The	Epistemic	Circumstances	of	Democracy Fabienne	Peter;	f.peter@warwick.ac.uk In	Miranda	Fricker	and	Michael	Brady	(eds.)	The	Epistemic	Life	of	Groups.	Oxford:	Oxford	University Press	2016,	pp.	133	–	149. Abstract Does	political	decision-making	require	experts	or	can	a	democracy	be	trusted	to	make correct	decisions?	Critics	of	democracy	tend	to	argue	that	democracy	cannot	be	trusted	in this	way	while	advocates	tend	to	argue	that	it	can.	Both	camps	agree	that	it	is	the	epistemic quality	of	the	outcomes	of	political	decision-making	processes	that	underpins	the	legitimacy of	political	institutions.	In	recent	political	philosophy,	epistemic	democrats	have	embraced this	instrumentalist	way	of	thinking	about	democracy.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	the attempt	to	defend	democracy	on	epistemic	instrumentalist	grounds	is	self-undermining.	I also	develop	an	alternative	–	procedural	–	epistemic	defence	of	democracy.	Drawing	on	the epistemology	of	disagreement,	I	show	that	there	is	a	prima	facie	epistemic	case	for democracy	when	there	is	no	procedure-independent	epistemic	authority	on	the	issue	to	be decided. I. Introduction Does	political	decision-making	require	experts	or	can	a	democracy	be	trusted	to	make correct	decisions?	This	question	has	a	long-standing	tradition	in	political	philosophy,	going back	at	least	to	Plato's	Republic.	Critics	of	democracy	tend	to	argue	that	democracy	cannot be	trusted	in	this	way	while	its	advocates	tend	to	argue	that	it	can.	While	they	come	to different	conclusion	about	the	epistemic	value	of	democracy,	both	camps	share	an 2 epistemic	instrumentalist	conception	of	democratic	legitimacy	and	of	political	legitimacy more	generally.	By	epistemic	instrumentalism	I	mean	the	view	that	epistemic	value	derives from	epistemic	outcomes.	Applied	to	democratic	legitimacy,	the	view	is	that	the	legitimacy of	democracy	depends	on	its	instrumental	epistemic	value.	On	this	view,	if	there	is	a	correct decision	–	an	outcome	that	is	truly	just	or	truly	for	the	common	good,	or	at	least	more	just or	closer	to	the	common	good	than	others	–	then	the	legitimacy	of	democracy	depends	on how	well-suited	it	is	to	track	this	decision. In	contemporary	political	philosophy,	many	epistemic	democrats	have	embraced	this epistemic	instrumentalist	defence	of	democracy	and	argued	that	democracy	is	a	good means	–	or	at	least	a	good	enough	means	–	to	reach	correct	decisions.	But	here	is	a challenge	for	this	view,	well	articulated,	I	find,	by	Hans	Kelsen	(1955:	2): "[T]he	doctrine	that	democracy	presupposes	the	belief	that	there	exists	an objectively	ascertainable	common	good	and	that	people	are	able	to	know	it	and therefore	to	make	it	the	content	of	their	will	is	erroneous.	If	it	were	correct, democracy	would	not	be	possible." The	challenge,	as	I	interpret	it,	is	that	an	epistemic	instrumentalist	defence	of	democracy	is self-undermining	because	the	epistemic	circumstances	it	presupposes	are	incompatible	with democracy.	Specifically,	as	I	shall	explain,	the	problem	arises	from	what	the	epistemic instrumentalist	conception	of	democratic	legitimacy	presupposes	about	epistemic	authority. To	illustrate	the	challenge,	consider	a	situation	in	which	there	seems	to	be	no	epistemic case	for	democracy.	Suppose	a	town	is	considering	the	plan	to	build	a	new	bridge	across	the river	that	runs	through	it.	The	decision	on	whether	or	not	to	build	the	bridge	depends	only 3 on	one	factor,	namely	on	the	stability	of	the	planned	bridge.	And	suppose	the	town engineer	has	the	expertise	to	assess	whether	the	planned	bridge	is	stable	and	concludes that	it	is. In	cases	such	as	the	bridge	case,	the	verdict	of	the	town	engineer	appears	to	be	sufficient	to legitimize	the	decision	that	the	bridge	should	be	built.	It	would	be	redundant,	or	perhaps even	crazy,	to	seek	a	democratic	decision	on	whether	or	not	the	bridge	is	stable.	The	fact that	the	town	engineer	enjoys	epistemic	authority	over	the	matter	thus	undermines	the epistemic	case	for	a	democratic	decision	on	this	issue. The	challenge,	as	I	interpret	it,	is	this.	If	there	is	a	correct	decision	to	be	made	and	if someone	has	legitimate	epistemic	authority	to	make	claims	about	what	the	correct	decision is,	the	epistemic	case	for	democracy	crumbles.	A	first	aim	of	my	chapter	is	to	show	how	the epistemic	instrumentalist	attempt	to	make	democratic	legitimacy	conditional	on	the epistemic	quality	of	the	outcomes	of	democratic	decision-making	runs	into	a	version	of	this challenge	and	should	be	rejected	for	that	reason. What	are	the	alternatives	to	an	epistemic	instrumentalist	defence	of	democracy?	The	first	is to	abandon	the	epistemic	strategy	altogether	and	defend	democracy	on	practical	grounds. This	way	of	responding	to	the	challenge	leads	to	"deep	proceduralist"	(Estlund	2008) conceptions	of	democratic	legitimacy,	according	to	which	democracy	is	legitimate	not because	it	tracks	a	procedure-independent	truth,	but	because	the	decision-makingprocedure	embodies	(moral)	values	such	as	equality,	dignity,	etc.	which	confer	value	to	its outcome.	This	is	not	the	strategy	I	shall	pursue	here. 4 The	second	alternative	is	an	epistemic	proceduralist	approach.	It	preserves	a	central	role	for epistemic	considerations	in	the	justification	of	democracy.	But	it	brings	such	considerations to	bear	on	the	evaluation	of	the	democratic	decision-making	procedure	directly,	not indirectly	via	the	outcomes	it	produces.	This	is	the	strategy	I	shall	explore	in	this	chapter. I	shall	use	epistemic	considerations	to	say	something	about	the	appropriate	scope	for democratic	decision-making.	Questions	about	the	appropriate	scope	for	democratic decision-making	are	typically	asked	in	socio-spatial	terms:	who	should	be	included	in	the democratic	collective?1	But	it	seems	to	me	that	we	should	also	ask	which	issues	should	be subjected	to	democratic	decision-making.	This	question,	I	want	to	argue,	is	in	the	first	place an	epistemic	question:	under	what	specific	epistemic	circumstances	is	democratic	decisionmaking	–	as	opposed	to,	most	importantly,	decision-making	by	experts	–	appropriate	and thus	potentially	legitimate? In	cases	like	the	bridge	case,	these	circumstances	are	not	given;	democratic	decision-making will	most	likely	be	illegitimate	in	this	case.	