Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] Emanuele	Serrelli1 Metascientific	Views:	Challenge	and	Opportunity	for	Philosophy	of	Biology	in Practice In	this	paper	I	take	evolutionary	biology	as	an	example	to	reflect	on	the	role of philosophy and on the transformations that philosophy is constantly stimulated	to	do	in	its	own	approach	when	dealing	with	science.	I	consider that some intellectual movements within evolutionary biology (more specifically, the various calls for 'synthesis') express	metascientific views, i.e., claims about 'what it is to do research' in evolutionary biology at different times. In the construction of metascientific views I see a fundamental	role	to	be	played	by	philosophy,	and,	at	the	same	time,	a	need to complement the philosophical methods with many more methods coming	from	other	sciences.	What leads	philosophy	out	of itself is its	own attention	to	scientific	practice.	My	humble	methodological	suggestions	are, at this stage, only	meant to	help	us imagine	metascientific views that are built with a more scientific, interdisciplinary approach, in order to attenuate partiality, subjectivity and impressionism in describing the scientific	community.	And	yet,	we	should	not	be	naïve	and	imbued	with	the myth	of	'data-driven'	research,	especially	in	this	field:	other	complex	issues about metascientific views call for a serious, constant philosophical reflection	on	scientific	practice. Keywords: Philosophy of science in practice; Philosopy of biology; Evolutionary	synthesis;	Interdisciplinarity. 1.	Introduction More	than	once,	through	its	history,	evolutionary	biology	has	tried	to	get	a	meaningful and comprehensive snapshot of itself. A few of these crucial moments are defined 'syntheses': these include the	Modern Synthesis some decades ago, and the Extended Evolutionary Synthesis today (Laland et al. 2014, Laland et al. 2015). I have studied synthesis for	several	years	now	(e.g.,	Serrelli	2015,	2016a,	Eldredge	et	al.	2016),	and	I have come to the conclusion that we may usefully define both 'syntheses' as metascientific views, in that they consist in claims about 'what it is to do research' in evolutionary	biology	at	different times.	Only indirectly they	are	scientific claims	about evolutionary	processes,	although	the	two	aspects	–	the	scientific	and	metascientific	–	are hardly	separable	(indeed, inseparable) in	any	chiefly	scientific	or	chiefly	metascientific discourse. I	take	evolutionary	biology	as	just	an	example	to	reflect	on	the	role	of	philosophy	and	on the	transformations	that	philosophy	is	constantly	stimulated	to	do	in	its	approach.	In	the 1 University of Milano-Bicocca, CISEPS Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Economics, Psychology	and	Social	Sciences.	Email:	emanuele.serrelli@unimib.it Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] construction	of	metascientific	views	I	see	a	fundamental	role	to	be	played	by	philosophy of biology (Serrelli 2016b), and, at the same time, a need to complement the philosophical	methods	with	many	more	methods	coming from	other	sciences. In	other words,	I	see	both	a	constant	opportunity	and	a	call	for	humility. The	opportunity	for	philosophy	comes,	on	the	one	hand,	from	the	fact	that	metascientific views are perceived as a need by the scientists too, and, on the other hand, from the intrinsic	complexity	of	the	effort.	A	comprehensive	and	reliable	picture	of	evolutionary biology	is,	in	principle,	very	useful	to	evolutionary	biology	itself	as	a	research	enterprise. Fragmentation coming, for example, from compartmentalization and hyperspecialization	is	often	seen	as	an	obstacle	to	the	advacement	of	the	science	of	evolution in many ways (Sidlauskas et al. 2009). A sense of evolutionary biology as a moving whole	can	be	crucial	for	many	important	issues	such	as	biology	training,	or	funding	and rewarding	policies.	The lack	of a general	picture	of evolution, or at least	of a sense	of communal endeavour, can prevent a researcher from grasping the potential evolutionary	relevance	of	their	study	case,	or	from	accessing	precious	resources.	