volume	15,	no.	8 march	2015 Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control Jozef Müller University of California, Riverside © 2015 Jozef	Müller This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/015008/> 1. Introduction 1.1. Aristotle's puzzle about lack of control in NE 7.3: the philosophical problem Nicomachean Ethics 7.31 is	constructed	as	a	solution	to	Aristotle's	first (and perhaps most important) puzzle (aporia)2 concerning lack of control,3	namely,	"whether	uncontrolled	people	[act]	knowingly	or	not, and	in	what	way	knowingly"	(NE 7.3,	1146b8–9).4	This	puzzle	arises	out of	a	conflict	between	two	views	of	lack	of	control.	There	is	the	ordinary view	according	to	which	the	uncontrolled	agent	knows,	while	she	acts, that	her	action	is	bad.	She	acts	as	she	does	because	she	is	overcome 1. The	main	ideas	of	this	article	are	derived	from	part	of	my	doctoral	dissertation,	which	was	submitted	to	Princeton	University in	2008. I	would like	to express	my	deepest	gratitude	to	my	dissertation	advisers	John	M.	Cooper	and Hendrik	Lorenz	for	their	many	insightful	comments,	suggestions,	and	astute criticisms	that	were	of	invaluable	help	to	me	both	in	writing	the	dissertation and	in	developing	my	ideas	further	into	their	present	form.	Earlier	versions of	this	paper	were	read	at	the	Comenius	University	(Slovakia),	University	of Toronto,	and	UC Irvine. I	would like to thank the	audiences for their comments	and	questions,	especially	Rachel	Barney,	David	Bronstein,	Tomáš	Čana, David	Charles,	Sean	Greenberg,	Róbert	Maco,	Casey	Perin,	Martin	Pickavé, Ladislav	Sabela,	and	Jennifer	Whiting.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	the	following	people	who	have	provided	me	with	many	useful comments	at	various stages	of	this	paper:	Stewart	Duncan,	Brad	Inwood,	Ben	Mitchell-Yellin,	John Palmer,	and	Naly	Thaler.	Finally,	I	would	like	to	thank	the	anonymous	reviewers	at	the	Philosopher's Imprint for	their	many	excellent	comments	and	Daniel Ehrlich	for	his	help	with	final	editing. 2. In	NE	7.2	Aristotle	raises	a	number	of	additional	puzzles.	These	additional puzzles	are	discussed	in	NE 7.4–10. 3. In	modern philosophical literature, "akrasia" (now an English word found in	the	OED)	has	come	to	refer	to	an	intentional	and	free	action	contrary	to one's	better	judgment.	For	Aristotle,	however,	in	order	to	act	with	akrasia	the agent	must	act	on	her	non-rational	desire	(appetite)	and	against	her	decision (NE 3.2, 1111b13–5; 7.8, 1151a6–7) rather than against	mere judgment, and she	must	experience	an	internal	psychological	conflict	between	the	decision and	a	non-rational	desire	(e. g.,	NE 1.13,	1102b13–25).	In	the	Aristotelian	sense, akratic actions	are	blameworthy	and	ethically	problematic,	but	akratic actions in	the	modern	sense	need	not	be	either	of	these.	In	order	to	avoid	confusion, I	translate	the	Greek	word	"akrasia"	as	"lack	of	control,"	reserving	the	English word	"akrasia"	for	the	modern	conception. 4. Aristotle's	dialectical	method	starts	from	collecting	the	relevant	phenomena that	prominently	include	the	views	of	other	experts	on	the	relevant	subject (endoxai).	When	the	phenomena	conflict,	they	give	rise	to	puzzles	(aporiai). These	puzzles	provide	Aristotle	with	starting	points	for	investigation.	For	an account	of	Aristotle's	dialectical	method	in	NE 7.1–2,	see	Cooper	(2009). ImprintPhilosophers' jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) Socrates'	account	of	uncontrolled	actions.	In	the	chapter,	this	claim	is anticipated	and	reflected	in	Aristotle's	repeated	insistence	that	acting against actively	held	knowledge	would	be	unintelligible,	describing such (impossible)	cases	as terrible (deinon) (1146b34) 8	and	astonishing	(thaumaston)	(1147a9–10).9	Similarly,	when	Aristotle	introduces	his well-known	pattern	for	explanation	of	action	(practical	syllogism)	at 1147a24–31,	he	asserts that	once its two	premises, the	universal	one (representing the agent's decision or desire) and the particular one (representing the	agent's	knowledge	or	awareness	of the	salient features	of	her	situation),	are	put	together, the	agent	necessarily	and immediately	asserts	and	believes	the	conclusion	or,	in	the	case	of	beliefs about	doing	things,	necessarily	and	immediately	acts	(1147a26–8).10 Aristotle	is	thus	committed	to	the	view	that	one	cannot	act	against one's	actively	held	knowledge	(or	beliefs)11	while	one	is	aware	that	the knowledge	applies	to	one's	situation.	But	he	makes	it	equally	obvious (in	NE 7.3	and	elsewhere)	that	he	thinks	that	uncontrolled	actions	(understood	as	actions	against	one's	knowledge)	exist:	the	uncontrolled agent	is	one	who	acts	on	her	non-rational	desire	and	against	her	decision	(prohairesis).12 8. That	the	meaning	of	deinon	in	NE 7.3	is	"terrible	because	impossible"	is	clear from	NE 7.2,	1145b23,	where	Aristotle	uses	it	-	in	reporting	Socrates'	view	that acting	against	one's	knowledge	is	impossible	-	to	express	the	idea	of	impossibility.	A	similar	use	of	deinon	can	be	found	in	Plato's	Theaetetus at	184d.	See Burnyeat	(1976,	30). 9. That	the	meaning	of	thaumaston	(which	can	simply	mean	puzzling	without any	implication	about	the	intelligibility	of	what is	puzzling) is	"astonishing because	impossible"	is	clear	from	its	correlation	with	atopon	(absurd)	in	the same	sentence. 10.	A	different interpretation	of	the	passage,	according	to	which	the	agent	can fail to act even	when she puts the two premises together, is defended by Charles	(1984,	128–32).	I	discuss	his	view	in	section	3	below. 11. One	needs	to	keep	in	mind	that	although	Aristotle	continues	to	speak	about knowledge,	the	puzzle	arises	on	his	view	equally	with	belief.	His	argument	is meant	to	apply	to	actions	against	both	knowledge	and	belief	(1146b25–32). 12. See	NE 3.2,	1111b13–5;	7.8,	1151a6–7.	In	NE 7.3,	the	term	"decision"	(prohairesis) comes up in the opening passage at 1146b22–4,	where	Aristotle characterizes	the	distinction	between	the	intemperate	(akolastos)	and	the	uncontrolled by	pleasure	(NE 7.1,	1145b12–4).5	And	there	is	Socrates'	view	according to	which	it	is	impossible	to	act	against	knowledge.6	Consequently,	it	is impossible	to	perform	an	action	that	one	knows	is	bad	when	one	has (and	knows	that	one	has)	some	other,	better	action,	available	(NE 7.2, 1145b23–7).	Since,	on this	view,	knowledge	cannot	be	overcome,	an uncontrolled	action	is	done	out	of	ignorance	of	the	true	value	of	the pleasure	at	which the	action	aims.	These two	views	contradict	each other	insofar	as	one	of	them	holds,	while	the	other	one	denies,	that the	uncontrolled	agent	acts	knowingly	when	she	acts	without	control.7 Aristotle's solution to the puzzle is, however, less clear than his statement	of	it.	Perhaps	the	most	striking	difficulty	concerns	Aristotle's claim,	at	the	very	end	of	NE 7.3	(1147b13–7),	that	his	solution	preserves 5. This	view	is	characterized	as	being	that	of	ordinary	people	(or,	rather,	of	"the many")	by	Plato	at	Prot. 352b–c.	But	it	is	also	a	view	expressed,	for	example, by	Euripides.	Thus	Medea	says: "I	understand the	evil	deed I am	about to commit,	but	my	passion	(thumos),	the	cause	of	the	greatest	evils	that	men	do, is	stronger	than	the	purposes	of	my	deliberate	thoughts	(bouleumatōn)"	(Medea 1078–80). 6. This	view	is	articulated	by	Socrates	in	Plato's	Protagoras at	358c–d. 7. The	puzzle	cannot	arise,	as it is	often taken to	arise,	merely from	Socrates' own	position	being	contradictory	to	phainomena understood	as	some	given facts	of	experience	since	Socrates'	position	is	an	explanation	of	that	experience.	In	the	Protagoras, Socrates	is	not	denying	that	there	is	a	certain	kind	of experience	people	have	that	they	call "being	weaker	than	oneself"	(to hēttō einai hautou)	(Prot. 358c)	wherein	people	fail	to	do	the	best	thing	available	to them	while	knowing	or	believing	(Prot. 358c–d)	(although	perhaps	only	beforehand)	that	it	is	available	to	them:	"Come	with	me	then	to	try	to	persuade people	and to teach them	what is this	experience (pathos)	which they	call being	overcome	by	pleasures	and	because	of	which	they	fail	to	do	the	best things,	when	they	know	what	they	are"	(Prot. 352e4–353a3).	Rather,	Socrates denies the truth	of	a	particular	kind	of	explanation	of this	experience that suggests that people act so because they (i. e., their knowledge or beliefs) have been overcome by pleasure.	Aristotle's own interpretation of Socrates' position	as	denying	that	there	is lack	of	control	needs	to	be	understood	in this	light,	i. e.,	as	denying	that	people	are	ever	overcome	by	pleasure	in	that way.	When	he	says	that	Socrates'	view	"manifestly	contradicts	the	phenomena,"	the	phenomena in	question	just	are	the	views	about	the	nature	of	lack	of control	he	has	already	mentioned	in	NE 7.1,	and	not	any	obvious	facts	about how	things	are.	On	this	point,	see	Owen	(1967)	and	Cooper	(1999).	For	a	view that	constructs	the	puzzle	(including	Socrates'	own	position	in	the	Protagoras) differently,	see	Corcilius	(2008). jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) has	when	one	believes,	and	takes	oneself	to	have	a	reason to	believe, that	something	is	good	for	oneself	(NE 3.4,	1113b23–7).	Decisions	are thus conative	psychological states that are	expressive	of the	agent's sincerely	held	beliefs or knowledge	of	what is good and	bad.	They carry	rational	conviction	(pistis)15	and	exhibit	what	Aristotle	calls	the strength	or	vehemence	of	supposition	(sphodrotēs hupolēpseōs).16	One can	usefully	conceive	of	them	as	sincere	resolutions	or	commitments to	action	that	one	has	made	with	full	knowledge	or	understanding	of why	one	does	them. The problem	of the uncontrolled agent is that although she has made	her	decision	and is convinced	about the	course	of	action she has	decided	for,	when	the	time	comes,	she fails to	stick to it	and instead	does	something	else	-	typically	the	very	thing	that	she	decided not to	do.	One	could	attempt to	solve the	problem	by	claiming	that people	who	act	in	this	way	retract	their	previous	decisions,	and	having	changed	their	minds,	make	a	new	one.	But	this	kind	of	solution does	not	work for	Aristotle: it	would require him to change the assumption	that	uncontrolled	people	can	and	do	have full	knowledge or	understanding	of	why	they	should	act	in	the	way	they	decided	to act.17	Only	if	their	knowledge	were	in	some	sense	incomplete,	would	it make	sense	to	think	that	they	could	have	come	to	see	something	(say, some	pleasure)	as	a	reason	for	changing	their	minds.	The	assumption of	full	knowledge,	however,	requires	that	no	such	further	reasons,	as not	know	explicitly	in	what	way	it	does	so).	For	an	overview	of	the	different interpretations	of	wish (including	views that	oppose	accounts that	ground wish	in	eudaimonia),	see	Pearson	(2012,	141–67). 15. Pistis (conviction) is tied to persuasion by reasoning (DA 428a16–24). As Aristotle	says:	"Some	people	are	convinced	about	what	they	believe	no	less than	others	about	what	they	know"	(1146b29–30).	See	also	EE 2.10,	1226b21– 30.	This is	why	Aristotle remarks that it	does	not	matter	whether the	state (which	one	should	not	be	able	to	act	against)	amounts	to	knowledge	or	belief (1146b24–31). 16. Here	I	follow	Burnet (1900,	299).	See	Top. 4.5,	126b25–7. 17. See	NE 7.1,	1145b10–4;	7.8,	1151a20–9. It	is	significant	that	Aristotle	conceives	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	as acting	against	her	decision	rather	than	mere	judgment.	Decisions	are not	mere	prescriptions	or	thoughts	about	what	one	should	do.	They are	desires13	that	result	from	successful	deliberation	(NE	3.3,	1113a2–5; 6.2,	1139a23; EE	2.10,	1226b17)	about	what	action	would	best	promote an	end	that is	desired	in	virtue	of its	being	conceived	of	as	good	by the agent.	An	end	of this sort is the	object of a rational kind	of	desire that	Aristotle	calls	wish (boulēsis).14	Wish is	a	desire,	which	one agent	in	terms	of	decision:	the	intemperate	agent	does,	whereas	the	uncontrolled	does	not,	decide	to	pursue	the	pleasure	at	hand.	That	the	uncontrolled agent	does	not	decide	to	do	so	is	obvious	to	Aristotle	from	the	fact	that	he does	not think	or believe that he should	pursue it.	Note that believing	or thinking	that	one	should	do	something	is	here	treated	as	a	necessary	condition	for	deciding	to	do	it. 13. Some commentators deny that prohairesis is a desire. For example, Sarah Broadie has argued that decision "as such does not carry an inherent psychological	power	or	forceful	tendency	to	suppress	or	push	past	recalcitrant elements	within	the	soul"	(Broadie	and	Rowe	[2002,	43]).	On	her	view,	decision	is	"more	like	a	judgment	than	it	is	like	a	desire"	(Ibid.).	There	is	perhaps no	single	passage	which	can	decide	the	issue	but	there	seems	to	be	cumulative	prima facie evidence	for	the	view	that	decision	is	a	desire.	First,	Aristotle defines	it	as	a	certain	kind	of	desire,	in	particular	a	"deliberative	desire"	(e. g., NE	6.2,	1139a24)	and	puts	it	on	a	par	with	other	desires	as	something	that	can make	an	animal	move	(e. g.,	MA 701a4–5).	Second,	when	he	argues,	in	NE 1.13, that	the	human	soul	has	two	distinct	aspects	or	parts,	one	rational	and	one non-rational,	he	appeals	to	the	presence	of	two	contrary	impulses	in	the	uncontrolled	agent	(1102b21).	One	of	these	impulses	originates	in	reason	(see, for	example,	DA 432b27–33a3,	433b5–10,	434a12–5;	EE 1224a32–b21,	1247b18 for	the	identification	of	the	reason's	command	as	an	impulse	or	a	desire)	and, in the uncontrolled agent, this rational impulse "fights against and resists" (1102b14)	the	other	one,	which	comes	from	a	non-rational	source	of	motivation	(Cf.	Republic 439c–441c).Third,	when	Aristotle	describes	the	case	of	selfcontrol	at	DA 433a1–5,	he	portrays	the	self-controlled	person	as	acting	(in	this case,	resisting)	on	her	thought	against	her	appetite.	The	case	of	self-control	is significant,	since	the	issue	turns	on	whether	we	need	to	invoke,	in	explaining the self-controlled agent's action of resisting her bad desires, anything besides	her	rational	commitment	or	beliefs.	Aristotle	does	not	appear	to	suggest that	we	do	(see	also	note	18	below).	For	a	detailed	discussion	of	the	issue,	see Dahl	(1984,	35–99;	188–200). 14. On	most interpretations,	wish (or, at any rate, the virtuous person's	wish) is	ultimately	grounded,	in	one	way	or	another,	in	the	agent's	conception	of eudaimonia;	if	something	is	to	be	considered	good	by	the	agent,	it	must	be	the case	that	she	thinks	that	it	contributes	to	her	eudaimonia (although	she	need jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) 1.2. The problems of interpreting NE 7.3: the exegetical problem Although NE 7.3 promises the answer, it poses difficult exegetical problems	that	make	determining	the	answer	exceedingly	difficult.	The core	of	Aristotle's	discussion is	divided into two	parts: the	first	part which	runs	from	1146b31	to	1147a24,	and	the	second	part,	which	Aristotle	calls	a	"physical"	(phusikōs) account,	and	which	runs	from	1147a24 to	1147b12.19	In	the	first	part,	Aristotle	introduces	three	ways	in	which someone can have but not use knowledge in action. These three ways	are	introduced	as	objections	to	Socrates'	view	that	while	acting without	control,	the	uncontrolled	agent	cannot	be	acting	against	her knowledge	and	so	she	must	be	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	what	she	does is	wrong,	instead	believing	that	it	is,	at	least	at	the	moment	she	acts, the	best	thing	to	do	(NE 7.2,	1145b23–32).	Of	the	third	way	of	having but	not	using	knowledge	(1147a10–7)	-	the	way	in	which	people	who are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep	have	but	do	not	use	it	-	Aristotle	asserts	that it	is	the	way	in	which	the	uncontrolled	agent	has	but	does	not	use	her knowledge	while	she	acts	without	control.20 In the	second	part	(the physical	account),	Aristotle	makes	use	of	syllogistic	apparatus	with	the overt	purpose	of	illuminating	the	causes	of	uncontrolled	action.	The Desires (whether rational	or	non-rational)	are	already	accompanied	by	(or involve)	heating	or	chilling	(it	is	in	fact	what	they	in	part	are)	and	that	is	why they	can	produce	the	pathē.	Desire	(orexis)	is	already	a	reaching	out	–	it	is	what leads	one	from	thought,	phantasia	or	perception	to	the	affection	that	then	extends	to	an	actual	movement	of	the	limbs.	It	is	important,	in	fact	crucial,	to see	that	the	pathē that	are	said	to	prepare	the	organic	parts	for	movement	in the	MA are	not	emotions	(such	as	love,	hate,	or	fear)	but,	rather,	alterations (701a5,	701b11–32)	in	the	animal	(in	or	around	the	heart)	that	are	productive of	the	appropriate	movements.	For	a	discussion	that	is	critical	of	the	kind	of view	adopted	(but	not	defended)	here,	see	Corcilius	2008d,	160–207. 19. It	is	often	thought	that	since	Aristotle	says	that	the	exposition	in	the	second half	of	NE 7.3	contains	a	phusikōs	account,	the	first	part	of	the	chapter	must contain	a	logikōs account	even	if	Aristotle	does	not	explicitly	say	so.	I	am	not committed	to	the	view	that	the	first	part	of	Aristotle's	discussion	is	logikōs in the	technical	sense	of	the	term.	For	the	contrast	between	phusikōs and	logikōs (or	analutikōs)	methods	see	Phys. 264a7,	GC 316a11,	or	DA 403a2. 20.	The	claim	is	repeated	at	NE 7.10,	1152a14–6. far	as	they	are	concerned,	exist.	Aristotle's	uncontrolled	agents	do	not change	their	minds	and	neither	do	they	retract	their	decisions. But	how	are	we,	then,	to	understand	Aristotle's	claim	that	the	uncontrolled agent acts against her decision and	on a	mere	non-rational	desire?	Given	Aristotle's	own	assumptions,	an	action	of	this	sort should	not	be	possible.	The	challenge	of	any	interpretation	lies	in	finding	a	satisfying	answer	to	how,	on	Aristotle's	account,	an	uncontrolled agent	can	both	act	against	her	decision	(or	knowledge)	while knowing that	she	should	not	be	doing	that	(1146b31)	and	yet	not	violate	Aristotle's	claim	that	acting	against	actively	held	knowledge	(i. e.,	decision) is	impossible.18 18. One	might	wonder	about	the	way	in	which	a	rational	state	(such	as	decision or	wish)	can	initiate	(or	prevent)	bodily	movement.	Given	that	Aristotle	tells us that	what is required for	movement is some form	of "heating	and	chilling"	(MA 701a35),	one	might	form	the	view	that	only	non-rational	desires	can initiate	movement.	One	might think this	because the	processes	of	heating and	chilling	are	connected	with	bodily	pleasures	and	pains	and	these	pleasures and	pains can take the form	of various affections	or feelings (pathē). Thus	when	Aristotle	tells	us	that	affections	prepare	the	bodily	parts	(702a18) which	then	perform	the	actual	movements,	one	might	form	the	view	that	it is	only the	non-rational	desires that can initiate	actual	movement. In	view of	this,	one	might	then	further	think	that	decisions	must	be	more	like	mere judgments	or	commands	that	have	to	be	carried	out	by	non-rational	desires which,	being	receptive	of	such	commands	(although	being	so	receptive	with a	varying	degree	of	enthusiasm)	are	in	a	position	to	initiate	the	appropriate bodily	movements	(Cf.	MM 2.7,	1206b8–29).	This	is	a	cogent	line	of	thought. However,	since	Aristotle's	distinction	between	rational	and	non-rational	desires	is	a	distinction	between	different	ways	in	which	we	can	come	to	desire things	(and	so	between	different	kinds	of	desire	insofar	as	their	intentional objects	are	concerned)	but	not	between	different	ways	in	which	desires	(rational	or	non-rational) initiate	movement, this line	of thought	need	not	be adopted.	First,	notice that	although	a rational	desire (such	as	a	wish) is	or can	be	characterized	as	a	desire	without	pain	(Top. 146b2),	this	can	mean	only that	it	does	not	arise	from	and	is	not	grounded	in	a	previous	"painful"	state	of lack	as	non-rational	desires	are.	Aristotle	never	says	that	it	is	a	desire	whose satisfaction	is	without	pleasure.	He	is	in	fact	quite	clear	that	the	rational	pleasures	are	real	pleasures	(e. g.,	NE 1168b28–69a8,	EE 1224b16–9),	and	that	they are	motivationally	efficacious.	