

The Ethics of Expectations

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You are not what your parents want you to be.
You are not what *you* want to be, because you love them, your parents, and you want to make them happy, and you just...can't. In fact, now you have no idea what you should be, instead. You are incomplete.

— N. K. Jemisin, *The Awakened Kingdom*

Joyce: Honey, are you sure you're a Vampire Slayer? I mean, have you tried not being a Slayer?

— *Buffy The Vampire Slayer*, "The Becoming: Part Two"

She was folding laundry when I told her I was gay. I'll never forget the look of sadness mixed with betrayal that fell across her face. I had seen my mother cry before, but never quite like that. I had hurt her in a way that I still struggle to make sense of, and she had hurt me too in a way that I still struggle to articulate. So, I wrote this paper instead of going to therapy.

Although that last sentence is meant in jest, it serves to highlight a mismatch between the central significance of parental expectations in our lives and the little philosophical analysis such expectations have received. How can I articulate the ways I've been hurt if I can't articulate what expectations are? Am I even right to feel hurt if I can't explain when expectations are appropriate or inappropriate? At least with regard to my mother's beliefs, I can pinpoint where she goes wrong because we have an ethics of belief. That is, we know what belief aims at, we know the norms governing belief formation, and perhaps we even know when beliefs can wrong. Expectation, however, is trickier to get a handle on.

"I never wanted life to be difficult for you," is what she said to me when she was able to speak to me again. My mother, in trying to explain the source of her grief, was speaking to a harsh truth. Life would be more difficult for me. All she wanted was the best for me, she had sacrificed so much for me to be able to live a better life than her own. She had raised me to be a particular kind of person, but now that same person was responsible

for upending her dreams and dashing her hopes for a better future by throwing all that she had sacrificed back in her face. I was choosing a path she couldn't even begin to fathom, let alone follow me on. And in her failure to accommodate my identity, to change or let go of the expectations driving her grief, I was constrained to two choices: either be someone I'm not or go on without her. At the heart of my mother's pain at the realization that I wasn't who she thought I was, at the heart of my feelings of betrayal at a parent that did not in fact love me no matter what, is an attitude of which little has been said. There is an attitude here that requires closer inspection, an attitude that has been structuring our lives from the very beginning but flies under the radar because it is neither merely belief nor desire.

The expectations my mother holds involve a rich constellation of attitudes ranging from beliefs to also include imaginings, hopes, fears, and dreams. She believes certain things are right, e.g., heterosexuality, and certain things are wrong, e.g., homosexuality. Her expectations express hopes for my future, often they are hopes that I'll be able to do the things she couldn't do, hopes that I won't have to make the same sacrifices she had to make. Her expectations include vivid imaginings and dreams, but they also express her deepest fears, e.g., fear of ostracization, fear of becoming a joke in the community, and, of course, shame. Given the range of attitudes involved it would be a mistake to treat expectation as merely a theoretical, practical, or evaluative attitude. Sometimes expectations are predictive, like your expectation of rain tomorrow, sometimes prescriptive, like the expectation that your students will do the reading, sometimes proleptic like the hope that your mentee will flourish, and sometimes expectations are peremptory in that they carry the force of moral law, like expecting your child not to bite others because that's simply not done in polite company. To further complicate the story, sometimes expectations play more than one of these roles.

The first part of the paper will be devoted to getting a rough handle on the target phenomenon, i.e., the nature of expectations. To get a broad account of the attitude of expectation on the table I begin by comparing expectation to more familiar attitudes that, when taken together, encompass the multiple roles that expectations seem to play. These attitudes include belief, including credences and normative beliefs and second-order beliefs about what other people believe, desire, aspiration, and interpersonal hope. Taking such a wide view will enable us to account for not only the different things we do when we expect, but also the multiple ways what we expect can be inappropriate or wrong. That is, once we get clear on the nature of expectations, or at least, unravel its multiple threads, we can turn to the second part of this paper: the wrongs of expectations.

I argue that given the multiple roles played by expectations there will be multiple norms governing different kinds of expectations. In turn, there will be multiple ways that expectations can not only go wrong, but also wrong. Of particular interest to me, given the opening example, are the ways that expectations can wrong the subjects of the expectations. Although not all of us know what it's like to come out to our parents, we do each know what it's like to let them down and the hurt and disappointment that follow. From doing poorly on an exam, forgetting to get the chicken out of the freezer, or missing the game-changing penalty shot in a championship youth hockey game, we each know what it feels like when we've failed to live up to someone's expectations, what it feels like to be burdened by unreasonable expectations, or what it feels like to be dismissed as someone not even worth having expectations of. Sometimes that person

we've let down, that person we feel burdened by, or that person we don't even bother sparing a thought for, is ourselves. Expectations are intrapersonal as well as interpersonal, they can be enabling as well as inhibiting. Worse still, some expectations can be deeply alienating. In exposing the range of wrongs we're capable of my goal is to demonstrate that we don't escape the demands of morality by retreating to our inner lives.

1. The Nature of Expectations

As little consensus as there is with regard to the nature of belief, expectations are trickier still. Whatever it means to say that beliefs aim at the truth, most agree that something has gone right when beliefs are true and something has gone wrong when they're false. To be able to say the same for expectations, i.e., when they go right and when they go wrong, we need to get clear on the functional role the attitude plays. That is, what is it that we're doing when we expect something? However, as we'll see, sometimes our expectations have a functional profile that is belief-like, that is, like a theoretical attitude, and sometimes expectations act in different ways altogether, that is, more like practical or evaluative attitudes. To see this, let us start by considering the following expectations.

- (1) I expect that it'll rain tomorrow.
- (2) I expect the meeting will end by noon.
- (3) I expect we'll run into each other at the party.
- (4) I expect you to do the reading before class.
- (5) I expect you to succeed at everything you set your mind to.
- (6) I expect you to be on your best behavior.

On a first glance, there seems to be something (1)-(6) have in common, they each contain a predictive element about what the world will be like. As a result, it might be tempting to conclude that the rationality of expectations is akin to the rationality of beliefs. That is, the rationality of expectations is dependent on whether you have sufficient evidence to expect the world to be as you predict it will be. For example, it'd be inappropriate to expect that it'll rain tomorrow if there's only a 5% chance of rain, it would be inappropriate to expect that the meeting will end by noon unless you have good reason to think so, if you're not going to the party it'd be odd to tell someone you expect to run into them there, etc. So, let us consider this connection between expectation and belief in more detail.

