Aristotle

Protrepticus

or

Exhortation to Philosophy

(citations, fragments, paraphrases, and other evidence)

Edited and translated by
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Aristotle,

*Protrepticus*
Aristotle of Stagira: 387 – 322 BCE.

Protrepticus (Exhortation to Philosophy) was originally published soon after 353 BCE, probably, in response to the Antidosis (353/352 BCE) of Isocrates; a later date of publication for Protrepticus is also possible, but less likely.

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Note to the Reader

What you are holding in your hands between the covers of this booklet is at the same time a very old text and a very new one. Aristotle’s original masterpiece was released in Athens between 2,340 and 2,370 years ago, and it must have played a role in inspiring many thousands of young students to embrace a life of philosophy in the ancient world, before Aristotle’s text succumbed in the general collapse of the affluent and literate civilizations of Greece and Rome. It has been a lost text for at least a millennium.

This draft of the booklet was finalized in January of 2015, incorporating recent developments that build on the last 15 years of research undertaken by D. S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, in Toronto and San Diego and elsewhere. This very recent document is also provisional, because this research project is ongoing and we expect to refine our presentation and add further evidence to our reconstruction of Aristotle’s lost dialogue (see Introduction).

The main readership we have in mind for this reconstruction of Aristotle’s work is undergraduate students at the University of Toronto, the University of California, and elsewhere, who would enjoy and benefit from a lively introduction to philosophy or to Aristotle’s ideas. There are special difficulties in presenting a greatly fragmented text such as this to students, and this booklet presents a new stage of experimentation for us in what we hope is effective layout and accurate presentation of the relevant evidence.

If students or their professors or any other readers wish to send us their queries and doubts and suggestions for improvement, these would be gratefully received by us, at www.protrepticus.info. Instructions for printing this booklet for student and academic use are provided on the back of the cover.

This research was begun in evening seminars that took place in Toronto, and has been discussed in many academic venues in the world. We have discussed these texts with scholarly audiences at Cambridge University (twice), Davis (University of California, Davis), Durham, Edinburgh, Florence (twice), the Jamahiri Thought Academy of Libya (via Skype), New Haven (Yale University), Oxford, Padua, San Diego (University of California, San Diego), South Bend (Notre Dame University), St. Louis (St. Louis University), Toronto (University of Toronto), Venice, and Victoria (British Columbia). We have worked on this text in manuscript libraries in Florence, Munich, Oxford, Paris, Ravenna, Rome, Venice, Vienna, and Zeitz (near Leipzig); and now our research is mostly conducted at our research archive in San Diego. But wherever we have been with this text, and wherever this text has gone to reach you, remember, as Aristotle said, “philosophers require neither tools nor special places for their productive work; rather, wherever in the inhabited world someone sets down his thought, it touches the truth on all sides equally as if it were present there” (p. 24).
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Introduction to Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*

Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* was a dialogue in which at least three characters debated with each other in front of an audience of youngsters about the true nature and value of philosophy. It was inspired in part by earlier works by teachers of philosophy which had the same ‘protreptic’ function, to inform youngsters about the nature and value of philosophy, including lost protreptic works by the Socratic philosophers Antisthenes and Aristippus, as well as the dialogue *Euthydemus* by Plato. Aristotle’s work was quickly recognized as a masterpiece and became one of the most influential works of philosophy in antiquity, inspiring in its turn many important later imitations, both in Greek and in Latin of which the most influential one was probably the lost *Hortensius* of Cicero. In this dialogue, Cicero presented speeches against abstract philosophy for the character ‘Hortensius’, as well as speeches for his own character ‘Cicero’, arguing against ‘Hortensius’ in favour of Academic philosophy, designing his dialogue partly on the basis of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*.

Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* apparently provided the literary model for Cicero’s dialogue, in which the author himself appears as a character who offers the decisive arguments that bring the work to a successful conclusion, accepting some and opposing other arguments presented by other characters. One of these characters was ‘Isocrates’, who stands for Isocrates of Athens, a teacher of what he called ‘philosophy’, but of which he had a more limited conception than did Plato and his student Aristotle. Another character was ‘Heraclides’, who stands for Heraclides of Pontus, a student of Plato and a contemporary member, with Aristotle, of Plato’s Academy. ‘Heraclides’ expressed enthusiasm for Pythagorean philosophy, which Aristotle shared only in part. The third main character is ‘Aristotle’, who articulates the particular views of Aristotle himself, views clearly reflected in his surviving treatises. There may have been a fourth main speaker, as well as minor characters.

Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* is a text with very many gaps, even in this relatively advanced state of reconstruction. We have no sure way of knowing how large these gaps are, or how extensive the work originally was, nor can we be sure what the dialogue did not contain. The beginning is particularly damaged, and we have no evidence of how the work gets going, except that it was addressed to a certain Themison, who apparently enjoyed a good reputation, not only for his wealth. The dialogue may well have been set in a Athenian gymnasium with young men in attendance, as in the related Platonic dialogues *Lysis*, *Euthydemus*, and *Philebus*.

Our conception of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* as a dialogue with contrasting speakers is fully consistent with all the relevant ancient evidence, beginning with its position on the ancient book lists among dialogues of Aristotle. Yet this suggestion is a neglected one in the tormented history of the reconstruction of the work. The most influential attempt was by the Swedish scholar Ingemar Düring in Aristotle’s *Protrepticus: an attempt at reconstruction* (Göteborg, 1961), but he started from the assumption that Aristotle wrote a continuous speech of exhortation, comparable to the protreptic speeches of his rival Isocrates. Starting from this assumption, he felt obliged (and permitted) to rearrange the evidence to that it would fit into what was expected of such a speech.

Düring’s attempted reconstruction was proven to be untenable by our recent study of the evidence preserved in the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus: “Authenticating Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2005), pp. 193-294. In this article, we showed that when Iamblichus cited or paraphrased from the works of Plato and Aristotle, he worked in the natural order, presenting later selections later in his work than selections that had come earlier in Plato’s or Aristotle’s work; he did not scramble or rearrange the order of passages, which scholars are now obliged to preserve, as we demonstrated. When we preserve the order of evidence, we see that there is a clear concluding climax at the end of chapter VIII of the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus (at p. 42 below), which had always been taken to be the end of the work, whereas it now seems clear to us
that it is the end of the concluding speech of one of the characters (‘Heraclides’), not the end of the work, which concludes with a speech of ‘Aristotle’.

Another technical shortcoming in the work of Düring was his not understanding the significance of the textual overlaps between passages in the middle of ch. VI of the *Protrepticus* (*Protr.*) of Iamblichus and passages in the middle of ch. xxvi of the next work by Iamblichus in his Pythagorean sequence, his *De Communi Mathematica Scientia* (*DCMS*). Since *DCMS* xxvi(B) overlaps with *Protr.* VI(B), and since Iamblichus assembled citations and paraphrases in a sequence that mirrors that of the original work, then the material cited in *DCMS* xxvi(A) (the first part of that chapter) must also have been part of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, and must have been located, in that work, prior to the location of the material cited in *Protr.* VI(B). The argument of *DCMS* xxvi(A) (pp. 7-8) is in the voice of ‘Isocrates’, arguing against Aristotle’s conception of philosophy; and since this argument cannot be part of a continuous speech of Aristotle, Düring excluded all of *DCMS* xxvi from the evidence base of the lost text, an incorrect exclusion.

We reached the contrary conclusion, that our knowledge of the citation technique of Iamblichus positively confirms this chapter to be evidence of Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*; this adds *DCMS* xxvi(A) (pp. 9-10) and *DCMS* xxvi(C) (p. 15) to the evidence base. We also accept the attribution to the lost text of Aristotle of *DCMS* xxiii, by Philip Merlan in ‘A new fragment of Aristotle’, in his *From Platonism to Neoplatonism* (The Hague, 1960; 2nd ed.). To accept this inclines us to accept that the intervening chapters have the same source. The two chapters that intervene (xxiv-xxv) were ascribed to Aristotle by Walter Burkert in his study *Lore and Science in ancient Pythagoreanism*, tr. Edwin Minar, Jr. (Harvard, 1972), correctly; but Burkert had surmised that the Aristotle work in question was his *On the Pythagoreans*, whereas we now tend to believe, though with some reservations, that its origin was *Protrepticus*. Further, we scanned backward and forward in the *DCMS*, and established that the whole section from chapters xxii-xxvii contains excerpts cited or paraphrased from our lost text, Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*. The attributions of *DCMS* xxii and xxvii and the tentative attributions of *DCMS* xxiv and xv to the lost work are new attributions on our part.

The combination of two long and overlapping stretches of dependable lambickean citation provides a new basis for a fairly full reconstruction, as if two partial but extended fossil skeletons had been found that overlap at the hip of the animal. The required ordered sequence of fragments, the sequence presented in this reconstruction, is therefore this: *DCMS* xxii (‘Heraclides’), pp. 8-11; *DCMS* xxiii (‘Aristotle’), pp. 12-16; *DCMS* xxvi(A) (‘Isocrates’), pp. 17-19; *DCMS* xxvi(B) overlapping with *Protr.* VI(B) (‘Aristotle’), pp. 20-27; *DCMS* xxvii (‘Aristotle’), pp. 28-32; *Protr.* VII (‘Aristotle’), pp. 33-38; *Protr.* VIII (‘Heraclides’), pp. 39-43; *Protr.* IX (‘Aristotle’), pp. 44-51; *Protr.* X (‘Aristotle’), pp. 52-54; *Protr.* XI (‘Aristotle’), pp. 55-59; *Protr.* XII (‘Aristotle’), p. 60.

We also need to recognize that *Protr.* VI(A) must come before *Protr.* VI(B), though we don’t know how it relates to the rests of the speeches in the sequence, and for this reason it is placed in ‘Peripheral Evidence’, together with *DCMS* xxiv and *DCMS* xxv and certain other items of evidence which should be attributed to the lost dialogue (pp. 62-70), despite being uncertain in this or another respect. For the difference between core evidence and peripheral evidence, see p. 61 below. The evidence base for the lost work is also composed of numerous uncertain or unclear items of evidence, collected on pp. 72-81, and some items that have been attributed incorrectly and should be rejected, are presented on p. 82. A concordance is provided to the superseded editions of Ross (1955) and Düring (1961), on p. 84.
Conventions used in this booklet

Words translated from ancient texts are set in boldface if we believe them to be the very words that were once in Aristotle’s text; when they are normal, not boldface, this means that we do not know exactly which words stood in Aristotle’s text, of which this passage may have been a more or less faithful paraphrase, not a citation. When Iamblichus uses paraphrase instead of citation, this is generally because the underlying text was in the form of a conversational dialogue, and Iamblichus transformed it efficiently and accurately into declarative prose.

References to primary evidence

For each paragraph or similar division of text, a reference is given to the primary evidence; for readers who need to give exact line references to an individual sentence, these may be found by using the paragraph reference together with the internal references which divide sentences from each other (“[5][6]” indicates that the previous sentence ended on line 5, and the next one begins on line 6). References to each block of text are given, to the line numbers of standard Greek editions, as detailed below.

To give a complete and accurate reference to any given sentence in the lost work, the following is exemplary: <Aristotle, Protrepticus>, ap. Iamblichus, DCMS ch. xxvi, 82.27-83.2, which is the proper reference for this sentence: “In addition to these, its use greatly differs from all others: philosophers require neither tools nor special places for their productive work; rather, wherever in the inhabited world someone sets down his thought, it touches the truth on all sides equally as if it were present there.” When it is obvious what the source text under discussion is, suppress author and title of source text; when it is obvious that Iamblichus is the author who provides evidence, suppress author of cover text; when it is obvious that DCMS or Protrepticus is the cover text, suppress title of cover text; in many cases a reference would suffice in its context if it had the form “xxvi, 82.27-83.2”. In our opinion, the chapter divisions of the cover text should never be suppressed, as they are the most convenient mnemonic handle for the larger blocks of speeches.

In cases where we use this text once only, we provide reference there to the current Greek edition of the text on the basis of which we made our translation: Stobaeus (p. 3); Alexander and other authors (pp. 4-5); Ammonius (pp. 76-77); and four papyrus fragments (pp. 6-7, p. 62, p. 63, pp. 72-73). On several occasions we translate evidence from the First Prologue of the Commentary on Euclid I by Proclus: passages in chapter 9 (p. 79 and pp. 28-29), in chapters 11 and 13 (pp. 74-75) and, on one occasion, from Proclus’ Second Prologue, in a passage in chapter 4 (pp. 75-76). For these Proclus passages our text of reference was Proclus, In primum Euclidis Elementorum Librum Commentarii, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig, 1873).

In all other cases, the evidence of which we provide a translation comes from one or other of these two Greek texts of Iamblichus, which provide not only the bulk of the evidence but also its sequence: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ed. H. Pistelli (Leipzig, 1888); Iamblichus, De Communi Mathematica Scientia (DCMS), ed. N. Festa (Leipzig, 1891, rev. U. Klein 1975).

We refer to the page and line numbers of the Iamblichus editions noted above, but we have ourselves collated the primary manuscripts and have consulted copies in our files for confirmations of readings; we are responsible for the readings of the manuscripts that constitute the text. We are also responsible for the choice of conjectural emendations, and in some cases for their proposal. A more explicit presentation of the Greek text, its variants and conjectures, is planned for future publication.
Title of the work:

**Protrepticus**

Προτρεπτικός


Περὶ δικαιοσύνης α’ β’ γ’ δ’

Περὶ ποιητῶν α’ β’ γ’

Περὶ φιλοσοφίας α’ β’ γ’

Περὶ πολιτικοῦ α’ β’

Περὶ ῥητορικῆς ἢ Γρύλου α’


Νηρίνθος α’

Σοφιστῆς α’

Μενέξενος α’

Ἐρωτικός α’

Συμπόσιον α’

Προτρεπτικὸς α’

Περὶ ψυχῆς α’

Περὶ εὐχῆς α’

Περὶ εὐγενείας α’

Περὶ ἡδονῆς α’

17. *Alexander, or About Colonies*, 1.  
Ἀλέξανδρος ἢ ὑπὲρ ἀποίκων α’

Περὶ βασιλείας α’

Περὶ παιδείας α’

Περὶ τάγαθου α’ β’ γ’

**Editorial notes:** The title *Protrepticus* occurs on all three of the surviving ancient lists of Aristotle’s works: the list of titles in Greek by Diogenes Laertius (title #12); the list of titles in Greek appended to the Vita Hesychii (title #14); and the list of titles in Arabic in Ptolemy al-Gharîb (title #1). The title Προτρεπτικὸς α’, meaning “Protrepticus, in one book” is the same on the two Greek lists, although the Arabic list conflates Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* with his *On Philosophy* and erroneously reports the number of books of the latter. In all three lists, the work is placed among the works of Aristotle that are definitely or probably dialogues.

This is the exact title that we should expect, to judge from the direct references to the work “in his *Protrepticus* ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ, in two commentaries by the later ancient scholars Alexander and Olympiodorus (in Top. 149.13 and in Alcib. 144.15; see pp. 4-5). Note also the expressions “in the Protrepticus that he wrote down” ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ ἐπιγεγραμμένῳ (Elias, Prolegomenon 3.18), and “in a composition in his *Protrepticus* ἐν τινὶ Προτρεπτικῷ αὐτοῦ συγγράμματι (David, Prolegomenon 9.2). Again, all cognate titles by other writers from the fourth century or earlier have the same title Προτρεπτικὸς: Antisthenes (DL 6.1, Athenaeus 656f); Aristippus (DL 2.85); Demetrios of Phaleron (DL 5.81); Chamaeleon (Athenaeus 184d); Epicurus (DL 10.28); cf. also [Plato]: Κλειτοφὼν ἢ προτρεπτικὸς (DL 3.60), and see Gigon, pp. 283-4.
Editorial notes: The beginning of the Protrepticus is lost, and we have no evidence of how the work begins, except that it was addressed to a certain Themison, who apparently enjoyed a good reputation, not only for his wealth. The notion that the work was ‘dedicated’ to Themison has been repeatedly stated, but it has also been argued that the practice of ‘dedicating’ works developed only later; however, the evidence makes it clear that the work was addressed to Themison. It does not, however, make clear who this Themison is. There is no other known record of any ‘king of the Cyprians’ called ‘Themison’, and his historical identity remains indistinct, confused, or perhaps fictional. If it weren’t for the claim, possibly a guess, that he came from Cyprus, Themison of Eritrea would be a good candidate as the work’s addressee.

This address was probably in direct speech to the addressee, constituting a kind of “preface”, after which followed the dialogue. This literary structure was described by Cicero in an explanation to his friend Atticus of the literary structure he himself was following in composing his own dialogues: “But you know the form of my dialogues: just as in my work on oratory <sc. De Oratore>, of which you speak so very handsomely, none of those taking part in the discussion could make mention of persons other than those had known or heard, in the same way I have put this discussion on the state <sc. De Re Publica> that I have embarked upon into the mouths of Africanus, Philus, Laelius, and Manilius, with the addition of some young men, Q. Tubero and P. Rutilius, and Laelius’ two sons-in-law, Scaevola and Fannius. So I am thinking of making a suitable occasion to address him in one of the prefaces which I am writing to each book, as Aristotle did in what he calls his ‘exoteric’ pieces (ut Aristoteles in iis quos ἐξωτερικοὺς vocat). I understand that you would favor that” (Att. IV 16.2, tr. Shackleton Bailey).

Stobaeus cites an extract found in an Epitome (done by the otherwise unknown scholar Theodorus) made from works by the Cynic philosopher Teles of Megara (fl. c. 235 BC). In this extract, Teles recounted a story told by Zeno of Citium (c. 334-c. 262 BC), the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy, about Crates of Thebes (c. 365-c. 285 BC), an earlier Cynic philosopher who is said to have offered a characteristically Cynic comment after having read Aristotle’s Protrepticus aloud in a shoemaker’s workshop. He jokes by encouraging a shoemaker to do philosophy since his humble station and relative poverty put him in a freer position to do philosophy than the social position occupied by Themison, burdened by wealth and responsibility. More recent commentators have also wondered why Aristotle should say that Themison “has more good things going for him to help him do philosophy, since, as he has great wealth, he can spend it on these things,” given what is argued elsewhere in the dialogue. The theme of wealth and responsibility resurfaces several times, in speeches by all three of the characters. Early on, ‘Isocrates’ argues that wealth without intelligence is harmful, like a knife for a child or a bad man (P. Oxy. 666). Then, in his attack on theoretical philosophy, Isocrates points out that we are not wealthy by knowing about wealth but by possessing property (DCMS 79.18-24). ‘Aristotle’ in turn argued that philosophers are willing to labor at theoretical science despite receiving no payment (xxvi, 82.17-19). Later ‘Heraclides’ argues that no one would accept having all the property in the world if it meant also being unintelligent (45.18-20).
Zeno said that Crates, while sitting in a shoemaker’s workshop, read the *Protrepticus* of Aristotle, which he wrote to Themison (the king of the Cyprians), saying that no one has more good things going for him to help him do philosophy since, as he has great wealth, he can spend it on these things, and he has a reputation as well. He said that when Crates was reading, the shoemaker was paying attention while stitching, and Crates said, “I think I should write a *Protrepticus* to you, Philiscus, for I know you’ve got more going for you to help you do philosophy than the fellow Aristotle wrote to.”
Several reports by ancient scholars about a remarkable argument in the Protrepticus.

It is possible to dismantle a position by taking all the significations of all of them; for instance, if someone should say that one should not do philosophy, then, since ‘to do philosophy’ means to investigate this very thing, whether one should do philosophy or not (as he <sc. Aristotle> says in the Protrepticus), and it also means to pursue philosophical study, by showing each of these to be appropriate for a human, we will entirely eliminate the proposal.

Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentary on Aristotle’s Topics, on II.3 110a2 (p. 149.9-15, ed. Wallies)

Indeed, as Aristotle says in the Protrepticus he wrote down, in which he exhorts the youth to do philosophy - he says this: if you should do philosophy, you should do philosophy, and if you should not do philosophy, then you should do philosophy. Therefore in every case you should do philosophy. For if philosophy exists, then positively we are obliged to do philosophy, since it truly exists. But if it does not truly exist, even so we are obliged to investigate how it is that philosophy does not truly exist. But by investigating we would be doing philosophy, since to investigate is the cause of philosophy.

Elias, Prolegomena to Philosophy, p. 3, lines 17-23 (ed. Busse)

Editorial notes: The above two reports, by later ancient commentators on Aristotle, indicate that a counter-argument was designed in this dialogue, to oppose a speaker who had been arguing that philosophy was not a worthwhile activity. Since investigating such questions as which activities are worth pursuing is a philosophical activity, the critic of philosophy is revealed to be in a pragmatically self-defeating position when he chooses to engage in philosophy while declaring that it is not worth doing. Of the two witnesses, Alexander is earlier and more likely to be basing his report on his own reading of the lost dialogue. The report of Alexander is repeated verbatim in the Byzantine Suda, at Φ 414 (under the lemma Φιλοσοφεῖν) without mention of the provenance of the information.

Hortensius in Cicero <sc. in Cicero’s dialogue Hortensius>, when disputing against philosophy, was trapped by a brilliant conclusion; when he said that one should not do philosophy, he seemed nevertheless to be doing philosophy, since it is up to philosophers to discuss what should be done, or not done, in life.

Lactantius, Divine Institutes 3.16 (396b??, ed. ??)

Editorial notes: When Cicero wrote his own protreptic dialogue Hortensius, he evidently borrowed this argument from Aristotle’s dialogue, with a very clear statement of the central premise, that “it is up to philosophers to discuss what should be done, or not done, in life.”

For this argument does indeed seem to me to be a good one: if one should do philosophy, then one should do philosophy, for this follows from the thing itself; but likewise even if one should not do philosophy, for one does not condemn something without first knowing about it. So one should do philosophy.

Clement of Alexandria, Miscellanies 6.18 (p. 162.5, ed. Stählin)

Editorial notes: The above report appears to be a less informative version of the argument reported above; it omits the provenance of the idea, and appears to modify the complaint to one of justice (‘one does not condemn something ignorantly’) from one of logic (‘one cannot be consistent when investigating such matters and condemning philosophy’).

And Aristotle said in his Protrepticus that if you should do philosophy, you should do philosophy; but if you should not do philosophy, you should do philosophy; and in every case you should do philosophy.

Olympiodorus, Commentary on Plato’s Alcibiades 119a-120d (p. 144.??, ed. ??)
This form \(<\text{sc. the paraconditional}>\) is also Aristotle’s argument in the \textit{Protrepticus}: whether you should do philosophy or you should not do philosophy, you should do philosophy. And indeed either you should do philosophy or you should not do philosophy; so in every case you should do philosophy.

Anonymous, \textit{On the General Forms of the Syllogism} xi.19-21 (in pp. ix-xii of CIAG 5.6, ed. Wallies)

\textbf{Editorial notes:} The arguments as reported above have a remarkable logical structure. In the above reports, only the structure is reported, not the reason why doing philosophy is inevitable.

The all-encompassing discipline is dialectical logic, and in general it is possible neither to speak nor to listen when this method is removed, for even this, that it is not necessary to pursue dialectic, must be understood through a dialectical undertaking.

Iamblichus, \textit{Letter to Sopater on Dialectic}, cited in Stobaeus, \textit{Anthology} II.2.6 (p. ?? ed. Wachsmuth/Hense)

And some also have this line of inquiry: ‘if demonstration exists, demonstration exists; if demonstration does not exist, demonstration exists; but demonstration either does or does not exist; so demonstration exists.’ … The second conditional is also sound, for from demonstration not existing, the leading premise, it follows that demonstration exists, for the very argument that shows that demonstration does not exist, since it is demonstrative, confirms that demonstration does exist.

Sextus Empiricus, \textit{Against the Logicians} II (Adv. M. VIII), 466-467 (ed. Mutschmann)

\textbf{Editorial notes:} The reports of Iamblichus and Sextus Empiricus appear to attest to a different version of the argument, either a misunderstanding of the original argument reported by our other sources, or else a correct report of a different version of the argument. We believe the latter, that there was another premise that could be used against the speaker in a paraconditional argument: the canons and standards of proof in argument are part of philosophy, and if the opponent were to succeed in his proof he would be succeeding in doing philosophy. This is not the same riposte as to point out that in investigating whether philosophy was worthwhile he was doing philosophy. Since one can investigate with non-demonstrative techniques, the two arguments are not identical.

In a certain composition in his \textit{Protrepticus} in which he exhorts the young men to do philosophy, Aristotle says this: if you should not do philosophy, then you should do philosophy, and if you should do philosophy, then you should do philosophy. So in any case you should do philosophy. For example, if someone says that philosophy does not exist, they have used a demonstration by means of which they refute philosophy. But if they have used a demonstration, then it is clear that they do philosophy. For philosophy is the mother of demonstrations. And if someone says that philosophy does exist, again they do philosophy. For they have used a demonstration, by means of which they demonstrate that philosophy truly exists. So in any case one does philosophy, both the one who refutes philosophy and the one who does not. For each of them has used a demonstration, by means of which the arguments are proven. But if one has used demonstrations, then it is clear that one does philosophy. For philosophy is the mother of demonstrations.

David, \textit{Prolegomena to Philosophy}, p. 9.2-12 (ed. Busse)

\textbf{Editorial notes:} The report of David is a verbose version of the second line of argument, centred on the centrality of demonstrative procedures in philosophy.

\textbf{Superseded editions:} Three of these passages were collected in Fr. 2 in Ross’ edition of \textit{Protrepticus}, of which the main texts are from Alexander and Elias and David, with subsidiary information from the anonymous scholiast, Olympiodorus, and the two witnesses to Cicero’s \textit{Horatius} (Lactantius and Clement). In the later edition by Düring, one sentence from Alexander (149.12-14) is recognized as fragment B6, while other passages are collected as \textit{testimonia} A2-A6: Alexander; anonymous scholiast; Olympiodorus; Elias; David.
Papyrus fragment from a speech by the character 'Isocrates':

... since ... ‘dog in the manger’ ... whenever ... prevent <them> from <both saying> and doing something they decide they need to do. [II.4]

This is why those who observe the unluckiness of these things should avoid them and consider success in life as in fact not consisting in the possession of lots of things as much as in the condition of the soul. [15] For one would not say that a body is also happy by being adorned with splendid clothing, but rather by being healthy and in a good condition, even if none of the things just mentioned is present in it; rather and in the same way, a soul too, if it has been educated, such a soul and such a man must be hailed as being successful, not if he is splendidly furnished with the externals but is himself worth nothing. [39] For nor is a horse, if it has a golden bit and an expensive harness but is itself bad, the sort of horse that we consider to be worth something; but it’s any one that’s in a good condition that we praise instead. [51 | 52] Apart from what’s been said, what happens to those who are worth nothing, when they do happen across wealth and the goods that come by fortune, is that their possessions are worth more than they are, which is the most disgraceful thing of all. [III.5 | 6] For just as anybody who is inferior to his own servants would turn into a laughing-stock, in the same way it turns out that those for whom their possessions are more important than their own nature should be considered pathetic. [III.17 | 18]

And this is truly how it is: for, as the proverb says, ‘satisfaction begets insolence, and ignorance with power beget senselessness,’ since for those whose condition is bad in those respects that concern the soul, neither wealth nor strength nor beauty is anything good; but rather, the more these bad conditions obtain to an excessive degree, the more greatly and the more often those things harm the man who possesses them, if he comes by them without intelligence. [41] For the saying ‘no knife for a child’ means ‘don’t put power into the hands of the bad.’ [46 | 47] But everyone would agree that intelligence comes from learning or from searching, the capacities for which are comprehended within philosophy. [53] Hence surely we have to do philosophy unreservedly, and ...

