Original	Paper	UDC	159.952.2:165.242.2 130.121:159.922.2 Received	March	1st,	2014 Michael Schmitz University	of	Vienna,	Institute	for	Philosophy,	Universitätsstrasse	7,	AT–1010	Vienna michael.schmitz@univie.ac.at Joint Attention and Understanding Others* Abstract In this paper I criticize theory-biased and overly individualist approaches to understanding others and introduce the PAIR account of joint attention as a pragmatic, affectively charged intentional relation. I argue that this relation obtains in virtue of intentional contents in the minds of the co-attenders, and – against the received understanding of intentional states as propositional attitudes – that we should recognize what I call 'subject mode' and 'position mode' intentional content. Based on findings from developmental psychology, I propose that this subject mode content represents the co-attenders as co-subjects, who are like them and who are at least disposed to act jointly with them. I conclude by arguing that in joint attention we experience and understand affective, actional and perceptual relations at a non-conceptual level prior to the differentiation of mind and body. Keywords joint	attention,	collective	intentionality,	other	minds,	intentionalism,	mind-body	dualism 1. Understanding others and the theory bias In	recent	decades,	mainstream	philosophy	of	mind	and	psychology	in	general and	the	theory	of	understanding	others,	of	social	cognition,	in	particular	have tended	to	be	under	the	influence	of	three	kinds	of	bias.	Two	of	these	can	be brought	under	the	heading	'theory	bias',	where,	however,	talk	of	the	theoretical	is	taken	in	two	different	meanings.	First,	'theoretical'	can	mean	mind-toworld	direction	of	fit	speech	acts	and	intentional	states	–	I	will	from	now	on use	'posture'	as	a	cover	term	for	both	–	like	assertions,	beliefs	and	perceptual states,	as	opposed	to	world-to-mind	direction	of	fit	postures	like	requests,	intentions	and	actional	states.	Examples	for	the	theory	bias	in	this	sense	include, but	are	by	no	means	limited	to,	the	idea	that	truth-conditional	semantics	can serve	as	a	general	theory	of	meaning,	belief	accounts	of	intention,	and	various	forms	of	cognitivism	in	metaethics.	Second,	'theoretical'	can	also	mean * I	would	like	to	thank	audiences	in	Berkeley, Helsinki	and	Vienna	for	helpful	comments	on earlier	presentations	of	parts	of	this	material, in	particular	Katharina	Bernhard,	Jennifer	Hudin,	Aloisia	Moser,	Hans	Bernhard Schmid, John	Searle,	Gerhard	Thonhauser,	and	Raimo Tuomela.	Further	thanks	to	Christian	Neitzel and	Josef	Ehrenmüller	for	written	comments on	the	penultimate	draft	and	to	Zdravko	Radman for being a patient, cheerful, and supportive	editor.	I	would	also	like	to	thank	the participants	of	a session	at	academia.edu	on an	earlier	draft, in	particular	Bernard	Baars, Jonny	Blamey,	Olle	Blomberg,	Anna	Moltchanova, Nikos Psarros and Guido Seddone. Last,	but	not	least,	I	thank	the	two	reviewers for Synthesis philosophica for very detailed and	helpful	comments,	and	Kirsten	Donaghey for	improving	my	English. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others236 –	and	in	common	parlance	that	is	its	prevalent	meaning	–	something	that	is intellectual	and	discursive,	that	is	propositional	and	has	conceptual	structure. The	theory	bias	in	this	sense	has	often	taken	the	form	of	the	idea	that	intentional	capacities	of	all	kinds,	ranging	from	actional	and	perceptual	capacities to	those	for	understanding	language	and	other	people,	are	to	be	explained	in terms	of	an	underlying	theory	–	usually	thought	to	be	unconscious	or	even nonconscious.	This	intellectualist	notion	has	been	extremely	influential	in	AI, cognitive science, psychology and philosophy, again in the idea of a truth theory	as	a	theory	of	meaning	(Davidson	1984),	and	of	course	in	the	theorytheory	of	social	cognition,	among	many	other	examples.	The	third	bias	I	have in	mind	is	the	bias	for	individual	over	collective	forms	of	intentionality.	This bias	we	can	simply	see	reflected	in	the	fact	that	until	fairly	recently,	there	was not	much	theorizing	about	collective	intentionality	at	all	and	that	much	of	that theorizing	still	tries	to	reduce	the	"we"	to	the	"I". If	we	were	looking	for	a	single	embodiment	of	these	biases,	we	could	find	it in	the	Quine-Davidson-Dennett	tradition	of	thinking	about	intentionality	and language	in	terms	of	the	thought	experiment	of	radical	translation	or	interpretation,	where	a	linguist	visits	a	community	(a	"tribe")	and	translates	their	language	from	scratch.	The	understanding	she	gains	is	thought	to	be	theoretical in	both	senses	of	the	term:	it	consists	in	a	translation	manual	with	statements about	what	the	words	of	the	interpreted	language	mean.	Moreover,	the	point of	ascribing	meanings	and	mental	states	is	also	thought	to	be	theoretical	–	it is	only	for	the	purpose	of	explaining	and	predicting	the	behavior	of	those	we interpret.	Finally,	meanings	and	mental	states	are	ascribed	reluctantly	–	if	at all	–	because	it	is	thought	that	while	behavior	is	publicly	accessible	and	thus epistemically	respectable,	mental	states	can	at	best	be	reasonable	theoretical postulates	–	in	pretty	much	the	same	the	way	that	physicists	are	often	thought to postulate 'theoretical entities' in order to explain observable going-ons. And	the	preferred	option	is	to	interpret	such	ascriptions	in	an	instrumentalist or	fictionalist	way. It	is	certainly	no	accident	that	in	this	picture	the	interpreter	is	an	outsider	and a	scientist,	somebody	who	comes	into	a	community	as	a	stranger	and	observes it from	a	detached, theoretical	point	of	view. In fairness to this tradition it should	be	noted though that	at least	Davidson in	his later	work (Davidson 2001)	moves	more	towards	a	view	which	emphasizes	such	points	as	that	in order	to	share	a	language	with	people	one	also	needs	to	share	many	beliefs and	values	with them	and to relate to them in second-personal rather than third-personal	sorts	of	ways. In	this	paper,	I	will	approach	the	topic	of	understanding	others	from	a	diametrically	opposed	starting	point,	namely	that	of	joint	attention.	In	joint	attention	we	do	not	take	a	detached	perspective	on	others,	but	rather	attend	to something	with them.	And	our understanding	of our co-attenders does	not take	the	form	of	beliefs	about	what	they	perceive,	think	or	mean,	or	of	other propositional	attitudes	about	them.	Rather,	it	is	manifest	in	actions	and	particularly	in	joint,	co-operative	actions.	And	it	is	manifest	in	how	we	experience our	co-attenders	and	relate	to	them	in	the	first	place.	So	this	understanding	is not	purely	theoretical	in	the	first	sense,	because	it	is	manifest	in	both	mindto-world	and	world-to-mind	postures,	and	it	is	not	theoretical	in	the	second sense,	because	all relevant	sensory-motor-emotional	experiences	have	nonconceptual, non-propositional intentional contents.	And it is an elementary form	of	collective	rather	than	purely	individual	intentionality,	a	precursor	of and	basis	for	saying	"we"	and	becoming	a	subject	of	joint	beliefs,	plans,	and values.	Or	so	I	shall	argue. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others237 Before	outlining	how	I	will	go	about	this,	let	me	say	a	few	more	preliminary words	about	my	use	of	such	notions	as	'representation'	and	'intentional	content' because it is easily	misunderstood in the present intellectual scenery. Many	theorists	nowadays	recoil	from	these	notions	because	they	are	associated	with	a	cognitivist	outlook	that	interprets	representations	as	being	essentially	symbolic	and	having	a	formal,	syntactic	structure.	