1.1 Expectations as predictions

Perhaps expectations are simply future-directed beliefs, that is, expectations are our predictions about what we think will happen. If this is right, expectations would also be weaker than belief because although expectations aim at getting things right, there's an inbuilt threshold of forgiveness for getting things wrong given uncertainty about the future. For example, if the meeting runs past noon because of an unforeseen urgent agenda item or because someone was uncharacteristically late, you weren't wrong to have nonetheless expected the meeting to end by noon and to have planned your day accordingly. In this way, we might expect expectations to be more akin to a report of our credences than a report of our outright beliefs. Although such an account would explain why it would have been inappropriate to expect that the meeting will end by noon unless you have good reason to think so, e.g., if you had this expectation despite

having good evidence that the meeting would run over, there are two reasons to doubt this initial analysis of expectations. First, expectations are not necessarily future-directed.¹ Second, expectations do not merely express our estimations or best guesses.² Rather, sometimes expectations express our wishes or desires for what we hope the world will be like. In performing this second function, expectations more closely resemble desires than beliefs.

On the first point, that expectations are not necessarily future-directed, consider the following past-directed expectations.

- (7) I expect the dog didn't eat her breakfast.
- (8) I expect it rained last night.

Although these expectations are past-directed, they still seem akin to the best guess gloss on expectations I noted above. That is, the rationality of (7) and (8) seems to depend on whether you have good evidence for what you expect to find out was the case. This can still be accommodated under a prediction gloss on expectations by noting that these expectations are still aiming at discovering something about the world. That is, these expectations are still making predictions, and they still involve some element of discovery of something not yet known or of anticipation of figuring something out. For example, when we think about when someone would utter (7) or (8), it is because there is some phenomenon in need of explaining, e.g., that the dog keeps begging for food or that the driveway is wet. Thus, although not future-directed, the expectations are still operating like predictions, they are still guesses about what the world must have been like in order to explain what the world is like.

However, not all expectations are predictions. Consider the expectation that your students will do the reading before class, i.e., (4). It seems felicitous to say that you expect your students to do the reading but that you believe otherwise and will be lesson planning accordingly. Similarly, you can make plans with your perpetually tardy friend and expect to see them at 9am but fully believe that they'll be late or simply not show because they slept in. That you have strong evidence on the contrary does not seem to make it any less appropriate to nonetheless still have some of the expectations we've been listing throughout this paper. It does, however, sound odd to say that you expect that it will rain tomorrow but you don't believe that it will. That is, we can contrast the following:

- (9) I expect students to do the reading, but I don't believe they will.
- (10) #I expect it will rain tomorrow, but I don't believe it will.

Expectation seems to be functioning differently in the cases of expecting your students to do the reading than in the case where you expect that it will rain. Expectation is playing a predictive role in (10) and that results in the Moore-paradoxical character of that sentence. You cannot predict that p, but also predict that not-p. The fact that (9) does not have the same Moore-paradoxical character suggests that 'expect' is playing a different role than the predictive role we see in (10), because if it were playing the same

¹ Thanks to Gabrielle Johnson for pushing me to say more on this point.

² For an account of thinking (and in turn, believing) in terms of guesses, see Holguín (forthcoming).

role then (9) would sound as odd to our ears as (10). Thus, sometimes expectation has a different functional profile than belief.

To explore this difference in functional profile I will now turn to two explanations of why expectation behaves differently in a sentence like (9). First, the expectation could be expressing a normative belief, a belief about what *should* happen. That is, students *should* do the reading, but I don't believe they will. This normative use of expect contrasts with the epistemic, or predictive, use of expect in (10) and explains why (9) isn't Moore-paradoxical (§1.2). Alternatively, the expectation could be expressing some kind of aspiration, some hope you've invested in your students. That is, I *hope* students will do the reading, but I don't believe they will. This would similarly give us a normative use of expect where expectations express proleptic reasons, i.e., reasons that we don't yet have but hope to have, to contrast with the epistemic or predictive use of expect that we've seen thus far (§1.3). I then end by attempting to weave all of these threads together to give a general account of the how expectations function by deploying a familiar metaphor about the nature of belief: expectations provide us with maps (§1.4).

1.2 Expectation, prescription, and normative beliefs

Perhaps expectations are simply normative beliefs about what we think should happen or would like to happen. That is, expectations contain not only a predictive element but also an element more like desire. That is, expectations have a direction of fit more like desires than belief.

To demonstrate this, consider the most common way to distinguish beliefs from desires, i.e., by their direction of fit. Standardly, discussions of direction of fit begin with Anscombe's grocery shopping case and the contrast between two kinds of lists: one compiled by a shopper and the other compiled by a detective following the shopper around the grocery store. The list compiled by the shopper is an expression of their desires. If what the shopper has in their cart doesn't match the list, then there's no mistake in the list but rather a mistake in the shopper's performance. However, if what is in their cart doesn't match the list compiled by the detective, then there is a mistake in the detective's list. The detective's list is subject to revision when the contents of the shopper's cart do not match what is on their list whereas the shopper's list is not similarly subject to revision.³ The lists relate to the world in different ways, just as desire and belief relate to the world in different ways. Desires have a mind-to-world direction of fit, i.e., we try to change the world to match our desires, whereas beliefs have a world-to-mind direction of fit, i.e., our beliefs aim to match the world.

So let us consider again the expectation that students will do the reading but believing that they won't. Is it a mistake to expect that students will do the reading but not believe that they will? No, not if the expectation is expressing a desire. Beliefs function to track the world, desires express our wishes for what we'd like the world to be like. Expectations, however, are not merely desires. As we've seen, they also contain an

³ As Anscombe (2000, p. 56) notes,

It is precisely this: if the list and the things that the man actually buys do not agree, and if this and this alone constitutes a mistake, then the mistake is not in the list but in the man's performance [...] whereas if the detective's record and what the man actually buys do not agree, then the mistake is in the record.

element of prediction which complicates the story. The expectation that students will do the reading is not quite the same as the expectation that you'll get milk at the store. When you expect to get milk at the store but fail to put the milk in your cart that's a failure of execution, it's a failure in your performance. When your students fail to do the reading, what kind of failure is that? It can't be simply that your expectation communicates your desire for students to do the reading because they have no reason to care about your desires or whether your desires eventuate. After all, the detective has no interest in what you planned to get at the grocery store, their interest is in what you actually get. As frustrating as it is to say the following vaguery: the expectations that go beyond mere predictions seem to be doing *something more* than just adding a prescription to the picture. It is this *something more* that we need to get a rough handle on before we can make progress on outlining how expectations can wrong.

