THE	GOOD	FLOW:	HOW	HAPPINESS	EMERGES	FROM	THE	SKILLFUL ENACTMENT	OF	MORALITY A	thesis	submitted	to	the	faculty	of San	Francisco	State	University In	partial	fulJillment	of the	requirements	for the	Degree Master	of	Arts In Philosophy by Justin	Donald	Kitchen San	Francisco,	California May	2016 Copyright	by Justin	Donald	Kitchen 2016 THE	GOOD	FLOW:	HOW	HAPPINESS	EMERGES	FROM	THE	SKILLFUL	ENACTMENT OF	MORALITY Justin	Donald	Kitchen San	Francisco,	California 2016 In this paper, I will argue that 'being good' positively correlates to 'being happy.' First,	I	will	clarify	how	I'll	be	using	the	word	'morality'	and	the	phrase	'being	good'. Second, I will claim that	moral goodness is developed and exercised as a kind of practical	skill.	This	will	allow	me	to	propose	that 'being	good'	–	like	other	complex and	engaging	skills	–	entails	the	elicitation	of	a	kind	of	Jlow	experience.	Third,	I	will propose	that	'being	good'	involves	achieving	what	I'll	call	'vertical	coherency'	within one's life	and that this	provides sustained	engagement ('Jlow')	and	meaning	while exercising	moral goodness. Lastly, I	will show	why the kind of happiness that	we truly	want	for	ourselves	and	those	we	care	about	emerges	from	a	moral	engagement –	a	'good	Jlow'	–	of	the	sort	described. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	AND	PREFACE I would like to thank those who have shaped my academic life and helped me produce this paper. Several professors from	RCC,	UCB, and	CSUEB	helped nurture my incipient interest in philosophy and religion. At SFSU, Justin Tiwald and Mohammad Azadpur helped	me appreciate virtue ethics and the notion of moral cultivation.	They	and	Michael	Sudduth	reinforced	this	appreciation	by	exposing	me to	wisdom	traditions	that	have	articulated	such	cultivation	in	different	ways.	I	would also	like	to	thank	David	Landy	who	helped	me	develop	a	similar	paper	as	part	of	his seminar	on	philosophical	writing.	Finally,	I	would	like	to	thank	my	partner,	Virginia. She	helped	me	maintain	the	patience,	equanimity,	and	emotional	fortitude	to	Jinish this	project	(among	many	others).	I	could	not	have	done	it	without	her	support. This	work	was	written	for	many	reasons:	in	general,	because	morality	and	happiness seem to	be the	most important concepts to fall	within the	purview	of	philosophy; more	speciJically,	because	the	view	articulated	in	this	paper	is	a	sincere	expression of	what	I	believe	to	be	true. यथा	िचत्तं	तथा	वाणी	यथा	वाणी	तथा	िक्रया	। िचत्ते	वािच	िक्रयाया	ंच	साधूनामेकरूपता	।।  iv TABLE	OF	CONTENTS Part	1:	Introduction 1	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Part	2:	Morality	&	Virtue 2	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2.1.	'Being	good'	is	a	kind	of	disposition 3	------------------------------------------------------------2.2.	'Being	good'	entails	performing	good	actions. 3	------------------------------------------------2.3.	'Being	good'	has	an	affective	dimension. 4	-------------------------------------------------------2.4.	'Being	good'	has	an	intellectual	dimension. 4	---------------------------------------------------2.5.	Some	additional	remarks	on	moral	goodness 5	-------------------------------------------------Part	3:	Moral	Goodness	As	a	Skill:	A	defense	and	expansion	of	the	"skill	analogy" 6	-------------3.1.	Early	stages	of	moral	development 7	--------------------------------------------------------------3.2	Later	stages	of	moral	development 8	---------------------------------------------------------------3.3.	Flow	experience 9	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------3.4.	Objection:	The	absence	of	intrinsically	motivated	moral	goodness 10	---------------------3.5.	Response:	Being	good	is	intrinsically	motivated 11	--------------------------------------------Part	4:	Morality	&	Flow	-	Enjoying	the	Good	Flow 14	-------------------------------------------------4.1.	'Vertical	coherency' 15	--------------------------------------------------------------------------------4.2.	The	good	Jlow 17	---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------4.3.	Moral	goodness	without	Jlow:	The	case	of	Angela	(objection	1) 19	-------------------------4.4.	Flow	without	moral	goodness:	The	case	of	Unscrupulous	(objection	2) 22	---------------4.5	'Horizontal	coherency' 24	-----------------------------------------------------------------------------4.6	A	hard	case:	the	successful	slaveholder 25	--------------------------------------------------------Part	5:	Morality	&	Happiness 29	----------------------------------------------------------------------------5.1.	Authentic	happiness 30	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------5.2.	What	'being	happy'	is	not 31	------------------------------------------------------------------------5.3.	Conclusion	to	Part	5 32	-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Part	6:	Concluding	Thoughts	-	Happiness	as	achievement 33	---------------------------------------REFERENCES 35-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  v  1 Part	1:	Introduction The	main	conclusion	of	my	paper is	the	following: 'being	good'	positively	correlates	to 'being	happy'.	If	you're	a	sincerely	good	person,	you're	more	likely	to	be	genuinely	happy;	if you're	genuinely	happy,	this	is	indicative	of	your	being	a	sincerely	good	person. I	acknowledge	the	unfortunately	common	circumstances	where	this	does	not	seem	to	be the	case.	For	example,	when	a	good	person	is	unhappy	or	when	a	bad	person	is	happy.	Yet, my position can accommodate most these ostensible counterexamples by insisting that these	cases	don't	exhibit	the	kind	of	goodness	or	happiness	that	we	truly	want	for	ourselves or	those	we	care	about.	As	one	would	expect,	this	paper	will	be	providing	a	restricted	or	thin account	of 'morality' and 'happiness' that I	will qualify	below (Part	2 and	5 respectively). This	is	-	in	part	-	meant	to	lessen	the	notorious	ambiguity	that	is	present	with	these	two terms	to	begin	with.	There	will	be	legitimate	counterexamples	(in	Part	4)	that	I	will	address once	this	ambiguity	is	averted. In general, my approach is meant to avoid pedantry and to propose a realistic and comprehensible way that	morality and happiness can be strongly related. I will not putforward	a	moral	theory	of	my	own	but	I	hope	to	show	that	modern	psychology	and	careful appeals to common sense reinforce my claim that moral goodness and happiness are positively	correlated.	The	paper itself	makes	use	of	substantial	engagements	with	positive psychology and cognitive science in order to provide empirical support for some assumptions	that	I	may	have	left	untreated. Part	2	of	the	paper	will	clarify	how	I'll	be	using	the	word	'morality'	and	the	phrase	'being good'. In Part 3, I	will claim that	moral goodness is developed and exercised as a kind of practical skill. This	will allow	me to propose that 'being good'	- like other complex and engaging	skills	-	entails	the	elicitation	of	a	kind	of	Jlow	experience.	In	Part	4,	I	will	propose that 'being	good' involves	achieving	what I'll call 'vertical coherency'	within	one's life	and that	this	provides	sustained	engagement	and	meaning	while	exercising	moral	goodness.	The convergence	of	engaging	Jlow	experience	and	meaning	is	called	'vital	engagement'.	In	Part	5 and	6,	I	will	show	why	vital	engagement	of	this	sort	is	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we	truly want for ourselves and those	we care about. Thus, I conclude that 'being good' positively correlates	to	'being	happy'. The conception of happiness I discuss is adapted from L.W. Sumner's notion of happiness	presented	in	his	book	Welfare,	Happiness,	and	Ethics	(1996).	There,	he	concludes  2 that	'being	happy'	"means	having	a	certain	kind	of	positive	attitude	toward	your	life,	which in its fullest form has both a cognitive and an affective component" (pp. 145-6). This working	deJinition	of	happiness	might	be	helpful	to	keep	in	mind	as	my	argument	unfolds. Part	2:	Morality	&	Virtue In the interest of developing a plausible way of showing that 'being good' positively correlates to 'being happy', I start from a thin account of 'being good' that, although controversial	in	contemporary	philosophy,	is	nevertheless	widely	shared	by	people	past	and present.	Although it goes beyond the	purview	of this paper to defend this thin account, I think	it	counts	in	favor	of	my	view	that	the	view	is	widely	shared,	seen	not	just	in	historical moral traditions (e.g., Buddhist, Confucian, and ancient Greek traditions) but implicit in moral	intuitions	of	many	people	today.	This	thin	account	puts	greater	emphasis	on	goodness as	a state	of character	or	a	description	of	agents (what I term 'being	good') than	on	right action	(what	I	term	'doing	good'),	and	it	assumes	that	being	good	demands,	in	some	sense,	a kind of sincere, wholehearted orientation toward the good, so that one's cognitions, conations	and	broader	ethical	commitments	are	aligned.	Some	might	recognize	this	account as being among the core commitments shared by virtue ethical theories, which is to say most	moral	theories	before	the	rise	of	modern	moral	philosophy.	But	in	the	interest	of	being more	ecumenical,	I	would	like	to	maintain	my	usage	of	'good'	and	'being	good'	so	that	I	can better appeal to non-virtue ethicists - philosopher and non-philosopher alike. Furthermore, I intend to exploit common sense and common usage in regard to my terminology	as	much	as	possible. That	being	said,	this	section	is	meant	to	present	a	congruity	between	what	most	people mean when they speak of 'being good' and what advocates of an agent-centered virtue theory	mean	when	they	speak	of	'being	virtuous.'	I	hope	this	will	provide	more	justiJication for	my particular use of 'moral goodness' in this paper and	my appeal to discussions on virtue	ethics	as	presented	by	various	philosophers,	ancient	and	modern. 1 This	section	of	my	paper	is	heavily	inJluenced	by	Julia	Annas	who	who	presents	similar	claims	in	two	of	her	1 works:	"Ancient	Ethics	and	Modern	Morality"	(1992)	and	Ch.	2,	§7	of	her	The	Morality	of	Happiness	(1993),	pp. 120-31.  3 2.1.	'Being	good'	is	a	kind	of	disposition 2 An agent seems	more	morally	developed if her good	actions are sincere, if they come from	an	effortless	expression	of	what	she	is	already	disposed	to	do. Imagine	an	infant	who	3 strays	away	from	her	parents	and	starts	crawling	into	a	busy	street.	A	person	who	instantly rushes	in	to	save	the	child	without	any	deliberation	seems	more	morally	developed	than	a person	who	rushes	in	to	save	the	child	after	quickly	deciding	that	it	would	be	the	right	thing to do. The difference seems to come from the former's already-established disposition to perform	such	an	action in such	a context. To	be sure,	both individuals are	praise-worthy	4 and good, but they are good to the extent that they have cultivated the disposition to perform	good	actions	in	such	morally-salient	contexts.	The	less	they	need	to	struggle	with enacting	such	behavior,	the	better. 2.2.	'Being	good'	entails	performing	good	actions. Despite	the	above	statement	that	'being	good'	is	a	disposition	of	the	agent	rather	than	a quality of her actions, no one could deny that 'being good' entails 'doing good' at times; 5 being a 'good person' means being sensitive to circumstances that demand appropriate responses.	More importantly, exposing oneself to such circumstances is crucial for	moral education	and	moral	development.	The	person	who	deliberates	before	rushing	in	to	save	the child	would	presumably	require	less	deliberation	in	the	future	if	confronted	with	a	similar circumstance.	Eventually,	this	individual	would	cultivate	a	sensitivity	to	such	circumstances that would dispose the agent to act freely without inhibition - I'm taking this kind of sincerity	paired	with	spontaneity	of	action	to	be	a	mark	of	moral	development. I	acknowledge	that	the	metaphysics	of	dispositions	is	a	current	area	of	contention.	As	I	use	'disposition'	here,	it	2 is	simply	a	condition	in	virtue	of	which	one	is	disposed	to	act.	