Preliminary	communication	UDC	111.1(292.6)(045) doi:	10.21464/sp33113 Received:	May	11,	2018 Thaddeus Metz University	of	Johannesburg,	Department	of	Philosophy, B-Ring	7,	PO	Box	524,	Auckland	Park,	ZA–2006	Johannesburg tmetz@uj.ac.za What is the Essence of an Essence? Comparing Afro-Relational and Western-Individualist Ontologies Abstract The dominant view amongst contemporary Western philosophers about the essence of a natu- ral object is that it is constituted by its intrinsic properties. The ontological approach salient in the African philosophical tradition, in contrast, accounts for a thing's essence by appeal to its relational properties. The Afro-relational ontology is under-developed, with the primary aim of this article being to help rectify that weakness. Specifically, this article's aims are: to articulate an African approach to understanding the essence of a concrete, natural thing in terms of its relationships; to illustrate the Afro-relational approach with the examples of the self and of water; to contrast the Afro-relational characterization of the essence of the self and of water with a typically Western construal in terms of their intrinsic properties; and finally to provide an initial defence of the Afro-relational approach, both by responding to some objections facing it and by providing some new, positive reasons to take it seriously. Keywords African	metaphysics,	essence,	intrinsic	properties,	natures,	ontology,	personal	identity,	relational	properties,	self,	water 1. Introducing African Relationality Over	the	past	ten	years	or	so,	work	in	the	African	tradition	of	moral	and	political	philosophy	has	begun	to	appear	routinely	in	books	and	journals	with	a global	reach.	It	is	not	unusual	these	days	to	find	African	ethical	perspectives in internationally influential textbooks, anthologies and collected	volumes. However,	the	same	is	not	true	for	African	metaphysics	and	epistemology.	Papers	on	these	topics	remain	by	and	large	restricted	to	national	and	regional fora,	with	the	present	special	issue	of	Synthesis philosophica	being	an	important	step	forward. African	ethics	is	characteristically	relational	in	certain	ways,	roughly	deeming	ways	of	interacting	between	people	either	to	merit	pursuit	as	a	final	end	or to	be	essential	means	towards	some	other	important	good.	For	instance,	a	certain	kind	of	communitarianism	(probably	best	called	"communalism")	is	salient	when	discussing	topics	in	interpersonal	morality	or	institutional	justice.	A broadly	similar	approach	is	found	in	African	metaphysics	and	epistemology. When it comes to	knowledge, for example, it is common to	encounter the view	that	to	truly	understand	something,	one	must	view	it	in	terms	of	how	it relates	to	an	interdependent	whole	(e.g.	Hamminga	2005;	cf.	Nisbett	2003). And,	then,	in	terms	of	what	exists,	a	recurrent	theme	is	that	a	thing's	nature	is SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?210 constituted	by	such	a	contextualization,	viz.	by	how	it	relates	to	a	variety	of forces,	including	imperceptible	agents,	that	are	all	richly	interconnected. This	article	focuses	on	just	one	aspect	of	this	conception	of	what	is	real,	specifically,	the	appeal	to	certain	relational	properties	when	seeking	to	grasp	the essence	of	representative	natural	objects.	Specifically,	this	article's	aims	are to articulate a characteristically	African approach to understanding the essence	of	a	concrete,	natural	thing,	roughly	a	spatiotemporal	object	that	is	not an	artefact,1	in	terms	of	its	relationships	with	more	care	than	has	been	done before,	to	illustrate	the	Afro-relational	approach	with	the	examples	of	the	self and	of	water, to	contrast these	examples	with	a typically	Anglo-American, and	more	generally	Western	approach	to	them	in	terms	of	their	intrinsic	properties	and,	finally,	to	provide	some	defence	of	the	Afro-relational	approach, both by responding to objections facing it and by providing new, positive reasons	to	take	it	seriously. In	pursuing these	aims, this	article	does	not	pursue	others.	For	example, it presumes,	for	the	sake	of	argument,	that	some	concrete,	natural	things	have an	essence,	roughly	a	nature	that	persists	in	all	possible	worlds	in	which	they exist.	It	also	assumes	that	not	all	of	a	thing's	properties	make	up	its	essence, i.e.	that	some	of	a	thing's	properties	are	accidental	or	that	things	can	survive change	(or	that	you	can	step	in	the	same	river	twice). Furthermore, this article addresses only one metaphysical view commonly espoused	by	African	philosophers, regarding the	respect in	which	a thing's nature	is	necessarily	constituted	by	its	relational	properties,	and	it	sets	aside other	views.	Thus,	for	example,	it	does	not	consider	the	claims	that	reality	is an interdependent	whole, that it is	ultimately	composed	of forces,	and that these include imperceptible	agents such	as	God	and	ancestors.	This	author does	not	believe	that	it	is	necessary	to	accept	these	claims	to	make	good	sense of	a	relational	approach	to	the	natures	of	things	that	are	not	artefacts.	If	they are	defensible,	that	is	to	be	shown	elsewhere. The	rest	of	the	essay	continues	by	providing	some	definitions	of	key	terms,	especially	what	is	meant	by	"intrinsic"	as	opposed	to	"relational"	properties,	as	well as	what	is	meant	by	the	claim	that	an	appeal	to	the	latter	as	essential	to	a	thing	is "African"	as	opposed	to	"Western"	(section	2).	Next,	it	advances	the	hypothesis, meant	to	refine	suggestions	from	African	metaphysicians,	that	the	essence	of	a natural	object	is	identical	at	least	in	part	to	its	relational	properties	(section	3). It	then	illustrates	this	claim	with	the	examples	of	the	self	and	water,	contrasting Afro-relational	understandings	of	their	natures	with	standard	Western,	intrinsic understandings	of	them,	and	it	also	provides	arguments	in	favour	of	the	former (section	4).	Next,	the	article	responds	to	some	objections	that	would	be	natural to	raise to	Afro-relationalism	and	contends that they	do	not	provide	enough reason	at	this	stage	to	reject	it	(section	5).	Although	the	article	does	not	conclude	that	the	relational	accounts	of	the	essence	of	the	self	or	water	are	correct, it	does	submit	that	they	are	worth	taking	seriously	by	philosophers	around	the world	as	rivals	to	the	intrinsic	views	so	prominent	in	the	West	(section	6). 