An account that could help us get clearer on this additional function of expectation is Cristina Bicchieri's (2016) account of expectations according to which expectations are a certain class of beliefs, beliefs about what *is* going to happen or what *should* happen.⁴ However, as I noted earlier, expectations can also be beliefs about what has happened, so expectations are not necessarily future-directed. Nonetheless, this account can capture the two roles that we've seen expectations play: a predictive role (what has or is going to happen) and a prescriptive role (what should happen or should have happened). The expectation that your students will do the reading is a belief about what should happen not how things will in fact play out. This is why there's no contradiction, nothing Moore-paradoxical, in expecting students to do the reading but believing they won't. Furthermore, the expectation contains an implicit prescription in the form of evaluating such a future state of affairs as a good state of affairs. That is, the students should do the reading because it would be good for them and that is why they should want to.

Further, consider the following two expectations that we haven't said much about:

- (5) I expect you to succeed at everything you set your mind to.
- (6) I expect you to be on your best behavior.

Both of these expectations involve predictive and prescriptive elements and *something more*. What it means 'to succeed' is normatively-laden. For example, my parents and I disagree about what's essential to succeeding at what one sets their mind to, similarly we have disagreements about 'best behavior'. What we see in these sentences are expectations that go beyond mere predictions or prescriptions in that these expectations are *heavier*. We often talk metaphorically of the weight of expectations or of expectations being a burden, and that metaphor of weight shouldn't be dismissed as merely metaphorical. This way of talking about expectations directs us to look for what more these expectations seem to include. Again, I repeat the annoying vaguery: there is *something more* going on here. There is still more left to unravel.

Perhaps all that's going on here is that these expectations are not only communicating predictions and prescriptions, but also beliefs about other people's personal normative beliefs. This, again, is what Bicchieri (2016) says of normative social expectations,

⁴ I've chosen to focus on Bicchieri (2016)'s account here, but for a comprehensive survey of various accounts of social norms and the discussion of expectations within that literature, see Bicchieri et al. (2018).

namely that they are second-order beliefs, beliefs about what other people believe. For example, imagine trying to drive without any expectations of how other drivers will behave or how the other drivers expect you to behave. Alternatively, returning to Anscombe's grocery shopping case, if we were to try to explain the behavior of the shopper and why they move through the store as they do, queue where they do, pay what they do, etc., it would be useful to explain all of that in terms of the shopper's beliefs and their beliefs about what other shoppers believe and what the store workers believe. Although these examples do not feel as *weighty* as the expectations in (5) and (6), some normative social expectations might simply serve to ease and enable social coordination. Group action is a coordination problem and it's helpful to know what an agent believes and what they believe others they're attempting to coordinate with believe. Expectations help structure these interactions so they go more smoothly.

However, as I've noted, not all of the cases we might call normative social expectations are on the same level with respect to their weightiness. That is, some of these social normative expectations perform a function that goes beyond the easing or enabling of social coordination. That is, some social normative expectations also engage in what we might call the practice of *shaping* or of *influence*. Consider again my mother's expectations of me. We can make some progress on understanding the case by analyzing it in terms of my mother's belief "that other people believe (and will continue to believe) that certain behaviors are praiseworthy and should be carried out, while others should be avoided" (Bicchieri 2016, p. 12). When my mother told me she never wanted life to be difficult for me, she was expressing her belief that other people believe that the life I had "chosen" for myself was not a praiseworthy one, that I ought not to have chosen such a path and made life hard for myself.

However, the depth of her disappointment can't be captured by beliefs about what the Chatterjees, Dasguptas, or Goswamis would think or even the prescription that I should act in accordance with prevailing social or cultural norms of what's expected of a good Indian daughter. What is missing from the explanation of the weightiness of some expectations is whatever mechanism is responsible for the obligation-generating nature of weighty expectations. That is, the expectations that share the same profile of expectations that generate the striking familiarity of the opening case.

We are complicated beings with complicated feelings towards one another that go beyond belief or desire. We also depend on people, rely on people, and feel let down by one another when we can no longer depend or rely on those same people. I feel let down when my mother doesn't accept me in a way that's different from when other people don't. My mother's expectations—more generally, the kinds of expectations our parents, teachers, coaches, advisors, lovers, and other attachment figures have of us—expresses a kind of dependence and reliance. She was depending on me, and now she can't depend on me anymore. I was upending the stable conditions under which she could think of me, and in doing so, she became unmoored. However, I too was depending on her, I needed her, and in her rejection of me, I too become unmoored. To make sense of this kind of unmooring, what we need to add to our account of expectations is a story about how some normative expectations play a role in shaping who we are.

That is, some expectations are not just predictive or prescriptive or second-order beliefs about what other people believe, rather, some expectations also express relationships of

dependence and reliance. Perhaps there are cases where it would be wrong to say that you expect your students to do the reading but you believe they won't. Perhaps there are cases where you need to *believe in them* and you wrong them if you don't. But before we get ahead of ourselves, let's turn to understanding what might underlay the *weight* that some expectations seem to have.

1.3 Expectations, proleptic reasons, hope, and attachment

To understand the class of what we might call *weighty expectations* we can start by noticing that there is a class of expectations that have a proleptic character in addition to a predictive or prescriptive character. That is, some expectations function in the same way as *proleptic reasons*. Proleptic reasons are the kind of thing that help us to make sense of how it could be rational for someone to keep drinking beer despite hating the taste; they keep drinking beer because they expect to like it one day. Proleptic reasons are reasons that are not yet our own but we expect will be ours in the future. For example, although your child may not currently show any interest or aptitude in mathematics it may nonetheless be appropriate to *proleptically engage* with them as though they will come to be interested in the subject. For example, to work through their math homework with them, send them to math camp, hire a tutor to cover more advanced topics, etc. As Agnes Callard (2018, p. 43) explains, “proleptic reasons are provisional in a way that reflects the provisionality of the agent’s own knowledge and development: her inchoate, anticipatory and indirect grasp of some good she is trying to know better.” As Mark Schroeder (2020, p. 11) explains, proleptic reasons are reasons that “get a little bit ahead of themselves.”

Proleptic reasons are central to the kinds of relationships we have with our parents and other guardian figures like teachers, coaches, advisors, and mentors and they are at the heart of our loving relationships more generally. These relationships all involve some kind of *attachment*. They are the relationships that help us feel solid, they are the relationships that shape the kind of people we are, they are relationships marked by dependence and reliance and a feeling of security.

