On the Cognitive Value of Literature:
The case of Nietzsche’s *Genealogy*

Near the end of the *Republic*, Plato challenges defenders of poetry to explain how it “not only gives pleasure but is beneficial…to human life.”¹ We sometimes hear a heightened version of this demand. Partisans not just of poetry but literature in general are asked to establish that the arts they celebrate possess a *distinctive or unique* value. In other words, they must show that poetry and literature are *irreplaceable* and that we would lose some great good were they banished from the scene.²

As with Plato’s original challenge, the more radical version is often met on cognitive grounds. It is said that poetry and literature can convey knowledge and insight that could not otherwise be conveyed. They can teach us truths that could not be taught via the ordinary prose works of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and the like.³

In *Beyond Selflessness*, Christopher Janaway depicts Nietzsche’s *On the Genealogy of Morals* as an example of a literary text that has this kind of cognitive value.⁴ Janaway’s argument has two parts. It begins with a claim Plato might concede. Unlike stereotypical academic prose, Nietzsche’s literary writing style arouses our emotions. But rather than going on to say, as Plato often does, that our emotions *interfere* with the knowledge acquisition process, Janaway pushes the opposite point. Feeling the emotions Nietzsche’s style provokes is *necessary* for understanding the truths he wishes to convey.

Janaway’s argument is provocative, intriguing, and in broad strokes somewhat popular.⁵ However, I find it defective. The purpose of this paper is to disclose its flaw. My objection will concern the second part of the argument. I will take issue with the claim that our emotions enable us to grasp truths we could not otherwise grasp. I will concede that this idea seems plausible when we think of ourselves as isolated individuals left to our own devices. However, it loses its appeal once we recognize that we can rely on the cognitive resources of others. Those who have grasped what their emotions reveal can communicate their discoveries to us in a straightforward manner. Thus, we can acquire knowledge of any (propositional) truth our emotions might disclose without actually experiencing these emotions.

In the first half of the paper (Sections I-III), I will develop this objection in more detail. In the second half (Sections IV-VI), I will examine the most promising responses someone who held Janaway’s position could offer and explain why they fail.
Janaway focuses on the specific case of Nietzsche’s *Genealogy*. However, we can interpret him as engaged in a more generic project. He seeks to establish that some works of literature can teach us things more traditional academic works cannot. This project has several supporters. In addition, Janaway’s way of going about it is common. Perhaps the most well known statement of the sort of strategy he employs occurs in Martha Nussbaum’s writings. Two insights she defends in *Love’s Knowledge* bring out some points of interest.

Nussbaum’s first insight is that the kind of prose we typically encounter in academic work, especially in philosophical treatises, only addresses our intellects. It does not speak to us on an emotional level, as poetry and literature so often do. This state of affairs, Nussbaum claims, reflects the deep but often unacknowledged influence of certain theoretical commitments held by Plato and, in the modern era, Locke. Both philosophers saw emotion as having pernicious effects on our philosophical judgment. It distorts our evaluation of evidence and leads to prejudice in our assessment of arguments. Thus, Plato and Locke counseled that any writing intended for the purpose of instruction should rid itself of emotive language. The following passage from Locke captures the point:

> But yet, if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheat; and therefore however laudable or allowable oratory may render them in harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault either of the language or person that makes use of them.

According to Nussbaum, the legacy of such a policy recommendation is the absence of literary and poetic elements in most academic prose today, which proceeds instead in an abstract, impersonal, and dispassionate manner.

Nussbaum’s second insight is that the adequacy of this kind of academic prose for imparting knowledge depends on the accuracy of Plato and Locke’s view of the emotions. If their position is correct, and our emotions only inhibit our attempts to acquire knowledge, then stereotypical academic prose will suffice. If Plato and Locke err, a different conclusion follows. Precisely what this conclusion is depends on how far wrong they go. Two possibilities deserve mention.

1. It may well be that sometimes our emotions do not inhibit understanding but *aid* it.
On this view, academic prose will not always be the most effective means for accomplishing our communicative goals. In some cases, we will be better off utilizing a literary or poetic style of writing that speaks to our readers’ emotions.

(2) It may well be that sometimes our emotions do not merely aid understanding but enable it.

If this second position is correct, at times academic prose will be inadequate for imparting knowledge. Conveying information will require activating faculties that academic prose does not address. To achieve our communicative ends, we will have to turn to literature or poetry, such being the forms of writing that rouse the emotions.\footnote{11}

In this way, Nussbaum carves out a strategy for defending the indispensable cognitive value of literature. One need only prove the second of the preceding two views of the emotions. As we will see, this is how Janaway proceeds.