2. Definitions of Key Terms This	point	of	this	section	is	to	clarify	the	central	terms	of	the	hypothesis	that the essence of a natural object is not exhausted by its intrinsic properties, but also invariably includes relational ones, where the latter view is aptly SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?211 described	as	"African".	The	hypothesis	itself,	as	well	as	illustrations	of	and defences	of	it,	are	discussed	only	in	the	following	sections. First	off,	by	an	"essence"	of	an	object	is	meant	those	features	of	a	thing	without	which	it	would	not	exist.	A	thing's	essence	is	those	properties	it	would have	in	any	possible	world	in	which	it	exists. Such	a	fundamentally	ontological,	and	specifically	modal,	construal	of	"essence"	differs	from	other,	more	epistemological	ones,	for	example, that	essence	is	to	be	identified	as	whatever	plays	a	certain	explanatory	role	of	best accounting	for	a	thing's	surface	properties	(e.g.	Nozick	2001:	126,	347).	By the	present	account,	if	a	property	of	a	thing	best	explained	a	wide	array	of	its other	properties,	then	that	would	be	strong	evidence	that	it	is	a	thing's	essence, but	it	would	not	necessarily	be	so	(as,	roughly,	our	explanations	might	not	be good	enough	or	could	even	be	incorrect). It	is	difficult	to	define	properties	that	count	as	"intrinsic"	as	opposed	to	"relational" without controversy; the literature is contested and intricate, and furthermore, sometimes the way these terms are defined in contemporary English-speaking	metaphysics	begs	the	question	from	a	more	relational	tradition	such	as	the	perspective	of	the	African.2	There	are	occasions	when	AngloAmerican	metaphysicians	analyse	intrinsic	properties	explicitly	as	essential properties	or	invoke	examples	of	intrinsic	properties	that	are	contentious	in the	context	of	the	cross-cultural	debate.	For	one	example,	consider	that	the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy	entry	on	the	intrinsic/extrinsic	distinction (Weatherson and Marshall 2012) uses being Obama as a purportedly clear	example	of	an	intrinsic	property,	while	the	entry	on	it	in	the	Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics	similarly	uses	being	identical	to	Nixon	(Garrett 2009:	258).	However,	one	major	aim	of	this	article	is	to	argue	(section	4	and 5)	that	there	are	strong	reasons	to	think	that	being	a	particular	person	such	as Obama	or	Nixon,	at	least	in	large	part,	is	a	relational	property. The	strategy	this	article	uses	to	understand	the	meaning	of	"intrinsic"	is	not	to provide	a	set	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions	or	an	analysis	approximating	that,	since	motivating	one	account	as	preferable	to	others	would	detract from	achieving	the	essay's	central	aim	and	is, in	any	event,	unnecessary	to achieve	it.	Instead,	this	essay	appeals	to	comparatively	uncontested	examples used	in	other	fields	and	draws	analogies	with	them. For	example,	in	ethics,	intuitively	intrinsic	properties	grounding	moral	status, i.e. the	ability	of	a thing to	be	wronged, include	having	a	soul,	having the capacity	for	rational	decision-making,	being	able	to	feel	pleasure,	exhibiting human	DNA	and	being	a	living	organism.	These	are	individualist,	as	frequently	distinguished	from	collectivist,	features,	in	that	they	make	no	inherent reference	to	another	being	beyond	the	one	with	them,	or	do	not	conceptually involve	interaction	with	another	being.	In	epistemology	and	the	philosophy	of language,	consider	that	properties	frequently	described	as	"internal",	e.g.	in relation	to	the	content	of	propositional	attitudes	or	linguistic	terms,	are	more 1 Where	an	artefact	is	roughly	something	other than	an	organism	that	has	been	intentionally fashioned	by	human	beings,	with	a	table	and an	artwork	being	representative	examples	(for those	wanting	a	more	fine-grained	analysis	of what an artefact is, see Hilpinen 2011). For many,	a	relational	approach	is	intuitively	apt for	the	natures	of	artefacts,	on	which	see	Losonsky	(1987a).	This	article	focuses	on	nonartefacts, and specifically natural objects, a relational approach towards which is prima facie more difficult to establish, in the absence	of the supposition that they	were	created	by	supernatural	beings. 2 And	also the	East	Asian tradition,	on	which see	Nisbett	(2003). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?212 or	less	brain	states.	Talk	of	an	"intrinsic"	property	in	this	essay,	as	it	pertains to	the	essence	of	a	spatiotemporal	object	that	is	not	an	artefact,	appeals	to	a feature	that	is	similar	to	these	examples. What	counts	as	a	"relational"	property	of	a	thing,	then,	will	roughly	be	one	that is	not	intrinsic.	More	specifically,	it	will	count	as	a	feature	of	a	thing	insofar	it involves	interaction,	normally	causally	but	perhaps	intensionally,	with	other, distinct	things.3	Returning	to	the	previous	examples,	in	ethics,	relational	properties	that	might	ground	moral	status	are	being	cared	for	by	someone,	being a	member	of	a	clan	or	having	the	capacity	to	relate	communally	with	others, while	in	epistemology	and	the	philosophy	of	language,	externalism	in	respect of	content	is	standardly	taken	to	be	constituted	by	what	"just	ain't	in	the	head" (Putnam	1975:	227),	viz.	the	composition	of	things	in	the	society	and	broader environment	with	which	one's	brain	interacts.	A	relational	property	of	the	self or	water,	the	two	cases	addressed	in	this	article,	will	be	like	these. One	might	wonder	about	some	of	these	examples.	Specifically,	it	appears	that to	feel	pleasure	or	exhibit	brain	states	more	generally	one	has	to	have	had	a body	that	has	been	interacting	with	society	and	nature.	People	need	to	have been	socialised	when	they	were	young,	and	brains	continue	to	need	nutrients and	oxygen.	Does	that	dependence	on	other	things	mean	that	these	conditions	are	in	fact	best	understood	as	relational	and	not	intrinsic,	or	does	it	mean that	this	distinction	is	not	important	(cf.	the	example	of	being	six	feet	tall	in Garrett	2009:	259)? In reply, even if the	existence	of another thing,	Y,	has	brought	X	about	or even	sustains	it	in	this	world,	it	does	not	follow	that	there	is	no	point	to	thinking	of	X	as	distinct	from	Y,	exhibiting	features	that	are	not	a	function	of	(at least) its	contingent	dependence	on	Y.	The	conceptual	distinctions	between individualism/collectivism	in	ethics	and	between	internalism/externalism	in the	philosophy	of	language	and	epistemology	have	been	useful	for	framing long-standing	and	important	debates.	One	can	expect	a	similar	distinction	to be	useful	when	thinking	about	metaphysics. It	would	be	nice	to	have	a	subtle	and	thorough	analysis	of	the	intrinsic/relational	distinction,	but	that	is	not	essential	to	make	headway	on	the	topic	of	this article.	