might be just an axiom*

A good theory must elucidate the appropriate correctness conditions for perceptual experiences if it is adequately to distinguish these experiences from states that do not represent the world as being a certain way to the subject. But the importance of elucidating representational content goes far beyond the need to draw that distinction in the right place. By perceiving the world, we frequently learn whether a judgement with a given conceptual content is true or not. This is possible only because a perceptual experience has a correctness condition whose holding may itself exclude, or require, the truth of a conceptual content.¹

In Christopher Peacocke’s *A Study of Concepts* scenarios are visual or spatial fields centred on an individual (sensitive bodywork composition). The individual experience, individually associated with a ‘scene’ (a filling-in, ASoC 64), stiffens delivered representational contents so that in their physicalised aspect described by Peacocke contents can be available as objectively describable in a way that then contributes to Peacocke’s thesis that they are both an index of and derivational base for assignment of non-conceptual contents. As I will stress in Peacocke such a characterisation is primarily focused on associating experience with content particularly as described utilising concepts. In *A Study of Concepts* ‘scenarios’—containers for scenes, for physical, spatial, egocentric awareness secured on bodily centres and made vivid basically—remain significantly local in the sense that they are allowedly but functionally and importantly (to his thesis) locally inchoate. I pass by the possibility that such inchoateness is a matter of gradience, that materials not rising to some degree are taken as support for some non-conceptual materiality, they expand only as they are a base for a conception of assigned non-conceptual contents where in that situation contents are a type of match. From that standpoint, scenarios describe local materials in terms of their development in the sort of way a certain gentrified kind of loaf of bread describes its origin in a starter.

Perhaps the characterisation of Peacocke’s sheerly invert objective groundings developed in representation dependencies is unfair. Then how are ‘spatial’ parts (ASoC 61 et seq.) ‘scenario’, ‘scene’ (ASoC 64) independently biased outside of some circular constraints holding for some described mutual interactions associated in term uses definitionally reflective of that? How more supported than, say, is either ‘bouquet’ or ‘floral’ as derived from their standing in ‘floral bouquet’ (or just ‘bouquet’) in an argument citing some contribution to a phrasing for some arrangement that is floral, like a bouquet? How is paired even regurgitative characterisation here in the light of paired definition (even labeling operating on grounds) effectively paratactic, dis-associative?²

My interest is not in the reality of divisions among content types. What does interest me is the division forged by Peacocke in having a medium, the ‘scenario’, become for primitive theoretical regulation of contents distanced from concepts which themselves feature essentially in the specification of descriptively matched content purely as a matter of theoretical imposition, and as Peacocke confirms, fundamental by way of giving the content of a scenario. This is a theory intent on stripping out its base as incoherent in a match qualifiedly dependent on some theory. Unless of course one believes that there is some base reality informing a paralleling structure ‘non-conceptual/conceptual’ realisable as parallels across type of realisation. The peculiarity being that contents in both senses—non-conceptual/conceptual
—have one form of realisation essentially invoked in descriptions capable of describing incoherence giving the content of a scenario in describing it.

The interest—ploy—here might be in seeing individuals’ materials labeled or called in realities localised to recovery of what they are as that feature of calling in a structure built as accommodations with available individuations. It might be offensive to some psychologist’s sense of realities that we think of theory structuring in terms of combination that’s analytically so immediately decomposable, of test contact at a theoretical match, not as supporting direct analogy drawn tight to fundamentals. What I want to suggest might be interesting in the Peacocke scenario sketch I offer is just a registering of kind of non-trivial concoction in having some underpinnings appear as they do as priming in their basicness. I then also want to draw some analogies with theories—in syntax and of syntax’s relations with other related theoretical disciplines—that occasionally derive alternation with respect to adequacy/inadequacy of committed descriptive characterisations where characterisation was itself operationally fundamental in building characterisation otherwise seemingly unsupported. Picturesquely, I want to describe some dangling dependencies of a type—a-localising. The type has, I want to say, consistencies across projections to do with content involved in analogical matching in descriptions, enriched in a special sense of unknowingly in Peacocke in theoretical construal from which depends fixed objective constructions involving material underlying constitutive experience available in a scenario related to descriptions that are intimately actually insufficiently refined, ‘intimate’ a necessary proviso for entering into that contrast.

