Taking their cue from Augustine’s account of self-knowledge in the latter books of De Trinitate, medieval philosophers hold that knowledge regarding our own mental states is epistemically distinctive in a number of ways. It is widely assumed, for example, that we are immediately aware of a wide range of such states and that the nature of our access to them yields knowledge that not only is utterly certain but also involves a kind of first-person authority (which is just to say that no one is better positioned to ascertain our mental states than we ourselves are). For the same reason, it is also assumed, on this medieval Augustinian picture, that the judgments or beliefs constitutive of self-knowledge — call them “self-attributing” beliefs — are characterized by (a) immediacy, (b) certainty, and (c) first-person authority.

Yet, even if medieval thinkers generally agree about the basic character of self-knowledge, they disagree about what is required to explain our possession of it. They disagree, in other words, over how to explain the nature of our access to our subjective states. As I see it, their disagreement on this issue is, at bottom, a debate about the nature and structure of conscious experience.1 In this paper, my aim is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate — one which has, as its locus, a particular concern about self-knowledge. The debate in question is between William Ockham (d. 1349) and Walter Chatton (d. 1343) over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”.2 Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) cognize its own states via higher-order (or “reflexive”) representational states (namely, acts of “intuitive cognition”)?

1. Although I am not the first to suggest that there is a connection between medieval discussions of self-knowledge and theories of consciousness (see, for example, Yrjönsuuri 2007; Rode 2008, 2010; and Toivanen 2009), the suggestion itself has yet to receive any systematic development or defense.

2. Earlier treatments of the debate between Ockham and Chatton can be found in Yrjönsuuri 2007, Michon 2007 and Putallaz 2005. Although there are differences in the details of our analyses, Yrjönsuuri sees the debate much as I do — namely, as fundamentally about the proper analysis of consciousness.
As we’ll see, Ockham answers in the affirmative, Chatton in the negative, with each arguing that his own position best accommodates the nature and character of Augustinian self-knowledge.

I take the debate between Ockham and Chatton to be representative both because it illustrates one of the main contexts in which issues connected with consciousness arise in the later medieval period and also because it showcases the central dialectical issues and alternatives at play in medieval discussions of consciousness generally. Ockham and Chatton’s debate illustrates the way in which questions about the nature and requirements for self-knowledge get connected to broader debates in cognitive theory.

What is more, the positions they stake out in the course of their debate represent what I take to be the two main types of approach to consciousness one finds in the later Middle Ages — namely, those that explain consciousness in terms of intentionality (typically, higher-order intentionality) and those that understand consciousness as a non-intentional, sui generis mode of awareness.

The discussion to follow divides into two main parts. The first part (which spans Sections 1 and 2) introduces the basic outlines of the debate between Ockham and Chatton. I begin with a brief sketch of Ockham’s theory of intuitive cognition generally. I then consider Ockham’s main argument for introducing higher-order, intellective intuition and Chatton’s arguments against doing so. In the second part of the paper (primarily Section 3), I draw out the implications of this debate for the two thinkers’ respective views about the nature of consciousness.

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3. See Putallaz 1991, which provides a very useful (and, to date, the most extensive) historical survey of later medieval discussions of self-knowledge. Although Putallaz’s primary focus is on medieval accounts of the soul’s knowledge of itself, he does also cover some of the debates about the soul’s knowledge of its states. See also Michon 2007.

4. As will become clear, I’m using the notion of intentionality expansively to refer generically to that aspect of a mental state or event that constitutes its being directed at or about something. Thus, I intend it to cover not only those accounts which, like Ockham’s, explain such directedness in terms of the representational features of such states but also accounts which take intentional directedness to be some kind of non-representational awareness of, or acquaintance with, intentional objects.

5. In what follows, citations of Ockham’s Latin texts are to Ockham 1967–88. My discussion draws solely on works in his Opera Theologica (=OTH). I use the following abbreviations in referring to particular volumes: Ord. (= Ordinatio. Scriptum in Librum Primum Sententiarum); Rep. (= Reportatio); Quodl. (= Quodlibeta Septem). All references to Chatton are to Chatton 1989. Unless otherwise noted, translations are my own.

6. Though Ockham distinguishes between acts of willing and intellect along these sorts of lines, in the end, he denies any real distinction between the faculties of intellect and will themselves.
Cognitive states, on Ockham’s view, can be exhaustively divided into two broad categories: those that are propositional in content (complexa) and those that are non-propositional (incomplexa). The latter category he further subdivides into what he calls intuitive and abstractive cognition. Broadly speaking, we can think of Ockham’s notion of intuitive cognition in terms of our own (perhaps pre-theoretical) notion of perception: it is a type of cognition that provides immediate access to the world, yielding information about contingent, current, local matters of fact — viz., how things stand right here and now. For the same reason, we can begin by thinking of Ockham’s distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition as, roughly, a distinction between perceptual and non-perceptual states.

While the foregoing characterization captures the basic intuition behind the intuitive/abstractive distinction, Ockham prefers to mark it in terms of the functional roles these states play in the formation and justification of certain kinds of judgments. Thus, on his view, an intuitive cognition of some object is one that directly produces and directly justifies beliefs about the existence and observable features of that object.

Typically, Ockham presents the distinction between intuitive and abstractive states as a distinction between two types of non-propositional state. He is willing, however, to allow for a broad usage of the term ‘abstractive’ according to which it refers to a cognitive state that is not intuitive. For this broader usage, see his discussion of intuition and abstraction at Rep. II 12–13.

That Ockham and his contemporaries think of intuitive cognition in terms of perception can be seen in their tendency to characterize it using metaphors of ‘vision’ or ‘seeing’. Indeed, for Ockham as well as Chatton, ‘intuitio’ and ‘visio’ are interchangeable expressions. Although Ockham explicitly allows that there are non-visual modes of intuition, visual perception is certainly treated as the paradigmatic case of intuition.

Although the issue of intuitive cognition arises in a variety of contexts in Ockham’s writings, the most extensive and systematic treatment of it occurs in the Prologue of his Ordinatio commentary (q.1, a.1). It is here that he offers a sustained defense of the notion of intellectual intuition.

On Ockham’s view, intuitive cognitions themselves are caused only by objects in relevant proximity — i.e., within causal reach of one’s sensory faculties. Hence, barring supernatural intervention, intuitive cognition is restricted to entities within one’s immediate environment.

Intuitive cognition of a thing is cognition such that by virtue of it one can know whether a thing exists or does not exist so that, if the thing does exist, the intellect immediately [statim] judges that it exists and evidently cognizes that it exists. … Likewise, intuitive cognition is such that when [two or more] things are cognized, one of which inheres in another, or is spatially distant from another, or stands in some other relation to another, then, by virtue of this non-propositional cognition, one immediately [statim] knows whether the one thing inheres or not, is distant or not, and so on concerning other contingent truths. For instance, if Socrates is in fact pale, that awareness of Socrates and his pallor by virtue of which we can evidently cognize that Socrates is pale is called intuitive. And, in general, any non-propositional awareness of some term or thing (or multiple terms or things) is an intuitive cognition if we can, by virtue of it, evidently cognize some contingent truth — especially about present matters of fact. (Ord. I Prol. q.1, a.1 [OTh I, 31–32])

In this passage, Ockham identifies intuitive states as those that play a twofold role in the formation of perceptual judgments: namely, a psychological role and an epistemic role. He tells us, for example, that an intuitive cognition of an object is such that, by virtue of it, “the intellect immediately judges that [the object] exists” and possesses certain attributes. This is the psychological role: intuition of some object is such that it automatically gives rise to judgments concerning its current existence and contingent, perceptible characteristics. In addition, the intuition plays a second, epistemic role vis-à-vis the judgments it occasions. As the foregoing passage makes clear, the sorts of judgments that are formed on the basis of intuition (namely, judgments...
about current, contingent matters) are also such that they are directly, or non-inferentially, justified by the intuition itself. This is indicated by Ockham’s repeated claim that such judgments constitute “evident knowledge” — or “evident cognition” of contingent facts. For Ockham, the notion of evidentness signals a class of epistemically secure, or even privileged, cognitive states.

Now, by contrast with intuitive states, abstractive cognitions play neither of these roles — they neither automatically give rise to nor provide immediate justification for judgments regarding contingent, current, local matters of fact. Indeed, Ockham introduces the label “abstractive” for any state that doesn’t function as intuitive states do:

Abstractive cognition, on the other hand, is that cognition by virtue of which we cannot know concerning some contingent thing whether it exists or does not. ... Thus, by means of an abstractive cognition we cannot evidently cognize any contingent truth — in particular, no truth relating to the present. This is clear from the fact that when Socrates and his pallor are considered in his absence, we are not able to know by virtue of this non-propositional mode of awareness whether Socrates exists or not, whether he is pale or not, or whether or not he is spatially distant from a given place — and so on concerning other contingent truths. (Ord. I Prol. q. 1, a.1 [OTh I, 32])

Accordingly, any non-propositional state that does not ground knowledge of contingent, current matters of fact counts, in Ockham’s scheme,

12. Karger 1999 (208–9) provides a useful overview of Ockham’s notion of evidentness.

13. What he means to highlight in the foregoing passage, therefore, is that perceptual judgments — that is, judgments arising from intuitive acts — qualify as evident in this technical sense. There is a long tradition of interpreting Ockham as holding that judgments grounded in intuition are infallible. See Stump 1999 for a recent discussion of the infallibilist reading and Karger 1999 for criticism of this line of interpretation.

14. Something like the notion of intuition is present in Vital du Four (d. 1327), for example. See Lynch 1972. Neither the early history of nor the driving motivations for the introduction of the distinction between intuitive and abstractive cognition is well understood. Useful treatments of the history of intuitive cognition include Boler 1982, Day 1947, and King forthcoming(a).

