volume	20,	no.	16 may	2020 Grace and Alienation Vida Yao Rice University © 2020 Vida	Yao This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/020016/> I. Introduction You have come to the troubling realization that a friend of yours, whom	you	have	loved	with	affection	for	many	years,	isn't	the	person he	seemed	to	be.1	You	hadn't	taken	seriously	enough	the	gossip	about his	obnoxious	and	cruel	behavior.	You	never	doubted	his	values	when he	made	"colorful	remarks".	And	in	the	last	few	years,	you've	been	so busy and	distracted	with	work	and	family that	you	haven't	really	been paying	much	attention	to	him	at	all.	But	now	your	attention	is	focused, your	awareness	heightened,	and	your	eyes	clear.	You	see	now	that	he really	is	a	pig,	that	his	kindness	really	is	put	on,	and	that	his	charms	are merely	that		charms. He	is	not	refreshingly	flakey,	but	unreliable	and insincere.	Not	charismatic,	but	sloppy	and	arrogant.	What	you	once believed	to	be	his	good	qualities	you	now	see	as	veneer	over	a	mix	of vice	and	hollowness	underneath. Given this revelation, it would be reasonable to conclude that you'd	be	justified	in	cutting	your	friend	out	of	your	life.2	But	let's	suppose	that	even	if	you'd	be	justified	in	doing	so,	you	feel		maybe	because	you've	known	one	another	so	long	and	your lives	are	now	so interwoven,	or	maybe	because	he	is	so	isolated	and	disconnected	from his	other	friends	and	family,	or	maybe	because	you	simply	don't	want to,	given	that	you	love	him		that	this	seems	too	simple	of	an	answer. Let's suppose, too, that your friend isn't	oblivious	or totally	beyond the pale.	He recognizes in himself the	flaws you see, and sees that 1. For	clarity	and	consistency	with	an	example	I	will	discuss	in	more	detail	below,	I	will	use	the	male	pronoun	for	the	beloved	and	the	female	pronoun	for the	lover. 2. One	might	conclude	that	you	must, in	some	way,	stop	loving	your	friend	because	one	might	think	it	simply	impossible,	conceptually	or	psychologically, to	knowingly	love	the	vicious.	Alternatively,	one	might	think	that	there	is	a moral	obligation	or	duty	to	not love	the	vicious.	This	second	claim	is	often presented	as	an	intuition	about	what	morality	demands,	but	has	also	been defended	by, for	example,	Julia	Driver.	Driver,	"Love	and	Duty",	Philosophic Exchange, 44:1	(2014).	Bernard	Williams	criticizes	a	similar	view	advanced	by David	A.	J.	Richards	in	Williams,	"Persons,	Character,	and	Morality"	in	Moral Luck (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1981).	Richards'	view	is	presented	in	A Theory of Reasons for Action	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	1971). Also,	consider	Aristotle's	view	of	friendship,	according	to	which	the	highest form	of	philia is	strictly	reserved	for	the	virtuous. vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 2 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) in	light	of	the	ideal	of	attentive	love,	you	look	again at	your	friend to make	sure	your	judgment	isn't	simply	mistaken.	Maybe	you've	been in	a	bad	and	unforgiving	mood	given	what's	been	happening	at	work or	on	the	news.	Or	maybe,	following	Murdoch	here,	a	fundamentally egoistic concern of yours (perhaps, for example, you are really just worried	about	your	own	moral	reputation)	is	preventing	you	from	seeing	your	friend	as	the	decent	person	he	really	is.	As	Murdoch	reminds us, you need not only strive to see your friend accurately, but also, justly.	But	suppose that	your	new	view	of	him	is	not	best	explained by	moral-epistemological	imperfections	on	your	part.5	The	more	you observe	your friend	now	and	the	more	your	moral	consciousness is raised,	the	more	certain	you	are	that	you	were	badly	mistaken	before seeing	him	in	this	new	light.	And	again,	complicating	matters,	though you've	attended	to	your	friend	out of love for	him,	your	friend,	aware that	his	mask	has	slipped	and	your	perception	has	honed,	shrinks	from your	gaze,	exacerbating	the	estrangement	you	might	have	hoped	your love	could	overcome. At	this	point,	one	might	propose	a	way	of	loving	your	friend	that	is less	attentive.	As	philosophers	have	discussed,	there	are	other	forms	of love	that	do	not	place	so	much	importance	on	attending to	your	loved ones,	but	instead,	on	sharing	in	their	ends	or	being	committed	to	their wellbeing.6	Consider,	also,	that	many	good	friendships	are	constituted Philosophy, Film and Fiction, Susan	Wolf and	Christopher	Grau (eds.) (New York:	Oxford	University	Press,	2014). 5. Thus,	the	case	I	am	interested	in	is	an	inverse	of	Murdoch's	famous	case	of	M who	(arguably	because	of	her	snobbishness,	classism,	and	not-disinterested hopes	for	how	her	son's	life	should	go)	cannot	initially	see	or	appreciate	her daughter-in-law,	D, for	who	she	really is.	Murdoch's	meta-ethical	positions are	more complex than I can address here, but importantly,	my argument should	not	necessarily	be	understood	as	a	challenge to	Murdoch,	but	rather, as	a	development	of	the	conception	of	love	as	attention.	Thank	you	to	Bridget Clarke	for	pressing	me	on	this	point. 6. See	Kyla	Ebels-Duggan,	"Against	Beneficence:	A	Normative	Account	of	Love", Ethics 119:1 (2008).	There, she considers	Harry	Frankfurt's view	as	paradigmatically	representative	of	what	she	calls the	"benefactor	view",	which	proposes	that	love	is	essentially	about	desiring	the	beloved's	wellbeing	for	his own	sake. they	are	flaws.	But	though	this	gives	you	some	reason	to	resist	writing him	off	entirely,	it	also	complicates	your	continued	relationship.	You now	realize	that	his	self-awareness	is	accompanied	by	bouts	of	shame, which	in	turn	(you	now	realize)	explain	his	caginess,	artificiality,	and withdrawal	from	those	whom	he	suspects	have	seen	him	truly	 including,	now,	yourself.3 I	am	interested	in	cases	like	this,	where	one	loves	someone	of	vicious	character	and	flawed	personality,	where	the	beloved	is	ashamedly	aware	of	the	qualities	that	both	drive	others	away	and	drive	him away	from	others,	and	where	there	may	be	very	little	he	could	realistically	do	to	change the	qualities	that	may	both	challenge	one's	love	of him	and spur	his feelings	of shame.	What is interesting	about such cases	is	that	though	they	seem	to	simply	yield	a	hostile	environment for human connection, love can still	make communion or intimacy between lovers	possible.	But it isn't	obvious	how this is so,	given	a certain	understanding	of	interpersonal	love	and	given	a	certain	understanding	of	shame. Consider	two	assumptions	about	interpersonal	love	that	drive	the puzzle.	The	first is that, ideally, love	encourages	and fosters connection and communion rather than estrangement between its parties, and	second,	that	one	centrally	important	and	desirable	aspect	of	love, discussed	by	Iris	Murdoch,	is	that	it	is	attentive,	where	the	ambition	of this	directed	attention	is	to	see	the	beloved	as he truly is.4 So	imagine: 3. As	Stanley	Cavell	writes, There	are	no	lengths	to	which	we	may	not	go	in	order	to	avoid	being	revealed,	even to those	we love	and	are loved	by.	Or rather,	especially to those	we	love	and	are	loved	by:	to	other	people	it	is	easy	not	to	be	known. "The	Avoidance	of	Love"	in	Must We Mean What We Say?: A Book of Essays (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1969),	284. 4. Iris	Murdoch,	The Sovereignty of Good (New	York:	Routledge,	2001).	Murdoch's ideal	has	been	discussed	by,	among	others,	Martha	Nussbaum,	David	Velleman,	and	Susan	Wolf.	Nussbaum, "'This story isn't true':	Madness,	Reason, and	Recantation	in	the Phaedrus"	in	The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2001). Velleman,	"Love	as	a	moral	emotion",	Ethics,	109:2	(1999).	Wolf,	"Loving	Attention:	Lessons in	Love from	The Philadelphia Story" in	Understanding Love: vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 3 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) an	affectionate	love	that	is	sensitive	and	responsive	to	qualities	of	the beloved,	where	the	qualities	it	responds	to	are	not	exhausted	by	good ones,	but	include	the	qualities of human nature. II. Shame, Vision, and Alienation Let	me	begin	by	describing	the	problem	in	more	detail,	which	I	will refer	to	as	the problem of alienation.	Importantly,	this	problem	is	distinct from	another	that	has	drawn	most,	if	not	all,	contemporary	philosophical	discussions	of	love:	the	question	of	the	justifiability or	rationality of loving	another	human	being,	either in contrast to	others (imagined to	be	just	as	lovable)	or	given	the	impartial	demands	of	morality.	This narrowing	of	our	focus	has	been,	I	think,	a	profound	mistake.	My	discussion	will	be instead	on	the	ability	of interpersonal love	to	satisfy what	we	might	think	of	as	one	of	its	internal	ideals,	or	proper	ends:	to foster	connection,	communion,	or	intimacy	between	its	parties.11 possible	for	this	concept	to	be	extricated	from	its	theological	background	and still	found	to	have	value	in	non-theological	ethics?	I	propose	that	we	try.	Consider	a	methodological	observation in	Annette	Baier's	pivotal	work	on the value	of	trust: Just	as the	only trust	Hobbist	man	shows is trust in	promises,	provided there	is	assurance	of	punishment	for	promise	breakers,	so	is	this	the	only sort	of	trust	nontheological	modern	moral	philosophers	have	given	much attention	at	all	to,	as	if	once	we	have	weaned	ourselves	from	the	degenerate	form	of	absolute	and	unreciprocated	trust	in	God,	all	our	capacity	for trust	is	to	be	channeled	into	the	equally	degenerate	form	of	formal	voluntary	and	reciprocated	trust	restricted	to	equals.	But	we	collectively	cannot bring	off	such	a	limitation	of	trust	to	minimal	and	secured	trust,	and	we can	deceive	ourselves	that	we	do	only	if	we	avert	our	philosophical	gaze from	the	ordinary	forms	of	trust	I	have	been	pointing	to.	"Trust	and	AntiTrust",	Ethics	96:2	(1986),	252. In this spirit, I	offer	a	nontheological conception	of	grace	or	gracious love, the need for	which remains even if	God is dead.	Once	we have "weaned ourselves"	from	His	grace	(for	worse	or	for	better),	it	would	be	a	mistake	to avert	our	philosophical	gaze	from	our	need	for	it,	as	well	as	from	the	ordinary forms	of	grace	I	will	point	to	here,	that	sometimes		miraculously,	albeit	in a	non-supernatural	sense		human	beings	feel	and	express	toward	one	another	in	thoroughly	human	circumstances. 11. While "intimacy" is ambiguous, I shall focus on connection and communion, rather than	on fusion and	procreation; thus, there is a respect in	which the by	simply	passing	time	together	given	a	shared	hobby.7	And	if	you	are worried	that	given	your	discovery,	you	would	no	longer	have	a	reason to	love	your	friend,	other	views	of	love	could	either	dispel	your	worries	by	pointing	out	just	how	blind	love	can	be,8	or	justify	your	continued	love	in	some	other	way,	perhaps	by	making	reference	to	the	long history	you've	shared.9 But I shall	argue that	attentive love, though	seeming to	give rise to	the	puzzle,	is	the	way	out	of	it	as	well.	