio: Philosophr Dtrumcru.rri<,n Center). 22 ft is notcu,nlr rhar both rhese kin,ls of mj"red or briilging er,rmplcs have been employed in r}c concqru.rli* e,rLrse. the former bv lllel),'*cll hrrseLf lith respecr tc' so eallerl ilcnr.,nsurtire conceptr'{sec brl<*), ,hc hntr in rhe lres rh.u sees e. er1drhg ar : r,:rr' (rcc nc\t n,)rlr. \l) rJl ot depicong wriaen senren.es, as it Jitiercnr trcm writing ricm, is nxenJeJ neLrrallv Bur someone could dcpitt. rrr-, a sentence inJapanese s'rdr pain:takilg rccuracy wirhour knc's'rng thar n was a sentencc, and rhat would not, I drink, be to wnre u. C)bjtcdons to l)lvidsoo end Mcf)owcll lt is, then, no n)ore a letp trurh about expericncc th:t wc pcrceivc, e.g. scc, that ltitgs are thus,urr/so than it is a dc'ep orth about photographs that chc1, rrcord tbat thhgs dre tllts dtld so, or, for that r)rancr, d)in it is a dccp tnrtb about thc r.torld tbat thitgs art, tbus anl so. tsmadly speaking (:nd cxcept in spcciJ cases),r1 concepts and propositions only colne into thc act when wc cndeavour to s:a1', to othcrs or to oursclvcs, how we arc perceiving things, or how photographs h.rve recordcd thern, or hou tirings are. \{hcn langu.rr:c is employcd to clcscribc things scen, or photographecl,.rs drcy are secn, or photograpbcd, üe thougin cxpressed has propc.rsirional fbmr. Bur tbat does nu rncan that the cxpericnce itscli, i.e. what is presented in thc crpcrience, any morc than what thc photograph shows, mystcriously takes on propositional form. And, to repear, in cach case thc propositional account of non propositionai rcprcsent rtional content is bascd or groundcd on th.rt contcnt, not sinrpll c,rused by it, ft h,rs to be so grouncreo, in order to be an account of drc thing of whc-h it is an account. The causc of a description is not t/.,rrel7 its object. The object ofa non rccidentally tmc description has both to cause and to cround it. 3. Mcl)ovrr-l AND IDEALIsM lr Chapter II of lls book Mind and Worlr/, McDorvell considcrs the irnagincd chargc that he is an idcaList. In a veridical experiencc, hc has said, onc t:rkes in rÄar thitgs are thus a*l n. That things are tlns arrd r-o is (1) thc content ol thc cxpcrienec; (2) the content of .r possible iudccnrent and thcrcfore conccpt,.raL; ancl 1.]1 ,r'hat lllcl)owcll calls "irn aspcct of rc l;r'our of the world." adding, " it is how rhings alc." Hence, 2l 'Il. necess.r'r' qu"lihi.rnon oi tlc p,'inr dr.u .orrccprs and pri,porri rral li,rm only enrcr rlc storv lhen hng,r.ri rrplr.unr,r6on J,rs sr'. rnJ not bei ,re, ir not|ini1 paftrLri.\riy rcuonLlirt. Exptrimce antl knowledge cm .rf[,.r the *ry we prnene dlngs (rr, indcr'(]. rxrpcrceirc dring:). p:rrJy, but nor "nJ1, by determim.ng rhat is salicnt lor us. what we notice or lu.rrd to, or dre opcrrti'c gesarlr. Th.rt cflect mav r,rvole coocepru.riization. Itr exnmple, j,rt possibly only vncone who knows whar a coin is will ;ee coins .s wc do, at least:t r shncc. turtl somcine q ho cannor read will rureil nevtr pcrceive a prinrcd page ur iust the wry a re er dcs a c:se qhth nvolves langu.Lgc, but.rs objecr prtsentecl r:uhcr dr.rn .rs me.rns of rcprocnring or crpnling wh.u rs prcscnred. \lut nrJics drir r qur}hcrLion ol mr dreus r}r.rr pcrccpn:,rl . onrcnr cornes fusr, con. cpr' l.rtr, is the p, rnt r]:at concepts anil propositlor s nul in suc} cascs cntcr dre rriry ;u .rn earlier sr.rqe rhan rhar of r/clrTrar ot wtr.rr rs prescntcd, in hetping t,, dctennine or ercn r, , constimte just rr hat r presenred, or ho* ir rs presentcd. Yet it rs r minor quali6c.roon, not a grorn<l lor scrious objecrion. lr *ould cleariv be unjustiGed ro gcrtrabze from such specialc,rsesro NlcI)<*ell's conclusion üar, wuhout cimccpts antl propositional tornr entering in drese l'rvs into perceptu.rl content, rhere wruld bc no content as ifthen norhing *',rulJ be s:rlienr enrugh to bc percelcd. or rs ii dre woriJ scru rncleed .r rexr, bur r rcxr \.r ,rur m prinr mystcriouslr vrsrblc only ro those engrgcd in re.rding t. z J l rest of us an answer to drat ,'nt direoion, a picture of a onn or the precisc, conceprrsc is standing under a tree. tein's early idca that juclgees are verv like judgemcnts rorial coment is prc$y ob\.icontcnt on which pictorial nse, aesthetic, indeed visual. iom a point of view, as seen. rptual q,hen pictorial contcnt €r pictorial or sensory is in ltcnt, and each has its own l pi!-rure is more precisc than t wcrc, by indefinircly many cise, since indefinitely many cnrre. A pictorial contcnt no :ribed thlm a description has :rwecn thc propositional and rts' may mingle the two, if uving been depictcd. So we to the täcc of a girl in a soap as *'e might have cmployed ken precisely, have been said tely, as in some 'conccPtual d in pictures which dcpict, uemly not seen in the samc ed.), PtrcEtim ant llottiry: B:,rys ndmcy ol conccptualists ro assume roken conceptu.rl. For criticism, see ntieth \\&1,! Angres: of I'klosapl+ . , Ohio: I'hilosophy L\xunrentrtr,rn examples haue been employcd in respect o so_called'demonsratire as a'teri (see next note). Mr talk is intcndeJ neutrally. Bur scrrlconc acy wirhout knowirg rhrr it was r a Nlichael Aycrs Afthough realit_v is indrpcndcnt of our thinking, it is not to bc pictured as ourside an outer bounda4, that encloses the conceprual sphere. lbdt thiryr dre thus antl so is thc conceptual content of an expcrience, but iI the subject of an experience is nor misled, drar very same thing, r/at thixgs are thus aa) so, is also a pcrccptiblc fact, an xspect ol the perccptiblc rvorld. @26) Mcl)owell now remarks, truly enough, that'ir can sccm rhat rhis refusalto locate perceptible reaüty outside the conceptual sphere must be a son of idcalism.' ln othcr words, his