They	find	this	outlook	inadequate	and	too	intellectualist	at	least	for	basic	minds	(e.g.	Hutto	and Myin	2012)	and	therefore	try	to	understand	elementary	forms	of	intentionality without	appealing	to	content	at	all,	for	example	in	purely	interactionist	terms. To	avoid	misunderstandings,	let	me	just	say	here	that	I	reject	the	cognitivist myth	of	an	arsenal	of	non-conscious	rules	and	representations	across	the	board –	not	just	for	basic	minds	–	and	that	I	think	of	mind	as	consisting	entirely	in states	of	consciousness	or	experience	and	corresponding	dispositions	to	be	in such	states	(compare	Schmitz	2012).	However,	it	would	be	awkward	to	try to	do	without	the	word	'representation'	and	its	cognates,	and	it	is	positively a	mistake to try to	do	without the	notion	of	content. Intentionality	without content	does	not	make	sense.	Whenever	there	is	intentionality	in	experience, there	must	be	an	answer	to	the	question	of	how	the	world	is	–	correctly	or	incorrectly	–	experienced	as	being	and	that	answer	specifies	the	content	of	that intentionality.	When	somebody	feels	tempted	or	even	compelled	to	deny	this, this	shows	that	they	must	associate	more	with	"content"	than	this	and	likely reveals	that	they	have	an	intellectualist, language-centric	notion	of	content. There	is	also	another	–	mostly	epistemological	–	set	of	motivations	for	rejecting	the	notion	of	content	for	the	experiences	of	perception,	action	and	joint attention,	associated	with	so-called	'relational'	accounts	of	experience	that	I will	briefly	address	below. In	the	following	section	I	will	now	first	more	sharply	delineate	the	phenomenon	of	joint	attention	based	on	how	it	is	understood	in	the	literature	of	developmental	psychology. I	will then	sketch	a framework for	understanding the	intentional	structure	of	joint	attention	that	introduces	the	concept	of	mode representation,	which is	based	on the idea that in taking	up	postures, their subjects	do	not	only	represent	what,	for	example,	they	perceive,	believe,	or intend,	but	also	their	own	position	–	through	what	I	call	'attitude'	or	'position'	mode	–	and	themselves	–	through	what	I	call	'subject	mode'	–	vis-à-vis the	relevant	state	of	affairs.	In	the	third	section	I	will	characterize	the	subject mode	experience	of	joint	attention	based	on	findings	in	the	literature	of	developmental psychology and introduce the	PAIR-account of joint attention as a	pragmatic and affective intentional relation. I	will then argue that the mode	account	can	explain	an	additional	result	from	that	literature,	namely	that infants understand their co-attenders better than people	whose interactions with	an	object	they	merely	observe.	The	fourth	section	addresses	the	question whether	in	joint	attention	episodes	we	understand	the	mental	states	of	our	coattenders	or	perhaps	even	perceive	them.	I	argue	that	in	joint	attention	we	understand	intentional	relations,	but	at	a	level	that	is	prior	to	the	differentiation of	mind	and	body	and	criticize	some	other	accounts	as	remaining	too	much	in the	grip	of	the	dualism	of	mind	and	body. 2. Joint attention, content, and mode The	most fundamental fact	about jointly	attending to	something is that the jointness	is	not	a	matter	of	what we attend to,	but	of	attending	with somebody (Campbell	2002,	chap.	8).	The	main	goal	of this	paper is to	argue that the best	way to	understand this fact is through the	notion	of	mode representaSYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others238 tions, through	which the	co-attenders	experience themselves	as	co-subjects of	a	shared	position	with	regard	to	the	object	of	their	attention.	By	contrast, and in accordance	with the biases noted above, some	have tried to understand	joint	attention	and	similar	phenomena	like	common	knowledge	purely in terms	of	what individual	subjects	attend to	or	what they	know.	But it is hard	to	see	how	from	such	a	perspective	joint	awareness	can	be	distinguished from	mere	mutual	awareness,	from	which	it	seems	clearly	different	–	though some highly technical attempts to accomplish this have been made in the literatures	on	common	knowledge	and	joint	attention	(Lewis	1969;	Peacocke 2005;	Schiffer	1972). Here	is	a	scenario	which	I	think	shows	why	any	attempt	to	treat	joint	attention as	a	merely	perceptual,	purely	cognitive	phenomenon	must fail	and	cannot distinguish	mere	mutual from	genuinely joint attention (with	apologies for its	homicidal	character).	Consider	two	people	who	are	focused	on	the	same target,	a	high-ranking	politician.	One	wants	to	shoot	him,	the	other,	the	politician's	bodyguard,	wants	to	protect	him.	The	bodyguard	tracks	the	assassin out	of	the	corner	of	his	eyes	because	he	has	become	suspicious	of	her.	The assassin	also	tracks	the	bodyguard's	attention	because	if	the	bodyguard	loses track	of	her,	he	will	have	the	time	to	get	his	gun	out	and	shoot	the	politician; otherwise	the	bodyguard	could	shoot	her	first.	So	these	two	are	attending	to the	same	object,	they	are	mutually	aware	what	the	other	is	attending	to	and there is a causal relation	between the	direction(s)	of their attention(s)	– as has	been	suggested	by	some	as	a	condition	in	an	analysis	of	joint	attention (as	discussed	by	Campbell	2002,	162f).	Still,	it	seems	clear	that	this	is	not	an instance	of	two	people	attending	to	something	jointly.	Again,	mutuality	is	not the	same	as	jointness.	How	do	we	get	to	jointness?	We	need	to	add	a	prosocial motivation	and	at	least	a	disposition	for	joint	action. This	suggestion	is in	accordance	with	proposals in	developmental	psychology,	where	a	prosocial	motivation	to	share	an	object,	even	to	share	it	for	the sake	of	sharing,	is	taken	to	be	criterial	for	joint	attention	(Carpenter	and	Liebal	2011),	and	is	often	also	thought	to	be	unique	to	humans:	even	primates	do not	go	around	pointing	out	interesting	things	to	each	other,	as	humans	do	all the	time.	Joint	attention	episodes,	which	are	usually	taken	to	begin	at	around 12	months	of	age,	often	have	a	tripartite	structure	of	(1)	initiation	by	getting the	other's	attention, followed	by	(2)	a referential	point to the	object to	be shared,	before	culminating	in	(3)	a	"sharing	look",	the	comment	on	the	object, which	closes	the	triangle	through	an	affectively	charged	meeting	of	minds. The	affect	can	be	sheer	pleasure	and	excitement	about	the	object;	concern,	for example	in	"social	referencing"	when	an	infant	checks	back	with	someone, often	the	caretaker,	whether	a	situation	is	safe;	puzzlement,	eye-rolling,	and many	more.	This	sharing	I	take	to	be	a	joint	communicative	action,	at	least when	it	is	successful.	Note	that	the	claim	is	not	that	sharing	itself	is	the	same as	joint	attention,	but	just	that	one	can	only	be	in	joint	attention	mode	when one	is	also	disposed	to	a	joint	communicative	or	other	joint	action.	Otherwise one	would	not	be	attending	with	the	other	person,	but	just	to	her	as	in	our	example	above.	This	also	means	that	the	joint	attention	mode	as	such	is	neither solely	theoretical	nor	practical,	but	rather	has	both	theoretical,	mind-to-world direction	of	fit	as	well	as	practical,	world-to-mind	direction	of	fit	aspects. To highlight the irreducibly practical, pragmatic aspect of joint attention, some	prefer	the	term	'joint	engagement'	(e.g.	