In	sum, syntheses	deserve	careful	consideration	because	of	their	potential	'maintenance	effects', ultimately	aiding	evolutionary	biology	in	pursuing	its	own	knowledge	aims. But	metascientific views are intrinsically complex: their achievement requires a great effort	of	domesticating	a	huge	mass	of	scientific	literature	(the	latter	being,	in	turn,	only one aspect of scientific work); they intertwine metascientific with scientific claims, descriptive	with	prescriptive	aspects,	and	multiple	historical	chronologies;	and	they	are often	elaborated through	conceptual analysis	by	one	or few	scientists	who	cannot	but rely on their particular experience and hold stakes in the scientific debate. All these features	of	metascientific	views	strongly	call	for	philosophical	inquiry	and	–	as	I	became inclined	to	remind, like	a	mantra	– for	an	attention	to	scientific	practice	(Ankeny	et	al. 2011, Boumans and Leonelli 2013, Soler et al. 2014). But	we should recognize at the outset that	philosophy	of	science is	being led	out	of itself, towards	an integration	with the methods of other scientific fields. What leads philosophy there is exactly the attention to scientific practice. In fact, the fundamental problem	of logical analyses of science	is	that	scientists	do	not	live	inside	theories,	rather,	at	any	particular	moment	in time,	they	have	different	versions	or	pieces	of	theory,	with	which	they	entertain	diverse relationships.	Different	periods	of	evolutionary	biology	can	be	described	as	nested	sets of	concepts	and	ideas	(Fig.	1),	but	evolutionary	biology	in	1980,	in	the	1930s,	and	at	any moment	in	history,	is	a	working	scientific	community	that	has	to	be	studied	under	more aspects.	While rigorous	methods such as	meta-analysis are used to combine available scientific	evidence,	rigorous	ways	of	knowing	the	scientific	community	seem	scarcer. 2.	Many	Methods	for	Getting	to	Know	a	Scientific	Community The intellectual movement called "Extended Evolutionary Synthesis" (EES) can be traced	back	to	Massimo	Pigliucci	and	Gerd	Müller	(Pigliucci	2007,	Müller	2007,	Pigliucci &	Müller	2010).2	The	extension	that	the	EES	suggests	refers	takes	the	Modern	Synthesis 2	It would be necessary to assess Pigliucci and Müller's discontinuities and continuities with respect to previous works like Gould's or Stebbins's. This would be particularly important because	the	EES	has	the	ambition	of	summoning	the	pleas	that	have	been	accumulating	over	the Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] (MS), temporally located in the first half of the 20th century, as a reference point. A reconstruction of the Modern Synthesis was published in 1980 by Ernst Mayr and William	Provine	(Mayr	and	Provine	1980).	While	the	book	became	the	official,	although in fact multifarious, account of the MS, the account was paralleled and immediately followed by pleas for an extension of the Modern Synthesis. Some critics, like early Stephen Jay Gould (1980, 1982), were more radical, whereas others, like G. Ledyard Stebbins, adopted a more integrative approach (Stebbins and Ayala 1981; Stebbins 1983).3 Müller	and	Pigliucci	wanted	to	point	out	some	missing	elements	of	the	MS	that	are	being added	by	current	evolutionary	research.	Initially,	they	both	focused	on	'organic	form'	as something overlooked by the 'essentially' genetic	MS, then they consciously started a proliferation of reflections on the EES, where they assembled a broader extension beyond	the	issue	of	'form'.	In	Fig.	1	we	see	Darwinism,	the	MS,	and	the	EES	represented as successive expansions of "conceptual pillars" (Pigliucci 2007). Notice that these expansions are meant to show not only cumulative growth of knowledge about evolution, but also the various transformations of evolutionary biology as a scientific field.	The	different	circles	aim	at	being	representative	of	how	working in	evolutionary biology	was,	is,	and	will	be	at	different	times. Figure 1. A comparison between the elements of an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) appearing in two	different	publications: (a) from	Pigliucci (2009); (b) from the	collective	book Evolution:	The	Extended	Synthesis (ed.	by	Pigliucci and	Müller	2010).	Each	of the two	diagrams describes	the	EES	as	inclusive	of	Darwinism	(inner	circle),	the	Modern	Synthesis	(middle	circle), and	additional	concepts	(outer	circle).	A	comparison	among	publications	(either	with	or	without diagrams) uncovers dynamism and problematic factors of complexity in the development of a metascientific	view. According	to	Pigliucci	(2007),	for	example,	the	MS	coincides	with	evolutionary	genetics, as	its	foundations	had	consisted	in	a	movement	of	"crystallization"	of	a	"theory	of	genes" out of the original Darwinian "theory of form" (p. 2744). Pigliucci supported such a claim	with a brief conceptual history of evolutionary biology, summarizing how 20th years.	The	analysis	is	however	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	review,	but	some	disconnects	will be	mentioned. 3	Stebbins	is	also	considered	among	the	architects	of	the	MS	(Pigliucci	2009,	p.	220;	Pigliucci	and Müller	2010,	p.	8;	Stebbins	1950).	Both	Gould	and	Stebbins,	although in	different	ways,	moved towards macro-evolutionary extension of the MS (Serrelli and Gontier 2014). Pigliucci and Stebbins	share,	besides	their	interest	in	extending	the	MS,	their	specialization:	both	are	botanists. Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] Century	Darwinism	overcame	Lamarckism,	and	how	Mendelism	was	made	compatible with	gradual	change	by	means	of	statistical	works	by	Fisher,	Haldane	and	Wright	(Ivi,	p. 2744). He described the major theoretical contributions by Dobzhansky, Mayr, and Simpson in the 1940s, and then identified some	missing elements in the	MS, namely: development,	studied	separately	by	embryologists	(p.	2745);	ecology,	secluded	away	as a background condition of evolution (Ibidem); implications of the '-omics revolution', and its relationships to	neutralism	and complex	genotype-phenotype interactions (pp. 2745-6); and phenomena such as plasticity, evolutionary capacitance, epigenetic inheritance	(p.	2746).	An	EES	would integrate	a theory	of form	back into	evolutionary biology	(p.	2745).	Some	"bits	and	pieces"	or	"recurring	ideas"	(p.	2746)	that	will	be	part of the EES	would be: evolvability, hinging on developmental systems'	modularity and robustness (p. 2746); phenotypic plasticity and the possibility of modes of evolution such as genetic accommodation (pp. 2746-7); epigenetic and multiple inheritance (p. 2747); complexity theory, revealing organizing principles different from natural selection	(Ibidem);	and	updated	adaptive	landscapes, in light	of	work that	reformulates their general shape (pp. 2747-8). Concluding the 2007 paper, Pigliucci anticipated a new,	complex,	constructive	process	analogous	to	the	MS	itself,	a	progressive	"expansion of theoretical biology (in the broader sense of conceptual understanding of the discipline's	foundations)"	(p.	2748). The idea of an EES enjoyed some success in the last few years. For example, several scientific journals reviewed the EES book (Pigliucci and Müller 2010) as a research proposal (Plutynski 2011; Reiss 2011; Travis 2011;	Witteveen 2011; Handschuh and Mitteroecker	2012). Some scientists accepted the challenge of imagining	how the	EES will	eventually	be	(Brooks	and	Agosta	2012),	possibly	pointing	out	neglected	extensions (Boto	2010;	Weber	2011).	Some	scholars	used	the	EES	perspective	to	look	at	evo-devo (Love	2009;	Medina	2010),	at	population	genetics	(Akey	and	Shriver	2011),	and	at	other fields (Noble 2011; Danchin 2013; L.A.B. Wilson 2013), and many focused on epigenetics (Danchin et al. 2011; Schrey et al. 2012, Dickins and Rahman 2012). The socio-cultural	sciences	showed	an	interest	in	the	extension	of	the	MS	as	well	(Mesoudi	et al.	2013;	Laland	et	al.	2009). At the same time, the EES became the object of interesting controversies. Single concepts of the EES have been questioned with respect to their scientific validity, relevance,	or	innovativeness	(Reiss	2011).	Coyne	(e.g.,	2009)	questions,	for	example,	the real	evolutionary incidence	of	epigenetic inheritance	due	to	the	short life	of	epigenetic changes over generations. Some pillars create different factions concerning their compatibility with long-standing knowledge (e.g., for evo-devo, Minelli 2010 vs. Laubichler	2010).	But	many	other issues are	more	exquisitely	metascientific: they	are about the science, not the	world. Fields such as "population genetics" or "ecology" or "evo-devo" that are listed among EES conceptual pillars are metascientific concepts rather than scientific ones (more will be said on this below). Another purely metascientific	debate	is	the	one	concerning	the	age	of	'pillars':	claims	for	additions	to	the MS	are	also	claims for the long	absence	of	some ingredient, for	example	ecology, from the field of evolutionary biology. Such absence is typically contested by groups of scientists who claim to have always taken ecology (or whatever pillar at hand) into consideration, or who point out forerunners. The timing of virtually each and every Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] concept	is	a	matter	of	metascientific	quarrel	between	different	members	of	the	scientific community. There is also a more fundamental disagreement about the EES as such. Müller and Pigliucci (2010) observe two opposite reactions to the EES: the "nothingsubstantially-new" position and the "more-change-is-needed" position. The first position	is	seen	as	being	represented	by	scientists	such	as	Douglas	Futuyma	and	Michael Lynch. Futuyma (2011, 2014) thinks that evolutionary biology had absorbed and incorporated discoveries throughout its history, without the need for a formal reconsideration	of	evolutionary	theory,	and	Lynch	(2007)	sees	a	multiplication	of	things to	explain	more	than	of	explanations.	The	second	position,	expressed	in	papers	such	as Craig (2010, 2011), is against extending the MS because elements such as evo-devo would	completely	overthrow	it:	the	MS	would	not	be	amendable.	