Monique Wonderly (2017, 2019) has offered an account of attachment that will be helpful for us.⁵ This account of attachment comes from attachment theory as developed by developmental and clinical psychologists. According to attachment theory, attachment involves:

a set of evolutionarily adaptive behaviors that serve to provide the infant with a sense of security. The attached infant attempts to remain in close proximity to her primary caregiver, treats her as a “secure base” from which to safely explore unfamiliar surroundings, seeks her out for protection as a “safe haven” when threatened or hurt, and protests separation from her—for example, via clinging, crying, and other displays of distress. (Wonderly 2017, p. 242)

Wonderly argues that the promise of an attachment account of love is that it can make sense of central features of love that are hard to capture on other accounts. Notably, her account can explain the sense of love’s depth, why the object of our love is necessarily nonsubstitutable, and her account doesn’t commit us to any of the worrisome

⁵ Thanks to Adrienne Martin for this pointer.

metaphysical questions that plague union theories of love, i.e., accounts in which your needs, cares, wants, values, etc. are deeply entwined with those of your beloved and together you and your romantic partner form a “we”.

Our interest is not in accounting for love, but in accounting for weighty expectations. And for our purposes, this account of attachment can help illuminate this class of weighty expectations by explaining how such expectations function in the context of loving relationships. That is, the shaping role that weighty expectations play and how some expectations function in a way that goes beyond the roles of prediction and prescription that we’ve discussed thus far. Consider, for example, love’s depth. When we lose what we love “we tend to feel as though we are “less together,” on unstable ground, no longer “all of a piece,” and so forth” (Wonderly 2017, 243). Compare this with the feeling of being unmoored that comes when weighty expectations are dashed. What our attachment figures do is provide a kind of stability and security. The functional role of the expectations of our attachment figures is to provide that kind of stability and security in our lives. As we grow into the people we become, the expectations of our attachment figures provide a kind of *affectively charged scaffolding*, their expectations shape us just as proleptic reasons anticipate who we will become.

If that language strikes you as familiar, that is because it is how Victoria McGeer describes interpersonal hope. That is, what hope does is it creates for children “a kind of affectively charged scaffolding, empowering their own sense of potential agency with the energy of our hope, and thus encouraging them to act in ways commensurate with the vision we maintain” (McGeer 2008, p. 248). Similarly, as Adrienne Martin (2020) notes about hope, hope is like an interpersonal investment. These metaphors, scaffolding and investment, are useful metaphors for several reasons. First, we recognize the metaphor of scaffolding in the kind of structure that expectations impose. Expectations help us grow by giving us direction. Second, we recognize the metaphor of investment in the way that some expectations seem to involve a creation of debts and how that gives rise to the obligation-generating feature of these weighty expectations. Often these debts are forgiven, sometimes investments are made with no expectations attached, but sometimes they can be held over you and when held in that way they can feel like an unwelcome burden. Think again of my mother. She had made sacrifices and invested her hopes and dreams into me. Perhaps her anger and disappointment in my coming out can be explained by my renegeing on some implicit agreement that she thought we had, renegeing on some of the expectations that come with her investment in me.⁶

Parents, and attachment figures more generally, seem well-positioned to offer precisely this kind of expectival scaffolding and investment and this fits neatly with the proleptic role of expectation we’ve been trying to illuminate. However, not all of their expectations take this form. Some expectations may be purely predictive or prescriptive, some may not even be proleptic but instead be more peremptory. For example, when you expect your child to be a good person that expectation is neither predictive,

⁶ Although not my focus here, it can be illuminating for criticism to compare my discussion here with Chenyang Li’s (1997) discussion of filial duties and criticisms of accounts of filial obligation that ground the obligations in either the contribution that parents make to the self, prudent investor accounts, and more generally, accounts that are based on the special relationship between parents and children. Thanks to Kenneth Silver for this pointer.

prescriptive, nor proleptic. Rather, it is an expectation about objective moral requirements and such expectations can feel pretty weighty as well. After all, they are moral requirements! Such expectations differ from what we've been discussing because you do not expect your child to be a good person in anticipation that they'll make that their reason, you just want them to be good simpliciter. As we'll see in the second part of this paper, when expectations are appropriate or inappropriate will depend on what kind of expectation is in play, and sometimes we may misunderstand one another because we think one kind of expectation is in play when really there are different kinds. However, before we get ahead of ourselves, let me say some final things about these so-called weighty expectations that seem proleptic in character.

If we think of these normative expectations that attachment figures like parents hold of their children in the same vein as interpersonal hope, then we are also in a position to recognize the following point from Martin (2020, p. 230): that “when we invest hope in people, we hope to create a certain intertwining of agencies. Put suggestively, the feeling that a person has let you down marks a hit on your agency.” Similarly, as Wonderly (2017, p. 244-5) notes: it is through our attachments with others that “they have the power both to help shape our agency (e.g., we function better with them; they play stabilizing, balancing, and corrective roles in our lives) and to cripple us in deep and devastating ways.” Weighty expectations shape who we are. When we think of teenage angst, it is directed at these weighty expectations. Because weighty expectations have a proleptic role, that is why they can feel *intrusive* and *unwelcome*. The expectations express reasons our attachment figures hope will become our own, and what we bristle at with respect to these expectations is how our attachment figures sometimes try to become *too involved*. As Chester Bennington sings in an anthem from my youth, “I’m tired of being what you want me to be.”

1.4 The Nature of Expectations: The Map Metaphor

So, what are expectations? We've seen that expectations play several roles and involve a rich constellation of attitudes. Some expectations are predictive, like belief and credence, some are prescriptive, like desire and normative beliefs, some are proleptic, like aspiration and interpersonal hope, some particularly weighty expectations emerge from our closest relationships because of how we depend upon, rely on, and influence one another, and some expectations function simply as imperatives. Some of the key features we've seen in expectations is that although they often play multiple roles, generally they have an anticipatory function. Even past-directed expectation involve anticipation, they anticipate discovering something. To capture this central feature of expectations it is illuminating to compare expectations to a metaphor that is often deployed when thinking about beliefs: the metaphor of maps.

