'Attention, Self and The Sovereignty of Good' was published in Anne Rowe (ed.) Iris Murdoch:A Reassessment Palgrave Macmillan, October 2006. ì 6 Attention, Self and The Sovereignty of Good Christopher Mole In 1958, Elizabeth Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy'1 forcefuUy launched the idea that character traits and states of mind are molally important in ways that could not be seen from the point of view of the contemporary moral psychology. 'ffioral philosophy', she wrote, 'should be laid aside [. . .] until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking' (p. 1). This idea influenced many ethicists in lds Murdoch's Oxford, and provides one of the motives for Mu rdoch's The SovereiSnty of Good, and in pafiicular, for Murdoch's attempt to establish that states of mind (construed broadly, so as to include character traits) are morally important for their own síkei that thet moral importance is not exhausted by the importance they derive ftom the actions they misht lead one to pedorm or the states of affairs that they might help to bring about.2 Murdoch's ideas about the moml importance of states of mind are closely related to her views about how one ought to think of oneself' Attention to oneself, she thinks, is a widespread source of molal failure: 'Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself';3'In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless e8o' (p. 51). These two aspects of Murdoch's thought seem to be incompatible. It is natural to thjnk that the states of mind whose moral importance Murdoch establishes are inner occu[ences taking place on the pdvate stage of consciousness. But this leads to the following problem. Trying to become good involves giving attention to things of moral importance, and so, if we understand the morally important states of mind to be private inne¡ occurrences, it involves Siving attention to pdvate inner states But this is a form of self-directed intellectual activiry and self-dtected intellectual activity is the very thing that Murdoch wants to chamctedze as a source of monl failure. ChrístophetMole 73 There arc at least two strategies for avoiding this problem. The first strategy avoids the problem by taking Murdoch's view of the self to entail something less than a com!Iete prchibition on attention to the self. Perhaps self-directed attention comes in different forms, only some of which are prohibited, or perhaps the prohibition on self-directed attention only applies in certain circumstances. Samantha Vice employs this strategy in her contdbution to this yolume. The present paper pursues a different stategy. It avoids the problem by understanding the morally important states of mind as something other than inner occurrences taking place on the private stage of consciousness. Vice's view is that the strong prohibition on attention to the inner life is neither plausible, nor waÍanted by Murdoch's position. My view is that we can keep the strong prohibition on attention to the innet, but must reject the idea that the morally important states of mind and character are inner states, and think of them instead as b eiîg world inyolyíng. The moral importance of the mind The claim that the moral importance of states of mind is not exhausted by the importance of thet effects can be interpreted in two ways: one strong and one weak. The strong position is that (independently oftheir effects) states of mind and character often have a qucial role in determining whether a person is doing well or badly, morally speaking. The weak position is that states of mind and character carry some wetg}ft, but vastly less than is caÍied by the moral importance of acts and states of affairs. Murdoch endorses the strong position. The parable of the mother-inlaw which is prominent in her discussion of this polnt, establishes only the weak posìtion. Murdoch asks us to imagine a mother-in-law who, by a process of reflection, comes to a positiye view of the daughter-in-law whom previously she had regarded as vulgar and noisy (pp. 1G23). it is specified that the mother-in-lawt new opinion is not accompanied by any change in outward behaviour (the daughter-in-law is dead or abroad). Murdoch thinks, and expects us to think, that there is something morally good about this change in the mother-in-law. Si\ce, ex Lrypothesí, the only changes that take place are changes in states of mind, it must be these states of mind that make the moral difference, and so it must be that moral importance attaches to states of mind in a way that does not depend on theil effects, Thls argument for the moral importance of states of mind depends on the fact that the case of the mother-in-law is one in which action is out of the question. But, fo¡ that very reason, the example cannot establish 74 Iris Mutdoch: A Reossessment that states of mind are morally important when the possibility of action is in question. The parable of the mother-inlaw shows, in the very special case of entirely mental conduct, that the question of whether the conduct is good or bad must be answered by refelence to states of mind or character. It does not show that states of mind are morally important in general, only that moral