SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 61	(1/2016)	pp.	(207–220) Book	Reviews	/	Buchbesprechungen210 doi:	10.21464/sp31116 Frederick Charles Beiser The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism Oxford	University	Press, Oxford	2014 Frederick Charles Beiser, professor of philosophy	at	Syracuse	University	(USA)	whose field	of	expertise	is	the	modern	German	philosophy,	is	one	of	the	most	erudite	historians of	philosophy	today.	His	first	book	The Fate of Reason: German Philosophy from Kant to Fichte (1987) didn't only present a fresh account	of	German	philosophy	at	the	end	of the	18th	century,	but	it	also	introduced	a	new method of historical research. His more recent works, starting with The German Historicist Tradition	(2011)	until	the	most	recent Weltschmerz: Pessimism in German Philosophy, 1860–1900	(2016),	have	focused	on	the main currents of the 19th century German philosophy. This is also the case with The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism. Spanning over more than	six	hundred	pages, this	book is	a major contribution to the history of an important philosophical movement that would dominate the German philosophy after the collapse	of	speculative	idealism	in	the	second half	of	the	19th,	and	the	beginning	of	the	20th century.	The	book	itself	is	divided	into	three main	parts.	The	first	part	(pp.	11–205)	is	concerned	with	the	origins	of	the	movement,	the second	(pp.	207–453)	with	its	maturation,	and the	final	(pp.	455–571)	with	a	new	generation of neo-Kantians that would be active from the	1870s.	Therefore, the focus	of this	book is on the history of neo-Kantianism before the formation of three famous neo-Kantian schools:	Marburg,	Southwestern	(also	known as	Baden	or	Heidelberg	school),	and	the	neoFrisian	school. Beiser	defines	neo-Kantianism	as	"the	movement	in	19th-century	Germany	to	rehabilitate Kant's philosophy". Although heavily indebted to previous scholarship on this subject,	mainly	Klaus	Christian	Köhnke's book Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus (1986),	Beiser	succeeds	in	providing	a	fresh account of the genesis of neo-Kantianism. He	challenges	the	widespread	prejudices	that the neo-Kantians were unimportant scholars locked up in their towers divided from the world, or that they were unoriginal thinkers who were just repeating what Kant had already	said.	One	of	the	most	innovative	theses of his book is that the movement's origins are to	be found	already in the	1790s, in the works	of	Jakob	Friedrich	Fries,	Johann	Friedrich	Herbart,	and	Friedrich	Eduard	Beneke. They	constitute	"the	lost	tradition"	which	preserved	the	"empiricist-psychological"	side	of Kant's thought, his dualisms, and things-inthemselves	against the	excessive	speculative idealism	of	Fichte,	Schelling,	and	Hegel	who tried to rehabilitate the dogmatic rationalist metaphysics of Spinoza, Leibniz, and	Wolff after	Kant's	critical	project. The	first	chapter	of	the	first	part	(pp.	23–88) is concerned with the philosophy of Fries who tried to base philosophy on empirical psychology, and epistemology on psychology which could recognize the synthetic a priori but not prove it. His book Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling (1803) saw the	history of	philosophy	after	Kant as the "struggle	of rationalism to free itself from the limits of the	critique".	In	his	political	philosophy	Fries was	an	anti-Semite,	but	gave	the	leading	role to public opinion which could correct even the ruler, although	he	encountered	problems in trying to reconcile his liberal views with the social injustice that liberalism created. Like	all	the	thinkers	of	the	lost	tradition,	Fries defended Kant's dualisms against Schelling and Hegel whose organic conception of nature he criticized because he saw it only as another	form	of the	mechanistic	explanation of nature. He also criticized Kant's attempt to rationalize faith, and he introduced the concept of Ahndung, a kind of a feeling on which	religion	was	based,	and	through	which humans are aware of things-in-themselves. Fries'	work	Neue Kritik der Vernunft (1807) tried	to	bring	a	new	transcendental	deduction of	the	categories	against	the	skeptical	objections	to	Kant's	philosophy,	but	Beiser	agrees with	Cassirer	that	Fries	had	failed	in	such	an attempt	because	of	his	psychologism. The	second	chapter (pp.	89–141) is	dedicated	to	Herbart	who	was,	according	to	Beiser, also	a	Kantian.	