Dow	2012;	Hobson	and	Hobson	2011).	However,	while	in	philosophy	and	psychology	attention	is	often treated	as	a	purely	perceptual	phenomenon	–	a	reflection	of	the	theory-biased SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others239 pre-occupation	with	perception	–	the	common	sense	understanding	of	'attend' clearly	also	has	the	pragmatic	meaning,	for	example,	when	we	say	that	the nurse	attended	to	the	patient.	I	will	therefore	stick	to	the	established	terminology.	Finally,	to	conclude	the	discussion	of	definitional	matters,	there	are	also more	intellectual	forms	of	joint	attention,	such	as	we-mode	deliberation	and discussion,	say	in	a	board	meeting	or	in	a	seminar,	but,	in	accordance	with most	writers	on	the topic,	I	will restrict the	notion	to the	more	elementary, non-conceptual,	sensory-motor-emotional	forms	of	attending	jointly. I	agree	with	the	Relational	View	of	joint	attention	(Campbell	2002;	Seemann 2011) insofar as it emphasizes its triangular nature; the distinctive	way in which the	co-attender	figures in that relation;	and	its	experiential	character –	the	latter	against	views	such	as	Peacocke's	who	see	it	as	conceptual	level propositional	attitude.	However, I reject its	disjunctivist refusal to	embrace the	notion	of	the	intentional	content	of	joint	attention	experiences.	The	Relational	View	tends	to	take	up	an	external,	third	person	perspective	on	joint attention,	asking:	what	makes	true	a	statement	of the	form	that	x	and	y	are jointly	attending to	z?	Relations indeed	make	statements	of this form true, but	these	relations	only	exist	because	of	the	contents	of	individual	minds,	and I think	we	want to	know	more	about	what the	contents	of these individual minds	are.	How	do	I	need	to	experience	the	other	and	the	relation	in	which	we participate	in	order	to	experience	him	as	a	co-attender	rather	than	as	a	mere object	of	attention?	This	cannot	be	answered	just	in	terms	of	saying	that	we are	both	constituents	of	an	experiential joint	attention relation.	We	need to characterize	the	individual	experiences	further,	and	to	do	that	we	need	to	appeal	to	the	notion	of	the	intentional	content	of	the	co-attenders'	minds	as	that in	virtue	of	which	they	participate	in	these	relations. Moreover,	that	the	existence	of	the	relation	depends	not	only	on	external	facts, but	also	on	the	contents	of	individual	minds	further	means	that	it	can	fail	to obtain	because	the	content	of	just	one	mind	is	not	appropriate.	That	is,	there can	be	and	sometimes	are	illusory	experiences	of	jointness,	as	when	you	turn to	me	excitedly	to	share	something	–	only	to	discover	that	my	attention	has wandered	away	from	the	movie	you	were	experiencing	as	an	object	of	joint watching.	So	we	need	a	notion	of	experience	and	an	understanding	of	intentionality	that	allows	us	to	locate	experiences	and	intentional	contents	in	the minds	of	individuals	in	the	good	cases	where	we	do	attend	jointly,	as	well	as in	the	bad	cases	of	illusory	experiences	of	jointness.	And	only	intentionalism can	provide	such	a	notion	and	such	an	understanding.	The	Relational	View only	allows	that	we	can	have	a	false	belief	about	joint	attention	experience, because	it	makes	the	existence	of	individual	joint	attention	experiences	dependent	on	the	relation	(Campbell	2002).	But	it	seems	wrong	that	the	contents of	our	minds	are	so	dependent	on	one	another	and that	we	can	only	err in thought	about	joint	attention	experience	rather	than	in	that	experience	itself. So	we	need to	distinguish	relational readings	of 'experience',	by	means	of which	we	report	intentionally	successful	experiential	relations	–	such	as	when we	say	we	experienced	the	scenery	–	from	ones	where	we	merely	say	that	we had	an	experience	as if	there	was	such	a	scenery	present,	or	that	our	experience	was	illusory	or	hallucinatory. Disjunctivism is chiefly motivated through epistemological concerns. The disjunctivist	is	worried	that	if	we	allow	that	there	are	intentionally	contentful	experiences in the	bad	as	well as in the	good	cases,	we	would	need to start	our	epistemological	reflections	from	this	place	of	subjective	experience common	between	the	good	and	bad	cases.	He	is	further	worried	that	content SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others240 would	become	the	object	of	our	intentionality,	intervening	between	mind	and world	and	blocking	our	access	to	the	latter,	as	it	were	–	rather	than	enabling it,	which	I	think	is	what	it	actually	is	doing.	Suffice	it	to	note	here	that	neither follows	from	anything	that	has	been	said.	This	is	not	the	place	to	discuss	these epistemological	worries,	which	apply	to	all	forms	of	sensory	experience	and have	nothing	specifically	to	do	with	joint	attention,	except	insofar	as	they	are encouraged	through	the	received	notion	of	a	propositional	attitude,	to	which I	now	turn. This	received	notion	can	be	characterized	through	the	following	three	claims: 1. The	proposition	is	the	object	of	the	attitude. 2. The	proposition	is	a	truth-value	bearer	and	yet	at	the	same	time	the	content of	practical	attitudes	like	intention	as	well	as	theoretical	attitudes	such	as belief. 3. The	intentional	content	of	a	propositional	attitude	is	identical	to	that	of	the relevant	proposition.	The	subject	and the	mode	of the	attitude	make	no contribution	to	content. The	idea	that	the	proposition	is	the	object	of	a	propositional	attitude,	respectively	the	failure	to	clearly	distinguish	object	and	content,	is	also	what	encourages	the	notion	that	content	is	somehow	between	the	subject	and	the	world. (2)	embodies	the	theory	bias	in	the	sense	that	it	is	claimed	that	something	that –	as	a	truth	value	bearer	–	must	be	theoretical,	is	contained	in	theoretical	as well	as	practical	attitudes.	To	the	extent	that	it	is	thought	that	all	intentional states	are	propositional	attitudes	–	and	historically	this	has	often	been	thought –	it	also	embodies	the	theory	bias	in	the	second	sense	I	have	distinguished. (3)	is	also	related	to	the	theory	bias	in	that	the	traditional	view	is	inspired	by reports	of	propositional	attitudes,	where	the	subject	and	the	type	of	attitude are	seen	from	an	external	point	of	view	as	something	that	is	the	case	–	as	opposed	to	how	it	seems	from	the	subject's	own	point	of	view. It	would	be	hard	to	overstate	the	grip	the	traditional	model	has	had	and	still has on the philosophical imagination. I have criticized it extensively elsewhere	(Schmitz	2013)	and	do	not	have	the	space	to	repeat	all	these	arguments, so	I	will	be	very	brief.	Propositions	are	not	the	objects	of	intentional	states except	in	special	circumstances	such	as,	for	example,	when	Californian	voters	make	up	their	minds	with	regard	to	the	propositions	on	their	ballot.	Rather the	object	of,	for	example,	the	belief	that	it	is	raining	is	just	the	corresponding state	of	affairs.	Now	suppose	that	the	same	state	of	affairs	is	also	the	object of	an	intention	to	make	it	rain,	let	us	say	on	part	of	a	general,	whose	troops have the corresponding capacity.	As I have emphasized, on the traditional view	even	this	practical	attitude	in	some	sense	contains	something	from	the theoretical	domain.	However,	on	reflection it is	hard to	make	sense	of this idea.	