SELF-REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE by Steven James Bartlett website: http://www.willamette.edu/~sbartlet Visiting Scholar in Philosophy and Psychology, Willamette University and

Senior Research Professor, Oregon State University KEYWORDS: self-reference, phenomenology, philosophy of science, selfreferential argumentation, transcendental philosophy, theory of meaning, selfrefutation, quantum theory This paper was originally published in the Netherlands, in Methodology and Science: Interdisciplinary Journal for the Empirical Study of the Foundations of Science and Their Methodology, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1980, pp. 143-167. Methodology and Science ceased publication in the mid-1990s and all rights to this paper reverted to the author. This electronic version supplements the original text with internet-searchable keywords and, following the paper, references to some of the author's subsequent publications that further develop this topic. 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The full legal statement of this license may be found at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/legalcode © Steven James Bartlett, 2014 Historical Note After a doctoral dissertation that sought to formulate, from a phenomenological standpoint, a rigorous, compelling, and self-reflexive methodology for a therapy of concepts, and then devoting much of a decade to further work within a phenomenological framework, I came to the conclusion that phenomenology was encumbered by much dead weight from the past, much terminological top-heaviness, and insufficient resistance to obscure thinking and its expression in avoidably convoluted language. This paper describes how I made the transition from a scientifically-oriented phenomenological approach to what I felt then, and continue to believe now, is a more exact and proof-based method that seeks to identify and eliminate conceptual pathologies. In the following paper, the focus of application is philosophy of science. – Salem, Oregon 2014 Abstract SELF-REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE by STEVEN J. BARTI.ETT Saint Louis University (U.S.A.) Tite paper begins by acknowledging that weakened systematic precision in phenomenology has made its application in philosophy of science obscure and ineffective. The defining aspirations of early transcendental phenomenology are, however, believed to be important ones. A path is therefore explored tlmt attempts to show how certain recent developments in the logic of self-reference fulfill in a clear and more rigorous fashion in the context of philosophy of science certain of the early hopes of phenomenologists. The resulting dual approach is applied to several problems in the philosophy of science: on the one hand, to proposed rejections of scientific objectivity, to the doctrine of radical meaning variance, and to the Quine-Duhem thesis, and or. the other, to an analysis of hidden variable theory in quantum mechanics. Phenomenological philosophy began in rigor and hi$ gradually *submitted to imprecision. Early in its development, phenomenology was cultivated in close connection with natural science and mathematics, and was inspired by an appreciation of exact standards of justification.• On the whole, it 5eems evident thatphenomenology 1. J. Robinson (1788), W. Whcwell (1847), E. Midi (1894) nriously conceived ofphcnomcnolo;y as a melhodologic:al tool o!' research in physics. Brent:mo (1888) ext&nded IIMthodoloiY llftd ....... wol. 13 • 3 • 1HO 143 STEVEN J. BAR7LE1T has placed this attitude to one side, and has become a humanistic tool of interpretation currently under the wing of hermeneutics and existentialist thought. Even within the individual lives of its main contributors, the:.! has been a perceptible transition from scientific standards of exactness to humanistic V erstehen. As a result of this change of orientation, phenomenology offers what is often judged to be an obscure and terminologically topheavy set of tools for usc by philosophers of science. However, phenomenology, at !e:.~st in the earlier thought of Husser! and to a lesser extent, in some works of Meinong and Brentano, offers a methodology which is distinguished by a number of properties of special interest to philosophy of science. I Phenomenology as conceived by the young Husser! and I have in mind that variety of phenomenology which identifies itself as non-genetic (non-explanatory), descriptive, transcendental phenomenology aspired to these ends: It sought to provide a method of descriptive analysis capable of explicating the transcendental preconditions which of necessity would need to be satisfied in order for it to be possible for certain objects of conscious life to possess essential properties which they do. An easily identifiable Kantian thread bound together a variety of interests in studies of the constitution of particular objects of consciousness, the constitution of the ontology of regions, the constitution of time, etc. In these investigations, phenomenology was to comprise, in the words of Stumpf, a "neutral pre-science" ( Vorwissensclzaft) which would introduce into its framework of descriptive analysis no special presuppositions, Mtev.:eU's classificatory conception into phenomenological psychology. Baron Jakob Johann van UexkilU (1909) published a group of studies undertaken from a phenomenolõ- c:~lly sensitive ecolõical standpoint, well ahead of his time. Husserl's doctoral research under Weierstrass on the calculus of variations suppOrted his Habilitation thesis on the concept of number (reworked later into the uncompleted Philosophie der Arithmttik of I 891). Husserl's Logisclre U11tersuchungen (the first volume published in 1900) and his Fonna/e 1111d tram;undento/c Logik (1929) add to this early picture of phcnomonology's dose association with the sciences. 144 SELF REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE and would enable. the phenomena treated to speak for themselves, as it were, without suffering from perturbations due to the method employed in their analysis. As a radical enterprise, in the special phenomenological sense of this term, this presuppositionfree approach would seck to account for its own transcendental structure. It would, that is to say, possess the property of self*reflex.iveness, falling within the scope of its own proper subject-matter. 2 The methodology resulting from this rigorous phenomenological orientation can be distinguished, then, by its claims to prcsuppositionlessness and self-reflexivity, and by its transcendental concern to explicate preconditions which must be granted for individual phenomena, classes of phenomena, and a wide range of properties and relations between them, to be possible. Such a proposal, had it borne fruit, would have found important applications in the context of a study of scientific theories. Ideally it would have provided a wholly intrinsic mode of analysis of the structure of a scientific theory, because it would have comprised an approach that claimed to impose no external standards of criticism. The results of such an intrinsic critique of a scientific theory could indeed "command the assent of all who are competent to form an opinion."3 Such a phenomenological approach would make possible an analysis of the prcsuppositional structure of a theory if not in its own terms, then of those terms from a neutral standpointless metraframework compatible with the framework of the theory. The approach would constitute a rigorous metatheory which could be applied in the dispassionate spirit of scientific neutrality both to individual scientific theories as well as to itself. This proposal and there is no judgment made here of the in principle possible future the proposal could have had or may yet enjoy historically has not been successful in the context of scientific interest. This is not, indeed, the sole arbiter of a philosophical methodology, but it is the one of interest to philosophers of science who share the desire to free their discipline from the uncertainties 2. For a fuller account or this interpretation or early phenomenology, see Bartlett (1975). 