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T h e m a jo r i ty o f users ind ica te th a t th e tex tua l c o n t e n t is of greatest value, how ever, a so m e w h a t higher qua l i ty rep ro d u c t io n could be m ade f ro m " p h o to g ra p h s " if essential to the unders tand ing o f the d isser ta t ion . Silver p r in ts o f "p h o to g ra p h s " m ay be ordered at add i t iona l charge by w riting th e O rder D epa r tm en t , giving the catalog num ber , t i t le , a u th o r an d specific pages y o u wish reproduced . University Microfilms 300 N orth Z e e b Road Ann A rbor, M ichigan 48106 A X erox E d u c a tio n C om pany 7 2 -3 2 ,5 7 1 SEGAL, Jerome L ., 1936JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION. Northwestern U n iversity , Ph.D ., 1972 Philosophy University Microfilms, A XEROX Company, Ann Arbor, Michigan NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY JOHN DEWEY'S THEORY OF PERCEPTION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS fo r the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY F ie ld o f Philosophy By JEROME L. SEGAL Evanston, I l l in o i s June 1972 PLEASE NOTE: Some pages may have i nd i s t i net p r i n t . Filmed as re c e iv e d . U n i v e r s i t y M i c r o f i l m s , A Xerox Educat ion Company CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... . 1 CHAPTER I . PERCEPTION IN GENERAL ............................................................... 7 CHAPTER I I . FEELING.......................................................................... 34 CHAPTER I I I . PERCEPTION AS AWARENESS OF SIGNIFICATION AND AS PRESENCE OF SENSE ................................. 64 CHAPTER IV. PERCEPTION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND...................................... 118 BIBLIOGRAPHY.............................................................................................. ... 172 INTRODUCTION I t was one o f Dewey*s deepest convictions th a t philosophers, because o f the sp ec ia l in te l le c tu a l nature o f th e i r a c t iv i ty , tend to read in to experience elements th a t a re not involved in i t a s i t o r ig in a lly occurs. And, perhaps even more im portan tly , they tend to ignore elements th a t a re involved in experience as i t o r ig in a lly occurs. Philosophers a re engaged in an a c t iv i ty o f inqu iry t they look a t experience from a cog- n it iv e po in t o f view. They ask themselves what experience i s l ik e , and in ad v erten tly take a s a ty p ic a l example o f experience the obviously in te l le c tu a l and cognitive kind o f experience in which they a re engaged while in q u irin g about experience. But in doing so they a re p ro jec ting in to a l l experience an a t t i tu d e and o. content th a t a re simply not p resen t in much o f the experience th a t we have, and a re Ignoring an a t t i tu d e and a content th a t a re involved in much o f our experience. For in much of our experience, even th a t o f a philosopher, we a re no t engaged in knowing o r cognition a t a l l j we a re engaged in lov ing , pursuing, escaping, h a tin g , hoping, try in g , doing, e tc . And such experience i s r e a l ly o f a noncognitive s o r t . What Dewey means here may become c le a re r i f we consider the analogy o f studying events in ano ther age o f mam's h is to ry . I t i s a no to riously d i f f i c u l t and, indeed, perhaps impossible ta sk to recap ture the po in t o f view th a t smother people had upon themselves and the world. I f one i s studying ancien t Greek h is to ry , fo r example, o n e 's f i r s t in c lin a tio n i s 1 I 2 to understand the a t t i tu d e and behavior o f these people from o n e 's own po in t o f view. In learn in g about Socra tes, fo r example, many students find i t r id icu lo u s th a t th is man behaved a s he did a t the t r i a l and then in the p rison . They see Socrates as a foo l fo r no t doing what h is accusers expected o f him, o r of no t a t le a s t escaping when the p o s s ib i l i ty o f doing so was given to him by C rito and o th er fr ien d s . But, o f course, in doing so such studen ts a re p ro jec tin g th e i r own and th e i r a g e 's values and p r io r i t ie s in to S ocra tes. They a re viewing Socrates as being fundamen- ta l ly the same as them selves. In doing so , o f course, they f a i l to understand Socrates and ancien t Greece a t a l l . Now the s itu a tio n i s analogous when one t r i e s to understand exper- ience from the po in t o f view o f h is p resen t kind o f experience, when th a t experience i s o f a cognitive s o r t . What r e s u l ts , Dewey says, i s an im- poverished view o f what experience i s . An example o f the d is to r tio n o f experience th a t occurs when a p h ilo s- opher views experience in th is e n tire ly cognitive manner i s the kind o f view most philosophers take o f perception . According to such a ty p ic a lly philosophical reading o f perception , what one a c tu a lly sees when one sees , fo r example, a c h a ir , a re the "co lo r th a t belongs to i t under [ c e r ta in ] conditions o f l ig h t , the shape which the c h a ir d isp lays when viewed from th is angle, e tc ." The man who has the experience, as d i s t in c t from a ph ilos- opher th eo riz in g about i t , would probably say th a t he experienced the c h a ir most fu lly no t when looking a t i t bu t when meaning to s i t down in i t , and th a t he can mean to s i t down in i t p rec ise ly because h is experience i s n o t lim ited to co lo r under sp e c if ic conditions o f l ig h t and angular shape. He would probably say th a t when he looks a t i t , in s tead o f experiencing something le ss than a c h a ir he experiences a good deal more than a c h a ir t th a t he lay s hold o f a wide s p a t ia l con tex t, such as the room where ■ 3 the c h a ir i s , and a spread o f i t s h is to ry , including the c h a ir 's period , p rice paid fo r i t , consequences, public as w ell as per- , sonal, which flow from i t s use as household fu rn itu re , and so on, Dewey puts th is po in t more c o lo rfu lly a few pages la te r : I would ra th e r take the experience o f the dog o f Odysseus upon h is m aste r 's re tu rn as an example o f the s o r t o f th ing experience i s , . . than t r u s t to such statem ents £as the above], A physio log ist may fo r h is sp ec ia l purpose reduce O th e llo 's perception o f a handker- c h ie f to simple elements o f a co lo r under c e r ta in conditions o f l ig h t and shapes seen under c e r ta in angular conditions o f v is io n . But the a c tu a l experience was charged with h is to ry and prophecyj f u l l o f love, jealousy , and v i l la in y , f u l f i l l i n g p ast human re la tio n sh ip s and moving f a ta l ly to tra g ic d estin y . Now i t seems to me th a t Dewey i s q u ite r ig h t in th is c r itic ism of the ty p ic a l way in which philosophers th ink about perception . Not only was i t tru e o f the philosophers whose view he was c r i t ic iz in g , but i t i s tru e o f many who do philosophy today. The quotation he gives sounds very fa m ilia r . Perception i s s t i l l in te rp re te d in an o v e rin te lle c tu a liz e d way, I b e liev e , th e re fo re , th a t a c a re fu l reading o f Dewey's view w ill throw considerable l ig h t on th is question o f the na tu re o f perception. For Dewey describes our experience with the kind o f s e n s i t iv i ty one finds in a novel. I t i s th e re fo re an en ligh ten ing and even re fresh in g exper- ience to read him. Most philosophers con ten t themselves, i t seems to me, with repeating the same old t i r e d formulas with regard to experience. Dewey never f a i l s to uncover something new. Even i f he i s wrong, he is ex c itin g ly wrong. One might even make use o f one o f pragmatism 's best-known th eo rie s - th a t a pe rso n 's perception occurs only by v irtu e o f h is being involved in a problem atic s itu a tio n to which awareness o f the th ings perceived i s re lev an t-and say th a t i t was p re c ise ly Dewey's g re a t in te r e s t in l i f e i t - alic! o f ways to improve i t th a t made him so sen s itiv e to i t , I am sug- g estin g , th a t i s , th a t the reason fo r the impoverished s ta te o f much contemporary philosophy i s the puny in te r e s t in l i f e o f i t s p ra c ti t io n e rs . I t i s no t re lev an t to the problem atic s itu a tio n o f such persons what various kinds o f experience a re re a lly l ik e , since liv in g in a f u l l and complete sense o f the term i s no t an end o f th e i r l iv e s . I remember Chamer P e rry 's r id ic u lin g G. E. Moore fo r recognizing "as by f a r the most valuable th ings which we can know o r imagine"^ only so c ia l in te r - course with fr ien d s and contemplation o f b e au tifu l o b jec ts . This, Perry sa id , i s an expression o f the emasculated world o f the B ritish p ro fesso r o f philosophy. But su re ly l i f e i s r ic h e r than th is . For there a re many o th er kinds o f people than professors o f philosophy a t Cambridge U niversity , and th e re a re correspondingly many o th e r a c t iv i t ie s th a t people fin d to be most valuable in l i f e . L ife includes among i t s most valuable a c t i v i t i e s , fo r example, g iv ing a ss is tan ce to su ffe rin g and needy people, avenging an in ju s t ic e to a fr ien d , "paying a t te n tio n ," a s Dewey puts i t , perhaps a b i t p ro fe s so r ia lly h im self, " to a young woman," rep a irin g a de fec tiv e autom obile, making a b e au tifu l ob jec t, so lv ing a problem in physics, learn in g the h is to ry and p resen t conditions o f an Indian tr ib e in the mountains o f Mexico, making and s a il in g a boat across the A tlan tic Ocean, climbing a mountain, playing a tenn is game, and so on. For Dewey, as fo r Terence, nothing human was a l ie n . And I be lieve i t i s th i s constan t readiness and zealous d esire to re tu rn to the fa c ts and to consider a l l kinds o f phenomena ( a l l kinds of perception , fo r example) th a t made h is view as en lightening as i t i s . 5 In what fo llow s, then , I would lik e to o f fe r th is immensely r ic h and ingenious view fo r the re a d e r 's considera tion . I be lieve a very v good case can be made fo r i t , and I s h a ll t r y to do so. But even i f , in the l a s t a n a ly s is , i t s basic theses cannot be defended, i t i s a view which has nevertheless shed tremendous l ig h t on our experience and which has the capacity to open our eyes to aspects o f r e a l i ty n o t s u f f ic ie n tly noted o r apprecia ted before. And th a t i s something th a t cannot be sa id o f views which, though perhaps more e a s ily d e fen sib le , a re so by v ir tu e o f being innocuously general and s u p e r f ic ia l , lik e th a t o f the philosopher whom Dewey quotes in the passage from Experience and Nature re fe rred to above. I NOTES 1. John Dewey, Experience and Nature ( f i r s t e d itio n j La S a lle , 111,i Open Court Publishing Co., 1925), pp. ^5"^ * 2. Ib id . p. 56. 3. G, E. Moore, P rin c ip le Ethica (Cambridgei Cambridge U niversity P ress, 1962 [ f i r s t published, 1903J ) , p. 188. 6 CHAPTER I PERCEPTION IN GENERAL Dewey recognizes, I b e lie v e , th ree kinds o f perception! (1) per- ception as fe e lin g ! ( 2) perception a s awareness o f s ig n if ic a t io n ! and (3) perception a s presence of sense. He makes a fu r th e r d is tin c tio n between sense-perception , on the one hand, and perception of ob jec ts in o th e r modes o f awareness, such as memory, im agination, h a llu c in a tio n , and so on, on the o th er. Before d iscussing in d e ta i l in subsequent chap- te r s the th ree basic kinds o f perception , I s h a ll , in th i s chap ter, a t - tempt to give th e reader a general idea o f what they are and how they re la te to each o th e r. And I s h a ll show how exactly Dewey d is tin g u ish es sense-perception from o th e r kinds o f perception o f o b jec ts . In genera l, I s h a ll be concerned to o f fe r no t only an ex p lica tio n o f Dewey's views, but an evaluation o f them as w e ll. Where I be lieve he i s c o rre c t, I s h a ll defend h is view by presenting h is own reasons fo r tak ing the view he ta k es , considering ob jections th a t have and seem to me can be made, and f in a l ly defending h is view a g a in s t these o b jec tio n s. One o f the most im portant reasons why Dewey's theory o f perception seems p lausib le to me i s th a t i t allow s fo r a so lu tio n o f c e r ta in very thorny problems about the natu re o f mind and i t s re la t io n to the body. Accordingly, a f t e r I have examined h is view o f perception in Chapters One, Two, and Three in some d e ta i l , and have considered various ob jections and defenses th a t a r is e w ithin the sp e c if ic area o f perception i t s e l f , 7 - ■ 8 I s h a l l , in Chapter Four, attem pt to show th a t i t -as co n trasted with o th e r th e o rie s-enables us to solve the much more general mind-body problem. Dewey uses the term "perception" in a very general way to r e f e r to any awareness we may have o f an ob ject,* my awareness now, fo r example, o f the coffee cup on my desk. And an o b jec t he d e fin es as "a s e t o f q u a li2 t i e s tre a te d as p o te n t ia l i t ie s fo r sp ec ified e x is te n t ia l consequences." But percep tual awareness need n o t be awareness o f an ob ject "contempora3 neously a ffe c tin g the bod ily organs." My n o s ta lg ic awareness o f th a t f in e o ld coffee cup I used to have bu t which i s now gone i s a lso a case o f percep tion . This i s perception by way o f r e c a l l . I t i s d if f e r e n t from sense-percep tion in th a t i t i s no t perceived by means o f contemporaneously opera ting sense-organs (hands, f e e t , nose, eyes, e t c . ) , bu t by means o f "some o th e r organic s tru c tu re ." Sense-perception i s then awareness o f an o b jec t in "some p resen t s ja c e -re la tio n " with o n e 's p re sen tly operating sense-organs.^ That the perception o f an o b jec t which I am now having i s a senseperception and n o t a memory-perception o r an tic ip a tio n -p ercep tio n o r iaag ination -percep tion i s not an in t r in s ic c h a ra c te r is t ic o f the presented q u a l i t ie s themselves. I n t r in s ic a l ly , the two kinds o f p resen ta tion a re the same| the sensed coffee cup and the remembered coffee cup (one could add the dreamed and the i l lu s o ry coffee cup) a re a l l , in them selves, equally capable o f being In te rp re ted a s sen se -p resen ta tio n s . There i s no c h a ra c te r is t ic , th a t i s , in the nature o f a memory-perception o r illu so ry -p ercep tlo n taken by i t s e l f why i t should be considered a memory- 9 perception o r illu so ry -p e rc e p tio n . The reason i s e x tr in s ic to i t . Now what ex ac tly i s involved in saying the p resen ta tion i s regarded as being a sense-perception o r a p resen ta tion o f some o th e r kind only by v irtu e o f something e x tr in s ic to i t ? Let us consider an examplei Former P residen t Eisenhower has ju s t died and I have been s i t t i n g up much o f the n ig h t watching reruns o f scenes from h is l i f e . That n ig h t I wake from my s le e p and see a l i t t l e fig u re on my bedroom w all which seems to be a l i t t l e Dwight Elsenhower. I t i s a s though the former P residen t has come to pay me a v i s i t in the n ig h t. Now how do I go about determ ining whether th is fig u re i s an ob ject o f sense-perception or o f h a llu c in a tio n ? By re f le c t in g on the presented q u a l i t ie s them selves, the p a r t ic u la r shape, c o lo r, s iz e , e tc ." Or per- haps by re f le c tin g on the a c t by which I apprehend the p resen ta tion? Dewey' s po in t i s th a t n e ith e r o f these i s the way to determine whether one i s having a sense-percep tion , a h a llu c in a tio n , a dream, o r whatever. The only way to do i t i s by means o f considera tion o f m ateria l e x tr in s ic to the presented q u a l i t ie s them selves. There a re two ways in which -this can be donei ( l ) One can inquire in to the causa tive conditions o f the presented m aterial} (2) one can check to see i f the consequences o f a c tin g on the assumption th a t , f o r example, the fig u re on my w all r e a l ly i s Eisenhower-whether a c tin g on th a t assumption produces consequences which 7 square with what one can expect i f a l i t t l e Eisenhower re a lly i s th e re . What fundamentally c h a rac te rizes a sense-perception a s opposed to a remembered o r h a llu c in a ted perception i s th a t a sense-perception can be "o v ertly ac ted upon now o r immediately, . . . When inqu iry reveals 10 th a t an ob jec t ex te rn a l to the organism i s now operative and a ffe c tin g the organism, the pertinency o f overt ac tio n i s e stab lish ed and the kind 0 o f ov ert adjustm ent th a t should be made i s in evidence," I f I am ly ing in bed seeming to see a l i t t l e Dwight Elsenhower on my w a ll, no amount o f Inspection o f the presented m ateria l i t s e l f w ill t e l l me whether I am sense-perceiv ing , h a llu c in a tin g , o r something e ls e . The contents o f sense-perception do n o t come labeled as such, nor do the a c ts o f sense-perception come with la b e ls o r c h a ra c te r is t ic s which d is - tin g u ish them-so w ell from a l l o th e r kinds of perception th a t they might q as w ell be sa id to have la b e ls . What i s necessary to determine what kind o f perception I am having i s , a s ind ica ted above, to inqu ire in to causative conditions and to p er- form experiments to determine fu tu re consequences. Now one o f the causa- tiv e fac to rs in the case in question i s , of course, the evening*s a c t iv i ty o f viewing Eisenhower on te le v is io n . This f a c t w ill be re lev an t in judg- ing whether the presented fig u re i s an ob ject o f sense-perception as opposed to some o ther kind o f perception . The o th er way o f find ing out what kind o f perception i s going on i s to acqu ire fu r th e r presented m ateria l by means o f some new overt a c tio n . By squ in ting my eyes, reaching over and turn ing on the l ig h t , pu tting on my g la sse s , I have subsequent presented m ateria l which, i f i t squares with the fig u res o f my i n i t i a l experience, w ill serve to v e rify th a t experience as having indeed been sense-perception and not h a llu c in a tio n . Or i f I address the fig u re and receive an appropria te response, then again I have evidence th a t , unusual a s i t may seem, I have been having a sense-perception . 1 1 Im p lic it in Dewey*8 a n a ly s is i s h is view th a t sense-perception i s an experience which in d ica tes the relevance o f a p resen t overt a c tio n . To sense-percelve i s to experience some presented m ate ria l which means th a t a c e rta in ac tio n i s re le v an t now. When I merely r e c a l l o r imagine a coffee cup, immediate ac tio n i s not re le v an t. I cannot reach out and take a drink from i t . I cannot pour some more coffee in to i t . The determ ination o f presented m ate ria l as sense-perceptual ra th e r than conceptual o r fa n c ifu l takes place in the course o f inqu iry . And the "ultim ate need o f the inqu iry is found in the n ecessity o f d iscover- ing what i s to be done, o r o f developing a response su ita b ly adapted to the requirements o f a situation ,"*® Dewey is here arguing a g a in s t an old bugaboo o f h is da ting from the days o f Essays in Experimental Logic and e a r l i e r -v iz . , the so -ca lled sp ec ta to r theory o f knowledge. According to th is theory , a kind o f d is - embodied mind can, simply by examining the ob ject o f i t s awareness o r " in te n tio n ," determine whether the o b jec t is perceived o r merely fa n c i- fu l , v a lid o r in v a lid . C la r ity and d is tin c tn e s s might be the c r i t e r i a . For Dewey, on the con trary , p r io r to some kind o f o v e rt, experim ental a c tio n , we have no way o f knowing whether a th ing re a lly e x is ts , "We do not believe a th in g to be *there* because we a re d ire c t ly cognizant of an ex ternal o rig in fo r our perception; we in fe r some ex ternal stim u- la tio n o f our sensory apparatus because we a re su ccessfu lly engaged in HUmotor response." How do I know, then, th a t I am sense-perceiving? Because my responding is working. 12 In summary, we have seen th a t sense-perception fo r Dewey occurs when presented m a te ria l, e .g . , the presented coffee-cup-data , i s found, upon in q u iry , to be contemporaneously a ffe c tin g o n e 's sense-organs. (The way we know, in the course o f inqu iry , th a t we a re perceiv ing by means o f our sense organs, to which the presented m a te ria l in question i s being con- temporaneously presented, w il l become c le a r l a t e r when we d iscuss percep- tio n o f sense. S u ffice i t to say now th a t th i s fa c t i s perceived d ire c t ly as the funded r e s u l t o f previous a c t i v i t i e s o f in q u iry .) And the way we know th a t presented m ateria l i s contemporaneously a ffe c tin g our sense organs i s no t by inspec ting the data them selves, but by means of overt a c ts th a t t e s t whether the da ta presented square with subsequent o r previous presented d a ta . When we sense-percelve, then , presented m ate ria l has the meaning of being re lev an t to contemporaneous a c tio n s . In a passage in Experience and Nature in which he d iscusses types o f percep tion , Dewey recognizes 12two o th e r general types o f meaning th a t presented m ateria l may have. F ir s t , th e re a re "conceptual" meanings; secondly, "non-cognitive" meanings. Conception, o r the presence o f conceptual meanings, occurs when presented m ateria l mean o r in d ica te a s ta te o f a f f a i r s th a t "cannot be [o v e rtly ] acted upon now o r immediately, but to which a c tio n of a p ra c t ic a l s o r t i s nevertheless re le v a n t," My thought now o f a place I would lik e to be during the Christmas vacation i s the awareness o f a conceptual meaning. The image o f , say, the narrow a lle y s o f Guanajuato, Mexico, i s not some- thing th a t I can walk through a t th is moment. Perhaps a t some fu tu re , "deferred" time I s h a l l be ab le to do so , but n o t now, contemporaneously. I 13 S im ila rly , the boxer In tra in in g f o r an upcoming f ig h t i s no t senseperceiving h is opponent now a s he shadow-boxes, does road work, and punches h is bag and h is sparring p a rtn e r. I f he were sense-perceiv ing h is upcoming opponent, he could h i t him now, in s tead o f the bag and h is sparring p a rtn e r. He i s , ra th e r , conceiving him a3 someone he w il l be ab le to sense-perceive (hopefully mostly w ith h is f i s t r a th e r than h is head) l a t e r . The second non-sense-perceptual kind o f meaning which presented m ateria l may have Dewey c a l l s "non-cognltiva" percep tion . On page 339 o f Experience and Nature Dewey includes in non-cognitive perception (as d is tingu ished here from conceptual perception and sense-perception) only perception involving the s o r t o f meaning th a t one is aware o f in imagi- n ative o r fa n c ifu l co n tex ts. I t i s the kind o f perception one has when one looks a t a pa in ting o r watches a play o r reads a novel. One i s n o t, Dewey says, involved, in such cases, in a problem atic s itu a tio n o f a p ra c tic a l s o r t to which ov ert a c tio n on one 's p a r t i s re lev an t. I f you see O thello about to s tab Iago, you do no t leap to h is defense, o r even c a l l a cop. And th is n o t ju s t because you a re a contemporary and th e re - fore uninvolved man. Overt ac tio n i s ir re le v a n t a lto g e th e r , both now 13and l a t e r . In genera l, then, such non-cognitive perceptions do not a f f e c t one 's v i t a l , p ra c tic a l in te r e s t s , but c a l l fo r ac tio n s o f a "dram atic o r U te r - i' h. ary o r p lay fu l s o r t . " And fo r th i s reason Dewey does n o t re fe r to them as sense-perceptions. But elsewhere Dewey includes among non-cognitive perceptions the perception one has in "a ffe c tio n , love and ha te , d e s ire , I 1 ^ 1 C happiness and m isery." J The young man "paying a t te n tio n to a young woman" i s an example o f th is kind o f percep tion .*^ He i s n o t u sually "observantly" aware o f h e r. And y e t p ra c tic a l , v i t a l ac tion in response to h e r i s re lev an t indeed. This i s n o t a p lay o r a novel. I f i t were, many a read er o f novels would be f a r le s s d is s a t is f ie d with the kind o f experience he i s having than in fa c t he i s . Ib is kind o f so -ca lled "non-cognitive" perception i s obviously a very im portant p a rt o f our l iv e s . And I th ink Dewey i s r ig h t in d is - tin g u ish in g i t from the kind o f perception one has o f th ings when involved in d e lib e ra te inqu iry about them. The young man "paying a tte n tio n " may be s iz in g up h is g i r l to see whether she would make him a good w ife. In such a case , h is perception o f h e r would become cogn itive! c e r ta in char- a c te r i s t i c s would be e x p l ic i t ly noted as s ig n ify in g c e r ta in th ings he may expect from h er. But u sually he i s n o t, in Dewey's view, in q u irin g about h e r, b u t ju s t responding to h e r in an " a f fe c t ia n a l ," " so c ia l ," and "aes17th e tic " way. ' The same d iffe ren ce can be seen in many cases. Eating Chinese food in an a c tiv e -a ffec tio n a l-en jo y in g way, on one hand, and e a t- ing i t in an e f fo r t to determine the in g red ien ts , t h e i r p roportions, e t c . , on the o th e r. I t seems to me th a t , in in te rp re tin g Dewey's theory o f percep tion , i t i s necessary to d is tin g u ish the kind ju s t d iscussed from a l l th ree o f the previous types. I t i s c le a r ly no t conceptual, since i t i s a kind o f perception in which we a re dealing with o b jec ts contemporaneously a f f e c t- ing our sense organs. Nor i s i t fa n c ifu l o r p la y fu l, since ov ert action i s re le v a n t. F in a lly , as we have ju s t seen, i t i s n o t l ik e cognitive 15 sense-perception in th a t i t i s n o t a product o f in q u iry th a t has ju s t preceded i t . But, as we s h a l l see in g re a te r d e ta i l l a t e r , th is kind o f noncognitive sense-perception i s n o t re le v an t to the passage from Dewey 18ju s t quoted because i t does n o t, in Dewey*s view, involve any meaning. I t i s a mere response to f e l t q u a l i t ie s , which q u a l i t ie s a re n o t i n t e r - preted e i th e r as the q u a l i t ie s they a re o r as p a rts o f an o b je c t. The perception o f the sidewalk as one walks on i t i s an example o f th is . One n e ith e r remarks i t s cracked q u a lity as cracked, nor in te rp re ts i t , even im p lic it ly , as being a sidew alk. One ju s t fe e ls q u a l i t ie s and responds. But th e re i s another kind o f "non-cognitive" perception recognized by Dewey, This i s a kind of perception one does have in contexts o f inq u iry , bu t which is no t i t s e l f co g n itiv e . I t i s a perception o f a th ing in a d ire c t and immediate way as re lev an t to a problem a t hand. I f my c a r breaks down on the expressway, I perceive the cars bearing down on me and the shoulder over on the s id e o f the road in th i s noncognitive way. That i s , I perceive them as cars and as a shoulder in th is non-cognitive way. The q u a l i t ie s th a t mean cars and th a t mean shoulder a re perceived non-cognitive ly and, as we s h a l l see , Dewey c a l l s 19th i s meaning sense. But the perception o f the cars and the shoulder as meaning " I 'd b e t te r g e t over th e re o r I w ill be smashed"-th is per- ception i s co g n itiv e . Dewey c a l l s I t perception as awareness o f s lg n lf - 20ic a t io n . The old fa m ilia r o b jec ts which previous inquiry-experience has taught me about I experience non-cogn itive ly j but the new meaning 16 they have In combination Kith each other in th is situation I experience cognitively, Nov th is kind o f non-cognitive perception occurs( according to Dewey, only in problem atic s i tu a tio n s where re f le c tio n and in q u iry a re going on. I t i s th e re fo re d if f e r e n t from the perception th a t was discussed above in which we a re involved in an ac tiv e-so c ia l-a ffec tio n a l-en jo y m en t kind o f a c t iv i ty . For in th i s kind o f percep tion , e .g . , in which one i s uninquir- ing ly courting a g i r l , one i s no t aware o f a meaning a t a l l . One i s simply responding to q u a l i t i e s . So th i s kind o f experience Dewey sometimes does n o t even c a l l perception a t a l l (although, as we have seen, sometimes he does) because he sometimes l im its perception to awareness o f meaning. And th i s kind o f perception involves the mere presence o f q u a li t ie s (which mere presence Dewey c a l l s fe e lin g ) and the immediate, u n re flec ted response to such q u a l i t ie s . Another k ind o f perception which Dewey recognizes bu t which does no t seem to f a l l under any o f the th ree types previously mentioned i s memoryperception . Ihe re c a lle d coffee-cup, f o r example, i s not sense-perceived, fo r i t i s no t an o b jec t contemporaneously a ffe c tin g ray sense organs. Nor i s i t conceptual, s ince i t i s n o t a n tic ip a to ry , but ra th e r re tro sp e c tiv e . F in a lly , i t i s n o t fa n c ifu l o r p lay fu l, b u t ra th e r e i th e r cognitive o r non-cognitive, bu t nevertheless rev e la to ry o f r e a l i ty . When one remembers, th a t i s , he e i th e r e x p l ic i t ly and consciously cognizes h is p a s t, o r , a s a r e s u l t o f previous such cogn itions, he remembers w ithout re f le c tio n , as when one u n re fle c tin g ly remembers th a t those th ings approaching him on the expressway a re c a rs . 17 We should, th e re fo re , i t seems to me, add a fourth type o f perception recognized by Dewey-v iz . , memory. And under th i s we should again make the d is t in c tio n between perception as awareness of s ig n if ic a tio n and as presence o f sense. Now l e t me try to put a l l o f these kinds o f perception to g e th er in the follow ing o u tlin e . This whole d iscussion has n ecessa rily been sketchy and cannot make complete sense a t th is p o in t. Hopefully i t w ill become c le a re r in the d e ta iled d iscussions th a t follow . THE TYPES OF PERCEPTION RECOGNIZED BY DEWEY A. Sense-Perception 1, Cognitive-Perception as Awareness o f S ig n ific a tio n 2, Non-cognitive- a . Mere Peeling o r Having o f Q u alities b . Active, S o c ia l, A ffec tio n a l, Enjoying Perception; Perception as Response to Had Q ua litie s c . Perception o f Sense, Occurring Only in Contexts o f Inquiry B. Conceptual Perception C. P ancifu l o r P lay fu l o r Dramatic o r L ite ra ry Perception D. Memory-Perception There a re , then, fo r Dewey, a t le a s t f iv e basic kinds o f perception. And th e re a re a lso fiv e kinds o f sense-perception . F i r s t , th e re i s the kind of sense-perception i l lu s t r a te d in the exper- ience one might have o f the c u ttin g down o f tre e s in fro n t o f h is apartment bu ild ing , a f te r being rudely awakened by the cacophonous, ja r r in g sounds made by the autom atic saws and the raucous vo ices. One g e ts up and p a r tic ip a te s 18 in a l i t t l e b i t o f inqu iry to determine ju s t what the source o f th a t hor- r ib le sound i s . Perception of the contemporaneously occurring events which re su lts when one ra is e s h is shade and peers out in an a c t of experim ental inqu iry , although not a very system atic one, i s cognitive sense-perception . In th is case, i t i s the perception o f the v isu a l da ta o f the men outside and th e i r rap id ly moving saws as being the source o f the cacophonous, j a r - rin g , and obnoxious sounds one had been hearing . Note th a t as cognitive i t occurs as the so lu tio n o f a problem. The perception , then, i s o f some- thing as being an explanation of something e ls e . This i s a case o f per- ception o f s ig n if ic a t io n . But one 's f i r s t perception o f those sounds, before any inqu iry began to take p lace, took place in the mode of what Dewey c a lls fe e lin g . One i s no t in te rp re tin g them o r a t tr ib u tin g any meaning to them a t a l l , although he may nevertheless respond to them by grimacing, moaning, o r even jumping up and slamming the window. This k ind of sense-perception Dewey sometimes regards as including the a c tiv e , a f fe c t io n a l, so c ia l, e tc . , kind o f per- ception in which, as I have sa id , he th inks we a re involved in much o f our experience. He includes the l a t t e r in the c la ss o f fee ling -percep tion because he believes no meaning i s p resen t in i t . I s h a ll th e re fo re d is - cuss i t in Chapter Three, which i s concerned w ith fee lin g . F in a lly , when one looked outside in an attem pt to determine the source o f a l l the n o ise , one no ticed saws and men. These were grasped immediately as such. One did not have to r e f le c t in o rder to recognize the sawq u a li t ie s as saws and the m an-qualities as men. These were grasped imme- d ia te ly as such. These kinds of inference one had made in the p ast and 19 they were now autom atic. Such percep tions, which, he i t noted again , do involve grasping a meaning and occur, according to Dewey, only in contexts of in q u iry , Dewey c a l l s perception o f sense. In the passage in Experience and Nature which suggested th i s d iscus- sion (p , 338 f . ) , Dewey neg lec ts the kind of perception o f meaning c a lled perception o f sense. I suspect th i s i s because o f h is concern a t th is po in t to show th a t presented m ate ria l i s n o t in t r in s ic a l ly one o r ano ther kind o f perception . Subsequent inqu iry i s required to determine whether i t i s sense-perception, im agination, a n tic ip a tio n , o r whatever. This par- t i c u la r kind o f non-cognitive perception-i . e . , perception of sense-does n o t, however, show i t s e l f to be sense-perception as a re s u l t o f a con- s id e ra tio n o f e x tr in s ic m atters revealed to inqu iry . I t Is immediately taken to be sense-percep tion . So i t seems to be an exception to the view th a t only e x tr in s ic considera tions enable us to judge a perception to be o f one s o r t o r another. Dewey's answer here i s th a t such non-cognitive sense-perceptions a re 22a r e s u l t o f previous cognitive sense-percep tions. At one tim e, th a t i s , we were aware of the nature o f men and saws by way o f an tic ip a tio n o f consequences which th i s kind o f th ing had come to suggest to u s . We were n o t sure what a saw was; we had to th ink about i t and what was to be done with i t , in the way the new d riv e r i s no t sure o f what the c lu tch i s and what i s to be done with i t . But now, o f course, we do no t have to s to p and th ink about a saw o r a mam. We experience the meanings of these th ings w ithout r e f le c t io n , o r "au tom atica lly ." As we have seen, Dewey uses the word s ig n if ic a tio n fo r the kind o f 20 meaning q u a l i t ie s do have when we a re cognizantly aware o f them, IM s i s the way we a re aware o f q u a l i t ie s and th e i r meanings when we a re en- gaged in a problem atic s i tu a t io n . But when we become fa m ilia r with such q u a l i t ie s a s those o f a saw o r a man, i t s a n tic ip a te d consequences become an " in te g ra l and funded fea tu re" o f those q u a l i t ie s them selves. The fu tu re consequences, the meaning, o f the q u a l i t ie s "already belong to the th in g "; they become "commuted" in to the q u a l i t ie s themselves and a re grasped a t the same time as the q u a l i t ie s them selves. Ib is Dewey c a l l s 23grasping the sense o f the q u a l i t ie s . I s h a l l d iscuss in d e ta i l below, in Chapter Two, these two d is t in c t kinds o f percep tion , the cognitive one o f grasping the s ig n if ic a tio n o f a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s , and the non-cognitive one o f g e ttin g the sense o f them. We see , then , th a t Dewey recognizes two types o f perception o f the meaning th a t presented m ateria l has, the f i r s t being perception o f s ig - n if ic a t io n , the second o f the sense o f th a t m a te ria l. Now the presen ta- tio n o f the m a te ria l i t s e l f i s the o th er kind of perception which I am arguing th a t Dewey recognizes, even though he does no t u su a lly use the term perception to r e f e r to i t . In every case o f sense-perception there i s n e ce ssa rily involved a p resen ta tion o f q u a l i t ie s them selves, and th is having o f q u a l i t ie s Dewey c a l l s fe e lin g . Feeling i s a non-cognitive, non-observant kind o f awareness. Sometimes i t occurs to g e th er with the in te rp re ta tio n o r meaning c o n s titu ted by sense and s ig n if ic a t io n , but in lower anim als which are locomotive and which have d is tan ce -recep to rs , and sometimes perhaps in man, i t occurs to ta l ly w ithout any in te rp re ta tio n . -•21 Feelings may be p a lnsf p leasu res , odors, c o lo rs , no ises , tones, o r whateverj but they a re so only " p io le p tic a lly and p o te n tia lly ," In them- se lv e s , they a re simply had q u a l i t ie s , to ta l ly u n in te rp re ted , u n c la ss if ie d , unlocated. The f e l t s ta te o f consciousness which one might l a t e r leam to c a l l "hunger" i s , before sudi use o f language to c la s s ify and lo cate i t , n e ith e r bodily no r m ental, n e ith e r in ten se nor weak, d ire c ted n e ith e r toward milk nor toward liv e r} i t simply i s . I t may cause responses, but i t i s no t known o r understood. There i s the hunger and the cry ing , but there i s not hunger, the recogn ition , "Hunger," and then the crying. Dewey seems to have changed h is mind between the w ritin g o f the "In troduction" to Essays in Experimental Logic and the w riting o f Logict The Theory of Inquiry on the question o f whether fe e lin g ever occurs in human beings to ta l ly unaccompanied by in te rp re ta tio n a l a c t iv i ty . In the "In troduction" to the Essays he claims th a t although fe e lin g may perhaps sometimes occur w ithout in te rp re ta tio n o r meaning, i t u sually does not and possib ly never does. Most o f our experience occurs in a prim arily non-cognitive framework, in which th e re i s a minimum o f cog n itio n a l ac- t i v i t y going on. But "some element o f re f le c tio n o r inference may be requ ired in any s itu a tio n to which the term 'ex p erien ce ' i s app licab le in any way which co n tra s ts w ith , say, the 'ex p erien ce ' o f an o y s te r or 25a growing bean v ine ," But in Logic: The Theory o f Inqu iry he says " th a t e i th e r an immediate overt response occurs, l ik e using the ty p ew rite r o r picking up the book (in which cases the s i tu a tio n i s no t a cogn itiona l one), o r . . . the ob ject d ire c t ly noted i s p a r t of an a c t o f inqu iry d irec ted I 22 towaiti knowledge." And we see front a passage In Experience and Nature th a t i t I s h is view th a t " the re a d ie r a response* the le s s consciousness* 27 meaning* th ink ing I t p e rm its ." So th a t i t seems c le a r th a t he came to th ink th a t , in a good deal o f our experience, fee lin g does occur w ithout any accompanying In te rp re ta tio n and meaning. In d iscussing above the fa c t th a t fe e lin g s , when they occur w ithout in te rp re ta t io n , a re only p ro le p tic a lly odors, sounds, co lo rs , e t c . , I used a s an example one th a t Dewey him self uses, the fe e lin g o f hunger. In i t s o r ig in a l s ta t e , th i s f e l t q u a lity i s not r e a l ly hunger; i t i s merely the p o te n tia l i ty fo r a l a t e r in te rp re ta tio n o f i t as hunger. Now perception o f i t a s hunger, when i t does occur, i s n o t, s t r i c t l y speaking, a case o f sense-percep tion . For Dewey lim its the term sense-perception to ob jec ts the perception o f which begins w ith ex te rn a l sense-organs. This d is tin c tio n between "p e rip h e ra lly in i t ia te d perceptions and ones in te rn a lly in i t i a te d i s not one th a t perceptions come marked w ith; i t i s 28a product o f a n a ly t ic a l observation ." N evertheless, Dewey does recog- n ize th is a s a leg itim a te d is t in c t io n . The perception o f hunger, then , o r o f any o th e r in te rn a l s ta t e , i s n o t then a case o f sense-percep tion , bu t perception by means o f some pro29p riocep tive organ. 