15. There is little literature devoted to Ockham’s treatment of sensory cognition — and most of what exists focuses on his rejection of sensible species. This lacuna in our knowledge of this part of his cognitive theory may owe to the fact that Ockham himself treats sensation as ancillary. Although he concedes the Aristotelian dictum that whatever is in the intellect is first in the senses, he gives little attention to the precise role sensation plays in cognition. For useful discussion of Ockham on sensation, see Perler 2008 and Tachau 1988 (130ff).
he did\textsuperscript{16}. In any case, even if Scotus is somewhat ambivalent about this, plenty of other thinkers are quite explicit in their rejection of intellec
tive intuition — thinkers including Peter Auriol (d. 1322), John of Reading (d. 1346), and, as we’ll see, Chatton himself.\textsuperscript{17} In rejecting
intellec
tive intuition, such authors are essentially rejecting the idea that we possess (at least in this life) a kind of non-sensory or “extra-
sensory” mode of perception.\textsuperscript{18} As they see it, perceptual states are
one and all sensory states.

Ockham offers a variety of arguments in defense of intellec
tive intuition.\textsuperscript{19} Among the most compelling, however, is what I’ll call “the argument from self-knowledge”. He thinks that the phenom-

16. Actually, there is good reason for supposing that Ockham is right about this. There is a good deal of textual evidence to suggest that Scotus took seriously
the possibility that the ‘intuitive’/‘abstractive’ distinction applies not only at
the level of sense cognition but also at the level intellect. What is more, it
looks like the reasons he has for taking this possibility seriously are much the
same as those advanced by Ockham. For a general treatment of Scotus’s
theory of intuitive cognition, see Dumont 1989, Marenbon 1987 (Chapter 10),

17. For Auriol’s account of intuition, see Friedman 2009. Ockham’s student and
secretary, Adam Wodeham, reports John of Reading as a critic (alongside
Chatton) of the view that the intellect is capable of reflexive intellec
tive
intuition. Presumably, his criticisms on this score, like Chatton’s, are part of a
wholesale rejection of the notion of intellec
tive intuition. See Wodeham 1990
(Prol. q.2, a.2).

18. Interestingly, even those who are unwilling to allow for direct cognition of
our own states in this life often allow that this will be possible in the afterlife
(since, at that point, human cognition will no longer be restricted to sensible
things but will include purely intelligible things such as God, angels, and
one’s own soul).

19. A number of these arguments are grounded in considerations having to do
with the nobility and immateriality of the intellect. Thus, for example, Ock-
ham contends that that whatever can be cognized by lower, sensory powers
can also be cognized by the intellect. See his discussion at Rep. II qq. 12–13
(\textit{OTh}, 284) and Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 (\textit{OTh I}, 45). His discussion at these points
looks to be directly influenced by Scotus. Related to considerations about the
nobility of the intellect is Ockham’s insistence that because sense faculties
cannot act with efficient causality on the intellect, it cannot be the case that
perceptual judgments, which are states of the intellect, have acts of sensory
intuition as their immediate cause. Such judgments must be caused by acts of
intellec
tive intuition. See Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 (\textit{OTh I}, 22ff).

\begin{center}
\textit{Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton}
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1.2 The Argument from Self-Knowledge

The argument from self-knowledge takes as its starting point the fact that we possess knowledge regarding a wide range of our states. This
is obvious, Ockham thinks, from everyday experience: “[E]veryone experiences in himself that he thinks, loves, rejoices, and grieves”\textsuperscript{20}
Not only does the argument assume the \textit{existence} of self-knowledge, however; it also presupposes an Augustinian account of its \textit{nature}. In fact, Ockham explicitly calls attention to the hallmark features of the Augustinian view: namely, the immediacy, certainty,\textsuperscript{21} and first-per
son authority\textsuperscript{22} of self-attributing beliefs. Following Augustine, moreover, he characterizes the immediacy of self-knowledge in terms of its non-discursive or non-inferential nature.\textsuperscript{23} Indeed, for reasons that
given of self-knowledge provides decisive evidence for the existence
of an intellec
tive, non-sensory mode of perception. Just how it does so, I shall now attempt to explain.

20. Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 (\textit{OTh I}, 40).

21. Indeed, as Ockham himself points out, in \textit{De Trinitate} 15, Augustine argues
that self-knowledge is indubitable — immune from any kind of skeptical
doubt. Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 (\textit{OTh I}, 43–44)

22. Ockham offers the following as evidence of Augustine’s endorsement of
something like first-person authority: “Again, in chapter 2 of \textit{De Trinitate}
he [Augustine] proves, first, that faith does not pertain to some sense of
the body, and afterward continues: ‘this thing belongs to the heart, not to
the body, nor is it outside of us but it is in the inmost part in us; nor does
any person see it in another, but each only in himself’. And he then contin-
ues: ‘therefore, anyone sees his own faith in his own self, but in another
he believes that it exists, he does not see.’ From this it is clear that one has
some non-propositional grasp of faith properly through which he evidently
cognizes that it exists, and another concerning the faith of someone else by
means of which he is not able to cognized whether it exists or not.” (Ord.
Prol. q.1, a.1, (\textit{OTh I}, 41–42))

23. To this effect, Ockham quotes Augustine’s account of the nature of a wayfarer’s
knowledge of his own faith: “This … can be confirmed by blessed Augustine
in \textit{De Trinitate} 13, chapter 1, where he says: ‘[T]he faith which everyone sees
in his heart if he believes, or does not see if he does not believe, we know in
a different way [than we know other things]; not in the way we know bod-
ies which we see with corporeal eyes and which — via images of them — we
retain in memory and even think about when absent; neither is it in the way
will become clearer below, Ockham highlights Augustine’s characterization of knowledge of our mental states as involving a kind of inner, non-corporeal “vision” of them. He also specifically notes the fact that, on Augustine’s account, the domain of self-knowledge includes both occurrent sensory states as well as purely rational states — namely, states of intellect and will (such as occurrent beliefs and desires).

The argument from self-knowledge is designed to show that the best (indeed, the only) explanation for our possession of such knowledge requires the introduction of intuitive cognition at the level of intellect. The core of that argument (together with my own more formal reconstruction of it) runs as follows:

It is clear that, in this life, our intellect not only cognizes sensible things but also cognizes intuitively and as particular certain intelligible things that do not fall under the senses any more than a separated substance falls under the senses. To this category belong thoughts, acts of will, and the ensuing delight and sadness. A human can experience things of this sort as being in himself, but they that we know those things which we have not seen...’ On the basis of this authority, it is clear that this faith which pertains to no bodily sense (just as he claims in the second chapter [of De Trinitate 13]) can be cognized by a single awareness [notitia] which suffices for judging whether or not it exists.” (Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 [OTh I, 29–30])

24. Ockham pays special attention to, and quotes at great length, Augustine’s account (in the early sections of De Trinitate 13) of the way in which the Christian wayfarer “sees” (videt) his own faith and his own acts of will. See, e.g., texts cited in notes 22 and 23 just above.

25. Regarding the domain of self-knowledge, Ockham notes that Augustine specifically says we can have knowledge of our faith (which is an intellective state) and then observes that “Augustine says the same thing concerning the will in chapter 3 [of De Trinitate 13].” (Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 [OTh I, 43])

26. Ockham rehearses the argument from self-knowledge at two points. As there is no significant difference between the two, I restrict my attention to the second and simpler statement of it. The first argument occurs at Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 (OTh I, 28). A similar but more abbreviated version of the argument can be found at Quodl. I.14.

are neither sensible nor do they fall under any sense. But the fact that such things are cognized intuitively and as particular is clear. After all, the following is evidently known to me: ‘I am thinking’ (ego intellego). Now, either this knowledge is (a) taken principally and immediately from a simple awareness (notitia) of the terms (or the things) [that comprise this proposition] or (b) it is known through something prior and better known. If it is known in the first way, (a), then, insofar as this is a contingent truth, it is necessary that its terms (or the things denoted by them) are seen intuitively. For, if they are cognized merely abstractively then it would not be possible by means of such an act to know a contingent truth that involves certain temporal differentia. (After all, as everyone agrees, this sort of cognition abstracts from here and now.) Therefore, the fact that it is evidently cognized requires some intuitive awareness. But clearly an intuitive awareness of me [viz., the thing denoted by “ego”] does not suffice: an intuitive awareness of the act of thinking itself is required. Therefore, an intellective intuitive awareness is required. The second alternative (b) is not to be granted, however, since there is no contingent truth from which ‘I think’ follows necessarily. (Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 [OTh I, 39–40])

1. We have evident knowledge of truths regarding our own occurrent mental (i.e., non-sensory) states.

2. Such knowledge is not derived from our senses.

3. Therefore, our knowledge of such truths derives from either (a) the intellect’s (non-propositional) cognition of its own acts or (b) inference from some contingent truth which is itself evidently known.
4. Not (b), since “there is no contingent truth from which ‘I am thinking’ follows necessarily”.

5. Therefore, (a).

6. This knowledge derives from either (i) abstractive cognition of one’s own acts or (ii) intuitive cognition of one’s own acts.

7. It doesn’t derive from (i), since abstractive cognition cannot ground knowledge regarding my current mental states.

8. It derives from (ii).

9. There is intuitive cognition at the level of intellect.

The argument is fairly straightforward. Ockham begins with the relatively uncontroversial observation that we possess introspective knowledge regarding our subjective states — in this case, he appeals to an example involving an intellective state, namely, knowledge that I’m thinking (intellego). The argument then proceeds by process of elimination: such knowledge cannot be derived from the senses (the object of such knowledge isn’t corporeal entity, hence isn’t accessible to the senses); it cannot be inferred from any other truth known to us (at least not in a way that preserves its evidentness);²⁷ and, finally, it isn’t had on the basis of abstractive cognition (since such cognition wouldn’t yield awareness of my occurrent states). Thus, it must be the result of an act of intellective intuitive cognition.