It	can	be	deemed	a	'stable	disposition'	that	results and	is	maintained	by	intelligent	practice.	(Annas,	1993,	pp.	50-52;	see	also	Aristotle's	Nichomachean	Ethics	II.5) Aristotle	makes	this	point	by	comparing	the	enkratic	individual	with	the	truly	virtuous	agent	(see	the	3 Nichomachean	Ethics	1142a	26-29;	VII.1-10).	The	highest	ideal	is	not	consistent	self-restraint	but	a	state	where no	self-restraint	is	necessary.	(Annas,	1993,	pp.	89-91) The	former	has	acquired	a	dispositional	belief	that	such	an	action	is	appropriate	and,	apparently,	there	are	no	4 conJlicting	feelings	that	would	obstruct	her	acting	on	such	a	belief.	The	latter	either	1)	has	the	dispositional belief	but	is	temporarily	obstructed	by	feelings;	or	2)	does	not	have	the	dispositional	belief	and	must	quickly acquire	an	occurrent	belief	to	provoke	her	subsequent	response. As	Annas	(1993)	notes,	"no	sensible	[moral]	theory	could	consider	merely	acts	or	merely	agents"	(p.	125)5  4 2.3.	'Being	good'	has	an	affective	dimension. If	the	enactment	of	a	good	deed	comes	from	an	effortless	expression	of	one's	disposition, the	concurrent	feelings	would	likely	endorse	the	action.	Moral	deliberation	is	not	isolated	to merely a rational consideration of possible actions; it involves overcoming fear, disgust, shock,	apathy,	lethargy,	and	the	like.	A	good	person	-	disposed	and	ostensibly	compelled	to act	- is not meeting resistance from such feelings that would otherwise undermine or impede an appropriate response. Considering the developmental aspect of morality, it seems	right	that	becoming	a	good	person	must	involve,	not just learning	how	to	deal	with our feelings, but bringing our feelings into harmony with our thoughts and actions. As	6 Aristotle is known to insist, this	harmony involves	balance (striking	a	mean	between two extremes):	the	savior	of	the	infant	-	like	a	Jireman	in	action	-	should	have	an	appropriate level	of	fear	-	not	so	little	that	she	is	foolhardy	but	not	so	much	that	it	would	preclude	the appropriate	action	from	the	outset. Additionally,	there	are	obviously	feelings	that	assist	the	7 good person in performing good actions: a volunteer at a homeless shelter can do	more good if she	has a certain amount	of compassion, loving-kindness, and sympathetic joy; in some cases, indignation and anger is appropriate in order to harden one's resolve for a righteous	cause. 2.4.	'Being	good'	has	an	intellectual	dimension. This	seems to	me	a less	controversial statement	but	some	clariJication is	necessary in order to show its relationship with the previous statements above. Being good involves performing	good	actions,	but it involves	performing	actions for the right reasons. If, after	8 interviewing	the	savior	of	the	wandering	child,	she is found	to	be	motivated	purely	by	the thought	of	a	hefty	cash	reward	(or	by	media	celebrity	or	by	the	accolades	of	her	peers),	the action is still considered good	but the	person is not	-	or, rather, the	person is less good because	of	her	motives.	Even	the	person	that	instantly	rushes	in	must	provide	reasons	-	if "Our	development,	and	especially	our	moral	development,	consists	in	our	getting	(more	or	less)	control	over	6 these	feelings	and	training	them	in	some	ways	rather	than	others	[...]	it	is	important	to	respect	in	ethical	theory the	everyday	contrast	between	someone	who	does	the	right	thing,	but	has	to	battle	with	his	feelings	to	do	so,	and thus	acts	reluctantly	and	with	a	sense	of	pain	and	loss,	and	the	person	who	does	the	right	thing	and	whose feelings	endorse	the	action,	and	who	thus	acts	gladly	and	with	pleasure."	(Annas,	1993,	p.	53). See	Aristotle's	popular	notion	of	'The	Golden	Mean'	(Nichomachean	Ethics,	Book	II)7 See	Nichomachean	Ethics	1140a	20-218  5 asked after-the-fact - that seem appropriate for a 'good person.' We want an educated reaction	to	morally	relevant	situation	(Annas,	2011,	p.	29).	If	the	agent	cannot	provide	any reasons, then her sincerity can be questioned; for example, she could have rushed in so quickly because she mistook the child for her own child. I will not suggest what the appropriate	reasons	a	good	person	would	provide	in	this	context	but	I	will	discuss	how	one develops	an	educated	response	to	these	situation	in	Part	3	of	this	paper. 2.5.	Some	additional	remarks	on	moral	goodness I've been dwelling on	what being a good person amounts to. Regardless of the	moral theory	one	adopts	-	be	it	a	version	of	consequentialism,	deontology,	or	ethical	egoism	-	I believe	one	would	accept the	above	statements to	a lesser	or	greater	degree.	The	morally developed consequentialist	would not spend time performing so-called 'hedonic calculus' while the child wanders into the street. The morally developed deontologist would not spend	time	consulting	her	set	of	principles	or	applying	Kant's 'categorical imperative.'	The morally developed egoist	would	not hesitate to act	when confronted	with an	opportunity that	would	beneJit	her.	This	is	because	extensive	training	as	assiduous	moral	agents	would make	them	receptive	to	the	morally	salient	elements	of	a	given	circumstance	and	they	would already be	disposed to respond in the	way their theory	demands.	To	be sure, they	would respond only if they were not too afraid or apathetic to commit themselves to their respective	theories. 9 Thus,	actually 'being	good'	-	according	to	common	sense	and	philosophy	-	seems	to be	a	kind	of	disposition	to	act in	appropriate	ways, to	which	the	moral	agent's intellectual and	emotional	life	conform.	If	someone	has	decided	to	perform	good	actions	in	accordance with	values	she	rationally	endorses,	or if	someone	has	decided	to	perform	good	actions	in The	proposal	I	will	present	in	this	paper	is	not	committed	to	any	one	theory	of	the	good.	That	being	said,	it	may	9 discourage	a	pluralism	about	the	good	insofar	as	such	theories	introduce	incommensurable	beliefs	about	the good	life	and	how	a	good	person	should	behave.	The	cognitive	dissonance	introduced	by	embracing	different notions	of	the	good	would	involve	feelings	that	undermine	or	impede	a	successful	enactment	of	morality	(see 2.3)	and	would	discourage	the	internalization	of	a	stable	moral	disposition.	In	general,	embracing	pluralism would	make	a	sincerely	good	person	less	likely	or	impossible.	My	proposal	is	more	suited	to	a	monism	about	the good.	SpeciJically,	it	is	suited	to	a	so-called	'naturalistic'	theory	deJined	in	the	living	of	a	human	life	rather	than	by transcending	human	life	(the	later	theory	is	exempliJied	by	Platonism).	Because	my	proposal	speciJies	the	good life	in	terms	of	certain	circumstances	(insofar	as	a	moral	agent	needs	to	address	current	socio-cultural	values),	it is	comfortable	with	Aristotle.	But	I	believe	my	proposal	could	also	be	reconciled	with	less	circumstantial	theories like	Stoicism	and	Epicureanism	(insofar	as	moral	agents	can	reappropriate	ideas	of	"society"	and	"culture").  6 accordance with values she feels passionate about (regardless of whether she fully understands	them),	both	decisions	may	be	evidence	that	she	is	starting	to	bring	her	intellect and feelings into conformity. The agent is on her	way to becoming good in the sense I'm concerned with. The key is that she is continually making decisions and this entails an intellectual engagement that gradually allows one to internalize a coherent network of beliefs	and	corresponding	behavior. Continuing	in	this	vein,	a	way	to	approach	morality	is	developmentally.	That	is,	we	can look	at	how	one	becomes	a	good	person	and	we	can	look	at	the	different	apparent	levels	of moral cultivation in	order to	extrapolate	and	see	what the full-Jledged	good	person	might look	like.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	defend	a	modiJied	version	of	the	so-called	'skill	analogy' which	Annas	uses	to	motivate	this	process	of	extrapolation.	Using	her	discussions	and	the four	statements	that	I've	presented	above,	I	will	propose	that	moral	goodness	is	developed	as a	kind	of	skill	-	one	becomes	a	good	person	as	one	would	cultivate	a	skill	and	one	exercises moral	goodness	as	one	would	exercise	a	skill.	A	consequence	of	this	is	that	there	is	a	kind	of satisfaction	or	enjoyment that	comes	with	being	a	good	person in the	way I've	suggested. We	will	have	to	explore	what	this	enjoyment	amounts	to	before	I	argue	my	main	point	that 'being	good'	positively	correlates	to	'being	happy'. Part	3:	Moral	Goodness	As	a	Skill:	A	defense	and	expansion	of	the	"skill	analogy" In	this	portion	of	my	paper,	I	will	adapt	what	Julia	Annas	calls	the	'skill	analogy'	which exposes similarities between the development of a skill and the cultivation of moral goodness (in the context of Annas' discussions, this is the cultivation of virtue but I will maintain	my	own	terminology	throughout).	After	brieJly	presenting	this	in	the	context	of	my discussion on 'being good' I will explore a potential objection to the "skill analogy" and respond	to	it	accordingly. 10 In the context in which I'm using the phrase, the "skill analogy" is the idea that the practical	reasoning	undertaken	by	a	sincerely	good	person	shares	important	features	with the	practical	reasoning	undertaken	by	someone	exercising	a	practical	skill	(Annas,	2011,	p. 2). Upon reJlection, this	will be especially obvious in the developmentally early stages of moral cultivation (we have	more intimate knowledge of these early stages and less so of Much	of	my	discussion	in	the	section	has	been	adapted	from	my	own	unpublished	paper	"Virtue	as	the	Skill	of	10 Living:	Inducing	the	Good	Flow"	presented	at	Loyola	University	Chicago	on	April	11,	2014.  7 very	high	developmental	stages	of	moral	cultivation).	By	conJirming	the	similarities	at	these early	stages	of	moral	cultivation	and	then	extrapolating	the	Jindings	using	the	skill	analogy,	I argue	that	the	phenomenology	of	being	a	highly	developed	moral	agent	would	be	similar	to the	phenomenology	of	the	expert	at	a	practical	skill. 3.1.	Early	stages	of	moral	development The	skill	analogy	is	most	helpful	in	comparing	how	a	person	becomes	good	with	how	a person	becomes	adept	at	a	practical	skill.	At	the	early	stages	of	moral	and	skill	development, we can see how	both require the	monitoring and targeting of our dispositions as	well as signiJicant	intellectual	and	affective	engagement. First,	since	-	as	discussed	above	-	'being	good'	is	a	kind	of	disposition	(a	disposition to	perform	good	actions	well	and	when	appropriate),	like	any	disposition	"it	requires	time, experience,	and	habituation	to	develop	it"	(Annas,	2011,	p.	14).	It	makes	sense	that	morality must	be	consciously	attended	to	in	order	to	either	foster	incipient	good	habits	of	behavior or else to override and replace ostensibly immoral tendencies. Regardless of your	moral theory, to become a sincerely good person requires time and effort,	much like any other complex	skill. Second, since 'being good' is a practical disposition - it entails performing certain actions	-	like	any	skill,	"it	can	be	learned	only	by	practice,	by	actually	doing	what	needs	to be	done" (Annas,	2011,	p.	16).	We	can	read	about	moral	principles	and	precepts in	books and classrooms, but real understanding comes from applying these principles in actual situations.	Likewise,	this	can	also	be	said	of	skills	which	tend	to	involve	learning	curves	that can only be ameliorated through practical engagement with the task in question. As Aristotle	observes,	"what	we	need	to	learn	to	do,	we	learn	by	doing;	for	example,	we	become builders	by	building	.	.	." An	individual	cannot	become	an	expert	builder	by	reading	books	11 and	remaining	indoors	-	she	must	gradually	develop	specialized	practical	dispositions	and habituate	herself	to	specialized	tasks. Third,	since	there	is	a	distinct	intellectual	dimension	of	being	a	sincerely	'good	person,' this	learning	cannot	be	done	mindlessly.	Our	sincere	and	spontaneous	responses	to	morallyrelevant situations must be educated responses. Likewise, as Annas (2011) observes, Nichomachean	Ethics	1103.32-3	(trans,	Crisp,	2000)11  8 "[b]uilding	is	not	what	we	think	of	as	a	particularly	intellectual	skill,	but	there	is	still	no	such thing	as	learning	to	be	a	builder	mindlessly,	by	rote	copying"	(p.	17).	