ABSTRACT. Our time is characterized by what seems like an unprecedented process of intense global homogenization. This reality provides the context for exploring the nature and value of toleration. Hence, this essay is meant primarily as a contribution to international ethics rather than political philosophy. It is argued that because of the non-eliminability of differences in the world we should not even hope that there can be only one global religion or ideology. Further exploration exposes conceptual affinity between the concepts of intolerance, ideology, and doctrinal evil. The last concept is developed in contrast to pure evil and average evil, and under the assumption of the metaphysical necessity of free will. Doctrinal evil is found to represent the main source of intolerance as a result of a mechanism that tends to confuse doctrinal evil (or the competing conceptions of the good) with pure evil. This connection between doctrinal evil and pure evil provides ideologies with their forcefulness. Tolerance cannot be properly understood in terms of a simple opposition to intolerance, however. Tolerance emerges as a sort of vigilance, conscientiousness, and non-negligence based not on a supposedly correct interpretation of the good, but rather on the acceptance of the fallibility of any such attempted definition. Conversely, the principal evil in doctrinal evil is found in arrogance that accompanies the intolerance-inducing irresponsible thoughtlessness. With this conceptual topology in mind the paper also addresses questions regarding religious tolerance, the ideology of human rights and democracy, the right to self-defense, ways to face evil, the dialectics of using old names for novel evils, and related issues.

KEY WORDS: collective identity, evil, globalization, human rights, ideology, self-defense, tolerance

1. TOLERANCE, FREEDOM, AND GLOBALIZATION

To suggest that tolerance is clearly relevant and important in our time hardly needs arguing. However, a phenomenon that appears closely connected to tolerance, but has yet to be fully explored, is that of globalization. Gaining in momentum, at the time of millennial succession, globalization as a process generates many questions including the question of its value. Tolerance, on the other hand, is accepted as an uncontested value; the sort of value that by its nature is (or ought to be) fundamental to democracy as a structural societal organization that in our time is the imprimatur for any government. Intolerance, by contrast, is taken to be of negative value before the understanding of its nature is even attempted.
If tolerance is an important value, we may want to explain how this came about. The ultimate source of tolerance must be sought in religious tolerance. While some type of tolerance has always been a necessary precondition for human interaction, cooperation, and coexistence, religious tolerance represents its first explicitly articulated form. Given the nature of religious values – in that they aspire toward being foundational – religious tolerance is the most challenging, yet singularly important kind, of tolerance. While utterly incomprehensible and perhaps impermissible, viewed from the perspective of the absolute religious principle designed to provide the meaning of life in the world, the availability of some minimum of religious tolerance is what opens the possibility for doubting and questioning. The practice of doubting and questioning, on the other hand, both offers the basis for real differences (individual and collective) to emerge and provides a ground for individual self-respect to materialize. In the end, difference and self-respect are mutually reinforcing essential elements of the human condition.

This non-eliminability of differences implies something entirely unexpected: We cannot even hope to have only one final religion in the world. The unity of the world appears as elusive as the horizon, were we to attempt to grasp it. However, religions have at their disposal the virtue of humility – embedded as an element of religious essence – which facilitates an openness to tolerance. Once toleration of differences becomes possible, real decisions must be made, which may establish religions as social facts prone to underwriting the formation of traditions. Given that such decisions must be collective decisions, this exposes the inevitable political character of every religion.

Political tolerance, however, represents a real extension of the freedom of human decision-making that incorporates respect for the needs and integrity of present and future people. In this way, politics can focus on accomplishing and improving its worldly purposes, whatever they may be, as long as the interested parties formulate them as a result of consented adoption. Departing from a religious, transcendent criterion for worthy

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2 Religious humility, manifested in the form of prayer, is the result of the aspiration of all religions to have grasped the essence of the cosmos through its Creator. The latter seems to imply the impossibility of tolerance toward other conceptions of the meaning of life, but the awesome power attributed to God underscores human fallibility and necessitates prayer as a component of religious experience. Together, a sense of fallibility needed for prayer and humility make religious tolerance possible, and by implication, all other forms of tolerance.
human ends, the achievement of diverse worldly goals in the context of politics is an important but complicated task, given the extensive diversity of opinions characteristic in this context of human decision-making. For, tolerance, as its name suggests, is not something easily practiced: tolerance presupposes *endurance* of something not only unpleasant but also unacceptable for *us*, while we grant it to *others*. Tolerance involves absorbing the attitude that others may have and act upon a definition of “the Good” which is different from our own.

Since any such definition would be part of a constitutive rule, tolerance clearly imposes upon all persons a demanding task. What makes this task even more difficult is that it is quite easy to substitute for genuine tolerance its pretend version. This so-called tolerance may in fact generate very intolerant attitudes and behaviors. For it will often be the case that a sincere conviction that one is in the possession of the *true interpretation* of “the Good” may lead to attempts at its universal imposition. Remarkably, this pattern is not prevented even when tolerance is included among the most fundamental definitional elements of such an interpretation of “the Good.” Many aspects of global ideology as well as many forms of “ecumenism” have this characteristic. There have been quite a few examples of imposition of an ideology, which would enjoy global supremacy. Examples from the past include Christianity, the Enlightenment, and socialism, while current examples may be political liberalism, democracy, and the ideology of human rights. The future will undoubtedly bring about other such attempts, perhaps entirely different and novel. Regarding projects favoring global supremacy of a single ideology, a few interesting questions can be raised. Is the dominance of a single, well-defined value-criterion over humankind a necessary requirement in order to properly consider our world as united? If so, what would be the price for achieving this? In particular, would the price be the abandonment of cooperation among equals who would respect each other? Could it not be the case that respect for diversity and differences is irreducible to a single common core?

These are in essence political questions, themselves generating further political and metaphysical issues: Do differences represent an obstacle on the road toward realizing universal prosperity and progress in happiness? Could this progress and prosperity be “too costly” when calculated in terms of some other potentially important values (if such exist)? Is the presence of often-tragic conflicting worldviews and varied definitions of “the Good” a political presupposition of freedom? Is the demand for the unification of the world through its universal cultivation and promotion of progress in essence a demand for the abolition of freedom? Is freedom itself a
value, or, is it something value neutral – something the existence of which could be a non-trivial metaphysical condition for other values? Finally, could it be that freedom is rooted in some primitive aspect of nature, something we are better off doing without, in exchange for the prospect of some benefit or the promise that we shall become righteous (or pure) in the “right” way?