Although	some	of	the cited workers actually have nuanced opinions, some of them did indeed express themselves in sharp contrast	with the EES through various	media (e.g., Coyne 2009). Proponents	of the	EES	usually	explain	away	such	a	diffuse	dissent	by the	conservative inertia	or	active	homeostasis	of	science, 'paradigmatic'	almost in	a	Kuhnian	sense. It is evident, in my view, that ongoing controversies on the EES mingle scientific and metascientific	aspects. How	do	we	get	insights	about	the	shifting	state	of	something	so	broad,	fragmented,	and lively such as evolutionary biology? An obvious obstacle to the achievement of a metascientific consensus is what could be called the scientist-field disproportion. Evolutionary	biology	is	vast	in	terms	of	involved	people	and	labs	all	over	the	world,	with their	diversity	and	ever-changing	boundaries.	All	sorts	of	science	are	being	done	in	the world:	do	they	fit	the	mind	and	the	reach	of	one	or	few	experts?	How	can	we	know	what all	those	people	are	doing? Massimo	Pigliucci	(2009),	to	explain	shifts	in	his	list	of	concepts	(Fig.	1),	acknowledges	a particular	meeting	(the	"Altenberg	meeting",	Pigliucci	&	Müller	2010)	as	an	occasion	for him to expand his thinking about evolutionary theory. Taking the cue from this, we ought	to	think	that,	in	general	and	inevitably,	concepts	are	included	by	the	author	partly as	a	function	of	contingent	biographical	and	professional	factors,	such	as	the	particular field	of	specialization,	the	network	of	professional	contacts,	the	encounters	that	happen, or	even	some	kind	of	personal taste.	Factors like	these	are	also	subject to	change	over lifetime.	All this speaks about the	disproportion	between any scientist's point of view and	the	necessary task	of	mapping	the field,	at	any	time in	history.4 Just think	to	how huge	and	fast-growing	the	scientific	literature	is	today.	A	metascientific	view	aspires	to describe the web of networks of researchers and labs that constitute evolutionary biology, i.e., people, along with their actions and knowledge, their instruments, the different media and various kinds of connections among them, and also, in part, the larger	contexts	in	which	they	work	and	operate.	When	we	are	interested	in	an	empirical concept	such	as	phenotypic	plasticity,	then,	we	want	to	know	for	example	where,	when, how, and how much phenotypic plasticity was effectively studied in relation to evolution. And it is not even enough to know how frequently phenotypic plasticity is mentioned,	or	who	are the	most	cited 'experts'	of it.	Before	being	able to	demonstrate 4	To the scientist-field disproportion we will add, in the next section, the 'flag effect': any scientist's	claims	are	part	of	socio-epistemological	and	socio-economical	dynamics	where	he	or she	has	needs,	aims,	open	accounts. Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] that plasticity is involved in the change of how evolutionary biology is practiced, we need	to	deal	with	how	phenotypic	plasticity is integrated in	scientific	practice,	what is its	incidence	and	role.	How	has	the	understanding	of	some	concepts	changed?	And	what is the importance of concepts in scientific work in different contexts and periods? In other	words,	how	much	research	is	theory-engaged	and	theory-driven	(Scheiner	2013)? While	databanks	of	specific	research	objects	(a	gene,	a	species)	are	flourishing,	scientists don't access	meaningful and rigorous	data	about the scientific community. Yet, let	me suggest that helpful methods and notions exist in different disciplines, and perhaps would only need to be applied and integrated to construct a metascientific view of evolutionary	biology.	What's	the	real	trajectory	of	the	consideration	of	phenotypes,	or	of ecology, in the community of evolutionary biologists? What is really happening to evolutionary biology in relation to what many people call 'evo-devo', or with what different	groups	call	'integration	of	evolution	with	ecology'?	When	and	how,	if	ever,	evodevo	changed	the	way	evolutionary	research	is	carried	out	in	other	parts	of	the	field?	Is epigenetic	inheritance	really	related	to	new	ways	of	doing	science? Conceptual	analysis	of theories,	beloved	by	philosophers	and	by	some	scientists,	must be	complemented	to	achieve	accounts	that	are	more	grounded	and	useful	to	biologists. Real	substance	of	metascientific	views	are	the	diffusion	of	those	concepts,	the	changing role of those concepts in scientific research, and the congruent partitioning and repartitioning	of	the	scientific	community	relating	to	various	ways	of	being	evolutionary biologists. Several studies already go in this direction. Scheiner (2013) performed some quick quantitative	historical	analyses	of	ecology	to	measure	theory-engagement in that field. Something similar might be done to assess the integration between evolution and ecology. Love and colleagues (Love 2003; Raff and Love 2004) made interesting attempts	to	re-evaluate	the	received	conviction	that	development	was	excluded	by	the MS. To this aim they mixed historical and conceptual methods: they dissected the different kinds of developmental studies that might have been excluded, looking for clues about possible exclusion of one or	more of these 'embryologies'; they searched fields like morphology and paleontology that also were seemingly side-lined; they spelled	out	different	kinds	of	exclusion.	