It	is	not	that	the	general	predicts	that	it	will	rain	on	the	basis	of	evidence in favor of this prediction. It is rather because his	meteorologists tell him that	it	will	not	rain	that	he	decides	to	make	it	rain!	Nor	is	it	plausible,	some philosophers	to	the	contrary,	that	intending	is	itself	a	form	of	believing.	So I	do	not	think	that	there	is	any	sense	in	which	the	intending	general	takes	a theoretical	position	vis-à-vis	this	state	of	affairs	or	that	his	practical	attitude contains	something	theoretical.	Rather	the	part	of	his	attitude	that	represents the	state	of	affairs	(in	this	case,	the	action)	that	the	belief	is	also	about,	is	not yet	a	complete	posture	–	that	is,	a	bearer	of	a	truth	or	other	satisfaction	value, a	speech	act	or	an	intentional	state.	To	get	such	a	posture,	we	need	to	add	the theoretical	or	practical	position	of the subject	vis-à-vis the state	of affairs. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others241 (The	mistake	of	(2)	of	the	received	view	is	to	assume	that	the	element	common to	different	kinds	of	postures could	be represented	by something that itself	has	a	satisfaction	value.) Now,	the	central	claim	I	want	to	defend	is	that	this	position	is	itself	represented.	The	subject	represents	and	is	aware	not	only	of	a	state	of	affairs,	but	of	his or	her	–	or	our	–	position	vis-à-vis	that	state	of	affairs,	or,	as	we	can	also	say, her	relation	to	that	state	of	affairs.	This	awareness	is	typically	backgrounded, the	focus	typically	on	the	state	of	affairs,	but	it	is	still	there.	In	order	to	be	said to	be	intending,	the	general	must	have	some	awareness	that	he	takes	it	upon him	to	bring	about	that	it	rains,	that	he	takes	practical	responsibility	for	this, and	so	on.	Correspondingly,	in	order	to	be	said	to	believe	something,	a	subject needs	to	be	aware	that	the	belief	must	be	responsive	to	reality,	that	she	takes theoretical,	epistemic	responsibility	for	the	reality	of	the	relevant	state	of	affairs,	and	so	on.	Note,	however,	that	the	claim	is	not	that	the	subject	needs	to apply	a	concept	in	taking	up	the	posture,	or	need	even	to	have	such	a	concept. It	is	surely	implausible	that	one	should	need	the	concept	of	belief	to	believe	or the	concept	of	intention	to	intend.	Rather,	it	is	sufficient	that	the	subject	has	a sense	of	her	position	–	in	about	the	same	way	in	which	one	can	have	a	sense	of somebody	as	a	potential	cooperation	partner	without	having	the	concept	of	a cooperation	partner	–	or	that,	as	in	joint	attention	experience,	she	experiences this	position	or	relation. The	next	step	towards	what	I	will	call	'subject	mode'	is	comparatively	easy. For a subject cannot represent its relation to some state of affairs	without representing	itself.	For	example,	I	cannot	represent	my	passive	position	visà-vis	the	objects	of	my	perceptual	states	without	representing	myself.	I	experience these objects as impressing themselves on me. Put generally, the claim	is	that	every	posture	also	has	an	aspect	of	self-consciousness.	We	are never	aware	of	objects	(including	state	of	affairs)	from	nowhere,	as	it	were –	and	by	nobody	–	but	always	situate	them	in	relation	to	ourselves	–	spatially, temporally,	causally,	cognitively,	conatively,	and	so	on	–	and	even	in	relation to	our	social	and	jointly	taken	positions.	Selfand	object-consciousness	are inextricably	linked,	as	Immanuel	Kant	argued	already	and	many	others	such as	Ludwig	Wittgenstein,	P.	F.	Strawson,	Jean	Piaget	and	Gareth	Evans	have since,	often	under	Kant's	influence.	And	the	most	characteristic	and	fundamental	use	of	'I'	is	its	use	in	subject	position	(Wittgenstein	1958),	which	may even	be	immune	to	error	through	self-identification	(Evans	1982).	That	is,	I can	be	wrong	about	whether	it	is	my	arm	that	I'm	seeing,	but	not	about	the fact	that	it	is	me	who	is	seeing	the	arm.	In	the	terms	I	have	introduced,	the key	to	understanding	self-awareness	is	to	understand	how	it	occurs	in	subject mode	position,	not	as	part	of the	what-content,	of	what I	see, think,	or	am otherwise	aware	of.	And	just	as	there	are	pre-linguistic,	non-conceptual	and non-propositional	forms	of	individual	self-awareness	(Bermúdez	1998),	for example	in	perception	and	action,	there	are	also	corresponding	forms	of	collective	self-awareness	in	joint	attention.	I	assume	that	non-conceptual	forms of	representation	can	be	distinguished	from	conceptual	level	ones	in	terms	of such	properties	as	the	absence	of	logical	operations	such	as	negation,	the	degree	of	differentiation	of	representational	role	–	e.g.	perceptual	vs.	linguistic structure	–	and	of	the	abstractness	/	concreteness	of	representations,	and	the degree	of	context-dependence	(Schmitz	2012). To	see	how	the	proposed	notion	of	mode	representation	has	immediate	benefits	in	understanding	collective	intentionality,	consider	common	knowledge. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others242 Standard analyses employ potentially infinite iterations of the following form: x	knows	[that	p]; y	knows	[that	p]; x	knows	[that	y	knows	that	p]; y	knows	[that	x	knows	that	p]; x	knows	[that	y	knows	that	x	knows	that	p]; y	knows	[that	x	knows	that	y	knows	that	p]; ...and	so	on... This	infinity	is	a	result	of	the	attempt	to	reduce	the	"we"	and	of	treating	mode as	non-representational.	Each	ascription	of	knowledge	to	the	other	will	produce	a	new	knowledge	position	with	regard	to	that	knowledge,	which	is	itself not	represented	–	and	thus	is	not	in	the	square	brackets	–	until	the	other	then again	takes	up	a	new	knowledge	position,	creating	another	unrepresented	position,	and	so	on.	In	contrast,	on	the	current	proposal,	our	subjects	can	just	say or	think	e.g.	"We	know	that	it	rains"	to	indicate	their	joint	knowledge	of	the fact	that	it	rains. Note	that	on	the	present	proposal	there	is	no	further	position	from	which	the theoretical	or	practical	position	of	the	individual	or	collective	subject	is	represented.	This	also	means	that	while	the	subject	is	represented	as	part	of	reality, it	is	not	represented	as	something	that	is	the	case,	from	a	theoretical	point	of view,	nor	is	it	represented	from	a	practical	point	of	view	–	at	least	when	it	is represented	in	subject	mode,	this	is	of	course	different	when	it	is	represented as	part	of	the	what-content.	In	subject	mode	representation	the	subject	is	aware of	itself	in	relation	to	states	of	affairs,	as	occupying	practical	or	theoretical	positions	with	regard	to	them,	not	as	an	object	of	a	further	position. Before	we	return	to	joint	attention	to	try	to	elucidate	it	with	the	notion	of	mode representation,	let	me	briefly	summarize	the	argument	of	this	section.	I	have argued	against	the	Relational	View	of	joint	attention	that	we	need	a	notion	of the	intentional	content	of	joint	attention	experience	to	explain	the	specific	way in	which	co-attenders	experience	each	other	and	the	relation	they	stand	in	with regard	to	what	they	attend	to,	as	well	as	to	account	for	cases	of	illusory	joint attention.	I	have	also	criticized	the	traditional	conception	of	intentional	postures as	propositional	attitudes	and	proposed	to	replace	it	with	a	view	according	to which	the	structure	of	postures	is	such	that:	(1)	one	part	of	their	content	represents their	object,	which is (at least typically)	a	state	of	affairs,	and	which I call	'state	of	affairs'	content	or	'what'	content	because	it	is	what	is	believed	or intended;	(2)	another	part	is	associated	with	the	type	of	attitude	of	the	subject, which I propose to understand in terms of the notion of the position of the subject	vis-à-vis	that	state	of	affairs	and	which	I	therefore	call	"attitude	mode" or	"position	mode"	content;	(3)	yet	another	part	of	content	represents	the	individual	or	collective	subject	of	that	position	and	is	called	'subject	mode'	content. 