

Contributions to Phenomenology 131

Francesca Brencio *Editor*

# Phenomenology, Neuroscience and Clinical Practice

Transdisciplinary Experiences

 Springer

# Contributions to Phenomenology

## In Cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology

Volume 131

### Series Editors

Nicolas de Warren, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA

Ted Toadvine, Department of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA, USA

### Editorial Board Members

Lilian Alweiss, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Elizabeth Behnke, Ferndale, WA, USA

Rudolf Bernet, Husserl Archive, KU Leuven, Belgium

David Carr, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, USA

Chan-Fai Cheung, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong

James Dodd, New School University, New York, USA

Alfredo Ferrarin, Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy

Burt Hopkins, University of Lille, Lille, France

José Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo, Canada

Kwok-Ying Lau, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sha Tin, Hong Kong

Nam-In Lee, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea (Republic of)

Dieter Lohmar, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany

William R. McKenna, Miami University, Ohio, USA

Algis Mickunas, Ohio University, Ohio, USA

J. N. Mohanty, Temple University, Philadelphia, USA

Dermot Moran, University College Dublin, Dublin, Ireland

Junichi Murata, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan

Thomas Nenon, The University of Memphis, Memphis, USA

Gail Soffer, Roma Tre University, Rome, Italy

Anthony Steinbock, Department of Philosophy Stony Brook  
University Stony Brook, New York, USA

Shigeru Taguchi, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan

Dan Zahavi, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark

Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA

### **Scope**

The purpose of the series is to serve as a vehicle for the pursuit of phenomenological research across a broad spectrum, including cross-over developments with other fields of inquiry such as the social sciences and cognitive science. Since its establishment in 1987, Contributions to Phenomenology has published more than 100 titles on diverse themes of phenomenological philosophy. In addition to welcoming monographs and collections of papers in established areas of scholarship, the series encourages original work in phenomenology. The breadth and depth of the Series reflects the rich and varied significance of phenomenological thinking for seminal questions of human inquiry as well as the increasingly international reach of phenomenological research.

All books to be published in this Series will be fully peer-reviewed before final acceptance.

The series is published in cooperation with The Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology.

Francesca Brencio

Editor

# Phenomenology, Neuroscience and Clinical Practice

Transdisciplinary Experiences

 Springer

*Editor*

Francesca Brencio  
Department of Philosophy  
University of Seville  
Seville, Spain

ISSN 0923-9545

ISSN 2215-1915 (electronic)

Contributions to Phenomenology

ISBN 978-3-031-66263-8

ISBN 978-3-031-66264-5 (eBook)

<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-66264-5>

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG  
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

If disposing of this product, please recycle the paper.

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b> . . . . .	<b>1</b>
	Francesca Brencio	
<b>2</b>	<b>The <i>Musicality</i> of Being, Embodiment and Temporality in the Development of Selfhood</b> . . . . .	<b>7</b>
	Valeria Bizzari	
<b>3</b>	<b>Passibility, The Pathic Dimension of Subjectivity</b> . . . . .	<b>25</b>
	Louis Schreel	
<b>4</b>	<b>Atmosphere and the Pathic <i>Epoché</i></b> . . . . .	<b>55</b>
	Veronica Iubei	
<b>5</b>	<b>Anxiety from Within: A Cognitive-Phenomenological Study</b> . . . . .	<b>71</b>
	Nofar Rodoy, Uri Hadar, and Yochai Ataria	
<b>6</b>	<b>Happy, from a Phenomenological Standpoint?</b> . . . . .	<b>87</b>
	Susi Ferrarello	
<b>7</b>	<b>Grief and Temporality</b> . . . . .	<b>103</b>
	Emily Hughes	
<b>8</b>	<b>Empathy, Reflection, and Mental Health</b> . . . . .	<b>117</b>
	Magnus Englander	
<b>9</b>	<b>Making Sense of Things in Dementia</b> . . . . .	<b>141</b>
	Roxana Baiasu	
<b>10</b>	<b>The Lived Body in E-motion: A Transdisciplinary Approach to Dementia Diseases</b> . . . . .	<b>155</b>
	Ragna Winniewski and Erik Norman Dzwiza-Ohlson	

