Public justification in political liberalism: the deep view

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1. Introduction
This discussion proposes a non-standard reading of public justification in Rawls-type political liberalism.\(^1\) On this reading, public justification has several roles. In one of its roles, (i) it is conceptualized as taking place not in ideal theory, but in the actual world. In this role, (ii) it fully enfranchises some actual people, namely, actual reasonable people, as recipients and equal co-authors of public justification and its conclusions. And in this role, (iii) it is systematically fundamental, or deep, in political liberalism’s order of justification, and gives rise to the project of a political liberalism. Call this reading the deep view.\(^2\) As it departs from common readings of political liberalism, it is best to start by locating it in a wider terrain. This may help, as well, to motivate the view.

The status of public justification and with it of public reason in political liberalism is contested. This is so in many respects, including the below three.\(^3\) To begin with what seems rather uncontested: in political liberalism, public justification is interpersonal justification, a form of justification-to, by a standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability by “reasonable” people. These are people who are reasonable in political liberalism’s sense; many interpreters take it that people who are reasonable in that sense would not reject political liberalism’s most important liberal values (below, the term “reasonable” is used in this sense; I may now set aside what exactly this sense entails, but I will return to the matter in section 4, below).\(^4\) Public reason “aims for public justification,”\(^5\) and to this end employs public reasons. In Macedo’s terms, these are reasons the goodness of which is “entirely a function of their capacity to gain widespread agreement between reasonable people.”\(^6\) Roughly, then, to publicly justify \(\phi\) is to justify \(\phi\) by a

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standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability by reasonable people, or by reasons that count as justifying insofar as they are so acceptable.

However, first, is public justification in political liberalism strictly indexed to ideal theory, as many interpreters assume? That is, does it always suppose the conditions of a Rawls-type well-ordered society? This is a society of reasonable citizens; it is regulated by a conception of justice such as Rawls’ *Justice as Fairness* (JF); its citizens comply with this conception, and it serves them as a shared, “public basis of justification,” or a “mutually recognized point of view from which [they] can adjudicate their claims of political right on their political institutions or against one another.” If public justification is construed as indexed to ideal theory, it is construed as supposing the conditions of a well-ordered society. Call the view that all public justification in political liberalism is indexed to ideal theory the “ideal theory view,” and call public justification that supposes these conditions “ideal public justification.” Ideal public justification does not actually occur (assuming no actual society is well-ordered). It is imagined to occur, or occurs hypothetically, in an ideal society, and it includes within its scope on fully enfranchised footing only the non-existent, ideal citizens of that society. On the ideal theory view, then, claims like “φ is publicly justifiable” are elliptical for claims like “Within a well-ordered society, φ is reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable citizens of that society,” while the claim “φ is publicly justifiable to you” (i.e., the reader) is strictly speaking not true or false, but ontologically confused.

On the deep view, public justification in political liberalism is not in all roles ideal public justification and in at least one role fully enfranchises actual people. What room is there for non-ideal public justification in political liberalism? Opinions diverge. Quong reads Rawls in ideal theory terms: Quong insists that public justification does not fully enfranchise any actual citizen. Lister and Weithman seem to take it that Rawls-type public reason, public justification, and reciprocity suppose conditions of a well-ordered society (or at any rate compliance), but discuss matters as if they referred to the actual world and real people. First-generation political liberals like Macedo and Larmore permit, if not prioritize, non-ideal public justification between actual reasonable people. Critics like Enoch, not least, attack Rawls-type public justification on the assumption that it is committed to fully include within its scope actual people, including people who reject political liberalism’s values.

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7 Rawls, *Political Liberalism*, pp. 100f, 143f, 192.
Needless to add, the more we water down, or de-idealize, the normative characteristics that mark a well-ordered society as an ideal society, thus making it look more like a successful actual liberal democracy, or the more we construe actual liberal democracies in idealizing terms that make them look less ill-ordered, the less apparent is the difference between ideal and non-ideal public justification, and the more the former looks like a merely idealizing variant of the latter. But a crucial difference remains: only non-ideal public justification fully enfranchises some actual people, or regards them as recipients and equal co-authors of public justification and its conclusions.

Second, what rank in the order of justification does public justification have in political liberalism? On a widely held view, it is a lower-order form of justification that applies a given conception of justice to matters of basic justice—a conception that has been justified as reasonable on prior grounds, and by more fundamental means, e.g., JF’s Original Position (OP). If all public justification in political liberalism is construed as applicative public justification, it is natural to also construe it as ideal public justification. Applicative public justification supposes that a reasonable conception of justice is already available as a shared basis of (applicative) justification. Yet that reasonable people already share such a conception as a “public basis of justification” is a characteristic of a well-ordered society. Thus, applicative and ideal theory construals of public justification often go hand in hand.

Alas, the view that all public justification in political liberalism is applicative sits uncomfortably with Rawls’s views. For Rawls, reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people matters not only at an applicative level of argument. E.g., he reserves a fundamental political role for the criterion of reflective equilibrium (CRE). It is from the standpoint of “you and me” that JF, “and indeed any other political conception, is to be assessed.” A conception of justice can be “the most reasonable for us” only if it “at all levels of generality” articulates, and coheres with, “our more firm considered convictions of political justice.” Thus, “[w]e decide whether the whole conception is acceptable by seeing whether we can endorse it upon due reflection.” The deep view reads this as adopting the perspective of reasonable people; Rawls supposes that there actually are such people, and that he and (some of) his readers qualify. And he claims that a conception of political justice must at all levels of argument be coherently acceptable by such people. On the deep view, this reflects that CRE is a condition of public justification: such a conception must be coherently acceptable by each reasonable person to be reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people. It thus seems that not all public justification is applicative or, for that matter, ideal public justification. In one, apparently fundamental role, it enfranchises actual reasonable people.