3. Joint attention as pragmatic, affective and relational: the PAIR-account But	how	do	I	experience	the	other	so	that,	should	she	also	experience	me	in this	way,	that	makes	us	co-attenders	rather	than	just	mutual	objects	of	awareness?	I	will	now	try	to	explain	what	it	means	to	experience	somebody	as	a	cosubject	rather	than	just	an	object	of	attention.	In	accordance	with	the	thesis	of an	inextricable	relation	between	selfand	object-awareness,	I	will	then	argue SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others243 that	the	way	I	experience	the	other	is	also	reflected	in	how	I	experience	the world,	or	rather	in	how	we	jointly	experience	it.	There	are	two	main	sources of inspiration for the idea that	we experience others as co-subjects.	One I have	mentioned already,	Wittgenstein's distinction between subjective and objective	uses	of	'I'.	The	other	is	the	linguist	Ronald	Langacker's	idea	that	we construe	an	entity	subjectively	when	we	construe	it	as	part	of	or	in	relation	to what	he	calls	the	ground,	by	which	he	means	the	speech	situation	with	speaker and	hearer,	the	immediate	context,	mental	background,	and	so	on	(Langacker 1987).	I	will	extend	the	notion	of	such	subjective	construction	from	linguistic, semantic	content	to	the	intentional	content	of	experience,	and	accordingly	I will	speak	of	experiencing	others	as	co-subjects	or	subjectively. The	basic	idea	here	is	that	to	experience	something	subjectively	is	to	experience	it	as	an	extension	of	my	(and	thus	as	part	of	our!)	perceptual	or	actional apparatus.	Langacker	uses	the	example	of	how	you	experience	the	glasses	that you	are	wearing:	normally	your	attention	is	not	focused	on	them	and	you	are mostly	just	aware	of	them	(if	at	all)	as	something	that	improves	your	access	to the	world.	Or	think	about	how	a	tennis	player	experiences	his	racket	as	an	extension	of	his	actional	apparatus,	as	improving	his	actional	reach	in	the	world. These examples can serve as	metaphorical	models for how in experiences of	jointness	we	experience	the	other	as	a	potential	or	actual	partner	for	theoretical,	epistemic	as	well	as	practical	cooperation;	as	a	source	of	information about	the	world	and	at	the	same	time	as	somebody	who	will	help	and	guide us;	as	somebody	who	draws	my	(our!)	attention	to	new,	exciting,	interesting things	and	who	I	in	turn	want	to	show	interesting	things	to;	but	also	as	somebody	whom	I	can	trust	in	a	dangerous	situation	(e.g.	social	referencing).	This is	how	to	experience	somebody	as	a	co-subject	of	perception	and	action	and thus	a	part	of	a	shared,	common	ground	rather	than	as	a	mere	object	of	one's intentionality. Again,	this	part	of	our	experience	is	typically	backgrounded;	we	are	focused on the	objects	of	our	attention,	not the	co-subjects.	When	we focus	on the other,	we	invariably	construe	her	more	objectively.	We	then	look	at	her,	not with	her.	(This	is	certainly	at	least	partly	what	people	who	talk	about	'objectification'	have	in	mind.)	The	level	of	experience	we	are	talking	about	here is	also	the	level	where	we	are	attuned	to	others,	resonate	with	them	and	are aligned	with	them	in	various	ways,	for	example,	with	regard	to	mimic,	gesture	and	posture.	That	we	are	more	sympathetic	to	those	who	are	attuned	to us	more	or	even	imitate	us	with	regard	to	such	features	and	are	more	likely	to respond	positively	to	their	wishes	and	requests	is	a	well-known	phenomenon often	called	the	'chameleon	effect'	(Chartrand	and	Bargh	1999). Many	insights	into	how	others	are	experienced,	understood	and	treated	in	joint attention	come	from	studies	that	reveal	the	characteristic	deficits	autistic	children	show	in	this	regard.	I	will	present	some	of	these	results	to	show	how	they support the theoretical fruitfulness	of the	distinction	between	subject	mode and	object	representation.	Strikingly,	when	asked	where	a	sticker	should	go, more	than	half	of	the	children	with	autism,	but	not	a	single	non-autistic	child, never	indicated	the	place	by	pointing	to	their	own	bodies	rather	than	at	the other's	body	(Hobson	and	Meyer	2005).	This	is	a	very	vivid	illustration	of	the difference	between	a	co-subjective	and	an	objectifying	style	of	reference.	To point	to	a	place	on	one's	own	body	to	pick	out	the	corresponding	place	on	that of	the	other,	is	to	treat	her	as	somebody	like	oneself	rather	than	as	an	object. Research	by	Peter	Hobson	and	Jessica	Hobson	also	shows	a	correlation	between	sharing	looks	and	role	reversals	in	joint	action.	They	conclude	that	"the SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others244 results	suggest	that	the	mode	of	social	perception	that	involves	sharing	looks [also]	gives	rise	to	self-other	transpositions	in	imitation"	(2011,	124).	On	the subject	mode	approach	this	can	be	explained	as	an	instance	of	experiencing the	other	as	a	co-subject,	as	somebody	who	is	like	me,	because	people	like me	can	perform	the	actions	that	I	perform,	and	because	I	experience	myself as	forming	a	joint	subject	of	action	with	the	other,	so	that	it	does	not	matter	so much	who	does	what	and	we	can	switch	easily	between	different	roles	in	the pursuit	of	a	common	goal.	Autistic	children	further	engage	much	less	in	the kind	of	affirmative	nodding	people	often	display	when	listening	to	others,	and only	3	of	16	children	with	autism	showed	a	concerned	look	when	the	drawing of	the	tester	was	torn	in	a	joint	attention	situation	(Hobson	et	al.	2009).	This shows	that	autism	is	also	connected	to	deficits	in	experiencing	the	world	with regard	to	other's	interests	and	concerns	and	thus	supports	the	thesis	of	a	deep connection	between	subjectand	object	awareness. This	interdependence	of	selfand	object-awareness	means	that	the	jointness of	joint	attention	is	generally	not	only	manifest	in	how	the	co-attenders	experience	each	other,	but	also in	how they	see the	world 'with	each	other's eyes'.	So	those	who	are	bound	together	in	a joint	attention	episode	tend	to experience the	world as containing things that they	want to draw the other's	attention	to,	but	also	that	they	might	want	to	shelter	him	from;	as	good and	interesting	or	bad	and	boring	for	the	other,	and	as	like	or	unlike	things they	have	jointly	experienced	in	the	past.	That	is,	joint	attention	means	that the	co-subjects are	attuned	and	aligned	with regard to	cognitive	and	conative	interests	as	well	as	with	regard	to	their	physical	features	and	stances	and that	we	often	experience	the	world	in	relation	to	us	and	our	common	ground of	shared	interests	and	past	experiences.	A	result	from	recent	developmental psychology	nicely	illustrates	and	supports	this	point.	Infants	shared	several toy	ducks	with	one	experimenter	and	then	several	teddy	bears	with	another. They	then	entered	a	room	with	just	one	of	the	experimenters,	in	which	a	duck and	a	teddy	bear	picture	were	on	the	wall,	and	were	much	more	likely	to	point to	the	picture	of	the	object	they	had	earlier	shared	with	the	experimenter	they were	with	(Liebal	et	al.	2009). There	is	some	evidence	that	subject	mode	intentional	content	rather	than	state of	affairs	content	explains	certain	kinds	of	social	understanding	and	social	actions	based	on	that	understanding.	