A Method for Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy Un método para evaluar argumentos por analogía Bo R. Meinertsen Department of Philosophy, Tongji University, Shanghai, China meinertsen@tongji.edu.cn Received: 10-09-2015. Accepted: 28-12-2015. Abstract: It is a common view that arguments from analogy can only be evaluated on	a	case-by-case	basis.	However,	while	this	reflects	an	important	insight,	I	propose instead a relatively simple method for their evaluation based on just (i) their general form and (ii) four core questions. One clear advantage of this proposal is that it does not depend on any substantial (and controversial) view of similarity, unlike some influential	alternative	methods,	such	as	Walton's.	Following	some	initial	clarification of the notion of analogy and similarity, I demonstrate the strength of this method by analysing and evaluating three prominent arguments from analogy. Keywords: Analogy, similarity, arguments from analogy, general form, evaluation. Resumen: Es una visión común que los argumentos por analogía solo pueden ser evaluados	sobre	la	base	del	caso	a	caso.	No	obstante,	y	a	pesar	de	que	esto	refleja	un elemento importante, propongo un método simple para su evaluación basado en (i) su	forma	general	y	(ii)	cuatro	preguntas	medulares.	Siguiendo	algunas	clarificaciones iniciales sobre la noción de analogía y similaridad, demuestro la fuerza de este método analizando y evaluando tres argumementos por analogía prominentes. Palabras clave: Analogía, similaridad, argumentos por analogía, forma general, evaluation. 1. Introduction In both ordinary and academic thought and talk, a very common type of argument is arguments from analogy. It is natural, therefore, that such arCOGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 110 guments are considered important to critical thinking and its textbooks. McKay (2000), Salmon (2012) and Kelley (2013), for instance, each devotes a chapter to them.1 However, there is no consensus on how such arguments should be evaluated, so it is an open question how to tell whether or not a particular argument from analogy is cogent or not, good or bad. In this paper, I shall put forward a simple method for answering this question. Note that, other things being equal, the virtue of simplicity is particularly attractive for a subject area like critical thinking, which is highly orientated towards applications and practice. This includes, of course, the popular teaching of it to students from majors other than philosophy: often their focus has to be on the most applicable and simple parts of critical thinking in general and arguments from analogy in particular. In order to put forward such a method, we need two things. Firstly, we need to possess a proper understanding of what I shall call the "general form" of arguments from analogy. For only when we can put a given argument	from	analogy	in	its	general	form	are	we	able	to	explicate	it	sufficiently to evaluate it. Secondly, we need to know the basic questions or parameters for its evaluation given its general form (that is, roughly, a method for evaluating it given this general form). I shall propose such a general form and a total of four evaluation questions, based in particular on work by McKay (2000) and Divers (1997). Putting an argument from analogy into this general form and answering the four evaluation questions jointly provide a method for how to evaluate an argument from analogy. 2. Analogy and Similarity As pointed out by Juthe (2005), a considerable proportion of reasoning using analogy actually is not in the form of arguments. A lot of use of analogies instead consists in attempts at describing phenomena and enhancing our understanding of them; in particular, phenomena that are unfamiliar to us. But as Juthe himself, I shall focus on reasoning with analogies that involve	"arguments	from	analogy".	However,	for	this	we	first	need	to	briefly 1 Their importance is by no means universally recognised, however: Fisher (2004), for example, does not even seem to mention them (though Fisher (2011) does). COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 111 expound the notion of analogy in itself. At the heart of this notion is the concept of similarity. To call something "an analogy" or "analogous" is to say that it is similar to something else, in a respect that is understood in the context in which it is claimed. To say that two cases are analogous or that one is an analogy of the other is thus to make a certain comparison between the two cases. The first	case	we	shall	call	the	theme; the second case, which is claimed to be analogous to the theme, we shall call the analogue. The analogy is the relationship of similarity between the two.2 In the so-called "descriptive" use of analogies, they are used merely to describe the theme. Consider an interesting example of the descriptive use of analogy (McKay, 2000, p. 102): "The galaxies are receding from each other like raisins in a pudding that is spreading	out	over	the	floor."	