The argument is, of course, helped by Ockham’s choice of example. By focusing on “thoughts and acts of will”, he is able to argue with some plausibility that only a non-sensory form of cognition can explain facts about the domain of self-knowledge. His contention that the form of cognition in question is intuitive gains traction from the Augustinian picture of nature of such knowledge. As we have seen, intuitive cognition is introduced specifically to account for non-inferential knowledge of contingent, present matters of fact. Given this, the appeal to such a mode of cognition at the intellective level provides a nice explanation not only of the content of introspective judgments (viz., contingent facts regarding my current states), but also of their immediacy. Indeed, Ockham thinks that Augustine’s propensity to characterize self-knowledge using visual metaphors makes it all the more fitting that the cognitive mechanism that underlies it should turn out to be a species of perception. And, given that intuition is defined precisely in terms of its relation to evident judgments, Ockham maintains that appealing to intuition as the basis for self-knowledge provides a straightforward explanation for its privileged status. Finally, insofar Ockham supposes that one can intuitively cognize only one’s own mental states, the introduction of intellective intuition also squares with first-person authority.²⁸

Although Ockham’s primary aim in offering the argument from self-knowledge is to establish intuitive cognition at the level of intellect, it turns out that the argument (if correct) establishes something rather more. For what self-knowledge requires is not merely the introduction of intellective intuition but the introduction of higher-order — or what Ockham himself refers to as “reflexive” — intellective intuition. The argument from self-knowledge, thus, establishes that the intellect is aware not only of objects in the world but also — via acts of reflexive intuition — of its own first-order states.

Insofar as Chatton wants to resist the introduction intellective intuition, he likewise rejects the idea that self-knowledge requires higher-order, or reflexive, intellective intuition. Before turning to

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²⁷ Here, I take it that what Ockham means is that the proposition ‘I’m thinking’ does not follow necessarily from any proposition that doesn’t already presuppose knowledge that I’m thinking. Obviously, there are some propositions from which ‘I’m thinking’ does follow necessarily. For example, ‘I’m thinking’ necessarily follows from ‘I’m thinking about this argument’ or ‘I know that I’m thinking’, etc. But these examples beg the question, since knowledge of such propositions presupposes the very thing we’re trying to explain.

²⁸ See text cited at note 22. On the face of it, however, the claim seems merely stipulative. As we’ll see, it is not clear how Ockham can justify it.
Chatton’s objections, however, we need to look a bit more closely at the account of self-knowledge that emerges from Ockham’s argument.

1.3 Self-Knowledge and Higher-Order Intuition
As is perhaps by now clear, self-knowledge, on Ockham’s view, turns out to be a variety of perceptual knowledge. To see this, consider Figure 1 below, which represents (very schematically) Ockham’s account of the general structure of perceptual knowledge.

Figure 1. The General Structure of Perceptual Knowledge

As the diagram indicates, in ordinary cases, perception begins with some worldly object, O. On Ockham’s view, the presence and proximity of the object brings about in the cognizer an act of intuitive cognition, I(O). This cognition, in turn, leads to the formation of and evident assent to a perceptual judgment regarding the existence of the object intuited (in the foregoing, assent is indicated by the judgment stroke).29 “Evident assent”, in Ockham’s vocabulary, is a form of knowledge.30

Ockham thinks that this same structure applies whether the object in question is external or internal. If the object is external, the intuition in question is what Ockham calls a “direct” or what we might call a “first-order” act. But if the object of the intuition is itself a mental state, the intuition is “reflexive”, or higher-order.31 In either case, however, Ockham supposes that, provided the object in question is sufficiently proximate to the cognizer, there will be an intuitive cognition of it.32 Thus, just as the presence of an external object causes

29. “If [an intuitive cognition] is naturally caused, then it cannot exist unless the object exists and is present in the required proximity. This is because there can be such a distance between the object and the power that the power cannot (naturally) intuit the object. But when the object is present and in proximity in such a way, the intellect (through an act of assent) can, in the aforesaid way, judge that the thing exists.” (Rep II 12–13 [OTh V, 258])

30. The diagram and this summary involve some oversimplification. On Ockham’s view, in the natural order, perception actually involves two acts of intuitive cognition: one at the level of the senses and another at the level of intellect. (As he says, “Naturally, the intellect intuits nothing unless by means of the senses existing in their act...” [Rep. II q.12–13 (OTh V, 285)]). Thus, strictly speaking, perception of some object, O, would begin with a sensory intuitive awareness of O, which in turn occasions an intellectual intuitive cognition of O. The act of intellectual intuition then efficiently causes the formation (in the intellect) of one or more judgments regarding O.

31. As will become clear, Ockham holds that direct (or first-order) states are always numerically distinct from the reflexive (or higher-order) states that take them as object. Even so, both he and Chatton explicitly recognize the possibility that numerically one state could be both direct and reflexive in the sense that a single state could possess both first- and second-order content. A case in point would be a self-representing state — i.e., a state which represents both an external object and itself. (More on self-representation below.) For the sake of clarity, in what follows, I restrict the term “higher-order state” for reflexive states that are numerically distinct from the direct, or first-order, states they take as objects.

32. In the case of reflexive intuition, just how to understand the notion of “proximity” is unclear. In many cases, Ockham will speak as if intellectual states are self-intimating: that is, he suggests that the mere presence of a first-order intellectual act is sufficient to cause higher-order awareness of it. Other times, however, he is more cautious and speaks as if some minimal form of attention (or lack of distraction) is required in order for the first-order state
a direct intuition of it, the presence of a first-order state generates a reflexive act of intuition — one which takes that first-order state as its object. Ockham is explicit, moreover, that the higher-order state in question will be numerically distinct from that which it takes as its object. As he says,

An act by which we think of an object outside the mind is called a “direct” act, and the act by which that direct act is itself is thought of is called a “reflexive” act. … [Addition-ally,] I maintain that the direct act and the reflexive act are not a single act. (Quodl. II.12 [OTh IX, 165])

Ockham’s insistence on this point entails that, on his view, cognitive acts are never self-reflexive — that is, they never take themselves as objects. Thus, in a passage that comes immediately before that cited just above, he tells us that

... acts may not, properly speaking, be taken to be both direct and reflexive, since what is properly called “reflexive” begins from a given thing and terminates in that same thing. Likewise, properly speaking, no single act is called “reflexive”. (Ibid.)

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33. Ockham holds that only first-order states cause higher-order acts of awareness directed at them. Second-order states do not likewise immediately generate third-order reflexive acts. Ockham’s view seems to be that, generally speaking, we are not aware of higher-order states.

34. He makes the same claim in the context of his Ordinatio discussion of self-knowledge: “I say that properly and strictly speaking there are no reflexive acts of thinking since, strictly taken, something that is ‘reflexive’ includes less than two things, as is clear in the case of local reflexive motion. But taking ‘reflexive’ broadly I concede that [an intellective awareness of one’s own acts] is reflexive — even so, there’s nothing against its also being intuitive.” (Ord. Prol. q.1, a.1 [OTh I, 43–44])

35. Here, too, for simplicity, I ignore the role played by senses in perception. As noted above (see note 30), perception would begin with sensory intuition of the rock, which intuition would give rise to intellective intuition of the rock.

Now, if we apply the foregoing account to a particular instance of self-knowledge, we get something like the following picture:

**Figure 2. The Structure of Self-Knowledge (of an Intellective State)**

![Figure 2](image-url)

Figure 2 represents Ockham’s account of the basic structure of self-knowledge. In this case, it’s knowledge of one’s first-order perceptual state (namely, perception of a rock). On this picture, there is, in the first place, a direct intellective intuition of the rock, I(r). The presence of this first-order intuition generates both a first-order perceptual judgment (├ ‘there is a rock’), as well as a higher-order intuitive cognition, I(I(r)), which takes that first-order intuition as object. Finally, the reflexive intuition, in its turn, generates a reflexive judgment — namely, a self-attributing belief regarding the occurrence of the first-order act (├ ‘I(r) exists in me’). As Figure 2 makes clear, therefore, the structure of self-knowledge parallels that of perceptual knowledge; indeed, it’s just a higher-order iteration of Ockham’s general model of perception. And this, of course, is the principle aim of the argument from...
self-knowledge: namely, to establish that self-knowledge requires acts of higher-order intellectual intuition.

More could be said both about the details of Ockham’s account of self-knowledge and the motivations for it, but this suffices, I think, to demonstrate the basic contours of his view. Let’s turn now to Chatton’s views — both to his objections to Ockham’s account and his proposed alternative.

2. Against Higher-Order Intuition: Chatton’s Alternative Account of Self-Knowledge

Chatton is among those who deny the existence of intuitive cognition at the level of intellect. For the same reason, he wants to resist the introduction of reflexive acts of intellectual intuition and, hence, Ockham’s account of self-knowledge as a whole.36 In responding to Ockham’s account, he pursues three main lines of objection: first, he argues that the postulation of reflexive intellectual intuition is insufficient to account for Augustinian-style self-knowledge; second, that it is unnecessary to account for such knowledge; and, third, that it gives rise to an infinite regress in intuitive acts. Chatton gives the lion’s share of his attention to the last of these three lines of criticism — indeed, by my count, he develops three distinct types of infinite-regress argument against Ockham’s position (and even offers multiple versions of each). But because the first two lines of criticism are the most important for understanding his own positive account of self-knowledge as well as its motivation, I focus on them in what follows.37 (I will, however, have reason consider one of his infinite-regress arguments in Section 3 below.)

2.1 Higher-Order Intuition is Insufficient to Account for Self-Knowledge

Chatton offers two arguments for the claim that higher-order intellectual intuition can’t itself explain the phenomena associated with Augustinian self-knowledge. To see what these arguments are, let us consider again the case of a subject — call her S — who is consciously thinking about a rock.38 Now, if S is aware that she’s thinking about a rock, then, according to both Ockham and Chatton, S will know — immediately, with utter certainty, and in a distinctively authoritative matter — both that she is thinking and that she’s thinking about a rock. The problem with Ockham’s account, as Chatton sees it, is that it fails to account for these two features of self-knowledge. In other words, on his view, the introduction of higher-order intellectual intuition doesn’t itself provide the means to account for S’s (immediate, certain, and authoritative) knowledge of the content of her thoughts nor even of the fact that such a thought is occurring.39

Let’s begin by considering the charge that a higher-order account cannot explain knowledge of the content of one’s conscious states. Here’s how Chatton frames it:

[On your account, Ockham,] I would, by virtue of a [higher-order] vision, be certain either that (a) I’m thinking of a rock, or I would be certain only that (b) I am thinking (but as to whether or not there is a rock, about this I would not be certain, in virtue of that vision). Now, you [Ockham] cannot accept the first option [viz. (a)], since

36. Chatton devotes an entire section of his own treatment of intuitive cognition to the question of self-knowledge — namely, at a.5 of q.2 of his Sentences Prologue. (See Chatton 1989.) His discussion in this context is essentially a sustained critique of Ockham’s own earlier treatment of the issue.

