Nietzsche’s Philology and Nietzsche’s Science:
On the “Problem of Science” and “fröhliche Wissenschaft”

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Man glaubt es sei zu Ende mit der Philologie—and ich glaube, sie hat noch nicht angefangen … Das 5te und 6te Jahrhundert sind jetzt zu entdecken.

— Nietzsche, Wir Philologen

In Memoriam John J. Cleary (1949-2009)

Nietzsche’s philology

Nietzsche writes his inevitably metaphilological challenge,1 “Wir Philologen” in the spirit of what Werner Jaeger would later name paideia.2 Using a typically complex but classically chiastic schema to articulate this challenge, Nietzsche writes, “Against the science of philology there would be nothing to say: yet the philologists are also the educators.”3 Everything hangs upon this double-point: die Philologen sind auch die Erzieher.

As an educator, or physician of culture, casting out what he calls “fish-hooks” [Angelhaken]4 meant to lure his “best” readers, Nietzsche again and again elaborated the limits of the rhetorical directionality of writing as the question of reading and the related necessity of learning to read. Nietzsche’s culturally didactic ambition was expressly, explicitly exoteric, related to his

1 Written in March of 1875: Nietzsche was still Professor of Philology at the University of Basel, as he would continue to be through to the summer of 1879, when illness compelled his retirement.
2 Werner Jaeger explicated the term as “the shaping of the Greek character,” 1965: ix.
3 “Gegen die Wissenschaft der Philologie wäre nichts zu sagen: aber die Philologen sind auch die Erzieher.” Nietzsche 1980: 8, 14.
4 “Von da an sind alle meine Schriften Angelhaken: Vielleicht verstehe ich mich so gut als jemand auf Angel? … Wenn nichts sich fing, so liegt die Schuld nicht an mir. Die Fische fehlen.” (EH, JGB §1)
concern with the question of communication as such and in general, and that is to say, as differentially tailored to individual contexts. As he understood it and by contrast, the esoteric or internal problem of philology, was to be the very undemocratic problem of writerly-readerly reciprocity, less the problem of the author’s prowess or genial talents than the problem of culture as a whole, a problem which and in other words, also corresponded to the related problem of “finding” the “right” readers.

The challenge as Nietzsche intended this emphasis was always directed (if it was by no means limited) to his own discipline of classical philology, a discipline Nietzsche held to be at inherent odds with itself, simultaneously “history as much as natural science as much as aesthetics.” At issue was the discipline of the science of philology qua science. Nietzsche’s ideal of the scientific rigor of philology reflects the influence of his teachers, including both Otto Jahn (1813-1869) and Friedrich Ritschl (1806-1876).

But it is not hard to see philology in contestation with itself, whether in terms of power politics—nor has much changed in this—or else in terms of the very scientific definition of classical philology as such. Naming philology a “centaur,” Nietzsche argued that the discipline itself overarched its own conflicts, maintaining or holding its promise and potential in this same very agonistic tension, as he puts it in his inaugural lecture, delivered in Basel on the 29th of May, 1869:

The entire scientific and artistic movement of this peculiar centaur is utterly dedicated, though with cyclopic slowness, to bridging the gulf between ideal antiquity—which is perhaps merely the most beautiful flowering of the Germanic passion for the south—and real antiquity; and therefore classical philology strives after nothing but the ultimate consummation of its own essence, the complete fusing together and unifying of initially hostile impulses that have only been brought together with force.

7 It is an error to conclude, as many do, that Jahn had no influence on the student, Nietzsche, simply because the masters had a falling out or because Nietzsche himself writes, in a self-assessment, or early curriculum vitae, or the kind that scholars who have applied for positions or grants, etc., should recognize, foregrounding Ritschl’s influence on him. See Nietzsche 1994 V: 253.
8 This holds, ceteris paribus, for Wilamowitz’s own students.
9 “Die gesamte wissenschaftlich-künstlerische Bewegung dieses sonderbaren Centauren geht mit ungeheurer Wucht, aber cyclopischer Langsamkeit darauf aus, jene Kluft zwischen dem idealen Altertum—das vielleicht nur die schönste Blüthe germanischer Liebessehnsucht nach dem Süden ist—und dem realen zu überbrücken; und damit
In the midst of such a complicated description, one can get lost in the very Goethean allusion to the south, as this is also the allusion to Germany’s self-imposed tutelage and not less to Nietzsche’s uncompromising advocacy of awe before the very idea of Greece, a perfectly complicit tyrannizing of Greece over Germany in Eliza Butler’s memorable expression, that is also the reverse as it is all about an elect or chosen affinity.  

Archaic in his sensibilities, Nietzsche always assumed that a like sensibility would be needed in order to know (or even to begin to recognize) a like sensibility: like to like. Indeed, Nietzsche explains, this is the point of his exoteric/esoteric style, i.e., contra the ordinary convictions of writing and communicating:

—Ultimately, nobody can get more out of things, including books than what one already knows. For what one lacks access to from experience one will have no ear. … Whoever thought he had understood something of me had made up something out of me after his own image—not uncommonly an antithesis of me. (EH, Why I Write Such Good Books, § 1)  

Nietzsche uses an acoustic metaphor throughout this first section: one cannot “hear” more in things [heraushören] than what one knows from experience. And lacking prior experience, one is vulnerable to “the acoustic illusion that where nothing is heard, there is also nothing there …” (Ibid.) But exactly this illusion would have to be a problem for his fellow philologists.  

Thus Nietzsche writes his “Remark for Philologists” in The Gay Science on the disciplinary project of philology as an enterprise dedicated to the conservation of “great” books. Here Nietzsche confesses philology’s ultimate doctrine of faith: “that there is no lack of those rare human beings (even if one does not see them), who really know how to use such valuable books:—presumably those who make, or could make, such books themselves.” And using a handily emphatic trope, Nietzsche repeats his claim as it concerns the “fu-
ture” presupposed by philological science: “I mean that philology presupposes a noble faith—that for the sake of the very few human beings who always ‘will come’ but are never there, a very large amount of fastidious and even dirty work needs to be done first: all of it is work in usum Delphinarum.”¹⁵

The relevance of Nietzsche’s “in usum Delphinorum”—a variation of ad usum Delphini—has not received the attention it deserves. The manifest allusion was to the archetypically paternalistic project of creating special editions of Greek or Roman classic texts destined “for the use of the Dauphin.”¹⁶

The project of classical education corresponds to this solicitous ideal. This same vision of paideia, as we may now see the point of our initial reference to Jaeger, was Nietzsche’s point in inserting just this invocation here in his own text. The same pedagogic ideal continues to animate the high tone with which we today speak of the so-called “great books.” If the “political” connection between this standard philological convention and Nietzsche’s ideal educator has not, to my knowledge, been explored as such (even by those who discuss Nietzsche in this same context and speak of the classical in the 18th and 19th century context), it manifestly has everything to do with the class distinctions that continue to be associated with a classical education. This is a prejudice, and it is the point of a prejudice that it does not and need not mean that a classical education will necessarily have anything enduringly “classical” about it—indeed, the character and substance of such an education changes with the style of philology: in some philological cultures and times, more grammar; in others, more archaeology (the things themselves, as it were); in others, more bits of everyday life (how the Romans/Greeks lived/died, their foodstuffs, their money); the coding of, the reading of inscriptions, or history quite apart from (and sometimes at the expense of) grammar, children’s roles, women’s roles, gay roles, etc.¹⁷

¹⁵ My emphasis. “Ich wollte sagen, die Philologie setzt einen vornehmen Glauben voraus,—dass zu Gunsten einiger Weniger, die immer ‘kommen werden’ und nicht da sind, eine sehr grosse Menge von peinlicher, selbst unsauberer Arbeit voraus abzuthun sei: es ist Alles Arbeit in usum Delphinarum.” (FW §102)

¹⁶ See Huet 1674-1691, as well as Puget de Saint-Pierre 1784. See also: Bossuet 1709 and Cordemoy 1691. Examples of the project include Doujat 1671 and Fléchier 1679. See further Volpilhac-Auger 2000.

¹⁷ Thus we do well to note the warning fable Hadot offers, a true story but a fable nonetheless. Hadot relates Pierre Courcelle’s perfectly and so seemingly innocuous philological reading of the fig tree under which Augustine is sitting in his account of his conversion in a Milanese garden as a symbolic allusion to the Bible, rather than a descriptive report. As Hadot warns us, in Courcelle’s case the problem had nothing to do with his reading but the metphilological circumstance that was the automatic Catholicism, not quite the fanaticism, of France at the time or better said and sometimes still
Nietzsche argues that the philologist labors on behalf of the ideal reader but the philologist himself can only appropriate the texts of the past to the extent that such an appropriation is possible. By such “possibility” Nietzsche emphasizes a *Goethean* affinity: one must be related to that same past. What then is the correspondence between philology and its objects? between the science of antiquity and antiquity itself? This is Nietzsche’s critical question to philology.

If Nietzsche wrote in his own time, he also took an explicitly metaphilological view, a view as it were, as a word to the current enthusiasm for source scholarship as this dominates Nietzsche studies, to the source of the sources. Thus Nietzsche can observe that the ultimate aim of philology as he explicates it here in his “Remark for Philologists,” is to generate “tidied up” source matter, undertaken in anticipation of a very valued reader, a particular reader who *needs* a certain indulgence, in the sense that, so Nietzsche suggests, is related to the sense in which the Dauphin had needed to be protected against the sullying (let us say: disputed or questionable), misleading (let us say: erroneous) aspects of this same source material. Thus Nietzsche’s fondness for the Nordic metaphors of swarming dwarves, thus his invocation of other low engineering or mechanical undertakings, comparing the art of philology with the craft of restoring a painting: a fine art in the sense of necessary focus and precision but a coarse art, as Nietzsche reflects with sorrow, when it comes to the philologist’s aesthetic sensibilities.18

Regarded with all the presumption of a duly vested member of the philologist’s guild, the “Dauphin” would thus correspond to the philologists of the future. Not students, but future philologists, one’s colleagues-to-be: one’s replacements. The problem, and this is more than obvious in Nietzsche (nor need one look for Wilamowitz-Möllendorff’s polemical hatchet-job, “Philology of the Future”)19 turns out to be that philologists, like many other academics, tend to be less than fond of their colleagues and even less sanguine about their students (at least collectively and that is to say: excluding favorites).


Thus William Arrowsmith felt compelled to translate Nietzsche’s “We Philologists” in the old series of the journal, *Arion*\(^\text{20}\) and a kind of battle joy shines through the enthusiasm with which Arrowsmith pursued the task. Arrowsmith regarded his revision of Kennedy’s translation and especially his publication of this new translation as a kind of gadfly’s inspiration for the future of the profession of philology. But the philological profession simply ignored Arrowsmith: this is Nietzsche we are talking about and classical philology has been following in Wilamowitz’s literalist footsteps, and *not* in Nietzsche’s for the past century, exceptions and occasional allusions included.