But	even	more	can	be	done. Information sciences have techniques for the automatic retrieval, analysis and representation in corpora of big data. Recent studies have focused on scientific/academic information, its search, recommendation and	distribution (McCain et	al.	2005,	McCain	2008,	2009,	Riviera	2013).	Scientometrics,	i.e.	the	quantitative	study of	science,	can	reveal	relations	between	units	such	as	authors,	disciplines, institutions, semantic elements. Study of patterns in citations, texts, and user behaviors (McCain 2013) through time can trace 'lineages of ideas' and reveal phenomena about the scientific community, such as fields emergence and decline. The ongoing explosion of online	journals	and	digital	archives	matches	perfectly	these	techniques,	although	it	also demands	corrections	and	creative	solutions	as	the	analysis	goes	back	in	time	–	as	it	will always do, since as we have seen metascientific claims are almost always historical claims. The domain of analysis can also be expanded multilingually to conference programmes and abstracts, research protocols, official documents, and to alternative Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] media	that	are	becoming	more	important	in	the	economy	of	scientific	work:	online	tools, institutional	websites,	science	news	and	blogs. Synthesis, if any, must have scientometric correlates, provided that, although textual search	is	very	powerful,	it	must	be	guided	by	the	right	queries.	At	the	same	time,	work	in the	social sciences	demonstrates that	understanding	scientific communities is	broader than	bibliometrics.	For	example,	quantities	about	scientific	papers	should	be	related	to the (changing) social function of scientific papers (Riviera 2013). White and McCain (1998)	affirm	that	techniques	such	as	'authors	co-citation	analysis'	are	"no	substitute	for extensive reading and fine-grained content analysis": "they produce history of the cliometric	sort,	which	leaves	out	almost	all	the	good	parts,	[for	example]	what	actually gave	rise	to	the	most	significant	work"	(p.	327). The	job	of	biologists	has	certainly	changed,	and	we	want	to	understand	how:	laboratory ethnography	and	biographical	research	have	methods	to	answer	(see	Caduff	1999,	Hess 2001), and	also to	bring about reliable indicators to	obtain large scale	descriptions	of evolutionary	biology. Some	prior,	qualitative study	of research	and	writing	practice in biology will be necessary in order to extract significant clues, indexes, proxies, and patterns that can feed quantitative research and yield meaningful answers. Ethnographic work must be in turn informed by sound theoretical knowledge and epistemological hypotheses, if it has to provide	quantitative analyses	with	meaningful search	keys. Then, if we really want to understand and explain, it will be necessary to involve knowledge and	methods from, e.g., the sociology (Gieryn 1983, 1999, Bourdieu 1993, Riviera 2013) and the economics (Stephan 2012, Sent 1999, Thicke 2013) of science, that hold important keys to the reasons for conformism and innovation, stability and change in science. Talking about the MS as a 'constraining theoretical framework' is interesting, but	many	quarrels on the	plausibility of such a constraint arise, probably, from the lack of serious consideration of other really constraining factors: policies, politics, culture, economic investments, technology, reward structure of science, the social	role	of	the	evolutionists,	the	structure	of	the	community,	and	the	like.	After	all,	the scientific conformism that EES advocates attribute to the rigid theoretical framework they	call	the	MS	might	well	find	appropriate	pieces	of	explanation	in	the	economic	and social structure of science over the 20th Century. This is why we also need to ask economics	and	sociology	to	describe	the	social	dynamics	of	evolutionary	biology	and	the conditions and identities of evolutionary biologists over time and across geographical ranges.	