Quantifier	Variance Eli	Hirsch	and	Jared	Warren (penultimate	draft –	please	cite	and	quote	from	the	final	version,	to	appear	in	the Routledge	Handbook	to	the	Philosophy	of	Relativism) Abstract Quantifier variance is a prominent approach to contemporary metaontology that is noted for leading to a deflationary view of ontological debates. Here we explain the metasemantics of quantifier variance and distinguish between	modest and strong forms of variance (Section I), explain some key applications (Section II), clear up some misunderstandings	and	address	objections	(Section	III),	and	point	the	way toward future directions of quantifier-variance-related research (Section IV). I.	What	is	Quantifier	Variance? Different	possible	languages	have	different	concepts	of	what	"exists"	or	what	"there	is". Despite	this	key	difference	between	them,	some	of	these	languages	are	equally	good	as tools	for	describing	reality.	These	are	two	of	the	central	claims	of	quantifier	variance,	a highly	influential	deflationary	view	in	contemporary	metaontology.	Variance	is	rooted	in widely	accepted	metasemantic	principles,	yet it	remains	controversial,	since	it	deflates the pretensions of philosophical ontology. Additionally, variance is very widely misunderstood. A proper understanding starts with the metasemantic background leading	to	variance,	in	both	of	its	principle	forms. Language	and	Meaning.	Linguistic	meaning	is	determined	by	actual	and	possible language use. Taken baldly, this is almost a truism. But more plausibly, this slogan about	use	expresses	a	commitment	to	charity in interpretation.	Minimally,	charity	ties meaning to use by ruling out interpretations that see those we are interpreting as uttering	falsehoods	inexplicably. 2 Say	that	an interpretation	of language	L	assigns	coarse-grained	truth	conditions to sentences of L relative to each	possible context of utterance. Coarse-grained truth conditions can be modeled as sets of possible worlds (Stalnaker 1984); and these functions	from	contexts	of	utterance	to	coarse	truth	conditions	are	called	"characters" (Kaplan	1989).	A	charity-based	metasemantics	assigns	L	the	interpretation	that,	when	all is	said-and-done,	when	every	disposition	to	correct	and	revise	is	accounted	for,	makes the best sense of the linguistic behavior of L-speakers by making their considered utterances	come	out	true	in	actual	and	possible	circumstances,	ceteris	paribus. Charity-based approaches are top down – they explain the meanings of subsentential	expressions	in	terms	of	the	meanings	of	whole	sentences.	Once	again	this respects	the	dictum	that	meaning	is	use,	as	the	meanings	of	subsentential	expressions will	be fully	explained in terms	of their	usage in the language.	By	contrast,	bottom	up theorists	start	with	the	meanings	of	subsentential	expressions	and	then	go	on	to	explain the	meanings	of	sentences	in	terms	of	them. To	top	down	theorists,	this	is	mysterious -	what	magic	could	attach	meaning	to	a	subsentential	expression	apart	from	its	use? Quantifier Expressions. What makes an expression in a given language a "quantifier"	on	a	charity-based,	top	down	approach	is	that	it	is	used	as	a	quantifier.	The inferential role of a quantifier expression is its defining feature	- an expression in a given	language	is	an	existential	quantifier,	for	instance,	if	it	plays	the	inferential	role	of an	existential	quantifier in	that language.	No	doubt	the	inferential	role	of	"there	is"	or "exists" in natural language is more complex than the role of "∃" in formal logical languages, but the formal-syntactic role of "∃" provides a tidy approximation of the informal	inferential	role	of	"exists"	or	"there	is"	in	English.	The	expression	"there	is"	is an existential quantifier, in English, roughly because for name "a" and predicate "F", from	"a	is	F",	"there	is	an	F"	follows;	and	if	a	non-"a"	claim	follows	from	"a	is	F",	with	no auxiliary	assumptions	made	about	"a",	then	that	same	thing	also	follows	from	"there	is an	F". Expressions	that	obey	this	role	unrestrictedly,	for	all	names	and	predicates	that could	be introduced into	the language,	express	the language's	unrestricted	concept	of existence. 