Herbart	defended	Kant	in	his claim that reason deals with concepts (and not	existences),	as	well	as	Kant's	dualism	of theoretical and practical reason, against the neo-rationalist	metaphysics	of	Schelling	and Hegel.	Although	a	Fichtean	in	his	early	years (and	later	a	Romantic),	Herbart	already	then criticized	Fichte	and	Schelling	for	their	foundationalism, and for the concept of the ego that	transcends	the	boundaries	of	experience and then relapses into	dogmatism	and fallacies of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Wolff. Beiser thinks	that	Herbart	didn't	start	to	develop	his new system in his Swiss years, although it was then that	he	broke	his relationship	with Fichte, but in his Bremen years. It was in SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 61	(1/2016)	pp.	(207–220) Book	Reviews	/	Buchbesprechungen211 his	manuscript	Zur Kritik der Ichvorstellung (1800) that Herbart criticized Fichte's ego, claiming	that	it	is	self-contradictory	because, as	Beiser	summarizes,	"thinking	of	being	and being"	are	not	the	same	and	therefore	"thinking	of	being	cannot	be	the	being	thought	of". Around 1802 Herbart adopted a skeptical standpoint	from	which	he	attacked	Kantian– Fichtean	idealism	and	the	Romantics,	but	he never rejected transcendental philosophy. In his	later	years	he	increasingly	identified	himself with Kant and was alienated from the prevailing currents of German philosophy. Thus, in his mature metaphysical writings he	defended the	synthetic	a priori,	unknowability of things-in-themselves, and the necessity, as well as complementarity, of both empiricism and rationalism for the critical philosophy.	However,	Herbart	recognized	the problem	of	formalism	or	moral	motivation	in Kant's	ethics.	He	held	that	morality	depends on	moral taste and	cannot	be	universal	or	a priori.	Like	Fries,	he	thought	that	psychology should	be	the	foundation	for	philosophy	and criticized	Kant's	antiquated	Wolffian	scholastic empirical psychology. It was because of these criticisms, Beiser thinks, that Herbart was	(wrongly)	not	considered	a	Kantian,	but concludes that his project failed for similar reasons	as in the	case	of	Fries, for trying to base	epistemology	on	psychology. Last	philosopher	who	belongs	to	Beiser's	empiricist-psychological triumvirate is Beneke to whom the third chapter (pp. 142–177) is dedicated.	Beneke	was	a	victim	of	Hegelianism	(he	couldn't	get	a	post	at	the	University of	Berlin	because	of	Hegel	in	1822),	he	was murdered	under	unsolved	circumstances,	and was therefore dubbed "neo-Kantian martyr" by	Beiser.	He	was	another	staunch	opponent of Romantic enthusiasm and neo-rationalist speculative	idealism,	as	well	as	a	radical	empiricist and an ally of the best that the new natural sciences could give. Accordingly, Beneke rejected Kant's division of judgements	into	synthetic	and	analytic	because	the only	criteria	for	the	validity	of	a	judgement	is its confirmation in	experience.	He	criticized Kant's claim that genuine self-knowledge is impossible,	but	defended the existence	of things-in-themselves	against	speculative	idealists.	Beneke	tried	to	base	ethics	on	aesthetics,	and	his	Grundlegung zur Physik der Sitten	(1822)	is,	according	to	Beiser,	"one	of	the most interesting	and important	works to	appear	in	the	early	19th	century",	an	attempt	to rehabilitate	British	sentimentalism	of	Hutcheson,	Hume,	and	Smith. The	last	chapter	(pp.	178–205)	of	the	first	part deals	with	the	circumstances	that	took	part	in the	1840s	and	the	1850s,	and	were	crucial,	in Beiser's interpretation, for the breakthrough of neo-Kantianism. Political context which prepared such a breakthrough was the failure of the Revolution of 1848 which meant a	disaster for the	Hegelians in	Germany	but a	victory	for	the	neo-Kantians	who	were	defenders of liberal ideals. At the same time, authors like Ernst Sigismund Mirbt, Christian	Hermann	Weisse,	Carl	Fortlage,	and	Otto Friedrich	Gruppe	called	for	a	return	to	Kant. However,	the	crucial	"philosophical	developments	without	which	neo-Kantianism	would never	have	taken	place",	Beiser	argues,	were the	rise	of	materialism	and	the	identity	crisis of philosophy due to a collapse of speculative	idealism	and	the	rise	of	the	empirical	sciences.	