Reference: P. Oxy. 666; column I lines 51-55 + II.1-57 + III.1-56, ed. F. Vendruscolo, Corpus dei Papyri Filosofici I.1 (Firenze, 1989), 269-279. This papyrus fragment is not the only source; the same passage is also quoted in the Anthology of Stobaeus at III.3.25, where Stobaeus refers to it as coming from ‘Aristotle’. The version in Stobaeus’ Anthology is slightly abridged; the words it conveys begin at line II.4 of the papyrus and end at III.41, with the omission of II.52-III.5.

Superseded editions: This fragment was collected as Fr. 3 (Ross) and as B2-5 in Düring’s edition.
Aristotle, *Protrepticus* (excerpts of speeches)

χιστιον. ἃπαν γὰρ εἴ τις τῶν οἰκετῶν τῶν αὐτοῦ χεῖρων εἶναι, καταγεί λαστος ἢ γένοιτο, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἷς πλείουσας ἀξίαν τὴν κτῆσιν εἶναι | συμβεβήκη τῆς, ὧδε φύσεις ἄθλιοις τοιτοὺς εἶναι | δει νομίζειν. [III.17 | 18]

καὶ τούτο κατ' ἄλληθειν οὕτως [e]xei' τίκτει γάρ, ἃπαν φησίν ἡ παροιμία, κόρος μὲν | ὑβριν, ἀπαιδεύσεια δι' ἕξος σιάς αὐτοῖν. τοῖς | γὰρ διακειθεῖνοις τὰ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν κακῶς | ὡς τε πλούτος οὕτως. ἡμεῖς οὕτε κάλλος | τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν, ἀλλ' ὀσφ' ἀν αὐτὶ τοῖς ἀι | διαθέσεις καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ὑπάρξῃ, τοσσύτως μείζων | καὶ πλείω τὸν κεκτημένον βλάπτουσιν,


II.5 θεωροῦντος DSH&MRJ: θεωρουσαν

**Editorial notes:** Our main source of evidence for this passage is a papyrus from Oxyrhynchus, which is rich with allusions to classic Socratic and Platonic protreptic argumentation. The speaker seems to be ‘Isocrates’, who liberally sprinkles his speech with sayings and slogans to argue that wisdom is worth far more than external goods. He seems to be making allusions or some sort of reference to the text from which a different papyrus, P.Oxy.3699, is a fragment (possibly of Antisthenes’ *Protrepticus*), especially at Fragment D, column I lines 2-14: “reputation, strength, beauty ... are unprofitable to such a person. It’s pretty much just like a knife to a child’ how any of such things turns out for an uneducated human, for where he owns the possessions he has the initial impulse for weak self-control, leading to self-indulgence and even gambling and women and other ... “ For this evidence, see pp. 72-73 below.
Paraphrase and citation from a speech by the character ‘Heraclides’:

But since when Pythagoras took mathematics over from foreigners he added much of his own, one should insert these sorts of starting points too, as well as adding the individuality of his mathematics. [7] He made philosophical observations of many of the truths of mathematics, and adapted them to his own operations, even the ones handed down to him by others; and he made an order to fit onto them that is suitable and conducted investigations into them that are appropriate.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxii, 67.3-11.

uggested by the next main source of evidence is the third book of the Pythagorean sequence written by Iamblichus of Chalcis, in the third part, entitled De Communi Mathematici Scientia. The second part is entitled Protrepticus, and the first is the Vita Pythagorica. Starting at chapter 21, the source for Iamblichus is Aristotle’s Protrepticus; this was always known for chapter 26, and in 1950 Philip Merlan postulated that chapter 23 also derives from Aristotle’s Protrepticus, a postulate that we can now confirm from a study of the entire range of chapters from 21-27.

It would seem that the character ‘Heraclides’ is providing an account of the development of Pythagorean philosophy up from its roots in geometry. ‘Heraclides’ regarded Pythagoras as being the first philosopher and his abstract and formal mode of doing philosophy as being the only correct one; these views about philosophy are dramatically opposed to those of ‘Isocrates’.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Heraclides’:

He fashioned them into a starting point for his instruction, which was capable of guiding his listeners, if any of them by adequate experience could understand the terms adequately. [22] Indeed, in the purity, subtlety, and precision of his demonstrations, surpassing every similar type of theoretical observation of other things, he both employs great clarity and sets out from evident facts; and the most beautiful thing in it is actually what is high-minded and leads to the primary causes, which both fashions its teachings for the sake of practical affairs and also lays hold of things in a pure way, and at times the mathematical theorems are even connected with the theological ones. [68.2] For to this extent they are what someone in the present would propose to be elements, since they are common peculiarities of this sort of science.


Editorial notes: The speech of ‘Heraclides’ continues by describing how Pythagoras incorporated his mathematical investigations (just mentioned) into his instruction and fashioned his teachings both for the sake of practical affairs and laying hold of things “in a pure way”, which seems to prefigure the distinction between instrumental and intrinsic value that occupies much of the subsequent speeches of ‘Isocrates’ and ‘Aristotle’.
Citation from a speech by the character 'Heraclides':

Since the greater part was worked out by these men, and it was preserved unwritten in memories which now no longer remain at all, about which no evidence is easy to find or discover, either from writings or from a hearsay witness, it's necessary to do something of this sort: setting out from small glimmers we should always build such things into a corpus and help make it grow, we should lead these things back to principles which are appropriate and fill in what was left out, and we should conjecture as far as possible their own opinion, what they would say, if it were permitted for one of them to teach us. [16] In fact, even from the consequences of the indisputable teachings transmitted to us, we are able to make appropriate discoveries of the ones that follow. [19] For such habits of investigation will allow us either to hit upon the really mathematical Pythagorean science, or make a very close approximation to it, to the highest degree which is possible. [22] And I believe that the proficiency for this, the proficiency diligently practiced by its own originator, is in agreement with that.


Editorial notes: After a gap, 'Heraclides' comments that although some of the Pythagorean framework is lost to history, it is necessary and possible to reconstruct the missing elements of it by research and intelligent speculation.

Aristotle, the author of these words, fascinatingly describes the process of researching ancient philosophy. This would seem to be the earliest evidence we have of a philosopher reflecting on the necessity of speculative reconstruction of the views of earlier philosophers.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Heraclides’:

And in the soul it contributes to purity of cognition and subtlety in thoughts, as well as to accuracy in its reasoning and contact with their own incorporeal substances, as well as to symmetry and good temper and conversion to reality; and in the human person it provides order in his life, as well as respite from the passions and beauty in character traits, as well as discoveries of the other things that are beneficial to human life. [13] And they turned their hands to philosophy throughout the whole of their domestic life, weaving the profit from it into their actions and their habits of mind, as well as into the construction of their cities and into the management of their private homes, as well as of skilled manufacturing and preparations for war or peace; and generally they applied mathematical science in all departments of life, appropriately in business affairs, beneficially for those who use it, harmoniously in both these ways, and in all other ways proportionately.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxii, 69.6-22.

Editorial notes: After a gap, ‘Heraclides’ reaches the conclusion, which is perhaps also the conclusion to this particular speech of his, that Pythagorean philosophy advances the intellectual and moral virtues of those who take it up, and provides many practical benefits as well.
Paraphrase and citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

If we have gathered any seed or principle of this kind of cognition by which we passed from a previous verbal acceptance of what kind of science it is to precisely observing what sort of thing its nature is, this came to us from no other source than from them <mathematics>. [11] But also the power of the science established it more clearly by its own arguments in the demonstrations about them. [13] Moreover it is the understanding of these things that has corrected us from being led astray when we were persuaded by many of the appearances, clearly establishing the truth about them, whatever it is. [70.16]

But most of all, we participate for the first time in a sight that is both liberated and fitting for philosophers when we are in their community; what is similar in nature to each thing is what belongs to it, and to the man of liberated status the dominant end of the activity in accordance with his proper way of life has its reference to himself and to nothing else external. [21] And this occurs in the sciences previously mentioned, being theoretical, and it occurs in the first sciences, because learning them occurs first in order, in accordance with the time of life, without further need of the kind of induction that naturally arises through a habit formed out of the particulars. [26] And if it is necessary to attribute to this person too the name that is proper to his passion (as with the desires proper to other people, which are named for their fondness for one kind of thing), the ‘philosopher’ seems to have a drive for a certain science that is prized for itself, and not on account of anything else resulting from it. [71.4]

For some of those who wish to advance them would not seem to assign to them the appropriate position, when they assert that we need to create understanding of them because a training in them is useful for other theoretical fields. [819] For those things for the sake of which they encourage us to do this are by their nature less close relatives of the truth, even in the usual speeches spoken about them, nor are they champions in terms of the precision of their demonstrations. [12] And here’s a sufficient indication of this: we see them enduring and being believed continually in the same way by those who take up those fields, but in the other fields we would discover extremely few demonstrations that are at all like that. [71.15]

Now then, mathematical philosophy has helped us, both for many of the necessities for life, and also for those things that are worthwhile in themselves, as soon as we are affluent. [18] For even among the industrial arts, in quite a few cases we would find that mathematics has come to their assistance. [20] And as for natural philosophy, even if some other one were to have a more exalted position, we would see that it makes use of many of the things that we have seen in their own demonstrations, which we have observed by the things that were mentioned.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxiii, 70.7-71.24.
Pythagorean was Euclid and Editorial, see p. 3, is quoted 3, 71.15 "apparently Pythagoras 76 notes: This transformed next indicates paraphrased gi/ne xro&non, philosofi/an, | oi0kei/wj the oi0kei/aij ou)de eu3roimen the oi0kei=on oi0kei=on de, the oi0kei/=on toiau&thj. [71.15] 15 τῶν δὲ παντελῶς ὁμίγας ἀν τινας εὑρόμεν τοιαῦτα.

[71.15][16] πρὸς πολλὰς μὲν οὖν καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἀναγκαίων καὶ τῶν ἐκ περιουσίας ἡδι καὶ καθ’ αὐτὰ τιμίων ἦ | peri tá mabhmatap filosofoia beboihekhen ἡμίν. καὶ ἂς τῶν δημιουρ- γiκών τεχνών οὐκ ὁλίγοις εὑρόμεν | 20 ἀν ἐπικουρίαν ἀπ’ αὐτῶν γεγενημένην καὶ τὴν περὶ | φυσικων filosofoian, καὶ εἰ τὶς ἐτέρα ταὐτὴς ἔχῃ τάξιν | ἐντιμοτέραν, πολλοὺς ἀν χρωμενήν ἰδοιμεν ἐν ταῖς | οἰκείαις ἀποδείξειυν, ὁ δὲ τῶν λεξικήνων λεξικήκαμεν.

Editorial notes: The next fragment of evidence comes from Iamblichus’ De Communi Mathematica Scientia, and it is apparently from the middle of a speech of ‘Aristotle’. In his introductory remarks to this chapter at 70.1-3, Iamblichus picked up a comment that was independently quoted by Proclus in his commentary on Euclid: “Pythagoras transformed the philosophy of mathematics into a scheme of liberal education” (65.16-17, see p. 76 below). This indicates that for his book Iamblichus chose to skip over most of the material that was quoted or paraphrased by Proclus, except to highlight the one comment that most suits his Pythagorean purposes, before citing the material that follows.
But not only because of this kind of assistance should anyone appreciate their power, but rather still more for themselves and because of their own nature. [72.2] For it is agreed that there are certain sciences that are valued for themselves and not only for what results from them; and this is possible either only or especially for sciences that are theoretical, because their end is nothing else than the theory. [6] But we use the same thing to posit one science as being more valuable than another as we use to judge each one to be valuable. [8] And we value one science over another either because of its precision or because what it observes is better and more honorable; of these sciences, everyone would agree with us that precision belongs especially to the sciences that are mathematical, but there are several who assign the aforementioned place of honor to the principles that are first, but they hypothesize that the nature of the principle is proper to numbers and lines and their qualities, because of the simplicity of its substance. [72.16]

Again, the objects that are observed in the sky have the most honorable and most divine place of the things perceptible to us and are naturally cognized by the science of astronomy, which is in fact one of the mathematical sciences; but it would seem to be absurd and entirely unacceptable for those who assert that the philosopher is related to the truth to think it necessary for him to seek some fruit other than from these kinds of observable objects, which share in the highest truth, and for him who is in love with spectacular sights to think it right to acquire such sciences as these for something else, sciences which are about the most common things in nature as well as about the most divine of the things perceptible to us, sciences which, being full of the most numerous as well as the most amazing observations, have a precision not molded from empty arguments, but one of their own, one that is solid and secure from their underlying nature. [73.3] In general, whatever someone would search to require to belong to those of the sciences which are valuable in themselves, we will find that mathematical sciences share in all of them.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxiii, 71.26-73.5.
νότατά τε | τής φύσεως εἰσὶ καὶ τῶν ήμῶν αἰσθητῶν τὰ θειότατα, | πλείστων τε καὶ θαυμαστῶν θεαμάτων οὐσαὶ πλήθους ἀκρίβειαν ὡς πλαστήν ἐκ λόγων κενῶν ἔχουσιν, | ἄλλῳ οἰκεῖον καὶ βεβαιόν ἐκ τῆς υποκειμένης αὐταῖς | φύσεως. ὅλως δὲ ὅσα ζητήσειν ἀν τὰς δεῖν υπάρχειν | ταῖς δὲ αὐτὰς αἱρεταίς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἀπάντων τούτων εὑρήσομεν κοινωνούσας τὰς μαθηματικὰς.

Editorial notes: After a gap, Iamblichus carries on quoting from the speech of ‘Aristotle’, who offers reasons why theoretical sciences have a higher status than other sciences, concluding that “it would seem to be absurd and entirely unacceptable” to maintain the position that ‘Isocrates’ must have been propounding previously. He had apparently viewed these sciences as defective in that they don’t yield results that are applicable in practice, and he returns to this sort of criticism later.
Moreover, by taking the principles of the demonstrations to be cognizable and in themselves trustworthy, in this way they create the syllogisms about them with them, so as to be a paradigm for those who wish to conduct the demonstrations in them in any precise way, which is why it would seem to be fitting for those who think that the profession of doing philosophy is in itself valuable, and that mathematical theory is related to and akin to philosophy. [73.17]

So it is probably for all these reasons that the Pythagoreans honored the effort put into mathematics, and coordinated it with the observation of the cosmos in various ways, for example: by including number in their reasoning from the revolutions and their difference between them, by theorizing what is possible and impossible in the organization of the cosmos from what is mathematically possible and impossible, by conceiving the celestial cycles according to commensurate numbers with a cause, and by determining measures in the sky according to certain mathematical ratios, as well as putting together the natural science which is predictive on the basis of mathematics, and putting the mathematical objects before the other observable objects in the cosmos, as their principles.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxiii, 73.9-74.1.

Editorial notes: After a short gap, Iamblichus carries on quoting from the speech of ‘Aristotle’, who explains how the formal procedure of ‘the Pythagoreans’ is a paradigm of rigorous thinking, and also how they apply their rigorous procedures to the mathematical science of astronomy.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Isocrates’:  

If their end result is useless, the point for which the philosophers say they should be learned, it will necessarily be much more pointless to put effort into them. [8] And on what the end is, there is pretty much agreement among those who have been most precise about it. [10] For some of them say that it is knowledge of what is unjust and just and bad and good, a knowledge similar to geometry and the other sciences of that sort, while others say it is intelligence about nature as well as that sort of truth, the sort of intelligence that those around Anaxagoras and Parmenides proposed. [79.15]

So it should not be overlooked by someone who is going to scrutinize these subjects that everything that is good and beneficial for the life of humans consists in being used and put into action, and not in the mere knowledge. [18] For we are not healthy by being acquainted with what produces health, but rather by applying it to our bodies, nor are we wealthy by knowing about wealth, but by possessing a very substantial amount nor, most important of all, do we live well by knowing certain sorts of beings, but by acting well, for this is truly what it is to be successful. [24] Hence it is appropriate for philosophy as well, if indeed it is beneficial, to be either a practice of good things or else useful for those sorts of practices.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxvi, 79.5-80.1.
Superseded editions: The first portion of DCMS xxvi (79.5-81.4) is a challenge to Academic philosophy in the voice of ‘Isocrates’. This portion was accepted as part of Fr. 5 Ross, but it was rejected (wrongly) by Düring, who recognized only 79.15-80.1 (Düring’s B52) as being derived from the Protrepticus.

εἰ ἀρχεῖον αὐτῶν τὸ | τέλος, δι’ ὑπὲρ αὐτὰ μανθάνειν φασὶ δεῖν οἱ φιλόσοφοι, πολὺ πρό—
tερον ἀνάγκη μᾶταιον εἶναι τὴν περὶ | ταύτα σπουδὴν, περὶ δὲ τὸ τέλους σχέδου ὀμολο—
|γοὺς πάντες οἱ δοκοῦντες περὶ αὕτην μάλιστα ἦκρι 10 ὑποκεῖναι. φασὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν εἶναι τὴν
tῶν ἀδίκων καὶ | δικαίων καὶ κακῶν καὶ ἄγαθων ἑπιστήμην, ὀμοίων | ὀσίαν γεωμετρία καὶ
tαις ἄλλαις ταῖς τοιαύταις, οἱ δὲ | τὴν περὶ φύσεως τε καὶ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀληθείας φρό—
|νσιν, οἷον οἱ τε περὶ Ἀναδηνόφου καὶ Παρμενίδου 15 εἰσηγήσαντο. [79.15]

dεῖ δὲ μὴ λελθῆναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ | τούτων ἐξετάζειν, ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἄγαθα καὶ τὰ
πρὸς | τὸν βίον ὑφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εὖ τῷ χρήσασθαι καὶ | πράττειν ἐστὶν, ἀλλὰ οὐκ εὖ
τῷ γινώσκειν μόνον: | οὔτε γὰρ υγιαινοῦν τῷ γυναικεῖ nation | ποιητικὰ τῆς 20 ὑγιείας, ἀλλὰ
tῶν προσφέρεσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε | πλουτοῦσιν τῷ γιγαντίασιν τοῦ πλούτου, ἀλλὰ τῷ
κεκτῆθαι πολλὴν ὑπαί | οὔτε τῷ πάντων μέγιστον εὑ | ζωέμεν τῷ γιγαντίασιν ἀττα τῶν
ὀντων, ἀλλὰ τῷ πράττειν εὑ | τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ’ ἐστίν, οὕτε 25 προσήκει
καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, εἰπὲ ἑστὶν ὕφελιμον, | ἦτοι πράξειν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ χρήσιμον εἰς
tὰς 80.1 τοιαύτας πράξεις.

Editorial notes: Iamblichus here begins quoting a speech from Aristotle’s Protrepticus in which someone attacks theoretical philosophy. The argument and style of the speech resemble Isocrates’ arguments against Academic philosophy in his Antidosis, Panathenaicus, and Letter to Alexander. The consequentialist assumption stated in the first sentence, that philosophy is valuable only insofar as it is useful is reiterated at 79.16-18 and 81.1-4. Both the starting point and conclusion of the argument represents Isocrates’ view: “I do not consider it proper to apply the term ‘philosophy’ to a training which is no benefit to us in the present either in our speech or in our actions” (Antidosis 266); “those who want to do some good in speeches and actions must eliminate from all their occupations the things that have no bearing on our lives” (269). The description at 79.10-15 of the kinds of science at issue corresponds to items in Isocrates’ attack in Antidosis (e.g., ‘geometry’ 261, and ‘Parmenides’ 268). Proclus paraphrased this passage in his Euclid commentary (25.12-26.9), and also paraphrased more of the response given by ‘Aristotle’, giving witness to different lines of challenge and defense that must have also taken place in the lost dialogue; see below, pp. 69-70.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Isocrates’:

Now then, that it is neither itself a sort of production of things, nor is any other of the sciences previously mentioned, is clear to all; and someone could realize that it is not useful for actions either, from this. [5] **We have the greatest example of this in the sciences that are similar to it and the opinions that underlie them, for we see the geometers being able to do none of those things that they observe by demonstration; and yet to divide an estate, and all the other properties of quantities as well as locations, is something that the land-surveyors can do on the basis of experience, whereas those who know about the mathematical subjects and the arguments about them know how they should act, but are not able to act.** [80.13]

The case is similar with music and the other sciences in which the cognitive aspect is divided off from the empirical. [15] For those who determine the proofs and the arguments about harmony and other things like that are accustomed to enquiring, but take part in none of their practical functions, just like those who do philosophy. [19] In fact, even if they happen to be capable of handling something in them, when they learn the proofs, they automatically do it worse, as if on purpose, whereas those who have no knowledge of the arguments, if they are trained and have correct opinions, are altogether superior for all practical purposes. [23] So too with the subject matter of astronomy such as sun and moon and the other stars; those whose training has been in the causes and the arguments have no knowledge of what is useful for humans, whereas those who have what are called navigational sciences about them are capable of predicting for us storms and winds and many of these events. [81.1] Hence for practical activities sciences like this will be entirely useless, and if among activities they miss out on the correct ones, the love of learning misses out on the greatest of goods.

**Reference:** Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxvi, 80.1-81.4.

**Superseded editions:** The first portion of DCMS xxvi (79.5-81.4) is a challenge to Academic philosophy in the voice of ‘Isocrates’, as we now believe. This passage (80.1-81.4) was accepted as part of Fr. 5 Ross (= Protr. VI, from 37.22), but was rejected by Düring, as not being derived from Aristotle’s Protrepticus.
Editorial notes: Iamblichus here continues quoting from the speech of ‘Isocrates’ attacking theoretical philosophy. It is unclear whether this piece of evidence is perfectly continuous with the previous one. The main reason for doubt is that the first sentence here seems to be a transitional and navigational remark of Iamblichus describing the overall argument of his chapter, not a remark in the voice of ‘Isocrates’; since ‘Isocrates’ has just concluded that philosophy is beneficial and useful (79.24-80.1), it would seem odd for him to say that philosophy in neither productive nor useful in the very next sentence. If, however, this first sentence is indeed a remark of Iamblichus, then an indeterminate amount of argumentation has dropped out. Apparently not much has been skipped over, but there must be enough of a gap for the context to shift so that it is now clear that ‘Isocrates’ is specifically referring to theoretical philosophy and arguing that theoretical mathematics is neither useful nor productive.

The Isocratean voice and lack of the rest of the argument is easy to discern and comes through forcefully. In his attack on Academic philosophy the historical Isocrates had mentioned a preoccupation with geometry and astronomy (Antidosis 261 and Panathenaiicus 26). Here ‘Isocrates’ offers a pairwise comparison of six different arts and sciences: land-reckoning and geometry; musical performance and harmonics; navigational star-reckoning and astronomy. The first of each pair is a practical “empirical” science that everyone agrees produces benefits; the second is the purely theoretical counterpart, which is argued to be useless. ‘Isocrates’ now argues that preoccupation with the theoretical science results in worse outcomes in each case, repeatedly echoing the general complaint of the historical Isocrates: “for those who are older … I assert that these disciplines are no longer suitable. For I observe that some of those who have become so thoroughly versed in these studies as to teach others in them fail to use opportunist the knowledge which they possess, while in other areas they are more unintelligent than their students—I hesitate to say more unintelligent than their servants” (Panathenaiicus 28). The last comment on the part of Isocrates seems to be his later riposte to the ventriloquist treatment that Aristotle had subjected him to in Protrepticus; in this dialogue (at pp. 6-7 above), Aristotle wrote a speech for the character ‘Isocrates’ that included this remark: “just as anybody who is inferior to his own servants would turn into a laughing-stock, in the same way it turns out that those for whom their possessions are more important than their own nature should be considered pathetic” (P.Oxy.666, III.6-17).

In the first chapter of his Metaphysics, Aristotle concedes part of this Isocratean point about “empirical” versus “theoretical” science: “with a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to skill, and we see men of experience succeeding more than those who have theory without experience. The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, skill of universals, and actions and productions are all concerned with the individual; for the physician does not cure a man, except in an incidental way, but Callias or Socrates or some other called by some such individual name, who happens to be a man. If, then, a man has theory without experience, and knows the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he will often fail to cure; for it is the individual who is to be cured” (I.1, 981a12-24, tr. Ross). The medical example in the Metaphysics echoes a formula of ‘Isocrates’: “we are not healthy by being acquainted with what produces health, but rather by applying it to our bodies” (xxvi, 79.19-20, p. 17). The subsequent defense of theoretical philosophy in Metaphysics I.1-2, despite initially acknowledging the advantage of experience over theoretical science in the context of practice, apparently drew heavily from the Protrepticus.

In Posterior Analytics I.13, 78b34-79a16, Aristotle describes the subordinate relationship of “empirical sciences” (“nautical astronomy”, “acoustical harmonics”) to “mathematical sciences” (“mathematical astronomy” and “mathematical harmonics”). He also discusses several empirical sciences in relation to geometry, including optics, meteorology, and even medicine. But he surprisingly does not hesitate to call these subordinate “empirical sciences” sciences, a fact which commentators have considered discordant with his view that only demonstrations of the causes of things (and not mere statements of empirical facts) deserve to be called sciences. But we can now see that the terminology of APo. I.13 is perfectly consistent with what Aristotle had said in the Protrepticus, using a less technical mode of expression that connects well with the conventional way of referring to these sciences on the part of people like Isocrates.
Paraphrase and citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

Since everyone chooses what is possible and what is beneficial, it must be pointed out that both these features belong to doing philosophy, and also that the difficulty of its possession is more than outweighed by the magnitude of its service; for we all work hard at the easier tasks with greater pleasure. [37.26] Now then, that we are capable of acquiring the kinds of knowledge about the just and the advantageous and also the ones about nature and the rest of truth, it is easy to exhibit. [38.3] For prior things are always more familiar than posterior things, and what is better in nature than what is worse, for there is knowledge of what is determinate and organized more than of their opposites, and again of the causes more than of the results. [7] And good things are more determinate and organized than bad things, just as a decent person is, relative to a worthless per-son; for they necessarily have the same mutual difference. [10] And prior things are causes more than posterior things (for if you do away with them, then you do away with the things whose substance is based on them: if numbers then lines, if lines then surfaces, and if surfaces then solids), and letters <are causes more> than what are named ‘syllables’. [38.14] Hence since soul is better than body (being more like a ruler in its nature), and the skills and intelligence concerned with the body are medical science and athletic training (for we posit these to be sciences and say that some people possess them), for the soul too and its virtues clearly there is a certain diligence and skill, and we are capable of acquiring it, if it is the case, as surely it is, that we are also capable of acquiring knowledge of things about which we are more mistaken and which we find more difficult to understand. [38.22]

Similarly for the natural sciences as well, for it is necessary much earlier to be intelligent about the causes and the elements than about the posterior things; for these are not among the highest things, nor do the primary things naturally grow out of them; rather, it is divided and because of the latter that the other things come into being and are evidently constituted. [39.4] For whether it is fire or air or number or any other natures that are causes of and primary to other things, it would be impossible to be mistake about these things and understand any of the other things; for how could anyone either recognize speech and be mistaken about syllables, or be knowledgeable about them without knowing any of their elements?


Superseded editions: This passage was collected as part of Fr. 5 Ross (= Protr. VI, 37.22+) and, in Düring’s edition, B31-36: 37.22-26 (B31), 37.26-38.3 (B32), 38.3-14 (B33), 38.14-22 (B34), 38.22-39.4 (B35), 39.4-8 (B36).
In Aristotle, *Protrepticus* (excerpts of speeches), on the nature of knowledge, Aristotle responds to the contrary that theoretical science is “possible”, and “beneficial”, and “easy”, *protreptic commonsense* prescribed at *Rhetoric* 1.6, 1363a19-24. The first sentence here announces these themes (compare the navigational passages on pp. 22 and 24), each of which is discussed further: “possible” (VI, 38.2-3, 38.20, 39.9-11); “beneficial” (39.12, 37.26); “easy” (xxvi, 82.17-83.2).