Using	this	analogy	makes	the	claims	there	is a similarity between the galaxies receding from another (the theme) and the	raisins	receding	from	another	in	a	pudding	spreading	out	over	the	floor (the analogue). It is this feature of similarity that is the most basic feature of an analogy. Indeed, the descriptive use of analogy is a special case of a simile	–	a	very	common	figure	of	speech	in	which	something	is	likened	to something else, usually preceded by the word "as" or, as in this example, "like", e.g. "He was cold as ice" and "Love is like a rollercoaster".3 While the descriptive use of analogy in itself does not play any very important role in arguments in our sense, it is very useful in general thought and talk. For it provides a helpful way of making vivid something that is difficult	to	visualise.	Raisins	spreading	in	a	pudding	on	the	floor	is	easy	to picture, but galaxies spreading from one another certainly is not, and similarly in other cases of the descriptive use of analogy. A descriptive use of analogy often suggests that there are more than one respect of similarity between the theme and the analogue, or more precisely, more than one property shared by the theme and the analogue. This is a general feature of analogies – and points to a general problem with them: their scope. It is often not very clear how many features the theme and the 2 The word "analogy" is commonly also used for the analogue itself, but it is useful to have	a	specific	term	for	it	("analogue"). 3 Not to be confused with metaphors, which do not assert similarity, but attribute a property or make a claim of identity in a non-literal sense without the use of "like" or "as", e.g. "His eyes were burning with anger" and "She is a rising star". A	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen 112 analogue are supposed to share. Raisins in a pudding spreading out over the	floor	recede	from	each	other	derivatively	on	the	spreading	out	of	the pudding;	specifically,	as	parts	of	the	spreading	out	of	the	material	they	are embedded in. But it is not clear if the analogy suggests that this is also the way galaxies recede from each other. This	uncertainty	about	the	scope	of	analogy	is	reflected	in	a	general	indeterminacy in the evaluation of arguments from analogy. It is arguably one of the main reasons why these arguments have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, as is often held. One way round this predicament is per	haps	to	provide	a	definition	or	theory	of	similarity	that	fits	in	with	the evaluation of ar guments from analogy. A lot of effort in the literature on is devoted to this: see, for instance, Walton (2012). The method I am proposing here, howev er, does not require any particular substantial of similarity. Accordingly, in the following section, I shall attempt to apply one and the same "general" method to three different examples of arguments from analogy, all the while being as quiet as possible about similarity. 3. Evaluation of Arguments from Analogy In an argument from analogy, the analogy is used to draw the conclusion that a thing or case has a certain property because it is similar to another case	which	has	that	property.	Specifically,	it	is	held	that	a	certain	case	A,	the analogue, is similar to another case T, the theme; that A has the property G; and that therefore T has property G too. Accordingly, a more precise rendering of the form of arguments from analogy on this construal is this: The General Form of Arguments from Analogy (P1) A (the analogue) and T (the theme) are similar (analogous) in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (P2) A has the additional property G. \ T has the property G.4 4 This is very much a "traditional" formulation of the form of arguments from analogy, which found one of its classic expressions in Thomas Reid"s Essays on the Intellectual COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 113 Consider now an example of an argument from analogy: Case 1: The balance of payments is a measure of economic health, not a cause of it;	restricting	imports	to	reduce	that	deficit	is	like	sticking	the	thermometer in ice water to bring down a feverish temperature.5 Here the conclusion, which is merely implied, is that one should not restrict imports	in	order	to	reduce	the	payment	deficit.	To	understand	this argument, let	us	first	say	that	trying	to	reduce	a	feverish	temperature	by sticking the thermometer in ice water is trying to change bodily health by manipulating one of its indicators (temperature). The author implies that (i) one cannot reduce a feverish temperature in this way and – arguably – also that one should not try to do so. Let us further say that trying to reduce a	payment	deficit	by	restricting imports is likewise	trying	to	change	economic	health	by	manipulating	one	of	its	indicators	(a	payment	deficit).	The author	implies	that	(ii)	one	cannot	reduce	a	payment	deficit	that	way	either and – arguably again – also that one should not try to do it. Thus, the example instantiates the general form of arguments from analogy as follows: (1) Bodily health and economic health are similar in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (2) Bodily health has the additional property of "not being changeable by manipulation of its indicators" and one should not try to do this (such that one cannot reduce a feverish temperature by sticking a thermometer in ice water and should not try to do this). \ Economic health has the property of "not being changeable by manipuPowers of Man	(Essay	1,	Ch.	4).	