The dynamics of scientific theories. Structuralism and the logical-formal understanding of Kuhn's epistemology Contents Preface, by Carl Ulises Moulines p. 9 Introduction » 15 1. The structuralist model and the logical understanding of the dynamics of theories » 23 1.1 Descriptive contexts » 23 1.1.1 Core and intended applications of theories » 23 1.1.2 Theory models and constraints » 31 1.1.3 Frame, core, and expanded core » 35 1.2 Theories as set-theoretical structures » 39 1.3 Scientific theories and temporality » 48 1.4 The axiomatization of theories on the basis of CPM system » 51 1.4.1 Theoretical models and constraints » 51 1.4.2 Empirical claims of theories » 56 1.4.3 The axiomatic method » 59 1.5 The problem of theoretical terms » 63 1.5.1 Explanation of the problem » 63 1.5.2 Sneed's hypothesis » 66 1.5.3 Stegmüller's hypothesis » 75 1.6 Summary » 84 2. The dynamics of theories as dynamical non cumulative advancing of normal science and scientific revolutions » 87 2.1 The constitutive process of the phenomenal world » 87 2.2 Paradigms and disciplinary matrixes » 95 2.2.1 The notion of paradigm and of disciplinary matrix » 95 2.2.2 Applications of a theory in the Kuhnian sense » 98 2.3 Dynamics of theories, normal science and scientific revolutions » 99 2.3.1 Normal science as puzzle-solving practice » 99 2.3.2 The emergence of anomalies: the extraordinary science » 102 2.3.3 The nature of scientific revolutions » 105 2.4 Incommensurability, incomparability and discontinuity » 107 2.5 Epistemic progress and scientific revolutions » 114 3. Reconsidering the core aspects of Kuhn's epistemology through set-theoretical predicates » 117 3.1 Kuhn's theory of science in critical perspective » 117 3.2 Stegmüller's analysis of the notion of paradigm » 120 3.2.1 Wittgenstein's notion of game » 120 3.2.2 Kuhn's notion of paradigm » 122 3.3 Intended applications » 125 3.3.1 Estensional and intensional descriptions p. 125 3.3.2 The Kuhnian acceptance of a physical theory » 128 3.4 Normal science and scientific revolutions » 130 3.4.1 The static nature of normal science » 130 3.4.2 Basic theories vs. derived theories » 133 3.4.3 Paradigmatic cases of theory replacement » 134 3.4.4 Dynamical reduction of theories » 137 3.4.5 The logic of theory change in the dynamics of sciences » 141 3.5 Post-rationalism and pseudo-relativism of Kuhn's epistemology » 145 4. On pragmatic and informal semantics » 151 4.1 Informal semantics as necessary integration of Bourbaki's program » 151 4.2 Pragmatic evolution of theories » 155 4.3 Scientific advances and rationality » 158 4.4 Formal appendix » 166 Conclusion » 173 References »