3. Russell (1914), p. 69 in 1972 edition. 145 STEVEN J. DARTLE'IT of controversy, and to contribute to the development of what has been called a ''vertical discipline'', one which builds progressively upon the demonstrated results of the past. II Frederic Brenton Fitch, a mathematical logician with an unusual sensitivity to things philosophical, has proposed an approach to phi~ losophy somewhat analogous to the transcendental phenomenological variety I have, perhaps too summarily for some, laid to rest. The '"universal metalanguage for philosophy,. that Fitch has endeav* ored to describe bears a close resemblance to one of the defining properties we have mentioned in connection with the methodology of rigorous, scientific phenomenology.4 Fitch's universal metalanguage has not been fomlUiated so as to include the critical resources needed to make possible its application as a tool of criticism by philosophers of science. Yet, unlike the approach of transcendental phenomenology, the view is clear, and with some phenomenologically-motivated supplementation which I shall suggest, appears to lend itself extremely well to certain of the objectives of philosophy of science. Fitch argues that the level of generality required for much philosophical discourse is such that the Russell-Whitehead theory of types must be rejected. Philosophical discourse desires "extreme comprehensiveness .. of the k.ind which requires self-reference. In philosophy, this situation is frequently encountered: Theories are constructed whicl!* purport to deal with all enUUes whatsoever and whkh therefore have an unrestrictedly extcnsive subject matter. In dealing with all endtiel, 111ch theories In particular deal with all theories, Iince theories are them* selves cnUties oC a spcclal JOrt. In philo10phy we thus encounter theories about the general nature oC theories... . If a theory is included within Its own subject matter, we uy that it is a relf*refe* rem ill/ theory.' 4. To be precise, Fitch discusses a f•mBy of languages any one of which avoids Tanld's limitative criterion for an acceptable definition of truth. 5. Fitch (19S2), p. 218. 146 SELF-REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE In particular, the concern of phenomenology "to explicate its own foundation .. requires th¢ self-reflexiveness which characterizes a self* referential theory. Discoveries since the turn of the century of set theoretical, se* mantical, and pragmatical paradoxes rendered suspect any self*rcferential theory of this sort. Self-reference was blamed, and it was banned by the cures that were prescribed to eliminate the occurrence of paradox. In the process, and virtually ignored by the phe* nomenological community, the Cartesian radicalness of phenom .. enology was made incapable of realization. The road to the desired self-reflexiveness Of the phenomenological approach would remain closed as long as it could be proved that such a theory of theories, or science of sciences, was paradox.generating.6 The disturbance due to the discovery of the paradoxes was felt by another field of study, within philosophy of science. Philosophy of behavioral science has often sought the extreme degree of comprehensiveness Fitch describes. A philosophical reflection on human behavior comprises, when umJertaken by a human being, a human behavior which falls within the scope of concern of behavioral science and its philosophy. Simtlarly, a comprehensive theory of human reflection, when the theory itself is an expression of this capability, requires self-reference. The anti-paradox cures which were prescribetl and which have almost universally been endorsed (e.g., variations on the theory of types and Tarski's limitative semantical results), effectively blocked hopes for extreme comprehensiveness involving self-reference. Fortunately, in the years since paradox paranoia first dis:ibled the logic of self-reference, certain constructive attempts were made to save the self-referential interests of phenomenology. philosbphy of behavioral science, studies of human reflection, etc. In 1963, Fitch demonstrated that non-Tarskian systems do exist which (a) 6. It would be possible to escape this conclusion if it could be shown that the nlcthodologlcal framework of phcnomology fonns a system of an essentially non-formalizable kind, to which formal set theoretical, semantical, and pragmatical. constraints *do not apply. However, this has not, as fu as I know, been done. 147 STEVENJ.BARTLETI are provably consistent, and (b) permi~ self*reference.~ Others, in* eluding Smullyan, Myhill, and R.M. Mi.iri.in, have reinforced Fitch's general conclusion. As a result of th~sc and similar efforts, it is no longer necessary to avoid all forms of self-reference in ordl!r to avoid the occurrence of paradox nor is it necessary to resort to an endless ladder of formal metalanguages. The extreme comprehc~siveness desired by much philosophy, by phenomenology, anJ by other fields, may now again be viewed in a favorable light. Ill With these traditional formal blocks removed, it is possible to consider how a sclf-referl.!ntial univ~rsal metatheory may be constructed as phenomenology wished. Certain of the fundamental interests of rigorous phenomenology ca!l perhaps be realized in a more perspicuous and more effectively applicable form, following recent contributions to the logic of self*reference. Specifically, (I) phenomenology's wish to explicate the essential structure of phenomena in a manner free from special presuppositions may be paired with (1 ') the intrinsic style of self-referential criticism of which a number of accounts are now available. (2) The self-reflexivity of transcendental phenomenology has a real analog in (2') a self-referential metalogic that seeks to identify preconditions of referring. (3) The twin foci of phenomenology's intentional and transcendental forms of analysis may be paired with (3') these two similar foci: a pragma tical description and analysis of intentions involved in referring, and a metalogical account of referential presuppositions subscribed to. Finally, (4) the wish in phenomenology for non-controversial results may be fulfilled by (4') the proof-oriented approach of a self-referential metalogic of reference. In earlier work, I have explored the idea of a general metalogic of reference, and have examined certain of the formal properties of 1. Speel(ically, these systems permit semantical self-reference, which is needed for such a sy&tcm to formalize Its own truth concept. Cf. Fitch (1963). 148 SELF-REfERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE the resulting metalogic.8 Here I would like to consider the concerns of a general metalogic of reference which correspond to analogous phenomenological interests. A sense of presuppositionlcssness is achieved by intrinsic, selfreferential criticism of a position. Henry W. Johnstone, Jr., has attempted to show that philosoph.ical arguments are successful only when ultimately they are ad hominem. For Johnstone, valid critical argument in the ad !Jominem style takes seriously claims made within the framework of a position, and then shows how some claims are self-refuting, short-circuiting the intended purposes of the advocate of the positior... Johnstone distinguishes seven types of philosophical argument. One of these, which he calls 'the charge of denying presuppositions'. is worth mentioning here.9 A denial of presuppositions occurs when a statement made on behalf of a position denies just what the position presupposes. As an example, Johnstone gives the * statement, "life is a dream," which is meaningful only if it is presupposed that a meaningful distinction between dreams and wakingstates is possible. But this possibility is precisely what is denied by the statement. Since philosophical argument appears to serve primarily a critical function for Johnstone, negCJtivc disputation is emphasized by him. (So it was when Kant suggested, in a 1772 letter to Lambert, the need for a phaenome11o/ogia generalis, a "negative science .. propaedeutic to metaphysics). An approach resembling the one suggested by Johnstone can, however, be used equally to show, as we shall see, the reverse: that one cannot not accept certain claims made within the framework of a position. John Passmore has formulated a position similar in some respects to Johnstone's. Passmore reviews three ways in which one can "con8. The l:ltter study will appear in il forthcoming paper, "Referential Consbtency ;n a Cri* tcrion of Meaning"; the former may be found in B;utlett (1970): (1975): (1976); and (1978) § § I 0, I 2. 