The	examples	of	intrinsic	and	relational	properties	in	other	fields,	or features	similar	to	them	there,	should	be	enough	to	fix	the	meanings	of	the terms. Also,	if	one	remains	uncomfortable	with	the	distinction,	one	could,	in	principle,	move	forward	without	using	these	particular	terms.	For	example,	one could	frame	the	debate	about	the	essence	of	water	simply	by	asking	whether it is identical to	chemical	composition	or instead	must include	reference	to things	in	an	ecosystem	with	which	it	interacts.	One	could	then,	when	seeking to	generalize	from	the	case	of	water	to	other	natural	objects,	appeal	to	properties	that	are	like	a	chemical	composition	or	are	like	ecological	interaction with	other	things.	This	author	believes	that	it	is	easiest	to	speak	of	the	former properties	as	"intrinsic"	and	the	latter	as	"relational",	and	that	it	is	revealing to	do	so	given	parallels	with	debates	in	other	fields,	and	therefore	invokes	this terminology	in	what	follows. Below	it	is	suggested	that	an	appeal	to	relational	properties	to	understand	a natural	thing's	essence	is	"African",	whereas	it	is	"Western"	to	appeal	merely to	its	intrinsic	properties.	What	are	these	geographical	labels	meant	to	signify? By	"African"	and	similar	words	such	as	"Western"	are	meant	features	salient in	a	locale	that	differentiate	it	from	many	other	locales.4	They	are	properties that	have	been	recurrent	over	a	large	range	of	space	and	a	long	period	in	an SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?213 area	and that	have	not	been in	many	other	areas.	This	use	of	geographical labels,	therefore,	is	consistent	with	the	idea	that	something	sensibly	characterised	as	"African"	might	be	encountered	outside	of	Africa	and	that	it	also might	not	be	found	everywhere	inside	of	Africa. Thus, when calling relational accounts of natural essences "African", the claim	is that they	are	salient in	philosophies that	have	been	expounded	for a long time throughout much of	Africa.	At the very least, they have been common	in	post-independence	English-speaking	works	described	as	"African philosophy",	which	are	well	known	for	being	informed	by	traditional	views held	by	many	black	peoples	south	of	the	Sahara	Desert.	Relational	accounts are	not	"Western"	insofar	they	have	not	been	prominently	held	by	philosophers	from	Europe,	the	United	Kingdom	and	North	America.	Instead,	what has	been	salient	in	their	views	are	intrinsic	accounts,	even	if	there	have	been some	exceptions	(mentioned	in	what	follows). 3. An Afro-Relational Hypothesis about the Essence of an Essence This	section	begins	with	some	quotations	from	African	metaphysicians	about how they	understand the fundamental nature of reality, sometimes specifically	the	nature	of	the	self.	They	do	not	always	focus	exclusively	on	the	notion that relational properties are essential to a thing's existence, but only those	remarks,	in	particular,	are	drawn	on,	setting	aside	other	sorts	of	claims, with	the	aim	of	advancing	a	clear	and	circumscribed	thesis	about	the	nature of	essence. Consider	the	following	passages	from	African	metaphysicians,	suggesting	a relational	approach	to	a	thing's	nature,	particularly	that	of	the	self:5 "In	traditional	life,	the	individual	does	not	and	cannot	exist	alone	except	corporately.	He	owes his	existence	to	other	people,	including	those	of	past	generations	and	his	contemporaries.	He	is simply	part	of	the	whole.	(...)	Only	in	terms	of	other	people	does	the	individual	become	conscious	of	his	own	being,	his	own	duties.	(...)	The	individual	can	only	say:	'I	am	because	we	are; and	since	we	are,	therefore	I	am'.	This	is	a	cardinal	point	in	the	understanding	of	the	African view	of	man."	(Mbiti	1990:	106) This	passage,	from	the	magisterial	historian	of	African	religions	and	philosophies	from	Kenya,	John	Mbiti,	is	one	of	the	most	frequently	cited	in	African philosophy.	One	way	to	read	Mbiti's	point is	weak,	as	merely	pointing	out that,	for	many	traditional	African	peoples,	an	individual	needs	to	be	socialized in	order	to	become	a	responsible	adult.	However,	another	reading	is	stronger, as	contending that, for them,	who	an individual	essentially is, i.e., roughly what	makes	her	one	person	as	numerically	distinct	from	others,	is	a	function of	who	has	socialized	her	and	how.	The	claim	is	apparently	not	merely	that an	individual	can	be	produced	only	by	a	society,	but	that	a	society	necessarily helps	to	constitute	the	identity	of	an	individual. 3 One	might	then	usefully	use	the	word	"extrinsic" to	mean	something	more inclusive,	e.g. not only relational properties but also, say, symbolic	ones,	on	which	see	Bradley	(1998). 4 For a more thorough exposition, as well as some	defence,	see	Metz	(2015). 5 For similar claims, see	Tempels (1959: esp. 103, 108); Shutte (2001: 22–23); Nasseem (2003: 306–307); Hamminga (2005: 62, 63, 68,	75);	and	Lajul	(2016:	29,	31–32,	37,	43). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?214 "African metaphysics or theory of reality differs significantly from that of	Aristotle, for instance,	with	its	individuated,	discrete	existences	–	'substances'	he	called	them	–	existing	in	and by	themselves,	separated	from	others	(...).	[T]he	essence	of	the	African's	cosmic	vision	is	that the	universe	is	not	something	discrete	but	a	series	of	interactions	and	interconnections.	This	is equally	the	category	of	understanding	self	(...).	It	is	the	community	which	makes	the	individual to	the	extent	that	without	the	community,	the	individual	has	no	existence	(...).	Our	summary view	of	self	in	African	Philosophy	is	essentially	social.	The	African	is	not	just	a	being	but	a	being-with-others.	Self,	or	'I'	as	we	have	seen	above,	is	defined	in	terms	of	'we-existence'	(...). Self	in	African	philosophy	(...)	is	almost	totally	viewed	from	the	'outside',	in	relation	to	other, and	not	from	the	'inside'	in	relation	to	itself."	(Okolo	2003:	251,	252) This	passage	is	from	the	Nigerian	Chukwudum	Okolo	in	a	paper	titled	"Self	as a	Problem	in	African	Philosophy"	that	was	reprinted	in	The African Philosophy Reader.	He	most	clearly	draws	the	contrast	between	different	metaphysical	approaches	that	this	article	spells	out.	As	Okolo	points	out,	it	is	not	just	the	self that	is	characteristically	understood	relationally	by	African	philosophers,	but also	everything	in	the	universe.	At	one	point	in	this	essay	Okolo	approvingly quotes	two	other	philosophers	working	in	the	African	tradition6	who	say: "To	exist	means	more	than	just	'being	there.'	