They	are	what	can	make	us	do,	or	refrain	from doing,	things	(1175a30–b25).	The	fact	that	they	do	not	involve	restoration	of a	bodily	lack	to	some	natural	state	does	not	imply	that	they	do	not	involve any	bodily	activities	at	all.	Second,	the	processes	of	heating	or	chilling	which are	required	for	the	pathē which	initiate	movement	(MA 702a17–9)	to	occur are	produced	by	thought	or	phantasia (701a35,	703b13–5)	and	not by	desire. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) at	1147a31–5,	the	uncontrolled	agent	draws	the	good	conclusion	(that she	should	not	taste).	But	according	to	the	immediately	preceding	passage	which introduces the	practical syllogism, the	agent should	not draw	the	good	conclusion	because	if	she	had	done	so,	she	would	not have	acted	without	control. The	second	challenge	is that in	the	"two-syllogism"	passage	Aristotle	clearly	says	(at	1147a33)	that	the	particular	premise	"this	is	sweet" is	active.	But	further	down	in	the	chapter	(at	1147b9–12)	he	says	(or	it seems	plausible	to	think	that	he	says)	that	it	is	the	particular	premise that	the	uncontrolled	agent	either	lacks27	or	does	not	use	when	he	acts without	control.	If	both	passages	describe	uncontrolled	action,	it	seems that	Aristotle	is	contradicting	himself.	It	also	seems	natural	to	connect the	later	passage	(1147b9–12)	with	the	passage	at	1146b35–1147a10	(the second	of	the	three	ways	of	having	but	not	using	knowledge)	according	to	which	one	can	act	against	a	universal	premise	or	proposition	if one	does	not	have	or	does	not	use	one's	knowledge	of	the	particular proposition.	On	the	basis	of these	two	passages,	one	may	well think that	Aristotle suggests, despite the contradictory appearances in the "two-syllogism" passage, that	while acting	without control the agent does	not	have	or	is	not	using	the	relevant	particular	premise. 1.3. The main interpretative strategies The	interpretative	strategies28	that	have	been	explored	in	the	literature divide	according	to	whether	they	do	or	do	not	allow	the	uncontrolled two competing practical syllogisms: one good (representing the decision) and	one	bad	(representing	the	uncontrolled	action).	I	am	not	committed	to the	view	that	there	are	in	fact	two	distinct	practical	syllogisms	described	in the	passage. 27. Some	scholars	have	argued	that	the	"last	proposition"	refers	to	the	conclusion of	the	practical	syllogism,	rather	than	to	the	particular	premise.	I	discuss	the issue	in	section	3. 28.	The	brief	overview	of	interpretations	of	NE 7.3	that	follows	is	not	meant	to	be an	exhaustive	discussion	of	the	literature	on	Aristotle's	theory	of	lack	of	control.	Given	the	number	of	interpretations	available	as	well	as	the	complexity and	difficulty	of	the	issues,	philosophical	and	exegetical,	involved,	such	discussion	is	not	possible	within	the	constraints	of	a	single	article. problem	is	that	it	is	neither	clear	how	the	two	parts	are	related	to	each other,	nor	what	the	theory	(or	theories)	in	each	of	them	is. Some	scholars	have	taken	at	its	face	value	Aristotle's	claim,	in	the first	part	of	the	chapter,	that	the	uncontrolled	person's	state	of	mind	is like	that	of	people	who	are	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep,	but	concluded	that it	leads	to	an	implausible	theory	since	it	would	mean	that	the	uncontrolled	agent's	mind	is	clouded.	David	Bostock	describes	it	in	the	following	way:	the	"desire	or	other	emotion	involved	simply	blocks	one's ability	to	take	in	and	keep	in	mind	the	relevant	facts."21	Some	scholars have	accepted	that	this	is	Aristotle's	view,	but	concluded,	along	with Bostock,	that	it	is	"a	wholly	incredible	account"22	since	it	reduces	uncontrolled	actions	to	outbursts	of	uncontrollable	emotions.23	As	they saw	it,	such	"general	obfuscation"24	of	the	mind	would	entirely	undermine	the	claim	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	knows	what	she	is	doing	in any	(still	plausible)	way	at	all. Most	scholars	have	thus	focused	on	the	physical	account,	treating the	previously	introduced	three	ways	of	having	but	not	using	knowledge	as	mere	preliminary	distinctions.25	The	problem	is	that	the	physical	account	appears	inconsistent.	It	describes	the	state	of	mind	of	the uncontrolled	agent	by	means	of	a	practical	syllogism	which	Aristotle introduces	at	1147a24–31.	The	first	challenge	is	that	according	to	the central	passage	of	the	account,	the	so-called	"two-syllogism"26	passage 21. Bostock	(2000,	127). 22. Ibid. 23. See	Austin	(1979,	198)	for	an	example	of	an	interpretation	of	Aristotle	(and Plato)	along	these	lines. 24.	Kenny	(1966). 25. The	traditional	view	has	been	to	see	them	as	the	first	three	of	the	gradually more	refined	solutions,	so	that	only	the	physical	account	is	in	fact	the	actual solution.	See,	for	example,	Gauthier	and	Jolif (1970,	605);	Joachim	(1955,	223); and	Robinson	(1969,	141).	A	similar	approach	has	been	recently	championed by	Whiting	and	Pickavé	(2008).	An	alternative	proposal	(one	more	akin	to the	interpretation	I	argue	for	in	this	paper)	has	been	put	forward	by	Corcilius (2008a),	who	argues	that	the	first	part	is	concerned	with	knowledge	of	the uncontrolled	agent	whereas	the	second	part	with	the	uncontrolled	action. 26. I	call	it	the	"two-syllogism"	passage	because	it	has	been	thought	to	contain jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) particular	premise	with	one	universal	premise	but	fail to	use	it	with another,	given	that	she	is	supposed	to	be	actively	attending	to	all	the premises	in	question.31	These	two	versions	of	the	first	strategy	are	thus exegetically	difficult,	since	the	former	has	to	postulate	the	presence	of an	additional	premise,32	and	the	latter	has	to	appeal	to	the	ability	of appetites	to	selectively	hijack	premises	away	from	reason's	(although not	the	agent's)	awareness.33 31. There	are	a	number	of	similar	interpretations,	each	with	significant	individual	variations.	For	some	of	the	classic	versions,	see	Joachim	(1955,	228);	Hardie (1981,	258–93);	and	Gauthier	and	Jolif	(2002,	602–17). 32.	Gosling (1990,	33–7)	also	argues that the	uncontrolled	agent fails to	use	a particular	premise,	but	it	is	not	the	particular	premise	"this	is	sweet"	(which is	needed	to	draw	the	good	conclusion)	but,	rather,	the	other	particular	premise	distinguished	earlier	at	NE	7.3,	1146b35–1147a10	that	concerns	the	agent and that is	also	needed if	one is to	act	according to the	universal	premise. The	agent fails to realize that	she is the	sort	of	person	whom	the	decision concerns since	appetite	makes the	agent forget that.	The	upshot is that although the agent	may perfectly	well know all the good premises and the good	conclusion,	they	lose	any	practical	import	for	him.	I	may	know	that	one should	not	eat sweets (and so	one should	not	eat the sweets that I see in front	of	me)	but	that	would	only	apply	to	me	if	I	was	interested	in	my	health. In the	uncontrolled	action	my	appetite	makes	me	temporarily lose interest in	health	(or	forget	that	I	am	interested	in	it)	and	so	I	will	take	some	sweets while	still	being	perfectly	well	aware	of	my	previous	reasoning.	Gosling's	solution	faces	various	problems.	First,	if	I	drink	wine	despite	my	decision	not to	drink	wine	when	driving	because	I	am	currently	unaware	of	the	fact	that I	am	the	driver,	then	it	is	not	clear	why	my	action	is	not	to	be	classified	as	a case	of	absentmindedness	rather	than	of	lack	of	control	(see	my	discussion	of 1146b35–47a10	below).	Second,	why	would	the	agent	be	thinking	(other	than by chance)	of the	universal	premise (as the	physical account suggests she does),	if	she	does	not	know	or	has	forgotten	that	it	applies	to	her? 33. Sarah	Broadie	attempts to	deal	with this	problem	by	proposing that in	NE 7.3	the	expressions	"knowledge	is	used"	and	"knowledge	is	active"	(or	"contemplated") are not interchangeable (Broadie and Rowe [54–57; 391–94]). She	interprets	"used"	as	meaning	"used	as	it	should	be	used,"	and	"active"	as meaning	"to	be	acted	upon."	Hence,	when	at	1147a33	Aristotle	says	that	"this is sweet" is active, it is still an	open	question	whether it is also	used	as it should	be	used.	In	fact,	it	is	not	used	as	it	should	be	used	since	the	agent	acts wrongly	upon	it	(instead	of	avoiding	the	sweet,	she	goes	for	it).	But	this	interpretation	cannot	be	supported	by	the	text	NE 7.3.	When	drawing	the	first	distinction	between	having	and	using	and	having	but	not	using	one's	knowledge (1146b31–35),	Aristotle	switches	freely	from	"use"	(chrēsthai)	to	"contemplate" (theōrein)	and	the	text	gives	no	incentive	to	interpret	"contemplate"	otherwise agent	to	draw	the	good	conclusion.	According	to	the	first	strategy,	the uncontrolled	agent	fails	to	draw	the	good	conclusion	since,	if	she	did, she	would	not	have	acted	without	control.	Because	Aristotle	says	that an	agent	must	draw	the	conclusion	when	both	the	universal	and	the particular	premises	are	present,	the	uncontrolled	agent's	failure	to	do so is	generally	explained	by	her failure to	grasp,	or	actively	hold in mind,	one	of	the	relevant	premises.	In	other	words,	the	cause	of	the uncontrolled	action is to	be located in	a	cognitive failure.	The traditional	approach	has	been	to	argue	that	the	agent	fails	to	grasp	the	particular	premise.29 All interpretations	based	on	this	strategy	run	into	a	similar	set	of problems.	First,	they	need	to	explain	why	the	particular	premise	is	said to	be	active	in	the	"two-syllogism"	passage	and,	in	fact,	the	agent	appears	to	be	drawing	the	good	conclusion.	One	solution	is	to	argue	that the	active	premise	is	not	the	one	leading	to	the	good	conclusion,	but to	the	bad	one	(i. e.,	there	are	in	fact	two	particular	premises,	although only	one	of them	is	mentioned	explicitly).30	The	uncontrolled	agent acts	as she	does,	because	she is solely focused	on the	attractive feature	of	what	she	desires,	ignoring	or	not	being	aware	that	the	object also	has	a	feature	that	made	her	decide	against	it.	The	problem	is	that it seems	perfectly conceivable that one can	be attracted and	not attracted	to	the	same	thing	in	the	very	same	respect.	One	may	have	an appetite	for	deep-fried	things,	precisely	because	their	being	deep-fried makes	them	pleasant	to	eat.	But	one	may	have	also	decided	not	to	eat deep-fried	things	because	they	are	unhealthy.	It	is	mysterious	how	one could	notice	that	something	is	pleasant	but	not	that	it	is	unhealthy,	if	it is	perceived	to	be	both	precisely	in	virtue	of	its	being	deep-fried. Another solution has been to argue that the premise is active, but	not in relation to	one's	decision,	but	only to	one's	appetite,	having	been	"hijacked"	by	it.	One	problem	with	a	view	along	these	lines is that it is unclear how the uncontrolled agent can use the same 29.	Examples	include:	Price	(2006);	Grgić	(2002);	Gosling	(1990);	Mele	(1985). 30.	For	a	classic	statement	of	this	view,	see	Robinson	(1969). jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) or	fickleness.	Another	problem	concerns the	way in	which	appetite is	supposed	to	make	the	agent	forget	her	decision.	One	way	in	which it could	do	so is	by	making the	agent ignore the relevant	particular premise.36	But	then,	similarly	to	the	preceding	case,	we	need	an	explanation	of	how	appetite	can	make	one	unaware	of	some	feature	of	one's situation if that feature could just	have served	as the	basis	of one's deliberation	and	decision. All	interpretations	based	on	the	first	strategy	solve	the	problem	of how	an	uncontrolled	agent	can	both	act	against	her	knowledge	while knowing	that	she	is	doing	so	and	yet	not	violate	the	dictum	that	acting against	actively	held	knowledge	is	impossible	by	making	the	agent	ignorant	(in	one	way	or	another)	of	the	fact	that,	at	the	moment	she	acts, she is acting against her knowledge.	Although this is a possible account	of	uncontrolled	actions,	it	comes	too	close	to	the	Socratic	denial of	uncontrolled	actions	and	moves	too	far	away	from	Aristotle's	claim that	the	uncontrolled	agent	knows,	even	if	only	in a way,	that	what	she does	is	wrong	(1152a14–6). The	second	strategy	tries	to	avoid	this	problem	by	arguing	that	although	the	agent	knows	that	she	is	acting	in	that	way,	her	knowledge	is somehow	not	full-fledged:	it	is,	one	might	say,	merely	theoretical.	The failure	is	thus	motivational	rather	than	cognitive.	This	strategy	begins by	arguing	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	draws	the	good	conclusion	(i. e., she	does	not	lack	any	of	the	premises)	but	that,	despite	doing	so,	she does	not	act	on	it.	Interpretations	along	these	lines	have	an	easier	time explaining	the	content	of	the	"two-syllogism"	passage	since	they	can take	it	at	face	value.37	But	they	face	another	problem	-	why	does	the agent	not	act	on	her	conclusion?	One	prominent	interpretation	claims that	it	is	because	her	mode	of	holding	that	conclusion	is	in	some	way 36.	Whiting	and	Pickavé	(2008,	335). 37. However,	they	then	have	to	argue	that	Aristotle	is	not	committed	to	the	view that	if	the	agent	has	and	actively	attends	to	both	premises	then	he	must	necessarily act	on them,	as the	passage	preceding the "two-syllogism"	passage appears	to	claim	(1147a24–31).	I	discuss	this	passage	in	section	3. Even	in	putting	these	issues	aside,	however,	there	are	two	difficult problems	that	tend	to	undermine	most,	if	not	all,	interpretations	along these lines. First, there is no viable explanation of how the uncontrolled	agent	suddenly	becomes	unaware	or	unable to	grasp the relevant	premise	-	especially	since	it	is	quite	possible	(as	well	as	highly probable) that the agent has	made her decision (i. e., the universal premise	-	say,	not	to	eat	sweets)	in	view	of	her	awareness	that	there are some	sweets	available (i. e., the	particular	premise).	Second, the lack	of	the	relevant	particular	premise	threatens	to	render	the	uncontrolled	action	involuntary:	if	the	agent	does	not	know	or	is	not	aware that	the	object	she	wants	(or	the	action	she	is	to	take)	has	the	feature that	made	her	decide	against	it	(say,	being	sweet),	then	her	engaging	in the	action	under	that	description	(say,	eating	sweets)	is	not	voluntary.34 In view	of these	problems, a recent approach,	developed	by Jennifer	Whiting	and	Martin	Pickavé, takes the	cognitive failure to	concern	the	universal	proposition	(i. e.,	the	agent's	decision)	rather	than the	particular	one.35	On	their	view,	the	agent's	appetite	impedes	her knowledge	of	the	universal	belief	prohibitive	of	the	uncontrolled	action.	She	consequently	does	not	or	perhaps	cannot	bring	this	knowledge	from	the	first	to	the	second	actuality	and	so	is	unable	to	refrain from	the	action.	In	other	words,	the	agent	temporarily	forgets	about her decision on account of her appetite.	One problem	with this interpretation is that the uncontrolled agent does not act against her decision	in	the	way	in	which	her	action	would	qualify	as	a	case	of	lack of	control	-	as	opposed	to,	for	example,	a	case	of	mere	forgetfulness, than as an alternative expression for "use." In the next passage (1146b35– 1147a7),	Aristotle says that it is	not strange to	act	against	one's	knowledge (i. e.,	one's	universal	premise)	when	not	using	the	particular	premise	that	goes with	it	(1147a2–3).	After	giving	an	example	of	the	premise	("this	here	is	such and	such")	he	says	that	the	agent	either	does	not	have	or	does	not	activate (energein)	it	(1147a7).	It	is	quite	clear	that	"activate"	and	"use"	are	used	interchangeably	in	this	passage. 34.	One	could	take	the	view	that	the	uncontrolled	action	is	involuntary,	but	this is	not	Aristotle's	view	(1152a14–6). 35.	Whiting	and	Pickavé	(2008). jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) out control, is in	possession	of	her knowledge	but she is	unable to use	it	as knowledge	due	to	the	temporary	disablement	of	her	reason by	appetite	(I	will	explain	this	in	section	2).	In	this	sense,	she	knows but	also	does	not	know	(1147a14–5).	Although	the	inability	to	use	her knowledge	as knowledge	has	little	impact	on	her	ability	to	act	in	general,	it	does	inhibit	her	ability	to	be	motivated	to	act	by	her	knowledge (and	so	by	her	own	decisions).	Second,	I	argue	that	the	physical	discussion	provides	an	analysis	of	the	particular mental	state	from	which the	uncontrolled	action issues.	The "two-syllogism"	passage (NE 7.3, 1147a31–5)	is	a	description	of	the	uncontrolled	agent's	state	of	mind	before	the	uncontrolled	action	and	not,	as	it	has	been	traditionally	understood,	a	description	of	her	state	of	mind	during	the	uncontrolled	action. Understood	this	way, the two	parts	of	NE 7.3	are	answers to two different	questions.	The	first	part	provides	an	answer	to	the	question about	the	possibility	of	uncontrolled	behavior	in	light	of	Aristotle's	assumptions	about	the	impossibility	of	acting	against	one's	knowledge or	decision.	The	second	part	identifies	the	local	or	immediate	causes of	uncontrolled	action	(appetitive	desire	and	perception	of	something that would satisfy it) as they must be present in the uncontrolled agent's	mind before the uncontrolled action occurs (i. e., before the agent	slips	into	the	state	in	which	he	acts	without	control).	Aristotle needs	both	accounts	to	capture	the	uncontrolled	agent	since	neither the	account	of	her	state	of	mind	during	the	uncontrolled	action	nor of	her	state	of	mind	before	it	are	distinctive	of	her	(the	former	applies also	to	other	agents,	such	as	those	who	are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep,	and the	latter	applies	also	to	self-controlled	agents).	This	explains	the	presence	of	both	accounts	in	the	chapter	(assigning	them	distinctive	and important roles) and avoids the various exegetical problems I have mentioned	above. Third, I argue that	Aristotle	does	not, in	NE 7.3,	offer	an	account of	the	transition	from	the	state	before	the	uncontrolled	action	(i. e.,	a other	texts	and	passages	to	which	Aristotle	alludes	in	NE 7.3.	As	Myles	Burnyeat	(2002,	31–2)	remarks,	the	cross-references	in	Aristotle's	works	can	offer "guidance	as	to	how	a	particular	stretch	of	a	writing	should	be	read." "off-color." 38 She	draws	the	good	conclusion,	but	lacks	the	motivation to	carry	it	out. The	problem	with	this	interpretation	is	that	it	works	well	as	a	characterization	of	the	uncontrolled	agent's	general	condition	but	not	as an	explanation	of	her	uncontrolled	action.	The	uncontrolled	agent's knowledge	seems	to	be	"off-color"	all	the	time,	not	only	on	the	specific	occasion	of	the	uncontrolled	action,	since	not	all	her	desires	reflect her	knowledge	of	what	is	best	for	her	to	do.	But	NE 7.3	makes	clear that	the	general	condition	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	not	sufficient to	explain	particular	uncontrolled	actions:	it	tells	us	that	during	the uncontrolled	action,	the	agent	is	in	some	abnormal	or	impaired	cognitive condition from	which condition the agent recovers after the uncontrolled	action	(1147b6–9).39 1.4. The main theses In	this	paper,	I	argue	for	three	main	theses.	First,	I	argue	that	the	first part	of	NE 7.3	(the	so-called	"logical"	account) is	not	a	mere	preliminary	stage	in	Aristotle's	investigation	but	that	it	contains	the	description of the overall state of	mind	of the agent	while she acts	without control.	The	core	of	Aristotle's	solution	lies	in	an	analogy	between	the uncontrolled	agent	and	people	who	are	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep,	which, however,	does	not	commit	Aristotle	to	the	view	that	the	uncontrolled agent's	state	of	mind	is	clouded	or	unclear	in	the	way	in	which	it	has been	thought	to	do	so	in	the	literature.	But	in	order	to	reconstruct	the precise	point	of	the	analogy,	one	needs	to	follow	the	trail	of	the	various	non-standard	cognitive	states	of	mind	in	Aristotle's	psychological writings.40	As it turns	out, the	uncontrolled	agent,	while	acting	with38.	The	best	example	of	this	interpretation	is	developed	in	Charles	(1984,	109– 160).	See	also	Charles	(2009)	and	Dahl	(1984). 39.	One	possibility	would	be to argue that the agent's knowledge	or decision becomes "off-color"	only	on the relevant	occasion.	