What Are the Wages of Justice? Rethinking the Republic’s Division of Goods

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Abstract

A growing number of scholars have seen that the Republic’s division of goods includes goods which possess value δι᾽ αὑτό in virtue of some of their causal effects. Building on this, I argue that goods, including justice, which are valuable διὰ τὰ γεγονόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (and whose effects can contribute to the value a good has δι᾽ αὑτό) are so in virtue of a limited class of beneficial effects: those that depend on the recognition of other agents. This way of dividing goods explains why Socrates legitimately invokes some effects of justice in his demonstration that justice is valuable δι᾽ αὑτό.

Keywords

Plato – Republic – division of goods – value

1 Introduction

Book 2 of Plato’s Republic begins on a note of disappointment. Although Socrates has managed to reduce Thrasymachus to silence by the end of Book 1, he has not refuted Thrasymachus’ thesis that the unjust life is happier than the just life. He has not yet demonstrated that ‘it is in every way better to be just than unjust’ (357b1-2).1 To prompt Socrates to offer a more complete and

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1 Greek is from the OCT (S. Slings’ edition of 2003 for the Republic). Translations are my own, although I have profited from consulting J. Cooper (ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997).
persuasive defense of justice, Glaucon, one of Socrates’ two principal interlocutors in the dialogue, proceeds to articulate a famous division of goods. Three kinds of goods are distinguished.

The first (Kind-A; 357b5-8) is the kind which:

> we would choose to have, not desiring the things that arise from it but welcoming it for the sake of itself (αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἐνεκα): rejoicing, for example, or the harmless pleasures from which nothing comes other than rejoicing.

The second (Kind-B; 357c2-4) is that which:

> we prize both on account of itself (αὐτὸ τε αὐτοῦ χάριν) and on account of the things that arise from it (τῶν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ γιγνομένων): knowing, for example, and seeing and being healthy.

The final kind (Kind-C; 357c6-d2) is introduced in the following way:

> There is athletic training, being treated while sick and practicing medicine as well as the other money-making activities. For we would say these are onerous, but that they benefit us, and we would not choose to have them for the sake of themselves (ἐνεκα), but on account of the wages and the other things that arise from them (τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν).

After making this tripartite division, Glaucon asks Socrates what kind of good he thinks justice is. Socrates claims that it is a Kind-B Good and further suggests that anyone who hopes to live a happy life ought to prize justice both ‘because of itself’ (δι’ αὐτό) and ‘because of the things that arise from it’ (διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, 358a1-3), evidently assuming the expression ‘because of itself’ to be equivalent both to ‘for the sake of itself’ and ‘on account of itself’ and the expression ‘because of the things that arise from it’ to be equivalent both to ‘on account of the things that arise from it’ and ‘on account of the wages and the other things that arise from it’.

2 In addition to αὑτοῦ χάριν, αὑτοῦ ἐνεκα and δι’ αὐτό, Plato uses αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ at 358a6. These four expressions are used to identify the value or properties something has all on its own or by its own nature, and indicate a contrast with what arises from it. In what follows, I will use ‘because of itself’ for all these expressions and ‘because of the things that arise from it’ for the contrasting expressions.
of this very claim. In Books 2–9 Socrates argues that justice is valuable ‘because of itself’ and in Book 10 he argues that justice is valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’.

Unfortunately, understanding this claim has proven difficult. There has been considerable scholarly debate over what sort of value the three kinds of goods possess and, consequently, what Socrates means in arguing that justice is valuable both ‘because of itself’ and ‘because of the things that arise from it’. According to one venerable interpretation of the dialogue, which I will call (for reasons that will become clear shortly) the No-Effects interpretation, Glaucon’s division of goods draws the familiar distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value. The example of pleasure and the language of valuing it ‘for the sake of itself’ has convinced generations of scholars that Kind-A Goods possess value in themselves, independently of their causal effects. Similarly, the example of money-making activities being valued on account of the things that arise from them has suggested that Kind-C Goods are instrumentally valuable. And since Glaucon’s division clearly presents Kind-B goods as possessing the value of the other two—both ‘because of themselves’ and ‘because of the things that arise from them’—this interpretation claims that Kind-A Goods are intrinsically valuable, Kind-C Goods are instrumentally valuable and Kind-B Goods are hybrid goods: valuable both intrinsically and instrumentally.

The No-Effects interpretation enjoys wide support. It is endorsed by many scholars of ancient philosophy. Additionally, it is frequently touted by

contemporary ethicists. Although the details of individual presentations may differ, proponents generally agree that to say Kind-B Goods are valuable ‘because of the things that arise from them’ is to say that they are valuable in virtue of their causal effects whereas to say that they are valuable ‘because of themselves’ is to say that they are valuable independently of these effects. Sophisticated versions of the No-Effects interpretation claim that justice is valuable ‘because of itself’ by literally being a part of happiness. Terence Irwin, for example, says: ‘If Plato’s claims about the intrinsic goodness of justice are consistent with his promise to prove that justice contributes to happiness ... then he ought to show that justice is a dominant component of happiness.’

On this interpretation, justice is intrinsically valuable because happiness, of which it is the dominant component, is intrinsically valuable.

Although this interpretation of the dialogue is the leading view in the literature, dissatisfaction is on the rise. A number of scholars have noted that Socrates never once says justice is a component of happiness in the Republic, something one would expect him to do if this what ultimately explains the value justice possesses ‘because of itself’. Others have drawn attention to the fact that multiple interlocutors use causal language when discussing the way in which justice contributes to human happiness. This dissatisfaction has given rise to an alternative interpretation, the Yes-Effects interpretation, according to which Socrates legitimately invokes some of the causal effects of justice in his argument that justice is valuable ‘because of itself’. Proponents of this interpretation deny that the division of goods distinguishes between what we now call intrinsic and instrumental value, as they maintain goods can

4 For one example chosen almost at random, consider the opening lines of Ben Bradley’s ‘Extrinsic Value’ (Philosophic Studies 91, 1996, pp. 109-26): ‘In Republic 357, Plato distinguishes three kinds of goods ... The three kinds of goods Plato distinguishes are intrinsic goods, instrumental goods, and goods that are both intrinsic and instrumental’ (109).

5 Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (above, n. 3), p. 193. Reeve advances a very similar view in Philosopher-Kings (above, n. 3), p. 33: ‘Glaucon wants to be shown that justice itself is a homoioimerous essential component of happiness. For this will establish each of the things on his agenda. First, it will establish that justice is wanted for its own sake. Second, it will establish that justice itself is more choiceworthy in terms of happiness than injustice itself.’

be valuable ‘because of themselves’ in virtue of some of their effects in addition to their intrinsic properties.