37. A more detailed discussion of the infinite-regress arguments can be found in Putallaz 2005.

38. The example itself I take from Chatton and Ockham — and it is a standard example in medieval discussions of cognition. Even Augustine, at De Trinitate 11.2, in the course of his discussion of sense perception, lists a stone as among the kinds of thing which might serve as the object of an act of perception. It may be that the example traces ultimately to Aristotle’s discussion of knowledge in De Anima and, in particular, to his example at 3.8, the soul’s knowing a stone via its possession of the form of the stone.

39. To be clear: When speaking of content, I’m presupposing an internalist notion of content. Thus, in the case of being certain that I’m seeing a rock, Augustine holds that what I’m certain of is that I am having a perception as-of-a-rock. But he does not suppose that certainty includes knowing that there is, in fact, a rock.
if you did, it would turn out that an angel could [also] be certain that you are thinking of a rock and thus wouldn’t need communication or illumination [in order to know your thoughts]. But you yourself think this false, since elsewhere you suppose that when an angel sees the cognition of another angel, nevertheless he does not know what the object of that cognition is. Nor can you accept the second [viz. (b)], since I am as certain that I am thinking of a rock as that I am thinking. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. I Prol. q.2, a.5, 122)

Admittedly, the way Chatton states the argument is a bit complicated. One part of the complication owes to his appealing to claims Ockham makes in other contexts about angelic mind-reading, another part owes to the fact that his interpretation of such claims is controversial. But none of this vitiates the overall thrust of his argument—the gist of which is clear enough. Basically, Chatton proceeds by arguing that Ockham’s account presents a dilemma both the horns of which Ockham himself is committed to rejecting.

Taking our example of a subject, S, consciously thinking about a rock again, we can represent his argument this way:

1. If Ockham’s account of self-knowledge is correct, then when S is consciously aware of her thought of a rock, S must know with certainty either (A) both that she is thinking and that she is thinking about a rock or (B) only that she is thinking (and hence not also that she’s thinking of a rock).

2. If (A), then (given Ockham’s account) self-knowledge lacks first-person authority regarding the content of one’s states.

3. But self-knowledge does involve first-person authority regarding the content of one’s states.


5. If (B), then self-knowledge doesn’t include knowledge of the content of one’s (occurrent) states.

6. But self-knowledge does include knowledge of the content of one’s (occurrent) states.

7. Not (B).

8. Ockham’s account of self-knowledge is false.

The crucial premise, of course, is the second. Here Chatton’s claim is that if, as Ockham supposes, S’s knowledge regarding the content of her thought owes to the existence of another state distinct from it and directed upon it, then it won’t be possible to preserve the first-person authority associated with self-knowledge. For, as Chatton explains, on such an account “it will turn out that an angel could [also] be certain that [S is] thinking of a rock and thus wouldn’t [even] need communication or illumination [in order to know S’s thoughts].” And this is because, in principle, an angel could, as it were, just peer into her head and come to know the content of her thoughts in just the way she herself does—namely, via an intuitive cognition of them. Indeed, there appears to be nothing in Ockham’s account that could explain how the angel’s knowledge of S’s thoughts differs from S’s own. But, then, it’s hard to see how the subject’s access to her own states is unique or privileged or how she is an authority regarding her own states. Hence the first horn must be rejected.

E.g., Ockham’s discussion at Quodl. I.6 and at Rep. II.16 (see OTh V, 377)

Ockham doesn’t claim, as Chatton’s gloss suggests, that an angel—Gabriel, say—cannot know anything about the content of another angel’s—say, Michael’s—act of cognition when he perceives Michael’s mental acts. Rather, what Ockham claims is that, in certain cases—namely, ones in which Michael is intuitively cognizing some singular object—Gabriel will be unable to determine precisely which entity (among several exactly resembling individuals) is the object of Michael’s intuitive act. 

42. Chatton goes on, in the passage, to offer independent evidence that Ockham is committed to the rejection of option (A). According to Chatton, Ockham in other contexts appears committed to the claim that one angel—Gabriel, let’s say—cannot know the thoughts of another angel—Michael, say—just via
To be sure, it's not at all clear what advantage is had by taking the second horn of the dilemma — at least when it comes to preserving first-person authority. After all, even if higher-order intuition yields only knowledge about the occurrence (but not about the content) of my thoughts, it remains the case that any angel intuitively gazing upon my states will know just as much about them as I know via reflexive intuition. Then again, it may be that Chatton is supposing that first-person authority extends only to knowledge of the content of one's states. But whatever the case may be, Chatton rules out the second horn on other grounds. For, as he points out, if higher-order intuition does not give S access to the content of her first-order thought, then there is another datum of self-knowledge for which Ockham has failed to account: namely, the fact that self-knowledge involves certainty regarding the content of one's own current states.

This objection exploits the fact that, on Ockham's account, a subject's awareness of her occurrent thoughts owes to the presence of a state that is distinct from and a representation of those thoughts of which she is aware. Indeed, it is precisely this feature of the account that allows for the possibility that someone other than S could know as much about her subjective states (and in precisely the same way) as she herself does. This same feature of the account also allows for the possibility of error. Thus, as Chatton attempts to show in the second of his two arguments, Ockham's theory fails to account not only for first-person authority but also for the certainty associated with self-knowledge. In order to show this, he constructs a scenario in which God is causing a person who has a second-order intuition of first-order thought of a rock to entertain this self-attributing thought: 'I'm perceiving a rock.' In the scenario, however, there is, in fact, no first-order perception of a rock. So, basically, Chatton is constructing a scenario in which we have a targetless higher-order state. Here's the idea:

intuitively cognizing them. Whether or not Chatton is right in ascribing this view to Ockham, his idea is just this: If it's the case that angel Gabriel cannot know the content of angel Michael's thoughts just by directly perceiving Michael's intellecitive acts, it's not clear why we should think Michael can know his own thoughts in this way.

Assuming such a scenario is possible, Chatton wants to know: Will the subject assent to (i.e., believe) the self-attributing proposition or not? Either answer, he thinks, will be unpalatable for Ockham. Here, too, therefore, his argument is best understood as taking the form of a dilemma. Chatton's own statement of the argument (once again with my more formal reconstruction) runs as follows:

Figure 3. Chatton's Skeptical Scenario

\[
\begin{array}{c}
\text{? \& \?}
\end{array}
\]

\[
\text{\small \{ I am perceiving a rock \}}
\]

\[
\text{\small = \{ } \text{I(r) exists in me} \}
\]

\[
\text{\small \{ } \text{Second-order intuition of a (non-existent) first-order intuition of a rock} \}
\]

\[
\text{\small ( \_ )}
\]

Suppose God were to conserve in the mind [of S] this thought: 'The act of thinking of a rock exists in me.' And suppose he were to introduce alongside it a [higher-order] vision of the act of thinking to which the subject term of that thought refers. If he did so when the [lower-order] act of thinking did not in fact exist, then perhaps, at this point (i.e., with only that thought and the [higher-order] vision existing in the soul) it would not be sufficient for generating assent to the thing signified by that thought — or at least not the sort of assent that is caused by intuitive cognition. ... The first assumption is clear, since the soul does not seem to be of such a nature that it would be disposed to cause an assent that it is thinking [of something] when it is not thinking of it. After all, nothing is more certain to the soul than the existence of its own act. Therefore, if the soul were disposed to cause an
assent that an act of thinking of a rock exists when it does not exist, it would, therefore, be disposed to cause an error in itself, regarding what is most certain to it. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.2, a.5, 123)

1. It is possible (via divine intervention) that a subject, S, could have a higher-order intuition of a nonexistent first-order state.

2. In such a case, the higher-order intuition would either (A) cause S to assent to a self-attributing proposition (e.g., ‘I’m perceiving a rock’) or else (B) not cause this.

3. If (A), it follows that S could be in error about things that are most certain to her — namely, about the occurrence of her own states. This is absurd.


5. If (B), then higher-order intuition is not sufficient for self-knowledge.

6. But higher-order intuition is (on Ockham’s view) sufficient for self-knowledge.

7. Not (B).

Since Ockham famously allows for cases of supernaturally induced intuitive cognition of nonexistent objects, he wouldn’t, presumably, object to the first premise. But he would most certainly reject its second premise on the grounds that it presents a false dichotomy. There is, after all, a further possibility: namely, that the higher-order intuition will lead S to assent to some self-attributing proposition — not to the proposition that she is perceiving of a rock but rather to the proposition that she is not perceiving of a rock (or that she seems to be perceiving of a rock but is not). Indeed, this is precisely what Ockham claims in cases of supernaturally induced intuitive cognition of nonexistent objects. He thinks that, in such cases, the intuition gives rise to an evident judgment (and, hence, certainty) that the object intuited does not exist. Yet, while such a response is available to Ockham, as a rejoinder to Chatton’s objection, it doesn’t help his case much, since the position it leaves him with is implausible at best. After all, it commits him to saying S knows herself not to be in a state she seems to be aware of being in. Indeed, she knows herself not to be in this state just in virtue of her seeming to be in it. An odd strategy for preserving the security of self-knowledge!

Whether or not Ockham has a plausible response, the upshot of the argument is clear enough. Chatton’s point — both here and in the previous argument about self-knowledge regarding content of conscious states — is simply that if, as Ockham supposes, our awareness of conscious states owes to a distinct, higher-order representation of them, it will turn out that the resulting form of awareness is insufficient to account for the various phenomena it was introduced to explain. If consciousness is a matter of higher-order perception, self-knowledge will turn out to be less than utterly direct, less than utterly secure, and in no sense first-person authoritative.