But then there	must	be something	that	explains	what	made	it	"off-color"	at	that	time	in	the	first	place. In	other	words,	pointing	to	the	"off-color"	nature	of	the	knowledge	at	the	time of	the	action	is	a	way	of	describing	the	phenomenon,	but	not	of	explaining	it. 40.	My	interpretation	relies	on	connecting	the	textual	evidence	in	the	chapter	to jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) does	is	wrong,	believing	that	it	is,	at	least	at	the	moment	she	acts,	the best	thing	to	do	(NE 7.2,	1145b23–32). According	to the	first	way	(1146b30–5),	one	can	act	against	one's knowledge	that	what	one	does	is	bad	provided	one	fails	to	use	or	attend	to	it	at	the	relevant	time.	Here	is	an	example:	Vrinda	decides	not to	drink	wine	at	a	party	because,	once	the	party	is	over,	she	has	to	drive a	car.	But	she	gets	so	caught	up	in	a	conversation	that	she	absentmindedly	pours	herself	a	glass	of	wine	and	drinks	it,	not	realizing	that	she does	what	she	decided	she	would	not	do.	Her	mind	was	too	intent	on the	current	activity	and	so	she	failed	to	make	the	appropriate	connection.	Socrates'	view	needs	to	be	modified	to	accommodate	cases	of	this sort:	it	is	impossible	to	act	against	one's	knowledge,	unless	one	does not	use	or	attend	to	the	knowledge	at	the	time	one	acts.	However,	this distinction	is	compatible	with	the	view	that	uncontrolled	action	is	impossible.	One	could	maintain	that	if	Vrinda	were	not	absent-minded and	attended	to	the	fact	that	what	she	is	about	to	drink	is	wine,	she would	not	have	poured	herself a glass.	And if she	poured	herself a glass	without	being	absent-minded, this	could	be	best	explained	by her	re-evaluating	her	original	decision. According to the second	way (1146b35–47a10), one can even act against	knowledge	that	one	uses	or	attends	to	at	the	time	one	acts.	Aristotle	distinguishes	between	two	different	kinds	of	propositions	(protaseis)	that	are	operative	in	one's	action.41	On	the	one	hand,	there	are universal	propositions	that	represent	one's	knowledge	or	beliefs	about what	one thinks is good	or	bad to	do (and so also	one's	decisions), such	as	one's	belief	that	drinking	is	impermissible	for	those	who	drive. On	the	other	hand,	there	are	particular	propositions,	which	represent one's	knowledge	or	awareness	of	various	particular facts	relevant to 41. Aristotle	sometimes	distinguishes	propositions	(protaseis) that	serve	as	premises from	those	that	are the	conclusions from	those	premises	and	uses the term	protasis (as	opposed	to	sumperasma)	to	refer	to	the	premises	in	those	contexts.	As	nothing	in	what	I	say	depends	on	whether	we	translate	protasis as premise	or	proposition,	I	continue	to	use	both	terms	as	translations	of	protasis, depending	on	what	seems	the	best	in	the	context.	See	Charles	(1984,	120)	for a	discussion	of	this	problem. state	in	which	the	agent	is	still	sticking	to	her	decision	and	resisting the	uncontrolled	desire)	to	the	state	in	which	she	already	acts	without control.	In	other	words,	he	does	not	explain	what	tips	the	scales	and prompts the agent to succumb to the non-rational desire.	However, in	referring	the	reader	to	"physiologists"	(1147b9)	for	this	account,	he provides us	with a vital clue to understand	what his account is (or would	be)	and	why	it	is	not	present	in	his	discussion	of	uncontrolled action	in	EN.	In	particular,	the	account	does	not	involve	any	psychological	state	that	would	constitute	the	agent's	choice	to	abandon	her decision	and	give	in	to	her	desires.	The	transition	proceeds	on	a	purely physiological	level. The	structure	of	the	paper	is	as	follows.	In	section	2,	I	discuss	the first	part	(1146b31–47a24)	of	Aristotle's	discussion	of	uncontrolled	action	in	NE 7.3	in	which	Aristotle	introduces	three	ways	of	knowing	but not	using	one's	knowledge. I	argue that the third	way is the	clue to Aristotle's theory	of the	state	of	mind	of the	uncontrolled	agent	during	her	uncontrolled	action.	In	section	3,	I	discuss	the	"physical"	part of	Aristotle's	discussion	of	lack	of	control	(1147a25–b5).	I	focus	on	the famous	"two-syllogism"	passage,	arguing	that	it	is	best	interpreted	as Aristotle's	description	of the	state	of	mind	of the	uncontrolled	agent before	her	uncontrolled	action.	In	section	4,	I	discuss	and	explain	Aristotle's	claim	(1147b13–7)	that	Socrates'	account	also	"comes	about"	in his	theory.	In	section	5,	I	conclude	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	voluntariness	of	uncontrolled	actions	as	Aristotle	conceives	of	them. 2. The first part of Aristotle's discussion (1146b30–47a24) 2.1. The first two ways of knowing but not using knowledge (1146b30–47a10) Aristotle	starts	solving	the	puzzle	(1146b8–9)	by	distinguishing	three ways	of	having	but	not	using	knowledge	(1146b31–1147a24).	These	distinctions	are	introduced	as	objections	to	Socrates'	view	that	while	acting	without	control,	the	uncontrolled	agent	cannot	be	acting	against her	knowledge	but,	rather,	must	be	ignorant	of	the	fact	that	what	she jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) fact that	one's	knowledge is applicable.	On the	contrary, it involves acting	as	one	knows	or	believes	one	should	not	act	when	one	knows one	should	not	act	that	way	(e. g.,	1146b34).43 2.2. The third way of having but not using knowledge (1147a10–7) Aristotle	thus	introduces	yet	another	way	of	having	but	not	using	one's knowledge that is	now	explicitly	supposed to illuminate the	case	of uncontrolled	action: (1)	But	human	beings	also	have	knowledge	in	a	different way	from	the	ones	described.	For	we	see	that in	having but not using, the state (tēn hexin)44 can differ, so that someone	both	has	[knowledge] in	a	way	and	also	does not	have	it,	as	with	someone	who	is	asleep,	mad,	or	drunk (ton katheudonta kai mainomenon kai oinōmenon).	But	those who	are	in	affective	states	are	in	fact	in	that	condition.	For spirited	desires,	sexual	appetites,	and	some	such	experiences	clearly	disturb	the	body	as	well,	and	even	produce fits	of	madness in	some	people. It is clear then that	we should	say	that	the	state	of	uncontrolled people	is	like	the state	of	these	people.	(1147a10–7) The	passage	makes	several	crucial	claims.	First,	one	can	have	but	not be	using	one's	knowledge	in	such	a	way	that	one	can	be	said	both	to have	it	(in	a	way),	but	also	not	to	have	it.	Second,	this	sort	of	way	of having	but	not	using	one's	knowledge	is	characteristic	of	people	who 43. Irwin	(1988)	suggests	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	initially	unaware	of	her future	bad	appetites	and	so	fails	to	anticipate	them.	She	thus	makes	a	decision	in	which	the	presence	of	those	appetites	is	not	taken	into	account.	It	is,	of course,	possible	that	sometimes	one's	decisions	are	of	the	sort	Irwin	describes. But	it	seems	that	often	when	one	makes	a	decision	not	to	do	something	one does	so	because	one	anticipates	that	one	will	feel	like	doing	it	in	the	future. It	seems	highly	unlikely	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	would	be	continuously unaware	of	her	own	bad	desires	that	she	is	repeatedly	trying	to	resist. 44. Alternatively, hē hexis could mean "the having." In that case what differs would	be	the	having:	it	is	possible	to	have,	while	also,	in	a	way,	not	to	have the	knowledge	that	one	does	not	use. one's	action	(e. g.	that	one	is	the	driver,	or	that	the	beverage	in	one's glass	is	alcoholic).	As	Aristotle	explains,	one	can	end	up	acting	against a	universal	proposition	(to	which	one	might	well	attend	at	the	time) if	one	fails	to	use	some	relevant	particular	proposition.	The	above	example	can	be	modified	to	fit	this	case.	The	conversation	Vrinda	gets caught	up	in	concerns	drinking	and	driving.	She	fiercely	defends	her view	that	one	should	never	drink	before	driving,	yet	she	drinks	a	glass of	wine, because she temporarily forgets (being too intent on arguing	her	case)	that	she	herself	has	to	drive	later	that	day.	She	thus	acts against	knowledge	to	which	she	is	actively	attending.42 Socrates' view	needs to be	modified further. It is possible to act against	one's	knowledge,	provided	that	either	one	does	not	use	or	attend	to	it	at	the	time	one	acts,	or	that,	although	attending	to	it	at	the time	one	acts,	one	is	unaware	that	it	is	applicable	to	one's	situation	in the	relevant	way.	Although this	distinction	allows for	action	against active	knowledge,	it	is	still	compatible	with	the	view	that	uncontrolled action	is	impossible.	One	could	maintain	that	if	Vrinda	recalled,	at	the crucial	moment,	that	she	is	a	driver	that	evening,	she	would	not	have poured	herself	a	glass.	And	if	she	did,	this	would	be	best	explained	by her	re-evaluating	her	original	decision. In	neither	of	these	two	distinctions	does	Aristotle	specify	any	particular	reason	why	one	does	not	attend	to	the	relevant	piece	of	knowledge	or	premise	at	the	time	one	acts.	It is left	open	whether	it is	because	the	agent	does	not	know,	temporarily	forgets,	or	some	cognitive failure	is	in	place.	Actions	in	which	one	acts	against	knowledge	in	this way can thus include cases of forgetfulness, absentmindedness, distraction,	confusion,	excitement,	or	simple	ignorance.	But	uncontrolled action	does	not	involve	lack	of	knowledge	or	lack	of	awareness	of	the 42. Commentators	often	think	that	the	particular	proposition	in	which	the	universal	term	refers	to	the	agent	is	irrelevant,	on	the	grounds	that	in	the	MA Aristotle	says	that	the	particular	premise	which	refers	to	the	agent,	is	obvious	and	thought	"does	not	stop	to	consider	it"	(701a	25).	But	as	my	example makes	clear,	it	is	possible	not	to	know	some	relevant	facts	about	oneself,	or not	attend	to	them,	and	to	act	against	the	knowledge	one	is	actively	attending	to	because	of that.	For	a	discussion,	see	Kenny	(1979,	156–7).	See	also Perry	(1979). jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) the	states	of	mind	it	mentions.49	We	must	thus	look	for	illumination elsewhere.	We	can	begin	with	a	passage	in	the	Physics	which	contains a	useful	remark	on	the	state	of	mind	of	the	people	in	the	conditions mentioned	in	NE 7.3: (2)	Further, just	as	with	someone	who	has	passed from being	drunk,	asleep,	or	being	sick	(ek tou methuein ē katheudein ē nosein)	into	its	contrary,	we	do	not	say	that	he	has become	knowing	again,	despite	the	fact	that	he	was	previously	not	able	to	use	his	knowledge.	(Phys. 247b13–5) Despite some terminological	differences, the states	of	mind that	Aristotle	mentions in this	passage	are identical to the	conditions	mentioned	in	the	passage	in	NE 7.3.	In	the	NE 7.3	passage	(as	well	as	at	NE 7.10,	1152a15),	Aristotle	uses	the	verb	oinoomai	(to	be	drunk	or	tipsy) to	describe	the	drunk	agent.	It	is	sometimes	thought	that	the	fact	that the	word	oinōmenos can	be	used to	describe	people	who	are	merely tipsy	(rather	than	dead	drunk)	is	of	significance	in	the	context	of	the discussion	of	lack	of	control.	However,	in	the	Physics	passage,	in	what surely appears to be the articulation of the same thought,	Aristotle 49. Perhaps	the	only	obvious	point	of	the	analogy	is	that	it	compares	or	likens	the ways	in	which	the	people	in	the	grip	of	passions	(and	so	also	the	uncontrolled people)	on the	one	hand,	and the	mad,	drunk	and	sleeping	people	on the other	hand,	relate	to	their	knowledge.	The	analogy	leaves	it,	however,	quite undetermined	what	the	nature	of	the	relationship	to	one's	knowledge	is	supposed	to	be	like.	If	taken	in	isolation,	it	forces	the	interpreter	to	supply	an	answer	which	can,	however,	very	well	make	the	analogy	strained.	For	example, Corcilius	(2008a,	153–4)	suggests	that	the	uncontrolled	agent's	emotions	are not	in	the	right	relation	to	her	knowledge.	But	it	is	difficult	to	see	not	only why	one	should	think	that	it	is	a	significant	feature	of	the	drunk	or	sleeping people	that	their	emotions	are	not	in	the	right	relation	to	their	knowledge	but also	why	that	should	have	any	explanatory	power	in	relation	to	their	inability to	use	that	knowledge.	What	is	at	stake	is	not	the	fact	that	emotions	hinder the uncontrolled agent from	using her knowledge.	Aristotle takes that for granted	and	so	he includes,	without	any	argument, the	uncontrolled	agent among	those	who	are	in	the	grip	of	emotions.	What	is	at	stake	is	an	elucidation	of	the	way	in	which	this	can	happen.	Aristotle	uses	the	analogy	between people	who	are	in	the	grip	of	passions	and	those	who	are	in	the	mad,	drunk, or	sleeping	state,	in	order	to	clarify	the	case	of	lack	of	control	which,	in	his view,	falls	into	the	broader	category	of	people	in	the	grip	of	passions. are	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep.	Third,	people	who	are	in	the	grip	of	emotions are also in such a condition.45 As	Aristotle says, various emotional	states,	such	as	spirited	desires	and	sexual	appetites,	can,	in	some people	and	on	some	occasions,	alter	a	person's	bodily	condition,	and thus	also	his	state	of	soul	or	mind.46	Fourth,	since	uncontrolled	people follow	their	non-rational	impulses	or	feelings	against	reason,	Aristotle concludes	that	their	state	of	mind	(with	respect	to	knowledge)	is	like that	of	the	people	in	the	grip	of	emotions.	When	they	act	without	control,	they	have,	but	are	not	using,	their	knowledge	in	the	way	in	which drunk,	mad,	or	sleeping	people	also	have	but	are	not	using	it.47 When	Aristotle	asserts	that	the	uncontrolled	agent's	state	of	mind is like	or	similar	(homoiōs)	to	that	of	people	who	are	drunk,	mad,	or asleep,	he	can	mean	that	there	is	only	a	resemblance	between	those states.	But	it	is	more	likely	that	Aristotle	means	that	the	same	account48 of	the	way	in	which	one	can	have	but	not	be	using	one's	knowledge applies	to	all	of	them.	A	mention	of	mere	resemblance	(without	specifying	any	further	details)	between	the	states	would	not	be	illuminating.	However, the	passage	does	not	offer	any	further	explanation	of the	relevant	way	of	having	but	not	using	knowledge	that	pertains	to 45. Obviously	not	all	people	who	experience	emotions	are	controlled	by	them. But	Aristotle's point is that people sometimes experience emotions	which are	such	that	they	disturb	their	bodies	and	minds	to	the	extent	that	they	can sometimes	"even	produce	fits	of	madness."	In	saying	this,	he	makes	clear	that he	has in	mind cases in	which emotions	have	decisive influence	over the agent's	rational	abilities. 46. I	take	it	that	in	kai to sōma	at	1147a16	the	kai	points	to	soul,	or	mind	(alternatively	one	can	supply	knowledge	as	that is	the	subject	of	discussion,	but it seems	to	me	preferable	to	supply	soul	as	the	counterpart	of	body). 47. This	claim	is	repeated	again	at	NE 7.10,	1152a15	and	should	be	compared	with MM 1201b9–23. 48. There	are	many	passages	in	which	homoiōs can	be	translated	as	meaning	"in the	same	way." See,	for	example,	DA 402b8,	404b6,	or	407a25.	Of	course,	Aristotle	is	not	saying	that	their	overall states	of	minds	are	exactly	the	same;	if he	wanted	to,	he	could	have	said,	for	example,	that	their	minds	are	all	in	the same	way	(ton auton tropon echei).	His	point	concerns	only	the	way	they	have but	do	not	use	their	knowledge. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) that the conditions of being drunk, mad, and asleep have in common: they are global conditions affecting the agent's knowledge indiscriminately	and	across the	board. In	other	words,	Aristotle is	not likening	uncontrolled	action	to	a	case	of	forgetfulness	(amnēmosunē), self-deception	(heautōn exapatān),52	inattentiveness	(aprosexia),	or	any other	such	condition	which	makes	one	unable	to	use	or	to	focus	on some	specific	piece	of	knowledge.	This	comes	up	clearly	in	passages	in which	Aristotle	makes	the	various	conditions	we	discussed	so	far	(i. e., sleep,	disease,	emotions,	desires)	responsible	for	disabling	one's	mind (nous) or	reasoning	(logismos)	across the board: (3)	And	because	phantasiai persist	in	us	and	are	similar	to perceptions,	animals	often	act	according to them,	some because	they	don't	have	mind, like	the	brutes,	some	because	the	mind	is	temporarily	covered	over	(epikaluptesthai)	by	emotion,	or	disease,	or	sleep,	like	human	beings. (DA 3.3,	429a4–8) (4)53 For it is so in the case of persons	who are drunk (methuontōn).	For	those	who	are	drunk,	when	the	drunkenness	(methē)	has	passed	off,	are	themselves	again.	Reason	(logos)	was	not	expelled	from	them,	nor	was	knowledge,	but	it	was	overcome	by	the	drunkenness;	and	when they	have	got	rid	of	the	drunkenness,	they	are	themselves again.	So,	then,	it	is	with	the	uncontrolled	person.	His	affection	(pathos) gains	the	mastery	and	brings	his	reasoning	(logismos)	to	a	standstill.	But	when	the	affection,	like 52. See	Pol. 1260a25	for	the	use	of	this	expression.	Aristotle's	account	of	lack	of control	is	interpreted	as	a	case	of	self-deception	by	Corcilius	(2008a). 53. Although it is	generally	not the	best	practice to	use	doctrines from	Magna Moralia as	evidence,	in	this	case	it	seems	to	me	that	we	are	entitled	to	do	so because the doctrine it spells out is fully consistent	with textual evidence from	elsewhere,	and	it	makes	explicit	a	point	which	other	passages	contain implicitly. uses	the	stronger	word	methuō (to	be	drunk)	and	the	same	stronger verb	is	also	used	in	MM at	1202a1–7	(translated	below),	where	Aristotle	(or	the	author	of	MM)	draws	another	analogy	between	the	drunk and	the	uncontrolled	agent.	Even	if	one	doubts	the	MM passage,	the passage	in	the	Phys. is	sufficient	to	show	that	it	is	highly	unlikely	that Aristotle	would	use these two	words, in the	same	contexts, to	mark distinct	states.50	In	any	case,	my	interpretation	of	the	analogy	does	not require that the	agent is	dead	drunk	(in fact, this	would	undermine it),	but	only that	she is	sufficiently	under the influence	of	wine that she	is	no	longer	sober	and	this	condition	can	very	well	be	described by	both	words.	Rather	than	the	mad	(mainomenos) agent	in	NE 7.3,	we have	now	someone	who	is	sick	(nosein).	But	these	two	words	can	be taken	as	equivalent	since	both	words	(in	Greek)	can	signify	temporary "disease"	of	the	mind	due	to	rage,	passion,	or	desire. According to passage 2, people sometimes end	up in conditions, such	as	being	drunk,	mad,	or	asleep	in	which	they	temporarily	cannot use	their	knowledge.	When	passages	1	and	2	are	put	together,	they	imply	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	while	acting	without	control	is	also	in such	a	condition:	she	cannot	use	her	knowledge	which	she	nevertheless	still	possesses.51	This	is	the	first	and	the	most	obvious	point	of	the analogy	and	one	clearly	attested	by	textual	evidence. Another	point	becomes	clear	once	one	focuses	on	a	notable	feature 50.	These	two	words	are	used	synonymously	by	Plato	at	Leg. 775b–d:	"To	drink	to the	point	of	inebriation	(eis methēn)	is	not	proper	at	any	place,	except	for	the feasts	of	the	god	who	made	us	the	gift	of	wine,	and	it	is	dangerous	too,	and	so especially	for	those	who	take	marriage	seriously.	...it	is	necessary	that	procreation	not	be	performed	when	the	bodies	are	dissolved	by	inebriation	(hupo methēs)...	But	one	who	is	drunk	(diōnōmenos)	moves	and	is	moved	around	in every	way,	raging	both	body	and	soul."	Similarly,	Euripides	uses	oinoomai in Bacchae	(685–90)	to	mark	the	stronger	state	of	inebriation.	It	is	true,	of	course, that	oinoomai can	be	and	often	is	used	to	express	a	moderate	state	of	being drunk,	whereas	methuō is	more	exclusively	tied	to	being	visibly	drunk.	Both can,	however,	be	used	to	simply	denote	a	general	state	of	not	being	sober.	If Aristotle	wanted	to	contrast	being	drunk	with	being	merely	tipsy,	he	could have	used	other,	more	exact	words.	So,	at	Prob. 875a29–875a40,	one	who	is methuōn is	contrasted	with	one	who	is	akrothōrax,	which	word	unambiguously means	"slightly	drunk"	or	"tipsy."	See	also	note	71	below. 51. For	this	point,	see	also	Zingano	(2007). jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) made	intelligible	as	an	account	of	lack	of	control.	But	before	doing	so, I	want	to	address	two	immediate	worries.	