But the type also supports idiomatic imposition or collocation, in deriving its materials just so intimately and in inverted analogues for materials then descriptively chained. For a type of two way licensing example, getting slightly ahead of myself, it’s as if referencing expansion on what may be fundamentally indexical or locative as associatively quantitively bound by presentational idiom would, in giving the content of particularised expansion, involve one in a kind of indexical periphrasis. One might then, as Peacocke does, equate the centres of bodies with that material supporting construction, but limitedly; say, as if invoking an implied agent of a construction—either robustly or internally, some functional entity marked for agency in functional accord, even of a type—to use an example from Landau (following)—the etiolated (in respect of the goals of a theory of content) controlling ‘it’, say, of ‘it was decided to leave’ or generally something as necessary to expansions as essentially involving form of content and agreement.

A different reader might naturally want to hold that the priority for Peacocke was the displacement of theoretically compounded material by more readied materials active at some core of centring or mapping interest explicitly; archiving, let’s say, input from the sensorium. Interest in the explicit philosophical Peacocke scenarios’ cases relates only to the having of structural descriptions absent their specified thematics on some directed reconstruction, the scenario. What this does in terms of supporting a metaphysics of workable, descriptive, separable, content complexes is a matter again of kind of status one affords contributing items. Whatever, that is, one takes a construal as implying in a context taken as freed of supported commitment. In his intended locally centring support to context in Peacocke there is some specialising a-localising supra context at work designed as though as enriched in relation to theoretical construal; a studied positioning in respect of detected effects invoking selectional properties taken in explanatory combination with predicates or properties. Returning in that construal materials primed for later conceptual consequentiality (invoked in ‘correctness conditions’ underlying application). Conceding
to Peacocke’s perceptual and spatial types of expanded correlate—those centred fields—this might be loosely an association to a ‘mapping’, a wrought from some centred cartographic input (again, associated by Peacocke with contents, see for instance his being driven around wearing a blindfold analogy of his earlier *Sense and Content*) that constrains representation ordered in some constructively available way as representative of sense dependents. With wrought-ness perhaps an achievement like some idiomatic imposition or collocation.

There is a less indirectly posed or artificial, clearly active median between mapping and syntactic (as even organisational) constraint as one might think of grammatical representation effects, as at least effects trimmed to representation. It, that median, doesn’t claim to elucidate anything; it will facilitate, if it does, a kind of representational, formal lucidity (not speciousness). Whether this amounts to more than a kind of organisational workspace clarity is something else. Clearly Peacocke is targeting something more, that interactional component bearing on a truth of a conceptual content on a basis of inference, explicitly. Absent completed detail in proposals about how that would go (detail in Peacocke is somehow to do with archiving stabs at the sensorium as a labeling-of constructed from the physical centre) that can be rather plain base construal, and one with no duplicative configurational base (studied effects a product of the theoretical imagining). So for instance as projected as worked on archived correlates’ sensorial dependents will not order relations of take-up in the un-configured base and there will be reliance on some organisational hierarchies that are said to effect or discipline uses in something like syntactic construction where active construction was a source of analogy.

It would be a commonplace to remark a syntax impetus as well as a cognitive science one invoking related matches assigned effectively among hierarchies supporting interconnections or chains or webs or type of augmented visualisation. What is not my target here is the way in which—endorsed, I think, by Peacocke—agents make inferential transitions involving materials supported by semantic matches within and among materials as a base of transitions (supported in the sense of mapped by structures for such transitions). Unsurprisingly, there is no necessarily objective visual or spatial component (excluding say, stringing) in metaphorical uses connected even in materials that appear sourced in that way which are not sourced in that way. A ‘scenario’ in Christopher Peacocke’s sense—a mode of transition for content—can be supported as visually coded in the same sort of way that some person’s choice of assignment from ‘rural’/‘cosmopolitan’ may be visually encoded too. Normal base arbitrariness in some reduction goes to typing encodings of oppositions as material (‘symphonies’/{symphon}{knees}, symphonies/’symphonies’)—I’m just adverting to mixing materials generable from analytic as opposed to quotational idiom/convention (where a theoretical use is an expansion on convention with a virtual component driven by analyses).