Critics	of	democratic	decision-making	have	a point	when	they	identify	cases	like	the	bridge	case	to	argue	for	the	unattractiveness	of democracy.	But	not	all	cases	are	like	the	bridge	case	and	this	leaves	room	for	advocates	of democracy	to	defend	their	cause.	I	will	argue	that	when	there	is	no	procedure-independent epistemic	authority	about	what	the	correct	decision	is,	then	there	is	a	prima	facie	epistemic case	for	democratic	decision-making. The	title	of	my	chapter	"the	epistemic	circumstances	of	democracy"	borrows	from	David Hume's	and	John	Rawls'	idea	of	the	"circumstances	of	justice"	and	Jeremy	Waldron's	idea	of 1	See	the	literature	on	what	is	called	the	"boundary	problem"	or	the	"constitution	of	the	demos"	(e.g. Goodin	2007;	Miller	2009). 5 the	"circumstances	of	politics".	Hume	(1978	[1739])	and	Rawls	(1971)	argue	that	justice	has its	natural	place	in	circumstances	of	moderate	scarcity	and	limited	altruism.	Waldron	(1999) argues	that	politics	has	its	natural	place	in	circumstances	in	which	there	is	a	need	for collective	action	but	where	people	disagree	about	what	to	do.	I	accept	this	characterization of	the	circumstances	of	politics.	But	Waldron	hasn't	explained	why	disagreements	need	to be	taken	seriously.	I	shall	make	use	of	the	epistemology	of	disagreement	to	help	identify	the appropriate	locus	of	democratic	decision-making. My	main	focus	shall	be	on	deliberative	democracy.	Let	me	explain	briefly	what	I	mean	by this	term.	Deliberative	democracy	is	usually	understood	in	contrast	to	aggregative democracy.	Aggregative	theories	of	democracy	take	the	key	feature	of	democracy	to	be	the aggregation	of	individual	preferences	or	beliefs	through	voting,	where	each	person's	vote	is given	equal	weight.	Theories	of	deliberative	democracy,	by	contrast,	view	democratic decision-making	as	embedded	in	an	exchange	of	reasons	for	preferring	certain	outcomes	or for	believing	certain	facts.	They	take	the	deliberation	among	the	members	of	the democratic	collective,	again	under	some	conditions	of	equality,	to	be	an	important	justifying feature	of	democracy.	Such	public	deliberation	may	take	place	formally,	for	example,	in parliament,	in	the	media,	in	meetings	and	events	of	political	parties	and	other	political organizations,	and,	informally,	in	people's	discussions	with	their	friends,	colleagues,	and family	members.	Since	such	deliberation	is	unlikely	to	produce	a	consensus,	however,	even a	deliberative	theory	will	assign	some	role	to	aggregative	decision-making.	A	stark	contrast between	the	two	theories	of	democracy	thus	overstates	the	case.	As	I	see	it,	the	main difference	between	the	two	theories	is	that	deliberative	democracy	does	whereas 6 aggregative	democracy	does	not	assign	a	legitimizing	role	to	public	deliberation.	It	is	in	this sense	that	I	shall	refer	to	deliberative	democracy.2 II. Practical	and	Epistemic	Authority My	argument	against	epistemic	instrumentalism	hinges	on	the	relationship	between epistemic	authority	and	the	legitimate	practical	authority	of	democracy.	Before	I	can	get into	the	argument,	I	need	to	say	something	about	what	I	mean	by	these	terms. By	legitimate	practical	authority	I	mean	here	the	right	to	make	claims	which	give	others sufficient	reason	for	action.	When	a	legitimate	practical	authority	says	you	ought	to	x,	you have	sufficient	reason	to	x.	Think,	for	example,	of	the	legitimate	authority	of	parents	or teachers	over	children	in	their	care.	Merely	de	facto	practical	authority	is	the	power	to	make claims	which	others	take	as	sufficient	reason	for	action.	The	difference	between	the	two	is that	the	claims	in	the	first	case	are	justified	while	in	the	second	they	are	not.	You	may	take the	say-so	of	a	de	facto	authority	as	sufficient	reason	for	action,	but	it	is	not	true	that	you have	that	reason. Political	legitimacy	relates	to	the	justification	of	the	practical	authority	of	political institutions	and	democratic	legitimacy	relates	to	the	justification	of	democratic	decisionmaking.	So	democratic	legitimacy	is	an	application	of	the	concept	of	legitimate	political authority	to	democracy.	If	political	authority	is	legitimate,	there	is	a	right	to	rule.	If democratic	decision-making	is	legitimate,	then	the	right	to	rule	is	jointly	held	by	the members	of	the	democratic	collective.	If	democratic	decision-making	is	legitimate,	then	the claims	that	can	be	associated	with	democratic	decisions	–	the	say-so	of	the	democratic collective	–	give	everyone	sufficient	reasons	for	action. 2	I've	discussed	the	two	theories	at	length	in	Peter	(2009). 7 By	legitimate	epistemic	authority	I	mean	the	right	to	make	claims	which	give	others sufficient	reasons	for	belief.3	If	you	legitimately	hold	epistemic	authority	over	p,	then	your claim	that	p	gives	me	sufficient	reason	to	believe	that	p.	Just	like	in	the	practical	case,	we can	also	distinguish	between	legitimate	and	de	facto	epistemic	authority.	Epistemic authority	is	merely	de	facto	if	someone	successfully	pretends	to	have	expertise	that	they	in fact	lack. With	these	terms	in	place,	we	can	now	address	the	question:	what	is	the	relationship between	democratic	legitimacy	and	epistemic	considerations?	We	can	distinguish	between two	main	approaches.	According	to	the	first,	democratic	legitimacy	is	independent	of epistemic	considerations	and	is	established	on	grounds	of	the	moral	values	embodied	by democracy.	That's	the	deep	proceduralist	scenario	I	mentioned	earlier.	Alternatively, epistemic	considerations	are	at	least	one	factor	in	the	determination	of	legitimate	practical authority.	This	is	the	approach	epistemic	democrats	take.	The	main	focus	of	my	paper	is	on the	question	how	epistemic	considerations	should	be	brought	to	bear	on	the	justification	of practical	political	authority.	In	the	next	section,	I	will	criticize	the	instrumentalist	way	of characterizing	the	relationship	between	epistemic	considerations	and	the	legitimate practical	authority	of	democracy.	