

Peter Danielson, *Artificial Morality* (London, Routledge, 1993), ix + 236 pp., £35.00  
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Peter Danielson follows in the footsteps of David Gauthier's *Morals by Agreement* in that both authors try to show from a game-theoretical starting point how moral constraints can emerge from rational agency. He explores two types of games – viz. the Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. Like Gauthier, he tries to escape the non-cooperative solution to the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma by stipulating that the players do not face a direct choice between cooperation or defection, but rather a choice between strategies that determine with what type of strategic player they will cooperate or defect. He argues on grounds of evolutionary stability that the rational strategy to adopt for transparent players in each game contrasts with Gauthier's solutions. Subsequently, a skillful defence is constructed for the moral acceptability of the proposed strategies. Danielson also argues against Gauthier that relaxing the requirement of transparency and taking into account informational costs makes a radical difference in that on this assumption multiple strategies become rationally acceptable. Last but not least, the reader is invited to request software through e-mail that is designed to simulate games in Prolog between players who adopt alternative strategies. This makes it possible to test the rationality of the respective strategies in various games within alternative environments and upon alternative assumptions.

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