I take then from the kind of examples above (and others to follow)—in which an item given a grammaticalised content characterisation carries extra-grammatical, say, semantic information plugged backed into any target of its functional profiling—material into combination with criticism of various apparent systematic inadequacies of grammatical systems in their parts determined as structural to fully characterise the content of structures they do characterise. An easier example of this comes from certain types of functional profiling accorded in linguistics targeting categories minimally imposed. So, for instance, discussing control3 structure Idan Landau in *Elements of Control*, gives examples necessitating speakers’ construal of controllers involving agents—p22, the paradigms b.,c. contrasted with a. taken as involving human agency (PRO marks the implicit controller)
a. (Before PRO entering the basement), the rain washed the stairs.
b. (Before PRO entering the basement), the stairs were washed.
c. (Before PRO entering the basement), Mary was washed.

The sample observations are given with others involving ‘blocking’ effects, effects of the identity and nature of the controller of PRO, the relation of salience as overriding representation (EoC, 22-23).

Of course this is a different matter than fully productive agency implied in Peacocke’s fillings-in, his centrings. How explicit does that have to get? Compare one (in-explicit) extreme, Peacocke’s idealisation in respect of the supporting mechanics of non-conceptual content as a match between sub-personal configurations in construction in dependent characterisation independently posed, to (explicit) segmented continuities supporting structurally associated dependencies, as formally necessitated in the grammar in dependent but nominally empty constituents (‘PRO’) recognised by the grammar (with the possibility of being full-on nodal representations). The earlier ‘do fully characterise’ point can then, I hope, be related to that sense of characterising that takes one to elements, formal, contrived; loosely, aspectual; in some theories involving identity reevaluation in affixation, or that are systematically but complexly stigmatic or inflecting (they mark); the failure I mentioned earlier being only the inability to characterise as properly systematic any types of relatable systematisation, so uncontrived (minimal).

Again, in control effects in grammar (active over strictly empty representations as a functional complement to categories bearing inherent content) the dis-analogy as it concerns me is between a relation of representation in construal in comparison to content with no limit as to how that is supported. It’s almost incidental that a philosopher should invoke a cartographic input to that base that supports generalisations described as contents. Almost any kind of attention to functional categories taken in distinctions imposed at the level of theory internal functionality disposes of some of that awkwardness of explicitly modeling associated instantiations covering content instantiation. The issue of content-types a matter of appropriate matches among categories, homogeneity in formalisations in ascribing of a kind relief from ascription of base linked credulities (easier to achieve as limited in the syntax) versus manner or aspect type debased to figure (overridden by philosophical ‘mode of presentation’ or ‘character’ I would suggest) in a philosophical retrieval. Or, as in Peacocke, figural as anthropomorphic dependency.

But where or what precisely is Christopher Peacocke’s ‘right place’ for drawing defining representational distinction reintroducing base linkage? More restrictedly I take it that there’s always at least some lock on to some specifier covering for representations in terms of support for contents in relating perception to content in tractable forms where in any expansion on that in descriptive context that expansion remains in lock with that core content (shifting the analogy again, as is some reduplication to its base as being—in the theory centric cases that count—differentiated in connection with a content core replicated). The figural, epistemological, metaphysical basis of that I mean here, although the analogy in formal terms that interests me comes straight from phonological theory; specifically, as originating in McCarthy and Prince (1993) as redescribed in their 1995 in terms of strictures on input output clauses considered under ordered competing constraints of that (phonological) theory.

I want to expand here a little to (try to) devolve analogies a bit. What if the kind of materialising mental figurations of in-existents, ascriptions of contents to contents underpinning significant orientation
in Peacocke’s way, even colluding as he describes effects of stimulated judgmental consciousness finally in passages of conceptualising (where conceptualising was, archly, implicated in attributions determinative of concept in application (correctness conditions), what if they (as determinations) were just and only further structured in reflecting strictures associated with some descriptive maintenance adequate to content reproductions *appropriated to* analogy?