Apart from Nietzsche, classical studies seem beset with internecine but not less broadly cultural woes, as witnessed by the Straussian Allan Bloom’s *The Closing of the American Mind* and moving beyond Straussians (who are interested in Plato and not interested in Nietzsche, and in spite of the very incidental detail that Strauss was interested in both, incidental because this contrast is normal for Straussians), one may consider both Martin Bernal’s *Black Athena*\(^\text{21}\) (and Mary Lefkowitz’ repeated counter-efforts)\(^\text{22}\) and indeed and in philology more broadly construed, Jan Ziolkowski’s rather testy engagement with Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in his article, “Metaphilology,”\(^\text{23}\) a testiness belying the enthusiasm of the article’s closing “… let us love the *logos!*”\(^\text{24}\) but which the author insists upon (sans the scholarly and sometimes merely superficial *pace*). The present author, limited as she is to the disciplinary perspective of philosophy, even if continental philosophy which tends to be friendlier to the textual rigors of philology, cannot help but wonder whether it is endemic to the discipline of at least ancient philology, Greek and Roman, that it would appear to stage an almost continual flirtation with the threat of disaster: always poised a step away from total laxity or, in the words of Nietzsche and his own generation, and not only his: holding down the fort against barbarism.\(^\text{25}\)

Nietzsche’s precious “future readers,” related to those contemporary readers he had specified in his earlier writings as those who “had not yet unlearned the art of thinking while reading, who even understand the secret of

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22 See, to start, Lefkowitz 1997.
reading between the lines …” are those who are to be protected from the less edifying aspects of classical literature, and by this “protection” Nietzsche refers to the work that rigorously “scientific” philologists (like Nietzsche) have to do. The point, solicitous and paternalistic as it may be is not without its barbs. For Nietzsche does not forget (and what, oddly enough, today’s classicists seem not to have fully grasped, ignoring, as classical historians, precisely what Nietzsche named a historical sensibility) is that the “texts” thus engendered, texts that become the classical standard works of philology itself for the scholars of the future, are not (and never do become or turn into) original works. The text itself, as Nietzsche famously puts it, thus disappears and, Nietzsche also adds, can only disappear under “interpretation.” This is the problem of presentism, “whiggish” or otherwise.

Conventionalized restorations, authoritative editions are in this sense utterly fabricated or prepared texts (and, so some critics will argue: expurgated or bowdlerized in the process, going in different directions depending upon whether the critic in question follows Vico or Dilthey, or even Butterfield). Such texts are manufactured or created, this is the hermeneutic point of Nietzsche’s “philologist’s complaint,” for very particular eyes. But whose eyes are we talking about? Who is Nietzsche really complaining about?

If we no longer have the moral justification or imperative for such an edifying project the results continue to live on in the methods of today’s classical philology and source scholarship. Nietzsche’s most extreme exemplification of this manufactured or idealized representation of antiquity is evident in the citational methods he employed in his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, with its notoriously creative (or indeed: “free”) variations on the received pre-platonic “fragments.” Beyond the reactionary or indeed the counter-reactionary moves of today’s ethno-classicist cum literary studies/anti-philological classics experts, it is worth reflecting upon the implications of Nietzsche’s project for ancient philosophy.

26 [That noch nicht verlernt zu denken, während er liest, er versteht noch das Geheimniß zwischen den Zeilen zu lessen …] (1980 I: 649).

27 Cf. Nietzsche, JGB §38. Nietzsche means this reference to the disappearance of the text under interpretation in another context here but the point remains relevant.

28 Although Catherine Osborne does not mention Nietzsche’s small book, see her 1987. Osborne’s study was initially (and arguably remains to some extent still) relatively unreceived within philosophy and the author has turned to other topics. Osborne’s reflections can be taken together with Nietzsche’s arguments regarding the so-called pre-Socratics (Nietzsche liked to speak of pre-Platonic philosophy) as calling for further critical reflection on the philological sources themselves.

29 In addition Marcel Detienne (who writes between Nietzsche’s two antipodes, Apollo and Dionysus) but see too Luc Brisson (especially on Plato’s *Timaeus*), and the recent work of Hadot on nature 2004, and Kahn 1960 just to begin with some of the themes Nietzsche touches on in his *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*. Although Hadot and
Given the presuppositions of his philological assumptions, claiming his works as written “for the future,” Nietzsche offers us a painful rumination on the damnation of the author and we can read this as our intimation of his own destiny. But Nietzsche was not a psychic, even if we cannot help reading him as if he were. Rather and in this way, Nietzsche expresses the philologist’s labor as bootless in an important sense, and the point of which bootlessness was part of the formal, and scientific preconditions of, and that is also to say, the limitations of the science of philology. In other words, Nietzsche, saw himself, as he saw philologists in general, writing in the hope of those “who always ‘are to come’ but who are never there.” These would be, so he argues, readers like the philologists themselves, readers who, like himself, could use, as he could use, texts of this kind for further but comparable labors of their own. But and in fact, Nietzsche is ambivalent on this point. It is not a philologist who will fit the bill but what Nietzsche here also calls a “Mensch” by which, as it turns out indeed he means a Greek. Thus Nietzsche seems to be writing for a future Greek of his imaginary specifications: someone capable of getting a point that as he says, one has to be Greek to get.

Thus he warns, very much in earnest and very much with literal justification, of the threat that the practice of philology has always tended to pose, through its own efforts and very well-meaning techniques, to the object of its researches, both hermeneutic and archaeological: “The philologists perish from the Greeks,” he writes, adding “—one might be able to endure that—but antiquity itself breaks into shards at the hands of the philologists themselves!” Nietzsche’s crossed or chiastic reflection refers to archaeological risks attendant upon the project (and this was a common “classical” undertaking of the 18th and 19th century), of archaeological restoration in the field. Today’s philologists, Nietzsche argues, engaged with their insistent efforts to reconstruct so many shattered “statues” from the dust of antiquity, are better compared to a company of “dwarves” swarming across a fallen colossus [ein Koloß]: “… no sooner is it lifted from the ground, than it

Detienne mention Nietzsche in their work, Brisson and Kahn do not and it remains unusual for a classical philologist to take Nietzsche seriously.

30 In Nietzsche’s Nachlass, after the notes for Wir Philologen, we find a little list comparing the philologists on side and the Greeks on the other. 1980 VIII: 57.


falls back and, falling, crushes the human beings beneath it.” 33 The statue metaphor is crucial for Nietzsche and references to the sculptor’s art and to philosophizing as a sculptor: i.e., with a hammer, occur throughout his work. 34

Previously Nietzsche had already warned his fellow philologists—including those who unearth nothing more vulnerable to manhandling in the field than “the proportions 7: 13 = 14: 26” (KSA 1: 702)—by teasing them with his own variation upon an Aristotelian riddle: “Have you heard that it is an untragic death according to Aristotle to be killed by a statue? And precisely this death threatens you.” 35 We may recall (it is one of Nietzsche’s habits that he does not give us the locus), 36 that Aristotle had invoked “the statue of Mitys at Argos, which fell upon his murderer while he was a spectator at a festival, and killed him” (Poetics, 6.1), but Nietzsche explicates this example as specifically non-tragic, intimating, as Aristotle does, that more is at work in such events, but also and exactly for the Nietzsche who, as we shall see later, was always concerned with the philosophical question of causality, as a paradox and hence as contrary to the “truly historical connexus of cause and effect” (Untimely Meditations, II) as well as to illustrate the paradigmatic value of glamorized historicizing in his “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life.”

The mythic image of revenge is thus not the “danger” that concerns Nietzsche who warns against the very practical, all too real problems of archaeological preservation with his dry reflection: “but who will take responsibility for assuring that the statue itself does not break into pieces as a result of these attempts!” 37 Nietzsche, ultimately, as one who understands something about philosophizing with a hammer, is concerned with the reciprocal, objective and thus scientific dangers of such an unintended “iconoclasm.”

The ideal and best readers are always protractedly, and elusively, only to be found in the future, so Nietzsche claims, arguing that the presuppositions of the discipline require this conviction despite the recalcitrant fact that there are no (and that there never have been) instances of such readers apart from the authors themselves, i.e., “those who make, or could make, such

33  […] kaum vom Boden gehoben, fällt sie zurück und zertrümmert im Fall die Menschen unter ihr.] (Ibid.)
34  See Babich 2009c.
35  [Hast Du gehört, daß es nach Aristoteles ein untragischer Tod ist, von einer Bildsäule erschlagen zu werden? Und gerade dieser Tod droht ihr.] (Ibid.)
36  But this, perfectly and literally esoteric modality, was common in his day.
37  [wer aber steht dafür, daß bei diesen Versuchen die Statue selbst nicht in Stücke bricht.] (1980 I: 703).
books themselves.” (GS §102)\textsuperscript{38} There are, it should but does not go without saying, fewer and fewer of even such author-readers.

Nietzsche’s science: humanization and method

When Nietzsche speaks of science, he challenges the positivistic thinkers of his day who claimed that “philosophy itself is critique and critical science—and nothing besides!”\textsuperscript{39} Instead, for Nietzsche, the philosopher will need to be critical of the claims of critical thinking, just to the philologically rigorous extent that critics, even critical scientists, are themselves no more than the “tools” [Werkzeuge] of the philosophers, and are hence “far from being philosophers themselves.”\textsuperscript{40}

Karl Jaspers\textsuperscript{41} explains what Nietzsche in his first book regards as the critical “problem” or question of science in terms of its scientific methodology. Jaspers traces this scientific focus to the open and rigorously research orientation of Nietzsche’s teacher Friedrich Ritschl. As Jaspers, himself a physician, explains this point, Ritschl’s seminar had included a range of “non-philologists, including even numerous medical men, [who] participated in it with a view to learning ‘method’ … the art of distinguishing the real from the unreal, the factual from the fictitious, demonstrable knowledge from mere opinions, and objective certainty from subjective preference.”\textsuperscript{42}

But it was nothing less than this rigorous emphasis on method that took Nietzsche to an insight into the very formal limits of science,\textsuperscript{43} an insight which can and, so I have argued, should be extended to the philosophy of science more broadly.\textsuperscript{44}

For Nietzsche (and in general), the German term \textit{Wissenschaft} refers not only to the natural sciences but the social sciences (including economics but also theology, so important for, among other things, the development of the life-sciences as well as the cultural sciences, including the theoretical study

\textsuperscript{38} One is reminded of Lewis Carroll’s rueful Alice, that fantasy mouthpiece, like James Joyce’s Molly Bloom, of male cupidity. “It is always” said Alice to the Red Queen, “jam yesterday and jam tomorrow but never jam today.” (I refer to Lewis Carroll’s temporally recursive, iterative rule as this always excludes any present instant in his 1871 \textit{Through the Looking Glass}.)

\textsuperscript{39} [“Philosophie selbst ist Kritik und kritische Wissenschaft—and gar nichts außerdem!”] (BGE §210) Here, Nietzsche opposes Schlegel’s canonic definition of philology as “nichts anders als Kritik.”

\textsuperscript{40} [noch lange nicht selbst philosophen!] (Ibid.)

\textsuperscript{41} Jaspers 1997 [1936]: 172ff.

\textsuperscript{42} Jaspers 1997: 30.

\textsuperscript{43} Again Jaspers 1997: 176ff., and, more broadly, Babich 2007: 205-237.

\textsuperscript{44} See Babich 1996. See too the contributions to Babich and Cohen 1999, and Babich and Cohen, eds., \textit{Nietzsche, Epistemology and Philosophy of Science} 1999a.
of art in particular). In the same 19th century fashion, Heinrich Rickert can distinguish the different traditions of science as such in his discussion of the notion of the limit concept. Rickert, like Nietzsche, also emphasizes science’s common reference to reality, including both the natural and the historical sciences. Writing on the “Use and Disadvantage of History for Life” in his Untimely Meditations, Nietzsche affirmed the significance of method as such for science as such, meaning history and philology but not less the physical sciences as well (1980 I: 295) arguing in Human, All too Human that “the scientific spirit rests upon insight into method.”

The same focus on method can be read in the reflections of social scientists like Max Weber but not less for formalist mathematicians like David Hilbert. This focus on method, clearly eliding any distinction between the natural and the social sciences dominates Weber’s 1917 lecture “Science as Vocation” [Wissenschaft als Beruf]. Thus we have seen that Jaspers could underscore the critical and scientific rigor inherent in Nietzsche’s thinking, which he understands in a Weberian sense in terms of method. Simultaneously, however, and in this same methodic context, Nietzsche also articulates his own reserves contra method, almost as Feyerabend would speak of being “against method” and in each case: for the sake of science as such. For Nietzsche, it is less “the triumph of science that distinguishes our 19th century, than the triumph of scientific method over science.” Nietzsche’s focus on method consequently includes (not by way of exception but as inherent to this same science-theoretical focus), an emphasis upon the limitations of the same.

