Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 1 Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality Woomin Park (Seoul National University) Draft (10-6-2019) 1. Introduction The aim of this paper is to argue that Moore's paradox stands for Essential Indexicality because it occurs only when self-reference appears, and thus, for the case of Moore's paradox, to contend that it is not possible to construct a case of the Frege counterpart that Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever assert as a counterexample to John Perry's Essential Indexical. In their recent book, The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person (Cappelen and Dever 2013), Cappelen and Dever show that there is opacity in the indexical in the case of behavior explanation, but exactly the same kind of opacity between the coreferring expressions also holds in the third person case. They argue that the opacity in the case of indexical does not necessarily hold the special status of the indexicality (or first-person) because of the more general latter opacity. According to them, Perry's Essential Indexical, contrary to its name, does not address the nature of indexical but suggests that there is a failure of truth-preserving substitution between the indexical and their co-referring expressions in attitude-context. Because, in those cases, the difference between one sentence and the other is, after all, a difference in the cases of Frege's puzzle. In the case where the Essential Indexical is considered to have emerged, they claim that it is possible to present a counterpart (Frege Counterpart) that is the same in all respects except that it occurs between two co-referring expressions, not between the indexical and its co-referring expressions. Cappelen and Dever write that they provide (and can provide) the Frege Counterpart to all possible Perry-style cases that Essential Indexicals are present, but I think there is a case they haven't dealt with yet. This is the case of Moore's Paradox, which many philosophers thought is the example of the firstperson personality (e.g., Moran 1997). Moore's paradox is widely regarded as a typical example of the peculiarity of the first-person, but curiously, they did not address Moore's paradox in their discussions that deny the philosophical significance of the first-person view. Against their thesis, I will contend that the indexical (or first-person) still seems to have a special status, based on Moore's Paradox. When self-reporting on belief attribution, it sounds strange to say "p" and then say, "I don't believe p." This paradoxical situation only occurs when one uses a sentence with the first-person indexical that reports his attribution of belief in p. With my analysis of Moore's paradox presented in this paper, we will see Moore's paradox only happens with self-reference and then the inability to remove the indexical or first-person perspectives. If Moore's paradox does not occur without self-reference, the case of Moore's paradox is a failure of substitution that occurs only when Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 2 the indexical is involved even if it is a failure of truth-preserving substitutions between co-referring expressions. I will argue, in the case of Moore's paradoxical absurdity, there is no Frege Counterpart, such as a failure to replace between co-referring expressions where the same absurdity is a problem. In the end, I will conclude this suggests the peculiarity and irremovability of the first-person view. 2. Preliminaries: Perry's Messy Shopper & the Problem of Essential Indexical Many philosophers believe that John Perry's monumental article "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" (Perry 1979/2000) showed this: it convincingly argues that some beliefs, such as selflocating belief, that use indexical to refer themselves, have some conceptual element that is not explained only by its propositional content. Let us consider two men along Perry who have almost similar belief systems. The situation is this: They believed that "one of us is making a mess" and "anyone who makes a mess should stop making the mess." In fact, one of them, John Perry, bought perforated sugar sacks, so he unwittingly puts it in a shopping cart and wanders around. Based on their observations, they believed that the shopper with holey sugar bags is making a mess. No one stopped at those beliefs alone. Looking around, they found out that "John Perry is making a mess." Then one person stopped the cart. If the situation is the above, their belief systems would eventually be the same. However, what do you find out that if one person stopped making a mess, why would it be? Perhaps, the person who stopped would have stopped because he thought he was John Perry. Without it, he would not have reached the point where the messer had to stop and would still be making messes. Observations like this seem to make it difficult to regard belief-attribution as merely a simple binary