It	means	standing	in	a	particular	relationship	with all	there	is	both	visible	and	invisible."	(Okolo	2003:	249) While	Okolo	does	not	provide	reason	to	favour	this	relational	approach	that he	presents	as	characteristically	African,	this	article	aims	to	do	so	below. "In	African	thinking	the	starting-point	is	social	relations	–	selfhood	is	seen	and	accounted	for from	this	relational	perspective.	Kuckertz	(1996:62)	puts	it	like	this:	'African	thought	and	philosophy	on	personhood	and	selfhood	is	that	the	'I'	belongs	to	the	I-You-correspondence	as	a stream	of	lived	experience	without	which	it	could	not	be	thought	and	would	not	exist.'"	(Teffo and	Roux	2003:	204) This	final	passage	is	from	two	South	African	philosophers,	Lesiba	Teffo	and Abraham Roux, in an essay titled "Themes in	African Metaphysics". In it they	approvingly	cite	Heinz	Kuckertz,	who	was	an	anthropologist	based	in South	Africa	and	who	for	several	years	studied	the	Mpondo	people	from	that country.	That	people's	view,	according to	Kuckertz	–	and	which	Teffo	and Roux	deem	to	be	representative	of	many	other	sub-Saharan	peoples	–	is	that relationships	with	others	are	essential	to	who	one	is. Abstracting	from	the	appeals	to	holism	and	an	imperceptible	realm	of	agents, here	is	a	circumscribed	hypothesis	about	the	essence	of	natural	objects:	the essence of any concrete, natural object is, at least in part, necessarily consti- tuted by its relationships with elements of the world beyond the thing's intrin- sic properties. Clarifying	the	proposal,	note	that it	does	not	say	that	nothing	exists	except relationships.	Instead,	it	implies	there	are	relata,	things	that	are	related	to	each other,	and	suggests	that	part	of	what	makes	something	a	particular	relatum, one	distinct	from	others,	are	the	ways	it	relates	to	other	things.	Also,	note	that the	hypothesis	is	not	that	a	thing's	essence	is	solely	a	function	of	its	relational properties	and	none	of	its	intrinsic	ones.	Instead,	it	is	consistent	with	the	idea that	part	of	what	constitutes	a	thing's	nature	is	its	intrinsic	properties,	at	bottom	denying	that	these	alone	are	sufficient	for	its	identity.7 While	this	hypothesis	focuses	on	what	it	is	to	be	a	particular	thing,	it	would be	natural	to	extend	it	to	apply	to	what	it	is	to	be	a	certain	kind	of	thing,	and that	is	sometimes	done	below.	For	instance,	instead	of	just	indicating	what	it is	to	be	a	particular	self	as	one	that	is	numerically	distinct	from	others	or	as one	that	is	numerically	the	same	over	time,	it	could	be	applied	to	selfhood,	i.e. what	it	is	to	be	a	self	in	general. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?215 Both the hypothesis and its potential extension contrast sharply with the dominant	views	of	analytic,	and	more	generally	Western,	philosophers,	according	to	which	the	essence	of	a	concrete,	natural	thing	(or	type	of	thing	as something	inclusive	of	tokens)	is	merely	its	intrinsic	properties,	representative	examples	of	which	are	discussed	in	the	next	two	sections.	Traditionally, the	idea	has	been	that	these	inherent	and	static	features	could	be	captured	by a	set	of	necessary	and	sufficient	conditions.	However,	even	cluster	or	family resemblance	models	of	what	a	thing	is	typically	suppose	that	it	can	(and	must) be	captured	solely	by	properties	intrinsic	to	it. Before	considering	what	there	is	to	be	said	in	favour	of	an	Afro-relational approach to	ontology, it is	worth	pointing	out	how it	differs from	one	of the	better	known	relational	approaches	advanced	by	a	Western	philosopher, namely,	Richard	Rorty's	(1999)	view.	Rorty	famously	rejects	the	existence of essences on the ground that there are no intrinsic properties and that there	are	instead	only	relational	properties.	Interestingly,	he	–	like	his	opponents	–	supposes	that	essence	is	to	be	identified	with	intrinsic	properties. In	contrast,	the	hypothesis	advanced	here	supposes	that	essences	exist	but it	is	the	view	that	they	are	at	least	partially	to	be	identified	with	relational properties.8 4. Motivating the Afro-Relational Approach This	section	applies	the	hypothesis	about	the	relational	essence	of	non-artefactual	objects	to	the	two	cases	of	the	self	and	water,	providing	some	detail about	how	plausibly	to	understand	their	essences.	One	aim	is	to	illustrate	the hypothesis,	while	another	is	to	begin	to	defend	it	by	providing	some	reason	to think	that	the	self	and	water	are	indeed	relational	in	nature.	Objections	to	the hypothesis	are	considered	only	in	the	following	section. 4.1. A Relational Account of the Self In	the	Anglo-American,	and	more	broadly	Western,	philosophical	tradition, the	self	or	person	is	usually	identified	with	something	internal,	either	a	soul that	contains	mental	states,	a	brain	that	contains	mental	states	or,	most	common	these	days,	a	chain	of	mental	states	themselves,	some	of	which	are	selfaware.	It	is	not	just	philosophers	who	think	of	the	self	in	this	way,	but	Western people	more	generally,	some	evidence	for	which	is	the	fact	that	such	a	conception	of	the	self	is	dominant	in	the	field	of	English-speaking	psychology	(as pointed	out	by	Markus,	Kitayama	and	Heiman	1996). 6 They	are	E.	A.	Ruch	and	K.	C.	Anyanwu.	The latter is a Nigerian epistemologist who published largely in the	1980s	and is	probably best	known	for	his	essay	titled	"The	Idea	of Art	in	African	Philosophy",	while	the	former is	a	philosopher	originally	from	Europe	who had relocated to southern	Africa and taught at the	National	University	of	Lesotho in the 1970s.	They	co-authored	African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa	(Rome:	Catholic	Book	Agency,	1981),	from	which	Okolo has	taken	the	quotation. 7 Indeed,	Okolo	in	a	further	passage	denies	that the	self	is	entirely	relational	(2003:	253). 8 When	giving a talk	based	on this essay, the author	happened to	meet	a	Western	philosopher who has advanced a view, particularly of the identity	of the	self, similar to	what is called	"African"	here,	namely,	Michael	Losonsky	(1987a,	1987b).	However,	Losonsky's view is not characteristically Western (on which	see	section	2	above). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?216 The	African	psychologist	Elias	Mpofu	(2002)	and	others9	have	complained that	Western	psychological	research	has	presumed	a	contested,	atomist	perspective	about	the	self's	nature.	As	noted	above,	the	self	as	typically	construed by	African	thinkers	is	at	least	substantially	relational,	largely	constituted	by interaction	with	other	persons	(and	the	environment).	