This	is	the	same	with all	skills	worthy	of	the	name	-	skills	that	require	time	and	effort	to	learn.	We	Jirst	need	to abstract the relevant features of the task and the intermittent goals; formulate rules or maxims based on those features and goals (usually with the help of an instructor or a manual); then carefully apply those rules in real situations so we can understand for ourselves what the best ways to perform the task involve (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1991, pp. 232-36). This procedure is undertaken by the child learning to tie her shoes, by the apprentice	builder	learning	to	build	well,	and	likewise	by	the	person	learning	to	be	a	good. Finally,	since	there	is	a	distinct	affective	dimension	of	being	a	sincerely	good	person,	this learning	cannot	be	done	emotionlessly.	The	difference	between	more	simple	skills	and	the more	complex	and	dynamic	ones	(like	moral	cultivation)	involve	what	Annas	calls	the	"drive to aspire." This affective component involves continually Jinding motivation to keep improving	-	to	stay	engaged	in	the	activity	long	enough	to	achieve	expertise.	(Annas,	2011, p. 16ff) If this minimal affective dimension is not generated, then "we lapse into simple repetition and routine" which often precludes mastery of a skill (Annas, 2011, p. 18). A sincerely	good	person	is	one	who	aspires	to	become	better. 3.2	Later	stages	of	moral	development We	would	expect	such	intellectual	and	affective	engagement	to	carry-over	into	expertise - both non-moral and moral - and serve as a means to sustain and improve one's competence	in	the	activity.	So	the	kind	of	habituation	we	would	Jind	in	moral	expertise	as	a result	of	moral	cultivation	"is	not	routine	but	the	kind	of	actively	and	intelligently	engaged practical	mastery	that	we	Jind	in	practical	experts	such	as	pianists	and	athletes.	. ."	(Annas, 2011,	p.	14): When	we	see	the	speed	with	which	a	skilled	pianist	produces	the	notes	we	might	be tempted to think that constant repetition and	habit have transformed the	original experience, which required conscious thought, into mere routine. But this is completely	wrong. The expert pianist plays in a	way not dependent on conscious input, but the result is not mindless routine but rather playing infused with and expressing the	pianist's thoughts	about the	piece.	Further, the	pianist continues to improve her playing. The way she plays exhibits not only increased technical  9 mastery but increased intelligence - better ways of dealing with transitions between	loud	and	soft,	more	subtle	interpretations	of	the	music,	and	so	on.	(Annas, 2011,	pp.	13-4) Due	to	such	active	engagement	with	their	respective	activities,	enjoying	both	non-moral	and moral	expertise	-	when	adequately	developed	-	will	exhibit	what	psychologists	call	Ilow experience. 3.3.	Flow	experience When	an	agent	is	completely	engaged	in	an	activity	(oftentimes,	a	very	challenging	one) and	exercising	a	highly	developed	skill therein,	she	can	experience	what	psychologists	call 'Jlow'	- the agent becomes "completely involved in something to the point of forgetting time, fatigue,	and	everything	else	but the	activity itself." (Csikszentmihalyi,	Abuhamdeh,	& Nakamura,	2005,	p.	599)	Some	phenomenological	characteristics	involve intense	and	focused	concentration	on	the	here	and	now;	a	loss	of	self-consciousness as	action	and	awareness	merge;	a	sense	that	one	will	be	able	to	handle	the	situation because	one	knows	how	to	respond	to	whatever	will	happen	next;	a	sense	that	time has	passed	more	quickly	or	slowly	than	normal;	and	an	experience	of	the	activity	as rewarding in and of itself regardless of the outcome. (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi,	2001,	pp.	88-9) One	of	the	most	important	factors	in	the	elicitation	and	preservation	of	Jlow	experiences is	how	the	experience	engages	one's	conscious	attention	-	the	agent	becomes	"completely involved	in	something	to	the	point	of	forgetting	.	.	.	everything	else	but	the	activity	itself"	and there is "an experience of the activity as rewarding in and of itself regardless of the outcome." That is, Jlow is elicited and preserved only when the motivation behind the activity takes the	activity itself	as its	direct	object; the	agent Jinds the	activity intrinsically motivating. As	the	phrase	is	used	in	the	psychological	literature,	experiencing	'intrinsic	motivation' means that the agent is operating "solely out of a sense of interest and enjoyment, as  10 opposed to for the sake of their ends" (Besser-Jones, 2012, p. 96). Classic examples of	12 activities that often include intrinsic motivation include physical sports (e.g. basketball, soccer), mental 'sports' (e.g chess, go), musical events (solo and concert pieces), and a variety of other activities ranging from rock-climbing to giving an engaging lecture.	All of these activities demand skill and when these activities are both skillfully enacted and enjoyed	for	their	own	sake,	Jlow	is	experienced. Drawing	on	the	previously	established	similarities	between	'being	good'	and	exercising a	practical	skill,	I	propose	that	'being	good'	can	be	considered	a	special	kind	of	skill	that	- when	adequately	developed	-	entails	the	elicitation	of	Ilow.	This	claim	is	crucial	for	how	I'll be	defending	my	overall	thesis	so	I	would	like	to	anticipate	a	potential	objection	and	quickly address	the	mistaken	assumptions	upon	which	it	is	based. 3.4.	Objection:	The	absence	of	intrinsically	motivated	moral	goodness I	Jind	that	the	greatest	potential	objection	to	the	claim	that	moral	goodness	entails	the elicitation	of Jlow	when	adequately	developed is in	regards to the	requirement that	moral action	involve	intrinsic	motivation.	As	stated	above,	such	motivation	seems	to	be	necessary to initiate and maintain the high level of engagement that the agent enjoys in Jlow experience. There	seem	to	be	moral	actions	that	produce	a	Jlow	experience	(for	example,	when	the brave	JireJighter is	wholly	engaged	in	the	act	of	putting	out	a Jire).	That	being	said, taking the	phenomenon	that	arises	from	the	exercise	of	certain	discrete	moral	actions	(i.e.	the	Jlow enjoyed	while being brave) and then extending that to the exercise of	moral goodness in general	(i.e.	the	Jlow	enjoyed	while	'being	good')	is	unwarranted.	There	seem	to	be	examples of	moral	actions	that	cannot	engage the	agent	to	the	extent	that	they	would	generate	Jlow. The	JireJighter	may	experience	Jlow	but	the	philanthropists	donating	to	charity	would	not. The activity of	writing a	donation check is not structured in a	way that could engage the agent	and	elicit	a	Jlow	experience.	Are	we	excluding	those	kinds	of	activities	in	our	picture	of Although	term	'intrinsic	motivation'	might	connote	a	different	phenomenon	in	philosophy,	it	has	been	well-12 established	in	positive	psychology	since	its	coinage	by	Koch	(1956)	(see	also	Deci	&	Moller,	2005;	Deci	&	Ryan, 2000;	Reiss,	2004;	Ryan	&	Deci,	2000a,	2000b;	Waterman,	2005).	As	Besser-Jones	(2012)	explains,	"the construct	of	intrinsic	motivation	was	developed	as	a	means	of	describing	the	enjoyment	we	Jind	in	pursuing challenges,	in	pushing	ourselves	to	learn	and	to	try	new	things"	(p.	95).	It's	easy	to	see	why	this	is	an	important element	of	Jlow	experiences.  11 'being	good'?	If	so,	not	only	would	this	seem	ad	hoc,	but	it	would	cause	us	to	diverge	from what	common	sense	includes	in	the	notion	of	morality A source of engagement is often the sense of harmony, unimpeded enjoyment, and pleasure involved in the activity. A moral agent could take pleasure in writing donation checks but such pleasure is not enough to determine that she experiences intrinsic motivation (Besser-Jones, 2012, p. 96). To establish that the sincerely good person is intrinsically motivated, "we need to determine whether or not she Jinds the activities enjoyable	and	so	pleasant,	apart	from	their	connection	to	separable	outcomes"	(p.	97).	This would undergird the kind of engagement exhibited in Jlow. But, again, such intrinsic motivation seems unlikely in the case of	writing checks. Similar cases are ready-at-hand: "keeping	one's	promises,	helping	someone	pick	up	papers	she	has	dropped	on	the	sidewalk, being	a	whistleblower, loaning	money	to	a	friend,	raising	money	to	help	victims	of	natural disasters,	and	so	on"	(p.	100).	All	these	'mundane	activities'	do	not	seem	to	have	the	kind	of structure	to	produce	the	kind	of	engagement	necessary	for	Jlow	experience.	They	are	only performed	because	of the	separable	outcomes ["...only	because they fulJill	a	promise,	only because justice requires it, only because raising money will help others..." (p. 100)]. My proposal that 'being	good'	entails the	elicitation	of Jlow	experiences	seems	to	be incorrect since	it	implies	that	'being	good'	is	intrinsically	motivated.	The	motivation	one	derives	while performing such 'good' yet	mundane activities like	writing checks, etc. cannot be derived from	the	activities	themselves. My	response	will	point-out	an	understandable	yet	mistaken	assumption	made	by	such an	objection.	I	will	insist	that	it	does	not	properly	address	the	notion	of	'being	good'	that	I am	utilizing. 3.5.	Response:	Being	good	is	intrinsically	motivated If 'being good' is considered a practical skill, one	must Jirst consider how this skill is exercised. The objection I presented above makes the assumption that 'being good' is exercised through local events in	which the agent performs discrete and isolated actions  12 that reJlect discrete and separable	moral traits (for example, the	writing of a check as a reJlection	of	the	agent's	generosity). 13 Instead of assuming that 'being good' is exercised within local events that demand different	local	skills	to	negotiate,	one	should	interpret	'being	good'	itself	as	a	'higher-order' or global skill. Thus, 'being good' is exercised by the agent in all areas of her life as a reJlection	of	her	way	of	being in	the	world. 'Being	good' is the	skill	and	one	of the	many	14 manifestations of that skill is in context-sensitive, circumstantial instances of 'doing good'	(like	writing	a	check	or	making	a	promise,	etc.).	A	helpful	way	to	describe	'being	good' is	as	an	enactment	of	a	variety	of	disparate	'lower-order'	activities	united	by	their	common source in the agent's moral disposition. Writing a check is not engaging in itself but if performing such 'mundane activities' is required to properly express one's moral disposition, the agent enjoys the engagement and Jlow experience entailed in expressing that	disposition	regardless	of	the	activity.	Again,	the	practical	disposition	of 'being	good'	is the	skill	and	can	be	exercised	in	a	variety	of	ways. At this point, a dissimilarity becomes apparent when comparing 'being good' to a normal	skill.	If	we	claim	that	'being	good'	is	the	skill	(as	opposed	to	discrete	activities)	and that 'being good' is a disposition to do good, there is the potential absence of any overt exercise of this skill. Although one has a disposition to behave a certain way, the circumstances may prevent one from manifesting such a disposition in overt action. We would say that a sculptor is exercising her skill only	while she is chiseling into rock and producing a sculpture or that a pianist is exercising her skill only	while she is producing beautiful	music.	But	we	would	not	say	that	the	sculptor	and	the	pianist	are	exercising	their skills	while	sitting	on	the	couch.	In	contrast,	the	good	person's	skill	is	always	exercised	(even This	may	conform	to	common	sense:	one	can	'be	good'	in	one	context	(when	being	a	good	father	or	husband)	13 but	not	in	another	(when	being	a	bad	boss	or	colleague).	In	response	to	this,	I	would	insist	that	we	dwell	on	the earlier	claims	of	the	paper.	If	'being	good'	is	a	practical	disposition,	then	in	order	to	learn	and	instill	such	a disposition	one	needs	to	practice	-	one	learns	by	doing.	