A number of passages in the early pages of *A Study of Concepts* locate a kind of fastidiousness in the attribution of theoretical character applying to concept attribution. That carefulness is activated in a dissimilation of levels associated with (perceptually, predicatively and otherwise) weighted attribution. So, (as according to his theory in his previous *Sense and Content*) initial conditions for possession of the concept red (perceptual content *red*) such that (*A Study of Concepts*, 7–8, reworded slightly and shortened by me) (the prime on *red* indicating a sensational property)

*red* is that concept *C* to possess which a thinker must meet these conditions: a thinker is disposed to believe a content consisting in a singular demonstrative mode of presentation, *m*, in predicational combination with *C*, when availability of *m* perceptually experienced presents its object as in *red*’ regions of the subject’s visual field (with conditions on a subject’s normal functioning and related disposition to form beliefs in accord with the taking of an object as so presented).

There is then a further condition presented by Peacocke as offering a ground in some condition *k* *not* meeting all those conditions above for *m*, for a content presenting *k* singularly as having as its object the primary ground (if any) of the disposition of objects to cause experiences of the sort mentioned above. Peacocke, I take it, wants to dissimilate grounds in support of something like a basis in disjunctive conception as implying the ability to make use of a conception in attributing its use as distinct from just using it. This would be a kind of theory of information content applying at a separate level to the kind of determination of content usual to self-orientating—taken in that tradition motivated by discussing, as cohesively internally motivating, distinctions relating to content type as just that. The tradition has a physicalist, perceptual—here colour perception—bias, with perceptual content locking into disposition in accounts invoking possession conditions but here with that attention to dissimilation allowing significant isolation of ‘possession conditions’ as objective source and target of explication. If, even if, you’re uncomfortable with possession conditions (linked in application to sensational properties in the account at this point) they apparently can still serve in an account that’s not circular and is independently ‘illustrative’ you can still use techniques similar to those used in the possession conditions to avoid circularity in the account of possession of the concept *red*. Suppose that the concept *red* is regarded as not explicable in terms of sensational properties and is regarded as covering a range of more finely sliced shades of surfaces and volumes. A theorist who accepts that can adapt the possession conditions by removing from it the clause (1) ‘presents its object in a red’ region of the subject’s visual field.’ [reworded slightly by me above.] That theorist should replace these words with ‘represents its object as having a shade that is in fact a shade of red.’ In the resulting possession conditions, the concept *red* is used in classifying shades. It does not occur within the scope of the thinker’s psychological attitudes. ASoC 8.

We utilise terms subject to specification without circularity in matching to concepts available to a theorist, circularity is avoided and specification is as it were innocent so long as terms don’t appear within that-
clauses or within the scope of a thinker’s attitudes, and more, that being outside the scope of such is partly constitutive of some material’s being a part of good explanation (appearing in an explainer’s that-clauses). Clearly there is an issue here of exactly what is contributed by circumstance, and, stemming in Peacocke’s strictures, how uses are not determinately describable in terms of formations detaching artificially one in connection to another without implying levels in approach that then figure into one’s scruples in assigning (if specifications were adequate). In a reversal of the role of explication (Peacocke’s ‘explicable’ above) the concept red has a determined classificatory extensional presence contrasted with a use value, or not in a remaindering so to speak, or that is ‘replaceable’ in an account that mentions original terminology in an exact match in determinative and applied uses (as available across ways, according to Peacocke, attributable in ‘protopropositional contents’, another form of matching, in object and property orientations divided up). (77) Explanation here is fundamentally, importantly opaque, matches are a matter of considered referential convention.

The point about embargoes on analytic analogies populating identities is made by Peacocke in respect of his subject matter, conditions on concepts ($A(C)$). Peacocke says, ‘A statement that individuates a concept by giving its possession conditions is an identity statement’ ($ASoC$ 9). So, in respect of the just discussed concept ‘conjunction’ a statement of its possession conditions has the form

\[
\text{Conjunction} = \text{the unique concept C such that for a thinker to possess C is for . . . C . . . . }
\]

And that

This identity does not imply that the concept of conjunction is identical with the concept of being the unique concept C such that for a thinker to possess C is for . . . C . . . .