II

Janaway’s version of the argument builds on Nietzsche’s perspectival view of knowledge. Janaway endorses a popular interpretation of this doctrine put forth by Brian Leiter. According to Leiter, when Nietzsche declares that all knowing is perspectival,\footnote{12} he means that our understanding of any particular topic is always somewhat one-sided. We only grasp some of the truths about it, not all of them. In other words, our focus is always selective. We attend to certain parts of the subject into which we are inquiring, but overlook others.\footnote{13}

The relevance of Nietzsche’s perspectivism becomes clear when we ask what factors might determine the focus of our mental attention. Scholarly responses vary here. Leiter holds that our practical interests and goals do the work.\footnote{14} Maudemarie Clark suggests that our background beliefs and cognitive capacities are partly responsible.\footnote{15} Janaway provides yet another answer. He claims that our affects – which he takes to include our feelings, moods, and emotions – sometimes direct our attention (pp. 208-209).

I find Janaway’s view attractive. It is a defensible interpretation of Nietzsche and a good account of how things go in the world. In fact, what Janaway says accords well with recent work on the emotions done by Jenefer Robinson, Noël Carroll, and others.\footnote{16} We can use their findings to flesh out his position.

Robinson and Carroll describe our emotions as performing at least three cognitive functions. First, our emotions make some aspects of our experience more salient than other aspects. They bring things from the margins of consciousness to its center. Second, our emotions organize our perception and our conception of the world, framing it in terms of a particular gestalt or whole.
(Robinson speaks here of viewing the world through an emotional lens.) Finally, our emotions prime us to be on the lookout for the emergence of considerations that will confirm or fill out this gestalt or whole.

For an example of how our emotions play these roles, consider GM I.14. Here Nietzsche describes the journey of Mr. Rash and Curious into the workshop where Judeo-Christian ideals are made. The workshop comes across as something out of a horror movie. It is dark, lit only by a “false iridescent light.” Mr. Rash and Curious can see next to nothing. Soft muttering and whispering arise from “cellar rodents” huddled together in hidden nooks and crannies. The smells are awful. The noxious air forces Mr. Rash and Curious to pinch his nose.

On an affective level, the scene evokes a sense of unease or even fear, as well as a slight feeling of disgust. These emotional responses prompt us to consider the secrets of the workshop from a certain perspective. They lead us to attend to what is unnerving about the Judeo-Christian values that Mr. Rash and Curious investigates. Thus, as we read about his terrifying discovery that these values are the product of deception, it hits home in a powerful way: “Now [the inventors of Judeo-Christian morality] give me to understand that they are not merely better than the mighty, the lords of the earth whose spittle they have to lick (not from fear, not at all from fear! but because God has commanded them to obey the authorities) – that they are not merely better but are also ‘better off,’ or at least will be better off someday. But enough! enough! I can’t take any more. Bad air! Bad air! This workshop where ideals are manufactured – it seems to me it stinks of so many lies.”

This first example captures an obvious way in which our emotions help us to understand the content of the Genealogy. However, our emotions also provide more subtle assistance. A second example illustrates the point. As we explore Nietzsche’s account of the slaves’ behavior, we experience something besides disgust and revulsion. Admiration mixes with these negative feelings (see Janaway, p. 101). This more positive emotional reaction toward the slaves constitutes an important piece of data, one we must take into account in our interpretation of Nietzsche’s text. Our struggle to accommodate it leads us to wonder what the slaves might be doing that gives rise to our esteem. We eventually come to realize that, despite their hypocrisy, the slaves are remarkably clever. Gaining revenge by inverting their oppressors’ value system is an ingenious strategy. In this way, our emotions help augment our grasp of Nietzsche’s take on slave morality.

III

We can now see how our emotions play a role in the knowledge acquisition process. We can appreciate how they help us understand what Nietzsche aims to convey in the Genealogy. These points are important—and underappreciated. Yet,
they fail to get us where we need to go. The pivotal question is not whether our emotions ever play a role in the knowledge acquisition process, but whether they ever play a necessary role. In other words, do they enable us to grasp truths we could not otherwise grasp?

Janaway answers this question in the affirmative (pp. 4, 48, 212). So do several other scholars. I find their response tempting but mistaken. The temptation arises because we have reason to believe a position confusingly close to the one they adopt. Explaining this position will allow me to clarify the challenge facing Janaway and likeminded thinkers.