Frank Ramsey (1990, p. 146) famously remarked that beliefs subserve the function of navigation, that is, beliefs are the “map by which we steer.” Expectations function similarly to maps. Expectations are maps we draw of what we expect to find, sketches of what we think we'll find, outlines of who we think we'll be when we get whenever we're going. But it does not follow from this metaphor that our expectations are simply our sketchy credences. Rather, the map metaphor can accommodate all the functional roles of expectation that we've outlined thus far. The shapes on the map need to be held fixed if the map is to serve the function of navigation, and this is the role played by our attachment figures. To navigate the world we have to depend on the map, make plans based on the map. The map provides a secure base from which to explore the world and

we cannot do so if it's constantly shifting, if the borders are constantly being redrawn, if we were unable to rely on it. Parents, and our attachment figures more generally, play a role in fixing a map for our lives and these maps contain implicit prescriptions about what ought to be there, what they expect to see, what other people expect to see, and their best guesses of how the map will be filled in as we use it to navigate.

Expectations as maps can also help us to grasp another function that expectations play. Navigating via a map is an act of trust, we trust that the map portrays where the land is accurately. As we've seen with weighty expectations, they occur within relationships marked by dependence. Within such relationships, expectations function a lot like trust. Trust isn't mere reliance, trust is marked by dependence.⁷ When you are trusted, you are being counted upon. Karen Jones (1996) goes as far as to give an account of trust in terms of expectations. As Jones (1996, pp. 5-6) argues, to trust someone is "to have the confident expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and favorably moved by the thought that you are counting on her." Furthermore, in a manner similar to the way in which some particularly weighty expectations can feel coercive and intrusive, Jones notes that trust can feel the same. That is, sometimes we don't welcome trust, sometimes trust can feel coercive. Jones (1996, p. 15) notes:

We would rather that the one trusting did not expect us to respond to her counting on us because we would rather not have her count on us. We may, for example, feel that we cannot live up to her expectations, or we may have reservations about what such expectations will amount to in a given case, or we may feel that too many people are already counting on us and that one more is a burden we would rather not have.

We trust maps, we depend upon maps, we rely on maps, we represent the world through maps, we use maps to navigate, maps impose structure on the world. Expectations function similarly. As tricky as it is to get a rough handle on expectations, thinking of expectations in terms of maps can give us something to grasp.

Thinking of expectations as maps can also help us to develop an ethics of expectations. After all, there are lots of ways a map can be wrong or used incorrectly. For example, to understand the disagreement between me and my mother, the map metaphor can explain how we might be talking past each other. In coming out, in upending her expectations of me, she might think that I was tearing up the map that she had given me. There was no map anymore. The lack of a map to understand what was happening is why she feels unmoored, lost at sea. However, there is something else that could be happening entirely.

With the map metaphor we can make a familiar distinction between parents having expectations regarding ends versus expectations about the means to those ends. My mother's end for me is to be happy and secure, and she had given me a map to ensure

⁷ For example, as Annette Baier (1986, p. 235) notes, "trusting can be betrayed, or at least let down, and not just disappointed" (235). Similarly, as Holton (1994, p. 57) puts it:

The difference between trust and [mere] reliance is that trust involves something like a participant stance towards the person you are trusting. When you trust someone to do something, you rely on them to do it, and you regard that reliance in a certain way: you have a readiness to feel betrayal should it be disappointed, and gratitude should it be upheld.

such a life. A map that marked out a path of all the conventional things. In rejecting those conventional things I'm not necessarily rejecting the map, rather, I could just be showing her that there was a different path to that same goal. That is, there are other paths to happiness and security. Happiness and security don't require a husband. The directions through the original map just need to be updated.

This now brings us to the wrongs of expectations. That is, if expectations are maps, we can ask about the right and wrong ways to draw maps. That is, what are the norms governing expectations? How should maps be updated when you run into something you didn't expect? In some cases we'll see that the norms themselves map onto the functional role that the expectation is playing. For example, predictive expectations aim to represent the world as accurately as possible. When expectations play multiple roles, however, things get trickier.

2. The Wrongs of Expectations

Within the ethics of belief it has brought to our attention the ways in which our relationships are not just morally fraught, but also epistemically fraught. Such discussion has occurred with regard to the epistemic demands of friendship (Stroud 2006, Keller 2004), with regard to both what we, and others partial to us, should believe about the difficult actions we seek to perform (Marušić 2015, Paul and Morton 2018), and with respect to whether some beliefs, in and of themselves, can constitute wrongs (Basu and Schroeder 2019; Basu 2019a, 2019b, 2021; Marušić and White 2018). Expectations throw an interesting wrench into this literature because as we've seen from the previous section, expectations involve a rich constellation of attitudes.

It is tempting then to simply extend the work done on the ethics of belief to develop an ethics of expectation. Although somewhat illuminating, such an extension won't suffice for capturing the full range of wrongs that we are capable of when we expect. Too narrow a focus on belief will only obscure just how treacherous the waters are. Beliefs are but a small part of our mental lives. Instead, a more promising route is to explore how the different functional profiles of expectations can result in different mistakes, and in some cases, different kinds of wrongs. Starting with the least weighty to the most, let us now explore the ways in which expectations can be poorly drawn, perform their function badly, and lead us astray.

2.1 A mistaken view of the evidence

The most obvious way that expectations can fail in performing their functional role is due to ignoring the evidence or an evidential mismatch between the expectation and the world. If we think back to the predictive function of some expectations, e.g. your expectation of rain tomorrow, such expectations can suffer from a purely epistemic fault. That is, just as something goes wrong with belief when beliefs are insensitive to the evidence, something goes wrong with predictive expectations when they don't match the world in the right way. For example, if you under or overestimate the abilities of the child, if your expectations are dogmatic, your expectations aren't appropriately connected to the evidence.

Although we should expect some expectations, in particular, the expectations that function more like prescriptions or proleptic reasons, to have some resistance to counter-evidence, our expectations cannot be completely untethered from the world.

That is, they must be anchored in reality and predictive expectations are constrained by the world. There must be some amount of counter-evidence that's sufficient to challenge and revise our predictive expectations otherwise it's unclear if they'd play any function other than that of a dream. Expectations that are unmoored from reality wouldn't serve the function of maps at all.

2.2 A mistaken view of morality

Sometimes expectations can not only fail to accurately represent the world, they can also involve a mistaken view of morality. It is not inappropriate to expect your child to become a good person. It is, however, inappropriate to expect your child to grow up to be a Nazi. Just as the world places constraints on what kind of expectations are appropriate or inappropriate, so too does morality.