3 Combining a top down charity approach to meaning with the inferential role priority	account	of	what	it	is	to	be	a	"quantifier"	results	in	a	deflationary	metasemantics for	quantificational	claims. This	metasemantics	entails	modest	quantifier	variance. Call a	language	with	quantifier	expressions	a	"quantifier"	language.	All	human	languages	are quantifier languages,	and	maybe	all	possible languages	are;	our terminology is	neutral on this. Modest variance says that there are many distinct quantifier languages - quantifier	languages	where	translating	one	language's	quantifier	into	the	other's	results in	massive failures of charity. This follows almost immediately from top	down charity and	our	account	of	quantifiers.	Obviously	there	are	many	possible	patterns	of	language use,	distinct	from	each	other	but	each	with	expressions	playing	the	role	that	"there	is" plays in English (of course, related expressions like "refers" and "object"	will likewise vary	in	meaning	between	distinct	quantifier	languages,	and	variation	in	the	meaning	of the referential apparatus of the language will induce variation in the meaning of ordinary	predicates	like	"red"	and	"on"	as	well). Quantifier	variance	is	often	associated	with	a	deflationary	view	of	philosophical ontology,	so	we	must	stress	that	modest	variance	is	not	necessarily	hostile	to	ontology. In fact, several prominent contemporary ontologists, including Cian Dorr (2005) and Theodore Sider (2009), count as modest variantists by our reckoning. The antiontological	arguments	associated	with	quantifier	variance	rely	on	a	stronger	form,	one that	builds	upon	modest	variance.	This	stronger	form	must	now	be	explained. Equivalent	Descriptions.	Languages	are,	among	other	things,	tools	for	describing the	world. And	like	most	tools,	languages	can	be	better,	worse,	or	equal	for	the	task	at hand. When	two	languages	are	equal	for	any	possible	descriptive	task,	we	say	that	the languages	are	equivalent,	and	that, informally,	despite	any	differences	between	them, that they describe the very same facts or states of affairs. The top down charity approach	allows for a simple	account	of language-wide	equivalence	- two languages are	equivalent	just	in	case	they	can	express	all	and	only	the	same	characters,	the	same functions from contexts to coarse-grained truth conditions. When languages are equivalent in this sense, then for any sentence in the language of one, there is a 4 sentence in the language of the other that is true in all and only the same possible circumstances. This provides a very natural sense in which speakers of each language can express all and only the same facts. There is no state of the world, considered in a coarse-grained	sense,	that	speakers	of	one	language	but	not	the	other	are	sensitive	to. Of course, each language may well describe these states of the world in apparently incompatible	ways,	using	their	own	idiosyncratic	notions.	But	what	could	it	mean	to	say that	one	of	these	ways	of	describing	things	was	closer	to	the	truth	than	the	other,	when they	are	both literally true, in their	home language? It is	difficult to	see	how	one	of	a pair of equivalent languages could be a better description of reality than another.	Of course, there are fine-grained notions of equivalence that distinguish between character-wise equivalent languages, but when considered merely as tools for describing	reality,	this	doesn't	seem	to	matter. Metaphysical Merit. Accepting that equivalent languages are of equal metaphysical	merit,	along	with	modest	variance,	leads	to	immodest	or	strong	quantifier variance. Strong variantists endorse an egalitarian version of the pluralism about quantifier	languages	endorsed	by	modest	variantists. Strong	quantifier	variance	applies to quantifier languages the general thought that truth-conditionally equivalent languages	are	equally	good,	metaphysically	speaking.	