7 S t r i c t ly speaking, then , i t seems th a t we should add ano ther kind o f perception to our o u tlin e above. The terms fe e lin g , s ig n if ic a t io n , and sense should then be viewed as applying to perception in gen era l, one sub-category o f which i s sense-percep tion , ano ther o f which i s perhaps "p ro p rio -cep tio n ." The t r i p a r t i t e d iv is io n would seem a lso to apply to many, i f n o t a l l , o f the o th e r types o f percep tion , 23 although Dewey does n o t, a s f a r as I can t e l l , e x p lic i t ly apply i t in th i3 way. In perception by way o f r e c a l l , fo r example, one may be fe e lin g o r having q u a l i t ie s which a re n o t produced by ob jects contemporaneously a f - fec tin g one 's sense organs, o r one 's proprioceptive organs e i th e r . They are produced by "some o th e r organic s tru c tu re ," a s he puts i t in the essay, 30"A N a tu ra lis t ic Theory o f Percep tion ." And these q u a l i t ie s a re in te r - p re ted , e i th e r in the sense o f acqu iring a sense o r in th a t o f acqu iring a s ig n if ic a tio n , as meaning some p a s t event in one 's l i f e . S im ila rly , imaginary perception may be based on q u a l i t ie s f e l t a s a re s u lt o f some o th er organic s tru c tu re than one 's e x te rn a l sense-organs, o r o n e 's pro- p rio cep to rs , both o f which t e s t i f y to a contemporaneously occurring event. Such q u a l i t ie s then come to have some s ig n if ic a tio n o r sense a s an in te r - p re ta tio n o f these q u a l i t ie s . Dewey's view th a t th e re i s no in t r in s ic d ifference between the various kinds o f perception ( i . e . , between sense-perception , h a llu c in a tio n , imagi- na tio n , and so on) perhaps s t r ik e s the reader a t f i r s t a s highly implau- s ib le . For th e re do su re ly seem to be fundamental and obvious d iffe ren ces between them, d iffe ren ces th a t a re in t r in s ic , not e x tr in s ic . One does no t have to engage in in q u iry , even o f a prim itive s o r t , to know th a t he i s now remembering what he was doing around noon yesterday , o r th a t he i s now seeing o r sense-perceiv ing c e r ta in ob jects around him, and so on. The d iffe ren ce between these various kinds o f perception i s ju s t obvious. When I remember, I know I remember. And so on with the o thers . Of course, th e re a re bo rderline cases (and borderline people, v iz . , madmen) in which one may no t be sure whether he i s imagining or sense-perceiv ing . And here 2k i t i s necessary to engage in in v estig a tiv e o r inqu iring a c t iv i ty . But such instances a re ra re , and i t would be preposterous to in f e r from such instances o f d i f f ic u l ty in id en tify in g the type of perception one i s hav- ing to the conclusion th a t a l l are in t r in s ic a l ly lik e them and cannot be known to be what they are w ithout e x tr in s ic considerations being made. Furthermore, even i f we gran t Dewey's contention th a t perceptions do no t d i f f e r in t r in s ic a l ly bu t only e x tr in s ic a l ly (whether these ex- t r in s ic considera tions be cu rren t ones o r ones th a t were made in the past and have now vouchsafed th is s o r t o f perception , in th i s s o r t of circum stance, as being memory, im agination, o r whatever), a fu r th e r 31d if f ic u l ty a r is e s . When one engages (o r i s engaged) in th is inves- tig a tiv e procedure to determine whether a s e t o f presented q u a li t ie s which he i s now having a re , l e t us say , imaginary o r cases o f sensepereeptlon , he must perform some a c t and then have more presented q u a li- t i e s as a re s u l t o f th a t a c t . But what about th is perception? I s i t one th a t i s known to be sense-perception in t r in s ic a l ly , o r does i t too requ ire fu r th e r , e x tr in s ic considerations before i t can be d e f in ite ly determined to be a case o f sense-perception and no t im agination, memory, o r whatever? I f the l a t t e r , as Dewey's view would seem to commit him to holding, then an in f in i te reg ress seems to r e s u l t . For obviously the same question w il l a r is e about th is p u ta tiv e sense-perception as wells What k ind o f perception ju s t i f i e s i t ? A perception known in t r in s ic a l ly to be sense-percep tion , or scoe fu r th e r sense-perception known i t s e l f only e x tr in s ic a l ly to be sense-perception? And so on end lessly . Now, o f course we do n o t, and could n o t, engage in an in f in i ty o f 25 t e s t s fo r any p a r t ic u la r sense-perception we th ink we a re having. I t follow s, th e re fo re , th a t e i th e r we never do have a leg itim a te senseperception , a view th a t Dewey's theory re s u l ts in , o r we have some sensepercep tions, a view Dewey e x p l ic i t ly den ies. Dewey answers th is type o f objection in the chap ter o f Logics The 32Theory o f Inquiry ca lled "Immediate Knowledge." He describes the objec- tio n as a d ia le c t ic a l argument which has been used ev er since the time of A r is to t le , and i s s t i l l cu rren t today. I t i s argued th a t inference must r e s t upon something known from which i t s t a r t s , so th a t unless th e re a re tru e premises which serve as such a b a s is i t i s im possible, no m atter how adequate inference and d iscu rs iv e reasoning may be, to a r r iv e a t true conclusions. Hence the only way o f avoiding a regressus ad in fin itum i s sa id to be the ex istence o f tru th s imme- d ia te ly known. . . , But the d ia le c t ic a l rep ly i s sim ple. I t su f- f ic e s to have h y p o the tica l (cond itiona l) m ate ria l such th a t i t d ire c ts inqu iry in to channels in which new m a te ria l, fa c tu a l and conceptual, i s d isc lo sed , m ateria l which i s more re lev an t, more weighted and confirmed, more f r u i t f u l , than were the i n i t i a l fa c ts and conceptions which served as the po in t o f d e p a r t u r e .33 Every in q u iry , then , fo r Dewey, begins with c e r ta in th ings taken fo r granted . These a re n o t taken fo r granted because they a re s e l f ev iden t, immediately known, indubitab le t ru th s . They a re simply the "funded" r e s u lts o f previous in q u ir ie s . And th e re are two s o r ts o f such th in g s , which Dewey re fe rs to as "conceptual" and "perceptual" o r " fa c tu a l •Ul o b je c ts ." Conceptual o b jec ts a re w e ll-e stab lish ed hypotheses o r th e - o rie s about what w ill happen i f c e r ta in ac tio n s a re performed. They "may be and u su a lly a re a b strac ted from ap p lica tio n to th is and th a t immediate e x is te n t ia l s i tu a t io n . But on th a t very account, they are instrum ents o f a wide, in d e f in ite scope o f o p era tional ap p lica tio n , a c tu a l 35ap p lic a tio n being made as sp ec ia l conditions p resen t them selves." I 26 Let us take a s an example o f such a conceptual o b jec t th a t o f "dan- gerous s i tu a t io n ." This o b jec t In d ica tes , In a general way, th a t un d esir- able and possib ly even ca tas tro p h ic consequences may r e s u l t i f c e r ta in developments occur o r i f c e r ta in preventive ac tio n s are n o t taken. But o f course i t i s s u f f ic ie n tly general to be app licab le to a tremendous v a rie ty o f fa c tu a l s i tu a t io n s . The f i l l i n g in o f the su b jec t o f the judg- ment to which the conceptual o b jec t, "dangerous s i tu a tio n ," i s a p red ica te i s done by means o f a determ ination o f what Dewey c a l ls a perceptual o r fa c tu a l o b jec t. The breakdown o f my c a r on a crowded expressway might be an example o f a percep tual o b jec t. My judgment would then become, "The breakdown o f my c a r on th is expressway i s a dangerous s i tu a t io n ." Now the two o b je c ts , perceptual and conceptual, did no t come to us in a moment o f contem plative specu la tion , nor were they the products o f in tu i t io n . They a re the products o f previous in q u ir ie s in response to previous problem atic s i tu a tio n s . I perceive th i s as a breakdown o f my car because o f previous experience with cars th a t suddenly lose speed w ithout e i th e r being out o f gas, having been dece le ra ted , e tc . Such an ob ject i s "a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s tre a ted a s p o te n t ia l i t ie s fo r sp ec ified e x is te n t ia l consequences." When we a re try in g to determine what the meaning o f a p a r tic u la r s e t o f q u a l i t ie s i s , e .g . , th e sudden d ece le ra tio n of o n e 's c a r , we are attem pting to determ ine o r define a percep tual ob jec t. What does th is s itu a tio n mean? J u s t a s in th e case o f the o ffensive sounds th a t woke one from s leep , one engaged in some o v e rt, experim ental a c ts to determine what they meant. In the course o f such an inqu iry we encounter o th e r 27 o b jec ts , both percep tual and conceptual, which a re the products o f p re- vious in q u ir ie s -such a s the cars bearing down upon one from behind, the shoulder onto which one might be ab le to p u ll o f f and out o f th e i r path , e tc . Or, in th e case o f the o ffensive sounds, men using mechanical saws on dead t r e e s . And o f course inqu iry u sually s tops here . We take fo r granted th a t th ese th ings a re r e a l ly th e re , contemporaneously a ffe c tin g our sense-organs. The reason we do th is i s , ag a in , not th a t they a re given as s e lf -e v id e n tly and indubitab ly sense-percep tions, ra th e r than im agination-perceptlons, de lusion-percep ilons, o r h a llu c in a tio n -p ercep tio n s . I t i s ra th e r th a t they a re taken to be sense-perceptions because we see no grounds fo r doubting them to be such. These o b jec ts a re the a l te rn a - tiv e to the "hard data" and " f i r s t p rin c ip le s" which o th e r philosophers th ink a re presupposed in a l l our judgments about the w orld. Some ob jec ts o r p r in c ip le s , Dewey recognizes, a re presupposed in a l l inqu iry o r judg- ment, bu t these need no t be ob jec ts o r p r in c ip le s about which we can be ab so lu te ly c e r ta in , but ones which a re taken a s being e stab lish ed hypoth- eses and ob jec ts "so in s t i tu te d and confirmed in the course o f d if fe re n t in q u ir ie s , th a t i t would be a waste o f time and energy in fu r th e r in q u ir 37ie s to make them o b jec ts o f in v e s tig a tio n before proceeding to use them," One might, however, ask fu r th e r how any perceptual o b jec t ever got e s tab lish ed in the f i r s t p lace, i f th e re were no o th e r perceptual ob jec ts to use to e s ta b lish i t . Granted th a t now we have percep tual o b jec ts l ik e men, t r e e s , saws, e tc . to use in making o th e r percep tual judgments. And granted th a t they a re p re tty w ell e s tab lish ed and founded, so th a t i t would be a "waste o f time and energy" to c a l l them in qu estio n . But 28 i s n ' t th i s p rec ise ly "because they have been seen in th e past to be con- firmed by those "hard ," indub itab le da ta th a t c e r ta in philosophers re fe r to? C. I . Lewis' theory i s an example o f th i s view. There a re , he says in f n a lv s ls o f Knowledge and V aluation, c e r ta in "term inating judgments" which can be v e rif ie d d ire c t ly and c e r ta in ly . And i t i s the p o s s ib il i ty o f c e r ta in confirm ation o f such judgments th a t enables us to have the con- v ic tio n we do about any p a r t ic u la r judgment which i s no t so v e r if ia b le - fo r example, the perceptual judgment th a t those men out there a re sawing a t r e e . "Only," Lewis says, " i f something i s conclusively tru e by v irtu e o f experience, can any ex istence o r f e e t o f r e a l i ty be rendered even p ro b a b le ." ^ At th i s po in t I th ink we might, in defense o f Dewey's view, r e f e r to the thought o f ano ther pragm atist who, o f course, had considerable in fluence on Dewey, G. S . P e irce . P e irce , in a b r i l l i a n t essay c a lled 39"Questions Concerning C ertain F acu ltie s Claimed fo r Man, " 7 d iscusses the question o f whether we have any in tu i t iv e cog n itio n . This he defines as a cognition o r judgment no t "determined" o r supported by some o th er cogn ition . This i s the kind o f cognition o r knowledge which Lewis th inks i s necessary i f we a re ever to have any fe c tu a l knowledge a t a l l . And the assumed n ecessity fo r th is i s what i s in back o f th is e n tire argument a g a in s t Dewey's view, Peirce re fe rs to th i s argument in "Questions Concerning C ertain F acu ltie s Claimed fo r Man" as an argument which claim s th a t th e re aust be some such s e lf -e v id e n t, se lf-confirm ing judgments to found the ordinary 29 perceptual judgments we make. And one o f h is counter-arguments seems to me to o f fe r an ex ce llen t reason fo r b e liev in g Dewey's view to be p lau sib le and the ob jection we have been considering untenable, This i s h is p o in t th a t a v a r ie ty o f prem ises, none o f which i s i t s e l f c e r ta in , may o f f e r support fo r a conclusion to such an ex ten t th a t i t i s more c e r ta in than any one o f them. Let us suppose, fo r example, th a t a dozen w itnesses t e s t i f y to an occurrence. Then my b e l ie f in the occurrence r e s ts on the b e l ie f th a t each o f these men i s gen era lly to be believed upon oath . Yet the fa c t t e s t i f i e d to i s made more c e r ta in than th a t o f any o f those men i s genera lly to be believed .TM Now, s im ila r ly , i f I am concerned to in q u ire in to the p rec ise na tu re o f the perception o f Dwight Eisenhower on my bedroom w all ( e .g . , by pu t- tin g on my g la sses and looking around th e room fo r o th e r sources fo r the image), I may be led to the conclusion th a t i t i s a shadow th a t was c a s t th e re by a s t r e e t lamp. This shadow so c a s t upon the spot where I thought I had seen a l i t t l e Eisenhower d isconfirm s my o r ig in a l inference as to what I was seeing . But now how do I know th a t th e shadow i s indeed a shadow and not r e a l ly a delusion o r h a llu c in a tio n o r memory? In sh o r t, how do I know th a t I am sense-perceiving? The answer is th a t I do no t know in the sense o f being ab so lu te ly c e r ta in , bu t th a t th e re are many o ther sense-percep tions, themselves a lso not ab so lu te ly c e r ta in , w ith which the inference th a t th i s i s a shadow so c a s t square. There i s a s t r e e t lamp and i t c a s ts a l ig h t across the photographic en la rg er which i s s i t - t in g on a ta b le in my room, and the shadow i s roughly the same shape a s the head o f the en la rg er. Furthermore, I d id no t have my g lasses on, and w ithout them cannot be sure ju s t what I am seeing, and I had been seeing 30 scenes from the l i f e o f Eisenhower on te le v is io n before I went to bed. The way th a t I have what Dewey c a l l s "warranted a s s e r t ib i l i t y " (he p re fe rs to avoid the term "knowledge") i s through the fe e t th a t th is in te rp re ta tio n does seem to account fo r the phenomena o f the s i tu a tio n . I t i s , then , i f you w il l , a kind o f coherence theory o f knowledge and hence, since knowledge i s involved in cognitive and in d ire c tly in noncognitive percep tion , a coherence theory o f percep tion . There i s , then , no regressus ad in fin itum not because we reach a case o f Inheren tly and in t r in s ic a l ly knowable sense-percep tion . R ather i t i s because we reach a perception which squares w ith the o th e r percep tions which we a re hav- in g , w ith those we have had in the p a s t, and with those we expect to have in the fu tu re . And with the perceptions which o th e r people t e l l us they are having. Something l ik e th is must be the way in which we f i r s t come to d is - tin g u ish our sense-perceptions from our im agination-perceptions, dreampercep tions, e tc . I t i s because some o f them cohere w ith o th e rs , none o f which i s i t s e l f known to be a sense-perception . And some a re no t borne out by subsequent developments among the perceptual m ateria l and do no t square w ith what has come befo re . None o f o n e 's perceptual exper- iences o f , say , h is mother a s she tends to him in h is c r ib i s r e a l ly c e r- ta in ly a sense-percep tion , bu t the f a c t th a t they a l l square w ith each o th e r and do n o t come and go in the way the "bad man" o f one 's dreams do must make the d is tin c tio n between the r e a l and the imaginary, fo r example, begin to take hold in the c h i ld 's mind. NOTES 1, S t r ic t ly speaking-o f a " fa c tu a l object" in some " e x is te n tia l s i tu a - tio n " -as opposed to a "conceptual o b je c t," which i s ab strac ted from any p a r tic u la r e x is te n t ia l s i tu a tio n . See above, p. 25 f f , 2, John Dewey, Logici The Theory o f Inquiry (New Yorki H olt, R inehart and Winston, In c . , 1938), p. 129. 3, John Dewey, Experience and Nature (second e d itio n ; New Yorftt Dover Books, 1958 [ f i r s t published, 1929j), p. 338. A ll subsequent quota- tio n s from Experience and Nature w ill be from the second ed itio n unless otherwise Ind ica ted . l+, John Dewey, Philosophy and C iv iliz a tio n (New Yorkt Capricorn Books, 1963), p. 190. 5. Ib id . . p. 190. 6 . See Dewey, Experience and Nature. p. 338 f , , f o r development o f th is p o in t, 7. Ib id . . p. 321. The d iscussion in Experience and Nature beginning on p. 308 and ending on p . 353 i s the most extensive treatm ent o f per- ception in Dewey's work and provides the b a s is fo r much o f my an a ly sis o f h is view. 8. Ib id . . p. 339. 9 . There i s a q u a lif ic a tio n to be made to th i s , however-v iz . , th a t c e r- ta in q u a li t ie s do become funded a s being o f one type o r anotheri such th ings as pink elephants a re genera lly in te rp re te d , because o f past experience, as h a llu c in a to ry , and the fa m ilia r ob jects o f o n e 's room a s sense-percep tual. See below, p. 77, fo r fu r th e r ex p lica tio n o f th i s , 10. Dewey, Experience and Nature, pp. 338-39# 11. Ib id . . p. 335# 12. Ib id . . p. 339# The p rec ise natu re o f meaning as Dewey uses th is term i s discussed below on p. 6^ f f . 13. I exclude applause because th i s i s a response n o t, e .g . , to the feigned ac tio n o f stabbing , bu t to the ac tio n o f a c tin g . Hie stabbing i s p er- ceived "non-cognitively ," but the ac tin g , when evaluated qua good o r bad ac tin g (appraised , then, r a th e r than merely prized) i s sense-perceived. 31 - 32 14, Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 339. 15, Ib id . . p. 310. 16, John Dewey. Essays In Experimental Logic (New Yorki Dover P u b lica tions, In c ., 1954 [ . f i r s t published, 1916J), p. 5. 17* Ib id . . p . 2. On p. 60 below I d iscuss In g re a te r d e ta i l and c r i t i c iz e as being im plausible th is view o f Dewey's on what our ordinary percep- tio n i s l ik e . I claim th e re th a t Dewey, in h is zea l to avoid what he sees as a ty p ic a l o v e rin te lle c tu a liz a tio n on the p a rt o f philosophers o f the na tu re o f our experience, comes him self to take an under- in te lle c tu a liz e d view o f i t . 18. Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 339. 19. See below, Ch. 3 , fo r a fu r th e r development o f th i s . 20. See below, Ch. 3 , fo r a fu r th e r development o f th i s . 21. Dewey does c a l l i t perception in Logic1 The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 150, and Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 256 . 22. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 182, 23. Ib id . . p. 182. 24. Ib id . . p. 258. 25. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 3. 26. Dewey, Logic» The Theory o f Inqu iry , p. 143. 27. Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 314. 28. Ib id . . p. 333. 29. Ib id . . p. 334. 30. Dewey, Philosophy and C iv iliz a tio n , p. 190, 31. I am indebted to P rofessor William Earle fo r th is argument ag a in s t Dewey's view. 32. Dewey, Logici The Theory o f Inqu iry . Ch. V III, p. 140 f , 33. Ib id . . pp. 142-43. 34. Ib id . . p. 132. I 33 35. I b id . , p . 132. 36. "Powder i s what w il l explode under c e r ta in conditionsj w ater as a su b s ta n tia l o b jec t i s th a t group o f connected q u a l i t ie s which w ill quench t h i r s t , and so on." (Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f Inqu iry . P. 129.) 37. Ib id . . p. 140. 38. C. I . Lewis, A nalysis o f Knowledge and Valuation (La S a lle , 111., Open Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 204. 39. C. S . P e irce , "Questions Concerning C ertain F acu ltie s Claimed fo r Han," rep rin ted in P h ilip P. Wiener, Charles S. P eirce: Selected W ritings (New Yorki Dover P ub lica tions, In c . ,1 9 ^ 6 ) , pp. 15-38. 40. Ib id . . pp. 29-30. CHAPTER I I FEELING We come now to the d e ta ile d a n a ly s is of Dewey's view o f the f i r s t o f the th ree kinds o f perception he recognizes. This he c a l l s fe e lin g . As I have ind ica ted above, each o f the th ree kinds perception can occur in any o f the various forms o f perception . Feeling i s n o t lim ited to q u a l i t ie s th a t a re received through ex te rn a l sense-organs, but can be produced by in te rn a l , p roprioceptive senso rs, o r o th e r "organic s tru c tu re s ," th is l a s t source being responsib le fo r q u a l i t ie s in te rp re te d a s memories, fo r example. Dewey does n o t generally c a l l fe e lin g a kind o f perception .* He usually lim its th a t term to the kind of awareness we have of q u a li t ie s to g e th er with th e i r meaning, which meaning i s e i th e r th e s ig n if ic a tio n o r the sense o f the q u a li t ie s o r presented m ate ria l. I am including h is view of i t in my d iscussion o f h is theory o f percep tion , however, because i t i s a kind o f awareness which i s custom arily discussed in philosophical accounts o f percep tion , many philosophers considering i t a kind o f percep- t io n . Furthermore, as we s h a l l see (p . ^5), i t i s in Dewey's view pre- c ise ly because philosophers have viewed what Dewey c a l l s "fee ling" on an analogy w ith the cognitive kind of perception which Dewey c a l ls "aware- ness o f s ig n if ic a tio n " th a t many o f the problems o f perception a r i s e . Feeling i s the having, in a non-cognitive way, o f q u a l i t ie s . I t i s the occurrence o f these q u a l i t ie s in a liv in g organism. These q u a li t ie s 35 include such th ings a s co lo rs , sounds, shapes, e t c . , which are sensed by sense-organs, a s w ell as such q u a l i t ie s as pa in fu ln ess , obnoxiousness, p leasure , s e t t le d , d is tu rb ed , harsh , barren , e tc . This l a s t group Dewey, following Santayana, o ften c a l l s " te r t ia ry " q u a l i t ie s . But such q u a l i t ie s a re not f e l t a s what they a r e , a s , f o r example, d is tu rb ed . Because f e e l- ing i s dumb; i t does n o t know what i s being had o r even th a t anything i s being hadi fe e lin g i s ju s t q u a l i t ie s occurring . Dewey's view, then , i s l ik e th a t o f James in "Does Consciousness E x ist?" Q u a litie s , o r "n eu tra l data" (as James re fe rs to them), ju s t happen. There i s no a c t o f being conscious o f th e i r happening. There i s no knowledge involved. And there i s no su b jec t to which the f e l t q u a l i t ie s occur. As we saw in Chapter One, f e l t q u a l i t ie s , in th e i r o r ig in a l s ta t e , before in te rp re ta tio n occurs, a re only "p ro le p tic a lly " hunger o r red o r fe a r , o r bodily o r environm ental. They have no ch a rac te r o r meaning or c la s s if ic a t io n a t a l l in t h e i r o r ig in a l s ta te . They ju s t a re . They may cause responses, bu t they do no t do so because they mean something th a t makes th a t response re le v an t. A dog may perk up i t s ears when i t hears thunder, bu t th i s i s merely a response, not a reac tio n to an in te rp re ta - tio n o f a sound-quality as meaning thunder o r even danger. In o rder to t r y to make c le a re r what Dewey i s g e ttin g a t he re , I would l ik e to ask the read er to imagine what the experience o f Helen K elle r must have been l ik e p r io r to th a t momentous occasion when she came to learn th a t th ings have names. I f the read er has seen the play o r movie, "The M iracle Worker," he w il l remember what a te r r ib ly ex c itin g moment i t was, both fo r Helen K e lle r and h er teach er. What happened was a revo lu tion in Helen K e lle r 's experience, a revo- lu tio n h e r teachers had "been t iy in g to accomplish fo r some tim e. They had "been try in g to teach h er th a t th ings have names and what some o f those names a re . Now, what I would lik e the reader to t r y to imagine i s what Helen K e lle r 's experience was lik e p r io r to th a t tim e. W ell, o f course some q u a l i t ie s did b rin g fo rth responses, b u t were these phenomena, these qual- i t i e s , in any sense known or cognized? Perhaps i t i s im possible to say, bu t I be lieve i t i s possib le th a t her experience was much l ik e th a t o f the h igher animals who have fe e lin g , but n o t mind. Let us anyway suppose th a t th i s was roughly what her experience was l ik e , and, in try in g to imag- ine i t , I be lieve we w ill ge t very c lose to what Dewey means by fe e lin g . Let us suppose, then , th a t p r io r to d iscovering th a t a l l th a t p res- sure on the hand meant a word o r s ig n , Helen K e lle r re a l ly d id no t have knowledge. Because, in her experience, nothing r e a l ly represented any- th ing e ls e . There was water and then there was the response o f running away or sh ivering , but th e re was no cognition o f i t a s w ater. Now the kind o f experience which she must have had o f the world p r io r to le a rn in g about language and rep resen ta tio n o r s ig n if ic a tio n corresponds to what Dewey c a l l s fe e lin g . What happens in experience o f th i s type i s simply th a t q u a l i t ie s occur. There i s , fo r example, a wet, co ld q u a lity . I t i s n o t known as being wet and cold; i t i s no t recognized; i t c a l l s fo r th n e ith e r memory nor expecta tion . There i s .just the wet o r ju s t the sm ell, in the case o f , say, an o lfac to ry sensation . Now these q u a l i t ie s may cause one to a c t in a c e r ta in way, bu t unless 37 with the sm ell one an tic ip a te d th a t ac tio n o r thought o f such ac tio n , un less, in sh o rt, the sm ell re fe rred back to something in the past o r ahead to something in the fu tu re , th e re was no knowledge o r meaning. Ihere was ju s t a b ru te , q u a li ta tiv e event. This i s the kind o f experience I am supposing Helen K elle r had p r io r to th a t moment a t the pump when she learned the name fo r w ater and thereby learned th a t there were names and meanings. Ihere had been (indeed, there must have been fo r l i f e to survive) q u a l i t ie s , movements,■and sa tis fa c to ry completions of those movements-as in ea tin g , fo r example. But th ese , I am supposing, occurred in what Dewey c a l ls a b ru te ly s e r ia l fashion. . . . The sm all, S, i s replaced (and d is - placed) by a f e l t movement, K, th i s i s replaced by the g r a t i f i c a - tio n , G. Viewed from w ithout, as we are now regarding i t , there i s S-K-G. But from w ith in , fo r i t s e l f , i t is now S, now G, and so on to the end o f the chap ter. Nowhere i s there looking before and a f t e r ; 2 memory and a n tic ip a tio n a re not bom . Such an experience n e ith e r i s , in whole o r in p a r t, a knowledge, no r does i t exercise a cognitive fu n c tio n ,3 So we may suppose th a t Helen K e lle r had previously learned to respond to the w ater from the pump by drinking i t . But th e re was ju s t the w ater and the d rink ing , occurring in a "b ru te ly s e r ia l" fash ion . The w ater did no t cause h e r to "look ahead" to the drink ing ; i t d id not symbolize i t . I t simply ca lled fo rth the response o f the d rinking . I t i s only when the q u a li t ie s o f wet and cold contain in themselves, by way o f a n tic ip a tio n , the drinking and the g ra t i f ic a t io n , th a t signs and mind a re bom . This Helen K eller had not achieved. Apparently she had even learned the names o f some th in g s , but again in a b ru te ly mechan- ic a l fash ion , not in a tru ly rep resen ta tiv e fash ion . The w ater caused h e r to make ce rta in pressures on h e r hand, and presumably she could even, 38 a f t e r receiv ing these p ressu res, respond ap p ro p ria te ly by making h e r way to the w ater. But the pressures themselves did not mean, contain immanen tly in themselves, the w ater i t s e l f . Not u n t i l th a t moment a t the pump did she learn th a t and what s igns a re , and thereby become a human being. So when she learned th a t the pressure on the hand was a s ig n , knowl- edge and mind were bom . She no longer responded to th ings merely in th e i r immediacy, bu t began to be capable o f remembering the past instances o f such th ings and a n tic ip a tin g fu tu re ones. In doing so , she began to have the second kind o f perception which Dewey recognizes-the perception o f the s ig n if ic a tio n o f q u a l i t ie s . Now she was ab le to a n tic ip a te the ta s te and the th irst-quench ing q u a l i t ie s , the easy p e n e tra b il ity , the coolness o f the w ater ju s t from the words sp e lled out on h e r hand. Ib is a n tic ip a tio n marked an advance to the le v e l of perception ca lled s ig n i f i - ca tio n . When experience reaches th is le v e l , Dewey says q u a li ta tiv e immediacies cease to be dumbly rap turous, a possession th a t i s obsessive and an incorpora tion th a t involves submergence: conditions found in sensation and passions. They become capable o f survey, contem plation, and id e a l o r lo g ic a l e labo ra tion ; when something can be sa id o f q u a l i t ie s they a m purveyors o f in s tru c - tio n , , , , Even the dumb pang o f an ache achieves a s ig n if ic a n t ex istence when i t can be designated and descanted upon; i t ceases to be merely oppressive and becomes im portan t,^ This passage seems to me one o f the most r ic h ly suggestive passages in Dewey*s w ritin g s. I t i s an example o f the s o r t of th ing I was saying in the In troduction about the way in which Dewey*s account o f experience rev ea ls so much about our experience. He never contents h im self with simply recounting the obvious fa c ts and then try in g to fin d an in te rp re - ta t io n o f them which w ill be more d ia le c t ic a l ly defensib le than th a t o f some o th e r equally t r i t e and hackneyed account. He a c tu a lly dares to 39 say something novel. The notion o f q u a l i t ie s as being "obsessive" seems to me esp ec ia lly r ic h in suggestions as to what fee lin g i s l ik e . "Obsessive" here im plies, I b e liev e , as does "submergence," the re la t iv e in a b i l i ty one has o f escap- ing from the q u a li t ie s one i s fe e lin g . One has a toothache, but one does not know th a t i t i s a toothache and therefo re does not know what to do about i t . One i s submerged in i t . Only when signs and th e i r meanings come in to ex istence i s i t possib le to escape th is submergence in the obsessive, "durably rapturous" world o f bare q u a l i t ie s . Then one can compare p resen t experience to o th e rs , remember what one d id then, and get o u t, "Survey" becomes possib le and, through i t , escape from pain . An experience I once had, which I have a lready re fe rre d to , i l l u s - t r a te s th is notion o f the "submergence" and re la t iv e im p o ssib ility o f escape th a t ch arac te rizes fe e lin g . While I was a sleep e a r ly one morning, the a i r in my bedroom had become permeated with a th ic k , smoky, sulphuric content given o f f , presumably, by some old so f t coal th a t the ja n i to r had decided to use, I s le p t in the midst o f th is g h astly , dangerous p o llu - tio n fo r I do not know how long before I woke gasping and coughing, I suddenly re a liz e d I had been breathing and ta s t in g th is "gook" fo r some tim e, bu t w ithout, o f course, even th ink ing of the p o s s ib i l i ty o f escap- ing from i t . The moment I woke up, o f course, I threw the window open and breathed the wonderfully fresh Chicago a i r from o u ts id e . ( I never thought I would find Chicago a i r re fresh in g ly c lea n .) Now as I lay there in the midst o f th a t s tu f f , I believe I was perceiving purely in the mode o f what Dewey c a l l s fe e lin g . I was su ffe rin g , and I was perhaps coughing, 40 but I had no idea th a t I was su ffe rin g o r coughing o r what I was s u ffe r- ing . I was dumbly and obsessively immersed in a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s , and, since I was not conscious, which only e x is ts when meanings a re given to q u a l i t ie s , I was not capable o f in te rp re tin g those q u a li t ie s o r o f doing anything to escape from them. When I woke, when mind and capacity fo r naming and grasping meanings returned to my experience, my f i r s t e f fo r t was to charac te rize these q u a l i t ie s I was experiencing. To the dumb, an im al-like absorption in them which characterized my e a r l i e r experience ( fe e lin g ) , they were n e ith e r sm elled, breathed, seen, f e l t , heard, due to in te rn a l o r ex te rn a l causes; they ju s t were. But consciousness imme- d ia te ly c la s s if ie d : "I'm breath ing i t ; i t ' s in the a i r , " and then en te r- ta ined possib le courses o f action to escape th is oppression: (a) run out o f the apartment immediately; (b) throw open the window; (c) t r y another room, perhaps i t ' s only in th is one; and so on. When q u a li t ie s begin to be in te rp re te d , when signs and meanings come in to ex istence , the world begins to become organized in to o b jec ts . Whereas before i t was a swimming mass o f "blooming, buzzing" q u a l i t ie s , without ch arac te r o r s ig n ifican ce , now some o f those q u a li t ie s become separated o f f and form ob jec ts . In the case o f Helen K e lle r 's experience, a s e t of q u a l i t ie s became, through the acq u is itio n o f a meaning, a bucket o f w ater, a b e l l , my teacher, the porch, and so on. And they were thus formed in to ob jects in th a t they came to s ig n ify what could be done with them and what one could expect from them. An ob ject i s p rec ise ly th a t: the s ig n if ic a tio n o f a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s with regard to fu tu re e v e n tu a litie s . But, a f t e r a time, some o f these fu tu re e v e n tu a litie s th a t a s e t o f k l q u a l i t ie s lik e those o f w ater had previously s ig n if ie d come to be imme- d ia te ly apprehended as p a r t o f those q u a l i t ie s . This, too , o f course must have happened to Miss K e lle r . She came to experience the ta s te , the th irst-quench ing q u a lity , e tc , o f the w ater, no longer as ind ica ted o r re fe rred to by the given q u a l i t ie s , but as a c tu a lly contained in them. Such perception , as we have seen, Dewey c a l l s perception o f the sense o f a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s . The sense o f a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s i s inheren t in i t and is grasped immediately. But th is occurs, I take Dewey to m aintain,"' only in contexts o f inqu iry . In such a con tex t, the th in g , which i s a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s w ith a sense, i t s e l f s ig n if ie s some new, a n tic ip a te d e v en tu a lity , l ik e , in the case o f w ater perceived in the mode o f sense, giv ing some o f th is to a person one knows i s very th i r s ty . The q u a l i t ie s , plus t h e i r imme- d ia te ly contained sense, s ig n ify an ac tio n n o t i t s e l f p a r t o f the essence o f w ater. So what was before awareness ju s t o f presented m ate ria l i t s e l f has now matured, through experience and consequent "funded" meanings, in to awareness o f ob jects themselves as s ig n ify in g possib le e v e n tu a litie s . Now Dewey*s view o f fee lin g i s s im ila r to th a t which some philosophers have o f what they c a l l immediate knowledge o r knowledge by acquaintance. These philosophers, however, claim th a t th i s most elementary kind o f awareness i s a cognitive kind o f awareness, th a t in i t we a re knowing the world. R ussell i s an example o f a philosopher who holds th i s view. Consider the following passage from h is Problems o f Philosophy» We s h a l l say we have acquaintance with anything o f which we a re d ire c t ly aware, w ithout the interm ediary o f any process o f in ference o r any knowledge o f t ru th s . Thus in the presence of hz my ta b le I am acquainted with the sense-data th a t make up the appearance o f my ta b le -i t s co lour, shape, hardness, smoothness, e t c . ; a l l these a re th ings o f which I am immediately conscious when I am seeing and touching my ta b le . The p a r t ic u la r shade o f co lour th a t I am seeing may have many th ings sa id about i t -I may say th a t i t i s brown, th a t i t i s r a th e r dark, and so on. But such sta tem en ts, though they make me know tru th s about the co lour, do n o t make me know the co lour i t s e l f any b e t te r than I d id beforei so f a r as concerns knowledge o f the co lour i t s e l f , as opposed to knowledge o f tru th s about i t , I know the colour p e rfe c tly and com- p le te ly when I see l t .° and no fu r th e r knowledge o f i t i t s e l f i s even th e o re tic a lly po ssib le . Thus the sense-data which make up the appearance o f my ta b le a re th ings with which I have acquain t- ance, th ings immediately known to me ju s t a s they a r e .7 So, fo r R u sse ll, the q u a l i t ie s which we a re immediately aware o f in our experience a re known. Dewey d isagrees w ith th i s . He adm its, as we have seen, th a t th e re i s a stage in our experience in which c e r ta in b ru te , dumb q u a l i t ie s a re p resen t. But he denies th a t we know, o r a re even con- scious o f , these q u a l i t ie s . For him, we simply have them; they are p resen t. There a re sev era l reasons why Dewey takes th is view, and I would lik e now to in d ic a te what they a re . F i r s t , th e re i s the testim ony o f a c a re fu l look a t the fa c ts them- se lv e s , the s o r t o f method some philosophers c a l l "phenomenology," and Q which Dewey c a l l s the "em pirical, deno tative method." Dewey th inks th a t philosophers l ik e R usse ll, who th ink o f our i n i t i a l o r most elem entary perception o f r e a l i ty as being a kind o f knowledge, a re simply not look- ing a t experience, but a re ra th e r m anipulating a b s tra c t concepts. I f one looks a t the f a c ts , Dewey says, he w il l fin d th a t we have constan tly a k ind o f perception which i s to ta l ly non-cognitive. Every time we respond to a stim ulus, which we do in much o f our l iv in g , we a re perceiving in th i s non-cognitive way these elem entary s e n se -q u a litie s which R ussell th in k s o f a s being known by us. As I w rite on th is paper, f o r example, 43 I am responding to f e l t , white sen se -q u a litie s which a c t a s s tim u li to ray w ritin g ; hut I am no t aware o f them a s q u a li t ie s in a knowing sense. I simply have them. I simply respond to them qua s tim u li. But i f I r e f le c t on what has been happening a s I w rite th i s , then I do become aware o f the stim ulus, but no longer qua stim ulus, f o r I am no longer responding. Now the stim ulus i s bracketed; we should perhaps put the word in quotes. For i t i s now lik e mentioning a word as opposed to using i t . Philosophers lik e R u sse ll, who claim th a t cognition i s involved even in th is most elem entary kind o f perception , a re g u il ty o f importing th e i r a t t i tu d e , as engaged in re f le c t iv e a n a ly s is , back in to the o r ig in a l exper- ience. In re f le c tin g on the stim ulus and our response to i t , we of course know i t . But t h i s was n o t the way in which i t was o r ig in a lly perceived. What Dewey i s suggesting with regard to the proper way to discover, what our experience i s l ik e a t th is le v e l o f most elementary perception can perhaps be c la r i f ie d by considering an account which i s s im ila r in some re sp ec ts , v iz . , th a t o f S a rtre in Transcendence o f the Ego. In th is essay S a rtre i s concerned w ith the question o f what s ta tu s the ego o r I has in our experience, and he claims th a t i t i s n o t presen t a t a l l in c e r ta in kinds o f experience which we have, v iz . , what he c a l l s "unre- f le c te d consciousness" o f the world, "When I run a f t e r a s t r e e tc a r , when I look a t the tim e, when I am absorbed in contem plating a p o r t r a i t , th e re i s no I . There i s consciousness o f th e s tree tca r-h av in g -to -b e-o v ertak en . e t c . , " bu t no consciousness o f the ego o r I to which th is s t r e e tc a r might be presumed to be appearing. I t is the a c t o f re f le c tio n upon th a t o rig - in a l , n o n -re flec tiv e experience of th e s t r e e tc a r which g ives r i s e to the 44 I o r ego, S a rtre says. But there i s a lso a mode o f access to the o rig in a l experience as i t was liv e d . This, S a rtre says, i s possib le because o f a "n o n -re flec tiv e memory" which i s l e f t o f i t in our consciousness. This kind of "n o n -re flec tiv e apprehension" shows us what experience was ac tu q a l ly l ik e , whereas " re f le c tio n m odifies the spontaneous consciousness,"7 S im ila rly , Dewey i s arguing th a t the kind o f r e f le c t iv e an a ly s is upon our experience which philosophers lik e R ussell engage in p ro jec ts in to the o rig in a l experience an element th a t was no t th e re a t a l l , v iz . , cogn ition . To recover experience as i t was o r ig in a lly liv e d , th e re fo re , i t i s no t enough ju s t to look a t i t{ one must look a t i t in the r ig h t way. In the case o f the paper on which I am w ritin g , th is involves no t looking a t how the paper appears to me now as I am engaged in re f le c tin g on i t in r e la - tio n to a problem in to the so lu tio n o f which i t en ters as a datum, but ra th e r to look a t th is "n o n -re flec tiv e memory" o f the o r ig in a l perception which p e r s is ts a f t e r the experience i t s e l f has ended. A second reason why Dewey denies th a t fe e lin g i s cognitive i s th a t i t i s (and th is i s tru e even fo r R ussell) the presence o f q u a li t ie s s tand- ing alone and in re la tio n to nothing e lse ; not even in re la tio n to them- se lv e s , But cognition i s always a re la tio n a l kind o f consciousness. One cannot s tand in a know ledge-relatlon to q u a l i t ie s which a re not themselves re la te d to o ther q u a l i t ie s o r to e v e n tu a litie s which they suggest. I f nothing e ls e , knowledge involves re la t in g th is o r these blue q u a lia to the word "b lue." But n o t even th a t is involved in th is most elementary kind of perception . Q u a litie s simply a re , to ta l ly w ithout re la tio n s . To be, a s R ussell says he i s in the passage quoted above, "immediately conscious" o f the co lo r, shape, e tc , o f the ta b le , w ithout re la tin g them even to the word "co lo r," "shape," e tc , i s not to know, but simply to have.