Two	other	significant	factors	were	the appearance	of	Trendelenburg	and	Lotze,	and lastly Helmholtz, a formidable and famous scientist	who	thought	that	the	natural	sciences confirmed Kant's philosophy, or at least its empirical	side. The	second	part	of	Beiser's	book	deals	with the	"coming	of	age"	of	those	neo-Kantians	that flourished	during	the	liberalism	of	the	1860s, a	"breakthrough	decade	for	neo-Kantianism". Beiser considers five major thinkers: Kuno Fischer, Eduard Zeller, Otto Liebmann, Jürgen	Bona	Meyer,	and	lastly	Friedrich	Albert Lange.	They	have	affirmed	psychologism	of Helmholtz	and	the	"lost	tradition"	but	wanted to	eliminate the thing-in-itself	and the	question of value. However, some of them have gradually distanced themselves from such views because of Schopenhauer's growing success during the 1860s, and because they wanted philosophy to be autonomous from psychology,	whose	possibility	could	be	proven	only	by	transcendental	idealism. Fischer is the first author to whom the first chapter (pp. 221–254) of the second part is dedicated.	This	may	be	a	surprise to	readers who	think	of	him	as	a	Hegelian,	which	is	confirmed	by	Beiser	who	cites	him	as	the	example	of	a	paradoxical	Hegelian	who	also	tried to be a Kantian. In his early work Diotima (1849),	Fischer	espoused	his	Hegelianism	or pantheism for which he was expelled from Heidelberg.	First	traces	of	his	Kantianism	are found	in	his	Logik und metaphysik oder Wissenschaftslehre (1852) where he claims that Hegel's system "must be placed under the control of Kant" because, as Fischer recognized in the late	1850s,	only	his	philosophy can	solve	the	problems	raised	by	Hegelianism and the empirical sciences. His Geschichte der neueren Philosophie	(18601)	was	important	for	spreading	the	fame	of	Kant's	philosophy	among the reading	public.	However,	by the	time	of	his	Kritik der kantischen Philosophie (1883) Fischer had turned a full circle SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 61	(1/2016)	pp.	(207–220) Book	Reviews	/	Buchbesprechungen212 because "he had created a Kantian system under	the	control	of	Hegel"	which	proved,	according	to	Beiser,	that	a	Hegelian	ultimately cannot	be	a	Kantian. Zeller,	a	great	historian	of	philosophy,	is	given his due space in the second chapter (pp. 255–282)	and	was	important,	just	like	Fischer, for	his	call	for	a	return	to	Kant	in	the	1860s. In	his	younger	days	he	was	also	a	Hegelian but	by	the	1840s	he	became	critical	of	Hegel, especially	his	philosophy	of	religion.	Historical	criticism	of	the	Bible	by	David	Friedrich Strauss	had	a	lasting	effect	on	Zeller	who	afterwards	became	close	to	Kant.	Unlike	Fischer, he thought that the collapse of speculative idealism	was	"irreversible	and	final"	and	that philosophy	should	become	epistemology	and logic of special sciences. However, he understood philosophy in psychological terms and	finally	claimed	that it	should	follow	the methods	of	natural	sciences.	Zeller	criticized Kant's	ethics	as	formalist	and	covertly	consequentialist,	adopting	instead	the	virtue	ethics of	Plato	and	Aristotle. Third chapter (pp. 283–327) of the second part	is	focused	on	Otto	Liebmann	whose	legacy Beiser rehabilitates and defends against Köhnke. In	his famous	Kant und die Epigonen	(1865)	Liebmann	interpreted	Kant's	critical	project	in	epistemological	rather	than	psychological	terms	and	would	therefore	precede in	this	respect	Hermann	Cohen	and	Wilhelm Windelband.	