In	the	rest	of	the	paper,	I	will	propose	an	alternative	– proceduralist	–	way	of	characterizing	this	relationship. III. Epistemic	Instrumentalism Variants	of	epistemic	instrumentalism	are	popular	among	epistemic	democrats	today. According	to	them,	the	epistemic	quality	of	the	decisions	made	justifies	the	authority	of 3	By	belief	I	hear	mean	both	full	and	partial	belief;	the	reason	for	belief	in	question	may	thus	either	be	a reason	for	a	full	belief	or	for	adjusting	your	belief,	e.g.	for	reducing	your	confidence	in	your	original	belief. 8 democracy	or	is	at	least	one	justificatory	factor.	Here	is	a	typical	characterization	of	the epistemic	conception	of	democracy: "For	epistemic	democrats,	the	aim	of	democracy	is	to	'track	the	truth.'	For	them, democracy	is	more	desirable	than	alternative	forms	of	decision-making	because,	and insofar	as,	it	does	that.	One	democratic	decision	rule	is	more	desirable	than	another according	to	that	same	standard,	so	far	as	epistemic	democrats	are	concerned"	(List and	Goodin	2001:	277). This	characterization	allows	for	different	conceptions	of	democratic	legitimacy,	depending on	how	much	weight	is	given	to	the	outcome	of	decision-making	relative	to	the	decisionmaking	procedure	itself.	One	possible	conception	is	what	David	Estlund	has	called	the "correctness	theory"	of	political	legitimacy.	On	this	conception,	a	political	decision	is legitimate	if	and	only	if	it	is	the	correct	decision.	With	regard	to	the	legitimacy	of democracy,	it	says	that	democratic	decision-making	is	conducive	to	political	legitimacy	to the	extent	that	it	successfully	tracks	a	procedure-independent	truth. But	making	political	legitimacy	dependent	on	the	correctness	of	the	decisions	presupposes	a right	to	make	claims	about	what	the	correct	decision	is,	as	without	the	possibility	of	judging what	the	correct	decision	is,	it	remains	indeterminate	whether	a	decision	is	or	is	not legitimate.	So,	on	one	way	of	making	sense	of	the	correctness	theory	of	political	legitimacy, someone,	or	a	small	group	of	people,	must	be	holding	the	right	to	make	claims	about	which democratic	decision	is	correct	and,	as	such,	legitimate.4	And	this	right	to	make	claims	about what	ought	to	be	believed	derives	from	procedure-independent	facts	or	objects	or	truths. Another	way	of	saying	the	same	thing	is	that	the	correctness	theory	of	political	legitimacy 4	I	shall	later	discuss	an	alternative	way	of	cashing	out	the	correctness	theory. 9 only	works	if	there	is	third-personal	epistemic	authority	about	the	matter	to	be	decided	–	if someone,	or	a	small	group	of	experts,	holds	a	right	to	make	claims	about	what	the	correct decision	is	that	derives	from	a	procedure-independent	truth.	But	this	way	of	interpreting the	correctness	theory	gives	rise	to	a	problem.	For	any	area	of	decision-making	where	there is	a	procedure-independent	right	to	make	claims	about	what	the	correct	outcome	is, democratic	decision-making	is	either	redundant	or	it	needs	to	be	defended	on	other grounds. The	availability	of	third-personal	epistemic	authority	presents	the	correctness	theory	of democratic	legitimacy	with	the	following	authority	dilemma:	if	practical	authority	is	justified on	epistemic	grounds,	then	legitimate	practical	authority	is	non-democratic.	If,	on	the	other hand,	the	practical	authority	of	democracy	is	to	be	legitimate,	it	must	be	justified	on	nonepistemic	grounds.	In	other	words,	for	those	areas	of	decision-making	where	there	is	thirdpersonal	epistemic	authority,	we	either	follow	those	who	know	what	the	correct	decision	is, in	which	case	our	decision-making	is	not	democratic,	or	we	insist	on	democratic	decisionmaking,	in	which	case	we	can't	defend	the	legitimacy	of	democracy	on	epistemic	grounds but	must	defend	it	on	purely	practical	grounds.	What	the	authority	dilemma	shows	is	that this	way	of	conceiving	of	the	relationship	between	legitimate	democratic	authority	and epistemic	authority	is	self-undermining. Can	the	epistemic	instrumentalist	defence	succeed	if	we	adopt	Estlund's	(2008) proceduralist	alternative	to	the	correctness	theory	of	democratic	legitimacy?	The conception	of	legitimate	democratic	authority	that	he	proposes	retains	the	truth-tracking aim	for	democratic	decision-making,	while	putting	weight	on	democratic	procedures	as	well as	their	outcomes.	As	he	characterizes	democratic	legitimacy	(2008:	98),	it	requires	that	the 10 democratic	decision-making	procedure	"can	be	held,	in	terms	acceptable	to	all	qualified points	of	view,	to	be	epistemically	the	best	(or	close	to	it)	among	those	that	are	better	than random."	The	thought	is	that	if	the	democratic	decision-making	procedure	satisfies	this criterion,	its	outcomes,	whether	correct	or	not,	are	legitimate.	In	other	words,	correctness does	not	directly	determine	the	legitimacy	of	decisions	made;	it	only	influences	the legitimacy-generating	potential	of	democratic	decision-making	procedures. This	is	a	step	in	the	right	direction,	but	I	don't	think	this	conception	can	avoid	the	authority dilemma,	at	least	not	if	we	follow	Estlund's	interpretation	of	his	requirement	of	democratic legitimacy.	Much	hinges	on	what	the	qualification	that	the	procedure	should	be	held	to	be epistemically	the	best,	in	terms	acceptable	to	all	qualified	points	of	view,	is	supposed	to entail.	I	see	two	possibilities.5	According	to	the	first,	what	is	acceptable	to	all	qualified	points of	view	(however	they	are	understood)	constitutes	what	is	epistemically	the	best	procedure. In	other	words,	what	is	epistemically	best	is	defined	in	terms	of	what	is	acceptable	to	all	the participants.	I	don't	think	that	Estlund	has	this	interpretation	in	mind	as	it	would	clash	with the	idea	that	democratic	decision-making	should	track	a	procedure-independent	truth.	This leaves	the	second	interpretation,	which	identifies	the	qualified	points	of	view	as	those	that acknowledge	the	independent	–	third-personal	–	epistemic	merit	of	a	decision-making procedure.	On	this	interpretation,	the	procedure	that	is	held	to	be	epistemically	the	best	is the	one	which	best	tracks	a	procedure-independent	truth,	as	identified	by	those	who	either hold	third-personal	epistemic	authority	on	the	matter	or	who	are	prepared	to	defer	to	it. 5	Gaus	(2011)	makes	similar	points	in	his	discussion	of	how	to	"test"	whether	democracy	is	the epistemically	best	procedure. 