Letters to the Editor

At its October 1992 meeting, the Board of Officers of The American Philosophical Association adopted the following policy concerning publication of Letters to the Editor:

Philosophical disagreements pursued through Letters to the Editor of the Proceedings and Addresses should be permitted to continue until the editor, exercising discretion, considers a topic exhausted. In deciding whether a response to criticism should be simultaneous, delayed, or not published, fairness should be a primary consideration.

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All Letters to the Editor must be limited to 1,000 words and should contain no footnotes.

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To the Editor,

This is a call to arms to members of the profession to take a leadership role in the recognition of teaching in the classroom. We believe that the APA has the responsibility and the ability to set high standards and to become a role model for other disciplines in higher education today.

We recently attended the interdisciplinary Conference on the Role of Advocacy in the Classroom (Pittsburgh, June 2-4, 1995) co-sponsored by the Modern Language Association and fifteen other organizations including the APA, the American Society for Aesthetics, the College Art Association, the American Historical Association, the American Sociological Association, the American Anthropological Association, the American Council of Learned Societies and the American Association of Law Schools. An interesting variety of topics made available a wide range of approaches, both in terms of content and methodology, from the advocating of neutrality (the APA-sponsored session), to the inevitability of advocacy, to discussions of academic freedom ("The Clash of Faculty and Student Rights"), the role of feminism and multiculturalism in the academy, advocacy and objectivity, religion and the classroom, and the cultural politics of the aesthetic ideal of disinterestedness (the American Society for Aesthetics session).

The issues were viewed from multiple perspectives: those of faculty (the AAUP was also a sponsor) as well as teaching assistants. We detected a general and amiable openness in the reception of others' ideas within the academy, a point we make if for no other reason
than to counteract the negative reputation that ‘dueling academics’ have recently received in the press. The 300 participants were interested in seriously discussing issues that would lead to making the classroom a more hospitable environment for students: more open to new ideas and more tolerant of a diversity of attitudes and beliefs.

Philosophers interested in these goals have the unique opportunity to provide a role model for others seeking good examples. In advocating ‘balance’ within the classroom or overall university curriculum, the philosophical concept of dialectic affords many opportunities for providing high teaching standards. The APA is in a position to be able to demonstrate to other learned societies of academics as well as those outside the academy, just how important is teaching, especially in the Socratic tradition. We recommend the following actions toward that end.

(1) The APA should publish a series of public statements (e.g., advertisements in mass media) that (I) elucidate the importance of teaching in the field of philosophy, (ii) point out the importance of philosophy for developing the mind, especially in professions like law and business, and (iii) extol the virtues of the Socratic method in opening up and maintaining dialogue among factions within the classroom. (2) The APA should use the occasion of Presidential addresses to recognize teaching awards won by its members, and to present a new award from the APA itself, for excellence in teaching. (3) The APA should recommend to Philosophy Departments across the country that they offer graduate level courses in pedagogy as part of their graduate curriculum. Note that such courses might be especially useful for recruiting and retaining female and minority students. (4) The APA should advocate that Departments implement peer review processes for evaluating and rewarding the teaching of philosophy that utilize ‘outside’ as well as ‘inside’ peers, i.e., objective reviewers outside the department as provided by an institution’s established units of Instructional Services as well as ‘insiders’ within departments.

This role would be new to the APA, at least in recent decades. It is a call that asks philosophers, through their professional association, to take a pro-active stance on teaching excellence. No other professional association has truly risen to the occasion. The APA can and should take the lead.

To do so, the APA will have to go beyond business as usual. It will need to put aside its usual cautious, conservative approach to taking a stand on national issues. It will have to take some risks.

The humanities, arts and social sciences, are under significant attack by the new Congress, much of the media, and a growing segment of the American people. The claim—false in fact, but widely held in perception—is that faculty members, especially in these fields, do not care about teaching. It is time to take a stand, and set the record straight!

Peg Brand
Myles Brand
Indiana University
To the Editor:

We were dismayed to learn that the Association scheduled a session at the December Eastern Division Meetings in which a speaker argued that the ideas Saul Kripke presents in Naming and Necessity are not Kripke’s own but rather taken from a contemporary scholar and presented without acknowledgment of that other scholar’s authorship.