relation between propositions and epistemic subjects, regardless of relations to any referential element. Consider two cases of a simple binary relation between propositions and subjects, de re relation and de dicto relation. In the case with de re relation between propositions and subjects, there is no distinction between the relation of the subject with "the shopper with holey sugar bags making a mess" and the relation of the subject with "John Perry is making a mess." If so, how can we explain the case why the messstopping event occurred when he had the latter belief? At first, Perry did not consider "The shopper with holey sugar bags making a mess" as the proposition about himself. After believing that "John Perry is making a mess," he regards "John Perry is making a mess" as the proposition about himself, and then he could conclude that "John Perry should stop." Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 3 Since John Perry stopped when he came to the latter belief, one could expect to explain this situation if the subject is related to the proposition in de dicto fashion where these beliefs can be distinguished naturally. However, if we are dealing with the case de dicto here, Perry believes in both beliefs at the same time but does not have the belief that I am making a mess. So, if Perry does not believe in "I'm a shopper with perforated sugar bags" or "I'm John Perry," he cannot draw conclusions like "I should stop" from the first two beliefs. After all, de dicto relation is not a solution to this situation and must be appealed to the indexicality. In both approaches, we do not seem to be able to explain this situation without appealing to something like "what I regard as a proposition about myself" or "what I regard as content about myself." In the end, the idea that this belief is de dicto or de re relation to the proposition does not seem to explain sufficiently the messy shopper case because it does not reflect the difference between the case with and without the indexicality. In addition, if John Perry says, "I made a mess," he expresses that he believes in a Russellian proposition <John Perry, making a mess>. But the other believes that same Russellian proposition, expressed by the belief report "John Perry has made a mess." Naturally, those who believe in the same proposition and make claims about it, but who are not John Perry, will hold it is false that "I make a mess." The proposition corresponding to this man's claim "I make a mess" is not about John Perry, but about himself and is therefore false. If so, the sentence "I make a mess" does not seem to identify some particular proposition. This shows that the belief report, such as "I believe I make a mess," does not have enough information that it is a belief-report on some particular proposition. Obviously, the propositional content of the beliefs shared by the two men in our example seems to be the same, but there seems to be a difference in the way in which the subject is related to propositional content. According to Perry, one breakthrough in solving this problem is to provide an explanation for it. In other words, it explains that any belief in the same proposition can be in a different state of belief if it is believed in a different way. Anyone can believe the proposition, <John Perry, making a mess> but only John Perry can have a state of belief that states, "I made a mess." When we have this type of belief in ourselves, we say that we have an indexical or de se belief. Because of that, he would have stopped making a mess. According to de re relation approach or the Russell propositional approach so far, we have the same belief in both cases when the indexical is replaced by a co-referring expression, just as when indexical has included in belief. However, when we have belief using the indexical, we have belief by means of some particular way, that is, an indexical way. If such indexicals are indispensable to describe some propositional attitude we have correctly, then the indexical used in that case can be called an Essential Indexical, and the phenomenon that emerges is called an Essential Indexicality. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 4 3. Cappelen and Dever: No Essential Indexical or Indexicality Perry, discussed in Section 2, contended that in the Self-Locating Belief, belief acquired by using Indexicals that directs believer himself, there is a conceptual element that is not explained solely by its propositional content. For the sake of understanding, consider the following example: Let us modify the example of the messy shopper case. Suppose John Perry forgot that his old name was Jack the Ripper, and this time it's the name tag that says Jack the Ripper, not sugar, that spilled over to the supermarket. He can look around and believe that "Jack the Ripper is making a mess," and at the same time, believe that "I am not making a mess." If I understood Perry correctly, given this situation, I assure he would argue that "John Perry" in