SYMBOULIC VIOLENCE IN RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN INDONESIA

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ABSTRACT
Religious discourse is one of the instruments that are often used by the dominant class (the majority, who are in power) to carry out a symbolic violence mechanism against the dominated class (the minority, who are ruled). For example, through religious discourses that seem plural and open, the power and domination of the dominant class are continuously perpetuated. This study aims to analyze the symbolic violence that occurs in religious discourse in Indonesia, especially in the study of religion, by reviewing the discourse of “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama”. The symbolic violence referred to here is, according to Pierre Bourdieu's theory, violence that does not appear as violence and is latent. Victims of this type of violence do not feel that they are victims of violence as if what happened was natural and it should have been. This study also argues that symbolic violence in religious discourse in Indonesia is widely produced in educational institutions, especially through the hands of academics, because through educational institutions, discourses of “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama” are formulated and then implemented in government policies, as if the discourse has accommodated all religions and beliefs, but only perpetuates the way of thinking and tastes of the dominant class. In short, this study argues that religious discourses such as “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama” are produced by the dominant class through educational institutions and so on and produce symbolic violence.

Keywords: symbolic violence, religious discourse, religious moderation, Pierre Bourdieu

1) INTRODUCTION
Language not only functions as a communication tool that can deliver information from one human to another but also functions as a creator or shaper of information. That is, language does not only carry out its informative function but also its formative function (Wijsen and Stuckrad, 2016). When a language is used to define something, for example, language plays an important role in shaping our picture of something, whether that thing is in the form of ideas, values, or the form of everyday practical knowledge. In this sense, language is also referred to as discourse or a system of knowledge that shapes our experience of the world, we live in. Since discourse plays an important role here, in the sense of shaping our knowledge and experience of this world, controlling discourse means controlling how this world is experienced and perceived.

A French philosopher named Michel Foucault mentions that discourse is the power door. Discourse as an accomplice of knowledge can launch the work of power. Power is everywhere, but it does not mean that it covers everything, this means that power comes from everywhere and in various forms, including through discourse. From this, it can be understood that early power was not exercised directly through violence or a matter of consent (as Hobbes and Locke explained) or as repression (as described by Freud and Reich), or as a struggle of power (to which Machiavelli and Marx wrote extensively), but power is exercised first through the structure of
action that makes us compelled or stimulated to do so. This stimulation and encouragement can be in the form of orders, prohibitions, or in other words, other effects of a discourse work (Haryatmoko, 2016). And after that, through discourse, power manifests itself in secret.

Likewise in religious reality, power hides in the form of discourse. Even religion itself as a phenomenon is a constructive reality or a reality formed from discourses (Stuckrad, 2016). In other words, radically, I want to say that religion is the result of historical discourse construction and reproduction, that the religion that survives today is a religion that can reproduce and construct discourse continuously so that religion, both as a value and as a practice, does not experience extinction. The problem here is that discourse is never separated from what Foucault calls the medium of power. Then, through power, the practice of domination, violence, and discrimination will occur and should not be ignored.

One type of violence that often occurs in religious discourse is symbolic violence. Violence is described by Pierre Bourdieu as violence that does not appear as violence and is latent. Victims of this type of violence do not feel that they are in a space of violence as if what happened was natural and it should have been. This is because symbolic violence occurs subtly and does not have a direct impact but the impact can be greater than the direct impact of violence, and in some cases, symbolic violence can be a trigger for physical violence. To understand further what Bourdieu calls symbolic violence, we need to understand his concept of capital (resources) as a modality of power and violence.

According to Bourdieu, in a society, there will always be a controlling group and a controlled group, and this power relation depends on the situation, capital (resources), and the strategy of each actor in using their capital. The capital intended by Bourdieu here is like “capital” in the economy, but the difference is, capital for Bourdieu does not only mean economic capital, but also means cultural capital, social capital, and symbolic capital (Deal, 2004). These four types of capital (act like economic capital) can lead to power, and power breeds inequality or domination of the ruling class, the dominant, against the dominated class. One way the symbolic capital works so that it can give birth to power is by using secession work, or Bourdieu calls it distinction (Bourdieu, 1984). The distinction between the ruling and dominant parties from the dominated and controlled parties.

