I will discuss Thrasyamchu’s new on present justice in the first and Second Republic of Plato’s. I will first demonstrate Plato’s project plan within its historical and cultural context. Now in order to show the function idea of Thrasyamchu as representing common cultural conceptions extant at the time Plato wrote the Republic I shall refer to “Solon and Thucydides”, Thucydides is of particular value and a fellow member of the relate aristocracy at a time very close to Plato. In his description of Athenian attitudes to justice, then therefore offers a close source to compare with Plato. I shall then examine the key steps undertaken by Thrasyamchu and then Glaucon in the Republic. Many of these steps are in response to objections by Socrates. Finally, I shall extract the logical propositions within these passages. By making explicit implied propositions and intermediate conclusions, I shall show that Thrasyamchu’s position offers a compatible view of justice. Moreover, I shall show that this view is not one which attempts to provide a single definition. I shall further indicate that it is the false assumption that Thrasyamchu is attempting a definition of justice, rather than merely describing various aspects of it, which generates the perception of incompatible.

“It is said that It has always been a rule that the weak should be subject to the strong;” These words were written by Thucydides a few decades before Plato’s Republic. He reports them as spoken by the Athenians to the Spartans in the debate,(Thucydides, History,433-431BC.), which preceded the opening rounds of the Peloponnesian Wars. These words reflect an understanding of human affairs which was common throughout classical Greece, not least during the decades between the Peloponnesian Wars and the rise of Philip of
Macedon, the era during which Plato lived and against which he reacted. It is this view which Thrasymachus represents in Plato's *Republic*.

Plato's *Republic* is a political work which examines, among other things, the nature of justice. In Athens, if not all of classical Greece, justice is both a personal view as valor and virtue and a civic necessity. The presence of justice was considered essential both for the orderly interaction between citizens and for the overall survival of the polis. These were considered inter-dependent, as we see in Solon’s *The Constitutional Order*, which states that, should the citizenry fail to protect the “revered temples of Justice,” disaster will befall each citizen in person, invading the very unit of society.

“Thus does the public evil come home to each of us. Straining, the courtyard gates no longer hold fast, the evil leaps o'er the high walls; it finds every one, even him fleeing to the inmost chamber.”

To the modern reader, it can appear that Plato is in error when he fails to distinguish between expressions of valor and virtue and the universal principle itself. However, this intimate interconnection between personal conduct and civic order means we cannot separate the relating aspects of justice from acting to illustrate of justice or its linguistic definitions. This is something we must bear in mind as we observe Thrasymachus offering apparently unconnected statements regarding justice, some of which appear unsteady if viewed as formal definitions.

The *Republic* begin with a recitation and analysis of some of the more common understandings of justice extant at the time. With respect, Socrates asks Cephalus if he would agree unconditionally that justice is speaking the truth and paying debts, (*Republic*, I, 331c.). Cephalus does not really answer, but the key point of the passage is to indicate that there is more to justice than a blind adherence to a rigid set of rules, and that the nature of justice deserves deeper examination. Here we see Plato’s dialectic in action, the formulation early in a dialog of a false proposition which can be subject to a Socratic refutation so as to clear the way for a proposition which can lead to a true conclusion.
Polemachus then takes up the discussion for Cephalus, taking the traditional view of the poet of Hesiod's value of doing good to one's friends and harm to one's enemies. An almost universally accepted value in the competitive culture of Classical Greece. *(Republic*, I,336a.), Socrates manipulates it until it becomes a practice of tyrants.

At this point, Plato has dealt with two traditional conceptions of justice. It is now time for the famous Sophist, Thrasy-machus, to appear. Thrasy-machus will provide a series of responses to the question “what is justice?” On the surface of it, these responses will appear contradictory. Debate has raged over whether these statements are, in fact, contradictory. Some have questioned whether they should even be seen as constituting a coherent argument, while others have attempted to resolve the apparent contradictions by searching for complementary meanings within the terms of the statements and which indicate the existence of some "inner" sense to which the terms pertain, like Aristotelian properties concealing a mysterious foundation.

Thrasy-machus starts by stating, that "Justice is nothing other than the advantage of the stronger." Socrates asks him to explain this statement further, *(Republic*, I,338c.). Thrasy-machus then offers the following argument. Some cities are ruled by tyranny, some by democracy, and some by a aristocracy. And in each city this element is stronger, namely, the ruler. And each makes laws as to its own advantage. And they declare that what they have made is what is to their own advantage to be just for their subjects, and they punish anyone accordance in Thrasy-machu’s understanding of Justice in Plato’s *Republic* who goes against this as lawless and unjust. This, then, is what I say justice is, the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule. Since the established rule is surely stronger, anyone who reasons correctly will conclude that the just is the same everywhere,( *Republic*, I,338d-339a.). The advantage is of the stronger.

It is important to focus on the specification that justice is not, in this passage, an inherent aspect of the laws, but is an attribute given them by the rulers. This is not a definition of justice, but an empirical observation of political reality.
Socrates’ objection is that the ruler may create laws which go against his own interests. Acting in accordance with these laws would still be called justice but would actually be to the disadvantage of the rules, *(Republic, I, 339b-e.)*

Clitophon attempts to recover Thrasyphus by arguing that "the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes to be his advantage," but Thrasyphus specifically rejects this interpretation, *(Republic, I, 340b-c.)* Instead, he responds that, a ruler, in so far as he is a ruler, *(Republic, I, 341a.)* never makes errors and accurate decrees what is best for himself.

