Part One Phenomenology and the Tradition 02 Chapter 1.indd 7 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM 02 Chapter 1.indd 8 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM 1 Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics Lawrence J. Hatab If we want to know how phenomenology can address virtue ethics, surely we must begin with Aristotle as the fi rst phenomenologist who thought about virtue. 1 How are we to understand him as a phenomenologist? Aristotle seems unique in the Western tradition up until the nineteenth century: for Aristotle, human beings belong in the natural world and are at home in it. Th ere is no other reality than the world we inhabit. Unlike Platonism, medieval philosophy, or even modern philosophy, human existence is not subject to some fundamental fl aw (respectively: embodiment, the fall, or common sense) that philosophy is called upon to repair. For Aristotle, the ordinary world of our experience is fully prepared and meant to elicit philosophical understanding. Philosophy, therefore, will begin with how the world already appears to us in various ways, before we philosophize. Philosophy amounts to an explication, clarifi cation, and improvement of natural experience, especially through gathering patterns and organizing concepts (see Physics , 184a1621). Aristotle ' s phenomenology is therefore a philosophy that begins with natural and cultural appearances , an orientation that can be understood in four main ways: Investigation 1. should begin with observable phainomena , through which the search for explanations can properly proceed ( Parts of Animals , 640a15ff ). Phenomena are the " witnesses " and " paradigms " for philosophical inquiry ( Eudemian Ethics , 1216b26ff ). Contrary to speculative metaphysics and etiological stories, Aristotle insists that the " why " and the " what " of things cannot be examined before the " that " ( to hoti ) of things; to reverse this order " is to inquire into nothing " ( Posterior Analytics , 93a1528). Aristotle takes his point of departure, not from theoretical constructions, but from what is immediately apparent in perceptible encounters. Th ese phenomena 02 Chapter 1.indd 9 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics10 should be understood essentially as perceptible wholes , in the way that things (like trees) present themselves to us in ordinary experience - an orientation that distinguishes Aristotle ' s thinking from Platonic transcendence and the elemental reductions of earlier natural philosophers and atomists. Investigation 2. will be guided by language . Aristotle oft en begins by consulting what " is said " or what " we say, " by taking certain meanings or usages as given. 2 He then proceeds to think with and through these linguistic inheritances toward clearer and deeper insights. In general terms, Aristotle assumes an intrinsic correlation between language and being; the elements of being cannot be understood apart from what is said of them ( Metaphysics , 992b1922). 3 Philosophy 3. should consult both " the many " and " the wise, " that is, both common beliefs and refi ned insights ( Topics , 100b22ff ). Th e implication is that philosophical fi ndings should be neither so unusual as to violate familiar senses of things nor so familiar as to rest solely with ordinary experience. With 4. respect to " the wise, " Aristotle begins most of his investigations with a survey of historical precedents that have marked philosophical understanding so far, with the aim of sorting out what in these sources is appropriate or inappropriate to phenomena. Contrary to some readings of Aristotle that take his surveys to be simply setups meant to valorize his own thinking by contrast, Aristotle seems to genuinely believe that philosophy should build from beliefs that have already found a place in human thinking (see Metaphysics , 993a30ff ). For Aristotle, it is hard for human thinking to be entirely in error. 4 Aristotle ' s philosophy As opposed to the transcendent tendencies in Platonism and the abstract deductions typical of earlier philosophers, Aristotle was a thoroughgoing realist and naturalist, and his thinking stressed particularity and plurality. Consider Aristotle ' s concept of ousia , the primary sense of being as the unifi ed reference for descriptions. Ousia , for Aristotle - unlike the Platonic conception of being and the connotations of the Latinate " substance " - is primarily a " this something " ( tode ti ), an imminent, concrete presence in experience ( Categories , 3b1012). Species and genera are ousia in a secondary sense, in that they reveal something about being, but not in a primary sense (2b2931). Secondary ousia (e.g. the 02 Chapter 1.indd 10 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 11 universal " tree " ) does not exist in its own right (hence Aristotle ' s critique of Platonic Forms). Th e primary sense of ousia suggests the radicality of the " that " over the " what, " the sense of presence in temporal experience. Aristotle ' s ontology of nature is essentially about temporal fi nitude, motion, and change. In the Physics , he investigates the explanations and ordering principles of nature ( phusis ), which is directly identifi ed with movement and change ( Physics , 200b12). Th ings of nature have an intrinsic principle of movement, as distinct from things brought into being extrinsically by production (192b10ff ). Phusis , then, has to do with self-manifesting beings. Th e task of analysis is to make sense out of change and movement, which Aristotle accomplishes by way of the concepts of matter and form, which are given a dynamic quality in the concepts of potentiality ( dunamis ) and actualization ( energeia ). It is important to stress that both dunamis and energeia are active concepts, for Aristotle. Th e two together represent a single model of process (201a10ff ). Dunamis as potentiality is not simply possibility, but an active power , a capacity to develop; and energeia as actuality is not simply a fi nished state, but being at work ( ergon ) in the actualizing of potential. Form ( eidos ), then, cannot be understood simply as a static " shape, " but rather as the active selforganization of a developing being (194b27). Notice that energeia and dunamis are coordinated with telos (end) in Aristotle ' s coinage of entelecheia (literally " having-an-end-in " one ' s being), so that the movements of phusis involve a being-toward, a self-emerging being on the way toward a not-yet that can-be, which is to say, a coming to presence of an absence ( Physics , 191b13ff ). In thinking ousia as a concrete occurrence in natural experience, Aristotle is able to give movement, change, time, and negation their appropriate senses of being. In Aristotle ' s text on the soul ( psuch ē , understood as life), we have a phenomenology of an active, temporal movement animated by potentiality. Th e soul is the form of the body ' s matter, not as something separate from the body but as the gathered actualization of potentials in a living being, an