THE ABSENT FOUNDATION:

HEIDEGGER ON THE RATIONALITY OF BEING

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*Nihil est sine ratione,* “nothing is without reason.” For everything that is, there is an answer to the question *why* it is just so and not otherwise—and, ultimately, there is a reason (*ratio*) grounding the fact that there is something rather than nothing. Reality as a whole is thus “rational” or “reasonable,” in the sense that everything is based on something and has a “why” or a “how come” that grounds it, rendering it comprehensible and meaningful and thus letting it be part of meaningful reality. Nothing *is* without something that lets it be what it is. This is the famous “principle of reason” (*principium rationis*)—in a slightly different formulation, the “principle of the restoration of sufficient reason” (*principium reddendae rationis sufficientis*)—which was first explicitly
formulated in these words by G. W. Leibniz, although not as a doctrine of his own but as a fundamental and generally accepted philosophical principle.

There is in Nature a reason [ratio] why something should exist rather than nothing. This is a consequence of the great principle that nothing comes to be without reason, just as there also must be a reason why this exists, rather than something else.¹

Indeed, in one form or another, the principle of reason has been an integral part of Occidental metaphysics ever since antiquity. The central issue of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*—the question which Heidegger names the leading question (*Leitfrage*) of Occidental metaphysics as a whole—concerns that-which-is, beings.² What is a being as such? What is a being insofar as it is a being? Or, as Aristotle reformulates the question, what is the being-ness (*ousia*), the fundamental being-character, of beings as such? For Aristotle, the first essential characteristic of being-ness is fundamentality, foundationality.³

What truly is must be a *hypocheimenon* (in Latin *substantia*, “substance,” or *subiectum*, “subject”)—literally, something that “lies beneath” as an ontological basis or foundation, letting other, dependent beings be while itself remaining ontologically independent. The most being of all beings is that on which all other beings are dependent but which is itself absolutely independent of anything beyond itself.

The ontological investigation of Books Zeta, Eta, and Theta of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* thus finds its culmination in the theology of Book Lambda—a
discussion of God as the absolute, the most fundamental and necessary being-
ness and principle. The Aristotelian notion of God as absolute self-awareness,
as perfect being in-itself and for-itself, was then taken over by medieval
Scholasticism—for St. Thomas, God as the uncreated creator and the ultimate
cause of things is not only the most being of beings (maxime ens) but
subsistence and permanence, that is, being-ness, as such (ipsum esse
subsistentes). Heidegger’s famous genealogy of modernity shows how, since
Descartes, the self-conscious I, now interpreted with regard to the absolute and
immediate self-certainty of the cogito, gradually replaces God as the
fundamental subject of reality. As modern metaphysics unfolds, human
subjectivity as the basis of meaningfulness becomes more and more absolute
and self-sufficient; this “subjectivization” culminates in Nietzsche’s idea of the
“superhuman” subject who no longer simply apprehends given objectivity but
instead gives itself its own “truths” as fuel for its essence, that is, the ceaseless
will to self-enhancement.

In asking its leading question concerning the being-ness of beings, the
metaphysical tradition has, according to Heidegger, constantly sought a
supreme, ideal form of being-ness which all beings could be referred back to
and founded upon. Yet from Plato to Nietzsche, metaphysics has been unable
to radically pose what Heidegger calls the “basic question” or “fundamental
question” (Grundfrage) of philosophy; it has never really inquired into the
origin of its own “rationality.” What are the experience of ideal being-ness as
something foundational and the subsequent metaphysical demand for
foundations in themselves based on? What is the foundation, ground, or reason of being-ness, of the presence of beings as such? How come there is being-ness in the first place?

We know that the achievement of Leibniz was to intimate this question by asking why there should be something rather than nothing. However, he also immediately provides this question with a metaphysical answer: the ultimate reason for the fact that there is being-ness at all is the perfection of God as the most being of all beings. Yet it must be emphasized that overlooking the radical dimensions of this question was neither a personal failure of Leibniz nor an “error” of the metaphysical tradition he stood in. Heidegger emphasizes that the basic question is only really becoming plausible as a question now, in the (post)modern epoch, after the project of founding beings on ideal being-ness has been pursued to its extreme point of culmination, completion, and saturation by Hegel and Nietzsche.

