

# Philosophers on Philosophy: The 2020 PhilPapers Survey\*

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## 1 Introduction

What are the philosophical views of contemporary professional philosophers? And how do these views change over time?

In November 2009, we carried out the first PhilPapers Survey. We surveyed 931 philosophers from 99 philosophy departments in the Australia, Canada, continental Europe, New Zealand, the US, and the UK on their answers to 30 philosophical questions. The results of this survey were published as “What Do Philosophers’ Believe?”<sup>1</sup> and have been widely discussed.

In October 2020, we carried out a follow-up survey: the 2020 PhilPapers Survey. It was intended to make at least three additional contributions.

First: the 2020 Survey allowed longitudinal comparisons of results in 2009 and 2020, giving information about how the views of professional philosophers have changed over time.

Second: the target population for the survey was enlarged from faculty members of 99 selected departments in a few selected countries, to a broader group including English-language-publishing philosophers from around the world. This allows broader information about views within the English-speaking philosophical community.

Third: the list of questions was expanded from 30 questions to 100 questions, allowing information about a broader range of philosophical topics.

As we argued in “What Do Philosophers Believe?”, surveys like this can play at least three roles within philosophy. First, today’s sociology is tomorrow’s history, and these results may be of some use to future historians of philosophy. Second, philosophers often appeal to sociological claims about the distributions of views among philosophers, for example in justifying which views should be taken seriously, and it makes sense for these claims to be well-grounded. Third, if philosophy has any tendency to converge to the truth, then

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\*This is an early draft. Feedback and suggestions for further analyses are welcome. Thanks to the staff of the Centre for Digital Philosophy, the many philosophers who helped develop and beta test the survey, and the many philosophers who took the time to answer the survey.

<sup>1</sup>David Bourget and David J. Chalmers, “What Do Philosophers Believe”, *Philosophical Studies* 170(3): 465-500, 2014

philosophers' views might provide some guidance about the truth of philosophical views. It is not clear whether philosophy tends to converge to the truth, so we don't make the third claim about guidance, but surveys can clearly play the first two roles in philosophical practice.

We begin by describing the methodology for the survey, including the target population and the questions. We then go on to discuss the main results of the 2020 survey, the longitudinal comparison to the 2009 survey, and correlations between answers to the survey. We end with a discussion of selection bias in the group of respondents and of correcting results to remove this bias.

## 2 Methodology

The PhilPapers Survey was conducted online from October 15, 2020 to November 16, 2020. Full details on the methods and the results can be found on the survey website at [survey2020.philpeople.org](http://survey2020.philpeople.org).

### 2.1 Target population

In the 2009 survey, we were restricted to a relatively small group of departments (based mainly on rankings and faculty lists from the Philosophical Gourmet Report) as this is where we had the most information. In 2020, the PhilPeople database includes information on philosophers and philosophy departments around the world (with strongest coverage on English-speaking and English-publishing philosophers), so we could survey a broader and more representative group.

After a period of consultation, we decided on a target group including (1) in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the US: all regular faculty members (tenure-track or permanent) in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more members (according to the PhilPeople database); and (2) in all other countries: English-publishing philosophers in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more English-publishing faculty members. Here an English-publishing philosopher is someone with one or more publications in the PhilPapers database with a wide range of English-language journals and book publishers. We restricted to English-publishing philosophers as we do not have adequate information on philosophers who do not publish in English, and the majority of our questions are drawn from English-language traditions.

For meaningful longitudinal comparisons, we also designated a "2009-comparable departments" target group of 100 departments in the same regions as the 2009 survey, based largely on rankings (all Ph.D.-granting departments with a 2017-2018 Philosophical Gourmet Report score of 1.9 or above, plus two leading departments with MA programs and a selected group of European departments based on expert recommendations). This group was used only for longitudinal comparisons.

After data entry and cleanup, our target population included 7685 philosophers, including 6112 in group (1) and 1573 in group (2). The 2009-comparable target group included

**Free will: libertarianism, compatibilism, or no free will?**

Accept: libertarianism

Lean toward: libertarianism

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Accept: compatibilism

Lean toward: compatibilism

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Accept: no free will

Lean toward: no free will

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Alternative view

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Evaluate multiple options (e.g. accept more than one, reject all)

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The question is too unclear to answer

There is no fact of the matter

Insufficiently familiar with the issue

Agnostic/undecided

Other

**Comment** ▼

**Submit**

Figure 1: Example survey form for one philosophical question

2407 philosophers. We used data entry from departmental websites to make our information as complete as possible, but inevitably the information is imperfect in multiple ways. Every member of the target group was sent an initial email invitation to take the survey, followed by additional email requests after approximately 10 days and 20 days if they had not yet responded.

## 2.2 Philosophical questions

In the 2009 survey, we asked 30 questions each with 2-4 answer options: for example, “God: theism or atheism” and “Mind: physicalism or nonphysicalism”.

In the 2020 survey, we used the 30 questions from the 2009 survey unaltered, to allow meaningful longitudinal comparisons. We expanded the list of 30 questions to a list of 40 main questions that would be asked of all participants. We also added a further group of 60 additional (often more specialized) questions that would be asked to one-sixth of participants each. As a result, each participant was asked to answer a minimum of 50 questions (40 main

Evaluate multiple options (e.g. accept more than one, reject all)

no free will	Lean toward
libertarianism	Reject
compatibilism	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>✓ Accept</li> <li>Lean toward</li> <li>Neutral</li> <li>Lean against</li> <li>Reject</li> </ul>

Add alternative

Figure 2: Selecting combinations of answers

questions and 10 additional questions). Participants were also given the option of answering some or all of the other 50 additional questions if they chose to, with a maximum of 100 philosophical questions per participant.

We determined the 70 new questions through an extended period of consultation, including consultation with PhilPapers editors and extended discussion on social media including PhilPeople, Facebook, and philosophy blogs. We also had a lengthy period of beta testing the survey questions and the survey interface with PhilPapers editors using the interface. We aimed for questions that covered many areas of philosophy, that worked in the multiple choice format, and that would be familiar to at least half of our target population.

The 100 resulting questions included approximately 50 questions drawn from metaphysics and epistemology (broadly construed), 30 questions drawn from value theory, 9 from the philosophy of science, logic, and mathematics, 6 from the history of philosophy, and 5 from metaphilosophy.

As in 2009, we did not include any questions drawn from non-Western and non-analytic traditions, as it proved too difficult to find questions from these traditions that met the familiarity and multiple-choice constraints. We attempted to include some new questions reflecting philosophy as it stands in 2020 (adding two questions each about gender and race, for example), but we acknowledge an overall bias toward certain relatively traditional issues in the analytic and English-speaking canons. In retrospect, we could have done more to reflect the diversity of contemporary philosophy. In future surveys, we will try to do so.

As in 2009, we allowed respondents to indicate that they “accept” or “lean toward” a view, and we allowed a range of other options. The options are shown in figure 1. We changed the 2009 answer options slightly to allow respondents more fine-grained options in endorsing multiple answers. Where the 2009 survey just had an option for “Accept both” (binary questions) or “Accept more than one” (ternary questions), the 2020 survey allowed respondents to accept, reject, or lean toward or against each answer separately if they chose to (as shown on figure 2). We also allowed respondents to write in alternative answers if they chose to.

## 2.3 Philosophical orientation

Respondents were asked the following questions about their philosophical orientation:

Areas of specialization: Respondents had to choose from the following list of areas (the primary areas in the PhilPapers category system): 17th/18th Century Philosophy, 19th Century Philosophy, 20th Century Philosophy, Aesthetics, African/Africana Philosophy, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Applied Ethics, Asian Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Decision Theory, Epistemology, European Philosophy, Feminist Philosophy, General Philosophy of Science, Logic and Philosophy of Logic, Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy, Metaethics, Metaphilosophy, Metaphysics, Normative Ethics, Philosophy of Action, Philosophy of Biology, Philosophy of Cognitive Science, Philosophy of Computing and Information, Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Mathematics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Physical Science, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Social Science, Philosophy of the Americas, Social and Political Philosophy.

Philosophical tradition: As in 2009, respondents could choose either “analytic”, “continental”, or “other tradition”. When selecting “other tradition” they could enter a tradition as free text.

Identification with philosophers: Respondents were asked “For which nonliving philosophers X would you describe yourself or your work as X-ian, or the equivalent?” Respondents could choose from a list of well-known philosophers or select “other” to specify philosophers manually. The 2009 list was based on online surveys of the greatest philosophers of the last 200 years and of all time. It included: Anscombe, Aquinas, Aristotle, Augustine, Berkeley, Carnap, Davidson, Descartes, Frege, Hegel, Heidegger, Hobbes, Hume, Husserl, Kant, Kierkegaard, Leibniz, Lewis, Locke, Marx, Mill, Moore, Nietzsche, Plato, Quine, Rawls, Rousseau, Russell, Socrates, Spinoza, Wittgenstein. For 2020 we added Dewey, Foucault, James, Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, Popper, Reid, Rorty, Sellars, and Whitehead (the ten most popular write-in choices in 2009), Parfit and Putnam (the leading candidates per previous criteria who died since the previous survey), and Arendt, Avicenna, Beauvoir, Buddha, Confucius, Deleuze, Derrida, Du Bois, Laozi, Nagarjuna, Rand, Sartre, and Wollstonecraft (to expand coverage of other traditions).

## 2.4 Background questions

Respondents were also asked the following background questions: year of birth, nationality, gender, doctorate in philosophy (respondents could indicate that they hold a doctorate in philosophy, and specify the granting institution and year), current affiliation and role.

## 2.5 Consent

Under consent guidelines approved by The Western University Non-Medical Research Ethics Board, respondents were told how their answers would be used, and at the end of the survey were asked to consent to the use of their answers. The Survey was largely anonymous,

although respondents were given the option to make their answers public eventually. Respondents were also told that their answers would be retained for use in possible follow-up surveys, and that any question could be skipped if they are uncomfortable in answering.

### 3 Main survey results

Of the main target population of 7685 philosophers, 1785 (23%) completed the survey. Of these, 522 completed exactly 50 questions, 338 completed 51-99, and 925 completed all 100. An additional 487 initially gave their consent but did not complete the survey.

Of the 2009-comparable population of 2407 philosophers, 648 (27%) completed the survey. Of these, 193 completed exactly 50 questions, 116 completed 51-99, and 339 completed all 100.

The results presented below are results for all questions answered by all respondents who completed the survey. These results are therefore subject to possible selection bias both among respondents to the survey and among respondents who chose to complete more than 50 questions. We discuss and analyze these sorts of selection bias in section 7.

#### 3.1 Main questions

The results for the main 40 questions are shown below. 30 of these questions overlap with the questions from the 2009 PhilPapers Survey and 10 are new. Each of these 40 questions was presented to all 1785 survey respondents. The figures below include all respondents except those who indicated “insufficiently familiar with the issue” or who indicated “skip” to skip the question.

Note that the results below should not be longitudinally compared to the main results presented in the 2009 PhilPapers Survey paper, for three main reasons. First, the 2020 population is much broader (not restricted to 99 departments). Second, the 2020 survey made it easier to endorse multiple answers than the 2009 survey. Third, the main results presented in the 2009 paper included respondents who skipped the question or checked “insufficiently familiar”, whereas the results below exclude those respondents.

For meaningful longitudinal comparisons, see section 5, where we present 2020 results that are more directly comparable to the 2009 results (restricting to 2009-comparable departments, exclusive answers, and including skip/unfamiliar answers under “other”).