active capacity to function and develop ( De Anima , II.1). For Aristotle, the self is essentially an activity, not a static entity. Th ere is a unifi ed coalescence of capacity, activation, performance, and being in human nature in such a way that we are a living and a doing ( NE , 1167b31 – 1168a10). Unlike the subject-object bifurcation in modern philosophy, Aristotle ' s refl ections on the soul off er a bipolar conception of self and world. Th ough sensation and its object are not the same being, they have one and the same energeia ( De Anima , 425b27 – 29, 426a16 – 18). In an analogous way, thought is potentially the same as the things it thinks (429a13 – 17). Th inking is nothing 02 Chapter 1.indd 11 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics12 until it thinks something in the world and what it thinks must be in thought (429b3 – 431a1). Th e actively thinking soul is the things it thinks (431b16 – 18). In this account of activity, Aristotle alludes (417a15 – 18) to a discussion in the Physics (III.1 – 3) where he claims that in activity the agent and patient are a single process of actualization (illustrated by teaching and learning, building, and a house being built). Th e agent is not something self-contained in an interior zone, " cut off " ( apotetm ē men ē ) from the object of its activity (202b2). Th e potential of both is actualized in a single bipolar process. Not only does Aristotle accept the existence of the external world without question ( Physics , 193a2 – 3), his realism goes so far as to claim that mind and world are a single joint activity, that the mind is meant to know the world and the world is meant to be known by the mind. We have here a single correlation rather than a relation between two separate spheres. Th e very being of thought is essentially correlative with what it thinks ( Metaphysics , 1021a27ff ). Th e realism of Aristotle is not of a uniform kind. First, there is the plurality of being: " being is spoken of in many ways " ( Metaphysics , 1003a34). Whatever unity there is in the notion of being will at best be analogical, since being cannot provide a universal genus (1042a23). Diff erent forms of being all " point " to ousia , but not in a uniform way (1003a33 – 34). Aristotle also gives a pluralistic account of truth in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics . Th ere he stipulates two basic modes of the soul ' s " having logos " ( logon echon ): (1) that involving beings whose origins cannot be otherwise (necessary being), and (2) that involving beings whose origins admit of being otherwise (contingent being), which calls for bouleusis , or deliberation and decision (1139aff ). Th e " virtue " of each mode is its own proper function or work ( ergon ) in relation to the diff erent spheres of being. What follows is a discussion of fi ve " intellectual virtues " : pertaining to the fi rst mode of logos are epist ē m ē (scientifi c knowledge), nous (intuitive grasp of indemonstrable principles), and sophia (wisdom); pertaining to the second mode are techn ē (skill in making) and phron ē sis (practical wisdom or acting well in human aff airs). Aristotle then identifi es these fi ve virtues of thought with fi ve modes of truth, which are defi ned as the diff erent functions and dispositions of the diff erent virtues; indeed, the virtues are fi ve ways in which the soul is al ē theuei or " in the truth " (1139b12 – 18). Aristotle is here connecting truth with the very being of the soul. Moreover, it is evident that truth is not limited to statements of scientifi c exactitude; it also applies to inexact modes of discerning appropriate action in spheres such as ethics. For Aristotle, there is truth in human living ( praxis ) that is diff erent from conclusive, demonstrative forms of truth. 02 Chapter 1.indd 12 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 13 Aristotle ' s ethics is prepared in his analysis of the soul. As indicated earlier, the human soul is not something separate from the body, but the active capacity to lead a natural life. And the capacity ( dunamis ) that moves human life is desire ( On the Soul , 433b1), understood as a striving toward conditions in the world aff ecting the actualization of potential. Desire ( oreksis ) cuts across all three parts of the human soul: as appetite in the vegetative part, emotion in the sensitive part, and wish in the rational part ( On the Soul , III.10). Desire involves the experience of an absence with respect to a desired condition ( orekton ), which opens up the structure of striving toward a desired end ( telos ), as well as the need for deliberation and choice regarding diff erent ways of actualizing potential ends. Deliberation about desire has an essentially temporal structure in considering future possibilities in terms of present aims in the light of past experiences (433b5 – 10). Th is brings us to the sphere of ethics. Aristotle ' s ethics For Aristotle, ethics, like any other area of inquiry, must begin with phainomena before relevant questions are sorted out ( NE , 1145b2 – 8). In the following passage, notice how a phenomenology of ethics includes the main elements sketched earlier in this investigation (the " that, " language, the many, and the wise): One ought not to demand an explanation [ aitian ] in all things alike, either, but it is suffi cient in some cases for it to be shown beautifully that something is so [ to hoti ], in particular such things as concern starting-points [ arch ē ]: the " that " comes fi rst and is a starting-point. And of starting-points, some are beheld by way of examples [ epagoge ], others by perception, others by becoming experienced in some habit, and others in other ways. So one must try to go aft er each of them by the means that belong to its nature [ pephukasin ], and be serious about distinguishing them rightly, since this has great weight in what follows. For the starting-point seems to be more than half of the whole, and many of the things that are inquired aft er become illuminated along with it. And in connection with the starting-point, one must examine it not only from its conclusion and supporting premises, but also from the things that are said about it [ legomen ō n ]. . . . Some of these things are said by many people and from ancient times, others by a few well-reputed men, and it is reasonable that neither of these groups would be wholly mistaken, and that they be right in some one point or at least or even in most of them (1098b1 – 30). 5 02 Chapter 1.indd 13 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics14 An additional element in Aristotle ' s phenomenology of moral life is that we must already be ethical to a certain degree before we think about ethics. Here the importance of upbringing and the inheritance of ethical shaping are essential to ethics (1103b22 – 25). Moreover, the extent to which normative factors are already operating in human life is indicated in the fi rst line of the Nicomachean Ethics : Every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim at some good, and hence it has been beautifully said that the good is that at which all things aim (1094a1 – 3). Th e ubiquity of the good means that Aristotle does not pursue metaethical questions such as moral skepticism or the is-ought divide, because human life is value-laden all the way down. 6 So the question is not whether ethics can be justifi ed, or whether one should be ethical, but rather how one should be ethical. 