For example, Robin Dembroff and Cat Saint-Croix (2019) argue that although there is a general duty to recognize and respect another person's identity, such a duty can be defeated when the identity in question is a *morally malicious identity*. As Dembroff and Saint-Croix (2019, p. 590) note, "agential identities are (in part) ways of being in the world. And we think that there are better and worse ways of being in the world." The externalization of identities that can cause undue harm should not be encouraged, recognized, nor respected.

We can use the phenomenon of *doxastic wronging* to make this point more forcefully. Doxastic wronging is the thesis that we can wrong others in virtue of what we believe about them (Basu and Schroeder 2019, Basu 2019b and 2021). Extending this thought to expectations, perhaps expectations to be a certain way are not only harmful if they're externalized because of the morally harmful effects of such externalization, but some expectations may themselves be wrong in virtue of being morally problematic expectations in and of themselves. The argument for doxastic wronging begins with the recognition that beliefs are committal mental states. As I've previously noted in defense of doxastic wronging, beliefs "involve committing the subject to the truth of the representational content. This is why beliefs can wrong: the representational content, together with that commitment, constitute a wrong in the belief itself, and not in any particular consequences that come from the belief" (Basu 2021, p. 108). Notice that the same can be said for expectations because expectations also commit you to a particular representation. Any mental attitude that is a committal mental state is capable of wronging by relating the subject to the content of that attitude and thereby contributing to a morally harmful narrative. Notice that this applies equally to expectation as much as it does to belief.

Returning to the map metaphor from earlier, normative expectations commit us to a particular map, a particular way of representing others and our relationships to them. Thus, the morally bad expectations, such as expecting a child to grow up to be a Nazi, would commit one to representing another person as a Nazi. However, being a Nazi is a morally harmful identity to encourage the externalization of. We shouldn't expect, in the normative, prescriptive, or proleptic way, for someone to be a Nazi. Sometimes, of course, you need to call a Nazi a Nazi, i.e., when they do, say, or believe things a Nazi would. However, in that case you're not *expecting* them to be a Nazi in the weightier sense of expectation, they just are a Nazi and you're calling a Nazi a Nazi. They've chosen a morally malicious identity for themselves and should be criticized for it.

However, we owe them no obligation to encourage the growth of that identity or hope for them to flourish in that identity. You shouldn't *hold* that identity for them.

2.3 A mistaken view of the ends and means to the ends

To understand when expectations that function proleptically can wrong we need to first understand why our attachment figures feel let down when those expectations are thwarted. That is, if we can understand why they feel let down, we can better pinpoint what went wrong in holding that expectation.

Being let down by our loved ones down is a common experience and this feeling of being let down stems from the disorientation that accompanies no longer being able to rely on the other person. As Martin (2020, pp. 232-3) argues, “when we build into our efforts particular events or objects, such that our efforts rely on those things, and those things do not eventuate, the bottom drops out of our agency or our agency rests on a base of reduced stability.” When we hold expectations of others in a proleptic way we are doing two things. First, we are giving them directions of how to live their lives. Second, we are structuring our own lives with those same expectations. The expectations we have of others are part of our own maps and we use these maps to help us make sense of the world and plan for the future.

The kinds of weighty expectations that were the focus of §1.3 involve our attachment figures extending their agency through us in this way and being disappointed when that extension fails. We carry their hopes and dreams on our shoulders, they depend on us. As Martin (*ibid.*) goes on to note, “disappointment marks the dissolution of the what-if attitude. The disappointed person has lost the possibility of living under the positive guidance of the question ‘What if the future contains what I desire?’”. We can see the dissolution of this “what-if” attitude in many stories of coming out. Our parents imagine various milestones we might meet based on societal expectations of success at those various stages, e.g., prom, graduation, marriage, children, etc. Our parents build plans around us, they rely on us to successfully execute those plans. When we disrupt that, the future no longer contains what our parents had desired and this naturally leads to feelings of disappointment, of feeling let down. Many parents successfully reimagine a future for their children under new what-if attitudes, that is, they can redraw their maps. Many, however, fail to successfully reimagine a future for their children. This kind of failure of reimagination or reconceptualization marks an expectation that is has been inappropriately held.

As I noted earlier in §1.4 we need to be careful to distinguish between two different ways one could fail to update their expectations. That is, there are two ways one’s “what-if” attitude could function. It could function as directions accompanying a map, or the expectation could function as the map itself. When the what-if attitude dissolves, the remedy might be either to rethink the ways one can use that same map to navigate, i.e., rethink the directions, or rethink how to draw the map in the first place. That is, we can make a distinction here between having expectations regarding ends versus expectations about the means to those ends. Expectations that simply serve to give guidance, like directions, can be more easily resolved because the map can stay fixed. Expectations that serve as guidance about ends themselves are harder to resolve. Such expectations are the subject of angsty teenage anthems because they feel particularly burdensome, intrusive, and coercive. These expectations seem the weightiest and capable of the worst kinds of wrongs to the subjects of the expectations. So, for the

remainder of this subsection I will focus my attention on these expectations, *alienating expectations*.

Some expectations are alienating. By this I mean that some expectations cut at the very core of who we are and tell us that we're unworthy. When expectations take this form, they go wrong in a manner similar to how predictive expectations go wrong: these expectations are not, nor could they ever be, connected in the right way to who you are. The ends provided by these expectations, the map that has been drawn, could never be an end under which you could act. I use 'alienation' here on purpose to draw an analogy to alienation as it appears in Williams (1973)'s critique of consequentialism, i.e., that consequentialism requires a kind of alienation from ourselves, that is, if we were to understand ourselves in the way consequentialism requires, we risk losing our grip on ourselves (see also Railton 1984). Alienating expectations function similarly. The map not only doesn't fit the world, but also to make it fit we would have to change something fundamental about ourselves. It especially hurts when the expectations of our loved ones take this form because we depend on them as the first people through which we understand ourselves.