9. Cf. Johnstone (1959), pp. 90f. It may later be noticed that Johnstone's •kni3l of prcsupposi.tions, if extended beyond its intended factual, ad llomiuem ranc.c of applica* tion, closely resembles the metalogical variely of self-referential inconsistency. (Sec be* low.) 149 STEVENJ.DARTLETT tradict oneself'. One of these results in what Passmore calls an "ab~ ~lute sclf*rdutation". It resembles Johnstone's denial of presuppositions. In Passmore's case, hoWl!Ver, it is not that the special presuppositions of a particular position are denied, but "implicit as~ sumptions ... about the conditions of inquiry," These "invariant conditions of discourse" cannot coherently be repudiated. At* tempts to deny these conditions resu!t in absolute self-rcf~.:tation. For example, ... it is prc~UP!'Osed in aU discourse that some propositions arc true, that there is a diffcrcñ-c between being the case and not b.:ing the case, and to deny this in discourse is alr~ady to prc~ume the existence cf !he difference since otherwise the notion of 'denying' is quite meaninglcu ••. Only if :1 philosOJlhical arguntent can show in this way that a sentence can propose nothingbecause what it asscru, if it were taken to propose something, would be inconsistent with the presuppositions of aU proposing is it pointing, I suggest, to an absolute ~clf-rcfubtion. 10 . Although the po$itions articulated by Johnstone and Passmore complement one another, there is disagreement. Johnstone, for example, docs not accept the view that Passmore's allegedly absolute selfrefutations cannot be evaded. Johnstone agrees that "invariant conJitions of discourse" do exist and are significant in the context of self-refutations. But, he argues, I only insist that we think of such Invariant conditions as being hypothetical rather than* categorical in fom1. While I am suspicious of 'Every sentence conveys some* thing', and doubt it has a role in self-refutation, I would be perfectly happy with 'If a sentcce is used as an assertion, it must convey something'. For I am willing to sec the consequent of this conditional apply to every sentence to which the antecedent applies. lt is only the cases to which the antecedent docs not apply that cause me to reject the categorical version. 11 For Johnstone, an effective argument must always take into account the intentions of the advocate of the position unuer analysis. For Passmore, this is not always necessary because some presuppositions of discourse cannot be suspended by personal fiat. There are other disagreements in the extensive literature treating self-refutation and ad hominem argumentation, but they need not concern us here. Neither Johnstone nor Passmore has shown that the invariant coñ 10. Passmorc(196l),p.68. 11. Johnstone {1964), p. 478. 150 SELF-REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PH[LOSOPHY OF SC[ENCE ditions of discourse which both authors claim exist, do exist. A few examples are given, but for most purposes these illustrations fail to establish the general thesis. The mathematical logician Paul Lorenzen has also endorsed undeniable conditions of discourse in his treatmt:nt of "elementary sentences'', which can be used to express basic assertions and denials. He reasons that the ... decision to accept elementary ways of spealdng is not a matter of argument. It does not make sense to ask for an 'explanation', or to ask for a 'reason', For to 'ask' for such things dentanC:s a much more complicated usc of language than the usc of elementary sen tenccs itself. If you ask such questions, in other words, you have ~lready accepted at least the usc of elementary sentences." Collingwood ami his constructive interpreter, Rynin. also argue that there exist "absolute presuppositions" which, although not themselves Lrulhrunctional propositions, underlie as necessary conditions f:;r systematic thought propositions that are true or false. For Collingwoou, a study of absolute presuppositions is a central task of philosophy. Such a view of philosophy requires self-reference. Philosophy is reflective. TI1e philosophizing mind never simply thinks about an object, it always, while thinking about any object, thinks :llso about its own thought about the objecLn IV We have described several views concerning self-refutation which are of interest in the context of an approach to intrinsic, and, in some as yet undeveloped sense, presuppositionlcss analysis. The views we have reviewed share a self-referential perspective, and focus either on (a) what must be presupposed as a general condition of discourse or of systematic thought, or on (b) what the advocate of a position in fact is forced to acknowledge if his intentionsare to be 12. Lorenz.:n (1969a), p. 14. 13. Collingwood (1946), p. I. O¥ertones of self*reference arc found, too, in Lorenzen's claim, in connection with his operative logic, that ''the method is Identified with its own result." (1969a), p. 89. Cf. Lorenzen (l969b). * 151 STEVEN I. BAR.TLETr realiud. Whichever alternative is followed, the claim is made that the conclusion of an argument by means of self-refutation is not dependent upon the prior acceptance of special nonns or criteria alien or external to the position analyzed. Analysis of this kind uses, so to speak, the energy of a position to provide a critique of that position. Philosophical argument in this style suggests a form of intellectual judo. In this general sense, it advances no special pre-suppositions of its own, endorses no partisan criterion of meaning, but has what we might be tempted to call a "tautological struc~ ture": A formulation of the regulative metalogic followed is devoid 0f positive content, and would articulate general principles that express equivalences of meaning.14 In a second analogy to phenomenology, transcendental self* reflexivity corresponds in a self-referential metalogic to a concern to identify preconditions of referring. A metalogical precondition of referring is specified when any attempt to reject that condition results in self-referential inconsistency. This "test" lends itself to formalization and supplies an intrinsic analysis with a logically nonarbitrary and compelling criterion,15 as I shall try to illustrate. Furthermore, such a critical criterion complements Johnstone's approach to a denial of presuppositions, and is in agreement with Fitch's understanding of a presupposition as "an assumption whose denial is self-referentially inconsistent." 16 A metalogical precoñ dition of referring is "absolute" within all contexts of reference of a certain kind. It will, as things tum out, share some of the properties ascribed by Passmore to his invariant conditions of discourse, and some of those ascribed by Johnstone to his ad hominem approach to philosophical argument. Two major varieties of self-referential inconsistency have been 14. Barlett (1970),Chapter 1.4. 15. This is shown in the forthcoming paper mentioned in note 8. 16. Fitch (1952), p. 221. Fitch hal in mind here that the acceptance or rejection of accepted principles or logic must rely upon the use or at least some 9f these principles. The kind or self-referential Inconsistency he hal in Yicw tums out to be or a lower "moaal or* der" than the transcendental variety to be described: that is to say, fitch is concerned with prindples which ;, facr must be presupposed, in contrast to presuppositions which In principle COin not be rejected. 