In what follows, I will briefly study Heidegger’s attempt to pose the basic question by way of reinterpreting and radicalizing Leibniz’s principle. He does this notably in the 1928 lecture course *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, in the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Reason,” and in the 1955–56 lectures on *The Principle of Reason*. Finally, following Jean-François Mattéi, I will try to suggest a sense in which the later Heidegger’s “fourfold” (*Geviert*) is an attempt to reformulate the traditional Aristotelian articulation of the essence of foundation or reason. I will argue that an insight into Heidegger’s reinterpretation offers an essential path to an understanding of his endeavor to
reconsider the ground—or rather, the back-ground—of the leading theme of the metaphysical tradition, of the being-ness of beings as such.

How do we primarily understand Leibniz’s simple thesis—that nothing is without being based on something? For the modern scientific mind, “reason” or “ground” is first and foremost associated with cause and causality. Modern science would tend to interpret the principle of reason to say that for every phenomenon, there is something that causes it to be the way it is; there is nothing random or spontaneous in nature. The initial approach of the modern scientist to any phenomenon is thus to attempt to explain it causally through an account of the factors that cause it to be the way it is, in accordance with certain causal laws. Such laws, which are basically formulated through induction from observations, tell us what is causally brought forth by what, thus permitting us to predict certain observations, to produce them experimentally and, eventually, to control them. As Heidegger points out in “The Question Concerning Technology,” modern science does not only make technological applications possible, it is essentially technical in itself. The conceptual origin of technology lies in the Greek technē, defined by Aristotle as familiarity with a principle that allows the bringing-about (poiēsis) of certain results—a “know-how”—and distinguished from epistēmē, true science in the sense of a disinterested, comprehensive grasp of the structures of a certain phenomenal field. Science is “theoretical” in the sense that it finds its fulfillment in the activity of theōrein, “theory” or “speculation”—that is, in the comprehensive overview of reality in its fullness, without productive aims.
In modernity, especially after the fall of German Idealism and its peculiar concept of science (*Wissenschaft*), “theory” and “science” have gradually come to mean the opposite of what they meant for Aristotle. It now belongs to the essence of scientific theories to have predictive power, and their role is thus essentially instrumental; scientific explanation of phenomena now entails the technical ability to produce certain results experimentally. Furthermore, whereas for Aristotle philosophical meditation concerning the principles (*archai*) of reality as a whole was precisely the most profound, most universal, and supreme scientific activity, in the modern age, scientific “research” and philosophical “speculation” have become two fundamentally different approaches. For the positivist and naturalist trends of thought, positive science, based on regularities in empirical observations, is our most profound way of getting to know what reality is like.

Kant, however, retains for philosophy another task as “transcendental” philosophy: philosophy seeks the necessary a priori basis and foundation of science, the condition of meaningful observations in the first place.

I call all cognition *transcendental* that is occupied not so much with objects but rather with our manner of cognizing objects in general, insofar as this is to be possible *a priori*. A system of such concepts would be called *transcendental philosophy*.\(^{16}\)

Kant, too, is looking for the grounds of phenomena. However, his transcendental approach does not seek the causal grounds of objects in other
objects; instead, following the metaphysical tradition, it seeks to ground objects in the necessary a priori structure of objectivity as such. Instead of reducing beings or facts to other chronologically anterior beings or facts, transcendental philosophy considers beings in relation to their very being-ness. Heidegger stresses that Kant’s use of the term “transcendental,” which in medieval philosophy denotes the most general categories of being-ness, is not arbitrary. In order to clarify the a priori structures of experience, it is necessary to transcend, to “overstep” (übersteigen) the immediately present, already constituted experience towards the structures of its constitution. However, these transcendental structures are not transcendent to our experience, in the sense of being beyond its reach. Rather, they form the structural background or horizon that necessarily accompanies and structures our experience of the object occupying the foreground or focal point of our experience.