importance attaches to inner states when noth¡n8 else is at stakeThere is another argument, however, that does support the strong position, according to which states of mind often have a crucial role in determining the morality of a person's conduct. Murdoch does not develop this argument in any detail, but we can rcconstruct it in telms boÍowed from the virtue-based approach to ethics that her work helped to revive. The vifue ethicist takes the proper starting point for ethical theory to be the fact that we should do what the virtuous agent would do werc he in oul circumstances. We act as we should only if we act as the virtuous agent would. The vi¡tue-ethicist tlen claims that there is not usually any description of an acl given ín putely behqviour^l temts t}l.al allows us to settle the question of whether that act is one that the vttuous agent would do. The virtuous agent míght lie if the circumstances called for it, but he would not lie callously. He might hurt othe$, but he would not hurt othe6 brutally. 'It is all very well to say that "to copy a riSht action is to act rightly"" says Murdoch, quoting stuart Hampshte's 'l,o8ic and Appreciation',a 'but what is the folm I am supposed to copy?' (p. 29)It cannot be t}re lotm of behaviorl, considered independently of its motivation. In order to determine whether or not an action is one that the vùtuous agent would peform, we need a description of the action that tells us more than is implied by a purely behavioural desqiption. We need a desqiption that tells us about the states of mind and character that the behaviou expresses. These states are important for determining the morality or immoraÌity of a course of action, not because, as in the case of the mother-in-law, we can f4ke 4w4),, the possibility of action and retain a morally significant inner state but because the descriptions of action under which we consider actions morally arc already laden with commitments to the agent's being in a certain state of min4 or having certain character traits. Actions lose a crucial part of their moral character if we attempt to divorce them from these commitments, Attention to the self The argument we have just explored does, as the parable of the motherinlaw cannot, provide Murdoch with a reason to believe that states oI Chistophet Mote 75 mind have an important role to play in ou¡ moral thinking. It shows that it is not mercly when nothing else is at stake that these states ate morally important. But the argument also seems to show that Murdoch is committed to the very un-Murdochian view that the attempt to become good essentially inyolves attention to oneself. The problem arises in the following way. ln order to know whether we are acting as the virtuous agent would we need to know which aspects of our character we are exercising. It is not enough to know that we are hurting others, or that we are benefiting them. We need also to know whether we are being callous or manipulative. To know these things we must, it seems, pay close attention to ourselves. And that is precisely w¡at Murdoch has told us we must not do. 'î}re príma facie innocence of self-directed attention What we have iust seen is that Murdoch,s best argument for the moral importance of states of mind entails a commitment to self_directed attention. This does not pose a p¡oblem by itself. The problem adses when this commitment is combined with Murdoch,s view that self_ directed attention is a source of moral failure. No problem would arise if we were to reject that view of self-directed attention, and it is tempt_ ing simply to do so. Self-directed attention does not seem fo be a rrlol:al failing. The folms of seìf-directed attention that we find ourselves com_ mitted to by the arguments of the previous section seem particularly innocuous when we consider their role in the mo¡al reasoning at work in the following example: a man is wondering whether he should tell his wife about a minor indiscretion in his past. He rccognizes that keep_ ing the seüet is a way of being untrustworthy and so he resolves to tell the truth. What mo\/es him is the realization that he does not want to be the kind of person who would continue to lie. The distinctive feature of this form of moral reasonlng is that the terms of evaluation it employs indict the agent rather than the act. Self-indicting formulations often sound more natural than the alter_ natives ftom which all reference to the self has been removed, and they are not mercly verbal vadants on them. The belief that my wife ought to be told the truth rationally motivates me to tell her the truth if I have the desire that things be as they ought. To be motivated to act by the belief that 'I ought to tell her,, I need only desire that I do what I ought. The self-directed attention rcquired for this folm of motal reasoning does not seem to be obiectionable. It may be clear that the agent who employs this sort of reasoning is not among the best of moral reasoners. 