Third, what is the status of Rawls’s reasonable overlapping consensus? Quong’s view is relevant here. Like many others, he strictly indexes reasonable overlapping consensus to ideal theory. For Quong, such a consensus is both a vehicle of stability and a condition of public justification in a well-ordered society: in such a society, a conception of justice can be suitably acceptable by all reasonable citizens—and through this secure stability for the right reasons—only if it is compatible with the reasonable comprehensive doctrines that these citizens affirm. But

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13 For the quotations in this paragraph: see Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 28. All emphases are mine.
unlike the “common view,” he reads Rawls as applying the requirement of reasonable overlapping consensus not only to the principles and values that a conception of justice advocates, but to the conception as a whole. In different terms: like the “common view,” Quong takes all public justification in political liberalism to be ideal public justification. But unlike the “common view,” he notes that not all public justification in political liberalism is applicative. This yields his variant of an “internal conception.” On his reading, Rawls claims that since a conception of political justice must as a whole be suitably acceptable by the reasonable citizens of a well-ordered regime, it must be able to attain a reasonable overlapping consensus in that society; but to be able to do that, it must be a political liberalism.

The deep view differs from this reading in a crucial respect. The deep view, too, reads Rawls as arguing that a conception of political justice must as a whole be suitably acceptable by all reasonable people, hence must be capable of a reasonable overlapping consensus, and so must take the form and content of a political liberalism. But the deep view does not take this to apply in ideal theory only. Public justification has more than one role; and in its fundamental role, it is non-ideal public justification. Correspondingly, the deep view does not index reasonable overlapping consensus to ideal theory. This coheres with Rawls’s view that political liberalism is to pursue such a consensus when reasonable pluralism obtains. Rawls uses two notions of reasonable pluralism. On one notion, a plurality of doctrines instantiates reasonable pluralism only if all of these doctrines are reasonable. This notion is in play when Rawls writes that “[a well-ordered society] is one in which there is diversity of comprehensive doctrines, all perfectly reasonable,” and that “[t]his is the fact of reasonable pluralism, as opposed to the fact of pluralism as such.” But on a second, weaker notion, a plurality of doctrines instantiates reasonable pluralism even if not all of them are reasonable:

[The fact of reasonable pluralism] is the fact that free institutions tend to generate not simply a variety of doctrines and views … Rather, it is the fact that among the views that develop are a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. These are the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that political liberalism must address.

I.e., reasonable pluralism obtains even if unreasonable doctrines are present (call this non-ideal reasonable pluralism). Accordingly, political liberalism, when it pursues the aim of overlapping consensus in non-ideal circumstances, must address only a subset of the doctrines that are then present, i.e., reasonable doctrines. The upshot: it pursues that aim not only in a well-ordered society (when all doctrines are reasonable), and also in the actual world where not all, and perhaps not even many, doctrines are reasonable.

This sits well with the view that non-ideal public justification is fundamental in political liberalism. If (i) a conception of political justice is reasonable only if it is reciprocally, equally and coherently acceptable by all actual reasonable people, and if (ii) each reasonable person affirms a reasonable comprehensive doctrine, then other things being equal, (iii) such a conception can be

15 Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, p. 163ff.
16 See Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, esp. pp. 6, 138f.
17 See [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review].
18 For this and the next quotation: see Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 24 n. 27. Emphasis added.
19 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 36. Emphasis added.
reasonable only if it is compatible with the reasonable doctrines that actual reasonable people affirm. On the deep view, this is (part of) why Rawls pursues the aim of reasonable overlapping consensus also in non-ideal reasonable pluralism, and why he argues that a conception of political justice must be a political liberalism.

Perhaps this suffices to locate the deep view in a wider terrain, and to motivate it. To suggest the view as a serious contender, I shall show how the view integrates a range of ideas, views, and commitments at the core of political liberalism’s justification architecture. These include pro tanto and full justification, the primacy of political values, justificatory neutrality, the role of reasonable comprehensive views, public reasons, the wide view of public political culture, overlapping consensus, political legitimacy, as well as the status of CRE and OP. Throughout, I interpret these things in terms that accord with the deep view: it is part of the point I wish to make that they can be interpreted in these terms. These interpretations sometimes depart from more common readings, which often reflect the influence that the ideal theory view has in the field. I will not argue that these things must be read in my terms, however, or that they cannot be read in other terms. My focus is on displaying the deep view, rather than on attacking alternative readings of political liberalism. Prior to defending any token reading of political liberalism against its (inevitably many) competitors, it is best to first lay out the reading itself. My discussion is part of an attempt to do just that.20

My discussion is in six sections. I begin with the relationship between public, pro tanto and full justification. Rawls relates these things in a way that gives priority to public justification, in one of its roles: public justification identifies what kind of values pro tanto justification must draw on and full justification must prioritize. And Rawls insists that only “political” values qualify for the role. To bring this into focus, section 2 begins with pro tanto justification, and section 3 addresses full justification. Section 4 turns to the idea of public justification and Rawls’s wide view of political culture. In section 5, I outline the deep view of public justification, and return to OP and CRE. I read Rawls as claiming that a conception of justice enables political legitimacy in a given society only if it is as a whole reciprocally acceptable by the reasonable people of that society. This also applies to actual society, outside ideal theory. Rawls (re)articulates JF as a political liberalism to bring JF into compliance with this requirement. Next, it is part of JF’s role to reconstruct the self-conception of reasonable citizens, seen as participants of deep public justification. And JF uses OP as a device to generate reconstructive suggestions. But only if these suggestions sit well with the considered judgments of reasonable people can JF achieve deep public justification. Section 6 concludes by highlighting some advantages of the deep view.