11 This	second	interpretation	of	the	relationship	between	the	legitimate	practical	authority	of democracy	and	epistemic	considerations	again	presupposes	third-personal	epistemic authority	and,	as	such,	leads	straight	back	to	the	authority	dilemma.	For	Estlund's conception	of	democratic	legitimacy	to	have	any	judgmental	bite,	there	must	be	a procedure-independent	right	to	make	claims	about	which	decisions	are	correct	and	which decision-making	procedure	is	most	likely	to	produce	correct	decisions.	Interpreted	in	this way,	the	conception	presupposes	third-personal	epistemic	authority	about	the	correctness of	outcomes	and	about	which	decision-making	procedure	can	best	approximate	it.	But	if there	is	such	a	right,	democratic	decision-making	once	again	appears	either	redundant	or,	if it	is	not	redundant,	then	its	value	must	be	non-epistemic. If	my	argument	so	far	is	correct,	it	shows	that	the	attempt	to	defend	democracy	from	a third-personal	epistemic	standpoint	is	self-undermining.	Third-personal	epistemic	authority can	ground	non-democratic	forms	of	decision-making,	but	it	cannot	establish	the	legitimacy of	democracy. Which	way	forward	for	defending	democracy?	The	authority	dilemma	suggests	two	possible strategies.	The	first	is	to	drop	the	epistemic	strategy	altogether	and	defend	democracy	on purely	practical	grounds.	As	mentioned	above,	this	is	not	the	strategy	I	shall	pursue	here. The	other	is	to	find	an	alternative	epistemic	defense	of	democracy,	one	that	is	not	affected by	the	authority	dilemma.	This	is	the	strategy	I	shall	pursue	here. But	before	I	can	do	that,	I	need	to	address	a	potential	objection	to	my	argument	so	far.	I have	said	nothing	about	the	popular	epistemic	defense	of	democracy	based	on	the Condorcet	Jury	Theorem	(CJT)	and	related	results.	The	objection	is	this:	a	defense	of democracy	that	rests	on	the	CJT	and	related	results	is	not	vulnerable	to	the	authority 12 dilemma	as	these	results	show	that	we	can	rely	on	democracy	to	discover	the	correct decision. The	CJT	says,	roughly,	that	if	there	are	two	alternatives	–	where	one	is	the	correct	choice and	the	other	the	wrong	choice	–	and	if	every	member	of	a	democratic	collective	is	more likely	to	make	the	correct	choice	than	the	wrong	choice	and	they	vote	independently	of each	other,	then	the	majority	is	also	more	likely	to	make	the	correct	choice	and	the probability	that	it	makes	the	correct	choices	increases	rapidly	with	the	size	of	the	collective. If	the	relevant	conditions	obtain,	the	CJT	shows	that	larger	groups	are	more	likely	to	make correct	decisions	than	smaller	groups	or	individuals;	a	democratic	collective	may	even outperform	a	group	of	experts.	The	CJT	can	thus	be	used	to	defend	democratic	decisionmaking	on	the	basis	of	the	claim	that	–	under	certain	conditions	–	epistemic	authority	is appropriately	held	by	a	large	collective.	Note	that	the	CJT	is	only	relevant	for	the	process	of aggregation,	not	for	deliberation.	It	highlights	features	of	large-scale	aggregation	of	votes, where	votes	are	understood	as	expressing	beliefs	about	the	correct	decision.	It	does	not cover	deliberation,	i.e.	the	process	of	exchanging	reasons	for	belief	or	action. There	has	been	much	discussion	of	the	likelihood	that	the	conditions	under	which	the	CJT holds	are	ever	met	and,	on	that	basis,	whether	it	can	be	used	as	part	of	a	defense	of democracy.6	But	I	shall	not	go	into	that	discussion,	as	my	purpose	here	is	neither	to	criticize nor	defend	the	CJT	and	its	applicability	to	democracy.	I'm	interested	in	the	question	what	an argument	from	the	CJT	would	imply	for	the	relationship	between	epistemic	considerations and	the	legitimate	practical	authority	of	democracy. 6	See	List	and	Goodin	(2001)	and	Dietrich	and	Spiekermann	(2013)	for	recent	discussions. 13 The	answer	to	this	question	depends	on	how	the	CJT	is	invoked	to	explain	why	an appropriately	made	democratic	decision	gives	individuals	sufficient	reasons	to	uphold	it.	The CJT	may	be	invoked	as	part	of	a	correctness	theory	of	political	legitimacy.	In	this	case,	it	is, as	before,	the	correctness	of	the	decision,	not	the	democratic	decision-making	process which	generates	legitimacy	and	the	authority	dilemma	looms.	Or	it	may	be	invoked	as	part of	an	argument	which	shows	that	democratic	decision-making	is	the	most	likely	decisionmaking	procedure	to	lead	to	correct	decisions.	In	this	case,	too,	the	authority	dilemma	will reappear	if	the	argument	presupposes	knowledge	of	what	the	correct	decisions	are. But	if	it	can	be	avoided	in	this	second	case,	it	is	because	the	CJT	is	invoked	in	an	argument that	starts	from	circumstances	in	which	we	don't	know	what	the	correct	decision	is,	i.e. when	the	third-personal	standpoint	is	unavailable.	Understood	in	this	sense,	an	argument from	the	CJT	is	compatible	with	the	thesis	that	I	want	to	defend	here,	namely	that	there	is scope	for	democratic	decision-making	when	there	is	no	procedure-independent	epistemic authority	in	the	relevant	area	of	decision-making.	Unlike	the	arguments	that	end	up	in	the authority	dilemma,	this	kind	of	argument	links	the	legitimate	practical	authority	of democracy	not	to	its	instrumental	role	in	reaching	correct	decisions,	but	to	procedural epistemic	considerations.	It	shows	that	under	certain	conditions,	the	claims	made	by individuals	or	small	groups	of	experts	lack	the	epistemic	authority	that	the	democratic decision-making	process	can	claim.	In	this	case,	our	reason	to	defer	to	a	democratically made	decision	is	not	because	it	is	correct	or	likely	to	be	correct,	but	because	there	is	no procedure-independent	way	for	assessing	claims	about	what	the	correct	decision	is.	If	the conditions	apply,	then	the	CJT	shows	that	epistemic	authority	is	appropriately	held	jointly and	exercised	through	a	democratic	decision-making	process. 14 The	argument	I	want	to	develop	in	this	chapter	parallels	this	kind	of	argument	from	the	CJT. I	shall	focus	on	the	deliberative	component	of	democratic	decision-making,	rather	than	the aggregative	component	to	show	that	the	deliberative	procedure	itself	may	have	epistemic value. IV. The	Procedural	Epistemic	Value	of	Deliberation The	argument	I	develop	in	this	section	parallels	the	argument	from	the	CJT	just	sketched	in the	sense	that	it	also	shows	that	there	is	a	prima	facie	case	for	democracy	when	there	is	no procedure-independent	way	of	assessing	epistemic	authority.	