76 l'is Mutdoch: A Reassessmenf In our best moral thinking our reasons for acting are not provided by concerns about oul own goodness. But this does not lead us to think that there is an)'thing wrong with deliberately undertakirìg the task of acting well, or with being motivated by judgements about whether one is succeeding in that task: the self-directed attention that is required in the making of those iudgements does not, on the face of it, ¡ule them out of the attempt to become good, especially when, as in the example above, the judgements are negative ones. Our argument for the moral importance of states of mind and character ca[ies an apparent commitment to self-directed attention only to the degree that self-directed attention flgures in the rather benign sort of reasoning sketched above. Murdoch herself seems to realize that selfdirected attention can have a rcle in the attempt to become good, Her own telling of the parable of the mother-in-law in fact, seems to involve self-directed attention : The M of the example lthe mother-in-1aw] is an intelligent and well-intentioned person, capable of self-criticism, capable of giving ca¡eful and jlrst attention to an object which conftonts her. M tells herself: "l am old-fashioned and conventional. I may be prejudiced and narrow-minded. I may be snobbish. I am cetainly iealous. Let me look again" (p. 17, emphasis Murdoch's). The mother-in-law's praiseworthy change of opinion is clearly precipitated by self-diTected attention of the sort that we met above. It is by attending to hetself tbaT M is in a position to know that she is oldfashioned, conventional and so on. In this passage Murdoch seems to recognize, even to endorse, the mother-in-law's self-directed attention as having a role in her moral progress. Why, then, does Murdoch also seem to think that self-directed attention is a source of moral failing? We have not yet seen any reason to think of self-directed attention in this way. It is neither selfish nor self-aggrandizing, and, moreover, it seems to figure in our eyeryday attempts to act well. The rejection of self-directed attention The self-directed attention involved in the sorts of reasoning discussed above is prima facie inîocerÍIt even seems to figure in Murdoch's account of the mother-in-1aw's praiseworthy change of opinion. It is tempting, therefore, to say that self-directed attention is not always a source of moral failurc, and that it is morally permitted in the service of an attempt to become good. This temptation should be resisted. For Murdoch the struggle to be good is a struggle to keep attention øulø/ from the self: 'Goodness is connected with the attempt to see the unself, (p. e1). It is important to be clear that Murdoch does not merely think that seÌf-directed attention has no role in the fully good life. There would be no problem with thinking that the fully virtuous agent does not think of himseu, while thinking that we should think of ou$elves in order to become good. (Just as the¡e is no contradiction in thinking that a good tennis playff gi\/es no attention to his ball-toss when serying, but that ,e need to attend to our ball-toss rather carefully in order to become good tennis playe$.) Murdoch's claim is that self-directed attention is absent fuoIJf ttre puTsuít of goodness, and not merely ftom the life in which goodness has been achieved. We see this most clearly in the concluding pages of 'The Sovereignty of Good Over Other Concepts, in the claim that 'although lthe humble manl is not by definition the good man perhaps he is the kind of man most likely of all to become good (p. 101). The thoroughgoing rejection of self-directed attention is also prominent elsewhere: 'In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego, (p. S1). Murdoch's thoroughgoing opposition to self-directed attention is clear throughout T/¡e Sovereígnty of Good but ,h), does she oppose it so? The following two passages provide some clues: The difficulty is to keep attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it retuming surreptitiously to the self with consolations of self-pity, resentment, fantasy and despair (p.8e). We are anxiety ddden animals. Our minds arc continualÌy active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying \/eil which partially conceals the world. Our states of consciousness differ in quality, our fantasies and reveries are not tri\¡ial and unimportant, they are profoundly connected with our energies and our ability to choose and act. And if quality of consciousness matte¡s then anything which alte¡s consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity and realism is to be connected with virtue (p.82). The prohibition on self-dirccted attention, then, is connected to the moral importance of accurately perceiving things as they really are. The 78 lis Mutdoch: A Reassessment accurate perception of things is cental to Murdoch's conception of the good life, and of the movement towards it, both becal¡se it is good in itselt and because it enables us to make the ri8ht decisions about how to act: 'The love that bdngs the dght answer [. . .] is an exercise of justice and realism, ar.drcally lookíng (p. 89). we shall see, in the next section, that the connection between this imperative to accurate perception and the prohibition on self-dtected attention is not an entircly straightforward one. But notice, for now that attempts to perceive the