An	influential	similar	formulation	among	contemporary authors is Walton's "argumentation scheme" for arguments from analogy (Walton et al., pp. 56, 315). 5 Michael Kinsley, "Keep Trade Free", The New Republic, vol. 188 (1983), p. 111, quoted in McKay (2000, p. 110). A	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen 114 lation of its indicators" and one should not try to do this (such that one cannot	reduce	a	payment	deficit	by	restricting	imports	and	should	not	try to do this). The	clarification	of	the	argument	obtained	by	putting	it	in	general	form like this will enable us to formulate the core questions required for evaluation of arguments from analogy. What should these questions "ask to", i.e. concern? They should not concern whether or not arguments from analogy are deductively valid, since, I shall assume, arguments from analogy are deductively invalid.6 Rather, they should concern how "reasonable" the argument is. "Reasonable" means "agreeable to reason", a notion that I shall	not	attempt	to	elucidate	here	(it	suffices	for	our	purposes	to	take	it	as primitive). An argument from analogy can be more or less reasonable. The more reasonable it is, the better it is; and conversely, the less reasonable it is, the worse it is. Unfortunately, there are not any straightforward criteria for when an argument from analogy is reasonable. We can, however, as pointed out by Divers (1997), ask the following four questions when trying to evaluate an argument from analogy, and this will get us a long way: Divers' Four Core Questions for Arguments from Analogy (Q1) Which two cases, A and T, are claimed to be similar (analogous)? (Q2) (i) What (property or) properties F1,..., Fn are supposed to make A and T similar (and from which further similarity is inferred) and (ii) is this supposition reasonable? (Q3) What property G is attributed to T in the conclusion? (Q4) (i) What kind of connection is supposed to exist between F1,..., Fn and G and (ii) is this supposition reasonable? These questions are endorsed from Divers (ibid.), though the evaluative additions (Q2ii) and (Q4ii) are my own. It is beyond the scope of this paper to 6 This is not an uncontroversial assumption (cf. e.g. Shecaira, 2013), but one that need not concern us in this paper. COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 115 give any independent account of them. For our present purposes, they are simply	to	be	taken	at	face	value	and	justified	by	the	work	they	are	brought to do below. They are my version of Walton's "critical questions" for arguments from analogy: as Walton points out, any argumentation scheme (my "general form") has associated with it a set of such "critical" questions which can be used in the evaluation of the type of argument represented by the scheme (Walton et al 2008, pp. 15ff). Walton's own set of critical questions for his argumentation scheme for arguments from analogy (ibid., p. 315)	mainly	concerns	the	notion	of	similarity	(specifically,	2	of	the	3	questions constituting the set). In line with his emphasis on this notion, he puts forward models of similarity using so-called "stories" or "scripts" from artificial	intelligence	(Walton	2012;	Walton	2013,	pp.	34-38).	As	mentioned above, the	method I propose	here attempts to sidestep specific views of similarity. I believe this is one of its advantages – especially for the purposes of teaching arguments from analogy in critical thinking – but this is not something I shall discuss in the present paper. Of Divers' four questions, it is (Q2) and Q(4) that are critical; (Q1) and (Q3)	are	only	needed	for	specification	of	the	parameters	A,	T	and	G.	Is	it reasonable	to	postulate	the	property	or	properties	identified	in	the	answer to	(Q2),	and	is	it	reasonable	to	postulate	the	kind	of	connection	identified in the answer to (Q4)? If, and only if, the answers to both of these questions	are	affirmative,	we	shall	say	that	the	argument	from	analogy	in	case as a whole is "reasonable". If, on the contrary, the answer to one or both of them is "no", we might choose to say that the argument from analogy is a fallacy of false analogy. To see these questions at work, let us answer each of them for Case 1: (1) It is easy to determine that the two things that are claimed to be analogous are bodily health (A) and economic health (T), thereby answering (Q1). (2) By contrast, it is not as easy to answer (Q2). For in Case 1, as in many other arguments from analogy, the (property or) properties which are supposed to make the theme and the analogue similar are not made explicit. Fortunately, however, we can normally infer which (property or) properA	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen 116 ties the proponent of the argument is tacitly assuming to be involved. Thus, in this example, it seems clear that both the state of the economy involved and the state of the body involved are claimed to be cases of "health". So A (bodily health) and T (economic health) are assumed to share "healthrelated" properties such as "being more or less wholesome," "depending for its wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts", and so on. Is this supposition reasonable? Yes, intuitively, just like we often talk of the "health" of complex systems other than bodies, including computers, cars, families, teams, societies etc., and assume they share "health-related" properties with bodies, it seems to be a reasonable assumption that both the state of the body and the state of the economy share the mentioned features. (3)	Like	the	first	question,	(Q3)	can	be	answered	trivially.	