I too am dissatisfied with the No-Effects interpretation, and I agree with the central claims of the Yes-Effects interpretation. Justice and other ethical virtues are identified as *dunameis* of the soul at a number of points in the *Republic* (430b3-5, 433b7-c2, 433d6-8 and 443b4-5); and, as Plato makes clear in a famous passage from Book 5, it is in the very nature of a *dunamis* to be set over something and to accomplish something (*ἐφ’ ᾧ τε ἔστι καὶ δ ἀπεργύζεται, 477d1-2*). The fact that justice is a *dunamis* of the soul strongly suggests that it will accomplish something and have some effects on the soul. So too does the causal language used in the discussion of justice and its relationship to happiness. Although a full defense of the following claim is beyond the scope of this paper, my own view is that the *dunamis* of justice actively orders the three soul-parts into a harmonious and unified whole. This produces a soul that is wise, courageous and temperate; it also ensures that the just agent will act in their long-term self-interest, be confident and experience the greatest pleasures available to human beings. These effects, which are detailed in Book 4 and in Book 9, are what ultimately make the just agent happy.7 All are utilized in the *Republic*’s argument that justice possesses value ‘because of itself’.

That being said, the Yes-Effects interpretation is still wanting. While previous adherents have successfully objected to the central claims of the No-Effects interpretation, they have not yet given a plausible account of what it means for something to be valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’ such that some of justice’s effects can contribute to its value ‘because of itself’. Certain scholars have neglected the issue. For example, Nicholas White, probably the most sophisticated and influential proponent of the Yes-Effects interpretation, devotes only one paragraph of his otherwise excellent 30-page paper to the nature of the things that arise from justice.8 Others have offered lengthier but ultimately untenable accounts of what it means to for something to be valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’.9 No Yes-Effects proponent has yet

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7 433b7-c2 establishes that justice entails the three other ethical virtues, wisdom, courage and temperance. 443c9-444a2 shows that the just soul will be unified, harmonious and that justice ensures that we will act in our long-term self-interest (cf. 442a4-b3 and 589a6-c4). The second and third proofs of the superiority of justice in Book 9, presented at 580d2-588a10, show that the just individual experience the greatest pleasures available to humans.


9 In ‘The Division of Goods and Praising Justice for Itself in Republic II’ (above, n. 6) Payne argues, for example, that the Kind-B goods possess value ‘because of themselves’ on account of (what he calls) their criterial benefits and that some of the Kind-C goods are valuable because of their criterial benefits as well. He thus takes the value Kind-B goods have ποιότι τε αὐτοῦ χάριν to be the same in kind as the value some Kind-C goods have τῶν δε μισθῶν τε
given a convincing account of the Kind-C Goods and what it means for them to be valuable only ‘because of the things that arise from them’. Without a satisfactory explanation of the Kind-C Goods, this interpretation is incomplete and cannot be said to offer a coherent account of Glaucon’s division of goods.

In this paper I try to complete the Yes-Effects project. By focusing on the Kind-C Goods, I offer an interpretation of what it means for something to be valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’ such that some of justice’s effects can contribute to its value ‘because of itself’. I shall argue that a preponderance of the evidence suggests that what it means to be valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’ is to be valuable for effects that depend on the recognition of other agents. Despite the evidence in favor of this reading, two important objections have left previous scholars reticent to adopt it. After making the case for this interpretation, then, I spend a significant amount of time responding to one textual and one philosophical objection. Defusing these objections paves the way for a complete and viable Yes-Effects interpretation of the Republic. When Socrates claims that justice is valuable both ‘because of itself’ and ‘because of the things that arise from it’ he means that justice is valuable, first, because it and its immediate effects on the soul contribute to human happiness; and second, because the recognition of justice results in rewards and prizes that also contribute to happiness.

2 What Are the Wages of Justice?

In an important passage in Book 10, Socrates explicitly transitions from treating the value justice possesses ‘because of itself’ to the value it possesses ‘because of the things that arise from it’ by turning to what he calls justice’s wages (612a8-c3):

Haven’t we done away with the other things in the argument and praised neither the wages nor the reputation of justice (οὐ τοὺς μισθοὺς οὐδὲ τὰς δόξας δικαιοσύνης), as you said Homer and Hesiod did? And haven’t we found that justice itself is the best thing for the soul itself and that the soul should do just things ...?

We have. That’s most true.

χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων δόσι γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν. But this is clearly wrong. We want the value that the Kind-B Goods possess ‘because of the things that arise from them’ to be the same as the value possessed by the Kind-C Goods.
Well then, Glaucon, can there now be any objection to, beyond these things, returning the wages (τοὺς μισθούς)—the full number and kind furnished for the soul both from people and gods—to justice and the rest of virtue?

Socrates goes on to enumerate three different sorts of wages: those that just agents receive from other people while they are alive, those that they receive from the gods while they are alive and those that they receive from the gods after they die (612e1-616b1). These wages are the only things identified as arising from justice in Book 10. It is worth noting at the outset that this is a relatively small class of justice’s possible effects—certainly a much smaller class than one would expect if the value of justice ‘because of the things that arise from it’ derived from all of its beneficial effects, as proponents of the No-Effects interpretation must claim.

What, then, characterizes the wages of justice presented in Book 10? They all depend on recognition or reputation of one sort or another—a point emphasized by the text time and time again. These wages are, Socrates says, procured through reputation and given to those who have justice (ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν κτωμένη ἃ δίδωσι τοῖς ἐχουσιν αὐτήν, 612d7-8). Over the course of the next Stephanus page, we are told in no fewer than three places that the justice of just individuals is recognized by the gods and other people (612e2-3, 613b2-6 and 613c5-7). This is why Socrates makes such a big deal of virtuous agents evincing their virtue for a protracted period of time. Even if one’s justice goes unrecognized at first, over the course of an entire life it will be noticed and rewarded (613c9-e3). A similar point is made about the afterlife. Our dearly departed souls are judged in the court of the dead and receive rewards or punishments for their behavior on earth. With signs of all that they have done branded on their backs, the souls convicted of vice are sent away for a millennium of torture. (The true wages of sin is not death: they come after death.) Those found to be virtuous mount their judgments proudly on their chest and spend an equal amount of time indulging in heavenly delights (614a-615c). The documents attached to the just souls not only lay bare their moral characters for all to see, they literally display their sentences and the rewards of which they have been found worthy. In death, too, one’s justice must be recognized in order to win its wages.

The picture developed in Book 10 is that the recognition of one’s justice is causally responsible for the positive responses of the gods and other people and, therefore, for the wages elicited by these responses as well. I will call the wages received through being recognized as just recognition rewards of justice. Book 10 gives every expectation that these recognition rewards are exhaustive of the value justice possesses ‘because of the things that arise from it’. And a close
reading of Books 2-9 confirms that justice’s value ‘because of the things that arise from it’ is indeed exhausted by these rewards, as Socrates is on multiple occasions asked to show that justice is valuable ‘because of itself’ by showing that it contributes to the happy human life even if it is not recognized at all:

(1) After Glaucon presents the division of goods, he and his brother, Adeimantus, implore Socrates to demonstrate the value of justice ‘because of itself’. Adeimantus imposes the following constraints on Socrates’ demonstration (367e1-4):

   So then don’t only show by argument that justice is stronger than injustice, but show, too, what each does because of itself to the one possessing it. Show that the one is good, the other bad, \textit{whether or not one escapes the notice of gods and humans.}\n
The recognition of virtue must be excluded from Socrates’ argument. It is only by removing the social and divine benefits associated with being just that one may isolate the value justice has ‘because of itself’.