A session at a national APA meeting is not the proper forum in which to level ethical accusations against members of our profession, even if the charges were plausibly defended. By scheduling this paper, the Eastern Division of the APA wronged Saul Kripke. We believe that the Division owes him an apology.

G.E.M. Anscombe
Donald Davidson
John M. Dolan
Peter T. Geach
Thomas Nagel

To the Editor:

I write to correct an item in the report on the NEH hearings by John Hammer of the National Humanities Alliance (Proceedings and Addresses 68:5, p. 124). Mr. Hammer was not, I think, present at those hearings when I testified. Otherwise I cannot see why he mischaracterized my testimony for the National Association of Scholars. While I did present suggestions for some changes in the way NEH structures its grants, Chairman Hackney must not have thought too badly of them as he is reported to be moving in directions I suggested though I cannot say that he is doing so because I suggested them.

Mr. Hammer must have had his tongue in his cheek when he noted that I “... offered no evidence for these broad assertions ...,” that the humanities today are in serious decline. For he knows quite well that, with the exception of Chairman Hackney, witnesses were allowed merely 15 minutes and that therefore I could not possibly have presented evidence along with proposals. From Mr. Hammer’s remarks one would not know that the National Association of Scholars is a member in good standing of his National Humanities Alliance.

Philosophers who care to learn the nature of the “harsh response” to me by Senator Wellstone (D-MN) may write to the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources for the transcript of the 2 March hearings. There on pp. 154-57 they will discover that the senator’s remarks are chiefly notable for the number of consecutive non-sequitors and ignoratios they contain.

Barry R. Gross
National Program Officer, National Association of Scholars
Professor of Philosophy, York College, CUNY

(We were sorry to learn that Barry R. Gross died on Friday, July 14, 1995. He apparently had a heart attack while working at the headquarters of the National Association of
Scholars. John Hammer was present at the hearings and stands by his report, confirming as well the NAS is a member in good standing of the National Humanities Alliance -EH).

To the Editor:

I have earned my M.A. in philosophy from the University of Sarajevo but I left Sarajevo a couple of years before the war. Back in Sarajevo, I maintained close contacts with philosophers both from Zagreb and Belgrade. I suspected, long before the hostilities, that the subtle and vicious forces of nationalism have already been sharpening their knives in order to dismember the body of that geographical and political Frankenstein—Yugoslavia.

In several recent issues of the Proceedings, there was much discussion about Serb philosophers and their role in the present Balkan conflict. The recent tragic events in the Balkans indeed awakened the ancient Serb national ghosts in many prominent Belgrade philosophers and intellectuals. Unfortunately, the situation in Zagreb is not much better.

My recent discovery that there are philosophers in Belgrade who revolt against the official Serbian regime, in a public and organized manner, prompted me to write this letter. I think that the American philosophical community should be informed about this group of intellectuals who need strong international support.

A desire to resist violence, xenophobia, racism, nationalism, sexism, ethnocentrism and every other “ism” has brought together a number of independent intellectuals in Belgrade. They have named themselves the Belgrade Circle and have initiated a journal bearing the same name.

The Belgrade Circle has defined its raison d’etre as being the public voice of “The Other Serbia.” Its role is to provide a framework for nonaligned intellectuals to engage in critical discussions about the institutions, policies, and practices of the “official” Serbia, and to present a different vision of the future of the “other” Serbia.

The first issue of the Belgrade Circle Journal features four thematic blocks: “The Critique of Centrism,” “The Subversive Discourse,” “War in the Tribal Zone: Yugoslavia,” and “The Inventory of Texts.” The editors of this journal, led by the influential Belgrade philosopher Obrad Savic, want to revive the idea of a new Europe. They have pinned their hopes on a new Europe, one which will accommodate a wide range of nations and regions, rising from the ashes of the cold war.

Furthermore, the editors of the Belgrade Circle Journal believe in a need for setting the highest standards of self-responsibility by formulating their own political attitudes and by defending their intellectual autonomy.