In table 1, for each question and each option, we present the total number of respondents and the percentage who either “accept” or “lean toward” that option. This figure can be calculated either as an “inclusive” figure, where respondents who endorse multiple options are included in the totals for each options, or as an “exclusive” figure, which counts only respondents who endorse that option and no other option. We present inclusive figures in all cases. To simplify the table, we present exclusive figures only when at least one of them differs by 3% or more from inclusive figures. This gives some indication of questions for which choosing multiple options is popular.

More information on combined and alternative answers can be found on the survey

website on the pages presenting detailed results for each question. Main questions for which combined answers were the most popular include: aim of philosophy (27%), gender (20%), normative ethics (15%), race (10%), knowledge (8%), political philosophy (8%), and vagueness (8%).

Among the 40 main questions, views mentioned most often as alternative answers (according to a semi-automated analysis) included: abstract objects: Aristotelian realism (24 respondents, or 1.5%); aesthetic value: intersubjective (25); knowledge: pragmatism (30), knowledge: Kantian (25), God: agnosticism (23); logic: pluralism (35); normative ethics: pluralism (31), normative ethics: particularism (23), perceptual experience: direct realism (23), perceptual experience: phenomenological (20), philosophical methods: phenomenology (30), truth: pragmatism (26).

The cases of logic and normative ethics (as well as numerous cases discussed in the next section) bring out that pluralist views were often expressed as alternative answers rather than as combined answers (“Evaluate multiple options”). On the logic question, for example, 76 respondents endorsed a combined answer (accepting or leaning toward both classical and nonclassical logic) while 35 endorsed pluralism as an alternative answer. Insofar as pluralism can be considered a combined view, a consequence is that combined answer numbers alone may somewhat understate the popularity of combined views, and information on both alternative and combined answers is required for a full analysis.

Table 1: Main questions: Respondents who accept or lean toward each answer.

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
A priori knowledge				
Yes	1274	72.8		
No	323	18.5		
Other	152	8.7		
Abstract objects				
Platonism	629	38.4		
Nominalism	686	41.9		
Other	323	19.7		
Aesthetic value				
Objective	740	43.5	683	40.2
Subjective	690	40.6	632	37.2
Other	322	18.9		
Aim of philosophy (which is most important?)				
Truth/knowledge	747	42.2	313	17.7
Understanding	988	55.8	524	29.6
Wisdom	552	31.2	178	10.1
Happiness	224	12.6	24	1.4
Goodness/justice	402	22.7	55	3.1
Other	191	10.8		
Analytic-synthetic distinction				

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Yes	1064	62.5		
No	439	25.8		
Other	203	11.9		
Eating animals and animal products (is it permissible to eat animals and/or animal products in ordinary circumstances?)				
Omnivorism (yes and yes)	847	48.0		
Vegetarianism (no and yes)	467	26.5		
Veganism (no and no)	324	18.4		
Other	174	9.9		
Epistemic justification				
Internalism	579	35.7	493	30.4
Externalism	819	50.5	735	45.3
Other	292	18.0		
Experience machine (would you enter?)				
Yes	219	13.3		
No	1262	76.9		
Other	160	9.7		
External world				
Idealism	117	6.6		
Skepticism	96	5.4		
Non-skeptical realism	1403	79.5		
Other	172	9.8		
Footbridge (pushing man off bridge will save five on track below, what ought one do?)				
Push	382	22.0		
Don't push	975	56.0		
Other	382	22.0		
Free will				
Compatibilism	1040	59.2		
Libertarianism	331	18.8		
No free will	197	11.2		
Other	200	11.4		
Gender				
Biological	480	29.0	250	15.1
Psychological	356	21.5	71	4.3
Social	1043	63.1	711	43.0
Unreal	70	4.2	27	1.6
Other	245	14.8		
God				
Theism	335	18.9		
Atheism	1185	66.9		
Other	248	14.0		



Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Knowledge claims				
Contextualism	805	54.6		
Relativism	80	5.4		
Invariantism	376	25.5		
Other	241	16.4		
Knowledge				
Empiricism	756	43.9	642	37.3
Rationalism	577	33.5	461	26.8
Other	475	27.6		
Laws of nature				
Humean	486	31.3		
Non-humean	844	54.3		
Other	231	14.9		
Logic				
Classical	759	53.6	689	48.7
Non-classical	374	26.4	308	21.8
Other	342	24.2		
Meaning of life				
Subjective	570	33.0	489	28.3
Objective	553	32.1	476	27.6
Nonexistent	278	16.1	257	14.9
Other	407	23.6		
Mental content				
Internalism	399	26.4	332	21.9
Externalism	880	58.1	815	53.8
Other	297	19.6		
Meta-ethics				
Moral realism	1067	62.1		
Moral anti-realism	449	26.1		
Other	202	11.8		
Metaphilosophy				
Naturalism	777	50.2		
Non-naturalism	482	31.1		
Other	296	19.1		
Mind				
Physicalism	900	51.9		
Non-physicalism	556	32.1		
Other	276	15.9		
Moral judgment				
Cognitivism	1133	69.3		
Non-cognitivism	339	20.7		
Other	169	10.3		

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Moral motivation				
Internalism	586	41.0		
Externalism	562	39.3		
Other	315	22.0		
Newcomb's problem				
One box	334	31.2		
Two boxes	418	39.0		
Other	323	30.2		
Normative ethics				
Deontology	558	32.1	343	19.7
Consequentialism	532	30.6	373	21.4
Virtue ethics	644	37.0	436	25.0
Other	316	18.2		
Perceptual experience				
Disjunctivism	207	15.6	183	13.8
Qualia theory	200	15.1	176	13.3
Representationalism	520	39.3	478	36.1
Sense-datum theory	66	5.0	51	3.9
Other	372	28.1		
Personal identity				
Biological view	308	19.1	252	15.6
Psychological view	705	43.7	637	39.4
Further-fact view	240	14.9	216	13.4
Other	429	26.6		
Philosophical progress (is there any?)				
None	68	3.8		
A little	827	46.6		
A lot	740	41.7		
Other	149	8.4		
Political philosophy				
Communitarianism	419	27.3	339	22.1
Egalitarianism	677	44.0	588	38.3
Libertarianism	206	13.4	158	10.3
Other	315	20.5		
Proper names				
Fregean	458	36.1		
Millian	491	38.7		
Other	323	25.5		
Race				
Biological	308	18.7	189	11.5
Social	1046	63.4	871	52.8
Unreal	248	15.0	188	11.4
Other	219	13.3		

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Science				
Scientific realism	1222	72.4		
Scientific anti-realism	254	15.0		
Other	217	12.8		
Teletransporter (new matter)				
Survival	555	35.2		
Death	631	40.1		
Other	390	24.8		
Time				
A-theory	306	27.2		
B-theory	429	38.2		
Other	406	36.2		
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?)				
Switch	1101	63.4		
Don't switch	231	13.3		
Other	407	23.4		
Truth				
Correspondence	844	51.4	794	48.3
Deflationary	403	24.5	365	22.2
Epistemic	167	10.2	144	8.8
Other	276	16.8		
Vagueness				
Epistemic	346	24.2	233	16.3
Metaphysical	298	20.8	217	15.2
Semantic	746	52.1	609	42.6
Other	223	15.6		
Zombies				
Inconceivable	264	16.4		
Conceivable but not pos.	588	36.5		
Metaphysically possible	393	24.4		
Other	362	22.5		
Philosophical methods (which methods are the most useful/important?)			Reject/lean against	
Conceptual analysis	1229	70.9	201	11.6
Conceptual engineering	684	39.5	357	20.6
Empirical philosophy	1040	60.0	251	14.5
Experimental philosophy	565	32.6	623	35.9
Formal philosophy	962	55.5	223	12.9
Intuition-based philosophy	857	49.5	503	29.0
Linguistic philosophy	800	46.2	373	21.5
Other	124	7.2		

### 3.2 Additional questions

Of the 60 additional questions, one-sixth of the 1785 respondents, or about 300 respondents, were presented with the question as part of their mandatory 50 questions. Typically, another 800 respondents (45%) were presented with the question by answering additional questions, for a total of around 1100 respondents (62%) presented with the question. The figures below include these respondents, excluding those who chose to skip the question or who indicated “insufficiently familiar”. As before, the results are subject to selection bias, discussed in section 7.

Additional questions for which combined answers were the most popular include: arguments for theism (18%), method in history (15%), response to skepticism (8%), method in political philosophy (7%), Wittgenstein (7%), and units of selection (7%).

Views mentioned most often as alternative answers included: arguments for theism: none (32 respondents, or 3.2%), consciousness: hyломorphism (12), foundations of mathematics: Platonism (15), method in history of philosophy: both (15), method in political philosophy: both (13), statue and lump: nihilism (10), units of selection: multilevel selection (29), units of selection: groups (11), well-being: hybrid (13): Wittgenstein: neither (29), Wittgenstein: both (14). As in the previous section, it is evident that combined views (e.g. “both”, “hybrid”, “multilevel”) were often expressed by alternative answers as well as by combined answers.

Table 2: Additional questions: Respondents who accept or lean toward each answer.

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Abortion (first trimester, no special circumstances)				
Permissible	917	81.7		
Impermissible	147	13.1		
Other	61	5.4		
Aesthetic experience				
Perception	193	28.2	171	25.0
Pleasure	97	14.2	76	11.1
Sui generis	255	37.2	245	35.8
Other	167	24.4		
Analysis of knowledge				
Justified true belief	242	23.6		
Other analysis	330	32.2		
No analysis	314	30.6		
Other	142	13.9		
Arguments for theism (which argument is strongest?)				
Cosmological	214	20.9	170	16.6
Design	181	17.7	142	13.9
Ontological	91	8.9	70	6.8

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Pragmatic	146	14.2	119	11.6
Moral	96	9.4	65	6.3
Other	258	25.2		
Belief or credence (which is more fundamental?)				
Belief	237	30.6		
Credence	242	31.3		
Neither	151	19.5		
Other	149	19.3		
Capital punishment				
Permissible	199	17.7		
Impermissible	843	75.1		
Other	80	7.1		
Causation				
Counterfactual/difference-making	332	37.2	298	33.4
Process/production	201	22.5	167	18.7
Primitive	183	20.5	169	18.9
Nonexistent	37	4.1	34	3.8
Other	184	20.6		
Chinese room				
Understands	184	17.8		
Doesn't understand	692	67.1		
Other	154	14.9		
Concepts				
Nativism	241	28.1	200	23.3
Empiricism	432	50.3	387	45.1
Other	215	25.1		
Consciousness				
Dualism	224	22.0	204	20.0
Eliminativism	46	4.5	39	3.8
Functionalism	337	33.0	301	29.5
Identity theory	136	13.3	117	11.5
Panpsychism	77	7.5	62	6.1
Other	232	22.7		
Continuum hypothesis (does it have a determinate truth-value?)				
Determinate	180	37.7		
Indeterminate	137	28.7		
Other	161	33.7		
Cosmological fine-tuning (what explains it?)				
Design	140	17.3		
Multiverse	122	15.1		
Brute fact	259	32.1		
No fine-tuning	175	21.7		
Other	144	17.8		