*® F in a lly , Dewey argues th a t the view th a t even the most p rim itive kind o f perception i s cognition o r knowledge leads to idealism ,** I f we assume, with R ussell and so many o ther philosophers, th a t the most prim itive kind of presented m ateria l i s in any sense cognized, we a re caught in the Cartesian tra p o f an encapsulated s e l f which cannot ever find a ground fo r b e liev ing in the existence o f o ther th ings than i t s e l f . D escartes, i t w ill be remembered, held th a t a l l p resen ta tions o f q u a li- t ie s a re cognitions, ob jects o f thought. And, having assumed th i s , he had upon h is hands, and bequeathed to those o f subsequent th in k e rs , the monumental task o f ju s tify in g our common-sense b e l ie f th a t we a re aware o f a world th a t l i e s outside o f, and i s independent o f, our own minds. Dewey th inks th a t one can never succeed in showing the p o s s ib il i ty o f a cognition o f the ex te rn a l world (the problem o f what i s to him an unnecessary d isc ip lin e ca lled "epistemology"-unnecessary because, as we s h a ll see, i t i s founded on a fa lse assumption) i f he s t a r t s with the assumption th a t a l l presented m ate ria l, a l l q u a li t ie s which in any sense "appear" to us, a re cognized o r known. In an in te re s tin g analogy which he uses in a very d i f f i c u l t essay ca lled "Naive vs. P resen tative 12Realism," in Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey says th a t the p h ilo s- opher who argues fo r realism ( th a t we are aware o f an independently e x is t - ing w orld), but who begins with the assumption th a t each o f our percep- tio n s o r sensations i s "an in t r in s ic case o f knowledge o r o f presen ta- tion to a mind o r knower . . . l e t s the nose of the id e a l i s t camel in to i*6 the te n t . He has then no g re a t cause fo r su rp rise when the camel comes 13in and devours the te n t ." What Dewey means, I b e liev e , i s th i s . I f we assume th a t , fo r example, the ra ilro a d track s as convergent and the ra ilro a d track s as p a ra l le l (o r the pencil a s one and the pencil as doubled) a re ob jects o f thought occur- rin g in s id e a mind o r, in some sense, to a knower, then the problem of deciding which cognition o r opinion i s co rre c t i s incapable o f so lu tio n . For we have nothing to turn to to t e s t one o r another o f them save another cognition . But how do we know th a t th is l a t e s t cognition o r opinion has anything to do w ith re a l i ty ? But a l l o f th i s i s unnecessary, Dewey says, because our most prim i- tiv e kind o f presented m ateria l i s not cognitive a t a l l . I t i s a re a l event in. na tu re . The co lo r- , sound-, shape-, e tc , q u a l i t ie s which con- s t i tu t e my experience a t i t s most p rim itive le v e l ( v iz . , fee lin g ) are outside mind and cognition to s t a r t w ith . They a re not opinions about or p u ta tiv e cognitions "of" n a tu re , which we then have to prove "corre- spond to" n a tu re . They a re p a rt of na tu re . There i s , then , a kind o f overlapping o f the world o f nature and the world o f perception in the event c a lled fe e lin g -i . e . , the bare pres- en ta tion o f un in te rp re ted q u a l i t ie s . In the essay, "The Experimental i h Theory o f Knowledge" in The Influence o f Darwin on Philosophy. Dewey puts i t th is wayt To be a sm ell (o r anything e lse ) i s one th in g , to be known as sm ell, another; to be a "feeling" one th in g , to be known as a " fe e lin g ," another. The f i r s t i s thinghoodj ex istence in d u b itab le , d ir e c t , . , • The second i s re f le c te d being, th ings in d ic a tin g and c a ll in g fo r o th e r th in g s-something o ffering the p o s s ib i l i ty o f tru th and hence o f f a l s i ty . if? And in the rep ly to R u sse ll 's c r itic ism s in the Schilpp volume, Dewey answers R u sse ll 's remarks about Dewey's view o f th ings an s ich o r in themselves as follow s: Things in our d ir e c t ly had experience (fee lin g ) a re events, a re th in g s-in th ea se lv e s . And these th in g s , f a r from being unknowable, are the m ate ria l which, when a s i tu a tio n becomes problem atic, "produce p rec ise ly th a t which i s to be known by being inquired in to ," Now to ta lk about what we d ir e c t ly experience o r fe e l a s being th ings in themselves may seem to commit Dewey to a kind o f idealism with fe e lin g experiences as those to which idea-experiences must conform-both o f these types o f experience nevertheless being experience and th e re fo re " id e a l," But such a c r itic ism would f a i l to take aocount o f Dewey's view th a t a t the le v e l o f fe e lin g , event and experience a re one. F e lt q u a l i t ie s , a s I haw been try in g to argue above, a re no t occurrences "in a mind," bu t a re re a l events in na tu re . This overlapping o f experience and nature in fee lin g helps to explain Dewey's contention in the "In troduction" to Experience and Nature th a t experience i s both "in" nature and "of" n a tu re . ^ And i t i s , in Dewey's view, the only way th a t we can avoid the impossible ta sk o f epistemology -to show th a t the mind can have knowledge o f , o r access to , r e a l i ty . For we do n o t begin, in in q u iry , with "ideas" in our mindsi we begin w ith events which a re re a l presented m a te ria l. 17The epistem ological problem a ro se , Dewey b e liev es , because i t was assumed th a t what i s " 'g iv e n ' in a prim ary, o r ig in a l way" i s mental in n a tu re . Consequently, the fa c ts about genuine primary experience, in which n a tu ra l [non-m ental] th ings a re the determining fa c to rs o f a l l change, were regarded e i th e r a s 4 8 not-given dubious th ings th a t could be leached only by endowing the only c e r ta in th in g , the m ental, with some miraculous power, o r e lse were denied a l l ex istence save a s complexes o f mental s ta te s , o f im pressions, sen sa tio n s , fe e lin g s . Not to recognize, then , th is con tinu ity o f experience in general and perception in p a r t ic u la r w ith n a tu ra l events, no t to see th a t in fee lin g perception and event overlap and experience i s both in and o f n a tu re , has led to the dualism according to which the "universe i s s p l i t in to two 18separa te and disconnected realms o f ex is ten ce ." To assume th a t these two realm s, "one psych ical and the o ther p h ysica l, . . . in s p i te o f th e i r to t a l d is ju n c tio n s p e c if ic a lly and m inutely correspond to each 19o th er . . . p resen ts the acme o f in c re d ib i l i ty ." Such a dualism p o s tu la te s a m iracle to account f o r knowledge, v iz . , the "m iracle o f a mind th a t g e ts outside i t s e l f to lay i t s ghostly hands 20upon the th ings o f an ex te rn a l w orld." There i s a k ind o f "Deus ex Machina, whose mechanism i s preserved a sec re t" which i s assumed by the "transcendental ep istem ologist" to account fo r the way in which "mental 21s ta te s g e t o b jec tive re fe ren ce ," Both id e a l is ts and p resen ta tiv e r e a l i s t s s t a r t w ith the assumption th a t a l l appearances, a l l p resen ta tions a re p resen ta tio n s to a conscious- ness o r a knower. They assume, th a t i s , th a t we begin with appearances which may o r may not have anything to do with the world as i t i s in i t s e l f . The id e a l i s t concludes th a t we can have no knowledge o f the world in i t - s e l f , th a t indeed we cannot possib ly have any evidence o f the ex istence o f such a world, since a l l our evidence i s n ece ssa rily o f ideas in our own minds. The p resen ta tiv e r e a l i s t concludes th a t through the ideas in our minds we can somehow, m iraculously, o f course, in Dewey's view, come i t .9 to have knowledge o f the world in i t s e l f , Dewey c a l l s h is own view a kind o f naive rea lism , since fo r him, a s we have seen, what i s d ire c t ly p re- sented i s i t s e l f r e a l , n o t id e a l a t a l l , although i t i s necessary to make 22c e r ta in d is tin c tio n s among these re a l th in g s . For Dewey, the episteraological question-i . e . , the question whether presented q u a l i t ie s have th is a p p l ic a b i l i ty o r correspondence to the re a l world-a r is e s only because o f the fa ls e assumption th a t a l l appearances o r p resen ta tio n s a re cognized. I f we recognize th a t th e re a re fe e lin g s , and th a t these a re not cognitions but r e a l occurrences o r events, then the epistem ological problem never a r i s e s . We are in the world to begin w ith. The re a liz a tio n th a t appearances o r p resen ta tio n s a re re a l occur- rences a lso so lves the problem o f the r e l a t iv i ty of sense-perception-i . e . , the problem o f how one o b jec t can appear in many d if f e r e n t ways to many d if fe re n t observers, and to d if fe re n t po in ts o f view of any one observer. For since these p resen ta tio n s a re p e rfe c tly n a tu ra l and r e a l events occur- ring in n a tu ra l th ings c a lle d organisms, they admit o f the same explana- tio n a s the r e la t iv i ty o f appearances upon the film in a camera, fo r example. Nobody i s su rp rised a t the d iffe ren ces in the appearances o f an o b jec t from the d if f e r e n t po in ts o f view o f the same camera, because th is i s ju s t the way a n a tu ra l o b jec t e f fe c ts changes in ano ther o b jec t under varying cond itions. But the convergence o f the p resen ta tions o r appearances o f the th ing in us "follow s from the physical p ro p ertie s o f 23l ig h t and a le n s ," ju s t a s i t does in the case o f a camera. And i t i s su b jec t to the same p e rfe c tly n a tu r a l i s t ic exp lanation . We seem to see convergent ra ilro a d track s and the camera re g is te r s 50 converging tracks on i t s film . And the physical exp lanation , in terms o f the behavior o f l ig h t ray s , app lies in the case o f the eye ju s t as i t does in th a t o f the camera. The problem o f r e la t iv i ty a r is e s only i f we assume th a t the various appearances o f the ra ilro a d tra c k s , e t c . , a re not r e a l events, but appearances to a mind o r a knower. I f we assume in s te ad , as the em p irica lly observed fa c ts suggest to us anyway, th a t the presen- ta tio n s a re a l l r e a l events in n a tu re , re su ltin g from the in te ra c tio n o f an organism and i t s environment, then a l l the p resen ta tions a re re a l and the only question i s which appearance i s most f r u i t f u l fo r our purposes. I s i t more f r u i t f u l , fo r example, to regard, the track s as p a ra l le l o r as convergent? And i f one's in te r e s t i s in tra v e lin g along them in a t r a in , f o r example, the assumption o f th e i r being p a ra l le l i s the b e t te r one. But th is does not imply th a t the p resen ta tion o f the track s a s convergent i s "mental"? i t simply im plies th a t the assumption o f them a s convergent, on the b a s is o f the p e rfe c tly re a l and n a tu ra l event o f convergent-track- p re sen ta tio n , i s no t the more usefu l assumption. The an a ly s is given here o f Dewey's view o f what he c a l l s fee lin g i s based on h is work up to and including Experience and Nature, which was published in 1925. From Essays in Experimental Logic to Experience and Nature he seems to have taken the view I have presented above. But in an a r t i c l e published in 1930» ca lled "Q ualita tive 'Thought" (rep rin ted in Experience. Nature, and Freedom, ed ited by B ernstein , L ibera l Arts P ress) , and in Logic? The Theory o f Inqu iry , published in 1935» Dewey's view has changed s ig n if ic a n tly . In Experience and Nature and e a r l ie r works, a s we have seen, Dewey 51 held th a t fe e lin g i s the alm ost to ta l ly non-cognitive presence o f unin- te rp re te d , meaningless q u a l i t ie s . Any in te rp re ta tio n such q u a li t ie s may l a t e r receive i s a l a t e r a d d itio n , occurring a f t e r they cease to be merely f e l t . They a re dumb, c h a ra c te rle s s , unlocated, and submerged. But in Logic and in "Q ualita tive Thought," Dewey uses the term "fee ling" to r e f e r to a mode o f awareness in which one g rasps, o r a t le a s t has a hunch, as to the meaning of a s i tu a tio n . I f a person su ffe rs an in s u l t and becomes angry, there i s a q u a lity o f, l e t us say, obnoxiousness th a t pervades every movement o f the person who has in su lte d him, and every person, th ing , and occurrence in the s itu a tio n i s pervaded with a c e r ta in "tone, co lo r, and q u a lity " which th i s in s u lt has produced. Or, l e t us suppose, to take ano ther example of th i s pervasive q u a lity which colors a s itu a tio n and makes i t what i t i s , th a t one comes back to h is apartm ent, fin d s the door thrown open, drawers pulled o u t, c lo thes and books ly ing around in to ta l d isa rra y , and c e r ta in th ings m issing. He then comes to perceive the s i t u - a tio n as pervaded by a q u a lity o f having-been-robbed. This q u a lity co lors the to t a l world o f th ings experienced. Everything is seen in the l ig h t o f th is pervasive q u a li ty . O bjects out o f p lace , e t c . , a re a l l viewed from the po in t o f view o f th is pervasive hunch-having-been-robbed. Now such a pervasive q u a li ty , Dewey says in "Q ualita tive Thought," i s f e l t . This kind of awareness i s l ik e th a t re fe rre d to by the word in tu i t io n , a s th a t word i s sometimes used in popular usage. For i t re fe rs to a s in g le q u a lita tiv e n ess underlying a l l the d e ta i ls o f e x p l ic i t reasoning. I t may be re la t iv e ly dumb and In a r t ic u la te and y e t penetra ting j unexpressed in d e f in ite ideas which form reasons 52 and ju s t i f ic a t io n s and y e t profoundly r ig h t , , . , R eflection and ra tio n a l e laboration sp ring from and make e x p l ic i t a p r io r in tu it io n [o r fe e lin g ] , , , , Thinking and th eo riz in g about physical m atters s e t out from an in tu i t io n , and re f le c tio n about a f f a i r s o f l i f e and mind co n sis t in an id e a tio n a l and conceptual transform ation o f what begins as an in tu it io n . In tu i t io n , in sh o r t, s ig n if ie s the r e a l i - zation o f a pervasive q u a li ty such th a t i t reg u la tes the determina- tio n o f re lev an t d is t in c tio n s o r o f whatever, whether in the way of terms or re la tio n s , becomes the accepted o b jec t o f th o u g h t,^ These fee lin g s o r hunches o r in tu itio n o f pervasive q u a l i t ie s , Dewey says, "have a cognitive im port," Even such a seemingly innocuous remark as " 'G oodl' may mark a deep apprehension o f the q u a lity o f a piece o f ac tin g on the s tag e , o f a deed performed, or o f a p ic tu re in i t s wealth o f c o n te n t ." ^ So i t i s on the basis o f a previously f e l t s itu a tio n th a t one i s ab le to make the sp ec if ic and e x p lic i t a c ts of perception which, Dewey th in k s , a re the only kinds o f perception which philosophers have gener- a l ly recognized. Most philosophers, th a t i s , th in k of perception as being b a s ic a lly awareness o f s p e c if ic , iso la ted o b jec ts , Dewey, on the co n tra ry , th inks th e re must f i r s t be the to ta l q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a tio n , which i s no t perceived o r thought, but f e l t o r " in tu ite d ," on the basis o f which these sp e c if ic , e x p l ic i t perceptions can be made. But i f f e e l- ing can grasp a q u a lity lik e having-been-robbed o r of a p e rfec t a c tin g ren d itio n o f the p a r t o f, l e t us say, some crabbed old man, fee lin g is now being seen as capable o f grasping the meaning o f a s ta te o f a f f a i r s , an accomplishment e x p lic i t ly denied to i t in the e a r l i e r works re fe rre d to above. The view th a t re f le c tio n (and th e re fo re , o f course, perception as awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n , th i s a r is in g only a f t e r re f le c tio n ) occurs 53 always ag a in s t a background o f th ings and ob jec ts o f the p ra c tic a l , common-sense world-th is view can be found even in the e a r l ie r works. The context o f the perception o f the apartment as having been broken in to and robbed, fo r example, i s not a s e t o f b ru te , un in te rp re ted qual- i t i e s , but a whole s e t o f common-sense ob jects standing in a re la tio n to each o th e r. Thought and perception cannot occur simply on the b asis of f e l t q u a l i t ie s which a re to ta l ly devoid o f meaning. I t i s necessary th a t there be a lready some kind o f meaning in the s itu a tio n on the b a s is of which to understand the s itu a tio n as being one o f having been robbed, or as fin e a c tin g , o r a s whatever. The "stream of existence" o r o f b ru te , c h a rac te r-le ss q u a li t ie s " is no sooner regarded than i t s to ta l incapacity 27to o f f ic ia te as m ateria l condition and cue o f thought appears." So, in these e a r l i e r works as w ell Dewey th inks o f inqu iry as occur- ring in a context o f a lready meaningful ob jects and s i tu a tio n s , funded products o f much previous inqu iry . But in these works Dewey tended to th ink o f the awareness o f the background involved in inqu iry as a per- ception o f the sense o f a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s . He even uses an example in Experience and Nature which c lo se ly resembles h is examples in the essay, "Q ualita tive Thought": When we a re b a ffled by perplexing conditions, and f in a l ly h i t upon a clew, and everything fla ils in to p lace , the whole th ing suddenly, as we say, "makes sense ." . . . The meaning o f the whole s itu a tio n a s apprehended is sense. Hie idiom atic usage o f the word sense [whereby a whole s itu a tio n makes sense, becomes organized by a cer- ta in s ig n ifican ce ] i s much n earer the em pirical fa c ts than i s the ordinary r e s tr ic t io n o f the word in psychological l i te r a tu r e to a sin g le recognized q u a lity , lik e sweet o r re d .28 But i t i s understandable th a t Dewey should l a t e r have come to regard awareness o f sense as a kind of fe e lin g . For they do both share the c h a ra c te r is t ic s o f being immediate and o f forming the background fo r the mediated perception th a t occurs in e x p lic i t inqu iry . In a t le a s t one passage in Experience and Nature he seems to th ink of them as being in te r - changeable. "The la rg e r system o f meaning su ffu ses , in te rp e n e tra te s , co lo rs what i s now and here uppermostj i t g ives them sense, fe e lin g , a s 29d is t in c t from s ig n if ic a t io n ," 7 N evertheless, i t seems to me i t would have made h is view much c le a re r i f he had always kept these two notions d is t in c t . I believe the l a t e r works, exem plified by the essay , "Q ualita tive Thought," do po in t to a d iffe ren ce in emphasis anyway in Dewey's view o f perception . In these l a t e r works, th a t i s , Dewey emphasizes th a t per- ception as a cogn itive , r e f le c t iv e occurrence always takes place ag a in s t a background in which a le s s e x p l ic i t ly r e f le c t iv e kind o f thought has been going on. I could no t have perceived as a r e s u l t o f inqu iry th a t the sounds I had grasped the sense o f as being sounds, coming from out- s id e . being obnoxious, e t c .-I could n o t have perceived them as being produced by a saw cu ttin g down a tre e i f th e re had not a lready been a to t a l q u a li ta t iv e s itu a tio n with a pervasive sense. Dewey a lso uses, in the l a t e r works re fe rre d to , the term " te r t ia r y q u a lity " fo r what he sometimes c a l l s sense. But c le a r ly the awareness o f such a pervasive q u a lity as having-been-robbed o r superb-actingperformance . although i t does have immediacy and p re re f le c tiv e s ta tu s in some in s tan ces , i s an awareness o f a meaning ra th e r than o f the b ru te ly given ex istence which a co lo r o r a shape has. And i t cannot, th e re fo re , be sa id , i t seems to me, to be f e l t , a t le a s t in the e a r l i e r sense in I 55 which Dewey used th a t term. What seems to me responsib le fo r th i s change in use o f terminology from sense to fee lin g i s a fa i lu re on Dewey's p a r t to d is tin g u ish two kinds o f perception we have, both o f which may be sa id to be awarenesses o f pervasive q u a l i t ie s . The f i r s t o f these he d iscusses in Logic> The 30Theory o f In q u iry . Here he says th e re i s a d iffe ren ce between sp e c if ic q u a l i t ie s l ik e red , hard , and sweet, and a q u a lity which, following San- tayana, he c a l l s a t e r t i a r y q u a li ty . Some examples he g ives o f te r t i a r y q u a l i t ie s a re d is tre s s in g , perp lexing , ch ee rfu l, d isco n so la te . Let us take the q u a lity o f ch ee rfu l. Imagine the way in which one perceives the b r ig h t cheerfu lness o f a p e rfe c tly c le a r day as an example o f th is kind o f a ll-p e rv a s iv e q u a lity . Every th ing and event does indeed seem to be a ffe c te d by th is q u a lity o f b rig h t cheerfu lness, ju s t a s on d u l l , gloomy days everything seems a ffe c te d by the q u a lity o f d u ll gloominess. Now th i s b r ig h t cheerfu lness i s n o t a q u a li ty th a t i s contained in any one moment o f the day o r any one o f the th ings th a t one encounters. I t I s a q u a li ty which comes to "permeate and co lo r a l l the ob jec ts and events th a t a re involved" in the experience. The people one meets and even physica l ob jec ts become in fec ted with the q u a lity , "A t e r t i a r y q u a li ty q u a l i f ie s a l l the co n stitu en ts to which i t a p p lie s in a thorough- going fash ion . Now, I t seems to me th a t th is kind o f a q u a lity i s indeed f e l t . For i t a r is e s spontaneously and p re re f le c tiv e ly . We do n o t in f e r th is b r ig h t cheerfu lness a s belonging to a day. I t ju s t happens. Of course, to use the term "cheerfu l" i s to make an in fe ren ce , to in te rp re t the s i tu a t io n . But p r io r to re f le c t io n , one i s ju s t confronted w ith a b r i l - l i a n t , sunny, cheerfu l day. But such a q u a lity has to be d is tingu ished from another s o r t o f pervasive q u a lity which Dewey, in these l a t e r w rit- in g s , seems to regard as occurring in the same way. Ihus, in both Logic and "Q u alita tiv e Thought" he says th a t sometimes we apprehend the s ig - n ifican ce o r ch arac te r o f a s i tu a tio n in a kind o f " in tu i t iv e ," "hunch"lik e fbshion, and such an apprehension i s a lso a case o f fe e lin g a per- vasive q u a lity . One might, fo r example, come to apprehend, a f t e r a few moments with a person, th a t he i s a very b i t t e r , s p i te fu l person. And th is q u a lity would be f e l t a s permeating the whole o f o n e 's experience o f th a t person. But c le a r ly , to experience a person a s being b i t t e r o r s p i te fu l , l ik e experiencing o n e 's apartm ent as having been robbed, i s an in fe re n t ia l kind of experience. I t i s g e ttin g the sense o f a s itu a tio n and thereby l i f t i n g i t out o f the immediacy o f the p resen t with a view to what has been and can be expected w ith re sp ec t to i t . Granted, there may be such in te rp re ta tio n and inqu iry th a t i s no t e x p l ic i t ly so . Never- th e le s s , one i s here grasping the meaning o f a s i tu a t io n , no t ju s t f e e l- ing i t as one fe e ls a d ay 's cheerfu lness. As I ind ica ted above, fe e lin g can be the mere having o f q u a li t ie s 32as a kind o f "surplusage" which i s n e ith e r in te rp re te d nor reacted to , and i t can a lso be the having o f q u a l i t ie s (w ithout any e x p l ic i t a tten d an t in te rp re ta tio n ) toge ther w ith a h a b itu a l, u n re flec ted response to these q u a l i t ie s . I f a backwoodsman i s on h is way back to town to s e l l the fu rs he has trapped during the week, he w il l have various kinds o f perception along the way. He w ill probably fe e l c e r ta in q u a l i t ie s which he w il l 57 n e ith e r re a c t to nor in te r p r e t . His gaze w ill doubtless wander, fo r example, over many t r e e s , e t c . , along the way, th ings which a re on the frin g e o f h is percep tual f ie ld and which he w il l not even respond to , much le s s in te rp re t . But he w ill respond to some c lu s te rs o f q u a l i t ie s . When, fo r example, he comes to a p o in t where the path he has been on ends and he must make h is way through v irg in fo re s t in order to g e t to the nex t path , he w ill respond to c e r ta in c lu s te r s o f t re e -q u a l i t ie s and o th e r q u a li t ie s which he has learned (having taken th is route count- le s s times before) as in d ic a tio n s a s to how to proceed. But he w ill not have to stop and r e f le c t about these q u a l i t ie s . He has been through a l l th a t severa l times in the p a s t and h is reac tio n s a re now autom atic. He probably does no t even th ink about i t a t a l l , anymore than we th ink about the c lu tch and the s t i c k s h i f t before going from f i r s t to second gear. Now the fee lin g o f these q u a l i t ie s and the immediate reaction to them Dewey does sometimes c a l l perception . Indeed, i t i s h is view th a t th is k ind o f non-cognitive response to q u a l i t ie s i s the most common kind of perception in which we engage in our l iv e s . My perception o f the pen with which I am now w ritin g i s o f th i s s o r t . I t i s n o t the ob ject o f a 33"cognitive regard ," o r the "theme o f an in te l le c tu a l g e s t u r e . I t i s a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s to which, as a r e s u l t o f h a b it , I respond w ithout r e f le c tio n . Dewey d iscusses th i s kind o f perception a t various places in h is 3/ l w ritin g s . In Essays in Experimental Logic he describes i t as a kind of experience in which the o b jec ts o f our awareness axe ob jects no t o f knowledge o r observation , but of 58 esteem o r av ersion , o f decision , o f u se , o f su ffe rin g , o f endeavor and re v o lt . When, in a subsequent re f le c t iv e experience, we look back and find these th ings and q u a l i t ie s (quales would be a b e tte r word o r values, i f the l a t t e r word were no t so open to m isconstruc- tio n ) , we a re only too prone to suppose th a t they were then what they a re now-- . . . known o b je c ts .35 But in Essays in Experimental Logic Dewey says th a t i t i s perhaps an exaggeration to say th a t a l l o f these p rim arily non-inqu iring , noncognitive experiences a re to ta l ly devoid o f in te l le c tu a l components. I t i s more l ik e ly th a t they contain a t le a s t some in te l le c tu a l elem ents. And t h i 3 he e x p lic a te s a s "a c e r ta in tak ing o f some th ings as represen37ta t iv e o f o th e r th in g s .' Otherwise there would not seem to be any d i f - ference between human experience and th a t o f "an o y s te r o r a growing bean v in e ." ^ But elsewhere Dewey seems to deny th a t any in te l le c tu a l o r cog- n i t iv e element i s involved in our ordinary , non-cognitive perception, 3 o Thus, he says in Logici The Theory of Inquiry^7 th a t " e i th e r an imme- d ia te overt response occurs, l ik e using the ty p ew rite r o r picking up the book (in which cases the s itu a tio n i s n o t a cogn itiona l one), o r , . . the o b jec t d ire c t ly noted i s p a rt o f an a c t o f in q u iry ." To say th a t "an immediate o v ert response occurs" seems to me c le a r ly to make o f non-cognitive perception a purely non-cognitive kind o f experience, w ith no elements a t a l l in which some th ings a re taken as rep resen ta tive o f o th e rs . In the essay , "The Logic o f Judgments o f P ra c tic e ," the l a s t essay in Essays in Experimental Logic. Dewey expands on what he ca lled in the "In troduction" experience o f ob jec ts in a non-cognitive way, whereby they a re o b jec ts o f esteem, aversion , enjoyment, and so on. Here he 59 says th a t such experiences a re " d ire c t experiences o f good and bad," a kind o f experience he c a l l s sometimes "p riz in g ," Such experiences of "finding a th ing good a p a rt from re f le c t iv e judgment" involve "simply tre a tin g the th ing in a c e r ta in way, hanging on to i t , dwelling upon i t , welcoming i t and a c tin g to perpetuate i t s presence, taking d e lig h t in i t . I t i s a way o f behaving toward i t . a mode o f organic a c tio n ." together i+Owith the fee lin g s which a lso form p a rt o f the organic reaction to i t . This desc rip tio n would a lso apply to ob jects which a re simply used in an u n re flec tiv e way, lik e the pen I am w riting w ith, although, of course, such an ob jec t i s no t found good o r bad in the way th is pipe I am smoking i s . I t i s nevertheless perceived in th is behavioral way, a s an ob ject not o f cognitive regard o r observation, but o f organic reac tio n . I t seems to me th a t in h is g re a t concern to draw a d is tin c tio n be- tween o b jec ts which e n te r in to contexts o f inqu iry and those which are perceived non-cognitively , Dewey drew the d is t in c tio n much too r ig id ly . For th e re seem to be many experiences in which, although our main in te r e s t i s no t in g e ttin g knowledge o r warranted a s s e r t ib i l i t y , we a re neverthe- le ss engaged in some in te l le c tu a l a c t iv i ty , i . e . , taking some th ings to be rep resen ta tiv e of o thers . And, indeed, th is may even fig u re ra th e r ex tensively in our experience. I f one i s , f o r example, involved in an ordinary conversation with a fr ien d ("the enjoyment o f so c ia l converse among fr ie n d s" ) , he i s using and lis te n in g to language. And language here i s n ecessa rily being used a s rep resen ta tiv e o f o ther th in g s . For one i s n o t, lik e the anim als, merely responding to the sounds being made by h is fr ien d s : ra th e r he i s understanding them. I 60 So, although c e r ta in ly some perception i s indeed o f an alm ost, i f n o t exclusively , non-cognitive s o r t , a mere response to q u a l i t ie s , o th e r perception , even when n o t p a r t o f a prim arily cogn itive , inqu iring s o r t o f experience, i s nevertheless in te l le c tu a l in na tu re . My perception o f the sidewalk I am walking on when I am walking along the s t r e e t i s indeed, a s i t u sually occurs, merely overt response to merely f e l t q u a l i t ie s . But my perception o f the meaning o f the words th a t a frien d u t te r s in d esc rib - ing , say, a scene he w itnessed, i s o f an in te l le c tu a l o r cognitive n a tu re , Dewey was, I b e liev e , led to th is u n d e rin te lle c tu a liz a tio n o f o rd i- nary experience in reac tio n ag a in s t the view o f those philosophers who had made a l l experience a cognitive a c t iv i ty . We have a lready seen above th a t he believed such a view leads in ev itab ly to idealism . This i s so because i t r e s u l ts in the view th a t na tu re i s fundamentally b ifu rca ted between a known experience and an unknowable r e a l i ty in i t s e l f . And, in h is zeal to avoid th i s conclusion, Dewey overlooked the fa c t th a t i n t e l - le c tu a l a c t iv i ty i s r e a l ly very widespread even in our ordinary experience. NOTES 1. Although Dewey does sometimes so r e f e r to i t . See, fo r example, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 256. 2. I t a l i c s mine. 3. John Dewey, The Influence o f Darwin on Philosophy (Bloomington, In d .t Indiana U niversity P ress, 1965 L^1-153* published, 1910], pp. 78-79 and p. 84. 4 . Dewey, Excellence and N ature, p. 167. 5. See below, p. 98 f , 6. I t a l i c s mine. 7 . B ertrand R usse ll, Problems o f Philosophy (Londoni Oxford U niversity P ress, 1912), p. 47. I t a l i c s mine. 8. Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 6. 9 . Jean-Paul S a r tr e , Transcendence o f the Ego (New Yorks Noonday Press, 195?), pp. 47-50. 10. For Dewey's d iscussion o f the re la t io n a l ch a rac te r involved in a l l cogn ition , see e sp ec ia lly "The Experimental Theory o f Knowledge" in The Influence o f Darwin on Philosophy. My view, Dewey there says, c a l l s a tte n tio n to the "d istance between being and knowings and the recognition o f an element of m ediation . . . in a l l knowledge." (p . 80) 11. See e sp e c ia lly Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 255. 12. Ib id . . p. 255. 13. I b id . , p. 255. 14. Dewey, The Influence o f Darwin on Philosophy, p. 81, 15. Paul A rthur Schilpp , e d ., Hie Philosophy o f John Dewey. Vol. Is Hie L ibrary o f Living Philosophers (second e d itio n t La S a lle , I l l s Open Court Publishing Co., 1951)» p. 548. 16. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 4a , 17. Ib id . . p. 16. 6 l - 62 18. Ib id . . p. 267. 19. Ib id . . pp. 26?-68, 20. Dewey, The In fluence o f Darwin on Philosophy. p. 81, footnote 2. 21. Ib id . . p. 105. 22. For th is d is t in c tio n between some o f the r e a l th in g s , v iz . , f e l t q u a l i t ie s , which a re " v e r id ic a l , '1 and those n o t so , see below, p. 71 , For the whole d iscussion o f p resen ta tiv e rea lism , naive rea lism , and idealism , see the essay , "Naive vs, P resen ta tive Realism," in Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 250-263. 23. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p . 250. 24. Richard J . B ernstein , e d . , John Dewey on Experience. Nature and Freedom! R epresentative S e le c tio n s . The L ibrary o f L ibera l A rts , No. 41 (New York« The L ibera l A rts P ress, i 960 [th e essay , Q u a lita tiv e Thought," f i r s t published in 1930]), p. 184. 25. Ib id . . p. 184. 26. In Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 128, fo r example. 27. Ib id . . p. 126. 28. Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 261, 29. Ib id . . p. 306. 30. Dewey, Logic! The Theory o f In q u iry , pp. 6970 . 31. Ib id . . p. 69 . 32. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 39^• 33. Ib id . . p. 4 . 34. Logic: The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 150j Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 3-4: Experience and Nature, p. 310, 35. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 4. 36 . Ib id . . p. 39^» footnote 1. 37. I b id . , p. 4. 38. I b id . , p. 3. 63 39* Dewey, Logict The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 143« 40. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 353-5^» I t a l i c s in l a s t sentence a re mine. 41. Ib id . . p . 2. CHAPTER I I I PERCEPTION AS AWARENESS OF SIGNIFICATION AND AS PRESENCE OF SENSE I have already re fe rre d a number o f times in the previous two chap- te r s both to perception o f s ig n if ic a tio n and to perception o f sense, since i t i s im possible to d iscuss fee lin g w ithout making a t le a s t some reference to the kinds o f perception which i t i s no t. I s h a ll now take up percep- tio n o f sense and o f s ig n if ic a tio n in more d e ta i l and system atica lly . In gen era l, what both o f these types o f perception involve which fee lin g does not possess i s meaning. Feeling is i t s e l f involved in both o f these . I t i s what has a meaning. Sense and s ig n if ic a tio n a re the " q u a lit ie s o f fee lin g [having]] become s ig n if ic a n t o f ob jective d i f f e r - ences in ex te rn a l th ings and o f episodes past and to come."* But fe e l- ing i s u su a lly not even c a lled perception by Dewey because o f the fa c t th a t i t lacks meaning. The sp e c if ic way in which fe e lin g has meaning determ ines whether one i s perceiving s ig n if ic a tio n o r sense. I f the meaning i s possessed immediately and d ire c tly by a q u a lity o r a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s , in re a l ly much the same k ind o f immediate and uninquiring, un in ferred , non-cognitive way in which fee lin g i t s e l f occurs, then i t i s perceived as awareness o f sense. But i f the meaning is a product o f conscious in q u irin g , cognitive in fe ren ce , then i t i s perceived as awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n . 6 4 - 65 Since perception as awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n and as presence o f sense a re d is tingu ished from fee lin g by the presence of meaning, we must now g e t c le a r p rec ise ly what Dewey means by meaning. Dewey th inks o f meaning a s o rig in a tin g in the communication s itu a tio n between human be- ings. What i s p e cu lia r to the human communication s itu a tio n i s th a t i t i s " p a r tic ip a tiv e ." A human being "puts h im self a t the standpoin t o f a 2s itu a tio n in which two p a r tie s sh are ." I f a person A is poin ting out a flow er to a person B with the in ten tio n o f having B bring him the flow er, the c h a ra c te r is t ic th ing about B 's understanding o f A 's movement and sounds i s th a t he responds to the thing from the standpoin t o f A. He perceives the th ing as i t may function in A 's experience, in stead o f ju s t eg o -cen tr ica lly . S im ila rly , A in making the request con- ceives the th in g not only in i t s d ir e c t re la tio n sh ip to h im self, but a s a th ing capable o f being grasped and handled by B. He sees the th ing as i t may function in B 's experience. Such i s the essence and import o f communication, signs and meaning. Something i s l i t e r - a l ly made common in a t le a s t two d if fe re n t cen tres o f behavior. To understand i s to a n tic ip a te to g e th er, i t i s to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, in - c lu siv e undertak ing ,3 Animals, according to Dewey, do no t possess communication, language, o r meaning, because they do no t engage in th i s p a r tic ip a tiv e experience in which two o r more organisms share in an undertaking. For animals a re k"eg o -cen tric ." Ihey engage in what Dewey c a l l s "signaling a c t iv i ty ." This i s a necessary but n o t s u f f ic ie n t condition fo r communication and meaning. What i t involves, Dewey says, quoting Max Meyer, i s a re fle x a c t iv i ty , l ik e th a t o f the peacock in spreading i t s t a i l , " 'th e lig h tin g o f a f i r e f l y , the squeezing out o f a black l iq u id from the ink bladder o f a c u t t l e f i s h , '" ^ These a c t i v i t i e s stim ula te on some occasions, "by some preformed mechanism,"*' a response th a t may be sexually o r protec- tiv e ly u sefu l to the agent o r to the sp ec ie s . But i t i s no t a signal 66 th a t the hen o r the peacock o r the c u t t le f is h performs from the po in t o f view o f the o th er. Indeed, i t o ften performs what functions on occa- sion as s ignaling a c ts even in the absence o f the o th e r anim als. I t i s in th is sense th a t Dewey c a l l s the s ig n a lin g a c ts o f animals "eg o -cen tric ," "The h e a rt o f language," then, fo r Dewey, i s th i s p a rtic ip a tiv e a c t iv - i ty in which there occurs "the establishm ent o f cooperation in an a c t iv i ty in which there a re p a rtn e rs ." Language i s no t the "expression" o f some an tecedently e x is tin g s ta te o f a f f a i r s o r s ta te o f mind to which i t a t - tempts to correspond. I t i s ra th e r th is cooperative a c t iv i ty , through the use o f s igns, o f two o r more persons whereby they work toward some consummatory experience. "A proposes the consummatory possession o f the flow er through the medium or means o f B 's a c tio n ; B proposes to cooperate - o r a c t adversely-in the fu lf il lm e n t o f A 's p roposal." Language, then , involves the s ig naling a c t iv i ty o f A by means o f motions and sounds, and •7 "the movements o f B, which a re signs to A of B 's cooperation o r r e fu s a l ," ' Understanding what ano ther person means i s not a m atter o f "grasping" an antecedent s ta te o f a f f a i r s th a t he proposed to make h is language cor- respond to , bu t the occurrence o f tin a c t iv i ty in which A and B a re work- ing harmoniously to g e th e r, an en te rp rise in which "the a c t iv i ty o f each i s modified and regu lated by p a rtn e rsh ip ." Correspondingly, " to f a i l to understand i s to f a i l to come in to agreement in a c tio n ; to misunderstand g i s to s e t up ac tio n a t cross purposes." Dewey's view o f understanding and misunderstanding here i s s im ila r to th a t o f W ittgenstein in Logical In v e s tig a tio n s . To grasp the meaning o f a sentence i s to do o r to be ab le to do the appropria te th in g . Understanding i s not then an a c t o f 6? a disembodied o r passive in te l l e c t reaching out to an an tecedent, pre- e x is tin g s ta te o f a f f a i r s . This i s the epistem ological o r sp ec ta to r theory ag a in s t which Dewey animadverts so o ften . No, to understand i s to do, o r to be prepared to do, something) i t i s therefo re fu tu re -o rien ted ra th e r than p a s t-d ire c te d . Meaning, we a re now in a p o sitio n to see , i s , a s th a t which i s under- stood, a property belonging to the signs used both by, fo r example, A and B, whereby they expect c e r ta in th ings to happen upon the performance o f c e r ta in a c tio n s . The meaning o f the poin ting gestu re i s the a c t iv i ty th a t A i s c a ll in g fo r , v iz . , tak ing the flower to him, and the s o r t o f expected consummation o f A 's in te n t in performing the a c t iv i ty . But not only do peop le 's movements and sounds come to take on meaning, but so do th ings themselves. HThe th ing pointed to by A to B gains meaning. I t ceases to be ju s t what i t i s a t the moment, and i s responded to in i t s p o te n tia l i ty , a s a means to rem oter consequences,"^ Having served in an a c t iv i ty o f being taken from one place to ano ther, as a means to the r e a l i - zation o f the in te n t th a t A meant, the flow er now comes to take on the meaning o f p o r ta b i l i ty . At f i r s t and "p rim arily ," Dewey says, i t has i t s meaning a s p a rt o f the cooperative a c t iv i ty which A and then B en- visage and achieve, but then , "secondarily ," i t comes to have the mean- ing o f p o r ta b il i ty on i t s own, as something th a t can fig u re in many ac- t i v i t i e s o f tra n sp o rt from one place to another. As a r e s u l t , i t i s l i f t e d out o f i t s b ru te ex isten ce , which i t has a s a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s merely f e l t o r perhaps perceived in a very prim itive way as ju s t a th ing of some s o r t , and i t comes to have a meaning, to be responded to , th a t 68 i s , not ju s t a s a b ru te s e t o f q u a l i t ie s , bu t as something having poten- t i a l i t i e s ; responded to , then , K ith an eye to the fu tu re , to what can be done with i t , ra th e r than th a t dumb absorp tion in the p resen t and the p a r tic u la r which ch arac te rizes fe e lin g . Meanings, Dewey say s , a re " ru le s fo r using and in te rp re tin g th ings; in te rp re ta tio n being always an im putation o f p o te n tia l i ty fo r some con- sequence."