I	shall	focus	on	the deliberative	component	of	democratic	decision-making,	rather	than	the	aggregative component.	My	aim	is	to	show	that	the	deliberative	democratic	procedure	itself,	i.e.	the process	of	exchanging	reasons	with	others	and	of	adjusting	one's	beliefs	in	response	to	the claims	made	by	others,	may	have	epistemic	value	–	above	and	beyond	the	value	of	making correct	decisions. I	understand	procedural	value	in	contrast	to	instrumental	value.	Deliberative	decisionmaking	has	instrumental	epistemic	value	if	it	leads	to	more	accurate	beliefs	among	the participants	–	for	example	through	comparing	evidence	and	opinions	and	responding	to	the evidence	and	opinion	that	others	present	–	and/or	to	correct	or	more	accurate	decisions.	It has	instrumental	epistemic	disvalue	if	it	hinders	the	formation	of	accurate	beliefs	and/or	the making	of	correct	decisions.	Epistemic	instrumentalism	reduces	the	epistemic	value	of democratic	decision-making	to	its	contribution	to	epistemic	ends	such	as	accuracy	or	truth. By	contrast,	deliberative	democratic	decision-making	has	procedural	epistemic	value	if	its epistemic	value	does	not	reduce	to	the	epistemic	value	of	the	outcome.	I	shall	focus	here	on the	procedural	epistemic	value	of	the	deliberative	process,	not	of	decision-making	as	such.	If 15 public	deliberation	has	procedural	epistemic	value,	it	has	epistemic	value	even	in	cases where	its	effect	turns	out	to	be	that	it	has	diminished	the	accuracy	of	the	beliefs	of	the participants.	This	may	sound	paradoxical,	but	I	will	show	that	it	is	possible	and	of significance	for	an	epistemic	defense	of	democracy. Procedural	value	can	take	different	forms.	Rawls	has	identified	the	following	three	main forms:	pure,	perfect,	and	imperfect	proceduralism.7	With	pure	proceduralism,	the procedure	is	necessary	and	sufficient	for	the	value	of	the	outcome.	There	is	thus	no procedure-independent	standard	for	what	counts	as	a	good	outcome.	With	both	perfect and	imperfect	proceduralism,	there	is	a	procedure-independent	standard.	With	perfect proceduralism,	the	procedure	is	necessary	to	realize	a	good	outcome.	With	imperfect proceduralism,	the	procedure	is	necessary	to	approximate	a	good	outcome,	but	it	may	fail to	realize	the	outcome	that	the	procedure-independent	standard	envisages.	For	example,	in a	trial,	there	is	a	procedure-independent	standard	for	a	good	outcome:	convict	the	accused if	guilty	and	don't	if	not	guilty.	The	trial	is	necessary	to	approximate	such	good	outcomes. But	justice	may	be	served	even	if	an	appropriately	conducted	trial	ends	up	making	a decision	which,	with	hindsight	or	from	some	other	vantage	point	of	privileged	information, turns	out	to	be	wrong. As	I	will	explain	below,	the	procedural	epistemic	value	of	deliberation	takes	the	form	of imperfect	proceduralism.	On	that	interpretation	of	procedural	epistemic	value,	accuracy	of belief	remains	the	intrinsic	epistemic	value	and	sets	a	procedure-independent	standard	for evaluating	deliberation.	But	what	distinguishes	imperfect	proceduralism	from 7	Rawls	(1971:	85);	he	introduced	them	with	regard	to	the	value	of	justice,	but	the	distinctions	apply	more generally. 16 instrumentalism	about	epistemic	value	is	that	the	former	captures	the	situation	in	which	the procedure	has	value	because	there	is	no	procedure-independent	access	to	the	correct outcome.	The	deliberative	procedure	thus	gains	its	value	from	being	a	proxy	for	good epistemic	conduct	in	situations	where	it	is	not	possible	to	appeal	to	the	procedureindependent	standard	directly	to	assess	this	conduct.	And	this	value	of	the	deliberative procedure	does	not	reduce	to	the	epistemic	value	of	its	outcome	as	assessed	by	a procedure-independent	standard. The	idea	that	deliberation	has	procedural	value	is	familiar	from	the	practical	context.	Rawls, for	example,	takes	reciprocity	to	be	a	fundamental	procedural	value	that	shapes	the	content of	the	claims	of	justice	we	have	on	each	other.	In	moral	philosophy,	Charles	Larmore	(2008) focuses	on	equal	respect	and	Stephen	Darwall	(2006)	on	mutual	accountability.	But	what I'm	claiming	here	is	that	procedural	values	play	a	role	in	the	purely	epistemic	dimension	of deliberation	as	well.8 How	should	we	make	sense	of	the	idea	that	deliberation	has	procedural	epistemic	value?	It turns	out	that	the	epistemology	of	disagreement	shows	that	under	certain	circumstances, epistemic	agents	have	reason	to	engage	in	deliberation	with	each	other	and	adjust	their beliefs	in	direction	of	each	other.	This	value	of	deliberation	does	not	reduce	to	the	value	of the	outcomes	of	deliberation,	i.e.	it	is,	to	some	extent	at	least,	independent	of	its contribution	to	the	accuracy	of	belief. The	relevant	circumstances	arise	only	with	certain	types	of	disagreement.	Specifically,	they arise	with	disagreements	among	epistemic	peers	that	are	persisting	in	the	sense	that deliberation	fails	to	reveal	evidence	that	one	party	left	unexamined	or	a	mistake	one	party 8	The	following	passages	borrow	from	Peter	(2013). 17 made	in	the	interpretation	of	the	available	evidence.	An	epistemic	peer	is	someone	who	you take	to	be	equally	likely	to	make	a	mistake.	This	is	a	weak	definition	of	what	it	means	to	be	a peer,	since	it	only	takes	the	form	of	an	all	things	considered	criterion	and	doesn't	involve any	input	conditions	such	as	equal	formal	qualifications	or	equal	computational	abilities.	On this	definition	of	peers,	deliberation	among	parties	who	consider	each	other	peers	can	occur not	just	in	the	context	of	academic	or	expert	inquiry,	but	in	any	small	or	large	social collective,	for	example	on	issues	which	are	too	wide-ranging	and	complex	for	anyone	to count	as	an	expert,	or	when	relevant	information	is	dispersed	across	all	deliberative	parties. It	turns	out	that	in	those	circumstances,	each	party	to	the	deliberation	has	reason	to	adjust their	beliefs	in	direction	of	each	other. But	before	I	go	into	more	detail	on	this,	it	need	to	address	the	objection	that	the epistemology	of	peer	disagreements	is	not	relevant	for	democratic	theory	since	the participants	in	democratic	deliberation	neither	do	nor	should	consider	each	other	as epistemic	peers.	