ffiHrurws Faraday undertook such anaryses out of a scnse of scientil,ic and, on occasion, patriotic duty-he looked at Thdmas Mitchell,s salt watcr l.rom New Holland, responding to a call 'fbr the good of Australia'. But hc saw such rnundane labours as 'sad consumers of that which I purchasc at a dcar rate namefy time'.Faraday's industry is, even for an agi that wor.shiirpccl cnergy and hard-work, astounding (his view that time is moncy perfcctly conventional, however). 'I am fagging hard & have scarccly rinre io cilr. rny nrcals', he scrawls in 1837. Did F'araday really work at his ,principal pleasurc', sciencc, 'fionr six in the rnorning till eleven or twelve, at night"? such was rhc clainr rnade on his behalf in a memorandum to prime ministcr Robert peel secking . the grant to Faraday of a f300 civil peniion. If by scicnce is meant toil in thc laboratory, then certainly not. But a more generous interprctation woulcl include teaching, writing, committee work and thc custom.s ol'sociabillty, and with thcseFaraday was tirelessly, if ofien unwillingly, engaged. clairns to priority seem on the evidence of this corresponclence to havc occupied him a great deal, and try as he might to avoid it, so did thc press of'polite socicty. Several people write outof the blue foraportrait of'the distinguishe<i chemist or merely for 'the f'avour of your signature'. Faraclay secnx nor tcl havc replied. Nor is a reply of his extant to a Mr w. Gibson, who wrires asking to be snatched liom 'the iron grasp of poverty' with enrployment at thc Royal Institution. I found this letter (number I lg7) the mo.st rlvcaling in the book: in barely 500 words of rude and carelul eloquenbe we sce a sudden glimpse of the world Faraday himself had left behind when he gained employment in London and how m"tropoiitan scientific culturc appears in 1839 to a labourer from the north. No one interested in workingclass and provincial science or in the protocols ofpatronage can alford to miss Mr Gibson's superb appeal. Although Faraday claims at one point ncver to go rut tbr dinncr, I 5 August 1839 llncls hinr sharing the evening with Miss Angela Burrlctl C<lutts at the 'Electric Ecl' . Not, one hastens to add, a London tavern but a tub ol-gymnoti displayed at the Adelaide Gallcry. Faraday never strayed lar liom clectricity, even in company of ladies. which brings nre to one ol'only a handful of perplexities left unilluminated by Frank James's thor.ough, cxtensive and scholarly reach. while he illuminates many .ntn.r, Lft obscurc in L. Pearce williams' selected correspondence of Mir:hctcl f:aruduy,I am left wondering what on earth was being tenclerecl Faraday whcn i n I 839 John webster sent an account of ' two v ery e le ct r ical Laclie s, ? We should,I think, be rold. Unit fbr the History and philosophy of Scicnce, University of Sydney, Sydney, New South Wales, Australia. ffirvr,ws History, Language and By John Sutton Mind heYn f<r,,rrc t\*.-J '-g+;{'t S Crert) Grztham Richards, Mental Machinery: the Origins und Citnsecluence,s rtf Psychological ldeas' Part I : 16001850' Loncloh: Athlone Press, 1993. Pp.xii + 490' UK f50'00 HB' any l-cachcrs <'tf unclcrgraduate history coul'ses in philosophy and psichology (or Psychology, to aclopt Richards' convcntion lbr aiit"r"ntiuting the Discipline tiom its subject-marter) will f ind rhis l.,ook ajoy to teach with. The writing is clear, witty, and provocativc: it is an crr.r.inous aclvance in style as wclI as content on the mass o{'ordinary history-ol-l)sychology textbooks. Enormously ambitious and bibliographically passi.natc, Riihards treats his 'intolerably vast' territo'y (p.392) withmrnethingapproachingthe.dauntinglevelofmultidisciplinar.y historical "*p"riir"; (p.sf ) which it requires, and with a humorous nosc lirr the