*^ The meaning th a t a q u a lity o r a s e t of q u a l i t ie s takes on when they a re perceived in the modes o f s ig n if ic a tio n o r o f sense, then, 11"i s a method o f a c tio n , a way o f using th in g s ." And th is use o f th ings i s o r ig in a lly "as a means to a shared consummation," although, a s we have seen, th ings such as roses can come to take on meanings o f , say, po rta - b i l i t y which do not n ecessa rily have to do with a shared consummation, but presumably to some consummation one envisages fo r o n ese lf. Neverthe- le s s , meaning, in Dewey's view, c le a r ly o rig in a te s in a so c ia l context. I f one perceives something as being p o rtab le , th is meaning which he in fe rs as belonging to i t ( s ig n if ic a t io n ) . o r which i s now inheren t in i t because o f funded habitudes (sen se ), has to do w ith what one can do with i t . To perceive p o r ta b il i ty as a c h a ra c te r is t ic o r meaning o f a te le v is io n s e t i s to expect th a t i t can be e a s ily , o r re la t iv e ly e a s ily , moved about; i t i s to expect th a t c e r ta in ac tio n s one might take would r e s u l t in c e r ta in consequences. Dewey th in k s the t r a d i t io n a l account o f the way in which meanings a r is e i s absurd . This theory ho lds, in a c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly unem plrical, a p r io r i manner, th a t "general ideas o r meanings a r is e by the comparison o f a number o f p a r t ic u la rs , eventuating in the recognition o f something 12common to them a l l . " Dewey ho lds, in a view th a t seems to me much c lo se r to the fA cts, th a t we take the meaning to th e th ings and see i f they f i t i t , r a th e r than to see i t in the f a c ts . We see a fea tu re in a th ing not because i t happens to have i t and i t s having i t impresses i t - s e l f upon u s . Ib is l a t t e r i s the contem plative theory o f knowledge again . We a re sp ec ta to rs reading o f f the c h a ra c te r is t ic s o f r e a l i ty ju s t f o r the sake o f knowing what they a re . Roses a re p o rtab le , and th a t fa c t ju s t comes across to our minds which a re busy Inspecting r e a l i ty and picking out i t s c h a ra c te r is t ic s -fo r i t s own sake. In f a c t , Dewey b e liev es , we have something we have to do, v iz . , in the case under considera tion , to take something over to A, who wants i t . And th is p ro je c t, th i s proposed course o f a c tio n , i s what leads us to n o tice th a t the rose i s p o rtab le . Except a s i t r e la te s to something we have to do, a rose l i e s hidden in n a tu re , born to blush unseen and waste i t s p o r ta b il i ty on the garden a i r . Furthermore, when the meaning, p o r ta b i l i ty , which has been discovered as belonging to a ro se , i s generalized to o th e r th in g s , i t i s no t because we see something common between the rose and something e ls e , say , a d o l- l a r b i l l discovered ly in g on the s t r e e t . Rather i s the meaning "ca rried 13 spontaneously a s f i r a s i t w il l p lausib ly go." We have discovered a new meaning and we apply i t to a l l kinds o f new th in g s . We look fo r por- t a b i l i ty in every th ing , o r many th ings anyway, th a t we come acrosB, o ften to many more than those to which i t leg itim a te ly a p p lie s . "A newly ac - quired meaning i s forced upon everything th a t does no t obviously r e s i s t i t s ap p lic a tio n , as a c h ild uses a new word whenever he g e ts a chance o r as he plays w ith a new toy . Meanings a re self-m oving to new cases." 70 Of couzse( i f we a re no t i r r a t io n a l , we w ill have to d is c ip lin e our a p p li- cation by observation and experim ent. But the observations a re t e s t s fo r an ap p lica tio n o f meaning th a t precedes them and i s spontaneous. We do not f i r s t see the fea tu re and then apply the meaning to the new th in g , which we previously found to belong to the ro se . We apply the meaning f i r s t and then see i f i t r e a l ly belongs. Dewey's a n a ly s is o f meaning ap p lie s a lso to the term " id ea ," which he o ften uses interchangeably w ith the term " m e a n i n g . T h u s he says th a t " ideas a re a n tic ip a te d consequences (fo re c a s ts ) o f what w ill happen when c e r ta in opera tions a re executed under and w ith re sp ec t to observed conditions."*^ But to re tu rn to the su b jec t o f meaning, the meanings which ob jec ts come to have and which c o n s ti tu te them as what they a re (sense) o r what they imply ( s ig n if ic a t io n ) , a re o b je c tiv e . They a re no t p ro p e rtie s o f 17"ghostly psychic e x is ten ces ." They a re p a r t o f r e a l i ty . By saying which Dewey does n o t mean to imply th a t a l l meanings a re equally v a lid . Some a re more le g itim a te ly meanings than o th e rs . For example, " the cere- monial sp rin k lin g o f water" does no t portend the imminence o f ra in a s i t 18i s thought to by c e r ta in p rim itiv e c u ltu re s . But th a t meaning, as sug- gested o r in d ica ted by the ceremony in qu estio n , i s nev erth e less an ob- je c t iv e , re a l occurrence, n o t an "idea" in the "minds" o f the people who be lieve in i t . Of course, fo r Dewey, i t , l ik e everything e lse th a t i s r e a l ; i s no t a se lf-en c lo sed , independently e x is tin g r e a l i t y . I t i s a 19product o f the in te ra c tio n o r tran sac tio n ' o f the organism and i t s en- vironment. But i f the f a c t o f i t s r e l a t iv i ty made i t su b je c tiv e , i t I 71 would make everything su b jec tiv e . There would be no meaning o f ra in , as imminently suggested by the ceremony in question , i f there were no t human beings and th e i r customs and expecta tions. But th is is tru e o f a l l re a l20i ty : i t i s a l l a product o f th ings in re la tio n to o th e r th ings. The only d is t in c t io n , then , among the meanings contained in o r im- p lied by a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s i s th a t some a re a c tu a lly borne out by sub- sequent experience and experiment and some a re n o t. Imminence o f ra in is as much a meaning of the sp rin k lin g ceremony a s f i r e i s a meaning of smoke. But to a c t on the assumption o f the imminence o f ra in in the sp rin k lin g ceremony w ill probably not re s u l t in a s g rea t a frequency o f subsequent ra in -experiences as ac ting on the assumption of f i r e on the basis of the suggestion o f i t by smoke w ill r e s u l t in subsequent f i r e - experiences. Dewey d is tin g u ish es c a re fu lly between those meanings which work and those which do n o t. A meaning may no t have the p a r t ic u la r o b je c tiv ity which i s imputed to i t , as w h istling does not a c tu a lly portend wind, no r the ceremony o f w ater in d ica te ra in . . . . I t req u ires the d is c ip lin e o f ordered and d e lib e ra te experim entation to teach us th a t some meanings, d e lig h tfu l o r hor- rendous as they a re , a re meanings communally developed in the proc- ess o f communal f e s t iv i ty and c o n tro l, and do not rep resen t the p o l i t i e s , and ways and means o f natu re a p a r t from so c ia l a r t s . S c ie n tif ic meanings were superadded to e s th e tic and a f fe c t io n a l meanings when ob jects in s tead o f being defined in terms o f th e i r consequences in so c ia l in te ra c tio n s and d iscussion were defined in terms o f t h e i r consequences w ith respec t to one another. This d iscrim in a tio n perm itted e s th e tic and a ffe c t iv e ob jects to be freed from magical im putations, which were due to a t t r ib u t in g to them in rerum na tu ra the consequences they had in the transm itted cu ltu re o f the group.21 22Meaning i s a lso u n iv e rsa l. For i t i s a method o r a "way o f using 23th in g s ," and methods a re u n iv e rsa l. I t i s a general way o f dealing 72 with a l l s itu a tio n s o f a general s o r t , A method o f checking f in g e rp r in ts , f o r example, i s a general way o f dealing w ith general fe a tu re s common to marks l e f t on guns, fu rn itu re , e tc . Even the no tion o f a f in g e rp rin t i t s e l f i s a general meaning te l l in g what one may expect i f one performs c e r ta in operations on th is mark l e f t on the gun. D etectives who come in to a room where a crime has been committed and d iscover a f in g e rp rin t a re f i r s t apprehending in the mode o f fe e lin g a c e r ta in 3 e t o f q u a li t ie s and then a re reading those q u a li t ie s as in d ic a tiv e o f c e r ta in operations th a t can be performed, comparing the mark here to a s e t o f marks on f i l e ifi the crime lab o ra to ry , and consequences th a t may be expected, e .g . , cor- re la tio n w ith some known crim inal whose id e n tity and whereabouts can then perhaps be determ ined. And these operations and consequences, the mean- ing o f the marks th a t make them f in g e rp r in ts and n o t, say , p a rt o f the design o f the ch a ir , a re genera l, ap p licab le to any number of q u a lita tiv e s i tu a t io n s , Let us t r y to g e t c le a re r now about th is d is t in c tio n between the two ways in which f e l t q u a l i t ie s can take on meaning, v iz . , a s having s ig n i- f ic a t io n and a s having sense. So f a r , I have ta lked ra th e r generally and sk e tc h ily about the two kinds o f meaning as being e i th e r inheren t in the q u a l i t ie s and immediately and d ire c tly experienced (sen se ), and as being im plied by them, consciously in fe rred a s a fu tu re ev en tu a lity th a t a c tin g on them in a c e r ta in way w il l lead to ( s ig n if ic a t io n ) . Let us look a t these now more c lo se ly . Perception as awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n occurs when a s e t o f q u a li- t i e s o r a th in g (a th in g being a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s w ith a sense already 73 inheren t in i t from previous in q u ir ie s ) i s consciously taken as a sign 2I f . o r index o f something e lse . Consider the following example« I am d riv ing in Mexico and have gotten o ff the road I was supposed to take to g e t to Guanajuato. So I consu lt my Mexican road map. I look a t the lin e s on the map u n t i l I find th e one I am on now, v i z . , Route 25. I follow the red lin e rep resen ting Route 25 u n t i l i t comes back to the highway I was supposed to be on, v iz . . Route 95. Now the perception of the red lin e w ith 25 on i t as in d ica tin g th a t , i f I go back 25 kilom eters and tu rn r ig h t on Route 95» I w il l be on the road to Guanajuato again- th is perception i s an example o f perception as awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n . I t i s perception of s ig n if ic a tio n in th a t i t i s an in f e re n t ia l awareness of q u a li t ie s o r a th ing as a sign o f something e lse th a t needs to be done to g e t to a consummatory experience I wish to have, v iz . , a rr iv in g in the fa m ilia r town o f Guanajuato. S ig n if ic a tio n , then, denotes an in fe rred operation to be performed subsequent to the perception and a consummatory experience which bne expects w il l re s u l t from performing th a t operation. The meaning o f the red lin e i s then a s e t o f fu tu re operations and th e i r consequences. This meaning i s e x tr in s ic to the lin e i t s e l f . When I looked a t th e map, I perceived i t s red l in e s as meaning high- ways, and i t was on the basis o f th is perception o f them as highways th a t I was ab le to in fe r what I had to do to g e t back on the roadI wanted to be on. But th is perception o f the l in e s as meaning highways was not a perception which had to be in fe rre d . I t was an immediately and d ire c tly noted meaning o f the l in e s th a t they represented highways. That the lin e s represented highways was therefo re perceived as the sense of the 74 l in e s . This kind o f meaning i s in t r in s ic to the l in e i t s e l f . This d is t in c t io n between s ig n if ic a tio n and sense i s i l lu s t r a te d in innumerable experiences which we have. Take the card, th a t comes in the s a i l informing one th a t a c a r he has ordered has a rr iv e d . The card i s perceived a s meaning ( in the sense o f s ig n if ic a tio n ) th a t one may now go to the d ea le rsh ip and pick up h is c a r . What i s meant by the card , then , i s a fu tu re operation th a t one must perform i f he i s to have a consum- matory experience which he wishes to have, v i z , , the possession and enjoy- ment o f the c a r . But the perception o f the word "car" a s i t appeared on the card was no t i t s e l f perceived in the same way. The meaning o f the word Ncar" was perceived d i r e c t ly and immediately, on the b a s is o f much fa m ilia r i ty w ith th e word. And th is immediate grasping o f the sense o f th e words and sentences on the card served a s th e evidence o r data on the b a s is o f which i t was possib le to make the in fe re n t ia l kind o f perception o f s ig n if ic a tio n which enabled one to know what to do to g e t the consum- matory kind o f experience which he wished to have. Perception of s ig n if ic a t io n , then , occurs in response to a problem- a t i c s i tu a t io n , l ik e th a t o f being lo s t , and i t i s o f something o r some q u a l i t ie s which in d ica te a course o f a c tio n which w il l so lve th a t prob- lem. Since one i s in a problem atic s i tu a t io n , i t i s c le a r th a t one does n o t perceive immediately and d ire c t ly what course o f a c tio n one should ta k e . One has to s to p and r e f le c t . I f one had no t been in a problematic s i tu a t io n , th e re would have been no consciousness a t a l l , according to Dewey, but ju s t immediate response to fa m ilia r s tim u li . For th is reason, Dewey's view seems to be th a t n e ith e r perception o f sense no r perception 75 o f s ig n if ic a tio n occur except in those cases in which one has a problem to deal w ith . When a problem does occur, consciousness a r is e s as a device fo r dealing w ith the problem. P r io r to th a t tim e, one has f e l t q u a l i t ie s and perhaps responded to them; but one has not been conscious o f meanings. Consider the follow ing example as an i l lu s t r a t io n o f the way in which perception o f sense and o f s ig n if ic a t io n a r is e ou t o f a previously e n tir e ly non'■cognitive kind o f experience when th a t s i tu a tio n becomes problem atic, I am d riv in g my ca r along the Kennedy Expressway here in Chicago, a route I have taken many times before in o rd er to g e t to my apartm ent b u ild ing . Since the route i t s e l f i s e n t i r e ly fh m ilia r , and d riv ing in general i s very fa m ilia r to me; and th e re a re no unusual t r a f f i c Jams o r detours today, I am re a lly d riv in g along in a more o r le s s unconscious way. I am, o f course, having o r fe e lin g q u a l i t i e s , some o f which I am responding to in accordance with h a b its I have developed, l ik e my tu rn -o ff a t the Montrose S tre e t e x i t ; o thers o f which a re mere "su rp lu sag e" --q u a litie s which axe had but n e ith e r noted n o r responded to , l ik e the banal nonsense coming from my ra d io , to which I have long since stopped paying any a t te n - tio n whatsoever. Ib is i s the kind o f experience in which, a s P ro fesso r Browning pu ts i t , we a re merely "coasting along on our p resen t equipment o f h a b it and in s t in c ts ( i f th e re a re any) un in terrup ted by any challeng- ing n o v e lty ."2** But then suddenly my c a r begins to lo se speed, and I am wrenched from my dogmatic slumber in non-cognitive co astin g in to an anguish o f thought and re f le c t io n . For, I note w ith te r r o r , cars a re bearing down upon me from behind. What to do? The s itu a tio n has become problem atic, and mind, which was slum bering, suddenly i s c a lled on to rescue me from d is a s te r , Vhen he says th a t a s i tu a t io n i s problem atic, Dewey means th a t i t i s indeterm inate with re sp ec t to i t s outcome. " 'T here is something the m a t t e r , a n d when we look more c lo se ly a t the s i tu a t io n , we f in d th a t t h i s something " is found to sp ring from the fa c t th a t th e re i s something lack ing , w anting, in the e x is tin g s itu a tio n as i t s tan d s , an absence which 27produces c o n f l ic t in the elements th a t do e x is t ." And th i s c o n f l ic t co n s is ts in the fa c t th a t the s i tu a tio n "tends to evoke d iscordan t re 2Q sponses," as con trasted w ith the immediate and sure responses evoked 29when " th ings a re going completely smoothly." 7 What i s lack ing in the s i tu a tio n on the expressway i s the power o f a c c e le ra tio n . My c a r i s lo s in g speed. And, as a r e s u l t , I do no t know what to do, A s e r ie s o f c o n f lic tin g courses o f a c tio n occur to mes l e t my c a r come to a stop and make a break fo r the shoulders a ttem pt to g lide to the shoulders fumble around w ith the ig n itio n sw itch to t r y to ge t the e a r s ta r te d ag a in , e tc . In ad d itio n to considering various possib le sug- g estio n s as to how to r e c t i fy the s i tu a t io n , I begin to look around and examine the fh c ts o f the s i tu a t io n . For the proper course o f a c tio n w il l be the one th a t i s app rop ria te to th e fa c ts o f the case. Now the way in which I perceive the fa c ts o f the case , when those fa c ts a re such fa m ilia r th ings a s c a rs bearing down upon me from behind, th e shoulder a couple o f lanes over to my r ig h t , my a c c e le ra to r pedal f l a t on the f lo o r , e t c . , i s c a lled by Dewey apprehension. This i s the 30word he uses in Logic fo r grasping the seuse o f q u a l i t ie s and th in g s . 7? These meanings axe grasped immediately and d ire c t ly in the sense th a t they a re grasped sim ultaneously w ith the q u a l i t ie s them selves, in the same moment o f awareness. There i s n o ty th a t i s t f i r s t the perception o f the q u a l i t ie s o f the cars approaching, and then the inference to th e i r meaning a s cars-approaching-portending-danger, To say th a t they a re ap- prehended d ire c t ly and immediately i s p rec ise ly to say th a t no inference from q u a l i t ie s f e l t in one moment to a meaning apprehended in a subsequent moment i s involved. Due to previous experience and the funding o f i t s r e s u l t s , I am able to grasp c e r ta in key f a c ts about the s itu a tio n imme- d ia te ly in th e form o f apprehension. A ll o f these sensed o r apprehended fh c ts o f the case a re then perceived in the o th e r sense o f meaning, as having the s ig n if ic a tio n of* I f I g e t over to the shoulder on what re - mains o f my rap id ly waning power, I w ill be sa fe . One i s not cogn itive ly aware o f the ob jects o f h is apprehension. He i s cogn itive ly aware o f the s ig n if ic a tio n o f, o r what can be done w ith , what he apprehends o r g e ts the sense o f . I f one had to be "observantly" and consciously aware o f everything th a t i s re le v an t to the so lu tio n o f a problem atic s i tu a t io n , one would n o t be ab le to a c t f a s t and e f f ic ie n t ly enough to g e t i t solved. The "p o te n tia l consequences" o f a th ing lik e a c a r o r a p la n t, when they a re repeated in our experience many times and when they a re re lev an t to our aims and needs, come to "mark" the th ing a s the so r t o f th in g th a t i t i s . They come to form the essence o r defin ing c h a ra c te r is t ic s o f th a t th in g . This e s s e n tia l meaning which q u a l i t ie s come to have comes to be apprehended o r recognized a f t e r much dealing w ith a th in g o f some s o r t . The essence i s , however, not the e s s e n tia l make-up o f the th ing a s i t i s 78 in i t s e l f . I t i s the c h a ra c te r is t ic s o f a th in g th a t a re most important to us in the l iv in g o f our l iv e s , A th in g lik e a o a r has innumerable consequences upon o th e r th ings and upon u s , but we ignore those th a t do no t r e la te v i ta l ly to our in te r e s t s . The n a tu re o f the th ings o f our world i s thus in tim a te ly tie d up with our in te r e s t s . We forge "objects" out o f the in f in i te ly r ic h and inexhaustib ly complex world o f n a tu ra l even ts. These ob jec ts a re "p o te n tia l consequences" o f a th in g as i t re - la te s to o th e r th in g s . Since, however, in doing so we a b s tra c t from many o th e r c h a ra c te r is t ic s o f a th in g , i t i s perhaps b e t te r to say th a t we 31c rea te ra th e r than d iscover the ob jec ts and world o f our experience. Dewey's a n a ly s is o f essence and o b jec t is suggestive , i t seems to me, o f what c o n s ti tu te s one o f the main d iffe ren ces between peoples o f d if f e r e n t ages in h is to ry . Since the in te r e s t s and aims o f people in d i f - fe re n t ages a re d if f e r e n t , i t would follow th a t they would not even per- ceive c e r ta in f a c ts about the world th a t might figu re very im portantly in the experience o f o th e rs . So th a t am an c ien t Athenian and a modern New Yorker, f o r example, would d i f f e r n o t only in th e i r behavior, but in the world o f t h e i r perception a s w ell. I f they could (p e r im possible) come to be in the same place a t the same tim e, th e re would re a l ly be two p laces , not one, since they would perceive ( i . e . , forge out o f the given q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a tio n ) to ta l ly d if fe re n t o b je c ts . Dewey recognizes ano ther way in which perception o f sense occurs, 32 33He c a l l s th i s sometimes contemplation and sometimes ap p rec ia tio n , Such a perception of sense occutb when one i s no longer s tru g g lin g to g e t a d if f ic u l ty so lved , b u t can r e s t in the ap p recia tion o r "savoring" 79 o f something. In the previous example, upon reaching ay l i t t l e refuge, the shoulder, I might w ell r e s t f o r a t in e in an ap p rec ia tio n o r savoring o f i t . And, a t th i s p o in t, the shoulder i s n o t a th in g en tering in to a re f le c tiv e con tex t, hut one th a t one re lis h e s as having saved one 's l i f e , 34I t i s apprecia ted fo r a meaning th a t has now come, to be Inheren t in i t . The d ifference between perception of sense which i s ap p recia tion and perception o f sense which i s apprehension seems to l i e in i t s position v is -a -v is the in q u irin g s i tu a t io n . When one grasps the sense o f a th ing in the course o f Inquiry and as a p a r t o f the inquiry process, he i s per- ceiving in the mode o f apprehension. His perception a t such tim es i s re a lly a shorthand version o f a cognitive percep tion , i . e . , perception a s awareness o f s ig n if ic a tio n . But i f h is perception o f sense comes a t the c lose o f inqu iry as an app rec ia tio n o f a s a tis fa c to ry term ination o f the re f le c tiv e process, then i t i s perception in the mode o f ap p rec ia tio n . The shoulder perceived while I was coming gradually to a stop in the mid- d le o f the Kennedy Expressway was apprehended a s something re lev an t to the possib le so lu tio n o f my urgent problem) but the shoulder as perceived when I re a liz e d I had escaped d is a s te r was perceived in the mode of ap p recia tion . Perception o f sense in the sense o f apprehension dominates the d is - cussion o f sense in Loglct The Theory o f In q u iry . Here sense i s regarded in an e n tire ly p ra c tic a l o r u t i l i t a r i a n way. I t i s th a t system o f mean- ings which gives a people the power to d iscrim inate the fe c to rs th a t a re re lev an t and im portant in s ig n ifican ce in given s i tu a tio n s ) i t i s power o f discernment) in a p roverb ia l phrase i a b i l i ty to t e l l a hawk from a hemshaw, chalk from 80 cheese, and to b ring the d isorla in& tions made to b ear upon what i s to be done and what I s to be absta ined from, in the "ord inary a f - f a i r s o f l i f e . "35 There a re two kinds o f such meanings which c o n s ti tu te what i s here c a lled the "common sense" o f a c u ltu re , and they a re both o f them connected w ith the conduct o f l i f e in re la tio n to an e x is tin g environmenti one o f them in judging th e s ig n ifican ce o f th ings and events w ith reference to what should be done; the o th e r, in the ideas th a t axe used to d ire c t and ju s t i f y a c t i v i t i e s and judgments,36 But elsewhere Dewey focuses on the kind o f perception o f sense which he c a l l s ap p rec ia tio n . In Essays in Experimental Logic, fo r example, he says th a t such terms a s "meaning," " s ig n ific an ce ," "value," have a double sense. Sometimes they mean a function* the o ff ic e o f one th in g rep resen ting ano ther, o r poin ting to i t a s Im plied; the opera tion , in s h o r t , o f serving a s s ig n . In the word "symbol" th i s meaning i s p ra c tic a lly exhaustive. But the terms a lso sometimes mean an inheren t q u a li ty , a q u a lity in t r in s ic a l ly ch arac te riz in g the th in g experienced and making i t worth w hile. The word "sense," as in the phrase "sense of a th in g ," (and non-sense) i s devoted to th i s use a s d e f in i te ly as a re the words "sign" and "symbol" to the o th er, In such a p a ir a s "import" and "im portance," the f i r s t tends to s e le c t the reference to another th in g while the second names an in t r in s ic con ten t. In r e f le c tio n , the e x tr in s ic reference i s always prim ary. . . . In the s itu a tio n which follows upon re f le c t io n , meanings a re i n t r in s i c *3? they have no Instrum ental o r subserv ien t o f f ic e , because they have no o ff ice a t a l l . They a re a s much q u a l i t ie s o f the ob jec ts in the s itu a tio n a s a re red and b lack , hard and s o f t , square and round. And every re f le c t iv e experience adds new shades o f such in t r in s ic q u a lif ic a tio n s . In o th e r words, while re f le c tiv e knowing i s in s tru - mental to gain ing co n tro l in a troub led s itu a t io n (and thus has a p ra c tic a l o r u t i l i t a r i a n fo rce ) , i t i s a lso instrum ental to the en- richment o f the s ig n ifican ce o f subsequent experiences.38 And then Dewey concludes, in re fu ta tio n o f the c r itic ism o f those philosophers who m istakenly regarded h is view o f experience as mere busi- n e ss , w ith no place fo r enjoyment, ap p rec ia tio n , o r r e s t f u l contemplation* "And i t may w ell be th a t th is by-product, th is g i f t o f the gods, i s 81 incomparably more valuable fo r l iv in g a l i f e than i s the primary and in - tended r e s u l t o f c o n tro l, e s s e n tia l a s i s th a t co n tro l to having a l i f e to l iv e ." 39 Let me summarize now Dewey's view o f perception in the following o u tlin e t A, Perception as Feeling (w ithout presence o f meaning). 1 . Here fe e lin g o r having o f q u a l i t ie s , 2. Having q u a l i t ie s , and responding in accordance w ith h ab its p rev iously developed, to those q u a l i t ie s . B, Perception o f Meaning, i . C ognitive, r e f le c t iv e perception o f meaning! perception o f s ig n if ic a t io n , C, Perception o f Sense. 1. Apprehension. 2. A ppreciation o r contem plation. I t seems to me th a t th i s d is t in c tio n between perception o f s ig n i f i - ca tion and perception a s apprehension, on the one hand, and perception a s app recia tion on the o th e r can be b e t te r understood by seeing i t in the l ig h t o f the two modes o f re la t io n in which Dewey th in k s we stand to the L q world. He c a l l s these consummatory and p repara to ry . A consummatory experience i s one in which we enjoy o r s u f fe r d ire c t ly an a c t iv i ty o r an o b jec t, and the a c t iv i ty o r o b jec t so enjoyed o r su ffe red i s immediate, f in a l , and absorbing. He a re absorbed in our a c t iv i ty o r the o b jec t o f our a tte n tio n ra th e r than dealing w ith i t as a means to some end which we a re concerned to b rin g about. For th is reason, Dewey c a l l s i t a f in a l 82 r a th e r than a p reparatory kind o f experience. He uses as an example o f an o b jec t so regarded the f la g a s perceived by a person in a moment o f 41p a t r io t ic fe rv o r. The f la g h e re , in such an experience, i s n o t a sign o r in d ica tio n o f something e ls e , some a c t iv i ty th a t one a n tic ip a te s in the way th a t , in my previous example about the road map, the l in e one sees on the map rep resen ts ano ther and separa te th in g , v iz . , a road and an action to be taken. Rather, Dewey says, i s the flag something like a totem in th a t i t embodies c e r ta in th ings ( in the case o f the totem a whole so c ia l o rg an iza tio n ). Such symbols a re "oondensed s u b s ti tu te s o f a c tu a l th ings and events^ which embody a c tu a l th ings w ith more d i r e c t and enhanced import than do the th ings themselves w ith t h e i r d is t r a c t io n s , 42im positions, and ir re le v a n c ie s ," Now the way in which the whole s o c ia l organization i s contained in the totem, and the meaning o f the f la g in the f la g a s experienced by the p a t r io t in a moment o f p a t r io t ic fe rv o r, i s the way in which the sense o f a th ing o r a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s i s perceived in ap p re c ia tio n . In both cases the meaning i s in h eren t in the th in g , and th e experience i s one o f absorp tion in something f in a l and se lf-co n ta in ed . A preparatory kind o f experience i s one in which, r a th e r than being absorbed in an o b jec t o r a c t iv i ty and i t s in t r in s ic meaning, we regard th in g s as p o ssib le means to a fu tu re ev en tu a lity . I f one has lo s t h is way and i t i s growing l a t e , he has no time to look a t f lag s p a t r io t ic a l ly , o r to have any o th e r such consummatory experience} he has to look around f o r signs o f th e way home. He th e re fo re regards th in g s a s means to the so lu tio n o f h is problem/ being lo s t and needing to g e t home. He looks 83 f o r road s ig n s , people he n ig h t ask fo r d ire c tio n s , and so on, in order to g e t some in d ica tio n o f the proper course o f a c tio n , the b e s t means fo r th e so lu tio n o f h is d i f f i c u l t i e s . The way in which these s igns a re experienced i s the way in which we perceive both in the sense o f apprehension and in the sense o f awareness o f s ig n if ic a t io n . I t i s perception which i s a p reparato ry kind o f exper- ience-an experience in which one i s looking forward to the occurrence of fu tu re events ra th e r than re s tin g in the consummatory enjoyment o r "su f- fe ring" o f a p resen t one. Now these two kinds o f experience-v iz , , the consummatory and the p reparato ry-a re no t ju s t two kinds o f experience th a t occur independently o f each o th e r in our experience. They a re re a lly c lo se ly t ie d up with each o th er. For s ig n if ic a t io n j Dewey says, "denotes the p o s s ib i l i ty o f a l a t e r f u l f i l l i n g sense o f th ings in immediate ap p ro p ria tions and enjoy- ments, So involved in the very notion o f s ig n if ic a tio n (and we may add, I b e lie v e , apprehension) i s i t s capac ity to lead us to a consummatory ii ) i experience o f "sen se-fu l" awareness o f th in g s . Furthermore, the appre- c ia tio n o f the sense o f a th ing i s enhanced by the p reparatory a c t i v i t i e s th a t have le d up to i t . This i s tru e both in the sense th a t , f o r example, one ap p rec ia te s a th in g more i f he has had to s tru g g le to g e t i t , and in the sense th a t i t takes on a new and r ic h e r meaning as a r e s u l t o f th a t very p reparatory a c t iv i ty . Take the f la g th a t was p lan ted a top Iwo Jima a s an example. I t i s app recia ted more because o f the agony, bloodshed, and death th a t went in to p u ttin g i t th e re , bu t i t a lso means, contains immanently in i t , th a t very f ie rc e f ig h tin g and dying th a t occurred in I 81* o rd er th a t i t n ig h t f ly th e re . Thus Dewey says, a s we have seen above, th a t the ob jec ts o f perception gradually acqu ire a richness and depth o f neaning (which i s appreciated) which nay w ell be nore valuable than the re so lu tio n o f a d i f f ic u l ty which inqu iry and preparatory a c t iv i ty (and th e i r a tten d an t apprehensions and perceptions o f s ig n if ic a tio n ) o r ig in a lly a rose to e f f e c t . Let ae emphasize the po in t th a t not a l l perception o f sense has th is consummatory ch arac te r o f absorp tion in the contem plation o f an ob jec t which we saw to be the case w ith the p a t r io t and h is f la g . There i s a lso an immediate grasping o f the sense o f a th ing which i s not o f th is appre- c ia t iv e or a e s th e tic ch arac te r, but i s n ev ertheless the apprehension o f a neaning th a t i s contained in the o b jec t o r the q u a l i t ie s . My awareness, f o r exanple, o f an American f la g , in a n o n -p a tr lo tic noaent, i s such a perception o f the sense o f a th in g . I f someone s e ts ne the problem of picking out the French f la g from a group o f f la g s , I w il l , in the course o f coning acro ss th e French f la g , n o tice th a t a p a r t ic u la r one i s the American f la g , and th e re fo re not the one I an looking fo r . This percep- tio n o f a p a r t ic u la r f la g as the American f la g w ill be a d i r e c t and imme- d ia te one o f i t s sense) I do no t have to r e f le c t o r e x p l ic i t ly to apply c r i t e r i a in o rder to id e n tify i t a s the American f la g . I t i s th e re fo re perceived in the mode o f apprehension. But the perception o f the French f la g , which i s one I am not fa m ilia r w ith , w ill req u ire re f le c tio n and Inqu iry . I n ig h t have to consu lt a manual o r ask sone questions, and then apply the r e s u l ts o f these inves- t ig a tio n s to the se le c tio n o f the appropria te f la g . In such a case, then . 85 perception would be in the mode o f s ig n if ic a tio n ra th e r than o f sense. For i t i s perceiving by in ference , ra th e r than immediately o r d ire c tly ( ra th e r than , then , n o n -re f le c tiv e ly , non -cogn itive ly ), and i t s meaning i s th e re fo re e x tr in s ic to i t , not immanent to o r inheren t in i t . Because o f previous experience with o b jec ts , Dewey says, we come to recognize some o f them on s ig h t. I see o r note d ire c t ly th a t th is i s a typew rite r, th a t i s a book, the o th e r th ing i s a ra d ia to r , e tc . This kind o f d ire c t "knowledge" I s h a l l o a l l apprehensions i t i s se iz in g o r grasping, in te l le c tu a l ly , w ithout questioning . But i t i s a product mediated through c e r ta in organic mechanisms o f re ten tio n and h a b it, and i t presupposes p r io r experiences and mediated conclusions drawn from them.^5 Apprehension i s p a rt o f the preparatory kind o f experience which i s inqu iry . The o th e r kind o f immediate grasping o f meaning occurs a f t e r preparatory experience has been completed. I t i s the enjoyment o f the s a tis fa c to ry term ination o f such experience. This, a s we have seen, Dewey c a l ls app recia tion o r contem plation. Like apprehension, appreci- a tio n o r contemplation involves perceiving something which i s "funded" w ith meaning given to i t by previous tran sac tio n s with i t . I t therefo re presupposes previous in q u ir ie s and th e i r consequent a c ts o f knowing, but i t i s not i t s e l f an a c t o f knowledge o r cognition , In contem plation, Dewey says, "knowing has stepped out o f the picture} the v ision i s e s- th e t ic . This may be b e t te r than knowing; but i t s being b e t te r i s no reason fo r mixing d if f e r e n t th ings and a t t r ib u t in g to knowledge charac46te r s belonging to an e s th e tic o b jec t." The question one might w ell ask a t th i s po in t i s whether Dewey could r e a l ly have maintained th a t app recia tin g o r contem plating a th ing can be I 86 sa id to be -perception o f i t . One n igh t argue, th a t i s , th a t sonething has to be perceived before i t can be appreciated o r contenplated , and th a t apprecia tion i s a subsequent and d if fe re n t a c t . Such perception need not be sense-percep tion , o f course. On can ap p rec ia te o r contem- p la te an o b jec t o f sense-perception , a s he does when he apprecia tes a pa in ting o r a fine build ing which i s contemporaneously a ffe c tin g h is sense-organs. But he can a lso app recia te an o b jec t perceived by way o f r e c a l l , f o r example, savoring the memory o f a fin e o ld church seen in Mexico. Or he can apprecia te an o b jec t perceived by way o f im agination, a s an a rc h ite c t might savor the o b jec t o f an Imagined perception which he plans to b u ild . But i s there not f i r s t the perception o f the o b jec t o f sense-percep tion , memory-perception, and inag ination -percep tion , and th en , a s ano ther s o r t o f a c t , the a e s th e tic enjoyment o r apprecia tion o f i t ? A ppreciation, then, would seem no t to be ano ther kind o f perception o f sense, but ra th e r a fu r th e r a c t , follow ing upon a previous perception o f sense, whether sense-perception , in ag ina tion -percep tion , memorypercep tion , o r some o th e r kind of perception. The issu e comes, then , to th is t Do we f i r s t perceive the o b jec t, l e t its say R oot's fhmous Monadnock bu ild ing here in Chicago, and then, in a separa te a c t o r group o f a c ts , which a re non-perceptual in ch arac te r, ap p rec ia te i t ? Or i s the app recia tion i t s e l f a perceptual ac t? Now i t seems to me th a t to hold th a t apprecia tion i s a separate a c t from perception i s to take a view lik e th a t o f the em otiv ists th a t a l l we a c tu a lly perceive in a work o f a r t o r a person o r s i tu a tio n th a t i s valu- ab le a re purely fa c tu a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s . A ll th a t we a c tu a lly perceive I 87 in the Monadnock a re i t s shape, co lo r, the th ickness o f i t s n a i l s , i t s undulating hay windows, i t s s in p le , unadorned w alls , e tc . And then , when we say i t i s g racefu l and th a t i t i s a wonderful balance o f a u s te r i ty and lig h tn e ss , we a re ju s t re a c tin g to i t with an e n tire ly sub jec tive response. These evalua tive c h a ra c te r is t ic s a re no t p a r ts o f what i s perceived. They a re in u s . n o t out th e re . Value i s su b jec tiv e ; fa c t alone i s ob jec tiv e . Such a view o f apprecia tion i s e x p l ic i t ly denied by Dewey, however. The grace, charm, balance, and a u s te r i ty o f the Monadnock a re no t in u s i they a re in the Monadnock. Thus he says th a t such q u a li t ie s "are as much q u a l i t ie s o f the ob jects in the s itu a tio n a s a re red and black, hard and hn s o f t , square and round." But to say th a t they a re in the s i tu a tio n seems to me to imply th a t we find them th e re , in some kind o f perceptual a c t th a t we engage in . C erta in ly i t i s tru e th a t such q u a l i t ie s a s a re appreciated a re not in the o b jec t a s we perceive i t i n i t i a l l y . They a re there as the product o f a study o r in v e s tig a tio n . A usterity as th e meaning o f the unadorned w alls and some o f the windows, which a re p riso n -lik e in th e i r recessed p o s itio n s , I s not obviousi i t probably must f i r s t be grasped in the mode o f s ig n if ic a tio n a s a sep ara te ly meant s ig n ifican ce o f the bu ild ing 's more obvious c h a ra c te r is t ic s , as something th a t i s e x tr in s ic to the q u a li- t i e s them selves. A ll a r t-a p p re c ia tio n would seem to involve a period o f a n a ly s is whereby we survey the obvious fhc ts o f the o b jec t; then the nean- ing o f those fa c ts comes to us; and f in a l ly , in the a c t o f ap p rec ia tio n , a s the kind o f perception "which follows upon re f le c t io n ," these meanings come to be in t r in s ic to the th ing i t s e l f . 