Nietzsche writes “It will do to consider science as an attempt to humanize things as faithfully as possible; as we describe things and their after-one-another, we learn how to describe ourselves more and more precisely.”

Nietzsche’s thinking on science, particularly regarding the inductive problem of causality parallels Hume’s own more famous critique and

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45 See Babich 2006: 97-114.
46 Rickert 1896.
47 [auf der Einsicht in die Methode beruht der wissenschaftliche Geist] (MM 1, §635; cf. §278)
48 [Nicht der Sieg der Wissenschaft ist das, was unser 19tes Jahrhundert auszeichnet, sondern der Sieg der wissenschaftlichen Methode über die Wissenschaft.] (1980 XIII: 442)
49 [Es ist genug, die Wissenschaft als möglichst getreue Anmenschlichung der Dinge zu betrachten, wir lernen immer genauer uns selber beschreiben, indem wir die Dinge und ihr Nacheinander beschreiben.] (FW §112) In the natural sciences, the chemist Alwin Mittasch writing on Nietzsche as a “natural philosopher,” argues that a certain anthropomorphization cannot be excluded even in the natural sciences: “All natural knowledge is in its kind and with reference to its boundaries conditioned by the psycho-intellectual organization of the knowing person and hence cannot avoid certain traces of ‘humanisation.’” Mittasch 1952: 47.
Nietzsche goes beyond Kant as he observes (and modern cognitive science stands with Nietzsche on the level of our perception of causality if it is also true that today’s cognitive science would not use the terms Nietzsche uses when he says) that “we learn how to describe ourselves more and more precisely. … The suddenness with which many effects stand out misleads us; actually it is sudden only for us. In this moment of suddenness there is an infinite number of processes that elude us.”

For Nietzsche, “We operate only with things that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, divisible time spans, divisible spaces—, how should explanations be at all possible when we first turn everything into an image, our image!” Highlighting this same anthropocentric critique of science as of mathematics, Felix Hausdorff, writing under the pseudonym of Paul Mongré, emphasizes the same and very radical point: “We lack a self-critique of science; judgements of art, of religion, of feelings about science are as many in number as they are useless. Maybe this is the last destiny of mathematics!” It is perhaps no coincidence, although the parallel has yet to be fully explored, that Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) comes closest to sharing Nietzsche’s philosophy of qualified and rigorously scientific restraint or limitation, emphasizing the precisely critical importance of reflective questioning: “To doubt everything or to believe everything are two equally convenient solutions; both dispense with the necessity of reflection.”

If Nietzsche famously proclaims that there is no truth, a claim which, when set into the context of Poincaré’s conventionalism, is not unrelated to Alain Badiou’s observation regarding the emptiness of truth as a category, Nietzsche is not interested in vetting truth claims, pro or contra. Instead, Nietzsche’s epistemological interests take him to consider the higher implic-
ations of the question “what in us wants truth?” as the question of the value of truth for those who make it. It is from this perspective that Nietzsche can speculate that science be regarded as a “subtle self-defense against—the truth?”54

Yet and quite apart from the separate question of understanding “the problem of science itself—science considered for the first time as problematic, as questionable,”55 Nietzsche’s self-avowed project of putting science itself in question, sets the critically scientific thinker in a no-man’s domain without orienting horizon. So distant from the Cartesian promise of an Archimedean foundation, conjured by rule and method, where—following Nietzsche but no less, following the skeptical legacy of philosophical nihilism after Kant—is the thinker to stand in order to raise the question of science?

On the judgment of style in art and science: philology as aesthetic science

Nietzsche’s 1869 inaugural lecture on Homer and the problem of classical philology turns upon nothing other than the very scientific significance of style, the issue of scholarly discernment conceived as the question of aesthetic judgment, there explicitly articulated as a judgment of taste and reprised as such in his second Untimely Meditation on the “Use and Disadvantage of History for Life.” This same thematic focus on style recurs throughout his later work as the work of many, many scholars can attest and as is exemplified by the tendency to characterize Nietzsche as an exemplary stylist.56

If Nietzsche begins his academic career by raising the Homer question as a question of specifically “aesthetic” judgment, he articulates it as a matter of taste. Likewise, he begins The Birth of Tragedy by invoking the “science of aesthetics” [aesthetische Wissenschaft], and later reminds his readers (all and none) that “all life however is a dispute over taste and tasting.”57

As a science of institutionalized judgment or taste, philology depends upon the expert ability to discriminate and attribute styles. It is exactly relevant to Nietzsche’s initial point here that beyond philology, the theoretical or “scientific” study of art also deploys the same stylistic terminology.58

54 [Eine feine Nothwehr gegen—die Wahrheit] (GT §i).
55 [das Problem der Wissenschaft selbst …—Wissenschaft zum ersten Male als problematic, als fragwürdig gefasst] (GT §ii).
56 There are many discussions of Nietzsche’s style. I examine the relevance of this style for philosophy and consider the rhetorical complexities it presents for understanding in Babich 2006 and in the first chapter on “Nietzsches Stil,” in Babich 2009.
57 [Aber alles Leben ist Streit um Geschmack und Schmecken.] (Z, Von dem Erhabenen)
58 This “scientific” style-orientation still dominates contemporary art history. See both Riegl 1992 and Riegl 2004, as well as Dessoir 1927 along with Wölfflin’s own evolutionary schema of stylistic development in his 1932 among others who inaugurated
German art historians thus speak of the same science of art invoked in the very first line of the *Birth of Tragedy*.

As a rigorous scientific modality, it was the distinguishing stylistic judgment of what Nietzsche called “the science of aesthetics” (BT §1) that made the philological identification of kinds (of texts and authors, artists, artifacts and even cities) possible. Hence it is no accident that the judgment of “style” is also the key to Nietzsche’s fundamental critique of empirical and historico-archaeological not less than the text-based or hermeneutic dimensions of philological research, if we recall the disciplinary conflict (around these thematic poles) classically attributed to Ritschl and Jahn, as we sought to differentiate this opposition at the outset.59

Nietzsche never separates the Apollonian and the Dionysian despite the common conviction that he abandons the Apollonian, as mistaken a belief as the view that he abandons the project of his first book on tragedy. This is also the meaning of *edification* or exemplarity and in a notebook fragment from 1884 entitled *On the Means of Beautification* [Von den Mitteln der Verschönerung], Nietzsche reminds us that “the Greek philosophers did not pursue ‘happiness’ in any other way than by finding themselves beautiful, thus making a statue of themselves, the look of which would do one good.”60 This aesthetic (and very sculptural) ideal once attained, like ancient Greek music drama or the tragic artwork, can be lost. Echoing Burckhardt’s judgment on the stylistic decline of sculpture, Nietzsche points to the “ruin” of sculpture in Bernini, a judgment subsequently repeated by Erwin Panofsky.61 As physician of culture, and here an analogy with Wagner is apt, Nietzsche advocates the restoration of the lost cultural ideal. The ideal to be restored is nothing other than the ideal that speaks to us in the statues, however, fragmentary, of antiquity. Hans-Georg Gadamer, himself a classical philologist as well as a philosopher, foregrounds a discussion of exemplarity as the sheer thatness of the fact that such a thing stood among human beings like ourselves, citing in this spirit, Rainer Maria Rilke’s influential reference to the moral claim exerted by ancient statues in his *Archaic Torso of Apollo*, one of Rilke’s the German tradition of *Kunstwissenschaft*, that is the *science* of art. On Aby Warburg, see Woodfield 2001 and on Wölfflin, see Hart 1982. For a discipline specific discussion of German-speaking approaches to art history, Onians 1978.

59 Even if it is evident that the dispute between them was more collegial (or all-too-human) than substantive was in any case decided in favor of a kind of positive classicism, the still-ongoing philological legacy of Ulrich von Wilamowitz Möllendorff (1848-1931).

60 [Die griechischen Philosophen suchten nichts anders “Glücke” als in der Form, sich schon zu finden: also aus sich die Statue zu bilden, deren Anblick wohltut.] (1980 XI: 36)

most beautiful poems on the power of beauty: “there is no place there, that
does not see you. You must change your life.”62

Actual or realized at one time, we understand Nietzsche’s challenge to us
to go and get ourselves a culture and in that way to become ourselves our
ownmost work of art. Although Nietzsche’s ideal of becoming what one is
can seem akin to the very Alexandrian origins of Plotinus63 who uses the
same very classical metaphor of creating one’s own statue. Nietzsche differs
inasmuch as he also insists on the classic understanding of the sculptor’s art,
a distinction which explains the paradoxical quality of Pindar’s recommenda-
tion to come to be not other than but just what one is.

To qualify this exemplary ideal for the ears of his contemporary nine-
teenth century audience, ears not unlike our own, Nietzsche cites Plutarch’s
remonstration against what might well be our own envy of the artisan’s skill
that “no noble-born youth would himself, upon seeing Zeus in Pisa, have
the desire to become himself a Phidias or else, on seeing Hera in Argos,
wish to become a Polycletus”64 and goes on to point out that for “the
Greeks, artistic creativity was as much to be subsumed under the undigni-
fied category of work as any banausic handcraft.”65 The focus, hard as this is
for us to see, and to this extent we are still children of the 19th century, is
not the artist, sculptor, genius, inventor. Given our own celebration of the
culture of the genius, the artist, the playwright, the director, the composer,
etc., Nietzsche’s point remains obscure: the paramount value was to become a
work of art. That is to say: to work on and to perfect oneself, such that and
for the Greek one could competitively, agonistically deserve, as Plato speaks
of it and as Pliny speaks of it, to have commemorative or portrait statues
made of the “statue” one had already consummated of oneself.66

In other words and rather than aspiring to be an artist on the model of a
creator-god, artfully creating oneself in the image of a higher power, or be-
coming this self and now that self (Nietzsche in his first book and elsewhere
talks about trying on such masks, and the image is one with the sculptural or
masked dimension of ancient Greek tragedy), we are enjoined to become a
work of art, to craft ourselves and thereby to craft our lives as art. As Nietz-

63 See for a discussion and for references to Plotinus as well as Epictetus, Babich 2008.
64 [kein edelgeborener Jüngling werde, wenn er den Zeus in Pisa schaue, das Verlangen
habe, selbst ein Phidias, oder wenn er die Hera in Argos sehe, selbst ein Polyklet zu
werden].
65 [Das künstlerische Schaffen fällt für den Griechen ebenso sehr unter den unehrwür-
digen Begriff der Arbeit, wie jedes banausches Handwerk.] (1980 I: 766)
66 See for discussion and further references, Babich 2008.
sche affirms, “we however want to become the poets of our lives and first of all in the smallest and most everyday things.”

Can we come to be part of this we? Is Nietzsche here speaking for us? The question is intensified as Nietzsche, the physician of culture and not merely of the cultic ideal of self-invention or self-creation, goes further and in the suggestive aphorism in Human, All too Human entitled: “The Statue of Humanity,” remarks upon the transformative alchemy of the creative artist in the forge of culture.

—The genius of culture does as Cellini did when he cast his statue of Perseus: the liquified mass seemed insufficient, yet he was determined to produce enough: so he threw into it keys and plates and whatever else came to hand. And just so does that genius throw in errors, vices, hopes, delusions and other things of baser as well as nobler metal, for the statue of humanity must emerge and be completed; what does it matter if here and there inferior material is employed.”