In	Kant	he	saw	the	central	figure	of	German	philosophy	whose	proper interpretation	could	solve	the	identity	crisis	of philosophy.	The	main	stumble	block	was	(in his interpretation) the thing-in-itself, whose existence he rejected, but he ultimately had to	admit	its	existence	and	his	failure	to	base philosophy on physiology. Beiser defends Liebmann against Köhnke's accusations of chauvinism,	concluding	that	he	is	a	conservative	liberal,	and	not	a	reactionary	monarchist. In the	1870s	Liebmann	discussed	Kant's relation to then-contemporary development of natural sciences, criticized	Naturphilosophie of	Schelling	and	Hegel,	as	well	as	materialists and	positivists,	and	developed	epistemological interpretation of transcendental philosophy.	Beiser	thinks	that	Liebmann's	Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit	(1876)	is	his	best	work, but	concludes	that	by	the	time	of	his	Grundriss der kritischen metaphysik	(1901)	he	fell	into Platonic	reasoning	beyond	the	limits	of	experience	and	even	mysticism. Meyer,	a	neo-Kantian	sceptic,	was	one	of	the last	who	offered	an important	psychological interpretation of Kant's philosophy, and is discussed	in	the	fourth	chapter	(pp.	328–355). In	his	Zum Streit über Leib und Seele	(1856) Meyer	thought	that	Kant's	main	goal	was	to set	the	limits	of	knowledge	and	that	his	philosophy	is	a	middle	path	between	"a	soulless materialism" and "groundless spiritualism" whose	dispute	was	irresolvable	because	both had tried "to conceive the inconceivable". Like	Fries,	he	criticized	Kant's	rational	faith and encouraged subjective belief. In Kant's Psychologie (1870) Meyer advanced the view	that	"the	greater	use	of	psychology	(...) would	have	saved	Kant	from	the	formalism	of his	logic	and	ethics"	and	he	tried	to	interpret Kant's	epistemological	project	in	psychological	terms,	which	is	why	his	views	became	obsolete	by	the	end	of	the	1870s.	His	Zeitfragen, populäre Aufsätze (1870) are neglected but, according to Beiser, "one of the best in the neo-Kantian pantheon". In this work Meyer put	forward	his	thesis	that	philosophy	should become psychology, defends the possibility of	the	freedom	of	the	will,	and	advocates	its compatibilism	with	theism.	Another	two	important aspects of Meyer's thought are his philosophy of religion, which he saw as an unalterable characteristic of human nature and	a	public	matter,	and	his	views	on	the	rise of scientific history which was a neglected topic	among	the	neo-Kantians. The	last	thinker	of	this	transitional	period	of neo-Kantianism is Lange to whom the fifth chapter (pp. 356–397) is dedicated. Beiser concludes	that	his	Geschichte des materialismus	(1866)	"overshadows	Fischer's	and	Zeller's	1860	lectures	and	Liebmann's	1865	Kant und die Epigonen", all of which advocated a return to Kant. However, he also argues (against	Ulrich	Sieg)	that	he	wasn't	the	father of	Marburg	neo-Kantianism	nor the founder of neo-Kantian socialism (against Thomas Willey)	because	he	criticized	Kantian	reasoning	concerning	private	ownership	and	ethics, in which he endorsed Smith's sentimentalism.	In	his	younger	days,	although	he	wrote poetry,	Lange	held	positivist	views	and	in	his Geschichte	he	would	show,	through	historical critique	of	materialism,	how	Kant's	philosophy	could	solve the	conflict	between	speculative	idealism	and	materialism	and	therefore preserve	their	good	sides	which	have	clashed during the	Revolution	of	1848.	Although	he held	positive	views	about	materialism	whose historical	mission	was	the	liberation	from	superstition,	Lange	thought	that	Kant's	philosophy	drove	it	into	a	crisis	because	it	proved	that "all	sense	qualities	depend	upon	our	perceptive	and	cognitive	organization".	It	is	important	to	note	that,	according	to	Beiser,	most	of Lange's	theories	failed:	his	attempt	to	prove	or reject the existence of things-in-themselves, his	interpretation	of	Kant's	critical	project	on psychological grounds, and his rejection of Kant's	"rationalist"	transcendental	deduction SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 61	(1/2016)	pp.	(207–220) Book	Reviews	/	Buchbesprechungen213 of	the	categories.	