152 SELF*REFERf:NCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE studied in analyses of self-refutation. It will be important to us to distinguish these clearly, sine!!, in the transformation of exact phenomenology to a metalogic of reference which I am suggesting, these two varieties comprise rough analogs of the ph!!nomenological modes of analysis, intentional and transcendental. In the remainder of this section, we shall look at one of these, and discuss two divergent conceptions of presupposing with which it has been associated. The self-referential analog to transcendental analysis will be considered in the next section. Both Passmore and Johnstone appear, in spite of their disagreements, to have in view fundamentally the same variety of self* referential inconsistency. Passmore claims that a proposition is absolutely self-refuting if the assertion of that proposition is equivalent to asserting both that proposition and its negation} 7 He gives a quite different formulation a few pages later when he claims that a proposition is absolutely self-refuting if it is taken as proposing something and if what the proposition does propose is "inconsistent with the presuppositions of all proposing." 18 The first claim has the form p is self-refuting if t* fJ ""p & p, while the second has the form pis self-refuting if (p proposes q) & (q is inconsistent with every a where a (1) is presupposed by all propositions). (2) It is not at all clear that (I) and (2) say the same thing, nor is it clear, given the confusion consequent to the array of analyses that have been supplied which treat the relation of presupposing, wheth* er or not o: should be interpreted as truth-functional. 19 Johnstone's corresponding view is this: He argues that a valid philosophical criticism (a) identifies an inconsistency between an opponent's thesis and what the thesis presupposes, and (b) shows why one's opponent must acknowledge this inconsistency .20 It I 7. Passmore (1961 ), p. 60. 18. Passmore (1961), p. 68. 19. On this question, see, e.g., the controversy between Donagan (1962) and Rynin' (1964). 20. Johnstone (1961 ), p. 353. 153 STEVEN I. BAR.nETr ihould be clear that Johnstone's attention* is focused on the inten- "tons of his opponent. It is relative to an opponent's acknowledged ntentions that both (a) and (b) above are to be accomplished . . Both Passmore and Johnstone, while clearly not in total aaree* nent, are concerned with what is in fact presupposed by the claims lf a position. Passmore wishes to make recourse to invariant and :ategorical conditions of discourse; Johnstone is more modest, ;ontenting himself with "a logic of intentions"21 revealed in a ;ase-by-case analysis through the means of explicit controversy. The variety of self-referential inconsistency of concern to both ?assmore and Johnstone has been termed 'pragmatical' or 'per- :ormative'. A substantial literature has been devoted to its study. A pragmatical self-referential inconsistency may be generally iefmed as follows: If .1 proposition p is used in a manner such that reference is m~dc by an individual a to an object o at a plate-timer, and if o is a pragmatical (or perform a tory) aspect or the use made of p by a at r, then pis called pragmatic11Uy (or pcrformatively) rei/* referentisl. If a pragmatically scll'*n:fcrentiaJ proposition p is such that o falsifies p, then p is said to be selfrefu.ting. (3) TI1e assertion, for example, "There are no truths", is self-refuting. [t is absolutely self-refuting for Passmore in that "to assert is to as~!?rt to !:>~ tru_e.."n It is self-refuting for Johnstone if we can determine that the claim is intended by its propounder as a claim to truth (and is not, e.g., for him merely a sequence of meaningtess noises or marks). In either case, the self-refutation concerns a factual aspect of the use made of a proposition. We note, then, that pragmatically self-referentially inconsistent or self-refuting statements are factually self-falsifying. Such a pragmatical variety of self-referential inconsistency, if it is to be used in a non-paradox-generating context, appears to require the rejection of excluded middle.23 The effect of this is twofold: First, a strengthened case for Strawson's familiar definition of 'presupposing' can be made. Strawson's view, that S presupposes S' iffS is neither trueror false unless S' is true, was objected to by H. Johnitone (1959), p. 120. l1. Passmore (1961), p. 68 (Pusmore's emphnis). ll. Fitch (1963) and (1952). l54 SELF-REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Rynin,24 as follows: Rynin reasoned that if S presupposes S', then both S--~> S' and -S --~> S' will be the case. Dy excluded middle, the conclusion follows that. S' is true, i.e., that all presupposed statements are true which is of course highly doubtful. Rynin's objection is dissolved when excluded middle no longer applies. Strawson 's analysis is left if not in a wholly unproblematical con* dition, at least repaired. Alternatively, the rejection of excluded* middle makes it in tel* ligible to consider presuppositions in Collingwood's sense: For him, absolute presuppositions are neither true nor false, but they express what might be called "quasi-propositions" that articulate basic conceptual commitments.25 This is the path I will pursue for reasons that will be evident shortly. It will be useful to make this restriction: For purposes here, S is said to presuppose S' fn a frame of reference F iff S is neither true nor false unless S' expresses a framework constraint that holds or is in force when Sis asserted relative to F. According to this formulation, it makes no sense to say of a presupposition that it is true (or false) relative to a frame of reference, just as it makes no sense to say in the context of a game (e.g., chess) that a rule (e.g., the rule governing castling) is true (or false). It does make sense to speak of such rules as holding or as having been broken in a particular game, just as it is intelligible to say that a presupposition holds or is violated in relation to a claim made in a particular frame of reference. When a presupposition holds or is in force, one may conclucte that the consequent of an associated conditional is true. For example, a presupposition of referring to an individual named 'Rima' is that there exist some object of reference so named. This presupposition of name-use, when in force, implies that the statement "There is some object of reference named 'Rima' " is true. But it is a mistake, 24. See note 19. 25. Collingwood limited the tenn 'proposition' to what may be understood as the (true or false) answer to a particular question. He did not wish to view absolute presupposi* lions as expressing genuine propositions, since they are not answers to particular questions, but rather underlie the asking of such questions. 155 STEVEN 1. BARTLETI rom the point of view described here, to equate the presupposition n question with the truth of the latter statement. The distinction nade here takes into account differences between a rule, instances vhich satisfy it, and statements about those instances. v Referential presuppositions analyzed in this way, constitute, in the phenomenological sense, preconditions of valid reference. Their rejection, relative to a particular frame of reference, leads to a form of self-referential inconsistency which elsewhere I have termed 'proiective' .26 A logic which studies relations between the referring use of concepts or expressions, and the referential preconditions which must be satisfied for that usc to be meaningful, I have called a 'meta logic of reference'. Its focus is, in the proper sense of the word, transcendentalr and its range of concerns parallels that of transcendental phenomenology. The strength of such an approach lies in the fact that the principles of the meta logic "self-l'alidatc" in the sense that their rejection leads to projectivr self-referential inconsistency. This metalogical variety of self-referential inconsistency is essentially distinct from the pragmatical variety. Where Passmore and Johnstone are alternatively concerned with absolute self-refutation or ad hominem argument in the context of factual conditions of discourse and acknowledged intentions, a metalogic of reference investigates the transcendental logic underlying all referring. Its interest is in preconditions of possible reference, and hence comprises a study which is properly metalogicat. The metalogical variety of self-referential inconsistency may be defined as follows: A proposition p ia tenncd metalopc11Uy relfre[eren&llf pis such that (I) If p is asserted, reference is made by some Individual II to an object o at a place-time s, and (ii) such reference metaloglcally presupposes endorsement by 11 at placc-tlrr.c s of a precondition Mp which must hold In order for p In principle to have a iii* nifican t tru lh*valuc. If p is metalogicaUy sclf*rcfercntial and p Is such that its assertion denies one or more conditions which must be satisfied In order for it to be possible meaningfully to asser! p, then pis said to be projective. (4) 26. Bartlett (1970), (1975), (1978). 