The	property	G attributed to T (economic health) in the conclusion is, as stated explicitly in the general form for the argument, simply the property of "not being changeable by manipulation of its indicators". (4)	The	final	question,	(Q4),	however,	is	more	difficult.	The	connection	between the shared (property or) properties F1,..., Fn and the property G attributed to economic health in the conclusion is probably assumed by the proponent of the argument to be similar if not identical to the connection between these properties and G for the analogue (bodily health). If so, it is arguably some kind of law-like connection which determines connections between properties and what is and what is not possible. Is this supposition reasonable? Yes, it is. For it is it plausible that there is a law-like connection which rules out that it is possible for a state to have the properties of "being more or less wholesome," "depending for its wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts" etc. (F1,..., Fn) and simultaneously to lack the negative property of "not being changeable by manipulation of its indicators" (G). We certainly have strong evidence based on observations of bodily health that such a connection holds for it. There is a question of which sense of "possible" is afoot here, but this we need not go into. For whichever it is, it seems very plausible that if the theme, here economic health, also has F1,..., Fn – and, as mentioned, that seems COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 117 a reasonable assumption – then it too has G. In short, this argument from analogy is reasonable. Let us consider a second case of an argument from analogy, and employ again our method of the general form and the four core questions. The following is from an essay by C.S. Lewis: Case 2: You can get a large audience together for a strip-tease act – that is, to watch a girl undress on the stage. Now suppose that you came to a country	where	you	could	fill	a	theatre	simply	by	bringing	a	covered	plate	onto the stage and then slowly lifting the cover so as to let everyone else see, just before the lights went out, that it contained a mutton chop or a bit of bacon, would you not think that in that country something had gone wrong with the appetite for food? (1952, p. 75) The	analogue	(A)	here	is	mutton	chop/appetite	for	food	and	the	theme	(T) is	strip-tease	shows/appetite	for	sex.	Of	course,	this	analogue	is	imagined only, but this does not matter for our purposes.7 The example instantiates the general form like this: (P1) Appetite for food (mutton chop) and appetite for sex (strip-tease shows) are similar in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (P2) Appetite for food has the additional property of having gone wrong (having become unhealthy) when it attracts a large audience who pay to have it peeked by watching unveiling of its objects on stage. \ Appetite for sex has the property of having gone wrong when it attracts a large audience who pay to have it peeked by watching unveiling of its objects on stage. 7 Since the analogue is imagined only, we might say, using the terminology of Govier (2012), that this is an example of an a priori argument from analogy, as opposed to the inductive argument from analogy of Case 1. A	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen 118 Consider next the four core questions: (1) It is easy to determine that the two things that are claimed to be analogous	are	unveiled	mutton	chop/appetite	for	food	(A)	and	strip-tease	shows/ appetite for sex (T). (2) The property or properties that are supposed to make A and T similar are that, roughly, people will gather (and pay) to have this appetite stimulated/peeked by "teasing" presentation of its object on stage (which of course is merely imagined in case of the food appetites). In my view, this (imagined) similarity does not seem reasonable. There are similarities between appetite for food and appetite for sex, such as both of them having a physiological underpinning, but one of the major dissimilarities is that it is entirely normal (in a certain cross-cultural sense) for a huge part of the appetite (drive) for sex to be directed at other objects than the biological act of sex it self – indeed, on some views, such as perhaps those of Freud, more or less everything. By contrast, this is arguably not the case for appetite for food: it is mainly only directed at food itself, and derivatively only at its closely related antecedents, such as anticipating eating or cooking. Thus, the analogy is not plausible. (3) Like in our previous example, it is easy to answer (Q3). The property attributed to T in the conclusion is the property of having gone wrong. (4) Finally, we come to (Q4). The connection between F1,..., Fn and the property of having