But we can move too fast if we forget the philological underpinnings of this sculptor’s metaphor and that and precisely in the technological and craftsman’s spirit as Jahn would have emphasized this point. As Nietzsche details, in part contra Hegel, in part against a then and today still widespread ahistorical presentism, the cultic relation of the Greek to the statue is otherwise than we assume, speaking as we do from an ineliminably Judeo-Christian point of view. At the same time, Nietzsche also emphasizes the depiction of historically specific contingencies, reflecting the values of ancient conflict and the importance of war in the sculptural expressions of antiquity: “The magnificent bodies of ancient statues look beautiful because fitting, because useful (always the awareness of war).” Nietzsche later repeats this point

67 [wir aber wollen die Dichter unseres Lebens sein, und im Kleinsten und Alltäglichsten zuerst.] (FW §299)
68 [—Der Genius der Cultur verfährt wie Cellini, als dieser den Guss seiner Perseus-Statue machte: die flüssige Masse drohte, nicht auszureichen, aber sie sollte es: so warf er Schüsseln und Teller und was ihm sonst in die Hände kam, hinein. Und ebenso wirft jener Genius Irrthümer, Laster, Hoffnungen, Wahnbilder und andere Dinge von schlechterem wie von edlerem Metalle hinein, denn die Statue der Menschheit muss herauskommen und fertig werden; was liegt daran, dass hie und da geringerer Stoff verwendet wurde?] (MM I §258)
69 [Die prachtvollen Leiber der antiken Statuen erscheinen schön, weil angenehm, weil nützlich (immer der Gedanke an Krieg!)] (1980 VII: 326) The same goes for our own conception of superheroes today, from the Terminator to the Batman, even if we achieve the look by mechanical means. And if we mix in fantasy, like that of Superman (not indeed the Nietzschean Übermensch but the DC comic figure), it is not enough that he has his strength from the yellow sun, he needs to look the part. Though a scrawny physique would have worked just as well in theory, given the very conceit, this is what the having of superpowers is all about. Indeed the evolution of the design of the graphic character makes Nietzsche’s point.
from his earlier notebooks when he writes: “The magnificent physical suppleness, the audacious realism and immoralism, which characterizes the Hellene, corresponds not to ‘nature’ but to a need.”

Contra Hegel, again, Nietzsche takes this notion of necessity to counter the prevailing idea of progressive evolution in conceptions of divinity from antiquity to the present day. The reference to Hegel is patent where Nietzsche writes against the error of taking “the simple” [das Einfache] as first (or indeed as the last) in the order of time or in cultural development: “One still believes, for example, in a gradual evolution of representations of gods from clumsy stones and blocks of wood up to complete humanization: and yet the fact of the matter is that, so long as the divinity was introduced into trees, pieces of wood, stones, animals, and felt to reside there, one shrank from a humanization of their form as from an act of godlessness.”

Thus Nietzsche opposes the whiggish or presentist conventionality that projects our own Judeo-Christian conception of idolatry onto the ancients as opposed to raising the question of a relationship to images and representations that, so he argues, cannot but be alien to our specular instincts: “The religious imagination for a long time refuses absolutely to believe in the identity of the god and an image: the image is supposed to be the visible evidence that the numen of the divinity is, in some mysterious, not fully comprehensible way, active in this place and bound to it. The oldest image of the god is supposed to harbour and at the same time conceal the god—to intimate his presence but not expose it to view. No Greek ever truly beheld his Apollo as a wooden obelisk, his Eros as a lump of stone; they were symbols whose purpose was precisely to excite fear of beholding…”

70 [Die prachtvoll geschmeidige Leiblichkeit, der verwegene Realismus und Immoralismus, der dem Hellenen eignet, ist eine Noth, nicht eine “Natur” gewesen.] (G-D, Was ich den Alten verdanke, §3)

71 See Donohue 1988. The assumptions that are built into the conventionality of “stylistic progress” are addressed in her more recent 2005. See too, again, Nietzsche’s inaugural lecture at Basel which concerns, indeed, the same themes.

72 [Man glaubt zum Beispiel immer noch an eine allmähliche Entwicklung der Götterdarstellung von jenen ungefügten Holzklötzen und Steinen aus bis zur vollen Vermenschlichung hinauf: und doch steht es gerade so, dass, solange die Gottheit in Bäume, Holzstücke, Steine, Tiere hinein verlegt und empfunden wurde, man sich vor einer Annäherung ihrer Gestalt wie vor einer Gottlosigkeit scheute.] (MM II §222)

For Nietzsche, the historical and philological point at issue concerned nothing less than a very different relation to contemplation, to the regard, the gaze. He drew this phenomenological and hermeneutic conclusion with reference to the ancient images themselves, including a reference to the significance of the title of his Human, All too Human: “The same applies to those wooden idols furnished with paltry carvings of individual limbs, sometimes an excess of them: such as a Spartan Apollo with four hands and four ears. In the incompleteness, in the allusiveness or overladdenness of these figures there lies a dreadful holiness which is supposed to defend against any association of them with anything human or humanlike.”

One can imagine images of Shiva, as these would be expressly cognate to the Spartan god, but the figures Nietzsche had in mind were apotropaic, like the Greek images of eyes in bowls and on the prows of ships and in many cases like ithyphallic herms, which deflecting power is part of the reason they would sometimes be covered, sometimes festively, sometimes protectively. In place of primitive skill or lack of competence developed from a quasi-embryonic potential, contra a traditional or all-too-Hegelian or evolutionary conceptions of art-history, it is worth emphasizing that Nietzsche suggests that another and different relationship with the divine is at work.

So too Nietzsche argues that the Greeks had an approach other than our own to things as seemingly universal as seeing and being seen. In this way, Nietzsche’s approach to the plastic art is of a piece with his understanding of ancient Greek architecture which he saw as the essentially integral architectonic design of temple and cult-statue. Thus the Greek relates to the numinous with a certain religious distance and that is also to say, with an unstable tension bound together with what is for us an extraordinary coordination between the human and the god, which only gradually advanced to a parallel with the divine. Almost on the example of the Medusa’s head, as he invokes this same similarly and explicitly apotropaic image in his first book, Nietzsche explains that “one thing was specifically avoided,” at least at the start, namely any “direct statement.” And, in the same locus, he argues that the design of the temple was directed to the same indirection and reti-

75 See for further references Hedreen 2007. Cf. Vernant 1991, etc.
76 [Vielmehr scheut man gerade eines: das direkte Heraussagen.] (MM II §222)
cence: As the cella contains the holy of holies, the actual numen of the divinity, and conceals it in mysterious semi-darkness, *but does not wholly conceal it*; as the peripteral temple in turn contains the cella and as though with a canopy and a veil shelters it from prying eyes, *but does not wholly shelter it*: thus the image is the divinity and at the same time it is also the divinity’s place of concealment.

In our day, we have lost the depth of such religiosity but we have also lost the tension that brought this ancient sensibility into being and as a result, the meaning of the style or significant form of these ancient statues in addition to that of the structure of the temples themselves is lost to us. I have elsewhere explored the question to be raised in this context, as much with reference to Heidegger as to Nietzsche using the example of sculpture as of architecture. It might be argued that nothing of what is left speaks to us, and not indeed because the gods have abandoned us.

More prosaically and on the archeological terms of art history, the “language” of such temples has become so alien to us, as Nietzsche emphasizes in *Human, All too Human*, that we do not notice our alienation. This conception of intellectual or theoretical oblivion and perceptual insensibility echoes Nietzsche’s recollection of an artistic language that can no longer be heard. For Nietzsche as he continues here,

very like the lost music of ancient Greek words, we seem to have outgrown the symbolism of lines and figures, just as we have weaned ourselves from the sound-effects of rhetoric, and no longer imbibe this kind of cultural mother’s milk from the first moment of our lives. Everything in a Greek or Christian building originally signified something and indeed something of a higher order of things: this feeling of inexhaustible significance lay about the building as a magical veil. Beauty entered this system only incidentally, without essentially encroaching upon the fundamental sense of the uncanny-exalted, of consecration by magic and the proximity of the divine; at most beauty softened the dread—but this dread was everywhere the presupposition.
In his first book, Nietzsche had articulated the question of religious practice in terms of a poetizing creativity, expressed as the musical rush \([\text{Rausch}]\) of transfiguration,\(^80\) and he does not fail to emphasize the cultic function of the tragic music festival as well as its extraordinarily sculptural and almost static structure in space and in time. “Dramatic music is accordingly sculpture in a higher sense: sun-like, the artist’s eye rests upon the whole.”\(^81\) In a similar manner, Nietzsche had earlier explained the “greatness” of the Greek sense of μουσική: “An ancient drama of this kind is a grand musical work: yet one enjoyed music never in an absolute sense but always interconnected with cult, architectonic, sculpture, and poetry.”\(^82\)

In this fashion, Nietzsche seeks to pose the question of sculpture in antiquity as a question much in the way he sought to raise the question of “The Divine Service of the Greeks”\(^83\) in order to advance the question of Greek religious practice as a question, just as he sought to raise the question of science as a question.

The question of science

I have sought to raise the question of classical, literary, linguistic, and historical science for Nietzsche but not less the question of the critical science of style and aesthetics inasmuch as the complex itself for Nietzsche highlights the question of science as such. But that said, it is important to emphasize that the very idea of conceiving science as Nietzsche does, beginning with \textit{The Birth of Tragedy} where he thematizes science “as problematic, as questionable,”\(^84\) that is to say, as the quintessential problem of a book he retrospectively regards as itself and inherently “questionable,”\(^85\) could not be more alien to philological as to philosophical discourse both in his day and in our own. This alien character has only increased in the interval, given the growing hegemony of analytic philosophy which is increasingly dominant

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82 [So ein antikes Drama ist ein großes Musikwerk; man genoss aber die Musik nie absolut, sondern immer hineingestellt in die Verbindung mit Cultus, Architekonik, Plastik und Poesie.] (1980 VII: 57) See on this and including a range of further references, Babich 2006, chapters 5, 6 and 7.
83 Nietzsche 1913. See further Orsucci 1996.
84 [als problematisch, als fragwürdig] (GT §ii)
85 Ibid.
both on the European continent as in Anglo-Saxon contexts, particularly interior to mainstream philosophy of science which excludes not only so-called “continental” philosophies of science but also historical and sociological and anthropological studies as well as the philosophies of non-physics sciences such as chemistry and biology unless articulated in accordance with the philosophy of physics.86 Indeed and in general and beyond the disciplinary foci of the philosophy of science proper, in the modern or post-modern and “globalized” world of today and in spite of certain exceptions,87 science “as such” is not only unquestioned but increasingly set into the place of philosophy, a reciprocal coordination inasmuch as mainstream philosophy has long been beset with what Richard Rorty named “physics envy”88 which Rorty characterizes as an “anxiety about whether one is being sufficiently scientific.”89

Most scholars, specialists or not, are pretty sure that Nietzsche is insufficiently “scientific” in any sense of the term and it is not irrelevant to this confidence that Nietzsche’s philosophy has been regarded from the start as not quite philosophy. This marginality may be the reason almost all university level departments of philosophy—not to speak of departments of classical philology or even German studies—whether in Germany or elsewhere tend not to have specialists in his thought.90 Where Nietzsche does appear on the academic scene it is only as a “moral” thinker and not as a thinker with epistemological concerns, not as a thinker concerned with science. As the antipode of scholarly rationality, the same can be said to apply, arguably, even more so for classics departments. Hence and although as noted above there are and for the past century have been classical philologists who write on Nietzsche, the classics profession as a whole would seem far from persuaded that theirs are needful efforts. And almost every classical philologist to my knowledge who works on Nietzsche also does other things, not just some other things but mostly other things, whether we are speaking of Hugh Lloyd-Jones or of James I. Porter, or of Monique Dixsaut as of Jerome Latacz, and Glenn Most. In this sense there are few specialists on his work. Recently young scholars have written on Nietzsche and classics from a

86 See Babich 2009a.
87 Explicitly critical readings of science are rare in the academic culture of philosophy but one can note, among others, authors like Theodor Adorno and like Martin Heidegger, themselves rather at odds with one another.
89 Ibid.
90 In the case of Germany this deficiency makes it difficult to recommend likely colleagues in individual departments to international students who seek, as a great many of such students seek, to study Nietzsche. Heidegger, of course, presents a comparable challenge.
range of perspectives from the political to the linguistic but even here, so it seems, after spending a few years on their labors, are now turning, as has been common in the past, in other directions. At the same time, Nietzsche studies seem an almost inexhaustible font of creative inspiration.