(2) After this demand is made, Socrates introduces the famous city-soul analogy so that the investigation into justice may be conducted more expeditiously. Once the city is founded, he returns to the question of justice and exhorts his interlocutors to investigate (427d2-7):

   Whether somehow we might see wherever justice and injustice are, how they differ from one another and which the one who is going to be happy ought to possess, \textit{whether or not they escape the notice of all the gods and humans.}\n
Note that Socrates adopts the language used in Adeimantus’ request and appears to be respecting the conditions imposed on him. He will investigate the status of justice without appealing to the benefits associated with being recognized by gods or humans.

(3) Once Socrates has identified the nature of justice and injustice, he announces that what remains to be done is to consider which of the two will make the individual happier (444e6-445a4):

   The remaining thing, then, as is likely, is for us to investigate again whether doing just things, practicing fine ones and being just is profitable—\textit{if}...
one goes unnoticed or not as such a person—or if practicing injustice and being unjust is—if one doesn't pay for it or, by being punished, becomes better.

(4) After Socrates offers his first proof of the superiority of justice in Book 9, we get an emphatic reminder that this proof does not depend on divine or social recognition of any kind. To confirm the legitimacy of his proof that the just individual is happier than the unjust individual, Socrates asks Glaucon (580c7-8):

Should I, then, announce it whether or not they escape the notice of all humans and gods as being such?

Announce it.

(5) One more passage from Book 10 should be added. When Socrates is summarizing his demonstration that justice is valuable ‘because of itself’, he says (612c7-d2):

I gave to you the just person seeming-to-be-unjust and the unjust person seeming-to-be-just. For you were claiming that, even if it would not be possible for such things to escape the notice of gods and humans, nevertheless this needed to be granted so that justice itself could be compared to injustice itself.

These passages all occur at crucial junctures of the Republic. They either flag what we should expect to follow or summarize what has preceded—thus, these passages carry a significant amount of interpretive weight. We learn that the interventions of the gods and other humans threaten to obscure any fair evaluation of the value justice possess ‘because of itself’ and must be excluded from the investigation in Books 2-9. There are no indications that Socrates objects to the demands made by Glaucon and Adeimantus. On the contrary, Socrates seems to endorse the methodological constraint that he should praise justice as valuable by showing that the just individual lives a good life whether or not they are recognized as just. All the interlocutors agree that to properly evaluate justice and injustice it is necessary to prevent any considerations depending on the recognition of gods and humans from bleeding into the analysis of the value that they possess ‘because of themselves’. In contrast the wages, which depend precisely on the recognition of the gods and humans, contribute to a different sort of value. They contribute to the value justice possesses ‘because of the things that arise from it’.
That these wages contribute to justice’s value ‘because of the things that arise from it’ is a point of agreement between Socrates and his opponents. While advancing the immoralist thesis that injustice is better than justice, Glaucon classifies justice as a Kind-C Good: not at all good ‘because of itself’ but ‘because of the things that arise from it’. He cites the view of most people who claim that although the practice of justice is itself difficult and unprofitable, a reputation for justice (whether deserved or not) procures many great rewards from the gods and other people. Political offices, a choice spouse and the privilege of marrying one’s child into a good family are all available to those who are thought to be just (362b2-4). Interestingly, Plato takes pains to remind the reader that the rewards of justice identified by Glaucon in Book 2 are the very same ones identified later by Socrates in Book 10, about which we have spoken above (613d4-5). This reminder is meant to underscore the similarity between the views of Glaucon and Socrates regarding the wages of justice.

This is important to note. Whereas Socrates believes that justice is a Kind-B Good, valuable both ‘because of itself’ and ‘because of the things that arise from it’, Glaucon claims it is valuable only ‘because of the things that arise from it’. But for both Glaucon and Socrates the value justice possesses ‘because of the things that arise from it’ is exhausted by the recognitional rewards of justice. Given that the division of goods is introduced precisely to facilitate an appreciation of justice and its value, the only good discussed at any length in the Republic, this suggests that what it is for something to be valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’ is—as in the case of justice—for it to be valuable for those of its effects that depend on the recognition of other agents. This suggestion enjoys significant textual support.

Consider Glaucon’s initial characterization of the Kind-C Goods (357c8-d2):


For we would say these are onerous, but that they benefit us, and we would not choose to have them for the sake of themselves, but on account of [1] the wages and [2] the other things that arise from them.

To understand the sort of value Glaucon ascribes to these goods, we must analyze ‘[1] the wages and [2] the other things that arise from them’. We will consider the two parts of this expression separately.

I have already argued that, in the case of justice, wages refer only to the goods that accrue through an individual being recognized as just. And far
from being abnormal, this reflects the way that μισθός is standardly used by Plato. Outside the Republic, Plato uses this word almost exclusively to refer to monetary fees. μισθός is the remuneration received for services rendered—in most cases, for educational services. One must, of course, be recognized as having completed such services (and preferably to have completed them well) in order to get paid. The word has a very similar, although slightly more expansive, use in the Republic itself. Aside from being used of the recognitional rewards of justice discussed in Book 10, it is used of monies paid for services as well as the honor bestowed upon those deserving of it. All the same, there are good textual grounds to think ‘the wages’ refers to recognitional rewards of the Kind-C Goods.

What of ‘the other things that arise from them’? If this refers to any and everything that might come from a good, such as beauty, confidence or comfort, then obviously the Kind-C Goods are valuable for much more than their recognitional rewards. But this is far from certain. Note, in the first place, that there is a question about how we should construe the Greek. There are at least two possible antecedents to which the final word of the expression could refer. All the translations of which I am aware read the αὐτῶν as picking up the αὐτά two lines above, which is itself a pronoun whose antecedent is the Kind-C Goods under discussion in this passage. On this construal, τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα γίγνεται ἀπ’ αὐτῶν are everything other than the wages which come to be from the Kind-C Goods. This construal is of course neutral about what comes from the Kind-C Goods. The relationship of coming to be from something could be very capacious or rather restricted. But it is also linguistically possible for the antecedent of ἀπ’ αὐτῶν to be τῶν μισθῶν, in which case Glaucon would be saying that the Kind-C Goods are valuable on account of both their wages and the things that