Supporters of the cognitive value of the emotions sometimes point out that dispassionate people as well as the affectively disabled struggle to solve certain problems. For example, Robinson cites empirical research showing that people who lack emotional intelligence have trouble figuring out how to respond appropriately in social situations. Similarly, on Janaway’s interpretation of Nietzsche, Paul Rée fails to come up with the correct explanation for the origin of punishment because he does not consult his emotions on the matter.

However, notice that the people discussed in these cases are depending on their own cognitive resources. Rée is striving to go beyond the work of other philosophers and make his own original contribution to the field. The people in the studies Robinson mentions are attempting to make decisions for themselves about matters of social importance. This consideration limits what conclusion follows from these cases. They may show that feeling emotions is indispensable for arriving at certain truths on one’s own. However, they do not prove that feeling emotions is necessary for understanding those truths.

An analogy helps here. It is consistent with the evidence provided by the cases in question that our emotions function how telescopes do, namely as “tools of discovery.” A telescope brings things into focus we otherwise could not see. However, we can convey the truths it reveals, e.g. that a planet exists in some distant solar system, to those who lack access to a telescope or who are not currently consulting theirs. Thus, learning these truths does not require gazing through a telescope.

Applying the analogy, there may be truths none of us would know unless one of us consulted his or her emotions. But it does not follow that each of us must consult his or her emotions in order to understand these truths. We could learn about them from others, provided the chain of testimony eventually stretched back to an emotionally attuned individual.

The notion that our emotions are merely tools of discovery is not just an idle possibility Janaway must rule out. At least when reading the Genealogy, our emotions appear to function that way. We can garner support for this claim by returning to the examples discussed in the previous section.
In the first example, I noted that the disgust we experience while reading Nietzsche’s description of the “workshop where ideals are made” brings into focus the negative aspects of what transpires there. It leads us to attend to the fact that the values created in the workshop are the product of dishonesty. However, this fact is something that can be communicated to people without first arousing their emotions. Indeed Janaway has done it in his commentary, as have I just now.

In the second example, I explained how our surprising admiration for the slaves prompts us to reflect on why such a feeling might overcome us. We eventually realize that the slaves possess subtle positive attributes in addition to their more obvious negative ones. In particular, they display astonishing creativity in their attempts to revenge themselves against their masters. However, once again, the information that our emotions help us to understand can be communicated in a perfectly straightforward fashion.

Thus, the challenge facing Janaway is to show that our emotions are not merely tools of discovery. He must prove that such an account undersells their cognitive power; our emotions actually enable us to grasp truths we could learn in no other way. In what follows, I will examine how Janaway tries to establish this point.

IV

I said in section II that our emotions can lead us to view the world in a particular way and then direct our attention toward considerations that support this view. One idea Janaway impresses upon us in *Beyond Selflessness* is that there is another side to this story. Our emotions can also inhibit us from attending to factors that would disconfirm or require us to reverse our judgments about the world. For example, a positive affective appraisal of a beloved family member can make it difficult to grasp unflattering truths about him or her. Similarly, harboring negative feelings toward ourselves can make it hard to see what we do well.

So much is fairly banal. Of greater interest is the fact that we encounter on occasion an extreme version of this phenomenon. Our affects at times prevent us from attending to certain information. When our emotions create cognitive blind spots in this way, straightforwardly telling us what we are missing is not going to work. We will misinterpret or ignore what is being said. (To return to my examples, our passion for our beloved can become so ferocious that it renders us completely unable to process other people’s insights into his or her flaws. Our self-loathing can become so severe that the honest and accurate compliments of others simply do not register.) Getting us to acknowledge the truth in these situations will require getting us to revise our emotional attachments. This in turn will call for a style of communication that addresses us on an emotional level.
Ordinary prose, especially of the stereotypical academic sort, is not suited to such a task. Literature and poetry are.

Janaway maintains that, in the *Genealogy*, Nietzsche sees himself as addressing an audience that is emotionally blinded in the manner just described (pp. 46-47, 52). We, Nietzsche’s readers, are deeply wed to Judeo-Christian values. These emotional bonds make us resistant to truly hearing the criticisms of altruism, compassion, and self-denial Nietzsche has to offer. Indeed, we are liable to distort or dismiss his attacks on the object of our affections. To get his message across, therefore, Nietzsche must first deal with our underlying emotional attachments. He must first reorient our feelings toward selflessness so that we no longer find it so attractive (Janaway, pp. 49-50). This task can only be done by getting us to form new, contrary emotional attachments. Herein lies part of the rationale behind Nietzsche’s literary writing style. It arouses the negative affective responses toward Judeo-Christian values that we must experience if we are to get past our hang-ups and grasp the uncomfortable truths he wishes to convey.