Nietzsche himself saw himself as reflecting on science, offering not just a metaprophilological reflection on philology but a metaprophilological reflection on scholarship in general, i.e., on science. In a retrospective reflection on his first book, Nietzsche defined his project not as a moral or cultural inquiry but an inquiry into “science itself, our science,” by which general term science [Wissenschaft] he meant science in general. By his qualifying reference to “our science” he intended nothing less than the perfectly scientific, rigorously methodological scholarship of classical philology. Nietzsche’s overall question in this broad sense is a critically philological, Nietzsche will also say, psychological and even physiological question. “Indeed,” Nietzsche asks, “what is the significance of all science considered as a symptom of life? For what—worse yet, whence—all science.”

This style of questioning tends to be characterized as Nietzsche’s prototypically genealogical question, a scholarly identification that is especially common given our tendency, however ahistorical it may be, to read Nietzsche backwards from Michel Foucault. Whatever advantages this kind of reading may have for us, to identify his questioning in this fashion can incline us to overlook the critical force of his reflections. Thus we do well to keep Nietzsche’s own explication as he describes his preface of his own Genealogy of Morals: A Polemic as a necessary complement or supplement to his earlier Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future.

91 But the question of Nietzsche and classical philology is daunting, even beyond James Porter’s magisterial 2000. Recent studies such as Benne 2005 are more concerned with literary studies than it is engaged with antiquity and Müller 2005 offers a reading of Nietzsche’s engagement with ancient Greek philosophy from the standpoint of contemporary and at times even analytic philosophy, such that it remains difficult to better Pöschl 1979 or indeed Lloyd-Jones 1976.

92 [die Wissenschaft selbst, unsere Wissenschaft] (GT §i)

93 [Ja, was bedeutet überhaupt, als Symptom des Lebens angesehn, alle Wissenschaft? Wozu, schlimmer noch, woher—alle Wissenschaft? Wie?] (GT §ii)

94 I take up this theme in part in Babich 2009a.

95 Nietzsche writes to Naumann in Leipzig that the Genealogy, considered as a “kleine Streitschrift” can be regarded as standing in “direktem Zusammenhang mit dem vori- ges Jahr erschienenen ‘Jenseits’: schon dem Titel nach.” Nietzsche 1986 VII: 111. Sarah Kofman has already reminded us how important it is to read Nietzsche’s letters to his publisher and in this context, in Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo, he notes that with Beyond Good and Evil, he begins his “No-saying, No-doing part.” [Nachdem der Jusgende Teil meiner Aufgabe gelöst war, kam die neinsagende, neintuende Hälfte derselben an die Reihe.] (EH, Beyond Good and Evil)
What is the enabling condition of science, understood here as philology, that is, again: as the length and breadth of academic scholarship, and what is it that makes science understood as such necessary for us?

Here, it is instructive that Nietzsche poses this question on the rigorously scientific and historical terms of his own era and his own scientific discipline by raising the question in historical terms with reference to the origins of science as such in antiquity, asking why modern science takes as long as it does to become the dominant force in conceptual culture? This is an unprecedented question and it has to date received no attention. Indeed, scholars have either overlooked or discounted the precision of this question for the history and philosophy of science per se, by which I mean what we today think of as scientific in the same 19th century sense that also concerned Nietzsche, defining science on the model of natural science.

Reflecting as he does on the question of the genesis and development of modern scientific culture from the beginning through to the very end of his productive life, Nietzsche challenges the standard evolutionary or progressive conventionality of modern scholarly conviction regarding the growth of science. Writing one of his last but in his lifetime unpublished monographs, Nietzsche put the presumption of such a progressive evolution concerning the same range of “perquisites” for science, as Nietzsche spoke of these, in question. Thus with reference to the matter of science and technology in ancient Greece, Nietzsche emphasizes that although “… all the scientific methods were already there,” what calls for reflection, for thought as Heidegger would say, is the utter lack of consequentiality for the Greeks themselves who in fact made nothing, at least as we would judge it, of the panoply of methods they had developed and, indeed, perfected, including a wealth of scientific methodologies, from the theoretical to the mathematical to the technological.

Let us emphasize this last point precisely because and for years one could simply assume, as Nietzsche is careful to note, the status of the artist as technical craftsman in the judgment of noble youth. This anti-banausic

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96 See 1980 I: 804, 813; KSA VII: 405, etc., in addition to the section of The Antichrist discussed here and beginning with the rueful musing “Die ganze Arbeit der antiken Welt anstand” (AC §59). The mathematician and historian, Lucio Russo has recently reprised this perspective for a modern sensibility, if Russo hardly shares Nietzsche’s reserves regarding the Alexandrian achievement and if Nietzsche for own part emphasizes the continuity with Aristotle and Plato. See Russo 2004. On Greek science more broadly, see not only Szabó 1992, and Kraft 1971, but also Couprie 2003.

97 The history of science is often inevitably given a Comtean rather than Hegelian expression. See for an account of George Sarton, the long time editor of Isis in this context, Dear 2009.

98 [alle wissenschaftlichen Methoden waren bereits da] (AC §59)
tendency was central to Nietzsche’s question “What is Noble” as well as to his understanding of the Greek relationship to art, and was thus part of the ideal of perfecting one’s own statue, and becoming oneself a work of art. Here indeed one works, as Nietzsche also says with a “nobler clay,” using the language of his early “artist’s metaphysics,” wherein the “artistic powers of nature, and no longer those of a human being, reveals itself here: a nobler clay, a more valuable marble is kneaded and hewn: the human being.”99 But and at the same time, the first and anti-banausic assumption applied to ancient science and technology has also had the effect of rendering the Greeks so many mandarins, a parallel Nietzsche for his own part never conceded, testifying to an attention to ancient technology bespeaking not Ritschl’s but Jahn’s influence once again.

Today we can repeat Nietzsche’s emphasis on ancient scientific accomplishment as including and to an extent that continues to surprise us today, not only in sheerly, purely theoretical detail but also consummately practical,100 precisely technological sophistication.101 First discovered in the year of Nietzsche’s death in 1900, the Antikythera mechanism may provide us with a sufficiently modern-like (or sufficiently modern-seeming) occasion to illuminate the urgency and complexity of Nietzsche’s question.102

Nietzsche’s unpublished reflection in The Antichrist raises the question of the development of Western science as such. And the Greeks, source of so much that we regard as the heart of Western scientific culture, present a conundrum in Nietzsche’s view at the end of his life, a conundrum Nietzsche articulates in the spirit of his lifelong effort to raise the question of science to, and in, and with his own science of philology. What is required for the development of science? Will it be mathematics? Is it theory? Is it technology? No matter what answer we give, so Nietzsche argues, it should be worth reflecting upon the sheer relevance of the positively historical fact


100 The practical and skeptical dimension in question led the Belgian philosopher René Berthelot to speak of Nietzsche as a pragmatist, comparing him to Pierce and James but not less to Poincaré. See Berthelot 1911.

101 See, not with reference to Nietzsche, but generally on this topic, Drachmann 1963 and in addition to Oleson 2008.

102 See de Solla Price 1957, as well as Price 1964 along with Drachmann 1963. Price himself offers a summary of his research in 1974. For more recent discussions of the function of the mechanism, supported with MRI technology, see Freath, et al. 2006.
that the Greeks already possessed every prerequisite for the development of science.

The Greeks thus already possessed everything needed to be “masters and commanders of the world,” long before Copernicus or Galileo or Newton, Descartes or Leibniz or Kant. Just to the extent that they possessed all the relevant technical and methodological prerequisites for the very modern development of “natural science,” so too was Greek natural science already articulated, according to Nietzsche, “with regard to mathematics and mechanics.” Thus Nietzsche reflects that regarded from our own modern scientific perspective, the Greeks ought to have been “on the best possible road” (ibid.) to modern science as we understand it.

Already alive to “the sense for facts” [der Thatsachen-Sinn], the Greek empirical sensibility that ought, by our lights, to have turned into something very like modern science, corresponded not to a bare moment in time and was repressed by no anti-empiricist, no clerical or religious tradition but was “already centuries old,” complete indeed with a variety of technological, scientific schools and traditions of the same. The substantive point Nietzsche seeks to make here, stylistically distant as it is from the more current reflections on Greek scientific philosophy that can also be adduced in support of his assertions, is far from transparent and anything but obvious. And here, writing in his unpublished Antichrist, although similar reflections appear throughout his work (published and unpublished), it is significant that Nietzsche provides even less source material for his claims (though this can be had) than he had offered for his initially published discussion of the metric origin of tragedy out of the spirit of music. Intended as a provocation, Nietzsche concludes his remarks here by asking us, his readers, if we get his point here: “Is this understood? Everything essential had been found, in order be able to get to work.” Here Nietzsche’s challenge to thought does not depart from his earliest concerns with the Socratic invention of reason and what he called Alexandrian culture. The most essential thing was already there: and by saying this we are speaking, as Heinrich Rickert would speak, of necessarily formal scientific methods. In Nietzsche’s own words: “—methods, one must repeat ten times, are the essential, as well as being the

103 [die Naturwissenschaft, im Bunde mit Mathematik und Mechanik] (AC §59)
104 [bereits Jahrhunderte alte Tradition] (Ibid.)
105 We are, this is perhaps more than a convenient but an utterly critical parallel only beginning to discover the literality of Nietzsche’s titular claim with respect to the musical generation of tragedy. I explore this in Babich 2005, and develop this more broadly in Babich 2006, ch. 3-5.
106 [Versteht man das? Alles Wesentliche war gefunden, um an die Arbeit gehn zu können.] (AC §59)
107 Rickert 1896.
most difficult, as well as being that which has habit and laziness against it for the longest time."\textsuperscript{108}

Why science?

Why reason and rationality? Why technological advance and what we call, happily mistaking technology for science, the everyday signifiers of scientific progress? What in us compels us to celebrate science and rationality, logic and truth? To ask this question in another way: let us again ask after the difference between what Nietzsche named “tragic knowledge” and modern, scientific knowledge? And in the same spirit in which Nietzsche raises the question: what is it in us that wants truth, he asks what is it in us that needs science?

Note that Nietzsche does not presume the value of either truth or science, hence he does not assume that it goes without saying that either truth or science is (or ought to be) desirable. Thus if we return to Nietzsche’s original question, the scholarly question of his own science, that is of philology, we recall that in his “Attempt at a Self-Critique,” Nietzsche goes further, suggesting that truth is lie (thus that the value of truth is not what it is assumed to be) and suggests likewise with respect to science, contra its vaunted neutrality, that, “morally speaking,” science might be hardly more than “a kind of cowardice and falseness—amorally speaking, a ruse.”\textsuperscript{109} Nietzsche concludes this retrospective overview (and it matters here that for the rest of his life Nietzsche will be increasingly concerned with such retrospectives), with the dancing, teasing irony of Zarathustra, encouraging his followers: “‘Raise up your hearts, my brothers, high, higher! And don’t forget your legs! Raise up your legs too, good dancers; and still better: stand on your heads!’”\textsuperscript{110}

Nietzsche’s Zarathustra invites us to laugh, and laugh we do but then, and like the herd at the start of his second \textit{Untimely Meditations}, we too forget what we were laughing about. Above all, and we do this constantly, we forget the original question of Nietzsche’s book—how shall we think the coordination of Apollo and Dionysus? What has this dyad to do with the “science of aesthetics”?\textsuperscript{111} How can tragedy be the \textit{daughter} born of the brotherly “secret marriage bond”\textsuperscript{112} between Apollo and Dionysus? Why does tragedy,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{108} [die Methoden, man muß es zehnmal sagen sind das Wesentliche, auch das Schwierigste, auch das, was am längste die Gewöhnheiten und Faulheiten gegen sich hat.” (Ibid.)
\item \textsuperscript{109} [Feig- und Falschheit? Unmoralisch geredet, eine Schlaudheit] (GT §i)
\item \textsuperscript{110} [Erhebt eure Herzen, meine Brüder, hoch, höher! Und vergesst mir auch die Beine nicht! Erhebt auch eure Beine, ihr guten Tänzer, und besser noch: ihr steht auch auf dem Kopf!] (GT §vii, citing Z IV, \textit{Vom höheren Menschen}, §17)
\item \textsuperscript{111} [aesthetische Wissenshaft] (GT §1)
\item \textsuperscript{112} [geheimnissvolles Ehebündniss] (GT §4)
\end{itemize}
thus conceived, “at once Antigone and Kassandra—,”113 go on to die at its own hand?