However,	he	was	also	one of	the	first	who	recognized	the	importance	of Hume	for	Kant. In	metaphysics	he	accepted dualistic	views,	in	his	philosophy	of	religion he	rejected	noumenal	world	and	rational	faith, he	thought	that	religion	should	be	"aesthetic experience"	like	poetry,	and	he	reduced	morality	to	aesthetics	which	he	in	turn	reduced	to subjective	taste.	Beiser	concludes	the	chapter on	Lange	with the	observation that philosophy	is	for	him	a	science	which	is	cut	off	from metaphysics as poetry and that he therefore "squeezed	out"	traditional	philosophy	whose place	should	have	been	between	science	and poetry. The last two chapters (pp. 398–453) of the second part are devoted to pessimism and Darwinism, both of which became a significant force in	Germany in the	1860s,	and would therefore challenge the neo-Kantian domination. Beiser follows Köhnke in his claim	that	pessimism	(whose	champions	were Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann) rose	because	of	social,	political,	and	economic	circumstances.	It	troubled	the	neo-Kantians because	it	showed	"that	all	striving	for	a	better world is pointless", but in their answer they	followed	Fichte,	not	Kant's	strategy	espoused	in	his	Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (1784), which, Beiser claims, was directed against Rousseau's pessimism. Fichte taught the neo-Kantians that the	better	world	would	be achieved	if	people	were	working	"together	in political	association".	Last	part	of	the	chapter on pessimism considers Schopenhauer's essay Über die Universitätsphilosophie which lampooned university professors because they	couldn't	teach	anything	contrary	to	religion	and	state,	but	Beiser	thinks	that	this	accusation	is	unfair	because	most	neo-Kantians were persecuted by the state in the period from	the	1820s	to	the	1860s.	Like	pessimism, Darwinism	also	had	a	quick	success in	Germany	in the	1860s	and	it	became	associated with leftism and materialism at first. Lange embraced Darwinism and tried to connect it with his socialist views, although he was critical	of	some	of	Darwin's	theories,	like	the natural selection as the only mechanism of evolution. Meyer was sympathetic but critical	of	the	theory	of	evolution	for	which	there was	no	empirical	evidence,	while	Liebmann sought	to	reconcile	Darwinism	and	Aristotelianism	in	a	kind	of	a	neo-Kantian	dualism.	The chapter	on	Darwinism	concludes	with	the	answers	of	Friedrich	Paulsen	and	Erich	Adickes to Ernst Haeckel's Die Welträthsel (1899) which advocated mechanism disguised in monism.	Their	refutations	were	theoretically successful,	but	Beiser	thinks	that	the	"spirit	of the	age",	which	was	increasingly	unfavorable to	neo-Kantianism,	had	already	changed. The	last,	third	part	of	the	book	deals	with	the first decade of "the neo-Kantian period of German	university	philosophy"	(1870–1900) or, more precisely, with the "new establishment"	of	neo-Kantians	who	marked	the	final victory of epistemological interpretation of Kant: Hermann Cohen, Wilhelm Windelband,	and	Alois	Riehl. In the	prevailing liberal	atmosphere	of	the	1870s	neo-Kantianism flourished	as	a	"bulwark	against	materialism" and	an	established	"account	of	philosophy	in the	modern scientific age", namely, as epistemology	or logic	of the sciences.	Although neo-Kantians	formed	an	uneasy	alliance	with positivism during the 1870s, such alliance proved fragile due to growing neo-Kantian involvement	with	ethical	problems	and their criticism	of	positivist	"extreme	empiricism", "naive	faith	in	given	facts",	as	well	as	equally naive	"belief	in	the	complete	autonomy	of	the sciences". The	philosophy	of	young	Cohen,	who	would become	the	father	of	Marburg	school,	is	discussed in the first	chapter (pp.	465–491). In his early days he was an adherent of Völkerpsychologie,	but	in	the	summer	of	1870	he wrote Kants Theorie der Erfahrung (1871) which	wanted	to	reconstruct	"proper	historical	Kant"	whose	critical	project	was for the first	time	clearly	understood	in	epistemological	rather	than	psychological	terms.	