As Heidegger emphasizes, Kant’s basic framework is that of Cartesian metaphysics, and he accordingly seeks the reality of things in their objectivity—that is, in their capacity to be represented by the cognizing subject—and therefore poses his transcendental question in terms of the preconditions of subjective representation (Vorstellung). However, this should not prevent us from appreciating Kant’s Greek background. It is precisely Kant’s transcendental search for the fundamental structural principles of meaningfulness that, according to Heidegger, makes him Greek in spirit. In the opening words of Aristotle’s Physics—words that Heidegger praises as being worth more than entire libraries of philosophical literature—we find the aim
of philosophy already defined as a transcending, an overstepping of the immediate and already constituted everyday reality toward its fundamental, transcendental principles (archai):

In all paths of research [methodos] to which principles [archai], grounds [aitia] and fundamental elements [stoicheia] belong, insight and scientific understanding result from acquaintance with these, for we take ourselves to be acquainted with something as soon as we are acquainted with its primary grounds and primary principles and have proceeded all the way to its elements. . . . Our path is originally such that it proceeds from what is more recognizable and more evident for us to what is more evident and recognizable originally [physei]; for what is recognizable to us is not identical with what is recognizable as such.22

What is more easily recognized by us—the immediately present and fully constituted reality—is not identical with what is more primary in the order of the origination and emergence (physis) of reality—that is, the structural principles of its constitution, which are always implicitly there as the necessary background of all beings. The “method”—literally, the “path” (hodos)—of philosophical investigation is to proceed from the immediately given and to transcend it towards its necessary structural background. Already for Aristotle, philosophy is essentially “transcendental” in the broadest possible sense.23

In the Physics, Aristotle presents his famous analysis of the four basic kinds of ground or reason (aition).24 These are: (1) “that out of which” (ex hou) the thing consists, its material or “stuff” (hyle), such as gold; (2) its form,
generic appearance or essence (*eidos*), such as that of a bowl; (3) the mover or originator (*ho kinēsas*) of its becoming what it properly is, such as the goldsmith; and 4) the final end or purpose (*telos*) of the thing, that for the sake of which (*hou heneka*) it is real, the “good” proper to the thing in question. These four are usually known by their Scholastic names as the material, the formal, the efficient, and the final cause. However, Heidegger maintains that there is no “causality” in the modern sense of cause and effect involved here. The very notion of “efficient cause” (*causa efficiens*) is Roman in origin and remains foreign to Greek thought. Instead, the four reasons are to be understood as the fourfold context on the basis of which the grounded thing becomes meaningfully present. The *aitia* are the four fundamental factors that are responsible for the coming-to-be of beings and for their emergence into presence. They form the background “through which” (*dia tī*) the presence of the grounded thing is possible, to which it owes its presence and therefore always refers back to—the fourfold answer to the question “why this (and not something else)?” What the Aristotelian description of the four reasons ultimately and half-unwittingly refers back to—in a Heideggerian reading that overcomes Aristotle’s own tendency to objectify these reasons—is “world” (*Welt*) as the context of mutual references that transcendentally surrounds every being and at the same time constitutes the horizon which makes this being meaningful in the first place, that is, lets it be.

Heidegger is, in fact, arguing that ever since its Greek beginning, Western philosophy has been “transcendental” in the sense that it has sought the
structural grounds that lie implicit within and beyond explicit reality.\textsuperscript{29} Even Husserl’s transcendental reduction can be understood as the last great attempt to revive this original transcendental sense of philosophical investigation as such.\textsuperscript{30} The phenomenological reduction is literally an attempt to re-conduct philosophical attention from already constituted things back to the structure and process of their constitution. Heidegger famously reinterprets the phenomenological reduction in the following manner:

\textit{For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction . . . is the method of re-conducting [Rückführung] phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of the human being, living within the world of things and persons, back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetico-noematic experiences, where objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For us, the phenomenological reduction signifies re-conducting phenomenological vision from the so-and-so determined apprehension of beings back to the understanding of the Being . . . of these beings.}\textsuperscript{31}

This is precisely how Heidegger reinterprets the question concerning the ground of beings and transcendental philosophy as the quest for these grounds. This was shown to be a questioning of the structural background, horizon, and context which surrounds and grounds beings and is necessarily implied in their presence. For Aristotle, this background is constituted by the principles (archai) of reality itself, the most fundamental principle being God. For Kant and Husserl, the background of objects is the transcendental
structure of objectivity-for-subjectivity—self-conscious subjectivity being itself
the fundamental foundation. In all of these cases, the fundamental background
of beings is ideal being-ness as the sphere of absolute self-presence, be it that
of God or of the I-subject. Heidegger now poses the fundamental question:
What is the background of this being-ness as such?