Although	it	may	appear	as though less attentive forms could re-establish connection between lovers in such cases, I	will argue that they cannot precisely	because they	are insufficiently	attentive,	and	because	of	what it is like to	be ashamed	of	who	you	are.	Rather	than	give	up	on	the	ideal	of	attentive love	in	light	of	this	problem,	I	argue	instead	that	we	should	reconsider what it is	that	we	love	about the	people	we	attend	to	in	a	loving	way. We	should	not,	I	propose,	limit	what	we	see	and	love	in	others	to	either	just	the	good qualities	of	their	characters	or	personalities,	or	to an	isolatable	or	abstract	value	that	they	possess	simply	in	virtue	of	being	fellow	human	beings	or	ends-in-themselves.	I	shall	articulate	and argue	for	a	secular,	or interpersonal,	conception	of	grace:	a love	that is	not	blind,	but	is	also,	as	Robert	Adams	has	put	it,	non-proportional to	the	excellence	of	its	objects.10	On	the	proposal	I	will	offer,	grace	is 7. Aristotle's taxonomy	of friendships	might allow for you to continue being friends	in	this	case,	as	long	as	it	was	not	a	"character"	friendship,	leaving	only the possibility of either a relatively shallow friendship of pleasure or relatively	depressing	friendship	of	utility. 8. The	Irrationalist	position	that	we	do	not	love	for	reasons	at	all	has	been	most recently	and	prominently	defended	by	Harry	Frankfurt in	Necessity, Volition, and Love	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1999)	and	The Reasons of Love (Princeton:	Princeton	University	Press,	2004). 9. Niko	Kolodny,	"Love	as	Valuing	a	Relationship",	The Philosophical Review,	112:2 (2003). 10. Robert	Merrihew	Adams,	Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics	(Oxford:	Oxford	University Press, 1999). There is nearly no	work on grace in contemporary	analytic	moral	philosophy,	with	Adams	and	Glen	Pettigrove as rare	exceptions.	Pettigrove,	Forgiveness and Love (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2012).	The	fact	that	I	propose	a	secular	or	interpersonal conception of	grace	gives	rise	to	an	important	worry.	One	ought	to	wonder:	is	it	really vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 4 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) shame.	For	example, it	explains	why	one	does	not	feel	shame	when viewed	negatively	by	others	whose	views	one	does	not	recognize	as authoritative	at	all,	as	well	as	why	one	can	be	ashamed	in	light	of	standards	that	one	does	not	fully	share,	for	example,	by	one's	appearance or	bad	manners,	even	if	one	does	not	actually	endorse	the	standards of appearance or	manners at play. The real social expectations embodied	by	the	other	who	sees	you	may	not	be	wholly	identical	to	your own,	but	you	must	identify	with	them	enough	to	not	be	fully	outside their	authority,	as	one	might	feel	when	a	tourist	in	foreign	lands. And because	shame	is	prompted	by	being	seen or	viewed by	this	other	(real or imagined), it gives rise to its characteristic feelings, expressions, and	behavior:	for	example,	of	not	being	able	to	look	others	in	the	eye, covering	one's	face,	wanting	to	hide,	to	sink	through	the	floor,	or	as Bernard	Williams	puts	it,	to simply disappear.	In	a	wave	of	shame,	one's whole	self	can	feel	diminished,	because	of	the	feeling	that	"the	other sees	all	of	me	and	all	through	me".14	And	because	the	imagined	other can	be	fully internalized,	these	urges	to	hide	typically	fail to	resolve themselves,	since	one	will	be	trying	to	escape	from	one's	own	gaze	 hence	for	the	tendency	of	shame	to	lead	to	self-destructive	impulses.	I will	focus	here	primarily	on	the	significance	of	shame	in	interpersonal relationships	with	actual	others:	on	how	it	alienates	or	estranges	one from	those	whose	seemingly	diminishing,	penetrating,	and	authoritative	gaze	one	strives	to	escape. Guilt,	too,	can	lead	to	interpersonal	alienation	and	estrangement.15 Through	one's	action,	one	has	violated	the	terms	of	a	relationship	with 14. Shame and Necessity (Berkeley	and	Los	Angeles:	University	of	California	Press, 2008),	89. 15. As	T.	M.	Scanlon	writes, "...	the	pain	of	guilt involves,	at	base,	a feeling	of estrangement,	of	having	violated	the	requirements	of	a	valuable	relation	with others".	What We Owe To Each Other (Cambridge,	MA:	Harvard University Press,	2000),	162.	While	I	agree	with	Scanlon	about	the	feeling	of	estrangement,	it's	not	clear	that	I	must	believe	I've	damaged a	relationship	in	order	to feel	guilty.	I	can	feel	guilty	for	just	directly	wronging	you	(even	if	no	relationship	is	in	place),	and	I	can	feel	guilty	even	if	I	don't	suspect	I've	damaged	our existing	relationship.	Thank	you	to	Samuel	Reis-Dennis	for	discussion	of	this point. The	problem	of	alienation	is	best illustrated	by	a	familiar	kind	of situation	one	can	find	oneself	in	either	as	the	lover	or	the	beloved.	As described	above,	the	more	extreme	versions	are	situations	where	one loves	someone	of	vicious	character	and	flawed	personality,	where	the beloved	is	ashamedly	aware	of	these	qualities,	and	where	there	may be	very	little	he	could	realistically	do	to	change who	he	is.	Thus,	the beloved	is	alienated	from	others,	including	his	intimates,	not	just	because	he	lacks	the	qualities	that	may	make	loving	him	easy	and	clearly warranted,	but	because	of	the	characteristic	feelings	and	motivations that	come	with	the	experience	of	shame.	While	it	may	be	most	vivid and	philosophically	challenging	to	think	of	cases	where	the	beloved	is especially	or	seemingly	thoroughly	vicious	or	his	shame	especially	cutting,	the	problem	can	arise	in	less	extreme	circumstances,	simply	between	any	two	lovers,	even	relatively	decent	ones	and	well-disposed ones	who	nonetheless	have	flaws	about	which	they	are	ashamed.12 Above,	I	noted	two	assumptions	about	interpersonal	love	that	motivate the problem: ideally, that it is both attentive and fosters connection	or	communion.	But	the	logic	of	shame	shapes	and	drives	the problem	as	well.13	Roughly,	shame	is	the	painful	experience	of	being viewed	in	"the	wrong	way"	by	a	real	or	imagined	(internalized)	other, where	this	other is	(i)	a	person	whose	view	the	agent	recognizes	as partly authoritative, (ii) an	embodiment	of a real social expectation, and	(iii)	a	person	with	whom	the	ashamed	person	can	partly	identify. This complex structure	mirrors the complexity of the experience of ideal	I	am	discussing	is	of	philia and	not	eros.	I	will	not	primarily	use	examples of	erotic	lovers,	or	the	love	that	parents	have	for	their	children	to	illustrate my	arguments,	but	rather,	on	friends	and	siblings.	Of	course,	we	sometimes aspire	to	have	philia	with	our	erotic	lovers,	our	parents,	and	our	children,	so the	lines	cannot	be	drawn	sharply	here.	Thank	you	to	John	F.	Bowin	for	discussion	of	this	point. 12. Thank	you	to	Ryan	Preston-Roedder	for	this	observation. 13. This	rough	sketch	is	all	I	need	for	my	purposes	here;	I	am	relying	on	the	detailed	work	of	Sartre,	Gabrielle	Taylor,	Bernard	Williams,	John	Deigh,	Herbert Morris,	Jeffrie	Murphy,	and	Sandra	Lee	Bartky,	especially	her	essay,	"Shame and	Gender"	in	Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (New	York:	Routledge,	1990). vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 5 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) or	look	away.	This is	why	when	one	is	ashamed,	one	might	not	feel punished, but	rather	exiled.	And	third,	the	aspect	of	shame	that	explains these two features is that shame is felt in regards to	who I am, and not	what I've done.	As	John	Deigh	writes,	"shame	is	felt	over	shortcomings,	guilt	over	wrongdoings".18	While	I	can	of	course	be	ashamed	because	of	an	action	I've	performed		given	that it	reveals	something shameful	about	me	or	because	it	is	part	of	a	larger	pattern	that	reveals something shameful about	me	 often there is	no	particular	wrong I	could	apologize	or	compensate for that	would	alleviate	my	shame, and	moreover,	often	what	I	am	ashamed	about	has	nothing	to	do	with what	I	owe	to	others.	Thus,	it	is	either	not	enough,	or	would	involve	a category	mistake,	for	me	to	apologize	or	compensate	others	in	order to	overcome	my	shame	and	re-establish	relations	with	them.	Rather,	I need	to change who I am.	As	Herbert	Morris	writes,	while	guilt	leads	to restoration,	shame	leads	to	creativity.19 But	what	happens	in	the	non-ideal	case,	when	creativity	is	not	a	realistic	option	for	the	ashamed	person?	Return	now	to	the	case	I	started with, in	which the beloved, though aware of his failings, cannot or will	not	change	in	the	relevant	way.	Perhaps	he	cannot	because	the	appropriate	task	he	must	accomplish	here	is	the	difficult	one	of	substantive moral improvement,	which	is	challenging	for	all	kinds	of	mundane reasons.	If	a	change	of	character	necessitates	something	like	habituation	and	reflection,	one	actually	needs	the	time,	energy,	and	resources to	do	both.	Bad	habits	are	difficult	to	quit,	we	are	too	susceptible	to mixed	motives	and	many	different	forms	of	akrasia, and	it	is	a	common phenomenon, as	Murdoch	warns, that	many	who actively strive to become	better	people	may	find	themselves	caught	in	a	self-absorbed spiral.20 18. Deigh,	"Shame	and	Self-Esteem:	A	Critique",	Ethics,	93:2	(1983),	225. 19. Morris,	62. 20.	"The	self	is	such	a	dazzling	object	that	if	one	looks	there one	may	see	nothing	else",	The Sovereignty of Good,	30.	For	discussion	of	this	observation,	see Samantha	Vice,	"The	Ethics	of	Self-Concern"	in	Iris Murdoch: A Reassessment, Anne	Rowe	(ed.)	(New	York:	Palgrave	Macmillan,	2007). another; guilt is the	pained recognition	of	what one	has done, and perhaps	of the	damage	one	has	done to	one's relationship	with the wronged person. But as	many have noted, guilt has its advantages when	it	comes	to	overcoming	this	estrangement.16	When	one	wrongs another	and	feels	guilt	in	response,	one	is	characteristically	motivated to	make	amends		when	I	feel	guilty	because	of	something	I've	done to	you,	I	want	to	look	you	in	the	eye,	apologize,	compensate,	and	reestablish	relations	with	you.	I	hope	for	your	forgiveness,	and	if	I	am fortunate,	you	may	give	it	to	me.	I	may	want	to	kneel	before	you,	not hide from	you.	