The list of the influential intellectuals, mostly philosophers, who have contributed their articles to the Belgrade Circle Journal in order to help establish the vision of the “Other Serbia” is rather impressive. The first issue of this journal features Karl Popper, Richard Rorty, Jean Baudrillard, Salman Rushdie, Peter Sloterdijk, and Christopher Norris.

The Belgrade Circle Journal publishes its articles in a bilingual form: it includes their original language version, coupled by their English, Serbo-Croat, or French translation. The address of the journal is:
To the Editor:

In a recent (May, 1995) contribution to the Proceedings, Leonard Harris offers a vociferous attack against American Philosophy, likening it to the Ku Klux Klan and proclaiming it to be the reason why there are so few Black philosophers in privileged positions of academic repute. Harris points out to the profession there are no Blacks on faculty in the Philosophy Departments of the eight Ivy League and eleven Big Ten universities and with only two exceptions, there are no Black philosophers that hold endowed chairs or distinguished professorships. Furthermore, Harris claims the most noted Black philosophers are "relegated to the status of kitchen help on the plantation" (p.133), and "Believe it or Not," all thanks to the oppressive conspiracy of American philosophers who are undoubtedly racially discriminating against the minority group, namely, the poor Black philosopher.

I think Harris' accusations are unwarranted and are clearly a projection of his own rage. He states: "When it is time to grant honors, such as professorships and endowed chairs, American philosophers tend to show deference to individuals that fit the proper racial kind and relegate the 'affirmative action' babies to the kitchen (p.135). First and foremost, positions of academic prestige (such as professorships and endowed chairs) must be earned based upon outstanding scholarly merit, not simply given away based upon color. One is not automatically entitled (in the name of affirmative action) to a distinguished honor of this magnitude simply due to one's race. A suggestion to the contrary does nothing but bastardize the integrity of Blacks in academia and disparage the intelligence and scholarly acumen of the Black philosopher in general. Furthermore, this does a disservice to Blacks who do hold academic positions and those who aspire towards scholarly excellence. Black philosophers already face a dialectical dilemma. That is, those who hold stellar academic positions are (1) viewed as 'a-typical,' thus alienated from their own race, or (2) they are prejudicially labeled a 'token,' thereby invalidating their scholarship and noteworthy level of achievement.

Are Whites accountable for the fact that there are so few Blacks in philosophy that hold academic positions? I think not. Given the fact that barely 1% of the APA membership is Black, what does he expect. Harris further complains that there are no Black graduate students in the top fourteen departments producing the majority of Ph.D.'s. Whose fault is this? Oh yes, I forgot, American Philosophy's. Perhaps philosophy is just not that attractive.
to Blacks. Instead of thinking about how they are socially, economically, and politically disadvantaged, maybe the majority of Blacks are actually doing something about it; pursuing avenues that are more conducive to ameliorating their condition. In fact, isn’t that what American Philosophy stands for anyway—finding useful means towards improving the quality of one’s life and well being? Of course a solution is that the profession in general needs to make philosophy more attractive to Blacks. That is, we have a responsibility to recruit Blacks and other minority groups as well. Harris, on the other hand, appears to be denying responsibility by placing the locus of control on the oppressive ‘White system.’

Harris continues to lambaste American Philosophy and point the racism finger, stating “the Klan’s prime directive of providing evidence for white supremacy and female inferiority characterizes how American philosophers live their profession” (p.136). This kind of gross distortion of American Philosophy is disturbing and obviously motivated from psychological variables rather than rational judgements about a particular philosophical enterprise. This seems to me to be a case of someone crying in their coffee and needing to find a convenient scapegoat. This is an angry, frustrated philosopher who is promoting his own agenda and displacing his rage by bashing Whites and crying racism. Harris may do better by taking a look at his own prejudicial assumptions and not castigate the ‘White’ profession for keeping Buckwheat in the kitchen.

Jon K. Mills
Vanderbilt University

To the Editor:

Leonard Harris makes the point that American philosophy as a profession has not done right by African Americans, at least not in its hiring practices (Proceedings, May 1995, pp. 133-137). The numbers are overwhelming, incriminating, and ought to cause alarm. I teach philosophy at the most prestigious of the nation’s 100-plus Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs)—Howard University in Washington DC—and so I am well acquainted with the challenges of doing philosophical work on topics in which African Americans have taken particular interest. I commend Harris and the editors for running the piece. I trust professional policies and practices will increase efforts to eradicate racism in American philosophy.