The	book also	stressed	the	importance	of	the	transcendental for Kant and the central role of the transcendental deduction in the first Kritik, although (ironically) Cohen denied Hume's influence	on	Kant.	Beiser	challenges	the	view that early Cohen's transcendental idealism is	"an	idealism	without	the	subject"	and	that Theorie is "the	product	of	Cohen's	mystical Platonism" because he emphasized Kant's rejection of intellectual intuition. In his groundbreaking book Cohen also responded to Lange and Trendelenburg and eliminated the	threat	of	materialism	which	both	have	left open.	The former	because	he thought that	a priori	forms	were	part	of	nature	and	the	latter because he presupposed the independent existence	of	matter	in	space. Main topic of the second chapter (pp. 492– 530)	is	the	concept	of	normativity	in	the	early works of Wilhelm Windelband who would become the father of Southwestern school. In	his	1881 lecture	Windelband	put forward "his normative conception of philosophy". According	to	him,	Kant	was	the	first	who	had explained "the possibility of knowledge not through the correspondence	of a representation	with	an	object	but	through	the	conformity	of	representations	with	rules".	It	was	here SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 61	(1/2016)	pp.	(207–220) Book	Reviews	/	Buchbesprechungen214 that	Windelband	introduced	the	term	"norm" in	the	rule:	"truth	is	the	normativity	of	thinking".	He	defined	philosophy	as	the	science	of norms	because	it	"makes	appraisals,	determining	what should	be	or	have	a	value".	When a critical philosopher makes an appraisal, according to Windelband, "he assumes that something	should	be	recognized	as	valid	for everyone".	In	his	interpretation	Kant	was	the one	who	held	that	philosophy	should	make	a difference in the	world,	but there	was	a	gap between	the	normative	(what	should	be)	and the	natural	(what	is)	which	young	Windelband tried	to	cross	with	his	compatibilist	theory	of freedom.	In	his	early	works	he	also	advocated foundationalism,	syncretism	of	epistemology, psychology,	and	metaphysics,	as	well	as the impossibility of the thing-in-itself. In the last part of this chapter Beiser clashes with Köhnke's	theory	of	Windelband's	intellectual development,	which	claims	that	he	had	conceived	his	normative conception	of	philosophy	only	in	1878,	after	assassination	attempts on	Kaiser	Wilhelm	I,	as	a	bulwark	against	the socialists	and	democracy.	Beiser	proves that Windelband	had	formulated	such	a	view	before	1878	and that	he	was	actually	advocating	a	"full	enlightenment"	which	would	make "every	individual	think	for	himself". The last chapter (pp. 531–571) of Beiser's book is dedicated to Alois Riehl, who, unlike	Cohen	or	Windelband,	never	became	the father	of	a	neo-Kantian	school	but	had	a	big following.	His	major	work	was	Der philosophische Kriticismus in three	volumes	(1876, 1879,	1887),	"one	of	the	classics	of	the	neoKantian tradition"	whose	goal	was to	affirm the existence	of things-in-themselves and to reinterpret	Kant's	philosophy	in the	spirit	of modern science.	Beiser challenges the common view that Riehl was a positivist and throughout the	chapter	stresses	both	positivist	and	anti-positivist	sides	of	his	philosophy. He	finds	the	first	traces	of	Riehl's	realism	in his	early	work	Realistische Grundzüge	(1870) and	stresses	that	in	his	early	years	he	adopted nominalism,	naturalism	opposed	to	dualisms, and	vitalism.	According	to	Beiser,	Riehl	preceded	psychology	of	Franz	Brentano	and	the interpretative	psychology	of	Wilhelm	Dilthey with	his	conception	of	philosophy	whose	object should	be the	content	of consciousness. By	realising	the	tensions	between	his	definition	of	philosophy	as	psychology	and	his	admittance that Kant's project was essentially epistemological, Riehl's conversion to Kant became complete, which can be seen in the first volume	of	Der philosophische Kriticismus. In the first part he followed Cohen in reconstructing the historical Kant but gave much	more	importance	to	British	empiricism, through	which	he	criticized	positivists.	