**11 The Phenomenology of Mutual Trust in Psychotherapy:  
A Relational Account of Meaning-Making in Recovering  
the Self in Borderline Personality Disorder** ..... 193  
Anna Bergqvist

**Index** ..... 215

# Contributors

**Yochai Ataria** is an Associate Professor at Tel-Hai College, Israel. He conducted his PhD in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and his post-doctoral research in the Neurobiology Department at the Weizmann Institute of Science. He has published over 40 papers. He is the author of the following books: *The Structural Trauma of Western Culture* (2017); *Body Disownership in Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder* (2018); *The Mathematics of Trauma* [Hebrew] (2014); *Not in our Brain* [Hebrew] (2019); *Levi Versus Ka-Tsetnik* (2022); *Consciousness in Flesh* (2022). In addition, he co-edited the following volumes: *Interdisciplinary Handbook of Culture and Trauma* (2016); *Jean Améry: Beyond the Minds Limits* (2019); *Kafka: New Perspectives* [Hebrew] (2013); *The End of the Human Era* [Hebrew] (2016); *2001: A Space Odyssey – 50th Anniversary* [Hebrew] (2019); *Body Schema and Body Image: New Directions* (2021).

**Roxana Baiasu** PhD, is a Senior Lecturer and Tutorial Fellow at Stanford University Centre in Oxford; MA Seminar Leader at the Blavatnik School of Government and Associate Member of the Philosophy Faculty at the University of Oxford; and a Wellcome Trust Research Fellow at the University of Birmingham. She is also Convener of the Oxford Forum. She currently works on philosophical and interdisciplinary issues concerning healthcare and mental health, vulnerability, and justice. She has written articles on these topics as well as in the wider areas of phenomenology and existentialism, and feminist philosophy. She edited (with G. Bird and A.W. Moore) *Contemporary Kantian Metaphysics Today: New Essays on Time and Space* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). Her recent publications include: “Contextualising Mental Ill Health: A New Model for Tackling Social Differences and Inequalities in Mental Healthcare” (co-authored with G. Messas) in *Philosophical Psychology*, M. Broome, L. Spencer and G. Stanghellini (eds.) (forthcoming); “The Lived Experience of Lockdown, Illness, Power and Epistemic Injustices” in *Time for Debate: Perspectives on Lockdowns from the Humanities and Social Science*, Y. Nehushtan et al. (eds.), Routledge, 2022; “Vulnerability, Well Being and Health” in *Vulnerability of the Human World*, S. Ferrarello and É. Boubliil



(eds.), Springer, forthcoming; “Phenomenology of Illness, Resilience and Wellbeing” in *Phenomenology of Bioethics*, ed. S. Ferrarello, Springer, 2021; and “Vulnerability and Resilience” in *Love and Vulnerability*, P. Goulimari (ed.), Routledge, 2021.

**Anna Bergqvist** PhD, MA Res, BA, Fil. Kand., FRSA, is Reader in Philosophy in the Department of History, Politics and Philosophy at Manchester Metropolitan University (UK) and Director of the Values-Based Theory Network at St Catherine’s College University of Oxford (UK). Her research ranges moral perception and narrative ethics to the philosophy of psychiatry and public mental health, with special focus on shared decision-making and relational moral agency. Dr Bergqvist is currently the Principal Investigator of the AHRC-funded research project *Philosophy of Psychiatry and Lived Experience: New Models of Public Mental Health* in partnership with the Mental Health Foundation, as well as the Co-Principal Investigator of the 4-year National Institute for Health Research project *Improving the Experiences of African Caribbean Men detained under the Mental Health Act: A Co-Produced Intervention Using the Silences Framework*. Dr Bergqvist is also Secretary of the World Psychiatric Association Section for Philosophy & Humanities in Psychiatry, Executive Committee Member of The Royal College of Psychiatrists—Special Interest Group in Philosophy and Centre Fellow at the Centre for Ethics at the University of Pardubice.

**Valeria Bizzari** PhD, currently works at the Husserl Archives of the Catholic University in Leuven. Her research interests involve phenomenology, philosophy of emotions and phenomenological psychopathology. From 2018 to the end of 2020, she worked at the Clinic for General Psychiatry, Universität Heidelberg, with a project on Asperger’s syndrome. She spent visiting research periods at the Center for Subjectivity Research in Copenhagen, the Oxford Empathy Programme at University of Oxford, and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Wien.