7 A good deal of Aristotle ' s ethics is simply stipulated (e.g., the nature of virtue), or taken as given, or accepted from precedents - a phenomenology that can surely frustrate the justifi cation agenda marking so much of Western philosophy. Th inking about ethics, for Aristotle, begins with the recognition that the word " good " indicates a desired end (1094a1 – 5). And like being, goodness takes a plurality of forms (1096a24 – 25), and the diff erent goods are not ultimately commensurable. 8 Living well amounts to an organization of diff erent desires in various practical milieus, in such a way as to allow the development of human potential. Th e unifying term for the good life, for Aristotle, is eudaimonia , which is the ultimate end for the sake of which all actions are done (1097b1). Th e usual translation of " happiness " does not suffi ciently capture Aristotle ' s meaning, which is better rendered as human fl ourishing - living well ( euz ē n ), acting well ( eu prattein ) - the active realization of human potentials and the attainment of various natural goods (1098b13 – 22). Aristotle maintains that his focus on eudaimonia is well attested to because it accords with both long-standing opinion and the claims of philosophers (1098b15 – 19). Beginning with the phenomenology of desire, ethics is the consideration of various orderings and judgments concerning better and worse choices - because some desires are necessary (needs) and some are contingent (wants), because some desires come in confl ict with each other ( NE , 1154b20 – 29), and because experience teaches a distinction between real and apparent goods. Eudaimonia will require the exercise of virtue ( aret ē ), which is better rendered as human excellence, or a mode of high-level functioning. Th e moral virtues 02 Chapter 1.indd 14 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 15 are those character traits, habits, and dispositions that disclose appropriate choices and judgments regarding the ordering of desires, all for the sake of living well. Aristotle ' s phenomenological ethics is deliberately counterposed to Platonic tendencies toward a rationalistic, universalistic, perfectionist ethics. 9 Refl ection on the good cannot bracket tradition and received opinions, but must begin with cultural appearances, which can then be submitted to analysis, clarifi cation, and puzzle resolution ( NE , 1095b3, 1145b3 – 7). Th e good must also be a human good, refl ecting the fi nite condition of a desiring being experiencing lacks and limits, and so ethics should not be measured by divine perfection (1096b30 – 35, 1178a5 – 15). Th e good is also particular, not universal (1109b22 – 23), relative, not absolute (1106b2), contingent, not necessary (1139b7 – 10), practical, not theoretical (1103b28 – 30), temporal, not eternal (1096b4), immanent, not transcendent (1196b30 – 35), and inexact, not precise (1094b20 – 25). Th e good has a decidedly performative meaning for Aristotle, since it is identifi ed with activity and ergon , which means function, task, or work ( NE , 1097b24ff ). Eudaimonia is called the activity ( energeia ) of the soul in accordance with virtue or moral excellence (1098a15 – 17). We should think of virtue here in the sense of " virtuosity, " as excellence of performance, as eff ective, successful action in social life. In fact, Aristotle connects aret ē in ethics with the excellence of a musician, who develops musical skill only by practicing ( NE , II.1). Here, Aristotle clarifi es that virtues do not arise naturally in people; they require development through practice. But people do have a natural capacity ( dunamis ) to develop virtue, which becomes actualized aft er practicing settles into a habitual disposition ( hexis ), which could be called " second nature " (1103a31ff ). In line with this, Aristotle identifi es ethics as essentially a practical endeavor, where the goal is not knowledge, but becoming good (1103b26 – 29). In fact, he chastises people who think moral philosophy is satisfi ed by mere argument or talk, comparing them to patients who simply listen to a physician without doing what is prescribed (1105b12 – 19). Eudaimonia is also analyzed in terms of a specifi c temporal structure of activity, as a process of coming into being and thus not as the constancy of a " possession " ( NE , 1169b29 – 32). Eudaimonia is fi nally understood in terms of the comprehensiveness of the virtues and the course of a complete life (1098a18 – 21) - in other words, as the overall temporal structure of a life fulfi lling potential, and not simply a focus on particular events or experiences. Th is is why the familiar association of " happiness " with " good feeling " is so misleading; eudaimonia is a comprehensive and ongoing achievement , not a " state of mind. " As Aristotle says 02 Chapter 1.indd 15 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics16 in another text, the very end ( telos ) of eudaimonia is not a certain " kind of being " ( poiot ē s ), but a life of activity ( Poetics , 1450a16 – 18). In the end, Eudaimonia is measured by the fulfi llment and achievement of various goods that are naturally benefi cial for human beings: goods of the environment, the body, and the soul ( NE , 1098b13ff ). Virtue Th e virtues are the capacities, dispositions, and habits that enable a person to orchestrate all the various possible goods, measured by the successful performance of a well-rounded life. In this regard, Aristotle insists on the importance of good upbringing prior to mature refl ection on the good life. He seems quite pessimistic about the prospects for ethical virtue without the cultivation of good habits and dispositions from early on in life ( NE , 1095b4ff , 1103b21 – 25). He connects character ( ē thos ) with habit ( ethos ) and says that virtues arise mostly through teaching and learning, and they require time and the accumulation of experience to develop (1103a14ff ). Th is is why Aristotle points to the limits of rational argument in ethics (1179b1ff ). Th ere is just so much you can say to a person inclined to vice, and people open up to ethical matters in ways other than strict analysis of beliefs and their rational justifi cation (1179a34 – 1180a33). For Aristotle, each virtue involves (1) a certain situation or context of action, (2) a certain aff ect, attitude, or capacity for action with respect to that situation, (3) vices of excess and defect with respect to the aff ect, attitude, or capacity, and (4) the virtue of the appropriate mean between the two vices. So virtues are defi ned as the capacity to discover a mean ( mesot ē s ) between