Thrasyphus examines here the nature of the definition of a role. He says that, though we may use the term ‘ruler’ within the language, such that we can say "a ruler in error," in actual fact, at the moment a ruler is making the error, he is not ruling. In this sense, ‘ruler’ refers to a form of principles, rather than a political position. In this case, the principle is present only when executed perfectly. According to Thrasyphus, there are no degrees of quality in the execution of principles. When is not executed with perfection, it is not present at all. The name which is applied to principles is also used as a generic referent to the person executing it.

However, this is merely a convenience of speech and not a definition. The true definition reflects the execution of the principles and not the person executing it, and this execution must be perfect, and so a person or number of people cannot be said to be a ruler when he decrees something which is not in his own best interest.

Thrasyphus’ objection, if accepted, does prevent Socrates from pulling together the different propositions within Thrasyphus’ argument in a contradictory fashion. Socrates does not attempt to refute this argument. Instead, he simply requests that, *(Republic, I, 341b.)* Thrasyphus speak more precisely in the future.

He shifts ground and starts to attack Thrasyphus by exploring exactly what the role of the ruler is by reference to the ends then he seeks to achieve through the execution of his role. *(Republic, I, 341c-e.)* At this
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point, Plato has shifted from Thrasymachus’ empirical analysis of the ruler as we experience the wood to a philosophical analysis. In a certain sense Socrates is responding to Thrasymachus’ description of political reality with a discussion of the ideal form of the ruler. Socrates argues to the conclusion that the function of the ruler is to do “what is advantageous for his subject” and states that is in fact. (*Republic*, I, 342e.) what happened.

Thrasymachus quickly dismisses Socrates’ proposition as in credulous, stating that the direction to caring for a flock of people or sheep is to exploit them. Thrasymachus instead focuses his response on the consequences of justice as a normative value. He argues that, in an exchange between two parties, the one who acts unjustly will have an advantage over the one who acts justly. It is at this point a new proposition about justice is introduced by Thrasymachus. “Justice is really the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys and serves. Injustice is the opposite, it rules the truly simple and just, and those it rules do what is to the advantage of the other and stronger, and they make the one they serve happy, but themselves not at all,” (*Republic*, I, 343c.). A just man always gets less than an unjust one.

He then proceeds to give examples drawn from personal conduct and builds upon these to the duplicity of conduct conclusion that unjust conduct of sufficient magnitude can lead to political domination. (*Republic*, I, 344a.).

Especially, A Demonstration of compatibility in Thrasymachus’ understanding of Justice in (Plato’s, *Republic*, VI.) “Injustice, if it is on a large enough scale, is stronger, freer, and more masterly than justice. And, as I said from the first, justice is what is advantageous to the stronger where does the justice end? (*Republic*, I, 344c.), while injustice is to one's own profit and advantage.

Thrasymachus never presents any further positions. The rest of *Republic*, I. Is occupied with various attacks by Socrates on Thrasymachus’ position. However, Glaucon, “as the older brother of Plato,” takes up Thrasymachus’ arguments in (*Republic*, II.). He reiterates Thrasymachus’ relying approach by proposing that, while justice is “valor and virtue,” it is a duty to perform. According to Glaucon, most people act justly for the
accrual of benefit rather than the sake of being just itself, (Republic,II,358a.). He then argues that justice is a compromise which people accept in order to prevent more powerful people from treating them unjustly. Here he reiterates and expands what had been a minor aspect of Thrasymachus argument’, (Republic,1,344a–d). He further argues that anyone who had both the power and the will to act unjustly towards others would never enter into such an agreement, (Republic,II,359a-b). Repeat any Thucydides’ Athenians,’ Glaucion contends that competition between people is natural, and justice is the process of using the law to force this competitiveness (Republic,II,359c-360c.) into patterns of behaviour governed by pleasing appearance. His following discussions throughout Republic II extend this position by showing that it is merely the reputation for justice which is important, not the reality (Republic,II,360e-362c.), even with regard to the gods. In fact, for Glaucion, the ideal is according to the principle combination of ruthless injustice combined with the appearance of utmost justice.

There are several arguments presented by Thrasymachus and Glaucion in Republic I and II. Only one offers an obvious definition of justice, while the others discuss the consequences and causes of justice. We can summarise the logical structure of Thrasymachus’ definitional argument as follows. Premise1. Laws are created by government for their advantage. PremiseII. Justice is obedience to the laws. Conclusion1. Justice is to the advantage of the government. Premise3. The government is the stronger. Conclusion2. Justice is the advantage of the stronger.

Afterwards Thrasymachus defines justice as the good of another, the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, and harmful to the one who obeys the law (Republic, I,343c.) and serves. It is often the case that the critical element examined within this statement is that justice is the good of another, as if this criterion can be separated from the advantage of the stronger and the ruler. This leads to the popular alternatives that there exists an apparent contradiction between justice is the advantage of the stronger and justice is the good of the other. However, Thrasymachus does not connect these two phrases with and. Had he done so, then the two phrases
could legitimately be treated as complementary elements in a definition which permits of multiple criteria. However, when commas are used in this fashion within definitional statements, they stand in for “that is to say”. Thus, the grammatical structure of the sentence implies that “the advantage of the stronger and the ruler is a clarification of the preceding phrase, If this is the case, then Thrasymachus has further defined “another as the stronger and the ruler.” On this basis we may represent the logical structure of this second proposition as

Premise1. Justice is the good of another. Premise2. The other is the stronger. Premise3. The good of another is the same as the advantage of another. Conclusion1. The good of the stronger is the advantage of the stronger. Conclusion2. Justice is the advantage of the stronger.