**Erik Norman Dzwiza-Ohlsen** PhD, studied philosophy, psychology, and theology at the University of Kiel. From 2013 to 2018, he completed his doctorate at the University of Würzburg and has been a research assistant to Prof. Thiemo Breyer in the Research Lab of the a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities Cologne since 2016 and at the Husserl Archive in Cologne from 2022. His research focuses on phenomenology, psychopathology, and philosophical anthropology. He is currently working on a monograph titled *Phenomenology of Dementia*.

**Magnus Englander** PhD, is an Associate Professor at the Department of Social Work, Faculty of Health and Society at Malmö University. He is associate editor for the *Journal of Phenomenological Psychology* and also the co-editor for the Malmö University Press book series *Malmö University Studies in Ethnography and Phenomenology*. Even though his background is in psychology, he has spent most of his career working in interdisciplinary settings. The overall purpose of his

research is to further the development of how phenomenological psychology and the phenomenology of empathy applies to qualitative research methodology, professional practice, and pedagogy. He is the author of multiple articles and editor of the book *Phenomenology and the Social Context of Psychiatry* (Bloomsbury, 2018) and co-editor of *Empathy and Ethics* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2023).

**Susi Ferrarello** is an Assistant Professor at California State University, East Bay (USA). Among her books: *Husserl's Ethics and Practical Intentionality* (Bloomsbury 2015), *Phenomenology of Sex, Love and Intimacy* (Routledge, 2018), *Human Emotions and the Origin of Bioethics* (Routledge, 2021), *The Ethics of Love* (Routledge, 2022). She writes for *Psychology Today* and works also as a philosophical counselor.

**Uri Hadar** is Professor of psychology in Tel Aviv University and the Rupin Academic Center. He studied BA and MA in Tel Aviv University and PhD in the University of London. His fields of research include psychoanalysis, nonverbal communication, and the cerebral representation of natural language. In these fields, he engaged deeply in both empirical and theoretical research and has published widely about these issues. His three books discuss psychoanalytic psychotherapy from the vantage point of integrating Lacanian and Relational approaches. Uri Hadar believes that psychoanalysis may offer a valid perspective for understanding social issues that may lay the basis for political involvement. He is a member of an Israeli organization (“Psychoactive: Mental Health Professionals for Human Rights”) that investigates, promotes, and practices this view, with special interest in Israeli-Palestinian relations and the need for justice for Palestinians.

**Emily Hughes** is a postdoctoral research associate in philosophy at the University of York working on the AHRC-funded project “Grief: A Study of Human Emotional Experience.” Situated at the intersection of existential phenomenology and the philosophy of psychiatry and psychology, Emily has published widely on affective and temporal experience.

**Veronica Iubei** is soon to defend her PhD thesis in Philosophy at the University of Heidelberg, under the supervision of Prof. Thomas Fuchs. Her project combines concepts from phenomenology, new phenomenology, and psychopathology. Iubei works mainly on the concept of atmosphere, investigating embodiment, affectivity, and the prodromal stage of several psychiatric disorders. She presented her work at numerous internationally renowned conferences, published papers in volumes and international journals. She has a background in the humanities, with two degrees in philology and philosophy and a research master's degree from the Radboud University in Nijmegen. Currently, she works as a university lecturer in a recognized American college in Florence, teaching philosophy of psychology and applied ethics.

**Nofar Rodoy** is a clinical psychology intern at Ziv Medical Center. She attained a BA in psychology (*magna cum laude*) from Tel Hai College and an MA in clinical psychology, wherein she specialized in adulthood and aging, from Ruppin Academic Center.

**Louis Schreel** works and teaches at the Department of Philosophy and Moral Sciences at Ghent University, Belgium. His research focuses on the relation between life and mind, the origins of intentionality in bodily movement and affectivity, and the relation between metabolism, cognition, and the emergence of self. He obtained his PhD in Philosophy in 2018 from the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf and the University of Antwerp. He is the author of *Deleuze and the Immanent Sublime: Idea and Individuation* (Bloomsbury, forthcoming).