10 The majority of the uses of μισθός outside the Republic refer to fees paid to teachers, quite often to the sophists. The one exception to this is Laws 921e, where the word refers to honors. Here μισθός is used in an extended sense to indicate that honor is given as ‘pay’ to those in the military. The recognition of military valor is what engenders the honor paid to soldiers.
11 Otherwise wages are withheld or demanded back (Meno 91d-e).
12 In one exceptional case, the word is used to refer to the triad of money, honor or penalty (ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τιμήν, ἢ ζημίαν, 347a3-5). Because the penalty in this case is being ruled by a less skilled ruler, something which one might suffer without being recognized at all, this seems to be a counterexample to my claim. But Plato clearly flags this as an aberrant use of the word by having Glaucon interject and complain to Socrates that he does not understand ‘what penalty you mean or how you can call it a wage’ (347a6-7). Socrates’ use of μισθός to refer to a penalty is the exception proving the rule about its appropriate use.
come from those wages.\textsuperscript{13} If this is the correct way to construe the sentence, then the value of the Kind-C Goods derives entirely from their wages, which themselves depend on the recognition of others.\textsuperscript{14}

At least two considerations suggest that this neglected construal is preferable to the alternative. First, the proximity of τῶν δὲ μισθῶν to ἀπ’ αὐτῶν would seem to make it a more natural antecedent than αὐτὰ. And, second, in a nearby parallel passage mentioning ‘the other things that arise from them’, wages are the only plural antecedent available.\textsuperscript{15} These considerations are certainly not decisive, and I do not want to insist that this construal is the correct one.\textsuperscript{16} But one wonders if this construal has been neglected out of a stubborn resistance to alternative ways of understanding the division of goods.

Even if one does not read the Greek in this way, there is good reason to think the second part of Glaucon’s expression must refer to recognitional rewards of one sort or another. This is made clear a few lines later, immediately after Socrates classifies justice as a Kind-B Good, in the only other text that explicitly discusses the nature and value of the Kind-C Goods (358a1-6):

\begin{quote}
Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, ὃ καὶ δι’ αὑτὸ καὶ διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ἀγαπητέον τῷ μέλλοντι μακαρίῳ ἔσεσθαι.
Οὐ τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ἔφη, τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους, ὃ μισθῶνθ’ ἕνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἔπτηδευτέον.
\end{quote}

I at least think that [justice] is in the finest kind [of goods], [the kind] which ought to be prized both because of itself and because of the things that arise from it by the one who is going to be blessed.

Well, it does not seem so to the many, but rather that [it] is a member of the painful kind [of goods], [the kind] which should be practiced for the sake of wages and good repute coming from reputation.

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\textsuperscript{13} One might object that the τῶν ἄλλων makes this construal impossible. It is the wages and the other things that arise from them, which suggests that these other things are distinct from the wages. But ἄλλος does not need to mean ‘other’. It is often used to mean ‘as well as’ or ‘in addition to’, as in Σωκράτης καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι γυναῖκες. See H. W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (revised by G. M. Messing) (Harvard University Press, 1956), §1272.
\textsuperscript{14} Thanks to Hendrik Lorenz and Thomas Davies for discussing this construal with me.
\textsuperscript{15} ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι τί τ’ ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθῶνθ’ καὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἔδαπτον χαίρειν (358b4-7).
\textsuperscript{16} The μέν … δὲ structure of the sentence militates in favor of the standard translation, as it makes it somewhat more natural to construe auta as the antecedent of autōn.
\end{flushright}
I have found it necessary to fill out the structure of this passage because its translation is sometimes blundered, and blundered in a big way. Grube’s translation (later revised by C. D. C. Reeve), for example, renders the last two lines: ‘That isn’t most people’s opinion. They’d say that justice belongs to the onerous kind, and is to be practiced for the sake of the rewards and popularity that come from a reputation for justice.’\(^{17}\) This translation runs roughshod over the neuter relative pronoun (ὅ) and takes justice as the subject of the relative clause. But this cannot be correct. The marked parallelism with the previous two lines, which are clearly not about justice itself but the entire class of Kind-B Goods, and the ready availability of a neuter noun compel us to construe τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους as the antecedent and translate as I have above.\(^{18}\)

This is crucial because, once read correctly, this passage does not offer a statement of why justice is to be practiced but a second, fuller characterization of the Kind-C Goods and why they are valuable. We can draw from this second characterization to supplement our account of Kind-C Goods in the division of goods itself, which unfortunately leaves the second source of these goods’ value underspecified. Our second passage indicates that, aside from their wages, the Kind-C Goods are valuable because of εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν.\(^{19}\) This good repute should be read back into the division of goods to fill out the second sort of valuable effect possessed by the Kind-C Goods. We must understand that they are valuable on account of [1] the wages and [2] good repute coming from reputation. Even if we reject the alternative translation of the division of goods, there is significant textual evidence that the Kind-C Goods are valuable for those of their effects that depend on recognition of one sort or another.

Thinking through the wages of justice leads to the conclusion that the value a good possesses ‘because of the things that arise from it’ is entirely mediated through the recognition of others. This is made clear in the case of justice from Glaucon and Socrates’ discussions of it in Books 2 through 10. But further investigation and close textual analysis reveal that this a general truth about all

\(^{17}\) In Cooper (ed.), Plato (above, n. 1), at p. 999.

\(^{18}\) Others have seen this. Alan Bloom (The Republic of Plato, New York: Basic Books, 1991, p. 36) does a better job with his literal translation: “Well, that’s not the opinion of the many”, he said, “rather it seems to belong to the form of drudgery, which should be practiced for the sake of wages and the reputation that comes from opinion”. Although it would be preferable if Bloom explicitly identified the ‘form of drudgery’ as the Kind-C Goods, he sees that the relative pronoun must refer back to the τοῦ ἐπιπόνου εἴδους.

\(^{19}\) Note that the dia doxan modifying the good repute suggests that, much like the wages of justice, the reputation is causally responsible for good repute.
goods. For there are only two characterizations of the Kind-C Goods and the value they possess in the Republic, and I have argued that a sensitive treatment of these characterizations is not only compatible with an interpretation according to which the value something possesses ‘because of the things that arise from it’ depends on recognition of one sort or another, but that it actually mandates such an interpretation.

3 Two Objections

In order to defend my interpretation and complete my argument on behalf of the Yes-Effects interpretation, I shall consider two important objections. Skeptics will raise both a textual and a philosophical challenge. I will state the textual challenge first. The three examples of Kind-C Goods that Glaucon gives in his division are athletic training (τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι), medical treatment while sick (τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι) and practicing medicine and other money-making activities (ἰάτρευσίς τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός). These examples are normally assumed to be valuable for bodily fitness (or, perhaps, health), the restoration of good health and monetary compensation respectively. Yet fitness and good health do not seem to be recognitional rewards, as the processes that produce them do not depend on recognition of any kind. Thus, an objector will claim my argument must be mistaken because it cannot possibly accommodate Glaucon’s examples of Kind-C Goods. It must be that the value Kind-C Goods possess ‘because of the things that arise from them’ derives, at least in some cases, from effects other than those that depend on social or divine recognition.20

I grant that this is a serious objection. If I cannot respond to it, my interpretation of the dialogue will be far less plausible. My response is to bite the bullet and say that even these three goods are valued for their recognitional rewards. I will argue that, according to the division of goods as articulated by Glaucon, undergoing athletic training is valuable for the sake of prizes and honors, undergoing medical treatment while sick is valuable for other recognitional rewards, such as making money or winning honor, and practicing medicine is valuable for the salary and social esteem that doctors receive.