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Environmental ethics				
Anthropocentric	376	42.2		
Non-anthropocentric	451	50.7		
Other	79	8.9		
Extended mind				
Yes	488	51.3		
No	353	37.1		
Other	112	11.8		
Foundations of mathematics				
Constructivism/intuitionism	92	15.3	82	13.7
Formalism	37	6.2	31	5.2
Logicism	71	11.8	62	10.3
Structuralism	127	21.2	107	17.8
Set-theoretic	92	15.3	78	13.0
Other	206	34.3		
Gender categories				
Preserve	201	20.4		
Revise	500	50.9		
Eliminate	160	16.3		
Other	150	15.3		
Grounds of intentionality				
Causal/teleological	249	34.7	214	29.8
Inferential	68	9.5	48	6.7
Interpretational	108	15.1	87	12.1
Phenomenal	90	12.6	72	10.0
Primitive	98	13.7	89	12.4
Other	160	22.3		
Hard problem of consciousness (is there one?)				
Yes	623	62.4		
No	297	29.8		
Other	79	7.9		
Human genetic engineering				
Permissible	680	64.2		
Impermissible	206	19.5		
Other	171	16.1		
Hume (what is his view?)				
Skeptic	318	36.5	252	28.9
Naturalist	479	54.9	413	47.4
Other	138	15.8		
Immortality (would you choose it?)				
Yes	500	44.9		
No	460	41.3		
Other	151	13.6		

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Interlevel metaphysics (which is the most useful?)				
Grounding	218	29.1	167	22.3
Identity	86	11.5	51	6.8
Realization	157	21.0	106	14.2
Supervenience	185	24.7	138	18.4
Other	212	28.3		
Justification				
Coherentism	225	23.7	182	19.2
Infinitism	19	2.0	14	1.5
Nonreliabilist foundationalism	239	25.2	207	21.8
Reliabilism	319	33.6	274	28.8
Other	207	21.8		
Kant (what is his view?)				
One world	328	45.4		
Two worlds	252	34.9		
Other	145	20.1		
Law				
Legal positivism	244	39.5		
Legal non-positivism	278	45.0		
Other	99	16.0		
Material composition				
Nihilism	47	8.2		
Restrictivism	201	35.0		
Universalism	157	27.4		
Other	173	30.1		
Metaontology				
Heavyweight realism	272	38.6		
Deflationary realism	198	28.1		
Anti-realism	84	11.9		
Other	152	21.6		
Method in history of philosophy (which do you prefer?)				
Analytic/rational reconstruction	569	60.8	402	42.9
Contextual/historicist	416	44.4	251	26.8
Other	112	12.0		
Method in political philosophy (which do you prefer?)				
Ideal theory	255	32.4	176	22.4
Non-ideal theory	456	58.0	377	48.0
Other	148	18.8		
Mind uploading (brain replaced by digital emulation)				
Survival	279	27.5		
Death	551	54.2		

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Other	187	18.4		
Moral principles				
Moral generalism	537	54.6		
Moral particularism	332	33.7		
Other	127	12.9		
Morality				
Non-naturalism	272	26.6	248	24.2
Naturalist realism	324	31.6	288	28.1
Constructivism	213	20.8	181	17.7
Expressivism	109	10.6	84	8.2
Error theory	54	5.3	40	3.9
Other	119	11.6		
Normative concepts (which is most fundamental?)				
Fit	63	7.3	43	5.0
Ought	122	14.2	91	10.6
Reasons	219	25.4	185	21.5
Value	322	37.4	282	32.8
Other	211	24.5		
Ought implies can				
Yes	682	62.9		
No	307	28.3		
Other	98	9.0		
Philosophical knowledge (is there any?)				
None	40	3.6		
A little	361	32.5		
A lot	624	56.2		
Other	90	8.1		
Plato (what is his view?)				
Knowledge only of forms	335	52.8		
Knowledge also of concrete things	179	28.2		
Other	122	19.2		
Politics				
Capitalism	323	29.5	286	26.1
Socialism	580	53.0	532	48.6
Other	211	19.3		
Possible worlds				
Abstract	583	54.8		
Concrete	49	4.6		
Nonexistent	319	30.0		
Other	116	10.9		
Practical reason				
Aristotelian	344	38.7	305	34.3
Humean	272	30.6	251	28.3



Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Kantian	168	18.9	141	15.9
Other	143	16.1		
Principle of sufficient reason				
True	336	35.9		
False	428	45.7		
Other	173	18.5		
Properties				
Classes	89	11.5		
Immanent universals	160	20.6		
Transcendent universals	154	19.8		
Tropes	119	15.3		
Nonexistent	63	8.1		
Other	226	29.1		
Propositional attitudes				
Dispositional	250	31.5	205	25.8
Phenomenal	55	6.9	35	4.4
Representational	369	46.5	325	40.9
Nonexistent	28	3.5	26	3.3
Other	150	18.9		
Propositions				
Sets	68	8.4		
Structured entities	311	38.3		
Simple entities	56	6.9		
Acts	66	8.1		
Nonexistent	125	15.4		
Other	203	25.0		
Quantum mechanics				
Collapse	95	17.1	82	14.7
Hidden-variables	122	21.9	104	18.7
Many-worlds	108	19.4	95	17.1
Epistemic	71	12.8	63	11.3
Other	178	32.0		
Race categories				
Preserve	77	8.2		
Revise	305	32.3		
Eliminate	381	40.4		
Other	196	20.8		
Rational disagreement (can two people with the same evidence rationally disagree?)				
Non-permissivism	193	19.4		
Permissivism	698	70.2		
Other	104	10.5		
Response to external-world skepticism (which is strongest?)				

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Abductive	206	22.1	160	17.2
Contextualist	100	10.7	72	7.7
Dogmatist	125	13.4	94	10.1
Epistemic externalist	176	18.9	136	14.6
Semantic externalist	78	8.4	50	5.4
Pragmatic	212	22.8	170	18.3
Other	160	17.2		
Semantic content (which expressions are context-dependent?)				
Minimalism (no more than a few)	73	9.4		
Moderate contextualism (intermediate)	409	52.5		
Radical contextualism (most or all)	199	25.5		
Other	102	13.1		
Sleeping beauty (woken once if heads, woken twice if tails, credence in heads on waking?)				
One-third	119	27.7		
One-half	80	18.6		
Other	229	53.4		
Spacetime				
Relationism	284	45.4		
Substantivalism	172	27.5		
Other	169	27.0		
Statue and lump				
One thing	288	30.1		
Two things	400	41.8		
Other	269	28.1		
Temporal ontology				
Presentism	135	18.4		
Eternalism	293	39.9		
Growing block	125	17.0		
Other	183	24.9		
Theory of reference				
Causal	406	46.3	360	41.0
Descriptive	194	22.1	149	17.0
Deflationary	132	15.1	123	14.0
Other	189	21.6		
Time travel				
Metaphysically possible	401	42.3		
Metaphysically impossible	389	41.0		
Other	158	16.7		
True contradictions				
Impossible	660	71.4		
Possible but non-actual	44	4.8		

Questions and answers	Inclusive		Exclusive if diff.	
	n	%	n	%
Actual	115	12.4		
Other	108	11.7		
Units of selection				
Genes	297	43.5	225	33.0
Organisms	294	43.1	223	32.7
Other	159	23.3		
Values in science (is ideal scientific reasoning necessarily sensitive or insensitive to non-epistemic values?)				
Necessarily value-free	170	17.7		
Necessarily value-laden	423	44.0		
Can be either	299	31.1		
Other	69	7.2		
Well-being				
Hedonism/experientialism	123	12.7	98	10.1
Desire satisfaction	180	18.6	146	15.1
Objective list	514	53.2	483	49.9
Other	194	20.1		
Wittgenstein (which do you prefer?)				
Early	237	24.6	200	20.8
Late	554	57.5	515	53.5
Other	166	17.2		
Other minds (for which groups are some members conscious?)				
Adult humans	1039	95.1	2	0.2
Cats	967	88.6	43	3.9
Fish	713	65.3	161	14.7
Flies	377	34.5	419	38.4
Worms	264	24.2	509	46.6
Plants	79	7.2	870	79.7
Particles	22	2.0	973	89.1
Newborn babies	921	84.3	53	4.9
Current ai systems	37	3.4	900	82.4
Future ai systems	428	39.2	293	26.8
Other	51	4.7		

## 4 Demographics

### 4.1 Geography

Each respondent is associated with up to three countries: nationality, country of PhD, country of affiliation. The USA is far ahead on all three lists, followed by the UK, followed by

Table 3: Nationality and country of primary affiliation

Nationality	Respondents	Country of affiliation	Respondents
USA	859	USA	1004
UK	163	UK	203
Canada	127	Canada	123
Germany	89	Australia	73
Australia	59	Germany	56
Italy	38	Sweden	34
Sweden	29	Netherlands	34
New Zealand	24	Italy	24
Netherlands	22	Spain	23
Spain	20	New Zealand	20
Israel	18	Israel	18
Belgium	13	Norway	15
France	13	Brazil	12
Denmark	12	Switzerland	12
Poland	11	Singapore	12
Switzerland	11	Hong Kong	12
Ireland	11	Belgium	11
Norway	10	Denmark	10
Austria	9	Austria	10
Brazil	9	France	10
Finland	7	Poland	9
Colombia	6	Ireland	8
Romania	5	South Africa	6
Portugal	5	Mexico	5
Greece	5	Other	45
Other	64	No answer	13
No answer	146		

Australia, Canada, and Germany in varying orders, and then numerous European countries. The leading non-European countries (aside from Australia, Canada, NZ, and the US) were Israel, Brazil, and Colombia (nationality), and Israel, Brazil, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Africa, and Mexico (affiliation).

## 4.2 Gender and age

Just over 20% of respondents who indicated gender indicated gender: female, while about 0.5% indicated gender: other, with the rest indicating gender: male. The most common decade of birth was the 1970s, followed by the 1980s and the 1960s.

## 4.3 Philosophical orientation

The most common areas of specialization (in order) were epistemology, metaphysics, normative ethics, and philosophy of mind. A large majority of respondents specified an analytic orientation, followed by continental orientation, and write-in choices including pragmatism, history, and a number identifying with multiple orientations. On identification with non-living philosophers, the leaders included Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Wittgenstein, Lewis, and

Table 4: Country of PhD

Country of PhD	Respondents
USA	835
UK	162
Australia	51
Canada	49
Germany	40
Netherlands	17
Sweden	14
Spain	10
Belgium	8
Italy	6
Switzerland	5
Other	30
No answer	540

Figure 3: Decade of birth




Table 5: Gender

Gender	Respondents
Male	1365
Female	357
Prefer not to say	25
Other gender	9
No answer	29

Table 6: Philosophical traditions

Philosophical traditions	Respondents
Analytic	1430
Other tradition	169
Continental	113
Both	17
Pragmatism	13
History	5
Aristotelian	3
No answer	73

Quine, with many write-in options included.

## 5 Longitudinal analysis

In this section we compare the 2020 results for the 30 main questions to the 2009 results. For this purpose, we restrict the 2020 results to the target group of 100 2009-comparable departments in Australasia, Europe, and North America. As explained in section 2, the 2009-comparable departments, like the target departments in the 2009 survey, were selected based largely on rankings.

It should be noted that the “2009-comparable department” group differs systematically from the broader target population in a number of respects. Demographically, it includes a higher proportion of UK-based philosophers and analytic-tradition philosophers than the target population. Philosophically, it includes a lower proportion of theists, along with many other differences evident in comparing 2020 results in table 1 (all departments) to table 9 (2009-comparable departments).