**Ragna Winniewski** is a PhD candidate in philosophy at a.r.t.e.s. Graduate School for the Humanities in Cologne and at Vita-Salute-San-Raffaele University in Milan. By reframing a phenomenology of bodily senses her research project focuses on inter- and intrabodily phenomena such as synesthesia, kinesthesia, and atmosphere as foundational concepts for theories of embodied cognition and embodied therapy practices. Her research interests revolve around theories of perception and personhood within strands of phenomenology, anthropology, and psychopathology.

## About the Editor

**Francesca Brencio** PhD, is an Associate Researcher in Philosophy at the Research Group “HUM018: Filosofía Aplicada: Sujeto, Sufrimiento, Sociedad,” University of Seville (Spain). She leads the Pheno-Lab, A Theoretical Laboratory on Philosophy and Mental Health. She studied Philosophy at University of Perugia (Italy) and Theology at the Theological Institute in Assisi associated to Pontificia Universitas Lateranensis (Vatican City). She was a post-doctoral researcher at the Western Sydney University (Australia) and the Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg (Germany). She was Visiting Professor in the USA for the Winter Semester 2017 at the Hillsdale College (Michigan), Wisconsin University, and The SUNY in Buffalo. Executive Committee Member of The Royal College of Psychiatrists Special Interest Group in Philosophy, since 2018 she collaborates with The Collaborating Centre for Values-based Practice at St. Catherine’s College at the University of Oxford (UK). Her fields of investigation are phenomenology, hermeneutics, phenomenological psychopathology, philosophy of psychiatry, qualitative research, and Heidegger Studies. He has published over 100 scientific papers in prestigious international journals, both in philosophy and psychiatry. Recently she co-edited the Special Issue of *Frontiers in Psychology* entitled “Phenomenological Psychopathology: Who, What and How? An Analysis of Key Figures, Advancements, and Challenges” (2024). She also works as APPA Certified Philosophical Counselor.

# Chapter 1

## Introduction



**Francesca Brencio**

*What is meaningful cannot in fact be isolated*

*K. Jaspers, General Psychopathology*

In recent years there has been a growing interest in phenomenology from the mental health sciences, especially from psychology and psychiatry. The legacy of its classic texts, combined with more recent intersections with other fields of knowledge (such as cognitive sciences and enactivism) has produced a rich literature on how to apply phenomenology in clinical practice. It is exactly the question of *how* to deploy the phenomenological method in an interdisciplinary field that this volume aims to explore. One of its main goals is to facilitate a dialogue between philosophers and mental health professionals, one which is central to the way we understand mental health and treat those who suffer from mental health conditions.

An essential element in this dialogue is the issue of recognition. When we refer to recognition in the broad scenario of mental health, we do not describe a cognitive but much deeper conceptual process (or, in the language of phenomenology, event). Recognition is not seen here as the automatic and standardized pattern-recognition processes that takes place in tasks such as diagnosis. Rather, we refer to a complex and nuanced one that involves individual subjects implicated in the I-Thou process of meaning-making and intelligibility. This view of the quest (and struggle) for recognition calls into question diagnosis itself as well as the epistemic models that ground classification systems; in the process pointing out the limits of particular metaphysical views in understanding psychopathological phenomena (Zachar 2014) as well as the need for re-assessing those concepts and values at the core of therapeutic practices (Brencio 2022). It is not simply describing a clinical case or providing a mere account of a conversation between a patient and her therapist; rather it implies a philosophical dialogue embedded into the inescapable dimension of the human encounter. The ability to live and remain in the dialectic tension that

---

F. Brencio (✉)  
University of Seville, Seville, Spain  
e-mail: [fbrencio@us.es](mailto:fbrencio@us.es)

arises from this encounter, we argue, can unveil the essential structure and role of vulnerability.