To show clearly that whether the two definitions of justice as the advantage of the stronger and justice as the advantage of another are contradictory or not depends on how one interprets the connection between the two adjacent phrases in the sentence. While this is not the common interpretation of this passage, and depends on the accuracy of the translation, I am inclined to trust the translation and regard Thrasymachu’s statement here as complementary to his original statement. There also exists an argument regarding the effects of justice. Premise1. Justice pertains to interactions between two parties of differing degrees of power. Premise2. Justice is good for the stronger party and bad for the weaker.

We can, furthermore, extend this by making explicit the implied connections between terms, as follows. Premise3. What is good for someone is to his advantage. We can therefore conflate good for with “the advantage” to reach the following at the end. Conclusion1. Justice is the advantage of the stronger.

These examinations show that Thrasymachus is operating on a principle view of justice, but that this stability is not made explicit within Thrasymachus’ statements. The unsatisfactory is, to a certain degree, a product of a modern understanding of the definition. Plato does not seek to create strict definitions in the modern mode, but indicates aspects of a concept through reference to linguistic usage, empirical examples, thought experiments, and so forth. To a certain degree, this is what Aristotle attempted to make formal with his
four causes. Thrasymachus describes a form of justice “obedience to the law,” an effect of justice “advantage of the stronger and an aspect of the dynamics of justice,”, that in an exchange between the just and the unjust, the unjust will win. If one accepts that Thrasymachus is discussing justice in this way, and if we make explicit the implied propositions and connections within his statements, a coherent picture emerges which enlighten various aspects of justice rather than attempting to define a single constituting definition.

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P1. What position does Thrasytes take on Justice and why.

P.1 How does he shifts his position under the questioning by Socrates.

P.11 What is that finally embraces Thrasytes into silence.
In this writing I will address Aristotle’s process of “ousia,” translated as “Property-Substance-one of the kind of matter” as used in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book I. and in relation to non-substance. Aristotle’s dispute that substance is before non-substance in definition, "knowledge” and time are largely inherent within his definition of substance. I shall therefore devote the majority of space to an exploration of Aristotle’s process of substance as it stands in relation to non-substance. I shall draw my analysis of substance first from the Categories. I shall demonstrate that substance is characterised by unity of identity and a relationship with non-substance which is not a consequence, but a specification, of Aristotle’s “definition,” I shall show that additional specification must be added by Aristotle to provide an account of substance across time. Throughout this discussion, I shall indicate where I consider Aristotle to be “fragile” in his contention that substance is fully capable and definable without reference to non-substance. I shall indicate the necessity beforehand of categories other than substance in order to know substance at several points as they appear. Along the way, I shall see how Aristotle creates a complete hierarchy of being through his capacity of substance and how this provides much of the justification for his position that substance is foregoing to non-substance.

Aristotle, in *Categories*, Book I, is distressed with the philosophical study of reality of being and logical relationships between substance and non-substance. It serves to distinguish substance as an object of enquiry from universals and from the other categories in order to make easier the way for the more detailed analysis of substance which follows in the later sections of Aristotle. In assuming the philosophical relationships, it offers an implied hierarchy of being which is often made more explicit elsewhere. In assuming logical relationships, it makes explicit an intellectual structure which lays out a program of work based on a strong method of knowledge.

In order to understand why substance is principal in definition, knowledge, and time, we must first understand Aristotle’s idea of substance as compared with no-substances. We cannot fully understand
Aristotle’s idea of substance if we confine ourselves to his philosophy. While the principle of philosophy devotes much space to the nature of substance, it is more clearly present with reference to non-substances in the Categories.

The prime property which characterises substance is union of identity. “That which is called a substance most strictly, prime, and most of all is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse” (Aristotle, *Categories*, Book I,2a 13-15), “Each substance seems to signify a certain ‘Things, Being’. As regards the prime substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain ‘This’; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one” (Aristotle, *Categories*, Book I,3b10-13) So a substance must be things, “something” cannot be a substance, and neither can a possibility or a probability” and the identity so identified must be a singular whole, a substance must always be “numerically one,” so any form of set, group, or other lots cannot be a substance. A substance may be collected of parts, but if it is to be a substance, those parts cannot be necessary to the relationship of the substance. For example, a complex object, such as a flock of birds, cannot be a substance because the relationship makes explicit reference to other objects.

Aristotle’s vivid substance includes an explicit relationship with non-substance “All the other things are either said of the prime substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the prime substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist” (Aristotle, *Categories*, book I,2b5-6). “It is because the prime substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances most obedient” (Aristotle, *Categories*, Book I,3a1.). “All other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this prime sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some of the determination of it” (Aristotle, *Methaphisics*, Book VII,1028a17-20),

The property above, “substance as known unity and substance as universal subject,” do not have to be associated of necessity. Neither proposition implies or involve the other. Aristotle could, for instance, have postulated substance merely as that suppose which is the subject of everything else and positioned identity and
unity as properties with the same relationship to substance as “orthodox” properties, such as extension or shade. Otherwise, he could have identified identity alone with substance without making any reference to non-substance and then allowed relationship with non-substance as simply a property of substance rather than a necessary “define.”