88 The view, then , th a t perception cannot ever have (and th a t Dewey cannot mean th a t i t has) a s i t s o b jec t anything lik e an a e s th e tic ob jec t, w ith i t s v a lu e -c h a ra c te r is tic 8 , seems to me to r e s t on the assumption th a t perception i s always o f f a c ts . But Dewey, I th ink r ig h t ly , th inks the world o f our percep tual experience has v a lu e -c h a ra c te r is tic s as much a p a rt o f i t a s co lo rs , te x tu re s , and shapes. There i s ano ther reason why one might be in c lin ed to regard appre- c ia tio n a s some kind o f a non-pereeptual o r post-percep tual a c t . This i s an In c lin a tio n on the p a rt o f some philosophers to l im it perception to such simple and mundane th ings a s t r e e s , ru g s , c h a irs , e t c . , and these a s they e n te r in to one's o rd inary , ru n -o f-th e -m ill a f f a i r s . But in f a c t , f o r Dewey, perception i s the grasping o f any meaning e i th e r im plied by o r contained in a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s o r an o b jec t. Perception can th e re - fo re be the apprehension no t merely o f the f a c t th a t th i s i s a c h a ir , but o f an immensely r ic h and complex meaning. I t can be something a s compli- cated a s a g e n e ra l 's grasping o f the e n tire s tra teg y o f h is opposing gen- e ra l from the configura tion o f the enemy's troops as sym bolically spread out on a tab le in fro n t o f him. Now I do n o t mean to claim th a t Dewey regards the whole experience o f apprecia tion o r contem plation a s being e i th e r percep tual o r lim ited to one p a r t ic u la r kind o f perception . E specially when one i s involved in th e kind o f app recia tio n in which he "savors a th ing fu lly -as Arnold 48B en n e tt's heroines a re wont to do ," would i t seem th a t more than mere sense-perceptlon i s involved. Dewey would probably want to say th a t such an experience goes beyond ju s t sense-perceptlon and involves o n e 's own -* 89 ~ emotional response. And i t might a lso involve some propriocep tive per- ception o f the meaning o f one*s own in te rn a l fe e lin g s . Also i t might involve some purely conceptual elements-"having meanings and ro l l in g them over as sweet m orsels under the tongue," 7 he says in Experience and N ature. And i t might a lso involve memory-perceptions and im aginationpereep tions. N evertheless, I th ink he does mean to say th a t a t le a s t p a rt o f the "enhanced and in te n s if ie d experience o f an object"**0 i s some kind o f per- cep tion . And th is no t in th a t some kind o f perception provides the mate- r i a l on the b asis o f which one performs subsequent ap p rec ia tiv e a c ts , but ra th e r th a t th e re i s a k ind o f perception which i s i t s e l f a p p rec ia tio n . For the o b jec t o f perception i t s e l f , and n o t ju s t o n e 's sub jec tiv e re - sponse, i s enriched and enhanced by the funding o f o n e 's previous exper- iences w ith i t . Most o f our experience i s n o t exclusive ly e i th e r o f the consummatory o r o f the p reparatory type. We a re n o t u su a lly involved purely in con- tem plative o r ap p rec ia tiv e savoring o f an o b jec t o r an a c t iv i ty , o r in - volved in a purely lab o rin g , working kind o f experience in which the mean- ing o f everything perceived l i e s beyond i t in a fu tu re ev en tu a lity which our a c t iv i ty i s p ro jec ted toward achieving . In s tead , most experience i s o f a dua l s o r t , involving both consummatory and p reparatory elem ents. Indeed, a t times Dewey seems to believe th a t there i s never an experience which i s purely the one o r the o th er. A ll experienced ob jec ts have a double s ta tu s . They a re ind iv idu- a liz e d , consummatory, whether in the way o f enjoyment o r o f s u f fe r - in g . They a re a lso involved in a c o n tin u ity o f in te ra c tio n s and 90 changes, and hence a re causes and p o te n tia l neans o f l a t e r exper- iences. Because o f th i s dual capac ity , they become problem atic. Immediately and d i r e c t ly they a re ju s t what they a re j but a s tra n - s it io n s to and p o s s ib i l i t ie s o f l a t e r experiences they a re uncer- ta in , There i s a divided response t p a r t o f th e organic a c t iv i ty i s d ire c ted to then fo r what they ism edlately a re , and p a rt to them as t r a n s i t iv e neans o f o th e r experienced o b je c ts . We re a c t to then both as f i n a l i t i e s and in preparato ry ways, and the two reactions do n o t harm onize,51 The answer to the question of whether experience i s always o f th is dual na ture would seen to depend on how th ic k ly o r th in ly we s l ic e exper- ience . C erta in ly th e re a re occasions when we a re completely absorbed in contem plation. One might ju s t savor the Parthenon, fo r example, o r a landscape, w ithout any kind o f inqu iry o r p reparatory a c t iv i ty in general going on. But such an experience doubtless soon g ives way to some kind o f preparatory a c t iv i ty , e i th e r inqu iry in to such a question a s why they b u i l t i t here on th is h i l l , and as they d id b u ild i t , o r where one s h a ll have h is d inner to n ig h t, o r from what perspective he can g e t the b est photograph o f i t . So the t o t a l experience o f viewing th e Parthenon one fin e Greek afternoon w il l include both perception o f sense in the mode o f appreci- a t io n , a p a r t o f consummatory experience, and perception o f s ig n if ic a - t io n , a p a r t o f p reparato ry experience. But w ithin the t o t a l experience th e re a re su re ly s tre tc h e s th a t a re purely the one o r the o th er. Dewey c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly re la te s h is metaphysics o f experience to v a lu e-considera tions. He sees here in th i s d iv is io n between consummatory and preparatory experience the source o f one o f th e basic o o n flic ts o f l i f e . I t i s the c o n f l ic t one sees running throughout Thomas Mann's w rit- in g s , f o r example, between the d esire fo r work and the longing fo r ju s t 91 stopping and enjoying th in g s , "Each o f us, "Dewey says, "can re c a l l many occasions when he has been perplexed by disagreement between th ings d ire c t ly present and th e i r p o te n tia l value a s signs and means? when he has been to m between absorp tion in what i s now enjoyed and the need o f a l te r in g i t so 52as to prepare fo r something l ik e ly to come," "The woods a re lo v e ly , dark , and deep? bu t I have promises to keep, 53and miles to go before I s leep , m iles to go before I s leep . In A rt as Experience Dewey deplores the separa tion between consum- matory and preparatory a c t i v i t i e s th a t ch arac te rizes so much o f modem l i f e . The a e s th e tic has been divorced from ordinary human experience and re legated to the museum, in stead of being in tim ate ly t ie d in w ith one's everyday experience, a s Dewey conceives i t was o r ig in a lly . And people's work has become humdrum lab o r, unaccompanied by a s a t is fa c tio n o f having completed something w ell. We now d iv ide our l iv e s in to work and p lay , and f a i l to achieve genuine s a t is fa c t io n even in the l a t t e r . For the f in e s t k ind o f experience , the a e s th e tic , which can occur in any endeavor, whether in te l le c tu a l , p ra c t ic a l , o r s t r i c t l y a r t i s t i c , i s an experience th a t l i e s between, on the one hand, "the humdrum" with i t s "submission to convention in p ra c tic e and in te l le c tu a l procedure," i t s " r ig id a b s t i - nence, coerced submission"? and, on the o th e r hand, "d is s ip a tio n , incoeh. herence, and aim less indulgence."-^ And these two re a lly seem to char- a c te r iz e the l i f e o f modem man, a humdrum performance o f h is job, which he does mechanically and sem i-consciously, and aim less, unconscious d is - s ip a tio n which he c a l l s enjoyment. The a e s th e tic experience, in which one i s most a l iv e , v i t a l , and I 92 p e rc e p t iv e ,^ has both p reparatory and consummatory elements in i t , in te - g ra lly joined and a ffe c tin g each o th er. The a n tic ip a te d consummation c a r r ie s over in to the p reparations themselves and g ives them a consumma- te ly elem ent, and the p reparations a re c a rrie d over in to the consummation and become p a rt o f i t s meaning in the a c t o f ap p rec ia tiv e perception . I t i s a lab o r o f love and an enjoyment th a t contains in i t a richness and d iv e rs ity made possib le by th a t very lab o r which preceded i t . Dewey pokes fun a t the ph ilosoph ical account o f enjoyment and p leas- u re . I t i s , l ik e the ph ilosoph ical account o f percep tion , cu riously re - mote from enjoyment as i t i s a c tu a lly experienced. Even philosophers who have conceived th a t p leasure i s the so le motive o f man and the atta inm ent o f happiness h is so le aim, have given a curiously sober, drab account o f the working o f pleasure and the search fo r happiness. Consider the u t i l i t a r i a n s , how they to i le d , spun and wove, but who never saw man arrayed in joy a s the l i l i e s o f the f i e l d .56 This in a tte n tio n to the way in which the joy o f consummation can carry over to the p reparation o f the b e au tifu l o b jec t o r the consummatory exper- ience in general led P la to to a disparagement o f p ra c tice and lab o r. And A ris to tle defines p leasure a s the completion o f an a c t . Dewey i s here po in ting to the f a c t th a t , as men a re "arrayed in joy" out in the f ie ld , in s tead o f as seen in the ph ilo sopher's study , they a re , a t b e s t, joyous in lab o r a s w ell a s in completion o f lab o r. Thus Dewey says th a t a t the o u tse t the hunt was enjoyed in the f e a s t , o r in the calm moments o f shaping sp ea rs , bows and arrow s. Only l a t e r was the content o f these experiences ca rr ie d over in to hunting i t s e l f , so th a t even i t s dangers might be savored. la b o r , through i t s s tru c - tu re and o rder; lends play i t s p a tte rn and p lo t (^otherwise i t would be the unrefined , unsophistica ted "enjoyment" o f d issipation]]t play then re tu rn s the loan w ith in te r e s t to work, in giving i t a sense o f beginning, sequence and climax. 5? 93 Ibus we see th a t the kind o f perception o f sense which Dewey c a l l s "appreciation" occurs not only a t the completion o f an a c t o f inqu iry . Bather i s i t the case th a t app recia tion occurs even before the consunaa- *58tio n i s reached. In A rt a s Experience Dewey expresses th i s point in th i s way: " Ib is consummation, moreover, does not w ait in consciousness fo r the whole undertaking to be f in ish e d . I t i s an tic ip a te d throughout and i s re c u rre n tly savored with sp ec ia l in te n s i ty ." Dewey i s ta lk in g here about those experiences which have a e s th e tic q u a li ty . Such q u a lity can belong to a l l kinds o f experience, no t ju s t " d is tin c t iv e ly e s th e tic " o n e s ,^ I t c o n s is ts in a re la tio n sh ip among the p a rts o f the experience which Dewey c a l l s " linkage," a re la tio n sh ip such th a t the various p a r ts look forward to th e i r successors and back- ward to th e i r antecedents r a th e r than simply succeeding one ano ther. In l is te n in g ap p rec ia tiv e ly to music, fo r example; one does n o t hear one sound o r even a group o f sounds and then fo rg e t i t . Bather does one keep previous sounds in mind and a n tic ip a te (e sp ec ia lly on l a t e r hearings) fu tu re ones. And in co n structing a proof in symbolic lo g ic , to take a n o n -aesth e tic experience which nevertheless has a e s th e tic q u a li ty , one must, in the m idst o f h is proof, be aware o f p r io r s tep s and be looking ahead toward subsequent ones and, o f course, u ltim ate ly to the f in a l one, the one a f t e r which he can w rite ; Q. E. D. Dewey's view seems to me suggestive , a s h is views u su a lly a re , but nevertheless questionab le . I ag ree , th a t i s , th a t , a s he claim s, the f in e s t experiences we have a re those " in te g ra l" ones in which a e s th e tic q u a lity o r linkage i s p re sen t. But I do not agree with him th a t the a c t 9** o f ap p rec ia tio n , when i t occurs in such an experiencê always co n sis ts in an a n tic ip a tio n o f the consusuaation o f the experience as a whole. One can a p p rec ia te , fo r exanple, a p a r t ic u la r passage in the course o f a musical work no t because i t i s perceived in any way as con trib u tin g to a f in a l consummation o r re so lu tio n , bu t ju s t in i t s e l f . I t i s appreci- a ted as being ju s t the lovely group o f sounds th a t i t i s . Of course, a l l o f these must be experienced to g e th e r a s one in te g ra l group, but they can form an o b jec t o f apprecia tion independent o f the consummation o f the work as a whole. I f one i s engaged in a p ra c tic a l kind o f undertaking, l ik e th a t o f fix in g a f l a t , then perhaps each s te p i s savored as being an tic ip a to ry o f the consummation, v iz . , having a t i r e a t f u l l pressure th a t one can d riv e on again . But d is t in c t iv e ly a e s th e tic experiences, although they a re perhaps id e a lly d irec ted towards ob jects which have a kind o f a l l - pervasive u n ity which the u ltim ate consummatory experience w ill appre- c ia te -these experiences seem nevertheless to have components th a t a re appreciated and y e t involve no reference a t a l l to th a t u ltim ate con- summatory in s ig h t. Dewey'3 a n a ly s is , in A rt a s Experience, o f a e s th e tic perception o r apprecia tion ra is e s some questions about the previously formulated scheme, according to which I have been try in g to in te rp re t h is theory o f percep- tio n . I t w il l be re c a lle d th a t I described app recia tion th e re as a kind o f sense-perception o f sense in which one experienced, l e t us say, the reaching o f the shoulder o f the expressway a s being the s a tis fa c to ry re so lu tio n o f a problematic s i tu a t io n , But h e re , in the d is t in c tiv e ly 95 a e s th e tic kind o f experience, we have no t been sense-perceiv ing , since Dewey l i n i t s h is use o f the term "sense-perception" to p ra c t ic a l contexts in which overt a c tio n i s re le v an t. In "dramatic o f l i t e r a r y o r p layfu l" co n tex ts , however, no such overt a c tio n i s ever c a lled fo r o r re lev an t. So i t would seem th a t the kind o f perception th a t goes on in d is t in c t iv e ly a e s th e tic experiences i s a non-cognitive kind of perception o f a meaning which i s n o t re lev an t to a c tio n now o r ever, (Perception o f a meaning which e n ta i ls the relevance o f a c tio n in the fu tu re he c a l l s "conceptual p e rcep tio n .") Rather i s i t a meaning on which we a c t only in a p lay fu l o r im aginative way. There i s a fu r th e r d i f f ic u l ty w ith Dewey's theory o f a e s th e tic per- ception which we need to consider now. This i s the problem o f whether a e s th e tic perception i s cognitive o r non-cognitive. I t i s undeniable, I b e liev e , and Dewey admits t h i s , ^ th a t th ink ing goes on in a r t . (And I be lieve he would say th a t i t goes on in the experience o f the apprec ia to r a s w ell a s in th a t o f the a r t i s t . ) For the p a in te r , fo r example, c e r ta in ly must co nstan tly undergo the e f fe c t o f h is every brush stroke o r he w ill n o t be aware o f what he i s doing o r where h is work i s going. Moreover, he h a s .to see each p a r t ic u la r connection o f doing and undergoing in re la t io n to the whole th a t he d e s ire s to produce. To apprehend such re la tio n s i s to th in k , and i s one o f the most exacting modes o f thought. But i f th inking goes on in a r t , then i t would seem th a t the aes- th e t ic experience i s a cognitive and not a non-cognitive one. I t would seem, th a t i s , th a t in d is t in c t iv e ly a e s th e tic experience the a r t i s t as w ell as the responsive viewer o r l i s t e n e r i s a c tu a lly involved in some- th in g lik e a problem atic s i tu a tio n . Dewey seems, th e re fo re , to be committed to the view th a t a e s th e tic perception i s a cognitive kind o f percep tion» a view th a t i s con trary to the view o f a e s th e tic perception he holds in Experience and Nature, fo r example. Let me suggest, however, the follow ing in te rp re ta tio n o f Dewey's view which w i l l , I b e liev e , rescue him from th is seeming co n trad ic tio n in h is view. I th ink what he means might be th a t the a r t i s t and the apprec ia to r , when they a re th ink ing , e .g . , tra c in g ou t re la tio n sh ip s between component p a r ts o f a p a in tin g o r a m usical composition, a re n o t appre- c ia t in g . They a re n o t, th a t i s , having an a e s th e tic experience a t a l l a t such tim es. Gather they a re having an experience lik e th a t o f the person involved in any o th e r problem atic s i tu a tio n ! they a re responding to a d i f f ic u l ty w ith hypotheses o r id eas ( e .g . , "suppose I p a in t th i s a s l ig h t ly darker shade o f re d " ) , and they a re then te s t in g these ideas w ith experim ents. Then, a f t e r the perception o f th e su ccessfu l reso lu - tio n o f the problem, do they have the a e s th e tic experience, which, l ik e my ap p rec ia tiv e perception a f t e r reaching the shoulder o f the expressway, i s indeed a non-cognitive savoring o f a completed performance. So the th ink ing th a t the a r t i s t and the ap p re c la to r engage in , although i t i s a necessary condition o f a t le a s t some a e s th e tic experiences, i s no t a p a r t o f the a e s th e tic experience. Let me re tu rn now to a d iscussion o f the th ree general k inds o f per- ception which Dewey recognizes, v iz . , fe e lin g , perception o f s ig n if ic a - tio n , and presence o f sense. The th ree c o n s ti tu te a kind o f evolu tion as w ell as a temporal development. For no t only i s s ig n if ic a tio n a l a t e r stage tem porally than fe e lin g , and sense than s ig n if ic a t io n , bu t each o f 97 those i s an improvement over i t s immediate predecessor. S ig n ific a tio n narks the b ir th o f mind in human experience, w ith the p ra c tic a l resource- fu lness th a t only mind can provide to a liv in g c rea tu re t hu t sense, in add ition to providing immense p ra c tic a l value in the form o f apprehension, i s , even more im portantly in Dewey's view, the source, through apprecia- tio n , o f the enjoyment o f the richness and d iv e rs ity o f our experience and o f the world. T his, a s we have a lready seen , Dewey regards a s a " g i f t o f the gods" perhaps even "more valuable fo r l iv in g than i s th e intended 62r e s u l t o f c o n tro l, e s s e n t ia l a s i s th a t co n tro l to having a l i f e to l iv e ." But th e development can be seen in ano ther sense as a kind o f Hegelian d ia le c t ic . Feeling in i t s immediacy and indeterm inateness i s the th e s is . S ig n if ic a tio n i s the a n t i th e s is . I t in troduces determ ination and the p o s s ib i l i ty o f co n tro l. Sense then syn thesizes the two, preserv ing the b e st o f each-the immediacy and d irec tn ess o f fe e lin g , and the determ ina- t io n , s tru c tu re , and p ra c t ic a l u t i l i t y o f s ig n if ic a tio n . I t i s im portant to d is tin g u ish between the experience we have o f an o b jec t a s i t occurs in a to ta l ly non-cognitive context and the experience we have o f I t when we a re engaged in some s o r t o f inqu iry . I f one i s walking down the s t r e e t w ith no problems whatsoever on h is mind, simply engaged in an experience which P ro fesso r Browning c a l ls co astin g , can he be sa id to be perceiv ing e i th e r in the sense o f awareness o f s ig n if ic a - tio n o r o f awareness o f sense? I be lieve Dewey's view i s th a t he p e r- ceives in n e ith e r sense o f the term perception . For Dewey, we perceive in these two ways only when we a re e i th e r involved in in q u iry , o r ju s t a f t e r in q u iry has been completed and we a re savoring o r contem plating 98 i t s re s u l ts . So in the case in question , viss., th a t o f non-cognitively coasting along the s t r e e t , we do not perceive the sidewalk o r the passing c a rs , even in the sense o f being aware o f the sense o f the sidewalk. He simply respond to the sidew alk-stim uli, o r simply have the passing-car and o th e r q u a li ta tiv e s tim u li. In the essay , "Q u a lita tiv e Thought," Dewey d iscusses th is m atter in connection w ith the experience o f waters When w ater i s an adequate stim ulus to ac tio n o r when i t s reac tio n s oppress and overwhelm us, i t remains ou tside the scope o f knowledge. When, however, the bare presence o f the th in g (say , a s o p tic a l stim - ulus) ceases to operate d ire c t ly as stim ulus to response and begins to operate in connection w ith a fo recas t o f the consequences i t w ill e f fe c t when responded to , i t begins to acqu ire meaning-to be known, to be an o b je c t. I t i s noted as something which i s w et, f lu id , s a t i s f i e s t h i r s t , a l la y s uneasiness, e tc . . . . As long as the v isu a l stim ulus operates as a stim ulus on i t s own account, th e re i s no ap- prehension, no n o tin g , o f co lo r o r l ig h t a t a l l . To much the g re a te r portion o f sensory s tim u li we re a c t in p re c ise ly th i s wholly non- .cognitive way. In the a t t i tu d e o f suspended response in which the consequences a re a n tic ip a te d , the d ire c t stim ulus becomes a sign o r index o f something e ls e -and thus m atter o f no ting o r apprehension o r acquaintance.63 For Dewey, then, a s I have sa id above, even perception a s presence o f sense occurs only in cognitive con tex ts, in connection w ith some in - qu iry we a re engaged in . I f my c a r breaks down on the expressway, I per- ceive the sense o f the q u a l i t ie s which c o n s ti tu te the cars behind me, by way o f try in g to s iz e up the s i tu a tio n and fin d a way out o f i t . But, un less I am in a t le a s t some degree engaged in Inqu iry , o r have ju s t f in - ished doing so , I g rasp no meaning whatsoever. I f e e l a to ta l q u a li ta - t iv e s itu a tio n and I respond to i t , o r , a s he says above, I am overwhelmed by i t , o r , a s the d iscussion o f "surplusage" in Essays in Experimental 64Logic in d ic a te s , I simply have i t , w ithout e i th e r responding to i t , I 99 being overwhelmed by i t , o r , le a s t o f a l l , in te rp re tin g i t . I spoke above about the immediate grasping o f the sense o f the q u a li- t i e s c o n s titu tin g my ty p ew rite r, lamp, books, and so on, which Dewey c a l ls apprehension* But such apprehension and i t s grasping o f sense does not occur a p a r t from some cu rren t inq u iry . And the kind o f grasping o f the meaning o f q u a l i t ie s and th ings which i s involved in contemplation does no t occur a p a rt from some in q u iry o f which i t i s the completion. At o th e r tim es, the ty p e w rlte r-q u a litie s may be responded to , o r merely had, but not perceived even as awareness o f sense. In the passage in Logic in which Dewey d iscusses the kind o f aware- ness o f sense which he here c a l l s apprehension, he says about i t th a t i t i s a kind o f awareness in which a f t e r considerable experience . . . we come to reoognize ob jects on s ig h t . I see o r note d ire c t ly th a t th is i s a ty p ew rite r, th a t i s a book, the o th e r th ing i s a ra d ia to r , e tc . Ib is kind o f d ire c t "knowledge" I s h a l l c a l l apprehension. I t i s se iz in g o r grasping, in te l le c tu a l ly , w ithout question ing , , . . But the im portant point fo r the purpose o f the p resen t top ic i s th a t e i th e r an immediate overt response occurs, l ik e using the typew rite r o r picking up the book (in which case the s i tu a tio n i s not a cogn itiona l one), or th a t the o b jec t noted i s p a rt o f an a c t o f inqu iry d irec ted toward knowledge o r warranted a s s e r t i o n . ® 5 Now th is claim th a t our perception in a non-cognitive s itu a tio n is e n tire ly o f un in te rp re ted q u a l i t ie s , u n in te rp re ted e i th e r as q u a li t ie s o f a c e r ta in nature o r as o b je c ts , perhaps seems im plausib le. Surely , one i s in c lin ed to o b jec t, th e re i s more involved in even a coasting ex- perience than the mere fe e lin g o f a q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a t io n . I t would seem th a t in our o rd inary , waking, but not prim arily cognitive experience we a re aware o f o b je c ts . I f I am walking down the s t r e e t , no t exercised by any problem, bu t ju s t coasting , do I not perceive more than mere "submerged" 100 and "obsessive" q u a li t ie s ? Do I not experience, even though no t obser- vantly o r concentrated ly , c a rs , people, s to re s , c a ts , shadows on the s t r e e t , s igns on windows, and so on? And do these no t appear to me not ju s t when I am being a l i t t l e curious about the way th ings a re looking today, say , on the f i r s t warm, b rig h t day in q u ite a while (which is re a lly a kind o f inqu iry in which I s e t myself a problem), but even when I am not in q u irin g a t a l l ? Even when I am coasting along, w ith no prob- lem occupying ray a tte n tio n , ju s t ly ing on the beach s ta r in g a t the sea and soaking up the sun, fo r example, and even on the fringe o r horizon o f my perceptual f ie ld when I am re f le c t in g , there seems to be a percep- tio n o f o b jec ts . Now, as I w rite th i s , I am engaged in a r e f le c t iv e , Inqu iring kind o f experience. On the horizon o f my perceptual f ie ld , meantime, there a re the sounds and shapes and co lo rs o f people s i t t in g a t the counter o f the re s tau ran t where I am. Am I not aware o f these people and the counter and the s to o ls on which they a re s i t t i n g , not merely as c lu s te rs o f u n in te rp re ted q u a l i t ie s , bu t as q u a l i t ie s with the meaning ( in the form of sense) of human beings, s to o ls , counter, conver- sa tio n , lau g h te r, and so on-meanings funded and made autom atic by pre- vious In q u iries? I t i s te r r ib ly d i f f i c u l t to perform the phenomenological o r "empir- ic a l , denotative" experiment required to answer these questions. To do so req u ires looking a t an experience which was n o n -re flec tiv e and noncognitive from a re f le c t iv e and cognitive point o f view. And doing th is seems in ev itab ly to turn th a t o r ig in a l experience in to a re f le c t iv e ex- perience, so th a t the f ie ld o f perception does indeed become one o f I 101 o b jects r a th e r than one o f c lu s te rs o f u n in te rp re ted q u a l i t ie s . Never- th e le ss ! armed ag a in s t such a danger, i t seems to me th a t one can recap- tu re the p re -re f le c tiv e experience a s i t was liv e d . As I re f le c te d on th is problem, fo r examplej I was looking in the d ire c tio n o f the d raperies of the re s ta u ra n t in which I was s i t t i n g , I had o r f e l t the q u a l i t ie s o f these d rap e rie s , but no t as red o r o f a c e r ta in shape o r tex tu re j in f a c t , no t a s anything a t a l l . They were ju s t b a re , dumb q u a l i t ie s . The kind o f re f le c tio n I am involved in , when d irec ted a t a p r io r experience, does indeed tu rn the content o f th a t experience in to o b je c ts . P r io r to such r e f le c t io n , the con ten t, the tha t-w hich-is-experienced , i s , I b e liev e , a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s submerged in the general q u a li ta tiv e s i tu a tio n . One may, however, respond to these u n in te rp re ted q u a l i t ie s , I may wince and grimace because o f the b i t t e r ly cold wind blowing in my face w ithout even bothering to id e n tify i t as wind o r b i t t e r ly cold . And, while coasting down the s t r e e t , I fe e l the q u a l i t ie s o f the sidewalk under my fe e t and, k in e s th e tic a lly , my own movements, and I respond to these v isu a l and k in e s th e tic cues in such a way as to co n s titu te walking. But these cues a re responded to no t a s ob jec ts o r meaningful cues, but as unnoted, dumb q u a l i t ie s , I do, however, take exception to Dewey's a s se r tio n th a t f a r the g re a te r p a r t o f our experience i s o f th is s o r t . I b e liev e , as I in - d ica ted above (p , 59)» th a t we a re engaged in some s o r t o f simple in - q u iry about the q u a l i t ie s th a t we a re experiencing much more o ften than Dewey seems to recognize. I t seems to me, th e re fo re , th a t Dewey underin te l le c tu a l iz e s experience. In the experience which he mentions in the I 102 "In troduction" to Essays in Experimental Logic, fo r example, in which we a re "paying a tte n tio n to a young woman" and not in q u irin g about whether, l e t us say, she would make a good w ife, I be lieve we might nevertheless be tak ing note o f fe a tu re s o f the young lady in connection with some s o r t o f a question which has come up in our minds. I cannot imagine a s tre tc h o f experience much longer than perhaps f iv e minutes in which we do no t encounter some question o r o th e r, and th e re fo re perceive the meaning o f q u a l i t ie s . So, although I agree with Dewey th a t what i s on the edge o r horizon o f our perceptual f ie ld i s n o t i t s e l f perceived with meaning, i t seems to me th a t in te llig e n c e and inqu iry come in to our experience and our perception much more frequen tly and ex tensively than Dewey seems to allow fo r , a t le a s t in such l a t e r works a s Logic: The Theory o f Inquiry and "Q ualita tive Thought. Dewey recognizes a kind o f experience, which he a lso c a l ls " fe e lin g ," and which i s a kind of perception which l i e s in between the purely noncognitive perception to which he u sually ap p lie s the term "fee ling" and the perception of ob jects which occurs in perception o f s ig n if ic a tio n and o f sense. The use o f the term I am re fe r r in g to occurs in the very in te r - e s tin g essay, "Q ualita tive Thought," and a lso in Logic: The Theory of 69In q u iry . A consideration o f the use o f the term "fee lin g " in these works w ill not only b ring to our a tte n tio n ano ther kind o f experience o r perception which Dewey recognizes in these l a t e r works, but a lso provide fu r th e r c la r i f ic a t io n o f Dewey's view o f how the cognitive kinds o f per- ception r e la te to the non-cognitive background out o f which they develop, i . e . , fe e lin g . 103 What Dewey says in these works i s th a t in a t le a s t some o f the cases o f our fe e lin g o f a q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a t io n , th a t s i tu a t io n , though " re la 68t iv e ly dumb and in a r t ic u la te ," nev erth e less involves a re a liz a tio n o f something bordering on s ig n ific a n ce . This re a liz a tio n i s not e x p l ic i t , 60 but i t i s a "hunch" 7 which provides the b a sis fo r the e x p l ic i t percep- tio n s th a t occur l a t e r to r e f le c t io n . Dewey uses a s an example o f what he means the background o f the perception of a lump o f sugar o r perhaps some honey a s th a t which one can use to sweeten something, one 's coffee 70perhaps. What happens in such a case i s th a t one has a problem o f fin d - ing something to sweeten h is co ffee . He i s in a problem atic s i tu a tio n . The s itu a tio n would n o t be problem atic i f the source o f a sweetener fo r h is coffee were ready a t hand in i t s usual p lace . There would then be simply the h ab itu a l response to the f e l t sugar-bowl q u a l i t ie s over in th e i r usual place on the b reak fas t ta b le . But in the instance in ques- tio n something i s awry, and th i s o u t-o f jo in t q u a lity o f the s itu a tio n causes i t to become problem atic. Let us suppose the sugar bowl i s empty, and one must th e re fo re find an a l te rn a t iv e way o f sweetening h is co ffee . So he looks around and esp ies a j a r o f honey. The j a r o f honey i s then perceived as th a t which w ill s u b s t i tu te as a sweetener fo r h is coffee. The sense o f i t as a j a r o f honey i s perceived in the mode of apprehen- sio n ; i t s u s a b il i ty fo r sweetening th is cup o f coffee in the mode o f s ig - n if ic a t io n . But before i t i s so perceived th e re i s a p r io r fe e lin g of the whole s i tu a tio n . This whole f e l t s itu a tio n Dewey, following James, 71describes as a "b ig , buzzing, blooming confusion." But i t i s not merely th i s , fo r i t 10J* buzzes to some e f fe c t ; i t blooms toward some f ru ita g e . That i s , the q u a li ty , although dumb, has as a p a r t o f i t s complex q u a lity a movement o r t ra n s it io n in some d ire c tio n . I t can, th e re fo re , be in te l le c tu a l ly symbolized and converted in to an ob ject o f thought. This i s done by a statem ent o f l im its and o f d ire c tio n o f t r a n s i - tio n between them. "That" and "sweet" define the lim its o f the moving q u a lity , . . . P u tting the nature o f the two lim its b r ie f ly and w ithout any attem pt to ju s t i f y the statem ent here, the su b jec t rep resen ts the pervasive q u a li ty as means o r oondition and the pred- ic a te rep resen ts i t as outcome o r e n d .72 There i s , then, in th is f e l t bu t uncognized s itu a tio n a complex qua l- i t y which c o n s ti tu te s the p o te n tia l i ty fo r an e x p l ic i t perception o f the honey as th a t which w ill sweeten o n e 's coffee. Before one has th is ex- p l i c i t percep tion , one has am im p lic it "hunch" o r " in tu itio n " o f the whole s itu a tio n a s allow ing fo r the p o s s ib il i ty o f using honey as a sweetener. But such a hunch, such " th in k in g ," i s done purely in connection with the q u a l i t ie s them selves, w ithout the employment o f any symbols o r meaning. 73Dewey says in an in te re s t in g footnote th a t even animals might be sa id to engage in th is kind of p re -re f le c tiv e hunching. This, he specu- la te s , could account fo r what the G esta lt psychologists c a l l " in s ig h t." That to ta l q u a lity operates with animals and sometimes secu res, as w ith monkeys, re - s u l ts l ik e those which we obtain by re f le c t iv e an a ly s is cannot, i t seems to me, be doubted. But th a t th is operation of q u a lity in e ffe c tin g r e s u lts then goes in to symbolization and an a ly sis i s qu ite ano ther m atter. What i s given to perception , then , is p re c ise ly th is q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a t io n . I f , because o f a problem I have, and upon re f le c t io n , I s ing le out from the to ta l s i tu a t io n some c lu s te r o f q u a l i t ie s ( e .g . , the j a r of honey), th is i s an a c t o f taking and making something out o f the given q u a li ta tiv e s i tu a tio n . The o b jec t, a ja r o f honey, i s not given, e i th e r to th e ch ild o r to the seasoned perceiver s e t t in g out to drink a cup o f 105 co ffee . Each o f us goes through, with each a c t o f re f le c tiv e perception , a re p e ti t io n o f the h is to ry o f our o rie n ta tio n process, the h is to ry o f d iscovery-creation o f the ob jec ts th a t c o n s ti tu te our world. I t i s not a m atter o f having to go through the same re f le c t iv e inqu iry v is -a -v is every o b jec t. Some can be d ire c t ly apprehended as having the meaning ( th e i r essence) th a t they have. These a re , o f course, those th a t are perceived in the mode of. sense. But the perception o f a possib le new re la tio n sh ip between these o b jec ts ( e .g . , using honey to sweeten one 's coffee) does requ ire new re f le c t io n -and th a t perception i s therefo re in the mode o f s ig n if ic a tio n . There i s something involved, then, in the development of a world o f ob jec ts out o f the pervasive q u a li ta tiv e s itu a tio n which is analogous to the re p e titio n by ontogeny o f phylogeny. For, as Dewey says, the to ta l q u a li ta tiv e s itu a tio n with i t s submerged, dumb, blooming, and buzzing q u a l i t ie s i s "not only the s ta te o f a baby 's experience but the f i r s t stage and background o f a l l th ink ing [[and we can add percep tion] on any 74 su b jec t," So ju s t a s the in d iv id u a l, in i t s embryonic development, reproduces the whole development o f h is ra c e , so does percep tion , in each o f i t s emergences out o f mere fe e lin g , reproduce the h is to ry o f i t s development from the inchoate confusion of the c h i ld 's experience. We see , then, th a t , in Dewey's view, perception i s not o f iso la te d , independently and an tecedently ex is tin g ob jec ts th a t p resen t themselves as such to us. Nor, as we s h a l l see in the next chap ter, i s i t by an iso la te d , independently and an tecedently ex is tin g s e l f th a t they are perceived. Both the o b jec t and the s e l f a re d is tin c tio n s introduced 106 7*5In to the given, e x is tin g th ing which is th e to ta l q u a li ta tiv e s i tu a t io n , '^ and a re ju s t i f ie d in th a t in troduction not by v ir tu e o f th e i r supposed rev e la tio n o f antecedent r e a l i ty , hu t by v ir tu e o f t h e i r u t i l i t y in ac- complishing our desired re s u l ts . This perception o f q u a l i t ie s and o b jec ts th e re fo re occurs w ith in a " f ie ld ." They a re s in g led out o f a to ta l q u a li ta tiv e s i tu a tio n . And they r e f e r back to i t ; i t i s the su b jec t-m atte r to which they r e fe r . The " th is" and the "sweet" a re "c o rre la tiv e determ inations o f . . . an unde76termined and dominant complex q u a lity ," One p a rt o f Dewey0s theory o f perception which seems to me most revealing and innovative i s h is view o f the spatia l-tem poral spreadoutness o f the q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a tio n as w ell as o f the re fined ob jec ts o f perception of sense and s ig n if ic a tio n . This i s a c h a ra c te r is t ic of Dewey0s view th a t I re fe rre d to in the In troduction to th is d is s e r ta tio n when I quoted a passage from Experience and Nature in which Dewey r i d i - cu les the ty p ic a l ph ilosoph ical account o f , say, O thello*s perception o f the handkerchief as con sis tin g "o f a co lo r under c e r ta in conditions o f l ig h t and shapes seen under c e r ta in angular conditions o f v is io n . But the a c tu a l experience was charged with h is to ry and prophecy! f u l l o f love; je a lo u s ly , v i l la in y , f u l f i l l in g p ast human re la tio n sh ip s and mov77ing f a ta l ly to tra g ic d e s t in y ." " Dewey d iscusses the s p a t ia l and temporal spread-outness o f th e f e l t q u a li ta tiv e s i tu a tio n in Logic a s w ell. Here he a c tu a lly re fe rs to the p re -re f le c tiv e experience o f the q u a li ta tiv e s itu a tio n i t s e l f a s percep- tio n , and uses the term observation fo r what I have been c a ll in g , in 10? accordance with h is usage elsewhere, perception of sense and s ig n if ic a - tio n , (This deviation in terminology and even, as we have seen in the case o f fe e lin g , in d o c trin e , i s one of the exasperating c h a ra c te r is tic s o f Dewey's thought.) He speaks o f th is perception a s being non-cognitive, and o f being o f "objects" which are no t, however, ob jects o f knowledge o r observation, but of an environment as a "scene o f ac tio n s performed and o f consequences undergone in processes o f in te ra c tio n ; only secondarily do p a rts and aspects o f i t become ob jects o f knowledge. I t s co n stitu en ts 7 8a re f i r s t o f a l l ob jects of use and enjoym ent-suffering," Now we could conceivably in te rp re t th is kind o f perception as per- ception o f sense, fo r he does say i t is o f "o b jec ts ." However, on p, 1^3 o f the same work, Logic, he speaks o f apprehension in the same way in which he speaks o f perception o f sense in Experience and N ature, and there (in Logic, th a t i s ) ta lk s o f apprehension a s occurring only in cognitive s i tu 7 9a tio n s as p a r t , then, o f what he here 7 c a l l s the observational process. Otherwise, he says, we do not have apprehension o r e x p l ic i t cognition , but Q0 "immediate overt response," fo r example, to a f e l t ty pew rite r o r book. This kind of non-cognitive perception of the ty p ew rite r and the book may seem to c o n s titu te a fourth kind o f perception , but in so fh r as i t is a response to a f e l t q u a lity or c lu s te r o f q u a l i t ie s and does no t involve the presence o f symbolization and meaning, I be lieve i t belongs in the category of fe e lin g . He may here regard i t , however, as having the kind o f im p lic it and p o te n tia l meaningfulness, by v irtu e o f a pervasive q u a lity , th a t he recognizes in the essay, "Q u alita tiv e Thought." I t seems a lso to be the same kind o f experience th a t he ta lk s o f in the "Introduction" of 108 Essays In Experimental Logic as the so c io -a ffec tio n a l experience o f the world. But to re tu rn to the po in t th a t in i t ia te d these observations: Dewey says o f th is kind of perception th a t i t i s o f an "environment" which "forms an extensive tem p o ra l-sp a tia l f ie ld . . , . [[For] the maintenance 81of l i f e i s a continuous a f f a i r . " To respond ap p ro p ria te ly to the environment involves an adap ta tion "to fu tu re conditions o r death w ill 82speedily ensue." But i t a lso involves continuing to respond to a past event, fo r , a s he says in the ea rly essay, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," the occurrence o f a stim ulus i s not i t s e l f s u f f ic ie n t to t r ig g e r running, fo r example, as an attem pt to escape danger. The o rig - in a l "sound experience must p e r s is t as a value in the running to keep i t up, to con tro l i t , " ^ So the continuation o f l i f e and the p o s s ib il i ty o f p e rs is tin g in an in teg ra ted ac tio n such as playing a composition on a musical instrum ent or v ir tu a l ly any o ther kind o f am ac tio n involves a response to q u a l i t ie s th a t a re p a s t, p resen t, and fu tu re , both here in th is place amd in some o th e r p lace. And those q u a li t ie s which re f le c t iv e an a ly s is focuses on w ithin the to ta l q u a li ta tiv e s i tu a t io n , amd forges in to o b jec ts , a re a lso tem porally and s p a tia l ly spread o u t. For an o b jec t i s n o t ju s t a s e t o f q u a l i t ie s now presen t to a p e rc ip ien t organism. An o b jec t i s so "by v irtu e o f the consequences o f which the e x is te n t q u a l i t ie s , be they few o r many a re s ig n s, and o f which they a re the conditions provided operations in s t i tu te 8kc e rta in in te ra c tio n s no t then and th e re occurring ," So what one i s aware of when one perceives, fo r example, the j a r o f honey i s what w ill 109 happen, v iz . , sweetened coffee even in the absence o f sugar today i f the ac tio n o f s t i r r i n g some o f the honey in the coffee i s undertaken. The ob ject th e re fo re involves in i t s veiy nature fu tu re ac tio n s and th e i r consequences. Dewey here s in g le s out the fu tu re o f q u a l i t ie s and our ac tio n s in response to them as being im plicated in the na tu re o f o b jec ts . But e ls e - where, as we have seen, he re fe rs to the p a st of the o b jec t as an essen- t i a l p a r t o f what we perceive, Desderaona's handkerchief i s what i t i s as perceived by O thello no t ju s t because o f what i t means in the fu tu re , but a lso because o f what i t has been in the p a s t. As perceived by him, as Dewey says, i t i s charged w ith prophecy and h is to ry . This recognition o f the spatio-tem poral spread-outness o f the ob jec ts 86o f our perceptual experience, and i t s fundamentally dynamic ch arac te r, seems to me perhaps the most s ig n if ic a n t con trib u tio n Dewey has made to our understanding of percep tion . By i t s "dynamic" ch a rac te r I mean the ftic t th a t perception o f sense and s ig n if ic a t io n , and perhaps a lso f e e l- ing in c e r ta in o f i t s modes, have an e s s e n tia l reference to fu tu re ac tion in response to a problem atic s i tu a t io n which consciousness has a risen to a ttem pt to so lve. What i s e sp e c ia lly lacking in most philosophers' ac- counts o f perception i s th is recognition o f why perception occurs, th is p u ttin g o f perception in the con tex t o f experience as a whole. What ch arac te rizes the account which most philosophers give o f per- ception i s the assumption th a t we a re sp ec ta to rs o f the world in our per8 7ception o f i t , looking out upon i t in a k ind o f detached contem plation, A physica l o b jec t, from such a view, has two c h a ra c te r is t ic s , both o f 110 which Dewey den ies i t has* (a) i t i s e s s e n tia l ly ir r e le v a n t to us and our p ro je c ts and needs, and (b) i t i s a se lf-en c lo sed , encapsulated sub- stance , One f in d s , then , in most contemporary th e o rie s o f perception a yanking o f perception out o f i t s a c tu a l p ra c t ic a l context and an an a ly s is o f i t in terms o f a pure contem plative knowing. We a re to ld th a t our experience o f the world and o f ourselves i s a m atter o f the inspec tion of a complete and fin ish ed world by a purely detached in te l l e c t whose only in te r e s t i s to note the way th ings a re . We may, o f course, go on to use these detached observations in the so lu tio n s o f our problems, but they themselves a re not e s s e n tia l ly re la te d to those problems. For Dewey, on the co n tra ry , one observes only in regard, to o n e 's problems. There i s no t even a moment o f d is in te re s te d inspection in percep tion . Dewey in s i s t s , then , th a t even the p u rest in te l le c tu a l in q u iry i s never so com pletely detached as these perception-comm entators would have us be lieve perception i s . Even the s c ie n t i s t examining h is c a re fu lly re fin ed data i s examining them w ith regard to th e i r s ig n ific an ce v is -a - v is a theory th a t he hopes to prove o r to d isprove. An example o f such a theory o f perception (a theory which regards perception a s the d is in te re s te d inspection by a sp e c ta to r o f the world around him) i s th a t of H. H. P rice . The H. H, P rice o f the alm ost c la s - s ic work, P ercep tion , th inks o f perception as being something l ik e " in tu - i t io n " in th a t the percep tual o b jec t appears d ire c t ly o r Immediately to the p e rce iv e r. We immediately and d ire c t ly apprehend the house, P rice contends, a s having the f ro n t surface we sense, and as being "a house, with four ou tside w alls and many in s id e ones: a l l th i s and nothing le s s I l l i s what I take to e x is t . And not only so i what I take to e x is t i s o ften n o t ju s t a house bu t a p a r t ic u la r house, with such and such a p a r tic u la r s o r t o f back . . . and such and such a s e t o f rooms, thus and thus s i tu i s no t an a c t iv i ty . I t i s no t a "doing" (though o f course i t may and u su a lly does accompany "doings" o f a p ra c t ic a l k ind), There i s in i t no element of fu ss in e ss , no wondering o r question ing . One does n o t have to take troub le over i t --it i s a b lessed r e l i e f from the lab o r o f d iscu rsiv e thought. The only e f f o r t required (and o f course i t may be very g re a t) i s th a t o f g e ttin g ourselves in to the r ig h t bodily o r mental s ta te , a s when we buy a p a ir o f sp ec ta c le s , o r climb a mountain to see what i s on the o th e r side . . , , but once we have go t in to the r ig h t s ta te o f body o r mind there i s no more to do. The Ihing (be i t re a l o r un real) j u s t comes, along i t ju s t dawns upon us o f i t s e l f . We look There i s no c le a re r and more d e ta iled statem ent o f the sp ec ta to r theory of percep tion . The house, the canyon, the mountain, and the p a ir o f sp ec tac les l i e there complete and se lf-e n c lo se d , ju s t what they a re , w aiting fo r us contem plative observers to read o f f t h e i r in h eren t q u a li- t i e s , And th a t a c t i s passive recep tio n , in which no doing o r a c t iv i ty whatsoever i s involved. For Dewey, on the co n tra ry , even when we have go t our bodies and our eyes in p o s itio n to look a t the sp ec tac le s , the perception is an a c t o f tak ing note o f q u a li t ie s v is -a -v is p ro jec ts o r ends-in-view we have. We do no t ju s t passively receive the Ih ing , We note i t s shape w ith respect to whether i t w ill be appropria te fo r the s iz e o f our faces, We note the degree of darkness o f the lenses with resp ec t to whether they w ill su f- f ic ie n t ly remove the g la re from o b jec ts . We note the hinges o f the stems as they a tta c h to the body w ith respec t to whether they a re s u f f ic ie n tly s trong to hold w ith much use. a te d ," 88 And a l l o f th i s , P rice adds, i s in tu i t iv e l ik e in th a t i t 112 Perception , in sh o r t, i s indeed a doing. I t i s not a mere receiv ing o f a fin ish ed Thing. I t i s tak ing d a ta and regarding them from the per- sp ec tiv e o f purposes which we have which have made us look a t the o b jec t in the f i r s t p lace. I f we did not have any purpose o r end-in-view fo r which the perception o f the o b jec t, e .g . , the sp ec tac le s , was re le v an t, we would merely receive u n in te rp re ted q u a l i t ie s dumbly, in the mode o f fe e lin g . He would not apprehend aui o b jec t; we would simply have q u a l i t ie s , A perceived o b jec t i s something th a t can be used, and i t is perceived p rec ise ly in re la t io n to th a t use to which i t can be pu t. There i s th e re - fo re , one must re g re t to suggest to P rice , no end to the wondering, ques- tio n in g , and fussing which ch a rac te rizes perception a s w ell a s "d iscu rsive thought" sh o rt o f no consciousness a t a l l . I f th i s does not seem reason- ab le to the reader, l e t him ask h im self ju s t what s o r ts o f th ings he per- ce iv es , and whether th a t perception i s n o t always the no ting o f a charac- t e r i s t i c o f the th ing , say , the s iz e o f a p a ir o f sp ec ta c le s , with regard onto some end-in-view he has. NOTES 1. Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 258. 2. Ib id . . p. 178. 3. Ib id . . pp. 178-79. k . I b id . , p. 177. Dewey tak es th is expression from a book by Max Meyer ca lled The Psychology o f th e Other One (1922), a book Dewey p ra ises as "a statem ent o f b eh av io ris tic psychology th a t has hardly received the a tte n tio n i t in t r in s ic a l ly deserves." 5. Quotation from Max Meyer, The Psychology o f the Other One, in Dewey, Experience and N ature, p. 176 . 6 . Dewey, E xp erien ce and N a tu re , p. 177. 7 . Ib id . . pp. 179-80. 8 . I b id . , p . 179. 9 . Ib id . . p. 180. 10. Ib id . . p. 187. 11. Ib id . . p. 188. 12. Ib id . . p . 188. 13. Ib id . . p. 188. 1^. Ib id . . p. 188. 15. Dewey, Logic» The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 109t "Observation o f fa c ts and suggested meanings o r ideas a r is e and develop in correspondence with each o th e r ." ( I t a l i c s mine.) 16. Ib id . . p. 109. 17. Dewey, E xp erien ce and N a tu re , p . 189 . 18. Ib id . . p. 189. 19. As Dewey came to c a l l i t in Knowing and the Known (Boston1 Beacon P ress, 19^9)• 113 - n k 20. For more on th i s , Dewey's "ob jective re la tiv ism ," see the d iscussion o f Dewey's thought in A rthur Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism (second ed itio n ; La S a l le , I l l . i Open Court Publishing Co., 19^0 [_ f i r s t published, 1930]), Chapter 3, and below, pp. 137-38. 21. Dewey, Experience and Nature. p. I 89, 22. Ib id . . p. 187. 23. Ib id . . p. 187. 2k, Ib id . . p. 261. 25. Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f Inqu iry , p. 1*4-3. 26. P rofessor Robert W. Browning in a l e t t e r to the au thor, 27. John Dewey, Theory o f Valuation (Chicago 1 U niversity of Chicago P ress, 1939)# p. 33. 28. Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 106. 29. Dewey, Theory o f V aluation, p. 33. 30. Dewey, Logic» The Theory of Inqu iry , p. 1^3, In Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, and Co., 193*0» and sometimes in Experience and Nature, he uses the term "recognition" fo r th is kind o f perception. See pp. 52-53 o f Art a s Experience and p. 182 o f Experience and N ature. 31. Dewey, Experience and N ature, pp. 182-83. The term "crea te" and the term "d iscover," as I sun using them here , a re no t taken from Dewey's own d iscussion , but a re my own suggestions based on my in te rp re ta tio n o f h is d iscussion , 32. Dewey, A rt a s Experience, p. 256 . 33. Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 351-52; Experience and Nature, p. 376. J k , Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 16-18. 35. Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inqu iry , p. 61. 36 . Ib id . p. 62 . 37. I t a l i c s mine. Note th a t i t i s the po in t in inqu iry a t which i t i s grasped th a t determ ines whether perception of sense i s apprehension o r ap p rec ia tio n . 38 . Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, pp. 16-18, 115 39. I b i d . . p. 18. 40. Dewey, E xperience and N a tu re , pp. 81 f f . 41. Ib id . . pp. 82-83. 42. Ib id . . p. 83. 43. Ib id . . p. 271. 44. I am indebted to P rofessor Browning fo r the term "se n se -fu l," 45. Dewey, L o g ic t th e Theory o f In q u ir y , p. 143. 46. Dewey, E xperience and N a tu re , p. 331. 47. Dewey, Essays in E x p e rim e n ta l L o g ic , p. 17. I b id . , p. 353. 49. Dewey, E xp erien ce and N a tu re , p. 331. 50. Dewey, Essays in E x p e rim e n ta l L o g ic , p. 352. 51. John Dewey, Quest fo r C erta in ty (New Yorki G. P. Putnam's Sons, Capricorn Books, i 960 (_f i r s t published, I 929] ) , p. 238. 52. Ib id . . p. 236. 53. R o bert F ro s t , "S top p in g By Woods on a Snowy E v en in g ," 54. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 40, 55. Ib id . . p. 19. 56. Dewey, E xperience and N a tu re , p. ?8, 57. Ib id . . p. 81. 58. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 55. 59* An experience i s " d is t in c t iv e ly e s th e tic " in which the main in te re s t o r purpose th a t i n i t i a t e s o r co n tro ls i t i s to have th a t experience ra th e r than to solve a p ra c t ic a l o r in te l le c tu a l d i f f ic u l ty (Art as Experience, p. 55)• 60, Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 45, 61. I b id . , p. 45. 116 62. Dewey, Essays In Experimental Logic, p. 18, 63. B ernste in , e d . , John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 5k. I t a l i c s mine, 6k , Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 39k . 65 . Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f Inqu iry , p, 1^3. 66. For the e a r l ie r view, however, see Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 39k , footnote 1 . 67 . B e rn s te in , e d . , John Dewey on E x p e rie n c e . N a tu re , and Freedom, pp. 17698 ; Dewey. L o g ic : The Theory o f In q u ir y , pp. 68-70. 68. B ernste in , e d ., John Dewey on Experience. Nature, and Freedom, p. 18^, 69 . Ib id . . p. 183. 70. I an tak ing the l ib e r ty o f am plifying h is example somewhat. Dewey h im self does not ta lk o f the o b jec t a s being perceived, but ra th e r as th e o b jec t o f an a c t o f judgment{ b u t the perception o f s ig n i f i - c a tio n , a s we have seen, i s the product o f r e f le c t iv e thought o r inqu iry as w ell, 71. B ern ste in , e d ., John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 190. 72. Ib id . . p. 190. 73. I b id . , p. 196. 7 k . Ib id . . p. 190. 75. When Dewey d is tin g u ish ed between o b je c t, which i s a product o f thought and in q u iry , and event, the ac tu a l e x is te n t , he means by the l a t t e r the q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a t io n i t s e l f . See Schilpp , e d ,, Philosophy o f John Dewey, p. 5^8, and B ernste in , e d , , John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 189 . 76 . B ernste in , e d ., John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 188. 77. Dewey, Experience and Nature ( f i r s t e d i t io n ) , p. 56. 78 . Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 150. 79. Ib id . . p . 150. 80. I b id . , p. 1^3. 81. Ib id . . p. 150. 117 82. Ib id . . p. 150. 83 . John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological Review. I l l (Ju ly , I 896) , p . 363 . 8^. Dewey, Logic: The Theory o f Inqu iry , p. 130. 85 . Dewey, Experience and Nature ( f i r s t e d i t io n ) , p. 56. 86. See John Smith, The S p i r i t o f American Philosophy (New Yorki Oxford U niversity P ress , 19^3), p. 119* There i s in Dewey's philosophy "a fundamental tendency" to " tra n s la te the s t a t i c in to the dynamic and rep lace substance o r e n t i t i e s w ith fu n c tio n s ." 87 . See Dewey, A rt a s Experience, pp. 52-53* "We are given to supposing" th a t perception "merely takes in what i s there in fin ish ed form, in s tead o f r e a l iz in g th a t th is tak ing in involves a c t i v i t i e s th a t a re comparable to those o f the c re a to r ." 88. H. H. P rice , Perception (London: Methuen and Co., 1950)» PP* 151-52. 89. Ib id . . pp. 152-53. 90. See Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 392, fo r Dewey's development o f th is p o in t. CHAPTER IV PERCEPTION AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND As I Ind ica ted early in th is d is s e r ta t io n , one o f the most in te r e s t - ing and s ig n if ic a n t aspects o f Dewey''s theory o f perception i s i t s import fo r c e r ta in d i f f i c u l t problems about the nature o f mind. I would l ik e now to d iscuss Dewey's theory from th is po in t o f view by considering how h is theory o f perception allow s fo r h is view o f "mind" and i t s re la tio n to the "body," and by o ffe rin g a defense o f th a t view. I t w ill be noticed th a t I put the terms "mind" and "body" in quota- tio n marks in the preceding paragraph. I did so because, a s we s h a l l see below, Dewey does not regard mind and body as independently e x is tin g e n t i t i e s which a re named by the two terms re sp ec tiv e ly . Dewey does no t th ink o f the world as co n sis tin g o rig in a lly and fundamentally of minds and bodies. R ather a re these concepts th a t we employ, w ith in a sp e c if ic con tex t, to accomplish c e r ta in purposes. Dewey's view, which I s h a l l be try in g to defend, i s th a t mind and body a re notions th a t have o rig in a ted out o f a more fundamental r e a l i ty th a t u n d erlies them. They a re th e re fo re not an teceden tly ex is tin g r e a l - i t i e s , which a re somehow m ysteriously re la te d to each o th e r. They a re ca teg o ries employed to f a c i l i t a t e dealing with c e r ta in d i f f i c u l t i e s th a t a r is e in the world th a t antecedes them, which i s a world th a t i s n e ith e r mental nor ph y sica l. His view i s th e re fo re very s im ila r to Jam es's as presented in "Does Consciousness Exist?"* 118 I 119 Dewey p re fe rs to avoid using the te rn "mind" to describe the subjec- t iv e s id e o f experience. His aversion to doing so i s based on i t s sug- gestions o f transcenden ta l s ta tu s . He h in s e l fy in describ ing the way in which the d is tin c tio n between the sub jec tiv e and ob jective comes about w ithin the underlying r e a l i ty , p re fe rs to use the term Morganism" o r " s e lf" fo r the su b jec tiv e s id e . In what fo llow s, th e re fo re , i t may some- tim es seem th a t I am o ffe rin g Dewey's theory o f the problem o f the r e la - tio n o f organism and environment r a th e r than th a t o f mind and body. In f a c t , however, what Dewey says in general about the way the ca teg o ries o f sub jec tiv e and o b je c tiv e , o r organism and environment, o r ig in a te , and about what they mean, he th inks a p p lie s to the mind-body ca teg o ries as w ell-except th a t fo r him the sub jec tiv e side o f experience i s the organ- ism, n o t the mind, amd the o b jec tive side i s the world, no t the body. In genera l, however, th is su b jec tiv e -o b jec tiv e d is t in c tio n , whether one in te rp re ts i t a s re fe r r in g to a mind-body o r to an organism-environment d is t in c t io n , i s a fu n c tio n a l, not an abso lu te one. Philosophers have mis- takenly assumed th a t o b jec ts and q u a l i t ie s forged out o f the underlying r e a l i ty and re fe rre d to the su b jec tiv e side r e a l ly and ab so lu te ly belong th e re , and they have posited a mental realm to hold them. The m ental, o r su b jec tiv e , i s , in Dewey's view, simply a category to separa te o f f from the environment q u a l i t ie s and o b jec ts which fo r o th e r purposes one may 2 wish to include in i t . In th i s chap ter, then, I s h a l l attem pt to show how Dewey's theory o f perception enables him to develop a philosophy o f mind which, I b e lie v e , so lves the problems which have plagued ph ilosoph ical thought on th i s 120 su b jec t a t le a s t since D escartes. We have a lready seen how Dewey's view o f th a t kind o f perception ca lled "fee lin g " allow s fo r a so lu tio n o f one o f the b asic problems in philosophy o f mind (as w ell as epistem ology). Hie problem I re fe r to i s th a t o f how thought can presume to have any connection w ith the re a l world. How can we know th a t a group o f thoughts o r ideas which we have in our minds has any resemblance to the world th a t i s ou tside our minds, o r , indeed, th a t th e re i s any world outside our minds? Hay we n o t, a s D escartes supposed p o ssib le , be deceived by an e v i l demon, be dreaming, h a llu c in a ted , e tc .? Why suppose, on the b asis o f an in n e r conviction , th a t our thoughts conform to d ie Sachen se lb s t? Dewey answers by saying th a t th is sk e p tic a l p o s itio n i s indeed in - ev ita b le i f we g ran t the premise th a t our experience i s exclusively a m atter o f thoughts o r ideas in an iso la te d mind. I f experience i s always cognition occurring in a mind, then there i s no way o f knowing whether i t has any resemblance to the way th ings a re . But i f a t le a s t some o f our experience i s no t only experience but a lso r e a l i ty , then the connec- tio n o f experience with r e a l i ty i s assured . Feeling i s p re c ise ly th a t mode o f experience in which thought and r e a l i ty in te r s e c t . Feeling i s no t the thought o f somethingj i t i s the something. To f e e l o r have a fo u l odor i s no t to th ink o f o r cognize th a t odort i t i s f o r th a t odor to be. This view i s c lo se ly re la te d to Dewey's view th a t main i s continuous with n a tu re , n o t a transcenden tal In te r lo p e r th e re in . I f we were d is - embodied, transcendental souls somehow contem plating a world outside us, 121 o as the tra d it io n has assuaed (even when n o t re a liz in g i t does so assume), then the Mproblem o f knowledge" would be In so lub le , There would be no conceivable way o f te s t in g one claim o f the mind over ano ther one. Such a theory , a s Dewey puts i t , l e t s the id e a l i s t camel in the r e a l te n t , which he then devours. The theory o f a disembodied, transcenden tal mind, Dewey says, i s not derived from an examination of experience. I t i s ra th e r the impo- s i t io n o f a conception once u n iv e rsa lly en te r ta in ed regarding the su b jec t o r b ea re r o r c en te r o f experience. The d esc rip tio n o f experience has been forced in to conformity w ith th is p r io r conceptionj i t has been p rim arily a deduction from i t , a c tu a l em pirica l fa c ts being poured in to the moulds o f the deductions. The c h a ra c te r is t ic fea- tu re o f th i s p r io r notion i s the assumption th a t experience cen te rs in , o r ga thers about, o r proceeds from a cen te r o r su b jec t which i s outside the course o f n a tu ra l ex istence , and s e t over ag a in s t i t -i t being o f no importance, fo r presen t purposes, whether th is a n t i th e t ic a l su b jec t i s termed so u l, o r s p i r i t , o r mind, o r ego, o r consciousness, o r ju s t knower o r knowing subject.^" Dewey suspects th a t th is conception o f experience i s derived from c e r ta in re lig io u s groundsi There a re p lau sib le grounds fo r th ink ing th a t the currency o f the idea in question [ th e transcenden ta l s e l f o r knower] l i e s In the form which men's re lig io u s preoccupations took f o r many cen tu rie s . These were d e lib e ra te ly and system atica lly o ther-w orld ly . They centered about a K ill which was n o t an event in n a tu re , bu t an a b o rig in a l catastrophe th a t corrupted Nature} about a redemption made possib le by supernatu ra l means} about a l i f e In ano ther world- e s s e n tia l ly , not merely s p a t ia l ly , o th e r. The supreme drama o f d estin y took place in a sou l o r s p i r i t which, under the circum- stan ces, could no t be conceived o th e r than as non-natu ra l-ex tra - n a tu ra l , i f n o t, s t r i c t l y speaking, su p ernatu ra l. When D escartes and o thers broke away from medieval in te r e s t s , they re ta in ed as commonplaces i t s in te l le c tu a l apparatust Such a s , knowledge is exercised by a power th a t i s e x tra n a tu ra l and s e t over ag a in s t the world to be known.5 This argument i s o f a type one o ften finds in Dewey. He attem pts 122 to re fu te an a l te rn a t iv e view by showing what i t s o rig in i s and then po in ting out e i th e r th a t the ph ilosophical motives fo r th a t o rig in a re no longer re le v a n t, axe no longer even held by the philosopher who holds the p o s itio n which d eriv es from th a t o rig in ; o r th a t th e re are good rea- sons f o r doubting the v a lid i ty o f the views c o n s ti tu tin g th a t o r ig in . In th i s case the p o s itio n in question i s th a t o f a transcenden ta l knower o r mind, Ihe o r ig in i s a th eo lo g ica l conception o f man as a c rea tu re fa lle n from pure, s p i r i tu a l s ta tu s by combination w ith an a l ie n and s in - fu l body and physica l world, I h is view of man's o rig in i s not even held by most o f the philosophers who n ev ertheless do hold to the d o c trin e o f the transcenden ta l s e l f . I t i s th e re fo re a v e s tig e , an anachronism. In o th e r co n tex ts, a s I have in d ica ted , the assumption i s no t one the philosopher in question would n ecessa rily disavow, bu t i s one never- th e le ss n o t e x p l ic i t ly acknowledged by him. And, having sp e lled i t ou t, Dewey then seeks to re fu te i t . An example o f th is approach can be found in h is a tta c k on the em otiv ist theory in e th ic s . This view m aintains th a t value statem ents cannot be cognitive o r p rep o s itio n a l because they a re simply expressions o f emotion, lik e such expressions a s "OuchJ" But th is theory , Dewey argues,^ r e s ts on the assumption th a t the world i s p e rfe c tly and exhaustive ly ch arac te rized by the s c ie n t i f ic account o f i t , an account which i s v a lu e -free , Dewey a tta c k s th is view by arguing th a t the s c ie n t i f ic view does no t exhaustively ch a rac te rize the world, but i s , l ik e any o th er c h a ra c te r iz a tio n , a perspective o r device u sefu l f o r the purposes fo r which i t i s designed, v iz , , a c e r ta in kind o f con tro l. For o th e r purposes, the secondary and t e r t i a r y (inc lud ing evalua tive) q u a li t ie s 123 which the s c ie n t i f ic view evacuates from the world have to "be brought back in . Dewey uses the expression " se le c tiv e emphasis"' to ch arac te rize the a b s tra c tio n o f c e r ta in q u a l i t ie s in primary experience a s being most u se fu l f o r c e r ta in purposes. But to i n s i s t th a t q u a l i t ie s so se lec ted a re the exclu sive ly r e a l i s the source o f the w orst e r ro rs th a t occur in philosophy. Now th is type o f argument i s objected to by many philosophers as committing the genetic fa lla c y . Such persons argue, th a t i s , th a t the question o f the v a lid i ty o r in v a lid i ty o f a p h ilo soph ical p o s itio n i s independent o f the motives o r h is to r ic a l o rig in o f the p o s itio n ; th a t i t i s simply ir r e le v a n t why a philosopher holds the view he does. What counts i s h is argument i t s e l f , Dewey does n o t, so f a r a s I know, speak to th i s ob jec tio n . My own th ink ing on th i s m atter i s th a t the "genetic" argument which i s so com- mon in h is work i s not re a l ly a case o f the genetic fa lla c y a t a l l , but th a t i t , to g e th e r w ith o th e r co n sid e ra tio n s , c o n s ti tu te s a leg itim a te and o ften very p la u s ib le form o f argument. What Dewey i s doing in such cases i s po in ting to a hidden assumption which he b e liev es l i e s in back o f a p h ilo so p h e r's-o r even an a g e 's -th ink ing , and which accounts fo r what he th inks to be a m isreading o f the f a c ts . Thus in the case o f the " tra d it io n a l" view o f immediate o r d ire c t experience, Dewey fe e ls th a t these philosophers have been led in to d isa s tro u s e rro rs by v ir tu e o f t h e i r assumption th a t a l l experience, a l l percep tion , i s co g n itiv e . Now the dem onstration of th e ex istence o f th a t assum ption, to g e th e r w ith an examination o f experience from the "em pirical, deno tative" po in t o f view, 1 2 4 do c o n s ti tu te a good argument. The d iffe ren ce between Dewey's method and the g en e tic fa lla c y Is th a t Dewey po in ts to a hidden assumption In a ph ilo so p h er's th ink ing , whereas those who commit the gen e tic fa lla c y po in t to an u l te r io r motive o f a philosopher. I t i s Indeed i r r e le v a n t to a ph ilo so p h er's argument fo r , l e t us say , the ex istence o f God, th a t he would lo se h is job i f he d id n o t be lieve in God. But i t i s n o t i r r e le v a n t th a t he believes and assumes in h is argument th a t every event has a cause. The l a t t e r i s a do c trin e th a t may be lo g ic a lly involved in h is argument, even when i t i s n o t acknowledged to be so involved. The form er i s not lo g ic a lly involved. I t obviously does n o t play any ro le whatsoever in the argument f o r God's ex istence th a t one would lo se h is job i f he d id not b e liev e in and defend the ex istence o f God. But th a t every event must have a cause does o r could conceivably p lay a ro le in the lo g ic a l ju s t i f ic a t io n o f God's ex is ten ce . I f , then , one can show (a) th a t the fh c ts about experience con tra - d ic t a ph ilo so p h er's view, and (b) th a t the philosopher makes some a s - sumption which makes an acknowledgement o f th e em pirica l fa c ts incon- v en ien t, then one has a very good argument ag a in s t th a t philosopher, an argument s tro n g e r by v ir tu e o f b than by v ir tu e o f a a lone . Moreover, i f one can add another kind o f co n sid era tio n , which we may c a l l ( c ) , th a t the consequences which the p o sitio n leads to a re unacceptable, th a t ; fo r example, they make a d is t in c tio n between v a lid and in v a lid thought and perception im possible, then m e has a very good case indeed. And th i s i s Dewey's technique. One o f the consequences o f the view 125 th a t th e re i s a mind o r knower which i s somehow non-natu ra l ( i . e . , the C artesian view) i s th a t i t commits the philosopher e i th e r to idealism o r the im p o ss ib ility o f d is tin g u ish in g tru e from fa ls e judgment. This i s an argument o f type c . A considera tion o f type b i s th a t which po in ts to a th eo lo g ica l framework long since abandoned by many o f i t s in h e r ito rs a s presupposed by C artesian dualism . What remains to be discussed a re considera tions o f type a-what the "em pirical, deno tative method" reveals to us to be re a l ly the case with regard to our experience in re la tio n to such th ings as minds and bodies. I f i t can be shown th a t the phenomeno- lo g ic a l o r em p irica l-deno tative da ta do n o t agree w ith the dual-substance hypothesis, then the re ference to a th e o lo g ic a l framework becomes much more p lau sib le than i t would be a lo n e , fo r i t o ffe rs an explanation o f why philosophers have f a i le d to see the fa c ts a s they a re . In the sec tio n o f th i s chap ter th a t fo llow s, then , I s h a l l t r y to g ive Dewey's own account o f the em p irica l, denotative fh c ts about how "mind" and "body" a re re la te d to each o th e r in our experience. Then I s h a l l o f f e r a defense o f Dewey's view o f what the fa c ts a re a g a in s t ob- je c tio n s th a t have been o r , in my view, could w ell be ra ised a g a in s t i t . This w il l ; then , c o n s ti tu te a fo u rth kind o f ju s t i f ic a t io n , which I s h a l l c a l l d , fo r Dewey's view. F in a lly , a f t e r p resen ting these arguments, I s h a l l re tu rn to a considera tion o f p a r t c o f Dewey's own argument, v iz . , the consequences o f a l te rn a t iv e views. Dewey d iscusses th i s question o f the re la t io n , in our experience, o f s e l f and o b jec t, o r o f mind and body, in connection w ith the d iscussion 126 o f the on to log ica l s ta tu s o f q u a l i t i e s . The most common (the "t r a d i - t io n a l" ) way o f regarding the q u a l i t ie s which we perceive o r experience i s to think o f them a s belonging to o r inhering in e i th e r mind o r s e l f , on the one hand, o r o b jec t o r th in g , on the o th e r. Thus we commonly and " tra d it io n a lly " th ink o f such secondary q u a l i t ie s as co lors and odors a s belonging e i th e r to mind o r body. Ju s t which they belong to i s , o f course, s t i l l in qu estio n . But we a re convinced th a t the co lo r o f the rug a c tu - a l ly inheres e i th e r in th a t an teceden tly e x is tin g rug, o r in one 's a n te - cedently e x is tin g mind, produced th e re iy something th a t does an tecedently e x is t in the rug. The c o rre c t view w ill be the one th a t b e st describes the an tecedently e x is tin g s ta te o f a f f a i r s . I s the c o lo r , before I i n t e r - a c t with the rug, p a rt o f the rug? Or a re the secondary q u a l i t ie s l ik e co lo rs , not to mention te r t i a r y ones lik e cheerfu l o r d u l l , not in rugs in themselves, but ra th e r produced in our an teceden tly e x is t in g minds and "ejected" from them in to the ex te rn a l world in our in te ra c tio n with the an tecedently e x is tin g th ing we come to c a l l a rug? Against th i s view Dewey contends th a t the q u a l i t ie s , say, o f green and even o f ch ee rfu l, do no t e x is t an tecedently to the a c t o f perception o f s ig n if ic a tio n o r perception o f sense e i th e r in the world o r in the s e l f . "With language" and hence meaning, Dewey says, q u a l i t ie s a re d iscrim inated and id e n tif ie d . They a re then o b je c t if ie d ; they are immediate t r a i t s o f th in g s . Ih is "o b je c tif ic a tio n " i s not a miraculous e jec tio n from the organism o r sou l in to ex te rn a l th in g s , nor an i l lu s o ry a t t r ib u t io n o f psychical e n t i t i e s to physical th in g s . Ihe q u a l i t ie s never were " in" the organism; they always were q u a li- t ie s o f in te ra c tio n in which both ex tra -o rgan ic th ings and organisms partake. When named, they enable id e n tif ic a tio n and d iscrim ination o f th ings to take place a s means in a fu r th e r course o f in c lu siv e in te ra c tio n . Hence they a re as much q u a l i t ie s o f th ings engaged as 127 o f the organism. For purposes o f co n tro l they nay be re fe rre d spe- c i f i c a l ly to e i th e r the th ing o r t e the organism o r to a sp ec ified s tru c tu re o f the organism. Urns co lo r which tu rn s out no t to he a r e l ia b le sign o f ex te rn a l events becomes a sign o f, say, a d e fec t in v isu a l ap p ara tu s .8 What e x is ts p r io r to the in s t i tu t io n , through language and meaning, o f o b jec tiv e th in g s , i s a f e l t t o ta l q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a tio n . This s i tu a - tio n i s n e ith e r s e l f no r o th e r) n e ith e r mental nor ph y sica l. There i s no s e l f o r su b jec t o r ego given over he re , and o b jec t given over th e re . What i s given i s a to ta l s i tu a tio n including numerous q u a l i t ie s to g e th er b u t submerged in a general u n ity . And, although th i s to t a l q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a t io n i s what i s given, i t i s m isleading to say th a t i t i s "given," because t h i s word suggests something to which i t i s given, mind o r thought o r con- sciousness o r whatever, a s w ell as something th a t g ives. In tru th "given" in th i s connection s ig n if ie s only th a t the q u a lity immedi- a te ly e x is t s , o r i3 b ru te ly th e re . In th is cap ac ity , i t forms th a t to which a l l o b jec ts o f thought r e f e r , although a s we have n o ticed , i t i s never p a r t o f the m anifest su b jec t m atter o f thought. In i t s e l f , i t i s the b ig , buzzing, blooming confusion o f which James w rote. This expresses not only the s ta te o f a baby 's experience but th e f i r s t s tage and background o f a l l th ink ing on any su b je c t.9 This l a s t po in t i s , i t seems to me, e sp e c ia lly im portant. I t e n ta i ls th a t in much o f our o rd inary experience ou r world i s n o t div ided up in to o b jec ts ou t th e re and s e l f over he re . There i s in s te ad ju s t a c lu s te r o r congeries of q u a l i t ie s , q u a l i t ie s o f a l l types-prim ary, secondary, and t e r t i a r y -and a l l e x is tin g to g e th e r in the way th a t fe e lin g in general perceives them, v iz . , w ithout c la s s if ic a t io n o r in te rp re ta tio n o f any s o r t . When engaged, th a t i s , in any p rim arily non-cognitive a c t iv i ty , such a s sh in ing my shoes, I do not experience my shoes as physica l ob jects o r th in g s , and myself a s a mind o r consciousness, to which the shoes a re ■ 128 given. There i s th e sound o f the music from my h i f i , experienced not as sound o r a s music, bu t as un in te rp re ted q u a l i t ie s f the sounds o f the a irp lan e passing overhead t sounds o f children playing in the s t r e e t j the fou l odor o f the Chicago a i r coming in my open windowt trucks roaring on the Kennedy Expressway | co lo rs and shapes o f ob jec ts around me-a l l per- ceived merely by fe e lin g and th e re fo re w ithout s ig n ifican ce o r meaning. Then l e t one o f these sounds g e t p ecu lia rly o ffensive and u p se ttin g , and i t w ill become a su b jec t fo r in q u iry , Non-eognitive ac tio n (coasting) gives way to re f le c t io n , and some o f the sounds and shapes begin to be organized in to o b jeo ts . Before th e re was no d iv is io n between s e l f and o th e r, tru ck s and a irp la n e s , bathroom faucet and ra in f a i l in g ou ts id e . Now a d isequ ilib rium in my experience n e c e ss ita te s c la s s if ic a t io n a s a means to e lim in a te , l e t us say , an offensive ring ing q u a li ty . What i s the source o f the sound? What does the sound mean? Does i t meant an alarm clock in the nex t room has gone o ff? a telephone in ano ther a p a r t- ment i s ringing? o r perhaps th a t something i s wrong with my in n e r ear? I n i t i a l l y , again , the sound was n e ith e r bodily nor m ental, alarm clock o r d is ta n t w h is tle . I t was ju s t a submerged, u n in te rp re ted q u a lity . When, however, the f e l t q u a lity became pa in fu l and obnoxious, though not o f course a s p a in fu l and obnoxious, then a tte n tio n and observation became necessary . And th e need to exerc ise c o n tro l, s p e c if ic a lly to elim inate th i s obnoxious q u a li ty , led to employment o f the extremely u sefu l ca teg o ries o f myself and o th e r , Ihu3 come in to play the ca teg o ries in question , i . e . , mind-body, s e lf -o th e r , e tc . But th ese ca teg o rie s a re n o t names o f e n t i t i e s th a t I 129 e x is ted an tecedently to the in q u iry to e lim ina te the sound. They axe devices fo r co n tro l o f the fh tu re , I f I want to elim inate the sound( what course o f a c tio n would i t he b e t te r to employ--an ac tio n on the th in g , th a t s e t o f q u a l i t ie s now id e n tif ie d a s an alarm clock, o r on the body, th a t s e t o f q u a l i t ie s now given the in te rp re ta tio n o f myself? In Experience and Nature Dewey puts the po in t w ith regard to the u t i l i t y o f the s e lf -o th e r c a teg o rie s in th is wayt I t i s obvious th a t a t o t a l , unanalyzed world does not lend i t s e l f to c o n tro l; th a t , on the co n tra ry , i t i s equ ivalen t to the subjec- tio n o f man to whatever occurs, as i f to f a te . U n til some a c ts and th e i r consequences a re d isc rim in a tin g ly re fe rre d to the human organism and o th e r energ ies and e f fe c ts a re re fe rre d to o th e r bod ies, th e re i s no leverage , no purchase, w ith which to reg u la te the course o f experience. The a b s tra c tio n o f c e r ta in q u a l i t ie s o f th in g s as due to human a c ts and s ta te s i s the pou s to o f a b i l i ty in con tro l.!-0 But the re s u lta n t su b jec tiv e -o b jec tiv e d is t in c t io n became hypostat iz e d in to a d esc rip tio n o f the o r ig in a l and fundamental s tru c tu re o f r e a l i ty . In stead o f philosophers* keeping th e i r a tte n tio n upon the " o r i- g in o f the 'su b jec tiv e* out of primary experience" fo r use as a function o f d iscrim in a tin g what i s usable in the management o f ex- perienced ob jec ts . . • , th e r e s u l ts o f psychological inqu iry were conceived to form a sep a ra te and is o la te d mental world in and o f i t s e l f , s e l f s u f f ic ie n t and se lf-e n c lo se d . Since the psychological movement n e ce ssa rily coincided w ith th a t which s e t up physica l ob- je c t s a s correspondingly complete and se lf-en c lo sed , there re su lte d th e dualism o f mind and m a tte r, o f a physical and a psychical world, which from the day o f D escartes to th e p resen t dominates th e formu- la t io n o f ph ilosoph ical problem s.!! The world i s no t in I t s e l f , noumenally, organized in to s e l f and o th e r. I t i s n o t even, noumenally, organized in to organism and environ- ment, a d iv is io n Dewey sometimes seems to recognize a s basic and noumenal. Thus in Logic he in d ic a te s th a t even th i s d is t in c t io n between organism 130 and environment i s an Instrum ental one, a r is in g to deal w ith a problem and ju s t i f i e d in terms o f i t s success o r f a i lu re in reso lv ing i t and no t in terms o f some supposed "correspondence** with o b je c tiv e , noumenal r e a l i ty . A ll o f these term s-s e l f , o th e rj mind, body* organism, environment- a re l ik e th e "simples" and "elements" th a t f ig u re in the th ink ing o f phys- i c i s t s , They a re r e a l ly fu n c tio n a l, not abso lu te in n a tu re . They a re , th a t i s , devices fo r e ffe c tin g a co n tro l w ith in experience. To regard them a s having independent e x is te n t ia l stand ing , Dewey says, " is one more case o f h y p o sta tiza tio n o f an instrum ent." ^ "There i s nothing in nature th a t belongs ab so lu te ly and exclu siv e ly to anything e lse j belonging i s always a m atter o f reference and d is tr ib u tiv e assignm ent, ju s t i f ie d in any p a r t ic u la r case a s f a r as i t works out w e ll," To help c la r i f y Dewey's po in t w ith regard to the fu n c tio n a l charac- t e r o f the s e lf -o th e r and oxganism-environment c la s s if ic a t io n s , l e t us look a t ano ther example, v iz . , th a t o f the p ro v erb ia l bent s t ic k . The question a r is e s i Where i s the ben t s t ic k -in the w ater, o r in the p e rc e iv e r o r sub jec t? For Dewey; i t depends on o n e 's purposes. I f one i s rowing and i s concerned to reach ou t and se ize h is o a r, the bentness o f the o a r i s i l lu s o ry and hence " in o n e 's mind." The re a l o a r i s s t r a ig h t . And th e reason i s th a t to regard i t in th a t way f a c i l i t a t e s the reso lu - tio n o f o n e 's problem atic s i tu a t io n , in th is case , re tr ie v in g the oar th a t has s lipped out o f o n e 's hand. But consider the case o f an a r t i s t whose aim i s to d ep ic t in a pa in tin g the s i tu a t io n o f the fisherman in h is boat. For him the r e a l oar i s the bent one, n o t the s t r a ig h t one. For so regarding i t i s the b e st way o f accomplishing h is purposes. 131 Which oar i s the r e a l ly r e a l one, the one th a t i s out th e re indepen- dent o f us and abso lu te ly? There i s no such oar. "Nothing in na tu re . . . belongs ab so lu te ly and exclu siv e ly to anything e ls e ," Both bentness and s tra ig h tn e ss a re e f fe c ts o f a tra n sa c tio n a l re la tio n sh ip between organism 15and environment. Both are th e re fo re equally r e la t io n a l c h a ra c te r is t ic s . The only question i s th is : Which way o f regarding the s i tu a t io n deals b est w ith ay s p e c if ic p ro b leaa tic s itu a tio n ? The ch a rac te r o f the given, o r th a t which e x is ts p r io r to thought and re f le c t io n and in te rp re ta t io n , nay be fu r th e r c la r i f ie d i f we con- s id e r such q u a l i t ie s as sounds and sm ells. These a re q u a l i t ie s which have never re a l ly go tten the d i f l n i t e and convenient kind o f c la s s i f ic a - tio n which most o f our t a c t i l e and v isu a l q u a l i t ie s have go tten . As 1 look out over my room now, I f in d th a t , a s a r e s u l t o f previous dealings w ith such q u a li ta t iv e s itu a tio n s^ I c la s s ify most o f the v isu a l q u a l i t ie s in my percep tual f ie ld as o b jec tiv e o r e x te rn a l. But when i t cones to sounds and sm ells, I am no t n early so c e r ta in what to do. For the most p a r t , I seem no t to l i f t sounds and sm ells out o f t h e i r given, p rer e f le c t iv e submeigence in the q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a t io n i t s e l f . The whir- rin g sound o f my a i r co n d itio n e r, fo r example, I have been experiencing, no t a s p a r t o f the a i r co n d itio n er, no r a s p a r t o f me, bu t a s given and submerged even when o th e r q u a l i t ie s a re l i f t e d up and o b je c tif ie d in to th in g s . In d esc rib in g i t , o f course, I have described i t a s being the sound o f the a i r co n d itio n e r, and I might th e re fo re m istakenly in f e r th a t i t i s a s p a r t o f th e seen o b je c t, th e a i r co n d itio n e r, th a t I have always experienced i t . And I might even, fu r th e r , in f e r th a t th a t i s i t s r e a l 132 s ta tu s , v i z . , a s p a rt o f the th in g , the a i r cond itioner. Such an in ference would be an example o f the assumption which Dewey 16csills the su p erio r r e a l i ty o f causes. I f one wanted to co n tro l the sound-qualitle s , one would want to make changes in the a i r cond itioner, no t in o n e 's e a r . On the assumption, then , th a t where the cause i s , the more r e a l i s , we come to believe th a t the r e a l i s ob jec tive o r physica l. And s in c e , fo r purposes o f co n tro l, i t i s p rim arily those primary q u a li- t i e s , l ik e mass and force (which a re re a lly r e la t io n a l in charac te r) th a t a re u se fu l, th e re i s a tendency to p o s it them as the only genuinely and independently r e a l ones, and to re le g a te the o thers to the realm o f the 17purely m ental. But in f a c t , the r e a l , in the sense o f what e x is ts p r io r to r e f le c - tio n , what l ie s ou tside o f thought, i s the q u a li ta t iv e s i tu a tio n which i s f e l t . But we a re n o t co g n itiv e ly a t te n tiv e to the q u a li ta tiv e s itu a tio n and we th e re fo re do no t o ften take note o f i t . We take note ra th e r o f the fin ish ed products o f r e f le c t iv e a n a ly s is , because i t i s o f them th a t i t i s u se fu l to take account. And we m istakenly in fe r from th i s th a t they a re the o r ig in a l fu rn itu re o f our experience and o f r e a l i ty . What Dewey means here can perhaps be c la r i f ie d by re fe rr in g to a passage from Jam es's Psychology which Dewey quotes in h is a r t i c l e , "The 18Vanishing Subject in the Psychology o f James." Take the example o f an a lto g e th e r unprecedented experience, such a s a new ta s te in the th ro a t. I s i t a sub jec tiv e q u a lity o f fe e l- in g , o r an o b jec tive q u a lity f e l t ? You do no t even ask the ques- tio n a t th i s p o in t. I t i s sim ply th a t t a s t e . But a docto r hears you describe i t , and sayst "Hal now you know what heartburn i s , " then i t becomes a q u a lity a lread y e x is te n t e x tra mentum tuam [" o b je c t if ie d " ] which you in tu rn have come upon and learned . 