In religious discourse, this “distinction” means the occurrence of secession between the religious aspects of the dominant class (the majority, who are in power) from the religious aspects of the dominated class (the minority, who are ruled). Furthermore, this secession (distinction) occurs when the religious practice of the dominant class (the majority) is used as a benchmark to assess the religious practice of the dominated class (the minority). In the context of religious discourse in Indonesia, this distinction is illustrated by at least two types of religious discourse, which will be further elaborated in the discussion of this research, namely first, through the discourse of “agama vs. kepercayaan”, and secondly, in the discourse of “moderasi beragama”. The point is, these two types of religious discourse represent Islam, the religion of the dominant class (the majority, in power), as a benchmark for other religions, so that those who agree with the benchmark are called true, moderate, and good (insiders) and those who contradict and do not meet Islamic standards are called wrong, infidel, extreme, and bad(outsider).
The consequences of these distinctions and restrictions lead to symbolic violence, that religions that are outside the criteria or do not meet the benchmark of the dominant class religion (the majority, those in power) are led to follow or convert to a religion that has been recognized by the state. In the Indonesian context, for example, in several previous periods, followers of ancestral religions were forced indirectly to choose one religion from the six religions recognized by the state so that they could access the same services from the state (Maarif, 2017a). This discrimination and domination stem from the power of religious discourse, then those who have power over the religious discourse perpetuate themselves through the reproduction of new discourses that secretly deepen the grip of that domination. At least, through the discourse of (1) “agama dan kepercayaan” and (2) “moderasi beragama”, this study shows how the dominant class religion (the majority, the ruling class) in Indonesia imposes and perpetuates its symbolic power over the minority class through various ways including through discourse and ultimately results in symbolic violence.

2) METHODS

The research method that I use in this research is a qualitative research method with a discursive-objective approach using the theories of the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu. Using such a method, this study aims to analyze and describe the mechanism of symbolic violence that occurs in religious discourse in Indonesia, especially in two special discourses, first, in the “agama vs. kepercayaan” discourse, and second, in the “moderasi beragama” discourse.

3) RESULTS

Symbolic violence can occur through two mechanisms, first, through the mechanism of separation (distinction) as we can find in the discourse “agama vs. kepercayaan”, and secondly, through the mechanism of blurring (euphemism) as we can see in the discourse of “moderasi beragama”. The mechanism of separation (distinction) means that the dominant class (the majority, in power) still ensures itself to be different and separate from other weaker classes (the minority, controlled). While the mechanism of blurring (euphemism) means that discourse is used as a tool to dominate, legitimize the actions and ways of thinking of the dominant class without being identified. Euphemism can make symbolic violence not appear as violence.

Through the discourse “agama vs. kepercayaan”, I find that there is a tendency for the dominant class (the majority, in power) to constantly differentiate themselves from the weak class (the minority, the ruled) which then results in symbolic violence. This distinction occurs through the construction of unequal definitions of “agama” and “kepercayaan”. Through the monopoly of the definition of “agama”, the dominant class seems to have the legitimacy to limit, to control, or even to destroy other groups which they call “kepercayaan. The dominant group builds their symbolic modality through definitional control so that they have legitimacy for the violence and discrimination they commit against the minority class.