First,	one	might	think	that any such general incapacitation of reason or	mind	would require a rather	intense	onset	of	emotions	and	that	this	would	severely	restrict the	kind	of	uncontrolled	behavior	Aristotle's	theory	(as	I	interpret	it) can	explain.	Second,	one	might think that the	very idea	of the incapacitation	of reason is implausible	as	an	explanation	of	any	kind	of uncontrolled	action. The	first	worry	might	lead	one	to	point	to	NE 7.6,	where	Aristotle distinguishes	between	two	kinds	of	uncontrolled	agents.	On	the	one hand,	there	are	the	weak	uncontrolled	agents	who	"having	deliberated do not stick to the results of their deliberation on account of affection (pathos)" (1150b21–2).	On the	other	hand, there	are the impetuous	uncontrolled	agents	who	"are	led	by	their	affection	on	account	of not	having	deliberated"	(1150b22–3).	So,	when	Aristotle	says	that	the weak	uncontrolled	agents	succumb	to	pleasures	or	temptations	smaller	(1151a1)	than	the	impetuous	agents,	it	might	be	thought	that	the	appetites	of	the	weak	uncontrolled	agents	are	just	not	strong	enough	to produce	the	kind	of	disablement	required	for	my	account.	Right	from the	start,	then,	my	account	of	the	meaning	of	NE 7.3,	1147a10–7	would be	well-suited	only	for	the	impetuous	type	of	the	uncontrolled	agent in	whom	appetites	are	quick	or	intense	(1150b27). The	proper answer to this objection can	only be given	once	my account	is	fully	on	the	table	and	I	will	come	back	to	it	at	the	end	of section	3.	But	it	is	important	to	notice	that	Aristotle	himself	does	not, in	any	of	the	passages	quoted	above,	presuppose	that	the	particular	affection	that	is	responsible	for	bringing	one's	reasoning	to	a	standstill	is marked	by	particularly	strong	intensity.	In	fact,	he	does	not	say	that	the passions that	are required to	produce the impetuous	kind	of	uncontrolled	action	need	to	be	particularly	strong	or	intense	either.	Rather, he	says	that	certain	sorts	of	people,	only	some	of	whom	have	intense desires,	are	likely	to	suffer	from	that	kind	of	lack	of	control: the	drunkenness,	has	passed	off,	he	is	himself	again.	(MM 1202a1–7) 54 In	passage	3,	Aristotle	tells	us	that	the	mind	(nous)	(rather	than	some specific	belief	or	thought)	is	"covered	over"	as	a	whole	since	it	is	not the	case	that	we	continue	to	guide	our	actions	by	its	cognitive	power at	all,	but,	as	he	says,	by	phantasia.	In	passage	4,	the	affection	(drunkenness or appetite) brings reasoning to a standstill.55	We	must conclude	that	Aristotle	thinks	that	the	agents	in	the	various	conditions	he mentions	cannot	access	or	make	use	of	their	knowledge	because those conditions (sleep, disease, emotions, and appetites) can and sometimes	do	render	one's	rational	faculties	inoperative:	they	temporarily "cover	over"	the	mind.56 According	to	these	passages, then,	Aristotle	thinks	that	an	action due	to	lack	of	control	involves	general	incapacitation	of	one's	reasoning	abilities.	There	is	much	work	to	be	done	before	this	idea	can	be 54. The	translation	is	that	of	St.	G.	Stock	in	J.	Barnes	(ed.),	Complete Works of Aristotle (Princeton,	1984),	modified. 55. In	his	discussion	of	pleasure	in	NE 7.11,	Aristotle	discusses	the	reasons	why some	people	think	that	pleasure	is	not	a	good.	One	of	the	reasons	is	that	pleasure	impedes	one's	ability	to	think	and	that,	in	the	case	of	certain	pleasures (sexual	ones)	it	makes	it	impossible	to	think	at	all:	"Further,	pleasures	are	an impediment	to	thought	(empodion tō phronein),	and	more	so	the	more	one	enjoys	them.	For	example,	no	one	can	think	about	anything	while	enjoying	the pleasures	of	sex	(oudena gar an dunasthai noēsai ti en autē)"	(NE 7.11,	1152b16–8). This	passage	is	problematic	as	evidence	for	any	view	held	by	Aristotle,	since it	is	a	report	of	an	argument	by	other	people.	However,	when	Aristotle	later rebuts	this	argument	(NE 7.12,	1153a20–3),	he	does	not	deny	that	some	pleasures	can	impede	thinking	(i. e.,	make	it	hard	or	even	impossible	for	the	one who	feels	the	pleasure	to	think).	Rather,	he	says	that	no	state	is	impeded	by pleasures that	are	proper to it.	There	are	pleasures	arising from	study	and learning and those	will	make	us study even	more.	But the	possibility that pleasures	alien	to	the	state	can	impede	it	is	left	open. 56.	See	also	NE	3.12,	1119b8–10:	"For	when	someone	is	without	understanding the	desire	for	the	pleasant	is	insatiable	and	indiscriminate,	and	the	activity	of appetite	increases	what	he	had	from	birth	and	if	the	appetites	are	large	and intense	they	even	drive	out	reasoning	(ton logismon ekkrouousin)."	Although this passage focuses on the vicious or intemperate people, it nevertheless provides	evidence	that	Aristotle	thinks	that	appetites	or	desires	have	the	ability	to	disable	one's	capacity	to	reason. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) uncontrolled	agent's	reason	gets	suspended	not	because	of	the	intensity	of	her	appetite,	but	because	she	has	failed	to	habituate	herself,	including	her	reason,	to	the	point	at	which	she	can	resist	them.	Even	a mild	storm	can	sink	a	boat	with	a	negligent	or	inexperienced	crew. The	second	worry	originates	in	the	modern	conception	of	akrasia which	begins	from	the	assumption	that	in	acting	akratically one	intentionally and	voluntarily acts against one's better judgment. It is then assumed that intentional and	voluntary	action	entails, among	other things,	that	one's	capacity	to	reason,	deliberate,	or	perform	logical	inferences	has	not	been	compromised.	In	view	of	this	conception,	the claim that the uncontrolled agent's reason is temporarily disabled during	uncontrolled	action	might	strike	one	as	intuitively	implausible, perhaps	even	a	non-starter.58	There	are,	however,	several	points	that should	significantly	reduce	this	initial	reaction. First,	Aristotle's	claim	might	not	have	struck	ancient	Greek	readers as	odd	(or	implausible)	in	the	same	way	as	it	does	us.	In	his	The Greeks and the Irrational,	E.	R.	Dodds	not	only	correctly identifies	Aristotle's claim	at	1147a10–7	as	entailing	a	temporary	suspension	of	one's	(rational)	mind,59	but	also	traces	the	quite	general	view	that	various	kinds of irrational, unwise, paradoxical or otherwise unaccountable acts are	due	to	a	temporary	suspension	of	one's	mind	all	the	way	back	to Homer.	In	Homer	(especially	in	the	Iliad),	such	actions	are	the	results of	blindness	of	judgment	or	delusion	(atē), which	are	usually	due	to various	external	agencies (such	as	gods).60	Moreover,	despite the	attribution	of	such	actions	to	external	agencies,	the	pre-Platonic	writers nevertheless	clearly	thought	that	at	least	sometimes	people	who	acted in such	ways (i. e., as	a result	of	atē) were	not	automatically	exempt from	responsibility	or	blame.61 By	the	time	we	get	to	Aristotle's	view	about	lack	of	control	(which	is 58.	See	section	1.2	for	interpretations	of	Aristotle's	theory	along	these	lines. 59.	Dodds	(1951,	185). 60.	Ibid.,	5. 61. See	the	illuminating	discussion	in	Williams	(2008,	ch.	3). (5)	The	quickly	excitable	and	the	volatile people	are	most likely to suffer from impetuous lack of control because the	former's	[appetites]	are	so	quick	and	the	latter's	so	intense	that	they	do	not	wait	for	reason	on	account	of	their tendency	to	follow	phantasia (dia to akolouthētikai einai tē phantasia).	(NE 7.7,	1150b25–28) The	passage clearly	makes room for other kinds	of agents (than the	excitable	and	volatile)	who	can	sometimes	be	prone	to	instances of impetuous	uncontrolled	action57 and these	agents	need	not	have particularly	intense	desires.	The	passage	mentions	people	who	have quick rather than	strong	appetites	and	who	can	act	without control on	that	account.	Moreover, it is	not	even	clear	that	the	weak	uncontrolled	agent's	desires	are	weaker	than	those	of	the	impetuous	one	to begin	with	since	all	Aristotle	says	is	that	the	weak	agent	succumbs	to smaller	ones	because	(one	can	assume)	he	has	already	tried	to	calm them	down	in	his	deliberation.	In	fact,	every	form	of	lack	of	control	is characterized	by	the	fact	that	it	is	succumbing	to	pleasures	that	"most people	can	resist"	(1150b14).	In	other	words,	lack	of	control	is	not	characterized	by	strong	and,	for that reason, uncontrollable	emotions	or	desires,	but	as	a	condition in	which	one fails to	control	desires	which are normally controllable. Their uncontrollability is not necessarily explained	by	their	intensity	(see	1150b6–12),	but	by	the	agent	having become	such	(through	habituation)	that	even	relatively	weak	desires cause	him	to	lose	control	over	them. Finally,	my	account	does	not	require	that	the	uncontrolled	agent's appetite	is	particularly	intense	-	it	only	requires	that	it	be	capable	of bringing	about	the	suspension	of	reason	in	the	particular	agent	(who is, in the case of the uncontrolled agent, particularly susceptible to its influence). What counts is not so much the appetite's intensity but the	agent's	overall	preparedness to	deal	with	her	appetites.	The 57. Notably,	even	the	good	can	act	in	this	way	at	MM 1203a30–6,	if	they	are	of	the right	kind	(warm)	temperament. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) states,	such	as	being	asleep	or	drunk,	follow	their	phantasia against,	or instead	of,	their	knowledge	or	reason)65	should	be	read	in	connection with	other	passages,	such	as	NE 1.3,	1095a2–10	in	which	people	are	said to	follow	their	affections	or	feelings	rather	than	reason.	The	cumulative evidence	of	these	passages	strongly	suggests	that	when	Aristotle	says that	one's	mind	or	reason	(nous)	is	temporarily	disabled	and	that	one, in	such	a	state,	follows	phantasia,	he	is	not	denying	beliefs	(in	a	broad sense)	or	coherent	trains	of	thoughts	to	the	agent	but	rather	something more	specific.	In	the	next	two	sections,	I	will	bring	out	the	meaning	of Aristotle's	claim	that	the	uncontrolled	person	"follows	phantasia"	rather than	reason	by	drawing	attention	to	Aristotle's	discussion	of	the	way in	which	sleeping	people	(i. e.,	one	of	three	sorts	of	people	used	in	the analogy	at	1147a10–7)	"follow	phantasia"	while	dreaming.	I	will	argue that	Aristotle	operates	with	a sufficiently rich	notion	of	non-rational cognition	to	allow	him	to	account	for	the	relevant	phenomena	in	connection	with	uncontrolled actions.	As I	will argue,	Aristotle's uncontrolled	agent	is	not	prevented	from	using	her	knowledge,	or	from	having	beliefs	(in	a	broad	sense	of	the	term)	about	any	relevant	facts.	Her problem	is	that	she	cannot	use	her	knowledge	as knowledge	or	form and	hold	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	reasons	(i. e.,	forming	them	by	treating some	other	facts	or	beliefs	as	what	makes	them	believable).	The	idea can	be,	perhaps	less	confusingly,	expressed	by	saying	that	the	uncontrolled	person	has	at	her	disposal	all	the	information	that	would	normally	constituted	her	knowledge,	but	she	temporarily	cannot	use	this information in the	way in	which its	use	would	qualify	her	as	having understanding	(rather	than	mere	knowledge)	of	what	she	is	doing. 65. Perhaps	most	strikingly	at	DA 433a10–1.	See	also	Insomn. 459a1–8	(translated below).	There	is	an	instructive	passage	in	Prob. 903b29–26:	"Why	are	those who	hesitate in their speech	melancholic? Is it	because	being	melancholic they	quickly	follow	phantasia (akolouthein tē phantasia),	and	this	is	characteristic	of	those	who	hesitate	in	their	speech.	For	the	impulse	to	speak	rushes before	their	ability	to	do	so,	just	as	the	soul	too	quickly	follows	phantasia (tō phanenti). The same thing happens	with those	who lisp. For the parts [responsible	for	speech]	are	too	slow.	A	sign	of	this	is	that	people	who	are	drunk (oinōmenoi) become lispers, since then they follow phainomena most of all (malista tois phainomenois akolouthousi)	and	not	their	mind." a	kind	of	irrational	or	unwise	action),	this	temporary	suspension	is	no longer	exclusively	due	to	such	external	agencies	(I	will	say	more	about Aristotle's	view	in	section	2.5	below);	and	in	the	cases	in	which	it	is	due to	factors	over	which	an	agent	is	expected	to	have	control,	the	responsibility	for	the	action	is	placed	squarely	on	the	agent.62	Aristotle's	view (which	is,	as	we	shall	see,	neither	identical	with	the	ordinary	view	that we	sometimes	do	what	we	know	is	bad	while	knowing	-	actively	and perfectly	well	-	that	it	is	bad,	nor	with	Socrates'	view	that	we	never	act that	way)	is	thus	a	view	which	has	some	basis	in	the	preceding	history of	thinking	about	human	psychology	and	which	would,	therefore,	also have,	to	his	contemporaries,	a	certain	amount	of	intuitive	appeal.63 Second,	one	should	not understand	Aristotle's	claim	to	mean that the	uncontrolled	agent,	while	acting	without	control,	is	not	able	to	use or	attend	to	his	knowledge	or	beliefs	at all or	that	he	cannot	think	(in a	broad	sense)	at	all.	As	passages	2	and	3 indicate,	when	people	are in	states	such	as	being	asleep,	drunk,	or	in	the	grip	of	emotions,	they are	not	governed	by	reason	but,	instead,	by	their	non-rational	desires (appetites)	and	phantasia.64	That this	account	applies to	uncontrolled people	is	confirmed	most	explicitly	by	passage	5.	This	passage	(as	well as other passages in	which	Aristotle suggests that people in certain 62. I	argue	for	this	view	in	"Agency	and	Responsibility	in	Aristotle's	Eudemian Ethics,"	forthcoming	in	Phronesis 60:	206–51. 63.	See	for	example	Gorgias'	Encomium of Helen,	especially	sections	16–19,	where he	discusses	the	love	as	the	cause	of	her	adultery	since	love,	just	like	fear,	can "extinguish	and	expel	thought" (houtōs apesbese kai exēlasen ho phobos to noēma). 64.	My	interpretation	of this	aspect	of	Aristotle's theory	of lack	of	control is in partial	agreement	with	the	interpretation	developed	by	Moss	(2012).	Perhaps the	main	difference	is	that,	on	my	account,	there	is	no	perceptual	(or	evaluative)	illusion	taking	place,	as	Moss	suggests,	since	there	is	no	distortion	of appearances taking	place at all. In fact, given the very striking similarities that	her	interpretation	bears	to	my	account,	there	should	be	no	need	to	for such	distortions since the	work is	done	by the	disablement	of reason	and not	by	perceptual	or	evaluative	illusions.	I	suspect	that	the	main	reason	she needs	something like	evaluative illusion to take	place is that	although	she also	claims	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	follows	phantasia because	of	the	disablement	of	reason	(113),	she	does	not	offer	an	account	of	what	this	disablement	of	reason	might	be,	why	it	occurs,	or	what	cognitive	resources	are	still available	to	the	agent. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) (6)	Then	could	it	be	true	that	one	[i. e.	the	dreamer]	is	not seeing	anything,	yet	not	true	that	the	sense	is	in	no	way affected?	Is	it	possible,	rather,	that	both	sight	and	the	other	senses	are	affected	somehow,	and that	each	of these impinges in some	way	upon	perception, as	with a	waking	person,	though	not	in	the	same	way	as	with	a	waking person?	And	does	belief sometimes	say	that	it	is	false,	as it	does	for	waking	people,	while	at	other	times	it	is	held in	check	and	follows	the	phantasia (akolouthei tō phantasmati)?	(Insomn.	459a1–8)67 In	the	passage,	Aristotle	contrasts	two	cases:	on	the	one	hand,	seeing someone	in	a	dream	and,	on	the	other	hand,	having	an	illusion	of	that person	while	being	awake.	In	the	former	case,	while	one	has	a	dream in	which	one	sees	Coriscus,	one	also	forms	a	belief	that	Coriscus	is	really	present.	In	the	latter	case,	when	one	is	awake	and	one's	power	of forming	beliefs	is	not	held	in	check,	one	declares	the	appearance	to	be false.	The	reason	why	one	declares	the	appearance	of	Coriscus	false in	the	latter	case	is	that,	while	awake,	one	is	able	to	evaluate	whether there	are,	in	addition	to	the	appearance	of	Coriscus,	any	reasons to	believe	that	Coriscus	is	really	there.	Since,	presumably,	there	are	no	such reasons	(as the	example	presupposes),	one	declares the	appearance false.68	In	contrast,	while	one	is	asleep,	the	belief	is	formed	without	employing	any	such	considerations.	The	sleeping	person's	judging	faculty is	held	in	check	and	she	can	only	form	beliefs	or	judgments	according 67.	The	translation	is	that	of	D.	Gallop,	Aristotle: On Sleep and Dreams (Warminster, 1996),	slightly	modified. 68.	In	DA 3.3,	Aristotle	explains	how	we	can	have	a false	appearance	of something	and	simultaneously	a	true	supposition	(hupolēpsis)	about	it:	the	sun	can appear	to	us	to	be	a	foot	across,	but	we	suppose	it	to	be	larger	than	the	inhibited	world	(428b1–4).	Supposition	is	to	be	distinguished	from	mere	phantasia because	it	involves	conviction	(pistis)	and	so	also	persuasion	and	reason	(logos)	(428a20–5).	It	thus	involves	taking	something	to	be	true	because	one	has or	thinks	that	one	has	some	reason	for	taking	it	to	be	so	over	and	above	how it	appears	to	one. 2.3. Uncontrolled action and phantasia According	to	Aristotle,	people	affected	by	drunkenness,	fits	of	madness, or	sleep	can	and	sometimes	do	behave	in	clever,	cognitively	rich	ways. A	drunken	person	may	correctly	recite	verses.	A	sleeping	person	may be	trying,	while	dreaming,	to	memorize	something	using	a	mnemonic system	that	she	has	previously	learned	(Insomn.	485b15–25).	Although these	people	use	their	knowledge,	their	use	of	it	is	irrational	in	the	following	sense:	they	act	in	a	way	that,	in	a	given	situation,	they	would themselves think inappropriate under normal circumstances (i. e., if they	were	not drunk	or	in	a	fit	of	madness).	A	drunken	person	can	sing a	drinking	song	that	she	has	previously	learnt	on	an	occasion	(say,	a memorial	service)	that	is	not	suitable	for	it	according	to	the	person's own	beliefs.	This	way	of	acting	reveals	that	one's	rational	powers	are not	properly	operational.	We	see	the	madman	or	the	drunken	person as	behaving irrationally	because they	behave in	ways in	which they should	not	and	would	not	behave	in	the	light	of	their	own	knowledge or	beliefs	about	what	they	should	or	should	not	be	doing.	A	description	along	these	general	lines	fits	the	uncontrolled	agent.	We	see	her behavior	as	irrational	from	the	point	of	view	of	her	own	knowledge and	beliefs.	She	acts	against	her	decision,	which	is	expressive	of	her knowledge	about	what	she	thinks	is	good	for	her. Passages	3	and	5	suggest that the	explanation	of	why the	uncontrolled agent's action seems irrational is that instead of acting according	to	her	knowledge	or	rationally	grounded	beliefs	she	"follows phantasia."66	A	clue	to	understanding	this	expression	is	given	in	a	passage in the	De Insomniis,	where	Aristotle considers the	view that although	people	who	are	asleep	cannot	be	perceiving	(strictly	speaking), their	perceptual	capacity	can	nevertheless	be	affected	by	the	remnants of	sensory	perception	(i. e.,	phantasiai).	When	that	happens, their	beliefs	and	emotional	states	"follow	the	phantasia": 66.	Aristotle's	most	systematic	exposition	of	his	theory	of	phantasia is	in	DA 3.3. That	discussion	is,	however,	too	obscure	to	be	analyzed	here	in	detail	and,	in any	case,	the	relevant	features	of	his	theory	are	available	elsewhere.	I	take	DA 3.3	to	be	compatible	with	my	account	of	lack	of	control,	but	the	defense	of that	claim	has	to	be	made	separately. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) consideration	of	reasons	(over	and	above	the	appearance)	for	believing	it.	In	such	cases,	one's	reaction	to	the	appearance	corresponds	to (or	reflects)	one's	particular	state,	desires,	habits,	or	character	(Insomn. 460b3–15). In the	absence	of	reasoned	oversight	(as	when	asleep	or drunk),	what	people recognize	as	salient features	of their situations are	not	features	that	are	(or	would	be)	salient	according	to	their	reasoned judgments or knowledge but, rather,	what seems salient are those	features	that	are	recorded	as	motivationally	significant	in	their experience	and	that	are,	in	some	relevant	way,	connected	to	their	current	condition.	What	stands	out	as	salient	about	a	given	situation	to	an amorous	man	(when	he	is	in	amorous	passion)	is	what	is,	in	his	experience,	connected	to	the	object	or	objects	of	his	love	(Insomn. 