Aristotle here argues that we are in fact capable of acquiring the kind of knowledge called into question by Isocrates at *DCMS* xxvi, 79.8-15; the description of the relevant kinds of knowledge here answers directly to that description, and to Aristotle’s own division of propositions at *Topics* 105b20 into ethical, natural, and rational; here we have “knowledge about the just and the advantageous” (i.e. ethics) “about nature” (i.e. physics) and “about the rest of truth” (i.e. logic).

On the point about priority, one should compare Aristotle’s distinction between two ways that things can be prior and more understandable: by nature and to us (*APo.* 71b33-72a5; cf. *Apr.* 68b35-37; *Phys.* 184a16-20; *Metaph.* 1029b12-13; *EN* 1095b2-4). The reference to knowledge of things “more determinate” and “more organized” (38.7-8) invokes two of three species of beauty also mentioned in a defense of mathematics at *Metaphysics* XIII.3, 1078b1, and Proclus, in *Euc.* 1, 19, 26.10-27.16 (see pp. 70-71 below).

On “elimination”, see *Metaphysics* V.1 1019a3-4; this logical device was very likely employed several times in the *Protrepticus*, including probably V.35.14-18 (p. 64 below) and definitely VII.44.11-13 (p. 37). On lines, surfaces, and solids specifically, see *On the Soul* I.2, 404b18-26 and *On Philosophy* fr. 1 (Ross). The expression “what are named syllables” recalls a related and characteristic expression of Aristotle: “what are named elements” (on which see Crowley, *Aristotle’s so-called elements*, *Phronesis* 2008).

On the soul being other than the body because it is “more of a ruler by nature” at 38.15-16, see below at VII, 41.29. This is a point on which the historical Isocrates agreed: “it is acknowledged that our nature is composed out of both the body and the soul, and no one would deny that of these the soul naturally grows to be more leaderly (hégemontikoteran) and is more worth” (Aristotle *Antidosis* 180). The reference to “skill and intelligence concerning the body,” and the specific example of gymnastics, is a further indication that this speech is responding to an interlocutor modeled on the historical Isocrates, who at *Antidosis* 181-183 drew an elaborate parallel between “physical training for the body and philosophy for the soul”. The reference to “knowledge of things of which we are less aware and find more difficult to understand” complicates the application the protreptic commonplace of “easiness” (also mentioned above at 37.22-26, and below at 82.17-22). *In Metaphysics* I.2, Aristotle, discussing “notions we have about the wise man,” asserts that we must suppose that he who can learn things that are difficult and not easy for a man to know is wise, sensation being common to all, and therefore easy and no mark of wisdom” (982a10-14, tr. Ross).

Regarding the natural sciences and knowledge of the elements mentioned in the last paragraph, Isocrates had ridiculed this kind of investigation, referring to “the speculations of the ancient sophists, who maintain, some of them, that the sum of things is made up of infinite elements; Empedocles that it is made up of four ... Ion of not more than three ... Alcmaeon of only two, Parmenides and Melissus of one; and Gorgias of none at all. ... such curiosities of thought are on a par with jugglers’ tricks which ... do not benefit anyone” (Aristotle *Antidosis* 268-269). Aristotle probably responded to this in a focused way in his *Protrepticus*, at P. Vindob. G.26008; see p. 63 below. Aristotle examines each candidate dialectically in *Metaphysics* I (e.g. “fire” 984a7; “air” 984a5; “number” 986a1-2). On not being able to cognize speech without syllables, or syllables without letters or “elements” see *Categories* 14b2 and *Topics* 14b5-19.
Now then, that there is a kind of knowledge of the truth and of the virtue of the soul, and how it is possible for us to acquire them, let this then be our statement about these topics; but that it is the greatest of goods and the most beneficial of all will be clear from what follows. [13] We all agree that the most excellent man should rule, i.e., the most superior by nature, and that the law rules and alone is authoritative; but the law is a kind of intelligence, i.e. a discourse based on intelligence. [16] And again, to us what standard or what guideline of good things is more precise than an intelligent man? [18] For all that this man will choose, if the choice is based on his knowledge, are good things and their contraries are bad. [20] And since everybody chooses most of all what conforms to their own proper conditions (a just man choosing to live justly, a man with bravery to live bravely, similarly a self-controlled man to live with self-control), it is clear that the intelligent man will choose most of all to be intelligent; for this is the function of that capacity. [25] Hence it’s evident that, according to the most authoritative judgment, intelligence is the most superior good thing. [40.1]

So one must not flee from philosophy, since philosophy is, as we think, both a possession and a use of wisdom, and wisdom is among the greatest goods; nor should one sail to the Pillars of Hercules and run frequent risks for the sake of assets, while not working hard or spending any money for the purpose of intelligence. [6] Yet it would surely be servile to cling to living rather than to living well, and to attend to the opinions of many others rather than to find that they have worth in terms of one’s own, and to search to get money but not to engage in any discipline of beautiful things whatsoever.


Superseded editions: This passage was collected as part of Fr. 5 Ross (= Protr. VI, from 37.22) and, in Düring’s edition, B37-40 + B53: 39.9-11 (B37), 39.11-16 (B38), 39.16-20 (B39), 39.20-40.1 (B40), 40.1-11 (B53).

"οτι μεν ουν της αληθειας και της περι ψυχης [10] αρετης εστιν επιστημη και διοτι δυνατοι λαβειν αυτης | εαμεν, ταυτα ημιν ειρησθαι περι αυτων οτι δε μεγιστον εστι των αγαθων και παντων οφειλομενων των άλλων, | εκ των δε δηλου, παντες γαρ ομολογουμεν οτι δει μεν των απουδιαται ορχειν και των την φυσιν κρατιστου, | τον δε νομον ορχοιναι και κυριον εις μονον ουτως | δε φρονησις της και λογου απο φρονισεως εστιν. ετι | δε της ημιν κανων η της υπος ακριβεστερος των αγαθων πλην ο φρονιμος; δασα γαρ αν ουτος έλειτο κατα | την επιστημην αιρουμενος, ταυτε εστιν αγαθον, [15] κακα δε τα εναντια τοιοτας. επει δε παντες αιρουνται μαλλιστα τα κατα τοις οικειας εξεις (το μεν γαρ δικαιος | ζην ο δικαιος, το δε κατα την ανδρειαν ο την ανδρειαν | έξων, ο δε σωφρων το σωφρονειν ομοιως), δηλον οτι | και το φρονειν ο φρονιμος αιρεται παντων μαλλιστα: [20] τουτο γαρ έργον ταυτης της δυναμεως. ωστε φανερον οτι κατα την κυριωτατην κρισιν κρατιστου εστι των [40.1] αγαθων | η φρονησις. [40.11]

Editorial notes: After skipping over a stretch of text in Aristotle’s dialogue, Iamblichus continues to paraphrase and cite from the speech of ‘Aristotle’, who has finished defending the feasibility of theoretical philosophy and is now arguing against Isocrates that theoretical philosophy is in fact highly beneficial, filling out the program announced at VI, 37.22-26 (p. 20 above).

One might ask who exactly the “we” is in the statement “we all agree” at 39.3 (compare the first-person usage in the next piece of evidence on p. 24), since both points seem controversial: that “the most excellent man should rule, i.e. the supreme by nature” and that “the law rules and alone is authoritative” with the law being understood not as an individual ruler but as “a kind of intelligence” (39.16) might not fit well with an Isocratean conception of law according to which authority is constituted by obedience to actual living rulers, whether kings or the majority (in a democracy): “Obey the laws established under the kings as well, yet consider the strongest law to be their behavior, for just as in a democracy a politician must serve the majority so too it makes sense for someone who has settled in a monarchy to revere the king” (To Demonicus 36). Isocrates asserts the same thing more prosaically at Antidosis 36.

Both of these points are, however, perfectly consistent with an Aristotelian perspective. That the “most excellent” and “strongest by nature” should rule is supported by an argument that Aristotle utilizes in his defense of “slavery by nature” in Politics I.6: “in some sense virtue, when furnished with means, has actually the greatest power of exercising force: and a superior power is only found where there is superior virtue of some kind, power seems to imply virtue” (1255a13-16). The context of slavery is directly relevant to the argument of the Protrepticus, as the condition of being “slave-like” is mentioned just below at 40.6-7. And that the law is a “kind of intelligence” is directly asserted at Nicomachean Ethics X.9, also in an anti-Isocratean context: “the law has compulsive power, while it is at the same time a discourse from a kind of intelligence and intellect” (1180a21-22).

Aristotle employs the concept of a “standard” or “criterion” elsewhere in the Protrepticus (kanon: Protr. X, 54.25 (p. 52 below), and horos: DCMS xlvii 85.9, p. 28 below), and in his ethics and philosophy of science (kanòn: EN III.4, 1113a29-33 and X.5, 1176a17-18; horos: PA 1.1, 639a13-14 and EE VIII.3, 1249a21-b3).

On having a “precise” account, see also below at xxvi, 82.21 (next page). The intellectual virtue of precision or accuracy is repeatedly mentioned in the Protrepticus. In DCMS xxiii, the issue of the precision of demonstrations is introduced (71.2). In DCMS xxvi the issue of the precision of opinion is raised (79.10), followed by the introduction of the idea of “precision in accounting about the truth” (83.7). Later the “beauty and precision” in mathematics (83.24-25) is mentioned. Following this, in DCMS xxvii the degree of precision (86.8) to be expected in mathematical demonstrations (and criticisms) is compared with the lesser degree to be expected in rhetorical arguments.

The expression “a possession and use of wisdom” at 40.2-3 relates to the distinction between possession and use at VI, 37.7-8 (below, p. 65) and in Protr. XII, 59.26-60.1 (below, p. 60).

The image of sailing to the ends of the world at 40.4-5 is returned to at Protr. X, 57.27 (p. 53 below), and was a common motif in protreptic discourses, compare the proverb of Isocrates: “Do not hesitate to travel a long way to those who proclaim to teach something useful, for it would be a shame when merchants traverse such vast seas for the sake of increasing the substantial fortune they have, but the young did not endure travel for the improvement of their own intelligence” (To Demonicus 19). Aristotle mentions the “Pillars of Hercules” in a geographical context at Meteorology II.1, 354a12 and 362b21-28.

Aristotle discusses the condition of being slave-like (andraptôdes) at 40.6-7, and uses the same term in the context of the “three ways of life” argument (Eudemian Ethics 1215b34-1216a1 and Nicomachean Ethics 1095b19-20), in the analysis of temperance and incontinence (NE 1118a25, b21 and 1145b24) and in the analysis of the vices in relation to good temper (EE 1231b10, b20, and b26; and NE 1126a8).

The distinction between mere living and living well, a distinction frequently invoked by Aristotle, is also invoked at VIII, 46.22-47.4 (p. 41 below). The theme is further developed in XI, 56.15-57.6 and 57.23-58.3 (pp. 55 and 56, below). This distinction seems to have been something of a protreptic commonplace; see the Greek Anthology 10.43.
And as to the service and the greatness of the thing, I consider this to have been adequately demonstrated; but as to the reason why it is much easier to possess it than other goods, I am convinced by the following. [17] The fact that the philosophers, despite running a short time, have passed the other skills in their precision, with their having bestowed much of it on them and with their having got no payment from the people with which they might have worked this intensely hard, seems to me a sign of the easiness there is in philosophy. [22] And again, the fact that everybody is fond of it and wishes to spend their leisure on it, letting everything else go, is no small evidence that the close attention occurs together with pleasure; for no one is willing to work hard for a long time. [82.26] In addition to these, its use is very differs from that of all other skills: philosophers require neither tools nor special places for their productive work; similarly, wherever in the inhabited world someone sets down his thought, it touches the truth on all sides equally as if it were present there. [83.2] But these considerations perhaps being out of place, they should be mentioned on another occasion, for it has been demonstrated that intelligence is possible, and why it is the greatest of goods, and easy to possess. [83.516]

Now admittedly minute precision about the truth is the most recent of the occupations. [7] For their first necessity, after the destruction and the inundation, was to think about their food and staying alive; but when they became more prosperous they worked out the skills that are for pleasure, such as music and so on, and it was when they had more than the necessities that they undertook to do philosophy. [12] And the progress that has now been made from small impulses in a short time by those whose research is about geometry and arguments and the other educational subjects is so great that no other race has made such progress in any of the skills. [16] And yet, whereas everyone helps to urge the other skills onward by publicly honoring them and giving payment to those who have them, those whose business is with these things not only get no exhortation from us, but often actually get prevented by us; [20] still, nevertheless, they have advanced the most, because in their nature they have seniority, for what is later in coming to be takes the lead in substance and in perfection. [22] And so the knowledge of mathematics is far superior to all these other kinds of knowledge, having an advantage over all the occupations in beauty and precision. [83.25] But this is true according to the following argument as well: [84.1] the things with which humans share affinity by birth are the first ones that are much sought after, so as to possess them as far as they can, but those that are released from our bodily nature are much more honorable than the first ones. [5] For the necessities are presupposed, but what is valuable for itself and serious is what is worthy of dignities and honor.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS xxvi 82.14-84.7, overlapping (at 82.14-83.5) with Protrepticus VI, 40.12-41.5.
Superseded editions: The first half of this passage (up to xxvi, 83.5) was collected in Fr. 5 Ross (= Protr. VI, from VI, 37.22) and, in Düring’s edition, as B54-57: 40.12-15 (B54 = xxvi 82.14-17), 40.15-20 (B55 = xxvi, 82.17-22), 40.20-41.2 (B56 = xxvi, 82.22-83.2), 41.2-5 (B57 = xxvi, 83.2-5). The second half of this passage (from xxvi, 83.6) was collected as Fr. 8 Ross, but not collected in Düring’s edition.

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On the idea of the rapid progress of philosophy “in a short time,” the speaker ‘Aristotle’ expresses some views about human prehistory and cultural development also touched upon in the Corpus. Aristotle holds that the skills and sciences, like everything else in the terrestrial zone, are subject to cycles of birth, development, maturation, and death, due to periodic meteorological catastrophes (see Meteor. I.3, 339b27; Metaph. I.2, 982b11-28 and XII.8, 1074b10; Politics VII.10, 1329b25). The “destructions and cataclysms” mentioned at

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83.7-8 are also discussed in: Physics 222a23; Cael. 270b19; Meteor. 352a33; Metaph. 1074b10; and Politics 1264a3 and 1329b25. Evidence corroborating the Protrepticus version as cited by Iamblichus is derived from Proclus.

Corroborating evidence: Proclus gives witness to this passage as well, in an instructive passage from the First Prologue of his Euclid commentary.

The intrinsic value for those who take part in it would be clarified also by what Aristotle somewhere says, that despite there being no payment offered to those researchers, they nevertheless in a short time have made such progress in mathematical theory, and moreover that everybody feels at home with it and wishes to spend their leisure on it, neglecting other matters, even those who attain little of the benefit that comes from it. [20] Hence those who are disposed to despise cognition of mathematical objects do not actually have any taste for the pleasures in them. [28.22.123]

Now then, mathematical science is not to be dishonored for this reason, that it makes no contribution to our human needs, for the ultimate echoes of it do aim at this kind of utility, especially those that are active together with matter; rather, on the contrary, one should admire its immateriality and its having the good in itself alone. [29.1] Indeed, it is generally when they stopped being concerned about the necessities that humans turned towards research into mathematics. [3] And this is likely: for the things that help nourish and are of the same nature in coming to be are the first ones to be taken seriously by humans, and the second ones are those that release the soul from generation and give it reminders of reality. [7] So, in the same way, we also have a share in the necessities before the things that are valuable for themselves, and in those that are of the same breed as perception before the ones that are recognized in accordance with intellect. [9.10] Indeed, the whole of generation and the life of the soul that turns around in it naturally advances from the imperfect to the perfect. [12] Let these things too be said against those who dishonor mathematical science.


Further editorial Notes: In his Commentary on Euclid, Proclus twice relates this speculative prehistory, attributing the ideas to Aristotle, as in his further discussion of prehistory in his Second Prologue, ch. 4 (64.7-65.7: see below at pp. 75-76). The account of the development of arts in three stages according to three different kinds of goods (goods necessary for life, goods for leisure and pleasure, and goods for contemplation and philosophy) follows the account at Metaphysics I.2: “at first he who invented any art whatever that went beyond the common perceptions of man was naturally admired by men, not only because there was something useful in the inventions, but because he was thought wise and superior to the rest. But as more arts were invented, and some were directed to the necessities of life, others to recreation, the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former, because their branches of knowledge did not aim at utility. Hence when all such inventions were already established, the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered, and first in the places where men first began to have leisure. This is why the mathematical arts were
founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure’ (981b, tr. Ross). “Leisure” is mentioned in this piece of evidence (pp. 24-25) of the *Protrepticus* at xxvi, 82.23.

Ammonius also recounts a story about the progress of human skills and wisdom after destruction and cataclysm, in a passage in which he references Aristotle of Messene, who may have used the *Protrepticus* as a source (in Philoponus, *Commentary on the Introduction to Arithmetic* I.1.5-49, see below, pp. 76-77). There is also an account of the development of the arts and wisdom along the same lines at *Epinomis* 974d8-976c7, written by an Academic philosopher, perhaps Philip of Opus.

“Precision” is referred to not only here at xxvi, 83.7 and 83.24-25, but also in the previous evidence (VI, 39.17) as well as earlier in xxvi, at 79.10 (p. 17). At 82.21 we have a reference to “precise skills” (in plural), which can be compared to the following plural usages. *Meteorology* II.5: “if one reckons up these voyages and journeys, so far as they are capable of yielding any precise things, the distance from the Pillars of Hercules to India exceeds that from Aethiopia to Lake Maeotis and the farthest parts of Scythia by a ratio greater than that of 5 to 3” (362b21-25, tr. Lee, adapted). See also *Republic* VI, part of an exhortation to philosophy in which Socrates complains that “it’s ridiculous, isn’t it, to make every effort to attain the most precise things about other things of little value, and not to consider the important things worthy of precise things” (504d8-e3). A similar protractive expression is found in *Philebus*, where Socrates tells Protarchus that what he was seeking was not “what skill or which science excels all others in grandeur and beauty, and is of most use to us, but rather to find out which one could oversee what is clear and precise and as true as possible, even if its profit is vanishingly small” (58c). The reference to “minute precision about the truth” (xxvi, 83.7) is also used at *Metaph.* II.3: “the minute precision of mathematics is not to be demanded in all cases” (995a15), raising an issue that was also raised in the *Protrepticus* (at DCMS xxvii, 86.8, p. 30). The reference to “advantage … in beauty and in precision” (83.24-25) makes it clear that Aristotle has beauty in mind when he mentioned “knowledge of what is determinate and organized” above (VI, 38.7-8; see also the reference to the “beautiful and good” at IX, 53.1, p. 50 below). Aristotle also uses the expression “latches onto the truth” (83.1-2) at EE II.10, 1227a1-2 (cf. Plato, *Timaeus* 90c1-2).

As he argues at 83.12-22, Aristotle viewed the gaining of precision in a short time a mark of the progress of theoretical science, and apparently considered the science of his day to be very developed and advanced. Cicero cited Aristotle from an unknown work as holding that “since great progress has been made in a short time, philosophy will in a short time be brought to completion” (*Tusculan Disputations* III.28.69; on this passage, see below, p. 78). Even if that is going farther than Aristotle himself claims in the acroamatic works, it is clear that he did think that the thought of his own age was a late stage of maturation. Consider what he writes in *Politics* II.5 about the advanced state of political science: “we must not fail to keep in mind the length of time and multitude of years in which these things, if they had been good, would certainly not remain unknown; for almost everything has been found out, though in some cases what is known has not been systematized, and in other cases men do not make use of the knowledge which they have” (1264a1-5; cf. 1268b36-1269a8).

The teleological principle that “what is later in coming to be takes the lead in substance and perfection” (83.21-22) is also stated below in a teleological argument at IX.51, 16-23 (p. 48); in that passage, Aristotle is referring to the natural development of an organism, and this principle is often invoked in that context by Aristotle in the Corpus (e.g. *PA* I.1 640a19-26, 641b23-642a1, II.1 646a25-27; *GA* II.1, 734a16-32 and II.6 passim; see also Johnson, *Teleology*, 165-171). It is striking to see the same biological principle applied here to cultural history.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

But since it is the function of the educated man to be able to judge to a good approximation what is right or not right in the contributions of the speaker, and we believe the generally educated man is someone like that, then being educated is also being able to do the aforementioned. [25] So this is clear, that the correctly educated man must, in the case of mathematics too, demand from the mathematician correctness and his proper function, whether he rightly or wrongly creates his theory about them. [85.3] For just as we consider the universally educated man is able to judge about everything, so to speak, despite being one in number, similarly too about some delimited science there would be someone else who has the same disposition as the one mentioned, about a portion. [85.7]

Hence it is clear that there must be certain such criteria in the study of mathematics too, with reference to which the educated man will accept the manner of the proofs, independently of how the truth is, whether thus or otherwise. [11] I mean, for example, whether those who grasp each individual theorem of the mathematicians should make determinations about it in accordance with itself, for example about these here triangles, or whether those who hypothesize the common theorems must also investigate the attributes of everything according to something common. [16] For many of the same things come about in many kinds that are different from each other, for example if someone were to make the demonstration insofar as it is a triangle or insofar as it is a rectilinear figure in common. [19] For if in a way the same things belong to things that differ in form, the demonstrations of them are not at all obliged to be any different. [21] But perhaps the ones in which the predicate happens to be the same are different by differing in form; for example, similarity in triangles is one thing, but in numbers is something else, and one must make particular demonstrations according to each one. [25] Thus one should investigate when to study what is in common according to a kind, and when to study individual particulars, for to determine these matters contributes a great portion to mathematical education.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxvii, 84.21-86.2.
Regarding every theory and investigation, the more humble and more valuable alike, there appear to be two manners of having, which one may properly be called knowledge of the subject-matter, the other like a certain educatedness. For it is in accordance with the manner of an educated man to be able to judge to a good approximation what is right or wrong in the contributions of the speaker, and since we believe the generally educated man is someone like that, being educated is also being able to do the aforementioned. Only we consider the one man to be able to judge about everything, so to speak, though being one in number, the other about some nature that is delimited; for there would be someone else who has same disposition about a portion as the one mentioned. So it is also clear for the inquiry into nature, there should be certain standards, such that by referring to them one can appraise the manner of its proofs, apart from the question of what the truth is, whether thus or otherwise. I mean, for example, should one grasp each substantial being singly and make determinations about this in accordance with itself, e.g. taking up one by one the nature of a human, lion, ox, or any other animal as well; or by establishing the accidents common to all according to something common? For many of the same things come about in many kinds that are different from each other, for example sleep, respiration, growth, deterioration, death, and in addition any remaining affections and dispositions such as these. I say all this because at the moment it is permissible to speak unclearly and indefinitely about these things. It is apparent that, especially when speaking one by one, we shall repeatedly say the same things about many kinds; for instance, each of the attributes just mentioned belong to horses, dogs, and humans. So if one speaks of their accidents one by one it will be necessary to speak re-peatedly about the same things—whenever, that is, the same things are present in different forms of animal, yet themselves have no difference. But perhaps the ones in which the predicate happens to be the same are different by differing in form; for example the locomotion of animals; it is apparent that locomotion is not one in form, because flying, swimming, walking, and crawling differ. Accordingly, one should not overlook whether one should investigate things in common according to kind first, and then later their distinctive characteristics, or whether one should study them one by one straight away. (PA I.1, 639a1-b6)

Each of the changes appear to be in the direction of adapting the earlier work (i.e. the Protrepticus, the source of DCMS xxvii) for the purposes of the later work, the introduction and exhortation to the theoretical sciences of life. Reasoning in the other direction, it does not make as much sense to adapt arguments about animals to the more precise science of geometry, and it does not seem likely that Iamblichus will have thought that it did. Now Proclus in his Euclid commentary attributes the exact arguments made here about geometry to Aristotle (32.21-33.20, in some cases giving verbatim quotations; see p. 74 below), as well as the rest of the argument from this chapter, in sequence (33.21-35.6, see p. 74 below). Thus Proclus establishes Aristotle’s authorship, and since Proclus cannot be adapting what he says from On the Parts of Animals (since his second, third, and fourth points do not parallel that work but do parallel what we find in Iamblichus), it follows that Proclus is adapting the source text itself. Thus the passage must be attributed to Aristotle’s Protrepticus, and it is clear that the speech was in the voice of ‘Aristotle’ himself. It is also highly significant that Aristotle has included in On the Parts of Animals I.5 an “exhortation to the life sciences” which is known to differ stylistically from the rest of the book but shows many parallels and connections with Aristotle’s Protrepticus (e.g. DCMS xxiii, p. 14 above). He evidently kept adapting Protrepticus material throughout the writing of the first book of his Parts of Animals.
Again, one must demand that the mathematician make his accounts in accordance with the underlying substance, and to make the manner of his demonstrations affiliated with that. [4] Thus, just as we are contented with plausible reasoning from an orator, so one must demand from the mathematician demonstrations that are necessary. [6] And one must not seek the same necessity everywhere nor, similarly, the same precision in everything, but just as we divide the technical fields by their underlying materials, not seeking precision similarly in gold and tin and bronze, nor in cork and box and lotus, in the same way this is so in the observational sciences. [12] For the underlying things will make an immediate difference when some are simpler and others more of a composite, or some are generally immovable and others movable, for example the things in numbers and in harmony, or those in geometry and astronomy; and the starting point of some of these is the intellect and of others it is thought, but of some other things there are also certain small impulses coming from the sense, just as from the celestial bodies. [19] For it is not possible to bring to bear the same or similar causes about such things; rather, to the degree that the starting points differ, to that degree as well the demonstrations differ, for in each of them the manner is cognate.

Reference: lamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxvii, 86.2-22.

EDITORIAL NOTES: The first sentence could be a transitional remark of lamblichus, but it is clear that the same speech continues to be excerpted. Proclus writes that Aristotle warns not “to demand proofs of an orator, or to accept persuasive arguments from a mathema-tician” (in Euc. I.11, 33.24; see below p. 74). But the same thought will be immediately recognized as Aristotle’s from NE I.3, where he opens a discussion of the degree of precision appropriate to ethics by noting “what is said would be sufficient if it were to provide clarification according to the underlying material” (1094b11-12) and then pointing out that good things such as wealth, virtue, and fine and fair conduct all admit of much difference and fluctuation (b15-16). So we should “appreciate” it if those who speak about and reason from such matters indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and reach conclusions that are like that, true only for the most part (b19-22). In what follows it seems that he is adapting (by memory or with consultation) a passage from this earlier published work of his: “So in the same way we should accept what is said, for it is the mark of an educated man to search for precision to the degree that applies to each type of thing, to the degree that the nature of the subject admits, for it seems pretty much the same <mistake> to accept from a mathematician plausible reasoning and to demand from an orator demonstrations. And each man judges well what he is cognizant of, and is a good judge of them; and while the educated man in each field is a good judge of that, the man who has a universal education is a good judge of everything” (1094b22-1095a2; cf. xxvii, 85.3-7, p. 30).
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

And there is still a greater difference than those, in that those who are doing research either have or do not have first principles; hence in this case one should not demonstrate either the causes or the arguments to be similar. [26] And in these respects one must recognize what is the same and different, and what is the same by analogy, and which sciences are in greater need and in which the perplexities are greater, for it is pretty much in these ways and in ways like these that there are variations in the demonstrations and arguments in each case. [87.5] This kind of observation could contribute not only to the judging but also to how research must be done, for by having a determination of the causes of each thing, you will create the proper arguments, which is not easy to do without being used to it. [9] For nature itself is able by itself to guide us to the starting points, but is not self-sufficient at judging each thing without taking hold of a different understanding. [11] Again, we should ascertain whether the causes about which the mathematician must speak are numerous, and what kind of them is naturally first and second. [14] For the mathematically educated man is able both to scrutinize the causes that have been supplied and to observe their order.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxvii, 86.23-87.16.