It	claims	that	when	two	quantifier languages	are	equivalent,	there	is	no	use	asking	which	of	them	is	metaphysically	better or	which	better	reflects	objective	reality.	Nothing	else	about	the	metaphysical	ordering of languages is implied; but for strong variantists, if there is a single, metaphysically special language, it can only be because that language can express truth conditions inexpressible in	any	other language.	Of	course,	while	strong	variance is	metaphysically egalitarian, it is not egalitarian in any stronger sense. Variantists can allow there are often important practical reasons for preferring one quantifier language over an equivalent	language. Strong quantifier variance takes the quantifier language pluralism of modest variance	and	adds	to it	an	account	of the	metaphysical	merit	of languages in	terms	of 5 their	truth-conditional	equivalence. Variance,	both	modest	and	strong,	is	interesting	in itself,	but	it	can	also	be	applied	in	philosophically	fruitful	ways. II.	Applications	of	Quantifier	Variance Here	we	explain	five	of	quantifier	variance's	most	important	philosophical	applications. Merely	Verbal	Disputes in	Ontology (Putnam	1987, 2004,	Hirsch	2008a, 2009). According to modest variance, for many ontological disputes, there are possible languages	associated	with	each	side in the	dispute that	make	the	typical	assertions	of that side come out true. So there is a possible language N in which the standard assertions	of	mereological	nihilists	come	out true,	and	a	possible language	U in	which the standard assertions of mereological universalists come out true. There is no metasemantic glue sticking words to meanings, so if philosophers depart drastically enough	from	standard	usage,	and	refuse	to	coordinate	or	defer	to	other	speakers,	we should attempt to interpret them on their own terms. When we do this, charity supports	the	claim	that	nihilists	are	speaking	N	and	universalists	are	speaking	U.	Since these	philosophers	are	speaking	different languages, their	dispute	over	whether there are	chairs	is	merely	verbal:	they	each	speak	the	truth	in	their	own	language	and	thus	talk past	each	other. They	could	attempt	to	reinstate	their	dispute	by	touting	the	superiority	of	their own language, whether N or U, over the other, metaphysically speaking. But for standard ontological disputes, including this one, the relevant languages are truthconditionally	equivalent.	So,	according	to	strong	variance,	N	and	U	will	also	be	of	equal metaphysical	merit. This	means that there is nothing factual distinguishing these two languages	-	each	theorist	speaks	the	truth	in	their	own	language	and	each	competing language is an equivalent description of the very same facts. There is no reason to prefer one language over the other,	metaphysically speaking. This provides a second sense	in	which	the	dispute	is	"merely	verbal". Ordinary	Ontology	(Hirsch	2003,	2005).	English	speakers	innocent	of	philosophy reject	the	distinctive	claims	of	mereological	nihilists	and	mereological	universalists	alike. But	English-speaking	ontologists	seem	untroubled	by	this,	apparently	thinking	that	since 6 there is only one thing for "exists" to mean, ordinary English claims about material objects	cannot	be	charitably	interpreted.	According	to	modest	quantifier	variance,	this	is false - there is a quantifier language in which the material object claims made by English	speakers	come	out	true.	Charity	demands	that	we	interpret	English	speakers	as speaking	this	language,	so	that,	in	English,	"there	are	turkeys"	and	"there	are	trout"	are both	true,	while	"there	are	trout-turkeys"	is	false.	Since	this	natural	language	concept	of existence does not perfectly correspond to any of the standard positions in debates about	material objects, if participants in these	debates are speaking English, they are often	speaking	falsely.	