gone wrong may be that F1,..., Fn concern natural appetites whose satisfaction are incompatible with the "wrong" behaviour mentioned by Lewis, or something along those lines. Recall in any case that a good evaluation in the answer to each of (Q4) and (Q2) is a necessary condition for the argument in case being reasonable, and since we already demonstrated that this is not the case for (Q2), we do not need to attend very carefully to (Q4). Thus we can conclude that Lewis's argument from analogy is not reasonable. In a more formal manner of speaking, it is "fallacious". The fact that an argument from analogy can fail as an argument is, like COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 119 the general problem with the scope of analogies mentioned above, related to the notion of similarity ("being analogous to"). Everything is similar to everything	else	in	indefinitely	many	respects.	For	that	reason,	in	a	sense, anything can be said to be an analogy of any entity! To avoid this trivialisation of analogies – and to avoid committing the fallacy of false analogy – it is important to be aware of which properties are singled out and claimed to be shared by the theme and the analogue. They should be non-trivial properties and they should be properties that concern important aspects of each. The properties which we found reasonable in our analysis of Case 1 – "being more or less wholesome," "depending for its wholesomeness on the functioning of its parts", and so on – are good examples of such properties. What such properties are varies from case to case. But we can say something general about what they are not. They are not properties such as "being an entity", "being self-identical", "being coloured if green", and other properties which necessarily applies to any object whatsoever. For since they apply to any object, the similarity that comes from sharing them is precisely not non-trivial. But clearly, as our method of evaluation shows, no such trivial properties are involved in Case 2. Nonetheless, one might have had a knee-jerk reaction to this argument as being weak anyway, holding that the element of disanalogy uncovered in the answer to (Q2) simply is too obvious. Consider, therefore, an argument from analogy where it in any case is not obvious whether the analogy is implausible or not. The following passage from a classic work by Viktor Frankl is our example of this: Case 3: A man's suffering is similar to the behaviour of a gas. If a certain quantity	of	gas is	pumped into	an	empty	chamber, it	will	fill the	chamber evenly,	no	matter	how	big	the	chamber.	Thus	suffering	completely	fills the human soul and conscious mind, no matter whether the suffering is	great	or	little.	Therefore	the	"size"	of	human	suffering	is	[...]	relative. (1946, p. 55) The analogue A here is the size of a certain quantity of gas and the theme T the "size" of human suffering. Frankl seems to be implicitly assuming some A	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen 120 kind	of	equivalence	between	the	alleged	fact	that	suffering	completely	fills the human soul and conscious mind and its "size" being relative. If so, on a charitable reading of the quoted passage, he is also implicitly assuming some (very similar) kind of equivalence between the alleged fact that a gas fills	an	empty	chamber	and	its	size	being	relative.	These	assumptions	are problematic,	but	fortunately	not	something	we	need	to	go	into	here.	Suffice is to say that, given these assumptions, we should not really separate the passage's explicit conclusion of suffering's "size" being relative from the claim	of	its	completely	filling	the	human	soul	and	conscious	mind.	Let	us do this in the comparatively informal manner of the following formulation of the general form of the argument: (1) The behaviour of a gas and human suffering are similar in that they both have properties F1,..., Fn. (2) A quantity of gas (big or small) has the additional property that when pumped	into	a	chamber,	it	fills	it	evenly,	no	matter	how	big	the	chamber; that is, its size is relative. \	Human	suffering	has	the	property	that	that	it	completely	fills	the	human soul and conscious mind, whether the suffering is great or small; that is, its size is relative. Let us next answer the four core questions for this argument: (1) As already mentioned, the two things that are claimed to be analogous are the size of a certain quantity of gas (A) and the "size" of human suffering (T). (2) The property or properties that are supposed to make A and T similar in this case are that, roughly, a gas occupying a chamber is similar to human suffering "occupying" the conscious mind. Is it plausible to postulate this property? Well, that depends on how we consider the highly metaphorical claim that there is the involved similarity. We of course commonly employ analogies and metaphors (the differCOGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 121 ence between analogies and metaphors does not matter to our purposes here) in our thought and talk about mental matters, e.g. when we claim there is a gap – analogous to a spatial gap – between thinking about doing something and actually doing it, and we often do this as a matter of course (Johnson and Lakoff 