Editorial notes: Proclus paraphrases this argument in sequence with others attributed to Aristotle in the two preceding pieces of evidence (in Euc. I, Prologue 1.11, 34.20-24). The speaker ‘Aristotle’ continues his speech on the value of theoretical and specifically mathematical philosophy. The focus shifts from a comparison between mathematical and rhetorical kinds of demonstrations and now focuses on the details of mathematical research and demonstrations. The educated person determines whether those researching a mathematical problem are working from first principles and causes, also discussed at xxiii, 79.10 (p. 17) and VI, 38.22-39.8 (pp. 20-21). In the event that they do not yet have first principles but are searching, Aristotle asserts that “nature itself is able to guide us to the starting points of research” (87.9), thus connecting this passage with the classic passages in Metaphysics I.1 and Post. An. II.19, where Aristotle suggests that the natural faculty of perception and experience enable us to apprehend the principles of scientific demonstration. The use here in the Protrepticus of the expression “guide us” also connects this passage to the methodological preamble of Politics I.1-2, which refers to “the method that has guided us.” “In the other cases we have to analyze a composite into its irreducible elements, the smallest parts of the whole. So let us in the same way examine the component parts of the state also, and we shall see better both how these too differ from each other and whether we can acquire some skilled understanding of each of the roles mentioned. Now in this as in other cases one would get the best view of things if one were to look at their natural growth from principles” (1252a17-27).
But this too should not be overlooked: many of the more recent Pythagoreans assumed that the things that are the same and in the same way are the subject matter solely of mathematics, and hypothesized only these principles; so they demarcate the sciences as well as the demonstrations about such things in the same way. [22] But since both in the speeches preceding this point and in the later remarks we will demonstrate that there are many and different substances that are unchangeable and exist in the same state, not only the ones in mathematics, and that those are more senior and more honorable than these, and we will also demonstrate that these mathematical principles are not the only ones, but there are also others, and these in fact are more senior and more powerful than those, and that these are not the principles of all the things that exist but only of some; so it is for these reasons that the mathematical demonstration now demands a determination of which of the qualities that remain the same and in the same way it can demonstrate, and from what kinds of principles it reasons, and about what kinds of problems it produces the demonstrations.


Editorial notes: After a gap, Iamblichus reports the conclusion of this phase of argument: along with Plato and other Academics such as ‘Heracleides’, ‘Aristotle’ appeals to the Pythagorean tradition to argue against Isocrates’ attack on theoretical philosophy. Note the reference at 87.23-24 to ‘previous speeches’ and ‘later remarks’. The reference “the more recent Pythagoreans” must be Aristotle’s, not Iamblichus; compare “the Pythagoreans” (xxiii 73.18-19, p. 16; xxvii 78.8, p. 68) and “those who are called Pythagoreans” (xxiv 75.5, pp. 65-66). The “principles more senior and more powerful than mathematical principles” (xxvii, 87.26-29) should be understood in connection with DCMS xxiii, where Aristotle remarks that “the objects that are observed in the sky have the most honorable and most divine rank of the things perceptible to us and are naturally cognized by the science of astronomy, which is one of the mathematical sciences” (72.16-20, p. 14). The principles under consideration must be more senior and honorable than those of astronomy; Aristotle seems to make allusion to Republic VI 509b9-10, where Plato claims that the good is “more senior and powerful” than being itself. In DCMS xxvi Aristotle claims that philosophy, despite having contributed to the other skills and not getting the honors awarded to practical skills, nevertheless has advanced more: “in their nature they have seniority, for what is later in coming to be takes the lead in substance and in perfection” (83.20-22, p. 24).
Paraphrase from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

To be intelligent and to understand is in itself valuable for humans, for it is not possible to live as a human without these; and it also provides something useful in our way of life, for nothing good happens to us unless it is perfected by having been worked out in reasoning and is in accordance with intelligence. [11] Moreover, whether living successfully consists in enjoyment, or in having virtue, or in intelligence, in accordance with all these we should do philosophy, for these things happen to us most of all, and in a pure way, through doing philosophy. [15] Furthermore, part of us is soul, part body; and the former rules, the latter is ruled; the former uses the latter, which supports the former as a tool. [18] Further, it is always with reference to the ruler and the user that the need for what is ruled, i.e. the tool, is arranged. [20] And of the soul one part is reason, which by nature rules and judges our affairs, and the other part is a follower and is naturally ruled. [22] And everything is well disposed when it is in accordance with its own proper virtue, for to have obtained this is good.


Superseded editions: This passage was collected in Fr. 6 Ross (= ch. VII, up to 43.25) and, in Düring, as B41 + B59-60: 41.6-15 (B41), 41.15-20 (B59), 41.20-24 (B60).

Editorial notes: At the end of DCMS xxvii, Iamblichus stops using Aristotle’s Protrepticus as a source. When, in chapter VII of his previously written volume Protrepticus, Iamblichus resumes his citations from Aristotle’s dialogue, the speaker is still (or is again) ‘Aristotle’. After a gap of unknown length in the dialogue, he elaborates a new phase of his argument, that being intelligent observers is the most valuable thing for humans, being the function of their highest virtue.
Moreover, it's when a thing’s most authoritative and most estimable parts have their virtue that it is well disposed; therefore the natural virtue of that which is better is naturally better. [27] And that which is by nature more of a ruler and more commanding is better, as a human is than the other animals; thus soul is better than body (for it is more of a ruler), as is the part of the soul which has reason and thought, for this kind of thing is what prescribes and proscribes and says how we ought or ought not to act. [42.1] Whatever, then, is the virtue of this part is necessarily the virtue most valuable of all as such, both for everything in general and for us; in fact, I think one might actually set it down that we are this portion, either alone or especially. [42.4 15]

Furthermore, when the natural function of each thing is brought to perfection and is said to be most beautiful not by coincidence but in itself, that is when one should say that it is good, and the most authoritative virtue should be reckoned the one by which each thing naturally fashions this very thing. [9] So something that is composite and partitioned has many other activities, but something that is by nature simple and whose substance is not relative to anything else necessarily has a single virtue in itself in the strict sense. [13] So if a human is a simple animal whose substance is ordered according to reason and intellect, there is no other function for him than only the most precise truth, i.e. to tell the truth about existing things; but if several capacities are ingrown in him, it is clear that, of the several things he can naturally bring to perfection, the best of them is always a function, e.g. of a doctor health, and of the navigator safety. [20] And we can name no function of thought or of the contemplating part of our soul that is better than truth. [22] Truth therefore is the most authoritative function of this portion of the soul. [42.23] And it performs this with knowledge as such, and it performs this more with more knowledge; and the most authoritative end for this is observation. [25] For when of two things one is valuable because of the other, the one on account of which the other is valuable is better and more valuable; for example, pleasure is better than pleasant things, and health than things conducive to health, for the latter are said to be able to create the former.

[42.29 43.1] Thus nothing is more valuable than intelligence, which we say is a capacity of the most authoritative thing in us, to judge one condition in comparison with another, for the cognitive part, both separately and in combination, is better than all the rest of the soul, and knowledge is its virtue.

Reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. VII, 41.24-43.5.

Superseded editions: This passage was collected in Fr. 6 Ross (= ch. VII, up to 43.25) and, in Düring, B61-67: 41.24-42.1 (B61), 42.1-4 (B62), 42.5-9 (B63), 42.9-13 (B64), 42.13-23 (B65), 42.23-29 (B66), 43.1-5 (B67).

καὶ ἠμὴ ὅταν γε ἔχῃ τὰ μάλιστα καὶ κυρίωτάτα | 25 καὶ τιμιώτατα τὴν ἀρετήν, τότε εὖ διακείσαι τοῦ | βελτίωνος ὧρα φύσει βελτίων ἐστιν ἢ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ ἀρετή. βέλτιον δὲ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἀρχικότερον καὶ | μᾶλλον ἤγερανικον, ὡς ἀνθρώπος πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῶα | οὐκοῦν ψυχὴ μὲν σώματος βέλτιον (ἀρχικότερον γὰρ) | ἢ ἀρχικότερον γὰρ (ἀρχικότερον γὰρ). | ὑπερήφανος δὲ τὸ λόγον ἔχου καὶ διάνοιαν ἢ ἐστὶ γὰρ τοιούτου δὲ κελέως καὶ καλέως, καὶ δεῖν ἀν θείη φησι | 32.1 πραττεῖν, ἔτις ποτὲ οὐν ἐστιν ἀρητὴ τούτου τού | καὶ τούτῳ μὲν ἀρετὴ ἄμεσα τοῦτος, ἀναγκαίων εἰσὶ πάντων ἀριστερότατην ἀπλῶς | τοῦ πάσης καὶ ἢμημέν καὶ γὰρ ἄν τούτῳ, οἴμαι, θείη τίς, | ἢ ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἡ μάλιστα ἢμεῖς ἐσμεν τὸ μόριον τοῦτο. [42.45]
ἔτι τοίνυν ὅταν ὁ πέφυκεν ἔργον ἐκάστου μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὐτὸ λεγόμενον κάλλιστα ἀποτελῆ, τότε καὶ τούτῳ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι λεκτέον, ταύτην τε ἀρετὴν ἑτέσιον κυριωτάτην, καθ’ ἑν ἐκάστου αὐτὸ | τοῦτο πέφυκεν ἀπεργάζεσθαι. τοῦ μὲν οὖν συνθέτου καὶ μεριστοῦ πλείους καὶ διάφοροι ἔσιν ἐνέργειαι, | τοῦ δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἀπλοῦ καὶ μὴ πρὸς τί τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχοντος μιαν ἀναγκαίον εἶναι τὴν καθ’ αὐτὸ κυρίως ἀρετήν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀπλοῦν τι ζῴον ἐστιν ὁ ἀνθρώπος | καὶ κατὰ λόγον καὶ νόημα τέτακται αὐτῷ ἡ οὐσία, οὐκ ἀλλὰ ἐστιν ἀυτοῦ ἔργον ἡ μόνη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἀλήθεια καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἀληθευέων εἰ δ’ ἐστιν | ἐκ πλειόνων δυνάμεων συμπεφυκός, δηλοῦν ἐστιν ὡς ἀφ’ οὗ πλείω πέφυκεν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ἀεὶ τούτων τοῦ βέλτιστον ἔργου ἐστίν, οἷον ἰατρικοῦ ύγεία καὶ κυβερνήτου σωτηρία. βέλτιον δὲ οὐδὲν ἔχομεν λέγειν ἔργου | τῆς διανοίας ἡ τοῦ δια-νοουμένου τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν | ἀλήθειας. ἀλήθεια ἁρὰ τὸ κυριωτάτου ἔργου ἐστὶ τοῦ | μορίου τούτου τῆς ψυχῆς. τοῦτο δὲ δρᾶ κατ’ ἐπιστήμην ἀπλῶς, μᾶλλον δὲ κατὰ τὴν μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην, | ταύτη δ’ ἐστι θεωρία τὸ κυριωτάτον τέλος. ὅταν γὰρ | δυοῖν ὄντων βάτερον διὰ βάτερον αἰρετὸν ἦ, βέλτιον | ἐστι τούτῳ καὶ μᾶλλον αἰρετὸν δι’ ὑπὲρ αἰρετὸν ἐστι | καὶ βάτερον, οἷον ἡδονή μὲν τῶν ἥδεων, ύγεία δὲ | τῶν ύγειεσμῶν. ταύτα γὰρ ποιητικά λέγεται τούτων. | οὐκοῦν τῆς φρονήσεως, ἢν φανεν δύναμιν εἶναι τοῦ | κυριωτάτου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, οὐκ ἐστιν αἰρετῶτερον οὐδὲν, | ὡς ἔξειν πρὸς ἔξειν κρίνεσθαι: τὸ γὰρ γνωστικὸν μέρος | καὶ χαρὶς καὶ συγκείμενον βέλτιον ἐστὶν πάσης τῆς | ψυχῆς, τούτου δὲ ἐπιστήμη ἀρετῆ.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

Therefore its function is none of what are are said to be parts of virtue, for it is better than all of them and the final creation is always superior to the knowledge that creates it. [8] *Nor is every virtue of the soul a function in that way, nor is it success; for if it is to be a skill that can create, other ones will create other things, as the building skill (which is not a portion of any building) creates buildings; however, intelligence is a part of virtue and of success, for we say that success either comes from it or is it.* [14] Thus according to this argument too, it is impossible for this to be a knowledge that can create, for the end must be better than its coming to be, and nothing is better than intelligence, unless it is one of the things that have been mentioned; and none of those is a function other than it. [18] Therefore one should say that this kind of knowledge is an observational one, since it is surely impossible for a creation to be its end. [20] Hence being intelligent and observant is a function of the virtue, and this of all things is the most valuable for humans, comparable, I think, to seeing for the eyes, which one would choose to have even if there wasn’t any other thing that was going to come into being through it beyond the sight itself.


**Superseded editions:** This passage was collected in Fr. 6 Ross (= ch. VII, up to 43.25) and, in Düring B68-70: 43.5-14 (B68), 43.14-20 (B69), 44.20-25 (B70).

- οὐκ ἂρα ἐστὶν ἔργον αὐτῆς οὐδεμία τῶν κατὰ μέρος λεγομένων ἁρετῶν πασῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ βελτίων, τὸ δὲ ποιούμενον τέλος ἀεὶ κρείττον ἐστὶ τῆς ποιούσης ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲ μὴν ἄπασα τῆς ψυχῆς ἁρετῆς οὕτως ἐργον οὔδ᾽ ἢ εὕδαι μονία. εἰ γὰρ ἐσται ποιητική, ἑτέρα ἐτέρων ἐσται, ὅσπερ οἰκοδομική οἰκίας, ἡ τίς οὐκ ἐστι μέρος τῆς οἰκίας, ἢ μέντοι φρονήσις μόριον τῆς ἁρετῆς ἐστι καὶ τῆς εὐθυμονίας ἢ γὰρ ἐκ ταύτης ἢ ταύτην φαινέν ἐγείρει τὴν εὐθυμονίαν. οὐκ οὖν καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀδύνατον εἶναι τὴν ἐπιστήμην ποιητικῆν βέλτιων γὰρ δεὶ τὸ τέλος εἶναι τοῦ γιγνομένου, οὐδὲν δὲ βέλτιον εἶναι φρονήσισιν, πλὴν εἰ τὶ τῶν εἰρήμενων, τοὺτον δὲ οὐδὲν ἔτερον αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἔργον.

θεωρητικὴν τινα ἂρα φατέου εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἐπεὶ ἀδύνατον ποίησιν εἶναι τὸ τέλος. τὸ φρονεῖν ἂρα καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἔργον τῆς ἁρετῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο | πάντων ἐστὶν ἀρετεύωτα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὡσπορ | οἴμαι καὶ τὸ τός ὁμοιαῖς ὅραν, ὁ καὶ ἐλοιτὸ τῆς ἄν | ἐχεῖν, ἐκαὶ μί οἱ τελείοι γίγνεσθαι δι᾽ αὐτὸ παρ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ὅμιν ἔτερον.

**Editorial notes:** This passage is continuous with the previous paragraphs and probably continuous with the next paragraphs (opposite).
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

Again, if someone appreciates a particular thing because some other thing occurs with it, it is clear that he will wish more for that which provides more of it: for example, if someone happens to choose to stroll around because it’s healthy, and it happens that sprinting is more conducive to health and is possible for him, then he will choose this even more, as soon as he understands it. [44.4] Further, if holding opinions truly is similar to intelligence, given that having true opinions is valuable in that and insofar as it is similar to intelligence on account of its truth, if true opinion exists more in being intelligent, then being intelligent will be more valuable than holding opinions truly. [9] And yet living is distinguished from not living by sensing, and living is determined by its presence and power, and if this is taken away life is not worth living, as if when you do away with sensation you do away with life itself. [13] But among the senses the capacity of sight is distinguished by being the most distinct, and for this reason as well we value it most; but every sensation is a capacity for understanding through a body, just as hearing senses the sound through the ears. [17] Thus, if living is valuable because of sensation, and sensation is a kind of cognition, and we choose it because the soul is capable of recognizing by means of it; but long ago we said that the more valuable of two things is always the one that provides more of the same thing, and of the senses sight is of necessity the most valuable and honorable, and intelligence is more valuable than it and all the others, and more valuable than living, intelligence is more authoritative than truth; hence the main pursuit of all humans is to be intelligent.


Superseded editions: This passage was collected as Fr. 7 Ross (= ch. VII, from 43.25) and, in Düring, B71 + B74-77: 43.27-44.9 (B71), 44.9-13 (B74), 44.13-17 (B75), 44.17-20 (B76), 44.20-26 (B74-77).
Editorial notes: This piece of evidence is continuous or nearly continuous with the previous. Iamblichus interrupts his citation, apparently briefly; when he resumes citing Aristotle’s text, the speaker is still ‘Aristotle’, who focuses his comments on the comparative value of sight, perception, opinion, and knowledge.
Paraphrase and citation from a speech by the character ‘Heraclides’:

So then this, at least, is very clear to everyone, that nobody would choose to live having the greatest property and power over people if, however, they ceased to be intelligent and were insane, not even if they were going to live enjoying the most wanton pleasures, in the way that some people carry on who are out of their right minds. [11] Thus everybody, as it seems, avoids being stupid most of all. [12] Now intelligence is the opposite of being stupid, and of these opposites the one is to be avoided, the other is valuable. [13] [14] So, just as being sick is to be avoided, so is being healthy valuable for us. [45.6-15]

... Even if someone had everything, but has some disease ruining his intelligence, that way of life would not be valuable, for none of his other goods would be beneficial. [20] Hence everybody, insofar as they have some sense of being intelligent and are capable of having a taste of this thing, think other things to be nothing; and this is the reason why not a single one of us would bear to be either drunk or juvenile up to the end of his lifetime. [45.18-25]


Superseded editions: This passage was collected in Fr. 9 Ross (= ch. VIII, up to 47.4) and, in Düring’s edition, B97-100: 45.4-6 (B97), 45.6-13 (B98), 45.14-20 (B99), 45.21-25 (B100).

... παντὶ δὲ ὦν τοῦτό γε πρόθελον, ὡς ὦν δὲ ἔλειον ζῆν ἔχων τὴν μεγίστην ἐπ’, ἀνθρώπων ὦν οὐσίαν καὶ δύναμιν, ἐξεστικος μέντοι τὸν φρονεῖν καὶ μιανομένος, ὡς ἐί μέλλοι τὰς νεανικότατας ἴδουνς | ἵ ζωέν χείρων, ὦσπερ ἐνοικατούρνων διήγουσιν. ὦκουν άφροσύνη, ὡς ἠτικ, μάλιστα πάντες | φεύγουσιν. ἐναντίον δὲ φρόνησις άφροσύνη, τῶν δὲ ἐναντίον ἐκάτερον τὸ μὲν φευκτόν ἔστι τὸ δ’ αἰρετόν. | ὥσπερ ὦν σιό τὸ κάμειν φευκτόν, ὄγδις αἰρέτου ἠμῖν τὸ | ἵ διοικείντοι. [45.6-15]

... εἰ γὰρ καὶ πάντα τις ἔχοι, διεφθαρμένος δὲ εἰ καὶ γοσσός τῷ φρονεῖν, ὧχος αἰρέτος ὡς ἄριστος | ὦδὴν γὰρ ὄφελος ὦδε τῶν ἄλλων ἁγαθῶν. | ὥστε πάντως καθόδεν αἰσθάνονται τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ | γέωσθαι δύνανται τοῦτο τοῦ πράγματος, ὄδεν | οἴονται τἀλλα εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τάς την αἰτίαν ὑπ’ | ἀν ἐνθαῦσιν ὄ,”πει παιδίνον οὐδ’ ἄν ἐνη ἔμ generates ὑπομείνειν | εἶναι διὰ τέλους τοῦ βίου. [14.18-25]

Editorial notes: At this point, after the end of ch. VII, we notice a change of speaker. Iamblichus has apparently designed the eighth chapter of his *Protrepticus* to contain paraphrases and citations from a speech of ‘Heraclides’, and this substantial speech divides the argument offered by ‘Aristotle’ (above, pp. 20-38) from the later arguments of Aristotle (below, pp. 44-61), the ones that seem to conclude the work. In this speech, ‘Heraclides’ gives a Pythagorean-tradition response to the challenge of ‘Isocrates’ (above, pp. 17-19), one that supplements the very substantial responses on the part of ‘Aristotle’. We do not know how the speech of ‘Aristotle’ ended or how the next speech began.

At the point of the dialogue paraphrased in 45.6-11, ‘Heraclides’ was saying that property, power over others, and pleasure, which are otherwise good things, would not be worth having if one had lost one’s intelligence and was raving mad. Next, at 45.11-16, ‘Heraclides’ evidently deployed an argument from opposites, a dialectical tactic typical of Plato and the Academy; and Aristotle attests to the importance of ‘tables of opposites’ in Pythagorean thought (*Metaphysics* I.5, 986ab).

The second, rather more vivid, paragraph is a citation from the same speech of ‘Heraclides’. It seems to be the text of which Iamblichus has already given a paraphrase above, at 45.6-11; however, the details in the two versions differ to some extent, and it is more likely that the two passages exploited by Iamblichus reflect two different passages in the source text. Apparently the paraphrase is a version of a dialectical discussion (modified into monologue prose by Iamblichus), which was then followed by a citation from a speech of ‘Heraclides’ that states a new version of the conclusions that were reached in the discussion.
Citation from a speech by the character 'Heraclides':

So on account of this, too, **though sleeping is extremely pleasant, it is not valuable, even if we were to hypothesize that all the pleasures were present to the sleeper, because the apparitions during sleep are falsehoods, while those of the waking are true.** [46.4] For sleep and waking are no different from each other except that the soul of the person who is awake often tells the truth, but when sleeping is always misled, for the phantom in dream visions is actually a complete falsehood. [46.7]

And the fact that most people avoid death also displays the soul’s love of learning; for it avoids what it does not recognize, what is dark and not clear, and by nature it pursues what is evident and cognizable. [11] This is why we say we should ho-nour exceedingly those who are most of all causes of our seeing the sun and the light, and revere our fathers and mothers as causes of the greatest goods; and causes they are, as it seems, of our having any intelligence and seeing anything. [15] It is for the same reason that we also enjoy what we are accustomed to, both things and people, and call ‘friends’ those with whom we are familiar.

Reference: lamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. VIII, 45.25-46.18.

Superseded editions: This passage was collected in Fr. 9 Ross (= ch. VIII, up to 47.4) and, in Düring’s edition, B101-102: 45.25-46.7 (B101), 46.8-21 (B102).

**Editorial notes:** This passage continues the argument from the previous paragraph, progressing through madness, dreaming, and now death, to the inductive conclusion, reached through the logic of opposites, that one should pursue intelligence. Both of the arguments about sleep (that it is not valuable, and that it harbors the false) are paralleled in the Corpus, but this Protrepticus formulation is nowhere else found. See below XI, 57.2-4 (p. 55), where Aristotle connects being awake with perception and life and enjoyment. For the argument that a human could not be happy in eternal sleep see NE I.13 (1102b5-11), X.8 (1178b18), and EE I.5 (1216a2-10). The images that appear to us in sleep are instanced in the definition and discussion of falsity in Metaphysics VII.29: “among the things that are false some are always so others sometimes so. For there are things that are not the same as the things that exist, although they are things that exist, but their nature is to appear either not to be what they are or to be what they are not, for example the optical illusions (skiaographia) and the things in dreams. For these are something, just not that which they are made to appear to be” (1024b20-24; on skiaographia see VIII, 47.8, p. 42). But Aristotle is not as definite in the opening of his investigation of prophetic dreams in On Dreams 1: “As to the divination that takes place in sleep, and is said to be based on dreams, we cannot lightly dismiss it with contempt or give it confidence.”

In the second paragraph, the speaker exhibits the semantic range of the Greek word philos, employing it in the compound word “love of learning” (philomathia) and “friends” (philoi); this may have been part of an effort to define “philosophy”, so the passage should thus be closely compared with Philothesis in Nic. Arith. Intr. 1 1.9-14 (below, p. 75), where an analysis of the semantic range of sophia is given. On philomathia, as used sarcastically by Isocrates, see xxvi, 81.4 (p. 18).
Citation from a speech by the character 'Heraclides':

Just as with property, where it is not the same possession that is for the sake of living and of living successfully in humans, so too with intelligence: we do not, I think, require the same intelligence for merely living and for living well. [26] Now then, much allowance is made for the many who do this (they pray to be successful, but appreciate it if they can just stay alive), but anyone who thinks he is not required to bear to live in every way already thinks it’s ridiculous not to bear every labor and exert every effort so as to possess this intelligence that will have a cognition of the truth.

Reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. VIII, 46.22-47.4. 
Superseded editions: This passage was collected in Fr. 9 Ross (= ch. VIII, up to 47.4) and, in Düring, as B103.

Editorial notes: The passage is a continuation of the argument in the two previous sections in favor of intelligence. The first-person reference at 46.25 (see also below at 47.20, same phrase, also in the voice of Heraclides) would thus seem to be a reference to ‘Heraclides’.

Here, instead of an argument from opposites, we are offered here an extension of the argument about the value of intelligence for life. It was argued at 46.8-10 that the avoidance of death proves that people have a “love of learning” and thus of some kind of intelligence. But now we are told that there is another kind of intelligence that is valuable not for the sake of mere living, but for “living successfully” or “living beautifully”. It would be a shame to only pursue intelligence insofar as it allows one to survive, and pay no attention to how it can provide a successful or good life.

The passage is remarkably dense and touches on two of the central themes of the Protrepticus: first, the value of wealth, property, and possessions; second, degrees of vitality (i.e. mere living vs. living well). As for the theme of wealth and property, this is raised already in the Address, where Aristotle mentions Themison’s wealth as a possible advantage for philosophy. See the editorial notes there for cross-references to main discussions of wealth, property, and possession.