This	view,	however,	is broad,	admitting	of	at	least	three	distinct	variants.	This	author	has	not	encountered	the	following	conceptions	in	the	literature,	but	presents	them	as	meriting consideration: According	to	the Origination Version,	a	person	is	essentially	who	they	are	at least	in	part	by	the	initial	relationships	they	have	had.	Person	X	is	numerically identical	to	person	Y	only	if,	and	at	least	partially	because,	Y	has	the	same	initial	relationships	as	X	had.	The	initial	relationships	might	have	been	the	ones of	genetic	bequeathal,	gestation,	care	or	sense	of	togetherness. By	the Contemporary Version,	a	person	is	essentially	who	they	are	at	least	in part	by	the	relationships	they	are	in	now.	Person	X	is	numerically	identical to	person	Y	only	if,	and	partially	because,	Y	is	presently	in	the	same	relationships	as	X.	These	relationships	might	be	cognitive,	emotive	and	volitional, e.g.,	how	one	thinks	about	others	and	how	they	think	of	one,	what	one's	attitudes	are	about	others	and	what	others'	attitudes	are	about	one,	and	how	one's decisions	affect	others	and	how	their	decisions	affect	one. The Historical Version	is	the	view	that	a	person	is	essentially	who	they	are	at least	in	part	by	the	relationships	they	have	been	in	over	time	until	now.	Person X	is	numerically	identical	to	person	Y	only	if,	and	partially	because,	Y	has been	in	the	same	major	relationships	as	X.	The	relationships,	here,	are	plausibly	the	same	as	those	intuitively	relevant	to	the	contemporary	version. These	three	views	admit	of	a	further,	orthogonal	distinction	that	grounds	six possible	views.	Above	all	three	were	characterised	descriptively,	in	terms	of what	the	relationships	have	in	fact	been.	However,	there	are	those	in	the	African	tradition	(one	of	whom	is	discussed	below)	who	would	instead	(or	also) opt	for	a	prescriptive	account.	By	this	approach,	who	one	essentially	is	in	part is	a	function	of	how	one	ought	to	relate	to	others	and	how	they	ought	to	relate to	one.	Any	of	the	above	three	versions	could	take	a	prescriptive	form. African	philosophers	are	likely	to	find	the	prescriptive	form	appealing	if	they believe	that	part	of	what	constitutes	our	identity	is	a	destiny,	roughly	a	purpose	towards	which	one	is	aptly	disposed	to	pursue.	When	the	Nigerian	philosopher	Segun	Gbadegesin	remarks: "Persons	are	what	they	are	in	virtue	of	what	they	are	destined	to	be,	their	character	and	the	communal	influence	on	them."	(1991:	58); he	is	plausibly	understood	as	including	normative-relational	elements	in	his understanding	of	personal	identity	with	the	mention	of	"destiny";	for	he	also remarks	that	"destiny	is	construed	as	the	meaning	of	a	person	–	the	purpose for	which	the	individual	exists"	where	"the	purpose	of	individual	existence is	intricately	linked	with	the	purpose	of	social	existence,	and	cannot	be	adequately	grasped	outside	it"	(1991:	58;	see	also	Abraham	1962:	52,	59–60). This	article	will	not	do	the	work	of	choosing	between	the	various	interpretations	of	the	relational	self,	a	fascinating	project	that	merits	systematic	enquiry elsewhere. However, it will note that the Contemporary	Version in its descriptive	guise	is	probably	the	least	plausible	of	the	six	options	distinguished above.	The	Contemporary	Version	does	have	some things	going	for it.	For one, it can	make sense	of the idea that changes	of a	name	are appropriate upon	major	changes	in	a	relationship,	e.g.	upon	getting	married,	converting SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?217 to	a	new	religion,	changing	gender, joining	a	society	with	a	new	language. For	another,	it	captures	"the	Eastern	conviction	that	one	is	a	different	person when	interacting	with	different	people"	(Nisbett	2003:	53),	an	intuition	that many	readers	(including	this	author)	lack,	but	that	Africans	steeped	in	their indigenous	culture	might	share.	Consider: "European	culture	has	taught	us	to	see	the	self	as	something	private,	hidden	within our	bodies (...).	The	African	image	is	very	different:	the	self	is	outside the	body,	present	and	open	to	all. This	is	because	the	self	is	the	result	and	expression	of	all	the	forces	acting	upon	us.	It	is	not	a thing,	but	the	sum	total	of	all	the	interacting	forces	(...).	[T]hese	relationships	are	what	it	is." (Shutte	2001:	22,	23) However,	the	Contemporary	Version,	at	least	in	its	descriptive	form,	risks	being	vulnerable	to	counterexamples	when	it	comes	to	ascribing	liability,	which of	course	famously	motivated	John	Locke's	reflections	on	personal	identity.	It seems	that	you	could	avoid	blame	by	killing	off	all	parties	related	to	you,	for the	Contemporary	Version	entails	that	you,	the	killer,	would	no	longer	exist by	your	relationships	having	radically	changed.	Having	killed	off	everyone you	knew,	the	present	"you"	is	not	the	same	as	the	past	"you";	for	there	is, by	that	theory,	now	a	new	person	in	virtue	of	completely	new	relationships having	been	formed. In	reply,	one	might	suggest	the	possibility	that	one	would	continue	to	be	related	to	those	whom	one	had	killed.	Traditionally	speaking,	African	peoples tend	to	believe	that	one	can	survive	the	death	of	one's	body,	in	the	form	of	the "living-dead"	(on	which	see,	e.g.	Mbiti	1975:	70–73).	Also,	it	is	intuitive	to think	that	one	continues	to	be	related	to	one's	departed	grandfather,	even	on the	supposition	that	there	is	no	afterlife	in	which	he	has	survived	the	death	of his	body.10 However,	this	article	seeks	to	abstract	from	reliance	on	other	facets	of	African metaphysics,	and	so	does	not invoke	the idea	of	an imperceptible	realm	of persons	without	bodies.	And	as	for	the	suggestion	that	one	is	still	related	to those	who	are	dead	(which	does	not	include	the	living-dead),	the	implication would	appear to	be that	one's	relationships	with	others	never	end	(and	can only	be	added),	which	does	not	square	well	with	the	idea	that	the	nature	of the	self	varies	as	its	relationships	vary.	Furthermore,	the	sense	in	which	one is	plausibly	"related" to the	dead,	presumably	principally	by sharing some genetic	material	and	by	remembering	them,	appears	to	differ	from	the	suggestion	that	the	self	is	a	function	of	the	forces	acting	upon	us. In	any	event,	to	keep	things	simple,	this	article	works	with	the	(descriptive) Origination and Historical Versions in what follows. If arguments can be provided to take	at least those	views	seriously, then	reason	will	have	been provided	to	doubt	an	intrinsic	view	such	as	an	appeal	to	the	chain	of	mental states. Why	believe	the	Origination	or	Historical	Versions?	