In incorporating the two, Aristotle creates a “hierarchy.” It is important to bear in mind that, for Aristotle, a definition is more than just about language and its usage. A definition does not provide the linguistic meaning of a term, but it says something real about the expand itself (Interpretation, *Metaphysics*, VII-IX, P.56.). When Aristotle places substance in a specific relationship with non-substance, he creates a concrete, if simple, philosophical hierarchy. Under this strategy, substances are existence basic beings,” (Interpretation, *Metaphysics*, VII-IX, P.48.).

Time and passes need to be taken into consideration if Aristotle is to define substance in a way which can be used to illuminate existence as we experience it overdue of time. Thus, a principal part of Aristotle’s portrait of substance makes reference to time and change. We experience a world in which things can change in many ways and yet remain themselves, and so our experience teaches us that identity can survive change in properties. Aristotle must therefore include an account of change over time in his definition of substance. “The way in which it is able to receive contraries through a change of itself would be unique of substance” (Aristotle, *Categories*, 4b3-5.), “It is characteristic of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries” (Aristotle, *Categories*, 4b17-19.). Thus, a change of property does not necessitate a change of identity. Moreover, Aristotle does not allow that identity can be qualified or vary in degree or be partial; “Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more or less” (Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b.34.). Any given substance is not called more, or less, than which it is (Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b.36.).

Hence, identity cannot change or vary within itself; it either is or is not. Under this strategy, variation in substance therefore constitutes a termination of one substance and a beginning of another. Substance
constitutes a system of numerical state a; specific substance is either present or it is not; it cannot be “introduce or” in one case than in another.

An object can therefore change the specific composition of its categories and still remain the same thing. Change, as opposed to cessation, is thus revealed as variation over time of non-essential properties. Variation in substance over time does not constitute change but destruction, one substance has been destroyed and a new substance put in its place; it is a change of identity an instant switch in which one substance ceases to exist and another comes into being.

When non-substantial properties vary, we call it change and not conclusion. Change is a process with implied or explicit references to “before” and “after,” Under Aristotle’s theory there cannot be degrees of substance, and so substance cannot “gradually” change from one thing to another. Change of substance, “change of identity,” cannot, consequently, be a process, but must be an event, and one which takes zero duration. This particular aspect of Aristotle’s thinking has, in my view, been particularly problematic for western thought because there are many situations in which it is not so obvious under this theory what identity a thing has. The most controversial examples are to be found in modern medicine regarding philosophy states and law, or personhood. By accepted Aristotle’s analysis of identity as being a notation absolute by present or not, with no intermediate states, we encounter difficulties regarding at what point an unborn becomes a person or at what point someone can be deemed to be a corpse and not a “living” person. Margin does not permit a detailed examination of the issues associated with Aristotle’s position in this regard, but it is worth noting that, if we held a conception of substance as capable of being more or less, issues such as these would not be so difficult. That such issues exist argues that Aristotle’s conception of identity does not obviously and precisely correspond with our experience of the world.

Auxiliary problems lie in Aristotle’s strict separation of substance from other categories. Aristotle works on the basis that knowledge in the full sense is knowledge of definitions and that a definition is not
merely a formula for linguistic usage but a complete answer to the question “what is it?” (Interpretation, *Metaphysics*, VII-IX, P.59.). According to Aristotle, a definition of a “this” provides reference to the relevant sort or division, “The sort and the division mark off the qualification of substance and they signify substance of a certain qualification” (Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b20-21, a24-35.). In other words, sort or division can serve to represent in a single term the parcel of random properties which we use to identify the substance. Therefore, the ultimate answer to the question “what is it?” becomes that “it” is a property of unity combined with categorical particular of a sort and/or division. Sort and division are so genuine by associated with substance that Aristotle designates them as “secondary substances”. “The sorts in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the logic of these sorts. For example, the individual man belongs in the sort, man, and animal is a division of the sort; so these both man and animal are called secondary substances. (Aristotle, *Categories*, 2a15-18.).

In my view, Aristotle cannot achieve foundational definitions, “definitions which define a thing and need no further explanation,” if he requires definitions by means of sort or division. A sort is a division plus differentia. Differentia are properties, and thus not substances. A sort is similarly defined by a parcel of properties. If the answer to "what is Socrates?" is given as "Socrates is a man," then perhaps we are entitled to ask "what is a man?" At this point, I must start using properties, such as height, weight and mortality, because a substance is an instance of a specific configuration of the finite set of properties which define the relevant (sort “or division). Some variation in the specific properties or their states is usually permitted to some degree. However, if that variation of properties within the specific object exceeds the limits permitted within the sort definition, then a change of substance “identity” will be deemed to have occurred.