This	learning	always	takes	place	in	an	embedded context	and	thus,	realistically,	'being	good'	cannot	be	abstracted	from	that	context	if	it	is	to	be	useful.	Morality	is only	compartmentalized	to	the	extent	that	our	lives	are	compartmentalized	and	this	is	probably	not	very	much (Annas,	2001,	p.	21).	I'll	have	more	to	say	about	this	in	Part	4. I take the term 'global skill' from Julia Annas - the earliest use I found is in her book, The Morality of Happiness 14 (1993) in the context of Stoic ethics (p. 378; see also pp. 53-7). A great exploration of the idea is found in her book Intelligent Virtue (2011): "In the case of skill, this is obviously a local matter; someone might be a skillful skater while having all kinds of unresolved issues in other areas of her life. In the case of virtue, the person's global state is what is relevant to the performance of the action . . ." (p. 75)  13 on	the	couch)	insofar	as	they	are	expressing	their	moral	disposition	sincerely	and	without internal	conJlict	(sometimes,	sitting	on	the	couch	might	be	the	moral	thing	to	do).	Again,	if the	good	person	were	never	confronted	with	the	opportunity	to	perform	any	overt	acts	of bravery	or	generosity, the	good	person	would	still	be	good	and	this inability to	act	on	her disposition	would	be	merely	circumstantial. 15 In	response,	I	would	say	that	this	is	not	as	strange	as	it	seems	when	we	discuss	activities and	skill	as	involving	a	variety	of	several	local	(or,	'lower	order')	activities.	Imagine	a	highly skilled	rock	climber	exercising	her	skill	on	a	challenging	cliff-face.	Any	thoughts	external	to the activity itself	-	even thoughts about the summit	-	hamper the skill being exercised during the climb. We would say that the expert rock climber is experiencing intrinsic motivation insofar	as she is rock-climbing.	But,	while traversing	up the cliff-face, the rock climber	often	stops	moving	in	order	to	survey	the	rocks	for	potential	handholds,	to	adjust	a carabiner,	or	to	put	more	chalk	on	her	hands.	These	lower-order	activities	-	as	it	were	- are	part	of	the	more	global	(or,	'higher-order')	activity	of	rock	climbing	despite	not	involving overt acts of climbing. Although it seems like inactivity, the climber is still receptive to opportunities	and	is	consciously	engaged	with	her	terrain.	Likewise,	if	we	could	imagine	the fully	developed good person	- a	moral expert	- she	would be	moving through life and exercising her	moral goodness continuously, surveying her terrain, and clearly perceiving any	actions	she	might	have	to	undertake.	Actual	overt	moral	activities	may	be few	and	far between	(and	the	agent	may	not	be	successful	in	these	activities	if	contingencies	disallow	it) but	that	does	not	discredit	a	sincerely	good	person.	The	good	person	is	good	because	of	an excellent disposition built-up through intelligent practice that allows her to respond to a situation	instantly,	without	deliberation,	and	in	accordance	with	that	moral	disposition. 16 This	scenario	seems	unlikely	unless	we	entertain	the	notion	of	moral	savants.	Common	sense	insists	that	to	be	15 a	good	person	you	must	learn	to	be	good.	This	learning	requires	responding	to	and	reJlecting	on	real opportunities	to	perform	overt	acts.	On	a	related	issue,	moral	luck	may	play	a	factor	in	the	early	developmental stages	of	this	moral	cultivation	-	I	don't	see	this	as	problematic. The	skill	in	which	I'm	presenting	could	be	designated	a	'stochastic	skill'	-	one	"in	which	a	failure,	because	of	16 contingencies,	to	achieve	the	outcome	is	different	from	a	failure	in	the	exercise	of	the	skill	itself"	(Annas,	1993, 400).	If	an	apparent	failure	in	'being	good'	occurs,	it	would	either	be	a	result	of	a)	poor	conditions	or	b)	a	defect in	one's	disposition.	The	former	would	not	be	an	actual	failure	insofar	as	the	agent	acts	in	accordance	with	her disposition.	The	latter	would	be	a	failure	but	it	also	reJlects	the	need	for	further	moral	development	so	that	one's dispositions	are	more	stable	and	reliable.  14 Both the expert rock-climber in the above scenario and the expert moral agent is engaged	in	Jlow	insofar	as	they	are	exercising	their	respective	skills	(Annas,	2008,	p.	24).	In the case of	what I deemed 'mundane activities' (writing a check to charity, keeping one's promises,	helping	someone	pick	up	papers,	etc.),	it	is	true	that	they	by	themselves	may	"lack the coherence and structure found in activities associated	with Jlow experience" (BesserJones, 2012, p. 100). But the good person may nevertheless engage with them while enjoying	the Jlow	brought	on	by	the	activity	of 'being	good'.	One	might	consider	the	act	of putting	chalk	on	one's	hands	mundane	in	itself	but	the	rock	climber	would	still	be	enjoying Jlow	due	to	the	already-present	Jlow	brought-on	by	the	global	activity	of	rock	climbing.	In	a similar	fashion,	the	sincerely	good	person	would	go	through	her	days	-	mundane	activities and	all	-	while	concurrently	exercising	the	highly	developed	skill	of	'being	good'. In	the	following	section,	I	will	elaborate	on	what	this	coherency	looks	like	in	regard	to morality. The discussion of Jlow experience, though, should be a helpful starting-point in understanding	the	phenomenology	of	moral	expertise.	For	example,	if	you	have	experienced Jlow in an localized case while playing an engaging game or sport, extrapolating that experience	to	all	aspects	of	your	life	might	provide	some	insight	into	what	will	be	discussed next.	After introducing the	notion	of 'vertical coherency', I	will discuss concrete examples and	counterexamples	to	my	proposal. Part	4:	Morality	&	Flow	-	Enjoying	the	Good	Flow I am claiming that 'being good' is a practical disposition that amounts to a skillful navigation	of	one's	moral	landscape.	In	the	morally	developed	person,	this	skill	is	exercised well insofar as one is responding appropriately to opportunities that activate this disposition. 17 In	order	to	enjoy	a	sustained	Jlow	experience	while	exercising	this	skill,	the	moral	agent would	have	to	strive	to	perform	optimally	within	her	so-called	'moral	landscape'.	Unlike	that of the rock-climber, the landscape of the moral agent admittedly involves many more dimensions that interact with each other in complex ways. Elaborating on the different dimensions or levels that the moral agent needs to operate within would allow me to illustrate how 'being good' not only provides experiences of Ilow	but how 'being good' is Again,	note	that	if	circumstances	don't	allow	for	any	opportunity	for	good	action,	then	the	appropriate	17 response	would	perhaps	be	inaction	[see	Annas,	1993,	p.	70	concerning	the	Stoic	notion	of	virtue].  15 positively correlated with a very	meaningful type of Jlow experience. By the end of this section, I hope that	my current proposal	- that 'being good' is a global skill	-	entails a special	kind	of Jlow	experience that is	not	only inherently	enjoyable,	but	also	meaningful. Part	5	of	this	paper	will	then	explore	the	relationship	between	this	kind	of	experience	and common	notions	of	happiness. 4.1.	'Vertical	coherency' There are several levels (or, 'dimensions' or 'spheres') to consider when discussing moral goodness and its successful enactment. Much like how the expert rock-climber successfully scales a cliff-face by bringing her local activities into alignment (gracefully coordinating	her legs	and	arms;	accurately identifying	proper	hand	and footholds;	quickly adjusting the carabiners, smoothly slipping	her	hand	behind	her	back to get	more	chalk, etc.) or how a master pianist successfully plays a concert piece by bringing her local activities into alignment (coordinating her torso, arms, hands and feet; quickly and accurately	reading	the	sheet	music;	striking	the	keys	accurately	and	precisely;	articulating the	keys	and	pedals	to	suit	the	tempo;	etc.),	likewise,	the	genuinely	good	person	successfully acts on her highly developed moral disposition by bringing her local activities into alignment.	We	will need to explore these activities and how they relate to each other in order	to	appreciate	what	it's	like	to	be	a	cultivated	moral	agent. Such	'local'	morally	relevant	activities	should	be	subsumed	under	the	overall	activity	of being	good	person	(that is,	acting	effortlessly	on	one's	moral	disposition).	These	activities themselves	should	be	separated	into	a	hierarchical	yet	irreducible	multi-level	model. Each	18 level has corresponding moral standards or values towards which a good person would strive	to	meet.	Thus,	being	a	good	person	would	potentially	involve	the	following: 19 The	following	model	is	adapted	from	McAdams'	(1995,	1996)	proposals	of	the	four	tier	personality	as	well	as	18 further	contributions	by	Sheldon	(2004)	in	his	discussions	on	multi-level	nature	of	subjective	well-being.	[see also	Haidt	(2006),	pp.	141-45,	226-29] It	seems	like	you	would	be	able	to	provide	a	moral	theory	using	any	one	of	these	levels	as	your	point	of	19 reference.	For	example,	you	can	say	that	our	psychology	demands	that	society	and	culture	be	organized	in	order to	suit	our	evolutionary	adaptations.	Or,	you	could	say	that	our	religious	(cultural)	values	demand	that	we	slowly reshape	our	psychology	in	order	to	conform	to	those	higher	standards.	My	notion	of	'being	good'	is	a	higherorder	property	that	describes	how	an	agent	can	skillfully	bring	all	these	levels	into	alignment.	I'm	not particularly	concerned	with	what	the	best	way	to	do	that	is	although	I	suspect	that	our	psychology	informs	our higher	standards	and	puts	constraints	on	what	kinds	of	societies	and	corresponding	norms	could	evolve.  16 'Being good' means skillfully bringing these levels into alignment or 'vertical coherency' with each other. This reduces impediments and frustrations while acting on one's disposition	and	allows	for	the	spontaneity	that	we're	looking	for	in	truly	good	people. At	20 the	subjective	level,	the	more	'vertical	coherency'	is	achieved,	the	more	likely	that	the	global activity of 'being good' feels like Jlow (i.e. effortless and enjoyable). The person who instantly	rushes	in	to	save	the	wandering	child	is	acting	in	conformity	with	her	personality [Level 1-4] and also her socio-cultural values [Levels 5-6]. There is little or no conJlict between	any level	and	this is	what	allows the	activity to	be	performed	spontaneously	and effortlessly. Again,	note that the	skill	of 'being	good' refers to	a	global (or, 'higher-order') ability in making all of these levels cohere for the purpose of manifesting freely one's dispositions.	The	more	skillful	this	ability	is	executed,	the	more	sincerity	and	spontaneity	is entailed	in	the	activity	of 'being	good.' This	proposal	is	inJluenced	heavily	by	the	hierarchical	model	of	causal	inJluences	upon human behavior as presented by Dan P.	McAdams (1995, 1996) and Kennon	M. Sheldon (2004).	These	models	-	in	turn	-	were	inJluenced	by	cybernetics	or	'control	theory'	which recognizes that "optimal functioning" occurs "when multiple, simultaneous, separate processes of a system work under control of centralized decision making, towards a common	purpose	or	goal" (Miller,	1978,	p.	89). In the	context	of this	paper, the "system" would correspond to the holistic phenomenological experience of the moral agent; the "centralized	decision	making"	comes	from	the	agent's	intellectual	and	affective	engagement with her experience; the "purpose or goal" of this engagement is intrinsic	- the goal of bringing	coherency	among	the	different levels	and	allowing	one's	disposition to	act freely. "Vertical	coherence	exists	when	lower	level	goals	are	consistent	with	or	regulated	by	higher	level	20 goals"	(Sheldon	&	Kasser,	1995,	p.	531) [Level	1] acting	in	conformity	with	one's	basic	psychological	needs; [Level	2] acting	in	conformity	with	one's	personality	or	character	traits; [Level	3] acting	in	conformity	with	one's	immediate	goals	and	intentions; [Level	4] acting	in	conformity	with	one's	self-image	or	self-narrative; [Level	5] acting	in	conformity	with	social	norms	or	values; [Level	6] acting	in	conformity	with	cultural	norms	or	values.  