133 The f i r s t spaces, tim es, th in g s , q u a l i t ie s , experienced by the ch ild probably appear, l ik e the f i r s t heartbu rn , in th is abso lu te way, a s simple beings, n e ith e r in nor out o f thought. Dewey, in d iscussing th is passage, adds th a t There i s nothing in t r in s ic a l ly sensory about red , h o t, r a in . They a re so named because experience has shown the importance o f the organic apparatus by which they a re mediated. That co lo r i s v isu a l and sound au d ito ry i s an item o f knowledge gained through the study o f the conditions o f the occurrence o f the q u a lity t i t i s no p a rt o f the q u a l i ty .19 Now th i s presence o f a f e l t s itu a tio n in which q u a l i t ie s are ju s t beings and not only a re not physical o r m ental, but a re no t even aud i- to ry , ta c tu a l , v isu a l, o r whatever-th is to ta l f e l t s i tu a tio n i s the background o f a l l thought. I t i s what our experience i s when we a re not co g n itiv e ly c la s s ify in g and in te rp re tin g these q u a l i t ie s v is -a -v is some problem we have. For, a s I ind ica ted above, fo r Dewey, Jam es's charac- te r iz a t io n o f the experience o f the c h ild ap p lie s a lso to a l l our exper- ience when i t i s not e x p l ic i t ly re f le c t iv e . But i f th e u ltim ate ly r e a l , the th ings in them selves, a re the qua l- i t i e s o f our d ire c t ly had experience (as he puts i t in h is rep ly to 20R ussell in the Schilpp volume), then i s no t Dewey him self an id e a l is t? I s i t n o t the case th a t the d is tin c tio n between s e l f and o th e r, mind and body, and so on, i s in s t i tu te d by v irtu e o f c e r ta in fa c ts ch arac te riz in g the In te r re la t io n s o f the f e l t q u a li t ie s w ith in the su b jec tiv e andideal sphere o f our experience? This i s a kind o f in te rp re ta tio n o f Dewey which i t i s easy to f a l l in to , I b e liev e , but i t i s a m isin te rp re ta tio n because i t neg lec ts Dewey's Id e n tif ic a tio n o f the raw q u a li t ie s o f d i r e c t , prim al experience with nature o r r e a l i ty . Or; as I put i t e a r l i e r , in the chap ter on fe e lin g , I 1 3 4 the f&ct th a t In fe e lin g experience and nature In te rs e c t o r co incide. The q u a l i t ie s which fe e lin g has, o r which a re denoted by the te rn " fe e l- ing , " a re n a tu ra l even ts , not events in a mind o r in a s e l f o r even in an organism. They a re the products, Dewey th in k s , o f n a tu ra l tra n sac tio n s . MAs m anifestations o f in te ra c tio n s o f a n a tu ra lly e x is te n t organism and e x is te n t environing conditions a l l experienced m ateria ls stand on exac tly 21the sane le v e l ," And these n a tu ra l in te ra c tio n s o r tran sac tio n s had been going on long before man came on the scene and began to g e t involved in them. But a fu r th e r question a r is e s i Even i f there a re n a tu ra l tran sac - tio n s which give r i s e to fe e lin g s , how are we to know what n a tu re i s re a lly lik e ? Have we no t got the o ld epistem ological problem a l l over again? He have various f e l t q u a l i t ie s which a re the products o f n a tu ra l tran sac tio n s o f some s o r t . But which o f these q u a l i t ie s most accu ra te ly rep resen ts the way th ings a re? Or i s i t ju s t im possible to say? Are we, th a t i s , n o t n ecessa rily lim ited to our own po in t o f view? Dewey answers th is question in two ways* 1, That d esc rip tio n o f the way th ings a re i s b e st which works, which g e ts us the kind o f re s u l ts which we need to solve our problems. And th i s working i s not a working o f the b e l ie f in the p roposition in question in e ffec tin g c e r ta in s a lu ta ry consequences in our experience, but the working o f the proposition i t s e l f . He thus re je c ts the Jamesian conception o f "pragmatic" ju s t i f ic a t io n a s co n sis tin g in a change which the mere holding o f a b e l ie f c re a te s in our l iv e s . There must in stead be "ob jective" changes e ffec ted by the te s t in g o f the hypothesis i t s e l f 135 before I t can be sa id to be a tru e o r v e r id ic a l one. One could no t demons tz a te the innocence o f L ieutenant C alley , fo r example, on the ground th a t b e l ie f In h is innocence would be b e t te r fo r o n e 's own l i f e , o r fo r Ameri- can so c ie ty in gen era l. I f he i s innocent, c e r ta in fa c ts and th e i r r e la - tio n s to laws w il l have to be discovered, and th i s i s so ir re sp e c tiv e o f how w ell b e l ie f in h is innocence might work to improve our l iv e s . For 22Dewey, then , a b e l ie f can be b e n e f ic ia l and f a ls e , o r harmful and tru e . 2. But in Experience and Nature Dewey d iscu sses ano ther c r i te r io n f o r determ ining what account o f the n a tu ra l tra n sac tio n s which c o n s ti tu te r e a l i ty i s the most a ccu ra te . " I t i s reasonable to b e liev e ," he says, " th a t the most adequate d e f in it io n o f the b asic t r a i t s o f n a tu ra l e x is - tence can be had only when i t s p ro p e rtie s a re most fu l ly displayed-a condition which i s met in the degree o f the scope and intim acy o f in te r - a c tio n s re a liz e d ." So, although fo r purposes o f c o n tro l, i t i s b e t te r to regard n a tu re in some o f i t s " le s s e r , more ex te rn a l f ie ld s o f in te r - a c tio n ," which a re the ones which the sciences d esc rib e , the kinds o f q u a l i t ie s which a re found in the more ex tensive and involved in te ra c tio n s which come in to play in human experience a re "more adequate in d ica tio n s 23o f the n a tu re o f na tu re than a re " those which f ig u re in the sciences. Such a view im plies th a t no t only a re the secondary and te r t i a r y q u a li- t i e s , and th e re fo re the v a lu e -c h a ra c te r is tic s , o f our experience equally tru e o f na tu re a s those which fig u re in the physica l sc ien ces , bu t th a t they a re even t r u e r o f i t than those o f the physica l sc iences. Parodi, in h is essay in the Schllpp volume, "Knowledge and Action 2h. in Dewey's Philosophy," r a is e s two very in te re s t in g questions about I 136 Dewey's view. I would l ik e to d iscuss these now, both because they and Dewey's answers c la r i f y Dewey's view o f "mind" and "body," and because they ra is e what seen to me the most se rio u s d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r Dewey's view. E aro d l's f i r s t ob jection questions the f e a s ib i l i ty o f p u ttin g the phenomena the p h y s ic is t describes and experienced q u a l i t ie s l ik e red on the same level* For I t i s from the ou tside th a t we experience both the v ib ra tio n s which c o n s ti tu te fo r the p h y s ic is ts say , the co lo r red , and the m odifications o f the nerves which transm it them ( i . e . , the impres- sions) to the b ra in ; and we would, i f we could follow i t s course fa r th e r , undoubtedly find in the b ra in I t s e l f a new s e r ie s o f phe- nomena o f a mechanical o r chemical nature . . , j bu t nowhere, c e r ta in ly , should we meet, from th i s po in t o f view, the co lo r red a s something f e l t , a s the sensation o r perception properly so c a lle d . I t seems indeed th a t , in o rder to apprehend something lik e th a t , i t i s necessary to change one 's po in t o f view and to place o nese lf in to the very c en te r o f the consciousness o f the su b jec t who p e rce iv e s .25 Barodi i s then suggesting here a d u a lis t ic theory o f mind and body, according to which some "outside" phenomena e x is t in the sphere o f body, and o th e r in te r io r o r p riv a te ones e x is t in the sphere o f mind. He i s making the fa m ilia r po in t th a t-supposedly, a t l e a s t-a physio log ist could probe a man's b ra in from now u n t i l the end o f time and never d is - cover what the man was th ink ing o f. I f he were th ink ing , fo r example, o f the co lo r re d , the p h y sio log ist would never be ab le to know th a t f a c t u n less he were informed by the man h im self. Dewey answers th a t the q u a lity red i s not an event in consciousness o r mind, but an event in the world. P arodi, he says, takes a q u a lity , say re d , to be . . . a "sensation" in and o f i t s e l f . My view i s more r e a l i s t i c a l ly naive. The q u a lity occurs ex ac tly , in p r in c ip le , a s any n a tu ra l even t, say a thundershower. There i s no passage from the physica l to the m ental, from an ex te rn a l world to 137 something f e l t o r o f the n a tu re o f a psychical consciousness, but from o b jec ts with one s e t o f q u a l i t ie s to o b jec ts w ith o th e r q u a li- t i e s , When, however, a q u a li ty i s termed a "sen sa tio n ," o r i s ex- p l i c i t l y taken in connection, w ith an a c t o f perceiv ing , something ad d itiv e has happened. I t i s now placed in a s p e c ia lly se lec ted connection, th a t to the organism o r s e l f . Fending the outcome of an Inquiry no t y e t completed, one may not know whether a q u a lity , say red , belongs to th i s o r th a t o b jec t in the environment, nor indeed whether i t may no t be the product o f In tra -o rg an ic processes a s in the case o f "seeing s ta r s " a f t e r a blow on the head. In o th e r words, the occurrence o f q u a l i t ie s upon my view i s a purely n a tu ra l even t, , . . [Even]] the f in a l reference o f q u a l i t ie s to in t r a - organic events i s i t s e l f a reference to one kind o f o b jec t in the n a tu ra l w orld ,2® B arod i's view, then , simply assumes th a t the red q u a lity i s in the mind, and the v ib ra tio n s and nerve system a re in th e n a tu ra l world, Dewey in s i s t s , however, and I th ink r ig h t ly , th a t the red i s n o t i n i t i a l l y ex- perienced a s In te rn a l o r a s e x te rn a l. I t i s ju s t a being, a q u a lity had 27a s p a rt o f a to ta l f e l t s i tu a t io n . Only l a t e r , in response to a prob- lem atic s i tu a t io n , do we lo c a te i t a s being in the organism, o r in the w orld. I t does no t e x is t an teceden tly to inqu iry in e i th e r p lace. But now, one can re p ly , in defense o f Banodi, th a t su re ly the red i s no t a s good a candidate f o r in c lu s io n in the n a tu ra l world as a r e , say , the v ib ra tio n s . For the red i s dependent on a re la tio n sh ip between the v ib ra tio n s and the organism. I t i s n o t a p a r t o f the ap p le , fo r example, in t r in s ic a l ly , bu t r e la t io n a l ly , Dewey*s rep ly h e re , I b e lie v e , would be th a t i f nothing i s p a r t o f th e n a tu ra l world th a t does n o t e x is t th e re ab so lu te ly , then th e re i s nothing a t a l l in the n a tu ra l w orld. Because a l l th in g s , including the e n t i t i e s th a t physics d e sc rib e s , have th e i r c h a rac te r by v ir tu e o f r e la - t io n s in which they stand to o th e r th in g s . Modem physics, Dewey says in Quest fo r C erta in ty , req u ire s us to abandon the view th a t the world I 138 c o n sis ts o f "unchangeable substances having p ro p e rtie s fixed in is o la tio n and unaffected by In te ra c tio n s , , , . For not only a re no such o b jec ts found to e x is t , but the very na tu re o f experim ental nethod, namely, d e f i- n it io n by operations th a t a re in te ra c t io n s , in p lle s th a t such th in g s a re no t capable o f being known." To c la r i f y what he means by the r e la t io n a l ch a rac te r o f s c ie n t i f ic e n t i t i e s , Dewey re fe rs to EdLdington's statem ent th a t " 't h e whole o f our physica l knowledge i s based on m easures,• and . , . whenever we s ta te the p ro p e rtie s o f a body in terms o f physica l q u a n ti t ie s , we a re im parting the responses o f various m e tric a l in d ic a to rs to i t s presence, and nothing m o r e . "^9 He then o ffe rs a s an example o f such a statem ent o f a body's p ro p e rtie s Eddington's a n a ly s is o f "what happens when an elephant s l id e s dow nhill. , . . The mass o f the elephant i s the reading o f a p o in te r on a weighing s c a le » the slope o f the h i l l , the reading o f a plumb lin e a g a in s t the d iv is io n s o f a p ro tra c to r» bu lk , a s e r ie s o f readings on the 30sca le o f a p a ir o f c a l ip e rs i" and so on. Another example o f the r e l a t iv i ty o f what d u a lis ts c h a ra c te r is t ic a l ly c a l l primary q u a l i t ie s (and thus suppose to be inheren t and ab so lu te ) i s th a t o f the length and shape o f a body. For, to the theory o f r e l a t i v i t y , the same body has many d if f e r e n t len g th s , in the d ire c tio n o f i t s r e c t i l in e a r unaccelerated motion; depending upon tfte~'state o f r e la t iv e no tion o f the reference-body with re sp ec t to which i t s motion i s defined! i t has th e re fo re many d if f e r e n t shapes! and these e f f e c ts , the L oren tz-F itzgera ld co n trac tio n s; a re o ften described by p h y s ic is ts , not a s i l lu s o ry ways in which the body merely "appears" to d i f - fe re n t observers, bu t a s physical p ro p e rtie s o f the body, any one o f them a s " rea l" as any o th e r. Thus a ch arac te r which a m a te ria l th in g has only in a sp ec ia l co n tex t, only in i t s re la tio n to ano ther 139 in d iv idua l th in g , i t has none the le s s o b jec tiv e ly and ph y sica lly . This suggested th a t a ch arac te r which e x is ts only in re la t io n to an Ind iv idual s e n tie n t o rgan ise , o r to an a c t o f percep tion , may be in l ik e manner,' o b jec tive and even '' p h y s i c a l , "31 But now, to cone to E a ro d i's second ob jec tio n , even i f i t be granted th a t q u a l i t ie s l ik e red a re n a tu ra l even ts , th e re i s a fu r th e r d iff ic u lty * How i s i t th a t a n a tu ra l even t, l ik e the co lo r red , can take on s ig n i f i - cance? How i s i t th a t the c o lo r red can meant I must now stop ny c a r l "He a re to ld ," fttrodi says th a t sensations and percep tions, which a re , u n t i l th a t moaent, simple n a tu ra l fa c ts [[Dewey's dumb, u n in te rp re ted , f e l t q u a l i t ie s ] , become ob jec ts o f knowledge when they serve a s signs and announce o r suggest o th e r fa c ts which a re no t y e t p resen t in the experience o f the senses, b u t, i f they were in the beginning only n a tu ra l fa c ts (which means, undoubtedly, th a t they were not y e t data o f consciousness), how could they e n te r as terms in to these conscious re la tio n sh ip s o r thoughts which c o n s ti tu te our in ferences and which perm it us to fo resee and to estim ate consequences? Would they n o t suddenly have to change th e i r na tu re in the most m ysteri- ous manner?32 The problem B arod i's ob jection p o in ts to , i t seeas to me, i s th a t o f how a n a tu ra l event can contain w ith in i t s e l f a reference to the fu - tu re and to the p ast. How can the red q u a lity "contain" the meaning I-m u st-s to p -o r-I-w ill-b e -ru n -in to -b y -an o th e r-ca r? I t would seem th a t a n a tu ra l event can s iap ly be what i t i s , what S a rtre would c a l l en s o l . For i t to be what i t i s n o t, a s something i t s ig n if ie s , seems su re ly to req u ire the operation o f ano ther kind o f ex istence than n a tu ra l ex istence , un less magic o r "mystery" i s a t work in the un iverse . And th a t o ther kind o f ex istence (S artre c a l l s i t pour so l) i s consciousness o r mind- the capacity to transcend the encapsulated being o f the p resen t moment and to p ro je c t in to the fu tu re and the p a s t. 1 4 0 Dewey, o f course, agrees th a t consciousness begins p rec ise ly w ith th is l ib e ra tio n from the p resen t. As I have pointed ou t, Dewey d i s t in - guishes between the "b ru te ly s e r ia l fashion" in which animals experience the world, and the presence o f p ast and fu tu re which ch arac te rizes man's 33experience. In the anim al, Dewey says, the sm ell, S, i s replaced (and disp laced) by a f e l t movement, K, and th i s i s replaced by the g r a t i f i c a t io n , G. Viewed from w ithout, fo r i t s e l f , i t i s now S, now G, and so on to the end o f the chap- t e r . Nowhere i s th e re looking before and a f te r ; memory and a n t i c lra tlo n a re no t bora. Such an experience n e ith e r i s , in whole o r in p a r t , a knowledge, nor does i t ex erc ise a cognitive fu n c tio n . ^ Now, as I be lieve Rarodi ag rees, Dewey describes experience w ith g rea t in s ig h t . But the question Parodi asks i s whether Dewey does n o t uncover some fa c ts about our experience which t e s t i f y eloquently to the Inadequacy o f h is own n a tu r a l is t ic s ta r t in g -p o in t. Dewey's commitment to the em pirica l-deno tative method would seem to have led him to conclu- sions in co n sis ten t w ith the fundamental assumptions with which he began. A ctually , th i s o b jec tion was made much e a r l i e r by Love joy in an a r 3*5t i d e ca lled "Fastness and Transcendence.""^ Here Love joy c a l l s in to question Dewey's contention th a t " e .g . , a p a s t f i r e can be now 'known* o r become 'p re se n t-a s -a b s e n t, ' i f , a s h is theory ho lds, nothing i s now given in experience bu t the e f fe c t o f the f i r e , v iz . . the smoke." 37Lovejoy here and in h is essay, "The Anomaly of Knowledge," i s asking Dewey, and n a tu r a l is ts in gen era l, ju s t how i t i s th a t an organ- ism can e f fe c t th e re la t io n between a p re sen t, a c tu a l th ing and a fu tu re , possib le one. How does i t l i f t i t s e l f out o f time and a c tu a li ty to b ring th is about? I s th i s not Indeed a sign o f a tran scenden ta l, non-natura l mind a t work? lk l Dewey's own answer to th is ob jection i s contained in the essay, "Realism Without Monism o r Dualism -11."-^ I t i s , in my opinion, an em barrassingly poor e f f o r t to answer Lovejoy's c r itic ism s . Rather than to d iscuss i t in d e ta i l , th e re fo re , l e t me o f fe r the follow ing a s a defense o f Dewey's view ag a in s t both Lovejoy's and B arod i's very tre n - chant c r i t ic is m s . When I become aware o f f i r e as a p resen t-as-absen t meaning o f smoke (o r o f any o th e r meanings th a t q u a l i t ie s and o b jec ts have), I am not transcending the p resen t in to the fu tu re . Such an operation o f tra n - scendence would indeed be possib le only by a transcenden tal o r psychical kind o f th in g . What i s happening i s r a th e r th a t I am using a general p rin c ip le I know, v iz . , th a t smoke always follow s f i r e , and upon seeing smoke now I am in fe rr in g th a t the general ru le w ill hold again and th a t , as before so many tim es, the smoke w ill be seen to have come about in conjunction w ith f i r e . I am no t transcending in to the fu tu re o r the p a s t, but am making an in ference in the p re sen t. The p resen t-as-fu tu re f i r e (which I expect to see) suggested by the smoke i s therefo re no t apprehended d i r e c t ly , but i s In fe rred from the general p r in c ip le , " I f th e re i s smoke, th e re i s (o r anyway was) f i r e , " and the s in g u la r propo- s i t io n , "There i s now smoke." The in ference i s , "There i s (o r was) f i r e , " In making th is in fe ren ce , I no more go to the fu tu re than I go to the apartm ent above mine when I in f e r th a t the sounds I hear up th e re a re fo o ts te p s . Does such an inference requ ire th a t I transcend from the apartm ent I am in to the one up above, no t o f course p h y sica lly , but psych ica lly? What I am contending i s th a t i t does n o t, th a t what one 14-2 i s doing in making such inferences i s making use o f a general p rin c ip le th a t sounds o f th a t s o r t a re created by a person walking on h is f lo o r . 39But ano ther ob jec tio n , one which was made by Blanshard, can be ra ised a t th is po in t: I f we a re not now d ire c t ly p ro jec tin g in to the fu tu re in a n tic ip a tin g f i r e from smoke, but a re ra th e r making an inference from a p r in c ip le o r ru le , what exactly i s the s ta tu s o f th i s ru le? I s i t not a supra-tem poral kind o f th ing? Are we n o t, th e re fo re , in understand- ing such a p rin c ip le , n ecessa rily making a leap out o f the p resen t in to the fu tu re and in to the past? For a general p rin c ip le l ik e th is by i t s very nature holds fo r a l l tim es. So th a t what we have avoided by re fe r - ence to the p r in c ip le , v iz . , transcendence in to the fu tu re , now seems to be contained in the p rin c ip le i t s e l f . Here I th ink one can answer th a t a general p rin c ip le i s not a d esc rip - tion o f p a st and fu tu re events, but what i s now sometimes c a lled a "d is - position" to a c t in c e r ta in ways under c e r ta in cond itions. To say th a t one be liev es th a t smoke means f i r e i s , then , n o t to say th a t one i s now surveying a l l o f time and noting th a t throughout i t s expanse a c e r ta in law o r general p rin c ip le holds tru e . I t i s ra th e r to say th a t one i s in c lin ed , i f he should encounter smoke, to expect f i r e , A general p rin - c ip le i s a d isp o s itio n to expect c e r ta in th in g s , o r to do c e r ta in th in g s , i f c e r ta in conditions a re f u l f i l l e d . We have already seen th a t th i s i s Dewey's view o f meaning on p. 68 o f th is d is s e r ta t io n . There I in d ica ted th a t fo r Dewey the meaning of a q u a lity o r th ing i s a ru le fo r in te rp re tin g o r using th a t th ing in somtp ra c tic a l con tex t. To say , then , th a t a th ing is portab le i s to be p repared o r d isposed to perfo rm a p p r o p r ia te ly under c e r ta in c ircu m stan ces . B ut such d is p o s it io n s do n o t in v o lv e making d i r e c t ( o r even in d i r e c t , through m en ta l c o n te n ts , as L o ve jo y m a in ta in s ) c o n ta c t w ith p as t and fu tu r e t im e s , b u t ju s t to a c t o r to be in a s ta te o f re a d in e s s to a c t . But now I th in k we must add th a t f o r Dewey th e meaning i s a ls o a p ro p e rty o f th e o b je c t . To say t h a t c louds mean r a in o r th a t smoke means f i r e is n o t to say m ere ly th a t som ething s u b je c t iv e c a l le d read in e ss to e x p e c t r a in and to seek s h e l t e r occurs in me when I see c lo u d s . F o r th e c louds them selves come to have t h is meaning as a q u a l i t y b e lo n g in g to them , n o t o f course i n t r i n s i c a l l y , b u t because o f t h e i r in te r a c t io n w ith me. J u s t as Desdemona's h a n d k e rc h ie f was I t s e l f "charged w ith h is to r y and p ro p h ecy ," and t h is was in th e h a n d k e rc h ie f as a p e rv a s iv e q u a l i t y o f i t , so a re many o f th e meanings t h a t th in g s a r e p e rc e iv e d as hav in g ju s t ifO such p e rv a s iv e q u a l i t i e s t h a t b e long to them - a lw a y s , o f co u rse , because o f t h e i r in te r a c t io n s w ith us and o u r e x p e c ta t io n s . I t i s th is q u a l i f i c a t io n o f Dewey's v iew o f meaning th a t rescues him from p h ys ic a lis ra and W atso n ian -typ e b e h a v io r is m , I b e l ie v e . The W atsonian b e h a v io r is t m ig h t a g ree t h a t meanings a re e x p e c ta tio n s and d is p o s it io n s , b u t he would n o t ag ree th a t th e s e d is p o s it io n s a re c o r re - la t e d w ith "em ergent" p ro p e r t ie s o r q u a l i t i e s in th e o b je c ts them selves. O th e llo in t e r p r e t s Desdemona's h a n d k e rc h ie f as in d ic a t in g th a t she has b e tra y e d h im . Ib i s meaning o f th e h a n d k e rc h ie f c o n s is ts in p a r t in a s e t o f e x p e c ta tio n s and d is p o s it io n s to behave on O th e l lo 's p a r t . B ut i t a ls o c o n s is ts , and in a way th a t is in s e p a ra b le from those exp ec ta - t io n s and d is p o s it io n s , in a c e r ta in q u a l i t y o f th e h a n d k e rc h ie f i t s e l f I 1/44 whereby i t i s o b je c t iv e ly charged w ith h is to r y and prophecy. T h is i s what Dewey means when he says t h a t th e expected consequences o f th e use o f a th in g become "commuted in t o . . . b a re th in g s " th em selves , "When am e v e n t has m eaning, i t s p o te n t ia l consequences become i t s in t e g r a l and funded fe a tu r e . When th e p o te n t ia l consequences a re im p o rta n t and r e - p e a te d , th e y form th e v e ry n a tu re and essence o f th e th in g , i t s d e f in in g , 4lid e n tify in g , and d is tin g u ish in g form." There a re many o th e r problem s w ith Dewey*s n a t u r a l i s t ic account o f consciousness o r c o g n it io n . To c o n s id e r a l l o f them in th e k in d o f d e t a i l th e y re q u ir e would c a l l , how ever, f o r a n o th e r d is s e r ta t io n , and one even lo n g e r than t h is one. B u t th e re i s one w hich I would l i k e to c o n s id e r b e fo re le a v in g t h is s u b je c t . T h a t i s th e problem o f how knowledge o f th e p a s t i s p o s s ib le f o r an o rgan ism . Dewey, in d is c u s s in g t h is problem , c h a r a c t e r is t ic a l l y says v e ry i l lu m in a t in g th in g s abo u t th e v a r io u s ways 42in which we have knowledge o f th e p a s t , b u t f a i l s , I b e l ie v e , to d e a l w ith th e m eta p h ys ica l problem s in v o lv e d , th e k in d s o f problem s p o in te d to by L ove joy and P a ro d i, t h a t i s . Such problem s have to do w ith th e q u e s tio n o f w h e th er c e r ta in fh c ts abo u t e x is te n c e do n o t n e c e s s ita te th e re c o g n it io n o f an e n t i r e ly d i f f e r e n t mode o f b e in g to account f o r them. I t i s th e k in d o f q u e s tio n t h a t l a u l W eiss i s concerned w ith in h is book, Modes o f B e in g . L e t me adum brate an answ er to t h is q u e s tio n o f how we have knowledge o f th e p a s t in a way th a t I th in k is c o n s is te n t w ith Dewey's p h ilo s o p h y , and w hich accounts f o r such knowledge on h is own n a t u r a l i s t i c grounds. We a re n o t , as I b e l ie v e Dewey w ould a g re e , d i r e c t ly a c q u a in te d w ith 145 th e p a s t in memory, any more th a n we a re d i r e c t ly a c q u a in te d w ith th e fu tu r e in a n t ic ip a t io n . Our knowledge o f th e p a s t i s an in fe re n c e from p re s e n t d a ta and p e rc e p tu a l and c o n c ep tu a l o b je c ts funded from p a s t i n - 43q u ir ie s , I know th a t I w ent to N o rth w estern U n iv e r s ity as an under- g ra d u a te , f o r exam ple, because o f th e p re s e n t evid en ce o f h av in g done so, and th e f a c t t h a t th e assum ption o f h av in g done so is th e b e s t account o f t h a t e v id e n ce . O f c o u rs e , I do n o t g e n e r a l ly go through t h is k in d o f p ro o f w ith re g a rd to my r e c o lle c t io n s o r b e l ie f s a b o u t th e p a s t , b u t t h is i s because such re c o n s tru c tio n s o f my p a s t e x p e r ie n c e , w ith o u t r e s o r t in g to t e s t s , " is so re p e a te d ly con firm ed by th e course o f ensu ing events t h a t we come to depend upon them w ith o u t a p p ly in g s p e c ia l t e s t s . O nly <|j|. in cases o f c r u c ia l doubt do we r e s o r t to th e l a t t e r , " B ut now th e m e ta p h ys ica l q u e s tio n rem ains! How cam I even under- s tan d t h a t I had a p a s t , o r w i l l have a f u t u r e , f o r th a t m a tte r , u n less 45 I am in some sense now d i r e c t l y a c q u a in te d w ith my p as t and my fu tu r e . Even, t h a t i s , i f one g ra n te d th a t in knowing ab o u t my p as t X am te s t in g a h yp o th es is abo u t what happened on th e b a s is o f what evidence e x is ts f o r t h a t h yp o th es is to d a y , how am I a b le to make sense o f th e f a c t t h a t t h a t h yp o th es is r e fe r s to th e p a s t u n less I have d i r e c t acq u a in tan ce a t le a s t w ith P ast-n ess? I f my awareness i s l im i te d to th e p re s e n t, what sense does i t make to t a l k ab o u t my p as t? O r, f o r th a t m a tte r , how can I even make sense o f th e n o tio * . o f th e p re s e n t, i f I do n o t have some d i r e c t acq u ain tance w ith th e pas t? L e t me now t r y to answ er t h is o b je c t io n to w hat I w ould ta k e to be Dewey*s v iew . Dewey would h o ld , as I have s a id , t h a t memory is n o t d i r e c t I 146 acquaintance with the p a s t. And I be lieve h is view can be defended ag a in s t views l ik e those taken by P rofessor William Earle in the chap ter, "Memory," in h is book, The Autobiographical Consciousness. F i r s t o f a l l , how i s i t th a t we a re ab le even to conceive o f the past i f we a re not d ire c t ly acquainted w ith i t ? The answer I would suggest to th is question i s th a t we a re indeed acquainted d ire c t ly with the p ast. For our awareness i s no t lim ited to the p resen t, but to the specious p res- e n t . And the specious p resen t contains in i t fu tu re , p a s t, and present time modes. Thus do I have the m ate ria l out o f which to construct my knowledge o f the p ast and my a n tic ip a tio n s o f the fu tu re . For I am, in the specious p resen t in which I now liv e and o f which I am aware, aware o f what the p ast and the fu tu re a re , although not o f the contents o f them. Any awareness a t a l l , i t would seem, no m atter how th in ly i t be s l ic e d , n ecessa rily contains a t le a s t a p ast mode and perhaps a fu tu re mode as w ell. You cannot s tep in to the p resen t even once. For the "present" i s re a lly a re la t iv e term. No moment i s ab so lu te ly p resen t. I t i s only more o r le s s p resen t than some o th e r moment, both o f which, however, contain in them- selves p ast and perhaps fu tu re modes. I t might seem th a t the a sse r tio n th a t we a re aware o f a specious pres- en t th a t includes p resen t, p a s t, and fu tu re time modes commits me to the view th a t I am try in g to re fu te , v iz . , th a t memory i s d ire c t acquaintance with the p a s t. I do n o t be lieve th is i s the case, however, because in the specious p resen t I am no t remembering the p ast mode th a t i s immediately presen t to me now. Memory i s p rec ise ly the recap turing o f a moment in one*s experience th a t has s lipped out o f the specious p resen t. I t would 1^7 su re ly be preposterous to say th a t I "remember" the beginning of the note when the middle, beginning, and an tic ip a te d bu t no t given completion o f th a t note a re a l l now p a rt o f my specious p resen t. Now to come to the second p a r t o f my defense o f memory as in d ire c t acquaintance w ith the p a s t. What we do when we remember, I b e liev e , i s e i th e r o f two th in g s , n e ith e r o f which involves d ire c t acquaintance with the past» I , We a re ab le to perform some ac tio n . This i s the kind o f memory which co n sis ts in being ab le to do something ap p ro p ria te ly . I f I say, fo r example, th a t I remember where I put my ca r, my remem- bering co n sis ts in my being able to fin d my car, Like under- standing as in te rp re te d by W ittgenstein , then, to remember i s to be ab le to do something. And the way we know th a t we remember i s no t by means o f a d i r e c t acquaintance with our p a s ts , bu t by attem pting to perform the action which the a sse rtio n th a t we remember p red ic ts we w il l be ab le to do. I I . The o th e r kind o f memory i s what I be lieve Dewey might c a l l a "memory-perception." An example o f th is i s my memory o f having seen Martin Luther King some years ago a t a church in Menasha, Wisconsin, Now th is k ind o f memory does not co n s is t in being ab le to perform some task ap p ro p ria te ly , but in having a per- cep tion , i . e . , a s e t o f q u a li t ie s o r o b jec ts w ith a c e r ta in meaning. And I believe th is kind o f memory can a lso be seen n e ith e r to co n sis t in nor requ ire a d ire c t acquaintance w ith the p a s t, but ra th e r an inference th a t proceeds along the m following l in e s : A, F i r s t o f a l l , a perception which i s taken to he a memoryperception i s e i th e r a new one which I must decide by a fresh a c t o f inqu iry to be memory and no t some o th e r kind o f perception , o r i t i s a perception which a previous a c t o f inqu iry has funded with the sense o f being a memoryperception and no t some o th er kind o f perception . Now i t i s these raemory-perceptions in the mode o f sense th a t mis- lead some philosophers in to th inking th a t memory i s d ire c t acquaintance with the p a s t. For they f a i l to re a liz e the fa c t th a t there has been a previous establishm ent o f such memories, o r a t the very le a s t a previous establishm ent o f a c e r ta in kind o f experience as being a re l ia b le sign th a t a perception i s memory. (See below, 2b, fo r fu r th e r devel- opment o f th is l a t t e r c r i te r io n .) B, But i f previous inquiry has no t funded a p a r tic u la r percep- tio n w ith the sense o f being a memory-perception, then a new a c t o f inqu iry has to be engaged in . And th i s inquiry involves the following stages: 1 , Ihe perception i s f i r s t determined not to be a sensepercep tion . This f a c t i s known by inference from e ith e r o r some o r a l l o f the following: a , I cannot a c t on the perception now. My perception o f Martin Luther King, fo r example, does not permit o f my walking over and shaking hands w ith him, o r 149 th e l i k e . b . The fa c ts about the percep tion , what s o r t o f th ing I am doing in i t , when i t occurs, and /o r where i t i s a re incom patible w ith what I know on o th er grounds to be the case about the p resen t. c . The p e rc e p tio n i s r e l a t i v e l y u n d e ta ile d and ske tch y as c o n tra s te d w ith w hat we know to be th e case w ith th e p re s e n t, i . e . , th e o b je c ts o f s e n s e -p e rc e p tio n . I t cannot, th a t i s , be examined fu r th e r and fu r th e r and thus sp e lled out in the kind of inexhaustib le d e ta i l th a t sense-perceptions admit o f. 2. The perception i s then determined no t to be a fan tasy perception o r an im agination-perception. And th is occurs, again , no t by means o f d ire c t acquaintance w ith the p a s t, bu t by e i th e r o r some o r a l l o f the followingi a . The perception i s independently v e r if ia b le as being o f an event th a t a c tu a lly occurred by means o f p re sen t, i . e . , sense-percep tual, evidence. Such th ings as e n tr ie s in jo u rn a ls , o r photographs th a t were taken a t the tim e, o r testim ony from someone e lse who was there a re examples o f th is kind o f evidence. b . The perception i s a fam iliar-seem ing non-contemporary percep tion , and i s coherent w ith o th e r fa m ilia r- seeming o r independen tly -verified non-contemporary percep tions. By " fa m ilia r ," I mean the f e l t conviction I 150 th a t th is has happened to me before . This kind o f fa m ilia r i ty has i t s e l f been confirmed as being a more o r le s s re l ia b le sign o f v e r id ic a l memoryperception by previous a sso c ia tio n o f i t with sub- sequent independent in q u iry -v e r if ic a tio n s . I f a l o t o f such fe m ilia r and non-contemporary perceptions a re found to cohere with one another, and to cohere a lso with some o th er memory-perceptions which have been independently v e r if ie d , then one has a very good case fo r a raemory-pereeption, ra th e r than an im agination-perception. c . The perception i s one with regard to which I am ab le to f i l l in a number o f d e ta i l s , the before and a f t e r o f i t , fo r example. And these d e ta i ls occur to me in v o lu n ta r ily , z a th e r than having to be constructed by me. I can say , fo r example, what led up to and followed seeing King, bu t not what led up to and f o l - lowed an imagined meeting with P residen t Nixon over h is policy in Vietnam. In my discussion above o f the general s o r ts o f considera tions which Dewey o ffe rs in b ehalf o f th is view o f "mind" and i t s re la t io n to "body," I re fe rre d to th ree such co n sidera tions. These were* (a ) the r e s u lts o f the ap p lica tio n o f the em p irica l, denotative method, i . e . , the observation o f the fa c ts a s we experience them; (b) the assum ptions, whether hidden o r 151 avowed, o f the philosopher who takes an a l te rn a t iv e viewj and (c) the unacceptable consequences o f the a lte rn a tiv e view o r views. I then added some co n sid era tio n s , d , in defense o f h is view ag a in s t a c tu a l and pos- s ib le ob jec tio n s, I would lik e now to re tu rn to the th ir d kind o f con- s id e ra tio n , c , and in d ic a te some o f the o th e r consequences Dewey believes ■ follow from a lte rn a t iv e th eo rie s o f mind and body. In Dewey's view, one o f the most serious consequences o f the view th a t mind and body, o r s e l f and the world, a re d i s t in c t e x is te n t ia l ly , a t h6l e a s t as th a t view i s g en era lly h e ld , i s th e evacuation o f "secondary" and " te r t ia ry " q u a l i t ie s from the "rea l" world and the re leg a tio n o f them to th e world o f the "mind." By "secondary q u a li t ie s " Dewey re fe rs to the c o lo rs , sounds, odors, ta s te s , and so on o f the world o f our ord inary experience, q u a l i t ie s viewed by many mind-body d u a lis ts a s no t a c tu a lly p a rt o f the fu rn itu re o f the independently e x is tin g un iverse , but prod- u c ts o f the ac tio n o f primary q u a l i t ie s (those described by physics) upon our minds. By " te r t i a r y q u a li t ie s " Dewey re fe rs to such q u a li t ie s as the fineness o f a work o f a r t , the i r r i t a b i l i t y o r su r lin e ss o f a bad w ait- re s s , the s to ic a l look and ways o f an American Indian. A ll o f these q u a l i t ie s , which a re , a f t e r a l l , the ones th a t make the world in te re s t in g and im portant to us, a re regarded by such p h ilo s- ophers as not r e a l ly inheren t in r e a l i ty . They a re the products o f r e a l- i t y ' s operation on u s. Whitehead puts th is po in t a s follows in Science and th e Modem World > The mind in apprehending experiences sensations which, properly speaking, a re q u a l i t ie s o f the mind a lone. These sensa tions a re p ro jec ted by the mind so as to clo the appropria te bodies in ex tern a l 152 n a tu re . Thus the "bodies a re perceived as with q u a l i t ie s th a t do not "belong to then , q u a l i t ie s which in fa c t are purely the o ff- spring o f the mind. Thus n a tu re g e ts c re d it which in tru th should . "be reserved fo r ourselves* the rose fo r i t s scen t: the n ig h tin - gale fo r h is song: and the sun fo r h is rad iance. . . . Nature i s a d u ll a f f a i r , soundless, s c e n tle s s , c o lo r le ss j merely the hurrying o f m a te ria l, en d less ly , raeaninglessly.