If	these	aspects	are	changing,	considering	them	will	be	crucial	in	either	the	EES or	other	metatheoretical	views	we	can	build. The	birth	of	a	field	is	also	the	birth	of	a	new	way	of	doing	science,	as	well	as	a	statement of	identity,	and	is	described	by	the	changing	conditions	of	the	scientific	community,	not only by the map of involved concepts. What can or cannot be done in a science is constrained and channeled by cultural, social, and economic aspects of science, for example	technological	advances	and	costs,	or	cultural	obstacles	regarding	training, job market	and	evaluation,	grant	systems,	publication,	language	barriers	(Sidlauskas	2009). Sociology,	ethnography,	economics	and	history	have tools	and	knowledge for	all these Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] explanatory aspects that, moreover, are essential to any description of a scientific community. Scientific methods can thus let us observe the metascientific change of evolutionary biology and, in face of their variety and heterogeneity, they should be themselves 'synthesized'	in	some	way.	The	National	Center	for	Evolutionary	Synthesis	(Sidlauskas	et al. 2010) defines 'synthetic science' as an integration of different kinds of data from multiple	sources.	Various	kinds	of	synthetic	science,	achieved	in	diverse	ways,	exist. My	humble	methodological	suggestions	are,	at	this	stage,	only	meant	to	help	us	imagine metascientific	views	that	are	built	with	a	more	scientific,	interdisciplinary	approach.	Of course,	we	should	not	be	naïve	and	imbued	with	the	myth	of	'data-driven',	especially	in this field: other complex issues about	metascientific views call for a serious, constant philosophical	reflection	on	scientific	practice. 3.	Philosophy There are inherent difficulties in the achievement of any metascientific view. The vastness	and	complexity	of	the	scientific	field,	seen	in	the	previous	section,	is	only	one	of them. Other difficulties are the insufficiency of conceptual analysis to capture the thickness	of	scientific	research,	the	entanglement	between	empirical	and	metascientific concepts, between multiple chronologies, and between descriptive and normative needs,	as	well	as the inevitable	stakeholding	of	any	reviewer involved in the	reviewed field. To all these difficulties, a mature philosophy of science in practice can bring a decisive	contribution. Philosophy	of	science	in	practice	has	the	task	of	reflecting	upon	the	claims	for	synthesis in the first place, and upon their role in the scientific community. The selfrepresentation of scientists claiming for synthesis is, in fact, an interesting object of philosophical	reflection.	Ernst	Mayr	wrote: The term "evolutionary synthesis" was introduced by Julian Huxley [...] to designate the general acceptance	of two conclusions: gradual evolution can	be explained in terms of small genetic changes ("mutations") and recombination, and	the	ordering	of	this	genetic	variation	by	natural	selection;	and	the	observed evolutionary phenomena, particularly macroevolutionary processes and speciation, can be explained in a manner that is consistent with the known genetic	mechanisms	(Mayr	in	Mayr	and	Provine	1980,	p.	1). We	should	contrast	Mayr's	account	of	the	MS	–	taken	at face	value	by	EES	advocates	– with	what	historians	of	biology	have	been	discovering	about the	MS.5	Cain (2009), for example,	focuses	on	the	pragmatic	and	strategic	utility	of	claiming,	back	in	the	1930s,	to be	part	of a	modernizing team	(see	also	Provine	1992, cit. in	Delisle	2011,	Smocovitis 1996).	To	the 'architects', the	claim	was	a	strategic	move	in	many	ongoing	battles,	and personally useful to their careers. 'Outsiders', as	well, employed the	MS in 'David and Goliath'	narratives	to	muscle	their	way	through. 5	Enlightening examples, beside cited Joe Cain, are Sahotra Sarkar, Betty Smocovitis, Michael Dietrich,	William	Provine,	David	Depew,	Richard	Delisle. Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] Cain	(2009)6	argues	that	traditional	historiography,	following	the	lead	of	MS	claims,	has been affected by	historical realism on the	MS, and that	many historical studies of the synthesis period create forced links between anything that was happening and that alleged	overarching	object,	the	MS.	The	idea	that	the	MS	'is	there'	as	a	certain	object	was born	and	cultivated	for	specific	reasons in	those	years.	Meanwhile	–	historians	show	– architects of the	MS such as	Huxley, Simpson, Dobzhansky, and	Rensch held different research agendas or even "incommensurable epistemological frameworks" (Delisle 2011, p. 57; see also Cain 2003), and paradoxically the advertised narrow set of concepts	ended	up	by	being	an	obstacle	to	the	advancement	of	these	agendas. History can actually be told differenly – for example, Cain thinks that while an evolutionary	synthesis	at	the	theoretical	level	was	proclaimed,	a	synthesis	of	taxonomy and systematics (old and new) was substantially more important. The 'constructed' nature	of	the	MS	was	epitomized	already	by	Burian	(1988)	when	he	defined	the	MS	as	a ''moving target'', with regards to both the list of its possible 'architects' and the boundaries	of	its	research	agenda. A step in the 'objectivization' of the	MS	was the 1980	Conference	on the	Evolutionary Synthesis whose proceedings are Mayr and Provine (1980). Ernst Mayr was a very influential	figure	throughout	20th	Century	evolutionary	biology.	