20 This objection has been made most recently by Payne, ‘The Division of Goods’ (above, n. 6), p. 76: A Kind-C Good ‘such as medical treatment produces valuable consequences apart from any consequence based on reputation’. A similar charge is made by Perry, Plato’s Craft (above, n. 3), p. 106.
I begin with a methodological point. Glaucon twice uses the first-person plural while discussing the Kind-C Goods. He explains that ‘we’ choose to pursue these goods—despite the fact that doing so is difficult or painful—on account of the benefits to which they give rise. This reveals something about the thinking behind Glaucon’s classification: he looks to the experiences and practices of his contemporaries to determine the value of particular goods. We have seen this already in the case of justice. In response to Socrates’ claim that justice is a Kind-B Good, Glaucon counters that it is a Kind-C Good by appealing to what ‘the many’ think and, in particular, by highlighting the recognitional rewards that they take to be the fruit of justice’s labor. To understand the value that Glaucon ascribes to athletic training, receiving medical treatment while sick or practicing medicine and other money-making activities, we should ask why he and his contemporaries would engage in these practices.

We begin with the most straightforward example, ἰάτρευσις τε καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμός. Glaucon clearly does not think his contemporaries value practicing medicine for itself. The activities involved in treating others were often uncomfortable and hazardous. And although restoring a patient’s health was no doubt recognized as beneficial for the patient and society more generally, this did not make the activity good for doctors. So why did the doctors practice medicine? The mention of the other ‘money-making activities’—which is almost epexegetic of practicing medicine—indicates Glaucon’s answer: doctors practiced medicine in order to get paid. Non-Platonic texts suggest that Glaucon is correct in assuming money is what doctors were really after, though to be sure, certain doctors may also have desired social prestige and authority among their peers. Presumably this was true for all the crafts. One

21 In Breaths 1, the Hippocratic author points out that medicine is often a great imposition on doctors, who must see many terrible sights and touch many unpleasant things. Practicing medicine was also dangerous. In Thucydides’ account of the plague, the historian observes (2.47) that doctors died earlier and in larger numbers than the general population.

22 Aristophanes has one of his characters say that where there are no μισθοί there are no doctors. (Wealth 407-8: τίς δῆτ’ ἰατρός ἐστι νῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει; οὔτε γὰρ ὁ μισθὸς οὐδὲν ἔστ’ οὖθ’ ἡ τέχνη.) The implication is clearly that wages are the reason doctors practice medicine.

23 Despite the fact that most practicing doctors were βάναυσοι and would, therefore, have been looked down upon by those members of the aristocratic class who believed working for wages was beneath them, doctors could trace their lineage back to Asklepios. ‘By doing so, they undoubtedly gained, and presumably intended to gain, authority and prestige among the population at large’ (B. Wickkiser, Asklepios, Medicine, and the Politics of Healing in Fifth-Century Greece, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008, p. 54). Additionally, as Vivian Nutton notes (Ancient Medicine, New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 87), doctors could win significant social capital by being appointed to serve their city.
person became a house-builder to earn a salary and another entered politics because they desired honor. In each case, the money-making activities are valued for the wages and esteem that arise from them.

I turn now to τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι. Although Socrates surely believes that athletic training produces strong bodies, in Book 3 he says that the purpose of such training is to improve the overall condition of the soul (410b1-412a7). It is very unlikely that Glauc on included the example of athletic training as a Kind-C Good on the philosophically-loaded assumption that its beneficial effects include a properly attuned soul. He must, then, disagree with Socrates' assessment of the good-making feature of τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι.24 But why did Glauc on think it was valuable? I suggest that he and his contemporaries practiced and valued such training for the prizes and rewards that could be won from athletic competitions.

Evidence from elsewhere in Plato's dialogues suggests that athletic training served two broad functions: training children through general physical education (which would have included basic training for war) and, more particularly, preparing youths for athletic competition.25 This is also suggested by what we know about ancient athletic trainers.26 The close relationship with athletic competitions is important to note because, 'etymologically and historically, 'athletics' presupposed prizes (ἄθλα) and 'prize-givers' (ἀθλοθέται). In short, Greeks could not imagine life without athletics, nor athletics without prizes'.27 As Donald Kyle here indicates, the connection between athletics and prizes

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24 This is a subtle but significant indication that Plato would not agree with Glauc on's characterization—and perhaps even classification—of some goods. Socrates will later suggest that virtuous individuals enjoy activities that promote the harmony and proper functioning of their soul (443d-444a). Presumably, such people would put τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι among the Kind-B Goods, because for them it would be valuable both 'because of itself' and 'because of the things that arise from it'. We must reject the view of Reeve, Philosopher-Kings (above, n. 3), p. 33, who claims that Glauc on's division 'is really Plato's division of goods'. Careful attention indicates that Socrates, who speaks for Plato if anyone does, has subtle reservations about Glauc on's treatment of the goods.

25 See, for example, Laws 764c5-7: 'The fitting thing to do after this would be to establish officials for music and athletic training—and two for each of these: those for the sake of education in them and those for the sake of competition.' See also Politics 1288b10-19, where Aristotle holds that the athletic trainer has the expertise to train students for competition.

26 According to Donald Kyle (Athletics in Ancient Athens, Leiden: Brill, 1987, p. 142), the γυμναστής was a more specialized trainer, hired to prepare an athlete for competition, supervising his exercises and diet.

was so intimate that it was embedded in language itself. Where you found the former, the latter was sure to follow.

The quest for prizes led many people to the training grounds. In a passage from Plato’s *Statesman*, which appears to represent a historical truth rather than a philosopher’s idiosyncratic views about athletic training, the visitor from Elea indicates why many elite males trained under experts (294d3-8):

Aren’t there also among your people the sort of training of large groups that there are in other cities—either for racing or anything else—and this for the sake of love of victory (φιλονικίας ἔνεκα)?

Indeed, there are very many.

Come now and let us call back to mind the orders of the expert athletic trainers (τὰς τῶν τέχνῃ γυμναζόντων ἐπιτάξεις) in these circumstances.

Training is here said to be φιλονικίας ἔνεκα. ἔνεκα is of course one of the prepositions used in Glauccon’s division to indicate the reason or end on account of which goods are valuable. In this passage it identifies the goal that makes the otherwise onerous practice of athletic training worthwhile. Because those who train do so on account of their love of victory, if asked they would presumably claim that they do not value the training itself or even the bodily fitness it produces. Rather, they would claim to value victory in athletic competitions as well as the prizes, honor and glory that attend such victories. This is highly revealing. Glauccon is operating with the background understanding, surprising to us, perhaps, but natural to his contemporaries, that one trains for the sake of the prizes and honors that could be won through competition. This is why he can so casually offer the example of τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι and trust his interlocutors to understand that its value derives from the prizes offered at athletic competitions and the great honor the bearer of these prizes can boast.