For longitudinal purposes, we use “exclusive” rather than “inclusive” answer figures: that is, we exclude respondents who endorse multiple options. Exclusive answers were used in presenting our 2009 results, so using them here maximizes continuity with existing familiar results. Furthermore, inclusive answers were handled somewhat differently in 2009 and 2020, so using exclusive answers maximizes comparability of the results. Using them should make no difference to relative results on binary questions (though absolute results are lower in some cases, as multiple options could be chosen more easily in 2020 than in 2009). On nonbinary questions, this method sets aside fine-grained information about respondents who endorse some but not all of the options; but since this fine-grained information was not available in the 2009 survey, it would be hard to use it for longitudinal purposes. We

Figure 4: Areas of specialization




Table 7: Philosophers most identified with

Aristotle (238)	Davidson (44)	Sellars (16)
Hume (221)	Leibniz (41)	Nāgārjuna (15)
Kant (188)	Anscombe (39)	Du Bois (13)
Wittgenstein (117)	Nietzsche (39)	Rorty (13)
Lewis (117)	Moore (39)	Sartre (13)
Quine (107)	Hegel (38)	Berkeley (12)
Frege (95)	Heidegger (34)	Austin (9)
Carnap (80)	Locke (33)	Wollstonecraft (9)
Russell (80)	Husserl (33)	Grice (8)
Plato (74)	Spinoza (32)	Derrida (8)
Rawls (71)	Reid (32)	Whitehead (7)
Mill (67)	Merleau-Ponty (28)	Rousseau (7)
Aquinas (56)	Foucault (27)	Sidgwick (7)
Marx (52)	Beauvoir (26)	Confucius (7)
Socrates (49)	Peirce (26)	Ramsey (6)
Descartes (48)	Augustine (23)	Buddha (6)
James (47)	Kierkegaard (22)	Zhuangzi (6)
Parfit (46)	Arendt (18)	Schopenhauer (6)
Dewey (45)	Popper (18)	Deleuze (5)
Putnam (44)	Hobbes (16)	Dummett (5)

have also included “skip” and “insufficiently familiar” answers as “other” answers in this context, to maximize continuity with how results were presented in 2009.

Our main longitudinal measure is the *swing* toward or against a position on the survey, defined as its relative strength in 2020 minus its relative strength in 2009. The relative strength of a position on a survey is defined as the percentage of respondents who endorse it exclusively, minus the average percentage of respondents who endorse other options exclusively (averaged across all other options). There is no perfect measure of swing when more than two options are present, but our definition has the nice feature that all swings on a given question sum to zero. Furthermore, in cases where all positions increase by the same amount (5%, say), as discussed above, the swing toward each position will be zero. The biggest swings toward any position from 2009 to 2020 are shown on table 8.

We also have the information to longitudinally compare results over the same people in 2009 and 2020: that is, over 2009 respondents in the target group who also responded in 2020 (regardless of whether they were in the target group in 2020). We have included these “same people” results with a corresponding swing, to shed light on the issue of how individual views may change over time. The biggest swings for this longitudinal comparison can be found in table 9.

The survey website includes some further longitudinal comparisons, including comparisons across “same departments” (the 2009 departments in both 2009 and 2020) . It also includes comparisons using “weighted scores” (0 for rejecting a view, 0.25 for leaning against it, 0.5 for other, 0.75 for leaning toward it, 1 for accepting it), which are more fine-grained than the current percentages which in effect assign 0 for the first three options and 1 for the last two.



Table 8: Largest swings from 2009 to 2020 across comparable departments.

Answer	Swing
Logic: non-classical	13.4
Knowledge claims: invariantism	-11.2
Moral motivation: externalism	8.7
Laws of nature: Humean	8.5
A priori knowledge: yes	8.5
Knowledge claims: contextualism	7.6
Aesthetic value: subjective	6.9
Trolley problem: don't switch	6.3
Meta-ethics: moral realism	5.4
Free will: compatibilism	5.3

Table 9: Largest swings from 2009 to 2020 across the same people (target 2009 respondents who also responded in 2020).

Answer	Swing
Trolley problem: don't switch	11.9
Logic: non-classical	9.5
Moral judgment: non-cognitivism	8.3
Knowledge claims: invariantism	-8.2
Abstract objects: Platonism	7.7
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	6.5
Knowledge claims: contextualism	6.1
Normative ethics: consequentialism	-5.9
Free will: no free will	-5.9
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	5.6

Table 10: Longitudinal comparison

Qs and As	Comparable departments				Same people			
	09%	20%	ch.	Swng	09%	20%	ch.	Swng
A priori knowledge								
Yes	71.1	74.8	↑3.7	↑8.5	73.9	71.5	↓2.4	↓3.0
No	18.4	13.6	↓4.8	↓8.5	16.0	16.6	↑0.6	↑3.0
Other	10.5	11.6			10.1	11.9		
Abstract objects								
Platonism	39.3	37.2	↓2.1	↓1.2	37.1	39.5	↑2.4	↑7.7
Nominalism	37.7	36.7	↓1.0	↑1.2	39.5	34.1	↓5.4	↓7.7
Other	23.0	26.1			23.4	26.4		
Aesthetic value								
Objective	41.0	37.8	↓3.2	↓6.9	36.8	36.2	↓0.6	↑3.0
Subjective	34.5	38.1	↑3.6	↑6.9	39.8	36.2	↓3.6	↓3.0
Other	24.5	24.1			23.4	27.6		
Analytic-synthetic distinction								
Yes	64.9	63.7	↓1.2	↑5.3	65.0	64.1	↓0.9	↑3.9
No	27.1	20.7	↓6.4	↓5.3	26.7	22.0	↓4.7	↓3.9
Other	8.0	15.6			8.3	13.9		
Epistemic justification								
Internalism	26.4	27.9	↑1.5	↑1.4	30.0	30.6	↑0.6	↑3.6
Externalism	42.7	42.9	↑0.2	↓1.4	43.6	40.7	↓2.9	↓3.6
Other	30.9	29.2			26.4	28.7		
External world								
Idealism	4.3	4.0	↓0.3	↓0.8	2.7	4.2	↑1.5	↑2.2
Skepticism	4.8	4.3	↓0.5	↓1.1	5.9	6.5	↑0.6	↑0.9
Non-skeptical realism	81.6	83.2	↑1.6	↑1.9	81.9	79.8	↓2.1	↓3.1
Other	9.3	8.5			9.5	9.5		
Free will								
Compatibilism	59.1	62.8	↑3.7	↑5.3	60.8	62.0	↑1.2	↑3.9
Libertarianism	13.7	12.8	↓0.9	↓1.7	12.2	12.2	—	↑2.1
No free will	12.2	10.0	↓2.2	↓3.6	14.8	9.5	↓5.3	↓5.9
Other	15.0	14.4			12.2	16.3		
God								
Theism	14.6	12.5	↓2.1	↓3.5	10.1	10.7	↑0.6	↑2.1
Atheism	72.8	74.2	↑1.4	↑3.5	78.6	77.2	↓1.4	↓2.1
Other	12.6	13.3			11.3	12.1		
Knowledge								
Empiricism	35.0	33.0	↓2.0	↓2.9	36.2	35.9	↓0.3	↑2.7
Rationalism	27.8	28.7	↑0.9	↑2.9	30.3	27.3	↓3.0	↓2.7
Other	37.2	38.3			33.5	36.8		
Knowledge claims								
Contextualism	40.1	42.4	↑2.3	↑7.6	39.2	40.1	↑0.9	↑6.1
Relativism	2.9	2.6	↓0.3	↑3.6	4.2	2.4	↓1.8	↑2.1
Invariantism	31.1	21.0	↓10.1	↓11.2	31.5	22.8	↓8.7	↓8.2
Other	25.9	34.0			25.1	34.7		
Laws of nature								
Humean	24.7	24.4	↓0.3	↑8.5	25.2	25.8	↑0.6	↑3.9
Non-humean	57.1	48.3	↓8.8	↓8.5	52.5	49.3	↓3.2	↓3.9

Qs and As	Comparable departments				Same people			
	09%	20%	ch.	Swng	09%	20%	ch.	Swng
Other	18.2	27.3			22.3	24.9		
Logic								
Classical	51.6	39.8	↓11.8	↓13.4	52.5	44.5	↓8.0	↓9.5
Non-classical	15.4	17.0	↑1.6	↑13.4	13.6	15.1	↑1.5	↑9.5
Other	33.0	43.2			33.9	40.4		
Mental content								
Internalism	20.0	18.2	↓1.8	↓0.8	19.9	21.1	↑1.2	↑4.5
Externalism	51.1	50.2	↓0.9	↑0.8	51.3	48.1	↓3.2	↓4.5
Other	28.9	31.6			28.8	30.8		
Meta-ethics								
Moral realism	56.4	59.9	↑3.5	↑5.4	54.9	56.4	↑1.5	↑4.5
Moral anti-realism	27.7	25.8	↓1.9	↓5.4	30.6	27.6	↓3.0	↓4.5
Other	15.9	14.3			14.5	16.0		
Metaphilosophy								
Naturalism	49.8	43.2	↓6.6	↓3.4	47.5	49.0	↑1.5	↑5.6
Non-naturalism	25.9	22.7	↓3.2	↑3.4	27.0	22.8	↓4.2	↓5.6
Other	24.3	34.1			25.5	28.2		
Mind								
Physicalism	56.5	57.4	↑0.9	↑2.2	61.1	59.3	↓1.8	↓2.4
Non-physicalism	27.1	25.8	↓1.3	↓2.2	24.3	24.9	↑0.6	↑2.4
Other	16.4	16.8			14.6	15.8		
Moral judgment								
Cognitivism	65.7	63.4	↓2.3	↓2.9	69.1	62.9	↓6.2	↓8.3
Non-cognitivism	17.0	17.6	↑0.6	↑2.9	16.6	18.7	↑2.1	↑8.3
Other	17.3	19.0			14.3	18.4		
Moral motivation								
Internalism	34.9	29.6	↓5.3	↓8.7	34.7	32.6	↓2.1	—
Externalism	29.8	33.2	↑3.4	↑8.7	34.7	32.6	↓2.1	—
Other	35.3	37.2			30.6	34.8		
Newcomb's problem								
One box	21.3	20.1	↓1.2	↓1.0	23.1	21.7	↓1.4	—
Two boxes	31.4	31.2	↓0.2	↑1.0	35.0	33.5	↓1.5	—
Other	47.3	48.7			41.9	44.8		
Normative ethics								
Deontology	25.9	22.5	↓3.4	↓2.2	22.8	20.8	↓2.0	↓0.6
Consequentialism	23.6	21.3	↓2.3	↓0.7	29.4	23.7	↓5.7	↓5.9
Virtue ethics	18.2	18.2	—	↑2.9	16.0	18.7	↑2.7	↑6.5
Other	32.3	38.0			31.8	36.8		
Perceptual experience								
Disjunctivism	11.0	11.1	↑0.1	↑1.8	9.2	8.6	↓0.6	↑1.2
Qualia theory	12.2	10.8	↓1.4	↓0.3	16.6	12.2	↓4.4	↓4.0
Representationalism	31.5	28.9	↓2.6	↓1.9	28.2	28.5	↑0.3	↑2.4
Sense-datum theory	3.1	2.2	↓0.9	↑0.4	3.6	2.4	↓1.2	↑0.4
Other	42.2	47.0			42.4	48.3		
Personal identity								
Biological view	16.9	15.3	↓1.6	↓3.0	17.5	17.5	—	↑0.5
Psychological view	33.6	37.0	↑3.4	↑4.6	35.6	37.7	↑2.1	↑3.6
Further-fact view	12.2	11.6	↓0.6	↓1.6	10.7	7.7	↓3.0	↓4.0