If we inspect this linguistically, we see the following situation; a substance is identified via a definition “or formula or account” which refers to a singular unity as a specific theory of a sort. A sort is a division combined with differentia. Therefore, we cannot define the species by which the individual substance is defined
without reference to distinguishes or properties. While a particular definition of a “this” may be linguistically complete without inclusion of the division and differentia which define the sort which defines the “this,” it is not logically or philosophical of being independent of them, for a sort cannot exist without its properties. Definition of a substance thus stands revealed as containing at least implied reference to non-substantial properties. Any conception of substance as prime in an existence sense, therefore, fails. It would be perfectly possible to create an alternative existence which treats substance as no more than a quantity of properties “with or without particular” while preserving all the linguistic requirements laid down by Aristotle for usage in definitions and identification of individual substances.

Let us now turn to issues of prime, some of which have been dealt with above. Aristotle states that substance is prime in three ways: “Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be prime, but substance is prime in every sense in formula, in order of ‘knowledge’, in time”(Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII,1028a32-33.). Aristotle’s claim to the prime of substance in other respects rests on the existence prime of substance. Aristotle states this quite simply: “For of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII,1028a34-35.). “All other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this first sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some of the determination of it.”(Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII,102 8a17-20.).

Moreover, we see that substance is clearly existence before to everything else for the reason that the existence of substance is necessary for the existence of “all other things” (Aristotle is thinking here only of prime substance, and not the second substances of sort and division (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Determination,.p171.). It strikes me that Aristotle has missed the prime of extension. The unity required for substance in physical objects depends on lack of variation in substance across space. The top of a tree is as much “tree” as the bottom of a tree. Indeed, a change in substance across margin describes a partition and constitutes a termination of identity. In order for there to be form, there must be extension and continuous
quantities, most especially exterior. While we may be able to express a definition without explicit reference to spatial categories, substance cannot exist without them. Maybe Aristotle would argue that extension is a property of substance. It is the case that an individual substance’s form does create a property of that substance, but the only possibility of form is itself necessarily dependent upon extension. Indeed, properties of extension are the prime determinants of identity. If we encounter two objects which are absolutely identical in all respects except that they occupy different positions in space, we have no difficulty identifying them as two distinct objects, and such distinction is precise. Nonetheless, once we remove space, identity becomes problematic. Is the number 3 I think of the same or a different number from the number 3 you think of? I propose no argument in this respect, but I purely use this example to indicate that issues of identification of substance cease to become straightforward without the property of creation.

It has been disputed that Aristotle holds the position that whatever might be predicated of substance is logical by dependent upon it (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, P.57-82.), and moreover logical by secondary, confining us back to Aristotle’s conception that the linguistic structure of a definition mirrors the metaphysical structure of the referents (Interpretation, *Metaphysics*, VII-IX, P.55.). We must therefore examine Aristotle’s claim that substance is before in definition. Aristotle states, “And in formula also this is prime; for in the formula of each term formula of its substance must be present.” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1028a35-1028b1.).

In this, Aristotle is making a categorical statement that reference to substance is always required in defining a non-substance. The existence of this is that, as I have discussed above, substance can be defined without reference to secondary properties. When the two propositions are confined, they make a strong claim for the prime of substance; in definition, it is possible to define substance without reference to other categories, and it is impossible to define other categories without reference to their associated substance. If both claims can be maintained, then substance is clearly prime in definition.
It has been disagreed that there are two grounds on which substance can be said to be “power” in definition. The first is that definitions of hemianopsia non-substances vary in relation to the substances in which they inhere a healthy person does not have the same form of health as a healthy apple. Alternatively, we can understand definitional superiority as referring to the concept that a definition is not complete unless it includes a substance referent. And therefore, neither conception applies in all cases. The definition of “3 inches” does not depend on any particular example of threeness or any examples of objects of that length. A length of 3 inches does not vary in any manner according to the substance in which it is found. (Interpretation, *Metaphysics*, VII-IX, P.55.). At this stage, we are encircle on the issue of the status of universals, which is beyond the scope of this work. However, even if we accept Aristotle’s position that universals exist only so long as they are instances in existent substances, it still remains the case that it is possible to define some non-substances without reference to examples of their instants and that such definition is both complete and would not be altered by the inclusion of substance referents.

It is Aristotle’s experimentation which leads him, in my view, to hold that substance is prior in knowledge. If non substances cannot occur, or even be defined, without reference to substance, then clearly we must know the substance in order to understand the property. Moreover, this is simply an inexorable consequence of Aristotle’s experimentation. A platonic idealist would argue that we know the thing by antecedent knowledge of its non-substantial properties. The arguments between experimentation and idealist arch in this respect are beyond the scope of this work. Aristotle justifies the claim for precedence in knowledge by noting. “We think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is”(*Aristotle, Metaphysics*, 1028b1-3.). However, I think Aristotle’s example here is confusing because he has explained priority of knowledge, not as it applies to substance, but to sort. “Man” and “fire” are not individual substances, but sort. Aristotle’s example, as written, does not provide any justification for substance as prior in knowledge to other categories. It has been argued
that Aristotle is, in this argument thinking of substance not as the concrete thing, but the essential nature (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Determination, p172.). Even if that is the case, it still fails to justify any claim for the preference in knowledge of substance.

Aristotle does not provide any justification for the preference of substance in time, though I think we can conclude a justification from his conception of the relationship between substance and change. A thing’s properties may vary over time, but the substance remains unchanged. Thus, a thing’s substance exists prior in time to the change and after the change. Properties may change, but they cannot change unless substance exists previous to the change. From a certain perspective, we may conceive of substance as existing outside of time. Substance does not change over time, as I have exhibited earlier; under Aristotle substance either is or is not, and even the termination or graduation of substance occurs immediately. It would maybe be a more accurate representation of his position if Aristotle had stated that substance is forerunner to time rather than forerunner in time.