We turn now to the final example, τὸ κάμνοντα ἰατρεύεσθαι. Can it be that Glauccon offered medical treatment as valuable for recognitional rewards rather than the restoration of good health? This strikes me as not at all implausible. It is a fact of everyday life that those who are sick are often unable to act in the ways needed to accomplish their goals. If these goals depend on recognition—as they so often do (just think of the singer addicted to the adoration of the crowd or the athlete craving the podium)—these individuals will value medical treatment on account of its recognitional rewards.

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28 While I was first thinking about this paper, Roger Federer won his eighth Wimbledon title. Because he was injured in the preceding season and required surgery to compete again, he was asked about his health after the tournament. His response was instructive: ‘It’s all
It is something of a platitude that much of Greek life revolved around glory and reputation. Consider the famous Greek heroes at war. In the pursuit of revenge and glory, Achilles sacrifices health and life, thinking that neither are worth much on their own; Ajax chooses to kill himself rather than to live in dishonor. The Greeks frequently pledged allegiance to the ideal of disregarding their own safety and health in battle to win the rewards of honor and fame. And this was clearly regarded as a noble way to comport oneself. Perhaps because of the relatively low premium placed upon health itself, we often see Greek heroes hoping to be healed not for the sake of health but for glory. In the *Iliad* Glaucus, for example, asks Apollo to heal him so that he may rally in defense of Sarpedon’s armor, a great prize of war. Glaucus’ monologue is perfectly unambiguous: the hero does not want to be healed for the sake of health itself—indeed, he does not even mention the word—but rather so that he may rejoin the battle and defend his honor as well as the honor of his comrades (*Iliad* 16.514-29).

These examples suggest that warriors could desire medical intervention for the sake of recognitional rewards instead of health. We possess other texts indicating that the same would have been true for Glaucos’ contemporaries as well. In Xenophon’s *Oeconomicus* Socrates’ aristocratic interlocutor, Isomachus, doubts that the value of health can be understood absent the noble wartime behavior and personal enrichment that health helps to facilitate. Indeed, Isomachus claims that noble behavior and the acquisition of wealth follows (ἀκόλουθα) from, among other things, health and that health is desirable for this reason (11.12). And at *Republic* 406d-e, we learn that poor manual laborers demand expedient courses of treatment because they have no time for a prolonged recovery. Though the rich have the leisure for lengthy treatments,

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Xenophon’s syntax reinforces this point: ἀλλ’ ἐστι μὲν, ἐφ’ ὦ Ἰσχόμαχος, ὡς γε ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ὡς Ἅρκικτες, ἀκόλουθα ταῦτα πάντα ἄλληλων. ἐπεί γὰρ ἐσθίειν τις τὰ ἱκανὰ ἔχει, ἐκπονοῦντι μὲν ὀρθῶς μᾶλλον δοκεῖ μοι ἡ ὑγίεια παραμένειν, ἐκπονοῦντι δὲ πολέμου κάλλιον σῷζεσθαι, ὀρθῶς δὲ ἐπιμελομένῳ καὶ μὴ καταμαλακιζομένῳ μᾶλλον εἰκὸς τὸν οἶκον αὔξεσθαι. The datives indicating the activity of the agent—ἐκπονοῦντι, ἐκπονοῦντι, ἀσκοῦντι, ἐπιμελομένῳ and καταμαλακιζομένῳ—give a sense of necessity to the progression from health to the acquisition of money, which suggests that all these activities lead to riches (*Oec.* 11.12).

If this is right, then an important and valuable feature of health is that it facilitates and contributes to the enrichment of the healthy individual.
most people want to return to their employment in a timely fashion so that they might receive their wages, win the social prestige associated with being a good worker and, perhaps in the case of the convalescent, avoid the obloquy that follows from being perceived as lazy.

Although by no means uncontroversial, thinking about medical treatment along these lines is intuitive. We certainly do value our body insofar as it helps us pursue goals, and should certain goals be sufficiently salient in our motivations we might well conceive of medical treatment as no more than one step in the pursuit of fortune or fame. I suggest that this is how Glaucon thinks of medical treatment when he introduces it as an example of a Kind-C Good. He comes from an aristocratic family that could easily regard proper bodily functioning as a means to pursuing glory or wealth, and he recognizes that the less well-off members of Greek society value medical treatment so that they can earn wages and win their own modicum of social esteem.31

I do not insist that the preceding is correct in every detail. Although the dialogue offers an extended discussion of justice which clearly indicates that the value it possesses ‘on account of the things that arise from it’ depends on the recognition of others, it contains very little discussion regarding other Kind-C Goods. Glaucon says virtually nothing about undergoing athletic training, receiving medical treatment while sick or practicing medicine. As a result, we are sadly not in a position to know exactly what he thought about them. But I do not claim that the argument of this paper is correct because my interpretation of these three goods is correct. My purpose in this section has merely been to respond to the objection that my argument fails because it cannot accommodate the three examples of Kind-C Goods given by Glaucon. To respond to this objection, it is sufficient to show that there is a plausible interpretation of these examples such that they are valuable for their recognitional rewards. This is all I have intended to offer here.

31 It must be admitted that this interpretation has one counter-intuitive consequence. Glaucon presents health as a Kind-B Good, valuable both ‘because of itself’ and ‘because of the things that arise from it’, but receiving medical treatment as valuable not for health but other effects. Glaucon presumably does this because he thinks that most of those who are sick think about the distant goals they desire to attain with a healthy body and, therefore, value treatment as a means to those goals, rather than health itself. Nevertheless, it is problematic that Glaucon does this. My own view is that Plato includes this slight infelicity to remind attentive readers that it is Glaucon who articulates the division of goods, rather than the more sophisticated Socrates, and to hint at his intellectual shortcomings, which are displayed throughout the Republic and announced explicitly in Book 6. There Glaucon and Adeimantus are said to be lacking—indeed, currently unable to acquire—the information needed to appreciate the ultimate goodness of justice (or of anything else, for that matter, 504b and 506d-e). See again also n. 24 above.
The second objection I would like to address is more nebulous. I can often detect a vague feeling among my interlocutors that the division of goods as I have interpreted it is somehow unworthy of Plato’s greatness. I believe the intuition lying behind this feeling is twofold: first, that there is something unnatural about distinguishing between goods whose value depends upon the recognition of other agents and those whose value does not; and second that distinguishing goods in this way is not particularly helpful in an ethical context. I am sympathetic to these worries. From our perspective it does seem somewhat strange—and perhaps even a little shallow—to divide up goods in this way. One might well wonder why Plato would do this instead of distinguishing between intrinsic and instrumental value. Attending to the historical context in which the Republic was written provides a compelling answer to this question, and I shall try to sketch it in what follows, but this answer may not allay the worries of those who desire a more principled and theoretical basis to the division of goods. I will, therefore, end this section by offering some speculative reflections about a philosophically robust way of dividing up value that lies in the vicinity of Glaucon’s.