2. Pro tanto justification and political values
According to Rawls, all political justification “must be pro tanto.”21 To justify a conception of justice, φ, pro tanto is to show that φ provides an ordering exclusively of political values that is “complete,” or such that “the political values specified by it can be suitably ordered, or balanced, so that those values alone give a reasonable answer by public reason to all or nearly all questions

20 See also [omitted for blind review], [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review].
concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice.”

Still, it can constitute genuine justification: for Rawls, all political justification is pro tanto, but he evidently takes it that political justification can at least sometimes establish φ as a reasonable, authoritative basis for a legitimate exercise of political power.

Why does demonstrating that φ provides a “complete” ordering of political values—or that φ can answer relevant political questions exclusively in terms of political values—count toward φ’s justification? Rawls points toward an answer when he links pro tanto justification to public reason. Public reason is exercised in reasoning that “aims for public justification.”

Public justification is justification by a standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability by reasonable people. Add to this Rawls’s technical notion of “political” values (below, I refer to such values simply as political values). These values share three features. First, political values apply to a given society’s “domain of the political” only. Second, they are part of the political tradition of that society—as Rawls focuses on the liberal political tradition of the United States, he takes it that these values are liberal in content. A third feature is particularly relevant here, albeit it is reflected not in Rawls’s express account of political values, but in the usage he makes of them: political values are acceptable by all reasonable citizens, while some political values are also non-rejectable by them.

Taken together, this suggests: to demonstrate that φ provides a “complete” ordering of political values is to demonstrate that φ answers relevant political questions in terms of values that are reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable citizens. Thus, arguments that demonstrate that φ provides a “complete” ordering of political values count toward φ’s justification because they count toward φ’s public justification.

Next, on Rawls’s account, completeness can come in degrees. Thus, there are at least two readings of pro tanto justification. Several conceptions of justice might advance political values that provide answers “to all or nearly all questions concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice,” while some conceptions do a better job at this than others. On a strong reading, then, φ possesses pro tanto justification not simply if φ passes the threshold of completeness, but only if φ provides an ordering of political values that is more complete than the orderings offered by φ’s competitors. To reject a pro tanto justifiable conception of justice would hence mean to reject a conception that best serves the aim of public justification. Arguably, for Rawls, this would not be reasonable. On a weak reading, φ possesses pro tanto justification if it passes the threshold of completeness. Here it can be reasonable to reject a pro tanto justifiable conception—e.g., if there is another conception that is more complete. Both readings come down to the same if there is only one pro tanto justifiable conception of justice. Still, the weak reading seems preferable. In his later writings, Rawls allows for more than one variant of political liberalism, and so pro tanto justifications can count toward completeness.

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22 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 386; 454ff.
23 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 386.
26 This simplifies. On this reading, to justify φ pro tanto is to demonstrate, or exemplify, completeness by answering relevant questions in terms of φ’s political values. On another reading, it is a matter of providing reasons for the view that φ is complete—reasons that might not employ political values. I adopt the first reading and assume that if φ instantiates public reasoning, or reasoning that (directly) aims for public justification, the standard of reciprocal acceptability by the reasonable applies to it.
justifiability is not an exclusive, positional merit, but a marker of a conception’s membership in the family of political liberalisms. On the assumption that this family can have more than one member, the fact that a conception of justice is pro tanto justifiable would not make it unreasonable to reject it.27 (This will become relevant later.)

Two things need highlighting. First, Rawls’s account of pro tanto justification conjoins a view of how political justification should proceed and a substantive commitment to political values. He tells us that a political justification of a conception of justice must take the form of demonstrating that it is complete, or that it can answer relevant political questions in terms of values that are reciprocally acceptable by relevant people. He adds that these values must be political values. Yet political values are not simply values that are suitably acceptable by all relevant people. Instead, they are liberal in content, apply to the domain of the political only, and are part of a given political tradition. And this defines substantive commitments into the idea of pro tanto justification. But we should keep these things apart. The role of political values in pro tanto justification turns on the view that only such values are suitably acceptable by all relevant people. Thus: even if we agree that political justification in a society, S, must take the form of demonstrating completeness in terms of values that, in S, are reciprocally acceptable by relevant people, we can still disagree that these values must be political values.

Next, consider the relationship between pro tanto and public justification. Rawls often suggests that when we justify pro tanto, we justify publicly—as if public justification was a mere matter of promulgating what justifies pro tanto. This would make pro tanto justification more fundamental in the order of justification than public justification. The above suggests a different picture: we cannot know in terms of what values completeness must be demonstrated unless we know what values are reciprocally acceptable by relevant people. Thus, it is by the standard of reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people, i.e., the standard of public justification, that we must determine what values may enter the pool of values that pro tanto justification is to employ. If political values (and they alone) meet that standard, then these values (and they alone) may enter that pool. In one respect, then, public justification must be more fundamental than pro tanto justification in political liberalism’s order of justification.