On Conclusion, I can say that Aristotle has created a conception of substance which requires that substance is necessarily antecedent to non-substance. A Principal part of the definition of substance is, in fact, that substance is defined precisely as that which is antecedent to non-substance. We identify a thing via substance and not via other categories; substance is that in which non-substance exists, substance is the universal predicate; substance is that which maintains identity through change. As we have seen, some of the contrast between substance and non-substance are not necessary. For example, unity could have been a property of substance rather than a necessary criterian. This would permit substances which are constitutionally comprehensive, such as assigning identity to a flock of birds. After all, once Aristotle has structured a definition of substance in the manner in which he has, the principle of substance becomes not so much an argument as a restating of the definition.
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What are the logical and prime of substance

What is bond between substance and non-substance

Substance and premises stand tautological
In this writing I will address Aristotle’s process of “Ousia,” translated as “Property-Substance-one of the kind of matter” as used in Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, book I. and in relation to non-substance. Aristotle’s dispute that substance is before non-substance in definition, "knowledge” and time are largely inherent within his definition of substance.

I shall therefore devote the majority of space to an exploration of Aristotle’s process of substance as it stands in relation to non-substance. I shall draw my analysis of substance first from the Categories. I shall demonstrate that substance is characterised by unity of identity and a relationship with non-substance which is not a consequence, but a specification, of Aristotle’s “definition,” I shall show that additional specification must be added by Aristotle to provide an account of substance across time. Throughout this discussion, I shall indicate where I consider Aristotle to be “fragile” in his contention that substance is fully capable and definable without reference to non-substance. I shall indicate the necessity beforehand of categories other than substance in order to know substance at several points as they appear. Along the way, I shall see how Aristotle creates a complete hierarchy of being through his capacity of substance and how this provides much of the justification for his position that substance is foregoing to non-substance.

Aristotle, in *Categories*, Book I, is distressed with the philosophical study of reality of being and logical relationships between substance and non-substance. It serves to distinguish substance as an object of enquiry from universals and from the other categories in order to make easier the way for the more detailed analysis of substance which follows in the later sections of Aristotle. In assuming the philosophical relationships, it offers an implied hierarchy of being which is often made more explicit elsewhere. In assuming logical relationships, it makes explicit an intellectual structure which lays out a program of work based on a strong method of knowledge.
In order to understand why substance is principal in definition, knowledge, and time, we must first understand Aristotle’s idea of substance as compared with no-substances. We cannot fully understand Aristotle’s idea of substance if we confine ourselves to his philosophy. While the principle of philosophy devotes much space to the nature of substance, it is more clearly present with reference to non-substances in the Categories.

The prime property which characterises substance is union of identity. “That which is called a substance most strictly, prime, and most of all is that which is neither said of a subject nor in a subject, e.g. the individual man or the individual horse”(Aristotle, Categories, Book I, 2a 13-15), “Each substance seems to signify a certain ‘Things, Being’. As regards the prime substances, it is indisputably true that each of them signifies a certain ‘This’; for the thing revealed is individual and numerically one” (Aristotle, Categories, Book I, 3b10-13) So a substance must be things, “something” cannot be a substance, and neither can a possibility or a probability” and the identity so identified must be a singular whole, a substance must always be “numerically one,” so any form of set, group, or other lots cannot be a substance. A substance may be collected of parts, but if it is to be a substance, those parts cannot be necessary to the relationship of the substance. For example, a complex object, such as a flock of birds, cannot be a substance because the relationship makes explicit reference to other objects.

Aristotle’s vivid substance includes an explicit relationship with non-substance “All the other things are either said of the prime substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the prime substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist” (Aristotle, Categories, book I, 2b5-6). “It is because the prime substances are subjects for everything else that they are called substances most obedient”(Aristotle, Categories, Book I, 3a1.).“ All other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this prime sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some of the determination of it”(Aristotle, Methaphisics, Book VII,1028a17-20),
The property above, “substance as known unity and substance as universal subject,” do not have to be associated of necessity. Neither proposition implies or involve the other. Aristotle could, for instance, have postulated substance merely as that suppose which is the subject of everything else and positioned identity and unity as properties with the same relationship to substance as “orthodox” properties, such as extension or shade. Otherwise, he could have identified identity alone with substance without making any reference to non-substance and then allowed relationship with non-substance as simply a property of substance rather than a necessary “define.”

In incorporating the two, Aristotle creates a “hierarchy.” It is important to bear in mind that, for Aristotle, a definition is more than just about language and its usage. A definition does not provide the linguistic meaning of a term, but it says something real about the expand itself (Interpretation, *Methaphysics*, VII-IX,P.56.). When Aristotle places substance in a specific relationship with non-substance, he creates a concrete, if simple, philosophical hierarchy. Under this strategy, substances are existence basic beings,” (Interpretation, *Methaphysics*, VII-IX,P.48.).