vicw suggcsts that reality in so far as it is accessible to us consnrs of items, facts or 'aspects', neady tailorcd by thoughts and concepts (in effect, the view just considcrcd that descriptions of zebras are not based on perceived or depicted zebras, but on perceived or depicted facts about zcbras). This charge of idealism is mistakcn, McDowcll claims, because it presupposes that there rs an altemative possibiliry which allows us to takc in, in expcricncc, bits of 'tlle Given' in an objectionable sense. As he puts it,'rW4ren we trace lempiricall justfications back, thc last thing we come to is still a tbinktbLe contatt; not somerbing morc ultimate than that, a bare pointing to a bit of the Givcn (p. 28-9).' These 'frnal thinkable contents', he says, arcputintoplacc in opcrations oi receptiviry, an.l thar n'reens thet when we ipps rorhcm we regisrer the required constraint on thjdring fiom a rcrlity cxtcrnal to it. The thinliable contents that are ultimate in the order ofjusrfication arc contcnts of cxpcricnccs, and in enjoying an experience one is open to manifest fects, facts that obtain findepcndcndy] and impress themselves on onc's scnsibility. (p.29) McDowcll assurcs us that to insist that it is facts which impinge on sensibiliry is nor to adopt a grand ontological or menphysical vision that "thc world is cverything that is thc casc", but is just to insist that the world,is tbinhtble, that expericncc takcs in the thinkable world, that what one thinhs can bc the casc. Moreovet (as we have seen) he calls a pafiic ular fact that thitgs are thus and so'an aspecr ofthc layout ofthe world'. Ifthc apparent ontology o{ facts is really just his way of saying rhat thc world is propositionally thinkable (let us say, des,ribable) thcr' rhe metaphor of an aspect would seem appropriate enough. A true description ofa thing docs not capturc how it is tn roro, but capturcs certain drpeclJ ofthe dring. ra The terms o{ the descnpuon itscJ{ supply, as it were, specific points of view on the rhing. Yct such mctaphorical 'aspects' are imponantly dificrcnt {aom literal aspects. A pictorial representatron or visual irrpression may literally be from just onc point of view, and may capture one aspcct ofa thing in a Jiteral sense, yet (as bas just been remarked) indcfinitcly many tbings may be said about thc objcct fron.r just that point ol view rü4ren we comc to count metaphorical, conceptual 'aspccts' ofan objcct, on thc other hand, we are 4 I am scnsirive ro. but hcre ignore, dre possibly dillerent implicatronr of philosophical ralk of'aspects of the world', :nd lcss exJrcd talk of rspects of p:nicular thilgs n the *rrrld. The tormer * rn,,re consonant wirh the tenor md antecedenrs of McDrwell's argurnent. A certain kind of idealist, för exarnplc, rnight rcgard particular material objerrs rs themselves aspecs of rhe World (x rie Absolutc). Objections to L)avrdson end Nlcl)owc'li simply counting panicular things wc can say xbout rc object. McDorvell's notion of an aspect is tigbrlv proposition-relativc. or conccpr rclativc, rs the norion of an JSpcct in the litcral sensc is nor. InJecd, rhis vcry diJier.cncc betwecn rretaplroric.rl and litc'ral uses ol rhe rcrrn 'aspcct' is simply a r.nanifestation oi the diHcrence bctrveen incommensurable types of content, conceptual and non-conccptual: thc diflercnce betwccn rhe csscntialll iinguiscic.rnd thc cssentialiv resthcric or scnsory. I1 rve takc a chrrinblc ricw of wh,rt McDou'cll is saving about the t;.torut, interprcring it as no rnorc than a way of puning thc platitude that the world ar.rd things in it are dcscribablc, it becomes rnl stcrious u'hy n'e camot exrcncl such an approach to cxpcricnce itsclf.rl Is saving tlrat cxpericnce is conceptual, that wc a)ways perc: civc that things are thus arul so, any nole than saying that expcricnce is clcscribablc in that an account can bc given that will capturc 'aspects' of irs contcnr or objects? The point is that, if McDowcll's quictist pancr is suilicienr to avoid comnitrncnr to a menphysics which has realiry (or accessibie realiry reality lor us) literally propositionally or conccprtLally stucturcd, much the same paner will allow us to deny chat serrse :s Lss"nri.rliy drc senre poilt nr.ry sctm ro be mrJc t') Cr$pin Wr;ghr in lvlcDorellt Oseillatiori, Philordtr anJ I'hornmolr4ral Rt,c.rnl, l-Vlll..l (l99ri), p..tolj 'Il,:I)r;*cli is qurrL'ulL,rr rs hL hrLl [encr be rl ürc :ccus.rrr,n ,ri rclo]isrrr rs.rs underentd,rs he wishes drat facts.rrr fconceprurlll srn-rcturcdl onll in so t:rr as essemial]v conceiva]/c. So r Iacr is esscnti.rllv such .rs, for ,rn .rppn4rnatc subject, to be conceired rs dre lict ürat Ir; bur ir., er.rsrrrrrc r,h.u m,rkes frtr dre mnh of rhe pr,rp,'suion th:t l'need n<'t rlepend on rnlonc\ aerurlly e.c.eurg any of rhe concepts ,:on soment in r.h,u pn 4rlsirion. \\4rat, rhen , x dre obsu.lL ro .rn absLrlu rely parallel concepuon ot cxpericnce?' Ycr, .rs rs made cle.rr i,r his l.rrer expl.rn.rrons rn Rra/,ra .i/r[.rrn r./1(ec1.Nich 'las H.Smnh), espec;rlly 'PostrcrrpttoChapter S'. Vrighr i5 sü(crsring. n('r dr.u expencnLe rs inrinsic.rllv and non-ccrnecptuallv conrenrtu l , ar in r tsc i i jusül ic : ro4' , hur rh.r r , l i l . rhe wor lJ. n rs 'con.