And	importantly,	your	resentment	or	indignation	in	response	to	my	wrongdoing	may	motivate	you	to	come	to	me,	to	demand something	from	me	for	what	I	have	done,	thus	facilitating	reconciliation	in	a	way	that	simply	avoiding	me	or	feeling	contempt	or	pity	for me	would	not.17 Shame, however, is more complicated, and the route from the circumstances that prompt it to re-established relations with those it	estranges	one	from	is	less	clear	for	three	reasons.	First,	when	I	am ashamed,	the	people	whom	I	will	feel	estranged	from	will	not	be	limited	to	those	I	have	affected.	If	one	is	disposed	to	be	ashamed	of	one's appearance,	any stranger's	gaze	might	prompt	an	episode	of shame; if	one	is	disposed	to	be	ashamed	of	something	less	visible	than	one's appearance	(one's	social	class,	perhaps,	or	one's lack	of	acumen, for example),	any	stranger's	imagined discernment	of	this	fact could	do	so. Second,	while	guilt	is	productively	paired	with	the	resentment	or	indignation of the people	my	wrongdoing estranges	me from, shame is	not	obviously	paired	in	this	way.	When	one	is	ashamed	in	front	of an	actual	other,	the	other	may	simply	feel	contempt,	pity,	or	vicarious embarrassment		emotions	that	do	not	characteristically	prompt	her to engage	with the person	who is ashamed, but rather, to	withdraw 16. Herbert	Morris, "Shame and	Guilt" in	On Guilt and Innocence:	Essays in Legal Philosophy and Moral Psychology	(Berkeley:	University	of	California	Press, 1976). 17. For	discussion	of	this	point	about	angry	blame,	see	Samuel	Reis-Dennis,	"Anger:	Scary	Good",	Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 97:3	(2019). vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 6 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) a	good	heart-to-heart.	Should	a	cool-headed	conversation	fail	to	move him, you could rely	on	blame's	prolepsis, insisting, perhaps	even	angrily, that	he	get	himself	and	his	life	in	order.22	But	again,	suppose	the situation	is	not	amenable	to	your	hopes.	On	better	days,	your	friend	is convinced	he	should	reform	himself,	but	finds	that	though	he	tries,	he keeps	returning	to	his	usual	haunts;	on	worse	days,	he	becomes	embittered	and	resentful	that	you	are	treating	him	in	this	way	because	he	is certain	he	either	can't	or	won't	change		your	sanctimonious	harping cannot	now	make	the	difference. So	you	might	consider	another	response:	compassion.	You	could	see him,	after	all,	as	having	gotten	to	where	he	is	because	of	events	from his	past	that	he	is	not	responsible	for.	You	could	see	him	now	presently subject to forces	and	motives that	make	him	a	victim	of	his circumstance,	brain	chemistry,	or	even	of	himself.	Seeing	a	person	in	these ways	can	often	mitigate the reactive	attitude	of resentment,	fill	one's heart	with	pity	and	sorrow	instead,	and	move	one	to	sincerely	want	to simply	help	the	poor	thing.	But	notice	how	risky	an	attitude	like	compassion	is	in	this	kind	of	situation.	Even	sincere	pity	for	the	suffering	of a	well-disposed	person	can	threaten	his	dignity;	and	in	the	cases	I	have focused	on,	the	operations	of	shame	will	make	sense	of	why	the	less well-disposed	person, in an effort of self-protection,	might not take well	at	all	to	your	compassion		it	may	only	be	an	insult.23 In contrast to tough love and compassion, the answer I shall explore	is	attentive love. According	to	Murdoch,	the	task	of	really	seeing 22. Bernard	Williams,	"Internal	Reasons	and	the	Obscurity	of	Blame"	in	Making Sense of Humanity: And Other Philosophical Papers (Cambridge: Cambridge University	Press,	1995). 23. For	an	argument	that	well-intentioned	and	effective	beneficence	can	be	disrespectful	and	offensive,	with	a	focus	on	cases	of	the	disabled,	see	Adam	Cureton,	"Offensive	Beneficence",	Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 2:1 (2016).	Part of the explanation is that to view	a	person compassionately involves,	at	least	on	standard	conceptions,	seeing	him	as	a	patient	rather	than an agent. Unmoderated compassion is commonly mistaken for complete moral	vision,	even	(perhaps	especially)	for	the	most	well-intentioned.	For	a recent	film	that	succeeds	in	cultivating	a	sincere	form	of	compassion	at	a	severe	cost	to	seeing	the	object	of	compassion	as	a	full	human	agent,	see	Roma. But another difficulty is that the ashamed person	may be partly unwilling to	change in the	appropriate	way,	even though	he	can	see the	reasons	for	doing	so.	One	problem	with	emerging	from	a	shameful	state	is	not	just	that	it	is	difficult	to	become	a	better	person	given the	assumption	that	one	is	wholeheartedly	invested	in	doing	so;	it	is also	that	in	many	cases,	because	one's	character	and	outlook	is partly constituted	by	vices	(the	very	ones	one	may	be	ashamed	of),	one	may be	inclined	to	resist the	authority	of	the	moral	view	from	which	one	is being	seen.	Yes,	it	may	be	true	that	I	am	riddled	with	envy,	arrogance and	malice	-	but	given	that I just	am this	envious,	arrogant	and	malicious	person, I	may feel	ashamed	while	also challenging the	moral gaze	which	issues	this	assessment,	and	which	I	am	ashamed	in	light of.21 In	wanting	to	disappear	from	the	view	of	others, then, I	am	not simply	trying	to	avoid	the	pain	of	being	seen	by	them	-	I	may	also,	in	a last-ditch	effort	at	self-respect	and	defiance,	be	trying	to	protect myself. III. Love and Attentive Affection Let	me	now	restate	the	puzzle	I	started	with,	incorporating	the	complexities	of	shame.	How	are	we	to	respond	to	the	ashamed	beloved	 not	just	so	that	he	has,	for	example,	his	wellbeing	attended	to,	or	his ends	respected	and	shared		but	so	that	he	feels	a	connection	or	communion	with	those	whom	he	loves	and	who	love	him,	rather	than	the alienation and estrangement exacerbated by his shame?	What reactions	are	available	to	those	who	see	him	as	he	is? One	answer is tough love.	That is,	you	could	rely	on	the	attitudes that	are	typically	paired	with	wrongdoing,	but	which	can	also	be	intelligible	responses	to	someone	(usually	only	our	intimates)	in	an	effort to	get	him	to	become	a	better	person.	You	could	sit	him	down	and	have 21. Consider	how	in	The Symposium, Alcibiades,	wracked	with	shame	and	desire, both loves	and	hates	Socrates for revealing to	him	the	possibility	of	virtue, and	for	reminding	him	that	he	cannot	achieve	it	without	becoming	someone else	entirely.	The	tension	arises	because	morality	and	virtue	civilize	and	constrain	our	baser	natures,	but	also	because	certain	moral	systems	can	threaten the	status	of things that	are	good	and	which	constitute the	good aspects	of who	we	are.	Susan	Wolf,	"Moral	Saints",	Journal of Philosophy,	79:8	(1982). vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 7 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) cheer	up".27	Stocker	characterizes	this	as	a	problem	of	the	"indirection" of	Smith's	motives:	he	doesn't	actually	care	about	you "directly",	but rather,	cares	about	doing	his	duty	given	that	you	are a fellow x, or	the neediest	x around.28 But	a	different	concern	arises	once	we	take	into	consideration	that there	are,	after	all,	duties	that	can	obligate	one	directly	to	a	particular person.	Consider	a	variation	of	Stocker's	hospital	case.	An	old	friend of	yours,	Zahra,	is	not	visiting	you	because	you	are	a	fellow	whatever. She	is	visiting	you	because	it's you, her	old	friend.	She	would	not,	outside	of	a	philanthropic	venture,	visit	some	other	x	in	the	hospital.	She is	here to	see	you in	particular. But importantly, imagine that	she is nonetheless	motivated	by	her	sense	of	duty. Consider	that	you	and	Zahra	were	once	thick	as	thieves,	but	she has	been	consistently	irritated	with	and	bored	by	you	for	months,	or even	years	now		not	because	of	any	particular	thing	you've	done,	but just	because	she	has	come	to	grow	tired	of	your	neurotic	fussiness	or alternatively,	your	filthy	sloppiness,	or	your	elaborate	love	of	bespoke cufflinks	or	nerdy	memorabilia,	or	your	endless	griping	about	"breeders". Importantly,	Zahra	doesn't	hate you.	She	genuinely	wishes	you 27. Stocker,	462,	my	emphasis. 28.	More recent	Kantian projects attempt to resist this objection; for example, Steven	Darwall's	"second-person	standpoint"	is	an	attempt	to	conceptualize respect	as	essentially	directed	toward	and	responsive	to	an	individual,	partly in	response	to	Murdoch's	complaint	that	this	is	what	Kant,	by	having	us	concerned	with	the	moral	law	without,	cannot	capture.	However,	Darwall's	conception	of	Strawson's	"participant	stance"	that	one	takes	on	when	engaging from	the	second-person	standpoint	wholly	moralized	is	most	fundamentally about	making	and	responding	to	certain	kinds	of	claims	on	one	another.	He only	briefly	mentions	the	role	of	love	in	engaging	with	an	individual	from	the participant	stance.	More	recently,	Melissa	Merritt	has	argued	that	Kant	takes our	obligations	to	be	grounded	in	and	directed	to	particular	individuals,	and not	simply	to	"the	human	being	as	such".	Nonetheless,	I	will	argue	below	that even	if	Kantians	and	Kant	can	respond	to	Stocker's	objection	as	he	originally presented	it,	my	variant	of	the	problem	of	alienation	still	has	teeth.	Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint:	Morality, Respect, and Accountability	(Cambridge, MA:	Harvard	University	Press,	2006).	Merritt,	"Love,	Respect,	and	Individuals:	Murdoch	as	a	Guide	to	Kantian	Ethics",	European Journal of Philosophy,	25:4 (2017). another	person	accurately	and	justly	is	a	moral	achievement	as	it	takes seeing	past	our	"fat,	relentless"	egos	in	order	to	recognize another	person	as	part	of	a	reality	that	exists	beyond	ourselves.	It	is	to	resist	seeing him	tainted	and	shaped	by	our fears,	needs,	and	(typically	narcissistic)	fantasies.	I	agree	with	Murdoch.	But	it	is	important	not	to	forget that	attentive	love	is	not	just	an	ideal	because	it	involves	a	moral	and epistemological	improvement	in	the	lover,	but	because	it	provides	the beloved	with	the	sense	that	he		who	he	really	or	most	fully	or	deeply is 	is	the	object	of	another's	loving	attention.24	He	can	let	down	his guard,	and	let	another	in.25 To illustrate the	difference that loving	attention to	and	of the	beloved's	self	or	soul	can	make	to	him, let's	revisit	Michael	Stocker's	famous	example	of	Smith,	dutifully	visiting	you	while	you	are "bored and	restless	and	at	loose	ends"	in	hospital.26	In	Stocker's	example,	our concern	about	the	quality	of	Smith's	attitudes	toward	you	arises	when we	learn	that	he	has	come	to	see	you	not	because	he	was	motivated to	do	so	"directly",	but	"...	because	he	thought	it	his	duty,	perhaps	as a	fellow	Christian	or	Communist	or	whatever,	or	simply	because	he knows	of	no	one	more in	need	of	cheering	up	and	no	one	easier to 24.	As	Nussbaum	characterizes	this	ideal	in	her	reading	of	the	Phaedrus,	it	is	love of	the	beloved's	character	"through	and	through"	(218).	