He	affirmed the version of realism which claims that	what	we	know	"of	reality	in	itself	is	only its existence, not its nature or essence" and which,	Beiser claims, corresponds to	Kant's formal idealism.	Unlike	Cohen and	Windelband who claimed that the thing-in-itself is only	a	"goal	of	enquiry",	Riehl	tried	to	prove its	existence	and	failed,	but	like	them	he	was bothered by Kant's practical or noumenal realm	where	he	placed	morality	and	religious belief	in	such	a	problematic	way,	relying	their existence	on	"mere logical	possibility".	Mature	Riehl	saw	theoretical	philosophy	as	epistemology, a servant of the natural sciences, but	practical	philosophy	as	a	noble	"guide	to life", and practical philosopher as "a moral legislator and guide". However, Beiser concludes, Riehl's big weakness was a huge divide between his theoretical and practical philosophy. It	is	impossible	to	give	full	justice	to	professor	Beiser's	bold attempt to sketch the	genesis of neo-Kantianism, nor to fully discuss all	the	topics	of	his	splendid	book	in	this	review.	Instead,	only	a	few	more	important	assessments	can	be	given.	Positive	aspects,	like the	rehabilitation	of	all	the	thinkers	and	their philosophical relevance mentioned above, definitely give his book the highest value. Therefore, only some problems and issues that	were	encountered	during	the	reading	will be	given	below. One	of	the	characteristics	of	Beiser's	general overviews	of	particular	periods	or	movements in	the	history	of	philosophy	is	his	heavy	focus on theoretical philosophy which leaves his readers	with	an	impression	that	practical	philosophy is	of lesser importance.	This is	particularly	sensitive	in	the	case	of	Kant	who	did gave	priority	to	theoretical	philosophy,	but	he also	gave	the	primacy	to	practical	philosophy. Kant's	first	Kritik	clearly	shows	that	empirical	sciences	threatened	to	destroy	the	unique place	of	philosophy	and	its	question	of	value already	in	the	18th	century.	However,	most	of Beiser's	book	is	concerned	with	metaphysics and	epistemology	and	the	reader	is	left	with	a false	impression	that	the	neo-Kantians	didn't really	concern	themselves	with	ethics	or	aesthetics	which	were	cut	off	from	their	theoretical deliberations. This is a false impression because	Beiser	completely	left	out	those	neoKantians	whose	main field	of expertise	was practical philosophy. In the first place one should	mention	Austrian	philosopher	Robert Zimmermann who opened philosophically interesting	debates	in	aesthetics	but	was	mentioned	only	in	a	footnote	as	a	teacher	of	Riehl (the	same	case	was	in	Köhnke's	book).	In	reality	Zimmermann	was	active	at the time	of Fischer	and	Zeller,	he	would	hold	lectures	on the	history	of	philosophy for	decades in	ViSYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA 61	(1/2016)	pp.	(207–220) Book	Reviews	/	Buchbesprechungen215 enna,	and	in	them	he	would	give	central	place to Kant. Moreover, Zimmermann would influence	generations	of	philosophers	throughout	the	Habsburg	Monarchy	and	that	means	a huge	part	of	Central	Europe.	This	opens	another	problem,	and	that	is	Beiser's	exclusive focus	on	Germany,	while	the	Habsburg	Monarchy,	which	would	reform	its	universities	according	to	Humboldt's	German	model	in	the Revolution	of	1848,	was	completely	left	out. There is also an issue concerning Beiser's lack	of	interpretations	and	a	conclusion	to	the book.	Although	there	are	many	places	where he engages in fierce debates, there are also many	places	where	he	just	reiterates	works	at length	without	discussing	their	philosophical importance or his own stance, for example, parts of Herbart's metaphysics or Beneke's rejection	of	universal	moral	principles.	Some of his interpretations are antiquated, which is	mostly	seen	in	his	interpretation	of	British philosophy. Thus he follows older scholars in claiming that Hume's Treatise of Human Nature has an anthropological foundation, although most contemporary scholars agree that	Hume	is	thinking	of	philosophy	of	mind and epistemology rather than philosophical anthropology	when	he	is	discussing	the	"human	nature".	