3. Full justification and justificatory neutrality
That φ has “full” justification for an agent means that φ can suitably be integrated with the agent’s doxastic perspective, including especially her comprehensive views. Full justification is carried out by an individual citizen as a member of civil society. (I assume that each citizen affirms both a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine.) In this case, the citizen accepts a political conception and fills out its justification by embedding it in some way to the citizen’s comprehensive doctrine as either true or reasonable, depending on what the doctrine allows.28

As I read this, it in effect claims that φ has full justification for citizens if they accept φ in such a way that φ integrates with—or “in some way” becomes embedded in—their comprehensive doctrines (this interlocks with the role of reflective equilibrium: see section 5). For Rawls, if

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27 See Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 450ff.
agents accept φ in a doctrinally integrated way, their acceptance of φ is motivationally and reflectively stable, or more so than it would otherwise be. And if citizens know about one another that each accepts φ stably, each can attribute to others a reflectively stable willingness to comply with φ. Full justification can hence contribute to the stability of a political conception of justice and the institutions ordered by it.

Two observations are in place. If full justification is a matter of how well φ integrates with an agent’s doxastic perspective, including especially her comprehensive views, then it can come in degrees. One conception, φ1, can be more fully justified for Betty than another conception, φ2, if φ1 integrates more fully than φ2 with Betty’s comprehensive views. And φ1 can be more fully justified than φ2 for a greater or lesser number of people. Either way, it seems we may say that the degree in which φ possesses full justification is a function of how deep φ’s acceptance can be for an agent: the more fully φ integrates with Betty’s comprehensive views, the deeper can Betty’s acceptance of φ be, and so the more fully justified can φ be for her.

A second observation concerns the role of comprehensive views in public justification. It seems that for φ to be publicly justifiable to Betty and Paul, then φ must have some degree of full justification for each of them. After all, if φ cannot achieve any degree of full justification for them, φ does not integrate at all with their comprehensive views. But then it would not be coherent for them to accept φ—which, I take it, entails that φ would not be reciprocally acceptable by them.29 This suggests: when reciprocal acceptability is present, some degree of full justification must be present, too. And if no degree of full justification can be accomplished, reciprocal acceptability cannot be had either. But this seems to elevate the role of comprehensive views in public justification. If φ’s public justifiability to Betty requires that φ can attain some degree of full justification for her, then it seems to depend on whether φ can integrate with her comprehensive views. And it is natural to infer from this that comprehensive views constrain the contents of a publicly justifiable conception of justice.30

Alas, Rawls denies this. He insists that the contents of comprehensive doctrines “have no normative role in public justification,”31 and so they do not constrain the contents of a publicly justifiable conception of justice. This reflects political liberalism’s commitment to justificatory neutrality, i.e., the view that a conception of political justice must be justifiable on grounds that are not reasonably contested by any member of its constituency—where disagreement counts as reasonable if it does, or can, obtain between reasonable people without impugning their reasonableness.32 This commitment flows from a populist view of public justification. For Rawls, if φ is, or can be, the subject of reasonable disagreement, φ is not reciprocally acceptable by, or publicly justifiable to, all reasonable people. He adds the (notorious) view that all non-political, comprehensive views are, or can be, the subject of reasonable disagreement, and hence cannot serve as justifiers in public justification. Thus, the non-political contents of comprehensive doctrines cannot serve as such justifiers.

29 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 387f. See also next section.
30 At stages, Gaus reads Rawls along such lines: see his The Order of Public Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 39–42.
32 This paraphrases Rawls’s view of reasonable disagreement as disagreement between reasonable people (see Political Liberalism, p. 55). My phrasing follows Macedo: see his Liberal Virtues, pp. 47, 71. I discuss Rawls’s view of reasonable disagreement in [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review].
How, then, can full justification cohere with justificatory neutrality? One reading is this. Rawls assumes that reasonable people, for the purposes of public justification, give priority to (some) political values where these conflict with their comprehensive views. This is not a factual claim about their doxastic life; rather, it expresses a normative condition of their reasonableness. For Rawls, reasonable people accept that a conception of political justice must be publicly justifiable to, or reciprocally acceptable by, reasonable people. But he also takes it that reasonable people rank the aim of public justification sufficiently high—high enough so as to prioritize in matters of basic justice values that are reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people. Now, again, Rawls supposes that only political values are so acceptable. Thus, full justification does not confer on comprehensive views a normative role in public justification: the focus here is exclusively on reasonable people, while (i) reasonableness is taken to commit to the priority of the aim of public justification, and (ii) only political values are taken to suit that aim.

What does this mean? Suppose reasonable Betty accepts a reasonable comprehensive doctrine, D. Now, comprehensive doctrines are reasonable only if they can be accepted by reasonable people without impugning their reasonableness. As a reasonable doctrine, then, D coheres with the commitments Betty has as a reasonable person, including her commitment to the priority of the aim of public justification and the importance of political values that this aim (supposedly) mandates. Thus, if conflicts arise between the political values of a conception of political justice and the contents of D, two outcomes are possible. Betty can modify the contents of D so as to better accommodate that conception’s political values. Or she modifies the content of that conception in light of other political values that can be better accommodated by D. Either way, the aim of reciprocal acceptability by the reasonable has the last word: this is the aim that Betty’s doctrine must accommodate to be reasonable.