Strong	variantists	will	add	that,	since	it	is	plausible	that	English	is equivalent to N, U, and the other languages of metaphysicians, English itself is a perfectly	legitimate	quantifier	language,	metaphysically	speaking. Vagueness about Existence (Hirsch 1999, 2002). It is widely believed that existence	claims	cannot	be	vague. This	is	because	vagueness	is	usually	thought	to	be	a matter	of	semantic indecision	-	there	are	various	possible	things	we	could	mean	by	a term	like	"bald",	but	our	usage	of	the	term	doesn't	decide	between	all	of	them,	so	the term is vague. Given this	picture	of vagueness, some	philosophers (Lewis	1986)	have argued that since there is only one possible thing that could be meant by "exists", existence	claims	cannot	possibly	be	vague.	But	once	quantifier	variance	is	accepted,	we can	easily	see	how	there	could	be	semantic	indecision	and	vagueness	over	"exists":	our usage	could	fail	to	decide	between	various	assignments	of	truth	conditions	to	sentences containing "exists", while on each assignment "exists" continues to play the same formal-syntactic	role	and	thus	remains	a	quantifier. Mathematical Freedom. (Berry 2015, Warren forthcoming). Mathematicians freely	introduce	theories	about	new	kinds	of	mathematical	entities.	If	a	mathematician introduces	a	new	kind,	the	Fs, it	would	be inappropriate	within	mathematics	to	object that	no	evidence	had	been	given	that	Fs	exist	(provided	at	least	that	the	assumption	of Fs is consistent). On bottom up views of the metasemantics of quantifiers this procedure is either epistemically reckless or wholly inexplicable. However, as was perhaps first recognized by Carnap (1934), quantifier variance makes sense of 7 mathematical	freedom	-	mathematicians	are	introducing	new	ways	of	using	sentences containing	"there	are"	and	"exists".	Charity	to	use	demands	that	we	interpret	them	as speaking truly, if	we can. And as quantifier variantists,	we can. In this	way, variance rationalizes standard mathematical practice by making explicable its ontological freedom.	Other	approaches	to	metaontology	are forced	to	criticize	the internal	norms of	mathematics	on	purely	philosophical	grounds. Paradoxes	and	Indefinite	Extensibility. (Warren	2017).	Naïve	set	theory is	beset by paradoxes, most famously Russell's paradox concerning the set of all non-selfmembered	sets. One	response	to	these	paradoxes,	inaugurated	by	Russell	himself,	sees set-theoretic quantifiers like "all sets" as being indefinitely extensible. The idea being that	when	you	attempt	to	quantify	over	all	and	only	the	sets	you	somehow,	someway, end	up	being	able	to	talk	about	another	set	that	was	not	in	the	original	collection. This idea has long been puzzling, since clearly	we aren't creating a new set	when	we run through the reasoning	of the	Russell paradox!	But	quantifier variance	makes sense	of extensibility	by	seeing	the	Russell	reasoning	as	creating	not	a	new	set,	but	rather	a	new and slightly expanded concept of "all sets", based on a slight change in the usage of sentences	containing	"all".	In	this	fashion,	variance	provides	an	all	purpose	strategy	for demystifying	the	hitherto	puzzling	paradoxes	of	set	theory	and	absolute	generality. III.	Misunderstandings	and	Objections There	are	many	ways	to	misunderstand	quantifier	variance,	most	of	them	witnessed	in the	literature. For	the	sake	of	clarity,	let	us	make	fully	explicit	some	of	what	is	merely implicit	in	the	foregoing. Quantifier Variance is not anti-realism. Ontological anti-realists think that, in some fashion or other, objects depend for their existence on human practices. But while it is	undeniable	that	some	objects	depend	upon	humans	(governments,	national borders,	thoughts),	it	seems	equally	undeniable	that	other	objects	do	not	(stars,	rocks, numbers). Nothing in	quantifier	variance	conflicts	with this	bit	of	good	sense. In fact, while	variance	says	much	about	the	nature	of	our	concept	of	existence,	it	says	nothing at	all	about	the	nature	of	the	things	that	exist	(Hirsch	2002).	To	reason	from	quantifier 8 variance to ontological anti-realism is just as confused as reasoning from the human invention	of	the	concept	of	"planet"	to	the	human	invention	of	planets. Quantifier Variance is not verificationism. Verificationists think that claims are only	meaningful if	they	have	clear	verification	conditions.	