Meanwhile, in the discourse of “moderasi beragama” which is claimed as “ammunition and alternative policies to tackle extremism”, I find that it results in symbolic violence. With the construction of a moderate position (the middle, the criteria built by the dominant ruling class) as an ideal position for the state, the left position represents liberals who use human rights as an approach and the right position represents religious people who use the holy book. become legitimate to be limited, weakened, and even destroyed. The discourse of "religious moderation" works using a euphemism mechanism so that symbolic violence does not appear as violence. Invisible does not mean that symbolic violence does not have a severe impact symbolic violence can have more severe implications than direct violence.
4) DISCUSSION

Symbolic Violence and Some Basic Concepts of Bourdieu

Violence can be understood in three ways. First, violence is an act of an actor or group of actors. Second, violence is an implication of structural work. Third, violence is a social network of actors and structures (Santoso, 2002). Violence in the first sense is understood as direct violence carried out by the actor both biologically, physiologically, and psychologically. Violence in the second sense means that violence is not only done by the actor physically but also because of the structure. The structure here is understood as the structure of the state or power and everything related to it. Violence in the third sense can be understood as a dialectical relationship between actors and social structures that result in violence (Martono, 2012).

Some social thinkers state that violence occurs in three forms, direct violence, structural violence, and cultural violence (as described by Galtung, 1990). But then, Pierre-Felix Bourdieu, an important French philosopher as well as sociologist and anthropologist, formulated another type of violence that also contributed to the novelty of social science studies to this day, namely symbolic violence. According to Bourdieu, violence is never separated from power. If the power exists, then violence will also be there. For example, when a certain social class dominates another social class, then in the process of dominating it there will always be violence. One of the instruments used in the process of dominating is a symbolic instrument which can be in the form of language, discourse, and so on. Symbolic violence occurs when the dominant party (a person or group) uses their capital or symbolic modality to suppress other parties who have weak power so that the other weak parties eventually change their actions and choices to follow what the dominant party wants.

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of Bourdieu’s ideas about symbolic violence, we need to look at some basic concepts of the capital, class, arena, and distinction (I chose to include Bourdieu's basic concepts to help us understand the meaning of symbolic violence a little better, as well as serve as an introduction to the realm of symbolic violence in social contexts and discourse).

1) Capital (Modality)

The word “capital” can be interpreted as “resources”, this word we often encounter in conversations about economics, but in the context of Bourdieu’s thought, capital or resources means a broader term. If in economics capital means the accumulation of material, namely money, then in Bourdieu’s thought, capital means more than just the accumulation of material. Capital in this sense is any resource owned by individuals (a person or group) that allows them to gain more social energy, position, and power. The resources referred to here can be in the form of material or non-material resources, as long as these resources help shape or influence the position of the subject (a person or group) in the wider structure of society.

Bourdieu said that in addition to economic capital, there is also social capital, cultural capital, and symbolic capital. Economic capital here refers to resources in the form of finance, while social capital means resources that are related to knowing each other and/or acknowledging each other in a community, and cultural capital refers to individual abilities obtained from cultural elements such as how to get along, look, etc., and lastly, symbolic capital means resources that come from different forms but are recognized as legitimate and natural such as language, certificate, and others (Bourdieu, 2004). According to Bourdieu, these four capitals are the source of power, and power is the source of violence. One of the most crucial capitals of power is symbolic capital because this capital of power can make power look not oppressive at all, as we will elaborate. Therefore, in some parts, symbolic violence becomes very important in Bourdieu's theory.
2) Class

The result of the ownership of capital or resources, the types of capital described above, produce social classes. The class in Bourdieu’s thinking is divided into three, the dominant class, the petty-bourgeois class, and the popular class. First, the dominant class is a class that has a large modality, that is, this class accumulates various types of capital so that it has greater power to show its identity. Because it has a large modality, this class can not only easily display its identity but also easily impose its identity on other classes. The dominant class in the religious aspect in Indonesia is the class that has power in the government, namely Islam. This dominant class can impose all its views, for example about “what can be called ‘agama’ and what cannot be called ‘agama’”, and the views of this dominant class then justify their treatment and actions towards other classes that are different from them.

Second, the petty-bourgeois, those who have the spirit of the bourgeoisie, want to rise to the highest social ladder, but basically, they are in the middle class. They are different from the dominant class and prefer to be like the dominant class rather than impose their views on other, more minority classes. In short, they prefer to be imitators of the dominant class to become synonymous with them. Third, popular class. This class is a class that does not have a large modality so that they are forced to be in a position that tends to accept the dominance of the dominant class. Because they have no modality and no power, those in this class cannot reject the views that are “imposed” on them by the dominant class (Haryatmoko, 2003).