2.2 Higher-Order Intuition is Unnecessary to Account for Self-Knowledge

Chatton maintains not only that higher-order intuitive states are insufficient to account for the phenomena associated with self-knowledge but also that their postulation is unnecessary. On his view, all the phenomena can be preserved without appeal to any acts of intellective intuition. As he says at one point: “[I]t is superfluous to posit [reflexive]

43. Since Chatton is aware of Ockham’s views on this score, it’s not clear why he doesn’t anticipate such a rejoinder.

44. E.g., Ord. Prol., q.1 (OTh I, 30–31)

45. One might also wonder whether Ockham could respond by simply grasping the second horn of the dilemma. Perhaps, but doing so would require him to revise his general account of perception (since it is that account which commits him to the claim that a reflexive intuition is sufficient for self-knowledge). Also, it would still leave him vulnerable to all the problems raised by the possibility of targetless higher-order states.
As Chatton here indicates, he thinks that evident assent to a self-attributing proposition can be accounted for without the introduction of acts reflexive intuition. Indeed, he insists that our knowledge of our subjective states requires merely the occurrence of those states themselves:

I say that the soul assents to the thing signified by this ‘I am thinking about a rock’ without any intuitive act. And this is because, in addition to this propositional thought ‘I am thinking about a rock’ (which is composed of abstractive cognitions which may or may not be caused

46. Rep. Prol. q.2, a.5, 126. Chatton qualifies this claim by saying that it holds true only ‘in this life’. Indeed, in other places, Chatton explicitly allows that post-mortem humans may indeed be capable of intellective intuition — both direct and reflexive.

47. In this passage, Chatton speaks as if the mere presence of the thought of the rock is sufficient for introspective knowledge of it. Strictly speaking, however, it turns out that this is not the case; something further is required. But because this further requirement is not an act of higher-order intuition, I’ll ignore this complication for the moment. I shall return to it in Section 3.2 below.

As it stands, Figure 4 involves some oversimplification, which I’ll eventually need to redress. For now, however, it suffices to highlight the most important features of Chatton’s account. Three things, in particular, are worth noting.

First, note that the example Chatton uses is one in which the state the subject is aware of is not an occurrent perception of a rock but
an occurrent thought of a rock. Chatton changes the example slightly, since, like Ockham, he wants to focus on cases in which one possesses knowledge of an intellec tive state. Yet, because he rejects the idea that perception (i.e., intuition) occurs at the level of intellect, he has to alter the case accordingly. (Now, as Chatton alludes in the foregoing passage and as I indicate in the diagram, it may be that, in order to think about a rock, one must have, at some point, an intuitive cognition of a rock — but that would be a sensory state, not intellec tive.) The second thing to notice is that, like Ockham, Chatton takes self-knowledge to involve assent to a higher-order propositional representation of lower-order states. In other words, it takes the form of a higher-order belief or judgment about those states. But — and this is the third point — on Chatton’s picture, such knowledge regarding one’s first-order states does not require higher-order perception of them. For a subject to know that she’s thinking about a rock, it is necessary that she be thinking about a rock, but, as Chatton says in the foregoing passage, “this suffices since that thought is suited to cause an assent with respect to itself without the mediation of any act of intuitive cognition of it”.

Of course, the most pressing question for Chatton is to explain how exactly the occurrence of the first-order state accounts for the subject’s knowledge of it. The answer to this question, as we’ll now see, turns on Chatton’s views about the nature of consciousness. Indeed, what the whole of the foregoing discussion makes clear, I think, is that at the heart of this disagreement about reflexive intellec tive intuition is a question about the proper analysis of consciousness itself. It is, therefore, to the accounts of consciousness presupposed by Ockham’s and Chatton’s respective analyses of self-knowledge that I now turn.

3. Consciousness: Higher-Order Intentionality vs. Same-Order Acquaintance

As we’ve now seen, both Ockham and Chatton accept the same, the broadly Augustinian, characterization of self-knowledge. What is more, they also end up with similar analyses of its basic structure.

For both thinkers, self-knowledge takes the form of introspective beliefs or judgments — that is, assent to higher-order, propositional representations of lower-order states. Finally, and most significantly for our purposes, they each hold that such knowledge isn’t the only, or even the most basic, mode of self-awareness. Rather, their analysis of self-knowledge presupposes the existence of an independent and more basic (sub-do xastic and non-propositional) awareness of one’s states. As they see it, a subject cannot know — i.e., immediately cognize and evidently judge — that she is perceiving a rock, if the very act of perceiving the rock is one of which she is wholly unconscious.

Thus, for both, knowledge regarding our mental states is grounded in and explained by one’s conscious experience of those same states.

Highlighting these points of agreement helps, I think, to target where the principle disagreement lies. Whatever similarities may be found in their accounts of self-knowledge, Ockham and Chatton part ways when it comes to explaining what’s required for possession of such knowledge. And, as I say, these differences amount to two fundamentally different approaches to the nature of consciousness. Ockham explains consciousness in terms of higher-order representation, whereas Chatton explains it in terms of a sui generis mode of awareness that is neither higher-order nor representational in nature. Of course,
to characterize their debate in this way is to frame it in a terminology that, while familiar to contemporary discussions, is foreign to their own. Certainly, Ockham and Chatton (and, to my knowledge, medieval philosophers in general) have no single Latin expression corresponding to our own term “consciousness.”

Even so, the phenomena their own discussions target clearly does share a great deal in common with current treatments of phenomenal consciousness. After all, at bottom, the issue at stake between them is a question about the proper analysis of our first-person awareness of our states. In particular, Ockham and Chatton are interested in what it is about conscious states that explains our awareness or experience of being in them. Given this way of characterizing their target phenomenon, it’s quite plausible to read them as attempting to provide a theory of what, in the current literature, goes under the name “self-consciousness” or “subjective consciousness.” What is more, the type of position each defends, and even the dialectical considerations that motivate their respective development, approximates those staked out in the contemporary debate—or so I shall now argue.

3.1 Ockham: Consciousness as Higher-Order Perception

According to what are referred to as “higher-order representation” (HOR) theories of consciousness, what makes a given state conscious is that the state is the intentional object of, or represented by, another of the subject’s mental states. Thus, on HOR theories, consciousness turns out to be an extrinsic property of conscious states—something they possess only in virtue of their relation to other, meta-intentional states. Nowadays, proponents of HOR theories divide according to whether they take the consciousness-bestowing state to be perception-like or thought-like in nature. According to friends of “higher-order perception” (HOP) or “inner-sense” theories, a state is conscious just in case it is the object of some kind of internal monitoring or quasi-perceptual faculty. By contrast, those advocating for the “higher-order thought” (HOT) approach hold that a state is conscious just in case it is the object of an assertoric thought to the effect that one is in that very state. On both approaches, however, consciousness is a matter of the mind directing its intentional aim upon its own states and activities.

That Ockham’s conception of consciousness fits the HOR model is, I think, fairly clear. As we’ve seen from his discussion of self-knowledge, Ockham argues that it is the presence of distinct, higher-order representations—namely, reflexive intuitions— that accounts for our consciousness of and, hence, knowledge regarding our (lower-order) subjective states. In this respect, he appears to share with HOR theorists the view that the distinction between conscious and unconscious states isn’t a matter of some difference in their intrinsic nature but rather a matter of a difference in the relations in which they stand to other states. Indeed, Ockham explicitly says as much in another context—one in which he is specifically considering whether reflexive

50. Leading defenders of higher-order perception theories include Armstrong 1968 and Lycan 1996, 2001, 2004. It may also have been the view of Locke, Kant, and other early modern inner-sense theorists—though recently the attribution of this theory to Locke has been challenged. See Coventry and Kriegel 2008.

51. Actually, higher-order thought theorists disagree about whether a given state is conscious in virtue of its being disposed to give rise to a higher-order thought or its being the actual target of such a thought. A prominent proponent of actualist higher-order thought theory is Rosenthal (1986, 2005); the dispositionalist approach is defended by Carruthers (1996). For a useful survey of higher-order representationalist approaches in general, see Carruthers 2007.

52. That intuitive cognitions are representational states is something I’ve argued for elsewhere. See Brower-Toland 2007.
awareness of one’s first-order states requires the introduction of a further, higher-order state. Here he asks whether a subject who “has only a single act of cognition directed at some [external] object … is aware of thinking of that object or not”. His response is clearly in the negative:

If we accept what is being supposed — namely, that there is only a single act of cognition, directed at some object, then, so long as we bracket every other act of the intellect, I reply that no [he is not aware that he is thinking of that object]. Indeed, I claim that if it were asked of him at that very moment whether he is aware that he is thinking of that object, he ought not agree that he does since, at that instant, he does not perceive that he is thinking of the object. (Quest in II Sent. q.17 [OTh V, 387–389])

On Ockham’s view, a first-order state that occurs in the absence of any further higher-order, or meta-intentional, state will, for the same reason, occur unconsciously.

In light of the foregoing, we can adapt our earlier diagram of Ockham’s account of self-knowledge so as to include in it his analysis of consciousness (which is indicated by the “pow” sign):

**Figure 5. Ockham’s Account of Consciousness:**

Here we get not only a picture of the structure of self-knowledge but also a sense for Ockham’s understanding of where and how consciousness occurs in it. In the case represented, the only state that occurs consciously is the first-order intuition of the rock and consciousness of it owes to a distinct, higher-order state: namely, to a second-order, perceptual representation of it. Clearly, an HOR model of consciousness.

There can be little doubt, moreover, about which variety of higher-order representationalism Ockham endorses. He holds that the conscious-making state is an act of reflexive intuitive cognition. But since intuitive cognition is just a form of perceptual awareness, it should be clear that his approach also falls in line with HOP theories. Admittedly, on Ockham’s view, conscious states are such that they will often (if not always) be accompanied by higher-order assertoric thoughts (i.e., by self-attributing beliefs).55 After all, he holds that acts of intuitive cognition (whether direct or reflexive) are such that they naturally and immediately give rise to judgments about their object. Even so, it remains true that such higher-order thoughts are always psychologically (if not temporally) preceded by perception-like awareness of one’s states.56 Fundamentally, then, consciousness is, for him, a matter of higher-order perception.

As it turns out, moreover, the kinds of considerations that lead Ockham to his view are very similar to those advanced by contemporary advocates of HOP accounts of consciousness: namely, (i) the fact that there are prima facie similarities between perceptual experience and conscious experience, (ii) the fact that HOP models can easily account for the difference between conscious and unconscious states, and, finally, (iii) the fact that HOP models can do so without introducing any

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55. Ockham often speaks as if intuitive cognitions always naturally cause acts of judgment. I’m assuming, however, that, since he also holds that such judgments involve concepts as constituents, for subjects who lack the relevant concepts — small children, say — an intuitive cognition would not generate full-fledged perceptual judgment.