Regarding the theme of degrees of vitality, it has already been argued that “it would be slave-like to strive to live rather than to live well” (VI, 40.7, p. 22). Aristotle also argued in VIII that to be intelligent and to understand is in itself valuable for human beings and “it is not possible to live as a human without these” (41.7-8, p. 33), and went on to distinguish several degrees of living even a human life (44.9-26, p. 37). This is the background against which Heraclides’ dark and pessimistic speech makes for such a stark contrast. In the next section, where ‘Heraclides’ calls into question whether living is worth it, and suggests that the answer is yes only to the extent that we cultivate the god-like part in us, the intellect, instead of the human part (48.9-21). Against this, Aristotle will offer several lines of response, all of them relatively life-affirming. The first is an argument that we can answer the question of why human life comes into existence by looking to natural teleology: human beings, like all animals, are born “by nature and according to nature” for the sake of something good (IX, 50.12-51.6, pp. 46-47). That thing turns out to be intelligence and wisdom, which come to be after the body and other aspects of the soul have matured, toward the end of life (IX, 51.16-52.8, pp. 48-49). Eventually the conclusion is reached that philosophers are “more alive” and “live most”, on the basis of an analysis of the semantic range of the term “living” (XI, 56.15-58.10, pp. 55, 56-57). This enormous network of interconnected arguments about living, living well, and living to the highest degree, delivered in the voice of ‘Aristotle’ himself, stands out more clearly in contrast to the gloomy pessimism and misanthropy that is characteristic of the speech of ‘Heraclides’.
Citation from a speech by the character 'Heraclides':

One will discover that all the things that seem great to people are an optical illusion. [8] From this too, it is right to say that the human creature is nothing and that nothing is stable in human affairs. [10] For force, size, and beauty are risible and worth nothing, and beauty seems to be like that because nothing is seen with precision. [12] For if someone were able to look as keenly as they say Lynceus did, who saw through walls and trees, how could such a sight seem bearable to him, seeing what bad things he is composed of? [15|16] And honors and reputations, objects of morestriving than the rest, are laden with indescribable nonsense; for to those who behold anything eternal it is silly to take those things seriously. [18] What is long-lasting in human affairs, what is of long standing? [19] It is actually owing to our weakness, I think, and the shortness of our lifetime, that these appear to be much of anything. [47.21]

So who could think himself successful and happy, looking at these things for which we have been composed right from the beginning by nature, as if for punishment - all of us - as they say the mysteries tell us? [24] For the more ancient rites tell us this in a divine way by saying that the soul gives a retribution and we live for the atonement of certain great failings. [48.2] For the conjunction of the soul with the body very much resembles a thing of this sort; for as they say the Tyrrhenians often torment their captives by chaining corpses right up against their living bodies, face to face, fastening each to a each part, similarly the soul seems to be stretched out and stuck onto all the sensitive members of the body. [48.9]

So nothing divine or happy belongs to humans apart from just that one thing worth taking seriously, as much insight and intelligence as is in us for, of what’s ours, this alone seems to be immortal, and this alone divine. [13] And by being able to share in such a capacity, our way of life, although by nature unfortunate and difficult, is yet so gracefully managed that, in comparison with the other animals, a human seems to be a god. [16] For ‘intellect is the god in us’ – whether it was Hermotimus or Anaxagoras who said so – and ‘the mortal phase has a part of some god.’ [18] So one must either do philosophy or say goodbye to living and go away from here, since everything else at least seems in a way to be lots of trash and nonsense.


Superseded editions: This passage was collected as Fr. 10 Ross (= ch. VIII, from 47.4) divided into 3 paragraphs 10a, 10b, and 10c. In Düring’s edition the passage is B104-110: 47.5-12 (B104), 47.12-21 (B105), 47.21-48.2 (B106), 48.2-9 (B107), 48.9-48.13 (B108), 48.13-48.1 (B109), 48.16-21 (B110).

εὐρήσει | γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι μεγάλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντα | ὅταν σκιαγραφίαν. ὅθεν καὶ λέγεται καλῶς τὸ μηδὲν | εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπον καὶ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι βέβαιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἵστατο ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος | γέλως ἐστὶ καὶ οὕδεσ τὰ ἄλλα καὶ τὸ παρά τὸ μηδὲν | ἐρατίστοις δικαίως εἶναι τὸ ᾿Οὐκότουν. εἰ γὰρ της ἐδύνατο | βλέπειν ὅξι καθάπερ τὸν Λυγκέα φασίν, ὅς διὰ τῶν | τοῖχων ἔσωρα καὶ τῶν δένδρων, πότε | ἀν ἄν δεσδια εἴη | τηλεό τὴν ὄψιν ἀνεκτὸν, ὅραντι ἑοίῳ συνεπτέτειν κακῶν; | τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ δοξῆς τὰ ἰχθύσωμεν μᾶλλον τῶν | λοιπῶν | ἀδιπετήτου γεμίσαι φλογαρίας | τῷ γὰρ καθόρωντι τῶν | ἁγίων τι ἤλθεν τοῖς αὐτών τοιαύτα | σπουδάζειν. τῷ δ’ ἐστὶ | μακρὸν ἢ τι πολύχρωμον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων; ἀλλὰ διὰ | τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν, ὁμίλως, καὶ βίου βραχύτητα καὶ | τούτο φανείται πολύ τι. [47.21]

τὸς ἄν οὖν εἶς ταῦτα βλέπων | οἴοιο εὐδαιμονείς εἶναι καὶ μακάριος, ὃς πρῶτον ἐθύσε | φύσει συνεστάμεν, καθάπερ φασίν οἱ τῶς τελετάς | λέγοντες, ὥσπερ ἄν ἐπὶ τιμωρία πάντες;
Aristotle, *Protrepticus* (excerpts of speeches)

... the sentiment “our way of life ... by nature miserable and difficult” is discussed in the *Eudemian Ethics* I.5 where the question “what would satisfy our desire to live?” is raised, and it is acknowledged that “there are many consequences of life that make men run away from life, such as disease, excessive pain, and storms, so that it is clear that from these starting points it would have been desirable were one given the power to choose not to be born at all” (1215b18-22). In the ps.-Platonic *Axiochus*, Socrates offers a selection of quotations from poets expressing similar sentiments (367d-368a). That this miserable condition is to be escaped by identifying with the godlike part in us, the intellect, and thus “becoming like god” surfaces in Plato (e.g., *Tim*. 90bc; *Theaet*. 176ab; *Phdr*. 253a, 500d, 613ab) and in Aristotle (e.g., *Metaphysics* I.2, 982b28f.; *NE* X.8, 1177b26f.). The remark “intellect is the god in us” appeared in the lost *Cresphontes* of Euripides (fr. 1018 Nauck). Aristotle attributes it to “Hermotimus or Anaxagoras”; both men were from Clazomenae, and Aristotle again mentions Hermotimus in connection with Anaxagoras at *Metaphysics* I.3, 984b15-20. Anaxagoras, whom Aristotle credits with the discovery of intellect at 984b15-20, is also mentioned again in the *Protrepticus* (IX, 51.11, p. 48 below). The conclusion “one ought either to do philosophy or say goodbye to living” is the most dramatic formulation of the often repeated overall thesis of the book. See also: *P.Oxy*. 666, III.55-56 (pp. 6-7); VI, 37.9 and 19 (p. 65); VII, 41.14 (p. 33); and XII, 60.8 (p. 60).
Some of the things that come to be come to be from a certain kind of thought and skill, e.g. a building or a ship (for a certain skill and thought is a cause of both of these), while others come to be not by means of any skill but through nature; for nature is the cause of animals and plants, and all such things come to be by nature. [8] But then some other things come to be by luck as well; we say, at least of those things that come to be neither through skill nor through nature nor by necessity, that most of them come into being through luck. [49.11]

Now then, of the things that come to be from luck, none comes to be for the sake of anything, nor do they have any end; but the things that come into being by skill have present in them both the end and what they are for the sake of (for the man who has the skill will always assign for you a reason on account of which he wrote, i.e. for the sake of what), and this is something better than what comes to be on account of it. [16|17] (I mean all such things as skill is naturally a cause of, in virtue of itself and not by coincidence, for strictly speaking we should assume medicine to be the cause of health more than of disease, and building skill to be the cause of buildings, not of their demolition.) [20] Therefore everything done in accordance with skill comes to be for the sake of something, and this end result is its best one, whereas what is lucky does not come about for the sake of anything; for something good might occur by luck as well, but of course it is not good by being in accordance with luck and to the degree that it is lucky, and what comes to be in accordance with luck is always indeterminate.

Reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. IX, 49.3-25.
Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 11 Ross (= ch. IX, up to 52.16) and, in Düring’s edition, B10-12: 49.1-3 (B10), 49.3-11 (B11), 49.11-25 (B12).
Editorial notes: After the rhetorical climax at the end of Protrepticus VIII, Iamblichus stops citing Aristotle’s text; when he resumes in chapter IX, the speaker is no longer ‘Heraclides’ but ‘Aristotle’. In this phase of his argument, ‘Aristotle’ elaborates two ideas that are extremely prominent in his surviving works: skill and nature. The conclusion is that nature has skillfully designed humans to be intelligent.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

But yet what is in accordance with nature does come to be for the sake of something, and it is always constituted for the sake of something better than what comes to be through skill; for nature does not imitate the skill, but it imitates nature, and it exists to help by filling in even what nature has omitted. [50.2] For some things nature itself seems capable of achieving by itself without actually requiring any help, but it hardly completes others or is absolutely unable. [5] For example, to begin with, even with reproduction, some seeds presumably generate unguarded, whatever kind of earth they fall down into, but others also have need of the skill of farming; and, in a roughly the same way, some animals also attain their full nature by themselves, but humans require many skills for their security, both at first in respect of their birth, and again later, in respect of their nurturing. [50.12]

Further, if skill imitates nature, a consequence from this for the skills as well is that everything that comes to be comes to be for the sake of something. [14] For we should posit that everything that comes into being correctly comes into being for the sake of something. [15] And surely if well, then correctly; and everything that comes to be (or has come to be) in accordance with nature at any rate comes to be (or has come to be) well, since what is unnatural is worthless, and a natural coming into being comes to be for the sake of something. [50.19]

And someone could see this also from each of our parts; for example, if you were to inspect the eyelid, you would see that it has come to be not in vain but in order to be of help to the eyes, so as to provide them with rest and prevent things from falling on them in front of their vision. [23] [24] Thus it is the same thing, both that for the sake of which something has come to be and that for the sake of which it was required to come to be; for example, if a ship was required to come to be to provide transport by sea, that’s why it actually has come to be. [26] [27] Moreover, the animals are surely things that have come to be by nature, either altogether all of them or the best and most honorable of them; for it is no different if someone thinks that most of them have come into being unnaturally because of some corruption or faultiness. [51.4] But certainly a human is the most honorable of the animals down here; hence it’s clear that we have come to be both by nature and according to nature.


Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 11 Ross (= ch. IX, up to 52.16) and, in Düring’s edition, B13-16: 49.26-50.12 (B13), 50.12-19 (B14), 50.19-26 (B15), 50.27-51.6 (B16).
εἰ τόινυν ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν, ἀπὸ ταύτης ἥκολούθηκε καὶ ταῖς τέχναις τὸ τῆς γένεσις ἀπασαν ἐνεκά του γίγνεσθαι. τὸ γὰρ ὀρθῶς γίγνοι[51] ἐκεῖνον ἀπαν ἐνεκά του γίγνεσθαι θείμεν ἄν. οὐκοῦν τὸ γε καλῶς, ὀρθῶς· καὶ τὸ μὲν γιγνόμενον γίγνεται, γέγονε δὲ τὸ γεγονός τὸ γε μὴν κατὰ φύσιν ἀπαν | καλῶς, εἰπέρ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν φαύλου καὶ τῷ κατὰ | φύσιν γένεσις ἐνεκά του γίγνεται. [50.19] καὶ τοῦτο ἵδιον τις ἀν καὶ ἂφ’ ἐκάστου τῶν ἐν ἑκεῖν μερῶν: οἴον εἰ | κατανοοῖς τὸ βλέφαρον, ἵδιος ἄν ὡς οὐ μάτην ἀλλὰ | βοσκείας χάριν τῶν ὁμμάτων γέγονεν, ὅπως ἀναπαυοῦν | τε παρέχη καὶ καλύπτει πρὸς τὴν ψυχ. | οὐκοῦν ταύτου ἔστιν οὔ τε ἐνεκα γέγονε τι καὶ οὔ | ἐνεκα δει γεγονέναι: οἴον εἰ πλοῖον ἐνεκα τῆς κατὰ | βάλαταν κομιδῆς ἐδει γίγνεσθαι, διά τοῦτο καὶ γέγονε. | καὶ μὴν τὰ γε ζωὰ τῶν φύσει | [51.1] γεγενημένων ἔστιν ἦτοι πάντα τοπαρά παν ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα καὶ τιμιώτατα· διαφέρει γαρ οὔτε εἰ τὸς οὐ— | τῶν ἄνθρωπος φύσει διά τινα ψηφαρί καὶ μοχθηρίαν. τιμιώτα— | τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔν ταύθα ζωὰν ἔστιν, ὡστε δήλον ὅτι φύσει | τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γέγονε.

**Editorial notes:** This section is continuous with the former two pieces of evidence; the argument of ‘Aristotle’ continues.
This is what we were generated by nature and the god in order to do. [7] So what is this thing? [8] When Pythagoras was asked, he said, ‘to be an observer of the sky,’ and he used to claim that he himself was an observer of nature, and it was for the sake of this that he had passed into his way of life. [10|11] And they say that when someone asked Anaxagoras for what reason anyone might choose to come to be born and to live, he replied to the question by saying that it was ‘to be an observer of the sky and the stars around it, as well as moon and sun,’ since everything else at any rate is worth nothing. [51.15|16]

Further, if in everything the end is always better (for everything that comes to be comes to be for the sake of the end result, and what is for the sake of something is better, indeed best of all), and the natural end result is the one that is last to be achieved in accordance with the generation that has naturally grown when the development is completed without interruption, surely the first human parts to acquire their end are the bodily ones, and later on the parts of the soul, and somehow the end of the better part always comes later than its coming to be. [23|24] Surely the soul is posterior to the body, and intelligence is the final stage of the soul, for we see that it is the last thing to come to be by nature in humans, and that is why old age lays claim to this alone of good things; therefore, some form of intelligence is by nature our end, and ultimately we have come to be in order to be intelligent. [52.4] Now surely if we have come to be, it’s also clear that we exist for the sake of being intelligent and learning something. [51.6] Therefore Pythagoras, according to this argument anyway, said well that it is for the sake of cognition and to observe that every human being has been constructed by the god. [52.8]

But later one should inquire whether the object of this cognition is the cosmos or some other nature; what we have said is enough for us for now at first. [11] For if intelligence is an end in accordance with nature, then to be intelligent would be best of all. [12] Hence, one should do the other things for the sake of the goods that come about in oneself and, of these goods, one should have the ones in the body for the sake of those in the soul, and virtue for the sake of intelligence; for this is the highest of all.

Primary reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. IX, 51.6-52.16.
Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 11 Ross (= ch. IX, up to 52.16) and, in Düring’s edition, B18-19, B17, and B20-21: 51.6-10 (B18), 51.11-15 (B19), 51.16-52.5 (B17), 52.6-12 (B20), 52.12-16 (B21).

καὶ τούτο ἐστι τῶν ὄντων | οὐ χάριν ἢ φύσις ἡμᾶς ἐγένησε καὶ ὁ θεός. τί δὴ | τούτο ἐστι; Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτώμενος, ‘τὸ θεασασθαί’ ἐλεύθερον, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἡ ἑνίκη παρελθοῦσα ἐν ἡμῖν. Καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ἄδειον ἀνείπησεν ἐν τῷ ὑπογείῳ. Ὠς τῷ γενόμενον ἐν τῷ ἐμφάνισθαι τῷ ἔστιν ἐν τῷ ἑνίκῳ ἔργῳ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀστρα ταῖς τοῖς ἐκεῖνοι | ἠλιθία | ὡς τῶν ἄλλων γε πάντων ὑδάτων. [51.15|16]

καὶ τούτῳ πάντως ἄει τὸ τέλος ἐστὶ βέλτιον (ἐνεκὼ | γὰρ τοῦ τέλους πάντα γίνεται τὰ γεγομένα, τὸ δὲ | ὡς ἐνεκὼ βέλτιον καὶ βέλτιστον πάντως), τέλος ἐκ τοῦ φυσικοῦ ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τὸν γενόμενον συνεχῶς· ὡς τοῖς πρῶτοι μὲν τὰ κατὰ τὸ σώμα τῶν ἀνθρώπων | λαμβάνεται τέλος, ὕστερον δὲ τα κατὰ τὴν πνεύμην, καὶ | πως οὐκ τοῦ βέλτιον τὸ τέλος ὑστερίζει τῇ γενόμενοι, ὡς τοῖς ὑστερίζει τῇ γενόμενοι, | οὐκοῦν πνεύμη σώματος ὕστερον, καὶ τῶν τῆς πνεύμης | τελευταῖον ὁ φρόνησις· τούτῳ γὰρ ὕστερον
ὁρῶμεν \[52.1\] γιγνόμενον φύσει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, διό καὶ τὸ γῆρας | ἀντιποιεῖται τούτου μόνου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· φρόνησις ἄρα | τις κατὰ φύσιν ἥμιν ἐστὶ τὸ τέλος, καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν | ἔσχατον οὗ χάριν γεγόναμεν. οὐκοῦν εἰ γεγόναμεν, \[\] δὴ λοι ὅτι καὶ ἐσμὲν ἑνὲκα τοῦ φρονήσαί τι καὶ μαθεῖν. | καλῶς ἀρὰ κατά γε τούτον τὸν λόγον Πυθαγόρας | εἰρήκεν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ γυνώια τε καὶ θεωρήσαι πᾶς ἀνθρωπος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ συνέστηκεν. [52.8]

ἀλλὰ τούτο τὸ | γνωστὸν πότερον ὁ κόσμος ἔστιν ἡ τις ἐτέρα φύσις, \[\] σκεπτέον ἵσας ὡσ—
terou, ὧν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἱκανὸν τήν | πρῶτην ἥμιν. οἱ γὰρ ἐστὶ κατὰ φύσιν τέλος ἡ φρόνησις, | ἀριστον ἂν εἴη πάντων τὸ φρονεῖν. ὥστε τὰ | μὲν ἄλλα δὲὶ πράττειν ἑνὲκα τῶν ἐν αὐτῶ ἁγινομέκων | ἀγαθῶν, τούτων δὲ αὐτῶν τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι τῶν | ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τῆν δὲ ἀρετὴν τῆς φρονήσεως· τούτο | γὰρ ἔστιν ἀκρότατον.

Editorial notes: Here Iamblichus seems to have skipped over a portion of Aristotle’s text (the bit containing the reference to Phlius) and resumed with the reason that Pythagoras gave for humans to be alive. The speaker is ‘Aristotle’, who concludes, “Therefore Pythagoras was right” to say that god constructed us for intellectual work.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

To seek for every science to produce some other thing and to require that it be useful is the demand of someone entirely mistaken about how much separates from the start the things that are good from the necessities; they differ the most. [20] For among the things without which living is impossible, one should say that those that are appreciated on account of some other thing are necessities and joint causes, while all those that are appreciated for themselves, even if no other thing results from them, should be called goods in the strict sense; for this is not valuable because of that, and that for the sake of something else, nor does this get lost by going forward to infinity – rather, this stops at some point. [25] So it is absolutely ludicrous, in fact, to seek from everything a service other than the thing itself, and to ask ‘So, what’s the benefit for us?’ and ‘How is it useful?’ [28] For what we say is the truth: such a fellow doesn’t seem like someone who knows what is beautiful and good or discerns what is a cause and what is a joint cause. [53.2]

One might see that what we say is all the more true if someone transported us in thought, as it were, to the Isles of the Blessed, for in that place there would turn out to be no need of anything nor any benefit from anything else, with only contemplating and observing left remaining, which we say now too is a free way of life. [718] If this is true, then surely any one of us would be justly embarrassed if, when the license was granted to us to settle in the Isles of the Blessed, he was by his own fault unable to do so. [10] Thus the payment to humans of knowledge is not despicable, and the good that comes from it is not a small good. [12] For just as the poets who are wise say that in Hades is transported to us the bounty of justice, likewise, in the Isles of the Blessed it would seem, is the bounty of intelligence. [53.15]

It is not a terrible thing at all, then, if it does not seem to be useful or beneficial; for we don’t claim that it is beneficial but that it is in itself good, and it is appropriate to choose it for itself, not for the sake of some other thing. [1819] For just as we travel abroad to Olympia for the sake of the spectacle itself, even if there is going to be nothing more to get from it (for the observing itself is superior to lots of money), and as we observe the Dionysia not in order to acquire anything from the actors (rather than actually spending), and as there are many other spectacles we would choose instead of lots of money, so too the observation of the universe should be honored above everything that is thought to be useful. [53.26 | 54.1] For surely one should not travel with great effort for the sake of beholding people imitating girls and slaves, or fighting and running, and not think one should behold the nature of existing things, i.e. the truth, for free.

Primary reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. IX, 52.16-54.5.
Superseded editions: This was collected as fr. 12 Ross (= ch. IX, from 52.16) and, in Düring’s edition, as B42-45: 52.16-53.2 (B42), 53.2-15 (B43), 53.15-54.5 (B44), 54.5-9 (B45).
Editorial notes: Iamblichus resumes, after having paraphrased the above line of argument, by citing the rhetorically climactic conclusion of the speech of ‘Aristotle’, a speech applying the conclusions from the previous arguments for a rebuttal against the consequentialist conception of philosophy of ‘Isocrates’ (DCMS xxvi, 79.5-81.4, pp. 17-19 above).
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

Just as the doctors who are sophisticated and most of those concerned with athletic training pretty much agree that those who are to be good doctors or athletic trainers must be experienced about nature, so good legislators must be experienced about nature too, indeed much more than the former. [18] For some are craftsmen of virtue only in the body while others, being concerned with the virtues of the soul and pretending to be an expert in the success and failure of the state, also have much more need of philosophy. [54.22]

For just as in the other craftsmanlike skills the best of their tools were discovered on the basis of nature (in carpentry, for example, the carpenter’s line, the standard ruler, the string compass) < … a line of text is missing … > for some are acquired with water, or with light and beams of sunshine, and it is by reference to these that we put to the test what is to our senses adequately straight and smooth - similarly the statesman must have certain guidelines taken from nature itself, i.e. from the truth, by reference to which he judges what is just, what is good, and what is advantageous.

Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 13 Ross (= ch. X) and, in Düring’s edition, as B46-47: 54.10-22 (B46), 54.22-55.6 (B47).

Editorial notes: Iamblichus finished chapter IX of his Protrepticus by quoting an anti-Isocratean climax of the speech of ‘Aristotle’. When he resumes quoting in chapter X, ‘Aristotle’ is still arguing against ‘Isocrates’; contrary to what Isocrates had said, political science cannot be done by imitation alone; it does need expertise and specifically expertise about nature.
And in the other skills people pretty much know that they do not acquire their tools and their most precise calculations from the primary things themselves, but from what is second or third hand or further away; and they acquire their calculations from experience, whereas the imitation is on the basis of the precise things themselves only for the philosopher, for he is a spectator of these very things, not of imitations. [14] So just as no one is a good house-builder who does not use a standard ruler or any other such tool but approximates them to other built houses, similarly, presumably, if someone either posits laws for states or does his deeds by looking at and imitating other human deeds or political systems, whether the Spartan or that of the Cretans or of any other such state, he would be neither a good legislator nor an excellent statesman; for an imitation of what is not beautiful cannot be beautiful, nor can an imitation of what is not divine and stable in nature be immortal and stable. [23] [24] But it is clear that the philosopher is the only craftsman to have both laws that are stable and actions that are correct and beautiful. [25] [26] For he is the only one who lives looking toward nature and toward the divine and, just as if he were some good navigator who hitches the first principles of his way of life onto things that are eternal and steadfast, he moors his ship and lives life on his own terms.

Reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. X, 55.7-56.2.
Superseeded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 13 Ross (= ch. X) and, in Düring's edition, as B48-50: 55.6-55.14 (B48), 55.14-25 (B49), 55.26-56.2 (B50).

καὶ τῶν μέν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τὰ τε ὄργανα καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους οὐκ ἂν αὐτῶν τῶν πρῶτων; ἔτη λαβόντες σχεδόν ἰσαίν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τῶν δεύτερων καὶ τρίτων καὶ πολλαπλών, τοὺς τε λόγους εἶ ἐμπείριας | λαμβάνοντες: τῷ δὲ φιλοσοφῷ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἂν | αὐτῶν τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἢ μίμησις ἐστιν: αὐτῶν γὰρ ἐστὶ | θεάτης, ἀλλ’ οὔ μιμὴ—μάτων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὕδ’ οἶκοι ὀδόμοι ἁγάθος ἔστιν οὕτως ὀστίς κανόνι μὲν μὴ χρήται | μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων μηδεὶς τῶν τοιούτων ὄργανων, ἐτέρωι | δὲ οἰκοδομήσαι παραβάλλων, ὄμως ἰσος καὶ εἰ τις | ὦ νόμος τίθεται πόλεως ἢ πράξεως ἢ παραβλέπων | καὶ μιμούμενος πρὸς ἄτερας πράξεις ἢ πολιτείας ἢ ἅρματος ἢ ἑκατέρους ἡ ᾿Κρητῶν ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων | τοιούτων, οὐκ ἁγάθος νομοθετήσει ὀυδὲ πολιτικὸς σπουδαῖος: οὐ | γὰρ οὐδὲξεῖται μὴ καλοῦ μίμημα καλὸν εἶπαι, μηδὲ | θείου καὶ βεβαιοῦ τὴν φύσιν ἄθανατον καὶ βεβαιοῦ, | ἀλλὰ δῆλον | ὅτι μόνον τῶν δημιουργῶν τοῦ φιλόσοφου καὶ νόμοι βεβαιοὶ καὶ πράξεις εἰσὶν ὁρθαὶ καὶ καλαὶ. | μονὸς γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων καὶ πρὸς τὸ | θεῖον, καὶ καθάπερ ἢ καὶ ὑπὲρ—νήτης τις ἁγάθος εἴξ | αἰδίων καὶ μονίμων ἀναφάσμενος τοῦ βίου τῶν ἀρχῶν | ὀρμεῖ καὶ ζῆν καθ’ ἐαυτόν.

Editorial notes: ‘Aristotle’ further develops his argument by stressing the value of direct knowledge of nature as opposed to imitating other apparently successful political systems.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

Just as sight is not able to create nor is it a craftsman of anything (for its only function is to judge and clarify each visible thing), but provides us with the ability to do an action through it and is the greatest help to us in our actions (for we would be pretty much absolutely motionless if robbed of it), so it’s clear that, though the knowledge is theoretical, we nevertheless do countless things in accordance with it, acquire some things and avoid others, and generally gain through it everything good.

Reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. X, 56.4-12.

Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 13 Ross (= ch. X) and, in Düring’s edition, B51 (56.2-12).

Editorial notes: ‘Aristotle’ further develops his argument by comparing theoretical knowledge to sight.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

The word ‘living’ seems to mean two things, one with reference to a capacity and the other with reference to an activity, for we call all those animals ‘seeing’ who have sight and are naturally capable of seeing (even if they happen to have their eyes shut), as well as those who are using the capacity and are casting their sight. [19] And similarly, with knowing and cognizing we mean, in one case, using and observing and, in the other case, possessing the capacity and having the knowledge. [22] Further, if we distinguish living from not living by sensing, and ‘sensing’ means two things – strictly as using the senses, but otherwise as being able to use them (that’s why we say, it seems, even of people who are sleeping that they are sensitive), clearly the consequence would be that ‘living’ also means two things: a waking person should be said to live in the true and strict sense, but sleeping people must be said to live because they are capable of making a transition into the process in virtue of which we mean that someone is both waking and sensing things.


Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 14 Ross (= ch. XI) and, in Düring’s edition, as B78-80: 56.13-15 (B78), 56.15-22 (B79), 56.22-57.6 (B80).

φαίνεται διττῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ ζήν, τὸ μὲν κατὰ δυναμὶν τὸ δὲ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ὑπόλοιπον γὰρ εἶναι φαμεν ὁσα τὲ ἑξει τῶν ζωῶν ὦσιν καὶ δυνατὰ πέφυκεν ἰδεῖν, καὶ τὰ χρώμενα τὴ δυνάμει καὶ προσβάλλοντα τὴν ὤσιν ὦρμοις δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐπισταθαί |20 καὶ τὸ γιγνώσκειν, ἐν μὲν τὸ χρῆσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν λέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τὸ κεκτήθαι τὴν δυναμὶν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἑξειν. ἐὰν τὸν τῷ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ |ζήν διακρίνομεν καὶ τῷ μὴ ζην, τὸ δ’ αἰσθάνεσθαι | διττῶν, κυρίως μὲν τῷ χρῆσθαι ταῖς αἰσθήσεις ἄλλῳς |25 δὲ τῷ δυνασθαι (διόπερ φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ |57.1 τὸν καθεύδοντα λέγοντες, ὥς εἶθε), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ |ζήν ἀκολουθήσας διττῶς λέγομενον τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἐγρηγοροῦτα φατέον ζην ἀληθώς καὶ κύριος, τὸν δὲ καθεύδοντα διὰ τὸ δυνασθαι μεταβάλλει ἐις ταύτην τὴν |κίνησιν, καθ’ ἂν λέγομεν ἐγρηγορέναι τε καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αἰσθάνεσθαι τῖνος.