ünd,r . ' , , r ' re l .hblc ' , anv ecturl rerding being rvh;u is conccprual rnd jusri6c:uorr,. This, Wright :rrgucs, oilers r war in which :mnrals and id.rnrs cal bc suppo'cd to sharc 'ense expcricuce *idr concc.pr possessn.g humm beings, ihhough ücir expericnce cl.rs not acru.rll! iusnFj arrr bchels. Llct)orvell's responsc ('Reply io (l'nx)enra(ri. p. .110 l) i! ro fla;n rhar ircrs ,.rl bc rrrercly .,nerir.l,r, iulr berr'rse drey .rrf independcnt ofthourhr. lur i;ecunencc in conseiousness', on rhe odrcr hand, r nor so indl))cndenr, .rnd to suppcxc th.rt ir coukl i;round a 'conccpru.rl articulatiorl widrour hcing irself conceprually artitulrtcJ is ro subr.nbe to dre Mltr of dre Civcn. Tht p,rrt ,rl rr) prnr rh,rr seenx to be shallrl rvrü Vrighr rs r,\rt tire pixsrbr-lir-r' oi.r ronrtprually .rrricul;red aconr ol rhings as expericncecl no nr ore em,lls drar drc cxryriemrc cxprcssed or describcd is conctptu.rlly artrculated than it ent.rils rhat the üings desdibcd, rhe rh;nqs dnr enrer ürro dr,rr expricnte-contcnr,.rt concepru.rlly articul.lcd. But m1'whole point is rh.l. iusr as nfle.rion on vr;u:rl representrtion ,rrrl rr ' rlrrion b, ,rh ro ho* rv e see rhngs anJ r,, iinsruistr r rcpr cscnr.rur n shou)J lorce us to conclude r,\rt sense cxptrierce is zot ,:onccptu:1Jv rueul.rted, such re0ecrion gir es rs rnuch rcron ro ,rccr:pr u,lut \\,righis .rr6urnenr tlts ncx elvisage, dr.rt experiencc is rn irself conrenriul and iustilic.rtory I uill .rlso sugge.,r bcl;w dr:rr sueh anicul.rron :rs thc conr.'rrr of sense experi<nre po:sc:s.r lexprriorrt presrnts drsrrlrc nrateri.rl objetr as suih, hrr cramplel ilcrircs flrnr rhc re.rlny exPer(nfeo! nor rr|r)r our ronceprs. 253 )r to bc picrured as outside an tal thrngs ate thus and 'Lt rs the rf an experiencc is nor misled, rcrcepdble lact, an aspcct of the em that this refusal to locate st be a son of idealism.' In it is accessible to us consists hts and concepts (in effect, are oot b.rsed on perceived ; abour zcbras). This charge presuPPoses rhar rhere is an rperience, bits o{ 'thc Given' ace lemp;ical] justilications wtmt; not something morc iven (p.28-9).' Thcse 'final ns that when we appeal to them liry cxternal to ir. Thc tlinkable conrenls of c\perienccs, .1nd in rs thar obhin findependendy] impinge on scnsibilin is not .rat "thc world is everlthing zAaäle, that cxperience takcs casc. Moreover, (as s'e have an asPe.l of the lrlour ofthe way of sa)'ing that th€ world n the metaphor of an aspect r thing docs not captur.c how lhe tcmrs of the dcscription hing. Yet such metaphorical A. pictorial representation r {view, and nay captrrrc one emarked) indcfinitell, many fi of vieq'. tWhcn we come r, on thc odrcr hand, we are rns of pbilosr',phical talk oi'asprcts in the world. The former is more rent. A cenrin kind of ide.rlisr, for ects of rhe V'orld (or üre Absolure). t 254 Miclue I Aycrs 26 'H.rvrrg rhc \((rld in View: Sell:rrs, Kant.rnJ LrrenrioraLry', lowul of pttfoapl,jy XCV,9 (199S), PP.431-.1S/. experience is )uera)ly so structurcd, wid)our assening or irnpl).ing that it thcrcby lics outside the 'sphere of drinkabie contem' or rhc 'space of reasons'. \ühat argurneru does he oI{er for distrnguishing 'experience' from 'the world' in rhis rcspect? If the thur-kabilin of thc world is nor a rcason ior xic,usj ascribing propositional or conceprual tbrm to the world, tircn rhe rhiokrbilitv, or thinliabie contcnr, of cxpcricnce is not a reason for serioustv .rscribing proposition;rl or conccptual fonn to expenencc ithcr Or so it would scerrr. Indeed, it would scenl to be a hcakhy movc to bring a similar objcction against the thcsis that thought itscl{ is aiways and necessarily conceptual. 'All thought (or all bclief is exprcssible' isnot a good rcason forthe conciusionthat there is no such thing as inaniculate thought, thought lacking propositional logical form. All that is entailed is that determinarc onccpr (not necessarilv possesscd by the thinker) c:n bc en.rployed ro caprurc .aspects, of the conlent oi inaniculate tbinkng. No thoughrs are Ln principie ineffablt, as no objects ol experiencc arc in principle indcscribablc. I canrot find n Miwl and V/c,rLl anygeneral argument desiqned to mcct this appeal for pariry of rcasoning about thc rvorld and about cxpcrience of it, which sccms hardll'to have becn foreseen. But hints in the text suggcst a cenain line of reply. Considcr again a passage {iom which I have alreadv quoted: When we trace iustifcations back, the last thing we come ro is still a thinl,ablc cc,mcnr; not somcrlinq nrore ultimarc thal thar, a bare pointing to a bit of rhe Gircn. But these lnal ürinl<ablc contents  re put tnto phrc in l'perarions of receptiviry .. rhc thinkable !_onrents rhar arc ulnutte n the ordcr <t{ justificatioo ere conrcnrs of experien..es, and in enio) ing an cxperiencc onc is .rpen ro man csa facts, facrs rhet obtain anyway and impress dronselves on one's sensibilirr'. (p.29, added emphasis.) Now wc are not to supposc drat talk of'facrs'means rhar the world (or,our world') is Literally propositional in form, since that would be too much like the Tiaczarrzs, whether interpreted as grand nctaphysics or as ransccndcntal idealism. How then do we get from thc non-propositionai but thinkable world ro rhe proposirional thoughrs that tbinli it? It scems thar exprricncl:, recepriviry imbued o irh iponraneiry is rhc rneclunism that works rhe supposedly. rrcccssary rransfonnlion. The very concepts excrciscd activelf in, tbr cxarnple, the predicativc judgement ,Thc cubc is tr:d' (i.e. cube and red) arc exerersed passivcly in rhe pe,cepii.rn of a red cube. Indeed. accordhg to a more reccnt cxposition of this claim bv McDowell,26 in both judgernent and perccption the exercises of these rwo conccprs are linled by the same 'rnodc of togetherness'. a psychologic.rl counreqp.rn ro rhe propo, sitional bond. Experiencc is a conceptuallv shapcd product of mind and world, ready to Iall into experienced facts in sorr:e way in which, presurnab)v, the real world döes not lall inro rcal facts. ft is indccd casy to see this as idcalism: the form implying that it the reby lies rf reasons'. 'What argument e world' in this respect? 