17 There	are certainly	different	goals	when restricting	ourselves to	different local levels (the 'goals'	pursued in the	service	of	one's	personality	must	be	articulated	differently than the goals	of	the	society	or	culture	with	which	one	identiJies)	but	optimal	functioning	is	achieved when	these	goals	are	made	consistent	with	each	other.	Optimal	functioning	in	the	context	of morality will manifest when the activities relating to our personality [Levels 1-4] are consistent	with	and,	thus,	reinforced	by	the	activities	relating	to	our	socio-cultural	context [Levels	5-6]. 'Vertical	coherency'	of	the	kind	I'm	discussing	is	the	mark	of	a	morally	developed	agent. The	kind	of integration and effortless engagement this skill entails has all the criteria for eliciting what I'm calling a 'global' Jlow experience. Achieving this coherency and 'being good'	is	a	global	skill	that	concerns	one's	life	as	a	whole.	The	rest	of	the	section	will	be	an elaboration	and	defense	of	this	proposal.	I	still	need	to	explain	why	and	how	this	experience is	positively	correlated	with	'being	happy'. 4.2.	The	good	Ilow We	can	easily	imagine	how	Levels	1-3	can	produce	Jlow	by	comparing	it	with	a	skill	as we	have	been	doing.	One's	psychological	needs,	personality	traits,	and	immediate	goals	are often	discussed	in	a	non-moral	context	within	the	literature	on	Jlow	experiences.	[...] Integrating	Level	4	(self-image	or	self-narrative)	requires	engaging	in	a	skill	that imposes	personal	meaning	on	one's	activities.	I	can	produce	an	isolated	instance	of	Jlow	by engaging	in	a	crossword	puzzle	while	sitting	in	a	hospital	waiting	room.	This	engages	my need	for	mental	stimulation	[Level	1]	while	catering	to	my	ability	to	work	through	puzzles [Level	2].	Games	prototypically	involve	intrinsic	motivation	(Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihayli, 2002,	p.	90)	so	engaging	in	the	crossword	puzzle	quickly	aligns	with	my	immediate	goals [Level	3].	Yet,	it's	harder	to	integrate	the	crossword	puzzle	into	my	robust	image	of	who	I	am -	it	surely	would	not	play	a	strong	role	in	my	'self	narrative'	(my	self-attributed	'life	story') -	and	this	is	why	I	can	be	painlessly	taken	out	of	the	experience	when	my	name	is	called	by the	nurse. As I stated	above,	bringing into	alignment	Level	4	with	Levels	1-3 require the	activity that	I	perform	to	be	imbued	with	personal	meaning.	The	best	example	of	this	is	in	moments of	what	Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihayli (2002) call 'vital engagement': "a relationship	with the	world that is characterized both by experiences of Jlow (enjoyed absorption) and by  18 meaning" (p.	87).	Yet, sources	of	meaning	-	commonly	perceived	-	are	often thought to transcend	one's	own	self-narrative	and	the	endeavors	that	are	informed	by	one's	self-image. Thus,	the	experience	of	'vital	engagement'	should	increase	the	more	one's	activities	include the	sense	that	they	serve	a larger	purpose.	The	more	one	brings	into	alignment	Levels	1-4 with the additional Levels [5 and 6], the more meaningful the engagement will be experienced	by	the	agent. 'Being	good' is	easily	characterized	as	an instance	of	meaningful	engagement	with the world when we understand that what we normally deem moral behavior is that which conforms	to	the	values	held	at	these	various	levels.	Our	personal	values	[Level	4]	are	often taken	for	granted,	procured	in	early	childhood	by	virtue	of	family,	culture,	and	history.	But they	can	also	be	actively	formulated	in	response	to	crises	or	traumas	in	which	'push'	us	to create	new	understandings	(ibid.	95,	Cf.	Haidt,	2006,	pp.	145-49).	Thus,	bringing	Levels	1-4 into alignment in this way can resolve some internal conJlict - procuring a degree of psychological	health	and	well-being.	But,	if	we	can	act	in	accordance	to	our	personal	values while	also	conforming	to	the	values	apparent	within	our	socio-cultural	context	[Levels	5-6], we	may	act	in	the	world	essentially	without	any	internal	conJlict	and	with	the	sincerity	and spontaneity that we Jind in a morally developed persons. At the subjective or phenomenological	level,	moral	actions	will	be	experienced	by	the	sincerely	good	person	as	a Jlow	experience;	"however	complex	and	hard	to	navigate	the	circumstances	are,	there	is	no felt	resistance	to	acting	good,	no interference	with the	expressing	of [moral]	responses	- that	is,	with	the	expressing	of	one's	moral	disposition	(Annas,	2011,	p.	75). Given what I have said here about the importance of integrating certain personal features of one's life (e.g., personal narrative, personality or character), one	might	worry that this invites a kind of subjective relativism. Perhaps, one might suggest, my account suggests that	we	achieve "good Jlow"	by	acting in conformity	with	our	personal	narrative and	character,	whatever	they	happen	to	be.	To	address	this	worry,	we	might	start	by	looking at	the	roles	played	by	levels	5	and	6	in	moral	development,	which	are	the	requirements	that one	act	in	conformity	with	social	and	cultural	norms	and	values.	First,	socio-cultural	values and the	agent's	personal	values inform	one	another.	At	a common	sense level, someone is considered	'good'	when	they	act	in	accordance	with	social	and	cultural	values.	They're	even better	when	they	act	on	these	values	sincerely	and	without	internal	conJlict.	Thus,	vertical coherency - bringing one's personality [Levels 1-4] into alignment with one's socio-  19 cultural values, or vice versa - allows for a more skillful navigation through the many spheres of one's life. But	more importantly, socio-cultural values are not only inJluential, they are 'in the air' throughout our entire moral development. Our personal values are entangled	with	our	higher-level	values	-	they	are	necessarily	framed	using	the 'language' provided	to	us	by	our	society	and	culture. The	second	reason	why	Levels	5	and	6	are	crucial	for	moral	development	is	due	to	the parameters that society and culture provide for morality. A serial criminal may not experience	any	qualms	or	internal	conJlict	when	repeatedly	committing	crimes	but	there	is conJlict and instability when she becomes frustrated as a result of municipal laws, condemnations	from	peers	-	in	general,	social	stigmas	and	religio-cultural	prohibitions	(I'll have	more	to	say	about this in	§4.4).	Because	of these 'invisible lines', so to	speak,	certain behaviors	preclude	the	enjoyment	of	effortless	and	meaningful	navigation	through	certain swaths of conceptual space. The 'lines' also serve to guide and reinforce the feeling of effortlessness	within	global	Jlow	experiences. In sum, I'm not only characterizing 'being good' as a kind of subjective psychological health (enjoying the psychological health that in entailed in vertical coherency) but also reconciling	one's	personality	with	the	values	already-present	in	one's	socio-cultural	context -	either	conforming	to	them	or	striving	to	change them. Although	there	may	be	many	objections	to	such	an	ambitious	proposal,	my	concern	from now	on	will	lay	with	addressing	ostensible	counterexamples	to	it.	In	doing	so,	I	can	address some	potential	concerns	with	moral	relativism	at	the	individual	and	cultural	level.	In	regard to my counterexamples, I will brieJly explore 1) ostensible examples of moral goodness without	Jlow	or	without	such	cross-level	integration	and	2)	ostensible	examples	of	immoral goodness that could produce the kind of integration and Jlow-like experiences that I am claiming are the mark of moral development. I hope to show how my model can accommodate	these	circumstances. 4.3.	Moral	goodness	without	Ilow:	The	case	of	Angela	(objection	1) In this section, I will present a couple hard cases - examples of moral goodness apparently absence of the vertical coherency and global Jlow that I proposed a sincerely good	person	would	exhibit.  20 The	following	is	taken	from	Haybron's	Pursuit	of	Unhappiness: 21 Consider then the case of a high-ranking career diplomat, Angela, who is contemplating	an	early	retirement	at	the	age	of	62:	having	served	her	country	with great distinction for many years, Angela has come into a good deal of money through	some	canny	investments	and	a	bit	of	luck.	She	has	all	but	decided	to	retire with her husband to a villa in Tuscany, and could do so very comfortably on her earnings.	(They	have	a	number	of	good	friends in	the	area	and	it	would	bring	her much	closer	to	her	daughter	and	grandchildren,	who	reside	in	Milan.)	She	correctly envisages	that	a	life	there	would	be	tremendously	satisfying,	occupied	largely	with good	company	and	food	and	drink,	walking	the	countryside	and	catching	up	on	her reading	-	in	short,	kicking	back	and	just	enjoying life. . .	Before	she	can	settle	on her plans, however, a political crisis arises overseas and she is asked to take an important	post	where	her	considerable	wisdom	and	skills	would	be	of	great	use.	.	. Naturally, the assignment would be taxing and heavy on travel, and frequently would involve dealing with unwholesome individuals about matters of extreme gravity,	often	calling	for	a	fair	measure	of	anger	and	indignation	on	her	part. . .	No one	would	dream	of	begrudging	her	the	comfortable	life	she	had	begun	to	set	before herself.	Yet	she	accepts	the	assignment	without	regret:	the	stakes	are	high	enough that	she	feels	they	are	probably	worth	it.	She	goes	on	to	serve	admirably	and	with	a good	deal	of	success	in	sustaining	the	peace,	but	another	six	years	pass	before	she can	take	her	retirement	.	.	.	(pp.	161-2) Although	Angela	seems	to	be	a	better	person	by	taking	the	assignment,	the	decision	seems to introduce	more	discord into	her life. If that's the	case,	being	a	better	person	would	not seem	to	put	her in	a	better	position	to integrate	the	different	activities	that	correspond	to the	different levels	of	her life;	she	does	not	seem	to	be	able to	enjoy the	kind	of Jlow	that results from such vertical coherency. In contrast, living in a more peaceful, more accommodating atmosphere like Tuscany would allow Angela to pursue the sorts of activities that	appeal to	her	and	would	presumably	allow	her to	successfully integrate the different	levels	of	her	personality	in	a	satisfying	way. In	response	to	this	counterexample,	I	would	note	that	it	is	difJicult	to	judge	which	Angela is	a	better	person	(Tuscan	Angela	or	Diplomat	Angela)	since	'being	good'	cannot	be dictated merely	by	the	choices	she	makes	but	more	so	by	how	she	makes	those	choices.	I	will	assume that	a	good	person	would	take	the	assignment	if	given	the	opportunity,	knowing	that	it	is	the best	option	in	that	context.	If	being	a	good	person	is	a	global	skill	that	is	exercised	as	a	result of integrating the levels	of	one's	personality	and	socio-cultural	values,	we	have to	explore whether or not Angela is allowing for more vertical coherency when she takes-up the See	also,	Neera	Badhwar's	response	(2014,	p.	207ff)21  21 assignment. If that's the case, I would insist that she would be exposed to more opportunities for Jlow	experiences than	she	would	be in	Tuscany. If it's	not the	case, then this	serves	as	a	legitimate	counterexample	to	my	proposal. An evaluation of which choice provides more vertical coherency must take into consideration Angela's personality [Level 1-4] and how it conforms to her socio-cultural values [Level 5-6]. The key to answering the former is in Haybron's characterization of Angela's	decision: "she	accepts the	assignment	without	regret: the	stakes	are	high	enough that she feels they are probably worth it." Although we don't know how sincerely she initially responded to the opportunity, her choice was made without subsequent regret. Haybron	needs	to	convey	this	fact	in	order	to	assure	the	reader	that	Angela	was	sincere	in her	convictions	and	was	not	met	with	internal	conJlict.	