**'? Dewey's view avoids th is outrageous denuding o f r e a l i ty o f a l l th a t i s in te re s t in g and valuable in i t by recognizing th a t science simply se le c ts from the r e a l th a t which i s capable o f providing co n tro l. I t does no t describe the exclu sive ly r e a l , but the more e a s ily c o n tro llab le . For i t s purposes i t picks out c e r ta in aspec ts o f the given, re a l s i tu a - tio n o f experience. But the o th e r q u a l i t ie s a re a lso th e re , a s p a rt o f the re a l world, and fo r c e r ta in purposes a re even more im portant p a rts o f i t than those which the s c ie n t i s t d isc lo se s . There a re , in Dewey's view, more o f those hidden assumptions involved in the thought o f those philosophers and s c ie n t i s t s who want to exclude secondary and te r t i a r y q u a li t ie s from the " rea l" world. One o f these i s the assumption, re fe rre d to above, o f the "su p erio r r e a l i ty o f causes." Since we can co n tro l the scen ts and co lo rs o f our experience by con tro l- lin g l ig h t waves and sound waves, and they a re th e re fo re the causes o f the co lo rs and sounds, i t i s assumed th a t the waves a re the re a l th in g s , and the co lors and sounds we experience merely m ental. But, in f a c t , e f fe c ts a re as much a p a r t o f r e a l i ty (indeed, a s we saw above, p. 135 perhaps more a p a r t o f i t ) a s causes, even though some o f them do not seem to give us handles fo r co n tro l a s much as do th e re la tio n a l char- a c te r i s t i c s th a t th e sciences describe . Another assumption in back o f the theory th a t secondary and te r t ia r y 153 q u a l i t ie s a re merely mental i s th a t the r e a l i s what knowledge o r cogni- tio n d isc lo ses about r e a l i ty . This i s the assumption th a t the " re a l i s the ra tio n a l and the ra tio n a l i s the r e a l ." In f a c t , knowledge in gen- e ra l and science in p a r t ic u la r give us only one po in t o f view on r e a l i ty ! they pick out re la tio n sh ip s in o rd er to f a c i l i t a t e co n tro l. This r e la - t io n a l ch arac te r o f the world i s indeed a p a rt o f i t , bu t the secondary and te r t i a r y q u a l i t ie s d isclosed in fee lin g a re a lso , and perhaps even more profoundly, a p a r t o f i t . F in a lly , the theory according to which mind and body a re separa te and ra d ic a lly d is t in c t e n t i t ie s leads to the problem o f how they can pos- s ib ly a c t upon each o th e r, Thi3 d i f f ic u l ty o f how a purely s p i r i tu a l th in g can a c t upon a purely bodily th in g , and vice v ersa , was so acu te ly f e l t by the philosophers who nevertheless accepted D escartes ' s ta r t in g - po in t th a t they devised, w ithout the s l ig h te s t b i t o f em pirical evidence, such fa n ta s tic hypotheses to account fo r i t as Spinoza 's mind-body p a ra l- le lism and Malebranche's occasionalism . And i t i s c e r ta in ly understandable th a t they should have devised such ex traord inary hypotheses. For i t i s nothing sh o rt o f magical to suppose th a t a pure thought, say the thought- I t would, be nice to have ano ther cup o f coffee-could "produce" the move- ment o f one 's body in the d ire c tio n of the coffee pot. To suppose th a t th e re la tio n between mind and body i s in te ra c t io n a l i s l ik e supposing th a t one could w ill an ash tray to r is e up o f f h is coffee ta b le , onto h is f lo o r , and down the h a l l . The p o s s ib i l i ty o f a causal connection between mind and body, a s conceived by the d u a l is ts , i s equally u n in te ll ig ib le and magical. I5fc Dewey's theozy remains in touch with the em pirical da ta while a t the same time avoiding any such ex trao rd inary d i f f ic u l t i e s and proposed so lu tio n s as those mentioned above. In d iscussing Dewey's arguments fo r h is theory o f "mind" and "body," I have re fe rre d to th a t group o f arguments, c , which consider the conse- quences o f a lte rn a tiv e po sitio n s only in connection w ith Cartesianism , o r mind-body dualism . There a re , o f course, o ther th e o rie s o f the nature o f mind and i t s re la tio n to body which need to be considered before one can maJce any claim to the p la u s ib i l i ty o f Dewey's view. One such view is the Id e n tity Theory. Ib is i s a view which d id not e x is t during Dewey's l ife tim e , a t le a s t in the form in which we th ink o f i t today. A consider- a tio n o f i t w ill th e re fo re provide the kind o f t e s t fo r Dewey's view which he believed a n a ly tic realism provided fo r the views o f Essays in Experi- mental Logic, which were o r ig in a lly d irec ted ag a in s t the kind of idealism contained in the philosophy o f Lotze, As Dewey says in the "In troduction" to Essays in Experimental Logic, which was w ritten in 1916, th ir te e n years a f t e r the essays themselvest I t i s one th in g to develop a hypothesis in view of a p a r t ic u la r s i tu - a tio n ; i t i s ano ther to t e s t i t s worth in view o f procedures and r e s u l ts having a ra d ic a lly d if fe re n t m otivation and d ire c tio n , . . , A considera tion of how sane o f i t s ^an a ly tic re a lism 's^ main ten e ts compare w ith the conclusions ou tlined above w i l l , however, throw some l ig h t upon the meaning and worth o f the l a t t e r [ [ i .e . , Dewey's own th e o r y ] .^ The following consideration o f the Id e n tity Theory on the re la tio n between mind and body should serve th e re fo re to throw some l ig h t on the meaning and t e s t th e worth o f Dewey's own view. I t i s a kind of use o f 155 the s c ie n t i f ic method in philosophy which charac te rized Dewey's own work* A hypothesis which o rig inated to deal with one o r more observed Mphenomena*1 i s then te s ted on new "phenomena" which subsequently come to l ig h t . The Id e n ti ty Theory, as i t i s developed by Place, F e ig l, and Smart, i s an attem pt to o f fe r an account o f mental events which does not commit the philosopher to the existence o f a non-m aterial kind o f r e a l i ty . One might m aintain, as indeed many philosophers have and s t i l l do m aintain, th a t the proper account o f such th ings as understanding, in tend ing , having afte r-im ages, and so on, i s th a t which describes them a s non-m aterial o r non-physical events. There a re a t le a s t two v a r ie t ie s o f such a view. According to the f i r s t , such events occur in the non-m aterial minds o f the persons having them. According to the o thers they a re events which, although perhaps not occurring in a mind, and although always a tten d an t upon c e r ta in physio log ical occurrences, are nevertheless irred u c ib le to such occurrences. The l a t t e r view i s u sually c a lled epiphenomenalism. There a re , then , according to e i th e r o f these views (the ones the Id e n tity Theory opposes, th a t i s ) , c e r ta in fa c ts about our conscious l i f e which can be accounted fo r only by recognizing the ex istence o f an i r r e - ducibly mental p a rt o f us o r irred u c ib ly mental phenomena occurring in us. This conclusion the Id e n tity Theory attem pts to re fu te . For i t i s the operating assumption o f the theory th a t th e re are no th ings in the world th a t a re non-m aterial, th a t , u ltim a te ly , everything th a t e x is ts comes w ithin the m a te r ia lis t ic scope o f sc ience. Now some o f those men- i a l phenomena which some philosophers have held to be Irred u c ib ly mental have, according to the Id e n tity Theory, a lready been adequately shown to I 156 50submit to a b eh av io ris tic a n a ly s is . So-called "mental" events such as understanding and in tend ing , we now see , a re not r e a l ly episodes occur- ring as irred u c ib ly mental events in the p r iv a te , s p i r i tu a l world o f the one who understands o r in ten d s , but a re ra th e r d isp o s itio n s to behave in a c e r ta in way. And th i s j according to P lace, i s so because th is i s what "understanding" means. To say, th a t i s , th a t "George understands" i s p re- c ise ly to say th a t George i s disposed to a c t in a c e r ta in way, th a t , given c e r ta in circum stances ( t e s t s and the l ik e ) , George w ill perform the appro- p r ia te a c tio n . And a l l o f th is i s to be understood a s a s e t o f fh c ts about G eorge's behavior, and th e re fo re as e n tire ly w ith in the scope of a m a te r ia l is t ic metaphysics. Now the Id e n tity th e o r is t m aintains th a t such accounts su ff ic e to re fu te the m en ta lis tic in te rp re ta tio n fo r many o f the notions fo r which i t i s claimed. I t s u f f ic e s , fo r example, to show th a t th e re a re no i r - reducibly mental a c ts o f understanding, meaning, remembering, wanting, in tend ing , e tc . A ll o f these can be regarded as what Ryle c a l l s "d is - p o s itio n a l" n o tions, i . e . , p ro c liv i t ie s on the p a r t o f people to behave in c e r ta in ways under c e r ta in circum stances. There a re j however, some events in the conscious l i f e o f human beings which the Id e n tity Theory holds w il l not submit to such an a n a ly s is . The having o f an after-im age i s am example o f such an event. This, those who hold the theory in s i s t , i s su re ly an episode occurring now, not a dispo- s i t io n to behave in a c e r ta in way. I f I say, " I am now having a yellow ishorange a fte r-im ag e ," I am not d esc rib in g something th a t i s going to occur i f something e lse occurs. Rather am I describ ing o r rep o rtin g an event 157 or process th a t i s going on in s id e me a t the very in s ta n t o f the u tte rance of the sentence. But th i s obviously c rea te s d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r a m a te r ia l is t . For I have sa id th a t I am having a yellow ish-orange image. But there i s nothing yellowish-orange in the world around me; o r , i f th e re i s , i t i s not i t th a t I am seeing , but ano ther yellow ish-orange th in g , one in s id e me. But there i s nothing yellow ish-orange in my b ra in . Everything there i s greymatte r . Where, then; i s th i s yellow ish-orange phenomenon th a t 1 p ". now "look- ing" a t? Apparently i t i s not physica l a t a l l , bu t an irred u c ib ly mental phenomenon. Indeed; i t i s a s a "place fo r w ild data" th a t one d u a l is t , Lovejoy, th in k s i t i s necessary to assume th a t th e re i s a mind. The answer th a t Place and Smart make to th is ob jection i s th a t i t commits what Place c a l l s the Phenomenological F allacy . This co n sis ts in regarding such an event as the having o f an after-im age a s the ex istence o f "the l i t e r a l p ro p e rtie s o f o b jec ts and events on a p e cu lia r s o r t o f in te rn a l cinema o r te le v is io n screen , u su a lly re fe rre d to in the modem psychological l i t e r a tu r e as the 'phenomenal f i e l d , '" The assumption o f such philosophers i s , th a t i s , th a t having an after-im age o f the moon is seeing a m iniature moon on a kind o f in te rn a l te le v is io n o r cinema sem en. To have an after-im age i s therefo re to have a re p lic a o f th e th ing ac tu - a l ly experienced before o n e 's consciousness, possessing the same yellow ishorange property th a t the th in g i t s e l f possessed when one looked upon i t . This view would, the Id e n tity th e o r is ts ag ree, commit one to the view th a t th em i s a p a r t o f us; o r th em am events in u s, th a t am irred u c ib ly 158 mental in n a tu re . But the view i s m istaken. For when one has, fo r ex- ample, an after-im age o f the moon, one does not have a l i t t l e re p lic a o f the moon before him, but r a th e r does he have "the s o r t o f experience which we normally have when, and which we have learned to describe a s , looking a t" the m oon.^ This, I take i t , means th a t we a re now in a su b jec tiv e s ta te lik e the sub jec tiv e s ta te we were in when the moon was a c tu a lly p resen t. And th i s su b jec tiv e s ta t e , we can q u ite c o n sis te n tly m aintain , i s simply a b ra in s ta te , fo r i t has none o f these phenomenal, re p lic a lik e charac- t e r i s t i c s which had seemed to some philosophers to preclude i t s being c a lle d a s ta te o f the b ra in . Smart, in "Sensations and Brain P rocesses," g ives a s im ila r rep ly to what he considers the s tro n g e s t ob jection to the Id e n tity Theory. Ib is i s the one he a t t r ib u te s to Max Black, according to which i t cannot make any sense to say th a t two th ings a re id e n tic a l ( e .g . , the Morning and the Evening S ta rs ) unless they have p ro p e rtie s by v ir tu e o f which they can be d is tin g u ish ed , "Suppose we id e n tify the Morning S ta r with the Evening S ta r . Then th e re must be some p ro p e rtie s which lo g ic a lly imply th a t o f being the Morning S ta r , and q u ite d i s t in c t p ro perties which *52e n ta i l th a t o f being the Evening S ta r . Hence th e re must be some prop- e r t i e s which charac te rize the sensation and e n ta i l i t s being the sensa- tio n i t i s , and some p ro p e rtie s which ch arac te rize the brain-process and e n ta i l i t s being the b ra in -p rocess i t i s . But now the p ro p e rtie s th a t ch arac te rize sensa tions are phenomenal q u a l i t ie s such a s yellow, green, e tc . But these a re n o t the s o r ts o f 159 ~ th ings th a t w ill f i t in to the m a te r ia l is t ic metaphysics. For, as Smart po in ts o u t, they a re e i th e r "o b jec tive emergent p ro p e rtie s o f physical o b jec ts , o r e lse . . , [powers] to produce yellow sense-data , where 'y e l - low ,' in th is second in s ta n tia t io n o f the word, re fe rs to a purely phe- nomenal o r in tro sp e c tib le q u a li ty ." To answer B lack 's o b jec tio n , Smart has th e re fo re to show th a t h is view commits him n e ith e r to the existence o f phenomenal p ro p e rtie s in the p e rce iver nor in the perceived. I want to come back l a t e r to h is attem pt to e lim inate the l a t t e r a l te rn a t iv e , th a t i s , , the ex istence of phenomenal q u a l i t ie s in the world. Suffice i t to say now th a t he regards a phenomenal p roperty , such as a co lo r, as a power in an o b jec t to produce a d iscrim inatory response in the perceiver, no t a s a q u a lity a c tu a lly ly ing upon the surface o f the o b jec t. There a re , then , no secondary q u a l i t ie s in the world; th e re a re simply powers o f ob jects to evoke responses from us. But to re tu rn to B lack 's ob jec tion . I f B lack 's argument i s co rrec t about id en tify in g th ings o r ig in a lly thought to be d iv erse , l ik e the Morn- ing S ta r and the Evening S ta r , then th e re must be some q u a l i t ie s th a t c o n s ti tu te being a yellow ish-orange after-im age and o thers th a t co n s ti- tu te being a b ra in -s ta te . But th is would, o f course, commit Smart to the a sse rtio n o f the ex istence or* phenomenal p ro p e rtie s-a view th a t i s anath- ema to him. His answer to th is i s th a t what happens when one has a yellow ishorange after-im age i s n o t, a s we saw th a t Place a lso m aintains in connec- tio n w ith h is d iscussion o f the Phenomenological F allacy , th a t , e .g . , a re p lic a o f the moon, a l i t t l e moon, now l ie s on a kind o f in te rn a l phe- nomenal f ie ld possessing the p ro p e rtie s o f being yellow ish-orange, round, I 160 e tc . Rather i s i t the case th a t something i s going on in one which i s l ik e what i s going on when one i s re a l ly seeing the moon. And th is some- th ing i s , Smart po in ts ou t, to n ic -n e u tra l. That i s to say, one i s not committing onese lf, when one has an after-im age o r hears a tune going through h is head, a s to whether the something going on i s a b ra in -p rocess, a process in the "mind/ 1 a f r e e f lo a tin g datum, o r anything e ls e -any more than a person who rep o rts th a t someone i s here to see Mr. X i s committing him self, by th is mode of expression, a s to what p rec ise ly the someone i s , whether doc to r, lawyer, bum, o r what. The po in t i s th a t one simply does not know where o r what the s ta tu s of what i s going on in him i s j one simply knows th a t i t i s the s o r t o f th ing th a t goes on when he i s r e a l ly seeing the moon. So th a t the answer to B lack 's objection i s th a t the person who has an after-im age does not have any phenomenal p ro p ertie s before h is con- sciousness a t a l l . He i s aware o f something, but he does no t know what i t i s he i s aware o f . Hence i t i s q u ite possib le to id e n tify th is th ing he i s aware o f, the p rec ise ch arac te r o f which he simply does n o t know, w ith a b ra in -s ta te . And we do th is in the way we id e n tify someone with a docto r. Now th i s , Smart adm its, commits him to saying th a t a person id e n ti- f i e s a s ta te he i s now in w ith a s ta te he has been in before , even though he does no t know the p ro p e rtie s on the b asis o f which he i s making the comparison. That i s i since he knows nothing o f b ra in -s ta te s , he cannot know th a t the p resen t s ta te reminds him o f the p ast one by v ir tu e o f , fo r example, s im ila r configura tions o f neurons in them. l 6 l Another way o f s ta t in g th is objection and re b u t ta l , according to Smart, i s the follow ingt The objection i s th a t a person unacquainted with b ra in physiology knows p e rfe c tly w ell what a sensation i s , but has no idea a t a l l what a c e reb ra l process i s . Hence ce reb ra l processes and sensations cannot be id e n tic a l . Smart's answer i s th a t such a person simply does n o t commit h im self one way o r the o th e r with regard to the nature and s ta tu s o f h is sensa tions, any more than the person who sees someone in the room commits h im self to the a c t i v i t i e s o r ch arac te r o f th is person. In the In troduction to th is d is se r ta tio n I re fe rre d to the inex- h au stib le richness of Dewey's philosophy w ith re sp ec t to i t s suggestive in s ig h ts in to the nature o f our experience. Here in the Id e n tity Theory we have exactly the opposite kind o f philosophy. I t i s the type o f phi- losophy which sane phenomenologists c a l l d ia le c t ic a l , in th a t i t begins with c e r ta in assumptions and proceeds to deduce i t s answers to sp e c if ic questions from these b a sic assumptions, and then to answer ob jections and o f fe r arguments in i t s defense. But i t i s a kind of philosophizing which never re a lly in te re s ts i t s e l f p a r tic u la r ly in d iscovering what experience i s l i k e . What i s experience l ik e , a s the Id e n tity th e o r is t sees i t ? I t i s an a f f a i r o f d iscrim inatory responses, sans q u a li ta tiv e perception , o f a n o n -q u a lita tiv e , m a te r ia lis t ic world-of course. Why? Because mater- ia lism i s tru e . I must say, I have learned very l i t t l e about experience from reading th e Id e n tity th e o r is ts , I have been occasionally impressed with th e i r c lev e rn ess/ b u t I have never found any o f the o r ig in a li ty and 162 s e n s i t iv i ty to experience which one d iscovers so abundantly in Dewey. Perhaps even worse than th a t fh.ct, however, i s the f&ct th a t the whole theory re s ts on an assumption th a t no t only does n o t reveal any- th ing new about experience, but a c tu a lly d is to r ts i t , I am re fe rr in g to the view th a t when we have c e r ta in kinds o f "mental experiences," such as afte r-im ages, we a re not a c tu a lly seeing a re p lic a , w ith phenomenal q u a l i t ie s , o f the th ing o f which we a re having the a fter-im age. This view c e r ta in ly f l i e s in the face o f experience as we a c tu a lly have i t . I t c e r ta in ly seems a s though we sometimes, a t le a s t , do have after-im ages which a re o f phenomenal q u a l i t ie s . When one looks a t an ob ject such as the sun, o r a f i r e , and then has an a fte r-im ag e , one i s su re ly regarding an a c tu a l re p lic a o f the sun o r the f i r e , w ith phenomenal, q u a lita tiv e p ro p e rtie s . And i f one i s asked, fo r example, to imagine the co lo r red , i t seems as though, sometimes anyway; one e n te r ta in s a re p lic a o f a colored patch , o r even envisages a p a r t ic u la r colored o b jec t. And in dreaming, one seems, sometimes anyway, a c tu a lly to be en te r ta in in g the phenomenal q u a li t ie s o f the persons and places being dreamed o f. The Id e n tity Theory re a l ly has no phenomenological o r em piricaldenotative ground whatever. I t i s simply an ad hoc move to rescue a theory , v iz . , m aterialism . The only reason these philosophers have fo r be liev ing th is theory i s , as Smart puts i t in Philosophy and S c ie n tif ic G(L Realism. th a t science with i t s " m a te r ia lis t ic metaphysics" has accounted fo r so much th a t i t i s u n lik e ly th a t i t cannot account f o r sensations as w ell. Otherwisê we are l e f t w ith so -ca lled "nomological dang lers," i . e . , secondary and, p e rish the th o u ^ it, t e r t i a r y q u a l i t ie s . 163 Let me now re tu rn to a po in t d iscussed b r ie f ly above, v iz . , the view o f the Id e n tity th e o r is t th a t secondary (and, we may add, m utatls mutandl. t e r t i a r y q u a l i t ie s ) do no t e x is t anywhere a t a l l . There a re , th a t i s , according to the Id e n tity Theory, no q u a li ta tiv e yellow s, greens, red s , odors, sounds, e tc . There a re simply l ig h t waves, sound waves, e t c . , and our behavioral responses to these . We have been to ld th a t secondary qua l- i t i e s do not e x is t in us when we have a fte r-im ag es, e t c . , but th a t ra th e r when we have such experiences we a re having experiences lik e the experi- ence o f a c tu a lly seeing the th ing o f which we a re now having the a f t e r - image, the perception o f the yellow ish-orange moon, fo r example. But now we re a liz e th a t what th a t o r ig in a l perception i t s e l f was o f was a purely m a te r ia lis t ic moon, a moon devoid e n tire ly o f q u a li ta tiv e yellow-orange- ness. In f a c t , there are no co lo r q u a l i t ie s out th e re in the world a t a l l . What, then , are co lo rs? What is the co lo r red i f i t i s no t a q u a lity experienced as ly ing on the surface o f an object? To explain what he th inks cc a co lo r i s , Smart uses the notion o f a "normal p e rc ip ien t, "This i s red" means something roughly lik e "A normal p e rc ip ien t would n o t e a s ily pick th is out o f a clump o f geranium p e ta ls though he would pick i t out o f a clump o f le ttu c e le av es ." . . . I th e re fo re e lu cid ate colors a s powers, in Locke's sense, to evoke c e r ta in s o r ts o f d iscrim inatory responses in human beings. They a re a ls o , o f course, powers to cause sensations in human beln-- * (an account s t i l l n earer Locke's ) , But these sen sa tio n s , I am ' , a re id e n t i f i - ab le with b ra in p r o c e s s e s . 56 So co lo rs and odors and ta s te s and a l l o f th\ Im portant and in te re s tin g c h a ra c te r is t ic s o f the world a re n o t q u a l i t ie s , bu t d iscrim - in a to ry responses re su ltin g from the operation of l ig h tra y s , e t c . , on the p e rc ip ien t organism. This i s , o f course, what one would expect the m a te r ia lis t ic hypothesis to lead to . But i t i s so outrageously untrue 164 to experience as i t a c tu a l ly occurs and as must be accepted by one f o l - lowing the em pirica l-deno tative method th a t i t i s d i f f i c u l t to believe th a t anyone a c tu a lly holds i t . The Id e n tity Theory seems to me to g e t in to fu r th e r d i f f ic u l t ie s when one considers o th e r "mental" experiences. Like a fte r-im ag es, itc h e s and pains a re , fo r th e Id e n tity Theory, no t to be understood a s d isp o si- tio n s to behave in c e r ta in ways, but ra th e r a s episodes o r occurrences in the in d iv id u a l having them. Now l e t us co n sid er a pain , say , a too th - ache, The Id e n tity th e o r is t would presumably agree th a t the toothache c rea te s s im ila r problems as the a fte r-lm ag e . For i t does no t seem as though we can adequately analyze the toothache as being simply a b ra in process any more than we can adequately analyze an after-im age as being simply a b ra in -p ro cess . There a re , a f t e r a l l , no pains occurring in one's nervous system, but ra th e r electro -chem ical im pulses. We saw th a t in the case o f the b ra ix -p rocess th a t i s the after-im age i t was necessary in h is a n a ly s is to make a re ference to something e ls e , v iz . , the a c tu a l percep- tio n o f the moon, as something the p resen t b ra in -p rocess resem bles. So i t seems here the proper an a ly s is o f the toothache w ill requ ire such a re fe rence . But what experience i s the experience o f the toothache sup- posed to resemble? A toothache i s n o t a reproduction o f some o th er ex- perience which has the a c tu a l e x te rn a l world d ire c t ly a s i t s ob jec t. And y e ti i t to ° seems no t to be analyzable simply in to a b ra in -p rocess. Smart's own account o f pains such a s toothaches i s th a t they a re experiences l ik e th e experience one has when, fo r example, one s tic k s a pin in h is f in g e r , o r the l ik e ex te rn a lly caused experience. But th e re 165 i s c le a r ly a g re a t d iffe ren ce between a toothache and an experience lik e th a t o f having an afte r-im age . For the l a t t e r i s , by i t s very n a tu re , a copy^ o f a previous percep tual experience, and i s immediately known by the person to be so . That i s , i t makes some sense to say of an a f t e r - image th a t i t i s an experience in which one i s in a s ta te lik e a s ta te he was in p reviously when he was a c tu a lly perceiv ing something. But i t i s r e a l ly very fa r-fe tch ed to say th a t the experience o f a toothache i s in any sense a copy o f, o r involves e s s e n tia l ly a reference back to , a p in -p rick experience. S m art's view here i s th a t , ju s t as th e re can be no co lors in s id e me when I am having an after-im age i f the s e l f i s e n tir e ly m a te ria l, so there can be no pains o r itc h e s in me. So we must somehow account fo r these experiences in the way we accounted fo r the a fter-im age. Pains and i tc h e s , a s they a re experienced o r liv e d , a re equally the s o r t o f th in g th a t cannot be going on in a body, since events in the nervous system, which i s where we would have to suppose them to be occurring, a re lim ited to electro -chem ical even ts. But th e re i s no ex te rn a l ob ject to which to reduce the pain in the way one might be ab le to reduce the after-im age to a previous percep tion . Furthermore, even i f we adm itted th a t a toothache could somehow be in te rp re te d as a b ra in -s ta te s im ila r to the s ta te one i s in when one i s being pricked with a p in , what account a re we to give o f the pain th a t i s experienced when one i s so pricked? Is i t a d iscrim ina to ry response to pins a s opposed to pillow s? Surely th is pain th a t I have when I am being pricked with a pin i s a q u a li ta tiv e event irred u c ib le to d iscrim inato ry 166 responses and b ra in -s ta te s . F in a lly , to deny th a t a person who has a toothache i s re a l ly exper- iencing a q u a li ta tiv e ache a t the very time when he has the toothache i s ju s t a s absurd as denying th a t there a re experienced q u a li ta tiv e co lo rs and odors in the world. When I have a toothache, th e re i s a th ing ca lled an ache going on, and i t i s not reducib le to an e lectro-chem ical impulse. And, fo r th a t m atter, when one has the p in -p rick , one 's experience o f th a t pain i s no t a b ra in -s ta te o r a d iscrim inato ry response e i th e r . I t i s a new s o r t o f th in g , a f e l t q u a lity , which, as Dewey po in ts o u t, emerges from the more complex kinds o f in te ra c tio n th a t animal organisms a re ca- pable o f. The Id e n tity Theory, then , l ik e C artesian dualism , f a i l s to o f fe r a s a t is fa c to ry account o f the fa c ts about our experience. For i t comes to the h ighly untenable conclusion th a t th e re a re no secondary q u a li t ie s in the world, Andi as I have suggested, i t would deny even more vehemently, we may be su re , th a t th e re a re t e r t i a r y q u a l i t ie s in the world. In doing so , i t fb i ls u t te r ly to "find a place fo r value" in the world. Dewey's theory , th e re fo re , seems to me to be the most p lau sib le fo r the fou r kinds o f reasons previously re fe rre d to* (a) I t i s a theory which is tru e to , o r a proper d e sc rip tio n o f, the fa c ts as revealed by c a re fu l ap p lica tio n o f the em pirical-denotative method, (b) The a l t e r - n a tiv e views make assumptions which render an acknowledgement o f the em pirical fa c ts inconvenient, (c) The consequences o f the a lte rn a tiv e views a re unacceptable, e i th e r because they c o n f lic t with the da ta o f 16? em pirical observation , o r because they make i t im possible to account fo r operations such as knowing and valuing. F in a lly , (d) the ob jections to Dewey's own view can be answered along the l in e s I have suggested above. In t h i s defense o f Dewey's theory o f mind, I have often go tten in - volved in the d iscussion o f top ics no t s t r i c t l y re la te d to perception. N evertheless, a s I hope I have shown, Dewey's theory o f mind o r s e l f derives fiom and i s made possib le by h is view o f perception . Perception i s i n i t i a l l y , both in the h is to ry o f the organism and in the h is to ry o f each experience, fe e lin g . What fe e lin g i s o f i s a to t a l q u a li ta tiv e s itu a tio n which i s a re a l product o f the in te ra c tio n of n a tu ra l events. But i t i s n e ith e r bodily nor m ental, n e ith e r ob jective nor su b jec tiv e . Within i t s f i e ld some ob jec ts a re forged out by perception of s ig n if ic a - tio n and perception o f sense, in connection with a problematic s itu a tio n and the inqu iry th a t i s prompted by i t . These o b jec ts a re , as a conse- quence o f in q u iry i re fe rre d to the ob jec tiv e o r world s id e , o r the sub- je c t iv e o r organism s id e o f experience. But these categories do not describe the condition th a t holds p r io r to inqu iry . They a re p rov isiona l and pragmatic ch arac te riza tio n s made w ith in a m ind-less, body-less q u a li- ta t iv e s i tu a tio n which antecedes them, and to which experience w ill re tu rn when th e i r problem i s solved and th e i r u t i l i t y term inated. NOTES 1 , W ill ia m James, "Does Consciousness E x is t? " Essays in R a d ic a l E m piric ism and A P l u r a l i s t i c U n iverse (New Y o rk t Longmans, Green and C o . , 1958), V o l. I , pp. 1-38. 2, See below, pp. 28 f f , , fo r development o f th i s notion , 3, See p. 3? o f B ernstein , e d ., John Dewey on Experience, Nature, and Freedom. 4 , Ib id . . p. 40. 5 , Ib id . . pp. 40-41. 6 , Dewey, Theory o f Valuation, p. 2. 7, Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 25» "S e lective emphasis . . . i s the h ea rt-b ea t o f mental l i f e . To ob ject to the operation i s to d iscard a l l th ink ing . But in ordinary m atters and in s c ie n t i f ic in q u ir ie s , we always re ta in the sense th a t the m ateria l chosen i s se lec ted fo r a purpose j there i s no idea o f denying what i s l e f t o u t, fo r what i s om itted i s merely th a t which i s not re lev an t to the p a r tic u la r problem or purpose in hand. 8 , Ib id . . pp. 258-59. I t a l i c s mine. 9 , B ernstein , e d ,, John Dewey on Expedience. N ature, and Freedom, p. 190. I t a l i c s mine, Sigmund Freud, in C iv iliz a tio n and I t s D iscontents (New Yorki W, W. Norton and Co., In c . , I 96I L^i r s 't published in German, 19313)» p. 15» takes a s im ila r view o f the ch arac te r o f a young c h i ld 's experience. He describes i t a s a kind o f "oceanic fee lin g " in which a l l ob jects and q u a l i t ie s a re experienced on the same le v e l, with no d is tin c tio n between what i s mine and what i s o ther. 10. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 13, 11. Ib id . . p. 15. 12. Dewey, L o g ic » The Theory o f In q u ir y , pp. 33-3^. 13. Ib id . . p. 152. 14. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 134. 168 - 169 15. See below, pp. 137-39, ^ox fu r th e r development o f th is po in t. 16. Dewey, E xp erien ce and N a tu re , p. 109 and p. 252, 17. Note th a t here we are making the kind o f consideration which belongs to p a rt b o f Dewey's argument-i . e . , consideration o f hidden assumptions, 18. Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. XXXVII, No. 22 (October 24, 1940), p. 595. Quotation from James i s from P rin c ip les o f Psychology, Vol. I (New York: Dover P ub lica tio n s , In c ., 1950), p. 272. 19. Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. XXXVII, No. 22, p. 595. 20. Sehilpp, e d ,, The Philosophy o f John Dewey, pp. 546-68, 21. Ib id . . p. 541. 22. See the essay, "What Pragmatism Means by P ra c tic a l ," in Essays in Experimental Logic fo r Dewey's development o f th is p o in t. 23. Dewey, E xperience and N a tu re , p. 263. 24. Sehilpp, e d ., The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 229-242. Dewey p ra ises Barodl severa l tim es in the course o f h is "Reply" fo r Phxodi's excel- le n t grasp o f h is thought, an honor no t s im ila rly accorded to Murphy, 25. Ib id . . p. 240. 26. Ib id . . pp. 597-99. 27. Using th a t term now in the sp ec ia l sense in which Dewey uses i t and as defined in the chap ter on fee lin g above, n o t in the sense in which Parodîtalks about q u a li t ie s as being f e l t . 28. Dewey, Quest fo r C erta in ty , p. 129. 29. I b id . , pp. 129-30. 30. Ib id . . p. 130. 31. Lovejoy, The Revolt Against Dualism, p. 101. 32. Sehilpp, e d ., The Philosophy o f John Dewey, p. 240. 33. Dewey came to change h is view about the experience o f anim als. See the essay , "Q ualita tive Thought," in B ernstein , e d ., John Dewey on Experience. N ature, and Freedom. 34 . Dewey, The Influence o f Darwin an Philosophy, pp. 78-79 and p. 84, 170 35. Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. XXI, No. 22 (October 24, 192*0, pp. 601-11. 36. Ib id . . p. 610. 37. A rthur 0 . Lovejoy, The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays (B altim ore» The Johns Hopkins P ress, 1963). 38. Journal o f Philosophy. Vol. XIX, No. 13 (June 22, 1922), pp. 351-61. 39. Brand Blanshard, The Nature o f Thought. Vol. I (New York: The Mac- m illan Co., 1939) * PPt 380-81. 40. E specia lly , o f course, meanings which sire perceived as the sense o f q u a l i t ie s o r o b je c ts . Note th a t a novel s i tu a t io n , as w ell a s fa m ilia r ones, can become perceived In the mode o f sense. Thus Dewey says (Experience and Nature, p. 261) th a t when "we a re b a ffled by perplex- ing cond itions, and f in a l ly h i t upon a clew, and everything f a l l s in to p lace, the whole th in g suddenly, a s we say, 'makes s e n s e . '" 41. Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 182. 42. See e sp e c ia lly Logici The Theory o f Inqu iry , pp. 223 f f . 43. See above, pp .25-27, fo r development o f the notions o f perceptual and conceptual o b jec ts , bb. Dewey, Logic> The Theory o f In q u iry , p. 227. b 5 . For a w ell-argued development o f th is kind o f o b jec tio n , see the chap- t e r , "Memory," in P rofessor William E a r le 's book, The Autobiographical Consciousness (Chicago! Quadrangle Books, 1972), pp. 142-7**. 46, Dating c le a r ly from D escartes, Locke, and Newton-and ev iden tly present in the thoughts o f some Greek a tom ists and o f some o f th e i r Greek and Roman Epicurean borrowers. 47, A lfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New Yorkt The Macmillan Co., 1926), pp. 79"80, 48, Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic, p. 26, 49, U, T. P lace, " Is Consciousness a Brain Process," in Vere Chappell, e d ., The Philosophy o f Mind (Englewood C lif f s , N .J .i P ren tice -H a ll, In c ., 1962){ H. F e ig l, "The 'Mental* and the 'P h y s ic a l , '" in Minnesota S tudies in the Philosophy o f Science. Vol. I I (Minneapolis! U niversity o f Minnesota P ress , 1958)1 J . J . C. Smart, "Sensations and Brain Processes," in Chappell, e d ,, The Philosophy o f Mlndi J . J . C. Smart, Philosophy and S c ie n tif ic Realism (London1 Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19337: 171 50. Place re fe rs to G ilb e rt R y le 's Concept o f Hind and Ludwig W ittg en ste in 's Philosophical In v estig a tio n s as having demonstrated th is d isp o s itio n a l ch arac te r o f some "mental" events. 51. Place in Chappell, e d ., Philosophy o f Hind, p. 108. 52. Smart, "Sensations and Brain P rocesses," in Chappell, e d ,, Philosophy o f Mind, p . 166, 53. I b id . . p. 166. 5^. Smart, Philosophy o f S c ie n tif ic Realism, p. 68. 55. Smart, "Sensations and Brain P rocesses," in Chappell, e d ,, Philosophy o f Mind, p. 166, 56. I b id . , pp. 166-67. 57. S t r i c t l y speaking, an after-im age should no t be sa id to be a "copy" o f an o r ig in a l phenomenon, e .g . , a yellow ish-orange moon. For the after-im age i s the complement o f the o r ig in a l . I t would th e re fo re be a b lu is h -v io le t , n o t a yellowish-orange image. This fa c t would seem to c rea te even fu r th e r d i f f i c u l t i e s fo r the Id e n tity Theory. For we see now th a t an after-im age i s no t a su b jec tiv e s ta te l ik e th a t which one was o r ig in a lly in , and, furtherm ore, th a t i t involves those very phenomenal p ro p e rtie s which the Id e n tity th e o r is t has been try in g to g e t r id o f. I BIBLIOGRAPHY Works by Dewey B ernste in , Richard J , , ed. John Dewey on Experience. Nature. and Freedom: Representative S e lec tions! New York: L ibera l A rts P ress , i 960. Dewey, John. Art as Experience. Capricorn Books. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1958. ________ . Essays in Experim ental Logic. New Yorkt Dover P ub lica tions, 1958. ■ . Experience and N ature. New York: Dover P u b lica tio n s , 1958. . "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A R ejoinder." The Philosophy o f John Dewey. Edited by Paul A rthur Schilpp, 2nd ed. LaSalle, 111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1951* ________ . How We Think. Rev. ed. New York: D. C. Heath and Co., 1933. ________ , Human Nature and Conduct. Modem L ibrary . New York: Random House, In c ., 1930. ________ . The Influence o f Darwin on Philosophy. Midland Books. Bloomington, Ind , 1 Indiana U niversity P ress, 1965. ________ , and B entley, A rthur. Knowing and the Known. Beacon Paperbacks. Boston: Beacon P ress, i 960 , ________ , Logic: The Theory o f In q u iry . New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938. ________ , Philosophy and C iv il iz a tio n . Capricorn Books. New York: G, P. Putnam's Sons, 1963. ________ . The Quest fo r C erta in ty : A Study o f the R elation o f Knowledge and Action. Capricorn Books. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, i 960 . ________ . "Realism Without Monism o r Dualism-I : Knowledge Involving the P a s t." The Journal o f Philosophy. XIX (June 8 , 1922). ________. "Realism Without Monism o r Dualism-I I , The Journal o f Philosophy. XIX (June 22, 1922). 172 - 173 - , Reconstruction In Philosophy. Beacon Paperbacks. Boston» Beacon P ress, 1957. . "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology." Psychological Review. I l l (Ju ly , 1896), 357-70. . "Substance, Power and Q uality in Locke," Philosophical Review. XXXV (1926), 22-38. , Theory o f V aluation. In te rn a tio n a l Encyclopedia o f Unified Science, Vol. I I . Chicago: U niversity o f Chicago P ress, 1939. . "Hie Vanishing Subject in the Psychology o f James." Journal o f Philosophy. XXXVII (October 24, 1940), 589-99. , "Logical Conditions o f a S c ie n tif ic Treatment o f M orality ." The Decennial P ub lica tions o f the U niversity o f Chicago. F i r s t S e ries ( I I I ) , 115-39. Works on Dewey B ernste in , Richard J . John Dewey. New York* Washington Square P ress, 1967. Blanshard, Brand. "Pragmatism and Thought," in The Nature o f Thought. Vol. I . New York: The Macmillan Co., 1939. Hendel, Charles W., ed. John Dewey and the Experimental S p i r i t in Philosophy. New York: L ibera l A rts P ress, 1959. Hook, Sidney. John Dewey. An In te l le c tu a l P o r t r a i t . New York: The John Day Co., 1939. Murphy, A rthur E. "O bjective R elativism in Dewey and Whitehead." The Philosophical Review. XXXVI (1927), 121-44. Schilpp, Paul A rthur, ed. The Philosophy of John Dewey. Vol. I : The L ibrary o f Living Philosophers. 2nd ed, LaSalle, 111.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1951. Smith, John E. "John Dewey: Experience, Experiment, and the Method of In te llig e n c e ," in The S p ir i t o f American Philosophy. New York: Oxford U niversity P ress , 1963. Thayer, H. S . Meaning and Action: A C r i t ic a l H istory o f Pragmatism. Ind ianapo lis and New York: Bobbs-M errill Co., In c ., 1968. Thomas, Milton H. John Dewey: A Centennial B ibliography. Chicago: U hiversity o f Chicago P ress, 1962. 174 Lovejoy, A rthur 0 . 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Cleveland* The World Publishing Co., 1955* James, William. The P rin c ip les o f Psychology. 2 vo ls, bound as one. New York* Dover P u b lica tio n s , 1950* Kohler, Wolfgang. G es ta lt Psychology* An In troduction to New Concepts in Modern Psychology. A Mentor Book, New York* New American L ibrary , 1959. Lewis, C. I . An A nalysis o f Knowledge and V aluation. L aSalle , 111,* Open Court Publishing Co., 19^6. Lovejoy, A rthur 0. The Revolt Against Dualism* An Inquiry Concerning the Existence o f Id eas . 2nd ed. Open Court C lass ic s . LaSalle, 111,* Open Court Publishing Co., i 960 . Lovejoy, A rthur 0, The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Other Essays. Baltimore* The Johns Hopkins P ress, I 963 . Morick, Harold, ed. In troduction to the Philosophy o f Mind* Readings from D escartes to Strawson. Glenview, 111,t S co tt, Foresman and Co., 1970. Moore, G. E. P rln c lp ia E th ica . Cambridge * Cambridge U niversity P ress, 1962. P e irce , Charles S. Values in a Universe o f Chance* S elected W ritings o f Charles S. P e irce . Edited by P h ilip P. Wiener, Anchor Books. Garden C ity , N.Y.t Doubleday and Co., 1958. P e irce , Charles S. Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Edited by Vincent Tomas, The American Heritage S e rie s , Indianapolis* BobbsM errill Co., 1957. Perry , Balph Barton. "The Ego-Centric Predicament." Journal o f Philosophy. v i i ( 1910) . P r ice , H. H. Perception . 2nd ed. London* Methuen and C o., 1950* Ryle, G ilb e rt. The Concept o f Mind. London* Hutchinson's U niversity L ibrary , 19 +9. R usse ll, Bertrand. The Problems o f Philosophy. London* Oxford U niversity P ress, 1912. S a r tre , Jean-Paul. The Psychology o f Im agination. New York* Philosophical L ibrary , 19^8, 176 S a r tre , Jean-Paul. The Transcendence o f the Ego: An E x is te n t ia l i s t Theory o f Consciousness. Translated, by F o rre st Williams and Robert K irkpa trick , New York: The Noonday P ress, 1957. Smart, J , J , G. Philosophy and S c ie n tif ic Realism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963. Smith, John E, The S p i r i t o f American Philosophy. New York: Oxford U niversity P ress, 1963. Swartz, Robert J . , ed. Perceiv ing . Sensing, and Knowing: A Book o f Readings from Twentieth-Century Sources in the Philosophy o f Per- cep tion . Anchor Books, Garden C ity , N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1965. Urmson, J , 0 . Philosophical A nalysis: I t s Development Between the Two World Wars. A Galaxy Book. London: Oxford U niversity P ress, I 967 . Werkmeister, William H. A H istory o f Philosophical Ideas in America. New York: Ronald P ress , 19^9. Whitehead, A lfred North. Adventures o f Ideas. A Mentor Book. New York: The New American L ibrary , 1955. W ittgenste in , Ludwig. Ph ilosophical In v e s tig a tio n s . T ranslated by G, E. M. Anscombe. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1953. VITA Names Jerome L. Segal Boms Memphis, Tennessee August 4 , I936 Colleges and degrees1 Northwestern U niversity , B.A., 1958 U niversity o f Chicago, M.A., I 96I Northwestern U niversity , Ph.D ., 1972 Teaching experiences In s tru c to r o f Philosophy, M ansfield S ta te C ollege, M ansfield, Pennsylvania, 1962-63 A ssis tan t P ro fesso r o f Philosophy, George Mason College o f the U niversity o f V irg in ia , F h irfax , V irg in ia , 1964-66 In s tru c to r Apf Philosophy, Wisconsin S ta te U niversity , Oshkosh, Wisconsinj 1966-67 A ssis tan t P ro fesso r o f Philosophy and Humanities, Wright College, Chicago, I l l i n o i s , 1968-present