This argument suffers from two problems. First, the need for emotional arousal does not stem from the *Genealogy* per se. It stems rather from certain psychological facts about the book’s intended audience. If Nietzsche were dealing with a different audience, one possessed of a different psychological makeup, presenting his message in ordinary prose would be unproblematic. The upshot is that, strictly speaking, the argument does not give us reason to think there is some truth only literature or poetry can convey. It does not prove *sans phrase* that the literary style of the *Genealogy* enables it to communicate some bit of knowledge it could not communicate were it written in ordinary prose. Given that this is what Janaway seeks to establish, the argument fails.

Defenders of Janaway’s view might retort that the line of thought he defends nonetheless establishes the irreplaceable cognitive value of literature in some situations. It shows that we must make use of a literary mode of discourse when our target audience is strongly emotionally predisposed against our message. This situation arises frequently enough to make the point worthy of note.

However, a second objection undercuts this fallback position. Notice how Janaway’s argument separates the ultimate cognitive payoff of Nietzsche’s literary writing style from its more immediate emotive function. The literary aspects of the *Genealogy* serve to arouse our emotions. But these emotions do not themselves disclose the truths Nietzsche wants us to know. Instead they enable us to overcome psychological obstacles that inhibit us from grasping these truths. This set-up renders the literary aspects of the *Genealogy* vulnerable to the threat of replaceability. If we had other tools to combat the relevant psychological impediments, we could convey Nietzsche’s message to everyone, including
people emotionally predisposed to ignore them, without resorting to the literary arts. As it turns out, we do in principle possess alternative means, namely the right drugs or the right psychotherapy. Therefore, even if Janaway’s argument is only supposed to establish the irreplaceable cognitive value of literature in some cases, it cannot shoulder its burden.

V

To avoid the problems just mentioned, Janaway must identify a situation in which emotion connects with cognition in a more intimate fashion. At various places in Beyond Selflessness, he suggests that we encounter such a situation when the truths we must learn concern our emotions themselves (pp. 96, 209). 25 His suggestion builds on his interpretation of the Genealogy. Let me explain.

On the standard view, the Genealogy contains a theory of the origin of Judeo-Christian values, one in which emotion plays a central role. For example, Nietzsche argues in the first essay that the slaves denigrated the attributes of power and magnanimity that characterized the nobles partly because the slaves felt ressentiment toward these people. In the second and third essays, Nietzsche says that one reason the slaves embraced asceticism is that it allowed them to vent, at least against themselves, their pent up delight in cruelty.

Janaway thinks this view needs fine tuning. As he sees it, Nietzsche aims to explain not only the slaves’ acceptance of Judeo-Christian values but our own current endorsement of them. His explanation involves pointing out how our own current emotions – rather than our reason, as we like to believe – drive our moral commitments (Janaway, pp. 11-12, 49-50). In summary, the explanandum of Nietzsche’s theory is in part the source of our own current moral values. Its explanans is in part our own current affects (Janaway, pp. 49, 209).

Janaway argues that dispassionate readers of the Genealogy cannot acquire the knowledge of themselves Nietzsche wishes to impart (pp. 12, 17-18, 48-53, 209). To make his case, Janaway points out that, by definition, dispassionate people ignore or suppress emotions they may currently have. They adopt a perspective that involves relegating such matters to the background or pushing them below the level of conscious awareness. In so doing, however, they remove their attention from considerations that occupy a central place in Nietzsche’s theory (namely, their emotions). This cognitive blind spot prevents them from fully understanding what Nietzsche says. As Janaway puts the point, dispassionate readers cannot comprehend all that goes on in the Genealogy because they cannot “identify” or “locate” in themselves the emotions Nietzsche discusses (pp. 49, 53, 96). This fact reveals why Nietzsche must use a writing style that arouses his readers’ emotions or, more precisely, brings their emotions back to the forefront of their minds. He needs to ensure that his readers attend to the crucial aspects of his theory.
This argument, although clever, does not succeed. We can see its defect by noting that it absurdly entails the unintelligibility of Janaway’s own commentary. His commentary proceeds in a stereotypical academic fashion. The prose is dispassionate, impersonal, and generally devoid of literary trappings. When we read it, it engages us only on an intellectual level. It does not arouse our emotions. Consequently, if the foregoing argument were correct, we should find ourselves unable to understand what Janaway says when he paraphrases Nietzsche’s claim that our emotions underpin our moral values. For example, confusion and perplexity should reign when we read on page 46 that “our current moral concepts are ex post facto rationalizations of our…inherited feelings” and “we have inherited an affective allegiance to what counted as good in the conceptual scheme of slave morality” (emphasis added). Yet, that is not what happens. We grasp without great difficulty the meaning of the words on this page of Janaway’s book. Moreover, we can do so while remaining completely dispassionate.

