The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept: subjective | | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | Yes, there are many analytic/synthetic distinctions, corresponding to the many different notions of content we can find uses for. None of these notions of content or analytic/synthetic distinctions are privileged. | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Lean toward: skepticism | | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | The question is too unclear to answer | It depends on what you mean by "free will". If we're trying to get at the folk notion, I would lean towards no free will. | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Reject both | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: contextualism | | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Lean toward: non-Humean | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | The question is too unclear to answer | It depends what you want to do with it. | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept: internalism | Internalism about the psychologically real kind of content, lean toward externalism about the (uninteresting) folk notion of content (the one we have intuitions about) | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral anti-realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Accept: naturalism | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | The question is too unclear to answer | Panpsychism | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: externalism | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Accept: two boxes | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: deontology | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Accept: representationalism | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Lean toward: further-fact view | ...if there is such thing as personal identity over time at all. | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific anti-realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Accept: death | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Lean toward: A-theory | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Accept: switch | | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept: correspondence | | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Accept: metaphysically possible | | |