That	one's	whole self is	the	object	of	love	is	why,	as	Susan	Wolf	writes,	love	can	boost	one's	selfesteem.	For	a	discussion	of	a	related	feature	of	love,	how	it	functions	as	a	bestowal	of	status,	see	Sandra	Lee	Bartky,	"Feeding	Egos	and	Tending	Wounds: Deference	and	Disaffection	in	Women's	Emotional	Labor"	in	Femininity and Domination. 25. "I don't	want to change you/ I don't	want to change you/ I don't	want to change	your	mind/	I	just	came	across	a	manger/	Where	there	is	no	the	danger/	Where love	has	eyes	and is	not	blind".	Damien	Rice, "I	don't	want to change	you"	in	My Favourite Faded Fantasy (2014). 26.	Michael	Stocker,	"The	Schizophrenia	of	Modern	Ethical	Theories",	Journal of Philosophy	73:14	(1976),	462.	Stocker	did	not	refer	to	the	problem	he	describes as	one	of	"alienation",	though	both	Peter	Railton	and	Adrian	Piper	do.	Railton, "Alienation,	Consequentialism,	and	the	Demands	of	Morality",	Philosophy and Public Affairs: 13:2	(1984).	Piper,	"Moral	Theory	and	Moral	Alienation",	Journal of Philosophy, 84:2	(1987). vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 8 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) sake, can be done without affection, without enthusiasm	 sometimes	without love at all.31 What	is	unfortunate	for	you	about	a	dutiful	friend's	visit	is	not	that her	love	is	lacking in	moral	quality,	but	just	that	your	friend	finds	you burdensome because	she	no	longer	has	affection	for	your	character	or personality.	Though	she	sincerely	hopes	for	your	speedy	recovery	for your	sake,	she	is	not	interested in	you.	To	put	this	plainly:	she	doesn't like	you.	This	is	glum,	and	you	may	justifiably	feel		even	as	she	sits by	your	side	and	tells	you	a	story	about	her	day	to	keep	your	thoughts occupied		estranged	from	her,	though	you	may	also	have	no	moral complaint	nor	doubts	about	the	fact	that	she	loves	you.32 Thus,	it	matters	that	we	are	not	just	loved,	but	appreciated	or	liked for	who	we	are.	However,	it	is	still	not	clear	that	attentive	love,	now understood	as	partly	a	matter	of	having	affection	for	the	beloved's	character,	will	alleviate	the	beloved's	feelings	of	alienation	in	the	kind	of case I started	with,	where	we can imagine that precisely	what is at 31. "To	be committed to	meeting children's	demand for	preservation	does	not require	enthusiasm	or	even love; it simply	means to see	vulnerability and to	respond	to it	with	care	than	abuse, indifference,	or	flight".	Sara	Ruddick, Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace	(Boston:	Beacon	Press,	2002),	19. This	point,	I	think,	is	exactly	right	and	can	clearly	be	extended	beyond	the vulnerabilities	of	children. 32. Though	I	have	other	objections	to	his	account	of	love,	I	agree	with	Frankfurt's observation	that ...	lovers	often	enjoy	the	company	of	their	beloveds,	cherish	various	types of	intimate	connection	with	them,	and	yearn	for	reciprocity.	These enthusiasms are not essential.	Nor is it essential that a person like what he loves.	He	may even	find	it	distasteful."	The Reasons of Love, 43,	my	emphasis. Nonetheless,	this	may	lead	to	some	justified	saltiness	on	the	part	of	the	beloved.	Consider	an	example	from	the	recent	film	Lady Bird.	In	response	to	her mother's	retort	that	a	pink	and	frilly	dress	which	Lady	Bird	takes	to	exemplify her	personality	is	too pink,	Lady	Bird	(Saoirse	Ronan)	laments,	"I	just	wish... I	wish	that	you	liked	me."	Her	mother	(Laurie	Metcalf)	replies,	"Of	course	I love	you."	"But	do	you	like	me?"	Her	mother	replies,	"I	want	you	to	be	the	very best	version	of	yourself	that	you	can	be."	"What if this is the best version?"	(It	is no	accident	that	writer-director	Greta	Gerwig	was	influenced	by	Simone	Weil, whose	proposal	that	love is attention	is	developed	by	Murdoch	and	given	voice to	by	Sister	Sarah	Joan	(Lois	Smith).) well,	wants	to	alleviate	your	boredom	and	loneliness,	and	hopes	you will	recover	and	get	back	to	your	life	soon,	all	for	your	sake.	She	does, in	a	real	sense,	love	you.	But	she	has	found	that	she	finds	you	tedious or impossible	to	spend	time	with;	she is	not	curious	about	your life, has	little	desire	to	stay	in	touch,	and	absolutely	no	desire	to	spend	a lazy	day	chatting	and	lounging	around	the	house,	as	once	you	loved to	do.	But	when	she	hears	that	you	are	in	hospital,	she	unhesitatingly recognizes that, after	all, she	owes it to	you to	pay	you	a	visit.	And seeing	you lying there	all sick	and	pale	and	at loose	ends,	she feels genuinely	sorry	for	you. In	this	case,	the	obligation	that	Zahra	is	and	feels	bound	by,	is	an obligation	to	you.	She	does	in	some	sense	care	about	you	in	particular. And	by visiting you, she is fulfilling	her obligation to you.	But	why might	you	still	find	Zahra's	attitudes	not	exactly	what	you	had	hoped for,	even	though	you	have	no	moral	grounds	to	object to	them?29	The worry	in	this	case	cannot	be	that	you get	into	the	picture	in	only	an	indirect	manner.	Rather,	it	is	that	even	though	you	may	want	your	friend to	visit	you	because	it's	you, you	might	also	not	want	your	friend	to visit	you	mainly	or	solely	because	she	is	obligated	to	do	so,	or	even	if she	desires	your	wellbeing	for	your	sake		even	when	you	are	the	particular	person	she	is	obligated	to,	or	the	particular	person	whose	wellbeing	she	cares	about.	As	Stocker	notes	elsewhere,	there	is	a	familiar and	crucial role that	duty	and	obligation	play in	close interpersonal relationships:	as	being	relied	upon	precisely	when	our	feelings	of	affection	are	"worn	thin".30	And	we	should	not forget,	also, that	much of	caring	about	the	wellbeing	of	another,	sincerely	and	for	their	own 29.	Angela Smith argues that included among the many things we owe our friends	are	certain	attitudes;	however,	she	emphasizes	attitudes	of	care	and concern,	respect,	taking	pleasure	in	their	accomplishments,	and	feeling	sadness	in	their	losses.	We	can	imagine	that	Zahra	feels	all	these	things	toward you.	She just	doesn't like you.	Smith, "Guilty	Thoughts" in	Morality and the Emotions,	Carla	Bagnoli	(ed.)	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011). 30.	Stocker,	465,	fn.	9. vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 9 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) One	way	of	understanding	the	challenge	Glory	faces	is	that	it	arises given	certain	assumptions	about	what	traits	of	character	or	personality love	can	be	an	appropriate	response	to.	Consider,	for	example,	Kate Abramson	and	Adam	Leite's	conception	of	love.33	In	elaborating	on	Peter	Strawson's	suggestion	that	there	is	a	particular	kind	of	reactive	love that,	in	his	words,	is	"the	sort	of	love	which	two	adults	can	sometimes be	said	to	feel	reciprocally,	for	each	other",34	they propose	a	love	that	is "an	affectionate	attachment	appropriately	felt	as	a	non-self-interested response	to	particular	kinds	of	...	features	of	character	expressed	by the	loved	one	...."35	So	far,	so	good. The	problem	emerges	once	we	see that the features	of character that	Abramson	and	Leite	believe	love	is	an	appropriate	affectionate	response	to	must	be	"morally	laudable	ones".	Putting	aside	a	more	general	objection	one	could	raise	to	this	idea,	when	it	comes	to	the	problem	of	alienation,	it	is	exactly	this	kind	of	love	that	the	beloved	will	be wary	of.	Jack	cannot	trust	it,	as	at	this	point	in	his	life,	he	(reasonably) believes	that	he	cannot	satisfy	the	conditions	that	it	sets,	nor	is	it	even clear	to	him		given	who	he	actually	and	presently	is		that	he	would want to	meet its	conditions	if	he	could.36	And	so,	Glory's	problem	is complicated	by	the	fact	that	not	only	is	Jack	lacking	in	good	qualities that	may	make	him	easier	or	more	appropriate to love	according to this	view,	he	is	also	alienated by	certain	forms	of love, including	this one.	They	have	driven	him	from	his	home. 33. "Love	as	a	Reactive	Emotion",	The Philosophical Quarterly, 61:245	(2010). 34. "Freedom	and	Resentment"	in	Freedom and Resentment and Other Essays (London:	Methuen	&	Co.	Ltd.,	1974),	9. 35. Abramson	and	Leite,	677. 36.	Consider	this	constructed	type	of	conversation	between	Jack	and	his	father, combining	memories	of	different	token	conversations:	"Jack,	can	you	tell	me why	you	have	done	whatever	you	did,	acted	however	you	did?	No,	sir.	You can't	explain it, Jack?	No,	sir.	...	You	do	understand	that	what	you	did	was wrong.	Yes,	sir,	I	understand	that.	Will	you	pray	for	a	better	conscience,	better judgment,	Jack?	No,	sir,	I	doubt	that	I	will.	Well	I'll	pray	for you	then.	Thank you,	sir." issue is the	question	of	whether	or	not the	beloved,	because	of	his character,	is	worth this	kind	of	attentive	affection,	and	where	this	question	is	for	him	live	enough	to	animate	his	shame.	Having	spelled	out shame's connection	with	vision, I can	now	state	more	explicitly the challenge	facing	the	ideal	of	attentive	love	if	it	is	to	foster	connection rather than threaten it.	What	attentive love	strives to	do	(to	see the beloved	as	he	really	is)	is	exactly	what	prompts	his	shame:	he	is	being seen	by	the	other	as	who	(he	fears)	he	really	is. Nonetheless, I	will	argue that	alternative	views	of love,	precisely because	they	are	less attentive,	only	exacerbate	this	problem,	and	that the	ideal	of	attentive	love,	when	modified	or	supplemented	by	grace, can	resolve	it.	In	section	V,	I	will	discuss	this	supplementation.	Before doing	so,	I	will	first	consider	three	otherwise	promising	views	of	love and	demonstrate	how they	each	exacerbate rather than	alleviate	estrangement	between	lovers. IV. Love, Vision, and Connection To	guide	and illustrate this	discussion, I	will	use	as	an	extended	example	Marilynne	Robinson's	novel,	Home.	In	it,	Glory	faces	a	problem that is similar to the one I started	with. As an adult, she is now finally	getting	to	know	her	older	brother,	Jack,	who	has	been	away	from home	for	twenty	years,	and	of	whom	Glory	has	only	childhood	memories.	Their	re-acquaintance	begins	tenuously	and	develops	in	fits	and starts	as	Jack	reveals	and	confesses	his	vices,	always	with	the	wariness and	expectation	that	at	some	point	his	sister	will	either	have	to	direct her	attention	elsewhere,	or	attenuate	her	affection for	him.	And	his apprehensions	are	partly	justified:	she	comes	to	see	that	he	really	is, among	other	things,	a	"drunk",	a	"thief",	and	a	"liar".	She	comes	to	learn that	he	has	no	excuse	for	fathering	and	abandoning	a	daughter,	whom Glory	comes	to	care	for	and	eventually love	before	the	child	dies	of illness.	