3) Arena and Distinction

One basic concept that is also important to understand to see how symbolic violence occurs is to understand the theory of arena and distinction. The arena here means that a space in which social class relations occur. These relationships can be in the form of economic, social, cultural, and/or political relationships, and so on. According to Bourdieu, an arena is a place of continuous struggle, competition, and conflict in many forms, including symbolic ones. In short, the relationship between the social classes, as briefly explained in the previous section, results in a power relation. The dominant class uses the dominant culture (their tastes and perspectives) as a reference to the minority or dominated class. Each of these three classes seeks to differentiate itself from other classes, or what Bourdieu calls a power strategy, otherwise known as distinction.

In his book, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste, Bourdieu (1984) shows how the classification of social structures is formed and contributes to the construction of perceptions and tastes of a person or a particular social group. One important thing about this book, which is relevant to our discussion of symbolic violence, is that Bourdieu shows how the “distinction” works. According to Bourdieu, through the social structure played by the “dominant” to the “dominated”, the “dominant knowledge/tastes/culture” plays its social function to differentiate itself (distinction) from the “dominated knowledge/tastes/culture”. This process occurs slowly and produces latent effects, such as the reproduction of increasingly blurred and lame social structures. In Bourdieu’s work, when he discusses “symbolic violence”, he often uses three different terms to refer to the same thing: “symbolic violence”, “symbolic power”, and “symbolic dominance” (Bourdieu, 1995).

Apart from using differentiation (distinction) techniques, symbolic violence can also occur in the form of euphemisms. Euphemism means that here is replacing or obscuring abusive and oppressive discourses by using other discourses that are more open, plural, tolerant, and seem to accommodate all parties. With this way of working, euphemisms can make symbolic violence not appear as violence, the way it works is silent and cannot be recognized directly. There are many forms of euphemism, including orders, prohibitions, rewards, beliefs, and others. The forms of euphemism in religious discourse in Indonesia can be seen in two forms—there are more examples but I will limit them to just two examples of discourse—discourses of “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama”.
The state (people in power) and adherents of the majority religion (Islam) often declare that they still recognize “kepercayaan” as part of the community of the state and nation, but in fact, they make specific standards for “kepercayaan” to be recognized as a religion, and standards it is always about them, the majority religion. This means that the dominant class, which is the majority and in power, often causes problems for adherents of beliefs than makes them recognized, more often performing discriminatory actions than accommodative actions. Another example that we can see is the discourse of “moderasi beragama”, a discourse that is constructed and used by power holders to destroy, limit, and separate certain parties who are outside the religious category created by the state. The worst thing that the state and the majority religion in Indonesia can do through discourses like this is that they can give names or definitions to other groups: left/right, true/wrong, good/bad/, liberal/radical, and so on. Then, when the group is different and does not meet the standards they have set, it seems that they have reasons to destroy, limit, and criminalize these different groups.

In short, social-religious-society life is an arena, where class struggles and symbolic identities take place, between the dominant class and the dominated class. The fighting mechanism takes place in various ways, including through power strategies or distinctions. In the context of this research, religious life is an arena. Various socio-religious classes fight through their modalities and power strategies. The struggle between the dominant class and the dominated class results in symbolic violence. I find that religious discourse in Indonesia contains symbolic violence, at least through the discourse of “agama vs. kepercayaan” and “moderasi beragama”.

Symbolic Violence in the Discourse of “Agama vs. Kepercayaan”

As I have discussed in the previous section that symbolic violence can occur through the mechanism of distinction (separation) and the mechanism of euphemism (obscuration). This distinction and euphemism occur in the symbolic means of language and discourse. Language as a medium of communication plays a very important role in conveying and/or instilling influence/power on others, meaning that language and discourse can become instruments to control the perspectives and behavior of social actors. In the religious discourse in Indonesia, especially in the discourse of “agama vs. kepercayaan”, we can find this distinction mechanism occurs.