Largely the last century was a century of political and ideological intolerance. The process of globalization characterized the beginning and the end of the century. At the beginning of the century, we had what could have been considered a completion of the grandiose project of colonization. This process was perhaps the biggest social endeavor in the history of humankind. Rarely has it ever happened that globalization has come so close to its full realization. Globalization qua colonization was guided by some version of utilitarianism, unobstructed by metaphysical obscurantism and without reliance on excessive and disproportionate use of force. Violence, however, was to begin soon enough. It came in the form of world wars that marked the first half of the century, destroying the project of colonization as cultivation of the world. In keeping with the proclamation of the right to national self-determination that was given the widest scope, fragmentation ensued. This principle was explicitly proclaimed to have primacy with respect to competing principles and was reinforced by the “auxiliary ideas” of social justice and political equality. Beginning with the second half of the century, nationalism effected a near de-colonization of the world. This way of putting the matter may be in conflict with the currently prevailing opinions regarding the (dis)value of nationalism. Also intriguing may be the phrase “de-colonization of the world” – which is in its meaning directly contrasted to the phrase “project of world cultivation:” what could be more natural than to “colonize” the world, i.e., to inhabit it fully? This, however, is not the place for a comprehensive conceptual analysis. However, it does seem important to draw attention to a significant difference in the meaning of the implied notion of “globalization” as it is invoked in the context juxtaposition of the two mentioned phrases. “Cultivation of the world” and “de-colonization of the world” together offer opposing interpretations of the way the world ought to be focusing on unification (globalization) or diversification (sovereignty). Be that as it may, we are now experiencing a repeat of the process that unfolded at the beginning of the 20th century – a globalization characterized more by homogenization than fragmentation. This difference in meaning clearly leads to very different implications regarding tolerance, including its very definition and value.

Currently, the spread of democracy and the ideology of human rights has attained such proportions that it can only be compared to similar
expansions of some religions, such as the Christianizing of the Roman Empire and, soon after, of the entire Europe. The expansion of Christianity was also relatively speedy and global in intention. However, alongside the ongoing promotion of democracy and human rights we can also observe aspirations to achieve global significance by other older ideologies such as religions of Christianity and Islam. All these processes unfold in parallel universes and, despite their fierce rivalry, make room for the question of tolerance to emerge in its full force.

The question of tolerance has particular moral significance regarding the status of the value of self-defense. The defense of items that happen to count as in some sense “one’s own,” those who enter in the constitution of one’s own identity, has always had unquestioned status of a moral value. However, this may be changing with the current wave of globalization. In what way do the new ideologies (democracy and human rights) call in to question the moral value of self-defense, or defense of those items that gain their cardinal importance by being identity-constituting elements? The “problematic” nature of defense draws from a source that, morally speaking, should not prima facie appear problematic at all, namely, the potentially slim prospects for success. If defense is justified, this cannot be based on calculable chances for success: if defense of a certain value is justified, this ought to be so no matter how limited the chance for success may be. Faced with the prospect of defeat, however, defense inevitably becomes less a matter of moral sensibility and becomes more about rational calculation or survival. Historically, forceful and overwhelming tidal waves of homogenization of the world through globalization have always exhibited this feature. Hence, the fact that the latest installment of global homogenization strikes us as something especially irresistible may be more a matter of perception than a true historical novum. Still, this does not succeed in reducing the value of self-defense from being an intrinsic moral value to a merely instrumental value calculable in terms of the chances within a context of a balance of power.

When considering tolerance, the terrain of its interplay with issues of defense is particularly fruitful. Rather than articulate the concept of tolerance simply as “enduring the disagreeable,” we can explore three venues for possible manifestations of tolerance or intolerance. First, there is the intolerance expressed by the global course of events toward everything

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that stands in its path, and vice versa, intolerance on the part of everything that is threatened by the current process of globalization and engaged in a defense against its global march. Second, there is the (in)tolerance among popular ideologies (e.g., democracy vs. Islam). Third, there is the issue of (in)tolerance posed within the specific (ideological) systems regarding differences, particularly toward matters that can be perceived or experienced as threatening destructive force (more often than not originating from outside sources).

A closer scrutiny may show that there is less difference between my first and third venues for manifesting (in)tolerance than it may initially appear. If we examine the third context with respect to, for us, the most interesting ideological system, the one expressed in terms of the values of democracy and human rights, we discover a curious form of intolerance. While insisting on comprehensive toleration of differences within the domain of individuals, the similar attitude toward collectives becomes unavailable as the collateral cost for achieving toleration of individual differences. By way of construing a specific principle of tolerance (the tolerance toward individual differences) as its main ideological tenet, the system based on the values of democracy and human rights naturally leads to the latter form of intolerance. An ideology explicitly and crucially constructed in terms of a specific understanding of toleration, therefore, is seen to generate intolerance at another level. This is the closest point of rapprochement between our first and third context for deliberating the subject of tolerance. For the conceptual-ideological implication that toleration of individual differences questions toleration of differences at the level of collectives can directly be linked to the real-life process in which a fair number of collectives struggle with their forceful perception that globalization presents a serious threat to their collective identities. The paradox of globalization, if there is one, is this: Regardless of the potential gains at the level of individual persons, the price may be unacceptably high for many different peoples.4

We have already explored the sense in which the practice of toleration constitutes a seriously demanding task. One must exercise almost unnatural control in order to refrain from interfering with affairs of others regarding items that seem to require coercive interference.5 Intolerance, however, is not the simple opposite of tolerance. For, as an attitude intolerance incorporates no normative or deliberative stance with room for

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4 Out of three “elements shared by all cosmopolitan positions,” the first is: “individualism: the ultimate units of concern are human beings, or persons – rather than, say, family lines, tribes, ethnic, cultural, or religious communities, nations, or states” [See Thomas Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” Ethics 103 (1992), p. 48].

5 The “refraining” implies that toleration is “something that we extend to those we are capable of suppressing.” Chandran Kukathas, “Cultural Toleration,” Ethnicity and Group Rights, Nomos XXXIX (New York: New York University Press, 1997), p. 101.
freedom to choose non-interference. Everything involving the subject, as it were, happens at the level of cause and effect. When an act or practice is recognized as satisfying one’s conception of “evil,” it prompts the effect of its attempted eradication. This may bring about the inadequate sense that the two attitudes are complete opposites in that intolerance treats the perceived evil in a strongly negative light, while tolerance incorporates the assumption that there could be competing and co-existing comprehensive conception of the Good. Not being direct opposites, intolerance, just as much as tolerance, allows for this plurality of views while tolerance just as intolerance must incorporate the negative attitude towards the perceived evil.

Coercive interference (whether envisaged or real) ensuing from an intolerant attitude derives its “authorization” and the sense of duty from an adopted definition of “evil” obtained as a mere negation of “the Good.” The sense of entitlement to combat “evil” may negate even the most basic conditions for constituting real moral responsibility, leading to such deficit of freedom as we can find in idealism, fanaticism, and totalitarianism, both as forms of thought and practice. The concepts of guilt, desert, and blame can obtain radically new meanings. This comes from a transition from a negative attitude-component characteristic of tolerance to the kind of negative attitude-component that characterizes intolerance, i.e., necessitating blame and interference. Consequently, assignments of blame and guilt become largely a matter of mechanical application, as if those are of no moral concern. This is an inevitable consequence whenever one chooses to deduce evil from a definition of “good.”