There	are	massive	epistemic	inequalities	among	the	members	of	a democratic	collective	and	this	renders	the	epistemology	of	peer	disagreement	unsuitable. In	reply	to	this	objection,	let	me	first	concede	that	these	epistemic	inequalities	are	often both	massive	and	justified.	You	might	very	well	know	a	lot	more	about	certain	subjects	than others	and	may	validly	claim	epistemic	authority	on	the	matter.	I'm	not	suggesting	that	the members	of	a	democratic	collective	generally	are	epistemic	peers,	nor	that	they	generally ought	to	regard	each	other	as	such.	The	question	I'm	interested	in	is	when	deliberative democracy	–	some	form	of	rule	by	all	–	is	appropriate.	And	the	claim	that	I	intend	to	defend is	that	when	there	is	a	disagreement	among	parties	that	do,	in	a	non-crazy	way,	take	each others	as	peers,	then	deliberative	democratic	decision-making	may	be	appropriate.	By 18 contrast,	when	some	hold	legitimate	epistemic	authority	over	an	issue,	the	epistemic	point of	view	supports	a	form	of	epistocracy	–	rule	by	experts. Secondly,	note	that	the	notion	of	peerhood	I'm	using	is	compatible	with	all	sorts	of epistemic	inequalities.	You	might	consider	someone	a	peer	–	with	regard	to	a	certain	set	of issues	–	even	though	your	formal	qualifications,	your	computational	abilities,	or	your	access to	information	differ.	In	addition,	this	notion	of	peerhood	is	domain-specific.	It	is	possible	to accept	someone	as	an	epistemic	authority	on	some	questions	but	consider	this	person	a peer	with	regard	to	certain	political	matters	at	the	same	time. Thirdly,	note	that	while	you	judge	your	peers,	by	definition,	to	be	equally	likely	to	make	a mistake	in	a	particular	situation,	this	doesn't	mean	that	two	peers	always	perform	equally well.	Sometimes,	you	have	information	about	the	circumstances	of	the	disagreement	that makes	it	appropriate	for	you	to	discount	their	judgment,	at	least	to	a	certain	extent.	For example,	of	two	scientific	colleagues	who	compare	their	different	conclusions	about	the validity	of	a	hypothesis,	one	may	have	double-checked	the	data	and	the	calculations	and asked	an	assistant	to	do	the	same	while	the	other	was	pressed	for	time	and	admits	that	he only	ran	what	he	was	given	through	an	off-the-peg	computer	program.	In	a	context	of	social deliberation,	imagine	a	case	of	committee	work.	Suppose	that	although	all	participants regard	each	other	to	be	equally	able	to	take	up	the	available	evidence,	some	may	have carefully	thought	about	the	implications	of	the	evidence	presented,	as	manifest	by	the quality	of	the	arguments	they	can	offer	in	support	of	their	beliefs,	while	others	respond	with 19 a gut	reaction.	If	there	is	such	information	which	suggests	that	a	peer	is	not	performing well,	you	are	entitled	to	discount	their	view.9 So	much	for	the	negative	defense	of	using	the	epistemology	of	peer	disagreements	as	a starting-point	for	understanding	democratic	deliberation.	It	shows	that	my	claim	is	not	a very	strong	one.10	But	I	haven't	said	anything	positive	yet	about	how	the	epistemology	of peer	disagreements	might	help.	I	now	want	to	get	to	that. Consider	the	following	case.	An	expert	committee	prepares	a	policy	together	with	relevant politicians,	for	example	a	new	minimum	wage	policy.	Suppose	there	is	a	disagreement	on the	question	whether	all	the	evidence,	appropriately	interpreted,	supports	the	policy	or	not. 9	You	might	even	be	entitled	to	discount	their	view	completely,	as	the	following	case	illustrates	(adapted from	Christensen	2007).	Suppose	you	and	I	regularly	have	dinner	together	at	a	restaurant	and	we	always	split the	bill.	Neither	of	us	has	any	problems	with	mental	arithmetic,	so	the	decision	about	how	much	we	each	owe is	usually	straightforward.	One	evening,	however,	I	claim	we	each	owe	£26	and	you	claim	that	we	each	owe £28.	In	this	case	we	each	have	reason	to	suspend	our	belief	about	how	much	we	each	owe.	But	now	suppose that	instead	of	claiming	that	we	each	owe	£28,	you	claim	we	each	owe	£280,	way	more	than	the	total	bill. Even	though	I	consider	you	a	peer	in	this	regard,	something	has	clearly	gone	wrong	and	I'm	entitled	to	stick	to my	guns	without	giving	any	weight	to	your	belief. 10	In	fact,	it	may	be	weakened	further.	The	epistemological	literature	currently	focuses	on	peer disagreement	and	my	argument	is	based	on	initial	findings	of	this	research	and	thus	somewhat	hostage	to	that literature.	As	will	become	clear	below,	what	is	key	to	my	argument	is	the	possibility	that	you	find	yourself	in	a disagreement	with	someone	to	whom	you're	attributing	some	epistemic	credibility	and	to	whom	you	owe some	sort	of	response.	The	peerhood	assumption	imposes	symmetric	credibility.	But	that	assumption	is	not necessary,	it	seems	to	me.	As	long	as	all	of	the	parties	attribute	some	epistemic	credibility	to	each	other,	then, everything	else	equal,	some	sort	of	response	may	still	be	required	of	each,	and	that	would	be	sufficient	for	my argument	to	go	through. 20 Will	the	policy	significantly	increase	unemployment?	This	would	speak	against	the	policy.	Or will	it	not	and	have	other	beneficial	aspects?	This	would	speak	for	the	policy.	Suppose	the disagreement	is	not	just	between	experts	and	politicians;	the	experts	disagree	among themselves.	Also	suppose	the	disagreement	is	not	the	result	of	one	party	not	able	or	willing to	consider	the	available	evidence,	draw	appropriate	conclusions	from	it,	etc.	What	we	have here	is	a	persisting	disagreement	among	parties	that	do	take	each	other	as	peers.	Now suppose	that	the	disagreement	isn't	limited	to	this	particular	committee,	but	is	mirrored	in similar	committees,	in	parliament,	in	academia,	in	the	media,	etc.	And	it	is	also	mirrored	in debates	among	friends	and	family	members.	Suppose	you've	looked	at	the	available	data and	the	available	arguments	by	the	experts	and	formed	the	belief	that	the	proposed minimum	wage	policy	will	significantly	increase	unemployment.	