How does this relate to pro tanto justification? A common reading of the relationship between pro tanto and full justification is this: the conclusions of pro tanto justification are provisional and need confirmation through full justification, e.g., in order to ensure the stability of these conclusions. The reading I propose goes beyond this. Whatever it takes for reasonable Betty to embed a conception of justice in her comprehensive views, in matters of basic justice she pursues full justification in a way that prioritizes, or stays within the limits of, values that are reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people. Now, for Rawls, only political values are suitably acceptable by all reasonable people and hence may enter the pool of values that pro tanto justification may draw on. Thus, when reasonable Betty pursues full justification, she prioritizes, or stays within the limits of, political values. We saw, as well, that different conceptions of justice can advance different orderings of political values, while achieving pro tanto justification. Thus, when Betty prioritizes political values, she may or may not prioritize the particular ordering of political values that is advanced by a token political liberalism. Hence, it can be true of reasonable Betty that she rejects a token political liberalism, φ, if φ’s ordering of political values does not suitably integrate with her comprehensive views—even if φ achieves pro tanto justification. In this sense, pro tanto justification is provisional. However, it cannot be true of reasonable Betty that she rejects φ if φ is the only available variant of political liberalism, or if φ is the variant of political liberalism that has the highest degree of pro tanto justification. And

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33 This goes beyond Rawls’s express account of the reasonableness of comprehensive doctrines (see Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 59), but it reflects the criterion operative in political liberalism. For a discussion: see [omitted for blind review]; Mandle, “The Reasonable in Justice as Fairness,” pp. 90-94.
this goes beyond the standard reading. Full justification can provide reasonable people with doxastic orientation within the normative space of political liberalism, but it cannot point them beyond that space.

One upshot: full, pro tanto and public justification are systematically integrated. As far as reasonable people and their reasonable doctrines are concerned, full justification must prioritize the same kind of values that pro tanto justification is to draw on, i.e., values that are reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people. As before, we can concede this structure, while bracketing the view that only political values qualify for the purpose. What values qualify depends on what values are reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people. And these values may not be all or only political values—despite Rawls’s substantive commitment to such values.

4. Public justification and the wide view of public political debate
In political liberalism, public justification is justification by a standard of reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people, or people that political liberals recognize as reasonable—this much is plain. However, the deep view takes public justification to be public in an especially robust sense. I shall first consider robustly public justification in more genera terms; political liberalism’s species of public justification will then fall into place.

Note first that there is no agreement as to what makes public justification public. It is sometimes construed as public in a thin, promulgatory sense as justification-in-public, or as a matter of voicing what, by the speaker’s lights, justifies φ. On a slightly more robust view, it is seen as justification by good reasons that meet a publicity constraint. E.g., on one view, to justify φ publicly is to justify φ by truly good or valid reasons that are also such that relevant people would, at a suitably level of idealization, grasp their goodness. The idea of public justification that matters now construes justification as public in a more robust sense.

Robustly public justification takes φ’s validity to depend on its authoritative acceptability by relevant people, but φ’s authoritative acceptability is here seen not as a function of φ’s merit, but as constituting φ’s merit—or its validity, rightness, or reasonableness. This is reflected in the kind of reasons that robustly public justification regards as justifying, i.e., robustly public reasons. Following Postema, public reasons are conceptually located between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. Agent-neutral reasons are reasons for every rational agent. Agent-relative reasons are reasons for individual agents only. Public reasons are located in between these categories: they are first person plural reasons, or reasons “for us”—they are relativized to some group or ‘public’, but, within that group, they are not relativized to any of its members. This group may or may not be fully inclusive. Restricted public reasons suppose a restriction on the membership in the relevant group. They are reasons “for us,” but not everyone counts as “one of us.” Unrestricted public reasons suppose no such restriction and, “at the limit, unrestricted public reasons may be universal.” Not least, robustly public reasons are such that their acceptability “by

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37 For this and the next two quotations: see Postema, “Public Practical Reason: Political Practice”, p. 349.
us” is (part of) what constitutes their status as reasons: they “are (...) ‘reasons for me’ because they are ‘reasons for us’ and I regard myself as ‘one of us’.”

In political liberalism, I submit, public justification is justification by restricted robustly public reasons. Political liberalism’s public reasons are reasons that are reciprocally acceptable by everyone included within the constituency of public justification—i.e., reasonable people. And they count as good reasons because they are so acceptable. Macedo is perhaps most forthcoming about the robustly public character of political liberalism’s good reasons: political liberalism, he writes, “regards certain kinds of reasons as politically authoritative: moral reasons that can be openly presented to others, critically defended, and widely shared by reasonable people;” and so “the goodness of good reasons (...) becomes entirely a function of their capacity to gain widespread agreement among reasonable people moved by a desire for reasonable consensus” (where the sought-after agreement is seen as a matter of reciprocal, equal acceptability). This reflects, as well, that political liberalism is constructivist.

With this in place, consider again pro tanto justification. I suggested earlier that there is a respect in which it depends on public justification. That completeness must be demonstrated exclusively in terms of political values turns on the view that only such values are reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people. However, if, following Rawls, we suppose that only political values are suitably acceptable by all reasonable people, only such values can serve as public reasons. It follows that demonstrating completeness exclusively in terms of political values is an exercise of public reason that can aim for public justification: for it exclusively employs values that can serve as public reasons. Moreover, pro tanto and public justification will each meet the demand of justificatory neutrality—at least when these kinds of justifications invoke that sub-set of political values that are non-rejectable by the reasonable (and, for Rawls, some political values have this strong standing).