None	of	the	following considerations	is	decisive,	but	as	a	package,	they	provide	some	support	for	it. First	off,	if	a	being	spontaneously	arose	in	a	chemical-rich	bog	and	happened to	have	a	copy	of	my	genetic	make-up	and	the	content	of	my	memories,	expe9 It	has	also	been	characteristically	East	Asian to understand personal identity in relational terms, on which see the philosopher Roger Ames (1994) and the Japanese psychologist Shinobu	Kitayama	in	Markus,	Kitayama	and Heiman	(1996:	860,	878–879,	884). 10 Jon	McGinnis	is	responsible	for	this	intriguing	suggestion. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?218 riences,	desires	and	beliefs,	it	would	not	be	me.	It	would	be	exactly	like	me, i.e.,	would	be	qualitatively	me,	but	not	numerically	one	and	the	same	as	me. I	am	essentially	the	one	who	was	given	birth	to	by	a	particular	woman	and reared	in	a	particular	family.	Swamp-Metz	would	not	have	the	same	relational history	as	this	Metz,	which	is	one	(not	the	only)	plausible	explanation	of	why it	would	not	be	me. Second, recall	Thomas	Nagel's	powerful	objection	to	the	Lockean/Parfitian stream	of	consciousness	view,	namely,	that	intuitively	one	could	have	been the	same	person	and	yet	had	substantially	different	mental	content	than	one did.	Of	himself,	Nagel	remarks,	"This	would	have	happened,	for	example,	if I	had	been	adopted	at	birth	and	brought	up	in	Argentina."	(1986:	38).	Nagel's brain theory of personal identity is one intrinsic account of how it would be	possible for a	given	person to	have	had radically	different awarenesses throughout	his	life	(1986:	40–41).	However,	an	appeal	to	relational	history	is another	plausible	explanation:	I	am	identical	to	the	one	who,	at	least	in	large part,	had	a	certain	historical	relationship	with	those	who	created	me	and	gave birth	to	me. Third,	it	is	common	to	accept	that	one	would	not	have	existed	had	one's	gamete	donors	or	their	donations	been	different	(somewhat	ironically	here,	given the	discussion	of	water	below,	see	e.g.	Kripke	1980;	less	ironically,	see	especially	Losonsky	1987a:	258).	I	would	not	have	existed,	had	the	sperm	or egg	from	which	I	was	generated	been	different.	A	broader	way	to	capture	this intuition	is	by	appeal	to	relational	history. Fourth,	and	finally	for	now,	consider	an	analogy	with	theories	of	the	mind.	Many theorists	of	the	mind's	nature	accept	multiple	realisability	and	reject	the	identity theory	that	the	mind	is	the	same	thing	as	the	brain,	even	if	it	is,	in	this	world, constituted	by	one.	Similarly,	a	functionalist	account	of	the	mind,	according	to which	the	mind	is	characteristically	caused	by	certain	things	and	in	turn	characteristically	causes	certain	effects,	remains	a	live	option.	Now,	what	goes	for	the mind	plausibly	goes	for	a	self	–	perhaps	because	a	self	just is	a	mind.	A	self	is plausibly	not	to	be	identified	with	any	particular	substance	composed	of	certain intrinsic	properties	(whether	physical	or	spiritual),	and	instead	is	identical,	at least	in	part,	to	certain	historical-causal	influences	on	it	and	by	it. 4.2. A Relational Account of Water This	section	extends the	African	approach to the	self to	natural	objects	more generally,	using	the	example	of	water,	famously	prominent	in	the	metaphysical discussions	of	Hilary	Putnam	and	Saul	Kripke.	For	them,	and	a	very	large	majority	of	Anglo-American	(and	more	broadly	Western)	philosophers,	water	is	identified	entirely	as	a	substance	and	as	something	intrinsic,	specifically,	the	chemical	composition	H2O.	This	section	articulates	and	defends	a	contrasting	view	of water	as	something	that	is	at	least	substantially	(if	not	purely)	relational. From	an	Afro-relational	perspective,	water	is	largely	constituted	necessarily by	interaction	with	other	things	in	an	environment.	In	particular,	consider	that water	might	be	essentially	what	it	is	at	least	in	part	by	virtue	of	the	causal	relationships	it	has	with	persons,	animals,	plants,	rocks,	gasses	and	other	liquids. By	this	account,	a	certain	kind	of	stuff	X	is	identical	to	water	only	if	and	partially	because	X	has	the	same	effects	on	other	things	in	the	environment	and they	have	the	same	effects	on	it. Here	are	two	major	arguments	for	a	relational	account	of	water,	using	some familiar	thought	experiments.	First,	consider	a	version	of	twin	earth,	in	which SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?219 two	things	that	are	chemically	different	are	arguably	the	same	sort	of	things,	in virtue	of	playing	the	same	role	in	an	environmental	system.	Imagine	that	XYZ on	another	planet	acts	in	precisely	the	same	way	that	H2O	does	here	on	earth, viz.	it	supports	life,	flows	downhill,	evaporates	and	so	on.	It	would	be	reasonable	to	say	that	water	on	this	other	planet	is	composed	of	XYZ	because	the relational	features	of	H2O	are	identical.	If	earthlings	landed	on	the	planet	with XYZ	it	would	be	sensible	–	both	intelligible	and	pragmatically	wise	–	for	them to	radio	to	their	spaceship	that	they	have	encountered	water	on	the	planet. Of course, Putnam (1975: 223–235; cf. 1990: 59) and Kripke (1980: 124, 128) have a famously opposing intuition. They would contend that, upon reflection, the	earthlings	should instead	say that they	found	something	water-like,	and	not	actual	water.	However,	it	is	not	merely	those	in	the	African tradition	who	would	question	their intuition;	there	are	some	in	the	Western tradition	who	have	questioned	it,	too	(e.g.,	Salmon	1981:	95;	Nozick	2001: 130,	346–347),	where	an	appeal	to	relational	essence	is	a	plausible	theoretical way	to	capture	their	dissent	about	this	particular	case. The second thought experiment is the inverse of the first; now consider a version	of	not-so-twin	earth	in	which	two	things	that	are	chemically	the	same are	arguably	different	sorts	of	things,	in	virtue	of	playing	different	roles	in	an environmental	system.	So,	imagine H2O	acted	radically	differently	on	another planet,	e.g.	did	not	support	life,	did	not	flow	downhill,	did	not	evaporate,	etc. It	would	be	plausible for	us	earthlings to	say,	upon landing	on	not-so-twin earth,	that	water	does	not	exist	on	this	planet,	because	the	relational	features of	H2O	have	dramatically	changed.	It	would	be	sensible	–	again,	both	intelligible	and	pragmatically	wise	–	for	people	to	report	that	humans	should	not move	there	since	there	is	no	water. In	one	of	his	mid-to-late	stage	works,	Putnam	considers	a	similar	case,	and	has a	different	intuition	or,	rather,	the	purported	lack	of	an	intuition	altogether: "Perhaps	one	could	tell	a	story	about	a	world	in	which	H2O	exists	(...)	