156 SELF-REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE A "precondition of reference", Mp, may be viewed as expressing a quasi-proposition, as described earlier. Such an Mp comprises a necessary condition of possible reference, a constraint which if violated in a particular cOntext of reference results in projection. Elsewhere I ~ave argued that metalogical referential consistency constitutes a tramcendental criterion of meaning in the sense that rejection of projective self-referential inconsistencies is a necessary condition o( the possibility of meaning, truth-functionally understood.27 From this point of view, a pragmatical analysis describes what one is in fact committed to in making an assertion, while a metalogical analysis describes what one musl be committed to if an assertion in principle is to be meaningful. A comparison of definition (4) and the earlier definition (3) of the pragmatical self-referential variety enables the reader to note these differences between the two forms of self-referential inconsistency we have discussed. The distinction between the two roughly parallels, I have suggested, the distinction betwl!en certain intentional and transcendental phenomenological analyses. On the one hand, a metalogical explication of preconditions of referring has an unmistakable transcendental orientation. On the other, ad hominem argumentation, or argumentation which attends to invariant conditions of discourse, requires a careful phenomenological description of identifiable intentional relations, either acknowledged by an individual advocate of a PIJSition or of necessity subscribed to in any use of discourse. A descriptive, intentional analysis of this kind would correspond closely to Johnstone's "logic of intentions" and to Passmore's study of absolute commitments of discourse. We turn now to several examples which illustrate applications of this self-referential, phenomenologically-motivated metatheory to certain problems in philosophy of science. VI Carl R. Kordig has argued forcefully that most contemporary philosophies of science are self-referentially inconsistent in the sense of 27. Sec note IS. 157 STEVEN J. BARTLETT being self-falsifying. His analyses emphasize the pragmatical mode of criticism, and merit attention. For example, Kordig argues that r:1e denial of objectivity in science and the doctrine of radical meaning variance are both selfreferentially inconsistent. Specifically, both constitute self-falsifying assertions. The falsity of each claim is derivable from the assump-. tion of its truth. In connection with Kuhn's and Feyerabend's rejections of scientific objectivity, Kordig is in agreement with Scheffler: ''Objectivity is presupposed by any statemer.t which purports to make a cognitive claim. To put forth any such claim in earnest involves a presuppositional commitment to the view that the claim has an objective truth value."28 Kording opposes the views of Fey era bend ( 1962), Hanson ( 1958), Hesse (1963) and (1968), Kuhn (1962), Smart (1953), and Toutmin ( 1961) who have each argued that a shift from one scientific theory to another involves an incommensurable change in the meanings of the terms used, and hence that there can be no statements whose meaning is invariant across scientific theories. Kordig supplies an argument resembling Scheffler's: A statement which rejects radical meaning invariance is intended by its advocates to express the sort of meaning invariance it denies. Thus, its falsity follows from its assumed truth. A possible objection is foreseen by Kordig: that the proposed rejection of objectivity in science and the endorsement of radical meaning variance are made from a restricted standpoint which is excepted from the claims made. It is true that in so doing the pragmatical self-referential inconsistency is* evaded. However, the consequences of the evasion are unfortunate. The denial of scientific objectivity and the doctrine of radical meaning variance then result, according to Kordig, in an unjustified dualism: On the one hand, both scientific objectivity and invariance across scientific theories are denied; on the other hand, objectivity and meaning in variance are presumed in the special perspective of philosophy of 28. Schemer (1965}, p. 21. 158 --------------------------- --------------------------- ----------------------------SELF*REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENcE science. This preference and privilege are not justified. 1berefore Kordig is able to conclude that objectivity and meaning invariance in science cannot consistently be rejected, or this rejection entails the arbitrariness of dogmatism. A third illustration of the pragmatical variety of self-referential * argument is available in an analysis, also due to Kordig, relating to the so-called Quine-Duhem thesis. Quine ( 1963) and ( 1972) has been responsible for extending Duhem's thesis concerning physical hypotheses to all hypotheses. Kordig distinguishes two versions of Quine's thesis: (i) No hypothesis can be irrevocably falisified. {ii) No hypothesis can be immune to revision. To show the pragma tical self-referential inconsistency of both versions, Kordig argues as follows: (i) The Quine-Duhem thesis is itself an hypothesis. By its own claim, it cannot be irrevocably falsified. Like the thesis itself, the negation of the Quin!!-Duhem thesis is an hypothesis which, according to the thesis, cannot be irrevocably falsified. Hence the denial of the thesis cannot be rejected with finality: It is possible to sustain the negation of the thesis, viz., that some hypothesis can be irrevocably falsified. Consequently, from the Quine-Duhcm thesis, its falsification can be deduced. It is a self-falsifying pragmatical selfreferential inconsistency, hence is not tenable. Alternatively, (ii) the Quine-Duhem thesis is an hypothesis which claims that no hypothesis can be immune to revision. Hence it is open to revision. To revise an hypothesis, in Quine's view, is to change its truth-value. In other words, from the assumption that the Quine-Duhem thesis is true it follows that it may be false, in which case some hypothesis can be immune to revision. But this latter clain1 is in direct conflict with the original thesis. Once again, from the assumption that the Quine-Duhem thesis is true, it follows that it is false. These three examples of pragmatical self-referential argumentation make two things clear: The claim that a position is pragmatically self-referentially inconsistent is forced, first, to suppose that the position attacked will acknowledge the legitimacy of its self-application. This is often problematic. As Passmore has ob159 STEVEN I. BARTLETT served in connection with pragmatical self-refutation, the propounder of a position under criticism is always free in principle, ''even if sometimes with almost inconceivable hardihood"l9 to deny the intentions attributed to him. . Secondly, provided the self-application of a position is accepted as legitimate by its propounder, it follows from a valid self-rcfu- . tation that the statement of the position in question is selffalsifying. But it does not necessarily follow that what is claimed by the position cannot be Lhe case. It may not be possible coherently to state the claim that there is no objectivity in science, or that there exists radical meaning variance, or that all hypotheses are open to revision, yet, it can be argued, it does not follow that any one of these cannot nevertheless be true. They may be true, but !his possibility cannot be expressed consistently. The sceptical mctaclaim, in attempting to say what cannot consistently be said, is doomed to self-referential inconsistency. The suspicion may linger that Feycrabend, Hanson, Hesse, Kuhn, Polyani, Quine, Smart, Toulmin may be right, but the suspicion cannot consistently be voiced. Among other things, this is what it means to say that a position is untenable. Kordig's self-referential analyses do not, in their current formulation, focus on invariant conditions of discourse (although elsewhere there are some hints that he may eventually move in this direction30 ). His analyses appear to express self-referential ad hominem arguments in Johnstone's sense. That this is so appears to be confirmed by the vulnerability of Kordig's arguments to objections regarding the legitimacy of forcing the self-application of a position. (Objections of the second kind, "Even if the position is self~referentially inconsistent, it still may be true," are effectively silenced.) Most self-referential analyses in philosophy of science have been pragmatical in focus, and have treated theories developed in philosophy of science about scientific theories. '29. Paslmorc(196l),p.63. 