11 ru/7 ascribing propositional ry, or thinkable content, of rsitional or conceptual form rould scem to be a healthy hat thought iaeH is always is exprcssible' is not a good raniculate thought, thought s tlnt dctcrminate concepts Loyed to capture ';upects' of in principle ineffable, as no ment designed to mcct this rout experience of it, which :ext sugge$ a certain linc of ady quoted: : ro is still a thinkable content; o a bit of the Givcn. But these of receptiviry ... thc thinkable e contcnr of experiences, and , {aca that obtain anyway and rhasis.) at the world (or 'our $,orld') :oo much like the Tiact"ztus, ndental idealism. How then world to the propositional viry imbued with spontanc essary transformation. The predicatiw judgement'The g in the perception of a red I this claim by McDowell,':6 3se two conccpts are linhed countetPart o the proporoduct of mind and world, vhich, prcsumably, the real ee this as idealism: the fonn vonal of Ph&npby xcv,e (1ee8), Obiections to l)avidson and N{cDorveil 255 of judgement structurcs thc world as cxperienced and known. Yet howcvcr th.rt may bc, it rcquircs a rather special philosopbical cast of mind in order to accepr that, for it to be possiblc to dcscribe the world, expericncc oi thc world, or the world as experienced, has to bc dcscription-shaped. A more straighdorward viov is that dcscriptions are clescription-shapcd, whcrcas thc things described, whetbcr in themsclucs or as thcy figure in pictures or in thc contcnt of cxperience, do not have to be description shapcd in order to be describable. That is nottosay that there is zro sort ofconsonancc bctwcen the logicJ structure o[our descriptions and the structurc of thc far from amorphous cxpcricnced world, for that would imply that thc lancr contributes nothinli to the lbrmcr. On the contrary, (to takc a prime and crucial exarnple) thc physical uniry and discreteness ofperceptible marerialobjccts is vcry much a structural leature oi thc world,literally a mancr ol the world's independcnt physical stmcture, however to be scientilically explaincd. And it is no accident tbat all natural languagcs are (rnetaphorically) structured around such naturally and pcrceptibly discrete objects asthc basrc, grvel, individual objccts of re{erence. Yet in many othcr respects there is no structural consonancc bctwccn our prelinguistic experience, or rhc world as we expcrience it, and ianguage, or the means of prcdicativc thought. It is bad rnetaphyrics to ancmpt to explain thc possibility of describing or charactcrizing objects by rneans of predicates, or thc possibility of referring to such entities as atributes, saks ol afi)in, or faas, in tenls of structural consonancc or correspondence betwccn language and the world. Thc world, on the scale at which wc expcrience rt, rs to an extent broken up into unitary material objects, and that is Dou wc cxpcrienre it. It is not brokcn up into propenies, tropes, srares of af1äis, or facts, nor do wc so experience it. Of coursc, prcdication is our linguistic means of'capturing' how things are and hor-we perceive them to bc, thc'aspects', resemblances or diffcrences that strike us. But language and conceptual thought arc not rcsponsible lor cxpcrience's having any content at all. ln general, experience comcs bc{orc conccpts, and it is bccause we experience the world as we do that we are in,r position to acquire the conccpts appropriate to any account of things in the world, or o{ that cxpcrience. 4. McDowrr-ris HoLrsM I: coroun coNcEprs So far from allowing that the experienced snucturc of thc world gives anwbing to thc structure of natural languagc, McDowell holds that expcriencc would not be the way it is, or any rvay at all, unless it were permcatcd and shaped by a system.rric way of thinking ofthe world, a schcmc of intcrdependent concepts, a'world vic ernbodied in languagc. He sees such a degree of cohcrcntism as the only way of allowing experiencc to havc contcnt while avoiding the 'Myth of thc Given'. a 256 Michlel Ayers McDowell takes it that the 'Myth' has bccn rcfutcd by \X'lngcnstein's Private l,anguagc Argumcnt, and hc stresses a central irnpliution of that argumcnt hat the prirnary role of secondary quality adjectives i in their application to objecrs, to things in the world. Tälk of a 'sensarion of red', or of 'pcrcciving red', where these are descriptions of inner cxperience, is secondary to straighdorwardiy objcctive predications, 'The ball is red', the patch on thc wall is red', and the like. But now Mcl)owcll ancmpts to get from this imponant and generally acccptcd point to the conclusion that experience inl.rerently and of its nature involves a scheme of concepts. First wc arc told that the concept of being red is indced ticd to the subjective character of expcricncc: \Vhat it is for somcthing to be red is not intelligible unless p:ckeged wirh an undcrstanding of *hat it is for somcthing to look rcd. Thc idca of bcing rcd does not go beyond rhe idca of bcing the way red things look in the right circumsranccs. (p. 29) This closeness to cxpcricncc means that colour concepts are 'minirr.ralll, intcgratcd' into the thinher's scherne of belicfs or world uicw. Ncvcnhcless, McDowell says, thcy are ncccssarily integrated. The thinker 'musr be equippcd with such things as the conc€pt of visiblc surfaccs of objects, and the concept of suiuble conditions for telling what sornething's colour is by looking at it.' This claim, McDowell suggests, is consonant with \XTingenstein's rejection of 'thc thought that, if being red and looking red are intelJigiblc only in tcnns of each other', we can only break into the circle by explaining both being rcd and lookng rcd in tcrms