Book Review

As the title indicates, this book is about the nature of goodness. Its aim is ambitious: to sketch and defend an informative analysis by employing some of the tools of contemporary formal semantics. I say 'sketch' because at various points (for example, pp. 85, 103, 122, 128-129) the author acknowledges that the account needs filling in or refinement, but postpones the task for a later occasion. Judging from the author's website, though, the occasion is forthcoming. A sequel to this volume, titled *On Purpose and Meaning*, is currently in progress. I, for one, look forward to seeing how the story unfolds. Most of *this* book, however, is about the meanings of 'good' and 'goodness'. But one can't responsibly theorize about the meanings of these terms while remaining silent about the meanings of gradable adjectives and adjectival nominalizations more generally. So large portions of the book are devoted to degree-theoretic accounts of gradability and mereological interpretations of mass nouns. The result is both an opinionated survey of recent developments in lexical semantics (one that I suspect students and professionals will find useful) and a thought-provoking argument for a conception of goodness in terms of making a significant contribution toward the realization of purpose.

 On Goodness is a work of metaphysics (p. xii). One of its central claims is about what value is: in short, value just is the property of being 'purpose serving' (p. 100). To be good is to have a considerable amount of value, or to be purpose serving to an extent that meets or exceeds a contextually determined threshold (p. 102). Now, admittedly, Wolfsdorf only says that one 'might' identify goodness with the property of contributing to the realization of purpose, but this suggestion appears in the context of a discussion about the theoretical payoff of doing so. The payoff appears to be embraced, and at no point is the identification disavowed or softened. A somewhat puzzling feature of the surrounding text deserves comment, though: not long after the author recommends the identification, he seems inadvertently to contradict it. Wolfsdorf says, 'I note in passing that the participial phrase "purpose serving" [...] is not gradable' (p. 120, fn. 35), and cites the awkwardness of '*x* is very purpose serving' as evidence. The remark appears in a section that's

intended to explain why 'value' and 'purpose serving' aren't synonymous. If true, however, it would seem to threaten the central claim of the book, for it would put one in a position to argue as follows: goodness comes in degrees; the property of being purpose serving doesn't, since the phrase, 'purpose serving', denotes that very property and it isn't gradable; so goodness and the property of being purpose serving mustn't be one and the same. What are we to make of this? It seems to me that the author's throwaway remark, denying the gradability of 'purpose serving', ought to be thrown away, for the phrase 'x is {maximally/moderately/minimally} purpose serving' is unproblematic. My considered opinion is that Wolfsdorf endorses the identification of value with service toward the realization of purpose.

What, exactly, is a purpose? We're never given a direct answer, and Wolfsdorf is explicit about this: 'I do not take myself to be in a position to advance such an analysis here' (p. 103). But it's not as if he leaves us completely in the dark: a purpose is the sort of thing that's grounded in an agent's intentions, or in certain desires she might have, or in biological/artifactual functions; and it has the sort of significance that one might paraphrase in modal terms. As Wolfsdorf says, 'If x has a purpose, then there is something that x ought to or must do or there is some way that x ought to or must be. [...] So I am encouraged to believe that "purpose" is to be explained in modal terms [...]'.

What, exactly, does 'serving' a purpose involve? Wolfsdorf says it can be understood in terms of causation or constitution: x serves a purpose by causing its realization, or by being among its many causes; x can also serve a purpose by constituting its realization, wholly or partly (p. 122). Either way, serving a purpose involves standing in the sort of relation to it that explains (in whole or in part) its realization. Putting this thought together with the author's modal conception of purpose, we obtain the thesis that value is identical with the property of standing in a relation that explains why something is or does what it ought to, or must, be or do. Such a relation can be a bigger or smaller part of the explanation, and variation in this respect corresponds to the presence of more or less value.

One might wonder whether the account does enough to accommodate the gradability of value. Can't something which serves its purpose to a considerable degree nevertheless have very little value because the purpose it serves isn't itself very valuable? It seems so. My nail clippers are a case of just this sort: they serve their purpose about as well as anything could, yet they don't have very much value. This suggests that the amount of value a thing has partially depends on the value of the purpose it serves. But the most straightforward account of this idea, in terms of Wolfsdorf's theory, requires that purposes have second-order purposes. Should we be worried here? A related point is that some things which serve their purpose to a very small degree may still have considerable value. Voting in a large democratic state, or habitually recycling, may provide compelling examples: my vote contributes

almost nothing to achieving its purpose, and my practice of separating recy-clables may be futile, yet it still seems reasonable that they have a lot of value.