2003). But this takes place with common (and "dead") metaphors, and it is one thing to use such common metaphors, it is quite another to use a highly speculative and controversial one as Frankl does here.8	Thus,	without	a	lot	of	independent	justification,	I	would	argue that positing this similarity and hence the involved property is implausible. (3) Like in our previous examples, it is straightforward to answer (Q3). The property attributed to T in the conclusion is stated explicitly there: Human suffering has the property that its "size" is relative in the sense that it completely	fills	the	human	soul	and	conscious	mind,	whether	the	suffering is great or small. (4) Finally, we come to (Q4). However, since we have already seen that the similarity, or property, allegedly shared by A and T is not plausible, we have	sufficient	reason	to	conclude	that	this	argument	from	analogy	is	not reasonable. The answer to (Q4), whatever it may be, is thus not needed in this case either. In Frankl's case, like in Lewis's, the failure of the argument is thus already exposed in the answer to (Q2), halfway through the four core questions. By contrast, in our example of a "reasonable" argument from analogy – Case 1 above – we need to go through every one of the questions. In future research, I intend to investigate if this asymmetric pattern can be generalized to all arguments from analogy susceptible to the simple method of evaluation advocated in the present paper. 8 It may be that the "size" of suffering is relative in the sense at issue – a view which Frankl argues for in various ways – and if so, it is reasonable to liken it to the adduced fact about a gas. But whether or not this controversial view is correct is a matter independent of the evaluation of the present argument from analogy in itself. A	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen 122 4. Conclusion If what I have argued in this paper is correct, my proposed method for evaluation of arguments from analogy is able to do useful work. This method consists only of the general form of these arguments along with four "critical questions". Importantly, it is simpler than other methods that rely on a substantial notion of similarity, such as Walton's. As we saw, it is true that the notion of similarity is central to the notion of analogy, and my method of course mentions the former. But, perhaps ironically, it does not require any particular view of this notion. Since it is thus not burdened by having to carry	on	its	shoulders	an	accompanying	definition,	model	or	theory	of	similarity,	it	is	simple	and	flexible.	This	makes	it	fit	in	well	with	the	common view that arguments from analogy should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Of course, further theoretical work is needed to compare in detail my method with Walton's and others' similarity-orientated theories. In addition, other, more applied, research incorporating education science is required	to	argue	for	my	specific	view	that	my	method	is	superior	in	the	context of teaching of arguments from analogy in critical thinking. But at this point, I hope some initial proof of my method's pudding has been shown by the use of it in the present paper.9 Works Cited Divers. John. Reason and Argument. Unpublished MS, University of Leeds, 1997. Fisher, Alec. The Logic of Real Arguments (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Fisher, Alec. Critical Thinking: An Introduction (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Frankl, Viktor. Man's Search for Meaning. Boston: Beacon Press, 1992. Govier, Trudy. A Practical Study of Argument (7th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning, 2012. 9 For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper or for stimulating discussions about arguments from analogy, I am grateful to John Divers, Roger White, Mike Wilby and the anonymous reviewers for Cogency. COGENCY Vol. 7, N0. 2 (109-123), Summer 2015 ISSN 0718-8285 123 Johnson, M. & Lakoff, G. Metaphors We Live by. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003. Juthe, André. "Arguments by Analogy". Argumentation, 19 (2005): 1-27. Kelley, David. The Art of Reasoning: An Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (4th ed.). New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2013. Lewis, Clive. Mere Christianity. London: Macmillan, 1952. McKay, Thomas. Reasons, Explanations and Decisions. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2000. Reid, Thomas. Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, many editions. Salmon, Merrilee. Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking (6th ed.). Boston: Cengage Learning, 2012. Shecaira, Fábio. "Analogical Arguments in Ethics and Law: A Defence of Deductivism". Informal Logic, 33 (2012): 406-37. Walton, Douglas. "Story Similarity in Arguments from Analogy". Informal Logic, 32 (2012): 190-218. Walton, Douglas. "Argumentation Schemes for Argument from Analogy". In Ribeiro, H. (Ed.), Systematic Approaches to Argument by Analogy (pp. 23-40). Dordrecht: Springer, 2013. Walton, D., Reed, C. & Macagno, F. Argumentation Schemes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. A	Method	for	Evaluation	of	Arguments	from	Analogy	/	B. r. Meinertsen