of the 'inner' experience of'secing rcd' (p. 30). NlcDowell's alternative isto recognize that coiour concepts'come only as clements in a bundlc of concepts that nust be acquircd togcther' that is, to embrace a fonn of conceptual holism. This argumcnt is signficantly unconvincing. First, although a philosophcr (amateur or professional) might claim with somc point dut, when it comes down to it, being red is just a maner of looking red to normal obscncrs in normal circumstanccs, that docs not mean that the child who can distinguish colours and correctly employ colour predicates must also har-e thc concepts employed in that philosophical reflection bcforc properly being creditcd with the concept re,y': c. g. the concepts of normality or ighness and circuntstinces, cxcrcised, as it might be held, with a spccificaily propositional 'mode o{ togetherness'. McDowcll's funher unpacking of the alleged conccptual bundle does linle to heip his case, sincc both concepts rnentioned (the concept of visiblc surfäccs of objects and the concept of suitrblc conditions for telling what something's colour is by looking at it) are distincdy sophisticated by comparison rvith tlle concept reel. A oisible surface is a fairly abstract entiry27 not at all thc first kind of thing we learn to talk about, while r/ Surfaces :rre not, of course, abstncr in thc \\'ar tirat univers,rls or numbers are absract, but in so far ls thev are conceived of br' .rbsrractron Fom what is concrcrc a.Ird drscrere. J by V'ingcnstein's Ilirate ,tion of tlnt argumc'nt hat :ir application to obiecrs, to 'erceiving red', wherc these suai$dorwardly ob jective lis red', and the like. But rd generally acceptcd point s nature involves a schcme rg red is indeed tied to the rckagcd with an undcrst.rnding g red does nor go beyt>nd the :alces. (p.29) s arc 'minimally intcgrated' v€rtheless, McDowell says, equipped with such things nccpt of suitable conditions ir.' This clarm, McDou'ell i the thought that, rl beLng h other', we can only break g red in tcrms of the 'irmer' e isto recognizc that colour cprs that must be acquicd ,l.ism. though a philosopher (amart, when it comes down to al observers in normal cir- :an distinguish colours and concepts employed in that wirh the concept rerl: e.g. es, exerciscd, as ir rnight be :mcss'. McDowcll's funher to help his case, since both o{ objects and the conccpt lour is by looking at it) are pr red. A visible ;urläce is a ve learn to talk about, *bile nu:rl'ers are abscract, but ir so lar ()bjcctions to Davidson and McDow<-ll 257 thc notion of suiable conditbns is eveu lcss likely to bc bmdicd about by loune children. It might be objccrcd that tlris criticisrn is absurdll uncharitablc. Pcrh.rps'conccpts' or 'conccptull capacities' arc not, after all, so tigh y linkecl to lanluagc. Possession of the conccpt rerl involves a widc range of experiential and agent capacities, and pcrhirps it is right thar a child who takcs its bricks out of the dark roorr into the'light roorr to son rhern thereby manifcsts one (or a ser) of rl.rcse capacities uch t is rcasonably cluractcrizcd as irs conccpt of 'suiubie conditions lor tclling rvhat sonrething's colour is bv looking at it'. \lt this approach, howevcr it may bc developed, docs not seem to ofter a dcfcnce ol McDowcll's clarm compatible with his general position. Our child bas rwiggcd somcthing about visror, ptrhaps about colour Yet McDowell's generalized dcscripdon or charactcrzarron fronr the outsidc of tbc child's intellectual achievernent is clccply problenatiu .rs .rn analysis oi th.rt :rchievemcnt iom the inside, purporring to ident(r'a couicepr posscsscd by the child, a distrnguishable mcmbcr of a bundle olconccpts rvhich the child mzr-t possess iI it is to acquire a futl undcrsunding of rhc tcr:rn 'red': i. e. which the child must acquire along with suclr concepts as rcl. Mcf)owell's argumcnt ar bcst conllates two diifi'rcnt notions o{ r conccpt. One is linkcd to language, and such that wc acquire the concept red *hen *'e achicvc a full understandins of 'rcd'or a synonvm. Thc other is evic{endy not so Linked, since it is p:rlpably zr.,t ncccssary to lcarn dre meaning oi an cxpression equiv.rlcnt o 'suitable conditions' u,hen learning the rneaning of'red' or, for that mancr, when reaiizing dut it is easicr to see the colours of things if they arc in a good light. To rcpeat, such an expression rnay be in placc in a charaooizdtiott of thc llncr achievcmcnt (rs it is in .r phi)osophical [llcrtion on rerlness), but that achielcnrcnt docs not oi itscll inuohr eoming cr-r urrJlrst.rnJ.uclr t exprc'sion. It is surely truc that a cenain witlc, practical familirriry with the worLd and bow we relatc to it in perception, including skills at picking out, exarnining and mirnipulating obje'cts and stufls, and perhaps son.rc grasp of how light bchavcs (not to spcak of sonre dcgrc'c of natura), panl'cmpathetic or ernotional apprrciation of the comnrunictivc rgeocy of thosc others lom n horn drc infant learn-s its tirst Lrnguagc)rs are norrnal conditions of an inJant's acquiring a full undersunding of such preclications as 'Tbis is red' and 'That is a doq'. Bcing thus at home in the world itself depcnds (as wcll, perhaps, as on gcneral intelligence) on a r rricrl' oi somctimes surprisingly specilic capacities or nechanisms, innatc or acquircd, idcnriliable by their ,rbsence in cascs oI gerrtric defect or brair.r damage, or possibly by significant, distinct steps in normai inlant devciopnlcnr, )'ct it is a qr.restion wonh l$ A .ccent approrch r.' ,rurisnr pnrposer thrr .ur ,ruristic child hck' .ur unate empadrctic rcsponse lr orlrcx. larnirg by illcrcnrc, ii ar all, * hrr rs ni'nrrll,enrhrxieJ rn