56. In general, Ockham holds that acts of perceptual judgment (i.e., assertoric, propositional thought) are always preceded by acts of intuitive awareness of the objects of such judgments.
Thus, like current HOP theorists, Ockham is motivated, in the first place, by the simple observation that there is much in the phenomenology and epistemology of conscious experience which seems akin to that of ordinary perception. Our awareness of our own states, like our perceptual awareness of extra-mental objects, is utterly immediate. Indeed, the phenomenology of consciousness is as of our states being immediately present to us—much as intuitive cognition of some object makes it present to us. Similarly, our awareness of our subjective states is such that it both immediately gives rise to and non-inferentially justifies beliefs about them—thus consciousness of our states seems to function in much the way the ordinary perceptual awareness functions vis-à-vis perceptual belief. It would seem, therefore, that the weight of everyday experience (and, on Ockham’s view, authority) favors an inner-sense, or inner-perception, theory of consciousness.

Again, like contemporary defenders of higher-order approaches, Ockham cites in favor of his view the fact that his theory provides means for explaining the difference between conscious and unconscious states. And since both experience and authority make clear that not all occurring states are conscious, he takes this to be no small advantage for his view. As he points out:

57. Lycan 2004 provides a useful overview of the motivations favoring higher-order perception theories. His discussion focuses primarily on the advantages of a higher-order perception approach over a higher-order thought approach, but the considerations he advances usefully highlight the motivations for the approach generally. See also Kriegel 2006 and Carruthers 2007 for further discussion of considerations favoring (and weighing against) HOP theories (and HOR theories in general).

58. Like Scotus, Ockham holds that one of the distinguishing features of intuitive states in general is that they make their objects experientially present to us.

59. As Ockham is well aware, Augustine himself markedly prefers to characterize consciousness using perceptual (indeed, primarily, visual) metaphors. Indeed, as we’ve seen, he calls special attention to precisely those passages in which Augustine explains self-knowledge in terms of inner-vision. See notes 22–23 above.

60. This point is made in response to an objection brought against his view by Chatton, who, as we’ll see, defends a one-level approach.


62. Of course, as I indicated above, there are different sorts of phenomena that go under the heading “consciousness”. Higher-order theorists are divided over whether higher-order intentionality accounts for both the subjective and the qualitative aspects of conscious experience. Lycan (2004), for example, argues that his HOP theory does not purport to explain anything about qualitative character.

The difference between unconscious and conscious states is easily explained on the higher-order approach. Indeed, as Ockham points out here, it’s merely a matter of whether or not the subject “perceives” his occurring states.

Finally, while this is not something to which Ockham himself calls attention, it should be clear that there are considerations of theoretical, or explanatory, simplicity favoring his approach. After all, a HOP theory of consciousness (or any theory which explains consciousness in terms of higher-order intentionality) is reductionist in nature: the strategy is to explain one sort of mental phenomenon—namely, consciousness (or at least certain important features of it)—in terms of another—namely, intentionality. In Ockham’s case, the project is to explain both consciousness and the various phenomena associated with self-knowledge in terms of intellective intuitive cognition. For him, then, accounting for consciousness requires nothing beyond a...
higher-order iteration of his general theory of perception. Although Ockham himself doesn’t cite theoretical simplicity as a consideration in favor of the theory, some of his successors did call attention to the fact that an approach such as Chatton’s introduces mystery where Ockham’s does not.

To the extent that Ockham’s account shares the advantages of HOR theories of consciousness, it is likewise subject to the same sorts of objections traditionally brought against such theories. Indeed, a number of the objections Chatton presses against Ockham persist even in current discussions of higher-order theories. For example, like Chatton, critics of higher-order theories frequently object that this approach threatens an infinite regress in higher-order states. Again, such critics — like Chatton — often call attention to fact that HOR theories allow for the possibility of non-veridical self-awareness—a possibility which seems incompatible with the apparent security and immediacy of self-consciousness. Unlike that of most contemporary higher-order intentionality theorists, however, Ockham’s reductionism isn’t motivated by physicalist or naturalist inclinations. Although he certainly means to explain consciousness in terms of the purely representational features of mental states, there is no program to further reduce these latter features to non-mental properties or relations.

Although, as indicated in the previous note, medieval philosophers do not share the kind of materialist outlook that motivates current reductionists’ accounts of consciousness, it is not immediately obvious how (or where) consciousness — if taken as primitive — fits within their own metaphysical paradigm. Wodeham points this out in his reaction to Chatton’s account. See note 83 below.

Although I passed over the details of Chatton’s formulation of this line of objection, the general direction of reasoning goes something like this: If a second-order state confers consciousness on a given first-order state, the second-order state must itself be conscious. Hence, there must be a third-order state, and so on. One finds, in the current (and even in the medieval literature, a host of different ways of formulating this sort of argument — different formulations having to do with (a) the particular version of HOR being targeted and (b) how the opening premise is motivated. See, for example, Rowlands 2001 (for a regress argument targeted specifically at HOT theories), Kriegel 2003a (ff.), and Zahavi 2005 (25Ff.). As it turns out, Ockham is no more moved by the charge of regress than contemporary proponents of HOP approaches typically are. The standard contemporary reply is simply to reject its guiding assumption. Ockham’s response is much the same. I discuss Chatton’s regress charge and Ockham’s response to it in detail elsewhere.

3.2 Chatton: Consciousness as Same-Order Subjectivity

What we’ve seen of Chatton’s account of self-knowledge makes clear that he not only rejects Ockham’s higher-order perception model of consciousness but also advocates some kind of one-level, or same-order, theory. What is less clear, though, is exactly how we are to understand his alternative proposal. If awareness of one’s states isn’t a function of higher-order representation of them, what does render a given state conscious?

One way to respond to this question — an approach frequently taken by contemporary advocates of one-level theories — is to argue that conscious states are self-representing: that is, they represent both the world and themselves (i.e., their own occurrence). According to such theories, consciousness is a function of same-order self-representation.

66. This line of objection is widely discussed in the contemporary literature. Discussions include Byrne 1997, Neander 1998, and Kriegel 2003b.

67. This sort of objection has been formulated variously by various people. Rudder Baker (1998, 2000), to take one example, has recently argued that naturalist approaches to consciousness, such as HOR theories, presuppose but fail to explain the first-person perspective. In a similar vein, Kriegel (e.g., 2003a) argues for the superiority of a same-order representational approach, on the grounds that HOR theories fail to adequately explain the subjective character of conscious states. This same line of criticism is also prominent in the phenomenological tradition. Phenomenologists such as Husserl and Sartre have traditionally argued against both higher-order and representationalist approaches to consciousness precisely on the grounds that such approaches fail to account for the phenomenon of subjective, pre-reflexive awareness. See Zahavi 2005 and Gallagher and Zahavi 2005.

As with higher-order theories, on the self-representational account, a state is conscious just in case it is represented in the relevant way; but unlike higher-order representationalist accounts, on this view, the representing state and the represented state are numerically one and the same. In order to distinguish this approach from higher-order representationalism (where the latter is understood as a two-level theory), I shall refer to it as “Same-Order Representationalism” or “SOR”.

This sort of approach has gained currency in contemporary discussions of consciousness and has been associated with historical figures ranging from Aristotle to Locke and Brentano. It is, moreover, an approach countenanced by some medieval thinkers. Indeed, Chatton himself explicitly considers this sort of view — but only to reject it. Consider his remarks in the following passage. Here Chatton is focusing on the case of a conscious desire (or “act of love”):

Barring any experiential cognition relating to love, and allowing only this, viz. that an [act of] love is received in the mind: in such a case, one will experience oneself to love. In much the same way, one experiences oneself to think of a rock when one has that act — here too, barring any experiential awareness of that act of thinking. It is the case, therefore, that if anyone has a proximate act of loving without any cognition of that proximate act, nevertheless, one will experience that act of loving, without any cognition of it. I confirm this in the second place, since that which is experienced — namely the act of loving or thinking — does not exist except as an act received [in the mind]. But from the fact that the mind receives that act, one is not entitled (contingit) to conclude that that act is its own object. Therefore, etc. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.1, a.1, 26)

This passage opens with Chatton reiterating his claim that the mere occurrence of a given mental act or state is sufficient for subjective awareness of it. On his view, there is no need for any further act of cognition. The subject, he insists, “experiences” his act “without any cognition of it”. And, as subsequent remarks make clear, this is meant to rule out not only cognition of the act by a distinct and higher-order state but cognition and hence representation of any kind — including same-order self-representation. As he says, “[F]rom the fact that the mind receives” (and, I would add here, experiences) “its own act, one is not entitled to conclude that that act is its own object”.

Although Chatton’s remarks in this passage don’t exactly amount to an argument against the SOR approach, the specific case he considers — namely, a conscious act of desire/love — does provide prima facie, intuitive grounds for rejecting it. After all, Chatton’s claim here is that whenever someone occupies a conative state (i.e., an act of desire or volition) he will — absent any other mental act — experience himself as being in that state. This much Chatton takes as intuitive. To grant him just this, however, is to grant all he thinks he needs for his case against a SOR theory of consciousness. And this is because, on Chatton’s view — as on that of many medieval thinkers — conative states such as loving or desiring are non-representational in nature. Hence,

69. What is more, self-representing states are like higher-order states in that they are reflexive (in Ockham’s sense) and, hence, possess higher-order content.

70. See Caston 2002 for a discussion of this view in connection with Aristotle and Kriegel 2003a for its connection to Brentano; see Coventry and Kriegel 2008 for an attribution of the view to Locke.

71. Interestingly, Ockham, too, considers and rejects this sort of approach. As it turns out, there was a good deal of debate about the possibility of same-order representation among late medieval thinkers. I sketch the outlines of this debate and situate it vis-à-vis broader medieval debates about consciousness in Brower-Toland forthcoming(b).