He	(1973)	had	battled to acknowledge "the naturalists" as he called them (e.g., zoologists, paleontologists) against	an	account	of the	MS	that	he	saw	as	too imbalanced	in favor	of	geneticists	and mathematicians (targeting, e.g., Provine 1971). An important moment for the establishment	of	Mayr's	own	view	of	the	MS	was	the	1980	Conference.	Mayr	wanted	to clarify	"the	sequence	of	events	[1936-1947]	leading	to	the	synthesis,	and	to	identify	the factors responsible for the preceding disagreements" (Ibidem). But despite Mayr's 'general	acceptance'	view	of	the	MS,	even	a	cursory	reading	of	Mayr	and	Provine	(1980) reveals a diversity of stories and visions of the	MS across points of view, disciplinary backgrounds, geographical positions. As Provine noticed, the 1980 Conference and proceedings are not a great example of consensus and agreement on a small set of concepts,	despite	Mayr's	efforts.	In	the	Epilogue,	Provine	wrote: One note of unanimity at the conference may perhaps need to be revised. Although all participants seemed to agree that an evolutionary synthesis had occurred, they may have had different syntheses in mind. The evolutionary synthesis may therefore have appeared more cohesive during the conference than	it	actually	was	(Provine	in	Mayr	and	Provine,	p.	408). There	is	not	much	consensus	on	the	proclaimed	consensus,	after	all.	1980	was	more	the attempted	construction	of	a consensus than it	was the	account	of an	already	achieved agreement.	We should probably derive two lessons for our interpretation of the EES debate. 6	Cain	wrote	many	papers describing the overall situation in the	MS	period.	He also published equally interesting monographic studies focused on personalities such as Simpson, Sewall Wright, Julian	Huxley,	Ernst	Mayr,	Theodosius	Dobzhansky.	Notice	that,	of	course,	Cain	is just	a telling	example	and	that	historians	themselves	are	not	monolithic	at	all	in	their	consideration	of the	MS	(cf.,	e.g.,	Sarkar	1992,	2004). Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] First, Ernst Mayr, along with others, produced, iterated, and defended for specific purposes	the	view	of	the	MS	that	is	now	adopted	in	the	EES.	The	Modern	Synthesis	was, first of all, a useful flag. The 'conceptual pillars'	must not be understood as a faithful account of the scientific community at any time, but rather a manifesto flag for the 'architects' in their respective times. This awareness, along with inconsistencies and shortages of the available descriptions of the MS, may make us more cautious in objectivizing	the	MS. Second,	EES	claims	may	be	analogized	to	MS	claims:	the	EES	can	itself	be	seen	as	a	useful flag,	although	obviously	in	a	completely	changed	socio-political	and	scientific	context.	If the 'flag effect' is	partly explanatory to the	MS, there is	no reason	why	we should	not consider it	when	we think to the	EES.	A collection	of conceptual pillars (Fig. 1) is not necessarily	a	good	description	of	the	status	and	tranformations	of	evolutionary	biology, whereas apparently it does	make an effective flag, an aggregating flag reminiscent of Mayr's	ensign.	The	instabilities	and	disagreements	we	have	described	stand,	in	part,	as symptoms for all these partiality aspects. On the other hand, the MS and the EES certainly	represent	more	than	partisan	interests:	they	are	pleas	for	the	good	of	the	field. With	reference	to	the	MS,	Delisle	(2011)	talked	about	a	"sociological	synthesis"	–	made of transformations in the social configuration	of science, exchange among	disciplinary communities,	institutional	bridges	–	as	something	separate	from	conceptual	unification that, for him and	many others,	was never quite achieved. The EES	might represent a continuation of the struggle – already present in the MS – against disfunctional imbalance	of	prestige	and	resources	granted	to	molecular	methods	vs.	other	methods,	in an	age	of cheaper	high-throughput	sequencing that	produces	streams	of	publications.7 Other redistributions might be at stake, for example between botanists and microbiologists vs. zoologists, or concerning new means of knowledge such as simulations. The	EES	could	be,	today,	a	flag	for	many	streams	of	study	that	have	been	suffering	due	to perceived scientific dominant tendencies or fashions, a flag recruited by an ongoing struggle for very basic needs of any scientist: funding, publication, consensus. Let us make some examples. Odling-Smee's suggestion of niche construction (1988) waited some	ten	years	to	be	taken	up	by	a	few	mainstream	modelers	and	population	geneticists (Laland	et	al.	1996),	who,	in	turn,	offered	their	models	to	call	for	a	global	rethinking	of evolutionary	biology	(Laland	et	al.	2009),	and	still, it	would	appear,	to	date	their	effort have breached almost exclusively among philosophers and human scientists (e.g., Kendal	et	al.	2011).	