In the religious discourse in Indonesia, “kepercayaan” is distinguished from “agama”. The “kepercayaan” that is meant here is the “agama leluhur” (ancestral religion) held by indigenous Indonesians from generation to generation from their ancestors, such as Ammatoa, Tolotang, and many others. Meanwhile, “agama” in the context of religion in Indonesia only refers to world religions, which means religions originating from outside Indonesia, such as Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. These religions were then recognized by the state as “agama” and through the constitution ratified as the official state religion, while “agama leluhur” were not recognized as religions, and were instead labeled as “kepercayaan” (Read more in Samsul Maarif, Pasang Surut Rekognisi Agama Leluhur dalam Politik Agama di Indonesia, 2017).

The symbolic struggle between “agama” and “kepercayaan” that occurs in religious discourse in Indonesia is the impact of a series of political contestations that have taken place since the Dutch colonial period (Maarif, 2017a). The Netherlands as a colonizer used a separation mechanism to facilitate its political strategy so that the separation between “agama” and “kepercayaan”, “santri” vs. “abangan” is carried out slowly as a political agenda. Before this phase, religious practices in the archipelago were still diverse, all religious practices were accommodated, and there was no domination of certain religious discourses. This symbolic battle that began in the colonial period then continues after Indonesia’s independence, to this day.

The genealogy of “agama” in Indonesia cannot be separated from efforts to politicize religion, that the process of forming the definition of religion and all its standardizations cannot be separated from the interests of certain groups (the majority, those in power) to legitimize their
power over other groups. Throughout its history, the definition of “agama” was controlled and patented by certain groups (the ruling, the dominant) and made it the standard, as a result, all religious practices that did not meet the requirements were referred to as “kepercayaan”, and from a colonial perspective, “kepercayaan” were then categorized “kepercayaan” as something different from religion (agama) by associating “kepercayaan” as something primitive and animistic. Instead of being recognized as a religious practice, “kepercayaan” is considered purely a cultural practice, which means it is not “agama”. This distinction is rooted in and stems from Dutch political efforts and the debate over the state ideology represented by two main groups, namely the “santri” and “priyayi-abangan” groups. This reinforces what Bourdieu calls the practice of power by one group over another using the mechanism of distinction, that power is a direct result of distinction, separation, and inequalities (Deal, 2004).

This separation and distinction begin through the definition of “agama” which becomes a problem because the definition and standardization of religion are compiled based on the perspective of the ruling group, which is dominant, and seems to have represented all types of religion (essentialization), and through a definition that is claimed to be universal. Therefore, the religion of the dominant group is justified as true or superior religion compared to minority religions which are labeled as wrong or inferior (Maarif, 2017b). The consequence of this control definition and domination of religious discourse is that the policy of religious management becomes lame, served by the state only the dominant religion, the religion of the majority people and discredit the ancestral religion of the minority.

In the religious discourse in Indonesia, “agama” and “kepercayaan” are distinguished. “Agama” is monopolized by the ruling dominant class, while “kepercayaan” is challengingly trying to survive, even though slowly they have to follow the tastes and ways of thinking of the “agama” doctrine imposed by the dominant class on them. Several examples can illustrate how symbolic violence occurs in the discourse of “agama vs. kepercayaan”. Among other things, coercion on adherents of “kepercayaan” to change or convert their religious identity into “agama”. After religion is monopolized by the ruling dominant class, and belief is separated from religion, people who adhere to a “kepercayaan” must convert their religious identity into an “agama” identity that has been officially recognized by the state. This is stated in a law issued by the government before the reform, which requires believers to fill in the religion column on their ID card with only an official religion recognized by the state (Maarif, 2017b). Even after the issuance of the Adminduk Law 23/2006, which meant that they were allowed to leave the religion column on their ID card blank, they still experienced discrimination or at least experienced symbolic violence, which continues to this day.