larcical too. His success in synthesising modern contextualist schrllarship in thc rclcvant areas of the history oi'science, and applying it accessibly within a survey ibrmat, is beyond dispute' Thematcrialisclivi<ledatvariouspointsaccorclingtochroncllogy' rJiscipline, or national/institutional diffbrence' In both length and strcngth' thc cighteenth-century is the focus; the promissory chapters on carly ninctclnth-century German, British, and French 'xrutcs' to Psychology f.int towarcls an intcncled second volume on the latcr period. I lcave to thc ,co,lcr'li plcasurc Richards' sharp critiques o1'the lacunac and agendas ol' mainstrcam history of' psychology; his recupcration ol phrcnology and n.rcsmerism fiom histori oi' science for history olPsychology; his sust aincd attcntion to Reicl and Scots philosophy to counterbalance l'ixation on a 'British Associationism' tht unity and importance of which Richartls q,,"rtinn*.; his carcf'ul ancl amusctJ t()urs across primary and scc<rndary litcralurc on eclucation, psychiatry, sex, proto-anthrtlpology' atttl nrttch clsc. 'WhcnRicharclshasbroughtstlnruchwonclcrli'rllnaterialttrlight' it sccttrs rttorc than usually carping to point to gaps: but two' I l'ccl'. alc signil'icant. [{e attcnds ttrroughout, il'always brictly, to clil'l'icult qucstions rrbout thc crncrgcncc of 'new autonomous individuality' as a conclil.ion of possi bi l i ty lirr thc study of a rcal m called 'thc psychological', and balances lirucauldian unrnasking ol' growing lnanagerial subject(ificat)ion in the hLrnran scicnccs with caution about spccifying tirnes belore which therc worc not unitary subjccts.In these areas, Richards' acknowledged bracketirtg ol'literary history ancl oi'ccrtain strands olphilosophy is perhaps responsible lirr thc scantincss of his treatmcnts (pp. 132-3,242-6,312-3). Hc lirils to dcal with any philosophical accounts of pcrsonal identity, even l,ockc's or Hurnc's, and thus rnissss one sct ol'symptoms and sources of widcr cultural conccrns about unity ancl continuity ol scll'. Abundant recent work on thc production and nraintcnance of solvcs in literature is ubsent, whcrc usc krl rcscarch on both thc Rcnaissance and scvcntccnth ccntury (Grccntrlatt, Dollinrore, Belscy, Barker) and the eighteenth ccntury (Spacks, Cox, I-yons) i.vould allow grcatcr integration ol'thcorctical with cultural sources. Secondly, Richards' lack o1' sympathy lor cognitivisnr ol any sort in rrrodcrn philosclphy and psychology means that he tends to use a stark ttpposition bctwecn social/contcxtual approaches to rnincl and reprcscntati<lnist thcorics lvhich seern to rely on static, ltre-linguislic iclcas. Although hc has rcached somc important conclusions which point against tliis dichotorny (fbrcxarnplc, Lhatassociationist 'ideas' wcre neveresscntially atomistic, but coulcl incorporate holistic context), Richards acccpts that 'cpistcniization' wtrs a ccntral philosophical change in the scvcntcenth ccntury: a ref'ercncc to Yolton's work notwithstanding, this is still thc vicw that what Rorty called the 'original sin of modern philosophy' was thu invcntion of mental representations which cu1 thc subjcct ol'l'bchincl a vcil ol'idcas. Nowhere mentioned are alternative histories liom within phiklsophy ol'nrind (Gary Hatflielcl, Thco Meycring, Kathy Wilkes), which look in a naturalistic history lbr representations of a dil'f'erent sort I'rom thc s.tat.ic local lepresentations ot classical cognitivism. But, beyond thc pros and cons ol'Richards' treatnre nt of spccil'ic topics, the book's rnost interesting aspect is the attempt consistcntly to apply to thc historical materialRichards' own metapsychologicalperspective, clcvelopecl in detail in his 191i9 book Orz Ps.t,chological Language.There arc. as I understand it without