Jablonski's	work	on	multilevel	processes	in	macroevolution	was	part of the paleobiological revolution (Sepkoski 2012) since the 1980s (Jablonski 1986). Macroevolution is today	a	big	and	consolidated	field,	but	the	most	radical implications for evolutionary	mechanisms are still unsettled (Serrelli and Gontier 2014). Jablonka has	been	a	vocal	and	harsh	critic	of	the	MS	for	many	years	(Jablonka	and	Lamb	1989). On the other hand, the evolutionary importance of epigenetics has been considered negligible due, for example, to the lability of epigenetically transmitted	modifications 7	One	thing	that	becomes	clear	from	a	reading	of	the	history	of	the	MS	is	that	it	sought	to	present a	unified	front	against	the	rise	and	usurpation	of	molecular	biologists.	This	aspect	of	the	story	is quite	relevant	to	understanding	what's	going	on	with	the	EES	as	evolutionary	biologists	face	up to	the	fact	that	many	of	their	tools	today	are	molecular. Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. ISSN 1121-2179 doi 10.19272/201700701005	[http://hdl.handle.net/10281/148832] over evolutionary time, and proponents like Jablonka have long been accused from overusing a few experimental cases (e.g., Haig 2007). David S. Wilson (e.g., 2009) describes	the	scientific	battle	over	group	selection	spanning	150	years,	beginning	with Darwin. Wilson himself started a strenuous defense of group selection since 1970s (Wilson	1975;	Sober	and	Wilson	1998).	Notwithstanding	peer-reviewed	publications	on the subject (Wilson and Wilson 2007), a multimedia battle still goes on with personalities such as	Dawkins and	Coyne that tirelessly deny any possibility of group selection	in	evolution.	Kirschner	and	Gerhart	started	to	defend	evolvability	in	late	1990s (1998).	Opponent,	Lynch	(e.g.,	2007)	keeps	bringing	back	evolvability	to	its	population genetics	meaning (related to	heritability)	and	defines	other	versions	of evolvability	as "speculation, which is almost entirely restricted to molecular and cell biologists and those	who	study	digital	organisms"	(pp.	8602-3). These	are	some	of the	various fierce	streams	of	research	that	have	decided	to	become associated	with	the	EES.	Notwithstanding	the	various	reasons	of	the	involved	actors,	just like the MS had helped the advancement of science, the EES really contains very important	questions:	biology	has indeed	been	changing, and is changing, around	us in many senses;	we	do	want to know	how, how fast, how	uniformly,	what scientists can and should do to second positive movements and contrast negative ones. Answers could,	for	example,	orient	economic	investment,	policy,	curriculum	planning,	publication choices. But if the EES, like other pictures, is biased by 'flag effects', scientist-field disproportion, and all other complexity factors we have reviewed, where	will we get those	answers? 4.	Conclusion I have remarked the potential benefit of knowing 'what is it to do research' in a particular field: to plan biology training, to choose research lines in a lab, to navigate career development, to connect specific researches to broader contexts, and to	make policy	decisions	on	research	funding	and	reward,	all	in	order	to	make	the	field	advance for the better. These are the high stakes and the promises of encompassing metascientific views, such as the EES, that, at the same time, encounter remarkable difficulties	on	their	way.	The	EES	is	a	metascientific	claim	in	its	being	a	statement	about what's	new	in	how	evolutionary	biology	is	carried	out,	not	only	a	statement	about	what's new	in	evolution	as	we	know	it. A	meaningful	answer	to	questions like	Pigliucci's	"Do we need an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis?" (2007) demand a great deal of philosophical	reflection	and	an	interdisciplinary	work	with	disciplines	that	can	provide scientific	models,	data,	and	evidence	about	scientific	communities.	Philosophy	of	science and philosophy of biology are thus provoked by metascientific views not only to empower	their	attention	to	scientific	practice,	but	also	to	revise	and	improve	their	own methods	and	their	ability	to	integrate	with	other	disciplines. References Akey JM and Shriver MD (2011) A grand challenge in evolutionary and population genetics: new paradigms for exploring the past and charting the future in the postgenomic	era.	Front.	Genet.	2(July):	47. Final version published as: Serrelli E (2017). Metascientific views: Challenge and opportunity for philosophy of biology in practice. Acta Philosophica 26(1): 65-82. 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