Editorial notes: Iamblichus has finished with the argument that philosophy is necessary for political science; after a gap, he turns in chapter XI to a new idea, that philosophers enjoy enhanced vitality as humans. The speaker is still ‘Aristotle’.
Citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

On this account, by looking at this, when one and the same word is said of each of two things, and one is used for acting and other for being acted upon, we shall assign the term as belonging more to the former; for example, ‘knowing’ belongs more to the one who makes use of his knowing than to the one who has the knowledge, and ‘seeing’ belongs more to the one who is applying his vision than to the one who is capable of applying it. [12] For we use ‘more’ not only in respect of excess in things for which there is a single definition, but also in respect of what is prior and posterior; for example, we say that the healthy is more a good than the things that are condu-cive to health, and that what is valuable by its own nature is more a good than what is able to create it. [16] And yet we see, surely, that it is not by the definition of ‘good’ being predicable of both that it applies to each of them, to beneficial things as well as to virtue. [19] Therefore a waking person, someone whose soul is activated, should be said to live more than someone who is sleeping and merely has it, for it’s on account of the former living that we say the latter is too, because, like the former, he is such as to be able to act and be acted upon. [57.23]

Thus using anything is surely this: when the capacity is for one thing someone who does this very thing uses it; but if it is for a larger number of things one uses it when one does the best of them, for example with flutes, one uses it either only or mostly when one uses a flute, for presumably the uses of the other capacities are also for this purpose. [57.27] 58.1 Thus one should say that someone who uses a thing correctly is using it more, for the natural objective and mode of use belong to someone who uses a thing precisely and well. [3] Now of a soul, too, thinking as well as reasoning is the only function of the soul, or is most of all its function. [5] Therefore it is now simple and easy for anyone to reach the conclusion that he who contemplates correctly is more alive, and he who most tells the truth lives most, and this is the one who is intelligent and observing according to the most precise knowledge; and it is then and to those that living perfectly, surely, should be attributed, to those who are using their intelligence, i.e. to the intelligent.

Reference: Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. XI, 57.6-58.10.
Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 14 Ross (= ch. XI) and, in Düring’s edition, as B81-86: 57.7-12 (B81), 57.12-19 (B82), 57.19-23 (B83), 57.23-58.3 (B84), 58.3-10 (B85), 58.10-14 (B86).
χείν τῶν χρωμένω καλῶς καὶ ἀκριβῶς. ἔστι δὴ καὶ ψυχῆς ἤτοι ἡ μόνων ἡ μᾶλλον πάντων ἔργου τὸ διανοεῖσθαι τε καὶ ἴδιον ἡ ψυχῆς ἢ τούτο καὶ παντί συλλογιζεῖσθαι ὧδειν ὅτι ἢ μᾶλλον ὡς διανοοῦμενος ὀρθῶς καὶ μᾶλλον πάντων ὡς μᾶλλον ἀληθεύως, οὕτως δὲ ἔστιν ὁ φρονῶν καὶ θεωρῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔπιστήμην καὶ τὸ γε τελέος ἢν τὸ τοῦτο καὶ τούτοις ἁπόδοτεν, τοῖς φρονούσι καὶ τοῖς φρονίμοις.

Editorial notes: The speaker is still ‘Aristotle’.
Furthermore, drinking while feeling pleasure is one thing and drinking with pleasure is another for nothing prevents someone who is not thirsty, or has not been served with the drink he enjoys, from enjoying himself while drinking, not because he is drinking but because it occurs at the same time as he sits there that he is observing or being observed. [21] Thus we will say that this fellow is having pleasure, and is drinking while feeling pleasure, but not by drinking and not because he is drinking with pleasure. [23] Thus in the same way we will also say that walking and sitting and learning and every process is pleasant or distressing, not insofar as it turns out that we feel distress or enjoyment in their presence, but insofar as we are all distressed by or enjoy their presence. [27] So similarly, we will also say that a life is pleasant if its presence is pleasant to those who have it, and that not all in whom it occurs that they enjoy themselves while living are living with pleasure, only those to whom living itself is pleasant and who enjoy the pleasure that comes from life. [59.3]

Thus we attribute living more to the one who is awake rather than to the one who is asleep, and to the one who is intelligent more than to the one who is stupid; and we say the pleasure that comes from life is the one that comes from the uses of the soul, for this is being truly alive. [7] Further, even if there are many uses of the soul, still the most authoritative one of all, certainly, is to make use of being intelligent as much as possible. [9] Further, it is clear that the pleasure that arises from being intelligent and observing must be the pleasure that comes from living, either alone or most of all. [11] Therefore living with pleasure and true enjoyment belong only to philosophers, or to them most of all.

Superceded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 14 Ross (= ch. XI) and, in Düring’s edition, as B87-92: 58.15-17 (B87), 58.17-27 (B88), 58.27-59.3 (B89), 59.3-7 (B90), 59.7-17 (B91), 59.17-18 (B92).

...
Editorial notes: Iamblichus continues to cite from the speech of ‘Aristotle’, who proceeds to demonstrate that philosophers enjoy the highest pleasure.
Paraphrase and citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

For all things, both those that are for this and those that are on account of this <are valuable ... a line of text is missing ... > to be valuable for everyone, both those things we do as necessary and the pleasant things that make us feel successful. [26] Thus we take the position that success is either intelligence and a certain wisdom, or virtue, or enjoying oneself most of all, or all the above. [60.1] Thus if it is intelligence, it is evident that living successfully would belong to the philosophers alone; and if it is virtue of the soul or enjoyment, even so it will belong to them either alone or most of all, for virtue is the most authoritative thing in us, and the most pleasant of all things, comparing one thing with another, is intelligence; and similarly, even if someone were to state that all these same things together are success, that is to be defined as being intelligent. [7] Hence everyone who is capable of it should do philosophy, for surely this either is living perfectly well, or else it is, most of all anyway, comparing one thing with another, a cause of it in their souls.


Superseded editions: This was collected as part of fr. 15 Ross (= ch. XII) and, in Düring’s edition, as B93-96: 59.19-26 (B93), 59.26-60.1 (B94), 60.1-7 (B95), 60.7-10 (B96).

πάντα γάρ τά μέν προς τούτο τά δέ δια τούτο πάσιν |[25] αἰρετέσθαι < ... αἰρετέσθαι> εἶναι, καὶ τά μέν ὡς ἀναγκαία τῶν πραγμάτων τά δέ ἥδεα δι' ὧν εὐδαιμονοῦμεν. οὐκοῦν τήν ἐγνατί—

Editorial notes: After a gap, in chapter XII Iamblichus continues quoting ‘Aristotle’, who braids together strands of previous arguments to reach a conclusion that is apparently his ultimate conclusion: philosophy is the indispensable key element in a successful human life. We believe that the paraphrased material that Iamblichus presents at 60.10-61.4 to finish his presentation of Aristotelian extracts is not derived from the *Protrepticus* but from Aristotle’s lost dialogue *Eudemus*, or from some other lost work of Aristotle.

The ending of the *Protrepticus* is lost and nothing can be securely inferred about it from the existing evidence. We tend to believe that the dialogue came to an end soon after the point where Iamblichus stopped his citation, at 60.10. It is very unlikely that we possess the last words of the lost work.
Peripheral evidence, possible further evidence, rejected evidence

The evidence presented in the preceding pages of Core Evidence (pp. 4-60) constitutes a partial reconstruction of Aristotle’s lost Protrepticus, and readers should share our confidence that these passages existed in identical or very similar versions in the original work, that the sequence of passages is preserved, and that the speaker is correctly identified. There is considerable further evidence, most of it identified by previous scholars, which should also be seen as having its provenance in the lost work; however, there is room for doubt in each case. We can’t be sure of its place in the sequence of passages, perhaps, or who the speaker was; or we can be sure only that a topic was broached but not in what terms the speaker handled it; or there is uncertainty as to whether the passage is derived from a different lost work of Aristotle, rather than this one.

In this section of Peripheral Evidence we present several groups of passages that derive from the lost work, in our judgment, together with editorial notes indicating reasons for attribution to author, work, speaker, and position in the work, as well as our grounds for doubt. The order of presentation of passages in the Core Evidence definitely reflects the sequence of passages in the original lost work, but the order of our presentation of passages in the Peripheral Evidence does not. First we present a) two papyrus fragments, then b) and c) two sequences of passages in two separate works of Iamblichus, then d) a passage from a work by Proclus.

Beyond the Peripheral Evidence that does derive from the lost work, there are many passages, identified by previous scholars or by us, that may well derive from the lost work, or are brief reports of it rather than excerpts, or have some other indirect or questionable relation to the original work. These are assembled in the next section (pp. 72-81), Possible Further Evidence. Finally, we list a handful of passages that have been attributed incorrectly, in our view, to the lost work, under Rejected Evidence (p. 82).
A. Two papyrus fragments

P.Oxy.3659. A fragment from what appears to be a speech of a speaker in Aristotle’s dialogue who argues against philosophy and philosophers.

... but they don’t agree at all on that; no, even silver – and yet what could be whiter than silver?! – no, despite this, Thrasylakes says it’s black. [8|9] So then, when even the whiteness of silver is on the doubtful side, why be amazed if people who are deliberating have their disagreements over war and peace, over alliances and revenues and disbursements and the like? [16|17] And what about the philosophers themselves? If you confined them together in the same house and an equal number of madmen in another house next door, you would get much, much, greater howls from the philosophers than from the madmen!! [25] In fact, this one, this Antisthenes here, says he would rather feel madness than pleasure; and Aristippus, what ... is mad ... and what about Plato ... and what ...


Editorial notes: We have no firm information about how the narrative of the dialogue began, but it is likely that at an early point there was a hostile challenge to philosophy, which stimulated exhortations to philosophy on the part of the three main speakers. This papyrus fragment P.Oxy.3659 was not attributed to any particular work by its first editor, but we believe it is precisely the sort of challenge that suits the drama of the lost dialogue. Several details point to Aristotle as being the likely author: the mention of the Socratic device of inmates, and the mention of the Socratic device of double columns (‘on the doubtful side’; cf. Xenophon, Memoirs of Socrates IV.2). The unflattering image of the ‘howling philosopher’ was recycled by Lucian at Hermitimus 11; this is a satire of earlier protreptics to philosophy, and so the recycling suggests a provenance in this work. Also pointing in the same direction are thematic connections to various passages in the core evidence, where one finds a focus on the topics of disagreeing experts, madness and stupidity, and the value of pleasure. The refutation of this speaker seems to come in several stages, of which an early one seems to have been the ‘self-refutation’ argument on pp. 6-7. That argument is precisely tailored to work against a speaker such as this one, who has been actively engaging in argumentation against philosophy. When this speaker refers to ‘this Antisthenes here’, he may be referring to a passage from a work of Antisthenes of Athens, perhaps his lost Protrepticus; the other possibility is that ‘Antisthenes’ was one of the speakers of the dialogue, but he was yesterday’s man.
P.Vindob.G.26008, fr. B, col. II. A fragment from what appears to be the speech of ‘Aristotle’ in response to the challenge of ‘Isocrates’ (pp. 17-19 above).

... but is likewise a science. [415] And so, concerning the beings in and the nature of the universe as well, they show that what the objects are composed of is not infinite, but for one there is one thing, for another there is two, for another three, and another four; hence they all try to say what this is, out of what things every other one is derived, and to reduce them all from infinite things to limited ones, and from innumerable things to a number. [19 ... (five lines are too damaged to be legible) ... 25] investigating nature, dividing off for themselves some one part among beings, declare the substances concerning these ...


Editorial notes: This Egyptian papyrus, now conserved in several fragments in Vienna, contains partially preserved text that has been attributed to Aristotle since the 19th century. The material in ‘fragment A1’ concerns faults in representational poetry, whereas the material in this ‘fragment B’ concerns principles in natural philosophy. In 1992, G. Most proposed the Protrepticus as the only Aristotle work that might contain both these two discussions. Another possible explanation of why these fragments belong to the same papyrus is that they may have belonged to a later excerptor of Aristotle, such as Aristocles of Messene, who may have exploited several different works of Aristotle. This is the view of R. Janko, who ascribes the ‘fragment A1’ material to the lost dialogue On the Poets, correctly in our view; see below, p. 82.

As for fragment B, above, its provenance in Protrepticus was rejected in 2008 by C.M. Rodriguez, who proposed On Philosophy instead as its source. This seems reasonable, but its content is also perfectly appropriate to an exhortation to philosophy such as Protrepticus. We believe this to be the source of the passage, because in the terms in which Aristotle makes this point shows that he is opposing Isocrates on this point, who had declared this (Antidosis 268): “I would, therefore, advise young men to spend some time on these disciplines, but not to allow their minds to be dried up by these barren subtleties, nor to be stranded on the speculations of the ancient sophists, who maintain, some of them, that the sum of things is made up of infinite elements; Empedocles that it is made up of four, with strife and love operating among them; Ion, of not more than three; Alcmaeon, of only two; Parmenides and Melissus, of one; and Gorgias, of none at all.” The passage in ‘fragment B’ of this papyrus serves to defend the rationality of the principles-based approach to natural science against the above attack. It would fit well into the speech of ‘Aristotle’ after his remarks comparing elements of compounds with letters in syllables (pp. 20-21, above).
B. A sequence of passages from Iamblichus, Protrepticus V and VI

Near the end of chapter V of his Protrepticus, Iamblichus includes at least two citations from Aristotle, very probably from his Protrepticus.

When perception and intellect are taken away, a human becomes pretty much like a plant; when intellect alone is taken away, he turns into a wild animal; when irrationality is taken away but he remains in his intellect, a human becomes like a god.


Superseded editions: This was not collected in Ross’s edition, but was collected by Düring as B28.

... indeed it is the only capability of all the ones we have that lands on target. Quite the reverse; our actions as well as everything else should be co-ordinated with a view to intellect and god, and it is from this too that the measure should be taken of what is reasonable in our particular duties. [36.4] For the judgment is both just and worthy, and is the only one of them that is sufficient to prepare the true success for humans. [36.6/7]

For what makes us different from the other animals shines through in this way of life alone, a life in which what happens cannot fail to have great worth. [9] For animals too have small glimmers of reason and intelligence, but they have absolutely no share of theoretical wisdom, and this is shared only with the gods, just as humans are actually left behind by many animals in the precision and strength of their senses and their drives, [13] and this the only really good thing that is inseparable, which they concede is included in the conception of the good, in accordance with the life of the excellent man, which is not at all subordinated to lucky things and which, to a degree higher than all others, is free from things in the grip of luck.


Superseded editions: This was not collected in Ross’s edition, but part of it was collected by Düring as B29-30: 36.7-13 (B29), 36.13-20 (B30).

μόνος δὲ πασῶν 36.1 τῶν ἄλλων ἂς ἔχομεν ἐπιτυχίας δυνάμεως, ἐμπαλιν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα πρὸς νόμο καὶ τὸν θεόν συμπάγεται, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου καὶ τῶν κατὰ μέρος· καθήκοντα τοῦ εὐλογίατον ἀναμετρητέον. δικαία τε ἡ γὰρ καὶ κατ’ ἄξιον ἡ κρίσις καὶ μόνη πασῶν ἱκανή· τὴν ἀληθινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐδαιμονίαν παρασκέυασε. [37.6/7]

ガー γάρ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρομεν ζώοι, ἐν μόνῳ δὲ τούτῳ· τῷ βίῳ διαλάμπει, ώσπερ ἦν τι τυχόν καὶ οὐ μεγά | ἔχον ἄξιον. λόγῳ μὲν γὰρ καὶ φρονίσεως μικρὰ τινα 15 καὶ ἐν ἐκείνως αἰθύματα, σοφίας δὲ θεωρητικῆς ταύτα | μὲν παντελῶς ἁμορία, μόνοις δὲ μετεστήθηθε· ωσ | αἰσθησίηι γε καὶ ὀρμαίς πολλῶν ἡδὶ ζώων τῆς ἁκριβείας καὶ τῆς ἱσχύος λειτυτά ἀνθρώπως, καὶ μόνον | τούτῳ ὑπάτῳ ἀγαθὸν ἀναφαίρετον, ὁ δὲ περιεχεῖν συγχάροις τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἐννοια, οὐδαμῶς μὲν τοῖς | τυχηρῶς υποτάττοντος οὐσίων κατὰ τούτον τού βίου | τοῦ σπουδαίου, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν ὑποχειρίων τῇ τύχη μα— | λίστα δὲ πάντων ἐστών ἐλευθερώσαντος.

Editorial notes: Iamblichus finishes chapter V of his Protrepticus, which consisted mostly of a complex exploitation of proterptic passages from the works of Plato, by citing from a work not by Plato, after making a barely noticeable transition: “The following approach also leads to the same result” (34.5). The material after this point has been attributed to the Protrepticus by scholars since the last century, correctly in our view. The speaker is probably ‘Aristotle’, although we cannot rule out ‘Heraclides’ as the speaker here. There are two different places in the lost dialogue where this passage could have belonged to a speech of Aristotle: either 1) after the challenge to Academic philosophy offered by Isocrates (pp. 17-19) and during an early phase of Aristotle’s speech responding to this challenge, a phase in which he agrees with much of what Isocrates had said; or 2) at a much earlier point in the dialogue, in the vicinity of the speech of ‘Isocrates’ in P.Oxy.666 (pp. 6-7), an early phase in which the speakers give their first responses to the challenge of some early speaker who had rejected all philosophy as such.
At the beginning of chapter VI of his *Protrepticus*, Iamblichus includes what seems to be a paraphrase and a citation from Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*.

The things that support our way of life, e.g. a body and what’s around it, support it in the manner of certain tools, the use of which is risky, and more harm than good is fashioned by those who use them in ways they are required not to. [7] Well then, one should desire the appropriate use as well as the possession of that knowledge by which we will posit all these well. [9] Hence we should do philosophy, if we are going to engage in politics correctly and carry on with our own life in a beneficial way. [37.11]

Furthermore, the kinds of knowledge that make each things that is advantageous in this way of life are different from the different kinds of knowledge that use them, and the ones that serve are different from the others that command; and in these kinds of knowledge, as if they were more dominant, exists what is good in the strict sense. [16] If, then, only that kind of knowledge which does have correctness of judgment, and does use reason, and observes the good as a whole - that is to say, philosophy - is capable of using everything and organizing it in accordance with nature, by all means one ought to do philosophy, since only philosophy includes within itself this correct judgment and this intelligence that is able to command unerringly.


Superseded editions: this was collected in Ross’ edition as Fr. 4, and by Düring as B7-B9.

Editorial notes: There is no doubt about the provenance of this material; it was authenticated by us in OSAP 29 (2005) as part of the sequence of chapters in Iamblichus’ *Protrepticus*. There is some slight doubt about the voice of this speaker, probably ‘Aristotle’ but possibly ‘Isocrates’. There is more doubt about its location in the lost work. The two main possibilities for its location are the same as the ones for the above passage, either after the challenge of ‘Isocrates’, or after the challenge of someone opposed to philosophy.
C. A sequence of passages from Iamblichus, *DCMS* chapters xxiv and xxv

In chapter xxiv of *DCMS*, Iamblichus includes what seems to be an extended citation from a speech of ‘Heraclides’ in Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*.

Now then, they applied this procedure to the theorems they observed and at one time they removed the knowledge of them from the common and popular awareness, and turned their transmission by the same token into a sworn secret. [19] They communicated the awareness of them to very few, and if anything anywhere got published to the masses, they abominated this as a sacrilege, which is why they rejected those who were outside their society as being unworthy to partake of them. [23] For Pythagoras took the position that mathematical philosophy should not be shared with everybody, but only with those with whom someone would share his entire life. [26] And into the membership of this group he didn’t just admit people randomly or unselectively, but he tested for a long time the ones that were taken and rejected the unworthy. [75.1] And to those outside the society he did not make public the advances he himself made, but kept the arguments about them secret from the others, while he contributed to great advances among those called ‘Pythagoreans’, because of their camaraderie with him, both in mathematical philosophy and in geometrical theory, and one would discover that the starting points of almost all later further advances have come to us from him.


Editorial notes: After a short gap at the end of *DCMS* xxiii, Iamblichus carries on citing from a work of Aristotle, probably his *Protrepticus*. If so, the speaker is now ‘Heraclides’, who offers an inside perspective on why the Pythagorean tradition kept its mathematical discoveries secret and unpublished, and why Pythagoras valued the contribution of mathematical education to philosophy. In this respect, ‘Heraclides’ gives a different answer from the one earlier given by ‘Aristotle’, who suggested (xxiii, pp. 14-16) that the primary contribution of Pythagorean mathematics was in its contribution to astronomy and other branches of natural science. The reason to doubt that this material was derived from the *Protrepticus* is that it has already been attributed by W. Burkert and others to a different work of Aristotle, his *On the Pythagoreans*. See below, in the material in chapter xxv, for further details.
Another citation in chapter xxiv, probably from a speech by the character ‘Heraclides’.

What he appreciated in mathematics was the observed theorems themselves not, unlike certain of his successors, their power to discover further solutions to problems; and of these he appreciated not the ones that were most difficult to discover, as did most of his successors, but rather those among them by which to discern to the highest degree an ordered rank or some natural joint feature. [15|16] They felt this because they thought that the first principles of all nature exist in them, and it is especially easy to observe what they are, and how many there are, because they concern a nature that persists and is stripped of motion and is also simple, which is why they didn’t take on the problematical areas (except the elementary ones) such as the application <of an area>, nor the squaring <of a circle>, nor did they make it their business to go through everything in detail, leaving aside none of the possibilities; they set out to see in each case only the principles themselves. [75.25]

And they turned a training in these sciences and a logical workout that was theoretically precise into a proper science, they set up the suitable ranking in the sciences, they made few commitments at first and then worked them out, and they brought to completion mostly the most honorable and most exalted of the theorems they observed, and otherwise they practiced the discipline of bringing the theorems around to apply to other things. [76.4] And they created a ranking among them, such that the ones that are simpler are given the primary rank, while the ones that are applicable to a complex are secondary.

Reference: Iamblichus, DCMS, ch. xxiv, 75.10-76.6.

Editorial notes: After a short gap, Iamblichus carries on citing from a work of Aristotle, probably his Protrepticus, probably from a speech of ‘Heraclides’. The reason to doubt that this material was derived from the Protrepticus is that it has already been attributed by W. Burkert and others to a different work of Aristotle, his On the Pythagoreans. See next page, in the material in chapter xxv, for further details.
In chapter xxv of his DCMS, overlapping with chapter 18 of his Vita Pythagorica, Iamblichus includes what seems to be a paraphrase from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’.

There was a certain Hippomedon of Asine, a Pythagorean of the acusmatici, who said that he <sc. Pythagoras> declared the reasons for and gave demonstrations of all these precepts, but because they were handed down through many intermediaries, who became progressively lazier, the reason was omitted, while the bare precepts remained. [12] And those concerned with the mathematical studies of the Pythagoreans (the mathematici) both agree that the others (the acusmatici) are Pythagoreans, and say that they themselves are even more so; and what they say is true. [14] They say that the cause of this dissimilarity was as follows. [15] Pythagoras came from Ionia and Samos during the tyranny of Polycrates, and while Italy was flourishing, and the pre-eminent men in those cities became intimate with him. [18] And with the older ones who had no free time because they were occupied with political business, it was hard to encounter them with mathematical studies and demonstrations, he conversed in a simple way, considering it no less beneficial, even without knowing the explanations, to know what to do, just as those who undergo therapy recover health no less, even when paying no attention to the reason why they need to do each of those things; but all the younger ones he encountered who were able both to work and to learn, he encountered such people with demonstration and the mathematical studies. [52.1] They themselves (sc. the mathematici) descend from these ones, and the other ones descend from the others.

Reference: Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorica 87-88, ch. 18, 51.7-52.2 (Deubner), overlapping (at 51.12-52.2) with DCMS, ch. xxv, 76.16-77.18.

Editorial notes: After a gap at the end of xxiv, Iamblichus turns in ch. xxv to another account of the division between the two traditions of Pythagoreans, in what seems to be paraphrased form. This material is literally identical with material at the end of chapter 18 of Iamblichus’ earlier work Vita Pythagorica, and this causes complications. Earlier scholars such as W. Burkert and others have seen this chapter as deriving from Aristotle’s lost work On the Pythagoreans, and this must be true for the middle part of the chapter, which displays overlaps with passages in chapter 28 that are definitely derived from On the Pythagoreans. There are two main scenarios: either Iamblichus switched source texts in the middle of VP 18, from Pythagoreans to Protrepticus, and then returned to Pythagoreans in ch. 28, or else Iamblichus switched source texts in DCMS from Protrepticus in ch. xxiii to Pythagoreans at the start of ch. xxiv or ch. xxv, switching back to Protrepticus in the middle or the end of ch. xxv. It would appear that Aristotle had a good deal to say about the Pythagorean tradition in his Protrepticus as well as On the Pythagoreans, and the content of these remarks does not serve to determine the question. We take the view that all this material is derived from Protrepticus, probably, with some chance of being wrong about this attribution, especially in this section that begins ch. xxv of DCMS.
In chapter xxv of his *DCMS*, Iamblichus includes what seems to be a citation from a speech by the character ‘Aristotle’:

Because the Pythagoreans occupied themselves with mathematics and appreciated the precision of its accounts, because it is the only thing that humans deal with that has demonstrations, and because equal agreement is reached by using numbers in harmonics and in the mathematics concerning sight, by using diagrams, for all these reasons, they thought that these things are causes of what exists and are their first principles. [14]

Hence someone who wishes to observe the things that exist as they are, has to look at them, the numbers and the geometrical forms of what exists and accounts, because everything is clarified by using them. [18] Now since they didn’t think it either more opportune or more worthwhile to attach themselves to the powers of each of them than to the cause of the whole, the Pythagoreans defined the others in these terms as well, in pretty much the same way.


Editorial notes: After a short gap, Iamblichus cites from a comment by ‘Aristotle’ who gives an account different from the one offered by ‘Heraclides’ about why mathematics is central to Pythagorean philosophy. This answer contrasts with the one earlier offered by ‘Heraclides’ (pp. 16, in the core evidence). In outline, ‘Aristotle’ respects the contribution of mathematics to natural science and thus indirectly to philosophy, whereas ‘Heraclides’ respects the direct contribution of mathematical thinking to philosophical values and positions. The reason to doubt that this material was derived from the *Protrepticus* is that it has already been attributed by W. Burkert and others to a different work of Aristotle, his *On the Pythagoreans*. See above (this page), in the material in chapter xxv, for further details.
D. A passage in the Commentary by Proclus on Book I of Euclid’s Elements

Prologue I, Chapter 9. In the course of Part I of his Prologue, Proclus pauses to respond to the “contentious people who attempt to demolish the value” of mathematics. It would seem that this attempted demolition took place on the pages of Aristotle’s lost dialogue, in a speech of ‘Isocrates’.