the above example would not have stopped making a mess because he was no awareness that "Jack the Ripper is me." For example, in the case above where John Perry believes that "I'm John Perry," if John Perry had believed "John Perry is making a mess," he would have stopped making the mess right away. In other words, "I," "Jack the Ripper," and "John Perry" are all co-referring expressions, but the only valid ones in explanation for not-stopping are "I" and "John Perry." The other pairs of co-referring terms, "Jack the Ripper" and "I" cannot be substituted in this explanation. There is an opacity that occurs in indexicals, as in the case described above, but even in the third person case, an opacity between co-referring expressions seems to be established. Suppose someone who watched the case believed that "I'll have to find Jack the Ripper and stop him making the mess." However, this person does not seem to believe that "I'll have to find John Perry and stop him making a mess," which replaced "Jack the Ripper" with the co-referring term "John Perry" in the above statement. Cappelen and Dever point out that the more general latter (above third-person case) holds, so that opacity in the case of indexicals does not necessarily hold the special status of indexical (or firstperson) (Cappelen & Dever 2013, 61). They argue that the latter-type case can be presented for each of the cases that Perry and other philosophers believe that the Essential Indexical appears. That is, they present a failure of truth-preserving substitution case (Frege Counterpart), which differs only in that it occurs between two co-referring expressions, not between the indexical and its co-referring expressions, compared to the Perry-type case. As such, they argue that Perry's the problem of Essential Indexical eventually turned out to be Frege's puzzle. Originally, Frege distinguished sense (Sinn) from reference (Bedeutung) because he thought that the cognitive significance in a sentence or propositional attitude was not purely determined by the referential content of the expression. Thus, according to Cappelen and Dever, Perry's Essential Indexicality is not, as opposed to its name suggests, the essentiality of the indexical, but rather an indication of the impossibility of truth- Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 5 preserving substitution between the indexical and its co-referring expression in attitude-context. Because, in those cases, the difference between one sentence and the other is only the difference that emerged in the cases of Frege's puzzle. So they argue that it is possible to present Frege Counterparts, which are the same in all respects but generally occur between co-referring expressions, not only between indexicals and their co-referring expressions. In my opinion, they wisely pointed out the essential indexicality implies the failure of truthpreserving substitutions, and the failure of truth-preserving substitutions does not imply the essential indexicality, but rather imply the opacity in attitude-contexts in general. This is correct. Also, it is correct that they found out that the basis for advocating the Indexical Opacity in Perry's examples can, at the same time, be the basis for advocating General Opacity. Therefore, to present a case where Cappelen and Dever's arguments fail, I will show that there is a special opacity that only occurs in cases where indexical are used. In other words, if I can present a special case of indexicality that cannot be regarded as a failure of truth-preservative substitution between common co-referring expressions they call Frege Counterpart, it would be possible for me to present a counter-argument for them. However, to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings, it is advisable to point out that the problem of Essential Indexical and the problem of Essential Indexicality that Cappelen and Dever regard as one problem and are used interchangeably are different but closely related. If I have understood Perry correctly, as I have already mentioned, Perry's central claims can be summarized as follows: We do not seem to be able to explain this situation without appealing to something like the proposition about myself or the content about myself. If an indexical is indispensable to describe any propositional attitude we have properly, the indexical used in that case can be called an Essential Indexical, and the phenomenon that emerges is called an Essential Indexicality. (p.3) Can indexicality be expressed only as indexicals? In Perry's messy shopper's case, if John Perry regarded the name "John Perry" as something about himself, the belief that "John Perry created a mess" is John Perry's self-belief, and that belief does not necessarily have to be expressed using indexical. The Essential Indexicality can appear without the Essential Indexical. In conclusion, the essential indexicals are the most typical case of Essential Indexicality, but the Essential Indexicality can occur without the essential indexical. In other words, I do not need indexical "I," although I need indexicality to regard a proposition or sentence as something about myself. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 6 4. Moore's Paradox: What Cappelen and Dever did not consider Moore's paradox can be seen as an emblem for peculiarities in the first-person point of view, specifically how the possibilities for thinking and talking about oneself are systematically different from the possibilities of thinking and talking about other people. (Moran 1997, 143) Cappelen and Dever seem to write they provided (and can provide) the Frege Counterpart for every possible situation in which Perry claims the Essential Indexicality appears, but, I think, there are situations they have not yet realized. In some special circumstances, even without an apparent contradiction manifested at the proposition or sentence level, there seems to be a problem where having a certain type of belief-ascription is as contradictory. This is the case of Moore's Paradox, which many philosophers thought was an example of the peculiarities of first-person, independent of the problem of Essential Indexicality. In this section, as I analyze Moore's Paradox, I will present an example of the Essential Indexicality opposition to Cappelen and Dever. Further, the analysis in this section will also clarify the relationship between Moore's Paradox and the problem of the Essential Indexicality. Let us compare "p, but someone does not believe p" and "p, but I don't believe p." George Edward Moore finds out that the latter is a paradox. This can be called a paradox because it appears to be a kind of <p and not p> even though the truth condition of <p> in the latter sentence and the truth condition of <I do not believe p> are completely different. However, we do not feel any absurdity about the third person sentence "p, but someone does not believe p." The fact that p and the fact that someone believes p is clearly different. When no other conditions are given to us, the fact that p is true does not allow us to find a logical (the former logically implies the latter) or rational reason for someone to believe it. However, when the subject of the sentence is "I," the moment when we consider "p," it sounds absurd that "I don't believe p." This distinction between third-person and first-person cases suggests that there is the peculiarity of the first-person view. I contend this peculiarity has to do with the Essential Indexicality. Let us consider how Moore's paradox reveals the Essential Indexicality. Moore: "p, but I don't believe p." Me: "p, but Moore does not believe p." At first glance, the two assertions seem to express our belief in the same proposition, but why is it that it seems paradoxical or absurd that only one, Moore's statement, even though it does not have a formal paradox? To explain the difference between the two, I need to note the commonality with propositional attitude-explanatory situations that Perry sees the essential indexicality. In this situation, Moore Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 7 considers himself a person who does not believe in <p> by using the indexical "I," while I see Moore as a person who does not believe in <p>. To express this very point, Moore uses the indexical "I" to differentiate his belief-ascription from my belief-ascription that uses a sentence without the "I." With this motivation in mind, I shall note Cappelen and Dever's Frege Counterpart, which opposes Perry's the inessential indexicality: Frege Counterpart is a case like the original one in all relevant respect except that the substitution failure involves names instead of indexicals. (Cappelen & Dever 2013, 61) Here, the essence of my claim that Moore's paradox can be a counterexample to Cappelen and Dever is that Moore's paradox only occurs with self-reference. If Moore's paradox does not occur without selfreference, then even if the case of Moore's paradox is clearly a failure of truth-preserving substitutions between co-referring expressions, it is a failure of substitution that only occurs if an indexical expression is involved. What I should clearly show for my readers is that the absurdity of Moore's paradox is inextricably linked to self-reference. The use of self-referential expressions by us does not lead to Moore's paradox. Instead, Moore's paradox occurs only when (loosely speaking) the listener knows that he or she speaks about himself, that is when self-reference occurs. I shall begin the analysis from: (a) Moore: "p, but I don't believe p." When Moore utters the above sentence, we will have the following belief-report about Moore, and we will feel Moore-paradoxical absurdity. (b) Moore believes p, but Moore does not believe he believes p. Moore's self-report: I believe p, but I don't believe I believe p. However, what if this report is done without indexicals? (c) Moore believes p, but Moore does not believe Moore believes p. Moore's self-report: I believe p, but I believe Moore does not believe p Because of the opacity of the belief-context, in the above belief-report, if there is no, so-called, coordination between the name appearances 'Moore', at least the second appearance of the name 'Moore' and the third appearance of the name 'Moore' are expressions with the same referent but are not guaranteed the sameness of referent. This problem is made clearer by considering Moore's self-report. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 8 The situation in which this belief-report is made is a case in which, as Moore does not talk about himself through the name 'Moore,' it is a case that (d) Moore: "p, but Moore does not believe p." In the case of (d), we may feel absurdity, but if we judged that he is not talking about himself, then in case of (d), we would not feel Moore's paradoxical absurdity. Rather, it is a reasonable expectation to think that Moore talks about another person named "Moore." Two analyzes can be given for this, as in the case of Perry's messy shopper. If we analyze de re this belief report, both (b) and (c) indicate that Moore believes in contradictions. However, we have Moore's paradoxical absurdity only in cases like (a). Moore's paradoxical absurdity in only one of the two cases seems to be because Moore considers one case to be about himself, while the other is not. Therefore, the de re analysis does not provide a sufficient analysis of this case without appealing to the indexicality. If so, what about de dicto analysis? On the de dicto level, it seems that (b) and (c) are distinguished unless Moore has a belief such as "I am Moore," and no formal contradiction or conflict is found concerning (c) alone. The de dicto analysis, however, does not distinguish between Moore's self-reference with the name "Moore" (the case with Moore's belief that I am Moore) from no selfreference with regard to the same name. If we know that Moore refers himself by the name "Moore," we would also feel Moore's paradoxical absurdity in (d). The de dicto analysis, however, suggests that Moore made literally the same assertion in both cases. Therefore, we cannot distinguish between the appearance and the absence of Moore's paradoxical absurdity between them. To provide the right analysis, we should appeal to the belief such as "I am Moore" where the indexical appears. Why then did it seem to have absurd beliefs on one side, but not on the other? On one side, the indexical "I" or "he" appeared, while self-reference occurred, but not on the other. The indexical assured Moore that the believer is himself and that he believed in himself. Without self-reference, this would be the type of case (d), which shows that Moore's paradox does not occur unless it is a special case. As for the type of case (d), I shall examine a more clear example of how this type of case may or may not present Moore's paradoxical absurdity. Case: Professor John Perry, who has gained excessive weight as he ages, believes weight management is important for many adult illness concerns. On that day, the station filmed at Stanford University, and Prof. Perry, who was walking on campus, was filmed without a face. The next day, watching TV news covering Stanford University, he sees a passing professor (in fact, Perry himself) and thinks, "Huh! That Professor, he does not care about weight management." Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 9 Then John Perry can make the following assertion: (e) Perry: "Weight management is important, but that professor does not believe weight management is important." The above utterance is clearly an utterance about oneself and seems to have a structure of Moore's paradox. However, as long as the assertor considers the subject of the sentence containing "believe" as three-personal, rather than first-personal, we do not feel Moore-paradoxical absurdity. In other words, "that professor" is co-referring with "John Perry" but not as an expression of self (self-referential expression). On the other hand, let us say we know someone who uses third-personal expressions for self-reference, such as "Commander was disappointed in you." We will feel Moore-paradoxical absurdity when he utters the following sentence, (f) Commander: "The US–North Korea summit was held, but "commander" does not believe it" thinking that "commander" was used as a self-referential expression rather than an expression for another commander or a general term. From this observation, Moore's paradox does not seem to occur without self-reference. After all, it can be concluded that Moore's paradoxical absurdity occurs if and only if the subject uses the expression for self-reference when asserting a type of sentence such as "a proposition, the subject does not believe that very proposition."1 Moore's paradox in which proper nouns are involved is not intuitively clear, so I haven't provided a case where proper nouns are involved. However, this is no obstacle to my discussion. To illustrate this, I shall look again into "Jack The Ripper" example: Suppose John Perry forgot that his old name was Jack the Ripper, and this time it's the name tag that says Jack the Ripper, not sugar, that spilled over to the supermarket. He can look around and believe that "Jack the Ripper is making a mess," and at the same time, believe that "I am not making a mess." (p.4) 1 To understand my point, it should be clear that self-reference is indispensable to Moore's paradox. Thus, Moore's paradox, in which proper nouns are involved, is likely to confuse the discussion because it requires the provision of unusual devices such as memory loss. So far, I have not shown that self-reference is indispensable for Moore's paradox with examples of proper nouns involved. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 10 In that case, Perry further believes that "if anyone knows that they are making a mess, they stop making a mess." If so, the following belief report may be possible. (g) Perry: "Jack the Ripper is making a mess, and Jack The Ripper does not believe that Jack the Ripper is making a mess." He makes this report, and after we hear it, we feel no absurdity. If there is no self-reference, then we do not seem to have Moore-paradoxical absurdity. If there is an absurdity when we hear and feel these words, it probably does not come from Moore-paradoxical reasons exactly. This may be absurd because Jack the Ripper is himself, although the assertor, Perry himself, did not know it. To illustrate this, consider the following two reports: (h) Perry: "Jack the Ripper is making a mess, and John Perry does not believe Jack the Ripper is making a mess." (i) Perry: "Jack the Ripper is making a mess, and I don't believe Jack the Ripper is making a mess." (i) is clearly a typical Moore-paradox situation. (h) does not sound absurd at first glance. Suppose we know that John Perry considers himself "John Perry" and that he can use it to refer himself. Then, when John Perry utters (h), the absurdity of (h) we feel would also be Moore-paradoxical absurdity. What we can see here in the differences between these examples is that Moore's paradoxical absurdity relies on the presence of self-reference, more than a merely truth-preservative substitution of truth between coreferring expressions. The situation of Moore's paradox at the linguistic level is an example of the failure of truthpreserving substitution between the co-referring expressions in the belief-context. I admit, there is no new opacity puzzle. At the same time, however, the analysis I have presented in this section at least shows that self-referring through expression has the indexicality in the assertion-context and beliefcontext, which is a crucial element of the absurdity of Moore's paradox. Since Moore's paradox does not appear without self-reference, the case of Moore's paradoxical absurdity is a unique case that is a failure of truth-preserving substitution only between the indexical expression and its co-referring expression. Unlike the Perry-style-Cases, where Cappelen and Dever have already presented the Frege Counterpart, in this Moore's Paradox case, I have found a reason for advocating Indexical Opacity, but no reason for advocating General Opacity. I thus conclude, in the case of Moore's paradoxical absurdity, there is no Frege Counterpart, such as a failure to replace between co-referring names whose absurdity is a problem. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 11 In addition, as we have seen, there are cases in which proper nouns in a sentence function as if they had the characteristics of an indexical. So I argued that Moore's paradox could occur, at least in that case. Although the Indexical does not capture the core of Moore's paradox, the Indexicality still captures the core. So the Essential Indexicality, rather than the Essential Indexical, seem to be safe from the objection that Moore's paradox still occurs in cases of proper nouns. The question of whether there is an Essential Indexical is a matter of language expression, and it is a side issue of whether there is an Essential Indexicality. After all, the existence of Essential Indexicality is at the heart of our debate. Keeping the Essential Indexicality per se is my ultimate goal, and trying to protect the Essential Indexical as a language expression is not my ultimate goal. 5. Closing Remarks Modest Goal: (...) We try to show that none of the published arguments in favor of Essential Indexicality are strong or convincing. (...) Ambitious Goal: Prove that perspective and indexicality are philosophically shallow: they play no important explanatory roles in philosophy. (Cappelen and Dever 2013, 5) In the light of their goals, let me summarize my argument in this paper. Since I argue Moore's paradox stands for Essential Indexicality because it occurs only when self-reference appears, for the case of Moore's paradox, I contend that it is not possible to offer the Frege counterpart that Cappelen and Dever assert as a counterexample to