From which Fregean considerations—criteria involving ‘informativeness’; ‘sense’ distinctions; failure of reference—are applied, culminating in a warning against identifying ‘entities referred to, here concepts, and the identity of sense of descriptions used in making the references.’ (10) Peacocke continues

Some relaxations consistent with the underlying motivation of the form $A(C)$ make that general form less demanding. One relaxation is motivated by the fact that in a wide range of cases a set of concepts has the property that one can give an account of possession of any one of its members only by mentioning what is involved in possession of the other members of the set. In such cases we have a local holism.

I resist italicising ‘mentioning’. It’s not clear that we have more here than a ‘local holism’, reformulated, perhaps, as theoretically effected dependencies as functionally defined in terms of independence of source materials promoting identification of referred to materials supporting something like quotational idiom. (With the allowance that idiom can be be less or more expansive in terms of construals.)

I want to try something else. Imagine, for the moment, a water colourist, impressed by Impressionism, intent on depicting a line of poplars following a river bank near Henley. What, in that very minimal description calling on your imagination, entitles anyone to any other than normalised dissociative interaction in following the contents of my words? What would that be that’s not in some way dependent on some further projective filling exploitative of something like one’s recall of illustrative sample, story,
analogy; illustration, sample, in some hyper-personal allocation (including product of disinterest) or other? But then even if it's the case that construction is possible from mental items secured minimally following conventions to do with narrative possibilities (in 'worlds' co-ordinating for projected conventions so driven, perhaps) then, where are there bases in matches among items as items invoked in conventions disposing one one way or another in respect of matching without including—in the story—some information respecting application of intention? (A case of a relaxation now deferring matches in the superficialities from which dependencies supporting, I would say, Peacocke's concept-type dependencies, are attributed.) But the point is this, in the story one goes to contents (ideas) constrained as applying to [some water colourist] [impressed by Impressionism] [intent on depicting a line of poplars following a river bank near Henley], but there is nothing here to help one in making that application beyond possession of concepts and related contents in one's possession un-complicatedly. In fact inalienably. So projection into fictional or imaginative construction is, inalienably, secured on concept-matter contracted in type of possession condition, ownership. That is, unless a different type of contractual condition, a kind of expansion of availability of counting materials (involved in identifications) is allowed, operating in some way across formative seemings and dissociation (which is something like the formative and even pseudo propositional material in accounts offered up in Peacocke as underpinning and shaping non-conceptual contents as preparative, prefatory). I'm saying that the oriented orientation is problematic for coordinating contents.

It might be that the phrase 'local holism' covers a range of explanatory possibilities spreading to consistencies of theories generally, that we can take something from Peacocke's caution about delimiting and differentiating modes of support for abstracts to sort something in the varieties of tensions at work in settling contents of theories self-determined to be consistent (facing a barrage of neo-consistencies). The subject-matter becomes then a holism in its entirety in self-consistent self-representation underpinned by that recognition operating over items formulated in a vocabulary supporting consistent representations and operations. In A Study of Concepts scenarios—described by me as 'containers'—associate a type of primitive to a grammar worked on transitions paralleling a proposed familiar egocentric type of orientation's handling of objects in a vicinity. The value of scenarios though is distanced from origination, it lies in the depiction of support for and delineation and record of separable coordinate valuations and conceptual transcribing.

If, adapting Susan Rothstein, syntactic representations have structure accorded by cognitive system in processing strings of words, then structures have a reality according to systematic input to semantic interpretation and one can evaluate a syntactic theory in terms of whether or not a semantic representation can be derived from it by algorithms. The issue according to Rothstein goes beyond linguistic theory because these syntactic structures are semantically interpreted. If a grammar can refer to an individual's knowledge of their language, as William Croft believes, then, as Croft sketches, a language user accesses specific knowledge of interleaved components of an encoding—syntactic, semantic, realised in syntactic forms—determined in access and production represented in what he calls the realisation or semiotic function of a syntactic form. In what sense (that supports a reversed characterisation of competent use, perhaps as 'realisation') can theoretically further grammaticalised characterisation (taken as internally supported in extensions from the meanings of analogies offered as determinative finally of contents) of pre or proto-linguistic non-conceptual/scene-like manoeuvrings depend on reverse characterising those to? That is manoeuvring is remotely equated with content. The Peacocke point
is related at least to that issue of psychological reality derived from that cognitive component of representational matching as transduction or transcription compositionally related to transfer and reception with no morphological limit on the thinness of interest. In an ascription related in transcriptions, any immediate event-like status as precisely constituting in discussions as first source for dependent characterisation might be weighted toward the, or identified as, literal.