How does all this sit with Rawls’s “wide” view of public political culture—or of “public reason,” as Neal calls it? (I return to an issue of labels shortly.) Following Neal, the wide view relaxes Rawls’s “inclusive” view—which marks a more inclusive departure from his initial, “exclusive” view. On the exclusive view, reasonable citizens may not invoke non-political or non-public values or reasons in public political debate, period. Rawls later opts for a more permissive view of public political debate. On the inclusive view, reasonable people may invoke non-political or non-public values and reasons in public political debate provided (i) this strengthens the idea of public reason and (ii) these values or reasons are at the time accompanied by political values or public reasons. The final, wide view relaxes this by replacing (ii) with the weaker condition that reasonable people must at least “in due course” provide “public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support.” Thus, Rawls

38 Macedo, Liberal Virtues, pp. 46. Emphasis added.
39 Ibid. Emphasis added.
42 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 247f.
43 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 453. See also p. 462ff.
finally concedes that the reasonable may invoke non-political values or non-public reasons in public political debate so long as doing so remains suitably tethered to public reason.

Alas, all but Rawls’s exclusive view seem to run up against key commitments of political liberalism, such as the views (i) that public reasoning aims for public justification and complies with the standard of reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people; or (ii) that public justification should avoid reasonable disagreement and may invoke as justifiers only public reasons; or (iii) that only political values are public reasons. For if public political debate may invoke non-political values or non-public reasons—as both the inclusive view and the wide view would have it—it will attract reasonable disagreement. But if it does this, it will not comply with the standard of public justification and hence will not instantiate public reason—or at last not on the interpretation that I attached to these things here.

Can the wide view cohere with these key commitments? Yes, it can. Note first that Rawls, while he proposes the exclusive and the inclusive view as views of public reason, refers to the wide view as a view of public political culture. And he contrasts what people may do on the wide view and what they must do in order to meet the constraints of public reason. Thus, the shift in labels might matter: it might herald that not all stretches of debate that instantiate public political culture—or public political debate, for short—must instantiate public reason. Now, the wide view coheres with the key commitments referred to in the last paragraph if it does not relax or contradict the constraints of public reason. And the wide view does not need to relax or contradict these constraints if we understand it in light of a distinction between two idioms of public political debate: (i) one idiom that instantiates reasoning that (directly) aims for public justification and that hence must meet the constraints of public reason, and (ii) another idiom that does not (directly) pursue this aim and hence may be less restrictive. (And reasonable people are able to differentiate between these idioms: Rawls evidently takes it that they can know what values are political, what it means to reason in terms of these values, and what it takes to aim for public justification.) So construed, the wide view does not entail that public political debate instantiates public reason even when public political debate invokes non-political values or non-public reasons. Rather, the wide view reflects a more differentiated view of such debate. The wide view supposes that public political debate is not co-terminus with the exercise of public reason. And it concedes that such debate hence does not have to meet the constraints of public reason in all instantiations—even though such debate must remain tethered to public reason (where this caveat distinguishes it from non-public and non-political debate).

5. Deep non-ideal public justification?
The deep view contrasts with the ideal theory view. On the deep view, there is fundamental, non-applicative non-ideal justification in political liberalism. Call such justification deep non-ideal justification. How does it relate to ideal justification?

According to the ideal theory view, all public justification in political liberalism is ideal public justification. Ideal public justification supposes the conditions of a well-ordered society and it includes within its scope on fully enfranchised footing only the ideal reasonable citizens of that ideal society. These citizens already accept a conception of justice as a shared, “public basis

44 Ibid. Neal seems to overlook this.
45 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 455ff, 461ff.
of justification.”

Ideal public justification hence proceeds on the basis of this conception. Accordingly, proponents of the ideal theory view tend to construe ideal public justification as applicative justification, although some, notably Quong, aim to recast matters to allow for non-applicative ideal public justification. Either way, on the view at hand, political liberalism appeals to public justification to test for stability: the overarching question is whether, in a well-ordered society, a candidate conception of justice could regulate matters of basic justice in ways that would find the ongoing moral support of all reasonable citizens of that society.

On the deep view, the standard of reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people plays a fundamental role—outside ideal theory. It is useful here to put matters in terms of two questions. Suppose we are reasonable in political liberalism’s sense (whatever exactly that sense is) and consider what conception of political justice would be the most reasonable for us to adopt here and now, in the actual world. We thus face at least two questions:

Q1. Should we accept a political and liberal conception, or a non-political or non-liberal one?

If we answer Q1 in favor of political liberalism, another question is:

Q2. Which token of the type “political liberalism” should we accept?

Rawls appeals to ideal public justification as part of an answer to Q2. He recommends JF as an attractive variant of political liberalism partly because—as he argues at JF’s “second stage”—JF can stably provide a public basis of justification in a well-ordered society effectively governed by it. If he is right, JF would be stable in the social conditions that it prescribes, and hence, in some sense at least, would not be self-defeating. Hence, one reason to reject JF does not obtain. But what is the point of that? That JF is a not self-defeating token variant of political liberalism means little if we decide against political liberalism in the first place. The point: any appeal to ideal public justification at JF’s second stage depends for it force on a suitable response to Q1.

Now, Rawls appeals to the standard of reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people also as part of a response to Q1—albeit indirectly. Consider again reasonable overlapping consensus. For Rawls, political legitimacy is possible only if political power is exercised in accordance with a conception of justice that is the subject of an overlapping consensus between the reasonable doctrines that reasonable people affirm. This applies in ideal theory, but also here and now, in the actual world where not all doctrines or people are reasonable. Why does an overlapping consensus matter? Such a consensus matters because a conception of political justice, if it is incompatible with any one of the reasonable doctrines that reasonable people affirm, is not equally acceptable by the reasonable people affirming that doctrine. Next, Rawls takes it that a conception of justice can attain such a consensus only if it avoids reasonable disagreement. And so he here and now applies a “principle of toleration” to “philosophy itself,” and interprets this as requiring the avoidance of reasonable disagreement in normative theorizing about basic justice. But, he insists, only a political and liberal conception of justice—one that contains only “political” values in the sense of section 2, above—can avoid such disagreement. This is why he

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46 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 100f, 143f, 192.
47 See Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy, Political Liberalism, pp. 217, 143f, 192.
48 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 9f.
here and now (re)articulates JF as a political form of liberalism, to here and now (re)submits the view as a whole to the considered judgments of his reasonable readers (or at least reasonable readers who are his fellow-citizens, and whom he shares a political tradition).