To make this point more precise, we need one further resource: Hilde Lindemann's (2016) account of holding. What our attachments figures do is they *hold us in personhood* through the beliefs and expectations they have of us. As Lindemann (2016) argues, we become persons through our interactions with other persons. There are stories that get told about us that shape who we become, and our identities are, at least in part, narrative constructions made up of these beliefs and expectations others have of us. Holding, when it is done well, "supports an individual in the creation and maintenance of a personal identity that allows her to flourish personally and in her interactions with others" (Lindemann 2016, p. x). When done poorly, holding can be destructive. Our parents are the first to hold us in personhood. Our parents engage in this practice of shaping and enabling our agency, they set ends for us before we're capable of setting those ends ourselves.⁸ When holding goes well, we can flourish, and when done poorly, it can be destructive.⁹

⁸ Compare also to (Ebels-Duggan, 2018, p. 1):

The task of raising children seems centrally to involve shaping their values or normative outlook. But many hold that imposing our conceptions of the good on others is incompatible with individuals' entitlement to freedom or autonomy. The worry can be seen as a version of the same, broadly Kantian, moral commitment that finds expression in liberal political theory: each person should be free to choose for himself what to regard as good and, within wide parameters, guide his own life by these normative commitments. Children's vulnerability to those primarily responsible for their upbringing arguably makes imposition seem particularly threatening here, even as their need for guidance makes it seem especially necessary. How, then, can conscientious parents both respect their children's claims to freedom and responsibly execute their childrearing task? Call this the liberal dilemma of childrearing.

⁹ Compare this to what we saw in §1.3 with Wonderly's account of attachment. Namely, that it is through our attachments with others that those others have the power to shape our agency. Just as Wonderly's account of attachment begins with our earliest attachments, e.g., the infant-primary caregiver relationship, in Lindemann's account of holding our parents are the first to engage in this kind of holding. As I've noted, when holding goes well, we can flourish, and when done poorly, it can be destructive. Similarly, our attachment relationships can either play stabilizing and balancing roles in our lives, or they can "cripple us in deep and devastating ways" (Wonderly 2017, p. 245).

So, what are some ways in which this setting of ends, this holding, can be destructive? Sometimes expectations can go astray when they involve an insidious coopting of the the mechanism of holding that undermines what is morally valuable about holding. We hold others in personhood to enable them to grow. When holding is done poorly, it is restrictive and inhibiting. An example of insidious holding is when we instrumentalize others. As Quill Kukla (2020, p. 15) notes, there is a pernicious idea that the role of parents is to “create a specific type of person.” This way of thinking treats children as products, as objects that can be crafted and according to which our own worth and success can be measured. This way of thinking encourages morally unacceptable behavior like coercion and surveillance. Under such a picture of parenthood a good parent would take any means necessary to craft the perfect child.

It should not be controversial, however, to make clear that instrumentalizing is wrong. When we instrumentalize we’re not providing scaffolding, rather, what is being provided is more akin to internal fixation, i.e., a mechanical device made of metal plates, pins, rods, wires or screws that is designed to fix broken bones and fractures. When our expectations function more like internal fixation than scaffolding the expectations aim at *correction* not *guidance*. Such expectations are trying to impose a structure on the agency of this person, a structure that simply does not fit. These kinds of expectations cut deep—literally, if we take the metaphor between scaffolding and internal fixation seriously—because of the vulnerability we bear to our parents. We are vulnerable to a lot of narratives about our lives, but we are especially vulnerable to the narratives our parents tell about our lives.

As children we learn to take up our parents’ perspectives, and it’s through taking up their perspectives that we come to have a better understanding of ourselves and our parents shape the kind of people we ultimately become. This is part of the work that parents do for their children through holding them in personhood, but this is also the mechanism by which parents are in a special position to wrong through the attitudes they have of their child. More generally, as social beings we are forced to understand ourselves through the multiple perspectives of others, and this is what makes us vulnerable to others and why others are under a moral obligation not to wrong us through their constructions of us in how they hold us in personhood.

The risk with proleptic expectations is that they can become not only unmoored from the person they’re about, but also that they can alienate. This is not the case for all proleptic expectations, however, just a particular class within a particular context. That is, there is a question here that has been lurking in the background that we should finally consider: do expectations all go wrong in primarily the same sorts of way with just the degree to which they wrong differing or is there something distinctive about the kinds of wrongs that our attachment figures are in a position to inflict on us? What we’ve now seen is that expectations not only wrong differently depending on what kind of role expectation is playing, but some wrongs that accompany expectations are unique to certain relationships. Particularly weighty expectations are a feature of a mode of relating: a relation of attachment or holding. Thus, the appropriateness conditions for expectations can differ not only according to their functional roles, but also their contexts. It is through the very role that parents have, of shaping their children, that they are capable of inflicting the worst kinds of wrongs upon them. As the character Waverly notes in *The Joy Luck Club*, our mothers know “how to hit a nerve. And the pain [we] feel is worse than any other kind of misery.”

To end on a positive note, let me say something in the direction of how to avoid these wrongs. To avoid these wrongs, we can employ a familiar Kantian distinction: the distinction between treating someone as a means versus treating them merely as means. We are permitted to treat others as means, but not merely as means. The key difference between these two ways of relating is whether the other person can share in your ends, share in your goal, whether the other person could choose your end as her end. When we deceive, when we coerce, we treat people as mere means because we act under ends they could not agree to. Perhaps the good weighty expectations can be distinguished from the bad along similar grounds. My conjecture is that the appropriateness of interpersonal expectations rests on whether we can justify our expectations to one another. The ends need to be such that there's the possibility that they could become coauthored. That is, we are not wronged when we find ourselves in the following position with regard to those who hold us in personhood: if we can understand ourselves the way our other understand us without risk of losing our grip on ourselves. I can't imagine myself how my mother imagines me, and she can't imagine me the way I imagine myself.

3. The Ethics of Expectations

The route I took in this paper was to cash out an ethics of expectation in terms of the different functional profiles of expectations. We've seen that expectations play several roles and involve a rich constellation of attitudes. Some expectations are predictive, some are prescriptive, some are proleptic, some expectations function simply as moral imperatives, and often expectations play more than just one of these roles. Key to expectations is that they have an anticipatory function and I cashed this function out with a familiar metaphor from the ethics of belief: the metaphor of a map. The map metaphor helped us to not only get a better grasp on the phenomenon of expectations, but also to understand the various ways that expectations can not only go wrong, but also wrong in and of themselves. That is, we now have a clearer picture of the different ways that expectations can lead us astray by being poorly drawn, i.e., either failing to perform their function or performing their function badly.

In canvassing the range of wrongs that expectations are capable of, we discovered that sometimes the kind of expectation affects the degree of the wrong whereas sometimes a different kind of wrong is in play altogether. For example, purely predictive expectations likely never *wrong*, they can simply be wrong because they don't adequately match the world. Proleptic expectations, however, introduce new wronging possibilities. Further, the wrongs we're capable of within intimate relationships seem to differ not only *in degree* but also *in kind* from wrongs we are capable of committing to strangers. Our attachment figures' expectations of us are never merely predictive nor prescriptive, their expectations take on an added weight given the role that they play in our lives. This enables our attachment figures to hurt us in a way that other people simply can't through merely the attitudes they have of us. We need them to think well of us, and when they don't, it hurts more than when a stranger doesn't think well of us.