having rcad that book, two central strands to lhis, both of which are usef ully contentious and historically tiuittrul. Fintly, Psychological Language devekrps in a 'physiorlorphic proccss' hy incorporating, by metaphoric rcdcscription and interiorisation, terirrs fiom 'Worl<l Languagc' (fiom changcs in technology, forms of social lilb, scicntil'ic thcory, and so on). Richards is at his best in tracking down historical assirnilation of new extcrnal tcnns (world-novelty) into 'rcflcxive cliscoursc'. His chapters on 'thc language problem' (thc seventecnthffirvuws ccntury hostility to lllctaphor as part causc ol thc lagging developmcnt of iov.rrJr,rgvi, nu,l n,., .idcas o1. languagc lion] Lockc to'rookc' (analyses ol' lbur tlil'l'crenr strancls ol'Lnlightcirnrcnr Iinguistic thcory, plus Coleridge) "..1 ,rutrt"r',..ling, sh'wing ho"w physiomo'pl'ric inntlvation wcnt on' lor i,'r,rlu.., by inJorporatin! into 'ette*iu" discourse new lerms fbr bodily ;;;;;;;in physblogty o'ntl '.'"u""ti"nce' against explicit rcsistancc to thc i,.,otr"ry oinrcraphoi' Richards'planncd'ernpirical philological survey ol frn-of irtt pty.frological languagc' is to be kcenly awaited' Ilichartls' ,".nJd claim (though l arn not surc he would want to tlistinguishllrcnr)isStrong(]r,andcharircteriscsthcav<lwcdly.linguistic ,.,",urJuf ,h" ,rpproac6 being acloptocl' (p'8 )' Just as Psychologic.l t-anguagc i. .nurtitut",i iry Worlcl i"ngu'g", xl 'the psychological" the subjecr ,r,,tt",. ri' l"y.t,.rlogy'. is csscniially constituted by Psychological Language ifr:gol-fh".lairr iicxprcsscd in i-il'fbrent.Yott' the psychological 'cxisl"s pritltarily as thc terms rn which rctlcxive cliscoursc is conductecl' (p'3)' is 1'tt,, ,.ttu,t"r, t l'lttrttrt 'sapierts sapien's at -lcast') generatccl' created' tlr clctcnninccl b1'langulgc (pp'19, 107' l3l)Evcn il'therc alc 'natural' irry.r.r,rrngi..ip, ,r1r!ri l* 'tti'iing' as it wcrc' bchincl thc languagc'' thcy are 'knowablc only as linguisrically* cncodccl' 1p' l9)' This ontological clairn about'thc pnyclrt,logicul' is noi cntailecl by tlrc prcvious claitn about thc 5uur."1; 11l"Itsycholtigicral l-anguagc, ancl in tl'ris cxtremc form raises a nurnbcr. ot. 1.rr.oblcrrs. what is"thJ r"clation hctwcen thc psychology til' .r"u,ur", witlr lrsychol'gical Language ancl that 'l'[)roor ncn-linguistic clcuturcs'l How. it'psych-ology is constitutecl by Psychological.l-anguage' can thc clainis tlraclc in thai Language cvcr bc in error' or thc cntitics' propcrtics. ancl processcs rct'erred ti initrat languagc ever bc rejected? How' i1;,iit u,lrftlrr i{ichar.ds' work, cloes rhis srrcss on public languagc.square r,vith his oclcl statcntcnt o{' 'the mctapsychological problcm' ch'iving,thc *i ,rf" t,rnt, that o1''how 'psychological language' is possible in.thc l'irst irf ,,.., rit ", t ltttt tlrc ltletto'i''i""" which it re'fers are ultittratclt'sultjective' ip.jci', rny italics):? It is surcly possitrlc 1<t nruintain a gap bctween prV.lf-f .,gV and Psychological l-anguagc while still attending' as Richards t6os s. wcll, to nistorlic-al changls in ttrat language: but thc logic ol' historical (as ol'cr<tss-culturai; scicnces of l11ind which questitln the rclation bctwcen shilis in language ancl shilis in psychology is rcndcred much too ,i,t.lpt" by sirrtply collipsing thc two' .Richards' achnirable wish to 'sub.rdinatc thc history ui'ery-.t1nt,,gy t. the Sist'ry ol'psychology' (p 93' pp.5-(r) is not so casily inrplontcntcd'. Pcrhaps it is, i; part' Ilichards' unwillingrlcss to take cither uncorrscious urcntal ,t^i", ,r, physiological psychology as cxplanatorily satis{.acttlrywhichlcatlshirnthisway.Dcsoartesnlaylravcgivcnmechanical accounts ol'memory, in.ragination, pcrrception, drearns and thc likc: but this was not Psychological, because he could