I've	also	looked	at	the	data the	arguments	and	formed	the	belief	that	the	policy	will	not	significantly	increase unemployment	(and	also	have	very	positive	effects	on	working	conditions).	Through deliberation,	we	become	aware	of	our	disagreement	and	neither	can	demonstrate	that	the other	obviously	made	a	mistake. I	want	to	claim	that	in	a	case	like	the	minimum	wage	case,	what	we	have	is	a	peer disagreement	writ	large,	extending,	potentially,	to	the	entire	democratic	collective.	What	is characteristic	of	this	situation,	from	an	epistemic	point	of	view,	is	that	each	side	of	the disagreement	deserves	some	weight	for	the	claim	it	makes	and	there	is	no	vantage	point from	which	the	disagreement	could	be	resolved. What	is	the	appropriate	response	to	such	a	disagreement?	I	follow	the	majority	view	here which	is	that	it	is	appropriate	that	both	sides	to	a	peer	disagreement	diminish	confidence	in 21 their	original	beliefs.11	Different	epistemological	theories	give	different	accounts	of	why	this is	so.	According	to	the	Total	Evidence	View	(Kelly	2010),	if	a	disagreement	with	a	peer receives	any	weight,	it	is	as	a	piece	of	evidence	that	a	rational	epistemic	agent	needs	to consider	together	with	the	other	available	evidence.	On	the	rivaling	Conciliatory	Views (Christensen	2011;	Elga	2010),	the	disagreement	with	a	peer	gives	you	a	reason	to	adjust your	belief	that	is	at	least	to	some	extent	independent	of	the	reasons	that	you	have	had	to form	your	original	belief.	On	this	view,	you've	done	the	best	you	could	given	the	evidence etc.	But	that	was	apparently	not	good	enough,	as	your	peer	has	formed	a	different	belief. You	now	need	to	put	the	reasons	you've	had	to	form	your	original	belief	to	the	side	and respond	to	the	situation	that	the	disagreement	has	revealed. There	are	significant	differences	between	these	two	main	views,	but	for	our	purposes	here, these	differences	do	not	matter,	as	both	theories	concur	that,	absent	independent information	about	their	respective	ability	or	willingness	to	perform	in	the	particular instance,	peers	need	to	adjust	their	beliefs	in	direction	of	the	other	party.	Both	accept	that the	fact	that	someone	you	ex	ante	regarded	as	a	peer	now	disagrees	with	you	is	not sufficient	for	you	to	dismiss	their	opinion	off-hand.	Some	sort	of	response	is	required. This	shows	that	there	are	circumstances	in	which	there	are	good	epistemic	reasons	for epistemic	peers	to	be	responsive	towards	each	other's	claims	and	to	consider	some	revision of	their	original	beliefs	on	the	basis	of	these	claims.	I	have	called	this	the	accountability 11	Some	(e.g.	Kelly	2005)	have	argued	that	peer	disagreements	do	not	require	a	response	at	all	by	claiming that	what	justifies	someone's	belief	is	their	response	to	the	available	evidence	and	by	denying	that information	about	the	beliefs	of	peers	carries	independent	epistemic	weight.	But	many	have	rejected	this "steadfast	view"	and	I	follow	them	here. 22 thesis	about	the	epistemic	value	of	deliberation	(Peter	2013).	Epistemic	peers,	in	these circumstances,	are	mutually	accountable	to	each	other,	in	addition	to	being	accountable	to the	truth	they	seek.	In	the	relevant	circumstances,	your	claim	(that	the	minimum	wage policy	will	increase	unemployment)	gives	me	a	reason	to	revise	my	belief	(that	it	will	not) and	vice-versa.	What	the	accountability	thesis	captures	is	that	there	are	situations	in	which we	are	doubly	accountable.	There	is,	on	the	one	hand,	the	familiar	accountability	to	truth. But	there	is,	on	the	other,	also	an	often	overlooked	accountability	to	epistemic	peers.	When we	find	ourselves	in	a	persisting	disagreement,	where	neither	party	can	demonstrate	that the	other	is	simply	wrong,	what	gives	each	of	us	reason	to	adjust	our	believes	in	direction	of the	other	are	the	claims	we	both	made,	not	just	first-order	evidence	about	the	fact	or	truth in	question. What	is	more,	in	those	circumstances,	neither	of	us	can	validly	claim	third-personal epistemic	authority.	Insofar	as	there	is	any	appeal	to	epistemic	authority,	it	takes	on	a second-personal	form.	To	see	the	point,	contrast	the	deliberative	situation	here	with	a	case of	testimony.	In	testimony,	we	are	also	considering	an	epistemic	relationship	–	the relationship	between	the	testifier	and	the	addressee.	This	relationship	is	hierarchical, however,	not	democratic.	If	the	relevant	conditions	for	successful	testimony	are	met,	your testimony	gives	me	a	sufficient	reason	for	belief.	My	reason	for	belief	is	thus	secondpersonal;	it	derives	from	your	claim.	But	your	authority	to	make	claims	that	give	me	reasons for	belief	is	not;	it	derives	from	your	accountability	to	the	truth	and	is	third-personal.	In	the case	of	peer	disagreement	I'm	considering	here,	each	of	us	has	a	second-personal	reason	to adjust	our	beliefs.	We're	both	accountable	not	just	to	the	truth	that	we	both	seek,	but	to each	other	as	well.	Good	epistemic	agents	enter	this	relationship	of	mutual	accountability 23 and	let	it	be	a	–	second-personal	–	source	of	reasons	for	belief	that	is,	at	least	to	some extent,	independent	of	truth	as	a	source	of	reasons	for	belief.	To	this	extent,	epistemic authority,	too,	takes	on	a	second-personal	form.	My	right	to	make	claims	that	give	you reason	for	belief	depends	on	your	accountability	to	me	as	someone	you	regard	as	a	peer and	vice	versa. I'm	not	denying	that	accuracy	or	truths	are	the	sole	epistemic	ends.	But	what	my	argument shows,	I	hope,	is	that	it	is	possible	to	value	the	deliberative	democratic	procedure	in	noninstrumental	fashion.	This	opens	the	door	to	an	alternative	to	the	epistemic	instrumentalist defense	of	democracy.	When	peers	cannot	agree	on	what	belief	is	warranted,	and	nothing suggests	malperformance,	then	at	least	some	reasons	for	belief	stem	from	a	relationship	of mutual	accountability	between	them.	But	mutual	accountability	is	a	procedural consideration.	Its	epistemic	value	cannot	be	captured	by	a	purely	instrumental	approach because,	if	the	relevant	conditions	apply,	my	reason	to	adjust	my	belief	in	your	direction obtains	independently	of	whether	the	adjustment	makes	my	belief	more	accurate. V. The	Legitimate	Authority	of	Democracy The	alternative	to	the	epistemic	instrumentalist	defense	of	democracy	that	I'm	proposing	is this.	