There remains though the potential for intra theoretic identification when theories are contrasted or compared. Again in phonology quite recently there has been attention to a relation with syntax asking a question about shared structure or bleeding at least between structures, stemming from work by Elisabeth Selkirk and others. A motivation here was to understand the nature of constraints as intramodal structural matching across materials placed in such a way (edges; constituents; representations) that they were available to theories of constituency (prosodic, syntactic) and to the characterisation ‘faithfulness’ (stemming in OT) across matched representations over input-output involving the placement of segments of output and input in corresponding positions (p→s; s→p). One could take it that this was ‘clarification’ given in terms of support to autonomous representation from shared segmental authorisation (input output) built from a match at levels. Of course whether there is real autonomy outside captured stricture is a difficult matter.

Other than at the neck of his constriction to local holisms Peacocke avoids some of that circularity involved in showing ascriptive displacement in taking materials in, his holisms really only involved in taking in materials in analogies referring to transfer of contents to content. Of course Peacocke could rely on that standardness of supporting analogies from bodily impinging and perceptual encounter with a revisionary capturing of input as an affecting of something like capacity, developing as, in something like Croft’s semiotic sense, linguistic consciousness. I haven’t touched on much of Peacocke’s book and the interactions it further exploits based on unfurling content constituency, with that constituency evolved in part from deposits of physical to mental interactions accruing over interactions that can be described. I’ve discussed an interaction that suggests a bleed among differently conceptualised component make-ups, as sustained by reality reflected in theories in divisions (non-conceptual/conceptual/descriptive) explanatorily sustained. Perhaps similarly a theorist working with a sense of theoretic structuring assessing structures for parallelisms wants to assess some materiality in assignments, in some sense independently, and can look to construals (again, as in broad ways attesting) as support to constructional comparison. But there will be some remaining drive to dissolve particular facts of theoretical implementations in more or less universalised assessments with the most general application developing in noticed connections. You stabilise your sense of the significance of those by positing structuring axioms implementing your insights (say).

Norvin Richards at the start of his ‘Deriving Contiguity’ describes the following principle from previous work

(1) Generalized Contiguity
If α either Agrees with or selects β, α and β must be dominated by a single prosodic node, within which β is Contiguity-prominent. (Richards 2017, 1)

an explicit adjustment to ‘Match Theory’, a mapping of syntactic structure explicitly onto prosodic structure. In Richards’ 2016, ‘Agree’ and ‘selection’ components as in (1) are developed in an exception to, as locally overriding some principles of Match Theory. The statement (1) is a few paragraphs later
discussed as problematic, as being perhaps ‘just an axiom’ itself pending development, attempts
at principled structured derivation—derivation involving ‘other principles’ (Richards 2017, 1-2).

The aim is now rather to develop from (1) a theorem invoking independent conditions, showing as
structured dependencies (e.g., ‘on the syntactic representation of Agree relations’, on ‘selection relations’) —to dissolve (1) in some greater dependencies. Why should Richards (for one) worry at and want to
decompose as merely axiomatic a usefully succinct projectable stricture, because there is a goal of greater
generality or realism in controlling in-explicitness attaching just to the idea of an interface derivationally
confronted? ‘Contiguity’ is an achievement theorised as associating distinguishing placements subject to
displacements characterising among potentials of located interactions—structure, edge, node,
multidominance structure, prosodic projection, probe-goal, Agree, selection constraint—all faced to relate
here at that interface syntax-phonology at the level of level of representation, interface condition made
discrete. Richards’ stricture on axiomatic presentation, his dissolving of purely representational (prosodic)
dependency in general conditions is to take the (in detail) form of ‘an independently proposed condition
on the syntactic representation of Agree relations’ in the context of a broadening of conditions on
‘prosodic representation’ like those in Match Theory ‘that map syntactic relations of dominance onto
corresponding prosodic dominance relations’. (2)