n,rnir.ll emotirnrl llruJes. a 258 Micbeel Ayers raking more slow lv than is appropri.uc hcre how fur aLl this cognitive achievcment is bcsr rlescribed as thc posscssion and cxercisc ol LonLepts, rathcr than mir,cn to constitute sucb command oI the perceivcd cnvi(rrrrent as is ncccssarily prior to the acquisition of any concepts.:') One way to go, taken by some psychologists, isto idcntify vinually all distrnguishable steps in a child's progress in pcrccpmal discr-imination a d in its comprchension of tlre svorld as concepaal advances, right trorn the infanr's tirst tracking p)rysical objects as objccts of anemion. rD \IÄcther tbis is a hclplul or wise employrncnt of the term 'concept' is here irrelevant. Mrat is to the prcscnt point is that McDowcll carurot consistently appeal to such corrsidcrations to bolstcr his conceptual holism, just bccause his notion o{ what is conccptual is tied so closely to proposition.rl form. Hc cannor have it both wavs. Lither he is claiming, nith minimal plausihrlirv, that a child canlot undersund colour-words rvithout aiso undcrsmncling, at least as thsv are enrploycd in the relevant contcxl, such words and phrascs as 'looks','normal people' and'suitablc conditions'; or he rs assening (contrary ro his mdn thesis, if, as some of us might drinl, platitudinouslv) that, bcfore acquiring colour-words or, wc might acld, any language at all, a child must be ro a sienificant ex:rcnr cognifively and acrivcly at home in thc n'orld of pcrceptible phvsicrl objccs: i. e. nrusr h,rvc experience, ü not rhought, s'ith structured and dctcrminate (but not, b McDowell's scnsc, clzce?tzz/Ä, strucrured and determinate) intcntional contenr. 5. M<:DowEu-'s Horrsu II: SsrE AND \WoRr-D Othcr holisric arguments adr'.rnccd by McDorvell arc no more coDvincing. Like Quinc and many others, he runs togethcr possession of a sct of systematically inter-relatcd c<lncepts with posscssion ofa systcm ofbeliefs, posscssion oia'world view'with posscssion of a conceptual schcme. The naturalopposite thought is that a yiew on thc *orlc{ is embodicd in rhe ordinary cxpcrience and accitc life of urany animals, and u.rdccd is so il hum;n expcricnce as a nnditnn of the acguisirion and possession of language and concepts. McDowcll tries to forestall th.is rhought by le One idenlfilhlc qcnctic defecr is.tr rnrhility ro judge numher' ,,i slall groups wirhour countr,'rg (an abiliry seeninglv poxessc'd by v-rme non-human animrlsl. Vh.rr sould be t}e point o[ srring ttrar such inLljvrdu,Js lacl number rrzrgr', or the roncept of nunrberi Vh:u conrepr *ou)d be laclong rn rhe case o{ a srlilar inabilir,vto judge disnnccs? There would scen to be sometlurg dceply wrong in treating such rccognirion:rl or judgcmc nt.rl cap.rcities rnd inc.rp,rciries rs in general conceptu.rl. r0 |liz:bedr Spelke is r currenrll inlluentral cxar4rle, rpparenrlv inllucnccd, Like Piager, bv broadly Krntian philrxophic.rl ideas. l rr rhore rvho :dopt ü'is apprr '.r.h, there n an easl r 'ute to iclenrili ing üre concept in quesrion: for a start, just ly what ürc child h.rs gr.rspedl llut however objectionable the te,m 'concepm.rl' s.ruscd nrar-bc, u rs surelv bettcr tien dreoretical'. J *ris cognitive achicvement :?rJ, rathcr rhan r.rlien ro t as is necessarily prior t<.r .dennfv inually all distinünation and in its comprer the infant's lirst tracking ; a helpful or wisc employo rhe present point is drat rations to bolster his connceptual is tied so closcly lithqr he is clairrung, wrth olour-s.ords without also ,.vant contert, such words ondidons'; or he is assenght drink, platirudinously) anv language at all, a child r at home in the world of if not thought, with struc- :o nc e?tt4lll stru ctur cd afid AND \WORLI) no more convincing. Like L of a sct of systematically liefs, possession i a'world .ral opposite drought is that :nce and active life of many /rrbz of the acquisition and ro forcsr. l thrs ttrought b1, ma.ll groups wirlour counting (rr woLrld be üe point oi saling ü;t Vtr.u concept *ould be lacking in L to be sometlLing deeply wrong in ies;rs generalconreptual. rlluenr:ed, Iike Pir6cr, bv brordly h.re ; an e:lst r.,ute rc identiry nt aspedl But however obje,;tion:rble ,reticil'. Obiecti.rrrs to Devid'on rnd Mcf)orvcll 259 bu ding up contrasting accounrs oi rvhat is involved il a world uicn-and of thc narurc of anirnal lile antl sensitivitv u hich kecp clear water betwcen tbcm. Thc finncst line of this arsLrmcnt, somewhat rhetorically developcd with aeklowledgcments to Kant, Pcter Strawson and Gareth Evans, is to the effect th.rr not only awarcness of oneselJ as ;n endurir.rg subject oi thought, bur any rhougbt or c-rperience n,hich has rcdrcncc to thinl:s;r thc n't>rld, rcquires m a sondititttt 'tl.re thinker's conpctcnt self-conscious prcsence in drc world'as onc matcrial object among othcrs. Aq,'arcness of oncsel{ as a rnaterial thing and a\\,arencss of an objective rtorld are rrutually dcpcndent. But such awareness, McDrrvcll takes it, involvcs the concept of a person, namely an understanding thrt the firsr person, thc continuilg rcfcrcnl o{thc "I" in üc "t rhink" that can rccomparLy all mv reprcscnrations is ;rlso l third person, sonretling such drar othcr modes ..f conunuing thought:rbout it *,oLrll irdec,J requi,-c kccpilg tr.rck of it lirr the objcctire worLll. (p. 102) Accordingly, he argucs that the Links betwcen the subject and otherp.rnicular objccts are also conceptual, through 'denronstrative ctrncepts' crustirudng Fregi:an senscs or rnoclcs of prcscnrraion, This is not thc only placc in n'hich Mc[)owcll's thc'is leans hcavily on the notion of a dcrnonstrative corlccpt, and here hc cxplains that by 'conccptual' he me.us sornething