30. In connection with Kordig's arguments that objectivity and meaning invariance are possible, see Kordig (197la), (197lb), (1971 c), (1973). 160 SELF-REFERENCE PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE In contrast to such a pragmatical analnis of theories of theories, we turn to a metalogical argument concerning a particular scientific theory. Before doing so,.let us recapitulate. We recall that in a metalogical analysis of preconditions of referring an attempt is made to identify constraints which cannot be violated without projective self-referential inconsistency. A projective claim is not, like a pragmatical self-referential inconsistency, self-falsifying, but is scl[*undarmining: A concept or pro* position is used in* a position in such a way th~Jt, literally and logically, precludes that the forms of reference involved can possibly obtain. A projective self-referential inconsistency results if one attempts to refer to an object o in such a way that denies one or more conditions which musl be satisfied in order for it to be possible to refer to o at all. A self-undermining claim does not falsify itself, but is such that it is incoherent to associate any meaningful trulh-valuc with the claim.ln a somcwhal metaphorical sense, pragmatical self-referential inconsistencies express factual short-circuits which involve either the intentions acknowledged by a position or ccrlain invariant conditions .of discourse, and which result in a falsification of that position. Projective self-referential inconsistencies express transcendental short-circuits which (a) involve self-validating preconditions of referring, and which (b) undem1ine the possible meaningfulness of a claim endorsed. These varieties of inconsistency, among others, represent ways in which conceptual structures may become dysfunctional and self-defeating. VII There has been strong opposition among philosophers to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Among physi* cists, however, this interpretation has been the substructure for progress in theoretical and experimental research in microphysics for several decades. Contrary to this trend in physics, a bias in favor of realism and physical detenninism was expressed in the opposing hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics. Numerous philosophers and a few physicists have claimed, in spite of the uncertainty 161 STEVENJ.BARTLETI relations, that a microparticlc in fact has a well-defined simultaneous position and moml!ntum. From lhc st,,;1dpoint of current quantum statistical m~chanics, such a claim involves a meta logical self* referential inconsistency. The uncertainty principle grows out of a calculus of operators. Two obscrvablcs are said to commute if the observations are noninterfering. Quantum mechanics, specifically, matrix mechanics, asserts that for a class of dynamical va:iables, if P and Q are noncommuting operators, then P and Q are canonically conjugate quantities: that is, if a physical systc:n is in a state for which P is determined with an accuracy e. then thL*re is a maximum limit to which Q may be dett:rmined, viz .• 17 = h/27T : e. The relation between such c<Jnonically conjugated variables is essentially one of uncertainty. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, which expresses the logic of such variables, is normally discussed in the context of the noncommuting observables, position and momentum. However, there are analogous uncertainty relations involving other dyn<Jmical variables which cannot be precisely measured simultaneously, for example, energy/time, number/phase, etc. The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics accepted the limitative results expressed in Heisenberg's application of the formalism of noncommuting matrices. In this view and in related formulations, the uncertainty relations do not merely represent technical limitations, but they rather constrain, in principle, what may meaningfully be stated in matrix mechanics, in wave mechanics, or in the more general so-called transformation theory. The micro* physical theory built on this foundation has been vigorously opposed by many philosophers and not very many physicists, among the latter Einstein, De Broglie, Jeffries, and Dohm. Of the arguments proposed, perhaps Bohm's is the only one which has not reduced simply to an endorsement of prejudices in favor of realism and complete physical determinism. Although it is not possible to go into the details of his view here, we may note that Bohm's rejection of the postulate of uncertainty did not evolve into mote than a hopeful sketch of an alternative microphysical theory, one which 162 SELF-REFERENCE, PHENOME!\'OLOGY, AND PHILOSOPIIY Of SCIENCE has* received a sceptical response from physicists.31 In discussing his alternative theory, Bohm speculated that ... the coordinatc5 and .momenta of individual atorna arc hidden variable~ which in ;a large scale system manifest thcrnsclvcs only as a statistical avi:r~cs. Perhaps (hen, our JHcscnt quantum mechanical averages ate simply a manifestation of hidden vari* abies. which have nor. how<we;, y e r been detected d ircctly. 32 To show that this point of view expressed by I3ohm and others is mctalogically projective in relation to contemporary Copenhagenbased quantum theory, it is necessary to demonstrate these things: -* that tht• uncertainty relations have ll prcsuppositional role in mod1m1 quantum statistical mechanics; that a denial of the post~late of unL~rtainty entails a denbl of prc~onuitions whi~h rnust be s:ltisfkd in order for physical reference to spedficd dynillllicJI varia blcs to be possible. It is rather straightforward to establish the first of these: Perhaps the most general assumption of existing quantum theory, as ac* knowledged even by Bohm, is that the state of a physic:.~! system* "is completely specified by a wave function that determines only the probabilities of actual results that can be obtained in a statistical ensemble of similar cxpcrimcnts".ll Prom this assumption, Bohm goes on to say, ... the uncertainty principle is readily deduced ... [lit become~ a contradiction in terms to ask for a state in which momentum and position nrc simultaneously .and precisely defined .•.. ll1e uncertainty principle is.;. a necessary con.cquencc of the assumption that the wave function and its probability int"rprl!tation provide the. most complete possible specification of the state of an individual system ... !• According to this view, the uncertainty relations can be derived from the assumption that the probability interpretation of the wave function constitutes a complete microphysical description. From the perspective of opponents to the Copenhagen interpretation, to claim, on this basis, that the postulate of uncertainty plays a presuppositional role would be to beg the question. It is precisely the foregoing assumption from which the principle of uncertainty is derived which they wish to question. 