Qs and As	Comparable departments				Same people			
	09%	20%	ch.	Swng	09%	20%	ch.	Swng
Other	37.3	36.1			36.2	37.1		
Proper names								
Fregean	28.7	27.0	↓1.7	↑0.6	27.6	25.5	↓2.1	↓0.9
Millian	34.5	32.3	↓2.2	↓0.6	35.9	34.7	↓1.2	↑0.9
Other	36.8	40.7			36.5	39.8		
Science								
Scientific realism	75.1	73.6	↓1.5	↓0.5	76.3	73.6	↓2.7	↓1.5
Scientific anti-realism	11.6	10.6	↓1.0	↑0.5	11.6	10.4	↓1.2	↑1.5
Other	13.3	15.8			12.1	16.0		
Teletransporter								
Survival	36.2	36.0	↓0.2	↓3.4	39.5	35.9	↓3.6	↓4.5
Death	31.1	34.3	↑3.2	↑3.4	32.9	33.8	↑0.9	↑4.5
Other	32.7	29.7			27.6	30.3		
Time								
A-theory	15.5	13.9	↓1.6	↓3.7	13.6	13.9	↑0.3	↑3.6
B-theory	26.3	28.4	↑2.1	↑3.7	30.3	27.0	↓3.3	↓3.6
Other	58.2	57.7			56.1	59.1		
Trolley problem								
Switch	68.2	66.2	↓2.0	↓6.3	74.8	67.4	↓7.4	↓11.9
Don't switch	7.6	11.9	↑4.3	↑6.3	6.2	10.7	↑4.5	↑11.9
Other	24.2	21.9			19.0	21.9		
Truth								
Correspondence	50.8	44.4	↓6.4	↓5.1	48.1	46.3	↓1.8	↑0.6
Deflationary	24.8	23.8	↓1.0	↑2.9	29.4	24.6	↓4.8	↓3.9
Epistemic	6.9	5.4	↓1.5	↑2.2	4.7	4.7	—	↑3.3
Other	17.5	26.4			17.8	24.4		
Zombies								
Inconceivable	16.0	13.1	↓2.9	↓1.9	18.7	16.0	↓2.7	↓1.6
Conceivable but not pos.	35.6	36.9	↑1.3	↑4.5	35.9	32.3	↓3.6	↓3.0
Metaphysically possible	23.3	19.9	↓3.4	↓2.6	20.2	21.7	↑1.5	↑4.6
Other	25.1	30.1			25.2	30.0		

## 6 Correlations

To calculate correlations, we first assigned a variable for each main answer option to a main question. Its value for a respondent ranges from -2 to 2 depending on whether the respondent rejects, leans toward rejecting, is neutral on ("agnostic", "too unclear to answer", or "no fact of the matter"), leans toward accepting, or accepts the position corresponding to the option. When a respondent selects "Accept: X" or "Lean toward: X" in the main interface without evaluating multiple options, we consider that they also reject or lean against the other options respectively. When they evaluate multiple options, we use those evaluations separately. Respondents who gave answers falling under "other" but that are not considered neutral were left out of correlation calculations for all relevant pairs of variables.

For demographic and orientation questions, each possible answer (e.g., "AOS: Feminist

philosophy”) was assigned a variable whose value is 2 for a respondent who selected that answer, 0 for respondents who specified another answer, and N/A for respondents who skipped the question.

We calculated the Pearson correlation coefficient for every pair of variables in the study. Tables 10-16 show the most correlated (or anti-correlated) variables across main answers, main answers and geographic variables, main answers and year of birth, and main answers and gender.

Table 11: Highest correlations between main answers

Answer A	Answer B	r	n
A priori knowledge: yes	Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes	0.51	1398
A priori knowledge: yes	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.36	1156
Abortion: permissible	Consciousness: dualism	-0.46	661
Abortion: permissible	Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	0.35	540
Abortion: permissible	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	-0.74	542
Abortion: permissible	Free will: compatibilism	0.35	943
Abortion: permissible	Free will: libertarianism	-0.45	940
Abortion: permissible	Gender: biological	-0.36	840
Abortion: permissible	Gender: social	0.37	846
Abortion: permissible	Gender categories: preserve	-0.44	687
Abortion: permissible	God: theism	-0.68	932
Abortion: permissible	Human genetic eng.: permissible	0.38	746
Abortion: permissible	Immortality: yes	-0.36	782
Abortion: permissible	Meaning of life: objective	-0.45	817
Abortion: permissible	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.44	787
Abortion: permissible	Mind: physicalism	0.44	896
Abstract objects: Platonism	Consciousness: dualism	0.38	649
Abstract objects: Platonism	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.45	996
Abstract objects: Platonism	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.39	1159
Abstract objects: Platonism	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.39	458
Abstract objects: Platonism	Morality: non-naturalism	0.36	700
Abstract objects: Platonism	Possible worlds: nonexistent	-0.36	757
Abstract objects: Platonism	Properties: transcendent universals	0.55	478
Abstract objects: Platonism	Propositions: nonexistent	-0.49	514
Abstract objects: Platonism	Propositions: structured entities	0.36	515
Aesthetic value: objective	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.39	525
Aesthetic value: objective	Meaning of life: objective	0.55	1098
Aesthetic value: objective	Meaning of life: subjective	-0.38	1099
Aesthetic value: objective	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.51	1236
Aesthetic value: objective	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.36	455
Aesthetic value: objective	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.38	1174
Aesthetic value: objective	Practical reason: Humean	-0.4	608
Aesthetic value: objective	Well-being: objective list	0.41	636
Arguments for theism: cosmological	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.38	444
Chinese room: understands	Consciousness: dualism	-0.37	572
Concepts: nativism	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.39	517
Consciousness: dualism	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.56	465
Consciousness: dualism	Free will: libertarianism	0.43	720
Consciousness: dualism	God: theism	0.47	693
Consciousness: dualism	Grounds of intentionality: primitive	0.36	385
Consciousness: dualism	Hard problem of consc.: yes	0.39	612
Consciousness: dualism	Meaning of life: objective	0.41	619
Consciousness: dualism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.55	622
Consciousness: dualism	Mind: physicalism	-0.73	712
Consciousness: dualism	Morality: non-naturalism	0.51	582
Consciousness: dualism	Personal identity: further-fact view	0.36	586
Consciousness: dualism	Zombies: metaphysically possible	0.41	622
Consciousness: functionalism	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	-0.36	465
Consciousness: functionalism	Mind: physicalism	0.47	714
Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	God: theism	-0.39	592
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Free will: compatibilism	-0.37	615

Answer A	Answer B	r	n
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Free will: libertarianism	0.54	614
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Gender categories: preserve	0.42	432
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	God: theism	0.78	592
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.36	492
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Immortality: yes	0.39	518
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Meaning of life: objective	0.58	524
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Meaning of life: subjective	-0.36	526
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.36	596
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.55	530
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Mind: physicalism	-0.53	581
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Morality: non-naturalism	0.43	498
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Personal identity: further-fact view	0.39	478
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Personal identity: psychological view	-0.36	480
Cosmological fine-tuning: design	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.39	397
Cosmological fine-tuning: multiverse	Quantum mechanics: many-worlds	0.57	258
Eating animals/products of: omnivorism	Environmental ethics: anthropocentric	0.36	745
Epistemic justification: internalism	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	0.45	644
Epistemic justification: internalism	Justif.: reliabilism	-0.47	647
Epistemic justification: internalism	Mental content: internalism	0.46	1052
Experience machine: yes	Well-being: objective list	-0.35	694
External world: non-skeptical realism	Metaontology: anti-realism	-0.36	517
External world: non-skeptical realism	Science: scientific realism	0.36	1376
Footbridge: push	Normative ethics: consequentialism	0.46	1133
Footbridge: push	Trolley problem: switch	0.35	1221
Foundations of math: cons/intuit	Metaontology: anti-realism	0.43	232
Free will: libertarianism	God: theism	0.49	1347
Free will: libertarianism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.41	1139
Free will: libertarianism	Mind: physicalism	-0.45	1319
Gender: biological	Gender categories: preserve	0.47	733
Gender: biological	Race: biological	0.45	1239
Gender: social	Gender categories: preserve	-0.45	745
Gender: social	Gender categories: revise	0.36	748
Gender: social	Race: social	0.45	1254
Gender categories: eliminate	Race categories: eliminate	0.41	598
Gender categories: preserve	Politics: capitalism	0.4	593
Gender categories: preserve	Race: biological	0.35	743
Gender categories: preserve	Race categories: preserve	0.4	597
Gender categories: revise	Race categories: revise	0.45	597
God: theism	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.4	774
God: theism	Immortality: yes	0.37	857
God: theism	Meaning of life: objective	0.53	1165
God: theism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.51	1102
God: theism	Mind: physicalism	-0.55	1289
God: theism	Morality: non-naturalism	0.37	794
God: theism	Practical reason: Humean	-0.35	643
God: theism	Principle of sufficient reason: true	0.38	670
Grounds of intentionality: causal/teleo.	Theory of reference: causal	0.4	379
Grounds of intentionality: phenomenal	Propositional attitudes: phenomenal	0.4	371
Hard problem of consc.: yes	Mind: physicalism	-0.35	797
Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	Morality: non-naturalism	0.35	553
Knowledge: empiricism	Laws of nature: Humean	0.37	980
Knowledge: empiricism	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	-0.35	419
Knowledge: empiricism	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.47	951
Knowledge: empiricism	Mind: physicalism	0.37	1079
Knowledge: empiricism	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.38	663
Knowledge: empiricism	Practical reason: Humean	0.37	558
Laws of nature: Humean	Meaning of life: objective	-0.36	1019
Laws of nature: Humean	Meta-ethics: moral realism	-0.35	1170
Laws of nature: Humean	Practical reason: Humean	0.39	592
Logic: classical	True contradictions: actual	-0.35	613
Logic: classical	True contradictions: impossible	0.38	613
Meaning of life: objective	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.49	1169
Meaning of life: objective	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.45	983
Meaning of life: objective	Mind: physicalism	-0.42	1122
Meaning of life: objective	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.37	1122