wider than 'predicative', namely 'belonginB to the rcrhr of Frcgean serrse'. A dcrronstrativc conccpr lra.s carlicr been cxplajncd rs a concept cxercise,l when ve pick out an object lbr thoughr by rneans o{'a pluase like "thar shadc", in which the dcrr.ronsrativc exploits dle prescnce of thc samplc' (pp.56-7). Ttis argurncnr is supportecl by a series .,[ cl.iirns, cchoing Gld.rnrer, allcginq a fundamencal differcncc in kind bctrveen mcrcly anirnal .rnd linguistically socialized human mcntality. Alimals and in{ants mav be'pcrceptually sensitivc'to icatures of their cnvironmcnt, but do not harc'outcr cxpericncc'in thc Kantian sense. Thcr arc inc.rpablc of thc 'disintercstcd contcmpl.rtion' tlut makcs room for rca..,ning and frec intentional acdon, and they tberetbrc lack a'trcc distanccd oriqntation t., the world', possessing only 'protosubjectivitl" rathcrdran lully flcdge'd subjecriuin. Yet, to pass over thc quc'stion whr,'ther all this scriously untlcrcstimatcs tbe e()$nitir(' capacirics of somc animals, such rhctoric begs the main question, si[ce propon€nts of non-conccptual intcntional content nccd only supp.rsc (as is prcny evidcnt ir.r itscll) that the sense e'xpericncc .,I animals and inlants from an car)r age, and lor that mrnerrlre cxperiencc of .rcluls, u,ill indccd includc in;rnicvlarc, ion-concepuul. senson'bodily aw:ucness of drcmselves as actinB widlin.r panly manipulable, p.rnly intracrablc cnviromrrcnt. Wc necd not supytosc that a hound rcquires nastcrt of thc first personal pro noun or a sophisricatcd gcncnl conception o{'thc *'orH in orclcr to be sensorill' aware of its physic.rl and active intcr relation *vith thc hare it chascs, or for thar inter-rclationship to fit into thc structurc of rhe hourtd's pcrceptual cum-agcnt t 264 lvlichacl Ayers consciousncss. r1 Indeed, unlcss an infant had first achicvcd such inaniculate self, consciousness it is difficult to sce how it could cver advancc ro the usc o{ first and third pcrson predication, not to speak of meditating on the logical relationship between sel{-refcrence and rcfcrence to othcrs. McDowcll's main thesis concerns intentioruliry and it drcrefore h;Lngs, not on whethcr the actions of animals and infants can count as 'free'or fully rntendcd, or on whethcr their expericnce and reactions are sufficiently rcflective ro count as rarion.ri, or on whcrher they take their immediate environment o bc pan of one widcr \üy'orld, but simply on whe'ther rhey ue subica lo sen\ory or p(Reprual surcs q ith inr.nrion.rl conrenL. In developing his clairns for the importancc of demonstrative conccpts,l2 McDowell seems at Ieast o envisagc a ccrtain way out of the problcm that animals pose for his thesis. Evans himselJ had in cffect assumcd what may scem no more than a piece of common sensc, namely that drc notion of a 'demonsuativc concept' presuppos cs a nollconceptu4l sensory presentadon of the sarnplc or object in question. Fbr how could a san.rplc be demonstratively exploitcd that was not already expeÄcntia y availablc? Mcl)owell's di{Jicult counterclaim (appealing a/ bominem to anidiosyncratic learurc o{ Evans's own position) secms to be that it is t}le availability of the deinonstrative couccpr irsell rhrt makc, rhe outcome of rhc sensory processes available as 'cxperience' to thc selJ-conscious subject. Hc cites and glosscs with qualificd approval thc vicw of Evans that a state of thc percepruel infomational systcm counrs as an experiencc onlv if its non conceptual contcnt is aveiLrblc as 'inpur to a thinking, conctpt applying:nd rcasoning systcm' . . . ; thet is, only if its non conccptual content is available ro e Iaculty of spontanciry, which can rationaliy make or u,ithhold judgements of cxpcricnce on thc basis of thc pcrccptual srare. (p. 49) By McDowell's ligbts, of course, thc non-conceptual contents of thc sub-persond perceptual states o{ linguistically sociaLizcd human bcings are availablc as the }arn of judgement only as and whcn already transformed into thc conceptual contents of conscious (: self-conscious) expcricnee. J\ Prior ro rhis ml.t"rious metamorphosis, thc 'blind' non-conceptual ctualizations of scnsitiviry are idcntfied with inlormational sutcs as conceivcd of by 'cognitivc pychology' (p. 54-5; p. 121). Yet this daring, but surely doomed anempt ro deal with late twentieth ccntury func tionalism within thc Kantian framcwork naturally stimulatcs ycr another quesuon about McDowcll's meaning. Is it his considered view (as it seems to have been Cl. Casserrrli's re.rcrlr:,n to Descutes's concepru;list.rl trtetlitrtn ' .n I:iEt Phlosod,), Iitü ser ()l Obic'ccions (AI I\/ 2/2-lJ. Ard clseutrere, as in his commenrary orr Evans's cl.un tht non conceprurl content is rnon: "tinegrained" dr:n thc conceprs ar,ailable ro express ir (pp.56-60). The rcader could be folgiven for wondcring whether al1 thc problenx rhat .rrc allcged by NlcDowell for rie idea rhat dre non conceptu:rl should grciund dre prop,sition.rl, rs wcll as for the contran jdea thrt sensarion can:t best rzar *re proposirional, have simply beeu shifted to *rir ml soul transformatron. ? Olrjcctiols to Devidson and McDou ell Evans's) that thc attribution of contcndul pcrccptud statcs to aninals and inlants lacking a world vicr-crnbodicd in language is aiter all accepable, pnrvidcd onlv th.rt we undcrstand the content funcionally or eusally, as 'inlbmration' in a tcch nical scnse, and do not suppose that animals havc scnse cxpcrience, that is cozr.r.rzr sensation? Hcrc wc secrn to bc left with conrary interpretivc considcrations. C)n the one hand McDowell's overall position (ike Davidson's) secrns to have a strong need ior just this ccrily Canesian view of animals as a way