But Nietzsche reprises this same question, heightening his answer in the midst of this reprisal (and there is nothing like revisiting a thesis): “Where does that synthesis of god and billy goat in the satyr point? What experience of himself, what urge compelled the Greek to conceive the Dionysian enthusiast and primeval man as a satyr?”114 How did the Greeks combine youth and strength with “the will to the tragic”?115

Youthful, tough, and tragically minded, will such sentiments or sensibilities account for Nietzsche’s distinction between “pessimism as strength”116 and “pessimism as decline”?117 What is the “will to the tragic”? Why not ask, after all these years, not What is Dionysian (we have tons of answers, no doubt, and all of them misleading) but What is the tragic? Do we need to bring Hölderlin into the game, inasmuch as Nietzsche quotes him (as much as Sophocles as much as Schopenhauer) as he raises the tragic question that turns into the language of the pessimism of strength? Won’t that bring in Empedocles? But with that question, we recall that the problem of Schopenhauer institutes its own epistemological rupture and the problem of tragic wisdom turns out to be the problem of tragic knowledge, a problem that, as we now read it, presupposes the question of philosophical nihilism that is also Kant’s problem, Jacobi’s problem,118 and not less Nietzsche’s problem expressed in this same Kantian constellation not in the typical references to Turgenev and Dostoyevsky but much rather and with reference to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche’s several allusions in his work to Lessing but perhaps above all to Heinrich von Kleist.

Can we understand this today, we modern, free-thinking, seekers of knowledge? For along with the complex question of the birth or origin of tragedy we have also forgotten the question of science, the “horned” question of science, as Nietzsche names it, quickly adding “but not necessarily exactly a bull.”119 That is the question of science as a question and as such and we are back to imagining that Nietzsche was mostly talking to himself.

What is certain is that very scholars have taken the question of Nietzsche and science seriously to date and of those few that have, still fewer of these

113 [das zugleich Antigone und Kassandra ist—] (Ibid.)
115 [den Willen zum Tragischen?] (Ibid.)
117 [Pessimismus als Niedergang] (Ibid.)
118 And Hamman and Herder too if we read, Beiser 2006.
119 [nicht nothwendig gerade ein Stier] (GT §ii)
dare to put science itself in question but tend instead to correct Nietzsche by raising the question(s) of how much “science” Nietzsche might have been said to have known (and to have been right about) or else and this emphasis is favored by modern positivists always manages to miss Nietzsche’s critical perspective utterly, to point to his admiration of “science.” Nietzsche, we are told, opposes scientism, not *science*. Rather than engaging Nietzsche’s critique of science, the great majority of those few scholars who have considered this topic at all have found it more productive to criticize Nietzsche’s understanding of science or else, and this is a more recent move, undertake to explain it away and thus to “eliminate” his concerns from philosophical consideration as a problem by locating Nietzsche in connection with the history of ideas, a history including science. My own work is an obvious exception to this reading as is Heidegger’s differently formulated reading of Nietzsche, and I would argue that I have allies in raising Nietzsche’s question of science (as a question) in Dominique Janicaud and Reiner Schürmann, but also indeed, if we include the question of truth, in Jean Granier among several, but and alas not very many, others.

In place of the modern constellation that sets philosophy at best as a handmaiden of science, Nietzsche raises the question of science as a philosophical question, further proposing to illuminate that question using the resources of art as a self-conscious and innocent illusion—a move that makes it possible to speak of science (as we have noted above) as a “ruse” [eine Schlauheit].

Thus art is the basis of the scientific ruse Nietzsche seeks to explicate. Indeed, the technical (as we have already referred to the 19th century manner of speaking of the “pragmatic”) foundation of art is methodologically indispensable for Nietzsche inasmuch as “the problem of science cannot be recognized in the context of science—.” As I have argued, Nietzsche coordinates science and art, differentiated only in terms of reflective awareness or indeed honesty. As distinguished from both science and religion, art is illusion with what one might call a good conscience. And art lacks the prevailing hostility to life characterizing both religion and science inasmuch as “all of life is based on semblance, art, deception, points of view, and the

120 See, for additional readings of Nietzsche and science, again, Babich 1994, as well as the contributions to Babich and Cohen eds. 1999, as well as Moore and Brobjer, eds. 2004. See also the contributions to the 2008 issue of *Estudios Nietzsche: Nietzsche y la Ciencia*.
121 See Small 2001, as well as Moore 2002.
122 See Babich 1994 on Nietzsche and science, see Babich 2007.
123 [das Problem der Wissenschaft kann nicht auf dem Boden der Wissenschaft erkannt werden—] (GT §ii)
necessity of perspectives and error.”

Truth, as Nietzsche reminds us, is not always or inevitably an advantage for life and some truths, as he tells us in his unpublished “Truth and Lie in an Extramoral Sense,” are dangerous and hostile to life and elsewhere he reminds us that some truths are bitter or hateful or repellent, etc. (e.g.: GM I: 1) It is, he declares, “not possible to live with the truth.” Hence we have need of the pragmatic convention (Poincaré) or researcher’s panache, including errors (Mach) or “fictions” (Vaihinger, Riehl) of art, and that also means that we have need of science qua art, in order that we are not done to ground by the truth.

To regard science as a kind of “self-defense” [Notwehr] in Nietzsche’s words “against—the truth” (BT §i) will turn out to cohere with Nietzsche’s definition of science at the end of On the Genealogy of Morals, as the “youngest and noblest form of” the ascetic ideal.

“Wozu—schlimmer noch, woher alle Wissenschaft?”

What makes science science? Considered in its modern sense as organized knowledge or especially as a learning or research process specifically concerned with the empirical world, natural and social, science is routinely presumed to be a matter of method (and quantifying analysis) and it was exactly the character of science as method that Nietzsche had in mind. Hence in the context of his early reflections on his first book on Greek tragedy and art, when Nietzsche proposed to examine the “problem” of science, he refers to this very broad sense of science [Wissenschaft]. Here Nietzsche invokes the specifically scientific character of science. In this way, Nietzsche’s talk of science with regard to aesthetics and philology in his first book on tragedy inevitably exceeded “the science of aesthetics” (be it with reference to literary classical theory in particular or art in general) both in scope and effect. Thus we find Nietzsche speaking in the text in question on logic and rationality as well as both the functioning of machines allegorically and literally, including the mechanized way of life of modernity.

For Nietzsche and from the start, the critical problem of science to be posed as a problem derives from science’s own self-founding limit. Neither Aristotle nor Newton nor Kant much less Gödel with his own reflections on the specifically formal limitations of formal conceptualization would

124 [[denn] alles Leben rugt auf Schein, Kunst, Täuschung, Optik, Nothwendigkeit des Perspektivistischen und des Irrthums.] (GT §v)
125 [d.h., für Wahrheiten gehaltene Unwahrheiten] (1980 VII: 433)
126 [(es ist) nicht möglich … mit der Wahrheit zu leben] (1980 VII: 500)
128 [dessen jüngste und vornehmste Form] (GM III: 25)
have quarreled with the language of such limitation. But Nietzsche goes beyond the issue of critical foundations and the concept of method and he consequently extends his critique beyond his own discipline to the natural sciences like physics and chemistry precisely in their mathematical articulation as such. Hence Nietzsche speaks of psychology (recall his disciplinarily discordant reference to those “English psychologists” who have such a mechanical “utilitarian” interest in the functioning of altruism at the start of his *On the Genealogy of Morals*) and here and there he makes manifestly biological and medical references and so on. It is important to note that the historical referents to such scientific kinds as Nietzsche criticizes are and of course not the same as those designated by the same terms today. To parse Nietzsche’s references to “psychology” here, English or otherwise, seemingly very like his invocation of science as such, and we need every bit of Nietzsche’s style as well as scholarly sensitivity together with the full resources of the hermeneutic and phenomenological traditions of philosophy and philology.

Nietzsche’s use of the word psychology is not identical to its contemporary usage and comes closest to contemporary cultural theory while it also includes consideration of what was available to Nietzsche from the analyses of consciousness, on both organic and supra-organic or “psychological” levels. “Physiology” as a term offers today’s scholar parallel challenges. Hence when Nietzsche speaks of human physiology as a basis for his claims about nutrition and climate, his comments about race and breeding seem to follow the prejudicial visions of the day but Nietzsche himself appeared to have been confident that as a science physiology would proceed in a more individually attuned fashion than it has to date, attending to climate and body type as well as nutrition in the interest of what for him seemed to be the manifest concerns of medicine. And beyond medical science, the task of historicizing such a reflection reminds us of our own all-too-persistently

129 See Small 2001 for a reading of Nietzsche and his contemporary scientific influences, including African Spir, Eugen Dühring, Gustav Teichmüller and Friedrich Lange, but also Ernst Haeckel, Richard Avenarius, and so on. The chemist Alwin Mittasch offers a sympathetic reading of Nietzsche’s relationship to natural science in Mittasch 1944, as well as Mittasch 1943; and Mittasch 1942. For an extensive (but by no means exhaustive) philosophically oriented bibliography on the question of Nietzsche and science, see my research bibliography in Babich 1999.

130 Readers wishing to pursue the question of psychologism are advised to begin, first, with Kusch 1995 and one might even go on in a contextualizing spirit to read Ernst Mach for his “psychology” of inquiry. See Mach 1906.

131 In addition to others who have written (usually from a literary perspective) on this theme, see Moore 2002 and Weiner 1997, especially his fifth chapter, “Icons of Degeneration,” and the section on Nietzsche entitled “Eyes of the Onanist or the Philosopher who Masturbated.”
presentist conceptions in the realm of cultural history, especially evident when the talk turns from the body to sex.\textsuperscript{132}

Problems remain even in addition to tracing the history of ideas as a history of scientific concepts and conceptualizations, because and even on their own terms, Nietzsche’s views are often perplexing (this is in part, but only in part, due to his rhetorical style). Hence, for example, his comments on Darwin are notoriously confusing to commentators and have inspired some to find him pro- and others anti-Darwinist.

Nietzsche himself alluded to Darwin either generally and as an emblem of scientific modernity or he railed against him and not merely, seemingly negatively. In addition to a passage entitled “Anti-Darwin” in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche can tease that the idea of survival of the fittest manages, on its own terms and against them, to leave out the mind altogether (and cleverness, for Nietzsche, trumps evolutionary “fitness” without being any less “decadent” for that): “Darwin forgot intelligence (—that is English!), the weak have more intelligence. You must have need of intelligence in order to acquire it—one loses it, when one no longer needs it.”\textsuperscript{133} Accordingly, Nietzsche ranks Darwin along with Mill and Spencer as respectable mediocrities (BGE §253), by which he also means those who elevate the level of the median. Thus he clarifies the point just cited in a context that emphasizes his insight into the superiority of slave morality and thereby the irresistible efficacy of a slave revolt in morals: only one type of human being survives longer than “the day after tomorrow,”\textsuperscript{134} Nietzsche says ruefully: “the incur-

\textsuperscript{132} See for a discussion and further references, Babich 2008a. I have argued that Nietzsche in a protophenomenological mode, regarded sexuality as a medium for scientific research, indeed even into his “own” science of philology. See Babich 2005-2006: 252.