Thus, the standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability by reasonable people plays a fundamental role in political liberalism. An answer to Q1 sets a frame that an answer to Q2 must fill out. Deliberation that provides an answer to Q1 uses the standard of reciprocal, equal acceptability by reasonable people to identify what type of conception of political justice it would be reasonable to adopt. An answer to Q2 then proceeds to propose a token of that type—and at this further, lower-order level of deliberation, Rawls argues that considerations of stability-for-the-right-reason do not rule out JF. The standard in question hence serves in a meta-theoretical capacity, as a standard of theory construction and theory acceptance for the domain of the political. In political liberalism, a conception of political justice must possess the capacity to enable a legitimate exercise of political power. But to possess that capacity, it must be reciprocally, equally acceptable by all reasonable people. This applies also here and now, to currently proposed conceptions of political justice and to current exercises of political power.

To further support this reading, consider the criterion of reflective equilibrium (CRE) and the Original Position (OP). The deep view integrates these things (I here only sketch the point, but develop it more fully elsewhere). CRE prominently plays a meta-theoretical role. CRE tests how well a conception of political justice coheres with “our” considered convictions, from the point of view of “you and me”—and a conception that meets this test “is the one most reasonable for us.” As noted earlier, the deep view takes these pronouns to refer to reasonable people only—i.e., actual reasonable people. After all, if JF, or any other political liberalism, must be revised at any level of generality if its contents mismatch “our” considered convictions (and the latter favor revising JF). Hence, if “you and me” or “us” refer to people whose “more firm considered convictions,” are inconsistent with political liberalism, or its most important political values, CRE rules out political liberalism, and with it JF. What counts, then, are the reflective equilibria of reasonable people, or people political liberals recognize as reasonable. And their reflective equilibria count equally—as part of the equal respect that political liberalism extends to each reasonable person: only if each reasonable person can accept JF in a manner that meets CRE can JF be the most reasonable conception “for us,” collectively. The upshot: CRE is a condition of deep non-ideal public justification. CRE specifies in what way JF must be acceptable by each reasonable person for this to count toward JF’s public justification: each must be able to accept JF in reflective equilibrium. Rawls supports this: he writes that a conception of political justice, when it attains public justification, is affirmed in reflective equilibrium.

This sits well with full and pro tanto justification. If CRE is a condition of public justification, JF is publicly justifiable only if JF can attain some degree of full justification for

\[\text{49 See [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review].} \]


\[\text{51 For these and the next quotations: see Rawls, \textit{Political Liberalism}, pp. 94, 28. All emphases are mine.} \]

\[\text{52 See Rawls, \textit{Political Liberalism}, p. 28.} \]

\[\text{53 Rawls, \textit{Justice as Fairness}, p. 29.} \]
each reasonable person. This is so if we (trivially) assume that reasonable Betty can accept JF in reflective equilibrium only if she can integrate JF at least to some degree with her comprehensive views. As to pro tanto justification, we saw that reasonable Betty must give priority to public justification; and, again, Rawls posits that only political values are reciprocally acceptable by all reasonable people (while some such values are reasonably non-rejectable). Thus, reasonable Betty, in pursuing reflective equilibrium, may reject JF even if JF achieves pro tanto justification if other, more suitable variants of political liberalism are available. But she cannot coherently reject JF if JF is the only available political liberalism, or if JF allows for the highest degree of pro tanto justification. The point: like the pursuit of full justification, CRE may provide reasonable people with orientation within the space of political liberalisms, but it cannot point them beyond that space.

The Original Position does not have a meta-theoretical rank. It is a device internal to one candidate political liberalism, JF. Its importance in matters of basic justice is conditional on its capacity to gain support by the reflective equilibria of each reasonable person: OP must be revised if any of its component ideas or results mismatch the “more firms considered convictions” of reasonable people (and these convictions favor revising OP). What, then, is OP’s function? OP is a tool to bring out, illuminate, or reconstruct, implications of the self-understanding of reasonable people: it is “a means of public reflection and self-clarification” that aims to help “us” attain “greater coherence among all our judgments; and with this deeper self-understanding we can attain wider agreement among one another.”\footnote{Political Liberalism, p. 26. Emphases are added.} On the deep view, Rawls here refers to actual reasonable people, i.e., people who deep non-ideal public justification includes within its scope on fully enfranchised footing. And, again, Rawls takes it that there are such people, and that he and his readers qualify (or at least some of his readers). If OP’s reconstructive suggestions matches their considered judgments, this recommends JF. But if OP’s suggestions mismatch these judgments, these people decide from the perspective of their self-conception whether to revise or reject OP. Their self-conception has the last word; it is their considered convictions to which OP and JF must measure up.

6. Conclusion
By way of conclusion, I list some advantages of the deep view. First, it captures political liberalism’s justification architecture better than the ideal theory view. As proponents of the ideal theory view think of public justification in ideal theory terms, they tend to look to OP as political liberalism’s fundamental justification device. But this is not the role of OP, nor does it capture the depth of political liberalism’s commitment to the standard of reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people. In political liberalism, OP is no more, though no less, than a device internal to a candidate political liberalism—a device, moreover, that serves in a reconstructive role—while all such candidates depend for their reasonableness, or authority, on being reciprocally and coherently acceptable by all reasonable people, including actual people.