And	importantly,	Glory	comes	to	see	the	traits	of	his	character and	personality	that	underlie	and	explain	Jack's	drunkenness,	thievery, and	lying:	he	is,	among	other	things,	partly	cowardly	and	partly	predatory,	arrogant,	and	belligerent. vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 10 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) This	marks	an important	moment in the	novel:	an	affirmation	of Glory's attitudes toward Jack.	Earlier in their re-acquaintance,	Glory had	noticed	and	remarked	that	she,	as	she	puts	it,	likes his	soul the way it is.	Given	the	sort	of	person	Jack	is,	and	the	person	Glory is,	she	was puzzled	by	this.38	Now,	explicitly	within	a	context	in	which	Jack	has again	failed	to live	up	to	values	and	standards	of	conduct	they	both recognize	the	authority	of,	and	in	response	to	another	breaking	and darkening	of	his	soul,	Glory	re-affirms	and	expresses	her	affection for his soul the way it is.	Though	Jack	tries	to	deflect	the	comment	by	suggesting	that	Glory	doesn't	really	know	what	his	soul	is	like,	she	pointedly	demonstrates	that	her	affection	toward	him	is	paired	with	a	discerning	awareness	of	his	vices	and	the	distinctive	ways	in	which	they manifest	in	his	behavior.	Rather	than	quarrel	with	or	reject	his	claim that	she	doesn't	know	him	by	citing	the	good	qualities	one	might	argue	he	nonetheless	possesses,	she	alludes	to	those	she	knows	he	finds most	shameful.	But	he	need	not	fear	that	her	love	assumes	too	much, nor	need	he	shrink	from	her	gaze.	She	likes	his	soul	the	way	it	is;	her love	is	gracious. Before	offering	one	proposal	for	how	to	understand	what	grace	or gracious	love	is,	and	before	showing	how	it	alleviates	the	problem	of alienation, I	will now consider three contemporary theories of love that	can	ground	the	appropriateness	and	rationality	of	loving	the	people	we	do,	even	when	their	souls	are	in	a	bad	state.	However,	none emphasizes the importance of attention to and affection for the beloved's	character	or	personality.	Though	these	forms	may	make	it	less puzzling	how	it	could	be	coherent, rational,	or	appropriate for	Glory	to love	Jack,	they	will	not	help	with	the	problem	of	alienation,	precisely because	of	their	lack	of	attention	to	who	the	beloved	is,	and	because of	the	operations	of	shame. 277−278. 38.	Glory is	both	a	morally	good	and	pious	person.	We	also learn that	Glory's dreams	of	a	simple	family	life	had	been	painfully	shattered	by	a	man	who,	like Jack,	took	advantage	of	a	"vulnerable	woman". Glory is	able to	meet this	challenge	better than	any	of the	other members of their family or townsfolk of Gilead who become reacquainted	with Jack	upon	his return.	Consider this scene late in the novel,	in	which	Glory	reflects	on	the	quality	of	Jack's	soul	while	helping	him	wash	up	from	a	night	of	heavy,	self-destructive	drinking: Glory	said, "You	might	rub	your	hands	with	shortening. That	would	probably	dissolve	the	grease.	..."	She	took	the can	from	the	cupboard,	scooped	out	a	spoonful,	and	put	it in	his	palm.	She	said,	"Remember	when	you	talked	to	me about	your	soul,	about	saving	it?" He shrugged. "I think you	may	be	mistaking	me for someone	else." "And	I	said	I	liked	it	the	way	it	is." "Now I	know	you're	mistaking	me for someone	else." He	did	not	look	up	from	the	massaging	of	his	hands. "I've thought about what I should have said to you then,	and	I	haven't	changed	my	mind	at	all.	...	[Y]our	soul seems	fine to	me. I	don't	know	what that	means	either. Anyway,	it's	true." He	said,	"Thanks,	chum.	But	you	don't	know	me.	Well, you	know	I'm	a	drunk." "And	a	thief." He laughed. "Yes,	a	drunk	and	a thief. I'm	also	a terrible	coward.	Which	is	one	of	the	reasons	I	lie	so	much." She	nodded.	"I've	noticed	that." "No	kidding.	What	else	have	you	noticed?" "I'm	not	going	to	mention	vulnerable	women." "Thanks,"	he	said.	"Very	generous	in	the	circumstances." She	nodded.	"I	think	so." He	said, "I	am	unaccountably	vain,	despite	all,	and I have	a	streak	of	malice	that	does	not	limit	itself	to	futile efforts	at	self-defense." "I've	noticed	that,	too."37 37.	Marilynne Robinson, Home (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2008), vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 11 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) of	his	actions.41	His father's love,	which,	when	affectionate, is	based on	the	interpretation	of	Jack	that	emphasizes	the	fact	that	Jack	started off a	lonelier	and	more	estranged	child,	only	leaves	Jack	feeling	more ashamed	and	defensive.	When	siblings	and	well-wishers	express	their faith	in	Jack,	these	expressions	only	push	him	further	away.42 Why	is	this?	Return	to	the	operations	of	shame.	First,	even	if	others have	faith	that	Jack	will	become	a	better	person,	or	that	deep	down he	is	a	better	person,	Jack does not.43	Thus,	their	love	does	nothing	to alleviate	the	shame	he	would	feel	in	light	of	a	more	discerning	other who	he	imagines	sees	all	of	him,	and	all	through	him,	or	who	would not	take	his	childhood	as	providing	a	genuine	excuse	for	who	he	has become.	He	cannot	trust	himself	to	be	the	kind	of	person	that	those who	have	faith	in	him	believe	he	can	be,	nor	does	he	fully	identify	as the	kind	of	person	that	the	charitable	see	in	him.	So	their	vision	of	him, in failing to see	him	as	he sees	himself, cannot	pierce through and dispel	the	shame	prompted	by	who	he	fears	he	is		it	instead	changes the	topic.44	Second,	his	shame	is	exacerbated	by	their	willingness	to continue	to	give	him	the	benefit	of	the	doubt:	though	a	temperamentally	different	person	might	react	more	positively	to	another's	sincere 41. Glory	offers:	"That	was	all	so	long	ago.	You	were	young."	Jack	responds,	"No, I	wasn't	young.	I	don't	believe	I	ever	was	young.	...	Excuses	scare	me,	Glory. They	make	me	feel	like	I'm	losing	hold.	I	can't	explain	it.	But	please	don't	try to	make	excuses	for	me."	Excuses	often	work	by	distinguishing	what	one	did from	who	one	really	is;	Jack	feels	disoriented	by	excuses	because,	as	he	experienced	his	actions,	they	were	the	product	of	who	he	really	is,	not,	for	example, the	result	of	weakness	or	immaturity	or	a	lapse	of	thought. 42. Faith is expressed	by another character (Lila), implicitly as a	way to think about	Jack:	she	suggests	that	God's	grace	is	the	understanding	that	everyone can change for the better.	Immediately	following	this,	Jack	goes	off	the	rails	once again,	drinking	himself	into	oblivion.	It	is	after this	episode	that	Glory	restates her	sentiment.	"I'm	trying,	but	I've	gone/Through	the	glass	again/	Just	come and	find	me/	God	loves	everybody,	don't	remind	me".	The	National,	"Graceless"	in	Trouble Will Find Me	(2013). 43. "Graceless/ I figured	out	how to	be faithless/	But it	would	be a shame to waste	this/	You	can't	imagine	how	I	hate	this/	Graceless".	Ibid. 44. Jack	responds	to	Glory's	claim	that	she	wouldn't	care	if	he	were	a	petty	thief (implying	that	she	trusts	or	has	faith	that	he	is	not, in	fact,	a	petty	thief),	"That's very	subjunctive	of	you". I'll	consider	three	views	here:	(i) the	proposal	that loving	people often involves being epistemically partial toward them, (ii) the proposal	that	we	love	people	just	because	of	the	relationship	we	stand	in with	them	or	because	of	our	shared	history,	and	(iii)	the	neo-Kantian proposal	that	when	we	love	a	person,	we	love	not	the	qualities	of	his character	or	personality	(good	or	bad),	but	his	personhood or	humanity. Begin	with	the	proposal	that	Glory	should	focus	her	attention	on more optimistic or charitable interpretations of Jack's character. As Sarah	Stroud	has	argued,	there	are	many	ways	in	which	we	can	see	another	in	a	more	positive	light,	some	of	which	result	from	an	epistemic partiality	that	good	friends	(and	good	lovers	more	generally)	exhibit toward one another.39 In a similar vein, according to Ryan PrestonRoedder, faith in another person involves believing of him that he is	fundamentally	good	or	decent,	even	when	one	lacks	the	evidence needed	to	fully	justify	that	belief.40	While	this	sort	of	faith	is	the	basis of	a	moral	virtue,	Preston-Roedder	also	argues	that	it	is	an	important aspect	of	sustaining	and	nourishing	a	loving	relationship	with	another, noting	how	having	faith	in	a	person	can	bolster	his	self-esteem. I	have	no	objection to the	claim that in	many	of	our friendships, forms	of	epistemic	partiality	are	needed	and	valuable; it is	also	true that faith in	others can sustain loving relationships,	may	be exactly the	kind	of	response	that	your	beloved	needs	to	bolster	his	confidence in	his	abilities,	and	is	the	basis	of	a	centrally	important	moral	virtue. The	challenge,	again,	is	that	in	certain	contexts,	with	people	of	a	certain	temperament,	something	else	may	be	needed	to	fully	reach	out	to the	beloved	without	alienating	him	further		a	kind	of	love	that	isn't based	on	partial	or	charitable	interpretations	of	who	he	is,	on	faith	that he	is	better	than	he	is,	or	that	he	will	eventually	become	the	better	person	you	believe	him	to	be.	To	illustrate	this,	return	to	Jack.	He	objects and	resists	when	his	family	members	offer	charitable	interpretations 39.	Sarah	Stroud,	"Epistemic	Partiality	in	Friendship",	Ethics, 116:3	(2006). 40.	Ryan	Preston-Roedder,	"Faith	in	Humanity",	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,	87:3	(2013). vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 12 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) Why	is this? In	the	hospital	example	I	described	above,	you	may feel	a	bit	glum	or	hurt	that	your	friend	doesn't	like	or	appreciate	your personality	or	character	anymore.	But	now	consider	how	you	might feel	if,	like	Jack,	you	are	also	ashamed of	who	you	are.	He	knows	that not	only	has	his family's affection for	him	worn thin (and that they often	rely	on	a	sense	of	duty	to	motivate	their	love	of	him),	but	he	also knows	that	he	is	a	disappointment	to	them.48	When	his	family	nonetheless	continues	to	love	him	and	express	this	love	through	a	sincere	concern	for	his	wellbeing	simply	because	he	is	their brother	or	son,	and	not because	of	who	he	is,	this	only	confirms	Jack's	fears	that	if	they	were to look	more	closely	at	who	he	is,	their	affection,	if	not	their	concern for	his	wellbeing,	would	be	challenged	and	attenuated	 as it in fact is. Moreover,	that	his	family	members	remain	committed	to	his	wellbeing for	the	simple	reason	that	he	is	their	brother	or	son	only	furthers	his shame	and	exacerbates	his feelings	of vulnerability and lack	of selfrespect,	and	this	in	turn	causes	his	self-protective	touchiness. Finally,	what	about	the	idea	that	Glory	loves	Jack	because	Jack	 like	all	human	beings		has	the	value	of	personhood or	humanity?	According	to	David	Velleman,	all persons,	even	those	with	the	kind	of character	that	Jack	has,	are	worthy	of	both	respect	and	love	simply	in virtue	of their existence	as rational	beings.	