To see that there is nothing unnatural about Glaucon’s division, we must bear in mind that Plato’s works engage with particular philosophical problems from particular historical periods. The question of whether the just or unjust life is more profitable was, already at the time of the Republic’s composition, an old one. Many in the fifth century had debated the question, and arguments were put forward on both sides. On the one hand, sophists like Antiphon and the author of the ‘Sisyphus Fragment’ believed that intelligent injustice offered the greatest promise of happiness. For clever individuals can selfishly circumvent the laws, take what they want from others and, if they keep their bad behavior hidden, they can enjoy the fruits of injustice without suffering any punitive or social consequences in turn. On the other hand, sophists like Prodicus and the Anonymus Iamblichi argued that the virtuous life is the best life. They argued that the society on which the very possibility of our happiness depends cannot function unless everyone is just and, in addition, that those who are particularly virtuous are likely to win the material goods and honors that make for a successful life.

Plato was not only aware of this debate. He engaged with it. The immoralist positions advanced by Thrasymachus in book 1 and Glaucon in book 2 of the Republic bear an undeniable similarity to the sort of view put forward by Antiphon, who may have been the historical inspiration for Plato’s presentation of the Republic’s two immoralists.32 And Adeimantus explicitly men-

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32 For an elegant statement of this possibility, see Rachel Barney’s insightful Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, ‘Thrasymachus and Callicles’ (Fall 2017 Edition,
tions previous attempts to defend the just life in the process of demanding that Socrates offer a different and better defense of justice (362d2-367a5). One interesting and (for our purposes) relevant feature of this early debate is that proponents of the unjust way of life would often highlight what injustice can do if practiced in secret. Antiphon, for example, tells his readers that they will best serve their own interests by committing injustice when no witnesses are present.33 The ‘Sisyphus Fragment’ implicitly suggests a similar point.34 In a marked contrast to the champions of injustice, however, the friends of virtue focused on the benefits justice provided when it was recognized by all.35

This way of praising justice continued well into the fourth century. To give one striking example, consider the following statements made by Plato’s contemporary and academic rival, Isocrates:

I am astonished if anyone believes that those practicing piety and justice preserve and remain in them because they hope to have less than the wicked, rather than because they suppose that they will carry away more than others from both gods and humans. (On the Peace 33)

And you ought now suppose that they get more and, further, consider that those who are most pious and most careful in their service to the gods will continue to get more, and they get and will continue to get more from people who, because they are best disposed towards those with whom they live and practice politics, have the best reputation. (Antidosis 282)

Isocrates tells us that people do—and should—persevere in virtuous behavior because, once recognized, this leads them to ‘get more’. What exactly they will get more of is left unspecified, but clearly it is supposed to benefit them. Note that the mention of gods and humans make these texts particularly relevant.

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33  87 B44 DK, Fragment A, esp. I.12-23 and II.3-10, where Antiphon suggests that we break the laws in private to avoid both punishment and shame.

34  88 B25 DK, esp. lines 9-15, where the author says that after laws and punitive sanctions were instituted people stopped harming others in public, preferring to do so in secret so as to avoid suffering any legal or social punishments.

35  Both Prodicus and the Anonymus Iamblichi argue that virtue paid because it could result in everlasting honor and an immortality of repute. For a full defense of this claim, see my ‘Immorality or Immortality? An Argument for Virtue’, Rhetorica 37 (2019), pp. 97-119.
Readers will recall that in laying out their challenge in the *Republic*, Glaucon and Adeimantus request that Socrates show justice profits the individual whether or not they are recognized by the gods or other humans.

As these Isocratean passages serve to emphasize, Plato was inheritor to a debate in which one side praised justice by focusing on what it accomplishes when witnessed by others. Plato even calls our attention to this fact in an uncharacteristically explicit and forceful way when he has Adeimantus complain that no one has yet blamed injustice or praised justice other than by invoking the honors, gifts and reputation that come from them (366d7-e5). Such was the meager state of ethical education in the early fourth century, Plato thought, that moralists were forced to appeal to recognitional rewards to show that justice was profitable. Of course, he planned to give a different and more satisfying defense of justice by proving that it contributes to human happiness even if no gods or other people see it. And this is the explanation of why it would have seemed natural to distinguish between goods in the way that I have suggested. Glaucon draws a distinction between goods whose value depends upon the recognition of other agents and those whose value does not. His brother then points out that previous defenses of the just life have praised justice only as a good of the former kind. Socrates’ job is to show that justice is good in both ways.

It is worth noting that the *Republic*’s partitioning of value is not the only one we find in Plato’s dialogues. One of the purposes of the *Euthydemus* is to show that many things conventionally regarded as good—most prominently, the crafts and other technical bodies of knowledge but also such things as wealth, health and beauty—are only good for the individual if their use is guided by wisdom. To make this point Socrates argues that wisdom alone is unconditionally good, whereas other goods are merely conditionally good.36 This argument influenced the Stoics and, through them, Kant’s account of the good will.37 Elsewhere, in the *Gorgias*, Socrates responds to two students of oratory who think that conventional morality should be flouted in the pursuit of power, material success and, most importantly, hedonic satisfaction. In this dialogue Plato is particularly concerned to drive a wedge between what people think they want and what truly serves their long-term interests. To do this he has

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37 On this feature of Kant’s thought, see Christine Korsgaard, ‘Two Distinctions in Goodness’, *Philosophical Review* 92 (1983), pp. 169-95, esp. 177-90.
Socrates distinguishes between goods that are instrumentally valuable and those that are finally valuable (467c-468b). Plato is fully capable of drawing philosophically rich and highly perceptive distinctions in value. He does so in different ways in different dialogues to serve different purposes. This should be enough to vindicate his greatness. It should also caution us against the conclusion that the Republic’s division is not helpful in ethical contexts. We should expect that it, too, serves to identify and resolve certain ethical problems. And, indeed, it seems to me to respond to a problem that remains pressing even today. We all make decisions that will be witnessed by others every day, and we know that our decisions will be judged. The pressure to maintain a good reputation among our peers can be intense and frequently leads us to do or acquire things that it would be best to avoid. This is a recurring theme of TV shows, pop psychology books and, above all else, Hollywood high school ‘Romcoms’. The hackneyed plotline of these shows testifies to the fact that concern about our peers’ opinion skews our ability to decide what or who is really good for us. So, too, does the advice parents give to their children. Growing up we all need to be reminded not to get carried away by peer pressure and to focus on what will pique our interest, keep us healthy and contribute to our happiness in the long run.

It is an unfortunate truth—but a truth all the same—that it can be very difficult to know that something is good for us by virtue of its own nature, especially when our peers deny this and insist that its only value comes from being recognized. In such circumstances, we would all profit from being able to correctly identify what benefits us because of itself and what is harmful but seems valuable because of the opinions of others. This is a pressing ethical problem that our dialogue’s division of goods helps to resolve.