self are prohibited, and that this is, in part, because they are attempts at a sort of perception that is particularly unlikely to be accurate, and that is likely to ímpaír accttacy when it comes to perceiving things other than the self. The situation we are in is this: we have seen that a role for selfdirected attention in the attempt to become good seems to be entailed by Murdoch's emphasis on the moral importance of states of mind, and that the existence of such a role is incompatible with a strong prohibition on self-directed attention. We have also seen that, although it may be tempting to reject the strong prohibition, Murdoch does not reject it. The prcblem that we face is one that Murdoch is vividly aware of. It is a source of much of the moral drama that animates The Níce and the Good, published in 1968 (two years before the appearance of T¿e Sovereignty of Good, but two years after the delivery of the lectures that the book of that title collects). The Níce and the Good Sives an explicit statement of our problem as a ?great paradox of morality' expedenced by the book's protagonist, John Ducane: \ trat Ducane was experiencing, in this form peculiar to him of imagining himself as a judge, was, though this was not entirely clear in his mind, one of the great paradoxes of morality, namelt that in older to become good it may be necessary to imagine oneself good, and yet such imagining may also be the very thing which rendess improyement impossible, either because of suÍeptitious complacency or because of some deeper blasphemous infection which is set up when goodness is thought about in the wrong way. To become good it may be necessary to think about virtue, although urueflective simple people may achieve a thoughtless excellence. Ducane was in any case highly reflectíve and had from childhood quite explicitly set before himself the aim of becoming a good man.s The problem that the authorial voice expresses here is the \/ery problem that we have found in Murdoch's philosophical work. If being good is thought of as involving vitue, then a deliberate attempt to become Chtistophet Mole 79 good (like Ducane's 'explicitly set[ting] before himself the aim of becoming a good man') seems to involve self-directed attention, which 'rendess improYement impossible'. One way to deal with this problem is not to try to eradicate it, but simply to embrace the conclusion that it is not possible to become good by trying. Ducane is sometimes tempted by that view, but Murdoch has no sympathy with it and thinks that we must account lor deliberate intellectual attempts to pursue goodness and account for the simple achievement of goodness. 'Ult must be possible to do iustice to both Socrates and the virtuous peasant. In such "musts" as these lie the deepest springs and motives of philosophy' (p. 2). A bad argument against self-directed attention The escape from our problem is seen by looking more carefully at the way in which the emphasis on 'realism and rcally looking' provides the foundations for the prohibition on self-directed attention. It is the imperatiye to 'realism and really looking' that leads Murdoch to prohibit self-directed attention, but it is not that Murdoch prohibits self-directed attention simply because the self is particularly difficult to reallt realistically, look at. We should not interpret Murdoch in this way because if we were to do so we would have to credit her with the following patently invalid argument: 1. Accurate perception of the self is difficult. 2. We are morally required to perceive things accurately. Conclusion; We are morally required not to attempt accurate petception of the self. This argument is clearly not valid. If the first premise only cites the difficulty of accllrate self-perception then all that follows is the entirely unremarkable conclusion that, when it comes to the perception of the self, the moral requirement of accurate perception is a diffrcult rcquirement to meet. That does nothing to justify the vilification of selfdirected attention. The struggle to become good is, after all, a difficult struggle. There is a temptation to strengthen the argument by beefing up the first premise. Murdoch sometimes seems to use an argument that is a version of the one above, bìit one that is less obviously invalid because the first premise has been stengthened so as to say that accurate 80 Ids Mutdoch: A Reassessment seÌf-perception is not merely difficult but impossible, and that the self prevents the accuÉte perception of other things: That human beings are naturally selfish seems true on the evidence, whenever and wherever we look at them, in spite of a very small number of exceptions. About the quality of this selfishness modern psychology has had something to tell us. The psyche is a historically determined individuaÌ relentlessly looking after itself. [. . .] one of its main pastimes is daydreaminS. It is reluctant to face unpleasant realities. Its consciousness is not normally a transparent glass through which it sees the world but a cloud of more or less fantastic reverie designed to protect the psyche from pain. It constantly seeks consolation, either thrcugh imagined inflation of self or through