Wolfsdorf provides a parallel account of disvalue: badness is the property of being 'purpose thwarting' (p. 127). To be bad is to significantly thwart the realization of purpose. But once we have the account of value and disvalue in hand, it seems to me we're owed more of a story than we're given about the nature of purpose. In particular, we need to know how to individuate pur-poses to properly apply the account. Relatively coarse-grained purposes seem to make trouble. For example, one's health is a relatively coarse-grained purpose for various medical procedures, including chemotherapy. But, of course, chemotherapy often serves *and* thwarts the realization of one's health to a significant degree. Should we be comfortable with the conclusion that it's both good and bad (in the same respect)? I don't think so; for if 'good' and 'bad' constitute an antonym pair, and surely they do, then the conclu-sion that chemotherapy is both good and bad (in the same respect) would entail that it's both good and not good, bad and not bad (in the same respect). One might think the problem can be avoided by requiring that purposes be individuated more finely: in a case of the relevant sort, chemo-therapy serves to a significant degree the realization of one's *long-term* health, and it thwarts to a significant degree the realization of one's *short-term* health. But aren't there also cases where chemotherapy both significantly serves and significantly thwarts the realization of one's long-term health? Simply imagine a cancer survivor who has to endure a life-long challenge to her health because of the particularly damaging form of chemotherapy she underwent. It seems much easier to think of cases that present this general problem than it is to think of ways around it. What would Wolfsdorf say about this?

On Goodness isn't just a work of metaphysics; it's also an account of the meanings of 'good' and 'goodness'. The author's core methodological com-mitment is that we can achieve a better understanding of the nature of value by investigating the language with which we ascribe it (pp. 8, 93-94, 251). I confess that, in the abstract, I don't really know what this means, because I'm not altogether sure what it requires. But we might be in a better position to appreciate its meaning, and to evaluate its success, by looking at the argu-ment for the book's central metaphysical claim.

Why believe that value is identical with the property of being purpose serving? The argument, as I understand it, is theoretical in nature. According to Wolfsdorf, it enables a uniform explanation of apparently quite hetero-geneous cases (pp. 93-104). To unpack this thought, consider some examples from the book:

(1) ?That atom is good;

(2) ?That shadow is good;

(3) ?That seven is good;

(4) Sloan's heart is good;

(5) This watch is good.

The fourth and fifth examples are perfectly fine as they are, but the first three examples are awkward at best. With the proper background in place, however, Wolfsdorf argues they become quite natural: 'A physicist and her assistant have access to a scanning electron microscope powerful enough to render images of individual atoms. Assume that it is due to certain intrinsic properties of atoms that they appear more clearly than others. Given a relatively clear image of an atom, the physicist [...] says: "Have a look; that atom is good"' (p. 95). The second example is thought to be appropriate in a context where two sisters are playing with shadow puppets. One sister is particularly amused with a certain shadow on the wall and expresses her pleasure by saying, 'That shadow is good'. As for the third example—a kindergarten teacher might utter it in the context of a lesson instructing students on how to write numerals; perhaps one student drew a legible seven and the teacher wants to offer some encouraging feedback.

Wolfsdorf invites us to consider why (1)-(3) become unproblematic in the right context, while (4) and (5) are perfectly fine on their own. His answer is that, in the right sort of context, there are salient intentions that confer on each of the relevant items under discussion a unique purpose. It's because the atom, the shadow, and the seven significantly contribute to the realization of their purpose that predicating goodness of them becomes reasonable (p. 96ff.). The fourth and fifth examples are fine as they are, because it's common knowledge that hearts and watches have purpose-providing functions: '[...] intention and desire, on the one hand, and biological evolution and culture, on the other, all share the property of providing or endowing entities with ends or purposes. [...] An entity's value might be identified with its serving the purpose or realizing the end it has. Accordingly, an entity's being good might be identified with its serving the purpose or realizing the end that it has to a significant degree' (p. 100); 'The crucial point now follows that purpose providers may constitute a heterogeneous class, but that being good and value may nonetheless each be a single thing. [...] In short, this [...] strategy preserves the unity of being good and of value [...] by suggesting that purpose serving is a single thing, despite the fact that the class of purpose providers consists of fundamentally heterogeneous entities' (p. 102).