One detail stands in need of correction. Harris claims that no HBCU confers graduate degrees in philosophy. This is false. Howard has been awarding M.A. degrees to philosophy students in our graduate program for decades. Recently, in fact, our graduate program was reviewed with accolades. Many of our recent graduates have gone on to eminent doctoral programs in philosophy. Our graduate students are extremely motivated, eager to direct their talents toward perennial philosophical problems. We are active, focused, and committed to rigor.

It is true that no HBCU presently offers doctoral degrees in philosophy, and this is a significant problem. For our part, our department has been exploring Ph.D. options for some time. Perhaps my chair will be able to report good news on that matter in the near future.
Impatience and perhaps anger are appropriate responses to Harris's piece, but we need not despair. Figures from other doctoral programs suggest that when HBCUs do grant philosophy doctorates, the number of African Americans on the job market will increase, perhaps dramatically. In fact, about the time the May Proceedings arrived in the mail, Howard had just graduated several dozen new Ph.D.s in the humanities. Nearly all of those graduates were people of color, including a substantial number of African Americans. I believe I was one of about a half-dozen African Americans to take a Ph.D. in philosophy the year I earned it; it's entirely plausible that a Howard doctoral program in philosophy could graduate that number on its own every year, effectively doubling that group's market presence. (This strategy seems so utterly obvious that I fear some other department will seize the opportunity before we do.)

People of good will, persuaded by reason, need not reinvent the wheel. Indeed, we philosophers are finally in a position to which we are not used: others have figured out for us what we should do. I trust we'll succeed in stellar fashion.

Stephen Lester Thompson
Howard University

Gentle person:

The philosophical community does not exist in a vacuum nor is it a self-contained social group. Thus, when a report on the status of women in philosophy is given, albeit briefly, (Proceedings 68:5), trends of the larger context should be given. For instance, the report cited by Longino mentions that the "fields of art history and modern languages and literature had the highest representation of females (55.1 and 47.2 percent, respectively), while females constituted only 16.4 percent of the doctorates in philosophy." That the community of philosophers has the lowest percentage of female Ph.D. holders may say something about barriers or it may say something about choice.

In any case, if the Ph.D. is the standard for employment, the population of eligible candidates is largely male.

The tenure data stated in the report on the status of women may only reflect the greater population pool of men compared to women. If we accept the report, though, the numbers provide evidence that sexism still persists and it persists in those most responsible for creating the policies meant to provide redress for the imbalance, i.e., those least likely to feel the burden of affirmative action and so on.

The National Research Council also reported that "men were much more likely than women to be full professors . . . the percentage of men and women who were associate professors were approximately the same; and the lower-ranking positions of assistant professor, instructor, and lecturer had higher concentrations of women." Given the report's data showing that the number of men earning a doctorate in humanities is higher than the number of women earning doctorates in humanities, the fact that women have higher concentrations at the lower, "newly hired" level is striking. It means that in the humanities,
the percent of women recently employed in the humanities exceeds their rate of representation of earned doctorates.

While the news in philosophy may be mixed, being a woman has meant preferential treatment and a greater than equal chance of finding a job in the humanities. Academia, at least with regard to the humanities, is far from the hostile environment that Longino’s brief report suggests (unless, of course, you are male).

Much of the above analysis can be transferred to the contents of the somewhat obnoxious letter of Leonard Harris. The National Research Council, in its Summary Report 1992, reports that “Just over 10 percent of all Ph.D.s awarded to U.S. citizens in 1992 were earned by racial/ethnic minorities . . . Of the minority groups, only blacks earned a smaller share of Ph.D.s in 1992 than did their predecessors 15 years ago. Since 1977, U.S. Asians have more than doubled and Hispanics have nearly doubled their representation among doctorate recipients.”