This	is	usually	understood	as entailing	that	disputes	are	substantive	just	in	case	they	can	be	settled,	in	principle. The logical positivists of legend used verificationism as a club with which to bash metaphysics,	and	some	(Hawthorne	2009,	for	example)	have	worried	that	variantists	are wielding the same club for the same purpose. But this is	mistaken; strong variantists think	disputes	are	metaphysically	insubstantial	when	each	side's	language	is	equivalent to	the	other.	This	criterion	only	entails	verificationism	if	"equivalent	to"	is	understood	to mean,	"has the	same	verification	conditions	as",	but	as	we	have	seen, this is	not	how quantifier variantists understand "equivalence" (Putnam 1983, Hirsch 2011, 2016, Warren	2015	appendix).	Unlike	verificationism,	the	charity-based	metasemantics	behind quantifier	variance	allows that	many	substantive	disputes	-	some	disputes	about the past,	for	example	-	may	forever	be	impossible	to	settle. Quantifier	Variance	does	not	venerate	quantification.	Some	think	that	variantists must mean something special by a "quantifier", beyond obeying a particular formalsyntactic	role. A	persistent	version	of	this	confusion	says	that	variantists	must	explain different	quantifier	meanings in terms	of	differing	domains	of	quantification (Finn	and Bueno	2018).	Obviously	this is	a	nonstarter	-	speakers	of	N	cannot	and	do	not	admit that U's quantifiers range over a domain containing composites (charitable critics of variance,	such	as	Sider	(2009),	recognize	this).	There	are	also	more	subtle	ways	to	read something	special	into	"quantifier"	variance	(Dorr	2014).	But	whether	expressed	simply or subtly, the thought is wrong. Those who think that something	more than formalsyntactic role is required for an expression is to count as a "real" quantifier should interpret our claims as concerning	only	quantifier-like expressions	-	expressions that have	the	same	formal-syntactic	role	as	our	quantifiers.	Everything	that	is	of	interest	to variantists can easily be said using this alternative vocabulary, though we think that 9 talking in	terms	of	quantifier	variance rather	than	quantifier	elimination is	much	more natural	and	suggestive	(Hirsch	2011	introduction). Even with these misunderstandings avoided, quantifier variance and its applications	have	been	challenged	in	the	literature. Three	of	these	challenges	warrant some	discussion. The Collapse Argument (Hale and Wright 2009, Dorr 2014, Rossberg unpublished). Imagine	that	we	quantifier	variantists	are	speaking	N	and	considering	U. As	variantists,	we	admit	that	the	sentence	"Bugs	is	a	bunny"	is,	while	false	in	N,	true	in U.	But (it is	claimed)	admitting	that it is true in	U	that	Bugs is	a	bunny,	entails,	by	the inferential	role	of	our	N-quantifier,	that,	something	(in	our	N-sense	of	"something")	is	a bunny.	Which	- since bunnies are composite objects	- contradicts the assumption that we were speaking N. It seems that N is not a possible language and modest variance	is	false. This	argument,	based	on	one	given in	Harris	1982,	has	tempted	many	critics	of variance. But	it	is	based	on	a	confusion:	admitting,	in	N,	that	"Bugs	is	a	bunny"	is	true	in U,	is	not	tantamount	to	admitting,	in	N,	that	Bugs	is	a	bunny. To	think	otherwise	is	to confuse	use	and	mention. In	a	language	that	calls	sharks	"dogs"	but	is	otherwise	exactly like	English,	"dogs	live	in	the	water"	is	true. We	can	all	see	that	this	does	not	imply,	in English, that	dogs live in the	water, but the	mistake	made	by this	brainless argument seems	to	be	the	very	mistake	made	by	the	collapse	argument. Discussing	the	language U,	within	N,	is	very	different	than	having,	within	N,	the	true	sentence,	"Bugs	is	a	bunny". Intra-language versions of collapse, though valid, don't threaten quantifier variance, while inter-language versions threaten quantifier variance, but are fallacious (Warren 2015).	