Wolfsdorf's argument is compelling, though I'm not entirely confident about his understanding of the first example. Value doesn't seem to attach to the atom, but to the image of the atom. Relatedly, there's nothing peculiar about the thought that games (for example, shadow puppetry) and conventions (viz., the English numeral system) confer purposes on the props we use

to participate in them (whether they be shadows on a wall or inscriptions on a piece of paper). But there is something a bit peculiar about the idea of a one-off intention conferring purpose on, say, an individual atom. Anyway, even if correct, these are minor points. What I want to emphasize is that the argument we're given doesn't seem to be crucially linguistic. We're presented with various cases in which value of a sort is exemplified, and naturally one supposes it would be a theoretical virtue to account for these cases uniformly. We're then told that the identification of value with the property of being purpose serving is able to do so. The end.

Now, to be clear, let me acknowledge that, as it's presented in the book, Wolfsdorf's argument is transparently about the interpretation of particular sentences in particular contexts. But it's not obvious to me that anything of real dialectical importance is lost by semantically descending, as it were, and presenting the argument entirely in the material mode of speech: consider a situation in which a physicist is..., and a situation in which two sisters are..., and a situation in which a kindergarten teacher is...; now, in the first situation, the atom is good, and in the second situation the shadow is good, and in the third situation the seven is good; finally, we obtain a uniform explanation of why goodness attaches to these items (and others) if we endorse the identification of goodness with service to purpose. The mere fact that one can formulate the argument in semantic terms doesn't seem sufficient to justify the sort of linguistic turn that Wolfsdorf wants to encourage (p. 8). Of course, something dialectically important *may* be gained on this particular occasion by 'semantic ascent', but if so, we're not told what it is. More to the point: the lengthy survey of high-tech semantics plays no essential role in the argument's success. This by itself isn't a criticism, but it does make for a somewhat disjointed read. My hunch is that, for the most part, value theorists will find it frustrating.

I've said something about the book's central claim and its general methodological orientation. But nothing I've said so far does justice to the impressively detailed, yet surprisingly comprehensive, discussions of ambiguity, gradability, and 'dimension specificity' (being good in a specific kind of way). Nor have I said anything about the book's informative survey of mass-noun and bare-noun semantics. In the space that remains, I'll discuss some of the book's finer points.

On Goodness consists of seven chapters, six of which are quite lengthy, and one of which is just shy of 80 pages. The first chapter provides a very brief description of the ongoing debate to which the book as a whole is a contribution. It identifies the articles, books, and dissertations that have had the biggest influence on the author, and it situates the author's project in relation to them. Three somewhat peculiar omissions from the pantheon of philosophers and linguists in the bibliography are G.H. von Wright (1963), Philippa Foot (1983; 2003), and Richard Kraut (2011). Although Judith Jarvis Thomson (1992) gets one very quick mention, in a section devoted to Zoltán Gendler

Szabó (2001), her more recent contributions to the topic, Thomson (1997; 2008), are ignored. This is odd. Thomson has done more than most to illuminate the relationship between ways of being good and function. In fact, something very like the argument from four paragraphs back can be found in her most recent work. (This is unsurprising, since both Thomson and Wolfsdorf draw inspiration from Paul Ziff (1960).) Thomson's contribution has had an impact on the current shape of value theory. And it's primarily with the foundations of value theory that Wolfsdorf is concerned (pp. xii, 1, 6).

It's because the author conceives of his work as a contribution to value theory that he expresses a reluctance to incorporate the sort of formal notation that's now customary in linguistics and philosophy of language. Following the advice of a reviewer for the press, Wolfsdorf assures his readers that the book assumes no background in linguistics (p. 7). Knowledge of basic predicate logic should suffice. One of the book's virtues is that it can be easily understood by graduate students and professional philosophers with little or no training in formal semantics. Perhaps some parts of the book will be a little puzzling to readers without a background in linguistics (for example, the treatment of indefinite descriptions as unbound variables, *à la* Discourse Representation Theory (pp. 112, 280), or perhaps the use of type-theoretic notation to characterize the difference between extensional and intensional predicate modifiers (p. 156)). But cases of this sort are both rare and brief. They aren't major impediments to comprehension.