460b3–15). The	amorous	person	will	think,	on	the	basis	of	mere	resemblance,	that he	sees	someone	he	loves,	even	if	there	are	no	reasons	to	think	that.71 In	the	case	of	uncontrolled	action,	the	idea	is	that	the	uncontrolled agent	"follows	phantasia"	insofar	as	she	acts	on	the	basis	of	the	mere appearance	of	something	as	pleasant	rather	than	on	the	basis,	reflected	in	her	decision,	of	her	reasoned	judgment	about	what	she	should do (DA 433b5–10). She does not act on her decision that she had 71. It is in	this	sense	that	one	needs	to	understand	Aristotle's	reference	to	people	who	are	drunk	as	well.	What	he	wants	to	point	out	is	that	when	drunk people	make	judgments,	they	make	them	on	the	basis	of	appearances	rather than	on	the	basis	of	deliberation	or	reflection,	and	that	they	do	this	because of their	state.	There	is	a	very	instructive	passage	in	the	Problems. In	the	passage, people	who	are	drunk	but	still	can	judge	are	said	to	be	unable	to	judge	well because	of their	drunkenness:	"Why	is it that	one	who	is tipsy	(akrothōrax) behaves	more	badly than	one	who is	more	drunk (mallon methuontos) and more	than	[even]	the	sober	man?	Is	it	because	the	sober	man	judges	well	(eu krinei)	but	one	who	is	completely	drunk	(pantapasi methuōn),	on	account	of his	senses	being	blocked,	is	unable	to	bear	the	heaviness,	does	not	judge	[at all],	and	so	because	he	does	not	judge,	he	is	not	behaving	badly,	but	one	who is	tipsy	judges	but	on	account	of	the	wine,	judges	badly	so	that	he	behaves badly.	And	so	he	is	just	like	Satyrus	of	Clazomenae	who	was	fond	of	abuse and	so	when	he	was	defendant	in	a	lawsuit,	in	order	that	he	might	speak	to the	matter	at	hand	and	not	be	abusive,	they	blocked	his	ears	so	that	since	he would	not	hear,	he	would	also	not	turn	to	abuse.	But	as	his	adversary	was about	to	stop,	they	uncovered	them	and	he,	having	heard	but	a	few	words, could	not	keep	away	from	speaking	badly	because	he	could	now	perceive	but judge	only	badly"	(875a29–875a40). to	what	merely	appears	to	be	the	case	-	she	takes	her	dreams	at	their face	value.69 When	Aristotle	then	says	that	some	agents,	including	uncontrolled ones,	"follow	phantasia"	in	their	actions	(1150b25–28),	he	means	that they	act	on	the	basis	of	how	things	appear	to	them,	rather	than	on	the basis	of	any	reasons	(over	and	above	the	appearance)	that	they	would have	for	their	actions.70	In	order	to	make	sense	of	this	idea,	we	need	to distinguish	between	reasons	in	a	broad	or	loose	sense	and	reasons	in the	strict	sense.	In	the	loose	sense,	the	uncontrolled	agent	has	reasons to	do	what	she	does	when	she	acts	without	control.	She	has	a	desire for some	pleasure (i. e., her appetite) and it appears to her that the desire	can	be	satisfied.	But	simply	having	a	desire	for	something	and it	appearing	to	be	the	case	that	now	is	the	time	and	place	to	satisfy	it are	not	"reasons"	for	acting	in	the	strict	sense.	Reasons	for	believing	or doing	something	in	the	strict	sense	require	that	one	recognizes	something	as	making	one's	belief	believable	or	one's	(proposed)	action	advisable	independently	of	one's	desire	to	believe	it	or	to	do	it. In	the	case	of	belief,	this	requirement	is	clearly	discernible	in	the passage	from	the	De Insomniis quoted	above.	The	judgment	that	what appears	to	one	is	false	(say,	that	Coriscus	is	there)	is	made	on	the	basis	of	one's	knowledge	of	some	further	facts	about	Coriscus	or	one's situation	that	make	the	belief in	the	reality	of	the	appearance	of	Coriscus	untenable	(say,	that	one	has	just	seen	Coriscus	leave	the	town). This judgment is not dependent on one's desires concerning	Coriscus:	in	fact,	one	has	to	form	the	appropriate	belief	in	view	of	the	facts and	despite	the	appearance	(DA 427b21–2).	This	contrasts	with	cases (e. g.,	when	asleep) in	which	an	appearance is	accepted	without	any 69.	See	also	Insomn.	460a32–b27;	461a25–462a8;	and	485b15–25. 70.	As	Schofield	(1991,	270–1)	says,	"It	is	evidently	because	sleep	and	fever	impair the	operation	of	our	faculties	in	general,	leaving	phantasia alone	efficacious, that	the	will	has	no	control	over	what	appears	to	us	in	such	conditions."	In the	De Insomniis 460b3ff,	Aristotle	asserts	that	the	same	account	is	true	also of	those	who	are	in	love,	have	appetites,	are	angry,	have	fever,	or	are	sick.	De Somno's	discussion (456b28–457a21)	of	the	effects	of	various	soporific	agents like	wine	or	poppy	yields	the	same	result	for	those	who	are	drunk	or	drugged. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) agent's	decision	to	have	any	traction,	the	agent	must	have	and	must	be actively	aware	of	the	reasons	that	explain	to	her	why	the	unpleasant action	that	she	decides	on	(say,	refraining	from	eating	sweets)	is	good (over	and	above	pleasure)	and	good	for	her. This	requirement	comes	out	most	clearly	in	an	important	passage in	EE 2.10	wherein	Aristotle	tells	us	that	human	beings	are	sometimes in	states	in	which	they	cannot	make	or	have	active	decisions	because they	cannot, in those	states,	deliberate.	Although	Aristotle	does	not say	what	kinds	of	states	these	are,	it	is	reasonable	to	assume	that	he means	the	states	mentioned	in	the	passages	cited	above,	such	as	being drunk,	mad,	asleep,	or	in	the	grip	of	emotions	or	non-rational	desires (including	being	uncontrolled): (7)	So	decision	is	not	present	in	other	animals,	not	even at every period of [human] life, nor in a human being in all states: for neither is deliberation nor a supposition	about	the	why:	nothing	prevents	that	many	people might	well	have	a	belief (doxa)	about	whether to	do	or not to do something but [have it] not through reasoning (di' logismou).	For	that	part	of	the	soul	is	deliberative which	is	capable	of	contemplating	a	cause:	for	that	for	the sake	of	which	is	one	of	the	causes	–	for	cause	is	anything because	of	which	[something	comes	about].	We	say	that cause	is	that	for	the	sake	of	which	something	is	or	comes to	be	-	for	example,	the	recovery	of	money	is	a	cause	of walking,	if	it	is	for	the	sake	of	that	that	a	man	walks.	That is	why	people	who	have	no	goal	(skopos)	before	them	are not	deliberative.	(EE 2.10,	1226b21–5) In	the	passage,	Aristotle	connects	the	capacity	for	decisions	to	the ability	to	contemplate	(i. e.,	be	actively	aware	of)	a	cause	(which	in	the case	of	action just is, as	he	explains, the reason for	one's	action)	as being	that	which	makes	and	explains	the	action	as	good	for	oneself. One	decides	on	an	action	because	one	believes	that	the	action	stands previously made because she temporarily cannot employ reasoned oversight	over	her	situation	and	actions.	The temporary	suspension of	reason	leads	her	to	move	from	sticking	to	that	decision	to	following the	appearance	of	pleasure	(i. e.,	to	following	her	phantasia)	which	is now	accepted	at	its	face	value. But	why	does	the	temporary	suspension	of	one's	power	of	reasoning	make	the	uncontrolled	agent's	decision ineffectual?	Why	cannot the	agent	simply	go	on	sticking	to	it?	It	does	so	because	decisions	are essentially	connected	to	deliberation	and	so	to	having	and	being	actively aware	of	the	reasons	for	one's	action	as	what	makes	the	action good	for	oneself.	In	principle,	of	course,	even	pleasure	could	serve	as the	relevant	reason.	But	in	the	case	of	lack	of	control,	the	uncontrolled agent's	decision	(i. e.,	decision	against	which	the	agent	acts)	is	characterized	by	the	fact	that	in	making	it,	the	uncontrolled	agent	decided	to act	on	the	basis	of	reasons	that	were	independent	of	her	non-rational desires	and	feelings	of	pleasure.	In	fact,	they	were	contrary	to	those	desires	and	so	also	contrary	to	what	she	finds	pleasant.	This	means	that the	decision	must	have	been	made	with	a	view	to	some	good	(such	as health	or	honor)	that	the	agent	has	adopted	(and	that	she	aims	at)	on other	grounds	than	pleasure	since,	in	the	other	case,	it	would	not	be	a decision	contrary	to	her	desires.72	But	in	order	to	adopt	X	as	one's	end independently	of	one's	non-rational	desires,	one	must	have reasons (other	than	mere	pleasure)	that	identify	what	it	is	about	X	that	makes it good and good for oneself. For example, in order for one to aim at	justice	independently	of	pleasures	or	pains	associated	with	just	or unjust	behavior,	one	must	have	some	reasons for	believing that justice	is	good	and	good	for	oneself	(DA	3.10,	433a9–26).	Otherwise,	in the	absence	of	some	pleasant	(or	painful)	consequences,	one	would have	no	motivation	to	pursue	justice.	A	mere	claim	of	the	form	"justice is good" is not	motivational unless it is either connected	with pleasures	(rewards)	and	pains	(punishments)	or	with	reasons	that	make	it clear	why	justice	is	good	for	oneself.	So,	in	order	for	the	uncontrolled 72. In	that	other	case,	we	could	have	a	clash	between	two	different	pleasant	options,	but	not	a	case	of	lack	of	control. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 19 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) uncontrolled	agent	acts	without	control	since,	as	his	analogy	tells	us, the	agent's	reasoning	power	is	suspended	across	the	board. 2.4. Knowledge vs. experience Although	a	disablement	of	reason	of	this	sort	has	direct	consequences	for	the	agent's	ability	to	be	motivated	by	goodness	(as	opposed	to mere pleasure), it has far less serious consequences for the agent's ability to	act in	cognitively	complex	ways. In	other	words,	although the	agent	needs	to	be	able	to	grasp	and	be	actively	aware	of	reasons for	her	decision	in	order	to	stick	to	and	act	from	it,	she	does	not	need to	grasp	and	be	actively	aware	of	the	reasons	why	certain	ways	of	acting	or	doing	things	lead	to	some	desired	results	in	order	to	act	so	as to	achieve	those	results.73	It	will	be	helpful	to	distinguish	two	ways	of finding	an	action	useful	which	do	not	involve	the	grasp	of	the	"why" but	which nevertheless involve awareness of how one can achieve some	desired	goal. At	the	most	basic	level	(BL),	one	can	become	aware,	on	the	basis of one's experience, that doing certain things reliably leads to some desired	result	while,	at	the	same	time,	not	having	any	conceptual	grasp of	the	connection	between	the	result	and	one's	action.	This	way	of	finding	an	action	useful	is	available	even	to	small	children	or	animals.	So,	a 73. It should be noted that Aristotle is happy to allow that some agents can stick	to	their	decisions	even while	their	reasoning	power	is	suspended.	But in such a case, they are	not strictly speaking acting	on the	decision itself (i. e.,	they	are	not	acting	from reason).	Rather,	they	are	acting	in	such	a	way because	they	enjoy something	that	acting	in	such	a	way	brings,	such	as	victory in contests.	These	are	especially the stubborn	people (ischurognōmes) who	superficially	resemble	the	self-controlled	people	but	differ	from	them precisely	because	they	do	not	act	on	their	decisions	themselves	but	stick	to them	only	for	the	sake	of	some	pleasure	which	is	gained	by	so	acting	and which	is	incidental	to	the	decision	itself.	Thus	they	are	in	fact	a	kind	of	uncontrolled	people.	See	NE 7.9,	1151b4–17.	One	can	also	imagine	a	scenario in	which	one's	reason	becomes	disabled	on	account	of	one's	emotions	(say, anger)	but,	despite	that,	one	does	not	end	up	acting	against	one's	decision or	knowledge	because	one's	experience	(i. e.,	what	one	finds	pleasant)	just	is what	one	thinks	is	good	in	the	first	place.	This	would	be	the	case	of	a	virtuous	person	who	can	rely	on	her	sensibilities	to	not	lead	her	astray	even	while her	rational	thinking	is	inhibited. in	the	right	relation	to	some	goal	one	has	and	the	nature	of	the	goal provides	one	with reasons to	perform this (rather than some	other) action.	For	example, if	one	wants to	promote	one's	health, then	one needs	to	start	from	a	conception	of	what	health	is	(its	nature),	in	order to	figure	out	what	action,	if	any,	could	be	taken.	In	the	following	passage	from	the	Metaphysics 7.7,	Aristotle	makes	clear	that	deliberation involves,	at	each	step,	the	recognition	of	the	salient	or	essential	feature (or	features)	of	what	it	is	that	one	plans	to	achieve	and	an	appropriate selection	of	the	means	to	achieve	it: (8)	All other [i. e., non-natural] comings-to-be (geneseis) are called productions (poiēseis). And all productions are	either from	art (apo technēs) or from	a capacity (apo dunameōs) or from thought (apo dianoias). ....from art come to	be the things	of	which the form is in the soul. By	form	I	mean	the	essence	of	each	thing	and	its	primary substance.	...health	is	the	ratio	(logos) and	the	knowledge (epistēmē) in	the	soul.	The	healthy	thing,	then,	comes	to be	as the result	of the following train	of thought: since this is	health, if the thing is to	be	healthy this must	first be	present,	e. g.	a	uniform	state	of	body,	and	if this is to be	present,	there	must	be	heat;	and	one	goes	on	always thinking in this	way	until one	brings the	matter to a	final	step	which	he	himself	can	produce.	Then	the	process (kinēsis) from	this	point	onward,	i. e.	the	process	towards health,	is	called	production.	(Met.	7.7,	1032a28–b11) Thus	decisions	that	rest	on	more	than	an	appearance	of	pleasure	depend	for	their	motivational	power	on	the	agent's	grasp	of	the	reason(s) why	the	action	on	which	she	decides	is	good	both	in	the	sense	of	being good	for	some	desired	goal	as	well	as	in	the	sense	of	being	good	for the	agent	as	being	done	for	that	goal.	But	it	is	precisely	the	ability	to grasp	such	reasons	that	is,	according	to	Aristotle,	suspended	while	an jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 20 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) tasiai (Mem. 451a14–7).	Once one accumulates	many	memories of a certain sort, they give rise to experience (Post. An.100a2–5). Experience is, then, a certain kind	of acquaintance or recognition (gnōsis) which	arises	once	one	accumulates	sufficient	amount	of	memories	of the	same	thing	and	formulates	thoughts	(Met. 981a5–7). The	simplest	example	of	experience	at	work	involves	identification of	something	that	one	perceives.	For	example,	seeing	a	figure	resembling	Coriscus,	one	forms	the	belief	that	there	is	Coriscus	approaching. This	judgment	is	not	the	work	of	reason	since	it	does	not	involve	any inference.75	It	is	achieved	through	the	application	of	one's	memories to	what	one	perceives	on	the	basis	of	similarity.76	But	the	build-up	of experience leads	to	more	than	just the	ability to identify things	one perceives.	It	also	results	in	the	formulation	of	general	thoughts	(such as	"light	meats	are	healthy")	and	rules	(such	as	"when	having	a	headache,	take	a	red	pill").	In	fact,	human	experience	can	achieve	such	high degree	of complexity and	precision that it is, for practical purposes, almost	equivalent	to	knowledge	or	understanding.	As	Aristotle	says: "With	a	view	to	action	experience	does	not	seem	to	differ from	craft, and	we	even	see	those	with	experience	succeeding	more	than	those who	have	theory	without	experience"	(Met. 981a13–5).77 In	the	following	passage,	Aristotle	explicitly	distinguishes	between grasping	something	in	the	light	of	mere	experience	and	grasping	it	in the	light	of	knowledge	(i. e.,	grasping	the	reason	why): (9)	For	to	have	a	supposition	that	when	Callias	was	sick of	this	disease	this	benefitted	him,	and	so	also	to	Socrates and so in	many individual cases, is a	matter of experience.	But	to	suppose	that	it	benefitted	all	people	of	a	certain	kind,	marked	off	according	to	one	form,	when	they 75. See	Cashdollar	(1973)	for	a	discussion	of	non-rational	cognitive	achievements. 76. In	Mem. 451b10–452a4 Aristotle introduces three	ways or rules of association	that	govern	the	orderings	of	one's	phantasiai: similarity,	opposition,	and proximity. 77. A	similar	point	is	made	also	at	NE 6.7,	1141b15–23. cat	can	discover	that	repeated	meowing	near	the	pantry	leads	to	food and	so	act	that	way	any	time	she	desires	food.	But	we	usually	do	not suppose	that	the	cat	grasps	her	meowing	as a	means	to	her	goal	or	that she	grasps anything	about	the	reason	why	it	leads	to	the	usual	result. At	a	more	complex	level	(CL),	one	can	learn	that	a	certain	action leads to a desired result and grasp, in addition, that the action is a means	to	that	result.	In	this	case,	one	grasps	the	action	as useful.	This stage is a vast improvement over the previous one since one now becomes aware that one could try other	means should the current one that one	uses become ineffectual. In the	basic case,	we	merely described	a	child	or	an	animal	as thinking	or treating	something	as useful	without	implying	that	it	was	grasped	by	the	child	or	the	animal as	such.	The	cat	does	not	grasp	the	meowing	as	a	means	to	her	end even though she acts that	way	-	she	does	not see it as one among various	possible	alternatives	of	getting	the	food.	Nevertheless,	notice that	even	at	this	more	complex	stage,	one	still	need	not	grasp	the	reason	why the	action	is	useful	for	the	goal.	For	example,	one	might	think that	ibuprofen	is	a	means	to	relieving	headache	without	knowing	the reason	why	it	does	so.	The	fact	that	one	does	not	know	that	does	not prevent	one	from	alternating	the	means	should	ibuprofen	not	be	available	(say,	by	taking	acetaminophen). This second way (CL) of grasping something as useful (or as a means)	is	both	highly	complex	and,	according	to	Aristotle,	quite	common in human behavior.	On his view, human beings have at their disposal	a	sophisticated	system	of	memories	in	which	they	can	make complex	judgments	in	a	systematic	albeit	non-rational	way.	Aristotle calls this	system	"experience"	(empeiria).74	Experience	arises through repeated	perception	of	the	same	thing	and	subsequent	structured	accumulation of the corresponding	memories (Post.	An.100a2–5). The retained	sensory	impressions	that	constitute	one's	memories	are	phan74.	The relevant aspects of	Aristotle's theory of non-rational cognition can	be gleaned	from	Met. 1.1	and	Post. An. 2.19.	In	my	explanation	of	Aristotle's	theory of	phantasia and	experience,	I	follow	Frede	(1996).	For	an	account	of	phantasia consistent	with	my	account	of	lack	of	control,	see	Lorenz	(2009,	148–73). jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 21 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) reason,	she	temporarily	cannot	act	on	her	decision	since	acting	on	her decision	requires that	she is	actively	grasping	the	reasons	on	which her	decision is	based	-	that is, she is	able to	contemplate the	cause. In	the	absence	of	such	an	active	grasp,	her	decision	ceases	to	be	an active	conative	psychological	state	and	the	way	is	cleared	for	bad	appetite to issue in	action. In	acting	on	her	appetite, the	uncontrolled agent	"follows	phantasia"	both in the	sense	that	she is	acting	on	the pleasant	prospect	that	aroused	her	appetite,	and	in	the	sense	that	her active	cognition	is	now	limited	to	various	forms	of	non-rational	cognition	(such	as	experience).	These	forms	of	cognition	are	rich	enough	to enable	her	to	act	in	a	way	she	desires,	but	they	lack	the	ability	evaluate	the	uncontrolled	course	of	action	independently	of	her	appetitive desire.	Thus	she	now	acts	according	to	how	the	situation	appears	to her	-	namely,	as	pleasant.78 If the interpretation so far is along the right lines, then	Aristotle distinguishes	between,	on	the	one	hand,	merely	having	thoughts	(or a train	of thoughts) and,	on the	other	hand,	having thoughts	while also	contemplating	the	explanatory	and	inferential	or	conceptual	connections	between	one's thoughts (or	propositional	contents). In	other	words,	the	distinction	he	is	drawing,	in	introducing	the	third	way of	having	but	not	using	knowledge is	not	between	possessing	some knowledge	but	not	having	it	currently	in	mind	(as	when	one	knows some	fact	but	one	is	not	attending	to	it	at	the	moment)	and	possessing and	also	having	it	currently	in	mind.	Rather,	the	distinction	is	between 78.	Destrée	(2007)	argues	that	the	motivating	force	of	a	phantasia is	given	by	the degree	of	pleasure	that	is	associated	with	it.	