Answer A	Answer B	r	n
Meaning of life: objective	Morality: non-naturalism	0.39	690
Meaning of life: objective	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.38	585
Meaning of life: objective	Practical reason: Humean	-0.49	584
Meaning of life: objective	Well-being: desire satisfaction	-0.35	621
Meaning of life: objective	Well-being: objective list	0.47	620
Mental content: internalism	Theory of reference: descriptive	0.41	566
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Metaontology: anti-realism	-0.35	508
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.42	511
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.61	1333
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Morality: error theory	-0.39	832
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Morality: expressivism	-0.49	833
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Morality: non-naturalism	0.38	831
Meta-ethics: moral realism	Practical reason: Humean	-0.42	655
Metaontology: anti-realism	Science: scientific realism	-0.52	498
Metaontology: deflationary realism	Truth: correspondence	-0.41	486
Metaontology: deflationary realism	Truth: deflationary	0.44	485
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.41	481
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Morality: expressivism	-0.35	436
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Spacetime: relationism	-0.37	278
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Theory of reference: deflationary	-0.4	376
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Truth: correspondence	0.53	487
Metaontology: heavyweight realism	Truth: deflationary	-0.49	486
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Mind: physicalism	0.65	1083
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Morality: naturalist realism	0.36	698
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.61	693
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Personal identity: further-fact view	-0.36	877
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Phil. method: empirical phil.	0.45	1166
Metaphilosophy: naturalism	Practical reason: Humean	0.41	577
Mind: physicalism	Morality: non-naturalism	-0.43	762
Mind uploading: survival	Personal identity: psychological view	0.37	623
Mind uploading: survival	Teletransporter: survival	0.68	693
Moral judgment: cognitivism	Morality: expressivism	-0.48	813
Moral principles: moral generalism	Normative ethics: virtue ethics	-0.42	716
Morality: non-naturalism	Personal identity: further-fact view	0.4	629
Normative ethics: consequentialism	Practical reason: Humean	0.5	632
Normative ethics: deontology	Practical reason: Kantian	0.51	628
Normative ethics: virtue ethics	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.52	635
Personal identity: psychological view	Teletransporter: survival	0.37	914
Political philosophy: libertarianism	Politics: capitalism	0.52	636
Politics: capitalism	Race: biological	0.38	749
Possible worlds: abstract	Propositions: nonexistent	-0.44	505
Possible worlds: concrete	Quantum mechanics: many-worlds	0.39	306
Possible worlds: nonexistent	Propositions: nonexistent	0.46	504
Practical reason: Humean	Time: A-theory	-0.36	324
Practical reason: Humean	Well-being: objective list	-0.42	499
Proper names: Fregean	Theory of reference: descriptive	0.39	491
Properties: nonexistent	Propositions: nonexistent	0.46	373
Race: unreal	Race categories: eliminate	0.36	667
Temporal ontology: eternalism	Time: A-theory	-0.73	413
Temporal ontology: eternalism	Time travel: metaphysically possible	0.39	426
Temporal ontology: growing block	Time: A-theory	0.38	412
Temporal ontology: presentism	Time: A-theory	0.62	414
Temporal ontology: presentism	Time travel: metaphysically possible	-0.36	426
Theory of reference: deflationary	Truth: correspondence	-0.44	583
Theory of reference: deflationary	Truth: deflationary	0.43	582

Table 12: Highest correlations between region of affiliation and main answers

Region	Answer	r	n
Region of affiliation: Canada	Well-being: objective list	-0.14	765
Region of affiliation: Europe	Aim of philosophy: wisdom	-0.1	1516
Region of affiliation: Europe	Capital punishment: permissible	-0.15	1028
Region of affiliation: Europe	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.15	875
Region of affiliation: Europe	Moral judgment: cognitivism	-0.12	1453

Region	Answer	r	n
Region of affiliation: Europe	Political philosophy: libertarianism	0.12	1198
Region of affiliation: Europe	Race: social	-0.21	1413
Region of affiliation: Europe	Race: unreal	0.18	1383
Region of affiliation: Europe	Race categories: revise	-0.14	736
Region of affiliation: UK	Perceptual experience: disjunctivism	0.13	934
Region of affiliation: Latin America	Arguments for theism: moral	0.15	752
Region of affiliation: US	Capital punishment: permissible	0.15	1028
Region of affiliation: US	God: theism	0.12	1508
Region of affiliation: US	Immortality: yes	0.13	951
Region of affiliation: US	Meaning of life: objective	0.12	1296
Region of affiliation: US	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.12	1501
Region of affiliation: US	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.12	1453
Region of affiliation: US	Normative ethics: consequentialism	-0.13	1397
Region of affiliation: US	Race: social	0.19	1413
Region of affiliation: US	Race: unreal	-0.13	1383
Region of affiliation: US	Zombies: metaphysically possible	0.11	1237

Table 13: Highest correlations between nationality and main answers

Region	Answer	r	n
Nationality: Canada	Well-being: objective list	-0.14	722
Nationality: Europe	Aim of philosophy: wisdom	-0.11	1410
Nationality: Europe	Capital punishment: permissible	-0.2	978
Nationality: Europe	Human genetic eng.: permissible	-0.14	831
Nationality: Europe	Immortality: yes	-0.15	896
Nationality: Europe	Meta-ethics: moral realism	-0.12	1398
Nationality: Europe	Moral judgment: cognitivism	-0.15	1353
Nationality: Europe	Morality: expressivism	0.14	844
Nationality: Europe	Race: social	-0.22	1328
Nationality: Europe	Race: unreal	0.19	1303
Nationality: Europe	Race categories: eliminate	0.15	701
Nationality: Europe	Race categories: revise	-0.16	701
Nationality: UK	Perceptual experience: disjunctivism	0.14	874
Nationality: UK	Personal identity: biological view	0.14	1091
Nationality: UK	Well-being: desire satisfaction	-0.16	723
Nationality: Oceania	Free will: compatibilism	0.11	1430
Nationality: Oceania	Properties: classes	0.19	508
Nationality: Latin America	Foundations of math: set-theoretic	0.22	363
Nationality: US	Abortion: permissible	-0.13	1001
Nationality: US	Aim of philosophy: wisdom	0.12	1410
Nationality: US	Capital punishment: permissible	0.19	978
Nationality: US	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.17	611
Nationality: US	Gender categories: eliminate	-0.14	787
Nationality: US	God: theism	0.17	1401
Nationality: US	Hard problem of consc.: yes	0.13	860
Nationality: US	Immortality: yes	0.17	896
Nationality: US	Meaning of life: nonexistent	-0.11	1204
Nationality: US	Meaning of life: objective	0.13	1217
Nationality: US	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.13	1398
Nationality: US	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.14	1353
Nationality: US	Normative ethics: consequentialism	-0.13	1299
Nationality: US	Perceptual experience: qualia theory	0.14	873
Nationality: US	Properties: classes	-0.19	508
Nationality: US	Race: social	0.2	1328
Nationality: US	Race: unreal	-0.15	1303
Nationality: US	Zombies: metaphysically possible	0.12	1149



Table 14: Highest correlations between region of PhD and main answers

Region	Region	r	n
Region of PhD: Canada	Analysis of knowledge: justified true belief	0.17	645
Region of PhD: Europe	Meta-ethics: moral realism	-0.14	1052
Region of PhD: Europe	Political philosophy: libertarianism	0.14	818
Region of PhD: Europe	Race: social	-0.15	970
Region of PhD: UK	Analysis of knowledge: justified true belief	-0.15	645
Region of PhD: UK	Analysis of knowledge: no analysis	0.21	644
Region of PhD: UK	Perceptual experience: disjunctivism	0.18	661
Region of PhD: Oceania	Morality: error theory	0.16	650
Region of PhD: Oceania	Practical reason: Humean	0.17	537
Region of PhD: Oceania	Proper names: Fregean	0.15	668
Region of PhD: Oceania	Properties: classes	0.21	388
Region of PhD: Oceania	True contradictions: possible but non-actual	0.17	589
Region of PhD: US	God: theism	0.15	1054
Region of PhD: US	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.14	858
Region of PhD: US	Meaning of life: objective	0.14	902
Region of PhD: US	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.13	1052
Region of PhD: US	Moral judgment: cognitivism	0.13	1022
Region of PhD: US	Properties: classes	-0.21	388
Region of PhD: US	Race: social	0.14	970

Table 15: Highest correlations between year of birth and main answers

Answer	r	n
Eating animals/products of: veganism	0.26	1445
Eating animals/products of: omnivorism	-0.24	1447
External-world skepticism: dogmatist	0.21	699
Interlevel metaphysics: grounding	0.2	495
Gender: biological	-0.2	1263
Race: social	0.2	1305
Time travel: metaphysically possible	0.19	726
Gender: social	0.16	1276
External-world skepticism: semantic externalist	0.16	697
Phil. method: conceptual engineering	0.15	1468
Morality: non-naturalism	0.15	828
Immortality: yes	0.15	890
Phil. method: empirical phil.	0.14	1468
Phil. method: formal philosophy	0.13	1468
Race: biological	-0.13	1305
Race: unreal	-0.12	1281

Table 16: Highest correlations between gender:female and main answers

Answer	r	n
Material composition: nihilism	0.2	390
Politics: capitalism	-0.2	845
External-world skepticism: pragmatic	0.19	738
Environmental ethics: anthropocentric	-0.17	788
Gender: social	0.17	1349
Race: social	0.17	1383
Eating animals/products of: omnivorism	-0.16	1533
Immortality: yes	-0.16	932
Morality: constructivism	0.16	874
Gender: biological	-0.15	1334
Capital punishment: permissible	-0.15	1012
Eating animals/products of: vegetarianism	0.14	1535

Answer	r	n
Gender categories: preserve	-0.14	799
Values in science: necessarily value-laden	0.14	862
Laws of nature: Humean	0.14	1291
Race: biological	-0.14	1382
External world: idealism	0.13	1543
Truth: epistemic	0.13	1322
Trolley problem: switch	-0.13	1290
Eating animals/products of: veganism	0.13	1531
Footbridge: push	-0.12	1312
External world: non-skeptical realism	-0.1	1540

Table 17: Highest correlations between areas of specialization and main answers

AOS	Answer	r	n
17th/18th Century Phil.	Consciousness: panpsychism	0.18	775
17th/18th Century Phil.	Practical reason: Kantian	0.16	726
19th Century Phil.	External world: idealism	0.21	1550
19th Century Phil.	Justif.: coherentism	0.17	726
19th Century Phil.	True contradictions: impossible	-0.17	804
19th Century Phil.	Truth: correspondence	-0.15	1331
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Normative ethics: virtue ethics	0.15	1375
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Political philosophy: communitarianism	0.16	1181
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.26	729
Ancient Greek and Roman Phil.	Practical reason: Humean	-0.22	728
Applied Ethics	Analysis of knowledge: no analysis	-0.15	867
Asian Phil.	Consciousness: panpsychism	0.2	775
Asian Phil.	Material composition: nihilism	0.21	399
Continental Phil.	External world: idealism	0.18	1550
Continental Phil.	Justif.: infinitism	0.17	716
Continental Phil.	Method hist. phil.: analytic/rational reconstruction	-0.21	807
Continental Phil.	Mind: physicalism	-0.16	1420
Continental Phil.	Propositional attitudes: representational	-0.22	630
Continental Phil.	Science: scientific realism	-0.19	1433
Continental Phil.	True contradictions: actual	0.19	804
Continental Phil.	True contradictions: impossible	-0.21	804
Decision Theory	Mind uploading: survival	0.16	815
Decision Theory	Politics: capitalism	0.15	864
Decision Theory	Practical reason: Humean	0.22	728
Epistemology	Justif.: coherentism	-0.15	726
Epistemology	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	0.18	725
Epistemology	Knowledge claims: contextualism	-0.19	1202
Epistemology	Knowledge claims: invariantism	0.16	1199
Epistemology	External-world skepticism: dogmatist	0.16	740
General Phil. of Science	Knowledge: empiricism	0.16	1213
General Phil. of Science	Phil. method: intuition-based	-0.17	1570
General Phil. of Science	Principle of sufficient reason: true	-0.16	744
Logic and Phil. of Logic	Phil. method: formal philosophy	0.19	1570
Logic and Phil. of Logic	Wittgenstein: early	0.15	783
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Abortion: permissible	-0.3	1046
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Arguments for theism: cosmological	0.2	752
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Causation: primitive	0.16	692
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	-0.17	643
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.33	644
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Free will: libertarianism	0.17	1513
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	God: theism	0.27	1479
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Material composition: restrictivism	0.22	399
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Mind uploading: survival	-0.16	815
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.27	729
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Practical reason: Humean	-0.21	728
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Practical reason: Kantian	-0.16	726
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Principle of sufficient reason: true	0.16	744