If	the	story	went	"she	accepted	the assignment with regret," Angela would seem less good. I agree wholeheartedly with Haybron	that	"no	one	would	dream	of	begrudging	her	the	comfortable	life	she	had	begun	to set	before	herself,"	but if forced to	compare the two	hypothetical	portrayals, the	Diplomat Angela	with	no	regrets seems	to	have	achieved	more	vertical	coherency.	Regardless	of	her success,	she	endorses	the	decisions	she	makes	and	this is the	sincerity	that	we	appreciate when	evaluating	whether	someone	is	actually	good. As	Annas	notes an action won't be performed easily and enjoyably if there is interference from attachment	to	goals	that	are	in	tension	with	what	the	person	is	doing	in	the	action. An	action	will then	not	be fully	generous,	say, if	accompanied	by felt	regrets	about the	money or time spent, and thoughts about how else the	money or time	might have	been	spent	more	gratifyingly.	(p.	75) Even	if	the	action	is	good,	the	agent	is	good	only	to	the	degree	that	she	has	achieved	vertical coherency	and	can	act	in	conformity	with	the	values	exhibited	at	each	level	of	her	life. This	does	not	mean	that	'being	good'	always	demands	the	kind	of	supererogatory	action that Angela seems to be performing. Indeed, if Angela were not such a talented and experienced	diplomat,	the	decision	to	leave	her	family	and	return	to	such	demanding	work at	her	age	would	seem	foolish.	The	less	her	talent	area	would	help	her,	the	more	foolish	the choice	would	be.	Since	Angela	"goes	on	to	serve	admirably	and	with	a	good	deal	of	success in	sustaining	the	peace,"	it's	apparent	that	she	was	cognizant	of	her	talent	area	and	how	to successfully	implement	it.	We	can	draw	a	parallel	with	a	volunteer	JireJighter	who	is	asked to	help	rescue	people	from	a	burning	building.	If	the	JireJighter	is	not	trained	for	the	speciJic  22 circumstance,	she	might	be	admirable	but	the	choice	was	not	a	good	one.	She	would	rush	in and encounter difJiculties which would impede a successful rescue. Acknowledging her talent	area	and	being	able	to	reconcile	it	with	her	higher	values	is	what	allows	Angela	to	Jind diplomacy	engaging. Finally, it's likely that Angela experienced a high degree of 'vital engagement' in the context	of	her	work	and	how	it	contributed	to	her	society	or	culture.	It's	not	enough	that	she Jinds	that	diplomacy	aligns	well	with	her	temperament,	developed	talents,	immediate	goals, and	self-image [Levels	1-4].	To function	optimally	-	so to	speak	-	she	needs to Jind	her work	meaningful	in	the	context	of	her	self-image	and	in	the	context	of	her	society	or	culture [Levels	5-6].	Work	can	be	experienced	as	a	'job,'	if	the	goal	is	Jinancial	rewards;	a	'career,'	if the	goal	is	opportunities	for	advancement;	or	a	'calling,'	if	the	goal	is	itself	the	"enjoyment	of fulJilling,	socially	useful	work"	(Wrzensniewski,	McCauley,	Rozin,	and	Schwartz,	1997,	p.	21). Since	Angela	was	able to	exercise	her talent	related	to	diplomacy	and	she found	her	work important	in	a	larger	sense,	it	is	likely	that	she	enjoyed	a	high	degree	of	vertical	coherency between	her	personality	[Levels	1-4]	and	the	socio-cultural	context	[Level	5-6]	in	which	her work	is	deemed	important	-	a	"calling."	If	she	moved	to	Tuscany,	it	is	possible	that	her	daily activities	are	not	going	to	fall	within	her	talent	area.	Moreso,	her	daily	activities	will	seem less	important	in	a	larger	sense	and	alignment	with	her	strong	socio-cultural	values	will	be less likely. Longitudinal studies show that people "still committed to involvement in their talent	area	were	more	likely	than	their	less	committed	peers	to	have	found	the	activity	both absorbing and important" - both criteria for vital engagement (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p. 96 citing Csikszentmihalyi et al., 1993). Thus, since Angela is 'good,'	she	enjoys	a	meaningful	and	persistent	global	Jlow	experience	as	a	result	of	achieving vertical	coherency	and	acting	freely	from	her	moral	disposition. 22 4.4.	Flow	without	moral	goodness:	The	case	of	Unscrupulous	(objection	2) There	is	another	hard	case	that	is	related	to	the	brash	diplomat,	the	brash	JireJighter,	or -	for	that	matter	-	the	brash	child	savior	who	could	achieved	a	kind	of	personal	coherency and	yet	may	have	been	motivated	by	immoral	or	just	wrongheaded	intentions.	Aren't	there As	noted	by	my	Justin	Tiwald	in	a	personal	correspondence,	there	is	another	way	of	Angela	achieving	vertical	22 coherency	even	while	enjoying	her	retirement	in	Tuscany:	by	adjusting	her	values,	revising	the	personal narrative,	etc.	I	also	would	acknowledge	that	option.  23 examples	of	immorality	that	could	produce	the	kind	of	absorption	and	Jlow-like	experiences that we say are the	mark of	moral development? Simply put, my answer is no. This has mostly	to	do	with	the	inability	to	abstract	oneself	from	a	larger	socio-cultural	context.	Any coherency that exists solely at the level of personality is plagued by frustration and instability.	Moreso,	I	would	insist	that	purely	personal	coherency	is	highly	unlikely. In	order	to	articulate	the	objection,	I	will	devise	my	own	counterexample	adapted	from those presented by Bernard Williams (1985), Brad Hooker (1998), and Neera Badhwar (2014).	Consider	a	person	we'll name 'Unscrupulous' (Hooker,	p. 149ff)	who is very, very bad	and	also	a	very	successful	mobster	(Badhwar,	2014,	p.	189ff).	Because	of	his immoral success	and	non-moral	skills,	Unscrupulous is	not	miserable	at	all	but, "by	any	ethological standard . . . dangerously Jlourishing" (Williams, 1985, p. 46).	He perhaps has non-moral skills that are "justiJiable objects of admiration to others, and a source of pride for the person who has them." For example, clever repartee, ingenuity at planning heists, daredevilry	and	physical	prowess	while	escaping	the	law,	ambidextrous	gunmanship	skills, etc. (Badhwar, 2014, p. 192). Furthermore, Unscrupulous' success as a	mobster and his intimate	role	within	the	mob	'family'	affords	him	values	to	which	he	can	conform	while	also insulating him from the opposing values society at-large hold. Thus, it seems that he can enjoy a degree of vertical coherency not only involving his personality but also his	more localized socio-cultural values. This would seem to provide him with meaningful and persistent Jlow experiences that I have previously described as the mark of moral development. The	purpose	of	presenting	this	counterexample is to	show	how	our intuitions	seem	to endorse the view that someone can be well-off, "Jlourish," and enjoy non-moral achievements without being moral - without 'being good'. But regardless of the intermittent	and	unstable	moments	of	pleasure	that	Unscrupulous	might	enjoy,	I	will	insist that	he	cannot	attain	the	degree	of	vertical	coherency	and	meaning	-	that	is,	the	degree	of 'vital engagement'	- that a moral person could attain. This is primarily because of two reasons. First, although Unscrupulous may be able to Jind meaning in his mob 'family' by conforming to the values that it collectively endorses, it would be impossible to abstract himself	from	the	larger	socio-cultural	context	(as	mentioned	in	§4.2).	I	suppose	it	could	be possible	to	be	enculturated	solely	by	the	'family'	if	Unscrupulous	was	"born	into	the	mob"	in  24 some	strong	sense	and	subsequently	indoctrinated	by	it	over	his	early	developmental	years. Nevertheless,	the	mob	itself	exists	dependent	upon	its	larger	law-abiding	community.	Much like	how	a	person	who	achieves coherency solely at the level	of	personality is	plagued	by frustration and instability, a mob 'family' collectively is plagued by frustration and instability. Being a member of this organization would mean to experience the negative effects	of	mob	values	in	conJlict	with	those	of	the	larger	community.	It	seems	highly	unlikely that Unscrupulous and any	member of the	mob 'family' could navigate freely within the parameters that the larger society and culture provides while being insulated from reprimands, stigmatization, and confrontations with other organizations. Thus, it seems very likely that his experiences of Jlow as a result of non-moral expertise would be constantly	thwarted	and	frustrated. Second,	even	if	the	mob	'family'	and	its	members	thrive	and	excel	as,	say,	'a	meaningful counterbalance	to	the	values	of	the	larger	community,'	I	would	insist	that	vertical	coherency is	still	highly	unlikely.	This	is	due	to	the	need	for	'horizontal	coherency'	at	each	level	of	our model.	I	will	dwell	a	little	on	this	point	since	it	also	serves	as	a	response	to	a	kind	of	cultural relativism. 4.5	'Horizontal	coherency' As	Sheldon	and	Kasser	(1995) insist, 'horizontal	coherency' is	necessary in	order	to	make 'vertical	coherency'	feasible: In	addition	to lower-to-higher level	connections,	systemic	[vertical]	coherence	also implies	connections	among	elements	at	the	same	level	of	a	hierarchy	[i.e.	'horizontal coherency']. . .	Speaking	from	a	bottom-up	perspective,	connections	at lower	levels presumably	make vertical coherence easier to achieve. Speaking from a top-down perspective, higher level synthesis can help forge connections among lower level elements	(p.	532). So, if	Unscrupulous	does	not	have	a	coherent	self-image	or	self-narrative (for	example,	he wants	to	be	a	mobster	but	also	thinks	of	himself	as	an	artist),	he is less likely	to	maintain vertical	coherency	(due	to	the	fact	that	his	mob	'family'	values	would	probably	discourage	or conJlict	with	his	artistic	aspirations). But	regardless	of	Unscrupulous'	aspirations, there	seems	to	be	a	systemic incoherency within any immoral organization like the	mob. That is, it seems that	mob 'family' values must necessarily reJlect incoherent beliefs	- at least	when it comes to honesty, fairness,  25 respecting property, open-mindedness, etc. That is, the kind of	moral decency that these values	convey	are	not	only	important	to	promote	when	maintaining	harmony	within	a	group like	the	mob	'family',	they	are	also	the	values	that	must	be	opposed	when	pursuing	immoral endeavors. 23 Even in basic college 'critical thinking' texts, this is the kind of incoherency that is portrayed	as	an	unbeneJicial	feature	one's	worldview.	If	our	beliefs	and	theories	about	the world	are	inconsistent	with	each	other,	we	are	less	likely	to	succeed	at	our	endeavors: a theory helps increase our understanding by Jitting our beliefs into a coherent pattern.	When	some	of	our	most	fundamental	beliefs	conJlict	with	one	another,	the relevant	theory	is	in	trouble	and	our	understanding	is	decreased.	.	.	To	achieve	true understanding, we must somehow resolve the inconsistency. Likewise, if the theories that make up our worldview are inconsistent with one another, there is obviously	something	wrong	with	our	worldview.	At	least	one	of	our	theories	must	be Jlawed	and	some	of	our	beliefs	must	be	wrong.	Our	understanding	of the	world is decreased, and our prospects for success (however we deJine it) are dimmed. (Vaughn,	2016,	p.	441) As	we	would	expect, there	are	some	worldviews	that	are	better	as	a	result	of their	beliefs and theories about oneself, one's social values, or one's cultural values being coherent at their respective levels. Being a criminal exhibits less horizontal and, thus, less vertical coherency	because	the	worldview	of	a	criminal	is	plagued	by	inconsistencies	that	manifest as	frustrated	motives	and	intentions.	This	frustration,	in	turn,	precludes	any	real	enjoyment of	sustained	and	meaningful	global	Jlow	experiences. 4.6	A	hard	case:	the	successful	slaveholder The	following	scenario	is	mentioned	in-passing	by	Daniel	Haybron	(2008): [Consider	a]	successful	Southern	slaveholder	who	enjoys	the	approbation	of	his community	and	a	comfortable	existence	with	a	loving	family[.	This	person]	has obvious	moral	shortcomings,	yet	it	is	hard	to	see	in	what	sense	his	life	must	be 'impoverished.'	Why	must	he	be	in	any	way	worse	off	than	he	would	be	were	he more	enlightened	about	human	equality?	Why	must	he	be	worse	off	than	a	morally better	counterpart	who	enjoys	as	much	wealth,	comfort,	success,	love,	and reputation,	but	without	ever	wronging	anyone?	(We	can	assume	that	both	are	wellsettled	in	their	moral	convictions,	equally	convinced	of	their	righteousness.)	