In the field of mental health, the person's constitutive vulnerability needs to be recognized as a transformative resource in the healing journey. This can be done through a genuine dialectic movement that is not finalized by removing this vulnerability, but rather continues by re-assessing its nature and its potentiality in a completely different way. An example of this is the difference between diagnosis and possibility, which every existence can embody, often to great degrees (i.e. "to be very high-functioning"), but is not stressed enough in the field of mental health. It lies at the heart of the disparity between psychiatric labels and ontological constitutions of human being; put another way, between clinical definitions and existential meanings. In clinical contexts, words often become kinds of "objects" (e.g., symptoms, signs, diseases) where meanings are reified and existential possibilities fore-closed. When we search instead for existential meanings, words become relationships, correspondences, and correlations. When the gap between clinical definitions and existential meanings is too substantial to be reconciled, recovering the direction of the meaning-making process can be quite challenging. Viktor Frankl (1992) suggests the deciphering of symptoms accompanied by the search for meaning is constitutive of patients' selves. From this standpoint, a non-reductionist approach to mental health is not only central to the recovery process, but vitally necessary for allowing individuals to regain a sense of meaning in life. It is of critical importance that clinicians abandon the idea that personhood is peripheral, which turns patients into passive victims of a disease to be fixed by the treater. The person is fundamental in the healing journey; she is a goal-directed being whose feelings, interpretations, and actions are central in driving both disorder as well as improvement.

This book was born from the results of a series of seminars that took place during the academic year 2020–2021 within the activities of the *PhenoLab: A Theoretical Laboratory in Philosophy and Mental Health*, that I set up and have led since 2019. It is intended to offer the reader a series of reflections and clinical examples around fundamental themes throughout human existence such as emotional life, corporeality, thinking, and perception. One of the main goals of this work is to facilitate a dialogue, at an educational level, between philosophers and mental health professionals, one which is critical to the way we understand and treat mental health conditions.

One starting point in facilitating this dialogue comes from interdisciplinary research in cognitive sciences and psychiatry over the past 30 years, which have led to a break from traditionally Cartesian and mechanistic models of the mind. The idea that the mind was reducible to an organ called the brain continues to have many important implications in mental health. The consequences of this materialistic monism shaped the biological approach to psychiatry between the end of the 1800s and the beginning of the 1900s. Mental disorders were considered brain afflictions. As seminal findings have shown, our mind—the contents of our inner life, our affectivity as well as our memory and behaviours—cannot be reduced to the sum of partial functions localized in the physical brain. The limits of this brain-based

approach to the mind are stressed, for example, in several cardinal works by Thomas Fuchs. In his words: “It is not in the brain that we discover conscious experiences, rather only the neuronal processes or correlates that we assign to them. Yet during this assignment, neuroscience can still make the mistake of overhasty localization, thereby arriving at a new form of ‘phrenology.’” (Fuchs 2014, 81). One of the most important contributions of a phenomenologically informed approach to neuroscience is the move away from simple and linear cause and effect mechanisms towards an appreciation of the circular interaction between the brain and the environment in which it is embedded.

This volume is built precisely upon following this shift in the understanding of the mind and psychic life. In the second chapter of this volume, *The musicality of being. Embodiment and temporality in the development of selfhood*, Valeria Bizzari draws on the work of classic phenomenologists like Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to show that subjectivity and emotional life depend critically upon two fundamental structures: embodiment and temporality, both central to self-awareness, intersubjective understanding, and world perception. The author argues that musicality characterizes the subject in terms of rhythm, synchrony, and coordination, respectively. Bizzari applies this account to a specific case study: autism spectrum disorder—Asperger’s syndrome in particular—in which she describes the patient’s detachment from the intersubjective world caused by disruptions in bodily synchrony. She argues that autism spectrum disorder is characterized by an “interbody-blindness”—a disorder of the intercorporeal, temporal self.

In the third chapter, *Passibility. The Pathic Dimension of Subjectivity*, Louis Schreel follows the phenomenology of Henri Maldiney to propose an account of subjectivity as ontologically constituted by passibility, by which he describes the affective capacity of enduring a critical event. This ontological constitution of subjectivity does not concern an intentional act of self-constitution, but rather an ontological event in which a subject can only emerge as the effect of an existential wound. Unlike animals, who are captive to their environment and who must respond to unforeseen circumstances with a variety of actions, human beings can transcend the formative cycle between an external event and the requirement of a behavioral response. The human capacity to bear an event is the capacity to take an affective attitude to one’s suffering, which ranges from openness to closure. As such, passibility is a responsive capacity that affords a tremendous amount of freedom: it makes possible a detachment from one’s ego and self-image, a projection into the future, and allows for making choices. In this chapter, the author examines what this distinct mode of affectivity entails, and how it is constitutive of subjectivity.