Tolerance thus appears necessarily connected to evil: with nothing to endure (in a rather strong sense), there would be no case for tolerance. For tolerance to exist it does not suffice that we simply dislike something and let it be: if what we dislike is not taken as important, indifference may be the way we respond to it, but indifference is not tolerance. There is a real problem, however, for philosophical exploration here. On the one hand, in morality no room for tolerance should exist (because the very act of allowing a difference implies the abandonment of universality which is definitionally connected to morality) while, on the other hand, granting others free reign within something that we do not care very much about amounts only to indifference. Neither is conceptually connected to tolerance.

2. Pure Evil, Average Evil, and Doctrinal Evil

We need clarity with respect to many conceptually connected distinctions and implied demarcation lines related to the notion of toleration and adja-
cent ideas. This is a par excellence job for philosophers. However, I take a
different approach. Rather than explore tolerance directly, which might be
of more practical importance, I focus on intolerance instead. I choose this
approach because intolerance has a more direct and stronger connection
to evil than in the case of tolerance. In addition, I want to explore one
taxonomy of evil in order to indicate how one type in particular may be the
main source of intolerance. Intolerance signifies a moral vice, and when
articulated as a practice, it can be evil. Intolerance, more so than tolerance,
is an active stance, it comprises eagerness and over-diligence that surpasses
mere enduring that tolerance incorporates. A strong incentive must exist in
order to generate intolerance. And, in fact, there is always such an incentive
in intolerance, but not as could be hastily concluded because of its defin-
tional wrongness, and in some direct pursuit of evil. Evil appears here
indirectly, through a process of redefining the conception of the Good. To
show this we should first undertake to explore a phenomenology of evil, to
discern this indirect influence that evil exerts.

My discussion presupposes that freedom of the will is metaphysic-
ally necessary for the possibility of choice, and that existence of freedom
must include the option that evil could also be chosen.6 Much of what
we experience as evil is suffering that comes as a result of avoidable
or preventable practices and deeds. Though avoidable and preventable in
principle those practices and deeds, of course, have their explanations.
Complicated networks of causes are at the bottom of the transition from
chance, negligence, and indifference to actual instances of evil, which
makes it always explicable in one way or another. When explicable in
purely causal terms, evil may be called natural evil.7 As such, natural evil
is a contributory element of a whole, which in the end amounts to moral
ever, so that an explication of any evil normally comes in a combination
of natural and moral “parts.”8 Natural evil, of course, exists independently

6 For discussion of these matters, see M. McCord Adams and R. Merrihew Adams

7 My tentative, incomplete, and rather long list of examples of natural evils includes:
physical and mental pain, diseases, accidents, obstacles, dangers, risks, deprivations, short-
gages, slowness, distances, weight, darkness, cold, etc., as well as the products of laziness,
organizational weaknesses, and stupidity. Compare this with what Albert Hofstadter calls
“passive evils” – “The evil that is most intimate in our experience is the evil that we
ourselves do, active evil, not the passive evil we suffer. Of passive evils, we know many.
We undergo them in sickness, suffering, and death, in being the victim of the active evil of
others, as when we are deceived, cheated, dealt with cruelty in body and spirit, or tyran-
nized over by the powerful” (Albert Hofstadter, Reflections on Evil, The Lindley Lecture,
The University of Kansas, 1973, p. 3).

8 This is a very specific account of the meaning of “evil” as will be used in this paper. Of
course, other accounts are possible. See, for example Hillel Steiner, “Calibrating Evil,” The
of moral evil, yet it serves to produce conditions conducive to much of the moral evil we experience. What makes it real is the natural component while what makes it avoidable is a moral element. This moral element is also what makes us accountable, and is practically relevant in a sense that goes beyond the scope of acquiring control over the natural world, making it something into an issue of self-control, or lack thereof. Only as combined into a single unit of evil do natural evil and moral evil represent something truly deserving to be viewed as evil. For natural evil without moral evil amounts just to misfortune or suffering, and moral evil without natural evil is just an instance of bad will without manifestation. For example, it is doubtful that merely conceived malice could amount to proper evil, but with coinciding influence of something like chance or opportunity, it is altogether a different matter. Imagined evil is not evil; cooperation from the world of causes is crucial. Conversely, a misfortune no matter how grave, when fully explicable in terms of (blind) natural forces does not constitute evil, for intentionality cannot be attributed to nature as such. (However, those who are willing to attribute such intentionality to nature would not be using a notion of evil different from mine, if they were to call such misfortunes by that name.) This amounts to a working definition of “evil” that the remainder of the paper will presuppose. There are three types of evil to consider.

2.1. Pure Evil

Individual instances of evil, while they incorporate intentionality, are also states of affairs. However, states of affairs represent real evils only to the extent that those states become actualized. As such, they combine natural and moral evil. This may appear to be in conflict with the way we speak about vices. While vices – such as malice, envy, greed, cruelty, or meanness – clearly appear to be evil, they cannot be conceived as states of affairs. Vices are attitudes and as such they constitute dispositions to do evil. However, dispositions alone, just as temptations that are never acted on, represent no accomplished facts. And while it may be a matter of controversy whether they could be subjects of moral judgment, it is certainly the case that calling them “evil” would be problematic. When they materialize in the form of specific deeds these wicked attitudes constitute the first type of evil we may call “pure evil.” What is characteristic of pure evil is that no inclination exists on the part of evildoers to morally justify their actions. The psychological state which is the starting point of such acts is
a simple one, made of bad will alone without accompanying conception of possible ways to present the action as an exception to a moral rule or in any sense a right act. Incorporating the perverse, bad will, these vices preclude the possibility of their moral justification, and thus they often appear as symptoms of abnormality or insanity.

What does it mean for an attitude that leads to an action to incorporate bad will, and what is its connection to evil? What is important for us to see is that we reject the presupposition of the existence of two independent causal realms, one that involves good and the other evil. The idea that good can only lead to good and evil to evil may be called “causal dualism.” This dualism must be rejected if there is to be any explanation of the possibility of agency. For, what is constitutive of being a person is the ability to choose a variety of goals while (ontologically) being uniquely bent on doing only evil (or for that matter good) could not be characteristic of persons. The plurality of goals that a person can choose, including the choice of evil, is an essential feature of having freedom at all. In this sense, neither saints nor devils are persons. This feature of freedom, as a constitutive element of personhood, is what makes pure evil possible.

Pure evil is therefore definitionally connected to the choice of evil for evil’s sake. I must immediately emphasize, however, that the characterization “for evil’s sake,” though repulsive, leads to a type of evil (pure evil) that is least relevant to our world of freedom. Two other types of evil, as we shall see, are of far greater practical significance.