72. Elsewhere, Chatton is even more explicit: “I say that a direct and reflexive act are never the same properly speaking, since an external rock and the thought of it in the soul are distinct things, therefore also thoughts properly of it are distinct. As a result, the thought by which an external rock is thought of is one thing and the thought by which the thought of the rock is itself thought of is another.” (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.2, a.5, 125–126)

73. Chatton holds that the intellect and will are not really distinct (but only formally). Nevertheless, he holds that, although acts of willing and refusing (and
the subject’s awareness of his desire (or “love”) cannot be explained in terms of that state’s representing itself.

Whatever we might think about the plausibility of this particular example, it highlights what I take to be the heart of Chatton’s own, alternative approach. On his view, consciousness is not only an intrinsic but also a non-representational feature of those states which possess it. Indeed, it is this latter aspect of Chatton’s account that most sharply distinguishes it from Ockham’s. What Chatton wants to resist in Ockham’s theory is not merely the appeal to higher-order representation but also — and, I think, most importantly — to intentionality in general as an explanation for consciousness. That this is the case becomes all the more clear when we turn to his own, positive characterization of the nature of conscious experience.

Take, for example, his remarks in the following text:

The mind experiences something in a two-fold way. This is because it experiences something as an object, and then something is experienced as a living subject experiences its own act. Otherwise, it would go on to infinity, since if its act were experienced only as an object, there would therefore be there another of which it is the object, and it would be experienced. Either, therefore, it is experienced as an act and not as the object — and we have our case — or just as an object through another act and so to infinity. Therefore, although the experience by which the soul experiences something as an object may require intuitive cognition (in which case, the soul experiences nothing in this way during this life except by sensation), nevertheless, the experience by which it

also acts of intellective assent and dissent) are states that depend on and accompany propositional representations, they are not themselves representational states. (This is not to say, of course, that they are not intentional states in the broad sense indicated in note 4 above.) For further discussion of Chatton’s discussion of the nature of assent and dissent, see Brower-Toland forthcoming(a).

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experiences something as an act and not as an object does not require such an intuition. This is because to be experienced in this way there need be only a living subject receiving its own act. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.2, a.5, 120–1)

In the opening lines of this passage, Chatton identifies what he takes to be two fundamentally different types or modes of awareness: namely, the way in which we are aware of objects and the way in which we are aware of our subjective states. After noting this distinction, he goes on to argue that failure to mark it will yield an infinite regress in higher-order states. Before considering that argument, however, we need to be clearer about the nature of the distinction itself.

“The mind,” Chatton says, “experiences something in a two-fold way” — namely, “it experiences something as an object and ... as a living subject experiences its own act”. The idea seems to be this: In any given conscious experience—conscious perception of a rock, say — one can identify two phenomenally distinct elements. There is (a) the subject’s awareness of the object of the perception, and there is (b) the subject’s awareness of her perceiving it — that is, subjective awareness of herself having such a perception. Chatton certainly does think that that first, outward-directed aspect of conscious experience is a function of the mind receiving the thought of the stone and experiences that thought, not as a power experiences its object but as a power experiences its own act in receiving it”.

74. Cf. ibid., 126, where Chatton puts the same distinction this way: “[T]he mind receives the thought of the stone and experiences that thought, not as a power experiences its object but as a power experiences its own act in receiving it”.

75. Similar distinctions are often drawn in contemporary discussions. See, for example, McGinn 1991, which describes conscious experience as “Janus-faced” (34) — having an “outward-looking face” (namely, directedness toward an object) and an “inward-looking face” (namely, its “presence to the subject”). Again, see Kriegel 2009 (7–11). In the phenomenological tradition, the same distinction is often put in terms closer to those Chatton himself uses in the foregoing passage — namely, as one between object-consciousness and self-consciousness. Zahavi (2005) puts it this way: “It makes perfect sense to speak of self-consciousness whenever I am not simply conscious of an external object — a chair, a chestnut tree, or a rising sun — but acquainted with my experience of the object as well, for in such a case my consciousness reveals itself to me. Thus the basic distinction to be made is the distinction between
tion of the intentional or, more specifically, the representational structure of our mental states. Indeed, he shares Ockham’s views about the representational nature of thought and perception broadly speaking. What Chatton wants to resist, however, is the notion that latter, inner or subjective aspect of conscious experience can be explained in terms of intentionality—in particular, in terms of higher-order representation. Thus, whereas Ockham holds that a state’s being conscious is a matter of its subject being conscious of it (via an act higher-order intuition), Chatton insists that awareness of one’s states is merely a matter of “a living subject receiving its own act”.

The argument for taking subjective awareness of one’s states as irreducibly distinct from higher-order awareness of it comes on the heels of the distinction itself. Here is the relevant bit of the passage:

... if [the mind’s first-order] act were experienced only as an object, there would, therefore, be, at that point, another [second-order act] of which it is the object, and that one [namely, the second-order act] would be experienced. But either it is experienced as an act and not as an object — and we have our case — or as an object through another act and so to infinity. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.2, a.5, 120–1)

To be sure, the argument is highly compressed. But I think it may be fairly reconstructed as follows:

1. A mental state, M, of a subject, S, occurs consciously only if S experiences her having M.
2. S’s experiencing M in this way owes either to (i) the occurrence of M itself or (ii) the occurrence of some further state, M*, which is distinct from M and takes M as its object.
3. If (ii), M* must occur consciously.
4. But M* occurs consciously only if S experiences her having M*.
5. S’s experiencing M* in this way owes either to (iii) the occurrence of M* itself or (iv) the occurrence of some act, M**, which is distinct from M* and takes M* as object.
6. If (iv), M** must occur consciously.

And so on...

7. If one’s experience of having a state owes to that state’s being the object of a state distinct from it, there will be a vicious infinite regress in mental states.

The first premise captures Chatton’s contention that a conscious state—call it M—is such that its subject is aware of her having it or being in it. (Or, in Chatton’s phrasing, it is such that it “is experienced as a living subject experiences its own act”.) The second premise then goes on to note two ways of accounting for such experience: either by appeal to some feature of the occurrence of M itself or by appeal to the fact that M serves as the object for a distinct, higher-order mental state, M*. So far, so good. The crux, of course, comes at premise 3. The basic claim here is that if a subject’s awareness of being in M owes to M’s serving as the object of some higher-order state, M*, it must be that that M* occurs consciously. And, if this is right, we’ll get our regress (as the remaining premises show). The obvious question: Why suppose premise 3 is true?

Chatton’s argument isn’t motivated by a failure to appreciate the possibility that some states can occur non-consciously (as, historically, many regress arguments against higher-order approaches have been). Rather, the motivation is the assumption that if the second-order state, M*, isn’t conscious, then its occurrence fails to explain the phenomenon in question, namely, S’s awareness of her having or being in the first-order state, M. We might, then, flesh out the support for premise 3 this way:
3a. If (ii), M* must occur either consciously or not.

3b. If M* occurs non-consciously, then its occurrence fails to explain the fact that S experiences her having M.

3c. If (ii), M* must occur consciously.

Of course, this just pushes the question back a step. Now we want to know why we should think that, for the subject to experience her having M, she must also experience herself having the higher-order state, M*, which takes M as object.

Here, I think Chatton’s answer comes to this: If M* is a non-conscious representation of M, then the nature of S’s awareness of M will turn out to be analogous to an ordinary, third-person awareness of an object. Thus, just as M—say it’s a perception of a rock—yields awareness of the rock’s existence or presence, so too M* (if it occurs non-consciously) will merely make S aware of M’s presence or occurrence. But, arguably, S’s being aware of the occurrence of M isn’t the same as her subjectively experiencing her having it (i.e., experiencing herself being in it or undergoing it). And this is because, as Chatton insists, in such a scenario, M would “only be experienced as an object” and not in the way that “a living subject experiences its own act”. But, of course, it is the latter phenomenon we’re trying to explain. What’s needed, as Chatton sees it, is mode of awareness adequate to ground first-person, self-attributing beliefs; it’s not at all clear, however, that merely being aware of the occurrence of some state is sufficient for first-person knowledge that I occupy or am the subject of such a state.\footnote{If, however, the higher-order representation of M is one S experiences herself as undergoing, S will not be merely (transitively) aware of M, she will also experience her awareness of it. And this, Chatton seems to allow, does account for the (first-order) phenomenon in question, but then we must explain awareness of M*.

The thrust of Chatton’s regress argument, as I understand it, is just to show that the subjective character of conscious experience cannot be explained by appeal to this sort object-directed awareness. The argument itself, therefore, entails that consciousness is a sui generis form of awareness: a kind of same-order subjectivity that uniquely characterizes the nature of our access to our occurrent states.

A final point about the argument itself: While specifically targeted at Ockham and, so, at a higher-order representationalist account of consciousness, the regress argument makes clear why Chatton would be no more inclined to accept a same-order, or self-representational, approach—or, for that matter, any intentionalist approach to consciousness. After all, what characterizes ordinary intentional awareness is, we might say, a kind of object-directedness. Intentional states are such that they are about or directed at something (and this is so whether we take their intentionality as a function of their representational structure or as some more direct, non-representational mode of acquaintance). The thrust of Chatton’s regress argument, as I understand it, is just to show that the subjective character of conscious experience cannot be explained by appeal to this sort object-directed awareness. The argument itself, therefore, entails that consciousness is a sui generis form of awareness: a kind of same-order subjectivity that uniquely characterizes the nature of our access to our occurrent states.

One significant consequence of all this is that, on Chatton’s view, consciousness turns out to be not only sui generis but also ubiquitous. If one’s merely “receiving” or undergoing a given act is sufficient for consciousness of it, then every state will occur consciously. There are
two reasons for noting this implication of Chatton’s account. First, because it looks to be a liability for it. Indeed, on this score, common sense (or everyday experience) appears to line up with Ockham — and with HOB theories more generally, since such views accommodate the (seemingly uncontroversial) fact that we are not always aware of our occurrent states. Chatton himself seems to be aware of this worry for his account and makes some attempt to address it. This leads to the second reason for noting Chatton’s commitment to the ubiquity of consciousness. In the course of trying to explain how it is that we can seem not to be aware of some of our states, Chatton introduces an important refinement on his account of self-knowledge — one to which I alluded earlier. In order to complete our picture of Chatton’s account of consciousness and self-knowledge, therefore, I want to briefly consider his response to the worry about ubiquity.