31. Heisenberg, Oppenheimer, Dirac, and Bcthc expressed their HWnJlc~t doubts con* ccrning Bohm'5 proposal (in pcrson:il communications with Nnmood R'Jss.-1 l!~nson). Cf. Hanson (1958), p. 174. 32. Bohm (1952). p. 166. 33. Bohm (1952), p.l66. 34. Bohm (1952),p.l67. 163 STEVEN J. BARTLETT Fortunately for our purpose, the reverse has also been shown: ;hat solely from an operationally-based sta tcment of the uncertainty relations the rest of quantum mechanics can be derived. In his famous proof, Von Neumann dcmonstrated35 that, indeed, the uncertainty relations make up, as Hanson put it, "the logical backbone of all quantum theory .''36 Two further remarks may exhibit some of the force behind this * demonstration. First. so-called "interference tem1s" occur in quantum mechanics. They are not understood simply as products of prob;Jbilities, but ar~* functionally def::~cd as products of 'It functions. Put somewhat differently, the noncommuting nature of such dynamical paralncters as position and !!!omentum is entailed by the nature of the IV function. Secondly, it is interesting to note that, as a consequence, the algebraic analog of a statement simultaneously specifying precisely de35. Von Ñumann (1955), Chapters IV, VI, especially pp. 323rr. 36. Hunson (1967), p. 46. It should be noted that Bohnl did not disagree with von Neumann's argument. Bohm coñ~ded that as !oñ; as the usual rules of calculating qua!ltum-mcchanic.al .probabilities arc in force, it h inconsistent to postulate a set or hidd~n p01rametcrs which simultaneously determines the results of measurements of noncommutint! obscrY~blcs. (Dohm (195 2), II, p. 187.) Dohm's proposal essentially sought to modify these rules: in particular, to consider such obscrvables as position and momentum u "potenlialitieswhosc precise develop* ment depends just as much 011 the observing apparatus as on the ob5crved system. In fact, \\'hen II'C measure the momentum .. observable'', the final result is determined by hidden parameters in the momcntum*mcasuring device as well as by hidden parameters in the obscrYed dcetron. Simil:lrly, \\'hen we measure the position "observable", the final result is determined in part by hidden parameters in the position-measuring device." (Ibid.) Bohm's proposal acknowlcd!!ed that thc.'c two m~~surements arc mutually exclusive since they depend on "mutually exclusive arrangements of matter 1hat must be used in making dilfcrcm kinds of measurements ... {Ibid., pp. 187 -188.) In spite or this block to simultaneous measurements of, e.g., position and momentum, Bohm wished to be able to claim that both obscrYabl~s ~rc in reality precisely determined in a physic:ll system. To maintain this, Bohm describes the preparation of a physical system in a state "in 'vhich the 'It-field and the initi~l particle position and momentum arc prcliscly known." (/bid., p. 185.) According to Dohm's theory, then, it is possible to measure only one of these observables precisely: it h necessary to infer the value of the other on the basis of formal rei:Hions of the theory. Bohm wished to preserve precise simultaneous determinability of both obscrYablcs, not merely by inferenc.:, but in fact. Tlte realistic claim, in the context of his own theory, l~ projective: The microphysical cJ;~im that both p~ramcters arc precisely defined and physically real pre~uppose~ that in principle both can simultaneously be measured. Vet, as we have seen, IJohm 's position accepts the constraint that measurements of position and momentum arc mutually exdusive. 164 SELF-REFERENCE. PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE fined values for position and momentum itself is without meaning in quantum statistical mechanics. The absence of meaning here is due to conflict with the rules of formation and transformation employed in the formalism. But there is another, perhaps more compelling, reason for its meaninglessness: As long as an alternative, comparably detailed microphysical theory is unavailable, the physical meaningfulness of a microphysical ch.1im -e.g., relating to mutually interfering observableswill be understood in terms of prevailing quantum statistical theory. The uncertainty relations have the status of presuppositions conceived of as rule-based constraints within the conceptual structure of the theory. The uncertainty relations are nothing more than the expression of a limitative postulate required in a calculus of operators. Now, a hidden variable theorist wishes to refer to subatomic events as currently understood in the context of existing quantum theory. He wishes, furthermore, to claim that mutually interfering observables actually posses well-defined simultaneous values. Such a claim is clearly proj~ctive: The hidden variable theorist refers to a pair of obscrvables which are essentia//_1* defined in a noncommuting sense, and in so doing explicitly denies a condition which logically is forced on our current understanding of interfering obscrvables. The condition he denies is a precondition which must be satisfied in order for it to be possible for him, or anyone else, to refer meaningfully in the theoretical context in question to such observables. It is not that what the hidden variable theorist says is self-falsifying; rather. his claim is sclf-undennining in terms of its possible meaningfulness. Should an alternative microphysics someday be developed as Bohm hoped, in terms of which micro particles meaningfully may be said simultaneously to possess precisely detennined positions and momenta, time and energy, number and phase, etc., the above conclusion will stand unaffected. The uncertainty relations essential to Copenhagen quantum mechanics remain essential in physics as long as that theory is held. A second theory in which this is not the case refers, in a quite literal and logical sense, to objects which are defined in an essentially distinct way. A physical meta theory -which 165 STEVEN J. BARTLETI' correlates predictions made by Copenhagen quantum mechanics and a possible alternative Bohm microphysics -would enable physicits to cvaiuatc the comparative usefulness of the two theories. The predictive value of the competing theory conceivably might be greater than that of the Copenhagen view, in which case it would have to give way to the new theory. Thus, where Bohm's hidden variable claim expressed in its present conceptual environment is projective, a corresponding claim asserted in the context of a fully developed, alternative microphysics, is trivial. The two claims can by no means be reduced to the same claim: One is self-undermining, while the other is best likened to a tautology. StcYcn J. Bartlett is Professor of Philosophy Ill Saint louis University, He attended the University of Santa Clara, Raymond College o£ the Univenity of the Pacific, 1he Universi* ty of California at Santa Barbara, and received his Ph.D. from the Universite de Paris, where hi1 research was directed by Paul Ricoeur. He has been a fellow in philosophy and JlJ;lthcmatics at the Center for the Study of DctnQ~;ratic lnslitulions, a vi~iting rcsc•u~h fellow at lhe Max Planck-Jnstitut in Starnberg, \Vest Germany, and has taught at the Uni* versity of Florida, the University of Hartford, and Saint Louis University. Dr. Bartlett is O!Uthor of a book on m~thcmatical logic, a monograph on general problem-solving and m~ny articles. REFERENCES Bartlett, Steven J.,A Relalit•istic 71teury ufl'henomcno/(}gical Comtitution: A SclfReferen* tial, Tram;cendental Approoclr to Conceptual PotholoKJ!, 1970, Diu. Ahs. lmernatl. No. 7905583. Bartlett, Steven J., "Phcnomcnoloj!y of the Implicit", Dialectics: Revue intemationale de philosophie de Ia connalssa11u, Vol. 29, No. 2*3 (1975), pp. 173-188. D:utlctr, Steven J., "The Idea of a Meta1ogic of Reference", Methodology and Science, Vol. 9, No. 3 (1976), pp. 85-92. Bartlett, Stev~:n J., .. A MctOI!lteorcrical BOI5is for Interpretations or Problem Solving Dchavior",Metluxlology and Science, Vol. 11, No.2 (1978), pp. 59-85. Bohm, David, "A Sup,gestcd Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of"Hif.lden" Variables", Phy1ical Review LXXXV (1952): Part I, pp. 166-179; Part II, pp. 180-193. CoUingwood, R.G., 1111: Idea of 1/istOI'y (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1946). Domi&an. Alan, The Later Phi/01ophy of R.G. Co/U11gwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1962). * f.:ycrabcnd, PaulK., "Explanalion, Reduction, and Empiricism", Minnesota Stlldies in the Philosophy uf St:icncc, Vol Ill, cd. H. Fcigl and G. Maxwell, (Minncapoli$: Uuiver* siiY of Minnesota Press 1962), pp. 28-97. Fitch, Frederic Brenton, "Self-Reference in Philosophy", in Fitch (1952), pp. 217*225. (Fh$1 publbhcd in Afind, Vol • .5.5 (1946), PI'* 64-73.) Fitch, frederic Brenton, S;llmbollc !.oxic (New York: The Ronald Press 1952). Fitch, Frederic Benton, "Univerml Metalanguages for Pltilosophy", Review of Metaphysics 17 (1963-64), pp. 396-402. 