not explain 'the pstchologit.alit.t' ol such cvents, i.e. their con.rcious constlual' (p.66, Richarils' italics). Despite attending to thc role of physiology in breaching houhclarics between physical and psychological domains and introducin-el ncw tcnns in to Psychol<rgical Lan gua ge (pp.64,92-3, 197 -9), an6l noti n g rhe u n hel p l u l statc of (he historiography of the neurosciences, Richards hinrscll'sccms {o see physiology, or any 'literal . . . physical modcls' as sontchow rrol Psychology, accusing only behaviourists and reductionists ol'disagreeing (pp.66, 394). Thus Richards (pp.67-9,394,429) hcaps praisc on Robcrr Hooke's (admittedly fascinating) modcl ol'rnemory, somewhat rnislcadi ngly callcd 'thomughly materialist', as uniquely 'tcchnical and Psychological' in its cxplicit incorporation of'physical theorics intcl a gcnuincly 'proto, Psychological' system. Thc critcria at work herc to clil'f'crcntiatc gcnuinc 'Psychology'fiomthcrnercphysiologyol'thcoricsol'nrcrroryinDcscartcs. Hobbcs. ancl others arc not clear. Such challengcs to Richalds' stratcgy and claints arise at nrttrry points, proving the book's fertility. (Two rninor odditiu-s urc thc portr.ail ol' Lockc as 'a political radical'(p.3 I), arnd a chronologic;.illy irnpr'..sihlc rcf'erencc to Stahl [p.39-should this be Steno'.tl). Readcrs acr.oss a hu-elc range of'historical disciplines will lind thcirown stintulation.I Iook lor.warcl to the sequel. School o1' History, Philosophy, ancl Politics. Macquarie U nivcrsity, S_ytlncy, Austral ia. Some Antipodes of Folklore By Godfrey Tanner Gregory SchrempP, Magical Arrows: The Maori, the Greeks trncl the Folklore qf the (Jnit'erse. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1992.Pp.xvrii + 217. US$16'95 PB. cspite thc slightly excessive claims madc lbr this 'paradigln shili' or 'intcllectual earthquake' in Prol'essor Sahlins' Iroreword, Dr IJ Schrc,rpp's clcveloprnent of his doctoral study is likcly to prove vcry in l-lucntial in aspccts 9l'the discussion ol'rnyth, religion and cgsmolo-ey. It constitutcs a ltcrsuasivecont[ibution to thcrelationship between philosophy ancl lblklorc as well, whilc of'f'ering a ncw insight into the interaction bctween the nrythical narratives and the cosrnological system of a given traclitional culturc. A closcly argucd analysis, it remains reasonably readable, clcspitc occasional lapses into the dialect ol' 'Thesisese'. Ccntlal to Schrempp's position is thc exegetic value of Kantian concepts, combined with an explanation of'the limitations in thephilosophical prcconceprions o1'Boas and Durkhcint which were imposed by theZeitgeist ol'thcir tirne (pp. 160-8). His approach to the relevance of Zeno thc Eleatic's worlcl vicw and its parallcls with Levi-strauss (pp.23-38) is original and suggestivc. Again, the parallclisms lbund between Zeno's cosnrological outlincs (p. 169) and thc Maori cosmology ol'Te Rangikaheke (pp' 186-8) lully juslily thc author's rcturn to cotnparatisrn bctwecn rcmote cultures in thc lraclition gf Frazer, but with his own novel methodology' However, to rnc, thc urost intcresting proposal is that paradox must imply a difl'erence between cosnric and logical truth. A logical impossibility based on inlinitc clivisibility is ncgal.ctl by expericnce, and thus two conf'licting truths are Possible, sincc they operate on dif'ferent levcls. 'something like the possibility ill'this sort ol'clouble or alternating fbrmulation secms to lun through lnuch ol'Maori social thought' (p.66). The introcluction (Sages and Sophists) deals with a numberol'the thcoretical issucs raiscd above, and is inrportant in justifying the long unpopular usc o[' 'cross-cultural' studics in Sociology (pp.5-6) and in "*ptriining Kant's 'f rcmscen4enta! Dialectic.doctrine of the antinomy o1'