In Chap. 4, *Atmosphere and the Pathic Epoché*, Veronica Iubei provides an illuminating analysis of the concept of atmosphere, a topic that has caught the interest of various academic disciplines, including phenomenological philosophy and psychiatry. In this essay, the author introduces the phenomenon of atmosphere (from the Greek ‘atmos’ = “vapour”, and ‘sphaire’ = “sphere”) by highlighting its main conceptualizations. While concreteness of the concept is certain, a problem lies at its roots: every time we theorize it, we somehow denature its essence. The most reliable way to appraise atmospheres, she argues, is to rediscover the domain of

situationality. Then, through an analysis of the main act of the phenomenological method, the epoché, she illustrates a certain affinity between it and the phenomenon of atmosphere, using the psychopathology of psychotic prodromes.

In Chap. 5, *Anxiety from Within: A Cognitive-Phenomenological Study*, Nofar Rodoy, Uri Hadar and Yochai Ataria discuss anxiety. Known as one of the most common mental disorders, current approaches (psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioural, biomedical, etc.) have failed to provide a comprehensive theory of the phenomenon or effective methods of treatment. Previous studies on a number of underlying pathologies (schizophrenia, post-trauma, depersonalization, etc.) have shown that taking a cognitive-phenomenological approach, which focuses on pre-reflective experience and especially its bodily aspects, may significantly improve our ability to understand a range of pathologies in this domain. Through their contribution, the authors offer a cognitive-phenomenological analysis of an excerpt selected from the personal diary of a woman coping with anxiety.

In Chap. 6, *Happy, from a Phenomenological Standpoint?* Susi Ferrarello discusses the notion of happiness from a phenomenological (and strictly Husserlian) point of view. In her paper, she combines her experience as philosophical practitioner with her philosophical knowledge of Husserl's phenomenology to address some of the most common questions that clients raise around happiness. The main questions which guide her contribution may be summarised as following: Can I have all that I desire and still be unhappy? Can good habits help me to live a happy life? Can I decide to be happy? Can I be happy despite (my) bad luck?

In Chap. 7, *Grief and Temporality*, Emily Hughes offers an accurate analysis of grief. In the bereavement literature, grief trajectories have for the most part been conceptualized according to linear time: whereas non-pathological grief is understood as being time-delimited, pathological grief is persistent and protracted. In diagnostic frameworks this is represented by the 'duration criterion' and the stipulation that grief can be considered pathological if it endures in a sustained way for 6 months or more in the ICD-11, and 12 months or more in the forthcoming DSM-5-TR. The author agrees that temporality is fundamental in the interpretation of different grief trajectories. However, she underlines a fundamental disconnect between the linear time used to conceptualize grief trajectories in the bereavement literature and the non-linear time through which grief is experienced. This is made particularly clear when it comes to the ongoing relationship between the living and the dead. Drawing upon data from a qualitative study conducted with colleagues at the University of York, Hughes provides an alternative conception of the grief process, according to the non-linear time of recurrence. Not only does recurrence help us better understand the process by which the bereaved repeatedly confronts and then gradually reconfigures the loss of a loved one in an ongoing and dynamic way, but it gives us a means by which to conceptualize how this relationship might be sustained as a continuing bond in and over time.

In Chap. 8, *Empathy, Reflection, and Mental Health*, Magnus Englander provides an outline of the phenomenological approach to empathy training within the context of mental health. The purpose of such an approach is to help professionals and researchers reflect on their empathic presence within the reciprocal, we-relation



that characterizes the interpersonal encounter. The idea is to foster an ethnographic attitude which is marked by an openness and acknowledgement of the other as an experiencing being reversibly situated within an intersubjective world. In an applied phenomenological sense, such training acknowledges the reversibility between science and philosophy made clear by participant observation. The implications of such an approach, towards practice as well as research, are described to further our understanding of the experiential relationship between psychopathological phenomena and the mundane intersubjective context of everyday life. Lastly, the interpersonal situation within professional practice is seen as a microcosm of what Karl Jaspers once pointed to as the tension between the individual and the social world.