AOS	Answer	r	n
Medieval and Renaissance Phil.	Propositions: acts	0.17	596
Meta-Ethics	Interlevel metaphysics: grounding	0.21	522
Meta-Ethics	Phil. method: intuition-based	0.16	1570
Metaphilosophy	Interlevel metaphysics: identity	0.24	515
Metaphysics	Abstract objects: Platonism	0.18	1281
Metaphysics	Continuum hypothesis: determinate	0.24	308
Metaphysics	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.17	644
Metaphysics	Extended mind: yes	-0.17	828
Metaphysics	Justif.: coherentism	-0.21	726
Metaphysics	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	0.18	725
Metaphysics	Knowledge: empiricism	-0.16	1213
Metaphysics	Material composition: nihilism	-0.22	399
Metaphysics	Metaontology: anti-realism	-0.2	538
Metaphysics	Metaontology: deflationary realism	-0.23	539
Metaphysics	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.3	541
Metaphysics	Method hist. phil.: analytic/rational reconstruction	0.19	807
Metaphysics	Morality: constructivism	-0.17	883
Metaphysics	Properties: classes	-0.18	536
Metaphysics	External-world skepticism: pragmatic	-0.19	749
Metaphysics	Science: scientific realism	0.15	1433
Metaphysics	Spacetime: relationism	-0.25	450
Metaphysics	Temporal ontology: eternalism	0.2	543
Metaphysics	Temporal ontology: growing block	-0.21	541
Metaphysics	Truth: epistemic	-0.18	1327
Metaphysics	Wittgenstein: early	0.2	783
Normative Ethics	Moral principles: moral generalism	0.2	844
Phil. of Biology	Propositional attitudes: nonexistent	0.17	616
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Consciousness: dualism	-0.18	774
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Grounds of intentionality: causal/teleo.	0.18	545
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Hard problem of consc.: yes	-0.17	899
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Justif.: nonreliabilist found.	-0.15	725
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	0.21	1225
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Mind: physicalism	0.21	1420
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Phil. method: empirical phil.	0.22	1570
Phil. of Cognitive Science	Phil. method: experimental philosophy	0.15	1570
Phil. of Language	Abstract objects: Platonism	0.15	1281
Phil. of Language	Phil. method: linguistic philosophy	0.23	1570
Phil. of Language	Possible worlds: nonexistent	-0.16	929
Phil. of Language	Principle of sufficient reason: true	-0.18	744
Phil. of Language	External-world skepticism: contextualist	0.18	737
Phil. of Mind	Perceptual experience: sense-datum theory	-0.15	918
Phil. of Mind	Properties: tropes	0.19	538
Phil. of Religion	Abortion: permissible	-0.44	1046
Phil. of Religion	Aesthetic value: objective	0.16	1342
Phil. of Religion	Arguments for theism: cosmological	0.15	752
Phil. of Religion	Capital punishment: permissible	0.18	1024
Phil. of Religion	Causation: counterfactual/difference-making	-0.18	701
Phil. of Religion	Causation: primitive	0.21	692
Phil. of Religion	Chinese room: understands	-0.16	861
Phil. of Religion	Consciousness: dualism	0.3	774
Phil. of Religion	Consciousness: functionalism	-0.23	776
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: brute fact	-0.26	643
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: design	0.53	644
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: multiverse	-0.2	644
Phil. of Religion	Cosmological fine-tuning: no fine-tuning	-0.2	640
Phil. of Religion	Free will: compatibilism	-0.23	1516
Phil. of Religion	Free will: libertarianism	0.29	1513
Phil. of Religion	Gender: social	-0.15	1364
Phil. of Religion	Gender categories: preserve	0.21	813
Phil. of Religion	Gender categories: revise	-0.15	816

AOS	Answer	r	n
Phil. of Religion	God: theism	0.43	1479
Phil. of Religion	Immortality: yes	0.26	946
Phil. of Religion	Laws of nature: Humean	-0.15	1286
Phil. of Religion	Meaning of life: nonexistent	-0.16	1265
Phil. of Religion	Meaning of life: objective	0.26	1281
Phil. of Religion	Meaning of life: subjective	-0.17	1283
Phil. of Religion	Meta-ethics: moral realism	0.16	1476
Phil. of Religion	Metaontology: heavyweight realism	0.2	541
Phil. of Religion	Metaphilosophy: naturalism	-0.3	1225
Phil. of Religion	Mind: physicalism	-0.24	1420
Phil. of Religion	Morality: constructivism	-0.17	883
Phil. of Religion	Morality: non-naturalism	0.24	879
Phil. of Religion	Personal identity: further-fact view	0.18	1142
Phil. of Religion	Personal identity: psychological view	-0.18	1153
Phil. of Religion	Politics: capitalism	0.2	864
Phil. of Religion	Practical reason: Aristotelian	0.15	729
Phil. of Religion	Principle of sufficient reason: true	0.21	744
Phil. of Religion	Semantic content: minimalism	0.16	666
Phil. of Religion	Well-being: objective list	0.17	758
Social and Political Phil.	Justif.: coherentism	0.15	726
Social and Political Phil.	Morality: constructivism	0.16	883
Social and Political Phil.	Normative ethics: deontology	0.17	1372
Social and Political Phil.	Political philosophy: communitarianism	-0.2	1181
Social and Political Phil.	Political philosophy: egalitarianism	0.17	1184

## 7 Selection bias

Selection bias arises when the group who responds to a survey question is not a random sample of the target population. In our survey, selection bias takes two forms. First, the philosophers who respond to the survey at all (completing at least 50 questions and consenting) are not a random sample of the target population. We call this *respondent bias*. Second, respondents have the option to complete more than 50 (up to 100) questions, and the group who do so are not a random sample of the overall group of respondents. We call this *enthusiast bias*.

The results presented in section 2 are subject to respondent bias and enthusiast bias, so they cannot be considered accurate guides to the distribution of views in our target population as a whole. To use survey responses to assess the distribution of views in our target population as a whole, we need to correct for respondent bias and enthusiast bias.

*Enthusiast bias*: Enthusiast bias does not affect the 40 main questions, which all respondents answered as part of their 50 mandatory questions. It affects only the 60 additional questions.

To correct for enthusiast bias on these questions, we can simply restrict our analysis to those “First 50” respondents who answered these questions as part of their 50 mandatory questions. This group should be a random sample of respondents as a whole. This information is shown in table 21 under the “F50” column. Enthusiast bias is reflected in the difference between the “All” column and the “F50” column.

We can also assess enthusiast bias by calculating correlations between the number of questions answered by a respondent and their various answers to questions. The highest correlations are shown in table 18.

Table 18: Correlations between number of answers and main answers where  $r \geq 0.05$

Answer	r
Tradition: Continental	-0.13
Gender: female	-0.12
Tradition: Analytic	0.11
AOS: M&E	0.1
Region of PhD: US	0.09
AOS: Tradition: 58	-0.06
Region of affiliation: Canada	-0.06
Nationality: US	0.05

*Respondent bias:* It is less straightforward to assess and correct for respondent bias, as we have less information on philosophers in the target population who did not participate in the survey. Publicly available information typically includes AOS, affiliation, and Ph.D. institution, and gender can be estimated using names. We can use this information to assess and correct for respondent bias with respect to these features. The biases that we have identified are summarized in table 19. Tables 20 and 21 summarize the main and additional results (respectively) corrected for AOS and gender. We did not make regional corrections because regions of affiliation are not very strongly correlated with philosophical views (see table 12) and the number of data points at our disposal did not allow a three-way stratification of respondents.

Table 19: Biases as proportion of respondents divided by proportion of population for (a) AOS clusters, (b) Region of affiliation, and (c) gender.

(a)		(b)		(c)	
Group	Bias	Region	Bias	Gender	Bias
M&E	1.54	Africa	0.67	Male	1.12
Value Theory	0.89	Asia	1.11	Female	0.77
S.L.M	0.93	Canada	0.83		
History	0.73	Europe	0.96		
Traditions	0.51	United Kingdom	1.15		
		Oceania	1.38		
		Latin America	1.05		
		United States	0.97		

It remains possible and likely that there are respondent biases that go beyond AOS, gender, and region of affiliation, but our ability to measure them is limited by the limited information that we have about nonrespondents in the target population.

[Still coming: expert specialization effects, order effects.]

Table 20: Bias corrections for the 40 main questions. All = pct. of all answers. Cor = Pct. of answers with gender and specialization correction applied. Corrections of 3% or more are starred.

Questions and answers	All	Cor.
A priori knowledge		
Yes	71.4	68.95
No	18.1	19.56

Questions and answers	All	Cor.
Abstract objects		
Platonism	35.2	32.53
Nominalism	38.4	39.29
Aesthetic value		
Objective	41.5	40.13
Subjective	38.7	39.05
Analytic-synthetic distinction		
Yes	59.6	57.5
No	24.6	25.05
Knowledge		
Empiricism	42.4	42.39
Rationalism	32.3	31.06
Epistemic justification		
Internalism	32.4	30.19
Externalism	45.9	45.05
Free will		
Compatibilism	58.3	57.83
Libertarianism	18.5	18.34
No free will	11.0	10.56
God		
Theism	18.8	19.08
Atheism	66.4	64.94
External world		
Idealism	6.6	8.02
Skepticism	5.4	5.78
Non-skeptical realism	78.6	75.24 *
Knowledge claims		
Contextualism	45.1	46.78
Relativism	4.5	4.47
Invariantism	21.1	18.43
Laws of nature		
Humean	27.2	27.39
Non-humean	47.3	44.97
Logic		
Classical	42.5	39.76
Non-classical	21.0	21.29
Mental content		
Internalism	22.4	21.68
Externalism	49.3	46.13 *
Meta-ethics		
Moral realism	59.8	57.74
Moral anti-realism	25.2	25.43
Metaphilosophy		
Naturalism	43.5	42.0
Non-naturalism	27.0	26.68
Mind		

Questions and answers	All	Cor.
Physicalism	50.4	48.53
Non-physicalism	31.1	31.17
Moral motivation		
Internalism	32.8	33.81
Externalism	31.5	29.86
Moral judgment		
Cognitivism	63.5	60.72
Non-cognitivism	19.0	18.97
Newcomb's problem		
One box	18.7	17.35
Two boxes	23.4	21.18
Normative ethics		
Deontology	31.3	30.83
Consequentialism	29.8	28.7
Virtue ethics	36.1	38.34
Perceptual experience		
Disjunctivism	11.6	11.05
Qualia theory	11.2	10.91
Representationalism	29.1	26.56
Sense-datum theory	3.7	3.85
Personal identity		
Biological view	17.3	16.43
Psychological view	39.5	39.46
Further-fact view	13.4	12.73
Political philosophy		
Communitarianism	23.5	24.46
Egalitarianism	37.9	38.8
Libertarianism	11.5	10.75
Proper names		
Fregean	25.7	24.36
Millian	27.5	24.4 *
Science		
Scientific realism	68.5	64.74 *
Scientific anti-realism	14.2	15.97
Teletransporter		
Survival	31.1	30.09
Death	35.4	33.73
Time		
A-theory	17.1	16.07
B-theory	24.0	21.27
Trolley problem		
Switch	61.7	58.64 *
Don't switch	12.9	12.84
Truth		
Correspondence	47.3	44.02 *
Deflationary	22.6	21.84
Epistemic	9.4	10.88