ofallowingthcm statcs with a kind of inrentionaliry less than thc tmc intcntionaliry o{ rhe propositional anitudes of the rational animal. C)n thc othcr hand, his argument is larded with clisclaimers (rcminisccnt of sevcnteenth-century d/,ti-Cefte sianism) to thc cffcct that it would be'outrageous' and an'obvious falschood'to dcny anirnals sensitiviry to prin or, more gcncrally, 'pcrceptual sensitivity' to features of their cnviromncnt (which surcly has to be perception of-things) (p.50). Thc ir.rdctcrminacies and stresses in rhe argument seem esscntial to it, manilcstations of a characteristically rwentiethcentury attempt to tie intcntionality and even consciousness in with language ancl hun.nn rationaliry with a rope that is a way rco shon. It is nevenheless tnrc cnough, if not lbr McDowcll's given reasons, that concepts are acquircd in bundles. Clcarly 'red' could not be tully undcrstood without sorne grasp of predication,ll and so a grasp of othcr tcrms such as 'brick' or 'flower', and of the role of drcir conjunction in such sentences as 'The brick is red'. Similarly the term 'rcd' will be acquired along with other colour terms (at a thcorctical mhimum, perhaps, a colour-tcnr.r vith thc extcnsion o{'not rcd'), and the distinct rolc of colour-tcrms will be marked by a contrast with othcr kinds o{ prcdicate. It is not necessary to adopt somc cxtrauagcndy supcr-Saussurian view that no word has meaning cxccpt in rclatior.r to the whole oi the langurge to which it bclongsr5 in order to recognise that an apprcciation o{ the syntactic and semantic role of one word will ncccssarüy include appreciation of the roles of others. That such basic bundlcs c:rn in fact be relatively small is panll bccausc languagc concs in layers, so that such absract or second order tcrms as'surface', 'conditions', 'predicate', 'numbcr', 'shadc' and 'bclief' naturally and necessariiy comc latcr to thc lcarncr th:rn words l ike'dog', 'round', 'two', 'red', 'Daru.ry' or'I ' . Moreover basic prcdication corncs to be grasped in the context of conmuli cation about a stmctured environment of prclinguisticaliv idcntfiable, pcrceptibly v;rious, variously manipulablc and intcracting natcrial objecrs and stuffs. Coming to understand a first langr.ragc is not a maner of learning a key to all permissiblc la Which ,locs nor, I tal.e rr, mean rlr.u rlrr chilcl must hrve the sophisric;uetl .rnrl secontl order conccprs, 'rQcLt at\ ptluatc. Lven to expl.rin the achicvcmcnt ol crnccprual dlrught *c need the notion of inaniculate, non or preconccpuel undcrsnnding. ln this c:rse n e could use sornedlng like dre scholrsric distinction betrvecn the abilitv to prctlic.rtc, rnd possess;on of dre conttpr ltnluatnn. r5 One oi the solier urgets of l;odor and Lepore,l|<t/nn: a.9x4po': thub 261 Lieved such inaniculatc sclfadvance to the use of first g on the logical relationship well's main thesis concerns the actions of animals and rether thcir cxpcrience and l, or on whether they take orld, but simply on whether t€ntional contcnt. demonsrrative concepts, l2 ut of tle problem that ani isumed what may seem no notion of a 'de monsuative nion of the sample or objea vely exploited that was not counterclaim (appcaling ad rsition) seems to be that it is : makes the outcomc of the conscious ubject. He cites :hat an experience onJy if its non xcept applying end reasoning Jable to a faculry of spontaneiry :xperience on thc basis of the ontents of the sub-personal ngs are availablc as thc Eari nto the conceptual contents r this mysterious metamor- :nsitiviry are idcntficd with ology' (p. 54-5; p. 121). Yet ate F/entieth century funcrulates yet another question r (as it sccms to havc been ns on Ivst Philtxrylry, Ftfr\ Sa ol L<oncepruai content is more "6ne rs that :re alleged by McDowell for as well as for the contrary idea th* fted ro this mysr.ic.rl rransformation. a 262 ]üic-hael Ayers combinarions of linguistic clcments, any rnorc than it is a mamcr o{ learning thc names ol givcn phenomenal sin.rples. It is a mattcr of getting the point of whrr is being done by others, and here the child can and must call on the world as she experiences it and is already at hornc in it, as well as on her prclinguistic rappon with other pcople, not to speak of any more specilic innatc Linguistic dispositions or capacirics rhcrc may bc. That bundlcs o[ o,prr..ion., have ro Lc le.rrnr al.rng.id. onc another cven at thc start is not to be explained, I would suggest, by the nccd ro possess sufficient material for a 'scbemc of belicfs or world vien/ into which all our concepts can and must be integrated, as if the exprcssions functioned as the rnterdefinable terms ofour hrst, lisping theory giving us our first hypostasizcd objects. Rather, it is necessary because of a more mundane necd for adcquate prompts and cucs to srimulate an inanicuiate, practical grasp of the fact that, and the wiys in which, cenain humanly produced soundsl6 constitutc aniculated sequcnces of elements that in.combinarion r anage (in the basic casc) to n/cz ro lenain percepr bly, physically discrcte objects of sharcd preconceptual cxperiencc, and ti describe those objects. To grasp all that is at least inarticulatcly to grasp how an anicuiate, propositional judgement may be grounded on what is not propositional. 17 Or gcstures nrany people, rlc.ri flrrl binh or urlr etildho(d, h.rve tcamt slgrmg as their first langunge. Jonathan Ree\ 15ec; l6nr ritllrs drught provokrng reflecuons on rhe relarion ot slg rg See nore:i4. I lm gnrefulto rlosc who h.rve corrunented on earlier drafts oi this anicle, and cspeci.rllv to Quassinr Cassam and 'Iom Crowrher, nrany of whosc helplü comrents have srimulatcd chrnges of text or fooorotes-