In Chap. 9, *Making Sense of Things in Dementia*, Roxana Baiasu offers a phenomenological approach to dementia and raises some ethical issues related to the notion of epistemic injustice. Her phenomenological analysis focuses on sense-making practices and aims to understand what basic layers of sense-making are preserved in dementia. By shifting the focus away from deficits to what is preserved in dementia and the resources that affords, she shows how it is possible to develop new practices of sense-making in a social and collaborative way. This involves caregivers and patients overcoming epistemic injustices together in healthcare settings and institutions. She also shows how a focus on deficits and incapacities can lead to the devaluation, marginalization, and disempowering of individuals, and can also prevent access to valuable resources for potential restructuring of experiences and modes of being in the world. Considering mental illness in terms of resources for reconstituting meaning through resilient strategies of life-coping can empower individuals affected by dementia as well as caregivers, thus improving their well-being. This paper contributes to the literature on person-based and value-based practices pursued in tandem with evidence-based healthcare.

In Chap. 10, *The Lived Body in E-Motion: A Transdisciplinary Approach to Dementia Diseases*, Ragna Winniewski and Erik Norman Dzwiza-Ohlsen provide a phenomenological approach to dementia. Dementia is not seen primarily as a neurodegenerative disease of the brain, but as a psycho- and socio-degenerative illness affecting the subjective experience of people with dementia within their social environment. In order to fruitfully link theory and practice, as well as diagnoses to resources, a phenomenological approach to dementia is provided that is anchored by the lived body and the lifeworld experience. Their chapter is structured in four parts. The first reflects on general methodological questions crucial for an inter- and transdisciplinary account of dementia, ultimately helping to refine our understanding of applied phenomenology. This, in turn, leads the authors to consider the lifeworld basis of every caring interaction and communication: the therapeutic field. The second part reflects on the role of embodiment in dementia, specifically the critical relation between memory and identity. Next the authors examine, in more detail, the fundamental role of the lived body in e-motion by referring to central phenomenological concepts such as orientation, kinaesthesia, synaesthesia, and intercorporeality in the third part, and then interpersonal affectivity, affordance, resonance, and atmosphere in the fourth part.

In Chap. 11, *The Phenomenology of Mutual Trust in Psychotherapy: A Relational Account of Meaning-Making in Recovering the Self in Borderline Personality Disorder*, Anna Bergqvist makes use of recent philosophical and empirical work on self-ownership in mental illness and the distinctive phenomenology of mutual trust to show how the complex relationship between agentic awareness and narrative self-creation in dissonance cases is best understood integratively against a wider background of a subject's intersubjective agency. The author argues that the phenomenology of mutual trust—critical in healing relational crises, intrapsychic conflicts and identity disturbance—is conceptually and ontogenetically prior to individual self-ownership in clinical situations involving an unstable sense of self. She shows how fractures to the sense of self (as well as to other intersubjective aspects of shared engagements) play a significant explanatory role in understanding the dissociative identity disturbance characteristic of adults with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). The intersubjective relational dimension of her account is central to showing how therapeutic hope points towards a second-person dimension of subjectivity—even when social cognition breaks down.

At the core of this volume lies a belief that health is a complex phenomenon inseparable from the relationship with one's personal story, others, and the environment. There is also the view that mental health can never be reduced just to the health of our biological body, or the condition of our brain functions. It argues that an accurate understanding aimed at clarifying the experiences that characterize our psychic life must consider the circular causality between the person, her social dimension, and the culture in which she is embedded. In this regard, an ecological approach nourished by an interdisciplinary methodology can lead to significant contributions in care practices and clinical treatments.

## Bibliography

- Brencia, F. 2022. From words to worlds. How metaphors and language shape mental health. In *Metaphors and analogies in sciences and humanities: Words and worlds*, ed. S. Wuppuluri and A.C. Grayling, 233–250. Cham: Springer. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-90688-7>.
- Frankl, V. 1992. *Man's search for meaning: An introduction to logotherapy*. 4th ed. Trans. I. Lasch. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Fuchs, T. 2014. Brain mythologies. Jaspers' critique of reductionism from a current perspective. In *Karl Jaspers' philosophy and psychopathology*, ed. T. Fuchs, T. Breyer, and C. Mundt. New York: Springer. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8878-1\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-8878-1_5).
- Zachar, P. 2014. *A metaphysics of psychopathology*. Cambridge: MIT Press.