Perry's Essential Indexical. So, in this paper, I provide a new argument in favor of Essential Indexicality against their first goals and the counterexample of their ultimate goals. Nevertheless, they were already skeptic of the existence of epistemological Essential Indexicality in their book as the Immunity to Error through Misidentification is powerless. Perhaps, they probably would respond to my argument like this: Moore's paradoxical absurdity is also powerless as if the IEM is powerless. I shall deal with this possible objection to my counterargument for their goals. Cappelen and Dever argued that there were no phenomena such as Immunity to Error through Misidentification (IEM), and then, based on this, they argued that there was no epistemological Essential Indexical. In this paper, I present Moore's paradox as a new ground for epistemological Essential Indexical. It seems plausible to suppose for them that there are no absurdities in Moore's paradox on the lines of their claim that there is no such absurdity by IEM. Also, to support the claim that there is no epistemological Essential Indexical, they make two further arguments that IEM cannot be the basis for the Essential Indexical (Cappelen and Dever 2013, 139). Introducing these arguments will help to construct their possible objections. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 12 (i) There is no IEM phenomenon that is philosophically interesting. (ii) Even if there is IEM phenomenon, it is not a deep or constructively indexical phenomenon. Many non-indexical beliefs are also immune to error through Misidentification (iii) There is no plausible explanation for the epistemological status of beliefs that are immune to error through misidentification derived from the epistemological status that originates in any indexical context. Based on this, three possible arguments about Moore's paradoxical absurdity can be constructed. (iv) There is no Moore's paradox that is philosophically interesting. (v) Moore's paradox, even if there is, is not a deep or constructively indexical phenomenon. Many non-indexical beliefs also cause Moore's paradox. (vi) There is no plausible explanation for the epistemological status of Moore's paradoxical phenomena derived from the epistemological status underlying any indexical context. Yet, isn't Moore's paradox obvious? I do not know with assurance what arguments support (iv) are possible. Also, I have already argued that claim (v) does not apply to Moore's paradox. Moore's paradox does not happen at least without self-reference. For (vi), are there deep reasons for not being able to raise the Frege Counterpart on Moore's paradox? Richard Moran says that Moore's paradox does not seem to be merely a pragmatic paradox or a linguistic phenomenon (Moran 1997, 144). Even if a person does not utter Moore's paradoxical sentences, the paradox still seems to arise if he has Moore's paradoxical type of belief (Moran 1997, 144). So, Moore's paradox leads us to expect that in the context of self-knowledge, there might be Essential Indexicality and essential de se attitude, as we have already seen in the analysis of the Paradox. I believe that the Essential Indexicality of Moore's paradox is ultimately based on the Essential Indexicality of Self-Knowledge. Consequently, I want to maintain it is possible to epistemologically defend the Essential Indexicality of Self-Knowledge based on Moran's theory of self-knowledge, regarding self-knowledge not as a matter of discovery but as a matter of self-determination (or selfconstitution). Moran writes: [W]e can see it[self-knowledge] as a rational requirement on belief, on being a believer, that one should have access to what one believes in a way that is radically non-evidential, that does not rely on inference from anything inner or outer. (Moran 1997, 143) Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 13 Though I cannot introduce it in detail here, according to him, our self-knowledge is the result of our rational ability to decide what is true. To illustrate that the evidential view is not right, let us suppose evidential view is right: what we do to find out what we want to do is to discover internal evidence. If so, what is the connection between what we discover and what we do after? It is just a causal relationship. In that relationship, we cannot find the very point that I decide my actions. What is more, even though I cannot be sure about what will actually happen, it is strange that it is impossible to decide what I want to do as in the evidence-discovery-view (Moran 1997, 157). However, if what we need to do to know what we want to do is decide whether we do, then the decision and the knowledge about what we will do is under my agential power. Matthew Boyle, an enthusiastic advocate of Moran, summarizes Moran's claim as that, I think Moran's idea-that I can have transparent knowledge of my own beliefs because they are expressions of my rational agency. (...) Briefly, the idea would be that, for