There	are	similar	issues	when	it comes	to	a	discussion	of	Hume's	skepticism, the	sentimentalism	of	Hutcheson,	Hume,	and Smith (as if they held completely identical views),	or	their	"relativistic"	ethics	(pp.	164, 171, 282). Beiser has also left out detailed historical	connections	between	philosophers, like the reaction of speculative idealists to arguments	of the	"lost tradition",	or the	fact that	some	neo-Kantian	philosophers,	like	Zeller and Fischer, were also important for the philosophers	of	the	"new	establishment"	and were active during that time, which alters chronological structure of the book. Sometimes	it	seems	that	the	book	was	written	with an intention of being a contribution to contemporary Kant scholarship in the USA as much	as	a	historical	investigation.	However, this	doesn't	have	to	be	an	issue	and	Beiser's book doesn't have to be read as a detailed historical study, but as a series of elegantly and seriously written philosophical portraits or	essays	which	are	connected	by	some	major themes like the	decline	of psychological interpretation	of	Kant's theoretical	philosophy in	the	19th	century	Germany. Careful	readers	will	also	encounter	some	contradictions	and	ambiguities	in	the	book.	One contradiction is a constant tension between defining Herbart as an independent thinker and	a	Kantian,	and	philosophers	under	his	influence	as	Herbartians	or	Kantians.	Although Beiser	thinks	that	Herbart	was	a	Kantian,	that didn't	prevent	him	from	claiming,	for	example,	that	Lange	was	at	first	a	Herbartian	and only later	became	a	Kantian (pp.	359,	463). The second contradiction is Beiser's claim that	a	"good	Kantian"	adheres	to	Kant's	ethics (p.	403),	although	all	of the thinkers	he	discusses	actually	rejected	his	formalistic	ethics and some	of them	embraced sentimentalism or	virtue	ethics.	Similar,	but	minor	examples can be found in the chapter on Meyer who advocated	theism	but	adored	Voltaire	and	deism (pp. 348, 351), or on early	Windelband who thought that logic should completely steer away from metaphysics and psychology	but	warned	that	it	should	"not	completely isolate itself" from	them	(p.	521).	There	are also	some	minor	mistakes	in	historical	facts, for	example,	claim	(p.	255)	that	Zeller	is	famous for his Grundriss der Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie	(his	most	important work	is	actually	Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung)	or	that the	Second	Reich	existed	already in the late 1860s (p.	349).	Beiser	also	sometimes	mentions	important	facts	for	neo-Kantianism	but leaves them unexplained, like the Kantian school	of	orthodox	dogmatic	theologians	(pp. 365–366). It should	be	noted, however, that those	are	rare	examples	in	Beiser's	otherwise consistent	account. The book itself is clearly and beautifully written. There are only a few mistakes like repeated	("that	that"	/p.	158/	"upon	upon"	/p. 488/) or dropped words ("[in] Lange's later philosophy",	/p.	362/).	There	are	some	problems	with	German language	and translation, for example, it should be Auflage der Geschichte des materialismus, not Auflage des Geschichtes des materialismus	(p.	83),	Jahrhundert,	not	Jahr hundert	(p.	145),	der alles Zermalmende	(!)	means	the	all-crushing,	not the "old destroyer" (p. 208), zweite Auflage instead of Zweiter Auflage (p. 312), and so on.	A	bigger	difficulty	might	be	the	index	of names	which	is	incomplete	and	so	the	reader cannot	find	important	figures	like	Marx,	Engels,	or	Zimmermann	that	are	mentioned	in	a book.	Concerning	the	physical	aspects	of	the hardcover	volume,	the	binding	seems	reliable and the design of the dust jacket stands out among	the	editions	of	the	Oxford	University Press. It can be safely concluded that the positive aspects	greatly	outweigh	the	flaws	of	professor Beiser's book which will become unavoidable	for	anyone	who	wants	to	understand not	only	the	neo-Kantian	movement	but	also much	of	modern	philosophy	which	emerged from	the	ruins	of	speculative	idealism	in	the second	half	of	the	19th	century. Matko Globačnik