Questions and answers	All	Cor.
Zombies		
Inconceivable	14.8	14.0
Conceivable but not pos.	32.9	32.66
Metaphysically possible	22.0	20.19
Aim of philosophy		
Truth/knowledge	41.8	40.18
Understanding	55.4	54.6
Wisdom	30.9	32.97
Happiness	12.5	13.44
Goodness/justice	22.5	23.92
Eating animals and animal products		
Omnivorism (yes and yes)	47.5	46.9
Vegetarianism (no and yes)	26.2	26.75
Veganism (no and no)	18.2	18.48
Experience machine		
Yes	12.3	13.03
No	70.7	68.3
Footbridge		
Push	21.4	20.19
Don't push	54.6	53.14
Gender		
Biological	26.9	27.89
Psychological	19.9	20.93
Social	58.4	59.88
Unreal	3.9	3.77
Meaning of life		
Subjective	31.9	31.71
Objective	31.0	30.23
Nonexistent	15.6	15.83
Philosophical progress		
None	3.8	4.88
A little	46.3	46.76
A lot	41.5	38.28 *
Philosophical methods		
Conceptual analysis	68.9	69.47
Conceptual engineering	38.3	36.63
Empirical philosophy	58.3	57.37
Experimental philosophy	31.7	31.36
Formal philosophy	53.9	50.38 *
Intuition-based philosophy	48.0	45.36
Linguistic philosophy	44.8	43.46
Race		
Biological	17.3	16.69
Social	58.6	59.42
Unreal	13.9	14.48
Vagueness		
Epistemic	19.4	18.64
Metaphysical	16.7	17.15
Semantic	41.8	38.69 *



Table 21: Bias corrections for the additional questions. All = pct. of all answers. F50 = pct. of answers among respondents' mandatory questions (the first 50). Cor = F50 with gender and specialization correction. Corrections of 3% or more are starred.

Questions and answers	All	F50	Cor.
Abortion			
Permissible	77.7	79.0	77.71
Impermissible	12.5	12.7	12.92
Aesthetic experience			
Perception	17.2	16.9	16.15
Pleasure	8.6	9.4	8.97
Sui generis	22.7	21.6	23.8
Analysis of knowledge			
Justified true belief	21.4	22.9	24.93
Other analysis	29.2	32.5	30.49
No analysis	27.8	25.7	22.66 *
Arguments for theism			
Cosmological	18.8	14.9	14.18
Design	15.9	13.6	12.51
Ontological	8.0	8.0	9.1
Pragmatic	12.8	13.3	15.49
Moral	8.4	10.2	10.9
Belief or credence			
Belief	20.8	22.6	21.8
Credence	21.2	20.5	20.3
Neither	13.2	12.1	10.75
Capital punishment			
Permissible	17.1	17.1	15.46
Impermissible	72.4	73.9	75.37
Causation			
Counterfactual/difference-making	28.9	32.8	32.17
Process/production	17.5	16.6	16.44
Primitive	15.9	15.3	13.63
Nonexistent	3.2	3.1	2.77
Chinese room			
Understands	16.0	16.2	14.23
Doesn't understand	60.0	60.1	59.57
Concepts			
Nativism	21.4	22.0	21.55
Empiricism	38.4	40.9	42.12
Consciousness			
Dualism	19.4	17.9	15.12
Eliminativism	4.0	4.2	4.0
Functionalism	29.2	30.9	28.89
Identity theory	11.8	11.1	9.64
Panpsychism	6.7	6.2	8.0

Questions and answers	All	F50	Cor.
Continuum hypothesis			
Determinate	16.2	16.6	15.06
Indeterminate	12.3	10.2	9.77
Cosmological fine-tuning			
Design	12.2	9.2	8.51
Multiverse	10.7	12.5	12.83
Brute fact	22.6	25.2	25.17
No fine-tuning	15.3	15.4	15.03
Environmental ethics			
Anthropocentric	32.9	30.7	31.56
Non-anthropocentric	39.4	37.5	38.69
Extended mind			
Yes	43.1	44.1	42.6
No	31.2	27.1	25.68
Foundations of mathematics			
Constructivism/intuitionism	8.2	10.2	10.87
Formalism	3.3	2.1	2.32
Logicism	6.3	4.6	3.37
Structuralism	11.3	14.4	14.36
Set-theoretic	8.2	8.1	6.64
Gender categories			
Preserve	17.4	17.2	15.14
Revise	43.2	48.3	48.42
Eliminate	13.8	17.2	18.66
Grounds of intentionality			
Causal/teleological	21.9	21.9	20.61
Inferential	6.0	5.8	5.34
Interpretational	9.5	11.9	12.75
Phenomenal	7.9	7.7	9.92
Primitive	8.6	10.0	9.82
Hard problem of consciousness			
Yes	54.6	56.0	54.63
No	26.0	23.2	25.01
Human genetic engineering			
Permissible	58.8	56.3	53.14 *
Impermissible	17.8	17.3	19.75
Hume			
Skeptic	28.0	30.4	30.27
Naturalist	42.2	39.5	44.11 *
Immortality			
Yes	43.3	36.7	35.27
No	39.9	44.1	45.86
Interlevel metaphysics			
Grounding	19.3	17.2	14.88
Identity	7.6	7.8	6.26
Realization	13.9	16.2	14.83
Supervenience	16.4	17.9	16.95
Justification			

Questions and answers	All	F50	Cor.
Coherentism	19.4	24.7	27.66
Infinitism	1.6	2.8	2.98
Nonreliabilist found.	20.7	17.4	14.37 *
Reliabilism	27.6	29.1	26.03 *
Kant			
One world	28.8	33.2	36.68 *
Two worlds	22.1	22.5	23.18
Law			
Legal positivism	21.8	22.4	23.6
Legal non-positivism	24.8	26.5	27.11
Material composition			
Nihilism	4.1	6.1	4.97
Restrictivism	17.7	15.5	13.49
Universalism	13.9	11.3	9.02
Morality			
Non-naturalism	23.8	24.8	24.4
Naturalist realism	28.4	27.7	27.45
Constructivism	18.7	20.1	22.3
Expressivism	9.5	10.5	8.11
Error theory	4.7	5.1	4.54
Metaontology			
Heavyweight realism	24.0	24.2	20.36 *
Deflationary realism	17.5	18.8	17.76
Anti-realism	7.4	6.1	6.4
Method in history of philosophy			
Analytic/rational reconstruction	49.3	49.8	50.05
Contextual/historicist	36.0	45.5	47.76
Method in political philosophy			
Ideal theory	22.3	23.7	24.19
Non-ideal theory	39.9	43.1	45.92
Mind uploading			
Survival	25.0	24.7	25.13
Death	49.4	51.7	51.92
Moral principles			
Moral generalism	46.3	43.8	43.82
Moral particularism	28.6	31.0	31.99
Normative concepts			
Fit	5.7	4.3	4.81
Ought	11.0	9.7	9.66
Reasons	19.7	24.8	27.72
Value	28.9	29.8	29.79
Other minds			
Adult humans	89.3	91.8	90.78
Cats	83.1	83.9	81.84
Fish	61.3	61.8	60.18
Flies	32.4	32.7	34.67
Worms	22.7	22.4	23.99
Plants	6.8	7.0	7.91
Particles	1.9	1.2	0.97

Questions and answers	All	F50	Cor.
Newborn babies	79.1	83.0	81.74
Current ai systems	3.2	3.3	3.94
Future ai systems	36.8	37.9	35.21
Ought implies can			
Yes	59.3	56.7	57.24
No	26.7	27.3	28.07
Philosophical knowledge			
None	3.4	3.6	4.23
A little	31.0	32.1	33.01
A lot	53.5	54.9	53.27
Plato			
Knowledge only of forms	29.8	29.2	32.79 *
Knowledge also of concrete things	15.9	17.9	19.83
Politics			
Capitalism	28.1	25.3	23.75
Socialism	50.5	50.7	54.28 *
Possible worlds			
Abstract	50.0	51.3	47.25 *
Concrete	4.2	3.2	2.05
Nonexistent	27.4	25.6	28.8 *
Practical reason			
Aristotelian	30.3	32.9	34.72
Humean	23.9	25.3	25.06
Kantian	14.8	15.8	16.15
Principle of sufficient reason			
True	29.9	31.5	31.7
False	38.0	38.8	38.41
Properties			
Classes	7.9	11.0	10.43
Immanent universals	14.3	18.2	16.62
Transcendent universals	13.7	16.5	14.57
Tropes	10.6	7.9	7.27
Nonexistent	5.6	3.1	3.83
Propositional attitudes			
Dispositional	22.2	21.6	20.54
Phenomenal	4.9	4.2	5.39
Representational	32.7	30.9	24.75 *
Nonexistent	2.5	1.9	2.88
Propositions			
Sets	5.9	5.5	4.74
Structured entities	27.2	25.4	22.88
Simple entities	4.9	7.1	6.26
Acts	5.8	5.8	6.72
Nonexistent	10.9	10.6	11.1
Quantum mechanics			
Collapse	8.5	6.8	6.1
Hidden-variables	11.0	9.2	8.69
Many-worlds	9.7	8.2	8.53
Epistemic	6.4	6.1	5.79

Questions and answers	All	F50	Cor.
Race categories			
Preserve	6.5	8.3	7.87
Revise	25.8	27.2	28.93
Eliminate	32.3	33.3	33.83
Response to external-world skepticism			
Abductive	18.1	16.2	15.8
Contextualist	8.8	9.3	8.58
Dogmatist	11.0	10.0	8.25
Epistemic externalist	15.5	16.9	16.0
Semantic externalist	6.9	9.0	8.06
Pragmatic	18.7	17.6	20.06
Rational disagreement			
Non-permissivism	16.7	16.6	18.58
Permissivism	60.5	65.1	62.26
Semantic content			
Minimalism (no more than a few)	6.4	5.7	4.79
Moderate contextualism (intermediate)	35.7	37.7	36.66
Radical contextualism (most or all)	17.3	16.8	18.08
Sleeping beauty			
One-third	10.5	11.3	9.78
One-half	7.1	6.8	5.88
Spacetime			
Relationism	25.1	24.7	29.05 *
Substantivalism	15.2	14.4	10.48 *
Statue and lump			
One thing	25.4	25.6	25.41
Two things	35.3	37.4	34.17 *
Temporal ontology			
Presentism	12.1	11.0	8.88
Eternalism	26.3	25.3	21.55 *
Growing block	11.2	10.1	10.45
Theory of reference			
Causal	35.9	37.0	32.99 *
Descriptive	17.2	17.0	14.72
Deflationary	11.7	11.3	11.39
Time travel			
Metaphysically possible	34.9	34.6	30.97 *
Metaphysically impossible	33.9	35.5	39.05 *
True contradictions			
Impossible	58.5	54.2	44.78 *
Possible but non-actual	3.9	5.4	5.35
Actual	10.2	9.0	9.73
Units of selection			
Genes	26.3	27.9	27.52
Organisms	26.0	26.9	28.43
Values in science			

Questions and answers	All	F50	Cor.
Necessarily value-free	15.3	17.2	15.58
Necessarily value-laden	38.0	40.7	42.69
Can be either	26.8	27.2	26.62
Well-being			
Hedonism/experientialism	10.7	11.0	11.06
Desire satisfaction	15.6	17.9	16.19
Objective list	44.7	44.1	43.4
Wittgenstein			
Early	20.7	19.8	18.58
Late	48.4	49.0	50.23