a rational creature, believing P just is being in a condition of actively holding P to be true. (Boyle 2011, 235-6) Though Moran didn't pay attention exactly quotes below, Gareth Evans already dealt with the selfknowledge in a similar point: I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p. (Evans 1982, 256) Also, Moran writes: In the first-person perspective on belief, however, my primary relation is not to the fact of having some belief but rather the commitment to its truth and what that requires of me. Detaching my relation to a state of belief (mine or another's) from the commitment to its truth is precisely what would allow for discretionary reasons in relation to its production. The first-person point of view presumes the absence of such separation, presumes the identity of the considerations in favor of the thing believed with the fact of one's believing it. (Moran 2012, 235) To summarize the citations, I think Moran is making the following claim: The answer to the following questions for the agent should be determined at the same time and should be the same. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 14 (1) Whether p (2) Whether I believe p So far, by excogitating the contents of these self-commitments, we have seen that self-knowledge is essentially indexical and de se. (3) The agent commits that p. (4) The agent commits that he believes that p. The agent must be convinced that the person who believes that p is himself and not anyone else. If his believed object is someone else, he does not have a belief in himself. To reflect this, because we cannot remove the indexical "he" as co-referring the agent in (4) above (obviously, its counterpart is "I" in (2)) in that sense, the indexical used here can be said to be the Essential Indexical. To make this clearer, I shall deal with the relationship between Moore's paradox and the indexicality of self-knowledge. According to my analysis of Moran, if we commit p to be true, at the same time, we are in a position to believe p. If we are not in such positions by judging that p is true, we will have to allow an epistemic agent who commits p to be true but does not believe p. Eventually, it is Moore's Paradox. Through this observation, we see that the absurdity of Moore's paradox is grounded in the absurdity of making "self-alienation"2 between one who commits p to be true and one who believes that p. Through this, we can explain why Moore's paradoxical absurdity arises: we feel absurd when we know that someone is self-alienated. Furthermore, to rationally have a belief that p, according to Moran, the agent must have had a commitment that p is true. I shall briefly explain why. Let us suppose I have a belief that p. At this time, for instance, if someone claims to me through third-person evidence of me that "you don't believe p," will I recant my belief that p? If I withdraw that belief, this recantation shows that I am not very confident in myself as a rational epistemic agent. That is, if I do not have a commitment to p, my belief that "I believe that p" is too easily recanted.3 On the epistemological level, Moore's paradox is inextricably linked to self-reference, which confirms that the theory of self-knowledge provided by Moran is corroborated. Clearly, Moore's paradoxical absurdity is a matter of self-belief, which manifests itself in the question of self-knowledge. As I have argued, since self-knowledge has the Essential Indexicality, Moore's paradox could only occur in the case of Essential Indexicality. Provided Moran's theory of self-knowledge is right, the reason why the Frege Counterpart cannot be raised in the context of Moore's paradox at the level of philosophy of 2 This word is borrowed from Moran (Moran 1997, 143, 155). 3 Be careful. I am not saying here that such recantation should not be allowed. Moore's Paradox and Essential Indexicality 15 language is not just a coincidence but is that the paradox is a phenomenon based on the epistemological Essential Indexicality. I would like to leave this as a matter for my further research. 6. Reference Matthew Boyle 2011, "Transparent Self-Knowledge." Proceedings of Aristotelian Society Supplementary, 85:1, 223-241. Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever 2013, The Inessential Indexical: The Inessential Indexical: On the Philosophical Insignificance of Perspective and the First Person, Oxford University Press. Gareth Evans 1982, The Varieties of Reference, Oxford University Press. Richard Moran 1997, "Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing" European Journal of Philosophy. 5:2, 141-61. Richard Moran 2012, "Self-Knowledge, 'Transparency', and the Forms of Activity" in Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and Daniel Stoljar, 211-237. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2012. John Perry 1979, "The Problem of the Essential Indexical" reprinted in John Perry 2000, The Problem of the Essential Indexical and Other Essays, Expanded ed., CSLI Publications.