Next, the deep view can integrate interesting recent developments in Rawls scholarship. E.g., Lister argues that the “duty of public reason”—i.e., the duty to show restraint, or to reason in compliance with the principle of justificatory neutrality—is conditional on reciprocity in that reasonable people, only insofar as they reciprocally act on that duty, enter or sustain relationships
“of mutual respect or civic friendship across deep disagreement.” In arguing his case, Lister makes ideal theory assumptions (at least he assumes compliance). But these assumptions are ultimately inessential for his point, and they should fall away—or so the deep view would suggest. In this case, the deep view agrees that a mutual commitment to public reason can enable, and express, relationships of “mutual respect or civic friendship,” although the deep view puts the point in different terms. On the deep view, the relationship between reasonable people as equal co-authors of deep non-ideal public justification is one of equal discursive respect—this is a recognizably meaningful form of respect—that, at least on the interpretation that political liberals attach to it, comes with a commitment to robustly public reasoning.

Another advantage springs from the fact that the deep view is a non-ideal theory version of an “internal conception” (Quong): on the deep view, political liberalism requires a conception of political justice to be publicly justifiable only to people who are reasonable in political liberalism’s sense (but it does not construe this in ideal theory terms). Thus, the deep view gives political liberalism a way to rebut objections raised by critics like Enoch. He argues that Rawls-type public reason liberalism responds to the presence of actual unreasonable people by adopting “idealization” strategies that are ineligible as they are not supported by political liberalism’s aim to respect the freedom and equality of all citizens. He focuses on two strategies. First, the “exclusion” of unreasonable people from public justification; rather than seeking reciprocal acceptability by all citizens, political liberalism seeks reciprocal acceptability by reasonable people only; second, “going hypothetical,” or the maneuver to seek acceptability not by reasonable citizen only, but by all citizens provided they were reasonable.

On the deep view, this line of criticism misfires. Yes, political liberalism only includes reasonable people on fully enfranchised footing in the scope of public justification. And it goes hypothetical at least in relation to the unreasonable. E.g., Larmore stresses that the reasonable should consider the interests of the unreasonable by imagining what they would accept or reject if they were reasonable. But this is consonant with political liberalism’s aim to respect freedom and equality. For, from the outset, political liberalism respects as free and equal only reasonable citizens. And, from the outset, it aims to fully include in public justification only people that it respects as free and equal. Thus, since there is not aim to fully include the unreasonable in public justification to begin with, a matter of excluding them does not arise. And so hypotheticalization at the fringes of public justification is not objectionably ad hoc, but a meritorious strategy to

56 On discursive respect: see [omitted for blind review]; on discursive respect in political liberalism: see [omitted for blind review]
57 On the relationship between discursive respect and recognition as a Rawls-type self-authenticating sources of valid claims: see [omitted for blind review]
58 See [omitted for blind review]
60 Ibid, pp. 120-126.
61 Ibid, pp. 126-130.
63 Macedo is straightforward about this: see Macedo, Liberal Virtues, p. 47, 71. For a discussion: [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review]
accord weight in deep non-ideal public justification to the interests of people that fail to be free and equal. In short: Enoch’s criticism works from an inaccurate reading of Rawls-type public reason liberalism.

Of course, this rebuttal does not address the underlying substantive issue. On what grounds may political liberalism fully include in deep non-ideal public justification only reasonable people—considering that “reasonableness” is here understood in non-trivial terms that are geared toward political liberalism’s political values. The deep view does not help political liberalism with this issue. Nor does it aspire to. It is an advantage of the deep view that it put the issue where it belongs: center stage. For this issue marks a long-standing core challenge to the idea of a political liberalism. This is not the challenge to explain how or why ideal public justification is relevant outside ideal theory. This may be a core challenge on an ideal theory view. But it is a more fundamental challenge to explain how political liberalism—even if JF is reciprocally and coherently acceptable by all people that are reasonable in political liberalism’s sense—is more than a stretch of public dogma if (i) deep non-ideal public justification is restricted to people who are reasonable in political liberalism’s sense, but (ii) many intelligent people to whom a conception of political justice applies are not reasonable in this sense, or reject political liberalism’s political values.

Again, this is a well-known issue. As the deep view reminds us, then, political liberalism’s prospects depend not so much on whether we can make ideal theory relevant for non-ideal purposes. Rather, they depend on whether political liberalism can devise a credible response to the charge of public dogma. On this, the jury is still out.

Needless to add, political liberals disagree about reasonableness. Larmore insists that Rawls’s notion of the reasonable is richer in content than his own. For Macedo, Larmore’s notion is richer than Macedo allows; Macedo concedes that “reasonableness” is rich in content. See Larmore, “Political Liberalism: Its Motivation and Goals,” p. 74; Macedo, Liberal Virtues, p. 260ff. On the deep view, political liberalism’s notion of the reasonable is richer in content than also Macedo allows: see [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review].

Larmore takes on the problem of public dogma in its depth. He embeds his version of public justification in a contextualist conception of justified belief according to which political liberalism’s key commitments are not in need of justification to begin with. But if this need is not present, public dogma does not occur. See his “Political Liberalism. Its Motivation and Goals,” pp. 76-85; Larmore, The Autonomy of Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 4f, 12. For a discussion: see [omitted for blind review] and [omitted for blind review].