There	is	an	epistemic	case	for	democracy	when	the	epistemic	circumstances	are	such that	there	is	a	peer	disagreement	writ	large	on	a	particular	issue,	one	that	cannot	be resolved	by	appeal	to	third-personal	epistemic	authority	and	one	that	places	the	members of	a	democratic	collective	in	a	relationship	of	mutual	epistemic	accountability.	In	this	final section,	I	want	make	a	few	brief	comments	on	how	this	claim	is	to	be	understood. The	situation	I	have	focused	on	is	one	in	which	deliberation	has	established	that	no participant	can	legitimately	make	decisive	claims	about	what	others	ought	to	believe	about 24 what	the	correct	decision	is.	The	necessary	adjustment	of	belief	may	have	lead	them	all	to suspend	belief.	Or	it	may	have	lead	to	a	reasonable	disagreement,	i.e.	a	situation	in	which parties	to	a	disagreement	hold	incompatible	beliefs,	but	each	has	some	justification	for holding	the	belief	they	do. If	a	decision	is	needed,	then	some	form	of	aggregation	may	be	required	in	these circumstances	to	reach	a	decision.	While	a	lot	more	would	have	to	be	said	about	when	and how	to	aggregate,	something	I	can't	do	here,	what	we're	beginning	to	see	is	how democratic	decision-making,	understood	as	a	combination	of	deliberation	and	aggregation, has	its	natural	locus	in	a	situation	in	which	the	reach	of	epistemic	authority	is	insufficient	to determine	what	the	correct	decision	is. Note	that	my	aim	in	this	talk	is	a	modest	one.	I'm	not	trying	to	establish	the	set	of requirements	which	is	jointly	sufficient	for	democratic	legitimacy.	Instead,	I'm	interested	in how	to	identify	the	epistemic	circumstances	in	which	deliberative	democratic	decisionmaking	is	potentially	legitimate.	In	other	words,	I'm	concerned	with	circumscribing	the logical	space	in	which	democracy	belongs. The	view	that	I	have	outlined	suggests	that	deliberative	democratic	decision-making	has	its appropriate	space	in	situations	where	disagreements	cannot	be	resolved	by	appeal	to	thirdpersonal	epistemic	authority.	When	they	can,	then	there	is	no	epistemic	basis	for democracy.	To	the	contrary.	If	legitimate	practical	authority	is	premised	on	epistemic considerations	and	if	there	is	third-personal	epistemic	authority,	the	decision	should	be made	by	those	who	know	what	the	correct	decision	is.	If	democracy	has	any	value	at	all	in those	epistemic	circumstances,	it	is	for	non-epistemic,	practical	reasons.	But	if	these disagreements	cannot	be	resolved,	then	the	decision	has	to	be	made	on	other	grounds 25 rather	than	by	appeal	to	third-personal	epistemic	authority.	Epistemic	considerations,	in	this case,	help	identifying	the	scope	for	democratic	decision-making	and	impose	certain conditions	on	the	deliberative	democratic	decision-making	process. What	is	the	connection	between	the	procedural	epistemic	value	of	deliberation	and democratic	legitimacy?	The	view	I've	outlined	supports	a	combination	of	imperfect proceduralism	about	epistemic	value	with	pure	proceduralism	about	the	legitimate	practical authority	of	democracy.	The	epistemology	of	disagreement	shows	that	in	certain circumstances,	the	epistemic	value	of	deliberation	doesn't	reduce	to	whether	it	produces more	accurate	beliefs,	but	depends	on	whether	or	not	the	process	itself	is	conducted appropriately,	i.e.	on	respect	of	the	relationship	of	mutual	accountability	between	the participants.	Since	an	appropriately	conducted	process	of	deliberation	is	a	proxy	for	aiming at	forming	accurate	beliefs	in	circumstances	where	disagreement	reveals	a	difficulty	with determining	directly	what	the	correct	belief	is,	epistemic	value	in	this	case	conforms	to	the structure	of	imperfect	proceduralism. In	circumstances	where	there	is	no	recourse	to	a	procedure-independent	standard	for correct	decisions,	the	legitimate	practical	authority	of	democratic	decision-making	can't depend	on	this	standard.	This	suggests	pure	proceduralism	about	the	legitimate	practical authority	of	democracy.	On	this	conception	of	democratic	legitimacy,	a	decision	is	legitimate if	and	only	if	it	has	been	made	through	appropriate	deliberative	decision-making procedures.12 12	As	such,	the	view	I	endorse	here	contrasts	with	Estlund's	imperfect	proceduralism	about	democratic legitimacy	as	his,	but	not	my	view,	makes	democratic	legitimacy	dependent	on	the	epistemic	quality	of	the outcomes	of	the	democratic	decision-making	process. 26 Can	the	view	I've	outlined	here	avoid	the	authority	dilemma?	I	think	it	can.	The	authority dilemma	arises	for	epistemic	instrumentalism	about	democratic	legitimacy	because	of	the tension	between	the	legitimate	practical	authority	of	democracy	and	procedureindependent,	third-personal,	epistemic	authority.	The	view	I	propose	distinguishes	between the	imperfect	proceduralism	that	shapes	legitimate	relations	of	epistemic	authority	and	the pure	proceduralism	of	democratic	legitimacy.	Epistemic	considerations,	on	this	view, influence	the	deliberative	decision-making	procedure,	but	they	do	not	set	a	procedureindependent	standard	for	democratic	decision-making.	Unlike	forms	of	epistemic instrumentalism,	it	can	thus	explain	under	what	epistemic	circumstances	it	is	appropriate	to put	practical	authority	in	the	hands	of	a	democratic	collective. Acknowledgements I've	benefitted	greatly	from	comments	and	suggestions	from	participants	at	conferences, workshops,	and	research	seminars	in	Basel,	Belgrade,	Geneva,	Hull,	Oxford,	Rijeka,	Stirling,	and Zurich,	and	I'm	very	grateful	to	the	organizers	of	these	events.	I	particularly	want	to	thank	Yann Allard-Tremblay,	Elvio	Baccarini,	Chris	Bertram,	Robin	Celikates,	Bruce	Chapman,	Tom	Christiano, Rowan	Cruft,	Stefan	Gosepath,	Antony	Hatzistavrou,	Chandran	Kukathas,	Katrin	Meier,	David	Miller, Snježana	Prijić	Samaržija,	Henry	Richardson,	Ben	Saunders,	Kit	Wellman,	Jo	Wolff,	and	Zofia Stemplowska.	In	addition,	I	want	to	thank	Michael	Brady	and	Miranda	Fricker	for	detailed	and	very helpful	comments	on	earlier	drafts. References Christensen,	David.	2007.	"Epistemology	of	Disagreement:	The	Good	News."	Philosophical	Review 116:	187-217. Christensen,	David.	2011.	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