The	uncontrolled	agent	is	characterized	by	having	a	strong	phantasia aisthêtikê (which,	on	Destrée's	view, represents things	as	pleasant) and	a	weak	phantasia logistikē (which represents	things	as	good).	During	the	uncontrolled	action,	the	agent's	faculty	of phantasia logistikē is	disabled	by the	strong	phantasia aisthêtikê.	His	view	is attractive	but	it	faces	a	number	of	problems.	In	DA 434a6–7,	which	contains the	reference	to	phantasia logistikē,	Aristotle	does	not	specify	its	content.	It might simply	be	a representation	of	different courses	of action to	oneself according to one's deliberation	without representing them as good	-	that determination	can	still	be	the	work	of	rational	judgment.	It	is	also	not	clear that	phantasia logistikē is	a	separate	kind	or	faculty	of	phantasia which	can	be disabled	independently. were	sick	of	this	disease	(for	example,	to	phlegmatic	or bilious	people	when	burning	with	fever), is	a	matter	of craft.	(Met. 981a7–13) According to this passage, a person of experience can formulate a number	of	propositions,	such	as	"treatment	T	helped	Callias	when	he had	fever."	He	can,	on	the	basis	of	these	propositions,	also	form	a	rule: "If	people	have	a	fever,	apply	treatment	T."	An	experience-based	rule	of this	sort	provides	a	quick,	reliable,	and	clear	guidance	to	one's	actions. On	this	account,	a	number	of	daily	activities	(including	those	associated	with	crafts	and	occupations)	do	not	require	any	exercise	of	reason in	the	strict	sense	in	which	it involves	deliberation	and	the	grasp	of reasons.	When	one	does	them,	one	does	them	on	the	basis	of	one's acquired	habits	or	experience	(Met. 1.1,	981b5). It	is	crucial	to	recognize	that	the	temporary	suspension	of	reason that	Aristotle	attributes to the	uncontrolled	agent	during	her	uncontrolled	action	does	not concern	either	of these two	non-rational (in Aristotle's	sense	of	the	term)	forms	of	practical	cognition	(BL	and	CL) since	neither	of	them	involves	an	active	grasp	of	the	reasons	in	the	strict sense for thinking	or	believing that	doing	something	would lead to some	desired	result.	In	this	sense,	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	draw	on all	her	experience	and,	in	fact,	on	all	her	already	acquired	knowledge that	does	not	require,	in	order	to	be	applied,	any	further	deliberative processes.	Thus,	although	she	cannot	deliberate	(in	the	strict	sense) during	her	uncontrolled	action,	she	can	nevertheless	think	about	how to	accomplish	her	goal	even	while	she	acts.	She	can	think	about	how to	achieve it	on the	basis	of	her	experience (just like	one	can think about	how	to	combine	spices	to	make	a	tasty	meal	without	engaging in	deliberation	about	it). It	is	time	for	a	quick	summary.	Aristotle	tells	us	that	when	the	uncontrolled	agent	acts	without	control,	she	is	like	people	who	are	mad, drunk,	or asleep insofar she temporarily cannot	exercise	her	knowledge.	She	cannot	do	so	because	her	reasoning	power	has	been	temporarily	disabled	by	her	appetite.	As	a	consequence	of	the	disablement	of jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 22 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) That	my interpretation so far is along the right lines is	well supported	by	the	next	passage	in	NE 7.3	in	which	Aristotle	compares	uncontrolled	agents	to	early	learners: (10) Saying words that come from knowledge proves nothing. For people in these affective states can recite the	demonstrations	and	verses	of	Empedocles,	and	those who	have learned	something	for the	first time	string	together	words,	but	do	not	yet	know	it.	For	they	must	absorb	it	and	that	requires	time.	In	this	way	one	must	suppose	also	uncontrolled	people	speak,	just	like	actors	do. (NE 7.3,	1147a18–24) The passage considers an obvious objection to the previous claim that	the	uncontrolled	agent's	state	of	mind	is	like	that	of	people	who are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep:	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	report	not	just what	she	is	doing,	but	also	her	previous	deliberation	and	its	conclusion	(and	so	the	content	of	her	decision)	that	what	she	does	is	wrong. There	thus	seems	to	be	a	reason	to	believe	that	she	knows	what	she	is doing	and	knows that	it	is	bad. Aristotle	replies	that	merely	saying	words	that	might	express	something	is	not	a	sign	of	knowledge	or	understanding.	People	affected	in certain	ways	(for	example,	drunk	or	mad)	can	recite	verses	without having any understanding of	what they say. Similarly, people	who have begun to learn something can string the	words together that express	what	they	are	learning,	but	be	doing	so	without	having	real understanding	of	what	they	say.	Obviously,	it	is	not	the	case	that	an early	learner	does	not	understand	what	she	is	saying	at all.	A	student can	write	out	Kant's	argument	leading	to	the	formulation	of	the	Categorical	Imperative.	She	might	also	very	well	understand	the	words that	Kant	uses to formulate the Imperative	and in fact, even	understand	the	individual	claims.	And	she	can	use	this	knowledge	to	report it	(say,	on	an	exam).	But	being	able	to	do	this	does	not	presuppose having	some	information	or	thought	currently	in	mind	but	not	being able	to	contemplate	or	use	it	as knowledge	(for	example,	as	standing in	explanatory	and/or	conceptual	connection	to	other	thoughts)	and having	this	information	in	mind	and	also	being	able	to	attend	to	it	as knowledge in this sense.79 It is	only this latter,	quite	specific	way	of manipulating	thoughts	or	propositional	contents	that	Aristotle	denies to	the	uncontrolled	agent	during	the	uncontrolled	action.	The	former case	is,	as	I	tried	to	show,	compatible	with	the	agent	still	being	capable of	highly	complex	cognitive	operations	(ones	we	would	normally	call thinking)	and	might	well	be,	as	far	as	Aristotle	is	concerned,	even	the dominant	way	in	which	we	normally	operate.80	Normally,	however,	we are	capable	of	rational	control	over	such	behavior	whereas	in	the	case of	lack	of	control,	the	rational	oversight	is	suspended. It is	sometimes	objected,	to	the	kind	of	account	that	I	have	been developing,	that	it	implies	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	does	not	know what	she	is	doing	when	she	acts	without	control.	It	should	be	clear	by now	that	this	objection	can	be	true	or	false,	depending	on	how	one understands the	phrase	"she	does	not	know." If it	means that	she	at the	moment	lacks	understanding	-	an	intellectual	grasp	-	of	the	reason why	she	should	or	should	not	be	doing	what	she	does,	then	the	objection	is	correct	but	it	does	not	succeed	as	an	objection	since	Aristotle would	agree	with	it.	But	if	it	means	that	she	does	not	know	what	she	is doing	in	the	sense	that	she	would	not	be	able	to	tell	what	actions	she is	performing	and	what	she	is	trying	to	achieve,	the	objection	is	false. 79.	Since	for	Aristotle	having	knowledge	ordinarily	denotes	the	latter	condition (i. e., having	understanding), he can and	does express this thought by saying that the	agent	both	has	knowledge in	a	way,	but	also	does	not	have it (1147a12–3). 80.	Leibniz held	a	view	similar.	In	Principes de la Nature et de la Grace,	he	claims that	the	difference	between	reason	strictly	speaking	and	a	certain	semblance of	reason	(which	is	an	exercise	of	a	highly	developed	capacity	of	memory) is that the former, but not the latter, is concerned	with causes and explanations.	The	non-rational	cognition is	common	to	both	human	beings	and animals,	and	we	rely	on	it	most	of	the	time.	See:	G.	W.	Leibniz,	Die philosophischen Schriften,	vol.	VI,	edited	by	C.	I.	Gerhardt.	(Berlin,	1875–90),	reprint: Hildesheim,	1965,	600. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 23 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) is	tempted	by	her	uncontrolled	desire	and	might	well	deliberate	about what	it	would	take	to	satisfy	it	and	whether	satisfying	it	would	be	permissible.81	She	can	achieve	a	high	level	of	sophistication	in	figuring	out the	ways	in	which	she	can	do	so,	being	an	agent	exhibiting	the	quality of	cleverness	(deinotēs),	which	is	the	ability	to	find	out	how	to	promote a	goal	quite	in	general	(EN 6.12,	1144a25–8),	independently	of	its	being good	or	bad.	After	all,	if	there	was	a	way	to	satisfy	her	desires	in	a	way that	would	be	acceptable	to	reason,	she	could	have	it	both	ways	and so	she	has	motivation to invest	energy into	such thought	processes. This	much	is	clear	both	from	NE 6.9,	1142b18–22	itself,	as	well	as	from NE 7.10,	1152a7–16	where	lack	of	control	is	said	to	be	often	associated with	cleverness. However, such deliberation presumably occurs before she acts without	control	(since	the	point	of	deliberation	of	any	sort	is	to	figure out	what	to	do	before	one	acts)	and	the	result	of	her	deliberation	as	a whole	is	a	decision	not to	satisfy	that	desire.	The	disablement	of	reason that	I	have	been	arguing	Aristotle	attributes	to	the	uncontrolled	agent concerns	only	the	time	during	which	the	agent	acts	without	control, not	the	time	before the	action	during	which	deliberation	occurs. It is aimed	to	explain	how	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	act	against	her	decision	without	having	reconsidered	the	decision.	This	disablement	does not	prohibit	the	uncontrolled	agent	from	making	use	of	her	previous deliberation	even	during	the	uncontrolled	action,	although	it	temporarily	prevents	her	from	using	it	as part	of	her	overall	knowledge	(in the	way	I	already	explained). It	should	also	be	noted	that	my	view	is	compatible	with	the	agent interrupting her	uncontrolled	action	in	order	to	deliberate	about	how to get to	her goal. This can	happen if her experience turns	out	not to	be	sufficient	(e. g.,	if	she	comes	across	unexpected	problems).	This might	in	fact	be	quite	a	common	occurrence	and	Aristotle's	theory	can accommodate	it.	But	such	deliberation	would	presumably	trigger	her decision	(since	it	would	trigger	her	reasoning	capacity)	and	so	it	might 81. See	NE 3.11,	1119a12–21	for	an	example	of	deliberation	of	this	sort. that	she	in	fact	understands	the	argument	and	the	logical	connection between	its	steps. The uncontrolled agent, while acting without control, is like an early	learner	insofar	as	she	has	knowledge	but	is	unable	to	use	it	as knowledge	(in	the	sense	I	explained	above).	She	knows	what	her	goal is	and	she	can	draw	on	her	experience	to	get	to	that	goal.	What	she cannot do,	when she acts	without control, is to reflect on	whether there	are	any	reasons	to	get	what	she	wants.	She	can	perfectly	well	say, e. g.	"this	thing	here	is	sweet	and	I	should	not	eat	it	since	I	have	decided not	to	eat	sweets"	and	perfectly	well	understand	the	meaning	of	what she	is	saying.	But	this	thought	will	not	count	as	a	piece	of	knowledge, or	as	a	piece	of	knowledge	that	is	actively	attended	to,	since	when	she says	it,	she	is	not	grasping	the	prohibition	to	eat	sweet	things	as	being implied	by	her	knowledge.	She	is	like	an	early	learner	who	recites	the correct	steps	in	a	proof,	but	does	not	grasp	how	one	step	follows	from another. This	is,	in	essence,	the	meaning	of	Aristotle's	analogy	between	the uncontrolled	agent	and	people	who	are	mad,	drunk,	or	asleep.	If	this interpretation is along the right lines, it suggests that	Aristotle conceives	of	reason	and	thinking	(and	so	of	rationally	grounded	and	guided	action)	as	a	highly	specific	ability	that	binds	together	the	ability	to construct	and	understand	rational	explanations	and	reasons	and	the ability	to	be	motivated	to	act	by	one's	understanding	of	such	explanations	and	reasons	-	i. e.,	to	make	and	execute	decisions.	Although	this way	of thinking	and	acting is specifically	human, it is	not the	usual modus operandi	of	human	beings.	Most	people,	most	of	the	time,	simply follow	their	feelings	(NE 1.3,	1095a2–10). Before	moving	on,	I	have	to	address	a	worry	about	my	interpretation that	an	attentive	reader	of	the	NE might	have.	Aristotle	tells	us	that	the uncontrolled	agent	can	deliberate	about	her	uncontrolled	desire	(NE 6.9,	1142b18–22)	and	one	might	wonder	how	this	claim	fits	with	my interpretation.	The	answer	is	that	it	fits	well	since,	on	my	view,	there is	no	reason	to	deny	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	deliberate	about her	uncontrolled	desire.	The	uncontrolled	agent	can	and	presumably jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 24 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) perception,	memory	or	anticipation	is	always	accompanied	by	"heating and	chilling"	(MA 8,	701a1).	Hence,	all	feelings	and	non-rational	desires involve	the	processes	of	heating	and	chilling	(whatever	the	precise	mechanics	of	these	processes	are),	even	though,	as	Aristotle	remarks,	this can	escape	notice	if	they	are	small	enough.	They	are	all	bodily	alterations	(MA 7,	701b16–32).82	But	it is	also	precisely	these	kinds	of	material	or	physiological	processes	that	are	the	causes	of	sleep,	madness,	or drunkenness	and,	hence,	also	of the incapacitations	of	one's rational capacities	that	Aristotle	describes	in	the	De Somno and	De Insomniis. Aristotle's thought, then, is that the	disablement	of reason in	uncontrolled action is brought about	by the	material processes associated	with	the	agent's	occurrent	appetites.	The	uncontrolled	agent	does not	choose	to	do	what	the	non-rational	desire	inclines	her	to	do.	She does	not	choose	to	abandon	her	decision	and	act	on	her	bad	desire. She	acts	on	a	desire	(the	bad	one)	that	was	present	all	along	and	this desire,	in	and	of	itself,	causes	her	action.	But	she	does	not	perform	any mental	act	that	would	constitute	her	choosing	to	do	so	(or	rejecting her	decision).	This	feature	of	Aristotle's	theory	makes	it	significantly different	from	akratic	or	weak-willed	action	as	it	is	traditionally	understood in the	contemporary literature.	Ordinarily,	philosophers try to explain	why	one	would	choose,	form	an	intention,	or	draw	a	conclusion	to	do	something	which	one	has	some	reasons	to	do	(since	one,	for example,	desires	it)	but	which	one	has	overriding	reasons	not	to	do.83 Alternatively,	they	try	to	explain	why	one	re-evaluates	one's	intentions when	confronted	by	the	very	temptations	that	one	intended	to	resist.84 82.	See	also	Aristotle's	famous	description	of	the	material	side	of	anger	as	"the boiling	of	the	blood	and	hot	matter	around	the	heart"	(DA 1.1,	403a29). 83.	For	example,	Bratman	(1979,	168)	describes	Sam,	a	weak-willed	agent,	who does	not	draw	the	inference	that	he	should	not	drink,	which	is	the	right	one in	view	of	his	own	evaluative	commitments,	"but,	rather,	focuses	his	attention on	the	former	evaluative	commitment	and	infers from	it	a	practical	conclusion	in	favor	of	drinking." 84.	Richard	Holton	explains	weakness	of	will	(as	opposed	to	akrasia,	which	he understands	along	the	lines	explained	in	note	1	above)	as	involving	an	abandonment	of	a	resolution	not	to	act	on	one's	future	inclinations.	See	in	Holton (1999,259). enable	her	to	refrain	from	her	uncontrolled	action	or,	alternatively,	she can	succumb	again.	An	example	would	be	a	smoker	who	has	been	trying	to	resist	his	urge	to	smoke	but	finally,	late	at	night,	gives	in	-	only to	discover	that	he	has	run	out	of	cigarettes.	When	he	tries	to	figure out	how	to	obtain	some,	he	is	forced	to	deliberate	(since	it	is	too	late to	use	any	of	the	usual	ways	to	obtain	them).	But	instead	of	deciding for	some	way	of	getting	them,	he	now	reinstates	his	commitment	not to	smoke.	Luck	helped	him	to	stick	to	it. 2.5. The transition from sticking to one's decision to acting without control Although	we	now	have an explanation of how it is that the uncontrolled	agent	acts	during uncontrolled	action	(i. e.,	we	now	know	what his	state	of	mind	is),	we	still	do	not	know	why	such	temporary	suspension	occurs in the	first	place.	Why	does the	uncontrolled	agent	end up	in	a	condition	of	this	sort?	And	how	does	she	move	from	resisting and	sticking	to	the	decision	to	acting	without	control?	We	can	begin by	looking	at	what	Aristotle	says	about	the	causes	that	lead	to	the	temporary	disablements	of reason in the	other conditions	he	mentions. Some	of	them	happen	as	parts	of	people's	natural	day-cycle	(such	as sleep),	but some	are the results	of	various	external influences	or internal imbalances.	When	one reads	about the	causes	and	processes that	are	involved	in	the	transitions	from	being	in	possession	of	one's rational faculties to their	disablement,	one	gets a story about	different	flows	of	exhalations,	heat,	and	blood	in	one's	body	that	cause	the disablement of one's cognitive faculties (Insomn. 460b28–61a25,	De Somno 456a30–b28).	Sometimes	these	processes	are	caused	by	the	intake	of	food	(as	in	sleep),	sometimes	by	the	intake	of	wine	(as	in	being drunk),	sometimes	by	illness. As	Aristotle	sees	it,	all	emotions,	feelings,	and	non-rational	desires are	alterations	or	affections	that	come	about	because	of	thoughts,	phantasiai,	or	perceptions that	present	to	one's	consciousness	things	as	having	certain	appropriate	motivational	features,	namely	as	being	pleasant or painful (MA 8, 701b33–7). As	Aristotle further tells us, the cognition	of	something	as	pleasant	or	painful,	whether	it	comes	from	direct jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 25 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) (11)	Further,	one	could	also,	in	the	following	way,	look	scientifically	(phusikōs)	at	the	cause.	For	one	belief	is	universal,	and	the	other	is	about	particulars,	of	which	perception is	in	control.85	When	one	[belief]	results	from	them,	it	is necessary	that	what	has	been	concluded	the	soul	asserts in	one	case,	and	in	the	case	of	[beliefs	about]	producing things	that	it	acts	[on	it]	immediately.	For	example,	if	everything sweet	must be tasted and this is sweet (some one	of	the	particulars),	it	is	necessary	for	one	able	[to	do it]	and	not	prevented	[from	doing	it]	at	the	same	time	to do	this.	(NE 7.3,	1147a24–31) The	pattern	that	Aristotle	presents	as	explaining	both	action	and	the formation of beliefs contains two relevantly connected beliefs, one universal, one about particulars.	Once these two beliefs are put together,	that	is,	once	they	result	in	one	belief,	the	agent	who	holds	the beliefs	necessarily	asserts	and	believes	the	conclusion	immediately	or, in	the	case	of	beliefs	about	doing	things,	necessarily	acts	immediately (NE	7.3,	1147a26–8). Why	does	Aristotle	think	that	once	two	such	beliefs	are	put	together,	one	immediately	and	necessarily	acts?	In	order	to	explain	an	action, one	needs to show	how the action follows from the agent's beliefs 85.	There is	a	question	about	how	to translate "ἡ	μὲν γὰρ καθόλου δόξα, ἡ δ' ἑτέρα περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά ἐστιν"	(1147a24–5).	What	feminine	noun	is	to be	understood	with	the	article	ἡ, protasis	(proposition)	or	doxa	(belief)?	If	we take	it	to	be	protasis,	we	should	translate	"for	one	proposition	is	a	universal belief,	the	other	is	[a	belief]	about	particulars."	Taking	it	the	other	way,	as	in my	translation,	we	get: "For	one	belief is	a	universal	belief." I	do	not think that	much	hangs	on	this	issue	here.	The	sentence	says	in	the	first	clause	that whatever	the	subject	is,	is	a	belief.	This	issue	can	be	important	if	one	wants to	argue that	when	Aristotle later (at 1147b9)	uses the	expression "the last proposition" (hē teleutaia protasis)	he refers to a conclusion	of the	practical syllogism.	For	if	we	take	the	noun	that	is	to	be	understood	with	the	feminine articles	here to	be	protasis,	one	could	argue that	Aristotle	means to say, in the	second	sentence,	"when	one	[proposition]	results	from	them..."	in	which case	Aristotle	would	be	referring	to	the	conclusion	as	to	a	proposition	(rather than,	as	in	my	translation,	a	belief).	That	would	be	a	good	precedent	for	the expression	at	1147b9. In	both	cases,	there	is	some	mental	act	the	akratic	or	weak-willed	agent performs	such that that	act (of	choosing, forming	an intention, refocusing	one's	attention,	etc.)	is	different	from	the	basic	desire	that	motivates	her	action.	