extreme conditions of excess and defect, of too much and too little ( NE , 1104a25ff ). For instance, the virtue of moderation in pleasure-seeking is a mean between overindulgence and ascetic denial or insensitivity. Acting well according to virtue, however, is a performance that does not operate on the basis of theoretical formulas or rules to guide action. Virtuous activity is inexact and can only be executed by a competent person in the context of a particular kairos , a particular situation at a particular time (1104a5ff ) - indeed, the telos of an action is specifi cally identifi ed with a kairos (1110a12 – 13). We might better understand Aristotle ' s sense of virtue by substituting an oscillating balancing act for the notion of a mean, because a mean suggests some " middle point " between two poles that distorts the sense of virtuous 02 Chapter 1.indd 16 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 17 action displayed in Aristotle ' s texts. Th e ethical mean, for Aristotle, is not like a numerical or spatial mean, which would be uniform for all cases ( NE , 1106a27ff ); it is more like a process of tightening and loosening a tension (1138b23). As indicated above, virtuous action varies according to the context, the specifi c individual, and the particular situation. Sometimes, the mean will be closer to one of the extremes than to the other ( Eudemian Ethics , 1222a22ff ); for instance, some situations might demand more or less generosity; sometimes, degrees of defi ciency or excess can be praiseworthy ( NE , 1109b16ff ), as in the case of certain strong passions that might be useful in leadership. A general account of the mean is diffi cult to articulate, since it is relative to particular cases and perceptions (1126b3 – 4). Even if we consider specifi c discoveries of the mean by particular individuals, what would tell them that they had found some " middle point? " If there is no general formula for fi nding the mean, why formalize the matter at all by suggesting some measure borrowed from mathematics? Instead, we can call virtue a balancing act in the midst of counterforces, in the manner of an oscillating attunement. Th is would be consistent with Aristotle ' s remarks about fi nding the mean by tending toward the extremes ( NE , 1109b2ff ). Th e measure of virtuous action would not be some generalizable or even particularizable locus of precision, but more a mode of discovery that unfolds as an experiment in learning how to live well, an experiment that proceeds by experiencing confl icting forces and possibilities, and then discovering balances that foster successful living. As Aristotle says, individuals have diff erent natural tendencies and aims, and they come to learn what works well by tending in confl icting directions and gauging the appropriate path (1109b2 – 28). We might say that the Aristotelian " doctrine " of the mean does not so much defi ne or locate a proper action, as much as set the negative boundaries for what is out of line (the vices), and open space for individual discovery somewhere between these boundaries. 10 Virtue as a balancing act within these boundaries is a general guideline that can only be actualized in concrete cases and in diff erent ways. Th e specifi city of virtuous action entails that there is no external or formulaic support for ethical action, which is thus " ungrounded " in the sense of being revealed only in the immediate present. Th e general character of virtue ( " Find the appropriate balance between extremes " ) does not justify or explain virtuous action (what the appropriate balance is in a certain situation); rather, the defi nition of virtue simply points to the task of its discovery. Th is would fi t Aristotle ' s account of his ethics as a rough outline ( tup ō ) of the parameters of virtue rather than an exact description of virtuous acts (1103b35ff ). 02 Chapter 1.indd 17 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics18 Th e logos of virtuous living A central term in Aristotle ' s ethics is logos , usually translated as " reason. " But it must be stressed that the " rationality " of ethics in Aristotle should not be understood in terms of modern models of reason that are based on abstract principles and the refl ective posture of the thinking subject detached from action in the world. Th e soul ' s bipolar relation with the world suggests that living well is environmentally responsive - that is, the movements of the soul are likewise the opening up of the world - as opposed to the modern theoretical model of constructing moral principles and applying them to experience as rules for action. We noted that a virtue becomes a hexis , a settled, habitual disposition to act and function well ( NE , 1106a12ff ). Th e word hexis is related to echein , having, and in another text, Aristotle defi nes hexis as both activity ( energeia ) and having, and in both cases, he assigns a bipolar structure between having and the thing had, also between making and the thing made ( Metaphysics , V.20) - which recalls the bipolar structure of activity and knowing discussed earlier. In another chapter, hexis is even something that can " possess " the haver, as when a fever " possesses " a person (V.23). All this suggests that virtue is not simply an agentcentered phenomenon, but an environmentally responsive power that " blends, " as it were, the agent with its world - where virtuous action and its situation in the world are co-disclosed. Th e structure of desire indicates complex intersections of self and world that call for appropriate ordering in practice, rather than some kind of theoretical governance. Th is is why ethical thinking, for Aristotle, has neither the precision nor the operative procedures of modern conceptions of reason. Th e Greek word logos has a rich array of meanings, and there are occasions where Aristotle clearly takes logos to mean a kind of proportional ordering and attunement ( NE , 1119b16). 11 Let us explore this idea in more detail. Th e practical virtue of phron ē sis (sometimes translated as " practical wisdom " ) is central to Aristotle ' s ethics. Since phron ē sis does not exhibit demonstrative certainty, it is better to see its " rationality " as an emergent ordering and balancing of desires in the midst of contingent practical environments. Aristotle characterizes phron ē sis as the ability to discover the mean ( NE , 1107a1 – 2). Rather than some kind of rationalized subjective agency, phron ē sis is " being in the truth " (1140b5), in the sense of disclosing an appropriate path in pursuit of an aim in the midst of confl icting forces. Phron ē sis and the mean are also identifi ed with orthos logos (1103b32 – 34, 1138b20 – 25, 1144b25 – 30), which is 02 Chapter 1.indd 18 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 19 oft en translated as " correct reason. " But orthos logos is connected with aiming at a target and with a tightening and relaxing that suggests either a bow string or tuning a lyre string (1138b21 – 25); at another point (1109b24 – 27), Aristotle