For	example,	14-months-old	infants	understood	an	ambiguous	request	by	an	adult	on	the	basis	of	a	shared	joint	attention episode,	but	not	by	merely	observing	his	otherwise	identical	interactions	with the	relevant	objects.	After	the	adult	and	the	infant	had	shared	two	objects	and the	infant	had	explored	one	object	alone,	the	infant	was	able	to	correctly	interpret	an	ambiguous	request	for	"that	one",	made	with	an	excited	expression by	the	adult,	as	referring	to	the	new	object.	But	14-months-old	infants	were not	able	to	do	the	same	in	conditions	where	infants	merely	observed	e.g.	the adult	examine	the	objects	by	himself,	or	the	adult	engaging	in	joint	attention with	another	person	(Moll,	Carpenter,	and	Tomasello	2007).	Moll	and	Meltzoff	conclude	that	"joint	engagement	is	thus	at	least	helpful,	if	not	necessary, for infants	of fourteen	months to register	others	as	becoming	familiar	with something"	(2011,	397). From	the	present	perspective,	what	is	most	important	about	these	experiments is	that	they	show	that	the	infants	could	understand	the	relation	of	familiarity between	the	adult	and	the	old	object	and	thus	that	the	other	object	was	new and	interesting	relative	to	it,	as	long	as	it	was	part	of	a	shared	familiarity,	a common ground established by joint attention,	but	that	they	could	not	underSYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others245 stand	it	merely	on	the	basis	of	observation.	I	think	this	strongly	suggests	that the	affectively	charged	subject	content	rather	than	the	object	content	explains the	infants'	understanding	of	the	adult's	request.	They	understood	the	adults relation	to	the	familiar	object	as	part	of	the	attention	relation	they	jointly	experienced.	This	explains	why	they	were	able	to	cooperate	with	the	adult	by means	of	handing	over	the	desired	toy. What's	the	common	denominator	of	these	findings?	A	slogan	that	I	find	useful here	is	that	joint	attention	subject	mode	experience	is	a	form	of	"like-me"-intentionality	(Meltzoff	2007).	I	experience	somebody	as	like	me,	when	I	feel that	I	can	take	on	any	role	she	can,	facilitating	role	reversal;	when	I	identify with	her	in	an	affectively	charged	way,	am	aligned	with	her,	attuned	to	her and	tend	to	affirm	her	postures;	and	when	I	refer to	her through	sameness, that	is,	through	imitative	forms	of	representation.	As	a	mnemonic	device,	let us	call	this	account	of	joint	attention	the	PAIR	account.	'P'	because	this	intentional	relation	has	an	irreducibly	practical,	pragmatic	aspect:	joint	attention	essentially	brings	with	it	at	least	a	disposition	for	joint	communicative actions	of	sharing	and	normally	also	for	other	joint	actions.	The	'A'	signifies that	this	relation	is	affectively	charged	and	typically	involves	alignment	with, attunement to, and affirmation	of one's co-attenders.	The 'I' indicates that this relation is intentional	and involves identification	with	and imitation	of one's co-attenders, including imitative styles	of reference to them.	Finally, the	'R'	reminds	us	that	this	relation	obtains	in	virtue	of	the	representational contents	in	the	subject's	minds	and	fosters	role	reversal	and	reciprocity	more broadly.	In	a	nutshell,	we	can	say	that	the	PAIR	account	conceives	of	joint attention	as	a	pragmatic,	affectively	charged	intentional	relation	that	obtains in	virtue	of	mode	content	in	the	co-attenders'	minds	that	binds	them	together as	co-subjects.	So	far	we	have	focused	on	subject	mode	content.	In	the	next and	final	section	of	this	paper	I	want	to	extend	the	account	to	position	mode. Again,	positions	can	also	be	thought	of	as	relations,	and	at	the	sensory-motoremotional	level	of	joint	attention	we	are	dealing	with	actional,	perceptual,	and affective	relations.	So	our	question	will	be	how	the	co-attenders	understand these	relations. 4. Understanding others and understanding minds I'll	restrict	myself	here	to	addressing	one	philosophically	contentious	question,	namely,	do	the	co-attenders	understand	each	other	as	subjects	of	mental states?	Do	they	perhaps	even	experience	these	mental	states	directly?	These questions are pressing in the context of theorizing joint attention because, as	we	noted	above,	infants	are	usually	assumed	to	start	participating	in	joint attention	around	12	months	of	age,	while	they	only	pass	classical	theory	of mind	tasks	like	the	traditional	false	belief-test,	which	requires	them	to	explain the	action	of	a	character	who	has false	beliefs, at around	3	1/2 to	4	years. They	are	even	more	pressing	if	we	subscribe	to	the	traditional,	theory-biased and individualist approach to	understanding	others described at the	outset, because,	naturally	interpreted,	it	would	suggest	that	children	should	first	understand	others'	minds	in	an	individualistic	context	geared	towards	explaining	and	predicting	their	behavior,	and	only	then	go	on	to	engage	in	forms	of collective	intentionality	based	on	shared	propositional	attitudes.	And	even	if we	accepted	at	face	value	the	claim	that	newer	versions	of	the	false	belieftest	based	on	violation	of	expectation	and	anticipatory	looking	paradigms	can push	down	the	relevant	age	to	15	or	even	13	months	(Baillargeon,	Scott,	and He	2010)	this	would	not	quite	solve	the	problem. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others246 One	possible	solution	is	the	suggestion	that	children	engaged	in	joint	attention can	simply	directly	experience	others'	mental	states.	Some	philosophers	(e.g. Krueger	and	Overgaard	2012;	Seemann	2008)	have	proposed	this,	even	independently	of	our	problem,	arguing	that	we	do	possess	a	more	direct	route	to understanding	others	than	the	already	quite	theoretical,	reflective	methods	of theory-building	and	simulating	others	that	the	traditional	approaches	to	social cognition	of	the	theory-theory	and	simulation-theory	appeal	to.	I	think	these philosophers	are	right	that	we	do	not	need	a	theory	and	do	not	need	to	engage in	simulation,	at	least	not	in	any	ordinary	sense,	to	see	what	another	person	is seeing	or	doing,	or	that	a	person	is	happy	or	in	pain.	But	does	this	mean	that we	perceive	mental	states?	Can	I	see	the	other	person's	perceptual,	actional, or	affective	experience?	If	we	put	the	question	in	this	way,	this	already	seems much	less	plausible.	Obviously,	we	need	to	be	clear	here	what	a	mental	state is,	and	this	in	turn	of	course	is	itself	a	contentious	philosophical	issue.	However,	it	seems	to	me	that	the	notion	of	internal,	subjective	states	of	experience or	consciousness	is	still	the	core	of	our	notion	of	a	mental	state.	Leaving	to the	side	some	extremists	who	deny	the	reality	of	experience,	this	is	true	even for	those,	who,	unlike	me,	are	not	ready	to	embrace	the	idea	that	the	notion	of such	states	(and	of	dispositions	to	be	in	such	states),	is	in	fact	the	only	notion of	mentality	we	need.	And	unconscious	mental	states	are	not	really	at	issue	in the	cases	of	experiencing	others	that	engage	us	here.	So	can	we	perceive	others'	states	of	consciousness?	We	certainly	cannot	experience	them	as	objects in	their	heads	and	since	–	pace	some	forms	of	externalism	–	they	are	located in	the	head,	that	seems	a	good	reason	for	denying	that	we	can	perceive	them. But	it	could	be	objected	that	this	is	the	wrong	model	for	experiencing	others' minds.	