Given the multiple roles that expectations play, we'll eventually find ourselves facing a dilemma. That is, sometimes the norms governing expectations will conflict. Dilemmas are generally bad, but in this regard we find ourselves no worse off than we are in the case of the ethics of belief. It is commonly accepted that there are at least two competing

norms governing belief, and we can't fulfill them both. This is the Jamesian dictum that we must both believe the truth and avoid error. Just as we make a choice with regard to belief to either err on the side of believing even if there's a chance of error or err on the side of not believing if the risk of error is too high, it seems we must do something similar with regard to expectation. For example, compare the requirement to avoid alienating a loved one through your expectations and the requirement to not hold a loved one in a morally malicious identity. What if it is really important to the person you love that they have this morally malicious identity, i.e., that they just are a bad person? In such a case, if you expect them to be otherwise, if you expect them to be better than they are, then you risk alienating them.¹⁰ We cannot simply stop expecting things of others because of the risks involved, and the task of figuring out how to balance the risks is the task of an ethics of expectations.

Furthermore, what I've said in this paper barely scratches the surface of what there is to be said about either the nature of, the wrong of, or the ethics of expectations. For example, there are other routes available for developing an ethics of expectation. To canvas just a few options that might arrive at different conclusions, one could stipulate fittingness conditions for expectations. After all, just as we can ask of a belief or an emotion whether it is fitting, we could similarly ask of an expectation whether it is fitting.¹¹ Similarly, when giving an account of expectations a different starting point could be to begin not with the question of how to expectations function, but rather what gives someone the authority to form expectations and impose those expectations on us.¹² Furthermore, even if we start with trying to understand the concept of expecting, the general notion of expectations can be multifaceted in more ways than outlined in this paper. For example, Rebecca Keller (manuscript) offers an account how expectations function in perception. Keller cashes out perceptual expectations in terms of the functional role they play in our visual system whereas here I have been focused on how expectations function within our interpersonal relationships. While tangential to the kinds of expectations under consideration in this paper, any full account of the general phenomena of expectations would need to consider not only how expectations function interpersonally, but also in other aspects of our lives.

Furthermore, at the beginning of this paper I noted that expectations function not only interpersonally, but also intrapersonally. However, interpersonal expectations have occupied all of my discussion as I have focussed on how what other people expect of us can be either enabling or inhibiting. I have not been able to explore the question of how our own expectations constrain ourselves. That is, how can we wrong ourselves through our own expectations? One direction to go for answers is to turn to the familiar literature on what it means to try to expect what we'll be like in the future (Paul 2015). However, the discussion of this problem has focused on the decision-theory side of the issue, that is, how we can make rational choices about who we become when we can't conceive of our future-selves' preferences. Asking about the ethics of expectations directs our attention to a different aspect of problem: how can we wrong ourselves through holding unreasonable expectations of ourselves? That is, how do we balance the tasks of having expectations that are responsive to the evidence while still aspiring

¹⁰ See Vida Yao's (2020) "Grace and Alienation" for cases that are like this.

¹¹ For examples of fittingness accounts for belief and emotion see D'Arms and Jacobson (2000), McHugh (2014), and Howard (2018).

¹² For examples of discussions of practical authority see Darwall (2006) and Enoch (2011).

against those odds? Asking the question in this way directs us to some work that has been done on how we should respond to evidence that we're likely to fail in our pursuits of difficult ends (Marušić 2015, Paul and Morton 2018, Morton forthcoming). In attempting to understand intrapersonal expectations it is not clear if what I've outlined with respect to interpersonal expectations will extend easily to the intrapersonal case. To once again devolve into vaguery: there is something different about our self-directed expectations. Succeeding at the expectations we set for ourselves is at least in one important sense *up to us* and this is different from the position we find ourselves in with regard to interpersonal expectations.

All of these questions, and likely more, fall under the broad topic of the ethics of expectations. But now you might begin to wonder why am I telling you about all the things I could have told you about, but didn't. My reason is to demonstrate just how complicated the question we set out to answer is. Expectations operate in multifaceted ways and it is not always clear if some of the ways we talk about expectation are at all similar to other ways we talk of expectations. I hope to have made some progress in untangling part of the mess, but there is still much more to do. Expectations are everywhere and we ignore them at our own risk.

In closing I should return to my mother. We're doing better now. She complimented my rice and recently added me to the extended family WhatsApp group.¹³

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I first started thinking about this paper after my interview at CMC where I was asked a question about why my dissertation was narrowly focused on belief when there are many other attitudes that seem capable of wrongdoing. It was a good question that deserved a better answer than whatever I managed at the time and I've been unable to stop thinking about it ever since. I have thank the Gould Center for Humanistic Studies for funding a humanities lab on the topic of expectations which allowed me to start to work out some of these ideas, and the students who participated in that lab for their feedback. This paper has been presented under a variety of titles, including "The Weight of Expectations" and "The Parent Trap: Does Doxastic Wronging Start at Home?", and this current version has benefited from feedback from audiences at the Washington University St Louis Workshop in Ethics, PeRFECT4 at the University of Pennsylvania, Indiana University, MIT, the Social (Distance) Epistemology series, the Oxford lockdown epistemology group, Cal Poly Pomona, Queen's University, the Central APA, the Center for Ethics at the University of Toronto, Oakland University, Trinity College Dublin, UT Austin, and the University of St Andrews. Also a special thanks to Cory Davia, Jenna Donohue, Maegan Fairchild, Amy Flowerree, Georgi Gardiner, Laura Gillespie, Sukaina Hirji, Paul Hurley, Liz Jackson, Gabbrielle Johnson, Zoë Johnson King, Renée Jorgensen, Adrienne Martin, Mukasa Mubirumusoke, Cat Saint-Croix, Kenneth Silver, Drew Schroeder, Mark Schroeder, Dion Scott-Kakures, Julie Tannenbaum, and Peter Thielke for taking the time to talk through many of these ideas with me and in some cases immensely helpful written feedback as well. Finally, an anticipatory thanks to those audiences and persons whose comments will undoubtedly further improve the paper before whatever final shape it takes.

¹³ My brother has been trying to get everyone to switch to Signal, but to no avail.

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