Further, as one black writer states: “32 percent of blacks are high school dropouts, according to the Census Bureau. Some 23 percent of young black men aged 20 to 29 are either in prison, on probation or on parole, according to the Sentencing Project . . . And 22 percent of black adolescents aged 14 to 18 use drugs, according to PRIDE, an Atlanta-based drug prevention program.” I humbly suggest that it is a bit of a reach to blame the APA for such conditions—conditions that affect representation in the philosophical community.

While I think it would be better to have greater numbers of blacks in the APA (which has far more members than it has employed members—I should know—by a rate of about 7 to 5), thinly veiled anti-white tirades are among the least productive activities (any more than thinly veiled anti-black tirades will affect the disproportionate black-white representation in the NBA).

What the contents of Harris’s letter do serve to do, at least for me—and I’ve gotten my requisite hate mail from the real KKK and won awards for promoting racial equality—is to remind me that in certain quarters, my being white is held against me. Harris’s letter suggests that there’s little sense in being white and committed to racial equality if calumny is an appropriate response to all whites. Happily, the rantings and hateful language of one person won’t deter me from my work toward a more just world.

Finally, Longino and Harris remind me that, collectively, the older generation of philosophers has produced some problematic patterns and problematic remedies while bearing little burden for the redress of those problems and that the philosophical community is only one little slice of the larger picture.

Richard J. McGowan
Indianapolis, Indiana

To the Editor:

At dinner recently with two other APA members, all of us near or recent Ph.D.s, one, a white man who has had bad luck on the job market in recent years, told how he had recently advised a white male undergraduate, who let drop an interest in the profession, to consider carefully. It is a dim time for white male Ph.D.s in Philosophy, he warned. This
is not the first time I have heard this complaint, but it was the first time I heard of anyone warning white male undergraduates that the system at present is stacked against them.

Do you have race/ethnicity and gender numbers on the applicant pool in philosophy and on tenure-track (or all) hires? Can you publish them, for the last couple of years say? My hunch is that most jobs still go to white men. Chances are—are they not?—that the job any given white man didn’t get went to another white man. Not that this is a good thing; the profession could use a little more diversity. The point is just that, as far as I have seen, philosophy is still a pretty good place for white men.

If you have the numbers, please publish them. If you don’t, I at least urge the Proceedings readers to have some common sense.

Jennifer Uleman
University of Pennsylvania

P.S. Needless to say, Oskar Gruenwald’s views, on affirmative action among other things, are ridiculous. But no need for the Proceedings to suppress his letter—better that other members of the APA should take public stands urging further opening up the profession. (Thanks for the pieces on this subject in the last “Issues in the Profession.”)

(We do not at present have reliable data on the applicant pool or results of hiring over the past few years. See the information reported in my piece in the “Issues in the Profession” section of this issue. We will be seeking better information on this subject in the near future. -EH)

To the Editor,

We should continue the discussion of the APA’s criteria for printing letters to the Editor which was prompted by Mr. Gruenwald’s proposed changes to the APA Code of Ethics (Vol. 68:2, pp. 87-88). As a student of the First Amendment, I agree with the Editor that the Letters section is not a “public forum” (Vol. 68:5, p. 114). Thus, the APA is under no legal obligation to publish any reasonable response, and especially not any irrational and bigoted reply, disagreeing with its decision to condemn discrimination based on sexual orientation. I also know that Mr. Gruenwald’s bigotry is not condoned by the APA’s Board of Officers, nor by any reasonable philosopher. And though I don’t know the exact criteria used by the APA, Mr. Gruenwald’s letter to the Editor, and my own recent experience with his ‘philosophical journal,’ raise some important questions concerning the criteria used in printing calls for papers and letters to the Editor.

Last year, in the same Proceedings that printed Mr. Gruenwald’s infamous letter, the APA printed a call for papers from his publication, the JOURNAL OF INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES: An International Journal of Interdisciplinary and Interfaith Dialogue (JIS). (Vol. 68:2, p. 113). The call was for papers on homelessness, so I submitted a paper arguing that the Supreme Court, in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), should have decided that the homeless had a constitutional right to sleep in the parks
near the White House in order to protest American domestic policy. At the end of the paper, I compared the homeless protest near the White House to those by civil rights activists in the 1960s and gays and lesbians in the 1990s. To my surprise, next to this comparison a JIS referee wrote “SHAMEFUL” in red letters. Mr. Gruenwald’s rejection letter summarized the paper’s alleged flaws and added: “To top if off, the reference to “gays and lesbians” (p. 20) insults the homeless and all men and women by shredding human dignity and sinking below the minimum acceptable ethical standards for responsible, civilized conduct.” The letter concluded by directing me to Mr. Gruenwald’s proposed changes to the Code of Ethics.