This	additional	psychic	act	is	the	cause	of	the	akratic action.	On	Aristotle's view,	however, the	original (bad)	desire is an impulse	which	can	cause	an	action	on	its	own	(NE	7.3,	1147a35). This	explains	why	Aristotle	is	not	trying	to	explain	(in	NE 7.3)	how or	why	it	is	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	moves	from	acting	on	or	maintaining	the	good	decision	to	acting	on	the	bad	desire.	As	he	asserts, one	should	consult	the	physiologists	for	the	explanation	(1147b9).	On his	view,	there	is	an	explanation	of	how	it	happens,	but	that	explanation	does	not	refer	to	any	psychological	acts	such	as	decisions.	Rather, the explanation is to	be	given in terms	of certain	physiological processes.	Notice that these	physiological	processes	are	not,	as	he	says, peculiar	to	the	condition	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	since	they	are	also found	in	people	who	are	(in	the	process	of	becoming)	mad,	drunk	or asleep.	In	some	sense,	then,	we	have	not	yet	arrived	at	the	full	account of	uncontrolled	action	since	we	do	not	yet	have	the	right	sort	of	grasp of	the	difference	between	uncontrolled	actions	and	actions	performed in	other	non-standard	states	of	mind.	As I	will	now	argue,	Aristotle completes	his	account	and	finally	"captures"	the	uncontrolled	agent,	in the	second	part	of	NE 7.3. 3. The second (phusikōs) part of Aristotle's discussion (1147a25–b5). Aristotle's	"phusikōs"	discussion	of	lack	of	control	contains	the	passage that	has	been traditionally thought to	contain the	core	of	Aristotle's theory	(1147a31–5).	The	passage	is	commonly	thought	to	describe	the state	of	the	mind	of	the	uncontrolled	agent	while	she	acts	without	control.	As	I	will	argue	in	this	section,	however,	the	passage	is	a	description	of	the	uncontrolled	agent's	state	of	mind before	the	uncontrolled action. I begin	with a translation	of the immediately preceding	passage	in	which	Aristotle	introduces	the	"practical	syllogism": jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 26 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) nal	to	her	agency,	such	as	a	desire)	since	that	would	undermine	the very	purpose	of	the	pattern	as	a	device	for	explaining	actions.	It	would turn	into	a	mere	presentation	of	available	actions	with	no	explanatory power: the	agent	would	act	on	the	two	beliefs	unless she	would	not want	to	(or	unless	she	does	something	else).88 However,	an	alternative interpretation	of the	passage,	developed by	David	Charles,89	claims	that	the	agent	can	reach	the	conclusion,	yet still	refrain	from	acting	on	it	not	only	due	to	some	external	factor	of prevention,	but	also	due	to	some	internal	factor,	such	as	an	opposing desire.	Rather	than	entering	the	intricate	debates	about	what	the	purpose	of	the	"practical	syllogism"	is,	I	will	concentrate	on	the	relatively simple	issue	of	the	sense	of	mē kōluomenon (not	being	prevented) in the	clause "it is	necessary for	one	able [to	do it]	and	not	prevented [from	doing	it]	at	the	same	time	to	do	this"	(1147a30–1).	Does	it	denote external	factors	only	or	can	it	include	factors	internal	to	one's	agency (as	Charles'	interpretation	claims)? The	verb	kōluein	can	have	the	general	meaning	of	one	thing	preventing	another	from	being	or	doing	something,	without	any	implication as	to	what	the	relationship	between	those	things	is.	This	use	is	present throughout	Aristotle's	works,	as in	a	sentence	"even if	all	A's	are	B's, and	no	A	is	a	C,	nothing	prevents	some	B	to	be	C"	(e. g.,	APr. 30b15)	or when	he	says	that	wealthy	people	should	be	prevented	from	undertaking	expensive	public	works	(Pol. 1309a17).	However,	in	the	context	of action	or	movement,	Aristotle	uses	the	term	to	denote	factors	that	prevent	action	or	movement	and	are	external	to	what	is	properly	speaking acting or	moving (e. g.,	De Caelo 311a20;	DA 404a14, 417a28;	HA 609b21;	Met. 1148a17).	Aristotle	thus	often	uses	it	to	describe	the	activity	of	something	that	compels	(De Motu 701a16;	Met. 1015a27,	1023a17) something	else	to	act	or	move	against	its	own	impulse.	As	he	makes clear in	both	NE 3.1 (1110a1–4)	and	EE 2.7–8	(1223a11–4,	1224b12–4), what	compels	is	always	something	external	to	the	agent,	either	in	the 88.	For	a	similar	point	see	Dahl	(1984,	162). 89.	Charles	(1984,	128–32). or	desires	and	the	agent's	perception	of	her	circumstances.	Aristotle makes use of two propositions, one of	which (the universal) represents the relevant feature of the agent's state of	mind (for example, her decision), and the other (the particular) the relevant feature(s) of	the	environment	as	the	agent	perceives	it.	If	this	is	what	Aristotle has	in	mind,	then	it	is	obvious	why	an	action	follows	inevitably:	the two	premises	represent	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	for	action insofar	as the	agent's	mind	or	soul is	concerned.	The	action	follows necessarily, just	as	belief in	a	conclusion	of	any	correct	syllogism	or inference	does. On	this	understanding	of	the	practical	syllogism,86	the	action	could be	prevented	or	interrupted	in	two	ways:	either	the	agent	changes	her mind	(e. g.,	her	decision),	or	some	factor	external	to	the	agent's	mind (i. e.,	to	her	beliefs	and	desires)	interferes	with	the	action.87	But	it	cannot	be	prevented	by	any	factor	internal	to	the	agent's	mind	(i. e.,	inter86.	In this	paper, I	do	not	defend	any	particular interpretation	of	what	has	become	known	as	Aristotle's	theory	of	the	practical	syllogism. My	interpretation of	the	syllogistic	machinery	in	passage	11	is	an	interpretation	of	that	particular passage	in	the	context	of	NE 7.3	where	it	seems	to	me	clearly	introduced	as a	way	of	explaining action	by	linking	one's	relevant	universal	beliefs	(expressing	one's	desires	or	judgments	about	what	one	should	or	should	not	do)	with one's	awareness	or	perception	of	the	relevant	features	to	those	beliefs	in	one's situation.	This	seems	to	me	to	be	the	explicit	content	of	the	passage.	In	the chapter,	the	syllogistic	apparatus	is	clearly	not	introduced	as	a	way	of	capturing	deliberation	(the	particular	premise is	not	one	that	says	what	needs	to happen in	order to achieve	a	goal specified in the	universal	premise) and so the question	of	whether or not it can	be used that	way is not relevant here.	Similarly,	it	is	irrelevant	whether	the	agent	is	explicitly	connecting	the premises	together	so	as	to	make	an	inference	to	a	conclusion.	The	important point is that the syllogism is a rational reconstruction of	what cognitively must	have	happened	in	order	for	an	action	to	happen	even	if	the	agent	was not	explicitly	aware	of	it	(although	she	very	well	might	have	been)	as	constituting	an	inference.	For	a	discussion	of	the	various	interpretations	of	practical syllogism	see	Corcilius	(2008b)	and,	for	a	defense	of	an	interpretation	that	is largely	compatible	with	the	minimalistic	account	assumed	in	this	article,	see Corcilius	(2008c). 87. It	is	important	to	realize	that	"external	factors"	can	include	more	than	just	factors	physically	external	to	the	person	who	acts.	The	internal/external	distinction	needs	to	be	understood	in	relation	to	the	person's	mind	(as	the	center	of agency).	I	will	explain	this	as	I	go	along. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 27 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) but	appetite	leads	one	on;	for	each	of	the	parts	can	move [the	body].91 (NE 7.3,	1147a31–5) In	the	passage,	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	said	to	have	a	universal	belief, which	is	not	clearly	specified,	that	forbids	her	to	taste	something;	she has	a	(universal)	belief	that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant;	and	she	has a particular belief that some	particular thing (that she	perceives) is sweet.	This	last	belief	is	said	to	be	active.	It	also	seems	that	the	agent has	drawn	a	conclusion	from	the	universal	belief	that	forbids	her	to taste	to	the	effect	that	she	should	avoid	the	sweet	thing.	But	the	agent has	an	appetite	that	goes	against	this	conclusion	and	leads	the	agent to	eat	the	sweet	thing.	The	appetite	is	said	to	be	able	to	move	the	agent to	do	this. We	now	take	into	account	two	things.	First,	according	to	Aristotle at	1147a25–8,	if	both	premises	of	the	practical	syllogism	are	known	and actively	attended	to,	the	agent	necessarily	acts	according	to	them.	Second,	in	the	"two-syllogism"	passage	the	uncontrolled	agent	is	clearly said to	be	drawing	the	good	conclusion	which	means	that	she is	actively	attending	to	both	premises.	It	follows	that	the	passage	cannot	be a	description	of	the	uncontrolled	action	itself	unless	Aristotle	is	grossly	inconsistent.	It	must	describe	the	uncontrolled	agent's	state	of	mind before	the	uncontrolled	action	when	she	is	not	yet	acting	without	control	(i. e.,	when	she	is	still	refraining	from	acting	on	her	appetite	and 91. Alternatively:	"for	it	[viz.,	appetite]	can	move	each	of	the	parts."	In	this	case "hekaston tōn moriōn"	would	refer	to	the	parts	of	the	body	that	are	responsible for	movement (i. e., limbs).	This	means taking	hekaston to	be the	object of kinein. As	I	translated	the	sentence	above,	"each"	refers	to	the	parts	or	aspects of	the	soul	that	move	(appetite,	wish,	etc.).	In	this	case,	hekaston is	the	subject and	kinein is	interpreted	as	meaning	"to	cause	movement." This	makes	more sense,	and	fits	the	context	well:	appetite	can	move	the	body,	just	as	decision (reason)	and	spirit	also	can	do.	There	does	not	seem	to	be	anything	in	the word order to prevent this translation. The interpretation of tōn moriōn as referring	to	rational	vs.	non-rational	part	of the	soul	seems	natural in	view of the frequent	usage	of that language in	both	EE (1219b20–20a3,	1224b26, 1202a29)	and NE	(1102b4,	1102b19,	1139a9,	b12,	1144a9,	1145a3–7). sense	of	being	external	physically	or	in	the	sense	of	being	external	to what	makes	the	agent	a	distinct,	individual	agent	(this	could	be	either the	agent's	nature	as	a	being	of	a	certain	species	or	bodily	processes that	are	outside	of	her	control).	In	fact,	this	is	Aristotle's	view	of	how the	agent's	good	action	(sticking	to	her	decision)	gets	interrupted:	by factors	external to	her	own	agency (even if they	are internal to	her body)	-	namely, the	material	processes	associated	with	her	appetite. Finally, in its	passive form	(which is the	one	used in	our	passage in NE 7.3),	Aristotle	uses	the	word	exclusively	to	describe	external	factors of	prevention	(Phys. 208b12; De Caelo 307a10,	311b16;	MM	1198b15–6). This	is	a	strong	argument	in	favor	of	reading	the	occurrence	of	kōluein in	NE 7.3	in	the	way	I	have	suggested.	The	most	natural	reading	of	the passage,	then,	suggests	that	the	prevention	of	the	action	would	be	due to	a	factor	external to	the	agent's	own	beliefs	and	desires,	in	the	way	I have	explained.90 Aristotle	now	proceeds to	use the	pattern to	describe the	uncontrolled	agent's	state	of	mind: (12)	So	when	there	is	in	the	agent	on	the	one	hand	a	universal belief forbidding tasting, and on the other hand [the	belief]	that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant,	and	this	is sweet,	and	this	latter	is	active,	appetite	happening	to	be	in the	agent,	then	on	the	one	hand	[belief]	says	to	avoid	this, 90.	When	the	word	is	used	of	internal	factors	(as	in	NE 7.3),	Aristotle	uses	it	to denote	prohibitions	that	are	put	on	one's	following	certain	emotions	but	not to	denote	being	prevented	from	following	them.	This	use	is	related	to	one	in which	laws	(1130b24)	or	shame	(1128b18)	as	external	factors	prohibit	one's following certain states or emotions. This is the	way in	which the expression is	used in	NE 7.3 at 1146a14	wherein reason (or	knowledge	or	belief) prohibits	one's	following	of	one's	appetites	(see	also	Plato,	Rep. 439c–440a) and,	similarly,	at	1147a31–4,	wherein	the	agent	is	prohibited	to	taste	by	one's belief;	that	is,	prohibited	to	follow	an	appetite	(i. e.,	reason	does	not	prevent appetite	from	tasting	but,	rather,	forbids	or	prohibits	the	agent	to	taste).	The only	clear	use	of	the	word	for	emotions	preventing	reason	from	exercising	its own	activity	is	thus	in	MM 1208a10–23.	However,	in	that	passage	it	is	notable that reason	and	emotions	are treated	as two	agents	preventing	each	other from	doing	something	and	so	as	being	external	to	each	other. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 28 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) so	on)	are in the same	state	with respect to their	knowledge.	What distinguishes	the	uncontrolled	agent	from	them	is	the	content	of	her mind	before	the	action	-	the	presence	of	a	good	decision	and	of	the contrary	appetite.	Although	this	conflicted	state	of	mind	is	shared	with other	agents	(such	as	the	self-controlled	one),	taken	together,	the	two states	of	mind	capture	the	essence	of	uncontrolled	action. The	interpretation	also	fits	nicely	with	the	immediately	following passage: (13)	So	that	it	turns	out	that	a	man	acts	without	control in	a	way	as	a	result	of	reason	and	belief,	but	a	belief	that is	contrary	not	in	itself,	but	only	coincidentally	to	correct reason	-	for appetite is contrary, not the belief. This is also	why	animals	are	not	uncontrolled,	because	they	do not	have	universal	supposition,	but	only	appearance	and memory	of	particulars.	(EN 7.3.1147a35–1147b5) The	passage	clearly	locates	the	cause	of	the	uncontrolled	action	in	the agent's	appetite.	It	also	tells	us	that	the	there	is	a	sense	in	which	she	acts on	her	belief	-	presumably	the	belief	that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant. This	belief	is,	of	course,	not	contrary	to	her	decision	since	it	does	not	say that	she	should	taste	everything	that	is	sweet	or	pleasant.	It	is	her	appetite	that	is	contrary	to	her	decision.	Her	action,	however,	is	done	in	accordance	with	this	belief	even	if	not	from	it	strictly	speaking	(hence,	the	"in	a way"	qualification).	This	is	because	she	acts	on	her	appetite	of	which	the belief	is	a	generalized	expression.	The	agent	realizes	and	so	believes	that everything	sweet	is	pleasant	for	her	but	since	she	does	not	believe	that everything	sweet	is	good	for	her,	she	does	not	decide	to	act	on	her	belief about	what	she	finds	pleasant.	Still,	once	she	acts	as	she	does,	the	belief that	everything	sweet	is	pleasant	comes	to	be	in	practical	contradiction to	her	good	decision	since	it	represents	the	appetite	on	which	she	acted. There	has	been	much	discussion in the literature	about the	final passage	of the	phusikōs discussion in	which	Aristotle refers to	something	he	calls	"the	last	proposition": sticking	to	her	decision).92	This interpretation	not	only follows	from the	features	of	the	text,	but	also	offers	several	exegetical	advantages. First,	we	get	rid	of	the	problem	of	inconsistency	between	the	"twosyllogism"	passage	(which	claims	that	the	particular	premise	is	active and	tells	us	that	the	agent	draws	the	good	conclusion),	and	Aristotle's claim	later	at	1147b9	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	when	acting	without control	does	not	have	(or	only	has	in	a	way)	the	final	proposition.	The latter	claim	concerns	(as it says)	the	uncontrolled	action	itself,	whereas the	two-syllogism	passage	describes	what	precedes	the	action.	Second, we	get	rid	of	the	inconsistency	between	the	"two-syllogism"	passage and the immediately	preceding	passage (NE 7.3, 1147a25–31),	which asserts that if both premises are active, the agent acts according to them.	Since	the	"two-syllogism"	passage	describes	the	state	of	mind of	the	agent	before	her	uncontrolled	action,	the	agent	is	still	acting	according	to	her	decision	and	so	drawing	the	good	conclusion.93 Third,	it	complements,	in	an	essential	way,	the	third	way	of	having but	not	using	knowledge	which	pertains	to	the	uncontrolled	agent's state	of	mind	during	the	action.	This	third	way	is	not	specific	to	the	uncontrolled	agent	-	people	in	other	mental	states	(drunk,	asleep,	and 92. It	may	be	objected that	when	Aristotle says, in the two-syllogism	passage that	"hē d' epithumia agei"	(NE 7.3,	1147b34),	he	means	that	appetite	leads	to action,	and	not	merely	that	it	urges	the	agent	to	action.	As	evidence	for	such usage	of	agein one	may	point	to,	for	example,	NE 7.3,	1146b23–4,	where	the intemperate	person	is	said	to	be	led and	this	must	mean,	in	the	context	that she	acts while	being	led	on.	However,	the	general	sense	of	agein in	practical contexts	is	to	"lead	to	action,"	where	it	is	not	necessary	that	the	agent	who	is "led"	also	acts.	There	is	a	clear	passage	in	the	MM 2.6,	1201a28–35	documenting	such	usage.	The	self-controlled	man	there	is	said	to	be	led	by	his	appetite, but	to	refrain	from	doing	what	the	appetite	leads	him	to	do.	The	exact	sense of	agein	must	be	then	determined	by	its	context.	In	any	case,	it	is	reasonable to	assume	that	there	is	a	period	of	time,	in	which	the	uncontrolled agent	feels the	pull	of	appetite,	without	yet	succumbing	and	this	can	be	well	described by	appetite	leading	him	on.	It	is	only	the	precipitate	uncontrolled agent	who acts	immediately	without	a	period	of	such	struggle. 93.	Rowe	(1971,	119)	has	anticipated	me	in	offering	a	similar	"two-stage"	analysis of	these	passages,	such	that	passage	(1)	describes	the	agent	in media and	the latter	passage	(11)	before	the	action.	However,	Rowe	thinks	that,	while	the agent	acts	without	control,	he	is	unaware	of	what	she	is	doing	(but	that	she was	aware	of	it	beforehand). jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 29 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) explained them above) for holding or rejecting either of them. But since	it	is	the	bad	conclusion	and	not	the	good	one	that	is	associated with	pleasure	in	the	agent's	experience,	it	is	the	bad	one	that	moves her	to	act. Before	moving	on,	it	will	be	useful	to	return	to	the	distinction	between the impetuous	and the	weak	uncontrolled	agent. It	might	be thought	that	even	if	my	interpretation	works	well	for	the	impetuous type, it still	needs to	explain	what	happens in the	case	of the	weak uncontrolled	agent	who,	after	all, is	supposed	to	reason	beforehand and	make	the	right	decision.	Does	she	then	fail	to	draw	the	right	conclusion	from	her	decision	to	the	right	action,	or	does	she	somehow	fail to	know	the	conclusion	even	once	she	has	drawn	it?	What	exactly	is her	failure? Here,	it is	important	to	keep	in	mind	that	the	interpretation	I	am arguing	for	does	not	explain	the	uncontrolled	agent's	action	simply	as a	(local)	cognitive	failure	to	draw,	or	to	know	once	drawn,	a	conclusion of	a	syllogism.95	In	fact,	Aristotle's	explanation	of	why	the	uncontrolled agent's	decision loses its	motivational	efficacy	does	not	concern the uncontrolled agent's failure to attend to any particular proposition or	belief.	Rather,	he	thinks	that	the	uncontrolled	agent	ends	up	in	a (global)	state	of	mind	in	which	thinking	-	understood	as	a	highly	specific	ability	that	crucially	involves	critical	evaluation	or	reflection	on the	basis	of	reasons	-	is	impeded	(due	to	the	physiological	processes associated	with	her	appetites)	and	that	in	that state	of	mind	she	cannot	be	motivated	by	reasons	that	go	over	and	above	appearances	and so,	ultimately,	over	and	above	pleasure	and	pain.	So,	the	agent	might well	be	able	to	draw	a	conclusion	of	a	practical	syllogism,	if	one	wants to	speak	that	way	(she	can,	after	all,	"reason"	in	the	way	in	which	experience	allows	one to reason,	as I explained	above).	But that	does not	mean that she also	has, at that	moment, active understanding of 95. The	syllogistic	apparatus	introduced	in	NE 7.3	is in	any	case	interpreted	as representing an explanation of an action rather than an actual process of thought. From this point of view, there is one syllogism that explains the agent's resistance	before the	action, and	another	one that	explains	her	uncontrolled	action. (14)	Since	the	last	proposition	is	a	belief	both	about	something	perceptible	and	controls	action,	this	is	what	the	uncontrolled agent	does	not	have, being affected as	he is, or	he	has	it	in	a	way	in	which	we	said	having	was	not	a matter	of	knowing,	but	of	saying,	as	with	the	drunk	and the	verses	of	Empedocles.	