\textsuperscript{133} [Darwin hat den Geist vergessen (—das ist englisch!), die Schwachen haben mehr Geist … Man muss Geist nöthig haben, um Geist zu bekommen,—man verliert ihn, wenn man ihn nicht mehr nöthig hat.] (G-D, Streifzüge, §14) In an exactly provocative rhyme against a number of views, Nietzsche writes: “An die deutschen Exzel. Dieser bra—

\textsuperscript{134} [dass Nichts bis übermorgen steht, Eine Art Mensch ausgenommen, die unheilbar Mittelmässigen] (JGB §262). For a representative “pro-Darwinian” interpretation of Nietzsche’s thought, see Podolsky and Tauber 1999. Note also Dennett’s casual gloss invoking Nietzsche: “Nietzsche’s idea of a will to power is one of the stranger incarnations of sky hook hunger.” Dennett makes this reference in the context of his assertion regarding Nietzsche’s “evolutionary Darwinism,” effectively instituting his appeal to Nietzsche as a kind of authority in Dennett 1996. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker adverts to Picht’s claim that Nietzsche’s Darwinism was Lamarckian at best in his 1999: 223. See also Henke 1984, Richardson 2004, etc. The present reader, by contrast, emphasizes Nietzsche’s anti-Darwinism. See Babich 1994, chapter 5.
ably mediocre.” What was at stake was a faulty conceptual slide between the idea of fitness and self-preservation or the preservation of the species.135

We have noted that what Nietzsche would call a lack of science, that is a “lack of philology” [Ein Mangel an Philologie?] (BGE §47), may be broadened to include history and I would take this still further to include the history of science. Our own historical scientificity or sophistication with respect to the question of science has certainly improved in the interim and we know better than an earlier tradition of historians (including both historians of ideas as well as historians of science) in the wake of recent sociological and anthropological studies of science and its technologies.136 But it is also plain that we are just beginning a needed reevaluation of a long and still “received” view on the “genesis and development” of science.137

What does science do for us? As Nietzsche would say, even worse: from what origination do we derive every last one of our sciences? What is it in us that needs science? What does science do for us?

There is, as in all things, a gap between what we know and what we do. This is not merely a matter of knowing but failing to act on that knowledge. It is also a matter of not knowing what we incidentally, inadvertently, and so unavoidably smuggle into our own effort to know not only what is other than ourselves but, and this was Nietzsche’s great insight, ultimately philosophical, into our effort to know ourselves as well.

Music as fröhliche Wissenschaft, causality, and the innocence of becoming

In his “Turinese Letter of 1888,” the subtitle of The Case of Wagner, the book Nietzsche writes after The Genealogy of Morals, bearing the epigraph, ridendo dicere severum, Nietzsche reflects on what he once called the “spirit” of music. He writes: “Has it been noticed that music liberates the spirit? Gives wings to thought? That one becomes more of a philosopher the more one becomes a musician?”138 The relevance of this musing for science, and indeed for the metascientific questions of the history and philosophy of sci-

136 See Shapin and Schaffer 1985; Dear 1995; Principe 1998. See too, as it is still relevant, Fleck 1979 [1935].
137 See for a discussion Babich 2001.
138 [Hat man bemerkt, daß die Musik den Geist frei macht? dem Gedanken Flügel gibt? daß man um so mehr Philosoph wird, je mehr man Musiker wird?] (Der Fall Wagner §1)
ence is plain enough as he continues: 139 “—The gray sky of abstraction rent as if by lightning; the light strong enough for the filigree of things; the great problems near enough to grasp; the world surveyed as from a mountain— I have just defined the pathos of philosophy.” And as if referring to Descartes (and here Nietzsche is indeed speaking of himself, or at least, because even this claim is complicated—we are still speaking about Nietzsche—an ideal listener of Bizet or Rossini rather than Wagner), Nietzsche interrupts himself again to clarify this pathos: “—And unexpectedly answers drop into my lap, a little hail of ice and wisdom, of solved problems …” 140

Nietzsche moves very quickly here almost retracing the steps of his philosophic path, resuming his critical perspectives not only on music but also on reason, causal thinking, including science in order to raise the very question of life he had already indicated in his “Attempt at a Self-Critique.” Thus he ends the Twilight of the Idols with a reflection on nothing less sensual (and nothing less odd for those of us who did not for ourselves make as Nietzsche had first made the scientific question of the birth of the tragic artform our own question) than the orgy as such.

For the classicist Nietzsche, a reference to the orgy was a perfectly scientific allusion, one he deployed by way of a kind of proto-phenomenological investigation and felt compelled to highlight in order to emphasize, yet once more, the focus of his first book on tragedy: “The psychology of the orgy as an overflowing feeling of life, an energy within which even pain acts as a stimulus.” 141 This explicitly empirical and physiological reflection offered, so Nietzsche claimed, nothing less than “the key to the concept of the tragic feeling,” 142 a feeling Nietzsche contends had been “misunderstood as much by Aristotle” as by Schopenhauer—and this was the clarification Nietzsche had thought to underline with his revised subtitle to his first book, The Birth of Tragedy or Hellenism and Pessimism. That one needs more than a subtitle (and even more than a new preface) to do this is made plain by the concluding reflections in Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche’s last published book.

I have elsewhere observed that Nietzsche’s return to just this thematic testifies to Nietzsche’s own recognition that Wilamowitz was not off base when he first charged that Nietzsche excluded the erotic dimension in his

139 [Der graue Himmel der Abstraktion wie von Blitzen durchzuckt; das Licht stark genug für alles Filigran der Dinge; die großen Problemen nahe zum Greifen; die Welt wie von einem Berg aus überblickt—Ich definierte eben das philosophische Pathos.] (Ibid.)
140 [Und unversehens fallen mir Antworten in den Schoß, ein kleiner Hagel von Eis und Weisheit, von gelösten Problemen …] (Ibid.)
141 [Die Psychologie des Orgasmus als eines überströmenden Lebens- und Kraftgefühls, innerhalb dessen selbst der Schmerz noch als Stimulans wirkt.] (G-D, Was ich den Alten verdanke, §5). I discuss Nietzsche’s appeal to science on just this point in Babich 2008a.
142 [den Schlüssel zum Begriff des tragischen Gefühls] (Ibid.)
Indeed the claim that Nietzsche fails to incorporate the folk- and orgiastic element of the archaic tragic tradition dominates Wilamowitz’s review of Nietzsche’s book on Greek tragedy from start to finish as it were. Thus Wilamowitz highlights his challenge by means of the fairly, indelicately obvious epigraph affixed to his review (not too taxing a locus, as my philological and philosophical friend David Allison is fond of saying). Wilamowitz would go on to elaborate and even, he was a young man, to belabor the same point toward the review’s conclusion, mocking Nietzsche’s account of the Greeks and their relation to nature and to sexuality. For Nietzsche, Wilamowitz writes, “the phallus is no phallus: ‘the unconcealed and vigorously magnificent characters of nature,’” neither do the Greeks, the eternal children, laugh at grotesque obscenities. No: ‘the Greeks used to contemplate with reverent wonder (the sexual omnipotence of nature).’”

Nietzsche, and I will maintain that this is to his credit, internalized the substance of this critique, thereby making a place in his heart for Wilamowitz, precisely as his enemy, following (Nietzsche will quote this) Balthasar Gracian’s advice that we treat our enemy with love, in a Jesuitical and strategic move, as our most salutary resource. And in *Twilight of the Idols*, Nietzsche will declare his investigation into the tragic in the very erotic dimensionality he had been mocked for glossing over in his first book, pronouncing the “Dionysian phenomenon” as ultimately “explicable only as an excess of energy.” To talk of such an “excess of energy” was explicit enough for Nietzsche (child of the nineteenth century as he was, and we can often, in spite of Wilamowitz’s rudest efforts, overlook this in our rage to take him as a contemporary) and in this same locus, Nietzsche refers to sexuality and even the “orgy” with every technically scientific (for Nietzsche: physiological) and today, even, explicit detail one might wish.

Hence and beyond the salacious, it is relevant to advert to a phenomenological and exactly scientific and archeological modality that goes by the wonderful German terminus of Vergegenwärtigung—re-presentation, realization. In my mind, this effectively orgiastic, ineluctably physicalistic investigation is what stands behind the apocryphal report that has Nietzsche dancing naked in his upstairs room in Turin, fully aroused, playing a flute. Such an active phenomenology was where Nietzsche’s choice of the seeker’s life would

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143 I draw here upon my earlier discussion of Nietzsche’s active and scientific phenomenology in Babich 2005-2006: 252.


145 Wilamowitz-Möllendorff 2000: 20. See epigraph citation on page 1 (and see also my editor’s note number ii: 1-2).

146 [einzig erklärbar aus einem Zuwiel von Kraft] (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrtümer, 4)
have to take him. What is actual, what can be done, is also possible. Thus if modern researchers can fashion tools with stones, we have no certainty, we do not even have probability (unless we like that word) but we have shown by the act of such fabrication, the very possibility of the same fabrication.

“If you want to achieve peace of mind and happiness, then have faith,” Nietzsche urges in an early letter to his sister. David Allison recalls this letter for us in his book, contrasting two very different sibling sensibilities and mirroring their very different fortunes. But Nietzsche continued, now for his own part: “if you want to be a disciple of truth, then search.”

Nietzsche’s own Dionysian emphasis upon the “affirmation of life, even in its strangest and sternest problems” is what will ultimately be at stake. But on the way to get to such an affirmation, a point his writings underscore again and again, Nietzsche names his final book with an allusion to the twilight of the gods to emphasize that he intends it as “a grand declaration of war” and so he begins with the same Socrates he had identified with the optimism of logic and science in his first book, now regarded as coordinate with the whole of philosophy and sharing his own hostility to life: “In every age, the wisest have passed the identical judgment on life: it is worthless …”

The problem Nietzsche here identifies is the very tragic problem of Socratic decadence. Like the artist, the philosopher is either on the ascent and only thus life-affirmative (that means: life-squandering), or else on the decline and hence life-denying (that means: life-preserving, life-conserving). We can go back to Nietzsche’s examples of Goethe or Schiller to emphasize this, Schiller in his youth, Goethe in his prime (and in Goethe’s case this was not the same as his youth), and the distinction here is the very point Nietzsche sought to make as he emphasizes the difference of personality, and that only means the rare individual. What works for Goethe may be too much to ask of a lesser poet, much less a philosopher like Schopenhauer. So too for Beethoven, Wagner, or Bizet. If even Goethe has his bad days and if even Goethe, however marvelously, grows old, the point here concerns what Goethe might have been able to do at his height, assuming indeed as


148 [Das ja sagen zum Leben selbst noch in seinen fremdesten und härtesten Problemen.] (G-D, Was ich den Alten verdanke, §5)

149 [Diese kleine Schrift ist eine grosse Kriegserklärung] (G-D, Das Problem des Sokrates)

150 [Über das Leben haben zu allen Zeiten die Weisesten gleich geurtheilt: es taugt nichts …] (G-D, Das Problem des Sokrates, §1)
Gadamer reminds us that there is ever such a thing as the height of one’s powers.\footnote{151}

Nietzsche’s point, taken with reference to philosophy and to philosophers rather than to poets, is that first species of philosopher necessarily goes to ground (one can think of Empedocles who was a poet but no less a philosopher) where the second endures. Philosophers of the ascendant kind are rare by nature and as Nietzsche says, perish early (thus Nietzsche’s reflection on the punctuation, both real and stylistic, of death) and seldom propagate themselves. By contrast, the majority of philosophers are of the common, reactive or decadent, and that is to say: enduring kind. It is no accident that the stone of the wise is said to be sought by the philosopher, in search less of wisdom than the preservation of life even at its lowest level for the most extended duration.