2.2. Average Evil

A familiar type of action that is considered morally wrong involves an attempt to exclude oneself from the demands of morality. Attempting to make this sort of exception may involve the explicit offering of an explanation for a justified exception to a rule. In cases when such an explanation fails (or is not even offered), remorse and distress may ensue. This amounts to one possible philosophical understanding of the phenomenon called “weakness of the will”9 which does not obtain when evil is explicitly chosen for its own sake, but is rather a case of capitulation to evil. When one makes an exception of this sort, one acts in a way against one’s own will, against the advice of the better part of her self, maybe even with reluctance, because one has at a certain level already accepted the moral law yet succumbs to a desire for something else. While they are clearly not “sinning” in the sense of pure evil, those who capitulate to evil in this way

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are certainly culpable and deserve blame. Examples of this sort of evil are stealing, lying, cheating. We may call this sort of evil “average evil.”

Though the first type of evil, pure evil, is manifested in the form of moral vices, it is still of morally marginal importance compared to this second type of evil, which provides the domain where we are fully confronted with moral evil. While we may intensely experience a wicked behavior and its resulting pure evil (in our technical sense) we react with almost no need to assess its moral justification. Rather, our first impulse when confronted with the vicious acts is to treat them as something merely aberrant or abnormal. Average evil, by contrast, cannot be so easily relegated to some non-moral domain, because of the following two reasons. First, when exceptions to a moral rule are made the competing desideratum is also presented as a good of sorts. When an item is stolen, for example, the desire to possess it overpowers all actual or potential moral deliberation by the agent. The possession of something is seen as a good that (psychologically) surpasses the sort of good that attaches to the same item when as a result of moral deliberation it is decided that the moral rule must prevail. Secondly, because of this feature, average evil is a much more widespread phenomenon compared to pure evil. Consequently, when evil is our concern it is average evil that we most often face.

2.3. **Doctrinal Evil**

Pursuing further the logic uncovered in average evil – when a choice is being made between two perceived goods, say, between enjoying the use of something and the respect for rightful ownership of it – we may want to consider what happens when what is protected by moral rules is in fact contrasted to something that is only presented as good (even as the only good), which it might not be. Though the latter cases look like sub-instances of average evil, they are sufficiently different to deserve a separate category. I shall call them “doctrinal evils.”

This sort of evil involves no attempt to make exceptions to moral rules. Rather it openly redefines them. To continue with our example, it is not unlike explicitly presenting stolen goods as rightful ownership according to some deliberately propagated “new,” or “higher,” morality. The power of this example may push us to think of doctrinal evil more along the lines of pure evil. However, doctrinal evil can be seen to be a result of a sort of economy of justification found in average evil. Namely, average evil follows the logic contained in what might be called the “axiology of change:” The status quo always enjoys a prima facie value priority over a (proposed) change; no (ongoing) justification is required to keep things as they are, but change must be justified. Thus, given that it represents
a violation of a rule in making an exception for one’s own sake (with no intention to challenge the rule), each instance of average evil requires moral justification. We can escape, however, this tedious labor with one fiat of justification. If we were to re-interpret our conception of the good we could justify in one fell swoop all exception we need. This is the “advantage” of doctrinal evil. When accompanied with adequate social power such re-interpretation turns into ideology. Ideology represents a form of exerting influence through meaning-change of important words. As Isaiah Berlin avers, “philosophical concepts nurtured in the stillness of a professor’s study could destroy a civilization.” This is the extent of similarity between average and doctrinal evil.

The phenomenon I am calling “doctrinal evil” could not be understood if we presented its perpetrators as choosing evil for its own sake. Viewed historically or from a safe distance, the “new morality” imposed by ideologists (whomever they might be) may strike us as evil “pure and simple.” But the phenomenon is more complex, and we are better served to contrast it with average evil. For instance, the “new” moralities imposed by Nazism or Communism – however they may put us off – were not and could not have been offered to the wide masses as an option to choose evil for its own sake. They were presented as good, in fact as a higher good than the rules that morality configures. With doctrinal evil, the choice is not between following a moral rule and making an exception to it for oneself. Instead, moral rules, as such, are presented as inferior to some newly constructed morality, derived based on some supreme ideal, perhaps accounted for in great detail in some specific philosophy or political ideology.

Doctrinal evil is a natural consequence of the internal structure of powerful political ideologies. What is characteristic of those ideologies is that they choose a certain interpretation of the ultimate good as the necessary or highest purpose of all individual and collective action. Never mind that this “highest good” may not be good at all, or whether its interpretation is objectively valid. If we were to think, however, that the leading figures and proponents of those ideologies considered their own postulates, goals and interpretations, as wrong and invalid this would lead us astray in our attempt to understand them. For it would take away our ability to make pertinent moral judgments, and would reduce the matter to a mere contest between our descriptions of the purposes we have selected and their description of theirs. This result would preclude any further analysis, which would explore causes and reasons behind one’s engagement on behalf of those doctrines, and the exact sense in which the resulting

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behavior was morally wrong. Accordingly, saying, for example, that Adolf Hitler knowingly chose evil would be pointless from the perspective of trying to gain an understanding of any aspect related to the origin and development of Nazism. The same is true of any attempt to grasp the consequences of all other ideologies.

3. Facing Evil

Having outlined a taxonomy of evil – pure, average, and doctrinal – we may want to shift the focus now on the specific ways of dealing with these different kinds of evil. That is, we can now approach the question of facing evil. To begin with, what is the proper response to pure evil? The short answer is total, utter, and unconditional rejection. There is no debate within it. The longer answer, which is at the same time a way of justifying this short answer, is that the latter is the only plausible resolution of the philosophical puzzle that emerges from our taxonomy of evil. Namely, when we look at the real source of what in slightly different ways makes ordinary and doctrinal evils into evils, we find a single phenomenon: supposedly, the good in its ontological status emerges as soon as something, whatever it is, becomes the subject of a want. In the case of ordinary evil, what one wants typically is the possession of some item while in the case of doctrinal evil a new system of rules governing proper behavior emerges. If what makes those objects of willing into something good is that they are merely willed,\(^{11}\) then this leads straightforwardly into the paradox regarding pure evil: pure evil would not only cease being a kind of evil, but would be transformed into a good. Since what is per definition wanted in pure evil is evil for its own sake, nothing including the fact that it is a subject of a will could turn it into something good. Therefore, if we allow that evil can be chosen for its own sake (and as reminded by our definition of “freedom” we definitely should), then mere wanting cannot by itself produce good. Accepting this latter point, we realize that in facing pure evil no reasoning is possible, only simple rejection – pure evil, pure rejection.

The situations are very different in the issue of facing ordinary and doctrinal evils. Unlike the case of pure evil, the latter two kinds of evil demand that they be addressed responsibly, which may involve reasoning, consideration of offered arguments, and justifications for ordinary evils, or the uncovering of causes and assessment of consequences for doctrinal

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\(^{11}\) As J. S. Mill writes: “the sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people do actually desire it” (J. M. Smith and E. Sosa (eds.), Mill’s Utilitarianism (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1969), p. 61.
evils. Ordinary and doctrinal evil cannot be simply dismissed. The only way to face these kinds of evil without trivialization is to understand them.