Richards derives in detail conditions on representation. General conditions on representation of a
type ‘constraint’ are suited generally to getting an understanding of principles involved in building
correctly coerced grammars themselves describable as a form of reflex to factored hierarchical constraint-
based interaction, hopefully with some further conflicted consciousness of a conception ‘surface’ or ‘level-
true’. Where the attention in Peacocke is philosophically constrained, I’ve tried to show that material is
still analogously exposed under a variant conception level-true, at least in so far as Peacocke generates
vocabulary disseminating distinction/bound referrals in covering distinctions. Vocabulary distinctions are
connected to identifications made in content transformations as obliged to descriptive characterisations of
contents. I hope I’ve framed discussion of that as moot in connection with anything other than moveable
or carried-over descriptive reality, which can be a kind of clarification. More floridly, and perhaps
simplistically, not so commonplace transcriptional entities are not restricted to their described subject
matters, they distance too. Again, perhaps the characterisation of Peacocke’s sheerly invert objective
foundations developed in mere representation dependencies is unfair.
* Norvin Richards’ expression in ‘Deriving Contiguity’ (author’s pre print, 2017).
2 Of course I don’t mean to address the basis in human psychology of observations relating to perception and the parsing of material related to that in informed philosophy of perception. With adjustment to what is meant by ‘level’ there is really nice attention to problems associated with regulating materials associated with a definitive parsing in achieving principled descriptive correspondence or matches in Match Theory, see Elisabeth Selkirk, 2009, in The Handbook of Phonological Theory, 2nd edition, John Goldsmith, Jason Riggle and Alan Yu, eds. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
3 (Elements of Control, 174.) Idan Landau is concerned with the specifics of control, he describes ‘it was decided to leave’ as an instance of control by ‘the implicit agent of an impersonal passive’ (174). For my purposes here, I want just to assimilate dummy, expletive or pleonastic instances, here ‘it’, to other positions as carriers of formally registering content, a kind of reversal of the philosophers’ pinning of contents to semantically superficially active items.
4 The phrase ‘mapping’ is problematic, so as supporting a reduction to content via some imposition of combination or inversion it’s problematic outside of usage carrying some kind of stipulated reductions anyway. For instance as linked with argument visualisation, instrumentation, boxing etc, in implementing associated generic senses for ‘argument’ as reproducing as ‘mapping’ is used that way in both (cognitive) linguistics, in combinatorics supporting syntax matches, and in philosophy as well in the sense of a recurrent or ‘object of’ in construals.
5 A control verb licences its arguments; subjects or objects. In Landau there are important distinctions relating to the nature of control and the character of that and a particular distinction between predicational and propositional characters of the control verbal relation to its objects.
6 Prominent across phonology/morphology/syntax (again, Richards 2017) where supported facts about an interface or interfaces derive continuities. More on this later.
7 But this is almost merely theory internal carping about the actual status of representations local to minimalism.
8 The ‘character’ association in philosophy of language carries centred material as indexed or available to index. It’s a kind of insufficient and problematic acknowledgment of irretrievable depth, we should not all be facing some form of synaesthesia or straight modal diffusion.
11 It’s not, I think, unreasonable to think of Peacocke’s non-conceptual contents as awaiting conceptual un-muting.
12 The interested reader could look at Elisabeth Selkirk, ‘The Syntax-Phonology Interface’, in The Handbook of Phonological Theory, citation above. More recent work by Emily Elfner on Match Theory is relevant too.
13 Tori Ishii in his review of Contiguity Theory, 2019, open access, elucidates Richards’ use of ‘contiguity’ thus: ‘In (9) [my (1) above], Β is Contiguity-prominent within Φ if Β is adjacent to a prosodically active edge of Φ.’ with contiguity a priming for grouping and aduction of adjacents—identifying prosodic nodes (referencing Richards’ 2016) Tori Ishii , ‘Contiguity Theory’, English Linguistics 36: 1 (2019) 69–80.
14. The reader may recognise amalgamate characterisations from OT.
15. ‘invert the mousse on to a serving table’, helpful illustration given by google in defining ‘invert’.
https://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=invert&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8