says that fi nding the mean is facilitated by tending toward the excess and defect, again suggesting a " tuning. " I want to argue that Aristotle ' s usage of orthos logos does not readily fi t what we would expect " correct reason " to mean, that is, an explanation or justifi cation that can satisfy intersubjective criteria for a logical argument. Aristotle ' s phenomenology of virtue seems to off er something diff erent from modern conceptions of rationality. At one point ( NE , II.2) orthos logos is correlated with action ( praxis ) as opposed to knowledge - and right here Aristotle talks about the " inexact " nature of this inquiry, that only virtuous agents themselves can discover in each specifi c case ( kairos ) what is orthos . It is not clear how such specifi city could satisfy familiar criteria for rational adjudication. We have noted that Aristotle sometimes employs logos as a kind of proportional ordering. He also connects logos with the essential being ( ousia ), function ( ergon ), and active capacity ( dunamis ) of a living being as a whole ( On the Soul , 412b10 – 413a10); indeed, " actuality ( entelecheia ) is the logos of potential being " (415b15). Th ese usages all suggest something substantive rather than discursive. In the same text (425b26ff ), when discussing sensation and its object having one and the same actualization, he describes proper sensation as the logos between extreme conditions that destroy the sense (426a27ff ), for instance, an excess of brightness or darkness with respect to vision. Here logos has nothing to do with " reasoning, " but rather the nature and bipolar structure of disclosure. Likewise, the ethical mean could be called the virtuous disclosure of proper action (and like the sensation case, it can involve the bipolar actualization of virtuous action together with its situation in the world). Th e point is that logos here would not mean a " rational account " but the very character and nature of an immediate virtuous act. Aristotle does use the word logos at times pertaining to an articulate account and reasoning, but at other times, logos pertains to the very form or essence of something. 12 Accordingly, orthos logos need not be understood as a rational account or guide for action, but as the very form of an achievement . 13 If we consider the examples of archery or music that Aristotle uses to illustrate orthos logos , we can see the futility of certain " rational " questions in this context: How did you (know how to) hit the bull ' s-eye? How did you know that the instrument was tuned properly? Th e best one can say is: " I just did. " Virtuous action, for Aristotle, seems to be a similar 02 Chapter 1.indd 19 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics20 case. As we will see, this is not to exclude logos -as-articulation from ethics. But it seems that orthos logos can be more like skillful action and direct engagement than an explanation or rational account. 14 Relevant to this discussion are the several times Aristotle calls virtuous discernment a mode of perception ( aisth ē sis ). 15 Indeed, in one passage ( NE , 1143a35ff ), Aristotle identifi es this kind of ethical perception with nous , in the sense of an immediate insight not derived from reasoning ( logos ). Moreover, the phenomenological character of this kind of insight is shown in the following passages: Th e person of serious moral stature discerns each thing correctly [ orthos ], and in each kind the truth shows itself to this person [ tal ē thes aut ō phainetai ] . . . [who] is distinguished most of all perhaps for seeing [ horan ] what is true in each kind, since such a person is as it were a rule and measure for what is noble and pleasant. (1113a30 – 35) What appears [ to phainomenon ] to the person of serious moral stature truly is the thing . . . . And what appear to be pleasures to this person truly are pleasures. (1176a17ff ) It seems that a virtuous person directly " perceives " the right path, which is diff erent from a reasoned inference. Phron ē sis is specifi cally identifi ed with perception because unlike scientifi c knowledge ( epist ē m ē ), phron ē sis apprehends " ultimate particulars " in direct experience (1142a24ff ), ultimate ( eschaton ) in that like intuitive insight in nous , such perception requires no further justifi cation. In general terms, virtuous perception attends to the specifi c features of a concrete situation that fi gure in ethical discernment (as opposed to generalizations). With respect to orthos logos , we should also consider the range of meanings in the word orthos . 16 It can indeed mean " correct, " but also straight, upright, safe, happy, and prosperous. Th e word also associates with seeing straight, hearing attentively, restoring to health and happiness, guiding rightly, honoring, and exalting. Th e word is derived from ortho ō , meaning to set up straight or stand up from a reclined or fallen posture. Orthos can also mean real, genuine, or steadfast. If we think of steadfast as a capacity to stand against falling back, we can think of orthos marking a steady capacity for proper action. We can see here the many shades of orthos connecting with Aristotle ' s sense of virtuous action, in ways that are diff erent from the meaning of " correct. " And orthos , as " straight " versus " crooked, " can have the sense of " direct " versus " roundabout " or " missed, " which certainly captures Aristotle ' s metaphor of hitting a target - which is a direct achievement rather than a cognitive claim. 02 Chapter 1.indd 20 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 21 Orthos can also connote succeeding at an aim, especially in the word katorth ō sis , variants of which Aristotle uses several times pertaining to virtuous action ( NE , 1106b26 and 31, 1107a15, 1142b30). Consequently, orthos logos can refer to successful action in a practical environment, accomplished by an attunement of the soul with its environment, something very diff erent from " correct reason. " Phron ē sis , then, is much more suggestive of an active self-world attunement than something like rational agency. Phron ē sis could be called a capacity for practical discernment, or an ethical fi nesse, a cultivated aptitude to uncover the appropriate balancing and ordering of practical possibilities. Aristotle specifi cally says that phron ē sis is not mere knowledge - it must include action (1152a8 – 9). Moreover, as a developed disposition and " having " ( hexis ), it is registered in a person ' s very being, and so it cannot be " forgotten, " as can factual knowledge (1140b28 – 30). And with respect to phron ē sis as a hexis , we should note that Aristotle describes it as a disposition to act not simply " according to ( kata ) orthos logos " - which carries a more inferential meaning - but " in the midst of/along with ( meta ) orthos logos " (1144b26ff ) - which suggests a more constitutive meaning. Measuring virtue Discovering the mean is relative to a particular person ' s situation ( NE , 1106b1), which makes virtuous action diffi cult, because it is context-dependent. Formal compliance with a rule is easy; judging the proper balance and appropriate action in a certain situation, in a certain way, at a certain time, to a certain degree, for a certain purpose, is hard (1109a24ff ). For example, generosity could vary in its suitability or vary in degrees according to the circumstances, persons, resources, prospects, and so on. What is appropriate can only be rendered at the time and in the situation of a particular agent, and it demands an experience of particulars, which is neither exact nor universal (1109b22ff ). Consequently, Aristotle ' s ethics does not involve moral axioms or formulas that can transcend and govern the specifi city of experience. To be sure, ethics can involve certain generalizations presented in an unqualifi ed ( hapl ō s ) form (e.g., " It is good to be generous " ), but ethical practice will always have to confront qualifi cations in experience (1134a25ff ). 