Now then, the benefit of mathematical science generally for philosophy itself as well as to the other sciences and skills will become more familiar to the listeners by means of these remarks; but there are actually certain contentious people who attempt to demolish the value of this science, some of them taking what is beautiful and what is good away from it because its arguments are not about those things, whereas others declare to be more useful the experiences of sensible things than the things that are universally observed in it, for example, that land surveying is more useful than geometry, and popular arithmetic than the one that subsists in theorems, and nautical astrology than the one that indicates universally. [23] For we are not wealthy by knowing about wealth but by using it, nor are we successful by knowing about success but by living successfully; hence, with respect to the human way of life as well as our actions, we will agree that it is not the cognitive but the empirical mathematics that brings this about. [26.6] For those who have no knowledge of the arguments but are trained by experience in the particulars are on the whole and in general outstanding for the needs of humans, compared with those who have devoted their leisure to theory alone. [26.9-10]

Now against those who say these things, we will oppose them by pointing out the beauty in mathematics by the ways in which Aristotle attempted to persuade us. [13] He said these three things are what especially bring about beauty both in bodies and in souls: order, symmetry, and definiteness, since what is ugly also arises in the body as a consequence of the material disorder and shapelessness and asymmetry and indefiniteness getting the upper hand in the composite, whereas in the soul it arises from unreason being in discordant and disorderly motion and being out of harmony with reason, and not accepting the limit from there; hence beauty too would have its existence in the opposite things, namely order, symmetry, and in being defined. [23] And these things we observe most of all in mathematical science; we observe order in the secondary and more varied things always emerging from the primary and simpler things (for what follows is always conjoined with what went before, and same have an account of a principle, while others <have an account> of the things that follow from the primary hypotheses), we observe symmetry in the consonance with each other of the proven results, and in the reference of all things to the intellect (for the intellect is the measure that is common to the whole science, with which one also grasps the principles and towards which one converts the students), and we observe definiteness in their arguments always standing without changing, for the objects of its cognition are not sometimes one way and sometimes otherwise, as with the objects of opinion and of perception, whereas the same things always present themselves and are defined by the intelligible forms. [10] Further, if the things that are productive of beauty are these things especially, and mathematics is characterized by them, then it is quite clear that in mathematics too there is beauty. [13] And how could it not be so, when intellect illuminates from above the science, which urges us to intellect and strives to lead us from perception to yonder?


εἰς ὑπόθεσιν πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφικὸν αὐτήν καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἑπιστήματα καὶ τίμιας ἔσται διὰ τούτων γνώριμον τὸιο ἀκούσωσι, ἢ δὲ τινὲς τῶν ἀντιλογικῶν ἑπιστημονάς καθαρεύει ἡ ἡμέρα ἐν ἡττίμησιν ταύτης, οἱ μὲν τὸ καλὸν αὐτῆς καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀφαιρεῦσιν ὦς οὐ περὶ τούτων ποιούμενοι τῶν λόγων, οἱ δὲ χρησιμοτέρας τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἑμπειρίας ἀποφαίνονται τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ καθόλου θεωρομένων, οίου γεωδεσίας γεωμετρίας, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν ἀριθμητικῶν τῆς ἐν θεωρήμασιν ψεφώσωσι, καὶ τῆς ναυτικής ἀστρολογίας τῆς καθολοῦ δεικνύοντοι. οὔτε γὰρ πλούσιον τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γινώσκει τόν πλοῦτον, οὔτε εὐδαιμονεῖ τὸν εὐδαιμονικόν, οὔτε τὸ γεωμετρικόν, οὔτε τὸν ἀκαθάρτιον καὶ τὰς πράξεις οὐ τὰς γνωστικὰς τῶν μαθηματικῶν, ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐμπειρικὰς συνείνιξεν, οί γὰρ ἀκυρωμένοι μὲν τῶν λόγων, γεγυμνασμένοι δὲ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἔκαστα πέραν ὧδε καὶ παντί διαφέρουσι πρὸς τὰς ἀνθρώπικας χρείας τῶν περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν μόνην ἐσχολακότως. [26.9-10]

Πρὸς δὴ τοὺς τάυτα λέγοντας ἀπαντησόμεθα τὸ μὲν κάλλος ἑπιστῆμαιν τῶν μαθημάτων ἀπὸ τούτων, ἀφ’ ἄν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπεχείρησεν ἤμας πείθειν. τρία γὰρ τάυτα διαφέροντος
and in Proclus, see below, pp. 74

the common source in Iamblichus and Proclus, the testimony of Proclus is in a position to supplement our paragraph in the report of Proclus corresponding to each successive part of Aristotle's view. The author of this text, however, with the information it conveys to us is both intrinsically interesting and confidently to be attributed to the good and the beautiful. (For Aristotle, see Prologue I.9 serves to corroborate part of Aristotle's answer to this challenge of Isocrates; for this section, see p. 26 above. A section in I.11 corroborates part of the speech of Aristotle that was cited by Iamblichus at DCMS xxvii, each paragraph in the report of Proclus corresponding to each successive phase of the argument as excerpted by Iamblichus; on this corroboration, see p. 26 above and p. 74 below. In virtue of the mutual confirmation of the common source in Iamblichus and Proclus, the testimony of Proclus is in a position to supplement our knowledge of the lost text, as happens in this case. For other possible further evidence deriving from Proclus, see below, pp. 74-76.

Editorial notes: The passage that Iamblichus had quoted at DCMS xxvi, 79.5-80.1 (p. 17) was evidently also under the eyes of Proclus who paraphrased not only the above criticism that mathematical theory is useless for practical purposes, but also Aristotle's response to a different argument, that there is no beauty or goodness in mathematics. (For Aristotle's response to the 'uselessness' criticism, see pp. 22-25.) Aristotle mentioned such criticisms twice in his Metaphysics, and these passages are informative. "Since the good and the beautiful are different, because the good is always found in some action whereas the beautiful is found also in unchanging things, those who say that mathematical branches of knowledge say nothing about the beautiful or the good are wrong. They do say something about the facts and the arguments that they show, but it is not the same as saying that they are saying nothing about them. The greatest forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry, and being definite, which the mathematical branches of knowledge show to the highest degree" (Metaphysics XIII (M), ch. 3, 1078a31-b2).

"This then is why some of the sophists, Aristippus for example, dragged mathematics through the mud: in the other skills, even the manual skills such as carpentry and shoemaking, everything is accounted for because it is better, or worse, but the mathematical subjects take no account of things that are good and bad" (Metaphysics III (B), ch. 2, 996a32-b1). All the evidence can be accounted for if we imagine that in the course of his attack on mathematics in the Protrepticus, Isocrates both referred to the view of Aristippus that there was no good in mathematics and also advanced the view that there was no beauty in mathematics, either as his own view or as the view of another philosopher or 'sophist'.

We are confident that the provenance of these remarks is Protrepticus, and that the voice is that of 'Isocrates' and that the position is somewhere in his 'challenge' speech. However, we do not know exactly where to sequence it and, more importantly, the mode of writing that Proclus employs slips into exact citation occasionally, but otherwise has varying degrees of paraphrase and condensation. This mixture of degrees of relationship to the source text makes it unsuitable to be a fragment in a reconstruction, and yet the information it conveys to us is both intrinsically interesting and is confidently to be attributed to this speaker in this text.

The testimony of Proclus in his Euclid commentary is extremely valuable in two separate respects. In the first place, it repeatedly corroborates the evidence that Iamblichus provides in his excerpts, providing the author's name on several occasions, as it does here. Another later section of Prologue I.9 serves to corroborate part of Aristotle's answer to this challenge of Isocrates; for this section, see p. 26 above. A section in I.11 corroborates part of the speech of Aristotle that was cited by Iamblichus at DCMS xxvii, each paragraph in the report of Proclus corresponding to each successive phase of the argument as excerpted by Iamblichus; on this corroboration, see p. 26 above and p. 74 below. In virtue of the mutual confirmation of the common source in Iamblichus and Proclus, the testimony of Proclus is in a position to supplement our knowledge of the lost text, as happens in this case. For other possible further evidence deriving from Proclus, see below, pp. 74-76.
Possible further evidence

In this order of presentation: several passages in Iamblichus (p. 72); fragments of P.Oxy.3699 (pp. 72-73); three selections from the Euclid commentary of Proclus (Prologue I.11, I.13, II.4, pp. 74-76); evidence from Ammonius, attributed to On Philosophy (pp. 76-77); evidence in the works of Cicero (pp. 78-79); evidence in other authors (Plutarch, Chalcidius, Tertullian, Ammonius, Alexander, and Synesius – p. 80); evidence in proverb collections (p. 81).

A report in Iamblichus, On Nicomachus

Iamblichus; in the fourth title of his Pythagorean sequence, his book On the Introduction to Arithmetic by Nicomachus of Gera, Iamblichus mentions some early history of number theory at 10.8-24, some details of which suggest that they derive from a work of Aristotle. A brief review of the views of Pythagoras, Eudoxus, Hippasus, and Philolaos preserves suggestive information about them. There is some evidence that speakers in Protrepticus had an interest in the history of number theory as well as the history of geometry.

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A set of papyrus fragments in P.Oxy.3699

P.Oxy.3699. An Oxyrhynchus papyrus, preserved in several fragments, conserves portions of a Socratic dialogue that seems to have been referred to in the Protrepticus.

... reputation, strength, beauty ... are unprofitable to such a person. It’s pretty much just like a ‘knife to a child’ how any of such things turns out for an uneducated human. For when he owns the possessions he has the initial impulse for weak self-control, leading to self-indulgence and even gambling and women and other ...”

(fr. d, col. I)


Editorial notes: This Oxyrhynchus papyrus, now conserved in many fragments (the mutual sequence of which is unclear), transmits a dialogue with protreptic themes. There is a close overlap of themes between this set of fragments and the passage in P.Oxy.666 (pp. 6-7 above), in which ‘Isocrates’ offers protreptic arguments along Socratic lines. Especially significant is the repetition of the slogan ‘no knife for a child’. The two main hypotheses to consider are a) that the above fragments derive from a work such as the Protrepticus of Antisthenes, and ‘Isocrates’ in Aristotle’s Protrepticus alludes to and exploits this earlier passage in his own speech, or b) that the above fragments derive from the Protrepticus of Aristotle, in which case the Isocrates allusions are intratextual, not intertextual.

... is his life unprofitable and harmful?” – “Unprofitable, certainly,” he said. – “So then,” he said, “the life of everyone uneducated is bad, and so are his actions, right?” – “Yes, indeed(?)” he said. – “So what possession,” he said, “would be profitable to such a person? For if,” he said, “someone individually ...”

(fr. a, col. III)

... ἀλυσιτέλης | καὶ βλαβερός ὁ βίος ἐστίν; | ἀλυσιτέλης | μὲν οὖν ἐφι. | οὐκοῦν | ἐφι παντὸς τοῦ ἀπαιδεύτου μοχθέρος ὁ βίος καὶ αἱ πράξεις εἰσίν. | [[[ν]]] ἦ οὐ; | καὶ ... ἐφι. | -τὶ ἀν οὖν ἐφι [τ]ωι τοι[ο]υτῶι λυσι[ελ]... | χοί; | καὶ γάρ εἰ καθ' ἐν τῖς, | ἐφι, ζητ[...]λ. | α

... so the man whose life(?) is bad,” he said, “isn’t his life(?) unprofitable (and harmful)”

(fr. b, col. I)
...]. ατ[...ουλ] | ει[...ικε] | ετοοοοουν εφη | μιοχθηρος εστιν | ιυ ουκ αλυσιτε

... if his life,” he said, “is unprofitable and harmful, what will it profit him to own?” -“And
more pleasant…”

(fr. c, col. I)

... ου εφη ο βιος άλυσιτελης και βλαβερος έστιν(ν) | έκεϊνω τι άνεσετεις υπάρχειν; - ήδιον τε του

Editorial notes: In the above fragments of the papyrus, we see a fairly clear line of argument, entirely
consistent with the one offered by ‘Isocrates’ on pp. 6-7 above (P.Oxy.666). The conversational dialogue is
consistent with the works of Antisthenes, but could also have been present in Aristotle’s Protrepticus.

“… doing it for the sake of silver; and again Alkmeon, like somebody driven mad, and
intending to do a favor either to his father or to the gods, killed his mother … but later
regretted doing it and cursed his own miserable fate, and went insane …”

(fr. a, col. II)

... ποιησαι ε[ν]ειν | ἀργυρίου· πάλιν τε ὁ [Αλ]κμέων ὡς παρακεκοφώς τις καὶ οἰόμενος | χαρ[ι]ε[ίς]θαί τι ἢ τῷ πα[τρὶ ἢ τοῖς] θεοίς τὴν | μητέρας ἀποκτείνας | [...]. Τεμεν ἐπὶ | θυ ... ἀποκτείναι | ὑστερόν δὲ ποιησάς | μεταμέλεσθαι καὶ κακοὶ κακομιζέτειν αὐτόν | καὶ μαίνεσθαι

Editorial notes: One element (madness) connects this passage to other evidence of Aristotle’s Protrepticus:,
such as the speech of ‘Heraclides’ (p. 39). This element is shared, as well as ‘silver’ with P.Oxy.3659 (above).

... of all the bad things of the Greeks none is worse than the race of athletes: first, they
neither learn how to live well nor would they be able to. For how, w

(fr. d, col. II)


Editorial notes: Two elements (slavery versus freedom, and athletes) connect this passage to passages in
the reconstruction. However, all these indications are suggestive but not probative.
A passage in the Euclid commentary of Proclus, Prologue I.11

After these things we should discuss what someone should demand of the mathematician, and how someone might be able to judge him correctly. [23] For he who has been educated absolutely is able to judge about everything, says Aristotle, and he who has been educated about mathematics will be able to judge the correctness of the arguments in it. [26] Moreover, he needs to have acquired criteria of judgment and to recognize in the first place when it is necessary to produce the demonstrations in common terms, and when one needs to look at the particularities of each one. [33.2] For often the same things exist in things that differ in form, for example, in all triangles there are two right angles. [4] And many things have the same predicate, but the common term differs in form in each case, for example, ‘similarity’ differs in shapes and numbers. [7] So one should not demand of the mathematician a single demonstration of these, for the same things are not principles of shapes and of numbers; rather they differ according to the underlying kind. [10] But if the intrinsic attribute is unique, then the demonstration is also unique, for having two right angles is the same thing in all triangles, and that in virtue of which it is an attribute is the same in all, the triangle, i.e. the definition of triangle. [13] So just as having four external right angles does not exist in triangles alone, but also in all rectilinear <shapes>, the demonstration also fits every case, insofar as it is rectilinear. [17] Indeed, each definition contributes some universal characteristic or affection, in which everything participates that has that definition, for example the definition of ‘triangle’, or of ‘rectilinear’, or in general of the shape it is. [33.2121]

In the second place: if he makes the demonstrations in accordance with the underlying material, e.g. if he offers necessary and irrefutable arguments, but not persuasive arguments or arguments filled up with plausibility. [24] For it is similar, says Aristotle, to demand proofs of an orator, and to accept persuasive arguments from a mathematician. [34.1] Everyone who has knowledge or is skilled should provide the arguments appropriate to the affairs about which he is treating. [314] Similarly, Plato in Timaeus also demands from the natural scientist plausible arguments, because the treatment concerns those kind of things, but of the teacher of higher things concerning intelligible objects and the stable reality, irrefutable and immovable ones. [7.8] For right away those things that underlie the sciences and the skills make for differences, for example if some are immovable and others movable, and some are simpler and others more complex, and some are intelligible and others are perceptible. [11] Nor should we demand from every mathematical science the same precision—for if one science were somehow to touch upon perceptibles, and another were to be a cognition of underlying intelligibles, they would not be similarly precise, but the latter would be more. [15] That is why we say that arithmetic is more precise than harmonics. [16] Nor in general would we think it right that mathematics use the same demonstrations as the other sciences, for the underlying things make for a difference that is not slight. [34.1920]

We say, thirdly, that someone who is going to judge correctly the arguments in mathematics needs to have made investigations about sameness and difference, and about the intrinsic and the incidental, and about proportion, and about all these kinds of things. [24] For pretty much all mistakes happen in this way, when people think they have given a mathematical demonstration, but are not actually giving a proof, when they make demonstrations of the same thing as different according to each form, or the different as the same, or when they mistake the coincidental for the intrinsic, or the intrinsic for the coincidental, for example, that a curved line is more beautiful than a straight one, or an equilateral than an isosceles, for these things are not the job of the mathematician to define. [35.617]

Now the fourth is that, since mathematics has a middle rank between the intelligibles and the perceptibles, and proves many images of divine things in itself, and many examples of natural arguments, he needs to observe the threefold demonstrations in it, those that are more intellectual, those that are more discursive, and those that actually touch on opinion. [13] For it is necessary for its demonstrations to differ according to the problems, and to divide the realities into kinds appropriately, since it is actually woven together of all these things, and adapts its own arguments to every case.

Reference: Proclus, Commentary on Euclid’s Elements I, Prologue I, ch. 11, 32.21-35.19.

Editorial notes: The first three paragraphs in the above citation from Proclus serve to corroborate three successive phases of the argument of ‘Aristotle’ as paraphrased and cited from the speech of ‘Aristotle’ by Iamblichus at DCMS xxvii; see above, pp. 28-31. The phrases marked in bold in our translation above are identical with phrases in the version of Iamblichus. The fourth paragraph, however, has no correspondence
in the version of Iamblichus, and has a very good chance of being derived from the lost work, from a place slightly later in the speech of ‘Aristotle’. Like Iamblichus, Proclus seems to be preserving the order of the source text as he exploits it. But he exploits it in a different way that Iamblichus does, a way that does not permit backwards inference to the words of the original. See comments above (pp. 70-71), on the material in chapter 9 of Prologue I of Proclus’ commentary.

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A passage in the Euclid commentary of Proclus, Prologue I.13

Geodesy and mensuration are analogous to these sciences <sc. geometry and arithmetic>, since they discourse not about intelligible but about sensible numbers and figures. For it is not the function of geodesy to measure cylinders and cones, but heaps of earth considered as cones and wells considered as cylinders, and it does not use intelligible straight lines, but sensible ones, sometimes more precise ones such as rays of sunshine, sometimes rougher ones such as a rope or a carpenter’s rule. … Again optics and canonics are offshoots of geometry and arithmetic. The former science uses visual lines and the angles made by them; it is divided into a part specifically called optics which explains the illusory appearances presented by objects seen at a distance, such as the converging of parallel lines or the rounded appearance of square towers, and general catoptrics, which is concerned with the various ways light is reflected. [39.20-40.2 and 40.9-18]

Editorial notes: Proclus has already been a witness in the First Prologue to his Euclid commentary: in chapter 9 (see above, pp. 69-70, where he both corroborates other evidence and supplies fresh evidence) and again in chapter 9 (see above, p. 26 to illustrate the corroboration by Proclus of evidence provided by Iamblichus), and in chapter 11, where he definitely corroborates evidence provided by Iamblichus and perhaps provides new evidence (see previous page). So it stands to reason that later sections might contain allusions or exploitations to the lost work, and this pair of passages in chapter 13 is a good candidate for consideration. The topic of applied mathematics and their role in practical subjects was at issue between ‘Heraclides’ and ‘Aristotle’ (see p. 11-15 above), and the idea of more precise tools for carpentry, such as sighting with rays of sunshine is used by ‘Aristotle’ in a section of the lost dialogue that is directed against Isocrates (see p. 53 above). This is a very suggestive zone of comments, but it is not easy to know the limits of exploitation of the passages of which Proclus makes use; so without a second witness this is likely to remain an unconfirmed suggestion.

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A passage in the Euclid commentary of Proclus, Second Prologue ch. 4, 64.3-65.23

Now then, those things have been recorded by many of our senior scholars who set out to sing the praises of mathematics, and for this reason we have presented here only a few of the many facts we might have cited to display the cognitive generality and the benefits of the science of geometry; but next we have to talk about the development of this science during this period. [8] The inspired Aristotle said that the same beliefs have often recurred to humans at certain regular periods of the world, and that it was not among us, or among any of those of whom we have any cognizance, that the sciences took shape for the first time; on the contrary, they appear and again disappear during other cycles, too numerous to tell, that have come to pass and will in turn exist. [15\n16] But since we need to investigate the origin of the arts and sciences in the present period, we say that geometry was first discovered by Egyptians, according to most of those who research the question, and owed its development to the re-measuring of their lands. [20] This was necessary for them because the Nile overflows and obliterates the appropriate property boundaries between them. [23] And it is not at all surprising that the discovery of this, as well as that of the other sciences, had its origin in utility, since everything that is carried on by coming into being proceeds from the imperfect to the perfect form. [65.1] So the transition from sense-
perception to thinking and from thinking to insight would be likely to happen. [3] Just as among the Phoenicians the precise cognition of the numbers got its origin from trade and commerce, it was also in this way that geometry was discovered by Egyptians, for the reason mentioned. [65.7]

Thales, having traveled to Egypt, was the first to bring this theoretical subject over into Greece; he made many discoveries himself, and taught the principles of many others to those who came after him, attacking some problems in a more general way and others in a more sense-perceptual way. [11] Next after him, Mamertius, brother of Stesichorus the poet, is remembered for the zeal with which he applied himself to the study of geometry; and Hippias of Elis did research showing that he acquired a reputation in geometry. [15] After them, Pythagoras transformed the philosophy of geometry into a scheme of liberal education, surveying its principles from above and investigating its theorems in an immaterial and intellectual way; he was also the one who discovered the business of the irrationals and the arrangement of the cosmic figures. [21] After him, Anaxagoras of Clazomenae applied himself to many questions in geometry, and so did Oenopides of Chios, who was a little younger than Anaxagoras.

**Editorial notes:** Proclus has already proved himself to be a valuable witness; see previous note. In his Second Prologue, he returns to the theme of the history of geometry and offers an Aristotelian account, which has the appearance of deriving from a speech of ‘Aristotle’ in the *Protrepticus*; if so, the most obvious place for this material would be in a speech of Aristotle just before or just after the speech of ‘Heraclides’ in *DCMS* xxii, as the two writers appear to be giving alternative accounts of the history of Pythagorean mathematics and Pythagorean tradition. The mention of geometry as arising in Egypt is confirmed in the first chapter of *Metaphysics*, but this does not mean that it was the source for Proclus; in fact the first 2 chapters of his *Metaphysics* appears to be recycling significant ideas from *Protrepticus* whereas chapters 3-6 appear to be recycling significant portions and ideas from *On Philosophy*. There would appear to have been a speech by ‘Aristotle’ on the history of the arts and sciences, for which the best evidence is derived from Aristocles (the next item of evidence); if there had been such a speech relatively early in the dialogue, this would enable Aristotle’s breezy later references to ‘the inundations’ and to the rapid progress of the precise forms of philosophy in his time (see above, p. 24).

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**Evidence from Ammonius, attributed to On Philosophy**

The late ancient scholar Ammonius gave lectures on the *Introduction to Arithmetic* by Nicomachus of Gerasa, incorporating passages by earlier scholars, including Aristocles of Messene, and his lectures were captured in two versions, one by Asclepius of Tralles, and the other by Philoponus of Alexandria, both ‘protocols’ of these lectures being very similar to each other. The first item of information may or may not be derived via Aristocles (see the following item of evidence), but this second longer passage is explicitly said to be taken from Aristocles’ work *On Philosophy* (not to be confused with Aristotle’s work *On Philosophy*). We present the prologue to the lecture by Ammonius, in the protocols by Philoponus (I.14-49).

> But since we use the terms ‘wisdom’ and ‘wise’ generally, you should know that the terms ‘wisdom’ and ‘wise’ are used homonymously; in fact, they have been taken by the ancients in five ways about which I am going to speak, as Aristocles says in his ten books *On Philosophy*. [17|18] For one needs to know that humans perish in different ways: by plagues and famines and earthquakes and wars and all sorts of diseases, among other causes, but most of all by rather cataclysmic floods. [20] For example, the flood of Deucalion was great, to be sure, but it did not overwhelm everything, for the shepherds and those who have their occupa-tions in the mountains or in the foothills survived, but the plains and those who dwell in them were flooded. [23] Thus they say that Dardanus was saved from the flood by swim-ming across from Samothrace to what was later called Troy. [25] It was out of fear that those who were saved from the waters lived in the foothills, as the poet *<sc. Homer>* shows when he says: “Zeus the cloud-gatherer first begat Dardanus; and he founded
Dardania, since Ilium was not yet built on the plain as a city for mortal men; but still they lived in the foothills of many-fountained Ida” <Iliad 20.215-218>. [30] The word “still” indicates that they were not yet fully confident to have their occupations on the plains. [32] So then, these survivors, not having a source of subsistence, conceived out of necessity the things they needed, either hulling grain in mills, sowing seeds, or some other thing like that, and they called that kind of conception ‘wisdom’, the kind that discovers the solutions in the face of the necessities of life, and they called the one who conceived of these things ‘wise’. [I.36]

Again they conceived of skills, “suggested by Athena” as the poet says, but no longer stopping at what was necessary in life, but also going so far as to produce things that are beautiful and refined. [38] And this again they called ‘wisdom’ and their discoverers ‘wise’, since “the wise craftsman fashioned it” <Iliad 23.712>, “knowing well the suggestions of wise Athena” <Iliad 15.412> for, because the discoveries were so exceedingly great, they attributed the conception of these things to a god. [41] Again, they focused on political matters, and discovered laws and all the things that sustain the cities; and again this sort of conception they called ‘wisdom’, for the Seven Wise men were people like this, who discovered certain political virtues. [44] Afterwards, proceeding in order, they reached the very bodies themselves and the nature that manufactures them, and this they called by the more specific name ‘natural theory’; and we say that these kind of people who are concerned with nature are ‘wise’. [47] Fifthly, they came at last to things that are divine, hyper-cosmic, and completely unchanging, and they named the cognition of these things ‘wisdom’ in the most authoritative sense.

Editorial notes: Aristocles of Messene seems to have been closely paraphrasing a work of Aristotle which feature the ‘five stages of wisdom’, and this has been attributed to the fragments of On Philosophy (fr. 8), without explicit argument, to our knowledge. It connects with many indications of a phase in the dialogue in which ‘Aristotle’ offered his developmental theory of the skills and sciences rising after periodic catastrophes (see above note, and the passages noted therein). The use of Homer’s poetry as a source of historical understanding is a typical reflection of Aristotle’s historiographical concerns, and many themes connect with details in our reconstruction of the dialogue.

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At the very beginning of the above commentary Ammonius offers material that surely comes from Aristotle, and shows signs of being derived from this text. We present the prologue to the lecture by Ammonius, in the protocols by Philoponus (I.1-14).

Wisdom (sophia) was so called as being a sort of clearness (sapheia), since it makes all things clear. This clearness being a sort of light (phaes), it has acquired its name from that of light (phaos), because it brings hidden things to light. Since then, as Aristotle says, things intelligible and divine, even if they are most clear in their own nature, seem to us dark and dim because of the mist of the body which hangs over us, men naturally gave to the knowledge which brings these things into the light for us the name of ‘wisdom’.

Editorial notes: Ammonius does not provide the name of his source for us, and it might be the same as in the section that follows (translated above), namely Aristocles. Alternatively, Ammonius could know these facts through some other ancient scholar, or perhaps from his knowledge of the text itself, though this seems unlikely, as other later ancient commentators after Iamblichus seem to have lacked access to it. In any case, it derives from an otherwise unknown work of Aristotle, perhaps his On Philosophy, where it has been collected together with the above passage as fr. 8. It seems to us that the attribution more likely to be correct is to Protrepticus, where it connects with many themes, especially themes in the thought and discourse of Heraclides’ from a speech of whom this may well be derived.
Evidence in the works of Cicero

On several occasions, Cicero explicitly says that his own dialogues were influenced by Aristotle’s popular ("exoteric") works. For example, Cicero says that he is following Aristotle by adding a preface to his dialogue (see the "Address to Themison" on p. 3). In a letter to Atticus, Cicero states: "my recent compositions follow the Aristotelian pattern, in which the other roles in the dialogue are subordinate to the author’s own (que autem his temporibus scripsi Aristotelieon morem habent, in quo sermo ita inducitur ceteroren, ut penes ipsum sit principatur)" (Att. 13.19.3-5, Letter 326). In another letter, Cicero says, "I have also composed ... three volumes in the form of an argument and dialogue On the Orator, in the manner (so at least I intended) of Aristotle (scripsi igitur Aristotelio more, quem ad modum quidem volui, tris libros in disputatone ac dialogo De oratore)" (Fam. 1.9.23, tr. Shackleton Bailey, letter 20).