(p.	159) I	think	that	Neera	Badhwar	(2014)	does	a	good	job	making	this	point	for	her	own	purposes	(in	defense	of	a	23 kind	of	eudaimonism).  26 The	case	of	the	slaveholder	can	be	formulated	as	a	response	to	this	paper's	proposal	by insisting	that	the	slaveholder	has	achieved	vertical	coherency	between	his	personal	values, goals,	and	self-image	along	with	the	surrounding	socio-cultural	values.	The	slaveholder "enjoys	the	approbation	of	his	community"	and	is	perhaps	insulated	from	the	insinuations of	Northern	abolitionists. Although	I	acknowledge	this	objection	as	a	hypothetical	scenario,	I	would	like	to consider	further	the	historical	context	of	such	a	character.	For	this	objection	to	be	effective, it	would	be	helpful	to	imagine	a	slaveholder	that	enjoyed	his	success	well	before	1860.	The closer	to	Abraham	Lincoln's	campaign	and	election,	the	more	anxiety	slaveholders	felt.	They were	continuously	challenged	to	reconsider	their	assumptions	about	slavery;	the	more exposed	to	the	national	dialogue,	the	more	ambivalence	was	expressed	in	their correspondences	and	diaries. Furthermore,	regardless	of	when	he	lived,	it	would	be	24 helpful	to	imagine	our	successful	slaveholder	closed-off	to	the	national	dialogue	altogether. This	is	because,	even	in	the	18th	century,	there	were	organizations	who	called	for	the abolition	of	slavery	or	the	'repatriation'	of	African	slaves	and	who	thus	challenged	the ideologies	of	slaveholders.	We	would	have	to	suppose	a	moderately	isolated	-	yet successful	-	slaveholder	living	in	blissful	close-mindedness.	I	don't	think	this	is	difJicult	to imagine. Furthermore,	regardless	of	being	sheltered	from	opposing	ideologies	which	expose inconsistencies	in	his	own,	there	was	never	a	time	when	slave	unrest	and	rebellions	were not	a	concern.	Such	an	ever-present	threat	to	the	slaveholder	enterprise	would understandably	be	cause	for	anxiety	and	would	itself	challenge	the	legitimacy	of	the A	fascinating	illustration	of	the	mounting	anxiety	and	ambivalence	of	Southern	slaveholders	can	be	found	in	24 Moore	(1993).	There,	we	Jind	a	widowed	slaveholder,	Keziah	Goodwyn	Hopkins	Brevard	writing	in	her	diary after	the	election	of	Lincoln:	"I	have	never	been	opposed	to	giveing	[sic]	up	slavery	if	we	could	send	them	out	of our	country	-	I	have	often	wished	I	had	been	born	in	just	such	a	country	-	with	all	our	religious	previleges	[sic] &	liberties	with	none	of	them	in	our	midst	-	if	the	North	had	let	us	alone	-	the	Master	&	the	servant	were happy	with	out	advantages	-	but	we	had	had	vile	wretches	ever	making	the	restless	worse	than	they	would have	been	&	from	my	experience	my	own	negroes	are	as	happy	as	I	am:	-	happier."	Just	to	note,	the	proposal	of colonizing	blacks	(in	particular,	to	what	is	now	Liberia)	was	proposed	by	Americans	since	the	Revolutionary	War. As	for	the	fantasy	of	her	"happy"	slaves,	Brevard	-	in	a	later	diary	entry	-	exposes	her	own	view	as	wishful thinking.	She	relates	how	she	become	angry	"when	I	Jind	out	their	feelings	to	me	-	with	all	I	have	done	for them	.	.	.	I	am	every	now	&	then	awakened	by	the	fact	that	they	hate	me."	She	wishes	she	could	"cast	them	off without	scruples	of	conscience,"	but	believes	she	cannot	"without	a	rebuke	from	my	Heavenly	father."	She acknowledges	that	all	slaves	"would	aim	at	freedom	-	'tis	natural	they	should	&	they	will	try	for	it."	It	is	not difJicult	to	imagine	the	discordance	present	in	the	mind	of	the	average	antebellum	slaveholder.  27 slaveholder's	beliefs.	All	these	factors	jeopardize	the	horizontal	coherency	of	the slaveholder	-	the	consistency	of	the	slaveholder	worldview	-	at	different	levels. Horizontal	incoherency,	in	turn,	would	make	vertical	coherency	unstable	and	short-lived. Now,	to	be	even	more	charitable	to	the	objection,	we	might	assume	a	successful slaveholder	who	is	not	concerned	with	unrest	or	rebellion;	he	would	not	be	be	plagued	by anxiety	or	ambivalence	towards	his	enterprise.	In	responding	to	this,	I	will	address	two types	of	slaveholders	that	could	potentially	establish	this	state-of-mind:	the	active slaveholder	and	the	passive	slaveholder. An	active	slaveholder	would	be	one	who	embraces	the	slaveholder	role	and	who	would play	an	active	role	in	the	management	of	the	'property'	alongside	his	overseer.	The	slaves would	be	monitored;	their	motives	would	be	anticipated;	unrest,	laziness,	and	dissension would	be	appropriately	discouraged;	and	potential	rebellions	would	be	successfully quashed.	The	question	is	whether	these	activities	could	provide	both	absorbed	enjoyment (Jlow)	and	meaning	as	a	result	of	vertical	coherency.	I	suspect	not. The	activities	involved	in	this	active	slaveholding	(monitoring	the	slaves;	anticipating their	motives;	appropriately	discouraging	unrest,	laziness,	and	dissension)	would	have	to conform	to	the	slaveholder's	basic	psychology	[Level	1]	and	character	traits	[Level	2].	In response	to	this,	I	Jind	it	unlikely	that	these	unsavory	activities	would	be	endorsed	by	a healthy	human	psychology.	Although	meaning	might	be	provided,	I	would	expect	the unsavoriness	of	the	activities	would	effect	the	enjoyment	gleaned	from	this	work	-	thus, making	vital	engagement	(enjoyment	and	meaning)	unlikely.	For	example,	to	enact	some	of these	"unsavory"	activities	with	proJiciency	would	require	an	intimate	familiarity	with	the human	beings	that	the	slaveholder	and	overseer	is	subjugating	(e.g.	anticipating	the	motives and	intentions).	Concurrently,	it	would	also	require	an	absence	of	any	empathy	on	the	part of	the	slaveholder	that	might	undermine	the	enactment	of	other	activities	(e.g.	discouraging unrest,	laziness,	and	dissension).	Taken	together,	these	two	criteria	seem	to	demand	a deviation	from	a	healthy	psychology	[Levels	1-2]. Thus,	there	is	less	likely	to	be	horizontal	25 Basic	empathy	as	a	result	of	mirror	neurons	is	especially	active	in	response	to	the	intentions	or	motives	of	25 other	human	beings.	The	"deviation	from	a	healthy	psychology"	could	be	merely	non-conscious	suppression	of any	emotions	towards	slaves	(as	a	result	of,	say,	the	dehumanizing	portrayal	of	black	africans	at	the	time).	On	the other	hand,	this	lack	of	empathy	could	be	the	result	of	sociopathy.	Whatever	the	deviation,	there	is	less	likely	to be	horizontal	coherency	at	the	more	basic	levels	of	the	personality	[Levels	1-2]	and,	thus,	there	is	less	likely	to	be vertical	coherency	at	the	personal	level	[Level	1-4]	despite	there	being	an	alignment	between	any	higher	levels [i.e.	Levels	3-6].  28 coherency	at	the	more	basic	levels	of	the	personality	[Levels	1-2]	and	at	the	levels	of personality	in	general	[Level	1-4].	Meaning	might	be	found	in	the	work	due	to	the	larger society	and	culture	apparently	endorsing	the	institution	of	slavery,	but	the	work	itself	would become	tedious	and	grueling	since	one's	psychology	would	not	allow	an	absorbed enjoyment. 26 In	contrast,	the	passive	slaveholder	would	not	actively	participate	in	the	management	of the	'property.'	He	would	be	relatively	aloof	and	hands-off	with	his	enterprise;	he	would	not interact	personally	with	his	slaves	-	leaving	it	to	his	overseer.	If	we	assume	that	such	a slaveholder	can	be	"successful,"	then	he	would	insulate	himself	not	only	from	other ideologies	but	also	from	the	"unsavory"	activities	-	those	activities	that	otherwise	would corrode	his	presumably	healthy	psychology.	In	response	to	this	scenario,	my	view	would seem	to	allow	this	hands-off	slaveholder	to	enjoy	much	more	vertical	coherency	-	and, thus,	vital	engagement	(absorbed	enjoyment	and	meaning)	-	than	his	more	active counterpart.	I	think	this	makes	sense.	But	note	that	how	he	is	able	to	achieve	such	vital engagement	-	by	not	playing	an	active	role	in	slaveholding.	That	is,	a	slaveholder	could	only be	said	to	exercise	moral	goodness	as	this	paper	is	deJining	it	only	insofar	as	he	is	not embracing	the	activities	involved	in	slaveholding.	Instead,	it	would	be	more	accurate	to	say that	he	achieves	vital	engagement	with	his	non-slaveholding	activities	-	those	involved	in his	role	as	a	father	or	husband	or	community	member. This	might	be	disappointing	for	those	that	prefer	a	more	black-and-white	picture	of	the moral	landscape	but	it's	helpful	to	dwell	on	the	conclusion	of	this	thought	experiment.	The proposal	presented	in	this	paper	provides	the	language	to	articulate	why	slaveholders exhibit	less	moral	goodness	the	more	they	play	an	active	role	in	the	morally	repugnant aspects	of	slavery.	This	is	because	the	actual	activity	of	slaveholding	is	not	something	with which	one	can	achieve	vertical	coherency.	My	proposal	acknowledges	that	slaveholders were	able	to	enjoy	intermittent,	episodic	cases	of	pleasure	or	satisfaction	-	this	seems realistic.	But	a	slaveholder	who	actively	engages	in	the	immoral	institution	of	slavery	cannot Nakamura	and	Csikszentmihalyi	(2002)	comments	on	how	difJicult	it	is	"to	sustain	prolonged	involvement	in	26 an	endeavor	that	is	experienced	as	signiJicant	if	a	person	does	not	Jind	enjoyment	within	the	activity	itself"	(p. 96).	See	also	Colby	and	Damon	(1992)	and	Ebaugh	(1988)	on	the	likelihood	of	burnout	in	meaningful	yet unenjoyable	activities.  29 enjoy	global	vital	engagement.	Because	of	this	-	as	I'll	discuss	in	the	next	section	-	they are	barred	from	what	most	people	would	recognize	as	authentic	happiness. 27 Part	5:	Morality	&	Happiness So	far,	I've	presented	an	argument	where	'being	good'	involves	sustained	and	meaningful global	Jlow	experiences.	This	experience	is	sustained	by	far-reaching	coherencies	cross-level (vertical coherency) which is sustained by consistency at each level of one's moral life (horizontal	coherency).	This	experience	is	global	because	'being	good'	is	a	disposition	that	is informed	ultimately	by	the	vertical	coherency	of	the	whole	system	-	it	does	not	reside	at any one level but as a higher-order property of all the levels. That is, 'being good' is a disposition that can	manifests freely and sincerely	when 'vertical coherency' is achieved. The	more	coherency,	the	more	an	agent	can	'be	good' As	implied	in	previous	sections,	'being	good'	can	also	be	described	as	involving	a	kind	of 'vital	engagement'.	As	expected,	this	kind	of	'vital	engagement'	is	global.	It	is	a	relationship with	the	world	that	is	characterized	both	by	global	Ilow	experiences	(enjoyed	absorption	or engagement)	and	by	meaning	(at	the	levels	of	one's	personality	[Levels	1-4]	and	one's	sociocultural	context	[Level	5-6])	(Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihalyi,	2002,	p.	87). It	will	not	take	much	to	argue	that	this	is	the	kind	of	happiness	that	most	people	mean	if pushed	on	the	subject	of	'authentic'	or	'genuine'	happiness.	At	this	point	of	the	paper,	I	will argue for my main conclusion: 'being good' positively correlates to 'being happy'. 'Being good' is	a	practical	disposition that	demands intellectual	and	affective	engagement. 'Being happy'	is	just	what	I've	described	as	global	vital	engagement.	This	is	authentic	happiness. Perhaps	one	can	respond	to	contemporary	cases	similar	to	the	slaveholder	problem	using	my	proposal.	For	27 example,	we	could	ask	ourselves	whether	factory	farming	is	allowing	its	active	participant	to	achieve	vertical coherency.	If	not,	there	may	be	something	inherently	problematic	in	the	institution.	Factory	farming	is	a	less obvious	case	of	moral	propriety	(compared	to	slavery)	and	so	it	is	supplemented	with	discussions	of	health, environment,	and	economics.	But	in	terms	of	being	consciously	confronted	with	distributive	injustice	(in	regards to	the	resources	wasted	in	factory	farming)	and	animal	injustice	(which	demands	more	sensitive,	perhaps	less universal	capacities	for	empathy),	our	goals,	self-image	and	the	values	we	endorse	as	a	community	may	not	be	as coherent	as	we	would	like.	Despite	being	agnostic	about	a	speciJic	theory	of	the	good,	the	developmental	picture presented	in	this	paper	allows	for	new	generations	of	mentors	to	alter	the	'trajectory'	so-to-speak	of	moral development.	