Symbolic violence through religious discourse does not only occur in the polarization of “agama” versus “kepercayaan”, but also occurs in the category of “agama” itself. In the “agama” embraced by the dominant and majority groups, for example, there is always a certain group or social class that is more dominant and has more authority to control and dominate other groups who are weaker and less powerful. In Muslim society, for example, the presence of different groups such as Shia or Ahmadiyah, whose religious doctrine is relatively close to Islamic doctrine, they are always considered as heretical, wrong, splinter, and different sects. The power over religious discourse held by this dominant group, this powerful group, has resulted in symbolic violence, and even other violence can take place, such as direct (physical) violence and structural-cultural violence.

One example of direct (physical) violence that occurred because it stems from symbolic violence (the power of discourse) is the recent burning incident of the Ahmadiyya house of worship in Sintang. The destruction of the Ahmadiyya congregation's house of worship in Sintang occurred because they were deemed ineligible and violated the criteria set by the dominant class religion, the majority, namely Islam, as the standard. This was explained by the Head of the Sintang
District Communication and Information Office (Kepala Dinas Komunikasi dan Informatika Kabupaten Sintang), Kurniawan (broadcast by Kompas, 2021), that the Sintang District Government respects and allows members of the Indonesian Ahmadiyya Community (JAI) to worship but JAI must admit to being Muslim. This is regulated in the provisions and joint decisions of the Minister of Religion, the Attorney General, and the Minister of Home Affairs Number 3/2008. Then Number: Kep-033/A/JA/6/2008, and Number 199/2008, concerning Warnings and Orders to Adherents, Members, and/or members of the JAI Management and Community Members (Kompas, 2021).

Symbolic Violence in the Discourse of “Moderasi Beragama”

In the book *Moderasi Beragama* (2019) it is stated that religious moderation was developed as “ammunition and an alternative to government policies in tackling extreme religious beliefs”, including to stem radical religious groups and minimize physical violence due to religious issues. “Moderasi”, whose root word comes from the word “moderate”, means staying in the middle, not being trapped in either the conservative or liberal extremes. The legal legitimacy of religious moderation efforts is stated in the Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional (RPJMN) 2020-2024 (national mid-term development plan). In that document, “moderasi beragama” (religious moderation) is understood as a way to achieve harmony (Mubarok, 2021).

“Moderasi beragama” (religious moderation) as a discourse that has only been formulated in the last three years, has been widely written, appreciated, and interpreted. Some of the scattered interpretations vary. Besides being understood as an “alternative policy in tackling extreme religious understanding”, some literature explains that religious moderation is a representation of efforts to create a harmonious relationship between religion and local wisdom (Sirajuddin M., 2020). Local wisdom here is referred to as the local cultural heritage of the archipelago. That is, religious moderation is an effort to juxtapose “agama” (religion) and “kearifan local” (local wisdom) so that there is no conflict between one another.

According to my reading, the discourse of “moderasi beragama” (religious moderation) is an effort to manage religion as desired by the state as a representative of the ruling and dominant class, which can be found in the book *Moderasi Beragama* (2019) published by the Research and Development and Training Agency of the Ministry of Religion of the Republic of Indonesia (Badan Litbang dan Diklat Kementerian Agama RI), that “moderasi beragama” is intended to moderate all religious sects and movements in Indonesia, both religious sects/movements that are oriented to the left (religious movements that use a human rights approach and have a pluralist character) as well as religious sects/movements whose orientation tends to the right (religious movements that use a biblical text approach and tend to be closed).

At least, religious moderation or “moderasi beragama” wants to be realized in four main indicators. The first indicator, religious moderation is realized if there is recognition and cultivation of the spirit of nationalism, namely accepting Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the principle of nationality. The second indicator, religious moderation, means respect for differences and providing space for people of different faiths to realize the practice of their beliefs and ensure their security in expressing their opinions. The third indicator, religious moderation wants to emphasize an anti-violence society, meaning that religious people must prevent violence, whether physical, verbal and so on. The fourth indicator, religious moderation means being friendly to local culture (Kementerian Agama, 2019).