(NE 7.3,	1147b9–12) Commentators	are	split	between	those	who	think	that	"the	last	proposition"	refers to the	particular	premise	(and	so	the	passage	has led them to focus on the particular premise as the principal item	of ignorance	for	Aristotle's	analysis),	and	those	who	think	that	it	refers	to the	good	conclusion.	The	arguments	for	both	positions	are	now	wellknown.94	It	seems	to	me	that	the	important	point	in	the	passage	is	that the	way	in	which	the	agent	has	the	"last	proposition"	-	which	just	is the	proposition	that	expresses	the	belief	that	would	led	her	to	refrain from	acting	without	control	-	is	precisely	the	same	way	in	which	having	knowledge	is	characterized	in	passages	1	and	9.	The	agent	can	be aware	of	it	and	report	it,	but	she	does	not	hold	it	in	a	way	in	which	it would	be	supported	by	some	beliefs	or	facts	which	she	would	identify as	her	reasons	for	holding	it.	Thus	the	good	conclusion	(if	we	adopt this	interpretation	for	the	sake	of	simplicity)	is	on	a	par	with	the	bad conclusion	-	the	agent	cannot	attend	to	reasons	(in	the	sense	I	have 94.	That the	phrase	refers to the	particular	premise is the traditional	view.	For arguments in favor of the view that it refers to the conclusion see	Hardie (1981,	287–289)	and	especially	Charles	(1984,	120–121).	One	can	argue	that there	are textual reasons to	believe that "the last	proposition"	does	or can refer	to	the	good	conclusion.	In	particular	it	can	be	argued	that	protasis could or	should	be	translated	as	"proposition"	and	not	as	"premise."	This	allows	the meaning	of	"the	last	proposition"	to	be	conclusion	(i. e.,	the	last	proposition	of a	syllogism).	This	can	be	further	supported	by	observing	that	"the	last"	should not	refer	to	something	that	is	second	in	order,	but,	rather,	to	something	that	is, at	least,	third	in	order	and	hence	to	the	conclusion.	However,	the	view	seems to	me	unlikely	in	view	of	1147a25–6	where	the	particular	premise	is	said	to be	about	particulars	of	which	perception	is	in	control.	When	then	Aristotle says that "the last	proposition is a	belief about something	perceptible	and controls	actions,"	his	language	seems	to	point	rather	straightforwardly	to	the particular	premise.	Moreover,	since	he	used	the	language	of	conclusion	before	(1147a27),	it	is	unclear	why	he	should	refrain	from	using	it	here. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 30 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) We are told that	what Socrates	was looking for in his account also "comes	about"	and	that	it	does	so	for	two	reasons.	First,	the	last	term does	not	seem	to	be	either	universal	or	as	expressive	of	knowledge	as the	universal	term.	Second,	the	affective	state	(i. e.,	the	state	in	which the	uncontrolled	agent is	when	he	succumbs)	does	not	come	about when	knowledge	in	the	primary	or	proper	(kuriōs) sense	is	present,	but only	when	perceptual	knowledge	is	present.	It	is	also	not	this	knowledge in the	primary sense, but (it seems	plausible to think)	merely knowledge	of	what	one	perceives	that	gets	"dragged	about." The	meaning	of	"the	last	term"	has	been	well	explained	by	David Charles.96	As	he	argues,	it	must	refer	to	the	term	which	is	introduced as	the	last	one	in	a	syllogism.	In	a	practical	syllogism,	this	must	be	the subject	of	the	particular	premise,	which	designates	"either	an	action or	a	particular	object	to	be	acted	on."97	The	two	universal	terms,	one of	which	serves	as the	predicate in the	particular	premise,	are introduced	in	the	universal	premise	that	comes	first	in	practical	syllogisms. If	Charles	is	correct,	it	is	knowledge	of	what	one	currently	perceives that	gets	"dragged	about"	rather	than,	say,	knowledge	of	what	is	good and	bad.	This	is	corroborated	later	in	the	passage	when	Aristotle	says that	it	is	perceptual	knowledge	that	is	present	and	gets	dragged	about when	the	agent	acts	without	control. The phrase "the affective state does not come about	when	what seems	to	be	knowledge in the	primary	sense is	present"	has looked implausible	to	many	commentators.	On	most	interpretations	the	only item that, according to Aristotle's analysis, the uncontrolled agent lacks	(does	not	use,	does	not	use	properly,	etc.)	when	acting	without control	is	the	particular	premise	that	would	lead	to	the	good	conclusion	of	the	practical	syllogism.	But	knowledge	"in	the	primary	sense," which is	generally taken to	be	universal	knowledge (i. e.	knowledge of	the	universal	premise),	was	something	the	uncontrolled	agent	was supposed	to	have	actively	in	mind.	But	that	is	exactly	not	what	this	last 96.	Charles	(1984,	122–4). 97. Ibid.,	122. that	conclusion in the	kind	of reflective	way	which is	systematically grounded	in	her	grasp	of	the	relevant	conceptual	and	logical	connections	that	it	bears	to	her	other	relevant	beliefs	and	values	(even	if	she can	recount	these	connections). One	can	describe	the	uncontrolled	agent's	failure	as	cognitive,	but doing	so	is	not	particularly	useful	since,	on	the	one	hand,	her	non-rational	cognition	is	working	perfectly	well	and	her	rational	cognition	is not	operational	to	begin	with.	It	is	also	not	particularly	useful	to	try	to capture	her	failure	by	the	difference	between	practical	and	theoretical cognition,	so	that	the	agent	would	have	the	latter,	but	not	the	former kind	of	cognition.	At	the	time	she	acts, the	uncontrolled	agent	does not	have	a	merely theoretical	knowledge	of	her	conclusion	(or	decision)	since	she	has	in	fact	no	true	understanding	of	it	to	begin	with	(in fact,	if	she	did	have	theoretical	understanding,	she	would	have	practical	one	too). If	anything,	hers is	a failure	of	character insofar	as	her ability to	guide	her	behavior in	a	rational, reflective	way	sometimes disappears	when	faced	with	her	appetites.	Her	behavior	is	then	guided by	her	accumulated	experience	(empeiria)	and	habit	(Cf.	1152a27–34). 4. Socrates' Account Coming About At the	very	end	of	NE 7.3,	Aristotle famously	returns to	Socrates'	account	and	compares	it	to	his	own: (15)	And	since the last term	does	not	seem	to	be	either universal or as expressive of knowledge as the universal term, also what Socrates was looking for seems to come	about.	For	the	affective	state	does	not	come	about when	what	seems	to	be	knowledge	in	the	primary	sense (kuriōs)	is	present,	nor	is	it	this	knowledge	that	is	dragged about	because	of the	affective	state,	but [when]	perceptual	knowledge	[is	present].	Let	this	much,	then,	be	said about knowing and not knowing, and about how it is possible	act	without	control	while	still	being	in	a	state	of knowledge.	(NE 7.3,	1147b13–7) jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 31 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) Thus	even	what	Socrates	was	saying	comes	about	because,	when an	uncontrolled	action	takes	place,	knowledge in the	primary	sense (i. e.	actively	attended	to)	is	not	present.	The	uncontrolled	agent	does not follow	his	passions	against	his	knowledge	while	actively	attending	to	it.	No	such	"dragging	about"	of	knowledge	happens.	The	only thing	that	is	"dragged	about"	(in	a	way)	and	interfered	with	directly	is perceptual	knowledge.	But	the	perceptual	knowledge	that	is	dragged about is also	not	present	as knowledge	when the	agent is in the	affective	state.	If	the	knowledge	that	is	not	present	is	said	to	be	active knowing,	then	it	is	just	as	true	that	knowledge	of	the	universal	term is inactive	as it is that	knowledge	of the	particular	premise (perceptual knowledge) is inactive.	However, the information contained in the	particular	premise	is	utilized	by	the	appetite	in	the	uncontrolled action.	Perceptual	knowledge	is	dragged	about	in	this	sense.101 5. Are uncontrolled actions voluntary? Does	Aristotle's theory of uncontrolled action	manage to avoid the charge of involuntariness? If it cannot, it would contradict Aristotle's	claim	that	uncontrolled	actions	are	voluntary	(1152a14–6).	Since a	proper	answer	would	require	a	careful interpretation	of	Aristotle's theory	of	voluntary	action,	I	will	confine	my	remarks	to	only	the	most pressing	concerns.102 It	might	be	useful	to	distinguish	between	two	questions:	(A)	whether	the	uncontrolled	agent's	action	is	voluntary	under	the	description 101. This	understanding	of	the	passage	is	not	without	its	problems.	First,	it	makes Aristotle contrast active knowledge with perceptual knowledge, and that does	not seem	be	as	proper	a	contrast	as that	between	universal	and	particular knowledge. Second,	on	my interpretation	perceptual knowledge is not	present	any	more	than	active	knowledge	is	present	contrary	to	what	the text	says.	It	requires	that	one	qualifies	Aristotle's	claim	that	only	perceptual knowledge	is	present	by	adding	"but	not	as	knowledge." 102. In	particular,	I	do	not	address	the	issue	that,	in	the	Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle appears	to	require	that	the	agent	has	knowledge	(in	the	technical	sense)	if she	is	to	act	voluntarily	(e. g.,	2.9,	1225b10–7).	A	view	of	Aristotle's	theory	of voluntary	action	along these lines is	argued for in	Charles (2012). I	argue that	this	is	not	in	fact	Aristotle's	view	in	"Agency	and	Responsibility	in	Aristotle's	Eudemian Ethics," forthcoming	in	Phronesis	60:	206–51. paragraph	says.98	Scholars	have	thus	adopted	Stewart's	conjecture	that instead	of	"parousēs ginetai"	in	line	1147b16	we	should	read	"periginetai."99 The	sentence	then	reads	"the	knowledge	that	is	overcome	when	someone	is	in	the	affective	state	is	not	what	seems	to	be	knowledge	in	the primary	sense."	In	this	case,	what	is	overcome	is	knowledge	of	what one	perceives	(i. e., the	particular	premise),	and	not	universal	knowledge,	which	is	knowledge	in	the	primary	sense.100 However,	we	now	have	a	way	to	preserve	the	text	as	received.	The idea	is	that	"knowledge	in	the	primary	sense"	means	knowledge	that is	actively	attended	to,	rather	than	universal	knowledge.	As	I	have	argued, such	knowledge (i. e. actively	attended to	as knowledge) is indeed	not	present	when	one	acts	without	control.	Because	of	his	current	affective	state	(pathos),	the	agent	does	not	and	cannot	actively	attend	to	her	knowledge	as	knowledge.	That	"knowledge	in	the	primary sense"	(kuriōs epistēmē)	is	knowledge	which	is	actively	attended	to,	can be	clearly	seen	from	DA 2.5,	417a21–b2.	There	Aristotle	distinguishes three	ways	of	calling	someone	"knowing"	-	either	someone	is	of	the genus	of	beings	that	by	nature	possess	knowledge,	or	someone	knows because	he	has	learnt	and	can	recall	what	he	knows	at	will,	or	he	is someone	who	is	knowing	kuriōs, i. e.	someone	who	is	"already	attending	[to	his	knowledge],	and is in	actuality	and in the	primary	sense knowing"	(DA	2.5,	417a28–9).	This	supports	the	claim	that	in	our	passage in the	NE, knowledge in the	proper	sense is	knowledge (whatever	it	might	be	knowledge	of	-	whether	of	universal	or	particulars) that	is	actively	attended	to	by	the	one	who	has	it. 98.	Stewart	(1892,	vol.	2,	163–4).	Stewart's	suggested	explanation	was	that	"true ἐπιστήμη,	which he (i. e. the uncontrolled agent) has	-	and has consciously	-	is	not	in	a	position	to	be	affected	by	πάθος,	because	it	is	universal,	and	so does	not	enter	the	arena	of	particular	action."	Stewart	himself	admitted	that this	is	to	skate	on	very	thin	ice,	and	suggested	an	alternative	reading	of	the Greek	text	(explained	below). 99.	For	example:	Broadie	and	Rowe,	ad	loc.;	Gauthier	and	Jolif, ad	loc.;	Robinson (1969,	199). 100. Most commentators think of "knowledge in the primary sense" here as knowledge of the universal premise. Burnet (1900, 305) interprets it as knowledge	where	all	the	terms	are	universals,	i. e.	scientific	knowledge. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 32 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) be	done	or	should	not	be	done, though	not through	reasoning" (EE 2.11,	1226b23–5).	One	can	know	that	in	order	to	get	X,	one	should	do	Y, without	at	the	same	time	grasping	(or	being	capable	of	grasping),	the reason	why	Y	is	suitable	for	X.105 Still,	one	might	wonder	whether the	claim that the	uncontrolled agent's	transition	from	adhering	to	her	decision	to	acting	without	control	is	explained	by	physiological	processes	rather	than	any	intentional activity	is	compatible	with	the	agent's	being	responsible	for	what	she is	doing.	Does	this	mean	that	the	appetite	is	irresistible	to	the	agent? As	Aristotle	sees	it,	there	are	certain	norms	(presumably	social	norms) that	govern	what	adult	human	beings	are	expected	to	resist.	Acting	in a	certain	capacity	is	generally	governed	by	certain	norms	or	standards pertaining to that capacity. For example, if one is acting as a physician,	then	there	are	certain	standards	that	one	is	expected	to	fulfill.	If one	does	not fulfill them	one	can	be justly	held responsible for the failure (unless one fails because	of some recognized	problem, such as	disease).106	In	a	similar	way,	being	an	adult	human	being	within	a society	implies	certain	expectations	or	norms	and	failure	to	fulfill	them may	be	blameworthy: (16)	But	since	knowing	and	understanding	is	of	two	kinds, one	having	and	the	other	using	knowledge,	the	man	who has	knowledge	but	does	not	use	it	could	in	a	way	rightly be said to	have acted in ignorance, but in another	way not; for example, if he failed to use his knowledge because of negligence. Likewise, too, someone	would be blamed	even	if	he	did	not	have	it, if it is	what	was	easy 105.	Cf.	NE 7.10,	1152a14–6. 106. "Surely	then	there	is	a	standard	(tis horos)	also	for	the	physician,	by	reference to	which	he	judges	what	is	healthy	for	a	body	and	what	is	not,	and	towards which	each	thing	is	to	be	done	up	to	a	certain	extent	and	[one	is]	healthy when	[it	is	done]	well,	but	not	if	more	or	less	[is	done].	So	it	is	also	for	the excellent	person	concerning	his	actions	and	choices	of	things	naturally	good but	not	praised"	(1248a21–b2). under	which	it	is	uncontrolled	and	(B)	whether	the	uncontrolled	agent acts	without	control	while	knowing	-	in	some	sense	of	the	word	-	that what	she	does	is	wrong.103	As	I	have	already	argued,	B	is	true	-	the	uncontrolled	agent	can	be	aware	that	what	she	does	is	wrong,	even	if	her awareness	of	that	fact	does	not	count	as	knowledge,	strictly	speaking. Concerning	A,	we	need	to	ask	what	the	description	under	which an	action	is	uncontrolled	is.	There	are	two	options:	either	(1)	the	agent acts	as	she	does	on	account	of	the	very	feature	that	made	her	originally decide	not	to	act	that	way,	yet	she	is	unaware	of	this	fact;	or	(2)	the agent	acts	as	she	does	on	account	of	the	very	feature	that	made	her originally	decide	not	to	act	that	way	while	being	aware	that,	according to	her	decision,	she	should	not	be	acting	that	way.	As	I	have	argued in	section	2,	actions	falling	under	option	1	need	not	be	cases	of	lack	of control,	but	also	of	forgetfulness,	inattention,	absent-mindedness,	and so	on.	This	means	that	the	relevant	description	is	the	one	in	option	2. According	to	Aristotle,	"Since	involuntary	action	is	either	forced	or [done]	through	ignorance,	the	voluntary	would	seem	to	be	that	which has	its	principle	in	the	agent	himself,	knowing	(eidoti) the	particulars of	the	action"	(NE 3.1,	1111a21–4).	On	the	view	I	attributed	to	Aristotle, the	uncontrolled	action is	not forced	since its	causal	origin is in	the agent	(i. e.,	the	agent's	appetite).	The	second	condition,	at	least	in	the Nicomachean Ethics, cannot	be	understood	as requiring that in	order to	act	voluntarily	one	has	to	have	knowledge (strictly	speaking)	of	the particulars	since	both	children	and	animals	act	voluntarily	(111a25–30, 1111b5–10). If the condition is, accordingly, understood as requiring that the agent is aware	of the	particulars,	my view satisfies it since the	uncontrolled	agent	is	perfectly	well	aware	of	the	particulars	of	her situation	and	action.	It	is	notable	that	the	list	of	particulars	at	1111a2–6 does	not include knowledge	of the	why (dia ti).104	As	Aristotle says, "nothing	prevents	that	the	many	have	a	belief	that	something	should 103. This obviously does not imply that she knows that she is acting	without control. 104. It	does	include	knowledge	of	the	result	at	which	she	aims,	but	that	is	quite different	from	grasping	the	dia ti. jozef	müller Aristotle on Actions from Lack of Control philosophers'	imprint – 33 – vol.	15,	no.	8	(march	2015) recognizes	that	much	of	our	behavior	is	not	guided	by	reflective	thinking	(even	if	such	thinking	is	the	one	characteristic	of	human	beings) but	rather	relies	on	much	more	basic	processes	that	may	superficially look	like	thinking	(in	the	strict	sense)	but	are	in	fact	only	extremely complex	exercises	of	our	capacity	for	perception	and	memory.	Another	striking	idea	is	that	the	capacity	for	reflective,	deliberative	thinking is	not	separated	from	bodily	processes,	even	if	it	is	perhaps	not	bodily itself.	On	the	contrary,	purely	physiological	processes	can	lead	to	its inhibition	even	while	they	do	not	inhibit	(at	least	not	to	the	same	extent)	the	more	basic	cognitive	processes.	The	very	human	capacity	of reasoning	which	is	so	powerful	is	thus,	at	the	same	time,	characterized by	inherent	fragility	insofar	as	it	is	coupled	with	bodily	processes	over which	it	(and	so	we)	have	little	or	no	direct	control.	Aristotle's	complex theory	of	lack	of	control	is	thus	perhaps	the	best	witness	to	both	the power	and	the	fragility	of	reason	as	Aristotle	conceives	of	it. Bibliography Austin,	John	L.	(1979).	"A	Plea	for	Excuses."	In	Philosophical Papers,	3rd edition,	ed.	J.	O.	Urmson	and	G.	J.	Warnock,	175–204.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Bostock, David. (2000).	Aristotle's Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bratman,	Michael. (1979). "Practical	Reasoning	and	Weakness	of the Will." Noûs 13:	153–71. Broadie,	Sarah	and	Rowe,	Christopher.	(2002).	Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press. Burnet,	John.	(1900).	Ethics of Aristotle. London:	Methuen. Burnyeat,	Myles	F.	(1976).	"Plato	on	the	Grammar	of	Perceiving."	The Classical Quaterly	1:	29–51. _______.	(2002).	"De	Anima	II 5."	Phronesis 47:	28–90. Cashdollar,	Stanford.	(1973).	"Aristotle's	Account	of	Incidental	Perception." Phronesis	18:	156–75. or	essential	that	he	fails	to	have	because	of	negligence	or pleasure	or	pain.	(12225b10–6)107 Although	the	uncontrolled	agent	might	find	it	subjectively	impossible	to	resist	the	desire,	this	subjective	experience	is	not	relevant	to her	being	responsible	for	her	action.	Unless	the	agent's	nature	makes her	stand	outside	of	the	expected	norms,	it	was	her	responsibility	to take	care to	not	become the	kind	of	person she	now is.	The	uncontrolled agent's condition is not the result of any particular external (overstraining)	circumstances	since if that	were the	case,	everybody would	be	uncontrolled	in	those	circumstances.	It	is	the	result	of	a	life in	which	the	agent	did	not	apply	herself	enough	to	the	proper	habituation of her appetites. Since habituation is realized not just during childhood, but also (and especially) during adulthood through the conditioning	of	one's soul through reasoned	decisions, it	was	up to her	to	take	care.	The	uncontrolled	agent's	failure	to	resist	is,	in	a	way, equal to	a failure to live	up	to	reasonable	expectations for	a	human being:	"perhaps	he	is	the	kind	of	person	who	does	not	care.	But	he	is responsible	for	becoming	that	kind	of	person,	because	he	has	lived	not caring"	(NE 3.5,	1114a3–5). 6. Conclusion On	the	interpretation	of	Aristotle's	theory	of	lack	of	control	that	I	have developed	here,	Aristotle's	theory	contains	both	decidedly	ancient	elements	as	well	as	elements	that	ring	almost	contemporary.	The	idea that	uncontrolled	action	can	be	explained	by	temporary	suspension	of reason	is	one	of	the	ancient	elements.	It	was	already	present	in	Ancient Greek	thought	before	Aristotle.	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