but	the	laws	are	slightly different	in	such	a	way	that	what	is	a	small	difference	in	the	equations	produces	a	very	large difference	in	the	behavior	of	H2O.	Is	it	clear	that	we	would	call	a	(hypothetical)	substance	with quite	different	behavior	water	in	these	circumstances?	I	now	think	that	the	question,	'What	is	the necessary	and	sufficient	condition	for	being	water	in all possible worlds?'	makes	no	sense	at	all. And	this	means	that	I	now	reject	'metaphysical	necessity.'"	(Putnam	1990:	69–70)11 In	reply,	recall	that	this	article	is	supposing	that	things	have	essences,	which	are best	understood	not	only	ontologically,	but	also	in	modal	terms,	and	that	it	is trying	to	ascertain	how	best	to	understand	their	content.	It	is	beyond	its	scope to argue that this concept of an essence applies to concrete, spatiotemporal objects	that	are	not	artefacts;	rejecting	the	idea	that	this	concept	denotes	something	in	the	real	world	does	not	provide	a	reason	to	doubt	that,	supposing	it	did denote	something	in	the	real	world,	it	would	include	relational	properties. 5. Defending the Afro-Relational Approach from Objections Whereas	the	previous	section	provided	some	positive	reasons	to	believe	that essences	of	natural	objects	are	at	least	partially	relational,	this	section	aims	to provide	a	negative	defence	of	that	claim.	It	seeks	to	rebut	some	objections	that adherents	to	an	intrinsic	approach	would	naturally	advance. 11 For	a	similar	view	of	metaphysical	necessity, see	Nozick	(2001:	133–141). SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?220 A	familiar	objection	is	that	relations	are	metaphysically	composed	of	relata that	must	have	an	intrinsic	essence	in	order	to	be	able	to	relate.	"If	there	were not a hard, substantial autonomous table to stand in relation to (...) there would	be	nothing	to	get	related	and	so	no	relations"	(expressed	but	not	accepted	by	Rorty	1999:	55)	and	"an	object	can	be	related	to	another	object	only if	it	is	already	individuated.	If	it	isn't	individuated,	what	is	it	that	is	entering into	the	relation?"	(expressed	but	not	accepted	by	Losonsky	1987b:	194).	Applied	to	the	self,	the	objection	would	be	that	any	relationship	between	selves presupposes	distinct	ones	composed	essentially	of	intrinsic	properties	alone. In	reply,	unlike	Rorty,	this	article	does	not	deny	that	there	are	intrinsic	properties	or	even	that	they	might	be	partly	constitutive	of	the	essences	of	nonartefactual	objects	such	as	selves	and	water.	The	hypothesis	advanced	here	is instead	that	relational	properties	are	invariably	also	at	least	partly	constitutive of	such	essences,	which	would	make	adequate	sense	of	the	claim	that	relations are composed	of relata – even though an admittedly fuller statement would	also	acknowledge	that	relata	are	partly	composed	out	of	relations.12 Another	familiar	objection	is	that	epistemically	identifying	a	particular	object is	metaphysically	best	explained	by	the	idea	that	it	has	an	intrinsic	essence alone.	We usually identify relations in terms of their relata, which, so the objection	goes, has to	be accounted for	with the idea that relata are	metaphysically	independent	of	relations.	How	else	could	we	pick	out	relationships except	by	having	some	independent	conception	of	the	things	that	are	related to	each	other?	Applied	to	the	self,	the	objection	would	be	that	to	identify	a relationship	between	persons,	we	must	first	pick	out	the	persons	separately, and	our	ability	to	do	so	is	best	explained	by	their	real	separateness,	i.e.	having essences	composed	solely	of intrinsic	properties	such	as	different	brains	or chains	of	mental	states. As	an initial reply, consider that identifying	a relationship	by	appeal to its relata	is	not	particularly	weighty	evidence	that	the	latter	is	utterly	metaphysically independent	of the former.	One	might	specify	a	dollar	bill,	my	hand, a	widget	and	another	person's	hand to identify	a financial	exchange,	but it hardly follows	with	any	strength that the	dollar	bill,	qua	money, is	not	essentially	relational.	Similarly,	you	might	be	able	to	pick	a	person	out	from	a crowd	knowing	something	special	about	her	brain,	but	it	does	not	follow	that she	is	exhausted	by	such	properties. A	further	reply	is	that	sometimes	we	identify	relata	in	terms	of	their	relations, not	solely	the	other	way	around.	To	identify	me,	you	might	plausibly	invoke	the fact	that	I	am	the	guy	who	was	born	in	Atlanta	to	parents	of	largely	Germanic/ Austrian	descent,	or	you	might	appeal	to	the	roles	that	I	have	played	(or	even, prescriptively,	what	roles	I	should	have	played,	given	my	particular	abilities). And	to	identify	water,	you	might	well	appeal	to	its	role	in	an	ecosystem.13 A third objection is that explanatory fundamentality tracks intrinsic metaphysical essence. Some maintain that essence is probably whatever "deep structure"	best	explains	a	wide	array	of	"surface	properties"	(Putnam	1975) or	which	"substance"	best	explains	"appearances"	(Kripke	1980).	Applied	to water,	H2O	best	explains	topical	features	such	as	being	a	colourless,	odourless liquid	that	is	found	down	streams	and	through	taps,	and,	for	this	reason,	is	the best	candidate	for	being	the	essence	of	water. However,	there	are	many	surface	properties,	particularly	regarding	how	a	self or	water	behaves,	that	are	plausibly	not	due	to	their	intrinsic	features	alone, but	also	to	how	other	things	in	the	world	bear	on	them	and	how	they	bear	on SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?221 other	things.	For	example,	why	does	water	move	downhill?	The	existence	of gravity	and	the	susceptibility	of	water	to	gravity	are	surely	part	of	the	explanation.	Why	does	water	not	give	off	a	taste?	Part	of	the	explanation	involves something	about	our	taste	buds,	and	not	merely	the	fact	that	water	is	H2O. The	intrinsic	theorist	is	likely	to	reply	that	it	is	the	chemical	composition	of those	other	things,	viz.	of	the	hills	and	the	taste	buds,	that	best	explains	how water	behaves	(which	Putnam	1990:	69	suggests).	However,	it	could	be	other, law-like	properties	that	best	explain	these	behaviours,	ones	that	are	not	reducible	to	chemical	composition,	say,	because	a	different	chemical	composition would	ground	the	same	laws.	