Religious moderation discourse has begun to spread in the last three years, and suspicions about this policy have quickly emerged. The suspicion that this discourse will be used by the government to control and limit religious movements that are not following the ideology idealized by the ruling government. This can be seen when the previous Minister of Religion (Menteri Agama), Fachrul Razi, made a policy to eliminate all content related to radical teachings in 155 Islamic religious textbooks under the pretext of strengthening religious moderation. In the policy,
strictly speaking, words such as “jihad” and “khilafah” contained in textbooks were removed and replaced with more moderate words. The excuse used by the state is that “jihad” and “khilafah” are not in line with the spirit of the state constitution, as stated in Surat Edaran B-4339.4/DJ.1/Dr.I.1/PP.00/12/2019.

In addition, based on the research results of the Setara Institute (2020), the number of incidents and acts of violation of freedom of religion/belief during 2020 were 180 incidents and as many as 424 forms of action. Of the 424 actions, 239 were carried out by the state, and another 185 were carried out by non-state actors (Hasani, 2021). Both those carried out by state actors and those carried out by non-state actors, all actors are part of the dominant ruling class of society. Acts of violence against religious people, or violations of religious freedom occur in various forms, including discrimination, arrests, accusations of blasphemy, prohibition of activities, and others (Hasani, 2021). All of these types occur because of the existence of vague and easy-to-use power instruments with the wrong purpose, especially policies regarding “moderasi beragama” (religious moderation) which sound simple but in practice become lame in practice.

The problem is that when religious moderation is applied, the reasoning used is that of the majority religion. To moderate, the taste/measure used is the taste/measure of the dominant group. Consequently, small groups that are not in the mainstream of religious discourse are vulnerable and marginalized. Groups that are not in the middle category become strange and inappropriate. The “gerakan kanan” (right movement) must be drawn to the center, the “gerakan kiri” (left movement) must be drawn to the center, as a result, they are repressed, forced, if not directly, repression and violence occur symbolically. Many cases can prove this argument. One example of a religious policy that controls restrict, and destroys religious movements under the pretext of “moderasi beragama” is the disbandment of HTI, FPI, and other religious movements. In addition, there are various cases where human rights activists are persecuted and repressed. This illustrates that “moderasi beragama” as a discourse breeds symbolic violence and even direct violence.

Another example that could be evidence of how the tastes and power of the ruling dominant class have become the standard in various religious policies in Indonesia is the prohibition of celebrating Valentine’s Day. The policy of prohibiting Valentine’s Day celebrations that have been issued by many local governments in several locations in Indonesia such as Banda Aceh City, Aceh Besar District, Bangka Belitung Province, South Bangka Regency, Depok City, Bekasi City, West Java Province, Tuban Regency, Blitar City, Bojonegoro City, Gresik Regency, and Makassar City (Hasani, 2021). Valentine’s Day activities are not worship activities or religious activities, but the excuse used by the government to prohibit this activity is a religious argument. The religious doctrines professed by the dominant class, which is the majority, are used to prohibit other types of activities carried out by minority groups. This is a strong example of how the religion of the dominant class becomes a measure and becomes a reason to prohibit, control, and limit the activities of other smaller, minority, and less powerful classes.

So far, as we can understand from the illustration above, “moderasi beragama” as ammunition and alternative government policies in religious discourse still need to be studied and reviewed. Especially if the reason for using it is to reduce conflict or violence. This is because, in my opinion, “moderasi beragama” as a discourse and policies will sharpen the distinction between groups labeled “moderate” and groups labeled “not moderate” (left group or right group) by the rulers or dominant class who have control. What is more, the discourse of “moderasi beragama” instead of being an alternative for countering extremist groups, can instead become a tool for power to repress groups that are outside of power. The discourse of “moderasi beragama” works as a euphemism, subtly contains political projects that result in symbolic violence, and has the potential to have a worse effect, namely triggering direct violence or physical violence.
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