When faced with ordinary or average evil we are in a position to examine directly invoked arguments and reasons purporting to justify a given exception to the related moral rule. The arguments in question are attempts to justify a choice of this sort, and one can engage in comparing argumentation in favor of all other choices that would have been available to the agent who opted for the exception. The responsible way of facing ordinary evil would carefully weigh all these arguments keeping in mind that not all exceptions are equally unjustified. This implies that the less unjustified the exception the better it is. This, in fact, amounts to moral deliberation with the final outcome of assigning as adequate a moral value to the given choice as possible. Exceptions are such that justifications are required to accompany them. To this extent, exceptions involve the kind of choices that can be assessed rationally. Since interests are essentially connected to exceptions – interests being underlying reasons for them – the whole context is amenable to the rational ranking of interests even when they produce evil. Moreover, this is the most common form of evil in the world.

Doctrinal evil is quite different matter altogether. Due to the comprehensive nature of (re)defining the notion of “the Good” in the new doctrine the scope of argumentation is made radically narrow here. The invitation to replace the definition of “the Good” seems to preclude argumentation either for or against the new definition. There is, hence, a tendency to perceive this sort of evil as identical with the first type of evil. What is the object of choice here, however, is not evil as such, but quite to the contrary, it is “the Good,” and in a much stronger sense of the word than in the case of the second type of evil. While ordinary evil involves attempts to justify exceptions (as something initially unjustified and requiring reasons which will help justify it), the third type of evil involves the choice of “the Good” as a direct object of choice. However, if those who disagree with the offered comprehensive (re)interpretation of “the Good” (peddled by the doctrinaires) try to reject it in the fashion characteristic of those doctrinaires, that is by reinterpreting their reinterpretation as being in fact an instance of type-one evil, pure evil, this would amount to abandoning the effort to understand it. Though this is a simple and comfortable response, it in no way constitutes facing doctrinal evil. What is more, as we shall see, this would in fact be a form of collaboration with it. Consequently, what is required is to achieve an explanation of every instance of type-three evil. The only way to accomplish this is to uncover the individual causes of every such (total) redefining of “the Good” and point to the
consequences as well as comprehend the general mechanisms that give rise to such phenomena and the impact they may have.\textsuperscript{12} What follows is a modest attempt to achieve such understanding. The full understanding would require much more, and would lead us outside the domain of this project.

4. DOCTRINAL EVIL EXPLORED

Having established that the proper way of facing doctrinal evil presupposes a serious, responsible attempt to understand each of its manifestations, we shall now focus on what is involved in such an attempt. A distinction can be made here between dealing with specific instances of doctrinal evil, which would involve uncovering their causes and underlying intentions, and the specifically philosophical concern of offering contours of the general features giving rise to doctrinal evil as such. The latter is my concern here. A closer examination of doctrinal evil would yield the following general features worth exploring in detail: idealism, totalitarianism, paternalism, fanaticism, impossibility of universalization, essential lack of universal respect, a craftsman-like approach to finding means for realizing set ideals, and an apologetic attitude toward final ends. All of these features are contained in one singularly important characteristic of doctrinal evil – arbitrariness. I shall now address these matters in turn.

Doctrinal evil comes about when an offered redefinition of the ultimate good finds sufficient following.\textsuperscript{13} The redefinition comes in the form of a description of a state of affairs treated as the necessary and absolute good, and hence designated as an ideal. There can be, of course, innumerable many such descriptions. However, once an ideal has been chosen and

\textsuperscript{12} The comprehensiveness of redefining what is good and true and the tendency to perceive any discrepancy as the symptom of the evil of the first type leads to unleashing of passions well described by Max Weber. Regarding the heavy responsibility of politicians regarding the “truth,” he writes: “The politician will find that as a result truth will not be furthered but certainly obscured though abuse and unleashing of passion; only an all-round methodical investigation by non-partisans could bear the fruit; any other procedure may have consequences for a nation that cannot be remedied for decades [Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (trans. and eds.), \textit{From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 120.

\textsuperscript{13} This point is captured very nicely by L. M. Thomas: “Ordinary people, though open to moral criticism in many ways, would not imagine themselves participating in evil institutions. In fact, many ordinary people subscribe to value that are diametrically opposed to evil institutions. Alas, however, for the compliance of enough ordinary people, some more compliant than others, neither the Holocaust nor American Slavery could have occurred.” [Laurence Mordekhai Thomas, \textit{Vessels of Evil} (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), p. 4].
instituted it becomes exclusionist. Being chosen, it turns into the measure of all things, thus validating itself through itself and precluding all other descriptions of the Good. An explicit circularity of this kind is the central feature of idealism.

Once an ideal is instituted as exclusive, we have totalitarianism as a natural consequence. Because of the comprehensive nature of the allegiance to the singled out ideal, choice is dramatically restricted or even precluded. Everything is reduced to the issue of realizing this ideal. At the practical level, this involves finding means for this purpose, which turns all moral and political questions into a technology for transforming all concerns into a pursuit of the final end. At the theoretical level, room for discussion is maximally narrowed, just to the apologetic endeavors. Together, the practical and theoretical aspects generate at the level of the everyday behavior a conformist attitude manifested as simple-mindedness, political correctness, self-denial, or over-diligence and zealotry. These are all well known characteristics of totalitarianism. Paternalism and fanaticism readily follow from this ardent pursuit of the final end facilitating the attitude of readiness to make decisions for others and radicalizing the enforcement of the widespread acceptance of the doctrinal description of the final good.

This vigorous pursuit of a chosen ideal as redefined morality, engendering idealism, totalitarianism, paternalism and fanaticism quite clearly will lack in universality. Despite this, one of the key features of the wide collective espousal of an ideal is its presentation in the form of the universal value. So presented, it is either adopted as the most fundamental, as if it were a self-evident truth, or absolutely dismissed (usually)

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14 The rejection of paternalism finds its finest version in Mill’s “simple principle:” “Th[e] principle . . . , that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection” [John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (New York: W. W. Norton Company, 1975), p. 10].


16 On the idea of final good and the related means-ends dialectic there is perhaps no better authority than Max Weber: “The ethic of ultimate ends apparently must go to pieces on the problem of the justification of means by ends. In fact, logically it has only the possibility of rejecting all actions that employs morally dangerous means – in theory! In the world of realities, as a rule, we encounter the ever-renewed experience that the adherent of an ethic of ultimate ends suddenly turns into a chiliastic prophet. Those, for example, who have just preached, “love against violence” now call for the use of force for the last violent deed, which would then lead to a state of affairs in which all violence is annihilated” (Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” p. 122).
from a safe historical distance). Both attitudes are wrong, however: The former because of its consequences outlined above, and the latter because it collapses the third kind of evil, doctrinal evil, into the first, pure evil. This is a mistake, according to our taxonomy. But it represents a moral failure as well, as it leads away from our duty to understand doctrinal evil before we can reject it. The widespread tendency of treating doctrinal evil as pure evil suffers from the very same defect as the blind acceptance of the offered description of the good – lack of universal respect. Both attitudes fail to take understanding as the condition of acceptance or rejection, respectively.