Chapters 2 to 5 make up the first major part of the book: the interpretation of 'good' and the nature of being good. In chapter 2, Wolfsdorf presents a lengthy and sophisticated case for distinguishing three different readings of the adjective. First, he distinguishes the 'evaluative' reading of 'good', as in 'That was a good movie', from the 'quantitative' reading, as in 'There's a good distance between Rooster Rock and Mt. Hood'. In the first example, the use of 'good' conveys something like the idea that the movie was entertaining (or, if not entertaining, then an instance of certain technical filmmaking virtues); in the second, it means that the distance was large. Wolfsdorf argues that evaluative 'good' and quantitative 'good' are homonyms (pp. 10-30, 37-44). He then argues for a distinct third reading, namely, the 'operational' sense of 'good', exemplified in sentences like 'The wine hasn't gone sour; it's still good'. Note that one might use 'good' in this way even if one knows the wine isn't enjoyable to drink.

I'm somewhat sceptical about the distinction between evaluative and operational 'good'. Perhaps the operational reading is just evaluative 'good' when the latter is taken to mean *merely good enough for use*. (The wine can be merely good enough for use as wine, without being good wine.) Two considerations tell in favour of this proposal. First, it would explain why operational 'good' isn't gradable (p. 31). Here are some examples from

the book—remember to interpret 'good' so that its meaning contrasts with having gone sour:

A: This coffee tastes funny. Is the milk good?

B: #Yes, it's very good.

C: This coffee tastes funny. Is the milk good?

D: #It's quite good, but there's some even better milk.

E: This coffee tastes funny. Is the milk good?

F: #It's somewhat good; but if you want some better milk, check the fridge.

According to the proposal I'm now entertaining, B's response amounts to this: the milk is very good enough for use, and that's undoubtedly bizarre. D's reply is awkward because the idea of something being quite merely good enough for use is odd. And F's answer is objectionable for a similar reason: what would it mean for something to be somewhat merely good enough for use? It's not that *no* meaning can be given to the idea; it's that assigning a meaning to it strains interpretation. Furthermore, the proposal we're now considering would explain why, in some cases, the applicability of operational 'good' would suffice for the applicability of evaluative 'good'. For example: this doorstop/paperweight isn't broken; it's still good; therefore, it's a good doorstop/paperweight. In light of what these particular artifacts are, the inference here strikes me as unobjectionable, and, given the proposal under consideration, we know why: there's nothing more required for being a good doorstop, or being a good paperweight, than being merely good enough for use in stopping doors, or being merely good enough for use in weighing down papers. (What more could be required for being good in these particular respects?) If the proposal were true, the premise from which the inference is made would guarantee the truth of the conclusion.

More could be said about the distinction between evaluative and quantitative 'good', but ultimately I think it would be quibbling. Wolfsdorf's case for that distinction is quite persuasive.

Chapter 3 is about gradable adjectives generally. It offers a tour of degree-theoretic semantics and an informative summary of a recent challenge to its most prominent implementation. According to the most prominent implementation, basic constructions, like 'Paolo is tall', involve an unvoiced syntactic constituent, *pos*, that plays a role in explaining why, on a particular occasion of use, the sentence means that Paolo has a significant degree of height. (The motivation for acknowledging the presence of *pos* is that it facilitates a compositional account of the basic construction, 'Paolo is tall'—an account that coheres with a promising story about corresponding comparative forms, like 'taller', and measure-term modification, as in 'five feet tall'.) As Wolfsdorf presents it (p. 68), the standard account entails that

'Paolo' denotes both an individual and his degree of height, δ_1; *pos* denotes a contextually variable standard degree of comparison, δ_2; and the sentence is true just in case $\delta_1 \geq \delta_2$. According to a rival account, recently defended in Jessica Rett (2015), *pos* doesn't exist. The literal content of 'Paolo is tall' is simply that Paolo has some degree of height, which is utterly trivial. As a result, an utterance of 'Paolo is tall' would flout the conversational maxim of Quantity (*Be informative!*) and thereby trigger an implicature to the effect that Paolo has a significant degree of height. This account runs parallel to Grice's treatment of informative tautologies, like 'War is war', which communicates, in context, that war has certain inevitable features, such as the loss of innocent life. Rett classifies the significance implicature as an aspect of semantic content, despite the Gricean mechanism that produces it, because it's the contribution a basic sentence makes to the interpretation of larger constructions, like negations and conditionals. As between the standard account in terms of *pos* and Rett's account in terms of implicature, Wolfsdorf's official stance is one of neutrality (p. 81).