And,	then,	note	that	gravity	is	not	composed	of chemicals	at	all	(though	admittedly	the	debate	about	whether	it	has	an	intrinsic	nature	continues	amongst	physicists). Fourth,	and	finally	for	now,	one	might	object	that	rigid	referential	designation entails an intrinsic essence. In the face	of	various criticisms,	Putnam	once remarked,	"I	still	believe	that	a	linguistic	community	can	stipulate	that	'water'	is	to	designate	whatever	has	the	same	chemical	structure	(...)	even	if	it doesn't	know,	at	the	time	it	makes	this	stipulation,	exactly	what	that	chemical structure	(...)	is"	(1990:	70;	see	also	59–60). In	reply,	yes,	a	linguistic	community	can	do	that,	but	it	does	not	follow	that linguistic	communities	always do	stipulate	that	"water"	picks	out	only	intrinsic	properties	such	as	chemical	structures	(or	that	intrinsic	properties	exhaust an	essence).	In	light	of	cross-cultural	investigation,	it	is	likely	that	many	African	societies	have	used	the	term	"water"	to	denote	relational	properties.14 6. Conclusion As	the	sort	of	cross-cultural	debate	about	metaphysics	undertaken	in	this	article	has	not	been	widespread,	it	is	too	soon	to	expect	firm	conclusions.	This article's	aims	have	been	the	weaker	ones	of	articulating	a	characteristically African	approach	to	understanding	the	essence	of	a	natural	object	in	terms	of its	relational	features,	illustrating	the	approach	with	two	examples,	contrasting	it	with	standard	Anglo-American	approaches,	noting	some	salient	arguments	that	must	be	considered	to	choose	between	them,	and	providing	some critical	appraisal	of	these	arguments	with	an	eye	to	showing	that	the	African view	should	not	be	dismissed.	It	is	time	to	give	much	more	of	a	global	hearing to	some	facets	of	African	ontology.15 12 For	a	bolder	reply,	see	Losonsky	(1987b:	194). 13 For	yet	another	response,	from	Rorty	(1999), consider	that	numbers	probably	lack	intrinsic properties,	but that	we	can	distinguish them easily by different relations they have. Perhaps	the	same	thing	goes	for	physical	things. 14 The	same	appears	true	of	some	East	Asian	societies,	on	which	see	Nisbett	(2003). 15 For	oral	comments	on	presentations	based	on ideas	in	this	article,	the	author	would	like	to thank	participants	at	a	colloquium	organised by	the	University	of	Missouri	–	St.	Louis	Department of Philosophy, and participants at the	Conference	on	Contemporary	Language, Logic	and	Metaphysics:	African	and	Western Approaches organised by the University of Witwatersrand's Department of Philosophy. This	article	has	also	been	improved	as	a	result of substantial written input from an anonymous	referee	for	Synthesis philosophica. SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?222 References Abraham,	William	(1962):	The Mind of Africa.	Chicago:	University	of	Chicago	Press. Ames,	Roger	(1994):	"The	Focus-field	Self	in	Classical	Confucianism".	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Specifično, ciljevi su rada sljedeći: arti- kulirati afrički pristup razumijevanju bȋti konkretne, prirodne stvari u pogledu njenih relacija; ilustrirati afro-relacijski pristup primjerima sebstva i vode; kontrastirati afro-relacijsku karak- terizaciju bȋti sebstva i vode s tipičnim zapadnim konstruktima u pogledu intrinzičnih svojstava; te konačno ponuditi inicijalnu obranu afro-relacijskog pristupa podjednako odgovarajući na postojeće prigovore i pridodajući nove, pozitivne razloge da se ozbiljno uzme u obzir. Ključne riječi afrička	metafizika, bit, intrinzična svojstva, narav, ontologija, osobni identitet, relacijska svojstva, sebstvo,	voda Thaddeus Metz Was ist das Wesen eines Wesens? Vergleich der afro-relationalen und westlich-individualistischen Ontologien Zusammenfassung Der überwiegende Blickwinkel unter den zeitgenössischen westlichen Philosophen bezüglich der Frage des Wesens ist die Tatsache, dass es auf inhärenten Eigenschaften beruht. Im Ge- genteil dazu legt der ausgeprägte ontologische Ansatz in der afrikanischen philosophischen Tradition das Wesen eines Dings nach dessen Relationseigenschaften fest. Die afro-relationale Ontologie ist nicht ausreichend entwickelt, daher ist das erste Ziel des Artikels, deren Entwick- lung anzutreiben. Spezifisch bestehen die Ziele der Arbeit darin, den afrikanischen Verstehens- ansatz zum Wesen des konkreten, natürlichen Dings bezüglich seiner Relationen zu artikulieren; den afro-relationalen Ansatz an Beispielen von Selbst und Wasser zu veranschaulichen; die afro-relationale Charakterisierung des Wesens von Selbst und Wasser mit typischen westlichen SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 65	(1/2018)	pp.	(209–224) T.	Metz,	What	is	the	Essence	of	an	Essence?224 Konstrukten hinsichtlich der intrinsischen Eigenschaften zu kontrastieren und schliesslich die initiale Verteidigung des afro-relationalen Ansatzes zu unterbreiten, indem man gleichermassen auf existierende Einwände reagiert und neue, positive Gründe hinzufügt, um das Bedeutsame in Erwägung zu ziehen. Schlüsselwörter afrikanische	Metaphysik,	Wesen,	intrinsische	Eigenschaften,	Natur,	Ontologie,	eigene	Identität,	relationale	Eigenschaften,	Selbst,	Wasser Thaddeus Metz Quelle est l'essence d'une certaine essence ? Une comparaison des ontologies africaines relationalistes et occidentales individualistes Résumé L'idée prédominante parmi les philosophes contemporains occidentaux sur la question de l'es- sence est de lui attribuer des propriétés intrinsèques. Au contraire, le fait de souligner l'appro- che ontologique dans la tradition philosophique africaine permet d'interroger l'essence de la chose par rapport à ses propriétés relationnelles. L'ontologie africaine relationaliste n'étant pas suffisamment développée, le but premier de cet article est de l'aider dans son développe- ment. De manière spécifique, les objectifs de ce travail sont les suivants : formuler l'approche africaine qui vise la compréhension de l'essence concrète, naturelle d'une chose par rapport à ses relations ; illustrer l'approche africaine relationaliste par le biais d'exemples qui por- tent sur le soi et l'eau ; nuancer la caractérisation africaine relationaliste de l'essence de soi et de l'eau en se servant de constructions typiquement occidentales eu égard aux propriétés intrinsèques ; enfin, présenter la défense initiale de l'approche africaine relationaliste tout en répondant aux critiques existantes et en amenant de nouvelles et positives raisons pour qu'elle soit sérieusement prise en considération. Mots-clés métaphysique	africaine,	essence,	propriétés	intrinsèques,	nature,	ontologie,	identité	personnelle,	propriétés	relationnelles,	le	soi,	eau