At first I was shocked that a ‘philosophical journal’ with a call for papers in the Proceedings actually used such inappropriate standards of review. After I read his proposed changes to the Code of Ethics, I thought, as did critics in a later Proceedings (Vol. 68:5, p. 108-114), that Mr. Gruenwald had failed to satisfy his philosophical obligation to make rational arguments instead of ad hominem attacks. I was then grateful that JIS thought that my paper was unworthy of publication, for such publication would have been an implicit professional endorsement, on my part, of Mr. Gruenwald’s bigoted views.

Unfortunately it appears that the APA does not think the same way, because it did print Mr. Gruenwald’s letter. Since his views have more in common with David Duke’s political hate speech than with philosophers’ rational argumentation, I fear that the APA’s publication of his bigoted letter—and given my experience, JIS’s call for papers—runs the risk of it implicitly endorsing his views. If David Duke joined the APA and started a journal, would his call for papers also be printed? I hope not. If an individual is openly and publicly bigoted, then there ought to be a presumption against publishing his call for papers in the Proceedings. This would not be a case of unjust censorship but of upholding the minimum standards of professional civility and rational argumentation for a community of philosophers. If that seems extreme, then at least the APA ought to require that, alongside a call for papers from a journal like JIS, there be some indication of its distinctly unphilosophical standards of review. After all, professional disciplines and compassionate religious believers should not sanction hate and intolerance as ways of creating ‘dialogue’ with peoples of the world. In the absence of such a statement concerning its standards of review, placing JIS’s call for papers in the Proceedings makes the symbolic statement that the APA believes that such bigoted criteria have significant philosophical standing.

The same considerations should inform the APA’s criteria for publishing letters to the Editor. Given his bigoted track record, are Mr. Gruenwald’s homophobia rantings really philosophically relevant to the APA’s anti-discrimination policy? They might be relevant if the Letters section were the editorial page of a newspaper, which may be a public forum responsible for publishing a wide range of readers’ opinions. However, even a newspaper should, and can, insist that such letters conform to minimum standards for “responsible, civilized conduct.” And since the Letters section is not the editorial page of a newspaper, we should insist on even more demanding standards of review, beginning with David Christensen’s reasonable suggestion that we not lends a platform to “every misogynist, anti­semite, racist, or other species of bigot who wanted to use our Proceedings to publicize his or her own brand of hatred” (Vol. 68:5, p. 110).

Since the Proceedings seems to be a private forum for philosophical discussion, I think we should print neither bigoted letters nor calls for papers from journals with bigoted criteria
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

of evaluation. At the very least this matter merits further discussion, so I urge my colleagues to accept the Editor’s invitation (Vol. 68:5, p. 114) to do so in the pages of the Proceedings.

John D. Musselman
Indiana University

To the Editor:

At some risk of beating an apparently dead horse, I must take exception to the remark that “The APA received no serious responses to the letter of Oskar Gruenwald in the November issue of the Proceedings” (Editor’s note: Proceedings, May ’95). Homophobia and anti-gay sentiment are very serious matters indeed, and I intended my reply to be taken seriously. It should not be assumed that because one employs humor or satire—as the other respondents did to wonderful effect—that one does not take seriously the matter about which one is writing. I suppose, being very charitable, that Prof. Hoffman meant that no responses that supported Mr. Gruenwald’s position were received. To say, even if carelessly, that “no serious responses’ were received is to slight those who took the matter seriously enough to reply. It also runs the risk of trivializing the whole matter of anti-gay prejudice.