17 Aristotle appears to be advocating a kind of decisionism or intuitionism in ethics, because the measure of virtuous action is the virtuous person ( NE , 02 Chapter 1.indd 21 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics22 1113a25ff ); the measure of the good is that which appears to the good person (1176a17ff ). An ethical decision cannot be arbitrary, however, since it must be responsive to the environment at hand and shaped by past experience. But as contextual, a decision is saturated with contingency (1112b8ff ) - which is exactly why ethical actions involve choice rather than necessary outcomes. To be educated in ethics is not to have decisive knowledge; indeed, the mark of an educated person is seeking only the degree of precision that the nature of an endeavor will allow (1094b23 – 25). As we have noted, the discipline of ethics cannot issue exact rules and measures; it can only be sketched in broad outline with an eye toward enactment by virtuous persons in concrete circumstances. Truth in ethics can only be judged by way of performances in life ( ta erga kai ton bion ); otherwise, it is mere words (1179a18 – 23). Aristotle is certainly not an ethical relativist or subjectivist. Th e proper action is " objective " in the sense of being duly responsive to the environment at hand, such that anyone in this situation would do the same thing. So there is a kind of " correctness " in virtuous action, but its immediacy does not issue an " objective standard " that anyone outside this situation would likewise grasp. In Aristotle, a virtue becomes a mode of the soul ' s being, a hexis , or " having " ( NE , 1106a13), a capacity to make appropriate choices that with practice becomes habit, or second nature (see 1152a31 – 34). An ethical habit, for Aristotle, is not some mechanical operation or instinctive drive, but an acquired capacity to act well that eventually can become relatively unforced and natural. As a settled way of being , we could call habit a mode of in-habiting an ethical environment. Aristotle seems to be saying that a truly virtuous person will act well without much analysis or diffi culty. It is important to note that genuine virtue, for Aristotle, is rare ( NE , 1109a29). A summary of Aristotle ' s conception of true virtue can be gleaned from his discussion of akrasia , or weakness of will ( NE , VII.1 – 10). Aristotle distinguishes persons as being virtuous, morally strong, morally weak, and vicious. A virtuous person does the good habitually, even with pleasure (1099a6ff ). A morally strong person knows what is good but struggles to do it. A morally weak person knows what is good but fails to do it. A vicious person acts badly without regret. We would tend to call the morally strong person virtuous in many respects, but Aristotle would not. Aristotle ' s ideal, though diffi cult to achieve, seems to be a person who moves through life with ethical composure and facility, whose desires have become properly attuned, and who possesses all the virtues as a unifi ed whole (1145a1 – 2). Aristotle claims that most people fall in between the morally weak and morally strong (1150a9 – 16, 1152a25 – 27). Morally weak 02 Chapter 1.indd 22 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 23 people merely speak the right words ( logous ), like actors reciting their lines. A truly virtuous person is " co-natural " ( sumphu ē nai ) with the proper path, where belief, desire, and proper action are coordinated together (1139b4 – 5, 1147a18ff ). Here phron ē sis , good character, and acting well are all fused in a single package (1144a, 1144b30 – 32). Logos , deliberation, and action Now I must confront the question of how my account can accord with elements of Aristotle ' s ethics that seem to refl ect reasoning procedures and logical inferences: the so-called practical syllogism and the role of deliberation in virtuous living. Th e practical syllogism seems to explain virtuous action as a result of logical inferences, with premise-conclusion structures patterned aft er theoretical syllogisms. When Aristotle gives examples of practical syllogisms, they usually pertain to action scenarios that are not exactly ethical in nature (e.g., navigation), but I will focus on one segment of the Nicomachean Ethics that is pertinent to ethics and illustrative of the complex questions at hand: NE , 1147a24ff , which is part of the analysis of akrasia . Th is segment immediately follows the claim about the " co-natural " character of the truly virtuous person cited above. Aristotle then moves to investigate akrasia " in terms of nature " ( phusik ō s ), that is, not according to logical argument but in terms of human nature. Th is is where an example of a practical syllogism about eating sweet things is introduced: If one ought to taste sweet things, and this thing here is sweet, then one must immediately taste it. 18 It would seem that the conclusion would more likely be " then one ought to taste this, " which would be followed by the action. But it looks like the conclusion is the action, which is confi rmed in another text, On the Movement of Animals , 7: the conclusion of a practical syllogism " becomes the action " ( ginetai h ē praxis ), something done euthus , immediately (701a13 – 15), as in the case of " Every man ought to walk; one is a man; immediately one walks. " Returning to the tasting syllogism ( NE , 1147a25 – 31), the major premise is a general belief about a good, the minor premise involves a perception of a particular, and then, just as in a theoretical syllogism, where the soul must affi rm the conclusion, here the soul is compelled ( anank ē ) to do the conclusion immediately ( prattein euthus ). Again, there is something logically peculiar about the practical syllogism; the conclusion seems to be not " cognition, " but an action. 