The	fallacy	has	only	escaped	notice	because	the	argument	is	typically	presented formally, in either a natural deduction system or a mathematically powerful metatheory.	But	a	fallacy	is	still	a	fallacy,	no	matter	how	many	technicalities	are	piled	on top	of	it. The	Tarskian	Argument	(Hawthorne	2006,	Eklund	2009). Imagine	again	that	we variantists	are	speaking	N	and	considering	U.	As	variantists	we	should	be	able	to	freely 10 admit that U is a possible language, in some general sense (we are not presently concerned with its psychological possibility). But according to many influential approaches in the philosophy of language and linguistics, claiming a natural language possible requires the ability to formulate a Tarski 1933 style semantic theory for that language.	And this seems impossible for the "smaller" language to do in the cases of interest to variantists. For example, a Tarski-style treatment of U, within N, would explain the truth of the U-sentence "Bugs is a bunny" by saying that the referent of "Bugs" has the property expressed by "is a bunny". But there is, according to Nspeakers,	no	suitable	referent	for	"Bugs",	since	"is	a	bunny"	has	empty	extension,	and so a Tarski-style approach seems impossible. If this is right, then N-speakers cannot admit	that	U	is	a	possible	language,	contradicting	modest	variance. In	response,	some	(Dorr	2005,	Sider	2007)	have	advocated	that	variantists	reject the standard Tarskian approach to semantics, at least as a constraint on admitting a language	possible. We	are	sympathetic to	this	suggestion,	but	have	elsewhere	shown that	it	is	not	strictly	required	(Hirsch	and	Warren	forthcoming). Through	devious	uses	of the resources of set theory, N-speakers can give a perfectly standard - though complicated	-	Tarskian	semantics	for	U	without	going	beyond	the	resources	of	N.	This completely undermines this particular version of the Tarskian argument, and it is plausible	that	similar	results	also	hold	for	all	other	cases	of	interest. Heavyweight	Ontology (Sider 2001 introduction, 2009, 2011, Fine	2001, 2009). Following	Quine (1948), quantifier variantists see existential quantification over Fs as expressing	ontological	commitment	to	Fs.	This	is	still	widely	but	not	universally	accepted in philosophy. Recently many metaphysicians have claimed that even if existential quantifiers	carry	some	kind	of	"lightweight"	ontological	commitment,	what	ontologists really care about is "heavyweight" ontological commitment, which is not carried by standard quantifiers alone. There is disagreement over the particulars, but most of these	heavyweight	ontologists	think	ontological	commitment	is	carried	by	some	sort	of special	metaphysical	primitive	such	as	"in reality"	or the like	-	for	example	by	saying that	ontological	commitment	to	Fs	is	expressed	by	the	claim	that,	in	reality,	there	are	Fs. 11 With	this	type	of	move	made,	there	no	longer	seems	to	be	any	reason	for	ontologists	to worry	about	quantifier	variance	or	deflationary	arguments	based	upon	it. Despite	the	recent	popularity	of	this	strategy,	it is	difficult	to	see	how	it,	alone, could	salvage	substantive	ontology.	Either	sentences	containing	"in	reality"	(or	the	like) have	clear	truth	conditions	in	the	language	of	heavyweight	ontology,	or	they	do	not. If they	do,	then	the	situation	is	not	importantly	different	than	it	was	with	the	quantifiers -	we	are	able	to	charitably interpret	each	disagreeing	heavyweight	ontologist	so	that they speak the truth in their own language and thus all talk past each other (Hirsch 2008b). On	the	other	hand,	if	these	sentences	do	not	have	clear	truth	conditions,	then ontological	claims,	questions,	and	disputes	are	problematic	for	that	very	reason	(Warren 2016). In	neither	case	has	substantive	ontology	been	rehabilitated.	The	devil is in	the details, but this general situation makes us highly skeptical about the prospect of rehabilitating substantive ontology simply by moving away from quantifiers as the source	of	serious	ontological	commitment. IV.	