For Heidegger, this necessary, implicit background of reality is, of course,
nothing else than what he calls Being (Sein or, more consistently with the
archaic orthography, Seyn)—Being not in the traditional sense of the being-
ness of beings or of the objectivity of objects, but instead in the radical and
archaic post- or pre-metaphysical sense. The question of the ground of being-
ness as such is, fundamentally, the question of Being (Seinsfrage). What
Heidegger’s post-metaphysical thinking calls into question is Being as the
implicit background which allows the being-ness or presence of beings as the
explicit foreground. Even though, in Being and Time, the discovery of Being is
referred to as “transcendental truth,”32 for the later Heidegger it becomes more
and more evident that this kind of new foundational thinking cannot properly
be called “transcendental,” for it no longer seeks an ideal, universal being-ness
that would “transcend” individual beings in the sense of being “superior” to
them in a metaphysically determined ontological hierarchy.33 Nor is it, strictly
speaking, “foundational” thinking, for the ground of being-ness cannot be a
foundation in the traditional sense of a point of reference that is more real than
immediate reality itself. What is sought in this other questioning of grounds is
a ground that is other to and different from being-ness, presence or reality—
and, in that sense, un-being, un-present, un-real—and lets being-ness occupy the foreground precisely in differing from it as its other.

Being in this other, different sense is precisely the nothing (Nichts), nothing-ness as such.\textsuperscript{34} This no-thing-ness should not be thought of as some self-contained “entity”, separate from some-thing-ness. Instead, Being as the nothing “is” precisely the “ontological difference” itself—not as the metaphysical distinction between beings and their being-ness, but in the radical sense as the event of differentiation and relative otherness which allows and “carries out” (austragen) the relative identity and stability of things.\textsuperscript{35} As Heidegger emphasizes in his 1949 foreword to “On the Essence of Ground,” while the ontological difference and the nothing are not mutually “equivalent” (einerlei), they nevertheless belong together as the self-same issue (das Selbe) for thinking—as Being.\textsuperscript{36}

In the 1929 essay “On the Essence of Reason,” Heidegger presents a threefold articulation of Being as the ground of beings. It is evident that this articulation is intimately connected to the analysis of the temporality of Dasein in \textit{Being and Time}, as well as to the analyses of significance and world. The point of departure is here the transcendence of Dasein. Dasein is itself precisely in transcending its immediate present.\textsuperscript{37} This transcendence is also called “freedom,” for in “overcoming” the immediately given toward its transcendental context, Dasein is also “free” from the given.\textsuperscript{38} However, freedom is not the arbitrary absence of grounds. On the contrary, freedom as transcendence is the original relationship to Being as the back-ground of
beings. “All the same, freedom as transcendence is not just a particular ‘kind’ of ground; it is the origin of ground in general. Freedom is freedom to ground.”

It is precisely through its freedom that Dasein is able to encounter a meaningful reality where given beings are placed into a meaningful context, into a background, and thus “grounded” or “founded” (gründen) in Being. Freedom “gives” and “takes” ground. This event of grounding has three aspects:

1. Transcendent freedom “establishes” (stiften) or “projects” (entwerfen) background in the sense of a “for-the-sake-of-what” (Umwollen)—a purpose or end which bestows a sense of purposefulness to the being at hand. For example, when a hammer is given to us in the primary mode of handiness (Zuhandenheit), we immediately transcend the hammer as a material object towards a futural dimension of purpose, a “for-which” or an “in-order-to.” The context of purpose, such as hammering a nail, building a house, having a place to dwell etc., makes the object meaningful to us in a practical context.

2. Transcendent freedom “takes ground” (bodennehmen) in its factical and historical background, in the situation in which it already finds itself entangled (Befindlichkeit). In other words, Dasein is always already “taken in” (eingenommen) by its factical circumstances. In projecting its goals, Dasein is itself already “thrown” or “ejected” (geworfen) into a certain factical situation which delimits in beforehand its possible goals in imposing on Dasein a given preliminary articulation and interpretation of reality. Because of the facticity, of the “already-going-
on” character (*Gewesenheit*) of Dasein, some possibilities are always already withdrawn (*entzogen*) from it. This limitation of proper possibilities constitutes the essential finitude of Dasein’s freedom.41

3. In their initial unity, these two dimensions of temporal transcendence allow an intentional relationship to the present as meaningful and well-founded. Transcendence thus “justifies” (*begründen*) the present. It makes it possible in the first place to seek reasons in asking the question “why” or “how come”: how come precisely this and not something else?42