In this context, however, understanding is a duty because doctrinal evil does not involve a choice of evil for evil’s sake, but it presents us with the choice of an alleged supreme good. If what is offered is not really such, an obligation exists that this then be explicitly exposed. But why is this so difficult? Understanding may require the sort of unpleasant identification that would suggest that a villain could be hiding in any one of us. Psychologically, this is difficult because understanding through identification looks too much like justification. However, justification is the last thing one would want here. For it is suggestive of the possibility that we could have ourselves committed similar evils or, God forbid, still can. Hence, it is much easier to run away and embrace the comfort of effortless rejection.

5. New Evils, Old Names

The generally superficial way in dealing with evil as if it were something self-evident and in need of no explanation is a practice that has its price. Approaching evil as something that must be readily apparent, that no particular effort is required for its detection, but only readiness to “actively adopt the attitude” of determination to combat it somehow leads to value blindness. This is a comfortable position of self-satisfying assessment and judging of others, never of oneself, as if the possible need for that is necessarily precluded, something about which no question should arise. It is a position very much alike the one fanatic doctrinaires adopt. In both cases, as a result we have intolerance in judgment and action.

There is one consequence of value blindness that seems quite significant – the inability to recognize new evils. While we tend to be impatient with, irritated by, or suspicious of change (that brings about something new), new evils generally are not confronted with intolerance. The resistance to new phenomena, a very natural one, is more something inertial than an active hostile attitude characteristic of intolerance [We find much more
intolerance towards old parts, the old familiar aspects of the world. But, on the other hand, many compromises with respect to injustice and evil are ingrained and invested in the always pre-existing structure of any society, not to mention that prejudices present in every society and articulated as traditions or their components are inherent in us as our hidden constitutions]. This inertia leads to the effect of the unrecognizability of new evils. We search for known, familiar marks – that is, old ones – which allow new evils to go unrecognized perhaps for a long time, disguised under the veil of intolerance towards the old ones. This weakens our position in combating evil to a great extent, and redirects the distribution of our tolerance and intolerance to a wrong path. As long as we think that evil has recognizable marks that we have already “mastered” comprehending (i.e., for as long as we believe that “we ourselves” are “immune” to such temptation), and that evildoers are just that, evildoers, having no possible good in themselves, our dealings with evil will remain mechanical and only accidentally correct. Evil, however, constantly appears in new forms, it is always really new. Freedom, in some sense, is the source of this. Decisions must always be made anew, as if they are being made for the first time. This is the case with all three types of evil discussed here, but it is particularly relevant for doctrinal evil.

The notion of “new evil” is crucial for responsible dealings with evil. Because evil is to be rejected (or “admitted” as an established element of “reality” having become an “old” concern, hence ceasing to be “evil” as it were, being a “real” part of established and accepted tradition), recognizing the possibility that the new evil may go undetected is of great importance. A prevailing phenomenon in this respect, however, is a notorious lag in labeling new evils. This, so to speak, is an element of evil itself: old words facilitate the new evil staying undetected in its specific malignancy, allowing it to spread beyond the point it otherwise would, sometimes even to the magnitude of enormous proportions. Hence, there is danger in using evil-labeling words like “Hitler” or “Nazism” (“Fascism”). The danger is twofold: first, regarding the consequences this kind of word usage has (as elaborated further below), and second, more directly, involves collaboration in concealing or even “producing” the new evil by labeling some obstacles to its wider spread by using old labels. The latter functions as a well-known phenomenon of “persuasive definitions”17 and offers the prospects of direct linguistic manipulation. Old descriptions (such as “Hitler”, etc.) become evaluative forces that ascribe well-known (old and established) negative values to the objects upon which they are

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attached. The choice to so label an object, therefore, is an act of power. Those who can make this choice of labels will be endowed with power, while the weak ones are those whose acts – even without prior analysis or detailed description – are thus labeled and hence automatically assigned their supposed value. The way this power plays itself out is twofold: as a way of issuing indulgences for true violations, and vice versa as false or wrong condemnation of acts that become “evil” solely on the basis that they are so designated.

There are three direct outcomes of the practice of using old names for new evils that serve to further amplify the new evil (or even generate it). To begin with, those on the receiving end of this practice cannot mount any defense, for the process yielding definitions includes no procedure of empirical verification or justification. Quite to the contrary, the very purpose of such labeling is to prevent this sort of verification, condemning in advance every request for “validation” as alleged demands for re-evaluation of already established evils. Verification would include restarting yet again the process of defining “facts” already defined by way of prior persuasive definition. That is, it would include such unpleasant questions as “Was Hitler really evil and why?” Such an approach, among other things, would dismantle the possibility of using such terms for any further such manipulations. Despite the expected validation that Hitler was evil, this word will no longer be applicable with its usual value automatism. Verification would destroy the definitional connection (i.e., the nexus independent of empirical conditions) with the object of the intended condemnation as necessarily evil. Therefore, no longer do we have the automatism of condemnation. Consequently, no proper reply is possible.

Secondly, naming new evils with old names has as its further consequence the minimization of those new evils. The old names suggest the presence of a familiar problem; one we have already confronted successfully; so that all that is needed now is the sincere determination to do away with it. This assumes that much of the work has already been done, thus entirely avoiding the essential question of why redefining “good” (in some specific way) is evil. The non-viability of the novel meaning of “good” we are invited to adopt accordingly would never be addressed, and to the extent that that understanding is a necessary component of facing evil, this approach underestimates the looming dangers.
Finally, the minimization is or leads to collaboration in the new evil’s progression. This collaboration has many faces; all characterized by a delusion that by re-directing our focus away from the oncoming evil it would simply pass us by. Instead of directly coming to grips with it in a responsible way by digging for causes, we do everything else: we are quick to take sides, pass judgments, think that final resolution is at hand, or take pleasure in “solving” problems by mere acts of naming.

Naming is a crucial part of any distribution of tolerance and intolerance, and before that, a part of establishing identifications that produce attitudes of tolerance and intolerance. Naming is the first, and often the last, step in defining what is to be held as “good” as well as what is its opposite – that which should not and could not be tolerated. A specific act of naming is always at the beginning of any intolerance.

The state of intolerance is very similar to the above described value blindness. Indeed, we usually connect the idea of intolerance with this comfortable position of self-satisfying assessment and readiness to judge others by self-contained “principles” that preclude any impartial evaluation and remove any inhibition and/or hindrance to act in a way of imposing and enforcing some fanatical ideal that one firmly holds. Sets of such beliefs are at the base of all doctrines or counter-doctrines that create and produce doctrinal attitudes characteristic of the third type of evil. This type of evil is thus essentially connected to the issue of tolerance – it is just its opposite. The third type of evil may even be designated as intolerance strictu senso. It is more than disrespect, the later being rather negative, passive, and detached without implying eagerness to fight to impose and enforce anything else instead. In its extreme form, disrespect does not imply fanaticism, but rather a sort of moral nihilism and apathy as a result.