Time and passes need to be taken into consideration if Aristotle is to define substance in a way which can be used to illuminate existence as we experience it overdue of time. Thus, a principal part of Aristotle’s portrait of substance makes reference to time and change. We experience a world in which things can change in many ways and yet remain themselves, and so our experience teaches us that identity can survive change in properties. Aristotle must therefore include an account of change over time in his definition of substance. “The way in which it is able to receive contraries through a change of itself would be unique of substance”(Aristotle, *Categories*, 4b3-5.), “It is characteristic of substance that what is numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries”(Aristotle,*Categories*,4b17-19.). Thus, a change of property does not necessitate a change of identity. Moreover, Aristotle does not allow that identity can be qualified or vary in degree or be partial;
“Substance, it seems, does not admit of a more or less” (Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b.34.). Any given substance is not called more, or less, than which it is (Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b.36.).

Hence, identity cannot change or vary within itself; it either is or is not. Under this strategy, variation in substance therefore constitutes a termination of one substance and a beginning of another. Substance constitutes a system of numerical state a; specific substance is either present or it is not; it cannot be “introduce or” in one case than in another.

An object can therefore change the specific composition of its categories and still remain the same thing. Change, as opposed to cessation, is thus revealed as variation over time of non-essential properties. Variation in substance over time does not constitute change but destruction, one substance has been destroyed and a new substance put in its place; it is a change of identity an instant switch in which one substance ceases to exist and another comes into being.

When non-substantial properties vary, we call it change and not conclusion. Change is a process with implied or explicit references to “before” and “after.” Under Aristotle’s theory there cannot be degrees of substance, and so substance cannot “gradually” change from one thing to another. Change of substance, “change of identity,” cannot, consequently, be a process, but must be an event, and one which takes zero duration. This particular aspect of Aristotle’s thinking has, in my view, been particularly problematic for western thought because there are many situations in which it is not so obvious under this theory what identity a thing has. The most controversial examples are to be found in modern medicine regarding philosophy states and law, or personhood. By accepted Aristotle’s analysis of identity as being a notation absolute by present or not, with no intermediate states, we encounter difficulties regarding at what point an unborn becomes a person or at what point someone can be deemed to be a corpse and not a “living” person. Margin does not permit a detailed examination of the issues associated with Aristotle’s position in this regard, but it is worth noting that, if we held a conception of substance as capable of being more or less, issues such as these would not be so
difficult. That such issues exist argues that Aristotle’s conception of identity does not obviously and precisely correspond with our experience of the world.

Auxiliary problems lie in Aristotle’s strict separation of substance from other categories. Aristotle works on the basis that knowledge in the full sense is knowledge of definitions and that a definition is not merely a formula for linguistic usage but a complete answer to the question “what is it?” (Interpretation, Metaphysics, VII-IX,P.59.). According to Aristotle, a definition of a “this” provides reference to the relevant sort or division; “The sort and the division mark off the qualification of substance and they signify substance of a certain qualification” (Aristotle, Categories, 3b20-21,a24-35.). In other words, sort or division can serve to represent in a single term the parcel of random properties which we use to identify the substance. Therefore, the ultimate answer to the question “what is it?” becomes that “it” is a property of unity combined with categorical particular of a sort and/or division. Sort and division are so genuine by associated with substance that Aristotle designates them as “secondary substances”. “The sorts in which the things primarily called substances are, are called secondary substances, as also are the logic of these sorts. For example, the individual man belongs in the sort, man, and animal is a division of the sort; so these both man and animal are called secondary substances.(Aristotle,Categories,2a15-18.).

In my view, Aristotle cannot achieve foundational definitions, “definitions which define a thing and need no further explanation,” if he requires definitions by means of sort or division. A sort is a division plus differentia. Differentia are properties, and thus not substances. A sort is similarly defined by a parcel of properties. If the answer to "what is Socrates?" is given as "Socrates is a man," then perhaps we are entitled to ask "what is a man?" At this point, I must start using properties, such as height, weight and mortality, because a substance is an instance of a specific configuration of the finite set of properties which define the relevant (sort “or division). Some variation in the specific properties or their states is usually permitted to some degree.
However, if that variation of properties within the specific object exceeds the limits permitted within the sort definition, then a change of substance “identity” will be deemed to have occurred.

If we inspect this linguistically, we see the following situation; a substance is identified via a definition “or formula or account” which refers to a singular unity as a specific theory of a sort. A sort is a division combined with differentia. Therefore, we cannot define the species by which the individual substance is defined without reference to distinguishes or properties. While a particular definition of a “this” may be linguistically complete without inclusion of the division and differentia which define the sort which defines the “this,” it is not logically or philosophical of being independent of them, for a sort cannot exist without its properties. Definition of a substance thus stands revealed as containing at least implied reference to non-substantial properties. Any conception of substance as prime in an existence sense, therefore, fails. It would be perfectly possible to create an alternative existence which treats substance as no more than a quantity of properties “with or without particular” while preserving all the linguistic requirements laid down by Aristotle for usage in definitions and identification of individual substances.

Let us now turn to issues of prime, some of which have been dealt with above. Aristotle states that substance is prime in three ways: “Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be prime, but substance is prime in every sense in formula, in order of ‘knowledge’, in time” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII,1028a32-33.). Aristotle’s claim to the prime of substance in other respects rests on the existence prime of substance. Aristotle states this quite simply: “For of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII,1028a34-35.). “All other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this first sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some of the determination of it.” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII,1028a17-20.).