VI

Janaway could attempt to preserve the spirit of his position by slightly altering it. He could jettison the claim that dispassionate people will fail to understand explanations that refer to their current emotions. Instead, he could maintain that dispassionate people will not believe such explanations.26

The idea here would be that dispassionate readers of the Genealogy occupy an epistemically impoverished state. Although they can comprehend what Nietzsche says, they lack access to pivotal evidence that would support his claims. As a result, they find it reasonable to reject or to withhold assent from his position.

Initially, we might wonder what dispassionate readers of the Genealogy cannot see. However, Janaway has already provided us with a plausible answer. Unlike their more emotionally attuned peers, dispassionate readers cannot identify or locate in themselves the emotions Nietzsche says are there (see Janaway, pp. 49, 53, 96).

Although prima facie attractive, this revised version of Janaway’s position still encounters a problem. The failure of dispassionate people to see the relevant emotions in themselves does not furnish them with a sufficient reason to reject Nietzsche’s claim that these emotions exist. For an inability to detect an emotion in oneself does not entail its absence. Such an inference overestimates our introspective powers. Indeed, it assumes the complete transparency of the mental realm. Nietzsche warns against such a view.27 Within many of us, there are emotions at work that do not rise to the level of conscious awareness.

Even though the emotional blindness of dispassionate people does not entitle them to dismiss Nietzsche’s claims, it might justify them in withholding assent. For it might leave them without a sufficient reason to believe what
Nietzsche says. However, this too is unconvincing. Even though dispassionate readers of the *Genealogy* cannot detect in themselves the emotions Nietzsche mentions, they could endorse his theory on other grounds. They could accept it on Nietzsche’s authority as an astute psychologist. Alternatively, they could accept it on the basis of induction. They could realize that his theory has explanatory power when it comes to other people’s moral evaluations and then generalize to themselves.

That said, the revised version of Janaway’s position makes an important point. Emotionally self-aware people are epistemically better off than dispassionate people in one respect. Consciously feeling the emotions Nietzsche tries to arouse supplies these people with a powerful piece of evidence in favor of his theory. For example, when we empathize with the slaves’ gnashing their teeth at those who exercise unfettered power over them, or when we experience waves of ressentiment toward the beasts of prey in our own lives, our estimation of Nietzsche’s position increases. It becomes more plausible to us that our emotions often drive our value judgments.

Thus, Janaway is right to defend the cognitive value of the emotions and, by extension, the cognitive value of Nietzsche’s literary writing style. His error simply lies in the fact that he goes too far. He claims that the literary aspects of the *Genealogy* enable the book to convey knowledge it could not otherwise convey. His arguments do not support a conclusion quite this strong.
Notes:


6 See note 5.

7 Nussbaum, *Love’s Knowledge*, pp. 7, 245-85. Cf. Janaway, pp. 4-5, 39, 52, 91, 96, 202. Of course, many philosophical treatises do address us on an emotional level. For instance, Berys Gaut argues that passages in Bernard Williams’s work, especially the famous thought-experiment about Jim and Pedro set forth in “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” fit this description (*Art, Emotion, and Ethics*, pp. 160-164). Nussbaum could respond, however, that such texts are not purely academic in nature. They possess literary or artistic properties. Moreover, these properties are the ones that arouse our emotions.

8 Nussbaum’s account of Plato’s views on this topic is partly a caricature used for rhetorical purposes.


11 Purely academic writing can arouse our emotions. A case report in a forensics journal of a loved one’s murder might make me despondent. A scholarly monograph that plagiarized my work might infuriate me. In these examples, however, my emotional response stems from the content and not the style of the writing. Thus, such cases are not counterexamples to Nussbaum’s claim that literature and poetry are the only styles of writing that provoke our emotions.


17 Robinson, *Deeper than Reason*, p. 128.


25 For another attempt at the same general strategy, see Nussbaum, Love’s Knowledge, pp. 261-69.

26 See Robinson, Deeper than Reason, p. 127.

27 See Nietzsche, Genealogy, Preface, section 1; Daybreak, section 119.