And	although	I	do	not	suggest	any	robust	conception	of	the	good	(i.e.	the	telos	of	our	'trajectory'), my	proposal	insists	that	a	consequence	of	successfully	enacting	the	good	should	be	cognitive	and	social	harmony.  30 5.1.	Authentic	happiness In this section, I	will be	presenting	a conception	of 'genuine' or 'authentic' happiness' adapted	from	L.W.	Sumner's	book	Welfare,	Happiness,	and	Ethics	(1996).	I	hope	to	show	that this	notion	of	happiness	conforms	to	common	sense	and	usage.	I	will	also	show	that	this	is identical to the	notion	of 'global	vital	engagement' that I	previously	argued	was	positively correlated	with	'being	good'.	This	will	effectively	show	how	'being	good'	positively	correlates to	'being	happy'. Sumner	(1996)	presents	'being	happy'	as	endorsing	and	being	satisJied	with	one's	life	as a	whole: Being	happy	in	this	sense	means	having	a	certain	kind	of	positive	attitude	toward your	life,	which	in	its	fullest	form	has	both	a	cognitive	and	an	affective	component. The	cognitive	aspect	of	happiness	consists	in	a	positive	evaluation	of	the	conditions of	your	life,	a	judgement	that,	at	least	on	balance,	it	measures	up	favourably	against your standards	or	expectations.	This	evaluation	may	be	global, covering	all	of the important	sectors	of	your	life,	or	it	may	focus	on	one	particular	(your	work,	say,	or your	family).	In	either	case	it	represents	an	afJirmation	or	endorsement	of	(some	or all	of)	the	conditions	or	circumstances	of	your	life,	a	judgement	that,	on	balance	and taking	everything	into	account,	your	life	is	going	well	for	you.	.	.	The	affective	side	of happiness	consists	in	what	we	commonly	call	a	sense	of	well-being:	Jinding	your	life enriching	or	regarding,	or	feeling	satisJied	or	fulJilled	by	it.	(pp.	145-6) Here,	Sumner	presents	two	dimensions	of	happiness	that	correspond	to	the	intellectual	and affective dimensions that comprise 'being good'. In order to cultivate one's moral disposition, there must be a mindful and intellectual engagement with one's moral life. Striving	for	cross-level	coherency,	one's	moral	disposition	and	the	behavior	that	it	generates allows for a	more "positive evaluation" of one's life. That is, one's behavior	measures up favorably against the recognized standards at each level. Concurrently, there	must be an affective and emotional engagement with one's moral life in order to synchronize one's behavior	with	one's feelings	and judgments.	This	allows for the	expression	of	one's	moral disposition	more	sincerely	and	spontaneously.	Phenomenologically, I	would	insist	that	this occurs as an enjoyable global Jlow experience. The	more engagement and coherency, the more	Jlow.	This	now	exposes	an	important	difference	between	Sumner's	view	and	my	own. Sumner is articulating a theory that	measures 'authentic happiness' (what he sees as comprising	one's	well-being	or	welfare)	in	terms	of	'life-satisfaction'.	This	means	that	one's happiness is informed by the positive evaluation of one's life and the occurrent sense of "feeling	satisJied"	with	it.	The	proposed	view	of	happiness	that	I've	articulated	in	this	paper  31 involves	these	intellectual	and	affective	dimensions	but	also	a	degree	of	engagement	in	these dimensions that Sumner	does	not acknowledge.	Using the skill analogy, I	believe that I've shown	that	including	Jlow	experience	in	a	discussion	of	moral	expertise	is	justiJied. Additionally,	I	believe	that	emphasizing	felt	engagement	or	absorption	in	one's	moral	life goes	a	long	way	towards	discouraging	a	charge	of	a	kind	of	intellectualism	that	comes	with Sumner's 'life-satisfaction'	view	of	happiness.	When	taken	out	of Jlow	(that is,	when	taken out of the actual activity which one Jinds inherently enjoyable), it's likely that the agent would provide a positive evaluation of one's experience. But this evaluation would be retrospective	and	external	to	the	experience	which	is	being	evaluated.	The	actual	instance	of happiness is immanent	- in the experience itself. Thus, it's more helpful to talk about happiness	as	comprising	of	a	global	Jlow	experience	and	a	sense	of	meaning,	both	of	which is the result of achieving (through intellectual and affective engagement) the vertical coherency	described	in	this	paper. The	resulting	view	shows	'authentic	happiness'	as	a	global	kind	of	'vital	engagement'.	As Nakamura	&	Csikszentmihalyi	(2002)	say,	"the	optimal	outcome	of	human	development	is	a life	characterized	by	the	conjunction	of	enjoyment	and	meaning	in	one's	endeavors"	(p.	94). Global 'vital engagement' entails both enjoyment and meaning which emerges from the sustained 'vertical coherency' found in the practical disposition of a morally developed agent. Angela is authentically	happy	because	of the	vital engagement she Jinds in	diplomacy. Unscrupulous	is	deprived	of	authentic	happiness	despite	experiencing	legitimate	moments of	'feeling	happy.'	To	clarify	why	this	doesn't	matter	much	to	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we care	about,	I	will	brieJly	present	what	'being	happy'	is	not. 5.2.	What	'being	happy'	is	not 'Being	happy'	is	not	'being	happy	with'	or	'about'	something.	The	way	that	this	phrase	is commonly used, 'being	happy	with' amounts to	merely being satisJied	with something	- having	a	positive	attitude	towards	it	or	expressing	a	positive	evaluation	of	it.	Sumner	rightly notes	that	"no	affect	or	occurrent	feeling	on	your	part	is	implied"	when	we	say	we	are	happy with	something	(p.	143).	This	kind	of	happiness is	potentially	absent	of	any	enjoyment	or felt	meaning.	It	is	not	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we	pursue	for	ourselves	and	our	loved	ones.  32 'Being happy' is not 'feeling happy'. This kind of happiness involves the affective dimension	that 'being	happy	with'	was lacking. It is	certainly	desirable	(this is the	kind	of happiness	that	hedonism	pursues)	but	-	as	Sumner	notes	-	"feelings	of	happiness	.	.	.	are frames	of	mind	subject	to	Jluctuation	from	day	to	day,	rather	than	settled	judgements	about the quality	of	our	lives"	(p.	145).	By	itself,	it	lacks	the	intellectual	dimension	which	is	meant to	guide	our	pursuits	appropriately	towards	things	that	give	us	more	stable	and	meaningful experiences	of	enjoyment.	'Feeling	happy'	is	certainly	good	but	it	is	not	what	we	should	aim for.	Authentic	happiness	should	allow	for	richer	and	more	consistent	experiences	of	'feeling happy'	but	it	provides	much	more	that	episodic	pleasure. 'Being happy' is not 'having a happy disposition'. This is "a settled tendency" toward occurrent	episodes	of	feeling	happy	(p.	145).	This	is	getting	closer	to	the	kind	of	authentic happiness	that	we	care	about	for	ourselves	and	our	loved	ones.	But	it	still	seems	unrealistic without it	being	guided	by	an intellectual	engagement	with	one's life	as	a	whole. In	other words,	although	I	agree	that	this	kind	of	happiness	would	be	close	to	the	kind	of	happiness we	care	about,	I	don't	think	it's	realistic	to	aim	towards	having	a	happy	disposition	without engaging	with one's life as a	whole and	how it 'hangs together' in the	way that I've been discussing in this paper. 'Being happy' should not be thought of as just increasing the amount one 'feels happy' - this is ancillary or even incidental to authentic happiness. 'Being	happy' is	about	ensuring that	your life is	not	only	enjoyable	and	engaging,	but	also and	meaningful. 5.3.	Conclusion	to	Part	5 In conclusion, 'being	happy' is the conjunction	of	enjoyment	and	meaning that results from developing moral goodness as a skill and achieving the vertical coherency characterized in Part 4 of this paper. 'Being good' is a practical disposition that entails intellectual and affective engagement with one's world, resolving inconsistencies and aligning	the	values	that	one	hold	at	a	personal	and	socio-cultural level.	To	the	degree	that this	coherency	is	achieved,	one	becomes	more	'good'	in	a	real	and	sincere	way.	Likewise,	to the	degree	that	this	coherency	is	achieved,	the	more	one	enjoys	a	global	Jlow	experience	and the	more	meaning	is	granted	to	one's	life.	These	two	elements	characterize	the	kind	of	'vital engagement' that	we can appropriately deem 'authentic happiness'. This is the happiness that	we	hope	for	ourselves	and	those	we	care	about.	If	one	pursues	this	kind	of	happiness  33 without also seeking to be good - without seeking vertical coherency - whatever happiness that is procured will be unstable and easily spoiled. 'Authentic happiness' is stable	happiness.	It	is	an	achievement	that	a	sincerely	good	person	enjoys	after	a	thoughtful and	careful	engagement	with	her	world,	her	community,	and	herself. Part	6:	Concluding	Thoughts	-	Happiness	as	achievement 'Being good' is a kind of global skill directed towards shaping and fashioning one's practical	dispositions.	The	goal	is	to	better	express	this	disposition.	The	only	way	to	do	this is by deliberately and gradually bringing all the activities of one's life into alignment. Exercising this global skill is inherently enjoyable and	meaningful. I think it's fair at this point	to	characterize	the	happiness	that	one	Jinds	in	this	process	as	-	more	than	anything - an achievement. Doing so will drive-home the point that my proposal conforms to common	sense	notions	of	happiness. Julia Annas in her article "Happiness as Achievement" (2004) conveys the sentiment nicely - making the distinction between 'feeling happy' as a result of "doing any old thing"	(p.	45)	and	actually	'being	happy'	and	living	a	happy	life: Getting	a	smiley-face	feeling	from	good	deeds	or	bad	deeds	lasts	only	as	long	as	the deeds	do.	And	this	kind	of	happiness	does	not	matter to	us	all that	much	once	we start	to	think	in	a	serious	way	about	our	lives.	As	we	bring	up	our	children,	what	we aim	for	is	not	that	they	have	episodes	of	smiley-face	feelings,	but	that	their	lives	go well	as	wholes:	we	come	to	think	of	happiness	as	the	way	a	life	as	a	whole	goes	well, and	see	that	episodes	of	happiness	are	not	what	we	build	our	lives	around	(p.	45)	.	.	. Even	if	episodes	Jirst	come	to	mind,	we	do	think,	centrally,	of	living	happy	lives.	And this	is	because	we	think	of	our	lives	as	wholes	when	we	are	thinking	of	how	to	live, what	kind	of	people	we	are	to	aspire	to	be.	(p.	46) We	have	the	thought	that	happiness	comes	from	living	in	some	ways	and	not	others, that	it is	not	something	that	others	can't	given	you,	either	by	giving	you	stuff	or	by getting	you	into	a	particular	state.	(p.	50) I	have	argued	that	the	kind	of	happiness	that	we	truly	want	for	ourselves	and	those	we	care about	comes	from	not	just	doing	good	things	but	being	good	people. This	can	be	perceived as difJicult at Jirst (and rightly so) but as	we gradually train ourselves and keep striving towards being better, such moral cultivation will not only become easier, it will become more	enjoyable	and	undergird	an	enriching	and	sustainable	happiness.	Now	we	can	see	this project	as	a	worthy	endeavor	not just for	morality's	sake	but for	our	own	happiness.	This  34 makes us	willing participants in this challenge, allows us to take pride in our success at being	good	people,	and	allows	us	to	take	satisfaction	from	our	well-earned	achievement	that is	true	happiness. 28 The	line	of	Sanskrit	in	my	acknowledgments	page	(p.	v)	is	an	Indian	proverb	presented	as	entry	26	in	Bhate,	S.	28 (Ed.).	(1987).	Subhāṣita-śatakam	[One	Hundred	Good	Sayings]	(Vol.	2).	Pune:	University	of	Poona.	My	own translation	is	as	follows:	"As	the	thought,	so	the	word;	as	the	word,	so	the	deed.	Among	good	men,	there	is	a uniformity	in	thought,	word,	and	deed."	This	rang	true	to	me	when	I	Jirst	read	it	and	served	as	an	impetus	for writing	this	paper.	The	sincerely	good	person	would	have	no	tension	between	her	thoughts	and	actions (including	her	speech	acts).	Once	we've	appropriately	cultivated	ourselves	morally,	the	beneJicial	consequences surely	include	a	free	and	enjoyable	relationship	with	our	surroundings	and	with	each	other.  35 REFERENCES Annas,	J.	(1992).	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