Seen in this light, Glaucon’s division is one manifestation of the distinction for which Plato is arguably most well-known—the distinction between appearance and reality. However attractive this result of my interpretation is, it might nevertheless be thought that I am missing a more philosophically robust distinction that is at play. For one might distinguish the value something possesses in virtue of the effects it inevitably produces alone and by itself from the value it possesses in virtue of the contingent effects it gives rise to when certain background conditions or co-causes are present. The two sorts of effects I have in mind can be illustrated with the following examples. Fire

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38 In his magisterial commentary on the dialogue, E. R. Dodds (Plato: Gorgias, Oxford University Press, 1959), explains the division as one ‘between activities which we pursue as being themselves ‘good’ or ‘desired’ (i.e. as ends) and those which are pursued only as means to something else’ (p. 235).
produces heat and warms nearby objects alone and by itself. This activity is circumstance-invariant. Some heat will be produced every time fire burns, no matter when or where this happens—it is an inevitable effect of fire's burning. However, it is not the case that the match's spark will inevitably start a roaring campfire, even though sparks are the sort of things that typically produce fires. Certain co-causes must be present if a spark is going to develop into a comforting blaze, such as, at a minimum, flammable wood and oxygen. Additionally, for the flammable material to combust it must also be the case that certain defeaters, like wetness, are absent. Whereas fire will produce heat alone and by itself, a spark will only do this when circumstances favorable to combustion are already in place. Similarly, we might distinguish between goods that necessarily produce valuable effects alone and by themselves and those that do so only in favorable circumstances.39

Because this distinction in value rests on fundamental facts about the nature of causation, it has a good claim to be the sort of distinction that carves nature up by the joints. It certainly seems like a philosophically rich and productive way to analyze value, and it can be readily applied to the case of justice to yield the distinction I have argued is in fact drawn by Glaucon. For, according to Plato, anytime justice is present in our soul, our reason, spirit and appetite will do their own work, we will act in ways that truly serve our long-term interests and we will experience great pleasures. Alone and by itself, then, justice unfailingly produces a number of effects that contribute to our happiness. But just individuals also win high social status, material goods and posthumous rewards, all of which improve their lives (or afterlives) in one way or another. However, justice does not produce these valuable effects either unfailingly or alone and by itself. They are produced in conjunction with the recognition of the other agents that are concerned to reward justice, and in a world empty of gods or peers, these valuable effects would never come to be.

Did Plato have this more philosophically robust distinction in mind when he wrote the Republic? He might have, but I doubt it. One would expect some sort of explicit textual clue that Glaucon's division of goods reflects some deep truth about the nature of causation, but I at least am unable to find any. The dialogue does not contain any extended theoretical discussion about the nature of causation, let alone raise the possibility that background conditions or

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39 Thanks to Benjamin Morison for suggesting this possibility to me. This way of distinguishing goods—or in any case, something similar to it—seems to be what White, 'The Classification of Goods' (above, n. 6), ultimately takes Glaucon's division of goods to amount to, although due to the brevity of his discussion regarding the things that arise from justice, I am not confident about this.
co-causes might be necessary for a whole class of causes to produce their wanted effects. Absent any positive evidence that Plato was actively thinking about such a possibility, it would be overly speculative to assume that it informs the central argument of the dialogue. Moreover, we should remember that, according to Glaucon, the whole class of Kind-C Goods is valuable for their wages and good repute, yet it is entirely unclear why this should be if Plato himself was thinking about goods that necessarily produce valuable effects alone and by themselves and those that do so only in favorable circumstances. Surely reputational rewards are not the only valuable effect that goods might produce in conjunction with other co-causes, and yet these are the rewards that make Kind-C goods valuable ‘because of the things that arise from them’.

Of course, Plato might himself have had this deeper distinction clearly in mind but nonetheless choose to have Glaucon offer a different one for pedagogical or other purposes. But it seems much more likely to me that, in the course of distinguishing between goods whose value depends upon the recognition of other agents and those whose value does not, Plato first came to realize that some causes require certain background conditions or co-causes to be effective. If this right, it may be that the concept of the *sunaition*, which plays such a significant theoretical role in the *Statesman* and *Theaetetus*, was developed at least in part due to reflection upon some of the outstanding problems left unaddressed in the *Republic*.

4 Conclusion

The central argument of this paper suggests that the effects of justice that contribute to the value it possesses ‘because of itself’ are quite expansive. This is a promising finding, as it reflects Socrates’ procedure in Books 2-9. The greater, better and more real pleasures experienced by just individuals are downstream effects of possessing justice in one’s soul, yet they are invoked in the demonstration that justice is valuable ‘because of itself’ (580d2-588a10).40 Also invoked in this demonstration is the fact that just individuals do a better job defending themselves from external enemies, although this is also a consequence of the three soul-parts doing their own work (442b5-9). Similarly—and more obviously—causal effects are used in Socrates’ demonstration that injustice is bad ‘because of itself’. Among a host of other evils, the unjust tyrant suffers a lifetime of intolerable groaning, fear, lamentation and regret (577d1-578b2).

Plato’s idea is that the tyrant, dominated as they are by the indiscriminate whims of their appetite, is compelled to satisfy their base and lawless desires. This leads to regret because they act in such a way that they are later unable to satisfy other, more important desires. In particular, their pathological behavior thwarts the natural interests of their spirited and rational soul-parts, which desire a good reputation among one’s peers and safety respectively. Since this regret occurs as a result of the workings of an unjust soul, it is clearly a downstream effect of injustice. But Socrates includes it in his discussion of the badness of injustice ‘because of itself’.

Proponents of the Yes-Effects interpretation have long since realized that these are compelling reasons to reject the No-Effects interpretation. Through the character of Socrates, Plato forcefully argues that justice is valuable ‘because of itself’ (and injustice bad ‘because of itself’) in virtue of some of its causal effects. But previous proponents of the Yes-Effects interpretation have failed to give a plausible account of what it means for something to be valuable ‘because of the things that arise from it’ such that some of justice’s effects can contribute to its value ‘because of itself’. Accordingly, they have failed to give a full and coherent account of the Kind-C Goods, the division of goods and the Republic itself. I have argued that there is a viable and principled way of distinguishing value δι᾽ αὑτό and διὰ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ that allows us to offer such an account. My hope is that by doing so, I have made the Yes-Effects interpretation viable.41

41 In addition to Hendrik Lorenz, Thomas Davies and Benjamin Morison, I would also like to thank Melissa Lane, André Laks, Gabriel Shapiro, Claudia Yau, Masako Toyoda and the editors at Phronesis for reading drafts of this paper and suggesting improvements. Thanks also to Alexander Nehamas, Daniel Kranzelbinder, Erik Zhang and Sam Preston for each engaging in hours of conversation that helped me crystalize my view and avoid many careless errors.