To preserve or conserve one’s own life always means that one must refrain from living one’s life with all its dangers and its risks. The conservation and the expression of one’s life are opposite impulses and for Nietzsche our disposition towards the one or the other depends on whether our physiological or bodily dispositions are what he calls active (ascendant life) or reactive (declining life).

In this way, Nietzsche can write of the metaphysical philosophers as he might also write of mathematicians and biologists and indeed physicists: “All that philosophers have handled for millennia has been conceptual mummies: nothing actual has escaped from their hands alive …”\footnote{152} Nietzsche’s plainest brief on behalf of the sciences is his brief on behalf of the senses: “We possess scientific knowledge today to precisely the extent that we have decided to accept the evidence of the senses—to the extent that we have learned to sharpen and arm them and to think them through to their conclusions. The rest is miscarriage and not-yet science …”\footnote{153} Science, morally conceived, to employ David Hume’s terminology as Nietzsche does, is all about what is given to us through our very human senses. By contrast, Nietzsche gives a little list of such not-yet sciences, the formulaic sciences, here using the conventionalist terminology of Poincaré: “Or: formulae, sign-systems: such as logic and that applied logic: mathematics. In these reality does not appear at all, not even as a problem, just as little as does the ques-
tion of what value a system of conventional signs such as constitutes logic might possibly possess.”

Such an empirically scientific recognition of the necessity of error includes what Nietzsche here names “the error of a false causality” but which he might have called the error of causal thinking _tout court._ “We have always believed we know what a cause is: but whence did we derive our knowledge, more precisely our belief that we possessed this knowledge?” The _cogito_ itself is the most patent illustration of this error: the I that thinks, the thought [that is:] thought, are exactly problematic considered solely on the level of cognition.

 Everywhere Nietzsche reflects, we impose “a doer and a deed” but his point, his coup-de-grace, is to observe contra Descartes and this is the heart of his celebrated critique of the subject, the “I,” ego: and it seems that the subject, _cogito_, should be unproblematic, if anywhere, in the mind. Thus Hannah Arendt notes Nietzsche’s discovery that the Cartesian “_cogito ergo sum_ contains a logical error … it should read: _cogito, ergo cogitationes sunt_, and that therefore the mental awareness expressed in the cogito does not prove that I am, but only that consciousness is.” It is this critically anti-Cartesian sense that Nietzsche writes, “We believed ourselves to be causal agents in the act of willing; we at least thought we were there catching causality in the act.”

The problem is that of free will and responsibility: “who would have disputed that a thought is caused? that the ego causes the thought?” As he writes earlier, “the famous old ‘ego’ is, to put it mildly, only a supposition, an assertion, and assuredly not an ‘immediate certainty.’” Indeed, he argues, insofar as “a thought comes when ‘it’ wishes, and not when ‘I’ wish,” it follows that “it is a falsification of the facts of the case to say that the sub-

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154  [Oder Formal-Wissenschaft, Zeichen-Lehre: wie die Logik und jene angewandte Logik, die Mathematik. In ihnen kommt die Wirklichkeit gar nicht vor, nicht einmal als Proble; ebensowenig als die Frage, welches Wert überhaupt eine solchen Zeichen-Konvention, wie die Logik ist, hat.] (Ibid.)

155  [Man hat zu allen Zeiten geglaubt, zu wissen, was eine Ursache ist: aber woher nahmen wir unser Wissen, genauer unsern Glauben, hier zu wissen?] (G-D, _Die vier grossen Irrthümer_, §3)

156  Arendt 1975: 240.

157  [Wir glaubten uns selbst im Akt des Willens ursächlich wir meinen da wenigstens die Ursächlichkeit _auf der Tat zu ertappen_.] (G-D, _Die vier grossen Irrthümer_, §3)

158  [wer hätte bestritten, daß ein Gedanke versacht wird? daß Ich den Gedanken verursacht?] (Ibid.; cf. JGB §19)

159  [jenes alte berühmte ‘Ich’ sei, ist, milde geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, vor Allem keine ‘unmittelbare Gewissheit’] (JGB §17)
ject ‘I’ is the condition of the predicate ‘think.’”

For Nietzsche psychological science had made progress on this front and such old habits of thought had lost their plausibility, albeit, and this should be underscored, for different reasons in his day than in our own. “The ‘inner world’ is full of phantoms and false lights; the will is one of them.” Thus the progress in question consists in the discovery of the very psychological mechanism of projection, and Nietzsche argues in this very positive and scientific spirit that the human being never discovers in things anything but “that which he had put into them.” (Ibid.)

Nietzsche’s strongest attack on such “imaginary causes” is thus on the level not of will (opposed as he is to the notion of the will as to the notion of a free subjectivity), but of memory, here articulated by means of a recollection of the dreamwork, traced through a reflection upon the inversion of temporal order that can occur for any dreamer seeking to prolong his dream (and so very incidentally preserving the sleeper asleep) as Nietzsche had already invoked this image in his “On Truth and Lie in an Extra Moral Sense” as indeed in the upstairs, downstairs reverie on the nature of dream in the section of his The Gay Science entitled, “L’ordre du jour pour le roi.” Nietzsche now examines the retrofitted nature of the (external) cause in the dream: “a cause is subsequently foisted (often a whole little novel in which precisely the dreamer is the chief character)” onto a certain sensation (in this case a cannon-shot), which persists, waiting, as it were in the wings, until “the cause-creating drive permits it to step into the foreground—now no longer as a chance occurrence.” Thus Nietzsche suggests that the shot causes the dream, arguing that the play of the dream, the dream work, plays with causality so that the shot is perceived only subsequently, “in an apparent inversion of time.” That which comes after the dream-inspiration of the cannon-shot, namely, the entire work of the dream “is experienced first, often with a hundred details which pass like lightening, the shot follows …”

Nietzsche explicates the analysis in physio-psychological-real terms: “The

\[\text{[ein Gedanke kommt, wenn “er” will, und nicht wenn “ich” will; so dass es eine Fäl-}\]
\[\text{schung des Thatbestandes ist, zu sagen: das Subjekt “ich” ist die Bedingung des Prädikats “denke”.]}\] (Ibid.)

\[\text{[Die “innere Welt” ist voller Trugbilder und Irrlichter: der Wille ist eins von ihnen.]}\]
\[\text{(G-D, Die vier grossen Irrtümer, §3)}\]

\[\text{[wird nachträglich eine Ursache untergeschoben (oft ein ganzer kleiner Roman, in dem}\]
\[\text{gerade der Träumende die Hauptperson ist)]}\] (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrtümer, §3)

\[\text{[bist der Ursachentrieb ihr erlaubt, in den Vordergrund zu treten,—nunmehr nicht}\]
\[\text{mehr als Zufall]}\] (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrtümer, §4)

\[\text{[in einer anscheinenden Umkehrung der Zeit]}\] (Ibid.)

\[\text{[wird zuerst erlebt, oft mit hundert Einzelheiten, die wie im Blitz vorübergehen, der}\]
\[\text{Schuss folgt …]}\] (Ibid.)
ideas engendered by a certain condition,” that is: the entire tapestry of de-
tails woven by the dreamer as the work of the dream, “have been misun-
derstood” (and of course, and Freud had a field day with this, as that same
misunderstanding is the point of the dream) “as the cause of that condi-
tion.” Nietzsche’s ultimate reflection here, a preoccupation for him since
the time of his “On Truth and Lies in an Extra-Moral Sense,” is that “we do
just the same thing, in fact, when we are awake …”

Illusion, invention, lie, dreaming and causal inversion of time? Science as
a subtle means, a lying means, innocent only of the sheer illusoriness of its
own illusions and so dishonest about its dissimulations as opposed indeed
to the honest dissimulation of art? Science as a means that does not at any
price describe itself as what it is, a means of self-defense against the truth?
This is quite strong stuff for a man who was, so I have argued, not against
science. But Nietzsche tells that science could, perhaps, go either way. And
still more crucially, what does Nietzsche offer us for his own part?

Precisely what he tells us at the start of his Beyond Good and Evil, once
again recalling his earlier and unpublished “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-
Moral Sense”: “Suppose we want truth, why not rather untruth? uncertainty,
even ignorance?—” As a classicist who cannot help himself, Nietzsche
had chided the scientists for what he called their bad modalities of inter-
pretation. Like the problem of David Strauss’s mechanistic philistinism, Nietz-
sche identifies the problem of science for the physicists, as a matter of
language and hermeneutics and thus as a problem of “bad ‘philology.’”

Rather than a kind of uniformity, supposed as holding everywhere in the
universe, as Nietzsche challenged at the start of his third book of The Gay
Science, we recall Nietzsche’s challenging supposition: perhaps the order
about us is a kind of singularity ordered in terms of our own conventions
but what other conventions can we have? What else would make any sense
for us? To raise this question, apart from our own conventions and convic-
tions Nietzsche suggests that there might be other orders; and perhaps
“someone might come along who” would be able to propose a science
not of laws but of “the tyrannically inconsiderate and relentless enforcement
of claims of power.” The point of this alternative interpretation is only,
but exactly, that it is an alternative interpretation, hence Nietzsche’s affirm-
ative conclusion, so much the better!, to any objection that would hold
that “this too is only interpretation—”173

And this same alternate affirmation recurs as the substance of affirmation per se, as the affirmation, the consecration of determinism: amor fati, not only in what Nietzsche calls his teaching, a teaching that is also his own “self-education” in Gadamer’s words:174 “That no one gives a human being his qualities: not God, not society, not his parents or ancestors, not he himself … The fatality of his nature cannot be disentangled from the fatality of all that has been and will be … One is necessary, one is a piece of fate, one belongs to the whole, one is in the whole—there exists nothing which could judge, measure, compare, condemn our being, for that would be to judge, measure, compare, condemn the whole … But nothing exists apart from the whole.”175

In other words, as Nietzsche’s Zarathustra has it: there is no outside, there is nothing beyond the whole, and to say this is to restore “the innocence of becoming.”176 And doing this, if it involves denying God, is all about denying accountability and for Nietzsche “only by doing that do we redeem the world.”177 This is the perspective of affirmation, of seeing the world and blessing it and calling it good, that is Nietzsche’s amor fati, Nietzsche’s voluntary life, “among ice and high mountains,” or as he expresses it in the epigraph to his Ecce homo: “On this perfect day when everything is ripening and not only the grape turns brown, the eye of the sun just fell upon my life: I looked back, I looked forward, and never saw so many and such good things at once.”178

Nietzsche’s gratitude to his whole life is the benediction here, and qua amor fati it is an expression of the very scientific vision, not of a science that propounds an ultimate truth in place of the truths of revelation, but of a

173  [dass auch dies nur Interpretation ist —] (Ibid.)
175  [Dass Niemand dem Menschen seine Eigenschaften giebt, weder Gott, noch die Ge-

sellchaft, noch seine Eltern und Vorfahren, noch er selbst … Die Fatalität seines Wes-

ens ist nicht herauszulösen aus der Fatalität alles dessen, was war und was sein wird. …

Man ist nothwendig, man ist ein Stück Verhängniss, man gehört zum Ganzen, man ist

im Ganzen,—es giebt Nichts, was unser Sein richten, messen, vergleichen, verur-

theilen könnte, denn das hiesse das Ganze richten, messen, vergleichen, verurtheilen

… Aber es giebt Nichts ausser dem Ganzen!] (G-D, Die vier grossen Irrthümer, §8)
176  [die Unschuld des Werdens] (Ibid.)
177  [damit erst erlösen wir die Welt.—] (Ibid.)
178  [An diesem vollkommenen Tage, wo alles reift und nicht nur die Traube braun wird, fiel mir eben ein Sonneblick auf mein Leben: ich sah rückwärts, ich sah hinaus, ich sah nie so viel und so gute Dinge auf einmal.]
new science of always progressive, always transformable interpretations, a joyful science dedicated to the restoration of the innocence of becoming.


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