Future	Directions Here	we indicate	four	directions for future	quantifier-variance-related	work.	Of course,	our	list	does	not	exhaust	the	possibilities. Strange	Languages.	Variantists	think	that	there	are	possible	languages	that	have distinct concepts	of "what exists."	But are there any limits on	how intuitively strange such alternative languages can be? Some quantifier languages are bizarre, such as Hirsch's Contacti language, where the identity of an "object" over time is partly determined	by its	contact	relations	to	other	things,	so	that if two	"objects"	come into contact with each other they exchange all of their properties including their spatial locations	and	material	composition	(see	Hirsch	1993	for	details).	Can	we	really	conceive of any beings speaking Contacti as their mother tongue? Can we conceive of beings using a language like this at all? Contacti is a describable language (we have just described it),	and	what's	more it seems that it is truth-conditionally	equivalent to	our language,	so	for	anything	we	can	say,	they	can	say	something	to	the	same	effect. It is not	clear,	therefore,	what	the	nature	of	the	intuitive	difficulty	is	in	imagining	speakers	of 12 such a language.	Nor is it clear	whether the intuitive difficulty is a real difficulty. But variantists	should	acknowledge	the	insistent	intuitions	about	such	cases	and	attempt	to account	for	them,	in	some	fashion.	There	may	be	plausible	metasemantic	principles	that exclude	certain	describable	quantifier	meanings	while	admitting	others.	The	matter	calls for	further	investigation,	with	quantifier	variance	kept	firmly	in	mind. Human	Limits.	The	question	we	have	just	been	sketching	concerns	the	possibility of	beings,	whether	human	or	not,	speaking	languages	with	wildly	different	concepts	of existence than ours. A related question is whether humans could be raised to speak such	languages,	as	their	mother	tongue. This	may	be	principally	an	empirical	question, informed	by	matters	of	psychology	and	neuroscience,	but	there	is	much	in	it	that	is	grist for	philosophical reflection. Many	of the	alternative languages	are truth-conditionally equivalent	and	so	express	the	same	facts	as	our	own,	but	are	there	deep	connections, perhaps even	a	priori connections, between	how	our concept of existence articulates the	facts	and	how	human	patterns	of	attention	and	learning	operate? A	start	on	these questions	has	been	provided	by	Hirsch (1978,	1997,	unpublished),	but further	work in this	area	would	be	valuable. Hyperintensionality and	Meaning. The	metasemantics of quantifier variance is avowedly intensional	- it	makes	no	direct appeal to	differences in	meaning	between necessarily equivalent sentences or expressions. Some critics (Hawthorne 2009) have seen	this	as	an	objection	to	quantifier	variance.	We	disagree	(see	Hirsch	2016),	but	think that	the	connection	between	so-called	hyperintensionality	and	quantifier	variance	needs further	exploration,	along	a	number	of	dimensions. One	of	these	dimensions	concerns cross-language	belief ascriptions. Suppose that in the	presence	of a brown	dog and	a green	turtle	a	speaker	of	U	asserts	the	true	U-sentence,	"There	is	something	here	that	is partly	brown	and	partly	green." Assuming	that	this	sentence	is	false	in	our	language,	it does	not	seem	that	we	have	any	sentence	in	our	language	that	is	synonymous	with	this true	U-sentence. It	may follow that English speakers cannot capture the fine-grained hyperintensional	content	of	the	belief	expressed	by	the	speaker	of	the	U-language. We 13 do not think this as a	major problem for variance, but both the general and specific issues	deserve	further	clarification. Beyond Philosophical Ontology. Naturally enough, the original applications of quantifier	variance	were	aimed	at	demystifying	the	ontological	disputes	engaged in	by philosophers. But philosophers don't have a monopoly here	- existence claims and questions	are	woven	into	nearly	every	aspect	of	our	approach	to	the	world. 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