Quite different is the case of intolerance, where we have a simple-and narrow-minded over-reactive urge to act, characteristic of all sorts of zealotry and fanaticism. Those with firm conviction about what constitutes intolerable behavior may choose without hesitation to act on those convictions. This demonstrates strong incentives specific conceptions of intolerance in instigating people to undertake deplorable acts. As a result, we may wonder what could be the ultimate domain of acts, not all necessarily cruel and visibly repugnant, yet also justified by invocation of a conception of intolerance. Clearly, there could be a wide range of acts that may be so justified.

Let us recall that traditions, to the extent that they incorporate prevailing prejudices, present our hidden constitutions. They determine not only the

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18 See the story of Hypatia who devoted her talents to mathematics and was butchered by the hands of Peter the Reader, in Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 368.
contents of our beliefs, but also the criteria for interpreting and evaluating those contents as desirable, permissible or intolerable. Presently dominant traditions, therefore, incorporate much of what may in the future become revealed as unjust. Analogously, they likely also contain much invisible injustice that will become revealed as soon as new criteria are instituted; hence, making them \textit{ex post facto} into visible wrongs. Which currently invisible wrongs might turn up on some future list of injustices committed in our time epoch?\(^{19}\)

In this regard, there is one set of values with pretension to global validity. It is generally referred to by the phrase “human rights,” and it is often taken to be a set of self-evident values in two senses. First, regarding its articulation, it is taken that it ought to be uncontroversial \textit{which} specific rights are to be placed on the official list of human rights. Second, regarding its justification, it is believed that human rights can constitute a legal mechanism based on a presumed moral argument that requires no spelling out. However, neither this articulation nor justification is self-evident in the ways that they are taken to be. Given that all ideologies incorporate the aspiration to self-evidence of their main tenets precisely with respect to their articulation and justification, the following question seems appropriate: Has a new ideology, understood in terms of human rights, already emerged?

Philosophically speaking, regardless of who takes what as being self-evident, we can explore what gives human rights their alleged special value and which specific rights make the list and why, i.e., what sort of justification ought to accompany the placement of a right on the list of human rights? Should the list be considered properly justified based on how attracted or drawn to it we feel, or would its \textit{de facto} wide adoption be sufficient? Neither of these ways of providing justification, however, is either clear in terms of what it would involve or obvious in the sense of offering the ultimate justification. But neither the wide appeal nor extensive acceptance of human rights really exists. Rather, in their place, is insistence (in some quarters) on the self-evident nature of the value human rights possess.\(^{20}\) This is exactly the sort of \textit{defect of justification} that as

\(^{19}\) Let me quote Weber once again. Discussing Niccolò Machiavelli’s passage from \textit{The History of Florence}, Weber tells of a hero who was praising “those citizens who deemed the greatness of their native city higher than the salvation of their souls . . . If one says ‘the future of socialism,’ or ‘international peace,’ instead of native city or ‘fatherland’ (which at present may be a dubious value to some), then you face the problem as it stands . . .” Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” p. 126.

\(^{20}\) Alfred Rubin makes the same point in terms of “international community:” “Those who think in terms of the ‘international community’ would do well to recall that about one-fifth of the world community is Chinese, another fifth or so Hindu Indian, and yet another fifth various radical religious groups whose notion of morality rests on the interpretation
a rule we find in the context of ideology building, and as we have seen above, it represents an essential component of doctrinal evil. Given the comprehensive nature of the proposed redefinition of “good” that every ideology incorporates, the scope of argument in favor of this redefinition is maximally narrowed to the mere invitation to accept the new definition. This is not meant just as an empirical claim about how ideologies or religions function (though as such the claim would probably be true), but conceptually the very comprehensiveness of the redefinition is experienced as so overwhelming that nothing other than self-evidence can even present itself, thus stifling all potential argumentation. Therefore, it may be asked: How did human rights become “self-evident”? Are the values of bygone times, such as justice, honesty, or civility less appropriately understood to be “universal,” “trans-cultural,” or “inalienable” so that we must replace them with human rights?

In this context, human rights are taken to have the following two features. They are unrestricted by state borders, and they are independent of any prior recognition and acceptance. While these features fail to specify the sources of authorization in would-be enforcement, they vastly facilitate aggressive display of allegiance in favor of “the novel good.” But what exactly is the content of this new good? What are the rights that should be on the list of the human rights? The scope and number of these rights is not currently specified, but what gives some rights the status of human rights is their presumed presence on some specifically designated list. If we take a closer look, we may discover that the list derives from a rhetoric associated with an exclusive group that gives itself a mandate to express the moral point of view that matters. This yields characterizations of various practices as either obligatory or impermissible in a manner that obtains features of a de facto ideology. This monopolization of moral sensibility amounts to a redefinition of the Good intended as the “final”

of some holy writ, be it the Jewish Bible, the New Testament, the Koran, or anything similar to any particular group. The three-fifths is a majority, and to those who would argue that many Chinese or Indians reject the teachings of their selected or elected leaders, the obvious response is that so do many Americans and Europeans reject the teachings of theirs” [Alfred Rubin, “Humanitarian Intervention and International Law,” in A. Jokic (ed.), Humanitarian Intervention: Moral and Philosophical Issues (Calgary: Broadview Press, 2003), p. 113].


expression of its meaning, which indicates that the process of application has advanced very far and that the shape of the new ideology is in sight. In redefining the meaning of “the Good” this group is representing their real or imagined over-sensitivity as the true and final moral sensibility, redirecting the universal moral sensibility to this list that is made of an indeterminate number of rules that specify what should count as “human rights.” The thesis that these rights “belong to everyone” implies an alleged universal authorization for their enforcement. The distinction between morality and legality becomes “dissolved” in a manner characteristic of ideologies (directly turning the content of the definition of “the Good” into law).23

Hence, we come to what in the future might be seen as the “sin” of our epoch. The danger is clear – those sufficiently powerful and motivated to impose their own moral sensibilities and intuitions will be the interpreters of this non-specific list of positively understood “human rights.” This may serve their purpose of spreading their influence and help achieve their goal of becoming and remaining ultimate guardians of the real meaning of the “good.” This is precisely the point where the doctrinal character of such guardianship emerges. As soon as one becomes convinced that he is in the possession of the right interpretation of what is best, and decides to promote this conception, one in fact is in the business of ideology construction. Should this practice find sufficient following the ensuing ideology may be imposed on the wide masses. When this succeeds, ideology serves as the revelation of the true meaning of the “good” becoming a political and social force capable of being used for mobilization in the name of new crusades.