Chapter 4 presents the central metaphysical claim of the book and the uniformity argument that I've already summarized.

Chapter 5 is about particular ways of being good, or what the author calls 'dimension specification'. The central question appears to be this: how does an utterance of, say, 'This is good' come to mean, in context, that this is a good book, or a morally good action, or whatever. Wolfsdorf surveys three proposals—one in Peter Geach (1956), one in Szabó (2001), and one in Muffy Siegel (1976)—criticizing them and offering an alternative account. In the background, there's a much larger issue about the nature of the interaction between context and communicated content: is the influence of context highly constrained, so that it contributes nothing beyond what happens to be syntactically mandated? Wolfsdorf calls an affirmative response to this question 'determinism'. A negative response is dubbed 'compatibilism'. Determinists and compatibilists disagree about whether there can be contextual meaning enhancement without the mediation of syntax. (The terminology here is a bit misleading. In discussions of free will, from which Wolfsdorf intentionally borrows these expressions, compatibilism coheres with determinism. In fact, there are some doctrines on which free will requires determinism. In this setting, however, compatibilism and determinism are contradictory positions. I'm not sure why Wolfsdorf didn't just use standard terminology.) Wolfsdorf is a compatibilist, and his account of dimension specification presupposes this commitment. Because of space restrictions, I'll pass over the details of this story to comment on a core feature of the broader view.

Wolfsdorf believes that 'good' is a monadic predicate. This belief is expressed early on (p. 90), and it's reiterated in chapter 5 (pp. 192-195), where Geach's influential criticism of the view is discussed:

The claim that 'good' is a unary predicate may be difficult to accept. But consider the following sentence:

20. If an entity is good, then it has value.

[. . .] If the basic sentence 'an entity is good' in the antecedent of the conditional did not express a proposition, then (20) could not be true. [. . .] Granted this, what is the lexical meaning of the basic sentence, '*x* is good'? Assume that *pos* is not a covert constituent of the predicate expression. In that case, lexically, the predicate expression denotes a degree of unspecified value. Given the semantic adjustment to the degree that occurs in the basic sentence, in that context the predicate expression denotes a significant degree of unspecified value. (pp. 192-193)

It's not immediately clear what 'unspecified value' is. But, in a footnote, we're told that it's 'value of an indeterminate kind' (p. 193, fn. 101).

How confident should we be in the intelligibility of the antecedent of (20), given its intended interpretation? What, exactly, is required for the intended interpretation to be true? Applying Wolfsdorf's suggestion, and translating it into the language of purpose, the truth of 'Something is good' requires that some entity serve its purpose but that it not serve any determinate purpose. I reiterate: this is the analysis that we obtain by applying Wolfsdorf's theory. And I'm not at all confident that I know what this requirement means. Are you? Why is Wolfsdorf so sure that he knows? What sort of 'purpose provider' (intention, desire, biological/artifactual function, or whatever) endows a thing with a purpose but no determinate purpose? For a purpose to be served is for its content to be made true; but if the content of a purpose is sufficiently determinate to be made true, how can it fail to be a determinate purpose? I don't deny that if an entity is good in some way, then it has value in some way. (Nor would Geach, I think.) And it seems plausible that, when asked to evaluate (20), it's this, or some closely related, interpretation that one naturally entertains. But this does nothing to vindicate the intelligibility of (20) on its intended interpretation.

Geach's attack on the sort of view that Wolfsdorf wants to defend relies on a principled understanding of the logical difference between 'attributive' and 'predicative' adjectives. An attributive adjective can't be inferentially 'split' from the noun it modifies ('*x* is a big flea; therefore, *x* is big and *x* is a flea' is invalid), nor can it be inferentially 'transferred' from one noun to another ('*x* is a big flea; *x* is an animal; therefore, *x* is a big animal' is also invalid). (The two sorts of inference are obviously related, but they're often distinguished in the literature.) Geach's point was that if 'good' were a monadic predicate, whose mode of semantic composition with another predicate involved the intersection of two extensions, then these inferences would be valid. Compare: colour predicates, such as 'red', can be inferentially split and transferred. However, 'good' can't be. Here are two examples from the book: 'Joe is a good father' doesn't follow from 'Joe is a good doctor' and 'Joe is a

father'; nor does 'Garth is a good surgeon' yield 'Garth is good' and 'Garth is a surgeon'. So, Geach concluded, 'good' isn't a monadic predicate.