fictions of a theological nature . (P76). The 'modern psychology' that Murdoch understands as revealing this picturc of the self is Freudian psychology, and one who thinks that Freudian psychology is rwong-headed wi be unmoved by Murdoch's argument herc. But even if we were to grant this picture of the self as a soulce of fictions, we would still not have a prcmise capable of patching the hole in the argument sketched above. Even if we believe that the self is a source of fictions we still lack a reason for not trying to perceiye it rightly. (A Freudian would say that we should Try to perceive it rightly.) The premise that is needed to establish an absolute prohibition on selfdirected attention is not iust that the self is a deceiver and that accumte self-perception is impossible. The needed premise is that the self is a deceiver, and that its deceptions are mc de worseby f}fe aTtempt to perceive it coÍectly. This ls a much harder premise to establish, lt is not a premise that can be established on the basis of introspection, for to believe it on the basis of introspection is to undemine one's on'n basis for believing it. Nor is it a claim that is made obvious on the basis of our observations of otheff. Î¡hen we observe othe$ we do, perhaps, find them to be somewhat deceived about the way things are, but the matter of whether they would be any less deceived had they not tded to perceive themselves is not a matter that our normal encounters with people, however carefully conducted, enable us to decide. This claim is too strong to feature as an unsupported premise in the argument against self-directed attentiol. There are no plausible strengthenings of the fisst premise that make the argument given above into a compelling one and so we should not understand Murdoch's prohibition on self-directed attention to be Chtistophet Mole 81, motivated by this argument, or by a version of it in which the fi$t premise is strengthened. We get a more satisfactory interpretation of Mudoch's reasons for prohibiting self-dirccted attention by getting a better understanding of the strength of the second premise the premise concerning the imperative to perceive the world cofiectly. Realism and really looking To understand the importance of really looking we must turr once again to the parable of the mother-inlaw. The mother-in-law's morally praiseworthy change of opinion involved her seeing that her daughterinlaw is 'not vulgar, but refreshingly simple, not undignified but spontaneous, not noisy but gat not tiresomely juvenile but delightfulty youthful' (p. 17). Such changes are said to result ftom'realism and really looking'ot as Murdoch says elsewhere, ftom a'just and loving gaze directed on an lndividual reality' (p. 33). Murdoch specifies that the case is one in which the mother-in-law is not deluding herself. The mother-in-law's vision is more accurate once she has revised her opinion upwards. But it must be a contingent fact that in this paúicular case the higher opinion is the more accurate one. Some daughters-in-law really are undignified, noisy and tircsomely juvenile, and the result of realistically looking at them would, presumabl, be to see them dr undignified, noisy and tiresomely juvenile. Murdoch herself has given us the verdict ftom her realism and really looking: that human beings are naturaìly selfish seems true whenever and wherever we look at them' (p. 77).If 'rcally looking' is valuable for itself then it is valuable whether or not it shows us things in a good light. In being told to /¿ally look we are notbeing invited to optimistically misperceive the world; we are being asked to perceive it as it really is. 'Really Iooking' witlì'a just and loving attention' is valuable whatevel it is that one is doing justice to. It may be a daughter-in-law that one had underestimate4 or the extent of human altruism that one had overestimated. The emphasis on resisting fantasy shows us that it is respect for the real which is the achtul¡g impelling Murdoch to act well: 'The authority of morals is the authority of truth, that is of rcality' (p. 88). This is not an emotional reaction to the world as known, but the rccognition of the world as something one must come to know (and thereby come to understand and rcspect): The value concepts are here lin the case of imaginative art and the practice of a skilled claftl patently tied onto the World, they are ll 82 lis Murdoch: A Reassessnent stretched as it were between the truth seeking mind and the t¡orld, they are not moving about on their own as adjuncts to the personal win [. . .]