Although Chatton holds that all occurrent states occur consciously, he nevertheless allows that there are different degrees or levels of consciousness. Consider the following case:

… someone can see something via the senses and, nevertheless, at the moment he sees it, does not attend (advertit) to himself seeing. But, after the vision, by a certain trace [left in the memory], when he attends, he perceives that he saw. I confirm this because someone can be thinking of a rock and still not entertain this proposition: ‘I am thinking of a rock.’ And if he does not entertain that proposition,

77. Chatton’s own contemporaries call attention to this consequence as a cost of Chatton’s view. Consider Wodeham’s remarks on this score: “It is one thing to experience an object and another [to experience] the act itself. … if [the soul] did [experience its own act], then it would be not be possible for a living principle to receive its own act without it being the case that one experience that act. But this is false, since a person can see and, nevertheless, not experience that he sees. … Here’s the proof: as blessed Augustine says in De Trinitate XLI, and as is certainly true, whenever we are walking along — over a bridge, say — we see it but do not register that we see. The reason for this, he supposes, is that we do not perceive, while we are seeing, that we are seeing. But we do, nevertheless, see. For if we did not, we would, as Augustine says, grope around as if in the dark.” (Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum, Prol. q.2 [I, 58–59])
that state. It should now be clear, however, that this is not, in fact, the case. For, as Chatton insists in the foregoing passage:

someone can think of a rock and, nevertheless, not entertain this proposition: ‘I am thinking of a rock’ ... but perceiving that he thinks (or asserting that he thinks) is an assent caused both by the [first-order] thought of the rock and by means of a [higher-order] propositional representation. (Reportatio et Lectura super Sent. Prol. q.2, a.5, 125)

On Chatton’s view, therefore, self-knowledge requires not only the conscious occurrence of, but also the subject’s explicit attention to, her first-order state. And, apparently, attending to one’s first-order states involves one’s entertaining some higher-order thought about it. In light of these refinements, we are now in a position to offer a more complete picture of Chatton’s account of self-knowledge — one which reflects his distinction between consciousness (indicated by the “pow” sign) on the one hand and the sort of introspective awareness that constitutes self-knowledge on the other:

**Figure 6. Chatton on the Structure of Consciousness and Self-Knowledge**

As Figure 6 makes clear, the ubiquity of ordinary consciousness does not entail the ubiquity of self-knowledge (or introspective awareness). Indeed, the latter is much rarer, since, after all, we rarely take our own states as objects of attention or observation. Thus, while we experience all of our states, we are, on Chatton’s view, introspectively aware of relatively few.

4. Conclusion: Ockham, Chatton, and Medieval Approaches to Consciousness

Although framed in the context of a dispute about a technical matter — namely, the existence reflexive, intellection, intuitive cognition — the issue at stake in the debate between Ockham and Chatton is both familiar and longstanding. At bottom, it is the issue of how best to explain consciousness — more specifically, our seemingly direct, experiential awareness of our own (occurrent) mental states. The way in which Ockham and Chatton approach this question not only illuminates medieval approaches to consciousness more generally but, as I have argued, also shares much in common with current treatments of self- or subjective consciousness.

As the debate between Ockham and Chatton also illustrates, medieval discussions of consciousness develop against the backdrop of Augustine’s theory of self-knowledge. Because self-knowledge is at the heart of Augustine’s widely accepted account of the mind as the *imago Dei*, his views about the nature of such knowledge come to figure among the basic *explananda* in cognitive theory. For the same reason, questions about consciousness and self-knowledge very often arise in connection with discussions about the nature and mechanisms of cognition. In this regard, too, therefore, the debate between Ockham and Chatton is perfectly representative.78 What is more, the specific issue about whether or not awareness of...
one’s states is explicable in terms of ordinary intentionality marks not only the fundamental divide between Ockham and Chatton but also the fundamental divide between the two main types of approach on offer in the late medieval period generally: intentionalist and non-intentionalist. Thus, there are those, like Ockham, who attempt to explain consciousness in non-subjective terms and those, like Chatton, who regard consciousness as a primitively subjective mode of awareness.

The former, “Intentionalist”, approach represents what I take to be the majority view among medieval philosophers. As a taxonomic category, however, it comprises a fairly heterogeneous group of theories. Although all who adopt this approach share in common the view that consciousness reduces to intentionality, nonetheless, there is a great deal of disagreement over the proper analysis of the intentionality in question. Thus, like Ockham, a number of medieval thinkers adopt a representationalist approach; on their view, a state is conscious just in case it is represented in the relevant way. Even here, however, there is a range of positions regarding what qualifies as the relevant mode of representation: some construe it as perceptual in nature, others as something more thought-like. Then again, there are those who explicitly reject the representationalist approach, insisting instead that the subject of intentional states is directly acquainted with her states without representing them in any way at all.

But even aside from questions about how to characterize the precise mode of intentionality, there are further questions regarding whether consciousness is a higher-order or same-order phenomenon — that is, questions about whether the consciousness-bestowing state in question (whatever its exact nature) is numerically distinct from the conscious state itself. (Indeed, as we’ve seen, Chatton’s anti-intentionalist arguments target both higher-order and same-order versions of the view.) All this is to say that, while Ockham’s view represents the dominant type of approach, his own higher-order perception account of consciousness is but one among the many ways in which that type of view gets developed.

The sort of approach Chatton defends is, by contrast, far less prominent. For the same reason, while there may be different ways of developing the details of a non-intentionalist approach, I’m unaware of any extensive discussion or development of it among medieval philosophers. Chatton himself, as we’ve seen, gives far more space to criticizing rival positions than to articulating the details of his own. Nevertheless, this sort of approach does occupy a significant place in medieval discussions of consciousness. Indeed, it receives attention not only from proponents as prominent as Chatton and (as I read him) Thomas Aquinas, but also from those critical of this sort of approach.

Interestingly, when it comes to criticism of this approach, two objections in particular come to the fore. One objection is just that this non-intentional, primitively subjective mode of awareness is mysterious. Thus, for example, Adam Wodeham, who responds explicitly to Chatton’s account, simply denies the postulation of a non-intentional or non-objectual mode of awareness. As he says, “I never experience an act as an act unless by simultaneously perceiving that

79. Although scholarship on the topic is nascent (my own included), it seems to me that the following could be included among the ranks of intentionalists: Matthew of Aquasparta, Roger Marsden, Vital du Four, Durand of Saint-Pourçain, Henry of Ghent, John Duns Scotus, and Adam Wodeham.

80. I offer a preliminary survey of medieval treatments of consciousness and self-knowledge in Brower-Toland forthcoming(b).

81. What is more, as there are a host of views about the nature of mental representation in general, there are a host of views about the nature and mechanisms by which the mind or intellect can represent its own states.

82. For example, among those working more in the phenomenological tradition — a tradition which seems to share much in common with this second type of approach — one finds what look to be different ways of developing an account of subjectivity in non-intentional terms. See Smith 1986, Thomasson 2000, and Zahavi 1999.

83. I defend this reading of Aquinas in Brower-Toland forthcoming(b). The same sort of view can also, I believe, be attributed to Peter Olivi. See Brower-Toland forthcoming(c).
act. And this is to experience the act as an object.” The second sort of objection draws on the authority of Augustine. As Ockham’s discussion makes clear, Augustine is often understood by his medieval successors as articulating a higher-order, intentionalist account of consciousness. And this is because Augustine himself frequently explains self-knowledge in terms of the mind turning its “gaze” upon itself and its inner states. What is more, it’s natural to suppose that Augustine takes this inner awareness to be structurally analogous to world-directed awareness. Accordingly, critics of the sort of approach that Chatton and Aquinas advance object to it on grounds that it runs “contrary to the opinion of Augustine” and insist instead that fidelity to Augustine requires taking consciousness as a matter of the mind’s taking itself and its states as objects of cognitive awareness.

In these ways, therefore, the debate between Ockham and Chatton illuminates not only the two main types of approach characteristic of medieval treatments of consciousness in general but also the dialectical considerations that motivate them. Indeed, I’ve argued that, in each case, the positions advanced not only hold a distinguished place in the history of philosophy but also continue to play an important role in current discussions of consciousness.

References

84. Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum, Prol. q.2 (l, 6o). A bit earlier on in the same discussion, Wodeham raises the following questions about Chatton’s account: “What is this experience? Either it is the soul itself when it receives its act, or is the act, or a relation to something, since there are not many absolute things here. It’s not a relation, since no relation is a vital act, whatever the nature of each experience is. It isn’t an act, for the act isn’t an experience unless of its object. Nor is it the soul, since, with the same facility, we could posit that it would experience every present object whatsoever when it is present — in which case it would be superfluous to posit ocular vision when visible color is supposed present.” (Lectura Secunda in Librum Primum Sententiarum, Prol. q.2 [l, 59])

85. Matthew of Aquasparta takes up just such a line of argument against Aquinas. Along these lines, he quotes Augustine as claiming that “the gaze of the mind” looks upon the mind in just the way that the ‘gaze of the body looks upon the sun or mountains’. (Quaestiones Disputatae de Fide et de Cognitione, Aquacchi, 2nd ed., 1957, q. 5, 303). Here Matthew cites Augustine’s letter ‘Ad Paulinam’ and De Trinitate XIII.

86. Contemporary proponents of higher-order perception theories of consciousness, for example, while habitually citing Locke’s “Inner Sense” theory as their philosophical ancestor, actually fall within a tradition that extends as far back as Ockham — and, indeed, even further. Again, while the type of theory Chatton defends receives less attention in current analytic treatments of consciousness, it nevertheless represents an approach that figures prominently in the phenomenological tradition and which has much in common with current phenomenological approaches to consciousness.

87. I’m very grateful to Jeffrey Brower for his comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Portions of this paper were presented in a symposium session at the 2009 Central Division Meeting of the APA, at the 2011 Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy at University of Toronto, and to the department of philosophy at Purdue University. I’m grateful to the audience on three occasions for stimulating discussion and helpful feedback. Particular thanks to Richard Cross, my commentator at Toronto, for his comments on the paper.


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