As to the APA’s editorial policy on letters, the position outlined seems sensible. While it is disconcerting to see Gruenwald-esque sentiments expressed by fellow philosophers (who are, alas, only human), I would not endorse blanket censorship. No, far better to let the market-place of ideas be the arbiter of worth. In the present instance this has worked splendidly: Mr. Gruenwald’s ideas have proven morally and intellectually bankrupt. Now, then, let the burial begin!

James S. Stramel
Santa Monica College

(I appreciate the author’s charitable interpretation and endorse the seriousness of the matter in the sense he describes. I also meant to express the view that even those who disagreed with Gruenwald did not see the matter as a “close question.”—EH)

To the Editor:

The recent controversy about the Smithsonian’s Enola Gay exhibit raises two issues deserving increased attention in contemporary American philosophy.

The first issue concerns the fact that scholars consulted by the Smithsonian suggested a “revisionist” commentary to accompany the Enola Gay’s restored fuselage. This commentary would have discussed the possibility that the Enola Gay’s mission violated just war principles by unnecessarily harming innocent civilians. For example, the commentary might have mentioned that some of the Manhattan scientists thought that, together with a Russian declaration against Japan, a demonstration on a deserted island would probably have persuaded Japanese decision-makers to accept unconditional surrender. (On the other hand,
the commentary might also have observed that the United States than had only two, not completely tested atomic bombs with which to end the war without an infantry invasion of the Japanese homeland.) Even with the parenthetical observation added, veterans and their allies objected to this implied criticism of American efforts to protect American servicemen while achieving entrenched war objectives. Such criticism was thought to be justified only if warfare generally or World War II specifically were themselves not justified. Otherwise, the right to effective leadership by American commanders outweighed the duty to protect innocent enemy civilians. Practically all American who lived through it, however, affirm that this war was justified. It is these Americans and their descendants who now pay the taxes which support the Smithsonian. Understandably, contemporary American decision-makers heeded the veterans’ objections.

This issue is related to another which has gained more widespread discussion recently, that of affirmative action. Many American organizations have made various pro-active efforts to be affirmative. Certainly the Congress and probably the President are in the process of criticizing and reducing some of these efforts. Interestingly, just war principles have been marshaled by each side of this debate. By virtue of their ancestor’s history of slavery and discrimination, and often by virtue of their own experience, contemporary black Americans can easily regard white Americans as adversaries or enemies. Not only were slavery and discrimination themselves wrong, but they also created adverse residues. Regaining those economic, political, and social possessions diminished by these wrongful residues is a “just end” which should be pursued by any means necessary, including affirmative action. By virtue of affirmative action, on the other hand, some contemporary white Americans regard black Americans as adversaries or enemies. Since most affirmative actions impose most direct costs on younger whites, many critics argue that affirmative action unnecessarily but primarily harms those who are innocent of the wrongdoings which might justify some form of reparational action. Since this isn’t fair and fair-ness is necessary for long-term peace, it violates the must war principle that deliberate harm is justified only if is rationally intended to produce long-term peace. This principle doesn’t always mean much internationally, but it clearly should nationally.

One helpful way each side of the affirmative action issue could test its use of just war principles would be to apply that use, or extensions of it, to the Enola Gay issue. Alternatively, philosophers concerned with the Enola Gay issue could test their uses of just war principles by addressing them to the affirmative action issue. Most importantly, now is the time to make our cases, before Americans are next put into harm’s way for the sake of politics.

Parker English
Central Connecticut State University
To the Editor,

For the benefit of my fellow job-seekers:

   Top Ten List of Things Not to Say at an APA Interview

10. That’s Mr. (Ms. ) NN to you.

9. Oh, that’s just something I put in my CV for padding.

8. Does everyone at your school dress like that?

7. Would I be able to avoid administrative duties, if I plan to leave the job after a year?

6. Could we continue this later? American Gladiators is starting.

5. Aren’t you the one who wrote that article Putnam trashed?

4. Well, I’d like to finish my dissertation this year, but I just recently got into cajun cooking, and I want to explore that for a while.

3. I really need to know whether you’re going to offer me the job by tomorrow.

2. I always figure that the really good students can learn just as much from true/false tests as from papers, so that’s my practice.

1. Mind if I take off my shoes? My feet itch.

Torin Alter
University of California, Los Angeles