Others	have	objected to Velleman	by	denying that there is an	essential and	valuable feature that	all rational	beings	share,	or	by	arguing	that	Velleman's	account, 48. Jack's	shame	is	surely	compounded	by the fact that	he	knows	that	his family	members	are	not	just	liable	to	be	disappointed	by	him,	but	they	are	also ashamed of	him.	Ward	E.	Jones	argues	that	this is	partly	because	one's	wellbeing	depends	upon	the	wellbeing	of those	whom	one	loves	(and	so	their shame	is	your	shame),	and	because	to	love	someone	is	to	persistently	believe in	the	beloved's	moral	goodness.	I	agree	about	the	connections	Ward	proposes,	but	disagree	that	this	persistent	belief	is	just	part of	what	loving	another person	is.	As	I	am	arguing	here,	it	may	be	ideal	to	give	up	the	persistent	belief in	the	beloved's	moral	goodness,	and	love	the	person	as	he	is	regardless.	It's true	that	one's	wellbeing	can	depend	upon	the	wellbeing	of	one's	loved	ones, but	the	ideal	of	attentive	love	strives	to	eliminate	the	extent	to	which	this	will determine	and	shape	how	one	sees	and	what	one	needs	from	the	beloved. See	Ward	E. Jones, "A	Lover's	Shame",	Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 15:5 (2012). faith	in	him,	Jack's	shame	has	already	made	him	touchy	and	resentful in	response	to the	blind	charity	of	others,	and	unable to	handle the unspoken	burden	made	on	anyone	who	one	has	trust	or	faith	in. Similar	problems	arise	with	forms	of	love	that	are	inattentive	to	a person's	character	not	because	they	involve	forms	of	epistemic	partiality,	but	because	they	are	grounded	in	facts	that	lie	outside	it.	As	Niko Kolodny	has	argued,	a	paradigmatic	form	of love	is	the	love	we	feel toward those	we	stand in	certain relationships	with.45	One	can love a	person	in	this	way	even	if	there	is	nothing	about	the	quality	of	that person's	character	that	one	thinks	of	as	good:	it	is	sufficient	that	one has	shared	a	history	with	him,	or	that	one	stands	in	a	certain	important relationship	to	him,	such	as	being	his	genetic	parent.46	Who	he	is	otherwise	is	not	of	much	importance. The	problem	with this	kind	of love is	not that it isn't intelligible, rational, appropriate,	or valuable. It can	be	all these things, and importantly,	it	can	make	sense	of	why,	in	the	kind	of	case	I	began	with, you	might	continue	to	love	your	friend	simply	for	having	known	him for	all	these	years;	it	is	also	what	seems	to	be	at	work	in	the	example of	you	and	Zahra.	There	is	a	kind	of	loyalty	exemplified	by	those	who love	in	this	way.	However,	within	certain	contexts	such	as	the	ones	I've focused	on,	the	beloved	might	need	something	else	beyond	a	love	that is	stable	because	it	is	based	on	just	one's	relationship	or	history	with him:	a	kind	of	love	that	is	attentive	and	responsive	to	who he is.47 45. "Love	as	Valuing	a	Relationship". 46.	Niko	Kolodny, "Which	Relationships Justify	Partiality?	The	Case	of	Parents and	Children",	Philosophy & Public Affairs,	38:1	(2010). 47. Part	of the tension toward the	end	of the	novel involves Jack	making	sure that	he	leaves	the	family	household	before	Teddy,	his	good	and	accomplished older	brother,	comes	to	tend	for	their	dying	father.	Jack	recollects: [Teddy]	came	to	St.	Louis	and	hunted	me	down.	He	walked	around	the back	streets	with	a	couple	of	photographs	until	he	found	someone	who recognized	me.	It	took	him	days.	He	was	just	out	of	medical	school.	And	I was		not	in	very	good	shape.	That	may	have	been	my	nadir,	in	fact.	We sat	on	a	bench	and	ate	sandwiches	together.	He	asked	me	to	come	home with	him,	but	I	declined.	He	offered	me	some	money	and	I	took	it.	A	miserable	experience	for	both	of	us. vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 13 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) Notice	how	Velleman	has	demarcated	the	territory	of	the	self	here. It's	true	that	many	people	might	reasonably	not	want	to	be	loved	solely because	of,	for	example,	the	yellow	of	their	hair	(an	example	that	Velleman	uses), their	flesh and	blood (literally), or their	mere	behavior. Even	if these	are	intrinsically	valuable	qualities, they	(on	their	own) serve	as	relatively	shallow	reasons	for	somebody	to	love	you,	and	they are	shallow	because the	qualities	of	one's	appearance	or	patterns	of behavior	are	not	on	their	own	aspects	of	one's	character	or	personality.52	These	are	qualities	accessible	to	one's	"empirical"	sense	of	vision. But importantly, these shallow qualities are altogether and importantly	different	from	one's	sense	of	humor,	taste	in	music,	boisterous temperament,	or	cutting	temper.	It is	important	that	we	not	conflate the	first	set	of	qualities	(of	one's	appearance	and	behavior)	with	the second (of	one's character	or	personality), even though it	would	be strange	to	think	of	either	as	"accessible	to	purely	intellectual"	experience.	Moreover,	one	might	want	to	be	loved	for	the	second	set	of	qualities	(of	the	character	or	personality)	not	because	they	are	expressive of	a	"deeper"	value	or	"inner	self"	that	lies	underneath or	beyond	them, or	because	they	are	the	necessary	means	to	loving	that	deeper	value, but	because	they	constitute	who he is.	Indeed,	these	qualities	are	of	the very	kind	that	are	at	issue	when	it	comes	to	Jack's	shame.53 But Velleman's proposal is Kantian.	What about	Kant? Consider Kant's	proposal	when	he	considers the	question	of	whether	we	can 52. To	be	clear,	I	am	not	claiming	that	these	shallow	forms	of	love	are	not	"really forms	of	love",	or	that	they	are	obviously	worse than	other	forms	of	love	that ground themselves in	character	or	personality,	or that	anyone	who is	after a	shallow	form	of	love	is	doing	so	under	the	guise	of	a	deeper	form	of	love. They	strike	me	as	just	different	ways	for	human	beings	to	be	attached	and	attracted	to	one	another,	and	that	we	have	some	reason	philosophically,	and	in our	personal	lives,	to	not	confuse	them	for	one	another.	Thank	you	to	Ulrika Carlsson	for	discussion	of	this	point. 53. Though	of	course,	we	can	also	be	ashamed	of	our	more	empirically	accessible qualities	(e.g.	our	bodily	appearance)	 in	which	case,	one's	shame	might very	well	be	alleviated	by	a	love	of	those	qualities.	I	might	have	affection	for your	paunch,	your	scar,	or	your	snaggle	tooth;	should	you	care	at	all	about how	I	see	you	and	whether	I	love	you,	this	might	very	well	go	some	way	in alleviating	some	of	your	shame	about	these	things. in	grounding	love	in	what	also	grounds	respect,	cannot	accommodate for	the	selectivity	of	personal	love.	I	will	discuss	a	different	worry	from these,	raised	by	the	problem	of	alienation. I've	already	noted	that	other	views	of	love	do	not	take	seriously	the idea	that	Jack	is	to	be	appreciated	for	who	he	is.	While	Velleman's	account	seems	better	able	to	accommodate	the	beloved's	self	(and	while Velleman	himself	presents	his	view	as	an	articulation	of the	Murdochian ideal of attentive love), it is important to see	what Velleman considers	that	self	to	be,	and	the	way	in	which	we	are	to	appreciate	it. Velleman	writes: The	immediate	object	of	love,	I	would	say,	is	the	manifest person,	embodied	in	flesh	and	blood	and	accessible	to	the senses.	The	manifest	person	is	the	one	against	whom	we have	emotional	defenses,	and	he	must	disarm	them,	if	he can,	with	his	manifest	qualities.	Grasping	someone's	personhood	intellectually	may	be	enough	to	make	us	respect him,	but	unless	we	actually	see a	person	in	the	human	being	confronting	us,	we	won't	be	moved	to	love;	and	we can	see	the	person	only	by	seeing	him	in	or	through	his empirical	persona.49 In other words, Velleman's Kantian view relies on a distinction between	a	self	that	is	accessible	to	the	senses	("the	manifest	person"	or "the	empirical	persona"),	and	a	self	(his	"personhood")	that	is	grasped "intellectually".	When	we love the "empirical	persona", our love is "a response	to	[his	manifest	qualities]	as a symbol or reminder of	his	value as	a	person".50	As	Velleman then	puts this	point, "One	doesn't	want one's	value as a person	to	be	eclipsed	by	the	intrinsic	value	of	one's	appearance	or	behavior;	one	wants	them	to	elicit	a	valuation	that	looks through	them,	to	the	value	of	one's	inner	self".51 49. "Love	as	a	Moral	Emotion",	371. 50.	Ibid. 51. Ibid.,	372,	my	emphasis. vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 14 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) V. Grace and Shame So	far, I	have	argued	that	views	of love	which	are	less	attentive	will only	exacerbate	the	problem	that	Glory	and	Jack	face.	This	is	because,	I have	argued,	given	that	what	gives	rise	to	Jack's	alienation	is	his	shame and	fear	that if one were to see him as he truly is, he	could	only	inspire feelings	of	disappointment,	pity,	or	contempt,	less	attentive	forms	of love	do	not	alleviate	his	fear,	but	rather,	serve	to	confirm	it. Return	now to the ideal of attentive love,	which	Glory's love exemplifies in the passage above. Glory's love does not skirt around the	facts	of	Jack's	past	and	the	conclusions	that	one	would	justifiably draw	about	his	character.	It	is	not evasive.	And	because	her	response is	nonetheless	one	of	attentive and	affectionate love	for	his	soul,	rather than	contempt	or	disappointment	or	resentment,	it	allows	her	to	see and	speak	truthfully	about	him	without	the	reactions	that	have	made that	truth	so	painful	to	him.	Because	her	response	is	nonetheless	one of	attentive and	affectionate love	for	his	soul	rather	than	compassion or pity, it	doesn't	risk	being	insulting	or	overbearing.	In	letting	down	his guard,	given	Glory's	affection	for	him,	Jack	allows	himself	to	be	seen and loved	by her, thereby retaining some small but utterly	priceless connection	with	another	human	being. However,	there	is	still	a	challenge	remaining	even	if	we	are	to	understand	Glory's	love	as	providing	us	with	an	image	of	the	ideal	of	attentive	love.	Suppose	that	one	grants	that	the	ideal	is	valuable	if	it	can be	made	sense	of,	but	that	it	is	hard	to	see	how	it	could	be.56	One	might character,	but	it	is	again	a	kind	of	love	that	Jack,	given	his	inability	to	believe that	he	will change	over	time,	would	find	alienating.	Those	who	have	a	more fluid	conception	of	themselves,	or	who	aspire	to	a	quasi-existentialist	process of	continually	creating	who	they	are,	may	also	not	need	or	want	fully	attentive	love	as	I've	described	it.	Jack,	however,	is	at	the	point	at	which	he	cannot believe	that	he	will	ever	really	change	at	all.	For	a	dynamic	view	of	love	that can	accommodate	existentialist	lovers,	see	Benjamin	Bagley,	"Loving	Someone	in	Particular",	Ethics, 125:2	(2015). 56.	A	different	important	worry	that	one	might	have	is	whether	loving	someone graciously	can	come	at	the	cost	of	other	important	values	and	ideals.	