166 SELF*REFERENCE, PHENOMENOLOGY, AND PIULOSOPHY OF SCIENCE Hllflson, Norwood Russel~ Patteml of DiscoPery (Cambridge: The University PreU 1958). H:mson, Norwood Ruacll, "Philosophical Implications of Quantum Mechanlcs",IJ'ncyc/o- . pedill of Plrilosoplly, VoL 7 (New York: Macmillan 1967), pp. 41-4'). Hesse, Mary," A New Look at llilplanalion", RePiew o{Metaph)llicr 17 (1963), pp, 98-108. Heue, Muy, "flnc'a Criteria of Meanin& On1np:", The JoiHNII of l'lrilofoph)l 65 (l!n8), pp.4~S1 Johnstone, Henry, W., Jr., Philosophy lind Ari(Unwnt (University Park, Penn.: Pen&ylvanla S Ia tc U niYCBity Press I 9.5 9). Jolln&tone, Henry \V,, Jr., "Argumentation and Inconsistency", Rerut inttma.tlontt/e dt pltilosoplue 15, No. 58 (1961), pp. 353-365. Juhnstonc, llcnry W., Jr., "Self-Refutation :and Validity", TlleMonirt XLVIII (1964), pp. 467*485. Kordig, Carl R., "Objectivity, Scientific 01angc, and Sclf*Rcfcrencc", Dorton Stud its In tire PllilrJSOfJII.~ of Sr:iem*e, Vol VIII {Dordrccht, llolland: D. Reidel Publishing Co, 1970}, pp. 519-523. Kordig, Carl R., "TI1c lltcory*ladcnncss of Observation", Review ofMetapllytics 24 ( 1971,a), Jlp. 448-484 .. Kordig, Carl R., "Scientific Transitions, Meaning lnvariancc, and Derivability", Southern lnuma/ of Philosopil)' 9 ( 1971,b), pp. 119-125. Kordig, Carl R., "l11e Comparability of Scientific Thcories", l'llilosophy of Sr:icuce 38 (1971,c), pp. 467*4!15. 1-:urdig. C~rl R., "Ob~ervational lnvilriancc", Plti/n:ro11hy of!lcicur:c 40 ( 197) ), pp. 558-569. Kuhn, 111omas S., The Stntr:ture of &it•ntifrc Rr:volllliOIIS (Olicago: University of Chicago Press 1962). Lorenzen, Paul, Normative /.ogir: antll:'thics (Mannhcim/Ziirieh: Dib1iographisches lnstitut 1969,a). Loren :ten, Paul, Elnfiilmmf{ in die operati1•e /,ogik lind .llathe11111tik (Berlin: Springer 1969,b). Pi1Ssmorc, John, 1'1Iilnsn/111ir:al Reasoning (London: Gerald IJuckworth 1961 ). Quine, Willard V., "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", in !*rom a J.ogicall'nilll of View, Second Edition (Ncw York: Harper and Row 1963 ), pp. 20*46. Quine, Willard V., Methods of Lngir: (New York: llolt, Rinehart and Winston 1972). Russell, Dcrtrilnd, Our K11owlcdge of the J:.xtemalll'orltl (london: r.reorge Allen i!Rd Unwin 1972rust published 1914). Rynin, David, .. Don;agan on Collingwood: Absolute Presuppositions, Truth, and Metaphysics", RevitM.' o[Metapllysir:s XVIII (1964), pp. 301*333. Schefnet, Israel, Scienr:cantl Subjectivity (New York: Bobb~Mcrri111965) . . Smart, J.J.C., "C".unOieting Views about Explanation", Boston St11dies i11 the PIIiloropiJy of Science, Vol. I, ed. R.S. Cohen and M.W. Wartofsky (New York: Harper and Row 1953), pp. 157*169. Toulmin, Steven, Forc8ixht autl Understanding (New York: Harper and Row 1961 ). Von Neumann, John, Matlltmatir:al Foundations of Quantum Mechll11ir:s (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1955); originally pu blishcd iiS Matlle11111tlsche Gruntllagen tler Quanttnmcr:hanik (Berlin: Verlilg Julius Springer 1932). 167 OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY THE AUTHOR RELATED TO THE TOPIC OF THIS PAPER BOOKS 1. Metalogic of Reference: A Study in the Foundations of Possibility, Max-PlanckGesellschaft, 1975. A research monograph that formulates the author's approach to epistemology through the use of self-referential argumentation and self-validating proofs. 2. Conceptual Therapy: An Introduction to Framework-relative Epistemology, Studies in Theory and Behavior, Saint Louis, 1983. An introductory text that gives students applied exercises in thinking using the author's approach to epistemology in terms of self-referential argumentation and selfvalidating proofs. 3. Self-Reference: Reflections on Reflexivity, edited with Peter Suber, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987; now published by Springer Science. The first of two collections (see #4 below), consisting of invited papers by leading contemporary authors, to be published in the new area of research, the general theory of reflexivity, pioneered by the author. 4. Reflexivity: A Source Book in Self-Reference, Elsevier Science Publishers, 1992. The second collection, consisting of classical papers by leading contributors of the twentieth century, published in the new area of research, the general theory of reflexivity. 5. The Pathology of Man: A Study of Human Evil, published in 2005 by behavioral science publisher Charles C. Thomas, is the first comprehensive scholarly study of the psychology and epistemology of human aggression and destructiveness. The study includes original research by the author, such as a detailed description of the phenomenology of hatred and the psychology of human stupidity, and an extension and elaboration of the author's earlier published work dealing with the epistemology of human thought disorders (Part III). 6. Normality Does Not Equal Mental Health: The Need to Look Elsewhere for Standards of Good Psychological Health, Praeger, 2011. The first book-length scholarly critique of the widespread and unexamined presumption that psychological normality should be employed as a standard for good mental health. The book extends the claim by Abraham Maslow that acceptable standards that define good mental health are to be found among exceptional people, and not among the average and psychological normal, who so often - as world history has amply proved, and as such experimental studies as Milgram's and Zimbardo's confirm - will, when circumstances are right, subject others to abuse, cruelty, and death in stateor group-endorsed wars, genocides, and terrorism (see publication #5 above). ARTICLES 7. "Referential Consistency as a Criterion of Meaning," Synthese, Vol. 52, 1982, 267-282. 8. "Philosophy as Conceptual Therapy," Educational Resources Information Center, National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, May, 1983, Document #ED 224 402. 9. "Hoisted by Their Own Petards: Philosophical Positions that SelfDestruct," Argumentation, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1988, 69-80. 10. "Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks," Animal Law (law review of the Northwestern School of Law, Lewis and Clark College), Vol. 8, 2002, pp. 143-76. The first comprehensive legal study of the psychological and epistemological foundations of human resistance to the compassionate treatment of animals. Contains an application of the author's self-referential argumentation to human conceptual blocks that stand in the way of the recognition of animal rights. 11. "Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights: Psychological and Conceptual Blocks," electronically re-published October, 2002, by the Michigan State University's Detroit College of Law, Animal Law Web Center, and maintained on an ongoing basis at: http://www.animallaw.info/articles/arussbartlett2002.htm Also available in German: "Wurzeln menschlichen Widerstands gegen Tierrechte: Psychologische und konceptuelle Blockaden," available at: http://www.simorgh.de/animallaw/bartlett_33-67.pdf 12. Also available in Portuguese: "Raízes da resistência humana aos direitos dos animais: Bloqueios psicológicos e conceituais," published in Brazilian Animal Rights Review (Revista Brasileira de Direito Animal), Vol. 2(3), July/December, 2007 [actually appeared in 2008], pp. 17-66. Available at: https://www.animallaw.info/sites/default/files/brazilvol3.pdf