02 Chapter 1.indd 23 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics24 In any case, Aristotle then depicts the logical structure of akrasia ( NE , 1147a32ff ), where the major premise concerns not consuming sweets (as in a diet, perhaps), and the conclusion is not to taste the sweet thing - but with akrasia , desire overrides the conclusion. Aristotle says that from the standpoint of physiology ( phusiolog ō n ), the akratic person is like someone drunk or asleep, whose desire runs contrary to orthos logos , and who thereby is precluded from " proper knowledge. " In context, it seems that the akratic person is constitutionally contrasted with the " co-natural " condition of the truly virtuous person noted in this segment of the text. I want to suggest that here the practical syllogism is more like a logical reconstruction of an ethical scenario, rather than a " causal " account of ethical action, and I say this for two reasons: (1) the conclusion seems to be the action rather than the cause of the action; and (2) the " natural " factors in the analysis seem to stress the very being of the agents rather than their reasoning. Th e reconstructive character of the practical syllogism can be gleaned from the Movement of Animals passage cited above. Here the premises involve a posited good and a current capacity ( dunatou ) to act on it (701a25). Th en, Aristotle says that with obvious premises ( " one is a man " ), " thinking ( dianoia ) does not stop and consider " them (701a26 – 27). But then, Aristotle speaks even more generally about immediate actions done without analysis upon the apprehension of some good: What we do without refl ection we do quickly. For with the activation [ energ ē s ē ] of a perception or an imagination or a thinking of the for-the-sake-of-which, what is desired is done immediately. For the energeia of desire is a substitute for inquiry or thinking. (701a27 – 33) Th e point is that ethical action need not stem from rational inferences - indeed it can be a " substitute " for reasoning - and so the practical syllogism can be read as a reconstruction of an action rather than a determination of it (who ever moves to walk by inferential steps?). Th is would accord with a passage from the Nicomachean Ethics that distinguishes between an action following examination and an immediate action in sudden situations that stems not from examination but a settled hexis (1117a18ff ). Generally, I want to say that at least with regard to a fully virtuous person in unexceptional circumstances, a logos of ethical action need not mean rational justifi cation, but rather an articulation that helps us make sense of an action that is not schematized in advance. 19 Next, we should consider the role of deliberation ( bouleusis ) in Aristotle ' s ethics ( NE , III.3). Deliberation leads to proairesis , which can be called decision 02 Chapter 1.indd 24 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 25 or resolve (1113a9ff ). 20 Th e question is whether deliberation fi ts typical models of rational analysis that justify or explain ethical decisions. I want to argue that ethics, for Aristotle, certainly includes examination and articulation, and that decisions can indeed follow upon such discursive practices - but that such practices are not a necessary condition for ethical action (especially with full virtue) and that even when such practices are in play, they will not likely satisfy familiar expectations for rational justifi cation. Deliberation, for Aristotle, is not about a good end ( telos ), but about the means toward that end ( NE , 1112b13ff , 1113b3ff ) - so a physician does not deliberate about whether to heal a patient, but how to heal a particular patient. Th e ethical telos seems already in place by way of boul ē sis , a wish or aim (1116b27 – 28). In deliberation, one " assumes " the end (1112b16). Th e nondeliberative is associated with the " immediacy " of the good person ' ingrained comprehension of what is worthy in life, which pertains not to ratiocination, but a person ' s very being, as indicated in the following account of a practical syllogism (1144a31 – 37), where the telos is the major premise: For deductive reasoning about things done [ sullogismoi t ō n prakt ō n ] has as a starting-point ( arch ē n , i.e., the major premise): " Since such-and-such is an end [ telos ] and the best [ ariston ], " . . . and this does not show itself [ phainetai ] except to a good person; for vice warps a person and produces error about the sources [ archas ] that govern action. So it is clear [ phaneron ] that it is impossible [ adunaton ] to have practical judgment [ phronimon ] without being good. Moreover, there is no deliberation about direct perceptions ( NE , 1113a1 – 2), which presumably play a basic role in ethical action. Deliberation concerns contingencies pertaining to actions that aim toward an assumed good (1141b10ff ), especially when the right means is uncertain or indeterminate (1112b8ff ). Upon deliberation, ethical decision or resolve is a function of desire, or desire fused with thought (1113a10, 1139b4 – 5); thus resolve is diff erent from mere cogitation, and even from true belief (1112a5). Resolve is identifi ed with virtue, which is called hexis proairetik ē , a settled disposition of resolve toward the mean (1106b36). Ethical decisions are measured as good or bad, not true or false as in the case of belief; and decisions mark who we are as constitutive of our character, which is not the case with mere cognition (1111b31ff ). Deliberation is associated in certain ways with orthos logos . In NE , VI.9, deliberating well ( euboulia ) is " a kind of " orthot ē s , but not the kind in epist ē m ē or true belief. Yet deliberation is a logos , a thinking things through ( dianoias ), which is not an assertion but an investigating ( z ē tei ) and reckoning ( logizetai ). Th e 02 Chapter 1.indd 25 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics26 orthot ē s in deliberation concerns what is advantageous or fi tting ( sumpheron ) for a particular telos ; and phron ē sis is the " true comprehension " ( al ē th ē s hupol ē psis ) of what is advantageous or fi tting. Th at orthot ē s here might involve what I earlier called a " successful completion of an aim " can be gleaned from another discussion, where Aristotle examines the main objects of pursuit ( aireseis ): the noble, the advantageous, and the pleasant (1104b30ff ). Th e good person " goes right " with these pursuits, while the bad person " goes wrong. " Th e two terms here are katorth ō tikos and hamart ē tikos , with the former having a meaning of setting straight or successful accomplishment, and the latter a meaning of missing the mark or failure. Th e point is that deliberation and resolve are not of an entirely diff erent order from features of orthos logos discussed earlier in this essay - that is to say, something more achievement-based then discursive. 21 Nevertheless, it is important not to exclude discursive practices, articulation, and reasoning from Aristotle ' s ethics. But even so, such elements cannot fully determine - and cannot be separated from - the more nonrational features of virtuous discernment we have examined. 