The global march of the new ideology of human rights, thus, places defenders of traditions who attempt to protect “their truths” in an entirely novel predicament. Rather than worrying how to repel potential challenges from, normatively speaking, their equals who defend their traditions, they now must prove the worthiness of their canons by demonstrating compatibility between them and the tenets of the new cosmopolitanism of human rights.24

23 The phrase “belong to everyone;” it should be clarified, is itself an ideological item. For, it remains unclear what characteristics one must have in order to be a bearer of those rights. Do such rights accrue to bearers no matter what values they happen to have in the real world, or only after they are “enlightened” to incorporate “human rights” among their own core values? If the former were the case, this would be in keeping with the attitude of tolerance. However, if the latter were the case, this would not only be an instance of intolerant imposition of values, but could threaten the basic identity of whole collectives by effecting a dramatic change in their conception of themselves.

24 See Pogge, “Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty,” p. 49f. On the other side, Kukathas writes: “… assuming that there is a common established standpoint. From that point
If this normative supremacy of cosmopolitanism were to become constituted in reality, it would directly disprove the claim made at the beginning of this paper: It is impossible for there to exist only one religion in the world. However, if I am wrong, there is no room for tolerance in the world. For, if there is to be tolerance, the perfectly natural aspiration to view one’s favorite values and convictions as everyone’s values and convictions, must remain just that: an aspiration. Only as such those (collective) values and convictions can realize their regulative function in a tolerant atmosphere. While naturally aspiring to universal constitutive status, these regulative rules do not preclude tolerance as long as this transformation (from particular regulative to universal constitutive) is cautiously guarded against. Ideology originates precisely at the point when this caution is lost sight of. What is more, this is also the stuff that doctrinal evil is made of. That is, what is approved of – the chosen values or adopted meaning of the good – is taken as proved universal truth. However, conscientiously keeping distinctions, where they exist, yields tolerance in the form of self-control and non-negligence.

6. Conceptual Topology

The result of our discussion suggests that the conceptual trio – intolerance, ideology, and doctrinal evil – have much more in common than at first might appear. It turns out that the shared core meaning between these concepts is quite substantial. In coming to this realization, a central role was played by the concept of doctrinal evil, as developed in contrast to pure and average evils, and under the assumption of the metaphysical necessity of the freedom of the will.

More specifically, pure evil was introduced as a sort of methodological limit because of the metaphysical need that evil could become an object of choice if persons were to be considered truly free. Since all practically relevant evil must incorporate both natural and moral evil, pure evil is least relevant. Because it is in some sense irrational, its would-be moral component cannot easily be matched with its natural counterpart. However, pure evil’s practical relevance becomes dramatically reversed as a result of the way doctrinal evil functions. The widespread impression that pure evil is a rather common phenomenon, while in fact it is quite rare, is the direct result of the broad impact doctrinal evil has at the practical level.

onwards, differing views are treated as dissenting from the received view, and tolerance is not possible since relations with dissenters are conducted on the basis of the principles implicit in the established standpoint” (Kukathas, “Cultural Toleration,” p. 81).
From the perspective of any doctrinal evil, everything that fails to fit in with a given re-definition of good is treated as intolerable in the specific sense of pure evil – “pure evil, pure rejection.”25 There is no need for any further argumentation, for pure evil is simply unjustifiable. Any success a proposed redefinition of the “good” might enjoy depends on intolerance toward the definitionally implied “pure evil.” By contrast, when it is defeated, doctrinal evil is minimized and eliminated as if itself a form of pure evil. Therefore, conceptually pure evil is instrumental in both the phase of successful expansion of doctrinal evil and the abandonment of responsible ways of facing evil in an instance of a defeated doctrinal evil.26 Early on, while still operative at the level of a proposed redefinition of the good, the ideological character of doctrinal evil may appear to support an attitude of tolerance, as in principle willing to entertain other ideas. However, whether it becomes successful or fails, intolerance ensues rather quickly. In success, doctrinal evil is intolerant towards everything that is different; in defeat, its definition of the good generates, among the victors, the same intolerant attitude as acts of pure evil do. Consequently, the doctrinal evil represents the main source of intolerance, because of the mechanism that identifies either the competition or the doctrinal evil itself with pure evil. It is precisely this connection between doctrinal evil and pure evil that provides ideologies with their forcefulness by enabling them to focus their motivational power exclusively on the promotion and realization of the goal selected as the absolute and unique good. This sort of focus is possible because the ideological designation of certain items as self-evidently pure evil allows all movements with doctrinal evil at their core to escape analysis, exploration, and argumentation presenting everything that must be pursued or avoided as self-evident.

While we have designated doctrinal evil in its attempt to impose a new definition of the “good” as the main source of intolerance in the world, the concept of tolerance cannot be properly understood in simple opposition to intolerance. Instead, tolerance emerged as a sort of vigilance, conscientiousness, and non-negligence, which is not based on a supposedly correct interpretation of the good, but rather on the acceptance of the fallibility of any such attempted definition. In order to achieve these conclusions we had to rely on a specific tripartite division within the concept of evil. Though neatly separated for the sake of our philosophical analysis, in their every day manifestations these three types of evil can, and often appear in their mutually combined form. Some of these combinations are partic-

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25 See above, Section 3.
26 Otherwise, it would become a part of an established tradition – a practice that by its being accepted was experienced to be acceptable.
ularly important, especially when they connect with the third type of evil. While doctrinal evil in its aspiration to act on behalf of some novel or specific definition of the “good” does not have evil as such for its directly chosen purpose. Because of its close connection to intolerance, it may not be easily distinguished from pure evil. In reality, when one over-identifies with a specific interpretation of the good, hence labeling all competing descriptions as “evil,” the result is a kind of unsanctioned gratification in consuming the enforcement of the “right” conception (or doctrine) without any effort to find out the specifics of the competitors.

This laborious affair of labeling in the most extreme terms of everything that is foreign to an exclusionary comprehensive scheme becomes collaboration with the greatest of evils. Rather than fostering responsible and difficult task of facing evil – even in the minimal form present in ordinary evil when the need is felt that one must justify the exception to the rule that one is tempted to violate – the campaign against “evil” only serves to conceal real evil. And it can even directly generate new evils through the unsanctioned enjoyment in an alleged absolute condemnation that serves as a liberating experience in order to “freely” and “rightly” practice “absolute intolerance.” While the utmost recklessness encountered here makes the entire enterprise quite banal, its significance is so great that it requires careful scrutiny. This scrutiny is also a matter of responsibility, which is based on tolerance and justice in contrast to the above enjoyment characterized by arrogant contempt, intolerance, and escape from facing evil. The principal evil in doctrinal evil, therefore, is found in the arrogance that accompanies the intolerance-inducing irresponsible thoughtlessness. This does not imply, however, that doctrinal evil could be identified with pure evil, nor that intolerance could turn anything into right and good while something else into wrong and evil.27

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