Moreover, we see that substance is clearly existence before to everything else for the reason that the existence of substance is necessary for the existence of “all other things” (Aristotle is thinking here only of
prime substance, and not the second substances of sort and division (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Determination, p171.). It strikes me that Aristotle has missed the prime of extension. The unity required for substance in physical objects depends on lack of variation in substance across space. The top of a tree is as much “tree” as the bottom of a tree. Indeed, a change in substance across margin describes a partition and constitutes a termination of identity. In order for there to be form, there must be extension and continuous quantities, most especially exterior. While we may be able to express a definition without explicit reference to spatial categories, substance cannot exist without them. Maybe Aristotle would argue that extension is a property of substance. It is the case that an individual substance’s form does create a property of that substance, but the only possibility of form is itself necessarily dependent upon extension. Indeed, properties of extension are the prime determinants of identity. If we encounter two objects which are absolutely identical in all respects except that they occupy different positions in space, we have no difficulty identifying them as two distinct objects, and such distinction is precise. Nonetheless, once we remove space, identity becomes problematic. Is the number 3 I think of the same or a different number from the number 3 you think of? I propose no argument in this respect, but I purely use this example to indicate that issues of identification of substance cease to become straightforward without the property of creation.

It has been disputed that Aristotle holds the position that whatever might be predicated of substance is logical by dependent upon it (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, P.57-82.), and moreover logical by secondary, confining us back to Aristotle’s conception that the linguistic structure of a definition mirrors the metaphysical structure of the referents (Interpretation, *Metaphysics*, VII-IX, P.55.). We must therefore examine Aristotle’s claim that substance is before in definition. Aristotle states, “And in formula also this is prime; for in the formula of each term formula of its substance must be present.” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1028a35-1028b1.).

In this, Aristotle is making a categorical statement that reference to substance is always required in defining a non-substance. The existence of this is that, as I have discussed above, substance can be defined
without reference to secondary properties. When the two propositions are confined, they make a strong claim for the prime of substance; in definition, it is possible to define substance without reference to other categories, and it is impossible to define other categories without reference to their associated substance. If both claims can be maintained, then substance is clearly prime in definition.

It has been disagreed that there are two grounds on which substance can be said to be “power” in definition. The first is that definitions of hemianopsia non-substances vary in relation to the substances in which they inhere a healthy person does not have the same form of health as a healthy apple. Alternatively, we can understand definitional superiority as referring to the concept that a definition is not complete unless it includes a substance referent. And therefore, neither conception applies in all cases. The definition of “3 inches” does not depend on any particular example of threeness or any examples of objects of that length. A length of 3 inches does not vary in any manner according to the substance in which it is found. (Interpretation, *Metaphysics*, VII-IX,P.55.). At this stage, we are encircle on the issue of the status of universals, which is beyond the scope of this work. However, even if we accept Aristotle’s position that universals exist only so long as they are instances in existent substances, it still remains the case that it is possible to define some non-substances without reference to examples of their instants and that such definition is both complete and would not be altered by the inclusion of substance referents.

It is Aristotle’s experimentation which leads him, in my view, to hold that substance is prior in knowledge. If non substances cannot occur, or even be defined, without reference to substance, then clearly we must know the substance in order to understand the property. Moreover, this is simply an inexorable consequence of Aristotle’s experimentation. A platonic idealist would argue that we know the thing by antecedent knowledge of its non-substantial properties. The arguments between experimentation and idealist arch in this respect are beyond the scope of this work. Aristotle justifies the claim for precedence in knowledge by noting. “We think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, what man is or what fire is,
rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is” (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1028b1-3.). However, I think Aristotle’s example here is confusing because he has explained priority of knowledge, not as it applies to substance, but to sort. “Man” and “fire” are not individual substances, but sort. Aristotle’s example, as written, does not provide any justification for substance as prior in knowledge to other categories. It has been argued that Aristotle is, in this argument thinking of substance not as the concrete thing, but the essential nature (Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Determination., p172.). Even if that is the case, it still fails to justify any claim for the preference in knowledge of substance.

Aristotle does not provide any justification for the preference of substance in time, though I think we can conclude a justification from his conception of the relationship between substance and change. A thing’s properties may vary over time, but the substance remains unchanged. Thus, a thing’s substance exists prior in time to the change and after the change. Properties may change, but they cannot change unless substance exists previous to the change. From a certain perspective, we may conceive of substance as existing outside of time. Substance does not change over time, as I have exhibited earlier; under Aristotle substance either is or is not, and even the termination or graduation of substance occurs immediately. It would maybe be a more accurate representation of his position if Aristotle had stated that substance is forerunner to time rather than forerunner in time.

On Conclusion, I can say that Aristotle has created a conception of substance which requires that substance is necessarily antecedent to non-substance. A Principal part of the definition of substance is, in fact, that substance is defined precisely as that which is antecedent to non-substance. We identify a thing via substance and not via other categories; substance is that in which non-substance exists, substance is the universal predicate; substance is that which maintains identity through change. As we have seen, some of the contrast between substance and non-substance are not necessary. For example, unity could have been a property of substance rather than a necessary criterian. This would permit substances which are constitutionally
comprehensive, such as assigning identity to a flock of birds. After all, once Aristotle has structured a definition of substance in the manner in which he has, the principle of substance becomes not so much an argument as a restating of the definition.

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