22 Surely, examination and deliberation are part of ethical life, although I would surmise that they more likely function in the spheres of morally weak and morally strong persons, since genuine virtue seems to be " second nature " to the truly good person. In any case, one can articulate ethical actions in various ways and even supply a set of reasons. Yet, the sheer specifi city of virtuous discernment suggests limitations on rational discourse: Why did you give him the money? Because it was the generous thing to do. How did you know it was the generous thing to do? Because it was a mean between stinginess and extravagance. How did you know it was a mean? Because he needs the money and will not squander it. How do you know that? Because I know him. How do you know him? . . . It seems that the articulation of virtuous action zeroes in on an immediate and unique discernment, in the face of which articulation runs out. So virtuous action can involve reasoning, but it need not proceed from reasoning, and even with reasoning, there is a limit to what can be communicated for explanatory purposes. Th e word logos can apply to the full range of elements here because it can refer both to articulation and to the substantive form of a virtuous act. 02 Chapter 1.indd 26 6/20/2013 6:47:29 PM Phainomenon and Logos in Aristotle ' s Ethics 27 Within Aristotle ' s ethical naturalism, there is a sense in which human actions are valueladen ; such meanings can be articulated but they need not be. Reasoned articulation can prepare and make possible the co-natural inhabitation of full virtue that can develop over time - and then function without reasoned articulation. Th e double-sense of logos thus helps us ascertain the complicated interplay of articulation and direct action in Aristotle ' s ethics. One could say that the intellectual virtue of phron ē sis , the metavirtue of ethical virtues, is itself a balancing act between extremes, between sheer cognition and sheer perception, between sheer refl ection and sheer action. Such is Aristotle ' s rich account of how ethical discernment shows itself in human life. Notes 1 Portions of this essay are drawn from my book, Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy (Hatab 2000). Extended passages from Aristotle ' s Nicomachean Ethics (hereaft er NE ) are taken from the following translation (occasionally modifi ed): Aristotle. 2002. Nicomachean Ethics , trans. Joe Sachs. Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing. 2 For example, NE 1094a3, 1095a16. See also Categories 2b31, Physics 191b2ff , Metaphysics 1003a34ff . 3 Consider how the basic concept of being is deployed as both the bearer of properties and the subject of predication ( Categories 1 – 5). For a focused treatment of the scholarship on the language-being correlation, see Long 2011, 49 – 56. 4 See Long 2011, 56 – 71. 5 Th e word arch ē in this passage is oft en translated as " principle " or " fi rst principle. " But that suggests a governing conception that does not always fi t Aristotle ' s phenomenology. Arch ē also means " beginning " or " origin. " I think " starting-point " fi ts the context of Aristotle ' s ethics because he is clearly not using arch ē as some kind of rational principle, but rather as the ways in which we already have senses of the ethical: " For the arch ē is that something is so ( to hoti ), and if this is suffi ciently apparent ( phainoito ), there is no additional need for the reason why " (1095b7 – 8). 6 Indeed, the very nature of language, for Aristotle, seems to be originally the making manifest ( d ē loun ) of normative concerns ( Politics 1253a10ff ). 7 See Burnyeat 1980, 69 – 92. 8 NE 1164b2 – 6, 1096a30ff ; Eudemian Ethics 1243b22; Politics 1283a3 – 10. 9 For a rich and extensive study of the diff erences between Aristotle and Plato on the good life, see Martha Nussbaum (1986). 10 One of the meanings of mesos is " between, " and on occasion, Aristotle will use a more specifi c meaning of " between " ( metaxu ) in relation to virtue (e.g., 1138b23). 02 Chapter 1.indd 27 6/20/2013 6:47:30 PM Phenomenology and Virtue Ethics28 11 For details on the complex and varied meanings of logos in ancient Greek, see Guthrie 1962, 420 – 4. 12 See, for example, the former usage in Metaphysics 1029b20 – 22, and the latter usage in 1035b26 – 31. 13 See Glidden (1992). Glidden says that Aristotle ' s call for orthos logos is like a baseball manager telling a pitcher to " throw strikes, " which is an ideal that cannot be a " rule " independent of achievement. 14 At one point, Aristotle indicates that the orthos logos of virtue is a mean between extremes marked by a certain horos (1138b18 – 34). Th e word horos is usually translated as " standard " or " criterion, " but it also means " limit " or " boundary " (sometimes between two places). If horos is a " standard, " we run into the problem of Aristotle not seeming to provide one. On this, see Peterson (1988). But it may be that there is no communicable " standard, " only the shaping of a " limit, " of a " place " between extremes in a particular case that only a virtuous person can gauge. 15 See NE 1109b18 – 24, 1113a1, 1126b2 – 4, and 1147a26. 16 Aristotle himself says that orthot ē s has more than one meaning (1142b18). 17 Th e word hapl ō s also carries the meaning of " simple, " which is connected with arch ē in Metaphysics 1059b35. As noted earlier, arch ē can be translated as " starting-point, " which fi ts a good deal of Aristotle ' s ethics. Once we have been schooled in the meaning and importance of the virtues, our minds can have in place simple, unqualifi ed guidelines - such as " Be generous " - that " start " our ethical sense; but these up-front conceptions are not governing " principles " that determine when, whether, or how to be generous. 18 For a thorough examination of this text, see Bogen and Moravcsik (1982). 19 See McDowell (1999), especially 134 – 7 and note 22. With the Greek word logos , its most basic meaning can be called an articulation that makes sense to an audience. See Ferrari (1997). 20 See Heidegger 2009, 97. 21 For an analysis of nondiscursive elements in Aristotle ' s approach to ethical practice, see Wiggins (1981). 22 It is crucial not to construe " nonrational " elements in Aristotle as " noncognitive. " Aristotle does not separate cognition from perception or even from emotion. Perception and emotion are not " thoughtless, " because they can in their way deliver knowledge. For an insightful analysis of the nonrational features of virtue that are yet not outside cognition, see Moss (2011). Moss takes on " intellectualist " readings of Aristotle that surmise a rational determination of moral ends in phron ē sis , in order to hold off a purported Hume-style demotion of reason in ethics. She ably shows how Aristotle ' s texts do not support such readings. Phron ē sis , she argues, is the discernment of how to fulfi ll virtuous aims that are already inculcated in the soul through habituation (emphasizing the key text of NE 1144a6 – 9). For an account of how emotions fi gure in ethical discernment, see Kosman (1980). 02 Chapter 1.indd 28 6/20/2013 6:47:30 PM