This threefold division is the original essence of ground. The essence of ground is thus the temporality of Dasein: the temporal unity of open futural possibilities and the factical, already-given historical background which, in their mutual interaction, allow the constitution of a meaningful present. Hence Heidegger’s compact and challenging summary:

*The essence of ground is the transcendentally off-springing threefold scattering of grounding into projection of world, having-been-taken-in among beings and ontological justification of beings.*43

The temporal freedom of transcendent Dasein is thus the origin of the principle of ground or reason that has haunted Western philosophy ever since Plato and Aristotle. “Freedom is the ground of ground. . . . However, as this ground freedom is the void [Ab-grund] of Dasein.”44 And as Heidegger puts it in the late 1930s, “As void [Ab-grund], Being ‘is’ at once the nothing [das Nichts] as well as
the ground." Being is the “void” (Ab-grund), the absent foundation, the background which itself withdraws and only thus allows beings to occupy the foreground. In other words, Being is the relative absentiality which allows meaningful presence – “presence-by-absence” or “pres-ab-sence,” as Thomas Sheehan famously puts it.

It must be noted, however, that whereas this formulation of the essence of ground in terms of the transcendence and the freedom of Dasein clearly indicates the fundamental orientation of Heidegger’s thought, it is far from being his final word on the matter. From the 1930s onwards he subjected the entire concept of “transcendence” to an immanent critique as potentially misleading and metaphysically determined. First of all, it could be taken as a subjectively free, ground-constituting activity of Dasein as subjectivity, whereas in the end Heidegger wants to show that it is the background itself that “gives beingness,” lets presence take place in the receptive open place, in the Da, of Dasein. Secondly, the concept of transcendence seems to imply that there is at first some immanent self that is then transcended, whereas Heidegger’s point is precisely that the “self” of Dasein, which forms the place in which the taking-place (Ereignis) of presence is possible, is generated through its prior “already being beyond itself.” In his 1955–56 lectures on The Principle of Reason Heidegger therefore attempts to reformulate his radicalization of the question of ground using entirely different expressions. Here he also notes that in 1929 he did not listen attentively enough to the wording of Leibniz’s principle. To say that nothing is without reason or ground is assuredly a metaphysical
statement, but if instead we emphasize the word nothing (*nihil*), we get: *nothing* is *without* ground. Being as the *no-thing-ness* is the ground, more precisely, the absent ground, which itself has no ground.

In the end, Leibniz’s grand principle, “Nothing is without reason,” has thus been reinterpreted to say, in a free formulation, “No being can be meaningfully present in the foreground of being-ness without the temporal event of Being that forms its relatively absent, differing, and withdrawing background.” There is something rather than nothing precisely because nothing-ness forms the background that lets presence as such occupy the foreground. Heidegger emphasizes that this background of presence is an *Abgrund*, a void, a bottom-less-ness, an *absence* or *lack* of foundation—but only from the point of view of traditional metaphysics. Considered in a positive manner, the *Abgrund* is not a “privation”—it is simply *not* the kind of positive foundation that metaphysics has been looking for. The ultimate foundation of reality and meaning in difference or absentiality does not imply the ultimate nihilistic collapse of all meaningfulness and rationality into nothingness—a superficial accusation that is often brought up against the thought of Derrida, in particular. The differential and absential character of the foundation only means that what rationality as such is based on is not itself rational, not a positive *ratio*.

By now, we have perhaps gained an initial understanding of the Heideggerian radicalization of the principle of reason or ground, and we begin to see its implications. Heidegger ends his 1929 meditation on the essence of
ground by arguing that the great shortcoming in Aristotle’s profound analysis of the four kinds of reason is its lack of unity.\(^{50}\) Aristotle is content with claiming that it is “evident” that there are exactly these four kinds, without really explaining why this is so and what constitutes the unity of the four.\(^{51}\) Heidegger is, in fact, indirectly proposing that he himself has found this lacking unity and common ground in his present analysis of the threefold temporal structure of groundedness.