Cicero, Hortensius (a lost dialogue). Some of the evidence for Cicero’s lost dialogue has been incorporated above, but all the remains should be searched again. For example, there were comments in that dialogue on the etymology of ‘philosophia’ (Boethius, Diff. Top. 2); did an argument like this take place also in Aristotle’s dialogue? However, a problem with working with this material is that this work is also lost, and even less of its literary structure is discernible than in the case of Aristotle’s work. It was reported by a Roman historian that “what Marcus Tullius said in his Hortensius” was “written following the example of a protreptic” (sic ignota esse arbitror quae dixit Marcus Tullius in Hortensio, quem ad exemplum protrepticis scrispsit) (Historia Augusta XIX.7-XX.2 =2.97.20 Hohl), and this is no doubt true to some extent. But it is impossible to know this extent, especially when we keep in mind that he also modeled his work on Plato’s Phaedo and perhaps other influential antecedent works.

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations III.28.69. “Aristotle, criticizing the older philosophers for having reckoned philosophy to have been brought to perfection by their genius, said that they were either extremely foolish or extremely vain, but that he saw that in a few years great advances had been made and in a short time philosophy will be fully finished.” This passage was collected as Protrepticus fr. 8 (Ross). It is evidently consistent with or part of the line of thought expressed by ‘Aristotle’ in response to ‘Isocrates’ (p. 24 above), that philosophy had developed into a period of great acceleration towards perfection.

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V.3.7-V.4.10. Crucial evidence about Heraclides of Pontus is preserved at V.3.8, where Cicero reports the comparison made by Pythagoras, according to Heraclides, between entering into this human life and attending an athletic festival, with competing participants, observant spectators, and greedy merchants. This was part of the answer given by Pythagoras to Leon of Phlius, according to a report in Diogenes Laertius (I.12), as recounted in Heraclides’ work On the Woman Who Stopped Breathing, and the Cicero evidence has been collected for this lost work (fr. 88 Wehril = 85 Schüttrumpf). However, these Heraclides editors have overlooked a very similar passage in Iamblichus, Vita Pythagorica 12, which is more likely to contain verbatim extracts and accurate parallels than is Cicero’s Latin account. A closer inspection of the chapters around chapter 12 suggests that it is part of a multi-chapter exploitation of the lost work of Heraclides (this is a new suggestion on our part), in which case Iamblichus is likely to have used the same techniques of paraphrase and citation that he used in his Protrepticus, and the lost work of Heraclides is now capable of being substantially reconstructed. When we turn back now to the Cicero evidence and look before and after the Heraclides passage, we perceive it to be a version of the Protrepticus episode in which ‘Heraclides’ admits that the name ‘philosophy’ is recent, though its activity is ancient, first giving evidence from the seven sages and from astrological considerations (V.3.7-8). Then follows the version of the ‘theatre motif’, with ascription to Heraclides of Pontus (V.3.8-9), then follows a further section (V.4.10) in which the topic is the focus of study of earlier philosophers, concluding with the famous comment that it was Socrates who brought philosophy down from the skies. This whole stretch is for us a zone of discovery, where further research might confirm our suspicion that this is derived from a portion of the speech of ‘Heraclides’, probably a portion that came before the climax of his speech in Protr. VIII (see pp. 42-43 above).

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V.35.101 and De Finibus II.32.106, collected as Protrepticus fr. 16 (Ross). Cicero pretends at De Finibus II.32.106 not to understand “why Aristotle derided to such a degree the epigram of Sardanapallus, in which that Syrian king boasts of having taken with him all his sensual delights. For he asks, how could he, when dead, continue to feel what he was aware of, when alive, just so long as he was enjoying it?” A fuller version of Aristotle’s attack on the hedonism of Sardanapallus, including the
Aristotle, *Protrepticus* (excerpts of speeches) 79

notorious epigram, is provided in *Tusculan Disputations* V.35.107, where Cicero refers to Sardanapallus as an “extremely wealthy king of Syria,” who “had inscribed this on his tomb: ‘What I have is what I ate and consumed in satisfaction of lust I but I threw away and left behind many brilliant things.’ What else, asks Aristotle, would you inscribe on the tomb of an ox rather than a king? He has, when he is dead, says Aristotle, what he had, even when living, just so long as he was enjoying it.” Aristotle regarded Sardanapallus as remarkably silly, “even sillier than the name of his father would suggest” (Athenaeus VIII, 335f). The lively way that Aristotle attacks Sardanapallus suggests a popular dialogue, such as *Protrepticus*; and this suggestion is supported by the presence of Sardanapallus stories in the opening pages of the *Eudemian Ethics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, in contexts where material has also been derived or adapted from his earlier *Protrepticus*. We regard it is a quite likely that there was such a mention of Sardanapallus in the lost work; if so, it was probably in an early speech of ‘Aristotle’.

Cicero, *De Finibus* II.13.40 = *Protrepticus* fr. 10c (Ross). Cicero cites this memorable comment by Aristotle: “a human is born for two things, as Aristotle says, for understanding and for action, as a sort of mortal god.” This proposition has a good chance of being derived from the lost dialogue, and should be compared and connected with a comment, apparently spoken by ‘Aristotle’, contrasting humans with beasts and gods, preserved in Iamblichus *Protrepticus* ch. V, 35.14-18 (see above, p. 64). We do not know the location in the lost work from which this Cicero comment was taken; perhaps it was part of a fairly early speech of Aristotle, of which Iamblichus (probably) preserves the above fragment and a few others. It was a mistake for earlier editors of Aristotle’s dialogues to catalogue it as among the evidence in ‘fragment 10’, as this material is unlikely to be derived from the same part of the dialogue as the closing paragraph of Heraclides’ speech reported in ch. VIII of the *Protrepticus* of Iamblichus; the line of thought and the way of expressing it is more appropriate to the character ‘Aristotle’ than to ‘Heraclides’, whose speech is collected as part of fr. 10. Although the speech of ‘Heraclides’ does conclude with a thought that it was for the purpose of intellectual contemplation that humans entered this world, that is his Pythagorean way of expressing what Aristotle refers to as “being born.”

Cicero, *De Finibus* Book V, passim. In Book V of Cicero’s *De Finibus*, Cicero expounds the Peripatetic view of the ultimate aims of human life; and since this was a key theme in Aristotle’s *Protrepticus* it stands to reason that Cicero might have recycled elements from Aristotle’s work, since he knew it well. Another reason to consider a lost work of Aristotle as a source for Cicero is that he comments (V.5.12-14) that he is restricting himself to the works of the older Peripatetics, including the *On Happiness* by Theophrastus (with whom he disagrees), the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and various works of Aristotle that are either popular or scholarly. One fairly strong indication that Cicero was exploiting Aristotle’s lost work is at V.5.11, which is apparently a reference to the *Protrepticus*, one of the “most noble and distinguished writings” of the Peripatetics: “The way of life that they <sc. the Peripatetics> most commended was one spent in quiet contemplation and study. This is the most god-like of lives, and so most worthy of the wise man. Some of their most noble and distinguished writing is to be found on this theme. Their discussions of the supreme good sometimes appear inconsistent. This is because they wrote two different kinds of work, one more popular which they called “exoteric”, the other more specialized, which took the form of note-books (unum populariter scruptum, quod exoterikon appellabant, alterum limatius quod in commentaris reliquerunt). In fact there is no variation in the main body of their thought, either within the individual works of the individual thinkers I have mentioned, or between them” (V.11-12, tr. Woolf). Another passage (V.19.53) that has a good chance of being derived from Aristotle’s work makes exactly the same point as one made by Aristotle, at Iamb. *Protr.* IX 53.2-15: “Philosophers of old picture what kind of life the wise will have on the Isles of the Blessed: freed from every trouble, and requiring none of the accessories and equipment that are necessary for life, they will simply devote all their time to investigating and researching nature.” Other passages give indications in the same direction, that Cicero was making use of themes and ideas from Aristotle’s work, such as these: V.19.54, which offers a comment about sleep that relates to one advanced by ‘Heraclides’ at VIII, 45.25-46.7 (p. 40); V.19.50, which offers comments about mental and intellectual pleasures that related to Aristotle’s discussion of intellectual pleasure at XI, 58.17-59.13 (p. 58); and V.14.39, which offers comments about agriculture that resemble those of Aristotle at IX, 50.5-12, (p. 46). Much of what Cicero writes in Book V of the *De Finibus* is of course entirely unrelated to Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*, or only distantly related; and since there is no definite technique of knowing whether any one passage is derived from that work, unless we have a second piece of evidence, this zone of evidence is likely to remain a source of suggestions about the lost work, and perhaps corroboration of ideas elsewhere witnessed, rather than an independent source of information. Further research is called for; what is needed is fresh scrutiny of Book V in its entirety, in the light of all the material attributed and attributable to the lost work in this provisional reconstruction.
Evidence in the works of other authors

Plutarch, *Is it right to say ‘Live inconspicuously’?* 5-7; this was attributed to *Protrepticus* by Bignone, on the basis of parallels with *Protr. VIII*. We agree that it seems to give parallel information that is relevant to *Protrepticus*, but we suspect that it primarily gives witness to the views of Heraclides, especially his doctrine of the light-like soul, views that are alluded to by ‘Heraclides’ in Aristotle’s dialogue.

Chalcidius, *On Plato’s Timaeus* 3d+ (CCVIII), collected as *Protrepticus* fr. 17 (Ross). In his commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus*, Chalcidius transmits a report about Aristotle which has a fairly good chance of being drawn ultimately from the lost dialogue *Protrepticus*. “Aristotle uses an example of crystal clarity: the height of madness is reached when a man not only is ignorant, but also does not know what he is ignorant of, and therefore gives his assent to false images and takes things that are true to be false, as when men think that vice profits them and that virtue acts to their prejudice and ruin … Aristotle calls such people ‘old children’, because their mind differs very little from that of a child.” A remark such as this could have found a natural place towards the beginning of the *Protrepticus*, and numerous themes in the surviving fragments seem to connect to this report, including: immaturity and lack of wisdom, being deceived by images, and great lack of wisdom or childishness being a form of madness.

Themistius, *On How the Philosopher Should Speak* (Oration 26); this speech contains numerous protreptic motifs that may indicate provenance in *Protrepticus*, though Themistius often reworks his sources almost beyond recognition. Themistius appreciated the dialogues of Aristotle, as he says; “these writings of Aristotle that are of general utility and were designed for a broad audience are truly full of light and radiance. They are useful without being boring or unpleasant at all. Aphrodite has been showered upon them, and the Graces make an appearance in them so that they will have an enticing quality” (319, trans. R. J. Penella). Of special interest are passages in 316-317, where Themistius offers a history of innovation in the arts and sciences at 316-317, running through a progressive history of philosophy from Thales to Socrates. On the development of the arts and sciences, see the evidence above from Proclus and Aristocles (pp. 75-77); on the high stage of development in philosophy, see the core evidence above (pp. 24-27). There are thematic connections with *Protrepticus* core evidence, more than with *On Philosophy*.

Synesius: Fragment 8 (Walzer/Ross) of Aristotle’s *On Philosophy*; this comment has been ascribed to *On Philosophy*, but *Protrepticus* is also a plausible candidate. Synesius asks why should proverbs not be considered wise “which Aristotle described as relics, saved by their conciseness and cleverness when ancient philosophy perished in the widespread destruction of mankind.” This evidence should be related to the material on the rise of the skills and sciences out of destructive cataclysms, above (Proclus, pp. 75-76, and Aristocles, pp. 76-77). The topic of philosophy developing in the historical aftermath of destructive floods also occurred in the core evidence (p. 24, above). On proverbs, see next page.

Synesius: Fragment 15 (Walzer/Ross) of Aristotle’s *On Philosophy*; certain comments on illumination have been ascribed to *On Philosophy*, but *Protrepticus* is also a plausible candidate. The Byzantine author Michael Psellus says mentions “illumination, which Aristotle describes as mysterious and akin to the Eleusinian mysteries for, in these, the initiate was being molded, not taught.” Synesius reports Aristotle as claiming that “those who are initiated into the Mysteries are not expected to learn anything but to experience some change, to be put into a certain condition, in other words to be fitted for a certain purpose.” This line of thought would fit well with the argument provided by ‘Aristotle’ (pp. 44-51 above) about the purpose of human beings. Both passages are collected in fr. 15 of *On Philosophy* (Ross).

Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics* (p. 5.13-20); M. Rashed has recently suggested that this section contains allusions to the comparisons between animals and humans in *Protrepticus*, on the strength of parallels with lamblichus evidence (p. 64 above), and with the beginning of Galen’s *Protrepticus* (1-4). Rashed finds that the *Protrepticus* was also exploited in his (lost) commentary on Aristotle’s *Physics* (evidence in Simplicius and in a later Arabo-Hebrew text); and he feels that his *Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics* would reveal more about *Protrepticus* if carefully scrutinized. In our opinion, the suggestion about the *Post. An.* commentary is an understatement, and there are reasons to believe that Alexander is familiar with and making some use of the lost dialogue in many passages in the preliminary remarks to this commentary, not just in 8 lines on page 5.
Evidence in collections of proverbs

The topic of proverbs appears to have played a prominent role in the early part of the work, not only “no knife for a child,” but also “satisfaction begets insolence, and ignorance and power beget madness” and the expression “dog in a manger,” all of which occur in the early speech of ‘Isocrates’ (pp. 6-7 above). The status of proverbs was an issue between Isocrates and Aristotle; Isocrates evidently felt it was sufficient to list a good batch of good ones, as he did in his protreptic work To Demonicus. Isocrates’s student Cephasodorus attacked Aristotle for making the collection of proverbs not worth while, which would be explained if in the lost dialogue Aristotle insisted on his practice of integrating proverbs with other sources of information and insight, to tease out their meaning by research. According to Synesius (p. 80 above), Aristotle described proverbs as “relics, saved by their conciseness and cleverness when ancient philosophy perished in the widespread destruction of mankind,” a description that may have occurred in the lost work.

Iamblichus, Protrepticus, ch. II. In the second chapter of his Protrepticus, Iamblichus lists at least 16 proverbs, though accidental damage to the text has obscured 2 of them and there may have been more. The sixth and seventh proverbs were present in the lost work, expressed in the voice of ‘Isocrates’, so this question raises: what about the other ones? To judge from their style and orientation, the first 7 would be appropriate in the voice of ‘Isocrates’, the next 3-7 would be appropriate in the voice of ‘Heraclides’, and the last 2-6 would be appropriate in the voice of ‘Aristotle’. One attractive hypothesis is that Iamblichus felt he could supply the whole of a short chapter of proverbs from his main source, Aristotle’s Protrepticus.

Since we live with the soul, it must be said that it’s by the virtue of it that we live well, since, as we see with the eyes, it’s by their virtue that we see well. [19]

Do not think of gold as touched by rust, or of virtue as touched by shame. [20]
Be impelled to virtue as to an inviolable sanctuary, so that we won’t be handed over to any ignoble outrage of the soul. [9.2] [3]
Feel secure in virtue like a chaste wife, but trust in luck like a fickle girlfriend. [4]
One must suppose that virtue with poverty is better than wealth with vice, or eating scarce food with health is better than overeating with sickness. [6]
Abundant possessions are much more harmful to one whose soul is in a bad condition than is abundant food to one whose body is in a bad disposition. [8]
It is dangerous to give power to someone faulty, similar to giving a knife to someone insane. [10]
Just as fasting is better for a festering man than carrying on, so is dying better for a depraved man than living. [11]
Enjoy the observations offered by wisdom to the greatest possible extent, as if they were ambrosia and nectar; for the pleasure that comes from them is both undefiled and … [14]
… the divine a great-souled man, and make <them>, if not eternal, then knowledgeable about things that are eternal. [16]
If sensing well is to be wished for, so much more to be worked for is intelligence, for it exists in the practical intellect in us as if it were a sort of sensing well; for the former prevents us sensing badly in what we experience, and the latter prevents us reasoning badly in what we do. [10.1]
And we revere the god, in a way, when we prepare the intellect in us to be pure of every vice as if it were a blemish. [3]
Adorn a temple with offerings and the soul with teachings. [4]
Before the great mysteries the little ones should be transmitted; likewise education before philosophy. [6]
The fruits of the earth are annual, but philosophy contributes in every portion of the year. [8]
The one to whom the best land has fallen needs to take the most care of it; just so with a soul, so that it might bear fruit worthy of its nature. [10]

In wisdom collections, numerous proverbs ascribed to Aristotle hold out the possibility of having been drawn from the lost work, and one of them certainly was: “satisfaction begets insolence” (#85 Searby). This protreptic life-affirming metaphor (#58): is appropriate to the voice of Aristotle: “those who are uneducated walk around among the living like corpses.” But this sentiment is appropriate to the voice of ‘Heraclides’: “What is a human being? A paradigm of weakness, a captive of opportunity, a playing of Fortune, an icon of deterioration, a balance-beam between resentment and misfortune; and the rest is phlegm and bile” (#52). See D. M. Searby, Aristotle in the Greek Gnomological Tradition (Uppsala 1998).
Rejected evidence

For the sake of completeness, we list here all the evidence that has been erroneously or very dubiously attributed to the lost dialogue. Most of these were collected in Ross' edition of fragments 10a, 18, 19, and 20 of Protrepticus, and fr. 14 of On Philosophy. Our reason in each case for rejecting the items of evidence below is that we see no solid connection between the ideas in the evidence and those in the core evidence of the Protrepticus, presented above (pp. 1-60).

Cicero, Hortensius (a lost dialogue) and De Natura Deorum II. Tacitus mentions (Dialogue on Orators 16.7) that Cicero, in his lost dialogue Hortensius, had commented on the ‘Great Year’, a long astronomical cycle; and Cicero also alludes to this in De Natura Deorum (II.20.51-52). Cicero does not associate this concept with Aristotle, but Censorinus, perhaps relying on Cicero, does mention Aristotle’s name, saying that it should have been named the ‘Greatest Year’ (De die natali 18.11). These passages were collected as Protrepticus fr. 19 (Ross).

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations V. At four points in Book V, Cicero disapproves of Theophrastus’ denial of the thesis that virtue is sufficient for success, contrasting him with Aristotle, who held that it was (V.5.12, 10.30, 13.39, 30.87). These passages were collected as Protrepticus fr. 18 (Ross).

Cicero, Tusculan Disputations I.3.94. From this we learn that Aristotle reported about a creature that lived for one day only, probably a may-fly, found near a river called Hypanis that flows into the Black Sea. This passage was collected as part of Protrepticus fr. 10a (Ross).

Seneca, On the Shortness of Life 1.2. Seneca reproves Aristotle for complaining that the lifespan of humans, who are “born to so many and such great achievements,” is shorter than that of certain irrational creatures. This passage was collected as part of Protrepticus fr. 10a (Ross).

Tertullian, De Anima 46. While attacking the idea of divination by dreams, Tertullian finds the idea that Saturn could have been the first to dream a ridiculous one; “he could be this only if he was the first to live. Aristotle, pardon my laughter!” The sarcasm of Tertullian is hard to interpret, and we see no reason to believe that it sheds any light on this lost work; in Book III of his On Philosophy, Aristotle speculated about the mode of activity and inactivity of the living beings that inhabit the celestial regions, and this seems a more likely source of Tertullian’s comment. This passage was collected as Protrepticus fr. 20 (Ross).

Plutarch, On Tranquillity, ch. 20. In the central portion of this final chapter of Plutarch’s work, we find a vivid exploitation of the ‘spectacle of the world’ motif (on this motif, see p. 50). This was collected as fr. 14 (Ross) of Aristotle’s dialogue On Philosophy, but then E. Bignone proposed to re-attribute it to Aristotle’s Protrepticus, on the basis of the prominence of the motif in this work and its apparent absence in On Philosophy. We temporarily accepted this attribution, but later came to the conclusion that a more convincing attribution can be made if we consider the whole chapter as a citation by Plutarch. Since the beginning of the chapter approves of Diogenes of Sinope, a contemporary Cynic philosopher of whom Aristotle did not approve, it cannot be attributed to Aristotle at all; since the end of the chapter stresses the value to emotional regulation of the spectator’s detached attitude, it is more likely to be the work of a middle Stoic philosopher, a fragment from a later Protrepticus, either by Panaetius of Rhodes or by Posidonius of Apamea.

P.Vindob.G.26008, fr. A1, col. II, lines 5-32. A remark mentioning the poet Timotheus and exploring the idea of correctness and error in poetical representation has been attributed since the 19th c. to Aristotle’s lost dialogue On the Poets. In 1992, G. Most suggested that it could be re-attributed to the Protrepticus, where it could find a place relative to the material cited by Iamblichus in ch. X of his Protrepticus. This hypothesis is not to be ruled out, but we believe that the more likely attribution is the traditional one, to Aristotle’s On the Poets. See above, p. 63, for references and a fuller discussion.
Notes and feedback

Please send any and all corrections, suggestions, and other feedback to us at www.protrepticus.info
Concordances to superseded editions of Aristotle's *Protrepticus*

Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, ed. W. D. Ross
(Chicago 1955)
(evidence on *Protrepticus* on pp. 26-56)

<core evidence for a reconstructed *Protrepticus>*
Fr. 1  address to Themison -- pp. 2-3
Fr. 2  reports of an argument -- pp. 4-5
Fr. 3  P.Oxy.666 fragment -- pp. 6-7

... Fr. 5  DCMS xxvi, 79.5-80.1 -- p. 17
Fr. 5  DCMS xxvi, 80.1-81.4 -- pp. 18-19
Fr. 5  *Protrepticus* VI, 37.22-39.8, +
DCMS xxvi, 81.7-24 -- pp. 20-21
Fr. 5  *Protrepticus* VI, 39.9-40.11, +
DCMS xxvi, 81.24-82.11 -- pp. 22-23
Fr. 5  *Protrepticus* VI, 82.14-83.5, +
*Protrepticus* VI, 40.12-41.5 -- pp. 24-27
Fr. 6  *Protrepticus* VII, 41.7-24 -- p. 33
Fr. 6  *Protrepticus* VII, 41.24-43.5 -- pp. 34-35
Fr. 6  *Protrepticus* VII, 43.5-25 -- p. 36
Fr. 7  *Protrepticus* VII, 43.27-45.3 -- pp. 37-38
Fr. 8  DCMS xxvi, 83.6-22 -- pp. 24-27
Fr. 9  *Protrepticus* VIII, 45.6-25 -- p. 39
Fr. 9  *Protrepticus* VIII, 45.25-46.18 -- p. 40
Fr. 9  *Protrepticus* VIII, 46.22-47.4 -- p. 41
Fr. 10a  *Protrepticus* VIII, 47.6-21 -- pp. 42-43
Fr. 10b  *Protrepticus* VIII, 47.21-48.9 -- pp. 42-43
Fr. 10c  *Protrepticus* VIII, 48.9-21 -- pp. 42-43
Fr. 11  *Protrepticus* IX, 49.3-25 -- pp. 44-45
Fr. 11  *Protrepticus* IX, 49.26-51.6 -- pp. 46-47
Fr. 11  *Protrepticus* IX, 51.6-52.16 -- pp. 48-49
Fr. 12  *Protrepticus* IX, 52.16-54.5 -- pp. 50-51
Fr. 13  *Protrepticus* X, 54.12-55.3 -- p. 52
Fr. 13  *Protrepticus* X, 55.7-56.2 -- p. 53
Fr. 13  *Protrepticus* X, 56.4-12 -- p. 54
Fr. 14  *Protrepticus* XI, 56.15-57.6 -- p. 55
Fr. 14  *Protrepticus* XI, 57.6-58.10 -- pp. 56-57
Fr. 14  *Protrepticus* XI, 58.17-59.13 -- pp. 58-59
Fr. 15  *Protrepticus* XII, 59.24-60.10 -- p. 60

<peripheral evidence, not in sequence>
Fr. 4  *Protrepticus* VI, 37.3-22 -- p. 65

<possible further evidence of *Protrepticus>*
Fr. 16  reports on Sardanapallus -- pp. 78-79
Fr. 17  evidence in Chalcidius, *in Tim.* -- p. 80

<evidence rejected by us, as not from *Protrepticus>*
Fr. 18  evidence in Cicero, *Tusculans* V -- p. 82
Fr. 19  reports on the ‘Great Year’ -- p. 82
Fr. 20  a witticism in Tertullian, *in de An.* -- p. 82

Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*: an attempt at reconstruction, ed. I. Düring (Göteborg 1961)
(Düring B fragments, on pp. 46-93)

<core evidence for a reconstructed *Protrepticus>*
B1  address to Themison -- pp. 2-3
B2-5  P.Oxy.666 fragment -- pp. 6-7
B6  reports of an argument -- pp. 4-5

... B10-12  *Protrepticus* IX, 49.3-25 -- pp. 44-45
B13-16  *Protrepticus* IX, 49.26-51.6 -- pp. 46-47
B17  *Protrepticus* IX, 51.16-52.5 -- pp. 48-49
B18-19  *Protrepticus* IX, 51.6-51.15 -- pp. 48-49
B20-21  *Protrepticus* IX, 52.6-16 -- pp. 48-49

... B31-36  *Protrepticus* VI, 37.22-39.8 -- pp. 20-21
B37-40  *Protrepticus* VI, 39.9-40.1 -- pp. 22-23
B41  *Protrepticus* VII, 41.6-15 -- p. 33
B42-45  *Protrepticus* IX, 52.16-54.5 -- pp. 48-49
B46-47  *Protrepticus* X, 54.5-55.3 -- p. 52
B48-50  *Protrepticus* X, 55.7-56.2 -- p. 53
B51  *Protrepticus* X, 56.4-12 -- p. 54
B52  DCMS xxvi, 79.15-80.1 -- p. 17
B53  *Protrepticus* VI, 40.1-11 -- pp. 22-23
B54-57  *Protrepticus* VI, 40.12-41.5 -- pp. 24-27
B59-60  *Protrepticus* VII, 41.15-22 -- p. 33
B61-67  *Protrepticus* VII, 41.22-43.5 -- pp. 34-35
B68-70  *Protrepticus* VIII, 43.5-25 -- p. 36
B71  *Protrepticus* VIII, 43.27-44.9 -- pp. 37-38

... B74-77  *Protrepticus* VII, 44.9-26 -- pp. 37-38
B78-80  *Protrepticus* XI, 56.15-57.6 -- p. 55
B81-86  *Protrepticus* XI, 57.7-58.17 -- pp. 56-57
B87-92  *Protrepticus* XI, 58.17-59.13 -- pp. 58-59
B93-96  *Protrepticus* XII, 59.19-60.10 -- p. 60
B97-100  *Protrepticus* VIII, 45.4-25 -- p. 39
B101-102  *Protrepticus* VIII, 45.25-46.18 -- p. 40
B103  *Protrepticus* VIII, 46.22-47.4 -- p. 41
B104-110  *Protrepticus* VIII, 47.5-48.21 -- pp. 42-43

<peripheral evidence, not in sequence>
B7-9  *Protrepticus* VI, 37.3-22 -- p. 65
B28  *Protrepticus* V, 35.14-18 -- p. 64
B29-30  *Protrepticus* V, 36.7-20 -- p. 64

<evidence rejected by us, as not from *Protrepticus>*
B22-27  *Protrepticus* V, 34.5-35.14 (Iamblichus)
B58  (no ancient witness adduced by Düring)
B72  *Protrepticus* VII, 43.25-27 (Iamblichus)
B73  *Protrepticus* VII, 44.26-45.3 (Iamblichus)