Could being	gracious	toward	a	loved	one	come	at	the	cost	of	one's	own	dignity	or self-respect?	Could	it	come	at	the	cost	of	being	giving	others		perhaps	those "well-like" and not just "well-wish" a villain. His answer, like Velleman's,	treats	the	qualities	of	the	villain's	character	as	of	secondary	or non-essential importance in comparison to	his abstract	humanity or personhood: ...	nobody can	have such	a liking	where there is	no	object	of	which	to	approve.	There	is,	however,	a	distinction to	be	drawn	in	a	man	between	the	man	himself	and	his humanity.	I may thus have a liking for the humanity, though none for the man.	I	can	even	have	such	liking	for	the	villain ...	for	even	in	the	worst	of	villains	there	is	still	a	kernel	of good-will.54 So	we	have	two	answers	that	will	be	unsatisfying.	On	the	one	hand, Glory	can	draw	a	distinction	between	Jack	and	his	humanity,	have	affection	for	the	latter	and	none	for	the	former.	Alternatively,	Glory	can have	affection for Jack,	as long	as	she	believes that (or	has the faith that)	even	in	the	worst	of	villains,	there	remains	a	kernel	of	good	will. The	objection	here is	not that there isn't this kernel	of good	will in Jack		arguably,	there	is,	even	if	he	and	the	people	of	Gilead	cannot see	it.	The	objection	is	that,	on	this	picture,	in	order	to	have	affection for	Jack,	Glory	must	either	rely	on	what	can	only	seem	to	him	to	be	a kind	of	faith or	charitable	interpretation	(that	even	in	him	there	is	still a	kernel	of	good	will);	or,	supposing	that	there	is	there	"no	object	of which	to	approve"	(as	Jack	fears),	all	he	can	receive	from	her	is	sincere well-wishing,	and	not	well-liking.	We	have	already	seen	that	either	option	 faith	and	charity,	or	good	will	without	affection		will	only exacerbate	Jack's	estrangement.55 54. Immanuel	Kant,	Lectures on Ethics, trans. J.	B. Schneewind, ed. Peter	Heath (Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	1997),	27:418,	my	emphasis. 55. This	discussion is	not	meant to	be	an	exhaustive	consideration	of the	various	forms	of	love	that	one	might	have	in	response	to	Jack.	Michelle	Mason has	suggested	to	me	that	the	kind	of love	that	Glory	has is	a love	"in	prospect":	that	is,	it's	a	kind	of	love	that	recognizes	that	Jack,	like	all	human	beings, doesn't	have	a	static	character	and	is	liable	to	grow	and	change.	This	proposal captures	the	importance	of	loving	a	person	over	time	and	the	dynamism	of vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 15 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) nature.57	Those	qualities	are	not	always	qualities	that	we	should	think of	as	good	in	any	non-trivial	sense.	Nonetheless,	it	is	still	possible	to become	endeared to	an	object	upon	noticing its	possession	of such qualities,	in virtue of recognizing	its	possession	of	those	qualities. There	are	many	everyday	examples	of	this	kind	of	affection	that	I could	point to,	but I'll start	with	an illustration from	within	philosophy.58 In	her	discussion	of	what she	describes as "arational" actions, Rosalind	Hursthouse	proposes that	while some	aspects of our emotional	lives	as	human	beings	can	be	"rationalized"	and	made	valuable through this process, other aspects are typically left untouched. Examples	of	"arational"	actions	include	those	explained	by	anger,	hatred, or	jealousy,	such	as violently	destroying	or	damaging	anything	remotely	connected	with	the	[hated]	person	...	e.g.,	her	picture,	letters or	presents from	her,	awards from	her,	books	or	poems about	her;	the	chair	she	was	wont	to	sit in, locks	of	her hair,	recordings	of	'our'	song,	etc.59 Here,	too,	Hursthouse	discusses	in	detail	the	example	that	has	puzzled	action	theorists:	that	of	Jane,	who,	"in	a	wave	of	hatred	for	Joan, 57. Adams notes that certain undesirable qualities can also serve as qualities that ground love	of a	particular	person,	but	gives alternative (and, I think, non-competing)	explanations	of	how	this	is	possible.	One	is	that	some	of	our qualities		those	that	we	can	see	in	light	of	a	person's	suffering	or	need		"... can	be	a	window	into	her	humanity"	(168).	Such	qualities	can	draw	us	closer to	the	beloved	because	of	the	possibility	of	helping	or	comforting	her.	I	agree. But	grace	as	I've	described	it	is	different	in	two	respects.	Not	all	qualities	of human	nature	are	those	we	should	see	as	resulting	from	suffering	or	need,	at least	without seeing them in	a fairly	condescending	or inattentive	manner, e.g.	if	my	friend	were	to	view	my	impatience	or	rudeness	as	arising	from	my suffering	or	need,	and	not	just	from	how	I	construe	the	world	given	who	I am,	I'd	probably	conclude	that	my	friend	really	didn't	know	me	after	all.	And again,	I	want	to	emphasize	the	affection we	can	feel	toward	such	qualities,	not just	the	motivations	we	have	to	care	for	or	comfort	those	who	suffer	or	are	in need	(which	again,	can	be	condescending		at	least	to	those	like	Jack). 58.	Rosalind	Hursthouse,	"Arational	Actions",	Journal of Philosophy,	88:2	(1991). 59. Ibid.,	58. think	a	person's	soul	in	these	cases	would	repel a	discerning	eye	rather than	attract	it.	As	Kant	plainly	puts	this	claim	in	the	passage	I	quoted above: "Nobody can	have such	a liking	where there is	no	object	of which	to	approve". The ideal	of	attentive love	can	respond to this	challenge,	but	we must	modify or supplement the ideal of attention	with the ideal of grace.	Consider	first	Robert	Adams'	discussion	of	grace,	by	which	he means	love's	non-proportionality with	the	goodness	of	its	object		capturing	the	idea	that	grace	is	a	meritless	gift.	Adams	argues	that	this	is an	essential	aspect	of	all genuine	or	good	forms	of	love.	I	am	inclined to	agree	with	this,	at	least	when	it	comes	to	interpersonal	love.	But	I shall	use	the	term	'grace'	to	focus	on	a	more	specific	attitude,	where this	love's	lack	of	proportionality	is	explained	by	the	fact	that	though it is responsive to qualities of the beloved, it is not fundamentally responsive to	his	good	qualities.	The	proposal I	offer is that	grace is love	that	is	non-proportional	to	the	goodness	of	its	object	because	it is	an	affectionate	love	felt	in	response	to	perceived	qualities	of	human who	have	suffered	at	the	hands	of	the	beloved,	or	perhaps	just	others	who	are even	more	needy		their	due?	(Might	it	even	constitute	a	wrong	to	them?) Perhaps.	Is	there	a	way	for	the	practically	wise	person	to	balance	or	harmonize	one's	graciousness	with	her	other	virtues	and	fulfill	her	duties	to	others? I	hope	so.	A	few	points	about	the	emotions	may	help	alleviate	some	worries here.	The	first	is	that	to	experience	an	emotion	is	not	ipso facto to	act	in	some determinate	way	rather	than	another	(e.g.	saving	one's	beloved	wife	rather than	a	drowning	stranger),	even	though	emotions	typically	come	with	characteristic	behavior	and	actions. It is	dogmatic	behaviorism	to	deny	this.	To borrow	a	quote	from	Murdoch,	slightly	out	of	its	context,	"We	are	such	inward secret	creatures,	that	inwardness	is	the	most	amazing	thing	about	us,	even more amazing than	our reason".	The Sea, The Sea (London: Penguin	Books, 2001), 173.	The	second is that it	would	be	a	mistake to think that	one	can only	feel	one	emotion	at	a	time	toward	the	same	object,	and	that	seemingly antithetical	emotions	cannot	be	held	consistently	with	one	another.	Gracious love	need	not	be	inconsistent	with,	for	example,	feeling	resentful	toward	the beloved	when	he	does	something	wrong,	just	as	to	forgive	someone,	need not	involve	completely	foregoing resentment,	as	argued	by	Andrea	Westlund in	"Anger,	Faith,	and	Forgiveness",	The Monist,	92:4	(2009).	How	exactly	grace would interact	with	other emotions, and	how	graciousness	would interact with	other	virtues,	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper. vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 16 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) This is not a complete explanation of why we are affectionate toward these aspects of ourselves and	others, nor is it a systematic presentation	of	these	aspects,	but	it	is	the	beginning	of	one.	We	have some	sense	already	of	what	we	mean	by	"human	nature".	As	Philippa Foot	emphasizes,	virtues	are	best	understood	as	correctives	to	the emotional	and	motivational	tendencies that	one	finds	in	human	beings.63 Thus, in investigating	virtues	and	vices	at	all,	we	must	already	have in	mind	some	conception	of	what	human	nature is like		one that is understood in terms of thick psychological qualities and dispositions.	And	what	we	know	about	those	qualities	and	dispositions	will inform	the	content of	the	virtues.	For	example,	we	know	that	courage is	a	virtue that corrects the	emotions,	motives,	pains,	and	pleasures that	partly	constitute	both	cowardice	and	foolhardiness;	we	know	that temperance	is	a	virtue	that	corrects	for	the	emotions,	motives,	pains, and	pleasures	that	constitute	gluttony	and	(as	Aristotle	observes,	more rarely	found	in	human	beings	given	our	nature)	abstemiousness.	On this	picture,	grace	would	then	be	a	love	for	human	nature, where	human	nature	is understood	to	include	those	emotional	and	motivational	tendencies	and	qualities	that	the	virtues	are	needed	to	correct	for: the	intemperate,	the	immoderate,	the	cowardly	and	the	foolhardy,	the stingy	and the	ostentatious, the	boastful	and the	undignified.	To	be gracious	would	be	to	have	the	disposition	to	love	those	qualities	with affection,	at	the	right	time,	to	the	right	extent,	and	in	the	right	ways, not	because	they	are	good,	but	because	they	are	human. Why	would	these	qualities	bring	us	closer	to	a	clear-eyed	view	of the	person who is the	object	of	our love?	Typically (perhaps ideally), these	aspects	of	a	person's	psychology	will	not	be	fully	tamed	by	virtue	or	brought	in	line	with	moral	obligation	and	duty,	and	may	even buck up against its constraints. But importantly, they nonetheless render	him	and	his	actions	what	Peter	Goldie	has	called	"primitively intelligible".64	As	Goldie	argues,	this	kind	of	intelligibility	allows	us	to 63. "Virtues	and	Vices" in	Virtues and Vices: and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2002). 64. The Emotions: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, tears	at Joan's	photo	with	her	nails,	and	gouges	holes in the	eyes".60 My	interest	here is	not in	Hursthouse's	arguments	about the	nature of intentional action,	but rather in	an	observation she	makes	about the	kinds	of	beings	we	are.	