. [Wle see it as natural to the particular kind of creatures we are that love should be inseparable from justice and clear vision ftom respect for the real (p.88f). The world-involving nature of the morally important states of mind The emphasis on the moral importance of character and of states of mind should be understood as an emphasis on the importance ofmodes of attention. The value that we pussue in developing craftsmanship, and in ou¡ engagement with the arts, is ,stretched between the truth seeking mind and the world, (p. 88) because it is value that inheres in attention. (There is a play on et''mology here. ,Attention, comes f¡om the Old French ød tendere: being strctched out.) Being loving and iust, and possessing the other vittuous chatacter traits, is not a matter of being in a particular sort of pdvate, inner state. It depends on our mode of engagement with the world. The facets of our character take on the status of virtues orìly insofar as they involve particular faculties of atten_ tion that bring us into a virtuous relationship with the world. Virtuous charactq traits involye particular ptopensities for varieties of valuable attention, while vices are tendencies towards inattention. Loving is (or at least, it essentially involves) an astute focus on the par_ ticulaúty of othe$. Kindness starts with an awareness of their needs. Pity pays heed to the origins of another,s misfoúune. Courage is the trait required for attention to produce action unimpeded. The angry man, the lazy marr and the disrespectful man are all, in their vaúous ways, negÌigent, careless, thoughtless, impulsive, tactless or lash, as is shown by the ftequency with which the harm and offence they cause is inadvertent (tendencies Murdoch explored in ]net 7971 rloveI, An Accidental Møn). The impatient man is the fi$t to look away. Possession of a chatactq trait is not a kind of bias in the way that events are depicted in one,s internal monologue. There is no distinctive profile to the inner phenomenology of acting ftom some particular character tmit. What is distinctive about acting from a patticular char_ acter trait is one's folm of engagement with the world. It is the world that sets the standards. In ûying to act well we must ask (as my argu_ ment in the first section demonstrated) questions about oul chatacte! but this does not commit us to problematically self-directed attention ChristopherMole a3 because these are not questions that can be answered by ditecting attention onto oneself. To know whether one's character is virtuous is to know one's mode of attentive engagement with the world, and this cannot be known by looking inwards, The question, 'Is this act loying?' is not a question about whether the behaviour is accompanied by a particular phenomenological twinge in the subiect, but a question about (among other things) whether the act does its obiect any good and whether it is motivated by a proper recognition of what wouÌd do the ob¡ect good. That is why'Love needs to be expressed, it needs to do work'.6 Reaìly looking does not get its value by rcvealing purposefulness and pre-eústing yalue out there in the world: ,If there is any kind of sense or unity in human life, and the dream of this does not cease to haunt us, it l. . .l must be sought within a human expedence which has nothing outside it' (p. 77). Nor does it involve an illusory projection of value from the self. Looking at the world is ifsef a bearer of value. Knowledge oÌ the nature of one's chatacter may be indispensable for the more or less reflective thinke/s deliberate progressing towards becoming good, but this knowledge of character is not attained through the worthless unstretched-out attention invoÌved in introspection. Even when introspection succeeds in being honest and astute, the features of ourselves that we learn about through introspection are featues that are morally salient only on account of their telationships to things outside the self. lntrospective meditations do not bring us into a proper relationship with the world, and they do not tell us whether we a¡e in a proper relationship with the world. It is carefuì understanding of the world that ¡eveals our failures of virtue as failures. If one takes our moral character to be partially constituted by the ways in which we attentively interact with the world, then one can hold that character traits are primary bearers of intdnsic value without thereby making one¡s own properties a focus of concern in one's pursuit of goodness. Insofar as the struggle to become good requires knowledge of one's own moral character it provides a furthe¡ impetus for patient and careful attention to the world, Notes 1. Anscombe, 'Modem Moral Philosophy' t^ Philosophy, XXXI (1958), 1-19. 2. Most of this work was completed while the al¡thor held the William Alexander Fleet fellowship at Pdnceton Unive$ity. An enormous debt of g¡atitude is owed to Miss Julia Fleet, whose death, while the wo¡k was beiûg p¡epared for publication, is an occasion of great sadness. Thaoks fo¡ useful discussions ale owing to David Sussman and Philip Pettit, io Jessica Boyd Id.s Murdoch: A Reassessment and, especially/ to ArudÍa Buûa, who read seveÉl earlie¡ drafts. Discussions leith Samantha Vice and others at the Ids Murdoch Confe¡ence at Kingston Unive¡sity in 2004 have also been a gteat help. AII page references are to The Sotercígnty of Good. Stua¡t Hampshire, 'Logic and Appreciatioi', ii Langøge and Aesthetics (ed.) W. Elton (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1954). The Nice and the Good (New Yo¡k Viking Press, 1968), p. 77. The ph¡ase is given to Willy Kost (p. 132). Murdoch probably endorses the view although orly with the additional obseryation that 'Love can't always do work' (p. 222). Part III Revisiting the Artíst The Saint ønd 3. 4. 5. 6.