"Look",	one	might	say,	"this	fails	because	of	the	subjectivity	of	consciousness	and	because,	as	you	have	emphasized,	our	primary	mode	of	access to	others	is	as	co-subjects,	not	as	objects.	So	we	experience	their	minds	e.g. by	following	their	gaze	and	jointly	attending	with	them;	by	empathizing	with their	pain;	and	by	cooperating	with	their	actions."	However,	while	this	is	how in	the	most	basic	cases	we	experience	and	understand	other	people,	it	does	not show	that	we	really	experience	their	states	of	mind. At	this	point	surely	the	objection	will	be	raised	that	this	is	just	an	artefact	of the	internalist	and	experientialist	understanding	of	mind	that	I	have	adopted. Can't	we	just	escape	this	conclusion	by	going	for	externalist,	extended,	enactive, embodied, or embedded conceptions of mind, or any combinations thereof?	But	this	argument	can	be	turned	around.	Adopting	a	different	definition	of	mind	as	such	can	only	lead	to	a	merely	verbally	different	result.	We might	be	able	to	say	then,	for	example,	that	we	perceive	mind	in	the	sense that	we	perceive	a	larger	complex	of	which	mind	in	the	sense	of	experience is	just	a	part,	but	this	still	would	not	give	sense	to	the	notion	that	we	perceive experience.	(This	is	not	to	say	that	there	is	not	anything	valuable	in	the	ideas that	mind	is	essentially	related	to	its	environment,	to	the	body,	and	to	action and	artefacts;	there	is,	but	it	does	not	lie	in	redefining	mind	in	these	terms, but	in	helping	us	to	both	understand	mind	itself	and	how	we	understand	mind through	these	relations.)	But	what	is	the	alternative?	Are	we	stuck	with	the traditional	view	that	we	just	perceive	the	body	and	its	behavior	and	relations to	the	world	and	can	(at	best) just infer	mental	states	as	internal	states	that explain	and	predict	that	behavior? I	think	we	are	in	a	bind	here.	We	are	caught	in	the	fly-glass	of	the	dualism	of mind	and	body.	Here	I	am	referring	to	the	conceptual	dualism	(Searle	1992) in	the	sense	of	the	idea	that	all	our	concepts	or	other	representations	can	be SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others247 classified as being either representations	of	mind	or of body, of	mental or physical	entities.	In	the	literature,	we	can	see	many	philosophers	struggling with	this	dualism,	saying	things	such	as	that	we	perceive	mind	"in	the	embodied	behaviors"	(Gallagher	2011,	298),	or	that	we	have	a	"minimal	theory	of mind"	that	"tracks"	mental	states	without	really	referring	to	them	(Butterfill and	Apperly	2013).	These	philosophers	sense	the	inadequacy	of	the	dualism and	are	trying	to	move	beyond	it,	but	cannot	quite	shake	it	off.	(In	philosophy, we	are	often	tempted	to	express	our	rejection	of	a	dualism	in	its	very	terms.) I	want	to	argue	that	we	should	simply	reject	it.	There	are	many	entities	that cannot	be	happily	classified	as	being	either	purely	mental	or	purely	physical, for	example	those	making	up	institutional	reality	(Searle	1995).	Is	a	university something	mental	or	something	physical?	How	about	the	property	of	being the	capital	of	Croatia?	Closer	to	our	present	concerns,	is	a	person	something mental	or	something	physical?	A	person	has	properties	of	both	kinds,	but	what is	it	as	such? I	suggest	we	add	the	person	to	the	list	of	entities that	straddle	the	mental / physical	divide,	and	also	related	entities	such	as	animals.	This	is	also	strongly called	for	from	a	phenomenological	point	of	view.	It	seems	neither	right	that we	experience	other	people	and	animals	as	mere	bodies,	nor	as	pure	spirits, souls	or	minds.	(It	is	tempting	to	say	that	we	experience	the	others	as	embodied	minds,	or	ensouled	bodies,	or	something	like that,	but this	seems	to	be another	attempt	to	state	a	rejection	of	a	dualism	in	its	very	terms.)	In	the	same way, it	seems	also	wrong	to	classify	basic	forms	of	affective,	actional,	and perceptual	relatedness	to	the	world	as	either	purely	mental	or	purely	physical.	In	other	words,	I	am	suggesting	that	action,	perception,	as	well	as	pain, happiness,	and	other	affects	should	also	be	added	to	our	list.	This	may	sound implausible	at	first,	but	I	think	that	on	reflection	it	is	actually	quite	intuitive that	we	begin	with	a	gestalt-like	understanding	of,	e.g.	pain	and	perception, and	only	gradually,	through	a	process	of	differentiation	and	abstraction,	are able	to	distinguish	pain	experience	from	pain	behavior	and	perceptual	experience	from	the	other	components	of	the	perceptual	relation.	Note	that	I'm	not making	a	claim	here	about	our	use	of	words	like	'pain'	and	that	I	am	not	trying to	legislate	that	use.	It	is	clear	that	pain	experience	is	what	most	interests	us about	pain,	and	so	it	may	well	be	the	case	that	this	is	really	what	most	people mean	by	'pain'	–	though	I	would	suspect	the	actual	situation	is	much	more complicated.	The	point	is	that	at	the	level	of	basic	forms	of	social	intentionality	such	as	joint	attention	we	do	not	experience	affect,	action	and	perception as	differentiated	into	their	mental	and	physical	aspects. It	might	also	be	objected	that	I	am	now	appropriating	the	relational	understanding	of	perception	and	attention	associated	with	views	such	as	Campbell's that	I	criticized	earlier.	But	here	we	have	to	similarly	distinguish	between	the perspective of the theorist and that of the subject of basic experience that we	are trying to	understand.	There	may	be some	similarities	between	how perception	and	attention	are	experienced	at the	basic level	and the	kind	of deliberate	primitivism	of	the	Relational	View,	but	the	deliberate	refusal	of	the latter	to	distinguish	object	and	content	at	the	theoretical	level	surely	cannot	be justified	by	a	similar	lack	of	differentiation	at	the	level	of	basic	experience. The	claim	then	is	that	at	the	level	of	basic	sensory-motor-emotional	experience	subjects	experience	and	understand	affective,	actional,	and	perceptual intentional	relations	between	people	and	objects.	They	experience	what	others perceive	and	their	affective	responses	and	goals.	They	also	register	such	relaSYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others248 tions	–	to	use	Butterfill	and	Apperly's	(2012)	apt	term	–	and	can,	for	example, on this basis	understand	people's requests and	what they	might	be excited about,	as	we	saw	above in the findings from	Moll	and	her	colleagues.	But I	do	not	think	there	is	sufficient	evidence	that	children	at	this	stage	already have	an	understanding	that	such	relations	obtain	in	virtue	of	representational	mental	states	that	may	or	may	not	agree	with	reality.	Such	understanding would	require	conceptual	abilities	such	as	the	mastery	of	logical	connectives like	negation	and	the	capacity	to	confront	perspectives	with	reality	(Moll	and Meltzoff	2011)	–	for	example	that	of	the	subject	of	a	false	belief	to	the	effect that	an	object	is	in	a	certain	container	with	the	state	of	the	world,	in	which	it is	not.	It	is	not	surprising	that	it	is	cognitively	very	demanding	to	keep	two contradictory	representations	in	mind	at	the	same	time	in	this	way	and	to	ascribe	one	to	another	subject	and	use	it	to	explain	and	predict	their	actions,	as traditional	versions	of	the	false	belief	task	require.	In	contrast,	I	do	not	think that	newer	versions	of the traditional tasks really test for the	same	kind	of capacities,	just	for	important	precursors	of	them.	