While	suggesting toward	the	end	of the paper	that	we	would	not	want	to	rid	ourselves	of	or	totally	suppress these	actions	and	the	unruly	emotions	and	motives	that	prompt	them, Hursthouse	writes: We	might	well	find	something	rather	touching	or	endearing	about	people's	performing	many	of the	arational	actions;	even	the	disturbingly	violent	ones	seem	to	evoke some sort of bond	of sympathy.	When I	have read this paper	to	discussion	groups,	I	have	found	that	the	list	of the examples at the	beginning always	provokes instant delighted	recognition	....61 Hursthouse's remark	highlights the	distinctive	affect	of the	emotion I'm interested in: it is "delighted" recognition, a feeling of "endearment"		rendering	it,	again,	a	love	of	affection, rather	than	a	response of	compassion or	respect.	Along	with	her	observation,	we	can	reflect on	the	common	idea	that	people	are	more likeable	to	the	extent	that they	are	"humanized"	in	light	of	their	flaws;	it	is	a	journalistic	cliché	to write	about	the	likeability	of	athletes,	artists,	or	actors	given	how	human (i.e.	imperfect)	they	seem	to	be		a	reminder	that	such	people	are, after	all,	mere	human	mortals.	Hursthouse	also	offers	an	alternative explanation for those	who	would	suggest that this feeling is	always the	result	of	"the	weak	and	fallible	finding	improper	pleasure	in	having company".62	What	can	also	explain	this	affection	is	that	what	we	value, or	at	least	like	about	ourselves	(that	is,	us	human	beings),	is	that	we	are partly	plainly	emotional	creatures	and	not	always	rational-emotional ones. 60.	Ibid.,	59. 61. Ibid.,	68. 62. Ibid. vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 17 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) Again,	the	qualities	that	render	a	person	primitively	intelligible	to us	and	which	can	also	be	the	basis	of	affection	are	not	in	any	non-trivial	sense,	good.	A	clear-eyed	view	of	your	friend	will	respect	this.	But	to love	in	this	way	is	to	refuse	to	look	away	from	these	aspects	of	who	he is,	excuse	them,	or	see	them	as	what	one	abstracts	from	when	loving him,	leaving	a	core	of	who	he	more	truly	or	deeply	is	(if	only	he	were better	than	he	in	fact	is).	Combined,	gracious	love's	two	attributes	 its	accuracy	and	its	affection		render	it	able	to	alleviate	the	problem of	alienation.	Like	shame,	it	is	a	complex	emotion.	It	incorporates	both how	the	shameful	agent	sees	himself	in	the	discerning	and	penetrating	eyes	of	another,	and	so	acknowledges	that	this	is who	he	is,	rather than	evading	the	issue.	Rather	than	excusing	his	bad	behavior	as	not really	part	of	who	he	is	(and	thereby	undermining	his	sense	of	himself as	an	agent),	it	grants	to	him	and	his	shame	that	he	really	is	that	kind of	person	who	sees	the	world	this	way	and	acts	as	he	does.	But	at	the same time, it allows for a reaction	unlike	disappointment,	pity, contempt,	or	compassion	for	who	he	is		it	is	to	feel	affection	for	who	he is,	through	and	through. Because	affection	is	not	based	on	merit	(and	is	thus	a	"free	gift"	to the	beloved), it	avoids	encumbering	him	with	the	presupposition	that he	is	what	he	isn't,	or	the	faith	or	trust	that	he	can	become	what	he cannot	or	will	not.	And	because	the	attitude	of	affection	is	not	a	gift that	is	typically	merited,	but	given	in	this	particular	case	without	consideration	of	merit,	it	does	not	"lower"	or	presuppose	the	lower	status of	the	receiver	in	the	way	that	charity	or	mercy	can.	Thus,	it	is	less	of a	threat	to	the	beloved's	dignity.	Importantly,	however,	we	should	not confuse	the	fact	that	grace's	affection	is	meritless	with	it	being	either blind or	ultimately	focused	on	something	beyond	the	person	it	is	felt toward.	It	is	a	response	to	qualities	the	lover	sees	in	the	beloved.	And when felt for a particular human being, it is not love for the qualities	of	human	nature	abstractly	understood,	or	the	abstract	concept	of and	amplifies	the	horror	of	her	murder	at	Babi	Yar.	Murphy,	"Kant	on	Theory and	Practice" in	Theory and Practice, Ian	Shapiro	and Judith	Wagner	Decew (eds.),	(New	York:	New	York	University	Press,	1995). get	a	sense	of	what	is	going	on	with	the	person	we	are	attending	to	in	a way	that	is	distinctively	"personal"  we	are	able	to	see	him	as	another human	being	with	a	point	of	view,	thoughts,	feelings,	and	emotions	of his	own,	vicious	though	he	may	be. It	is	to	see	him	from	what	Strawson calls	the	"participant	stance",	and	to	love	him	graciously	is	to	respond to	him	in	light	of	these	qualities		as	another	person,	a	fellow	adult 	with	affection.65 2009).	As	Aristotle	notes,	we	can	understand	human	vice;	we	do	not	react	with blame	(a	second-personal,	or	participatory	reaction)	to	the	bestial	vices,	but rather,	with	fear	(VII, NE).	For	some	more	discussion	of	these	ideas	and	their relationship	to	the	guise	of	the	good	thesis,	see	Vida	Yao,	"The	Undesirable and	the	Adesirable",	Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,	99:1	(2019). 65.	At	this	point,	one	might	hope	for	a	more	general,	theoretical	approach	to	understanding	what	the	qualities	of	human	nature	are,	and	so	arrive	at	a	more determinate	picture	of	what	qualities	grace	is	responsive	to,	or	harbor	some skepticism	about	the	legitimacy	of	the	claims	that	there	are such	qualities.	I have	not	offered	such	a	theoretical	approach,	nor	have	I	fully	defended	the legitimacy	of	the	idea	of	human	nature;	my	proposal	can	thus	be	seen	as	a framework	for	grace.	Note,	however,	the	extent	to	which	any moral	theory	operates	by	already	assuming	that	there	are	such	qualities,	as	well	as	proposing concretely	what	they	are.	As	Allen	Wood	argues,	Kant's	ethics	is	formulated given	a	particular	conception	of	human	nature.	For	Kant,	we	are	the	species that	sets	its	own	ends,	but	we	are	also	highly	competitive	and	possess	deep impulses	of	both	self-love	and	self-conceit.	We	need	the	moral	law	to	strike down	our	self-conceit in	particular,	precisely	because	(so	Kant	claims) it is such	a	powerful,	natural	tendency	within	us.	Wood	also	makes	a	more	general	methodological	point	about	ethical	theory	worth	pausing	on: Basic	to	any	practical	science	is	a	knowledge	of	its	materials	...	it	must	be based	on	a	knowledge	of	human	nature,	on	human	psychology	in	a	broad sense	(Kant's	name	for	it	is	'anthropology').	The	intellectual	power	of	an ethical theory is	mainly a function of its anthropology. "Unsociable Sociability:	The	Anthropological	Basis	of	Kantian	Ethics,"	Philosophical Topics, 19:1	(1999),	326. Wood's remark reminds	us that it is	not just	Aristotle and	Kant	who	must, in	offering	us	powerful	ethical	theories,	strive	to	understand	human	nature in terms	of thick	qualities	of	psychological	disposition, and so	not just	Aristotelians	and	Kantians	could	adopt the framework	of	grace I	am	offering. Think	of	Hobbes'	conception	of	human	nature	(fearful,	curious,	and	narrowly self-interested);	think	of	Plato's	(appetitive,	spirited,	always	at	risk	of	illusion). Think of Freud's.	As pointed	out by Jeffrie	Murphy, consider the love that one	may	feel	for	Frau	Anna	G,	the	central	figure	of	D.	M.	Thomas's	novel,	The White Hotel,	and	how	the	intimacy	of	one's	knowledge	and	love	for	her	colors vida	yao Grace and Alienation philosophers'	imprint – 18 – vol.	20,	no.	16	(may	2020) discussions	with	Laura	Gillespie,	Kyla	Ebels-Duggan,	Ryan	Davis,	and	Oded Na'aman. I	have	benefited from	discussion	with	audiences	at	UNC-Chapel Hill, the	University	of	Toronto,	New	York	University,	and	the	University	of Chicago.	Special	thanks	are	owed	to	Kristina	Gehrman,	Ulrika	Carlsson,	Andrea	Westlund,	and	Uriah	Kriegel	for	detailed	comments	as	well	as	stylistic suggestions.	Finally,	I	am	indebted	to	Zahra	Hussain	Rizvi,	Mary	Renee	Lindsey,	and	Christopher	R.	Hakkenberg. "human	nature".	It	is	distinct	from	forms	of	love	justified	by	a	person's bare	or	abstract	personhood or	humanity,	as	well	as	the	explicitly	theological	view	that	all	human	beings	are	worthy	of	love	simply	because we	are	God's	creatures.66	These	ideas	on	their	own	pick	out	too	thin or	abstract	a	quality	to	serve	as	the	right	object	of	fully	attentive	love, given	the	richness	of	the	qualities	of	our	psychological	lives,	our	characters,	and	our	personalities,	and	given	how	our	feelings	of	shame	are typically	generated	by	those	concrete,	richer	qualities	that	can	be	so apparent	to	those	who	see	us.67	To	be	loved	graciously	is	for	one's	lover to	grant,	and	then	rely	on,	this	repertoire	of	qualities	to	inform	and	sustain	her	affection	for	him.	As	an	ideal	of	love,	grace	asks	one	to	notice more	and	feel	affection for more of	one's	beloved	-	though	it	is	true	that he	may	be	too	unruly,	too	fearful,	or	too	wild,	to	be	good.68 66.	Kieran	Setiya	has	recently	argued	for	an	agapic	form	of	love	that	is	sufficiently justified	simply	on	the	basis	that	the	object	of	one's	love	is	a	fellow	human, and	not	on	the	basis	of	any	qualities	of	the	beloved.	While	I	agree	with	Setiya that	the	fact	that	someone	is	a	human	being	can	sometimes	be	sufficient	for love,	I	think	that	without	further	qualifications,	this	kind	of	love	is	too	inattentive	to	avoid	the	problem	of	alienation,	and	depending	on	the	quality	of the	love	Setiya	has	in	mind,	it	might,	to	put	it	a	little	too	bluntly,	give	rise	to justified feelings that the lover is	being creepy.	After	all, it	presupposes	no knowledge	of	who	the	beloved	actually	is.	I	also	believe	that	my	proposal	alleviates	at	least	some	of	Setiya's	worry	that	a	quality-based	view	of	love	would render	some	people	unlovable.	Kieran	Setiya,	"Love	and	the	Value	of	a	Life", Philosophical Review, 123:3 (2014). 67. For	the	metaphysical	thesis	of	original	sin,	which	of	course	can	be	the	basis	of shame	for	some,	a	theological	conception	of	grace	might	be	needed.	Again,	I have	no	ambition	or	interest	in	defending	a	theological	conception	of	grace. 68.	"I	am	not	my	rosy	self/	Left	my	roses	on	my	shelf/	Take	the	wild	ones,	they're my	favorites/	It's	the	side	effects	that	save	us/	Grace/","Graceless"."	For	their comments, discussion, and encouragement throughout several developments of this paper, I am	grateful to Susan	Wolf, Thomas	E.	Hill Jr., Ryan Preston-Roedder,	Samuel	Reis-Dennis,	Robert	Smithson,	Douglas	MacLean, Benjamin	Bagley,	George	Sher,	John	Lawless,	and	Francey	Russell.	Especially helpful	with early versions	of this paper	was the conference	on	neglected virtues	held	in	honor	of	Rosalind	Hursthouse	at	the	University	of	Auckland in	2015;	my thanks,	especially, to	Glen	Pettigrove,	Noell	Birondo,	and	Nim Kirkham.	Especially	helpful	with	later	versions	of	this	paper	were	comments from	Michelle	Mason	Bizri	and	Bridget	Clarke	at the	2018	Eastern	APA in Savannah,	and	the	12th	Annual	Northwestern	Society	for	the	Theory	of	Ethics and	Politics	Conference in 2018. I am	grateful for comments from	and