Starting from the fragments for *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* in the late 1930s, Heidegger increasingly refers to the unity of four dimensions of sense which he names “gods” (*die Götter*) or the “divine ones” (*die Göttlichen*), “human beings” (*die Menschen*) or “mortals” (*die Sterblichen*), “world” (*die Welt*) or “heaven” (*der Himmel*), and “earth” (*die Erde*). In his famous essay on “The Thing” (1950), Heidegger rather opaquely describes how these four dimensions are to be found in unity, as a “unity of four” or “fourfold” (*Geviert*), within a simple thing, a Greek pitcher; pouring wine from the pitcher supposedly refers back to the gods, the mortals, heaven, and earth.\(^{52}\) In a recent work, the French Heidegger scholar Jean-François Mattéi has argued that this baffling account is to be understood precisely as a reinterpretation and reworking of the four Aristotelian grounds.\(^{53}\) Fully in agreement with Mattéi’s insight, I will try to elaborate this suggestion by trying to show in what sense it could be true, and to develop it further by suggesting the fourfold to be a rethought version of the threefold division of Dasein’s transcendence to grounds in “On the Essence of Ground.”\(^{54}\)
In Heidegger’s later work, “gods” name the futural sense-bestowing dimension of ultimate goals, aims and purposes—we are tempted to say “values,” although Heidegger despises this modern subjectivist concept—in short, the Aristotelian “final cause.” The “divine ones” are what is most high and holy for a given historical world; the “eschatologically” final, ultimate and unattainable character of this divine dimension is further emphasized by the highly demanding discussion of the “ultimate God” (der letzte Gott) in the sixth part or “joining” (Fuge) of the Contributions to Philosophy. “Mortals” are the historical and finite community of human beings as receivers, interpreters, and re-shapers of meaningfulness—the Aristotelian “efficient cause”—whose activities always remain determined by what is beyond human action, by the divine. These are the two temporal dimensions of transcendence—the historical and social background and the future realm of possible meaningful ends—whose dynamic mutual conflict (Kampf) creates the context where presence can take place.

Presence is itself a two-dimensional event of internal conflict, consisting of the basic dimensions of “earth” and “world.” “Earth” names the opaque dimension of inchoate and implicit potentiality-to-be, the solid ground for the material and sensuous presence of things in their particularity—the Aristotelian “material cause.” “World” or “heaven” is the dimension of light and visibility, of significant, discursive articulation which grants relative permanence and generality to particular things—the Aristotelian “formal cause.” The dispute or discord (Streit) between world and earth, which itself
always takes place in the historical situation shaped by the ongoing conflict between men and gods, between history and future, forms the dynamic bipolar event of the meaningful articulation of concrete reality and of the materialization of meaning; for Heidegger, highlighting this event of meaning-formation constitutes the essence of the work of art. As is shown by the interesting diagram that we find in section 190 in the fourth joining of the Contributions, entitled “Grounding,” the horizontal “transcendent” axis of men and gods informs the vertical “immanent” axis of world and earth.

The intersection of these two mutual oppositions assembles these four dimensions into the concrete present reality which forms their “in-between” (das Zwischen or Inzwischen)—into the meaningful thing that is grounded in the convergence of these dimensions. Meaningful presence is precisely the “in-between” of these four foundational dimensions. This fourfold dimensionality of sense forms the context and background in relation to which things become significant for human beings—that is, the fourfold is precisely Being, which in withdrawing lets beings come forth into presence.


20 Heidegger, *SG*, 131; *The Principle of Reason*, 76.

21 Heidegger, *SG*, 112; *The Principle of Reason*, 64.


27 Aristotle, *Physics* 2.3.194b18–19.


33 An excellent critical study of how Heidegger purports to abandon his initial “transcendental” project and to what extent this really happens is Daniel Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Transcendentalism” (forthcoming in *Research in Phenomenology*). I thank Prof. Dahlstrom for the opportunity to read this unpublished article.


Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz [1928], Gesamtausgabe, 26 
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1978), 276–77; hereafter, GA 26; The Metaphysical 


Heidegger, GA 66, 99.

See, e.g., Thomas Sheehan, “Heidegger’s Topic: Excess, Recess, Access,” 
Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 41 (1979): 629; “Heidegger’s Philosophy of Mind,” in Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey, 

“On the Way to Ereignis: Heidegger’s Interpretation of Physis,” in Continental Philosophy in America, 

See Heidegger, GA 65, 322; Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 226.

See Heidegger, SG, 84–90; The Principle of Reason, 45–49.

See Martin Heidegger, “Der Satz der Identität” [1957], in ID, 20; “The Principle of Identity,” in 
Identity and Difference, 32.

See Aristotle, Physics 2.7.198a21.


56 See Heidegger, GA 65, 310; Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 218.

57 See Heidegger, GA 65, 310–11; Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), 218–19; as well as GA 66, 117, 309–11.