That	a	child,	as	evidenced by	increased	looking	times,	is	surprised	when	a	subject	does	not	look	for	an object in the	place	where the	child last experienced the subject interacting with	it	and	rather	expects,	as	evidenced	by	anticipatory	looking,	that	it	should go	to	the	old	place,	shows	that	the	child	has	registered	the	intentional	relation between	subject	and	object	and	is	habituated	to	and	expects	certain	patterns of	interaction	between	them.	But	it	does	not	show	that	the	child	has	a	conception	of	false	beliefs	and	thoughts	and	beliefs	about	them.	We	are	familiar	with all	kinds	of	patterns	that	we	have	no	concepts	of	and	do	not	think	about.	For example,	we	are	used	to	people	aligning	with	us	and	attuning	to	us	in	interactions	in	certain	ways	and	–	as	shown	by	the	chameleon	effect	–	this	will influence	how	we	feel	about	them.	But	that	is	not	something	that	we	normally, much	less	necessarily,	are	aware	of	and	register	in	thought.	Our	surprise	at	deviations	from	such	patterns	is	not	evidence	that	we	have	thoughts	and	beliefs about	them,	but	often	what	gets	us	to	think	about	them	in	the	first	place.	So while	such	deviations	are	likely	to	be	part	of	what	gets	a	child	to	start	thinking	about	the	mind	and	its	content,	conclusive	evidence	that	it	has	understood the representational	mind is	only	provided	by	passing the traditional tasks. Before	this	developmental	breakthrough	the	child	experiences,	registers	and understands	intentional	relations	between	its	co-subjects	and	objects,	but	not yet	that	these	relations	obtain	in	virtue	of	representational	states	with	contents that	may	or	may	not	match	the	world. Conclusion Let	me	conclude	this	paper	by	summarizing	its	main	line	of	argument.	Against the	traditional, theory-biased	and	strongly	individualistic	approaches	to	understanding others I have in effect argued that the theoretical, explanatory and	predictive	stance	of	the	radical	interpreter	can	only	emerge	–	through	a process	of	differentiation	–	from	more	basic	affective,	actional,	and	perceptual	modes	of	relatedness	to	others	as	we	find	in	joint	attention.	I	proposed	to understand	joint	attention	as	a	pragmatically	and	affectively	charged	intentional	relation	(PAIR),	in	which	we	are	aligned	with	and	attuned	to	others	and experience	them	as	co-subjects,	who	are	like	us	and	like	to	share	things	in	the world	with	us.	We	also	to	some	extent	see	the	world	with	their	eyes.	I	have argued	that	there	is	empirical	evidence	that	it is	actually	this	mode	of	joint attention	rather	than	the	stance	of	the	observer	that	explains	certain	forms	of SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 58	(2/2014)	pp.	(235–251) M. Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others249 understanding	others.	And	I	have	made	a	case	that	we	best	account	for the intentional structure	of joint	attention	by rejecting the traditional	notion	of propositional	attitudes	and	replacing	it	with	an	understanding	of	postures	according	to	which	subject	mode	and	attitude	or	position	mode	are	also	thought of	as	being	representational.	Finally,	I	proposed	that	in	joint	attention	experience	we	understand	others	at	a	non-conceptual	level	prior	to	the	differentiation	of	mind	and	body,	which	only	occurs	on	the	conceptual	level. The	next step	would	be to show	how, if	we think	of applying	concepts	of mental	states	as	arising	from	such	a	process	of	differentiation	rather	than	as inferring	mind	on	the	basis	of	observing	mere	behavior	as	on	the	received	approach,	we	can	get	a	new	perspective	on	the	traditional	skeptical	problem	of other	minds.	But	this	must	be	left	for	another	occasion. References Baillargeon,	Renée,	Rose	M.	Scott,	and	Zijing	He.	2010.	"False-Belief	Understanding	in Infants."	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Schmitz, Joint Attention and Understanding	Others251 Michael Schmitz Zajednička	pažnja	i	razumijevanje	drugih Abstract U ovome radu kritiziram pretjerano individualističke i teorijski pristrane pristupe razumijevanju drugih te uvodim PAIR shvaćanje zajedničke pažnje kao pragmatične, afektivno nabijene intencionalne relacije. Tvrdim da ova relacija postoji kao intencionalni sadržaj u umovima sudionika u pažnji te da bismo trebali – nasuprot uvriježenom razumijevanju intencionalnih stanja kao propozicijskih stavova – priznati ono što nazivam 'subjektni modus' i 'pozicijski modus' intencionalnog sadržaja. Na temelju rezultata istraživanja razvojne psihologije, predlažem da ovaj subjektni modus sadržaja predstavlja sudionike u pažnji kao ko-subjekte, koji im nalikuju i koji su u najmanju ruku u mogućnosti djelovati zajedno s njima. Zaključujem tvrdeći da u zajedničkoj pažnji iskušavamo i shvaćamo afektivne, djelatne i percepcijske relacije na nekonceptualnoj razini koja prethodi razlikovanju uma i tijela. Ključne	riječi zajednička	pažnja,	kolektivna	intencionalnost,	drugi	umovi,	intencionalizam,	dualizam	uma	i	tijela Michael Schmitz Gemeinsame Aufmerksamkeit und das Verstehen anderer Zusammenfassung In diesem Artikel kritisiere ich theorielastige und übertrieben individualistische Ansätze zum Verstehen Anderer und führe die PAIR-Auffassung gemeinsamer Aufmerksamkeit als einer pragmatischen, affektiv geladenen intentionalen Relation ein. Ich vertrete die Ansicht, dass diese Relation aufgrund der intentionalen Inhalte im Bewusstsein ihrer Subjekte existiert, und dass wir – im Gegensatz zur traditionellen Auffassung intentionaler Zustände als propositionale Einstellungen – anerkennen sollten, dass auch das, was ich als „Subjektmodus" und „Positionsmodus" bezeichne, intentionalen Gehalt hat. Basierend auf Forschungsergebnissen aus der Entwicklungspsychologie schlage ich vor, dass der Inhalt des Subjektmodus die Aufmerksamkeit-Teilnehmer als Mitsubjekte repräsentiert, die ihnen gleichen und zumindest geneigt sind, gemeinsam mit ihnen zu handeln. Ich schliesse mit der Behauptung, dass wir in der gemeinsamen Aufmerksamkeit affektive, aktionale und perzeptuelle Beziehungen auf einer nicht-begrifflichen Ebene erfahren und verstehen, die der Differenzierung von Geist und Körper vorausgeht. Schlüsselwörter gemeinsame	Aufmerksamkeit,	kollektive	Intentionalität,	Verstehen	Anderer,	Intentionalismus,	Dualismus	von	Körper	und	Geist Michael Schmitz L'attention conjointe et la compréhension des autres Résumé Dans cet article, je critique les approches de la compréhension des autres excessivement théoriques et individualistes, puis j'introduis l'explication PAIR de l'attention conjointe comme une relation intentionnelle pragmatique, chargée affectivement. J'affirme que cette relation a cours comme contenu intentionnel dans l'esprit des co-participants et que – à l'encontre de la compréhension habituelle des états intentionnels en tant qu'attitudes propositionnelles – nous devrions reconnaître ce que j'appelle contenu intentionnel en « mode sujet » et en « mode position ». Me fondant sur les résultats de la recherche en psychologie du développement, je propose que ce contenu en mode sujet représente les co-participants en tant que co-sujets, qui leur ressemblent et qui sont les moins disposés à agir conjointement avec eux. Je conclus en affirmant que dans l'attention conjointe nous vivons et comprenons les relations affectives, actives et perceptuelles à un niveau non-conceptuel préalable à la différenciation de l'esprit et du corps. Mots-clés attention	conjointe,	intentionnalité	collective,	autres	esprits,	intentionalisme,	dualisme	esprit-corps