Wolfsdorf addresses the issue at length. In fact, his discussion is *so* lengthy that I'm unable to convey a full appreciation for its many ins and outs. But I will address two crucial points. First, Wolfsdorf notes that, on some occasions, even 'red' fails to license inferential splitting and transfer: one can't correctly infer 'This is red and a pen' from the most natural interpretation of 'This is a red pen', according to which the item in question dispenses red ink; nor would one be warranted in concluding 'This is a red cylindrical object' from 'This is a red pen and a cylindrical object' (pp. 206-208). Second, Wolfsdorf explains the problematic inferences in Geach (1956) by appealing to 'implicit contextual supplementation'—a process whereby the most natural reading of, say, 'Garth is good' comes to be identified with the proposition that Garth is *morally* good. Inferential splitting is invalid, according to Wolfsdorf, because Garth's being good as a surgeon doesn't guarantee that Garth is morally good (p. 203). More generally, Wolfsdorf's view is that the meaning of 'good' is contextually enhanced *on almost every occasion of use* so that, if one wanted to explicitly specify its meaning on any particular occasion, one would almost certainly have to resort to adverbial modification (pp. 185, fn. 87, 194-204). Sometimes the relevant modifier would be 'morally', as in 'Garth is morally good'; on other occasions it might be 'aesthetically', as in 'This pen is aesthetically good' (p. 186); and, in the transfer inference above, the meaning of 'Joe is a good doctor' is identified with the proposition that Joe is a 'doctor-wise' good doctor. Similarly, the meaning of 'Joe is a good father' is that Joe is a 'father-wise' good father. This enables Wolfsdorf to accommodate the invalidity of the transfer inference by pointing out that Joe's being a 'doctor-wise' good doctor and Joe's being a father doesn't guarantee Joe's being a 'father-wise' good father.

My concern here is that if the meaning of 'good' were modified in context as pervasively and as permissively as Wolfsdorf describes, then competent speakers would naturally assign certain sentences interpretations that they manifestly don't have. To make the worry more concrete, consider the different senses of 'red pen'. Wolfsdorf is right; the phrase can mean *pen that dispenses red ink* and *pen with a red exterior*. This difference allows one to intelligibly say, 'This is a red pen, but it's not a pen that's red'. Philosophically uninformed speakers have no difficulty interpreting this sentence: it clearly means that the pen under discussion can be used to produce red ink, but the pen doesn't have a red surface. Now consider the corresponding sentence involving 'good': 'This is a good pen, but it's not a pen that's good'. What could this mean? Its most natural reading sounds contradictory. Theoretically noncommittal yet fluent speakers of English invariably find it hard to understand. But why doesn't implicit contextual supplementation come to the rescue here and enhance its meaning so that it naturally says that the item under discussion is a good pen, but not a pen that's

aesthetically good (meaning beautiful)? Why is there supplementation of the sort described in the previous paragraph, but not supplementation of *this* sort? Either the account posits an unattested interpretation, or it bars the interpretation in a way that smells awfully *ad hoc*.

The problem here is both general and specific. In general, positing unconstrained/pervasive interpretive processes raises questions about unattested readings. More specifically, predicative adjectives can be used in a way that 'good' can't be. The 'red pen' sentence doesn't require any sort of priming or storytelling to receive a coherent interpretation; the 'good pen' sentence, on the other hand, is most naturally assigned an interpretation on which it's contradictory. Why should there be this particular difference, if it were so easy for context to enhance meanings in ways that undermine Geach's argument? Semantic theories should not only accommodate *positive* data (that is, account for the presence of readings that speakers attest), they should also accommodate *negative* data (that is, account for the absence of readings that speakers don't detect). Theories that aren't adequately constrained typically have trouble with negative data. This issue receives detailed discussion in Mahrad Almotahari and Adam Hosein (2015).

Chapters 6 and 7 make up the second major part of the book: the interpretation of 'goodness' within a broader framework for analysing the meanings of nouns generally and mass nouns specifically. As with every other chapter of the book, these two chapters are rich in detail and provoke a great deal of thought. Unfortunately, I'm unable to give them the attention they deserve here.

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